TORN BETWEEN BOUNDARIES:

BODIES-IN-PAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND FEATURE FILM.

BY

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Abstract

The central argument of this dissertation, contrary to the secularisation thesis which predicts the decline of Christianity, is that Christian-inspired values tacitly influence embodied experience. Crossing disciplinary boundaries, various theoretical perspectives and empirical studies, the case of bodies-in-pain is used as the focus for empirical analysis. This study draws heavily on Mellor and Shilling's (1997) ideal-type analysis of Medieval Catholic and early Modern Protestant forms of embodied sociality and knowledge to produce an original model of bodies-in-pain. This model is then used as a comparative heuristic tool to assess to what extent bodies-in-pain can be identified as communicating meaning in the 'reel world' of fiction films. Three films that on the surface do not appear to have explicit Christian motivation are chosen for detailed examination. These are: Se7en (1995), Minority Report (2002) and Cape Fear (1991). The final chapter relates the bodies-in-pain models to a pre-existing audience response study focused on Cronenberg's film Crash (1996) to indicate what it is about the body that allows it to be depicted and constructed in certain ways. Overall this dissertation departs from the idea that Christianity must be at odds with secular society, instead, secularisation is reframed as a catalyst for social change that does not mean the end of Christian influence in society. In light of this, I claim Christianity remains socially and institutionally significant for contemporary Western people and the way in which they make sense of the body.
ILLUSTRATIONS: FILMS, FIGURES, TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

List of Key Films

List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 2</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Matthias Grunewald ca. 1515. The Crucifixion from the Isenheim Altarpiece (closed state), 15.8 x 10.1ft. Musee Unterlin, Colmar, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Matthias Grunewald. ca.1510. The Crucifixion. Tempera on panel. Kunstmuseum, Basil, Switzerland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Salvador Dali, 1954. Corpus Hypercubicus. Oil on Canvas, 763/8 x 487/8 in. I Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.3</td>
<td>Dali, (1954) Corpus Hypercubicus &amp; Grunewald (ca.1515) The Crucifixion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Graham Sutherland, 1946. Crucifixion. Oil on hardboard, 96 x 90inches. St. Matthew's Northampton, England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Arnulf Rainer, 1957/78. Wine Crucifix. Oil Cotton Linen, 168.5 x 103 cm. London, Tate Gallery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 6</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>The Main characters and Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>The Living Sight of Sloth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.3  John Doe’s Apartment  200
Figure 6.4  The Embodied Sins of Gluttony and Greed  202
Figure 6.5  Mills and John Doe in the Final Scene of Envy and Wrath  210

Chapter 7
Figure 7.1  Main Characters and the Director of Minority Report  216
Figure 7.2  The Clean and Controlled Sites in Minority Report  220
Figure 7.3  The Sprawl  221
Figure 7.4  Pre-crime – It Works  224
Figure 7.5  John Anderton and Snippets of Film  226
Figure 7.6  John Anderton’s Eyes, Stored in a Plastic Bag  227
Figure 7.7  Perpetrator and Victim’s Name Ingrained in Wood  229
Figure 7.8  Spyders and Teaching Child to submit  234

Chapter 8
Figure 8.1  Main Characters and Director  244
Figure 8.2  Sam and his Modern World  246
Figure 8.3  Sam about to Crush Cady’s Head  252
Figure 8.4  Cady in his Cell  254
Figure 8.5  Cady’s Body and Signifiers in His Cell  256
Figure 8.6  Tattoos from a Living Prisoner  257
Figure 8.7  Cady’s Hair and Release from Prison  262
Figure 8.8  Cady’s Modern Body  263

Chapter 9
Figure 9.1  Main Characters and Director of Crash (1996)  273
Figure 9.2  James and Catherine after He has Rammed her Car off the Road  277
Figure 9.3  Vaughan’s Photos at the Hospital  281
Figure 9.4  The Droning Highway System  286
Figure 9.5  Gabrielle’s Wound and her Leg Braces Worn as Fetish Gear  289

Concluding Remarks
Figure 10.1  David Mills after His Violent Confrontation with John Doe  298
Figure 10.2  John Anderton before and after his Fight with Danny Witwer  299
Figure 10.3  Max Cady after Being Beaten by a Several Men  300
List of Tables

Table 2.1  Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Volatile Body

Table 3.1  Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Sinful Body

Table 4.1  Reformations of Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality Over Time

Table 6.1  Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Volatile Body

Table 7.1  Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Sinful Body

List of Diagrams

Diagram 4.1  Contemporary Bodily Choices between Orientations and their Tacit Christian boundaries.

Diagram: 8.1  Contemporary Bodily Choices between Orientations and their Tacit Christian boundaries.
INTRODUCTION

‘I do not see a true resolution to the problem of pain control until its cultural dimensions are confronted honestly’, Kilwein, J. (1998)

Acknowledging Mellor’s assertion that the Christian underpinnings of contemporary society are often “unacknowledged, but may also be expressly denied” (2004:5), my research question asks: to what extent does Christianity remain socially and institutionally significant for the way in which people in Western contemporary society make sense of the body? My central argument is that Christian-inspired values and bodily orientations tacitly influence collective representations in general and the embodied experience of male bodies in pain in particular.1 To be more specific I argue that Christian influences still affect the use, and interpretation, of information which is apprehended through the senses. In turn this encourages and limits the way in which bodily pain can be understood. In order to pursue this argument this dissertation is divided into two parts.

In Part I the main research method or framework is systematised by developing Mellor and Shilling’s 1997 ideal typical analysis Re-forming the Body: Religion, Community and Modernity as the foundation. That is, I systematize Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types in a particular direction by using additional primary and secondary resources in relation to pain. The purpose is to produce three re-forming bodies-in-pain ideal types that can be used not only as a model (framework) for analysis in general but also for use in the second part of this dissertation in particular. In Part II, the newly systematised re-forming bodies-in-pain ideal types are employed as a comparative heuristic tool. This tool will be used to analyse whether, or not, interpretations of the body-in-pain are influenced by particular Christian interpretations. Specifically I highlight the way

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1 Further into the dissertation the terms: ‘tacit dimension of knowledge’, ‘collective representation’ and male bodies in pain will be defined. However to minimise confusion at this point simplistically it can be said that these terms are used in this dissertation in the following way. 1) I use Polanyi’s concept of the “tacit dimension of knowledge” (1966) as a collective term for the “substratum of knowledge that can elude our conscious, rational formulations” (Mellor, 2004:133). 2) ‘Collective representation’ is a term derived from Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method ([1895] 1938) and was developed in relation to his term ‘collective consciousness’. Simplistically it could be defined as ‘things socially given’ (Marshall, 1994:67-68). 3) Concerning the selection of male bodies in pain: my dissertation is neither a study of gender nor of sexuality, however I maintain that most historical writings (such as Descartes) which are expressed in supposedly gender-neutral terms are, nevertheless, based on the male body (see for example Midgley, 1997:57).
in which bodies in pain are represented in the ‘reel’ world of fiction film and by extension in the ‘real’ world of contemporary everyday life.

This study is situated within a subset of the Secularisation Thesis debates. Within these debates, this dissertation aligns with the aspect of the sociology of religion which intersects with the sociology of knowledge, rather than with the traditional secularisation thesis and the “hard-line secularists” (Possamai and Possamai-Inesedy, 2007:301) who argue that Christianity has lost its “social significance,” (McLeod, 2000:653).² My focus is on Christian forms of sociality and knowledge and the part they play (if any) in linking forms of embodiment with collective representations in contemporary society. While these concepts will be discussed in more depth later in the following chapters, at this point I will continue by outlining the secularisation debates in order to show where, in these debates, this study is situated.

What Is The Secularisation Thesis And How Has It Been Debated?

While the word ‘secularisation’ was initially used to refer to the transference of certain tracts of land from Church to private ownership, the term Secularisation Thesis is a theory which claims that secularisation is a process in which Christianity will diminish and thus, of necessity, must be at odds with secular society (McLeod, 2000:653; Thomson, 1986). The “hard-line” view, maintained that “religion would disappear in Western, modernised societies” (Possamai and Possamai-Inesedy, 2007:301). It was also argued that this perspective was sourced from the work of the “fathers of sociology” - [Marx, Weber and Durkheim] (Possamai and Possamai-Inesedy, 2007:301). As a result it became a sociological preference to focus on religion in relation to the modernisation, or rationalisation, of society. Rather than emphasising Marx’s ([1857] (1973)) analysis of people as beings of a sensual species, or Weber’s concern with the irrational foundations of rationality, or even Durkheim’s ([1912] 1995) homo

² The term Christianity, in this study, refers to the Judeo-Christian tradition and all biblical quotations are from the King James Version, Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1977 unless otherwise stated. Furthermore when referring to the Bible I include both the Old and New Testaments. This is not to claim that the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is unproblematic. For example Beal argues that “for modern Protestant European cultures Judaism has often posed a kind of identity crisis” (2002:128). The reason for this is that Christian theology depends on its link “with Judaism”, because “the God of Israel is the God of the Church” (2002:128). At the same time however, “Christianity has [also]... defined itself against Judaism ... [because] Jews forfeited their status as the chosen people” (2002:128). Beal notes, therefore, that “modern, (especially Protestant), Christian discourse often regards Judaism with deep ambivalence” (2002:128).


duplex

perspective, it was instead repeatedly and selectively argued by sociologists (amongst others) that:

1. the Marxian tradition considered religion to be an obstacle that must be replaced with the secularising ‘religion’ of communist or socialist progress;
2. the Weberian tradition considered religion, especially Calvinism, to be the catalyst for the personal and social driving force that is required for industrial progress in a disenchanted world; and
3. the Durkheimian tradition considered religious sentiment to be the foundation for the social integration of society, and therefore primarily concerned with social order.

Over time this practice of selectively reading the ‘founding fathers’ was instrumental in the Secularisation Thesis becoming an increasingly dominant paradigm within the sociology of religion. In different ways, it became anchored in the writings of the theologian Harvey Cox (1965) and the sociologist Bryan Wilson (1966) and as it became a dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion the preference was for a quantitative and/or statistical analysis of: patterns of religious service attendance, patterns of religious beliefs and practices, social networks, and complex organisational analysis. Many of those who were to follow Wilson and Cox, argued that although religion may not have disappeared as quickly as predicted, it had become irrelevant to society (McLeod, 2000:653; Bibby, 2007:2-3). Based on these arguments many of the secularisation debates revolve around four major concerns which included:

1. the differentiation of religion from other institutional paradigms, making its influence in the social and public sphere insignificant;
2. the privatisation of religious belief and experience;
3. the desacralisation and the declining scope of religious authority; and
4. the ‘liberalisation’ of religious doctrine.

Using these four departure points these debates centred on proving, or disproving, the concept of secularisation. They focused on defining religion or religiousness and/or its objective measurement in society. ³ One example of this line of argumentation is the assertion that the diversity of new religious movements was evidence of the traditional Church’s loss of social and/or

³ The definition of religiousness I refer to here is the “feelings, perceptions and sensations ... experienced by an actor, or defined by a religious group, as involving some communication, however, slight, with a divine essence, that is, with God, with ultimate reality, with transcendental authority” (Stark and Glock quoted in Thompson (1986:15)).
religious authority. However there were alternative qualitative studies in relation to the secularisation debates and these tended to follow proponents such as Berger (1969) who regarded religion as a ‘Sacred Canopy’ that gave meaning to what could be a meaningless and disordered existence. Others followed concepts such as Luckmann’s (1967) notion that society had an “invisible religion”. Nevertheless, within these debates many studies still concluded that since religion addresses “ultimate meaning” and pervades everyday activities the primary function of religion was to sustain the moral order, and this, it was argued, “lead to religious authoritarianism” (Stark & Bainbridge, 1996; McGuire, 1997). The “hard-line” secularists also maintained “that religion, being other-worldly directed, was a derived reality construction and therefore suspect if not [actually] deceptive” (Oswalt, 2003:4; see also Hammond, 1985; Hadden, 1987; Chaves, 1994).

These dominant ways of assessing religion meant that very little attention was paid to the influence of Christianity outside of either organised religion and cults or concepts such as Bellah’s (1967) notion of civil religion which rendered the sacred abstract (see also Shils and Young, 1953; Goethals, 1990). Although statistical and directly observable methods of research supported sociology’s quest for objectivity towards social reality they were, according to Bibby (2007), ultimately used to show the decline of religion, despite statistical evidence to the contrary. The consequence of this approach was that the definition of religion and its ability to be measured within society resulted in an “analytical cul-de-sac” (Turner, quoted in Chaves, 1994:749). According to Friedland (2005:248), this not only deprived the sacred “of its inherent transgressive and thus transformative possibilities” but also its capacity to be studied as socially productive.

In recognition of these limitations, more recently there are new approaches within the sociology of religion which are challenging and revising the traditional Secularisation Thesis. For example, Stark and Bainbridge (1996) have maintained that the Secularisation Thesis failed to account for the ongoing religious demands of individuals. Bibby (2007), who directly attacked the data of the ‘hardline’ secularists, demonstrates the way in which Canada’s participation in organised religion has not declined. Another perspective comes from Bailey (1998) and those who have used the concept of ‘implicit religion’ to show that the Holy, or religiousness, is still very much part of modern day life. A further perspective is that of Ostwalt who maintains that “secularisation might
not destroy religion” because religion persists across cultural forms (2003:5). In line with this area of research are those scholars from within the sociology of knowledge whose concentration is on contemporary cultural beliefs and social systems in relation to cultural products (see Bergeson and Greeley 2000; Bergesen, 2006). This is an area of study with which my research is aligned. However there is a further aspect to this.

Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) ideal typical analysis of re-forming Christian Bodies is a study which provides an indirect critique of the secularisation thesis. They are not concerned with the rise or fall of people’s religiousness nor are they interested in people’s attendance at either explicit, or implicit, religious activities. Instead, they argue that Christian thought, in relation to the constitution of knowledge and the consequences of beliefs about the body, continues to influence, and limit, the contemporary way in which people understand and use their bodily senses. They maintain that these influences and limitations affect the way in which embodied minds, that is, thinking sensory bodies are expected to behave in certain social circumstances. This in turn, they argue, gives rise to particular social systems. As a result and due to the nature of my research question this kind of indirect critique is where my dissertation sits.

At this point it could be assumed that Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) study would be the ideal framework to use for this study. However one limitation of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types is that they have a broad scope. This would suggest that a different applicability would require that these ideal types were refined and/or narrowed. Accordingly this affords me the opportunity to develop a specific framework that not only narrows their focus but also gives an original aspect to it. Hence my focus is on developing their ideal types in relation to the male body in pain. Although this study focuses solely on the male body, it is neither a study of gender, nor of sexuality. Rather it is a study of the embodied experience of Christian-inspired collective representations and influences on the use of the different bodily senses such as hearing and taste. On the surface then it could be concluded that this study is gender-neutral. However, because most historical writings which are expressed in gender-neutral terms are, nevertheless, based on the male body and because I draw from these resources,

4 Whilst the male body-in-pain ideal types that I develop in these chapters are drawn from Mellor and Shilling’s work, and I have attempted to remain true to Mellor and Shilling’s intention, any deviations from their framework are entirely my own.
by necessity then I too focus on the male body. Friedland argues this point very poignantly:

Politics has a sex because sex is our first politics, our first agency, our first subjection. Over the long sweep of history, collective representation, the capacity to stand for the collectivity, to speak in its name, has been gendered. Men have historically dominated the public sphere, their bodies massed, displayed, and sacrificed as the primary medium and content of collective representation. Women are absent, offstage, or more recently, play minor parts (2005:239).

In order to address this imbalance it is necessary to have both gendered and female-centred studies. However my study draws from historical material in which “the autonomous and unitary male subject of modernity is constructed as the ‘epitome of normative existence’” (Hughes, 2009:402) and in this way gendered pronouns were significant. This study could continue this submersion of women in dominant discourse but instead I wish to recognise the normative existence of these discourses. Therefore in the structure of this dissertation I neither assume, nor suggest, that this is a gender neutral analysis, but rather acknowledge that this study is based on discourses that are centred on male bodies. Furthermore, the films that I have selected for analysis also centre on male bodies (protagonists) as their subject matter, despite the presence of female characters.

The Structure of this Dissertation

Drawing the previous section together the central argument of this dissertation is that despite the claims of the secularisation thesis Christian thought continues to structure forms of knowledge and sociality in relation to the body-in-pain and this is significant for how people in contemporary society use their senses to interpret and communicate knowledge. Therefore the aims of this study are:

1. to outline Mellor and Shilling’s embodied ideal types in order to focus attention on the subtle influence of aspects of Christian thought on the tacit dimension of knowledge,\(^5\) (covered more fully in chapter one)

2. to systematize one dimension of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types, the male body-in-pain in order to examine: (i) the ways in which the generation of acceptable knowledge within Christian (Catholic and Protestant) worldviews continues to shape, and to be shaped by, the use

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\(^5\) Although a brief definition of tacit knowledge is already stated on page one and will be explained further into this introduction, it may be helpful to restate it here - simplistically the term “tacit dimension of knowledge” is drawn from Polanyi’s (1966) work and “refers to a substratum of knowledge that can elude our conscious, rational formulations” (Mellor, 2004:133).
of the bodily senses; and (ii) whether, or not, male bodies-in-pain are generally interpreted within the boundaries of these two worldviews; (covered in chapters two to five)

and

3. to examine whether, or not, the use of different bodily senses and the interpretations of bodily pain, as influenced by Christian systems of thought, are circulating in the entertainment media of fiction film (covered in chapters six to nine).

In order to achieve these three aims, as noted previously, the dissertation is divided into two parts. Clarifying this division further, Part I is divided into five chapters. These chapters draw heavily from Mellor and Shilling’s concept that there is not only an historical relationship between a re-location of the sacred in time and space and Christian forms of embodied sociality and knowledge but also that this shift affects the prominence, acceptance and representation of bodily senses. Chapter One, therefore, is not a literature review. Instead Chapter One begins with the intellectual history of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical analysis in order to clarify and make Mellor and Shilling’s concepts transparent before they are used as the foundation for my ideal typical analysis of pain. In Chapters Two, Three and Four each one of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types - the Volatile Body, the Sinful Body or Ambivalent Bodies – are developed, and systematised in relation to pain, by drawing upon a number of historical and contemporary writings, sermons and execution narratives.

Central to each of these chapters is the systemisation of male bodies-in-pain in order to examine the way in which society shapes, and is shaped by, the image of a body in distress. Therefore as a re-presentation of the body-in-pain, and as an image central to the Western Judeo-Christian tradition which is important to any analysis of Western culture, I draw together several historical iconic and narrative paintings of the crucified God in order to visualise Mellor and Shilling’s “sensory body”.6 In the manner of Karen Vogel (1982) who argues that art can be used as a “barometer of social change”, I use different images (paintings) of Christ suffering and exuding pain as he is strung out on two cross-jointed beams of wood. These paintings are used in the chapters to illustrate the three re-

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6 This study is located within western dominant forms of thought and sociality. This is because, although collective representations of bodies-in-pain outside Western culture would give a more global perspective to this study, it would require different forms of knowledge and resources. This is outside the frame of reference in this particular study. However it would be an avenue for future research.
forming body-in-pain ideal types (Valued Embodied, Anaesthetised and Torn Pain) which are produced in Part I of the dissertation. They will then be used as the overarching framework for an analysis of the case studies in Part II of this dissertation.

Concluding Part I is Chapter Five which illuminates the combination of the ideal type framework with the other methods used in the analysis of the case studies. This chapter also discusses the films which were chosen as case studies for analysis. These films: Se7en (1995), Minority Report (2002), Cape Fear (1991) and Crash (1996) were all selected as case studies because on the surface they are not considered to be deliberately religious, or proselytising, despite containing a number of overt references to Christian stories, signs and symbols. Although these are present in the films under analysis they are not deliberately used to either inspire Christians or to promote conversion. They simply appear in these films amongst a plurality of other sign systems. Similarly these films were not promoted as assisting viewers to understand Christianity as was Mel Gibson’s film The Passion, (2004). In using films that have no overt religious purpose I am seeking to give visibility to invisible, but normalised, assumptions contained in the concepts and imagery of contemporary Western culture. I also seek to take up Weber ([1905] 1949) and Polanyi’s (1966) challenge which maintains that it is in applying a method that its value is made manifest. This challenge is taken up in Part II.

In Part II the heuristic body-in-pain ideal type model developed in Part I is utilised within the three pronged approach discussed in Chapter Five. More specifically in the first three chapters of Part II - Chapter Six, Seven and Eight – this approach is used in order to explore whether, or not, these ideal types can be identified as communicating meaning in relation to sensory priorities in the ‘reel world’ of neo-noir films. In other words this exploration centres on the extent to which historical traces and collective representations, as defined in the re-forming bodies-in-pain (ideal types), are represented in the selected contemporary fiction films. My overall purpose in these chapters is to investigate if the Christian based re-forming bodies-in-pain ideal types are shaping and/or are being reinforced and shaped by, fiction films in general and the films in these chapters in particular. Clearly I cannot, and do not, conclude that all fiction films fall within the boundaries established by Mellor and Shilling’s

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7 The relevance of drawing Weber into the discussion will be clarified in chapter one and Polanyi will be further discussed later in this introduction.
ideal types or even that they all communicate pain in the same way. Consequently, in Chapter Nine a different direction is taken.

In Chapter Nine I consider Cronenberg's (1996) film *Crash* which became a media event and moral panic. In this chapter I examine socially produced discourse about this film in conjunction with the implications of this as it relates to my argument: that Christian-inspired values toward bodily orientations tacitly influence and inform the way in which carnal/cognitive phenomenal experience is used to 'make sense' of both the body and everyday life. Finally, in the Concluding Remarks, I emphasise the way in which the body-in-pain ideal types have broad applicability. I discuss the way in which these ideal types, as an heuristic model, have the ability not only to answer the research question but also to draw out further issues relevant to real world conditions and the implications of these issues for public policy. Accordingly my dissertation not only provides a method for analysis but also contributes to those areas of scholarship that consider film as a site worthy of serious consideration despite their classification as being merely entertainment, mainstream, secular, and appealing to a mass cross-section of the populace.

**Major Objections**

Before beginning Chapter One there are four possible objections to my approach that will be dealt with first and discussed under the following headings.

1. The focus on culture or structures of knowledge rather than religiousness;\(^8\)
2. The Mind/Body split and the concept of a 'thinking body';
3. Representation and the study of art works and films for analysis; and
4. The limited role of interviews in this evidence base.

**The Focus on Structures of Knowledge rather than Religiousness**

Gregory (2006) laments that in the discipline of sociology (and social science), many scholars approach religion and religious experience from the biased perspective of the “hardline secularists” as if Christianity is a “derived reality construction” (Ostwalt, 2003:4). My focus on the structures of knowledge

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8 The definition of religiousness I refer to here is the “feelings, perceptions and sensations ... experienced by an actor, or defined by a religious group, as involving some communication, however, slight, with a divine essence, that is with God, with ultimate reality, with transcendental authority” (Stark and Glock, quoted in Thompson, 1986:15).
supporting Christianity, as opposed to the notion of religiousness, could be interpreted as perpetuating this bias. This is not my intention. Rather, I agree with Turner’s discussion (within the sociology of religion) that the definition and purpose of defining religion has become an ‘analytical cul-de-sac’ and it is time for a fresh approach.

In attempting a study that began with a fresh approach I initially thought that my line of inquiry would have similar aims to those scholars who employ the concepts developed from within the implicit religion thesis. However, it quickly became apparent that their purposes and aims were very different from my own and that the sociology of knowledge was more akin to the needs of my study. In order to clarify this and to explain the reason why this study requires a different approach from those that use the concept of ‘implicit religion’ it is necessary to understand the broad tendencies which underpin the “Implicit Religion” thesis.

“Implicit Religion” was an expression coined in the late 1960s by Edward Bailey, in order, to use it as an analytical concept. Today it has become a collection of approaches which seek to understand the “form [that] religious experience typically take[s] in contemporary culture” (Sharpe and Bryant, 1999:5). More specifically it seeks to find, in contemporary life, the existence of “commitment”, “intense concerns” and “integrating foci” (Bailey, 1998:22-24), such as “different types of meaning” (Sharpe, et al., 1999:5). In other words, it is a search for the ‘sacred’ or ‘holy’ in spaces in society believed to be secular, such as ‘the pub’ (Bailey, 1997:129). Many authors, including Bailey, debate the meaning of the two terms “holy” and “sacred” (Bailey, 1997:3). The definition of the ‘sacred’ that is usually intended within the context of ‘implicit religion’ is that which contains “an element of awe”, “transcendent reality” and “fear held in check by admiration” (Evans, 2003:34-35). Furthermore, Bailey, quoting a research respondent’s comment, states that while “both [sacred and holy] meant ‘special’ ... ‘holy’ was more Goddy” (italics in the original) (Bailey, 2003:58). Using this phrase to summarise then, it could be said implicit religion, as developed by these scholars and others, is a search for “Goddy[-ness]” in society.

In this vein, and against the secularisation thesis, many scholars searched for the “Goddy” in society by suggesting that religion would change its form, and

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9 For a citation analysis of the key scholars outside of the Journal of Implicit Religion see Lewis, (2006).
may become invisible or implicit. In order to study these changes in form, it
becomes necessary to separate the idea of a Christian God from the definition of
religion. As a result, functional definitions of religion were used. One such
definition is; “a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of
people struggle with the ultimate problems of human life” (Clarke and Byrne,
citing Yinger, 1993:15). Berger, amongst others, has argued that the problem
with functional definitions is that they can become “tautological” (Bibby, 2007:2)
or, as McLellan notes, this definition is too all-encompassing to be analytically
useful (1987:169). For example, it is possible to use the definition above
tautologically. To do this, one could classify any group struggling with human
life and define the struggles as the ‘ultimate problem’ and then declare that
group a religious group. For example, using these kinds of definitions, debates
in the US have been made, for and against, classifying and defining US pro-
football as a religion (Bibby, 2007:2). In New Zealand Grimshaw (2000) has
argued that the game of rugby can be understood as a form of ‘implicit religion’.
One strategy for avoiding this problem - the problem of the definition of religion
becoming too broad to be meaningful – would be to replace ‘ultimate problems’,
with the “effort” “mankind” puts in “to giv[ing] his (sic) reality human
significance” (Nesti, 1990:423). Quoting Berger Bibby argues that strategies like
this, that are designed to bound the concept of religion, prevent the search for
‘implicit religion’ becoming a hunt for “grey cats on a dark night” (2007:2). In
this respect it is useful to employ two criteria in order to highlight the boundaries
around the interests of ‘implicit religion’ scholars to ensure the analytical concept
of ‘implicit religion’ remains meaningful – (a) an interest in the way “Goddy[-
ness]” gives meaning to the world and (b) the use of the word ‘meaning’ to
equate with something beyond the everyday.

The difference then, between the above perspective and the purpose and aims of
this dissertation, is that my interest is not in researching the “Goddy”, the holy
or ultimate meaning in society. Nor am I trying to ascertain whether, or not,
people’s ‘religiousness’ remains significant. As previously stated, my project sits
more comfortably within the subset of the “sociology of religion” that aligns with
the “sociology of knowledge” (Thompson, 1986:16). Those within the sociology
of knowledge, such as Mannheim (1936) and Stark, (1958) are not necessarily
looking for God. Their interest is in understanding the processes in which
subjects and objects become defined and classified as sacred. More specifically
they focus on the way in which these classifications of collective representations
as sacred, manifest and impact on the “way people interpret, make sense of,
and give [everyday] meaning to the world around them” (Thompson, 1986:16).
In other words it is the way in which a belief system, about sacred affects, has
an effect upon the hermeneutic construction of knowledge/action in everyday
life. Within this way of thinking, the term sacred is being used to mean that
which a culture “set[s] apart” from ordinary “things” (Evans, 2003:33).

While my dissertation does examine the social significance of Christianity, it does
not focus on people’s “commitment”, “intense concerns” or their faith in God.
Rather, what I am researching is whether, or not, the Christian system of ideas
and practices is still significant, either overtly or covertly, for contemporary
choices. That is, whether what was once classified as sacred still influences the
way in which bodies are used to ‘make sense’ of the world. Generally my
question is not whether contemporary society is Christian, or religious, but
whether contemporary collective representations of bodies in pain in the West
are still underpinned by Christian (Catholic and Protestant) ideas and/or
practices. My dissertation, proceeding from Mellor and Shilling’s study, does
examine what is, and is not, classified as sacred, but abstains from debating the
notion of “Goddy[-ness]” within contemporary society. Instead, I examine the
boundaries surrounding social thought and action in relation to bodies and pain.
I use the word ‘boundary’ in the sense that it refers to the limits and rules
society establishes around acceptable actions (Marshall, 1994:256). This
includes those rules overtly enforced through legal action, such as the banning of
a film, and those enforced through social disapproval, such as the
marginalisation of alternative lifestyles. I also consider the boundaries around
which connections and actions are encouraged, which includes critical acclaim
and box office sales. As a result my research is not a study of the “Goddy[-
ness]” of society, nor is it a film-study analysis. It is a sociological study that
investigates if, and how, the Christian belief system influences the process of
establishing (un)acceptable (bounded) action. I do this by using the ‘reel’ world
of film as a case study.

What can appear similar in both my dissertation and in the Implicit Religion
Thesis is the idea that both religiousness and the structuring of knowledge
generation are invisible or an “absent presence” within society.10 It is in this

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10 This is the first mention of the term ‘absent presence’. This is a concept discussed widely within
the sociology of the body and although it will be discussed in more depth further into the dissertation,
in order to give some clarity at this point the term ‘absent presence’ is employed here to denote
objects and subjects that are present in society but are overlooked or unseen when society is analysed,
or are unseen within a society’s self-image. For example Chung Simpson (2001) uses the term to
describe the role of Japanese Americans in Post World War II America.
sense that the structures of knowledge I look for in society are ‘implicit’. To distinguish my position further from that of the Implicit Religion Thesis I utilise Michael Polanyi’s term the “tacit dimension of knowledge” (1966). This concept of tacit knowledge is an underlying assumption throughout this dissertation, but is rarely discussed explicitly. So at this stage I will clarify this term by outlining Polanyi’s usage to show that although I search for something ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ and I also assert that this invisible ‘thing’ is derived from Christianity, I make no comment on the “Goddy” in contemporary society.

Polanyi, in order to define what he means by the dimension of knowledge divides knowledge into two dimensions. One dimension is rational calculation, and the other is “the tacit dimension [of knowledge]” (hereafter tacit knowledge, (Polanyi, 1966).

Rational calculation is considered to be the foundation of nearly all scientific study. Despite this, Polanyi argues that just as important as rational calculation is tacit knowledge that “we know” but “cannot tell” (1966:4-5). For example, tacit knowledge might be our understanding of the colour blue. It might be how we know and learn to manipulate equipment to create new objects (such as a paint brush) or it might be how a scientist believes in the existence of a previously unknown (“original”) phenomenon (Polanyi, 1966:22-24). Polanyi argues that as soon as we try to explain this tacit knowledge and where it comes from, our ability to describe it, and even to be certain of it, disappears. However, without thinking about it, “we ... [just] know” (Polanyi, 1966:4).

Hoverd and Shilby (2007) seek to investigate this kind of knowledge, which Polanyi might have described as being ‘beyond’ rational calculation. They do this by testing the idea that there is an automatic connection between morality and images by timing how long it took research participants to associate moral words, such as “sinful and pious”, with images and words about fat and thin bodies. They discovered that moral words were associated more quickly than other positive or negative words, such as unhealthy or healthy (Hoverd and Shilby (2007:392). This led these researchers to reason that less calculation is required to associate moral words with body size, because less time was taken to calculate the answer (Hoverd and Shilby (2007:395). While they use the word “implicit” to describe this pre-conscious association, it is clear that they are researching what Polanyi would have called the ‘tacit dimension of knowledge’

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11 I have derived this term from the name of one of Polanyi’s lectures “Tacit Knowing” (1966:3-25), published in a book entitled The Tacit Dimension.
The methodology which Hoverd and Shilby (2007) use to demonstrate the tacit connection between Christian morals and bodies is very useful in revealing the extent and speed of the automatic connections that they observed. Additional studies using similar methods will reveal even more about the extent and nature of the automation of knowledge. Rather than repeat this kind of experiment, however, my approach is designed to answer more questions than simply whether, or not, Christian structures of knowledge influence bodily associations (although my study is founded on this assumption).

From a sociological perspective, however, Hoverd and Shilby’s (2007) study lacks information pertaining to what it is that lie behind the automatic connections between sinful and fat in the minds of many of their research participants. Furthermore their method fails to provide any information on the consequences of these associations for contemporary society.

This is the reason I have chosen ideal types in conjunction with collective representations as part of my research method. Using ideal types in order to examine collective representations provides more contextual information than that which a Hoverd and Shilby-type study would provide. In this dissertation, the definition of collective representation that I use is drawn from Durkheim’s ([1895]1938) work and refers to subject matter in which socio-political beliefs and ideas have been so compressed that they symbolise society's broader ideas and moral systems. Examples of collective representations can include “religious doctrine … customs and traditions”, laws, folklore, and parables (Morrison, 1995:154). There are several ways that Durkheim claimed collective representations can reflect compressed ideas. These include that:

1. the individual’s perception and the collective representations are independent forms having different characteristics and sensibilities; and
2. collective life gives rise to collective representations, they are not private constructs or derived from “psychological or biological laws” (Morrison, 1995:154).

Taking this into account I argue bodies-in-pain can be analysed as a collective representation and they need to be studied as relational experiences. I also argue that Polanyi’s explanation of the components of the tacit dimension of knowledge is useful for unpacking the way in which collective representations form. Polanyi (1966:12) claims that there is a relationship between objects and the reaction of the human body/mind to it. He explains this in the following way. First, he terms the object the “distal”, and clarifies that “distal” might mean
something concrete such as a desk, but it could also mean a hunch about an unknown natural law. Secondly, he uses the term “proximal” to describe the sensations and feelings that one’s lived body/mind associates with the distal. The “proximal” is the collection of feelings, rules and associations that the body immediately has upon encountering the “distal”, prior to the calculation of rational thought (Polanyi, 1966:13-17).

Collectively this is a relational experience where the proximal and distal form an “entity” and it is this entity that is the “tacit dimension of knowledge” (Polanyi, 1966:13). For example, tacit moral knowledge occurs when moral teachings become the proximal and are applied to a distal, such as a picture of a wounded body, without calculation of whether the moral knowledge and the distal picture should be, or, need to be, connected. That is, if we wince in empathetic pain and look away at a photo of a car crash even if we know the photograph is based on a staged accident in which no one was hurt, what does that reaction tell us about modern views of pain? What I fix my focus on is the question of whether the particular proximal connections, currently being displayed in contemporary culture, are still influenced by Christian thought. This is irrespective of whether people can, or cannot, identify or calculate where these associations and connections come from, especially when people are unable to explain those associations, such as an aversion (or fascination) to the sight of blood. In Polanyi’s words, when we “display a knowledge that we cannot tell [or describe]” (1966:5).

Significantly Polanyi’s (1966) perspective does not encourage the study of the body per se, hence I have not studied the body as an object, or as a subject, but have instead studied the relationship between the values we acquire and the way in which we use this information/values to understand distal objects, such as images of painful bodies. This means it is necessary to traverse not only those views that explicitly focus on the body, but also other contextual information that shapes views toward the body and pain. For example, explicit views about the body in Christian thought might be that it is weak and impure. However, to understand the tacit knowledge associated with the body in pain and its relationship with weakness, it is necessary to understand where those weak and impure judgements came from. Following Polanyi’s form of knowledge, my dissertation is a study of “the knowledge-effect of particular institutions” (Marshall, 1994:271). In this dissertation this refers to the institution of
Christianity, however I do avoid the notion of the study of religion on its own terms.

In order to shift seamlessly between perspectives, such as distal and proximal, I place the body-in-pain at the centre of the “webs of significance” that Geertz (1973:3) argues forms the basis of any culture. This means I do not take the body as a single isolated object, but I do take a “strategy of embodiment” (Csordas, 1990:132) that gives a unity to my approach. Following the interrelated strands of the web, within the patterns spun by ‘man’, I can easily move between theory, representation and everyday life in the real world. This is because in this ‘web’, Christian values and cultural products, such as films, are understood to be significant strands that influence, support, shape, question and critique the social order and vice versa. Studying these strands concentrates the dissertation on exploring the unspoken and unacknowledged rules that shape social action (Marshall, 1994:256). I use the concept of the habitus to describe these flexible feedback loops and strands of the web. Habitus, taken from the work of Bourdieu (1977) and as used by Mellor and Shilling (1997), is a concept discussed more fully in chapter one. For now, it is suffice to say that it is the relationship between social structures and people’s dispositions. Accordingly my study focuses on Mellor and Shilling’s concern with both “how the body is seen and portrayed” and “what it is about the body that allows it to be depicted and constructed in certain ways” (1997:5).

The second direction I take from Polanyi is that “true knowledge lies in our ability to use it” (Polanyi, 1966:17). Consequently this dissertation focuses on using an existing model rather than in developing an entirely new one. Therefore I will neither attempt to synthesize the broad multidisciplinary literature on the body nor will I develop an entirely new model of the body.

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12 Following Mellor’s line of reasoning I maintain that the concept of the real has not become so relativised that it no longer exists (2004:1). People do feel pain and social and institutional arrangements affect the way in which people experience that pain. In this dissertation I refer to this real experience as ‘everyday life’. I am not privileging what is real, or not real, to any individual or group of individuals. Rather, I recognise that at an individual, and at a collective, level we all define some things as real and other things as not real.

13 The habitus denotes: “a set of acquired patterns of thought, behaviour, and taste which is said by Bourdieu (Outline of Theory and Practice, 1977) to constitute the link between social structures and social practice (or social action)” (Marshall, 1994:209).

14 Chris Shilling’s book The Body in Culture, Technology and Society (2005) gives a wide ranging coverage of scholarly interest and development of studies in relation to the body. It highlights the way in which the body is both a corporeal and critical reality and makes the argument that corporeality can be seen “as a multi-dimensional medium” that effects, and assists in, “the constitution of society” (2005:9).
Instead, in this dissertation, I focus on the application of one particular model and develop and systematize that model in order to study the relationship between tacit knowledge and the body in pain. My purpose is to ascertain whether, or not, this chosen approach yields more, or new, knowledge in its application to contemporary society in general, and to pain in particular.

Many models could have been used as the basis of further development including studies by Turner (1984), Shilling (2005), Scary (1985), Frank (1991; 1995), Morris (1991), Glucklich (2001), Douglas (2002), Foucault ([1975] 1979) and many others. I could have also followed scholars such as Deacy (2001; 2005), or Miles (1996), who have claimed that film-going can be a redemptive experience in a secular society because the themes in films such as Scorsese’s *Mean Streets* (1973) or *Raging Bull* (1980) tell stories about Christian redemption. Another alternative would be to analyse films which mimic the Jesus story of sacrifice and salvation (Christologies) or to analyse films that focus on the specific values that Christianity and/or that different religions demand, such as the disapproval of incest, or stealing or respect for parents. All of these are worthwhile methods, models and theoretical approaches. However I argue that to explore the connection between proximal (Christian values) and distal (bodies in pain) knowledge in order to answer this dissertation’s research question, the best model to use and develop is Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) reforming ideal types. This is because their approach centralises sensory bodily experience and the relationship between everyday meaning and social action. It is an approach developed specifically for the purpose of making visible hidden and circulating everyday meanings in contemporary life. It is also an approach which makes visible the discontinuities and continuities within the Christian belief system in contemporary society, without entering into the territories of faith, or commitment or the transcendental divine.

**Mind/Body Splits and the Concept of a ‘thinking body’**

The mind-body dualism is sometimes so ingrained in habits of thought in the modern age that even sociologists seeking to explore bodily relationships, such as intimacy, may approach the topic from the perspective of disembodied subjects.\(^\text{15}\) Consequently, it may seem redundant, but it is nevertheless important to state that this dissertation starts from the position that people “do not have unmediated access to knowledge, but acquire information through their

\(^{15}\) See for example, Shilling and Mellor’s (1996) critique of Anthony Giddens’ work.
bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). It is necessary to state this because the “Enlightenment belief that the mind has become more important than the flesh” means analysis of the way in which minds and bodies interact with the rules and structures of society are “frequently overlooked” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). While chapters three and four in this dissertation explore some of the underpinning Christian principles that shape the mind/body split in Enlightenment thought, at this point it must be stressed that this view of humans as primarily disembodied minds contained within Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’ is locally (Western) and temporally (modern times) contingent. Consider, for example, how strange it feels to read of the following judgement recorded against Gilbert de Middleton’s body in the 1300s:

because the heart and other entrails of Gilbert have furnished him with the presumptuousness to think out such horrible felonies... to be practiced against God and Holy Church and the King, his liege-lord, let his heart and entrails be [burned] together under the gallows (Jean Le Bon Chronicle quoted in Westerhof, 2007:105).

From the medieval perspective, Gilbert de Middleton’s heart and entrails were believed to be just as culpable for his actions as his mind and consequently deserved physical punishment for evil-doing. Hence this type of ‘thinking body’ contrasts with the modes of ‘bodily-being-in-the-world’ that prioritise cognitive powers of the mind, and senses associated with mental activity such as sight and reading. Comparing these modes can make visible the changing approaches to the body and senses. However, because of the significance that modern analysis places on the view that the mind dominates the body, I will quickly summarise that route to knowledge and the way in which it has resulted in resistance to studies which investigate the ‘thinking body’ as it was accepted in the medieval era.

The Enlightenment (which grew out of Protestant and scientific reforms) included a very explicit and structurally important process for classifying society into either the sacred or the profane.16 While the processes of classifying society in this way are not unique to the Enlightenment period, or even to Western people, the significant impact of these classifications on social life in this period has been well established (see Andersen and Clack, 2004). After the initial classification into sacred and profane (see chapters one and three for further discussion) society then further classified the profane world into natural and social phenomena so that it could develop scientific rules for the management of

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16 The Enlightenment as a way of thinking will be explored more fully in Chapter Three and Four.
natural phenomena (those that existed regardless of human intervention) and social phenomena (those created by man and consequently easily amenable to control). Latour calls this division of society the "work of purification" (1993:11) and in effect, when applied, the "practices of purification" (Latour, 1993:11) could be said to spawn a number of related purified pairs, or binary oppositions, such as good and bad, metaphor and metonymy, light and dark, mind and body, and men and women (see for example Salmon, 1983). Over time the inherent instability of binary opposites as a classification system meant that the pairs were classified into hierarchies in order to stabilise them.

While much of the analysis of binary opposites was completed with regard to the structure of European languages (Salmon, 1983:285), it was also applied to phenomena in the everyday world, such as the relations between men and women or good and bad. For example, Coe, Domke, Graham, John and Pickard (2004:235) have analysed how binary opposites structure “conceptions of reality” in the US “president’s national addresses” and the mediated “press responses” regarding terrorism. Within a framework of oppositions, the ‘good’ or superior side was required to either control or eliminate the ‘bad’ or inferior side. While this process of suppression was impossible for many dualisms or binary opposites (for example the mind cannot live without the body), the inability to purify and control all physical and social phenomena was overcome through the use of linguistic symbols, which, in discourse, could guarantee that good would be ordered over bad. Control of these hierarchically organised dualisms became “violent” (Derrida, 1981:41) because it was only by demonstrating control over these hierarchies that the new (colonialist) society justified its control over, and elimination of, other inferior elements, such as Demons and fearful others (for example, ethnic minorities). Evidence of any negative dualism which defied control was removed, marginalised or silenced.17 By insisting that only the superior sides of dualisms existed in ‘civilised’ society, it provided a rationale for conquering and educating those fearful others (Said, 1978). Therefore this discursive control meant that modernity could claim it was on the verge of achieving its aims, despite any evidence to the contrary. As a result in more contemporary times the body has been viewed as a profane object devoid of the capacity to participate in society except in so far as the mind wills it.

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17 Marginalisation occurred only as a concession to the negotiation of hegemony.
This belief has become so normalised that it resulted in “a hidden history of bodily-relevant writings” (Shilling, 2005:7) and possibly stimulated the resistance to the then emerging sociology of the body. It was only with the contribution of scholars such as Merleau-Ponty (1962), Goffman (1969), Foucault ([1975] 1979), Turner (1984), Shilling (1993, 2005, 2007) and Shilling and Mellor (2007) as well as journals such as Body and Society that the mind’s absolute control of the body has been fundamentally challenged. For example by viewing people as “multidimensional mediums for the constitution of society” (Shilling, 2005:212), Mellor and Shilling’s framework of ideal types makes clear the interconnectedness of senses, minds, bodies and thought and confronts the mind/body split. Accordingly this study is not to reverse dualisms or binary oppositions by saying the body is a person’s primary connection to interpreting the world, without a place for the mind (Shilling and Mellor, 1996). Rather this research considers the constituent elements of senses, minds, sociality and structures of society and the combined contribution that they all make to the acquisition of knowledge. This area of research is significant in that by suspending an assumption, such as a mind/body split, it opens up for analysis the ways in which people decide whether they should:

1. be in-touch, or out-of-touch, with their senses;
2. be open or closed to physical bodily invasion; and
3. prioritise some senses over others, and if so, which senses have and should have priority for sensory perception.

If this dissertation successfully demonstrates that changing Christian frameworks still guide these kinds of mind/body choices and are an organising principle of contemporary films, I will have demonstrated that, despite the secular labelling of many fiction films, Christianity remains sociologically significant for the way in which many Western people make sense of the body-in-pain.

**Representation and the Study of Artwork and Films**

To study images as represented in paintings and film is to engage with the concept of the ‘real’. As mentioned previously, I follow Mellor’s line of reasoning and maintain that the concept of the real has not become so relativised that it no longer exists (2004:1). I argue that people do feel pain and that social and institutional arrangements influence the way in which people experience that pain. I call this real experience ‘everyday life’. I am not privileging what is real, or not real, to any individual or group of individuals. Rather, I recognise that at an individual level we all define some things as real and other things as not real. I also make a further distinction between the real and reel world. This is not
done to create a false opposition between fact and fiction, or even a false opposition between reality and imagination, but to note that, although these worlds are different, there is a correlation between social actions which occur in both the real and the reel world. As Dowd claims, films are representations made in social worlds to present social worlds (1999:329).

This study is not pointing to a one-way process by which the real world determines the reel world or vice versa. Instead, the area of sociological interest is a two-way process in which social actors and structures in the real world are selected for representation as an arrangement of the real world within the reel world. In turn, this artificially arranged reel world shapes the parameters and imaginations of possibility for social actors in the real world. That is, representations in popular culture make assertions and connections that repetitively circulate particular understandings, and this repetitive circulation creates the possibility of shaping the choices that real social actors make. This occurs when actors knowingly take up the ‘reality’ of the reel world, such as an interest in Jedi religion as a result of the Star Wars films (see Possamai, 2005:72-75).

It also occurs more subtly when the constant repetition of the same type of representations of pain normalises particular responses to pain, limiting the options of social actors in their everyday management of real bodies-in-pain. Therefore, within any habitus, past or present, and especially in a habitus which violently suppresses the reality of the negative sides of binary oppositions, representations are always “selective, limited, framed or mediated” by people and the habitus (Newbold, Boyd-Barrett and Van den Bulck, 2002:260). The study of any process of re-presentation is, at the same time, a study of the process by which that selection of particular information becomes normalised as the only acceptable form of information to be used. Accordingly studying representations is not a straightforward ‘revealing’ of an ideological message that is sent from director to recipient audiences (Hall, 1997:1). While in popular culture these meanings are deemed to be transparent, because they are aimed at mass-audiences, the statement that the purpose of film and popular culture is “to entertain” (Bergesen, 2006:1) conceals more than it illuminates.

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18 The repetition of the same types of representation (along with other contributors) reinforces stabilised collective representations, such as bodies-in-pain.
Taking heed of this concept and the centrality of bodies to society, this study places Durkheim’s notion of the embodied sociality of collective representation at the forefront of consideration. Representation is viewed as a social process that shapes, and is shaped by, interacting human actors and objects, such as films and bodies. Films are understood as social activities and its interpretation includes the whole process of determining how, when, and where, to see it. “[M]ore trickily” (Barker, Arthurs, and Harindranath, 2001:27) it also includes, the way [the film’s] actual watching [of the cultural object itself] is permeated by learnt and shared ideas and assumptions, wishes, hopes and fears that arise from [the audience and film maker’s] social history (Barker, et al., 2001:27).

This study focuses on this shared social history through the embedded epistemology and ontology of bodily knowing and action. However what is often not covered when the concept of collective representations is considered is that they act “similarly on people who share a particular form of embodiment” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). Defining this problem, but in different ways, scholars such as Ostwalt (2003), Franklin (2006) and Lowenstein (2005) argue that the activity of suspended disbelief, coupled with the empowered discussion that film often generates, provides a significant site for visualising both the possibilities and also the limits of contemporary embodiment.

Despite this potential, the role of the entertainment media in forming and transferring culture is often missed (see explanations of academic marginalisation in Miles, 1996; Lowenstein, 2005, Franklin, 2006). Popular film is often ignored because there is an assumption that its ideological message is so overt that it does not require educated reading and can be thought of “as frivolous and trifling” (Cormack, 2007:527). This results in resistance to the sociological viewing of the media as ‘staged facts’ that influence society (Boltanski, 1999:174). Yet, when powerful political figures repeat references from popular culture, the filmic arrangements of reality and the importance of popular culture in shaping daily life emerge. For example Franklin (2006:15) and Alfonsi (2006:308) discuss the political use of quotes from Dirty Harry and/or Barney Fife. Thus as sites of study, films and characters make comments about class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and an array of other variables. What I add to these studies is an example of the way in which Christian approaches to the body have become so embedded that many films circulate particular Christian interpretations regardless of the director’s religion, or of the audience’s ability to read the messages in their Christian context.
The pragmatic selection of specific artworks and films for in-depth analysis in a dissertation, however, cannot definitively prove an argument. Like Bergesen (2006), I have nevertheless selected examples that can be generalised and are indicative of broader patterns. My dissertation takes an “impressionistic”, rather than a ‘positivist’ approach (Possamai, 2005:22). An impressionistic approach illustrates that it is enough to find the characteristics of my ideal types present in film to show that Christianity is still significant for the way pain is understood in Western society.

**Limited Use of Interviews and Audience Reception Studies**

Once one accepts the importance of popular culture's contribution towards understanding contemporary society, it is often expected that an audience reception theory which includes a series of interviews will be used in order to analyse the topic (Barker, et al., 2001; Black, 1994; Peterson and Thurstone, 1933; Blumer, 1935). The sociological preference for the interview method follows from the idea that the most significant interpretation of a cultural object is the viewer’s interpretation. However Bergesen (2006) critiques this notion, noting that artworks and different forms of popular culture also make independent assertions and it is necessary to study these assertions as well. So, to ensure that this two-way process is studied I have not conducted interviews myself. Instead I draw from a range of different research sites and synthesise this information in order to compare them with the body-in-pain ideal types.

More specifically I draw from sermons, artworks, film, scholars, critics and a study produced from the analysis of interview data. I examine social responses, particularly from scholarly studies, discourse and collective actions (such as box office sales) as indicative of societal preferences. In addition in several places I utilise lay people and/or scholar’s quotes of earlier scholars or religious authorities. For example, I use Caton quoting Bacon. In these cases it is not necessarily what Bacon did, or did not say, that is important to my study. Rather it is the way in which Caton understood and reports on Bacon that informs and contributes to contemporary understandings, whether these reports are scholastically well-informed or not. (It must be noted that all the sources I use in this way are well-established and recognised as experts in their fields, although this is not the main reason they were chosen). I do concur that the addition of an audience reception study, based on interviews in relation to the framework that I have developed, would be a useful next stage for research. Nevertheless as this study stands it makes a contribution to the renewed interest
occurring in sociology (once limited to the sociology of religion) in morality and secularisation as well as to the less well-studied examination of the body-in-pain and use of fiction film within sociology.

**Why is this Study Important?**

The importance of looking at the connections, associations or interpretations of Christian bodily orientations circulating in contemporary society is to recognise and to heed Nietzsche’s warning. He warned that with the believed death of God, people would overlook the social significance of the Christian belief system, if not the belief in God, and that the Christian system would become normalised as natural and unseen (Nietzsche, [1882] (1974)). In order to ascertain if this is happening, a conceptualisation of modernity will be improved by considering the ways in which the system of thought known as Christianity (not “Goddy[-ness]”) continues to guide, encourage and limit societal interpretation of collective representations (for example bodies-in-pain). This is regardless of whether, or not, we are believed to live in a publicly secular, post-modern or indeed in a Christian age, however defined. The study of ‘tacit knowledge’ and the way in which it gives everyday meaning to events, will assist in exploring an aspect of contemporary society not often ‘seen’. This reveals that just because something is unseen does not mean it has “ceased to have any significance for the workings of the social system” (Thompson, 1986:19).

A better understanding of these influences, for example, will put a context behind claims of scholars, such as Kubler-Ross (1974), who argue that pain and death are experienced in a reasonably singular and staged way by most people. Whether Kubler-Ross is right or wrong for every individual is not my concern, although I agree that society usually confines those in pain to specific socially-accepted spatial, social and psychological boundaries (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2002). Instead my purpose is to highlight the way in which normative imperatives that are based on Christian approaches to bodily pain both influence the tacit dimension of knowledge and also limit the choices of experience and representation in everyday life, whether, or not, they are actually acknowledged to be anchored in Christian concepts.

From another perspective this study seeks to illuminate the way in which continuing Christian thought and bodily orientations can, for example, broaden
Scarry's (1985:1) notion that, in the moment of pain, bodies lose their sense of self. This ensures that pain, which is unseen, remains intangible. Ultimately what will become apparent in the course of this dissertation is that Scarry’s automatic (tacit) association between ‘invisibility’ and limited communication is a modern belief in which sight is prioritised over other senses (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:7). Consequently, while on the surface this study is about representation, it is also about the embodied sociality of collective representations and the interactive process bounding viewing and living. The focus is in the way in which Christian thought shapes those boundaries. Following in Mellor and Shilling’s footprints, this study contributes to, and provides new, insight into the way in which the secularisation debates that focus on religiousness have blinkered a full analysis of the lived experience of phenomena such as bodies-in-pain and its Christian connections.

In highlighting the importance of the sensory body in information transference, Mellor and Shilling’s framework and my development of it, provides an additional approach that contributes to Ostwalt’s (1998) quest “to seek even more typologies, more methods, for categorising and studying film and religion”. Viewed in this way, this study fits alongside the limited number of studies which give cultural context to the experience of pain (see Morris, 1991; Bendelow, 2000; Williams and Bendelow, 1998; and Kilwein, 1998). Overall Kilwein’s (1998) challenge, which opened this chapter, is taken up and in this way this study has relevance to those studies that incorporate the concept of the modern ‘medicalisation of society’. I argue that a significant part of the cultural context of pain is shaped by Christian perspectives. Accordingly this dissertation can be used as a resource for understanding the underlying reasons behind why the management of contemporary bodily pain has become so ambivalent.

Finally, a short aside before starting the first chapter - although I provide images from each film these are limited and do not have the same impact as does the embodied experience of physically watching film. Therefore, although not imperative, it is recommended that the readers of this dissertation watch these films, particularly before reading Part II. This comes with one caveat. As I am focusing on male bodies-in-pain, these films display varying amounts of pain, violence, body-horror or sex and depending on the viewer’s sensibilities may be a more or less challenging viewing experience. Therefore, an alternative is to skim through each film with the remote control and linger, in order to reflect, upon the senses and scenes from which I have plucked the images.
Mellor and Shilling’s study, *Re-Forming the Body: Religion, Community and Modernity* (1997), analyses medieval Catholic and early modern Protestant forms of embodied sociality and knowledge to develop three re-forming ideal types. These ideal types are the foundation upon which I develop a model of bodies-in-pain that will be used as a framework for analysis in Part II of this dissertation. To produce this model it is necessary to clarify Mellor and Shilling’s foundational perspectives which my model is dependent upon. Consequently the purpose of this chapter is not to conduct a literature review but to clarify Mellor and Shilling’s methodological assumptions, founding concepts, central influences, key terms and intellectual history. Accordingly my aim is three-fold.

First my aim is to demonstrate the reason why ideal types in general and Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types in particular, are the appropriate framework in which to answer the research question. Second I consider the criticisms that have been levelled at Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and analysis as well as those that could be levelled at this study by extension. Third I explain Mellor and Shilling’s philosophical, sociological and methodological foundations. In order to accomplish these aims, after a brief introduction, this chapter will be structured around a series of questions. The first set relates to my method. These are:

1. What are ideal types?
2. What is the advantage of using them?
3. Why build on Mellor and Shilling's ideal typical analysis?

The second set examines critiques of this method (both of the method as conceived by Weber and as applied by Mellor and Shilling) by asking:

4. What are the potential critiques of ideal types?
5. Are there any limitations in using Mellor and Shilling's analysis?

To answer these questions I have drawn from the work of Max Weber as well as various secondary sources that discussed Weber’s work in a contemporary context. Finally I conclude this chapter by clarifying the founding concepts that
are drawn from Mellor and Shilling’s analysis and developed in a distinct direction in this dissertation. I do this by answering the following question:

6. What are Mellor and Shilling’s methodological assumptions, founding concepts, central influences, and key terms?

In answering this question I draw heavily from Mellor and Shilling’s 1997 study while at the same time drawing from other academic work in order to clarify particular details.

Introduction

Tacit values and bodily orientations are difficult to expose because they are so firmly ingrained within our epistemologies that even the researcher may not recognise the links between currently normalised concepts, social relations and their origin. For example, in the introduction I discussed how in the medieval era Gilbert de Middleton’s entrails and heart were made culpable for his actions. However with the rise of historical, social and academic changes such as the: Protestant Reformation, Enlightenment thought, Cartesian influenced mind/body division and the Industrial Revolution, the above medieval way of understanding the body gradually lost its status as self evident truth. In keeping with this shift, early sociological thought did not focus on either, the natural and biological body or the bodily senses as a primary source of investigation. Instead much research focused on the dual status of the disembodied subject, whose mind, consciousness and language defined their social being. The body was an “absent presence” - it may have been “present as a topic of discussion ... but is absent as a focus of investigation” (Shilling, 1993:80) – it may have “been present as an item of discussion but absent as an object of analysis” (Shilling, 1993:81). Yet because the body is central to social and academic categorisations and divisions, such as nature/culture and social/biology, this epistemological belief proved to be an inherent tension and a force for change. This change is demonstrated in contemporary academic and popular interest, which is now focusing on the body as a phenomenon in its own right and “moving it away from being an absent presence towards becoming a central object of study” (Shilling, 1993:29).

Within sociology, and particularly since Bryan Turner’s seminal study the Body and Society (1984), a growing number of sociologists have questioned the mind/body division (amongst others) and are now examining the body and
embodiment in a variety of ways. Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical study and their term “re-forming the body” encapsulates this shift. They contend that the way in which we make sense of the body in contemporary society has become doxic. They argue that because it was not always this way, this has significance for how we make sense of our bodies and the world we live in (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). To simplify this argument and to give a level of precision and transparency to their study, Mellor and Shilling use an ideal typical analysis that follows a means-end chain. This method of clarifying does not necessarily lead to any predictions, nor does it paint a complete picture for the way in which particular circumstances came about. Rather it is a method that seeks to clarify some aspects of a complex reality and often begins by drawing on an established model.

Mellor and Shilling means-end chain, that is their ideal typical analysis, begins with Tonnies (1855-1936) ideal type forms of sociality “Gemeinschaft ‘community’” and “Gesellschaft ‘society’” (1997:14). Mellor and Shilling link these ideal types with the medieval Catholic and Protestant Reformation forms of embodiment and knowledge. Using these antecedents they ask, what can a perceived change in the location of God (from a ‘this worldly’ to an ‘other worldly’ position) reveal in relation to the meaning of the profane, and the meaning of the body, within contemporary society? They introduce their analysis by identifying particular forms of embodiment, sociality, knowledge, the sensory body and its use of the close and the distant-contact senses. Mellor and Shilling’s model is distinctive because they do not privilege mind, body or social constitution. Instead, they build and develop a model that is at the nexus of the

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19 Examples include: O’Neill (1985) Five Bodies: this study examines both discursive and material bodies. Williams and Bendelow (1998) The Lived Body: Sociological Themes and Embodied Issues (1998); this study provides an overview of the way in which the study of the body has slowly developed within sociology. Chris Shilling’s The Body and Social Theory (1993; 2003, 2nd ed.) and The Body in Culture, Technology and Society (2005) gives a comprehensive overview of much recent sociological academic interest in sociological theory and studies surrounding the body. Both studies analyse and appraise fundamental sociological contributions. The peer reviewed journal Body and Society introduces new research on the topic of the body and embodiment primarily from a sociological perspective.

20 The term ‘doxa’, when associated with the work of Bourdieu, refers to “the beliefs of a person as a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation [with which] the natural and social world appears as self evident. It is the experience of a ‘sense of reality’ that is created by habitus and infused with an element of misrecognition of the arbitrariness of relations in and between objective structures” (Throop and Murphy, (2002:188 -189) drawn from Bourdieu (1977:156).

21 Following Durkheim and fundamental to the sociological sub-discipline of religion is the “absolute nature of the distinction between the sacred and profane “. It is an on-going debate within sociology in general and the sociology of religion in particular (Marshall, 1994:457). Therefore because this dissertation sits within the sociology of religion, the sacred and its (often) binary opposite, the profane, will be discussed in more depth and throughout this dissertation.
somatic/corporeal body, modes of “bodily-being-in-the-world” and the social construction of knowledge. Within this nexus I have chosen a specific aspect of their sensory body – the body in pain - to systematize and develop a model of re-forming body-in-pain ideal types in order to use these models as the organising system (framework) through which to argue my case later in the dissertation. However before I can do this I need to ensure that my development and systemization of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical analysis is made apparent. This is because throughout this dissertation in general there is a reliance on, and in this chapter in particular an in-depth discussion of, their study. Therefore to ensure that both their method, (ideal types) and foundational principles are understood and recognised I proceed with an explanation of these. To do this I begin with the following questions.

**What Are Ideal Types? What is the Advantage of Using Them?**

An ideal type is a research method that is developed in order to clarify certain features of phenomena so that it can be used as a framework for analysis. Within the social sciences Max Weber (1864-1920) ascribed his particular meaning to the ideal type method in response to the methodological debates of his time. These debates were focused upon finding a common ground between the disciplines within the social sciences. Weber maintained that ideal type models were not a new conceptual method but because most researchers were not fully aware of the kind of concepts they were using in their research they often overlooked that ideal types were an existing approach (a common ground) already used by many social scientists. Therefore he argued that an ideal type method was an “epistemological basis for ... the conceptual activities of the social scientific investigator” (Hekman, 1983:122).

Weber did however, criticise social scientists who conducted studies that were either ambiguous and/or imprecise in their design and standards of comparison. For example, Weber argued that the historian uses “hundreds of words which are ambiguous constructs created to meet the unconsciously conceived need for adequate expression and whose meaning is definitely felt, but not clearly thought out” (Weber, [1905] 1949: 92-3). He was most concerned with separating historical fact from theory. He states:

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22 The research question (as noted in the introduction) asks: To what extent does Christianity remain socially and institutionally significant for the way people in contemporary Western society make sense of the body. My central argument is that Christian inspired values and bodily orientations tacitly (Polanyi, 1966) influence embodied experience.
Nothing, however, is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the ‘true’ content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such ‘ideas’ as real ‘forces’ and as a ‘true’ reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works itself out in history ([1905]1949:94).

Weber’s critics, (for example see Rex, 1971), argued that conflating the “methodological tools of the historian and the sociologist must be seen as a failure because the two are not really compatible” (Hekman, 1983:123). In a reassessment of Weber’s ideal type method Hekman “challenge[s] these negative appraisals” (1983:123). She argues that Weber’s concept not only offers a foundation for “the analysis of subjective meaning and structural forms” but also is “methodologically sound” and logically consistent (1983:120). Taking Weber’s perspective, she notes that, the difference between an historical research question and a sociological research question is that the historical question often concentrated on the particular characteristics of a phenomenon that were embedded in the contextual facts of a particular time period and/or society. In contrast the sociological research question usually widened the subject matter. In turn this broadened the phenomenon under investigation such as over time, or between societies, or even across institutions and practices within their “cultural significance” (Hekman, 1983:122). Overall however Weber maintained that the process of ideal type accentuation was “to a very large extent the same” but the main difference was that the researcher’s discipline guided a different selection of “facts” and trends (Hekman, 1983:124). Accordingly, historical ideal types are constructed to answer questions with regard to that which the historical context is of primary importance while general sociological ideal types answer questions in which this is only one of the many relevant aspects (Hekman, 183: 125).

Therefore although the sociologist, in taking a broader perspective across time, may diminish historical complexity this does not weaken a sociological analysis. This is because an ideal type method is not the result of an analysis; it is an heuristic tool or framework that makes analysis possible. It makes sense then that an ideal typical analysis, when understood in this way, is not “empiricist history” but a valuable “sociological approach” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:32). To those with a hard science perspective a discussion of concepts of reality and

23 “Cultural significance”, as defined in Hekman’s article refers to “the meaning which the social actors bestow on their actions” (1983:122).
perspectives, combined with time spent developing an ideal type, may be less interesting. However to appropriately situate a study that crosses multiple perspectives on what counts as reality and/or time periods it is essential to make these epistemological distinctions and any foundations transparent.

The value of an ideal typical analysis is in its usefulness, not its approximation to reality. This means ideal types compensate for any limitations in their development through their clarifying and unifying power when applied to complex data. The construction of an ideal type simplifies the complexity and contradictory aspects embedded within socio-political, economic, environmental and physical reality in order to accentuate specific self-sustaining features. In simplifying, not the aspects themselves, but their embeddedness in other phenomena, an ideal type makes comparative analyses less difficult and analytically more precise. In this way the generality of ideal types is an advantage. The analytical power of an ideal type lies in its construction. Weber contended that ideal types were constructed through “one-sided accentuations” that created a necessary precision for conceptual analysis (Weber, [1905] 1949:90). This precision is necessary because in any given society, dominant ‘ideas’ are never coherent, because ideas “exist in the minds of an indefinite and constantly changing mass of individuals and assumes in their minds the most multifarious nuances of form and content, clarity and meaning” (Weber, [1905] 1949:96).

As a “one-sided accentuation” (Weber, [1905] 1949:90) an ideal type model turns complex practices and phenomena into an abstracted ‘idea’ to construct a less conflicted notion that makes explicit and transparent those aspects that are relevant or to use Goffman’s phrase ‘framed in’ or “frame[d] out” of the analysis (Morrison, 1995:272). For example in much sociological research variables such as the sacred and/or the sensory body are often “framed out”. In Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical analysis they “frame in” the sensory body and the sacred, alongside variables such as gender relations, female bodies, and status. They ‘frame out’ variables such as age and ethnicity. My development systematizes an aspect of their study that, although mentioned, is not centre stage. I “frame out” their discussion of variables such as gender relations, female bodies, status, as well as ethnicity and age. This enables my study to specifically develop the dominant ‘ideas’, as well as the influences, surround the changing location of the sacred in relation to Christian ideas concerning bodies-in-pain.
Weberian ideal types are also a method for making transparent and explicit value judgements guiding the selection of material (Weber, [1905] 1949:96), in other words, what was either “framed in” or “out” of the analysis. For example the intrusion of value judgments is not made very clear within the secularization debates. And yet these are often based on the researcher’s implicit judgment of what a “truly religious society” is. Similarly many researchers take an implicit view as to whether, or not (and in many cases not), God is real. In addition to these factors ideal types also demonstrate the self-sustaining or “logical connections” between different phenomena. For example Weber argued that any idea is bound to “constitute a chaos of infinitely differentiated and highly contradictory complexes of ideas and feelings” ([1905] 1949:96). However, as an investigative or heuristic model, a logically consistent ideal type exposes the way in which a logical connection of ideas, relationships and events is made comprehensible, if it existed. It is in this sense that ideal types are ideal. This is not to say that the logical connections were the essence of the period or phenomena being studied or were they paramount in the minds of those acting on them but, as an “analytical accentuation of certain aspects” selected for analysis, they reinforce each other (Morrison, 1995:271). As Weber noted, ideal types are conceptual patterns that “bring together certain relationships and events of historical life in a complexity which is conceived of as an internally consistent system” ([1905] 1949:90). Accordingly ideal types are constructed to show a “coherent means-end chain” within particular aspects of the broader complexity and contradictions in everyday life (Marshall, 1994:231).

In this way, an ideal type “functions as a shorthand medium of concept formation” (Morrison, 1995:272) which, when clearly explained, indicates a degree of historical specificity and simultaneously assists in comparing general continuities and discontinuities across certain aspects and phenomena. This means that at the outer limit of the model there are the general concepts that can be unambiguously defined as existing, such as the idea of ‘Catholicism’. At the inner limit of the model’s framework there are references to the subjective meaning of the concept for particular individuals, such as recorded reactions of individual Catholics to bodily stimulus. This means that ideal types, which are extrapolated from medieval Catholic and Early Modern Protestant eras, should not internalise dichotomous thinking or be a table of comparative elements (Morrison, 1995: 271-3). Instead, ideal types from different time periods can be made from characteristics that may, or may not, continue throughout time. The usefulness of the ideal type is its ability to capture continuity and/or discontinuity. This is because ideal types, constructed as they are from modes
of thought and bodily-being-in-the-world that dominated the past, can usefully measure to what extent those modes of ‘being’ and ‘thought’ are circulating in the world today. As Weber argued the purpose of constructed ideal types is to use them “as conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement of reality” (italics in the original, [1905] 1949:97).

Why Build on Mellor and Shilling's Ideal Typical Analysis?

Inherent in a research question that asks whether, or not, Christianity remains significant for the way in which Western people make sense of the body are two key concepts. One is change over time. The other is the idea that we make sense of the world through the body. Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types, which are focused on the ways in which senses and bodies re-form over time, are therefore well suited for comparing what is locally and temporally contingent in contemporary society. In addition their ideal typical analysis of embodied sociality and knowledge exposes how changing attitudes and values impact on the way in which we make ‘sense’ of the world. When viewed in this way the ideal type method in general and Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical analysis in particular is an excellent foundation upon which to build my own comparative framework in order to answer the research question. However methodologies are open to criticism and what I am proposing to use in this dissertation is no exception. To address this, again, I continue by answering the following question.

What are the Potential Criticisms of Ideal types?

The usefulness of ideal types does not go unchallenged. Consequently to ensure this dissertation utilises the strengths of this method and minimises its weaknesses, I outline four critiques and my response to them. Firstly, when Weber developed ideal type models of phenomena such as “craft-based economy [and the] ... capitalist city economy” (Morrison, 1995:271), it was often claimed that he was creating a research tool to determine the ‘real’ cause of change in societies or systems (see Freund, 1968:68-69). This claim to definitive knowledge reflected the influence of a positivist paradigm on Weber’s work and/or on those who were to use and interpret his work. Some scholars (perhaps those who aspire to being at the forefront of postmodernism) would claim that there is no such thing as a real or singular cause or that comparisons across time are impossible. Whatever one thinks of the (im)possibility of finding real causes, my dissertation is not a search for causal explanations;
therefore I do not use ideal types in this way. Instead, by situating the sensory body-in-pain within Geertz’s “web analogy” (1973:3) and Latour’s (1993) view of modernity, I am exploring impacts, effects and incentives. As noted previously I am not convinced that the concept of the real (which is necessary to a belief in a cause leading to an effect) has become so relativised that it no longer exists (Mellor, 2004:1). People do feel pain and social and institutional arrangements do have effects on the way in which people experience that pain. Nevertheless I do not accept that it is always necessary to prove cause and effect within the multifarious infinite manifestations of human experience and meaning. I agree with Latour (1993:84) that it is a particularly modern pursuit to seek a single or limited number, of scientific ‘causes’. This does not make my dissertation a fiction, rather reality in this dissertation should be understood without reference to cause. As Halpern, drawing from Nietzsche, claims

causality is another delusionary construction like subjects and objects. There are no causes and effects, but only what we read into events as causes and effects. And our perspectives change what we count as causes and effects (2002:231).

I may not agree with these extreme views, but to find causal relationships is not the purpose of this analysis. I use ideal types to make visible persistent continuity in belief systems, not causal elements. As a result I am using the ideal types as models to expose Christian hermeneutic structures of bodily pain that might otherwise be invisible – that is, that they have informed the “tacit dimension of knowledge” (Polanyi, 1966) and are now embodied within contemporary society.

A second criticism of ideal types is that the word ‘ideal’ means that the means–ends chain is an ideal process and/or outcome. Weber never intended the word ‘ideal’ to be understood in this way. As Freund (1968:62-63) argues the ideal type “is never, or only very rarely, encountered in all its purity” in the realities of social life. Being ‘unreal’ means the ideal type has the advantage of being a conceptual tool that can be used as a standard of comparison to make key elements, within complex reality, observable. That is, the ideal type brings to the forefront that which is usually overlooked as absent making it visibly present and an object of study. Consequently ideal types offer a logical organisation that is neither true or false, but only helpful or unhelpful as an heuristic model in an investigation of humanity, everyday life and the world around us. Furthermore, in an ideal type framework the word ‘type’ should not be read to imply either typical, or any form of averaged, behavior. Nor should
the ideal type “be confused with an [is/ought] ethical model or even with a practical rule of conduct” (Freund, 1968:64). For example the sociologist when studying the “cultural significance” of Christianity (which is what I am doing this dissertation) cannot let personal views “of what ought to be” in this regard, enter into the analysis (Freund, 1968:64). Accordingly both Hekman and Freund (in different ways) conclude that,

it may well seem pedantic to transform most of the ideas which historians and sociologists take for granted into ideal types. Yet that is the only way to arrive at precise definition of concepts and to avoid hollow rhetoric, fallacious reasoning, ambiguity and pernicious error (1968:65).

The third criticism is one Mellor and Shilling raise themselves and is also a critique that has been levelled at Weber’s studies of Protestantism. This critique claims that the range of differences within Protestantism itself means it is not open to generalisations and, if attempted, such generalisations would be “at best misleading and at worst simply inaccurate” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:9). In response, Mellor and Shilling acknowledge that Protestantism is “undeniably” “diverse” (1997:9). However they maintain that to gain new insights into the “development and character of the modern world”, it is also “important to focus on the limited nature of this diversity” and the environmental factors which allowed Protestantism to develop. They argue that an “attention to forms of embodiment” allows them “to account for Protestantism’s diversity [and] ... to deal with this religious form at a general level” (1997:9). Given that my focus in this study is to produce a means-ends chain framework that has the potential to reveal a link between the location of the sacred and bodies-in-pain, an ideal type method is an excellent method. However for those seeking a deeper understanding of Protestantism itself, what it means for its believers, and what impact it has in specifically shaping public affairs this method is insufficient. I direct those readers to studies that place religion (in any of its myriad forms and definitions), rather than culture, at the centre of analysis.

The fourth criticism is more pertinent to this study not only because the criticism has been debated since at least Weber’s time (c1904), but also because the same criticism has been levelled at Mellor and Shilling’s study. Some historians and sociologists have mixed feelings towards ideal-typical “accentuations” because they deem them to be either useless or fantastical. Specifically Marie Griffith (1999:201) has claimed that Mellor and Shilling’s study produced a “narrow view of their subtext and [was] in need of sound historical research”
This type of criticism is anchored within assumptions of the empiricist historian as discussed earlier in this chapter. However to address this particular criticism I reiterate that my use of ideal types is not to better understand historical understandings of pain. Instead, I use ideal types to 1) investigate whether, or to what extent, the ‘tacit dimensions of knowledge’ are influenced by Christian interpretations of the body-in-pain and 2) whether, or not, making this connection visible is useful to the analysis of contemporary society. Indeed as a sociologist, and not an historian, I go further and refute any suggestion of making a contribution to the study of medieval, renaissance or modern history, or the causes of societal change. On the contrary, this dissertation contributes to an area of knowledge that is concerned with understanding contemporary sociological approaches to the western body-in-pain, not to empiricist history. Following Mellor and Shilling, (and the scholars before them), my ideal typical analysis does not construct history into static concepts but use only the internally consistent aspects of forms of knowledge acquisition from previous eras to examine particular continuities within emergent and dynamic phenomena in the contemporary era. Contemporary examples of scholarly work with a similar approach (although different) include: Turner’s (1984) theory of bodily order, Frank’s (1991; 1995) typology of bodily use in action, Denzin’s (1995) social types of the voyeur gaze and Glucklich’s (2001) models of sacred pain. Taking this into account then I agree with Mellor and Shilling (1997:9) that such criticisms, and I give the example of Griffith’s critique, reflect a “highly partial” reading of ideal types and are “sociologically misplaced”.

What are the Limitations of Mellor and Shilling’s Analysis?
I have previously covered critiques of Mellor and Shilling’s methodological base, (pages 33-36), so in this section I focus solely on limitations that apply to Mellor and Shilling’s analysis. I located only one scholarly criticism of their analysis and I have one of my own. My critique is based on Weber’s belief that the value of an ideal typical analysis is its usefulness, not its approximation to reality. As already mentioned Mellor and Shilling’s work is complex and draws from a variety of sources to cover many different aspects relating to embodied forms of sociality and knowledge within everyday life as it changes over time. This makes their study both convincing and thought provoking. It also makes it difficult to apply as specifically outlined in their work. To address this limitation, I spend the next three chapters systematising one aspect of their extensive theoretical analysis – the sensory body - to create specific bodies-in-pain ideal types that
can be used as a comparative model. I draw on both different, and similar, resources to Mellor and Shilling (such as sermons and diaries). However my concentration is on sources that are significant to the development of the sensory body in relation to pain. This is a topic that is underdeveloped in Mellor and Shilling’s analysis as their areas of concern take them in different directions.

In each of the following three chapters then I begin with an outline of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal type of embodied sociality derived from the Catholic, Protestant and contemporary eras. I then use additional sources that elaborate on the points Mellor and Shilling ‘touch on’ to highlight the way in which logical connections can be made between the key aspects Mellor and Shilling develop and new material related to bodies-in-pain. For example, Mellor and Shilling analyse the centrality of the Mass to the medieval Catholic worldview. However I cross disciplines to apply the work of scholars, such as Santana (2003), who highlights the performative, the commemorative and the transformative epistemology of the Mass because it is this transformative potential that is a significant factor in understanding the way in which pain fitted into a medieval Volatile worldview. These types of connections are not something Mellor and Shilling develop in any depth but are the ideal type of connections I develop and are entirely in harmony with their analysis.

Having indicated how I am addressing what could be the main limitation of using Mellor and Shilling’s ideal typical analysis (its need to be systematized in order to apply it as a framework for this study), I turn to the only other scholarly critique of their work that appeared in peer reviewed journals. Again, in a book review of their 1997 work, Bunton (1998:408) claimed the work’s minor limitation was that very little attention was given to bodies outside the Western (Christian) tradition. While I think that Mellor and Shilling would agree that broadening their analysis to other cultural groups would make their study more comprehensive, their analysis still provides significant insights into the dominant culture of Western societies. Indeed, Mellor, in a subsequent work (see Mellor, 2004:162) takes up the importance of better understanding Christianity as the foundation for a better understanding of the current “clash of civilisations” in Britain. In my study there is also a single focus on Western male bodies-in-pain. I do this deliberately in order to be both transparent and precise in the development of my model. In the concluding chapter I indicate further areas of application for the model I develop in terms of public policy and this would be an excellent starting point for considering whether minority ethnic and religious
groups have enough cultural capital in consensus-based democracies to shape the values of public policy debates. For example, in New Zealand commentators have speculated on the ability or not for *te ao Maori* (the Maori worldview) to influence public policy (Australian Associated Press, 2008:online). In the meantime however, in order to keep this analysis focused and precise, in this dissertation I concentrate on the influence of dominant European and American cultures and Christian notions of the body-in-pain that are circulating in art and contemporary American film.

**Mellor and Shilling’s Methodological Assumptions, Founding Concepts, Central Influences, and Key Terms**

Mellor and Shilling suggest that currently there is an unsatisfactory sociological understanding of the conditions of modernity because “relatively little [sociological] attention has been devoted to [its] corporeal constituents” (1997:1). To address this unsatisfactory conceptualisation of modernity, Mellor and Shilling do not start with a definition of what modernity is, debate whether we are living in a post-modern age, or even consider, as Latour (1993) does, whether we “have ever been modern”. Instead they introduce their study through a reading of Durkheim’s insight into the inter-related nature of “human sociality”, the changing character and location of “the sacred and embodied patterns of reality construction” which they capture in three re-forming ideal types (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3).  

Although their study is not a straightforward Durkheimian analysis, their concern with the inherent conflict and complexities of emergent social realities that give rise to collective representations of human ideas and experience links their study with Durkheim’s work (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3-4). Connecting collective representations of human ideas and experience with the perspective that “human embodiment not only acts as a medium for [societies’] emergence but necessitates it” (Mellor, 2004:2), Mellor and Shilling move beyond a body-related study which focuses solely on images and representation, to pursue various

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24 Following Durkheim the sacred has been defined “as [a] something separated from the profane and [b] as a factor that is at the same time crucial for the establishment/conservation of the social bond while also being repulsive”. Defined in this way “the sacred ... [is] “ambiguous: it attracts and unites exactly as it repels and divides” (Rosati, 2003:177). Reflective of this, Mellor and Shilling define the “somatic experience of the sacred [as] something added to and above the real” (1997:1).

25 Mellor and Shilling use Durkheim’s work in a different way than most other sociologists because their interest reflects Durkheim’s concern with “forms of embodiment and the transformative capacities of effervescent forms of sociality” (1997:1).
theoretical avenues of inquiry. On the one hand they explore the way in which people, in order to satisfy needs and desires, act collectively in particular forms of social organisation. On the other, they explore the way in which people’s corporeal engagement with the world can stimulate a collective social development of emotional, cognitive, moral and religious capacities and capabilities.

In this way Mellor and Shilling are able to not only place bodies at the centre of their study but also build and develop a distinctive view in relation to the way in which bodies re-form over time. As a result, their body-centred approach addresses contemporary society through a "theoretical analysis of successive re-formations of the body and their relationships between various forms of cultural and religious life" (1997:1). Therefore central to an understanding of their theoretical ideal-typical analysis is the concept that the body and “its senses and sensualities are differently structured by social forces” and therefore “re-form” “over time” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:2).

Methodological Assumptions: ‘Over Time’ and ‘Re-Forming Bodies’
Mellor and Shilling (1997:21), drawing inspiration from Braudel’s time-scale perspective, base several methodological assumptions in the bodily characteristics and evolutionary dimensions of Braudel’s three temporal vantage points:

1. the macro time of the human body’s longue duree;
2. conjunctural time represented by the habitus; and
3. the micro daily-time of individual bodies (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997, 18-22).

Over Time

Longue Duree
The longue duree is a time-scale perspective which encompasses “the evolution of fundamental social structures ... deeply embedded ... cultural-philosophical systems” and forms of human embodiment which endure steadily, or even obstinately, across centuries (Latham, 2002:235). It also takes account of those overlapping "slow-moving biological, geographical, climactic and social
processes” involved in human evolution (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18). Spanning many thousands of years the human body's *longue duree* is an “evolutionary inheritance” which, regardless of hopes or desires, results in “species-specific capacities”, and in “certain ways of knowing the world” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:19). This continuance has also been described as a “stubbornness of human bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18) in resisting change. Mellor and Shilling note that an adherence to the *longue duree* timescale perspective and to the “stubbornness of bodies” is not a value judgement but a reminder that the basic form of human existence remains constant across both “traditional and modern societies” (1997:18). Yet this “stubbornness of bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18) is incomplete because bodies are “unfinished at birth” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:32) and through different survival techniques (such as the “use of tools”), accidents (such as car accidents) or deliberate control (such as exercise regimes), the body's adaptability, “malleability” and “openness” to change can either encourage or limit the possibilities of either “stability [and/or] change” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18-19).

Within these stabilising and destabilising trends, “species-specific capacities” remain reasonably constant, but the “unfinishedness of human embodiment” tends toward socio-natural processes that affect the “size, health and capacities of bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18-19). In turn these changes have implications for social relations, the prioritisation of one sense over another sense, meaning-making abilities and institutions. The prevailing social patterns and interaction that shape, and are shaped by, these bodily “species-specific capacities” can be “patterned and organised ... between different generations and cultural contexts” (1997:19). These patterns are captured in Braudel’s second time scale perspective which he terms “conjunctural time”.

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26 Mellor and Shilling state: “evolution has left humans with a ‘poverty of instincts’ compared with other’ animals. This makes our bodies and our world relatively open ... [accordingly] we need to saturate ourselves and our environment with knowledge, meaning and shape” (1997:32).

27 Mellor and Shilling (1997:19) stress that historical change, such as the shift from medieval to modern cultures, could not have occurred without the pre-existing processes and “re-formations of the body” and sociality. To give more depth to this argument, Mellor and Shilling discuss Elias’ concept of symbol emancipation, which explores the body’s “liberation from the bondage of largely unlearned or innate signals and its transition to the dominance of a largely learned patterning of one’s voice for the purposes of communication” (See Elias, 1991:53).
Conjunctural Time Represented by the Habitus

"Conjunctural time" or immediate time is a time-scale perspective which is concerned with “medium-term historical episodes” and is “the history of broad social, economical and political trends and developments such as the French Revolution or the Protestant Reformation” (Latham, 2002:235). Mellor and Shilling argue that "conjunctural time [can be] represented by the establishment of a habitus" (1997:18). They maintain that the habitus is a concept with historical origins in the thought of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but today it is more likely to be connected with the work of Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:19-20). 28 In different ways Elias and Bourdieu consider the way in which the body is “intimately and generationally involved in the development of human culture” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:21). Elias concentrates on the “civilising” and “decivilising” processes and a shift from “external expression to internal experience” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:20).29 This shift can change the assumptions of appropriate bodily conduct, for example the acceptability, or otherwise, of exposing bleeding sores in public. Bourdieu, although more interested in the “unfinishedness of bodies”, sits comfortably with Elias analysis as an embodied part of the social structure. Bourdieu focuses on the way in which the habitus gives people agency, as well as structuring bodily interaction and acceptability. He claims that “enfolded in the social habitus” are the doxic, or the “taken for granted knowledge” that manifest in collectively expressed individual preferences (Mellor, 2004:135).

Drawing from both Elias and Bourdieu’s work, Mellor and Shilling define the habitus as:

28 The habitus is: “a set of acquired patterns of thought, behaviour, and taste which is said by Bourdieu (Outline of Theory and Practice, 1977) to constitute the link between social structures and social practice (or social action)” (Marshall, 1994:209).
29 According to Mellor and Shilling, Elias’ study is not based on an evaluative concept. It is not “a way of hierarchically ranking the moral, economic and political progress of people” (1997:33). Instead Elias develops his concept of the civilisation process “as a set of processes which encompass the degree of internal pacification in a society; the refinement of customs; the amount of self restraint and reflexivity involved in relationships and the experiences of growing up in a society” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:33). Mellor and Shilling also note, that according to Elias civilisation and “the development of human embodiment” are linked by three processes; rationalisation, individualisation and socialisation. [1] “Rationalisation refers to the ability of people to exert self-control over their bodies by preventing emotional impulses from being translated immediately into physical action. [2] Individualisation [refers to the way in which] an increasing capacity for affect control and reflection leads people to experience themselves as detached from other people and from their own bodies ... [3] Socialisation refers to the progressive separation of the body from nature and it’s promotion as a bearer of value and codes of communication in social and economic market places” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:33). However, the qualities of the civilising process are no guarantee of a civilised end product. If at any time there is disruption and contradiction within society there is always the potential for decivilising tendencies to dominate civilising tendencies.
those precognitive, embodied dispositions, which promote particular forms of human orientation to the world, organise each generation’s senses and sensualities into particular hierarchies and predispose people toward specific ways of knowing and acting (1997:20).

To deepen this concept further, Mellor and Shilling draw on Mauss’ interest in “techniques of the body” (1997:20). Mauss argued that different cultures have specific “techniques of the body” that define people’s identities and are the way “people learn to relate to and deploy their bodies in social life” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:20). Although these techniques can occur pre-cognitively and are often believed to be the only choice because they are doxic within a specific habitus, they still need to be put into practice and sanctioned. Social acceptability depends on the body’s ability to execute these sanctioned activities and maintain a level of control in non-sanctioned activities. However this can create tension and introduces the possibility of doubt and change into bodily organisation. For example, a belief that God uses physical pain as a cure for evil can be put into practice through the encouragement of pain in penal acts. If beliefs change, and pain is no longer viewed as a morally sanctioned cure, then its visible display becomes more difficult to justify. Consequently, at the institutional level, executions will become less painful and less visible. Furthermore doubt enters the system when bodies do not conform to these changing beliefs. For example in the case of penal executions becoming painless, the guillotine was a bodily practice that was promoted as offering a painless death. However the gnashing of teeth and the twitching body after beheading created doubt as to the body's painless status (Smith, 2003:39-40). In this way, the habitus does not determine people’s practices but is the result of feedback loops between doxic beliefs/practices, institutional encouragement and people’s active participation (either through compliance or resistance or through response to doubt). This use of the doxic habitus has the potential to facilitate the study of interaction between structure and agency. 30 It renders irrelevant the debates as to whether society, institutional arrangements or individuals create the current social environment and individual action.

Despite this potential, Mellor and Shilling highlight the way in which previous studies have focused mainly on the way in which the habitus structures action, or how it inscribes the body with cultural traditions. While noting that these contributions are “sociologically significant”, they also point out the importance of capturing the “possibilities for change inherent in patterns of human

30 “Agency is usually juxtaposed with structure” and stresses the underlying and “undetermined nature of human action”(Marshall, 1994:7).
interaction” (1997:21). Therefore, in order to capture these possibilities, Mellor and Shilling examine how it is that “social interaction reacts back on, and leads to the development of new orientations to the body” which in turn stimulate the development of a new habitus (1997:21). To examine these feedback loops in more depth Mellor and Shilling turn to the events-dimensions of Braudel’s third time-scale perspective and use the temporal vantage point of “daily time” to draw attention “to that flux, change and contradictions that appear to mark the events of everyday life” (1997:21).

Events/Daily Time
Events time, or what Mellor and Shilling refer to as “daily time” (1997:21), is a time-scale perspective which is concerned with the diminutive time-span of “daily time” within everyday life. It is “proportionate to individuals ... to our illusions, to our hasty awareness – above all it is the time of the chronicle and journalist” (Latham, 2002:235). Mellor and Shilling discuss daily time in connection with Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Goffman’s (1969) work. Merleau-Ponty’s perspective focuses on the importance of this time-scale perspective in relation to the way in which “techniques of the body” “are transformed through performance” as well as “on how we operationalise our bodily-being-in-the-world” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:21). In contrast, Goffman's interest lies more in the body’s role in public order. His work “develops ... concepts sensitising us to how bodies are creatively deployed in social interaction” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:22). For example, he maintains that people, in their everyday lives, encounter numerous “face-to-face rituals” in which one manages their body (often pre-cognitively) in order to produce a specific bodily “impression”. When these “impressions” are mismanaged these “rituals” also have the ability to “repair' moments of embarrassment” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:22).

These three time-scale perspectives offer Mellor and Shilling a way of conceptualising historical change that envelops both continuity and discontinuity. To explore how these changes impact on “bodies-in-time”, Mellor and Shilling use the term “Re-forming Bodies”.

Re-forming Bodies
Based on the stubborn continuance of the longue duree but the incompleteness of people’s bodies, Mellor and Shilling claim that bodies (at this point in their evolution) “re-form” over time rather than transform. Within the time-scale
perspective of various *habitus*, Mellor and Shilling examine successive re-formations of the interrelationship between ways of acquiring knowledge, community relations and ways of viewing the body in order to elucidate various changes that have implications for the way in which the body is sensed and perceived. Underpinning these re-forming bodies and concepts are three Durkheimian interests. The first is Durkheim’s insistence that the creation and evolution of different forms of human community are intimately related to the immanence of powerful passions and emotions of a collective sacred character (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:1).

Mellor and Shilling maintain that the interconnectedness of collective effervescence and the sacred in social restructuring has been underestimated in many studies. To rectify this omission they contend that this connection is an integral part of the development of the Western world because the “somatic experiences of the sacred both symbolise and participate in broader patterns of feelings, passions, aspirations and belief which characterise particular forms of social life” (1997:2-3). Significantly the sacred, which in Mellor and Shilling’s study, is mainly the Christian God (and values and bodily orientations linked to this conception of the sacred), has the potential to “transform people’s experiences of their stubborn fleshy selves and the world around them” (1997:1).

The second Durkheimian interest Mellor and Shilling build upon is the underestimated role of the sacred in social restructuring. They highlight Durkheim’s insistence that in “modern societies religion would transform rather than disappear” (1997:3). This insistence in “the persistence of the sacred” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:14) was a response to the prevalent idea that religion and Christianity would become irrelevant in public spaces and institutions. Durkheim shared Weber’s view that Protestantism located God outside the community/body and hence was a source of individualism that separated bodies from a supportive religious Catholic community. Moreover, in expecting people to be responsible for their own salvation, Protestantism encouraged “patterns of individual reflection, critical scrutiny and perceptions of self and world that stimulated social change” toward individualising knowledge and behaviour (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3).

This individualism did not eliminate religion. Instead Durkheim maintained that the sacred relocated and over time this relocation re-formed the organisational
patterns of the *habitus*. Following Durkheim, Mellor and Shilling argue that this is not a “matter of transpersonal conceptions of reality being replaced by a multiplicity of individually constructed beliefs” (1997:3). Rather it is “a change in the *embodied process* of reality construction” and this influenced the emergence of each successive re-formation of the *habitus* (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3). In this way Durkheim’s view of an emergent society which incorporated a dynamic social life dependent on relations between individuals as well as a circulation of pre-existing (pre-contractual) social forces, energies and obligations, imposed certain ways of acting, thinking and developing identity within a *habitus*. Mellor and Shilling build on these forces and ideals to develop their re-forming ideal types in relation to changing forms of knowledge, associational life and collective representations.

Taking these ideas still further, the third influence Mellor and Shilling draw from is Durkheim’s conceptualisation of the *homo duplex* character of humans. Durkheim developed this model from traditional understandings of the dual nature of humanity which considered that:

> individuals are embodied beings with a predisposition to experience themselves and the world around them through sensory perception. The individual’s participation in society transforms this embodied predisposition towards the senses into a collective embodied predisposition towards shared social practices and emotions which are so powerful as to allow cognitive representations of social life to emerge (Fish, 2005:25).

This influence is subsumed within Durkheim’s *homo duplex* model. This model not only considers the Apollonian dimensions of control within the *habitus* but also the Dionysian passionate side of humanity and this draws attention to the dualistic manner (rational and irrational) in which people come to experience their embodied sociality. As Durkheim stressed, an individual is divided because while he has his “basis in the body”, he is also a “social being that represents within us the highest reality” (Durkheim, quoted in Fish, 2005:24).

According to Durkheim this dual nature ensures a mutual antagonism between the two and for this reason individuals “are never completely in accord with [themselves] for [they] cannot follow one of [their] two natures without causing the other to suffer” (Durkheim, quoted in Fish, 2005:24). Thus the *homo duplex* model exposes an inherent tension within the modern *habitus* that has consequences for shaping both the individual and collective sources of identity or collective effervescence. The advantage of this model is that it permits a critique of binary oppositions because it challenges the relatively static view of human embodiment and the “disappearance of the body” (Mellor and Shilling,
A disadvantage is that it does not allow for an examination of the way in which “senses and sensualities are themselves differently structured by social forces over time” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:2). This disadvantage is minimised in Mellor and Shilling’s work through their concept of the “sensory body”.

**Sensory Body**

Mellor and Shilling use the term ‘sensory body’ to discuss the ways in which the changing location of the sacred is reflected in the significance attributed to the organisation of historical, Christian and cultural sensory patterns. The sensory body is a dimension of embodiment that draws attention to the way in which people come to interact with, and know their, everyday world as shaped by the prioritisation of certain senses over others within particular historical periods and sacred/profane cosmologies. Contrary to Descartes’ mind/body/senses relationship and the dominant Enlightenment project which sought to make “the mind ... more important than the flesh”, they argue, people are “not disembodied rationalist beings” with “unmediated access to knowledge” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). Instead people interpret knowledge through the senses, that is, through the activity of the eyes, ears, skin, nose and mouth as well as their mind and in this way they “make sense’ of the world in a variety of ways” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:6).

By using the concept “sensory body”, Mellor and Shilling (1997) place the body, its *homo duplex* nature, the restructuring of the senses, the location of sacred solidarities and associations at the heart of their ideal-typical analysis of contemporary society. They argue that as the sacred relocated, Christianity slowly re-formed and in turn it influenced and had an affinity with other constituents of the contemporary world. For example when Mellor and Shilling (1997) describe their re-forming ideal type bodies as having an ‘affinity’ with various forms of Christianity, they are referring to the changing emphasis in the beliefs and values of particular forms of Christianity which are captured in their ideal types. In this context ideal types not only clarify connections between the sacred, bodies-in-time, shared meaning, and collective effervescence embodied in a *homo duplex* model, but also provide a “highly illuminating theoretical lens through which to examine” contemporary developments and re-formations (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3).
In using the re-forming sensory body as a theoretical lens Mellor and Shilling’s overall aim is to generate “fresh insights into the emergence, development and transformation of the modern western world” (1997:1). This is done through their central argument; “unless we investigate the *forms of embodiment* which underpin thought, belief and human interaction, we fail to understand the chief characteristics of how modern persons come to act upon the world around them” (1997:4). To discuss these aspects in more depth, in the following section I will give a short definition of each of Mellor and Shilling’s key terms and these, in turn, will be discussed more fully.

**Mellor and Shilling’s Key Terms**

It is important to understand Mellor and Shilling’s key terms. This is because in the following three chapters I rely heavily upon them as I systematize changing understandings of pain. I use these changing understandings of pain to develop my ideal type bodies-in-pain which will be used as the framework in Part II of this dissertation. (As all of Mellor and Shilling’s key terms and concept are taken from their 1997 book and used extensively throughout their study I will reference them only once.)

- **“Forms of sociality”**: Forms of sociality are social organising principles or patterns of shifting human interaction. A form of sociality is the generally agreed principles of what is, and what is not, acceptable in terms of interaction and engagement with the environment, other people and institutions (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:13-14).

- **“Forms of embodiment”**: Forms of embodiment recognize that social interaction does not just occur between disembodied minds, but includes bodily ways of interacting with other people, with the environment and with forms of knowledge. Forms of embodiment refer to bodily organising principles that incorporate “habits, techniques of the body and types of *habitus*” that situate “the stubborn enfleshment of humans within particular societies and particular cultures and eras” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:4). They are the patterns of sensory organisation and bodily performance (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:4-5).

- **“Forms of knowledge”**: Forms of knowledge recognise that over time societies have had different approaches to the reason for gaining knowledge, different ways of acquiring that knowledge and consequently
different roles for the body in managing knowledge acquisition (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:22-23).

- **“Embodied sociality”:** Forms of sociality, embodiment and knowledge combine in any given *habitus* to construct the particular boundaries within which society encourages and discourages thought and behaviour. Embodied sociality is the collective term that Mellor and Shilling use for these changing organisational forms of human interaction, regimes of the body and customs which are relational and that people undertake in their everyday life (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:1-33).  

These terms will now be discussed in more depth by outlining established ideal types regarding medieval Catholic and early modern Protestant forms of sociality which Mellor and Shilling draw on to develop their ideal types. However, it must be remembered that what is described below are ideal type constructs and as such can not be hardened into dichotomies. Instead the characteristics contained within each type - in the ‘real’ world of life - could have overlapped, recurred, coexisted and contradicted each other throughout time.

**Forms of Sociality**

Mellor and Shilling’s study does not begin the topic of forms of sociality anew but draws from existing research so that they can focus on supplementing concepts of sociality with the location of the sacred and consequential impacts on forms of embodiment. Accordingly they use Tonnies' ideal types of *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society) and corresponding forms of *Wesenwille* (instinctual will) and *Kurwille* (rational will) as the basis for their ideal type development (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:13-14).  

Tonnies’ ideal types illustrate that a transition from the medieval era to the modern era corresponds with a shift from a corporeal-communal form of sociality (*Gemeinschaft*) to an individualistic-rational form of sociality (*Gesellschaft*). While this might seem like a simplification of the embodied lives of people living in specific time periods,

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31 ‘Body regimes’ is a term used to describe the medieval Catholic Church’s attempt to order the body through bodily based rituals. These activities were more often practised by religious specialists or devout penitents and are an example of “aggressive if structured flights into physicality” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36, Shilling, 2003:191-193). In comparison, ‘body options’ or “body projects” (see Shilling, 1993, 2003) is more useful in denoting the experiences associated with the disciplined Protestant sinful body’s promotion of choice, and the need to actively make covenants as part of identity construction (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36-38). More recently “body projects”, through new technologies, have the potential to “radically reconstruct” the body several times in one’s lifetime (Shilling, 2003:188-, Shilling, 2003:189).

32 Similar characteristics have also been identified in the work of Weber, Durkheim and Simmel.
by using Tonnies’ ideal types, Mellor and Shilling are able to focus on the way in which institutions and societal processes are used to describes and reinforces the shift and dominance of one form of sociality and knowledge over another. For example Tonnies ideal types make it clear that within Gemeinschaft, social organisation was on the basis of status and interaction was embodied in a will of “instinct, habit and spontaneity (Wesensille)”. Within Gesellschaft social organisation was based on contract, and interaction was embodied in “a more deliberative, calculating and rational ... will (Kurwille)” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:13). Over time it was a transitional change “from a sacred-communal to a secular-associational” form of sociality and a shift from a carnal to a cognitive apprehensive form of knowledge. In accordance with this Tonnies maintains that “in Gemeinschaft people remained essentially united in spite of all separating factors where as in Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:14).

**The Staying Power of the Sacred**

While the forms of sociality outlined above have been described without reference to the location of the sacred, Mellor and Shilling specifically focus on this changing aspect of the *habitus*. This allows an examination of the critical importance of the interrelationship between the changing location of the sacred and the boundaries of normative acceptable sociality which was partly “‘held together’” through people’s collective “creation and experience of the sacred” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:15).

This collective creation, according to Durkheim, determines the rules defining the idea of the sacred and thereby classifies both what is, and is not, sacred and/or profane (Morrison, 1995:191). The sacred not only includes what is consider a God, spirit or supernatural phenomena but also includes the beliefs and objects which should be linked to that which is defined as either sacred or its opposite – profane. Classifying an object, or belief, as sacred manifests certain sets of social rules and appropriate behaviour toward that object or belief. In addition, changing locations and/or definitions of the sacred or God, that is the sacred representative of a society, can contract or expand the area of significance for the sacred, or for the profane, sphere. For example, within medieval Catholic society the majority of social life was considered sacred because God lived both within the body and within ‘this-world’.
In comparison, Protestantism separated the sacred and profane more clearly by adopting the Lutheran concept of 'faith alone'. In this world faith was ‘other-worldly’ directed and the sacred relationship was directly between oneself and God’s Word, rather than the sacred solidarity of fellow believers (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:109). This different emphasis and its link to the location of the sacred can be explained through an allegory. Puritans believed that the body was a (profane) vessel that (the sacred) God filled with grace. While the vessel was filled with grace, it was to be treated as sacred. However, if it fell from grace or died (separated from God) then the body was no longer sacred. Using this concept of the body as a vessel or cup means that if the cup is full of water it is sacred, yet the water and the cup are not blended but always separate even when together. In medieval Catholicism, God was permanently fused with the body and soul therefore the sacred/God was ever present, or immanent in all things. In this way the body is always sacred because God is always present. Accordingly the ‘persistence’ and location of the sacred impacts on and affects the chosen form of sociality. This change in location had the power to influence the accepted rules of interaction and bodily behaviour.

Durkheim argued that in any society “the sacred is always separated from all other objects and thereby constitutes things set apart” and boundaries that “divide the” sacred from the profane are both “important” and dangerous because one can “contaminate” the other (Morrison, 1995: 191). Durkheim also argued that the larger the area of profanisation, the less religion was considered integral to society. However I argue that a sacred/profane division still structures the acceptable moral rules of society regardless of whether, or not, there are many or only a few “things set apart [sacred]” (Morrison, 1995:191). Consider for example the implications when Church and State are intellectually separated, as in the US or French Constitution. This action defines the public sphere as profane, without a single authority (God) to direct moral action, regardless of any individual beliefs. As a result, in most cases, multiple objectives are free to compete. This is not to say public spheres are amoral, but to say that, in becoming profane, the moral authority can be widened to goals outside of sacred control, such as profit or efficiency. An instance of this might be the widening of the public debate on the acceptability of the death penalty to include the cost of incarceration of criminals, rather than being limited to the moral authority of the State to sanction death. This means the public sphere does not reinforce one particular set of God-sanctioned rules, as might be

33 This concept underpins applications such as Mary Douglas’ ‘matter out of place’ (2002:109).
possible when the leadership of a country is underpinned by a belief in the Divine Right of Kings.

The effect of Protestantism is another example of the idea of contracts. In Protestantism, as opposed to medieval Catholicism, relations between people became more profane. Theories, initiated by thinkers, such as Hobbes (1588-1679) and Locke (1632-1704) (but from different perspectives), noted that social order was achieved through coercive and voluntary enforcement of contracts (Olsen, Codd and O'Neill, 2004:79-81) in which tangible benefits were acquired through the loss of other equal but different benefits. This contractual and transactional approach to human interaction negated the concept of the community making a contribution to God's divine plan, which for Protestants was mediated directly between the individual and God. Therefore, over time, contracts devoid of sacred meaning could be entered into and also ended without any moral consideration. Given this lack of moral or sacred commitment to contractual relations, only the fear of secular enforcement (a disadvantage) remained if the contracts were broken.

By building on existing ideal type forms of sociality Mellor and Shilling demonstrate the way in which changing boundaries of what is classified as sacred or profane, (stemming from the perceived location of the sacred), reveal a transformation rather than disappearance of the sacred in contemporary society. However this, by itself, fails to account for the integral role of the body in this re-formation of emphasis in acceptable and expected forms of social interaction. This is addressed by developing their account of ideal type forms of embodiment.

**Forms of Embodiment**

Forms of embodiment are inherent in forms of sociality and Mellor and Shilling clarify this concept in order to explain the corporeal constituents that shape, and are also shaped by, forms of sociality. Forms of embodiment do not refer to the individual body, the body’s particular context, upbringing or environment, nor do they “determine social epochs in the 'last instance’” (1997:5). Instead forms of embodiment refer to not only the stubborn fleshy body – people who are more than their minds, more than Foucault's 'docile bodies’ – but also to “those general 'habits', 'techniques of the body' and types of *habitus* which tend to be characteristic of bodies within particular eras and cultures” (Mellor and Shilling,
Hence the overall context for human embodiment is the *longue durée*, which is punctuated by the *habitus* that allows for both stability and change. In this way, forms of embodiment are similar to “Marxian modes of production that signify those underlying structures that provide the parameters” or boundaries for particular societies (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5). One dimension integral to the re-forming body that can illustrate these underlying forms of embodiment is the sensory body and the prioritised significance attached to particular human senses, sensualities and sensory organisation in various time periods.

Mellor and Shilling make a connection between the sensory body and the location of the sacred because the rules governing the sacred within a society can determine which senses are considered appropriate in the acquisition of valid knowledge. For example, if God (sacred) is located in this world, in the body and in close contact senses - smell, taste and touch - then knowledge acquired from these senses is deemed sacred and can be used to better understand the sacred/material world. That is, in medieval times, when God was immanent in this world, the close-contact senses were priorities central to the communal experience of faith and everyday life. Medieval worshippers affirmed communal emotions, “a shared fate” and participated in rituals by embracing all their senses in general and their close-contact senses in particular. For example people believed in the institutionalised “odour of sanctity” in which “great sinners could be recognised by their stench” and “the holy ... [by] a sweet odour” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:9). It was also believed that to be a Christian was to have “a taste for God” and in eating the flesh of Christ at Mass, people made sensory contact with God through close contact. Medieval worshippers were literal in their beliefs and assumed that “Christ makes things savoury for humanity” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:78). Within this form of sociality/habitus the involvement of the sensory body in society encouraged participation in sensory activities, such as morality plays, sporting tournaments and executions rituals. This form of embodiment and knowledge acquisition Mellor and Shilling associate with medieval Catholicism and is in line with Tonnies’ *Gemeinschaft* pattern of sociality.

In contrast, in societies where bodies are considered profane humans, not God, are free to intervene with regard to the body at their will and discretion without reference to sacred rules or beliefs. Mellor and Shilling claim that this approach, when used by the Protestant Reformers, “ruptured human experience” from embodied sensory contact with the world and marginalised the close-contact...
senses (1997:121). The Protestant was not encouraged to know God through
the sense of taste but through an individual’s cognitive and textual engagement
with God’s Word written in the Bible and religious discourse. If something could
not be justified on this written basis it was considered a threat to Protestant
associations. Consequently the Eucharist was redefined as a symbolic exercise
(Mellor and Shilling, 1997:121). This distancing of people from the close contact
senses, from one another and God was considered more important than fleshy
relationships (1997:121). The distant-contact senses such as the mind, the
sense of sight and, to a lesser degree, hearing were prioritised.

In the modern experience this shift, popularised as individual and unique to
distinguish it from its communal past, was a literal loss of touch between the
close contact senses and knowledge acquisition. That is, what was once learnt
through the body lost its status as self-evident truth and instead a process of
“self-referentiality” within an estranged mind stimulated a sense of “isolation,
doubt and nostalgia” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:25). This process contributed to
a profanisation of society and to individuals becoming alienated from the
corporeal solidarity of the sacred community and through a brutal division of
“minds from bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:25). This form of embodiment is
in line with Tonnies’ Gesellschaft pattern of sociality and introduces in to it the
importance of knowledge gained through the disembodied mind. Thus the re-
organisation and changing hierarchal prioritisation of bodily senses (sensory
body) highlights societal boundary shifts in what is considered acceptable uses of
the sensory body to gain knowledge (1997:5).

Forms of Knowing: Carnal Knowing and Cognitive Apprehension
Mellor and Shilling link the already discussed forms of sociality and embodiment
with different forms of knowing. Forms of knowing are the organising principles
of knowledge and meaning construction in a particular habitus. The term “carnal
knowing” (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:23-25) is the term Mellor and Shilling
use to refer to the form of knowledge that aligns with the Catholic Volatile body
which prioritises a ‘thinking body’ ‘in touch’ with the close contact senses.
Carnal knowing is endemic to the medieval Catholic focus on a sensuous
understanding that involved all the senses and the links between the fleshy body
and the mind. It is a form of gaining knowledge about the world which is
thoroughly embodied, and connected to people’s senses and sensualities. Carnal
knowing orientates people to the world by fusing mind and body and in this way
people are ‘thinking bodies’ who “experience their minds and bodies as
inextricably related” (1997:23). This form of knowledge highlights the fusion that exists between experience and awareness in a ‘thinking body’.

In contrast to the term ‘carnal knowing’ the term “cognitive apprehension” (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:23-24) refers to the form of knowledge which aligns with the Protestant Sinful body that has ‘lost touch’ with the close-contact senses. Instead it prioritises a disembodied mind and the distant-contact senses. ‘Cognitive apprehension’ is endemic to a Protestant focus on the text, a re-ordering of the importance attached to contact and non-contact senses and a rejection of the body. Bodily experience is considered cognitively; it is then conceptualised and finally evaluated by the mind. In this way cognitive apprehension is a form of gaining knowledge about the world through the mind, perception and discursive symbolisation and particularly through the Word of God. The mind is experienced not only as “separate from, [but also as] superior to, [one’s] limited and limiting bod[...y]” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:23-24).

Cognitive apprehension presupposes that an increase in knowledge is only possible if one loses a degree of sensuality and sensory contact with fleshy experience. It helps explain why “mental reflection has become more important than physical prowess to many modern persons” (1997:24).

Carnal knowing and cognitive apprehension, as routes to knowledge, are contrasting emphasis in the way in which knowledge can and should be acquired (as defined by collective effervescence). Although they are different, they are both sensory ways of gaining knowledge about the world. They are not value judgements, about which form is right or best, but engage with Elias’ civilising processes and at the same time draw attention to decivilising affects and effects. As ideal-typical accounts these routes to knowledge “denote broad tendencies rather than universal states” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 33).

**Embodied Socialities: Consequences of an Embodied Sociality**

By developing contrasting forms of sociality, embodiment and knowledge Mellor and Shilling have constructed re-forming ideal types that make explicit the shifting boundaries of sacred and profane and their effects on, and consequences for, sensory bodies and social interaction. Mellor and Shilling argue that these changing contexts “predispose people towards particular types of community or association and different civilising potentialities” (1997:4) which result in historically changing modes of ‘bodily-being-in-the-world’ (forms of embodiment,
sociality and knowing). Mellor and Shilling also make it very clear that there is change even though the forms of sociality, knowledge and embodiment cannot be “entirely separated from one another and they recur in different forms through time” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:4). Each analytically separate change or ‘re-forming body’ is the basis of one of the three ideal types.

Mellor and Shilling’s first re-formed ideal type body connects a this-worldly god, carnal knowing and meaningful communal interaction with the sacred volatility of the medieval Catholic body. This ideal type they entitled the Volatile Body, Sacred Communities. Their second re-formed ideal type connects the term “cognitive apprehension” with a sublime God and ‘sinful flesh’ that dominated the Modern Protestant body. This ideal type they entitled the Sinful Body, Profane Associations. To make it clear that these ideal types are not simply contrasting opposites, below I outline a comparative example that shows a continuity and discontinuity between the Volatile and Sinful ideal types’ response to anxiety over its sinful flesh (see Hill, in press).

In forms of carnal knowing the sensory body, as sinful flesh, was a structured “flight into physicality” embracing the carnal element of sin and the collective security of medieval Catholic sacraments along with the cyclical rituals of sin, repentance, confession and absolution and sometimes the individual often-extreme bodily regimes of devout penitents (1997:37). These conditions metaphorically and literally opened the medieval Catholic body to the idea that everyday objects or events could lead one either toward, or away from, God. It encouraged ‘thinking bodies’ to cultivate an immersion in a community or sacred milieu where signs and words were “saturated with extra-discursive [sacred] significance” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:58) and therefore everything was an open possibility that needed interpretation. For example, when discussing the side-wound made on Jesus by a soldier during his crucifixion, Vincent of Beauvais (an encyclopaedist, d.1264) wrote that the side wound “opened” the “door of life ... from which came the sacraments of the church” (quoted in Bynum, 2007:18). In other words the open bleeding body had the ability to open possibilities for the believers and was not inherently bad or polluting (see for example Bynum’s work on blood devotions, 2007). From another perspective, as St Irenaeus, a 2nd century church father and apologist put it “in God nothing is empty of sense” (quoted in Harris, 1992:8). Within this social material world routine, habits and consumption were structured mostly by the social whole shaping the individual’s identity. Nevertheless this relationship was
a bi-directional shaping process. This was experienced in the ability of the medieval Church’s use of the carnival to encourage the carnal and otherwise sinful desires to shape and to be shaped by both church and laity and to define and reintegrate sin, sinful flesh and salvation into the community.34

In comparison, in forms of cognitive apprehension the body, as sinful flesh, was a structured “cognitive distancing or flight away from the body” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:37). The fleshy body was closed and controlled within the boundaries of scripturally justifiable narratives. This was a 'loss of touch' that detached words from bodily senses. This was experienced in Protestantism as a liberated means of expression and representation as it prioritised the Word above any sensory knowledge (1997:43). Within these conditions, as the Protestant modern body became reflexively aware of its embodied self it was closed to the carnal route of sensing the world. As a result, identity, consumption and routine were decided upon individually in relation to the Word of God. This placed faithful Protestants in an abstract relationship with a cognitively understood God. In this relationship the sacred became increasingly sublime existing, but defying, satisfactory representation and encouraging estrangement from, rather than incorporation within, the Body of Christ (1997:108). In this retreat away from a physical knowledge of the sacred, faith and reason became separated and all that was non-rational and excessive was to be controlled or disciplined. This included the fleshy body that was to remain bounded or closed at all times. As Mellor and Shilling note, carnal knowing embraces bodily knowledge as central to understanding oneself, the world and the sacred. Cognitive apprehension on the other hand rejected the body and elevated the mind and

is endemic to the Protestant focus on the text as a source of religious truth and is intimately linked to the Enlightenment stress on the acquisition of scientific knowledge through reason and rationality (1997:58).

This route to knowledge included direct observation and the use of the sense of sight rather than the body’s sense of touch or taste to understand scientific objects (bodily phenomena) such as pain.

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34 Carnival and Lent are two parts of the same event. Carnival was a “carnal indulgence” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:41). Its religious significance was intended to represent and reveal the workings of sin so that the faithful could purge themselves of sin “in preparation for a regime of denial during Lent” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:41, Bakhtin, ([1941] 1984)
In dealing with the same cosmology and basic problems, such as sinful flesh, these two approaches of carnal knowing and cognitive apprehension are still bounded by Christian values but had different consequences for the way in which people learned to respond to bodies and the way bodies are deployed in action. Over time, Mellor and Shilling argue that Protestant and Enlightenment approaches came to dominate institutional arrangements; however, a Catholic counter-Reformation and its use of Baroque culture led to a resurgence of carnal knowing. This, combined with the internal contradictions in both Catholic and Protestant ways of knowing and bodily being-in-the-world, led to new and old forms of embodied sociality and knowledge competing, or being torn between dual social impulses. They term these new re-formed social impulses “banal associations” and “sensual solidarities” which together can be found in the Baroque Modern Ambivalent Body, their third re-formed ideal type body (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 17).

**Banal Associations**

This form of embodied sociality is an extension of the Protestant modern body in the sense that, although structured by forms of cognitive rationality, it has become “dislocated from the” ‘discursive symbolism’ of a sacred referent, the sublime or “more sensually visible manifestations of the sacred” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:166). This is because a Protestant restriction of the sacred to the personal allowed room in public discourse for the sacred to become invisible. The term “banal associations” is not a judgement of its value, it is designed to signal that associations are no longer justified through a sacred worldview but are “productive forms of sociality” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:166). The example that Mellor and Shilling impart is Weber's concept of rational organisation and its “instrumentally efficient pursuit of a goal” that does not require justification (1997:166). Any sense of telos, that is, ultimately meaningful human purpose in this environment can be superseded with notions of efficiency or cost-savings. As a result, because of its profane status, nothing is deemed ‘out of bounds’ and everything becomes open to critical human intervention and reconstruction. Sacred areas of society and consequent certainties are slowly broken down and questioned. Over time information “utility is determined by principles of performativity ... profitability [and commodification and] separated from consensually shared” forms of fate and “notions of truth” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:167). Therefore discursive information, which is no longer confined to formal organisations and outside an ontology of the sacred, is enhanced and distributed by new technologies so prolifically and quickly that it “threatens its status as meaningful knowledge” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:166).
**Sensual Solidarities**

Sensual solidarities can be perceived as “consumption-orientated forms of [embodied] sociality” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:174). They are formed in response to the banalities of formal associations. Based on feelings, emotions and effervescence from being with others, these forms of sociality attract an increasing visibility to the sacred and turn “cognitive problems into a carnal opportunity” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:174). Sensual solidarities are a force that is both positive and negative but lay bare the way in which the disenchantment of Weber’s ‘iron cage’ has been unable to absorb all of society. For example, “Durkheim’s view of society as ‘always already’ embracing conflict” is pertinent to this return of the sacred and its awesome and ‘aw(e)ful’ traits that are at the same time “shocking, violent and divisive” yet “glorious and salvational” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:176). This emotional and fleshy view imbued with the sacred is made apparent in a collective effervescence that has the potential to “bind societies together, cementing conflicts, division and violence” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:175). These aspects are readily seen in Durkheim’s and Girard’s notion of sacrifice which displaces conflict through violent ritual acts. As Sobchack (1995:207) notes "there is nothing like a little pain to bring us back to our senses".

Sensual solidarities may seem to suggest a similarity to the traditional characteristics of Gemeinschaft community in which people are united within specific boundaries. However the difference is that outside of these boundaries, people are often divided. Therefore sensual solidarities are more in line with Maffesoli’s (1996) concept of “neo-tribes” and “tribal fealties”. Neo-tribes can be defined as “the breakup of mass culture into affinity-based groups with overlapping memberships” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:174). Within neo-tribes the significance relies on that which is “emotionally common to all” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:175). That is, communal emotion and sentimentality is valued above any individual adherence to contracts. In this way, even if one feels alienated from the socio-economic and political order, one is instead able to maintain some degree of power over one’s immediate environment (1997:176).

Within this environment Mellor and Shilling also make it clear that ‘banal associations’ tend to dominate the formal institutional arrangements of contemporary society. This maintains a continuance of many Protestant/Puritan values, which have become state sanctioned responses to bodily phenomena. For example they suggest that the idea of information is becoming banal,
“expressing a self-referentiality so thorough that even evil can mutate into a transparent, fleeting image for those removed from its immediate effects” (1997:173). However the control and discipline of banal associations combined with the instability of binary oppositions “cannot contain the human body in its entirety” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:175). Taking this all into account then, Mellor and Shilling argue that “banal associations leave our senses and sensualities with energies to expend ... [and] sensual solidarities ... provide for an expenditure of that energy” (1997:175). Consequently banal and sensual forms of embodied sociality are not opposites but are intimately related and connected. The freedom of their coexistence is instrumental in understanding the sociological ‘schizophrenic-like’ impulses that the contemporary body is allowed to experience and sometimes presents.

These contemporary embodied socialities in general and an ambivalent flight into and/or away from the body in particular, characterise the boundaries of contemporary society, creating the appearance of choice and ever-shifting boundaries. Yet, as this ambivalent Janus-faced embodied sociality of the contemporary era illustrates, that which is labelled ‘modernity’ has not necessarily ended. Instead some aspects lie dormant while others have developed and extended. Mellor and Shilling's ideal types extrapolate from these complexities and contradictions, constructing an account of the nature of the ambivalent impulses in contemporary times. They trace the two bodies in relation to the location of the sacred, routes to knowledge and the accompanying embodied sociality. While these ideal types are developed from religious movements known as Catholic and Protestant, the ideal types focus on volatile, sinful and ambivalent bodies. This separates the ideal type from its chronological development, but makes its Christian heritage visible.

Once separated the ideal types can reveal that Christian boundaries are not only operating but are also impacting on definitions of acceptability and morality in the contemporary habitus. An advantage of using an ideal type, clarifies that not all people who identify with a particular religion will conform to all aspects of the ideal type or that all those who belong to other religions cannot use knowledge structures and embodiment captured in the ideal types of a particular religion. That is, I am not making a causal connection between religion and individual action. For example, in chapter three, I use Salvador Dali’s crucifixion painting Corpus Hypercubicus (fig. 3.1) to illustrate the Sinful ideal type regardless of Dali’s religion, the dominant religion of his habitus or any other
temporal influences. This is because the painting resembles the emphasis that Protestants place on the sublime God, which tacitly influences many societies, cultures and people. Noting that a particular form of knowledge or embodied sociality manifests in a particular painting does not make a causal connection between the painter’s religion and his depiction. It is merely saying that the depiction conforms to an embodied sociality and form of knowledge that was most clearly articulated and sustained by a group of thinkers that came to be labelled Protestant. Indeed it is highly unlikely (although not impossible) that I could find a crucifixion painting from the Puritan era by a Puritan painter because the cognitive focus on sensing God through written words discouraged artistic representation and were to be banned as idolatrous. Nevertheless Dali’s painting captures aspects of the Protestant Sinful Body regardless of the Puritan disdain for images and representations of God.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the way in which Mellor and Shilling highlight different human capacities and capabilities as well as the institutional relationships that align with three modes of historically contrasting re-forming bodies. These bodies, rather than being made anew, re-form from an evolutionary species-specific inheritance. This inheritance encapsulates patterns of biological, historical and cultural organisation as well as patterns prevalent in the *habitus* of a particular time, place and society. Mellor and Shilling claim that an ideal-typical analysis which considers the way in which these forms have altered over time has the potential to reveal much about the contemporary experience of the world (1997:35). Their analysis is not “empiricist history” but a “sociological approach” which is able to show how bodies re-form over time and how new ideas on embodiment do not necessarily mean the complete eradication of all the older ones. The purpose of Mellor and Shilling’s study is not historical insight, but a fresh look at historically and religiously embedded embodied socialities and forms of knowledge. Their study builds on earlier scholarly studies by exploring not only the "broad contours of those socially dominant forms of *habitus* which have influenced Western development" (1997:32) but also the way in which “social interaction reacts back on and leads to the development of new orientations to the body” (1997:21).

As this outline of Mellor and Shilling’s study has shown the dominant *habitus* which they draw their ideal types from are: the Catholic re-formation of the
medieval body, the Protestant re-formation of the medieval Catholic body and the Catholic counter-reformation's use of Baroque culture to re-form the Protestant modern body. These re-formations produce three major modes of bodily-being-in-the-world. Mellor and Shilling combine forms of embodiment, sociality and knowledge into ideal types that recognise the sensory as well as cognitive aspects of bodily-being-in-time. They explore the way in which people gain information through their bodies and how these bodies have an influence on, and an affinity with, other variables as they re-form over time. These re-forming bodies as ideal types provide an heuristic device through which to analyse whether, or not, tacit Christian forms of sociality and knowledge continue to shape both the boundaries of the sacred and profane as well as acceptable bodies and action. Therefore I maintain that this is the ideal foundation upon which to develop and systematize my own account of bodies-in-pain ideal types.

In order to do this, the next three chapters will broadly revolve around the following two questions. (1) What cultural, creative and social interactions impact on the way in which bodies sense the world around them? (2) What is it about bodies-in-pain that allows them to be represented in collective and/or habitus-specific ways? In seeking answers to these questions, I begin to define the moral boundaries which encapsulate each of the bodies-in-pain ideal types.
CHAPTER TWO

THE VOLATILE BODY AND VALUED EMBODIED PAIN

The bodies and voices of past others echo forward to help us to grapple with the textual traces those ghosts have left behind (Cavenaugh, 2004: 25).

The previous chapter not only situated Mellor and Shilling’s theoretical analysis in its intellectual history, assumptions and possibilities, but also introduced their interest in the relationship between the changing location of the sacred and three major re-formations of embodied sociality and routes to knowledge. The aim in this chapter, and the next two, is to show that Mellor and Shilling's ideal-typical analysis of medieval Catholic and early modern Protestant forms of embodied sociality and knowledge can be used as a foundation on which to build and develop different sociological variables in general and, in this dissertation, male bodies-in-pain in particular. Therefore, taking the view that bodies-in-pain are one aspect of the sensory body and in this way are a dimension of Mellor and Shilling’s larger frame, my purpose is to build and develop each of Mellor and Shilling’s re-formed ideal type bodies in terms of the dominant interpretations of pain that are relevant to the ideal type’s particular routes to knowledge and embodied sociality.

To accomplish this, in this chapter, I begin by locating my study within Mellor and Shilling’s ideal-typical analysis of medieval Catholicism and embodied sociality and knowledge which they entitle Volatile Bodies, Sacred Communities (hereafter Volatile Bodies). While Mellor and Shilling occasionally ‘touch on’ pain in their ideal typical analysis, I pursue this aspect in more depth by developing my own account of bodies-in-pain that are consistent with their re-forming ideal types. To do this, I draw upon a variety of primary and secondary sources which include paintings, medieval Chronicles, philosophical and theological texts that are central to, and also highlight, relationships between pain, embodied sociality, routes to knowledge and the location of the sacred. I have entitled this aspect of the Volatile Body: Valued Embodied Pain (hereafter Valued Embodied Pain).

It is important to introduce this re-formed Volatile Body ideal type and to develop the significant aspect, Valued Embodied Pain, because, as Mellor and Shilling make clear, the medieval era presents a habitus that had a profoundly
different approach to routes to knowledge, sociality and the sensory body from that of the Protestant, Enlightenment and contemporary eras. Comparing and contrasting this medieval mode of bodily-being-in-the-world with different modes of bodies in time and space demonstrates that interpretations of bodies-in-pain are locally and temporally situated. It also provides background for a model that will be useful in making visible salient but tacit features of the present.

Possible objections to the evidence I use in this chapter could be that it relies on translations, secondary resources and diverse documentary evidence which spans medieval periods that were both socially and culturally vastly different. My response to this criticism is to reiterate that if the purpose of this chapter was to describe the way in which particular groups of medieval people experienced pain at any specific time in history, then perhaps the above objection may be valid. However my purpose, like Mellor and Shilling, is not to produce an historical record of events pertaining to the medieval era. Instead, I follow the sentiments of Jody Enders who, in her study of medieval snuff theatre, notes it may “seem strange to speak of “medieval” rather than Renaissance when dealing with” the period up until the late 1500s (1998:171). However, like her, I do this in order to develop a medieval ideal type that “look[s] back to classical antecedents rather than look forward to seventeenth-century classicist continuations” (Enders, 1998:171). In this way I am able to both further develop and systematize Mellor and Shilling’s re-forming ideal-type model as well as illuminate continuities and discontinuities within and between modes of ‘bodily-being-in-the-world’ in relation to changing ideas about pain.

At this point perhaps it is worth mentioning again that this is an ideal-typical analysis and therefore my point is not to argue that the interpretations contained in this chapter were the only interpretations of pain used by all medieval people. Neither is it to argue that Catholics today do, or do not, adhere to these interpretations. Instead it is to argue that, by relying on a variety of sources from a period in which Catholicism was the dominant religion, it is possible to discern patterns of embodied sociality and knowing. In this mode of bodily-being, at a general level, these patterns are coherent and self-sustaining approaches to bodies-in-pain and produce one enduring interpretation of the body and are compelling components of a medieval ideal type. This is not to privilege Christianity or medieval Catholicism as the only source of knowledge,
but it is to acknowledge the significant place which medieval Catholicism, and its eclectic incorporation of alternative positions, held in Western history.

Structuring this chapter is complex because describing a worldview that is multi-layered and, at the individual level full of inherent contradictions, is generally difficult. Therefore in the interests of clarity I will, in this chapter and the next two, describe each ideal type and their \textit{habitus} through a series of linked means-end chains. In order to achieve this the starting point of each chapter is Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) description of the location of the sacred and the way in which this conceptual shift is linked to a specific form of control that was believed to be the sole prerogative of God. In this way I define the routes to knowledge within each ideal type and then discuss how that definition of knowledge both enabled, and bounded, the possibilities of knowing and living in the world. I then consider the way in which these boundaries impacted on knowledge and embodied sociality. Finally I examine the consequences of this in relation to the interpretations and conditions of bodies-in-pain. In this way I build and develop the ideal type in three steps. That is by starting with Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) study as the foundation the first two steps build upon this work and the third step is my systemisation and account of bodies-in-pain.

1. Location of the sacred and the route to knowledge;
2. How this manifests in embodied action; and
3. Implications for bodies-in-pain.

I begin the analysis in this chapter with a brief visual introduction to the Volatile Catholic Body-in-pain through Matthias Grunewald’s painting \textit{Crucifixion} (see Figure 2.1 Isenheim Altarpiece, (closed state)). I then continue by using the three steps outlined above to develop the distinctive components of the ideal type under the following headings:

1. God is located in this world and knowledge supports faith;
2. The word is actively made flesh through carnal knowing; and
3. The body is a central organising principle in which pain is valued as a pedagogical technique.

**Back to the Future: Locating God**

As a starting point then, suspend any twenty-first century trappings and imagine yourself traveling back in time to approximately the year of Our Lord 1515. Visualise yourself lost in the spaciousness and ornamentation of a Gothic
monastery. In front of you, and above you, towers the closed state of the Isenheim Altarpiece on which is painted Grunewald’s *The Crucifixion* impressively enlarged to twice the height of man.

![The Crucifixion from the Isenheim Altarpiece](image)

**Figure 2.1** Matthias Grunewald (c1515). *The Crucifixion* from the *Isenheim Altarpiece* (closed state). 15.8 x 10.1ft. Musee Unterlin, Colmar, France.

On this painted screen the severe pain and misery experienced by Jesus during the Passion is expressed somatically through the sinews on His up-stretched arms combined with the downward gravitational pull and gaping wounds on His sagging crucified body. As Dury argues given that we have, and are a body, when painfully confronted by images of this kind,

we, [a ‘modern’ people] can only be distressed, even appalled by the central body in ... [medieval representations of the crucifixion] hanging on a cross: an atrocious form of public death by ignominious torture which any body can see only with feelings of horror (1999:ix).
Dury’s perspective although it suggests that the role of the body in pain with in medieval piety is not only profoundly alien to contemporary sensibilities it also raises the question: in what way does one approach a habitus that locates such images and tropes at its centre? To answer this question I take advantage of Mellor and Shilling’s Volatile Body to demonstrate the reason why a graphic display of, and mediation on, the “palatable unbearable” body was so important in this era and in this way I develop Valued Embodied Pain. As will become clear, this ideal type allows the medieval to be rediscovered and to locate its place in the modern and, vice versa, the modern’s relation to the medieval location of the sacred.

**Locating God in this World/Body and Knowledge that Supports Faith**

The medieval world, as Mellor and Shilling describe it, was more “unpredictable and volatile” than modernity, but at the same time had a “relative stillness” that contrasts with the “noisy hustle and bustle” of contemporary life (1997:36). Within this world disease and violence were normative if not commonplace and the necessary sustenance of life was constantly threatened or at least uncertain. It was only in court society that the volatile medieval body could focus on beautification (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36). Instead the medieval Church gave a certain status and sensorial significance to the invisible activity of the divine or the demonic. It encouraged the faithful to investigate events, beings and inanimate objects in the physical world because they all held the possibility of possessing an inner meaning that could be “more important than their simple outward appearance” (Harris, 1992:7).

This form of embodied sociality and route to knowledge was, in part, a result of early Christendom’s ability to incorporate into its vision the Jewish belief that “the whole of life was the unfolding of God’s divine plan for the world as it had been exclusively revealed to his chosen people – a viewpoint the Christians had naturally acquired with the rest of their Jewish inheritance” (Harris, 1992:7). In this context, the Catholic Church, “seeking to harness [the] somatic experiences” of medieval people to its vision (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:64), structured an all-encompassing reality saturated with sacred perception in which everything had a purpose and a wide range of capacities and capabilities – including that which

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35 Scholarly debate shifts between: those who consider violence to be a frequent occurrence in the middle ages, those who considered conflict to be pervasive and those who considered conflict to be extraordinary. More recently debates have began to include the argument that whether, or not, violence in medieval society was frequent it was consider normative (see Huizing, J. (1924); Bellamy, J. 1973; Hanawalt, B. (1976, 1998); Kaeuper, R. ed. (2000); Meyerson, Thiery, D. & Falk, O. eds. (2004).
was unseen (Erickson, 1976:19; Cadden, 1995:174). For example, within this reality and intimately connected to medieval phenomenal experience, physical and spiritual geography simultaneously filled social spaces with repetitive cycles of Christian ritual, everyday work, pilgrimages, “violent passions, stark opposites and dramatic contrasts” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:64). It was an enchanted world in which people, God, the benign and the demonic interacted on a daily basis. The main source of protection from the omnipresent and mysterious in this world was faith. Erickson argues that “the bounds of reality were bent to embrace - and often localise - the unseen ... [Foundational to this was the] mutually held worldview which found in religious truths the ultimate logic of existence” (1976:27).

Routes to knowledge in this world of phenomenal experience and daily work were not understood in terms of operations and causes, but in relation to meaning. Meaning was found in a search for truth and truth was understood as the Truth of Christ’s pain and suffering for the sins of humankind. This “truth of God in Christ was not just a message, then, but an embodiment [by both] the Church [as] the Incarnation of Christ” who performed the sacraments and by the laity partaking of those sacraments (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:65). From the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) onward, living with Christ meant “living with one’s sinfulness and living with how far one’s life was from the model of Christ” (Cavenaugh, 2004:39). In this Christian age the ultimate sin was to deny either the active intervention of God and/or the interaction of invisible Godly and demonic entities in the physical/material world.

This medieval route to knowledge which was governed by the Catholic Church focused existence on the body of Christ and confined knowledge to that which supported Belief. Belief in the medieval habitus held a privileged place and preceded knowledge. This way of meaning-making is found in Augustine’s writings, The Teacher, in which he argues, “I must believe rather than know” and he quotes Isaiah, 7:9 to support his argument (quoted in Santana, 2003:30). In this way “knowledge was acquired, made and classified within the bounds of [embodied] ... faith” (Santana, 2003:30). Knowledge could be acquired from any source, including non-Christian resources, as long as it strengthened and deepened Christian faith.
Altarpieces, lyrics, art, drama, stained glass windows and saint’s relics (religious artefacts) were all rich and vivid material commentaries that explored and extended medieval Catholic doctrines and rituals. Similarly, marks on the body, such as the stigmata, were interpreted as a sign from God, and were an important route to knowledge. This medieval Catholic need to deepen faith, rather than create provable certainty, allowed room for apparent contradictions in knowledge. This meant that, for a period of time (the conjunctural time of the medieval habitus), contradictions within routes to knowledge, such as Christian, Gnostic, Roman and Neo-platonic, could be accommodated within the medieval Catholic worldview (Enders, 1999:2-5). An example of this eclecticism is the seven cardinal virtues which linked three innovatively Christian virtues - “faith, hope and charity” (Corinthians, 13:1-13) - with Plato's and Pythagoras' pagan list of virtues – “wisdom, justice, courage and temperance” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:71). Prudentius (c348 – 413), in his poem *Psychomachia* (the Battle for the Soul), listed these virtues as cures or remedies for the seven deadly sins and they were depicted in this way in morality plays such as *Everyman* and the *Castle of Perseverance*. As time passed people began to consider that these ‘Christian’ virtues were a protection from the temptation of the seven deadly sins (Allman, 2007:40).

The medieval Catholic faith embraced a geographical locus of invisible Truths where both the physical and spiritual geography was impossible to disentangle because it was believed that God existed in this world. Accordingly meaning was found in examining the complex interaction between the material and spiritual in which God actively intervened to judge right from wrong (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:75). In this enchanted world, flesh and spirit intertwined and flesh could include more than human bodies. Evidence of this was doxic and seen everywhere because as “everyone also knew - and every child was taught - ... the air around them was infested with invisible, soulless spirits, some benign but most of them evil” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:76). This required constant and vigilant interpretation and meant that one needed to be on the alert for any signs from within the physical and material world (including the body) which could either lead one to, or away, from God.

God’s active and direct intervention in people’s phenomenal experiences was recorded in medieval church histories (Chronicles). For example, an entry in the

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36 It also meant the contradictions between the competing philosophies had the potential to lead eventually to new re-formation(s).
Chronicle of John Hardyng recorded that the angry, but divine, wrath of God was at work in 1405 when "the King [Henry IV] was smitten with leprosy" because he had executed the Archbishop Scrope ([c1572] (trans) 1812, quoted in Royer, 2001:34). From another perspective, an entry in the Chronicle of Lanercost recorded God's intervention in monastic life, when a Rector had been forced to prepare a previously excommunicated person for sacred burial. In this instance, "an enormous wolf" seized and removed the corpse from sacred space (Anon, [ca.1275] 1913:12-13). The monks interpreted the wolf as God's active intervention against a sacrilegious act, that is, as a figura.

Figura

Figura is an hermeneutic tool for interpreting God’s active intervention in this world. It allows for the past and future to come into contact with the material present of the medieval era. Figura is defined as the act of interpreting events and knowledge as literal and as eternal predictions of the future. According to Auerbach this interpretative method was used to provide moral guidelines and was an element of medieval knowledge that makes the medieval era so “baffling” to modern sensibilities (1959:61). Because figura is difficult to understand (know) it is necessary to elucidate the concept in more depth in order to make a linked connection between a dominant meaning-making framework of the era (figura) and the interpretation of the body-in-pain. This means in order to study Polanyi’s concept of the whole entity, that is, the distal object of the body-in-pain and the proximal bodily and value-based responses to it, it is necessary to fully understand the way in which knowledge was believed to be connected to life in the medieval era.

Tracing the development of the word figura, Auerbach claims the medieval term figura is not to be confused with the contemporary definition of 'figurative', which opposes figurative to literal.37 Early Christians and medieval people used figura to mean a “mixture of spirituality and sense of reality” (Auerbach, 1959:61). It was “a middle term between littera-historia and veritas” (literal, historical and real perspectives) (Auerbach, 1959:47). The term figura described these perspectives because it captured the belief that the Bible and other religious actions should be interpreted simultaneously as a ‘literal’ description of events and as ‘foreshadows’ or ‘symbols’ of ‘things to come’, in which moralistic

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37 For example, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the modern day term ‘figura’ as: “an act or deed that is representative or symbolic; metaphoric not literal” (Trumble and Stevenson, 2003:953-4).
analyses would be re-lived (Auerbach, 1959:45-49). This meant all things could be the “enacted intention of God to signify” (Dawson, 1998:187). For example, Augustine writes, “the Old Testament contains promises of temporal things … but that in these temporal figurus there was the promise of future things” (quoted in Auerbach, [trans] 1959:41) and “quotes 1 Cor. 10:6 and 11” to support his argument (Auerbach, [trans] 1959:41). Consequently, the Bible was interpreted simultaneously as a description of real history, a metaphor for learning and a prophecy of the future. To know figura-ly is to understand events as simultaneously literal, symbolic, allegorical and as marks of forewarning (Kolbialka, 1999:212).

Tertullian (c160 – 225), a pagan until his conversion (c197), along with other early theologians, goes further, arguing that “the Holy Scriptures, even when prophesising of things that are already done, outlines … a figure of future things” (Auerbach, 1959:43). More explicitly Tertullian stated “that what was reserved to be made manifest at the end of the ages should be announced in material and verbal figures to those who came before” (quoted in Auerbach, 1959:43). For example, Adam, within a system of seven ages, was interpreted as a figura of Christ (Harris, 1992:100). Consequently, early theologians looked for prophesies of the future in the literal events depicted in the Bible. Each figura repeated simultaneous moments “within a single divine intention to signify” (Dawson, 1998:187). Medieval people were encouraged to use the same framework in daily time as well. For example, in the 13th century, using a figural route to knowledge, the monks at Lanercost recorded in their Chronicle that just as the “renewer of old Adam” [Christ] had “made all things new”, so too will the new king [Edward I] “induce new growth of virtues in the Church” (Anon, [c.1274] 1913:8). In this context, pagan philosophers, for example Cato and Cicero, could also be neatly incorporated into the medieval Catholic doctrine because their ideas and concepts could be considered foreshadows of the Christian doctrines. It was not only the Old Testament that foreshadowed Christ’s coming, but that Greek and Roman philosophers were often considered to have foreshadowed his teaching. This means that although the term Christianity in this instance is used to describe the religion of the medieval period, this form of Christianity was able to eclectically include ideas and practices from other belief systems.

Even though many medieval theologians were comfortable with these kinds of contradictions, the concept of figura as a route to knowledge was debated.
Dawson (1998:188-189) highlights some of the theological debates which have argued that figurative-symbolic meaning would inevitably come to dominate understanding. However for theologians, such as Tertullian, it was imperative to maintain the sensual approach as well as the symbolic one. According to Auerbach (1959:32) Tertullian criticised the “spiritualising tendency” used by some interpreters of the Bible and for this reason he “expressly denied that” ... “figural interpretation” ... “diminished” ... “literal and historical” ones. Using the central event of the Mass, the sacring of the Host, as an example, Tertullian wrote “for there could not have been a figure unless there were a true body. An empty thing, that is, a phantom, could not take on a figure” (quoted in Auerbach, 1959:31). Moreover, Tertullian was especially critical of those who saw “resurrection ... [as] ... an imaginary meaning” (Auerbach, 1959:32) and over time this side of the debate became dominant. For example, by the 12th century, texts such as the Hortus Deliciarum were telling “the story of salvation” (Bynum, 1995:117) which included Christ's material resurrection.

In this enchanted medieval worldview, where people were in touch with both literal and sensual understandings of the world, figura interpretations intertwined real, metaphorical and symbolic meaning and interpreted it through signs of God's active intervention in the world. Consider, for example, the graphic display of Christ’s body-in-pain in late medieval artefacts such as crucifixion paintings, frescos or Altarpieces (see for example Fig. 2.1). Symbolically artefacts such as these capture the tenets of resurrection; redemption and salvation as victory over death and in this way illuminated Christ's divinity. By the late middle age they also capture Christ’s crucified body-in-pain as sore-infested, blood-streaked, suffering and hanging limply from a cross and in this way illustrated his humanity.

Religious artefacts repeatedly incorporated numerous literal, symbolic and allegorical narratives. Again using the closed state of the Isenheim Altarpiece (figure 2.1) as an example, two literal stories are immediately visible to its medieval 'see-ers’. The first expresses the literal belief that Jesus, after a week of agonising torture (The Passion), was crucified for our sins. The second expresses the literal pain and suffering which the medieval people who engaged with this painting were often subjected to within their everyday lives. Grunewald

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38 Between approximately 1167 and 1185 Herrad, Abbess of Hohenbourg at Alsace, directed the compilation of the Hortus Deliciarum. This text was a compendium of knowledge that was used as a teaching tool for the convent novices (Bynum, 1995:117).
was commissioned to paint, restore and complete this Altarpiece for the Antonite Monastery hospital in a period when many people in that area were experiencing pain, suffering and the visible marks incurred, not only through the uncertainty of food supplies, injury, and war, but also from what was then a deadly disease – what is now known as Ergot’s disease which is a small grain wheat disease (see Hayum, 1989:21; Ziermann, 2001:82). This disease left the person’s body putrid, discoloured, blackened, bleeding, scarred and dead. Grunewald incorporated this into the altarpiece in his depiction of the crucified Christ (Hayum, 1989:21) and in this way he created a “heightened sense of the present” (Hayum, 1989:149).

By incorporating the main source of bodily suffering in the area and representing people’s debilitating pain as Christ’s bodily pain, Grunewald’s work embodied the Christian message of charity and suffering. These bodily images and messages also made the literal everyday suffering of these people’s pain relevant by emphasising the link between thinking bodies-in-pain, illness and death within the ritual of imitatio Christi. In this ritual, the believer was not only able to identify with Christ but also by imitating him they were able to “plumb the depths of Christ’s humanity at the moment of his most insistent and terrifying humanness – the moment of his dying” (Bynum, 1992:131). The Isenheim Altarpiece with its themes of illness, pain, suffering and death was inescapable but these and other symbols provided comfort through signs of redemption, resurrection and salvation.

Thus by appealing to sensorial routes to knowledge through the use of resources such as figural interpretations and religious artefacts medieval society embodied a belief in salvation and in the knowledge that actual bodily pain and suffering was a necessary prelude on the path to heaven as was the pain and violence implicit in the Second Coming. Consequently, religious artefacts not only illuminated the somatic importance of the body-in-pain but also prepared the believer’s senses to be both open to God’s Grace and vigilant against the Devil who aroused temptation and lead one down the path to, and through, the Gates of Hell.

In sum, God’s location in this world stimulated feedback loops where the mind, body and interaction sustained a belief that God’s lessons and moral guidance for his people were manifest in the relationship between them and between
objects and events around them. This meant that everything that was visible and invisible related to God’s signs and symbols and should be interpreted through the vision of figura. Vision understood in this way linked internal and external knowledge and was more significant than that which was seen through the eyes (Erickson, 1976:27). Figura was both an interpretive and a moral framework where knowledge was embodied within a ‘thinking body’ which could be used to make the word flesh. This gave significance to bodily/sensory knowledge.

The Word is Actively Made Flesh through Carnal Knowing

As previously noted an ideal type makes an ends-means chain between linked ideas. In the medieval worldview, Mellor and Shilling link a this-worldly God who communicated sacred messages through everyday subjects and objects, such as bodies and events, with the idea that knowledge could be acquired through and by the body. Mellor and Shilling (1997) describe this connection between the location of the sacred and the body as “carnal knowing” a term they borrow from Miles study Carnal Knowing (1992). Before discussing this term in more depth, however, I will introduce Kilgour’s (1990:62) understanding of ‘incarnation’ which could, arguably, complement what I have called figural routes to knowledge.

The purpose of using the word ‘incarnational’ at this point is to highlight the importance of the sensory body and its connection to a sacred living God who literally made the word flesh. I introduce the word incarnational to refer to Mellor and Shilling’s concept of carnal knowing, not because I make a different point from them, but because the modern framing and connotation of carnal means it is easy to overlook the sacred component within this concept. For this reason I am spending time at this point to illustrate the importance of the concept of incarnation to the Volatile Body, so that, in each subsequent reading of the term ‘carnal knowing’ in the following chapters, it will be understood not only with a bodily/material dimension but also inclusive of its sacred dimension.

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39 Mellor and Shilling refer to the ‘thinking body’ as one that “involved all the body’s senses and the intricate links which exist between the fleshy, physical body and the mind” (1997:23). That is it is a thinking, knowing and active being located in the interrelationships between, and in, various ecological systems.

40 For example, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines carnal as “relating to or given to crude bodily pleasures and appetites” or “marked by sexuality” (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carnal). Mellor and Shilling use the term to refer to the body’s sensory attributes as opposed to merely the sexual connotations.
Using many commonly heard expressions, I have defined the term ‘incarnational’ to mean: to make God flesh, make material and to make visible in the human body, which Kobialka (1999:215-216) argues is, symbolically and materially, a key element of medieval Catholicism. That is, the Catholic Church knew God by institutionalising and making relevant and visible the Incarnation and Resurrection. For example Halpern notes that Christ and the Apostles were embodied, materialised, made solid and visible in stone and glass, vestment and order, laws and ritual, sacrifice and martyrdoms in the world as the Church (2002:44).

In this way, the literal and metaphorical body of the Church became the body of Christ. Artefacts like Grunewald's *Crucifixion*, (fig. 2.1) for example, reinforced the belief in the continuing presence of God in this world by anchoring the cross in the earth, thus locating the sacred in this world (this is an idea that was to change in later eras as explained in chapter three).

Incarnational knowing implies an embodied approach to a *figurally* known sacred world in which ritualistic words and actions were made flesh everyday through the sacraments and the body. Consequently the importance of the “structured opening of the medieval body, the embodied participation and the Mass are of central significance to the *habitus* of the Volatile Body and its community (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:38). The Mass is significant in this world because it is the ritual that makes visible the medieval worldview in which transformation of matter is possible.

**Mass as Embodied Transformation**

From the vantage point of the contemporary *habitus*, it is easy to miss the embodied epistemological framing of The Mass, especially if one focuses on the Eucharist alone. Santana, amongst others, have suggested that the Mass should be viewed as a ritual which incorporates a range of communal activities and “shared semiotic presentations”. This includes not only the seven sacraments (baptism/confirmation, marriage, confession, Eucharist, penance, holy orders, extreme unction) but also altarpieces, woodcuts, music, morality and mystery plays performed at the various festivals, such as the “Corpus Christi cycles” (2003:58-59). When viewed in this way, the Mass endorsed the authority of the Church, existing community power structures (confraternities) and at the same time drew upon collective imagery. Again using Grunewald's *Crucifixion* and the *Isenheim Altarpiece* (fig. 2.1) as an example, this “semiotic presentation”
visually and sensorially introduced and prepared the believer for Mass. It literally and symbolically engaged the sensory body in narratives of pain and suffering, through the concepts of sacrifice, salvation, redemption and bodily resurrection. At the same time it also made specific allegorical (but well known) references to the sacraments. For example, at Christ’s feet there is a chalice catching the blood which is gushing from the neck wound of a cross-carrying lamb. This allegorical link to the Eucharist (amongst others) provided both the sick and faithful with “relevant and physical images through which to perceive the process of transubstantiation” (Hayum, 1989:70).

The process of transubstantiation is a good example of the importance of the body’s performed role in actively participating in, and corporeally transforming, knowledge about the Faith. The Eucharist combined the power of a linguistic statement and the embodied faith of the community into a belief that it literally turned bread and wine physically into the Body and Blood of Christ. Mellor and Shilling note that of “all the sacramental activities, the Eucharistic Mass ... provides ... a key to the communal forms which both shaped medieval bodies and provided a context for religious civilising processes” (1997:78). The catalyst for this transformation is embodied faith. According to Santana:

> Christians did not need to ‘know’ what was happening in the consecration of the Host, [for the transformative power to work] they needed to “believe” that the real presence of Christ was immanent in the bread and wine (2003:31).

Catholics during the Mass believed they were literally eating and drinking the body and blood of Christ thus ingesting through their sensory bodies and sharing the body of Christ with the community. *Figurally* they were also using their bodies and close contact senses (taste and touch) to foreshadow the impending transformation of the world into Heaven on Earth after the second coming of Christ, the return to Eden, the first promise of the future. Similarly but “unofficially,”

> the Mass was also used as a form of ‘poison ordeal’, with the suspect required to communicate risking damnation, but taking an opportunity to demonstrate innocence in front of the Christian community (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:79).

This transformative objective of Mass is a ritual because its purpose is transformation of body and soul. The Mass demonstrates how the medieval *habitus* supported the possibilities of bodily/material transformation through active participation. Understood in this way the Mass is conceptualised as the
pivotal point in a number of rituals or pedagogical techniques that incarnationally
instils faith and transforms the person into the incarnate Christ, thereby forming
a union with God (Santana, 2003:52). Santana, in tracing “the shift from
performative to a commemorative epistemology in English literature”, argues
that “all medieval ‘drama’ developed out of the dramatic ritual of the Mass”
(Santana, 2003:58-59). Therefore to understand the individual sacrament, or
medieval drama, or art, as separate manifestations would be an anachronistic
distinction. A distinction like this turns medieval devotion into the modern
division that separates religion and devotion from entertainment (drama). In
the medieval worldview these were not experienced as divided. However the
Mass, at its core, is a ritual which creates and enacts knowledge with the
intension of transforming understanding and the lived body of participants and
as a result is performative rather than commemorative (Santana, 2003:58-59).

The medieval Mass did not simply imitate or represent a past event (the last
supper). It required an embodied re-performance of the past in the present.
This active participation of the ‘thinking body’ in the Mass cemented the
importance and visibility of the body in collective knowledge of the world
(through literally and symbolically ingesting God), unifying all with the body of
Christ and foreshadowing future things. Thus as an integrating ritual it included
the community and reinforced the necessity of combining language,
matter/bodies and transformation in everyday living. Transformative possibility
had an opening effect on the symbolic boundaries of the body in world filled with
options and belief in magic and enchantment that could occur in both physical
and/or symbolic forms.

Within this *habitus* belief in life after death was literal and in this manner
embodied participation became a pedagogical technique. More than just
learning through reflection, the medieval Mass reinforced the view that knowing

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41 This is in line with the concept of *figura*, leading Auerbach to question “to what extent [was]... art
[from the Middle Ages] viewed as the *figura* of a still unattainable fulfilment of reality” (Auerbach,
1959:62). Art, which includes images, theatre and sermon, can be seen as a literal description of
something, a future prediction and an allegorical way of communicating an aspect of religious
teaching. However unlike the Baroque painters of the seventeenth century, Auerbach argues, “the
question of the imitation of nature aroused little theoretical interest ... [Instead] the artist, as a kind of
figure for God the Creator, realised an archetype that was alive in his spirit” (Auerbach, 1959:62).
This reflects an incarnational or carnal knowing of reality and imitation and its visibility being
immaterial to its consequences. Similarly Kobialka notes “the pursuit of origins will only
communicate [contemporary] ... desires for ‘real’ identity ... [organised and given authority] by the
present organisation of knowledge” (1999:18).
must come from bodily participation that opened the body to transformative lessons. The word ‘open’ in this context is used to denote the “lack of a barrier between the real world and the metaphorical world” in medieval thought (Ross, 1997:26). Specifically there was a moral imperative to open the body to the possibility of embodied transformation in order to live the faith. The malleability of the body was encouraged as an adaptive strategy of survival. Consequently the Mass needed embodied participation to integrate sacred and profane and facilitate a transformation of matter and believers.

These ideas when linked together into a means-ends chain reveal that a this-worldly presence of the sacred fuses the sacred and earthly world and makes bodily transformation and resurrection concrete, possible and good. Consequently, the ritual of the Mass, in addition to the transformation of bread and wine, also included the literal and symbolic transformation of people in their union with Christ. The incarnational approach to the Mass was confirmed at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, through confirmation of the manifest visibility of God in this world.\textsuperscript{42} Within this worldview God dwells within the body. He does not merely fill it with Grace, as the Puritans were to claim; rather the Mass solidified the literal physical incorporation of Christ into the body, blood, mind and soul of the believer. “Eating God during the Mass ... [was] an oral signifier of the Catholic emphasis on the transformation of the body through its incorporation of Christ” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:79).

Paintings such as Grunewald's depiction of the crucifixion reinforced this viewpoint. The paintings were not looked upon as a commemoration of Christ’s death; they were actually engaged with, within embodied action. According to Lemakis (1990) the iconic crucifix form is significant because it is a supporting ritual which denotes the structuring of space, time and body. This iconic form, the most popular form in the early medieval ages, establishes the schematic order and hierarchy of God, the community and the body. Grunewald's painting depicts this because in this painting Christ is frontal, symmetric and has the cross as its axis. The body of Christ occupies the centre, denoting his purpose of salvation, as opposed to being a hapless victim of unjust execution. He is frontally placed and connects directly and incarnationally with the viewer. This implicates the viewer in an ‘I-thou’ relationship with “Christ that raises them...”

\textsuperscript{42} For an in-depth account see Kobialka (1999) who traces the history of the debates concerning both the ‘reality’ of the transformation of the bread and also the resulting ‘substance’ after the transformation.
both above the historical moment” (Lemakis, 1990:14), but at the same time Christ’s pained humanity is anchored in this world. Christ is not alone in medieval crucifixions; he is surrounded by biblical persons and participates in a this-worldly transformation that clarifies the way in which the embodied sociality of the Volatile ideal type can value pain as a tool of transformation and communication.

**Bodies as Central Organising Principle which Speaks to the Community**

In creating a means-ends chain as part of the ideal type, this transformative, symbolic, as well as the literal potential of the medieval Catholic body, meant it could be a central organising principle of the social world, similar to the way Douglas claims the body is the symbol of contemporary worldviews. As such, one acquired knowledge through an open body with limited metaphorical barriers. Consequently the body could be used to express both sacred and State messages and as a result becomes a “means of expression” (Enders, 1999:19) or commentary that spoke to the community.

In living the medieval Catholic Faith, following the parameters of ritual structures and transpersonal meaning systems, as a route to knowledge and as an organising principle, the body was believed to locate and anchor meaning. As Cicero (a pagan figura incorporated into medieval thought) claimed, an act of thought required an “abode in as much as a material object without a locality is inconceivable” (Cicero, c55BC, quoted in Enders, 1999:67). Thought alone, without the agency of a body to live it, could not be a foundation of faith. This led to a view that minds, souls and bodies were linked and inseparable and therefore “by action the body talks” (Cicero, quoted in Ender, 1999:19). This means that agency through ritual, bodily images and responses (performative speeches) depicted in such things as hagiographies, passion plays and Altarpieces (amongst others) were understood as routes to knowledge and guides for action and bodies were described as a “principal means of expression” (Enders, 1999:19). Bodies could be the guiding principle for interpreting the habitus while the habitus of incarnational transformation helped interpret the sensory body. For example, the body in Grunewald’s Crucifixion (fig. 2.1) represented Christ’s humanity, his sensory pain and suffering and his act of divine charity and mercy. It could be identified and interpreted by the viewers

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43 Agency refers to the ability to operate independently but still be bound to the group.
10 In the middle ages charity, in relation to human agency, was considered to be the main purpose of a religious life and structured the “social integration or solidarity” of society. This solidarity was
as relating to their own sense of pain and suffering, their need to be charitable and their sense of belonging. In the same way the living body could also be read as a *figural* sign.

Decay of the body, for example, could be interpreted as literal and allegorical. Decay not only signalled death, but also signalled the location of the body's soul. The absence of decay denoted a state of grace and confirmed residence in Heaven. As the *Chronicle of Lanercost* records, a 170-year-old grave of a former Bishop of St Andrews was accidentally disturbed and his body found with no sign of decay. This was accepted as “evidence of his holiness”. After showing the intact body to several persons the “unchanged remains of this venerable man” were reburied in a new geographical space, befitting his new found sacred holy status (Maxwell, (trans) 1913:36-37). Conversely, if a body decayed, the decay was read as a sign that the person was currently located in Hell and therefore was finally dead without the hope of resurrection. Thus death and salvation were known through corporeal signs on the body – not through debates about whether, or not, the mind still functioned. Establishing final death was crucial in an era that allowed for the possibility of transformation and resurrection, because final death could be difficult to identify. For example, Edward I ordered his body to be boiled until the flesh had gone. A body without flesh guaranteed that he was dead (with no sign indicating he had gone to Hell). It also allowed his bones to be taken on campaigns against the Scots, which would bring sacred luck. A monastic chronicler interpreted Edward’s son’s battle losses as God’s intervention as punishment because the final instructions that Edward I had left (God’s word delivered through the King) were not followed (Froissart, c1453:105). Hence, in different ways, the body was understood as corporeal transmitter that carried and displayed meaning and had the potential to be used to unmask religious meaning. The form of the body and forms of architecture were also reciprocal models that shaped and were shaped by city, institution, disciplinary and religious processes. For example, “in 1354 Henry of Lancaster” equated six orifices of the body to the “six streets” that enter the “market place” (Enders, 1999:103). Durandus of Mende (1230-1296) an ecclesiologist maintained that,

>the arrangement of a material church resembles that of the human body: the chancel, or place where the altar is, represents the head: the transepts, the hands and arms, and the remainder - towards the west - the rest of the body. The sacrifice of the altar denotes the vows of the heart (Erickson, 1976:19)

“directed through sacred ties” based in confraternities. “By the late Middle Ages one-fifth of the adult population was likely to belonged to at least one confraternity” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:80-81).
Close-contact Sense with the World

To consolidate these routes to allegorical and literal knowledge, medieval Catholic practices relied on all the senses - particularly the close-contact senses - to communicate meaning in which people were physically and metaphorically immersed in this world and in the body. This framed the way in which ‘sense’ was made of the world. The sensory body as the routes to knowledge required a teaching and learning method that incorporated sensorial learning experiences. Accordingly the Volatile Body’s performative epistemology not only gave agency to the body but also created transformative possibilities where language, bodies, actions and faith could transform the world. Consequently, physical experiences such as pain and disease played a role in communicating to, about and between bodies. Although the body had always been a means of religious access within medieval Catholicism, from the twelfth-century onward a new significance was placed on both Christ’s body and the human body. Therefore, linked to the idea that Christ could be both human and divine, bodies-in-pain had the potential to cement worldly visibility of knowledge about God in all active (and responsive) participants. Increasingly the presence of death and its corollary, pain, began to pervade medieval Chronicles and devotional works and bodies-in-pain came to be seen both as deterrents and cures for evil. In relation to punishment, redemption and salvation two types of execution narrative emerged. These were (i) pain as deterrent and (ii) pain as cure and mercy.

Pain as Deterrence

To modern sensibilities, the use of pain has an obvious role as a deterrent. In the Chronicles of John Hardying, Richard Grafton in 1497 claimed that the body could, and should, be used as a “document for hereafter to beware” (quoted in Royer, 2001:21). Consequently some scholars, such as Foucault or Spierenberg, have asserted that the technologies of punishment in the medieval execution process are displays of State power to deter. However, Royer (2001:7) argues that this focus often “weaves the history of capital punishment into a narrative of the modern State. Foucault’s analysis of punishment concentrates on a shift from the body to the mind and then to discourse. This he claims is achieved through institutions of punishment which include prisons, schools and the military. (Royer, 2001:8). However studies such as these overlook the religious significance of bodies and the body in pain in particular.45 The body’s message

45 Royer (2001:10) contends that because the majority of studies that analyses gallows rituals and execution narratives often begin in the sixteenth century and this has resulted in a Reformation or Puritan based focus and interpretation of execution narratives (see for example Lake and Questier,
of deterrence was not just about State control of the body and its bounded symbol. The decaying public body reminded people that the State had executed both a heretic/traitor and a sinful person because the decay told them the deceased was currently being punished in Hell. Consequently State control of the body was fearful because the display of decaying bodies served to confirm that the retributive State had been right to execute a person to end evil. Therefore, the body was the medium through which both sacred and State messages were delivered.

**Scaffold Execution Narratives and Death**

The message that pain and execution acted as a deterrent from evil was recorded by the monks in medieval church Chronicles. These Chroniclers often described in vivid detail not only what was done to the condemned sinner’s body on the scaffold but also the distribution and location of their fragmented body parts (see for example *Chronicle of Lanercost*). With an emphasis on shame, rather than physical or emotional pain, those voiceless sinners on the scaffold (particularly in France and England) were presented as past the point of hope or salvation. This was because people under death sentences were often refused the sacraments of Confession and Extreme Unction (de Lasteyrie, [ca.1759-1849] 1848:202) and this ensured their eternal damnation because once their distributed body parts began to decay it was evidence of their sin, punishment and damnation. Thinking bodies in the medieval era that suffered capital punishment were an interpretive text. Spectators at an execution did not need to be told about the sins of the accused, they could read the condemned’s body and its form of punishment to gain this knowledge, for example beheading as opposed to hanging.

Within this worldview, bodily texts linked crime and punishment to the audience - the knower to the known - echoing Grunewald’s linking of ergot disease and (1996); Halttunen (1998; Boudreau, 1997). Royer (2001:10) also argues that the study of this topic should include the 13th century Chronicles because this is when these narratives were first written. Drawing from the work of Durkheim and Mauss, Mary Douglas, in her study of *Purity and Danger* argues that, “the body is a model which can stand for any bounded system ... We cannot possibly interpret rituals ... unless we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of society and to see the powers and dangers credited to social structure reproduced in small on the human body” ([1966] 2002:116).

For medieval people dismembering the body on the scaffold was also a sign of disgrace. Wide distribution of the body parts guaranteed that a wide audience saw the decay of the body and the power of the State. Royer (2003) argues that what was also significant was that the destruction of internal body organs was used to expose the “inner moral debasement” of the condemned sinners. In this way the sin and the sinner were kept ‘alive’ in order to serve as a deterrent or as an *ars memoria*, to others. Only final interment would end the sinner or “traitor’s fall from grace” (see Westerhof, 2007:105; Royer, 2001).
Christ’s painful Passion. The scaffold and execution narratives incarnationally related the acts of life to the acts of death. For example, dying once was not enough for a person who had committed multiple sins. As the Chronicle of Lanercost makes clear, justice demanded William Wallace “die three times” and David of Wales, who was:

A fourfold criminal in life
Now dies by horse, fire, rope and knife
The ruffian thus deprived of breath
Most meekly dies by fourfold death (Anon [ca.1272] 1913:35)

Devotional Narratives and Death

In comparison to a focus on body parts, sin/shame and death in the Chronicler’s execution narratives, as previously noted, the writers of religious devotional works also presented a second type of execution narrative. This narrative shifted attention away from Christ’s divinity and triumph over death to a focus on Christ’s humanity and His painful death. These execution narratives presented an obedient but less than stoic Christ, putrid, bleeding and filled with despair as He endured (what was then considered) the purifying power of pain for mankind’s redemption and salvation. Both devotional and scaffold execution narratives operated as socio-political and religious feedback loops in order to stimulate both spectators’ and worshippers’ incarnational (carnal) “faculties of memory and association” (Hyman, 1989:149).

Over time however, the medieval narrative of the crucifixion alongside a rising concept of purgatory began to break down the distinctions between the different representations of the death of Christ on the Cross and those of live executions. Concepts such as the power of pain to purify were integrated into various forms of medieval media. Examples again can be seen in Grunewald’s paintings, as well as various altarpieces, saints’ relics and even in the condemned’s penitent’s dying words from the scaffold. This intertwined different intertextual reading of the dismembered body which included the “final speech … gesture [and] … demeanor” at the execution (Royer, 2001:62). This late medieval epistemological shift dictated that execution narrative feedback loops stimulated carnal memory, association and emphatic mediation on the blood, torment and painful body of Christ and the condemned’s performance on the scaffold. This social world guided the embodied medieval worshipper, condemned sinner and spectator (the community) “towards enlightenment and hope” (Hayum, 1989:149) through rituals of imitation (imitatio Christi) and/or the art of dying well (ars moriendi).
Pain as Cure and Mercy

From the perspective of dying well, the infliction of pain could also be seen as a cure for evil in the soul and body. For example, Wolfgang Katzheimer (1478-1508) chiselled into one of his medieval woodcuts “if you bear pain patiently it shall be useful to you, therefore give yourself to it willingly” (quoted in Merback, 1999:155). The reason that pain could be useful as a cure was because the body and soul were considered united. According to Olson in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, the body and soul shared their sensory perception, “body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made one substance actually existing” (quoted in Olson, 2005:32). This meant that in its unified form the body/soul was closer to God, that is closer to perfection, than the body alone or soul alone. This way of understanding perfection is based on the medieval belief that evil is the absence of ‘what ought to be’ or the proper order.

That there was a ‘proper order’ of ‘what out to be’, and that any entity was evil if it did not conform to this order, was a central disposition within the medieval habitus. It was recognised that in the ‘proper order’ an entity would of necessity be different from another; nevertheless each had its own undeniable order. So while any other organism would not be held up to human standards, or vice versa, all humans would be judged by the same standard of what ‘ought to be’. Therefore because humans had bodies (which was proper) and souls which dwelt within bodies, the proper (right) order for the human was to have both a body and soul whether dead or alive. This unity of body and soul is a theme Dante explores in the Divine Comedy. “In Canto 14” where the characters are located in purgatory, “Solomon assures [them] that-with flesh resumed [in Heaven they] will-gain more fervour, winning ... greater radiance” (quoted in Bynum, 1995:303).

This proper order encompassed spatial coordinates and was communicated in numerous ways including the pictorial surface of crucifixion paintings. For example the two main coordinates of the picture plane are vertical and horizontal. According to Lemakis the Latin cross has this strong vertical and weak horizontal which shapes and “creates the conditions of the image’s vertical predisposition” (1990:11). In most European crucifixion paintings there is a system of hierarchy which demands an upright bodily form that mediates a connection between the human and God. Dury goes further arguing that Christ’s body symbolises and reinforces his role as a mediator between man and God and
that the cross is the “bridge between humankind and eternity” (1999:4). Lemakis also maintains that the vertical predisposition allocates a reality outside of time – “a static left/right [and up/down] imperturbable order of things in which each detail is symbolic” (1990:11) and I would argue is also incarnationally literal. This hierarchy predetermines the positioning of figuras and became an irrefutable verification of their worth and ‘proper order’. For example, the centrality of Jesus’ body and the horizontal beam of the cross polarises his head and feet, denoting his head as a symbol of the divine and his feet as the symbol of humanity.

Another aspect in this hierarchy is the grouping of figures at Christ’s feet which leads the eye from bottom to top, confirming the path of salvation. Whilst on the one hand, the dominance of the vertical gives this iconic form its certainty, regardless of the passage of longue duree and conjunctural time, the horizontal plane on the other hand symbolises the temporal nature of current existence and daily time. The horizontal axis parallel to the plane of the earth guides the eye from left to right, reinforcing the concept of linear time (daily time). The meaning is relative to its context and medieval everyday life is captured in this plane. For example, in a different version of Grunewald’s Crucifixion (Fig. 2.2) a knight in full armour is located in this space, possibly representing conjunctural time as represented by a medieval habitus, rather than Christ’s Roman habitus of Golgotha.

Figure 2.2 Grunewald, Crucifixion. c. 1510s. Tempera on panel. Kunstmuseum Basel, Switzerland (a knight in the plane of Conjunctional/ Temporal Time).
This proper order of things and the significance of the physicality of the body already existed in the pre-Christian world. It continued with the early Christians who used the physicality of the body as a symbol of Christ's victory over death and the old 'corrupt' human order. The medieval Catholic Church pursued this perspective in order to encourage people to not only transform their 'fallen' flesh and habits but also to attract converts by focusing on passionate and intense "flights into physicality" (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36). For example, when people yielded to temptation and indulged their fallen flesh (evil), pain was often used to return the person to the right path and restore the 'proper order'. In this way the body-in-pain was a source of sacred meaning which could be used within effervescent forms of medieval Catholic sociality which was transformed into a renewed understanding of right – 'what ought to be'. As a result, pain, whether self-inflicted, or as torture, or even as the painful punishment of death, offered a corrective opportunity and/or sensory contact with the sacred. However mercy when required, or if asked for, could be used to reduce the severity of the punishment. For example a death sentence could be commuted to bodily maiming such as eye gouging or even receive a pardon (see Olson, 2005:22-28). Consequently when painful treatment (including bodily dismemberment) was bestowed upon sinners or (heretics/traitors) by the divine right of the King it could be viewed as an act of mercy and a restoration of the 'proper order'.

Moreover, self-administered pain such as self flagellation was often the basis of religious “body regimes” which were mainly practised by saints, monks, nuns and sometimes by the laity (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36). In the 15th century John Lydgate noted that these practices were an extra-discursive "mediation on the blood, wounds and love of Christ" in which "Ye shall also most louyngly remember/Uppon hys most peynfull passyoun" (quoted in Enders, 1999:66). Hence the emphasis in these regimes was on the natural as well as the supernatural body in which the senses and physical body were intended to absorb the most extreme physical tortures that a body could withstand - given the grace of God. Pain was a pedagogical technique that transformed the body into a sacred space. As Brown argues,

the pain of Christian Asceticism consisted in the fact that the present human person was an unfinished block, designed to be cut into the form of an awesome model. The body required the deep chisel-bites of permanent renunciation, if the Christian was to take on the lineaments of the risen Christ (quoted in Mellor and Shilling, 1997:57).
The combination of these two ideas of pain as deterrent and mercy and intertwined as they were in religious art and execution narratives, confirmed both the importance of reading the sacred meaning of the placement, and state, of body parts as well as the *ars moriendi*. Many examples of the medieval source for reinforcing the outcome of either dying well, or badly, were repeatedly found in the spatial organisation of artworks. For example, Merback discusses the spatial location of the two criminals dying on either side of Jesus. The thief on the right (Dysmas) is associated with the right hand of God (the right-side). His often relaxed demeanour in death is said to represent that he died penitent (the art of dying well). In contrast, Gestas, the other thief, was depicted as suffering from pain. His spatial location on the left marks his impenitent death. This was a shameful death that would not result in salvation or redemption, and hence the negative associations with the ‘left’ (1999:23). Thus the spatial structuring of the body at peace in death is located on the right side and this spatial structuring is subtly portrayed in Grunewald’s *Crucifixion* (fig 2.1) where Christ’s death (or near death) is depicted with his head slumped towards his right side. This idea carried forward into everyday life where the process of one’s death, whether peaceful or violent, was read as an indicator of an acceptance into the Kingdom of Heaven, or conversely was read as the dis-ease of re-locating into Hell.

Therefore the beheaded traitor whose body was drawn and quartered and left to decay in different public and spatial locations was sending much more than a message of deterrence from the State. The severed and decaying body parts advertised the finality of the condemned man’s death and the presence of his soul in Hell. It also reinforced the role pain had in ending evil. Consequently bodies in this *habitus* were read literally and symbolically for both profane and sacred meaning. In this way executions “became a performance” (Royer, 2001:25). This aesthetic developed over time so that by the late medieval period England had entered an age of spectacular justice for the elite (Royer, 2001:28). For those who were considered traitors to the King a “painful justice and judicial cruelty were in full bloom” (Royer, 2001:26). However Hanawalt notes that, “Goal delivery evidence shows that only 17 percent of those tried for homicide were convicted” (1976:315). Nevertheless it was always in the sinner’s interest to confess in order to make his peace with God and the community. For example a person’s confession and penance on the scaffold ensured a good death through the grace of God and at the same time legitimised
the execution process in ending evil. Proper order was restored and in this way, a painful death could be seen as both valuable and merciful.

Consequently, within this volatile, Catholic medieval world of shared faith and pain, the body was a very public space. This shared living communication of pain contrasts with Scarry’s contemporary notion that it is only the torturer and violence that bestows a “visibility on the structure and enormity of what is usually private and incommunicable, contained within the boundaries of the sufferers’ body” (quoted in Enders, 1999:102). The concept of private or individual bodily boundaries was an anathema in a society that lived in, and was part of, the wounded body of Christ. Therefore, pain and violence in the ideal type of Valued Embodied Pain is communicative and shared by the community. Just as language could not perform its transformative power in the Mass without matter and faith, rituals of faith could not be performed without a public sharing of painful bodies and the community. The sacramental rituals all required the collective effervescence of community to actively participate, purge and witness in order to create and maintain the ‘proper’ order. According to Enders (1999:103-107), the concept of community was reinforced through the collective painful memories of marked bodies and the painful memories that marked new bodies as a forewarning.

Valued Embodied Pain as Pedagogical Technique

The idea that bodies-in-pain acted as deterrents and cures links with the idea that bodies-in-pain had a valued role in the medieval *habitus* (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:93). Providing more detail, Enders (1999:66) claims medieval learning, and in particular memory, was embodied through the marking of violent painful suffering, a pedagogy of mnemonics that were literally and symbolically, that is *figurally* and incarnationally, etched on the body. Pain becomes a memory and mark of forewarning (*figura*). It records and re-lives the past, present and future. Furthermore the “mental rehearsals” of violence and pain, as learned through repetitious exposure to real and represented violence and pain in this world, physically marked the body so that the body then re-enacts incarnational knowing in “medieval courtrooms, classrooms, churches and theatres” (Enders, 1999:66).

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48 A refusal to confess on the scaffold created uncertainty and contradiction within the habitus (see Smith, 1996).

49 In the 12 century the medieval Catholic Church as the Body of Christ ‘Christianised’ people’s crucial life stages by formalising these life stages within the seven sacraments and in this way was able to integrate people into the community.
In this way violence and pain were considered a normative means for dealing with disputes (Meyerson, Thiery, and Falk, 2004:6). Mellor and Shilling note the importance of the trial by ordeal. They note that one common trial included holding a burning iron which was “accompanied by the solemn blessings of the priest” (1997:75). The authority of these trials came from God judgment. God was believed to write the guilt/innocence or the right or wrong upon the body of the participants. This practice was concerned, less with finding the ‘truth’ and more with disputes resolution (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:75). Nevertheless, just as memory and pain were linked, bodily pain and truth were also linked in this volatile worldview. Enders maintains, ideas concerning incarnational responses to pain, which “mixed classical and medieval legal theories” as part of Catholic eclecticism, assumed that torture of the body was linked “hermeneutically to the truth … [and used] torment and corporal suffering and pain to exact the truth” (1999:18).

In addition, because pain was viewed as a cure for evil, "the penitent, who flailed his skin … to the point of intense pain … removed … shame … humiliation … and isolation" that came from evil-doing (Glucklich, 2001:178). The pain of penance reintegrated the suffering body into the community and thus was experienced as a reduction from the isolation of sin. Cicero advocated this embodied approach to learning and reintegration, claiming that, “we ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest to memory... images ...that [are] doing something (agentes)” (quoted in Enders, 1999:67). Following this line of thought I suggest that he seeks images that have agency. That is, medieval images (living and artistic) not only re-membered acts like the Crucifixion, but also transformed or gave agency through the memory of past pain and lived painful existence. 50 For example, the witnesses at the foot of the cross in Grunewald's painting all reach toward Jesus, willing the sense of close contact (touch, taste and smell) with his broken and bleeding body. While in contemporary thought this longing for close contact sense between open bodies might be considered excessive, within medieval thought this form of sense contact was believed to be, not only necessary but also, the ‘proper order’ for social relations, community and God. Furthermore, figural and incarnational interpretations meant that paintings assisted in transforming bodies in the sense of rejoining the totality of the community and reminding people of the memory of future pain and violence before the final arrival of the resurrection and kingdom of Heaven. Within this medieval worldview, memory that is painfully marked on the body, such as

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50 Using the term re-membered signifies that the act of remembrance is a mental activity but it is also a reassembling of body parts of association (Enders, 1999:60-70)
during the Inquisition, conflates past, present and future both literally and symbolically, allowing for the transformation of the body in the process. Consequently pain was persuasive and dramatic because it was violent and it literally, symbolically and carnally, cut or incised the memory of the *habitus* into the body (Enders, 1999:66-69).

Paintings such as Grunewald's and other religious teaching tools were not just representations of the pain and suffering of the Christ story but reinforced the embodied concept of painful charity and feedback loops of what 'ought to be'. Embodied experience expected this kind of depiction, and this type of depiction encouraged medieval people to mediate their corporeal world through pain. The collective social imagining of the suffering body's abject pain demanded the detailed representation of blood, flesh, and spiritual anguish both in art and in life. As Merback notes, “pain ... though ugly to behold ... revealed the inner beauty of the soul that had made its peace with God” (1999:20). Consequently the temporal flow of the Volatile Catholic ideal type body is grounded in bodily experiences of living, seeing and imagining competing narratives of painful justice (deterrent and cure) framed in a practice of imitating Christ's pain and death - rather than his life. Within daily life people followed a religious requirement to value painful suffering and a sense of humility and gratitude, gave pain meaning. The body-in-pain was a necessary attribute on the path towards redemption and salvation (Merback, 1999:157).

As these texts, trial by ordeal, execution narratives, artefacts and artworks all illuminate pain was accepted as a legitimate part of knowing the body, the world and God. The body was not a source of distrust nor was it a problem to be managed (Turner, 1984). In the medieval *habitus* the fleshy and incarnational communication of information through the ‘thinking body’ was integral to everyday life; despite becoming suspect in later eras. The consequence of these components of the ideal type means that developing inventions to completely eliminate pain (rather than merely relieving it to allow healing), such as anaesthesia, were not a priority. As Tertullian argued, “the leg feels no pain in its tendon, when the soul is in heaven” (quoted in Bynum, 1995:45). Thus, the Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain is an ideal type that links a this-worldly God, carnal knowing, and open bodies with transformative potential and pain as a valued pedagogical technique.

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51 The Inquisition was a judicial institution established by the papacy in the Middle Ages, charged with trying and sentencing persons guilty of heresy (www.encarta.msm.com/encyclopedia.)
Tensions that were an Impetus for Change

As an ideal type, the Volatile Catholic Body gives certain coherence to the idea of Valued Embodied Pain. However, the everyday reality of life within the medieval era was complex and the location of the "sacred expressed a tension between the productive activity of humans and the ‘glorious consumption’ of a religious order of meaning which was both transcendent in its cosmic scope and immanent in the bodies of humans” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155) and artefacts. The body-in-pain was one element which contributed to these contradictions, and this facilitated innovation and an impetus for change. For example, medieval Catholicism contained the dialectic between bodily suffering [destruction] and the restoration of the unblemished body on the Day of Judgement which blurred the distinctions between the material and the spiritual, the soul and the body” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:68).

This meant that while pain and the wounded body had the ability to achieve union with Christ; it was also believed that it was the unblemished body that was resurrected at death. These contradictory elements mitigated against a stable and coherent understanding of bodily security.

To manage these tensions the Church attempted to curb any enthusiasm for bodily destruction and dismemberment, so that it could more tightly control the symbolism of salvation with wholeness and the symbolism of damnation with decay. To achieve this Pope Boniface VIII’s decree Detestande Feritatis of 1299 forbid the division of a corpse because it was argued that only an intact body could be resurrected (Bynum, 1992:269). However, fragmentation of the body, sensory and incarnational forms of embodied sociality (as far as both the laity and Kings and Queens were concerned) persisted for sometime after theological doctrinal coherence was structured (Bynum, 1992:270-271). Nevertheless it was these types of instabilities, tensions and contradictions, both in practice and in doctrine which eventually allowed room for new formations of the body in which the physical, literal, and allegorical sources of knowledge were considered less important than symbolic sources. Kobialka (1999) is one scholar who argues that the 12th Lateran Council created room for this approach. This approach was eventually developed and furthered by the Protestant reformers and alongside other factors resulted in an incarnational, that is, carnal, way of knowing to giving way to cognitive apprehension as the route to valid knowledge. This is discussed further in the next chapter.
Conclusion

Mellor and Shilling begin their analysis of key re-formations of forms of embodied sociality and knowledge in the Catholic and Medieval era, where the Volatile Catholic Body (ideal type) was immersed in a web of obligations and communally generated meaningful rituals. The Volatile Body ideal type was open to the sacred within the bonds of communal effervescence, sensual solidarities and a marked pluralism that was to a large extent contained within the corporeal unity promoted by Catholicism through the sacraments and Passion of Christ. Within this community then, ritual and bodies-in-pain were considered the medium through which people experienced, talked about and became reconciled with the Will of God. In this way a symbiotic relationship evolved in which identity was shaped by a communal approach to the beliefs and values of medieval Catholicism. In turn medieval Catholicism was shaped by the communally generated ritualised bodily interaction and ties to the group. This shaping produced a *habitus* in which one's identity was considered to be carnally ‘in touch’ with the sacred (the Catholic Church as the body of Christ), the community and the body.

The opening of the Volatile (Catholic) Body ideal type within a medieval *habitus* results in an ideal type that is based on embodied corporeal and multiple sensorial routes to knowledge and participatory action within communities, which are physically embodied in a union with Christ. The Volatile Body and the dimension of Valued Embodied Pain provides a different insight into an active and present God, a particular embodied sociality and carnal routes to knowledge. More specifically, because pain engaged with a united body and soul, (and therefore, is as it ‘ought to be’), it reveals that the suffering body-in-pain was valued as a pedagogical technique. Despite many and varied tensions and contradictions within the Catholic medieval *habitus*, the ideal type of the Valued Embodied Pain stabilises within a transformative pedagogical performance. This performance, while not uncontested, was valued for what it taught, what it signalled and for what it produced. Thus, explicit acts, collective representations, and images of pain and suffering all promoted relational feedback loops in which pain, blood, gore, and suffering bodies were normalised and central to living the Faith. In later chapters I will compare and contrast these aspects of the Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain to examine what has remained from this Volatile and Valued approach to bodies-in-pain in the contemporary era. Hence, for analytical purposes and immediate reference, I have summarised the key components that influenced bodies-in-pain in this
Volatile Body ideal type in the following chart:

**Table 2.1 Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Volatile Catholic Body**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes to Knowledge</th>
<th>Routes to Embodied Sociality/Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God dwelt and actively intervened in this world and within the body, as expressed</td>
<td>Incarnational experience: Lived bodies and action activating the faith were required and the world/body was known simultaneously as literal and allegorical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in divine order. The search for knowledge was confined to that which supported faith.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words Made Flesh: People were responsive active participants in ritual that engaged with their surroundings and experience, literally and symbolically.</td>
<td>Carnal relationships with the world yielded knowledge. Communities of knowledge acquired understanding through images, oral traditions, bodies, action and ritual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived ritual was performed and resulted in reformation of material and sacred objects. Bodily integrity and instability resulted in contradictory positions and responsive uncertainty.</td>
<td>Pain was accepted as communicative, natural and meaningful as well as potentially reformative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously before the contemporary implications can be analysed there is first a need to discover how, both in practice and in doctrine, a medieval Catholic form of embodied sociality and knowledge was able to re-form. Therefore in the next chapter I will examine what happened to Value Embodied Pain when the Protestant Re-formers relocated God from a ‘this-worldly’ locality to a sublime ‘other-worldly’ location?
CHAPTER THREE

PROTESTANT SINFUL BODY: ANAESTHETISED PAIN

“God is no longer immanent within a magical unpredictable world, but was radically transcendent of His fallen creation” (Berger quoted in Mellor and Shilling, 1997:106).

The previous chapter outlined the Volatile Body and the prioritised bodily aspect entitled Valued Embodied Pain. This is an important aspect because it demonstrated the significance of the Volatile Body: Valued Embodied Pain as a collective representation that was embodied as a pedagogical technique. The aim in the current chapter is to show that Mellor and Shilling’s ideal-typical analysis of the Protestant re-formation of the Medieval Catholic Body is a useful foundation upon which to develop a comparative ideal type of bodies-in-pain. In order to accomplish this I locate this chapter within Mellor and Shilling’s ideal-typical analysis of the early modern Protestant reformer’s re-location of the sacred and changing forms of embodied sociality and knowledge, which they entitle Sinful Body, Profane Associations (hereafter Sinful Body). Drawing from this area of their study and supplementing it with different primary and secondary research on the body in pain, again I focus on the painful aspect of the sensory body in order to systemise the dominant interpretations of pain relevant to the Protestant re-formation of the body. I have entitled this aspect of the Sinful Body: Anaesthetised Pain (hereafter Anaesthetised Pain).

This apparent contradiction in terms (pain and insensitivity to pain) is significant because it demonstrates the inherent tensions and intellectual somersaults made possible by the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing changes which loosened the body from its corporeal and carnal existence. Furthermore using the term Anaesthetised Pain may appear to be anachronistic given that anaesthesia was not invented until approximately 1840. Nevertheless I use the term to indicate the tendency of the Protestant framing of bodies-in-pain which created a habitus that allowed the invention and widespread use of such technology. I also argue that over time the pursuit of a pain-free body became a moral imperative. In so doing, I trace the way in which changing Christian framings of pain altered the way in which the body could be, and should be, read. These shifting boundaries resulted in the body becoming isolated, more disciplined, idealised and revered when beautifully unblemished. This bodily orientation is illustrated in Salvador Dali’s painting Corpus Hypercubicus (1954).
Within Dali’s *Corpus Hypercubicus*, Christ’s body not only loses the pain and gore as represented in Grunewald’s ‘palatable unbearable’ iconic form of painful death and suffering but also loses its transformative lesson. In this painting the sacred rotates into space and relocates into an ‘other worldly’ sphere where the crucified body of Christ, devoid of any evidence of his prior week of bodily violence and agonising death on the cross, is an object of beauty – a perfect aesthetic body in a state of anaesthetisation. Dali’s representation of the *Crucifixion* is both above and independent of the traditional grounded position of the cross and is a “shift from a ritual form to a perspective mode of vision” (Lemakis, 1990:14). In this perspective Christ’s body transcends both the painting and the viewer’s world and in this way alters the viewer’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship with Christ to a perspective that is more narrative-like and temporal.
In this narrative Christ, both physically and metaphorically turns away from the viewers (both inside and outside the painting) discouraging any physical or sensual interaction. This ruptures the close contact links between the sacred, the community and the body and this “psychologically distance[s]” the viewer (Lemakis, 1990:15) from Christ through forms of cognitive apprehension which in turn support a “self-consciously critical observer of an independent action existing in its own time and place” (Lemakis, 1990:15). Yet, as far as the contemporary viewer is concerned, this painting is ‘hailed’ as a legitimate portrayal of the Crucified Christ and the ‘ignominious torture’ and painful ordeal that he suffered. In this respect I would argue that the representation of pain (or lack of it) as seen in Dali’s painting can be understood in relation to the re-formation of forms of embodied socialities and knowledge that came with the Renaissance, the series of reformations that made up the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment project.

In order to demonstrate the way in which these re-formations developed I begin my ideal typical analyses in two ways. Firstly, drawing from Mellor and Shilling, I introduce the way in which the sacred relocated and the way in which the routes to embodied knowledge and sociality re-formed. This will reveal how this shift first created, and then precariously stabilised, ties to a Protestant community. Secondly I consider the way in which this relocation not only supported particular moral interventions but also resulted in changing interpretations of the body and its role in society in general and bodies-in-pain in particular. As in the previous chapter I begin this analysis with a brief introduction and accomplish the aims of this chapter by building and developing the ideal type in three steps. Using Mellor and Shilling’s study as the foundation the first two steps build upon this work and the third step is my systemisation and account of bodies-in-pain.

1. An Abstracted God, Imagined Worlds and Cognitive Apprehension;
2. Human Intervention and the Creation of a New World; and
3. Discipline and the Body; Conquered and Anaesthetised Pain.

Re-locating God

According to Mellor and Shilling (1997), a second major re-formation of embodied sociality and routes to knowledge was due, in part, to the Protestant Reformation and the Reformers’ insistence that God could, and should, be directly apprehended through scripture, not through ritual, religious bodily
practice or the Church. This placed Protestants in a highly abstract relationship with God who was located outside this profane world. This distancing of God from the profane physical world and of people from a sensory experience of God had a number of consequences for everyday life, including the distancing of knowledge and sociality from the close contact senses of the sensory and communal body. In this light, the term “profanation of society” came to mean that the “sacred was ... removed from large areas of the social and natural worlds ... [and] to some extent this changed its nature” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:106). This concept is exemplified in Dali’s Corpus Hypercubicus (fig. 3.1).

Based on these changing sensibilities and the severing of particular social bonds (as discussed in the previous chapter), Mellor and Shilling constructed the ideal type, which they label the Protestant Sinful Body. Because the purpose of an ideal type is to make distinctions clear, this ideal type emphasises how Protestantism re-formed medieval Catholic routes to embodied sociality and knowledge. Yet, as Marshall argues, the Re-formation was not a triumph of an uncontested singular viewpoint. It was a variety of developments and a re-formed worldview that supported private choice (see Marshall, 2003:114-117). Therefore, rather than describe all the possibilities supported by the new framework, the effects and characteristics of the Sinful Body ideal type can be summarised, for purely analytical purposes and immediate reference, in the following table:

**Table 3.1 Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Sinful Protestant Body**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes to Knowledge</th>
<th>Routes to Embodied Sociality/Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An abstract God dwells in a perfect external (otherworldly) imagined world.</td>
<td>Human intervention into the imperfect profane world is through social control and regulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive apprehension is through discursive symbols, not lived experience.</td>
<td>Importance of text (in particular scripture) and a devaluing of oral traditions and image-based communication, and support for individual choice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A negation and devaluation of physical relationships with the mundane world, including the body and thereby distancing of physical sensations, and elevation of sight as an ‘uncontaminated’ form of perception.</td>
<td>Silencing and removal of pain through anaesthetisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table emphasises that which distinguishes this ideal type from its predecessor. It does not imply that the two ideal types were polar opposites or a dualism. Mellor and Shilling stress that their ideal types are re-formations of emphasis, rather than fundamental breaks with the past. In this re-formed Protestant-inspired ideal type then, spirit was separated from matter, knowledge from action and mind from body. Moreover the routes to embodied sociality that accompanied this form of knowledge acquisition was separated off from the sensory body and given an apparent independent identity. These re-formations in emphasis will be explored in more depth in the following sections.

An Abstracted God, Imagined Worlds and Cognitive Apprehension

Mellor and Shilling argue that Protestantism “abstracted religion from” people’s sensory experience of the sacred in their everyday environment (1997:103). This abstraction or relocation of the sacred not only dislocated faith and reason from flesh and blood communities but also from the enchantment of cyclical sacramental rituals encountered through the collective effervescence of passionate sinful bodies. Within this fundamental shift “the sacred, the very essence of religion” (1997:106) was transformed into a sublime disembodied transcendence. This relocation of the sacred resulted in two separate worlds - the sacred world (other worldly) and the profane world (this worldly) - and they were “in conflict with each other” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107). Life for the Protestant believer was both an external activity that sought to control and discipline an anxious sinful body and fearful others. It was also an inner search for the perfection of God, which was expressed as cognitive ideals (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103-7).

Drawing on Anderson’s notion of “imagined community”, although not the link he makes with secularisation, Mellor and Shilling note that because Protestantism promoted abstraction and the seeking of ideal states, profane associations among Protestants were “imagined” to be connected with ideal communities of faith (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:111). Aspects of the world that were “imagined” and “centred upon language and faith” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:111) were prioritised over the world as ‘sensed’ through close contact. This “stimulated a common cognitive idea of Protestant sociality as the ideal model of association” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:111). This included “people living within [clearly defined boundaries] and those existing, as strangers and demons, outside those Protestant boundaries” (1997:111). According to Bataille a consequence of this was that a “sensual separation of people minimises what they have in common
and emphasises their isolation as individuals” (quoted in Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103).

Dali’s *Corpus Hypercubicus* (Fig. 3.1) depicts these themes. In his publication, the *Mystic Manifesto*, he wrote that he wanted his depiction to be the most aesthetically beautiful Christ that had ever been painted. As Dali explains it, his Christ “is the absolute antithesis of the materialist and savagely anti-mystical Christ of Grunewald” (quoted in Moorhouse, 2002:102). For that reason Dali represents Christ as the perfect male form – “a perfect incarnation unblemished by wounds or bodily hair” and removed from any form of pain or suffering. Dali also maintained that he was the “saviour of Modern Art”. He stated he was the only artist capable of sublimating, integrating and rationalising imperially and beautifully all the revolutionary experiments of modern times, in the great classical tradition of realism and mysticism (quoted in Moorhouse, 2002:102).

Thus in *Corpus Hypercubicus* Dali depicts the witness, alone, isolated and separated from both community and God. Mellor and Shilling argue that in a Protestant *habitus* “the melancholic personality is explicitly related to a concept of the sublime precisely because of the vast gulf between the sublime and the painful, lonely and finite world of humans” (1997:107). Rather than a sensorial bodily experience of daily life the prioritisation of cognitive ideals, mainly apprehended through the written Word, led to an elevation of the importance of discursive symbols as routes to knowledge. For example, Luther obscured the *figura* of the Eucharist. He claimed that although “Christ [was] present ... he was not physically present in the ... substance of the bread and wine” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:102). Zwingli (1484–1531), a Swiss Reformer, developed the symbolic function of the Eucharist more explicitly. He claimed that it was not “the bread and wine” that alter during the Eucharist, it was “their signification”. “The presence of Christ is ‘spiritual’ and therefore to be experienced psychologically, while the ‘body’ of Christ becomes a mere signifier, a way of speaking” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:102).

This focus on the signification as opposed to the literal transformation of matter downgraded medieval materiality while elevating the commemorative dimension of Protestant religion. Santana (2003:35) argues that a “spiritual rather than a corporeal change creates a very different set of ontological questions” and accordingly Protestant faith became more akin to commemoration rather than performance. Accordingly “the redemptive quality of the Mass was replaced with
a mystic personal relationship with Christ” (Santana, 2003:35). Within this commemorative form of knowledge there is no requirement to include an abject depiction of the Passion on Christ’s body because the crucial link with Christ’s body has re-formed into symbolic value and is understood as the path to salvation. Because this pathway was between the individual and God and had no physical community referent Dali was enabled to signify this individualised relationship with God in his depiction of a single human as witness to Christ’s death. The witness is not depicted as physically reaching out to Christ as did the witnesses in medieval paintings (Fig 2.1). Instead she is alone, distanced and dwarfed by the monumental awesomeness of a sublime Crucified Christ. Christ is no longer the mediator in ‘this world’ but is relocated to an ‘other-worldly’ location; his witness is isolated in a profane ‘imagined community of faith’ rather than in a sacred world as sensually shared through ritual and collective effervescence. She no longer knows the sacred through the close contact senses of the sensory body but through the rationality of discursive symbolisation and ‘faith alone’.

This distancing and estrangement from God, from each other and from the close-contact senses, that is in this ‘profanisation’ of aspects of daily life, the link between God’s divine will and earthly relational actions, were detached. This meant that social action, such as “religious practice, [came to be] understood as ‘applied religion’ rather than an expression of its essence” or inner meaning in everyday life (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107). Knowledge and action were not incarnational nor were they a figura. Paintings, images and rituals did not make promises about the Christian future. This is illustrated in Dali’s portrayal of a profiled Christ, the loss of close bodily contact and participatory pedagogical techniques. Significantly in this reformation images did not strengthen the faith but became idolatrous. While Dali would not have been permitted to paint a representation of the crucified Christ in the Puritan worlds (new or old) of the 1600s, his painting does represent the bodily orientations of their new world.

The Protestant Re-formers progressively dissolved the unity of collective effervescence and the feedback loops inherent in much religious ritual by dislocating and separating people from their “natural, supernatural and social environments” and abstracted people’s understanding and unity with God (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:42). This change in emphasis gradually re-formed the medieval Catholic body by connecting Protestant profane associations that “sought to reconstruct faith” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103) by divorcing mental
states from physical ones. This was done by linking individuals not only through their obedience to a personal interpretation of the Word of God but also through a shared use of linguistic discursive symbols, such as the Bible, covenants, contracts and sermon and execution narratives. In this way “the Protestant body was closed to tradition” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:43). Instead embodied in this *habitus* was a form of sociality and knowledge that included “discursive symbolisation” [that] was closely associated with male authority” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:105) and placed importance on individual reflexivity. Text and preaching became the source for an individual’s sense of choice, belief and self-identity.

A sublime God, a profane world and a reliance on linguistic symbols “encourage[d isolated] estrangement rather than incorporation” and although God existed he escaped “satisfactory representation” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:106). A profane world also encouraged the existence of an autonomous individual subject and the development of scientific knowledge. The purpose of pursuing knowledge which in a Volatile Body had been to serve the faith was loosened from these ties and there was no longer any need to acknowledge the religious consensus regarding human origins. This allowed for a “new social activism” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107) which not only drew attention to the concept of the ‘Protestant Work ethic’ but also to “the doctrine of predestination” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:109) in which one’s fate was already determined by God. This doctrine however did not stop either the Calvinists, or the Puritans, from placing immense value on rational labour (Weber, [ca.1905] 2002:109) and “seeking for signs of election in the fruits of their labour” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:109).

**Human Intervention and the Creation of a New World**

An objectification of the profane environment and a disembodied approach to the sublime meant that the social world encouraged rational individualised human intervention. This included the Protestant Reformer’s moral imperative to reconstruct faith by displacing ritual and the Church’s authority to interpret the Bible. They argued that God’s will was made known through the Bible and as the “inspired Word of God” it could be “validated and interpreted by the power of personal inspiration” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:104). Rather than relying on the Volatile Body that tested knowledge against faith in a framework of what ‘ought to be’, the Puritans actively promoted a more equalised subjective and introspective individual interpretation of the Bible that relied upon reflection and
a framework of ‘correct knowledge’. In this view the sublime sacred became a form of discourse in which the flesh was made Word.

Once the existing conditions were no longer vindicated by divine plan or will and where scripture created a pattern of the ideal and the ability to create it on earth (cognitive powers brought to bear upon material profane objects) a profane world opened up to the plans of humans. This ability to make the public environment profane was signalled by Luther’s interest in the parallel morality of “two [earthly] kingdoms”. The first was “a private Christian ethic based on the doctrine of justification by faith alone” and the second, a “public morality based on coercion” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:145). For example the general assumption that vice and virtue would gain their true deserts acted as a powerful sanction for the morality of the day. Many of the blatant examples of Puritan intolerance are to be explained by the firm conviction of the godly that everyone would suffer if action was not taken on God’s behalf against ... whoever his enemies might be (Thomas, 1971:92).

A human re-making of the world grounded in ‘correct knowledge’ was not merely possible but, as Weber, ([ca.1905] 2002:xl) argued, it was vital in order to sustain an adherence to a pious “inner-worldly asceticism” when living in a rational secular world. Intervention in this environment became a moral imperative.

In order to acquire ‘correct knowledge’ an individual interpretation was accompanied by an emphasis on the need to identify “authentic and inauthentic” doctrine (1997:109). Therefore despite creating an appearance of freedom of interpretation, the theme of authenticity was a tool the Reformers used to control discursive consistency. This was achieved by professionalising the clergy and appointing ministers who became part of the social elite, rather than part of the sacred (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:104). Evidence of this form of control is demonstrated in the Antinomian controversy which developed in Massachusetts Bay Colony, New England where local Puritan ministers (despite supporting personal interpretation based on scripture) banned Anne Hutchinson’s bible-study groups. Hutchinson’s teachings incorporated tenets from the highly respected Puritan Reverent John Cotton and Reverent John Wheelwright’s sermons. However once she questioned the teachings of Reverent Wilson and began dividing the Boston congregations (Battis, 1962:107) Hutchinson was charged with advocating ‘inauthentic’ readings of scripture. It was argued that she was teaching the covenant of “free grace and the indwelling of the Holy
Reverend Wilson and Governor Winthrop reacted against this doctrine claiming that she was the “breeder” of the Antinomians – a minority sect (Battis, 1962:249). There had been no formal organisation to disseminate or enforce the acceptance of Hutchinson’s teachings but by 1638 she had been tried, excommunicated and banished from the colony as a “heathen ... a Publican and ... as a Leper” (Wilson quoted in Battis, 1962:247). According to Governor John Winthrop Hutchinson’s ‘inauthentic’ teachings were “above reason and Scripture” and had “threatened the continued existence of the social structure which he and his fellows had so painstakingly wrought out of the wilderness” (Battis, 1962:286).

Believing ‘Old’ England and Europe to be “a church half-reformed” (Marshall, 2003:119) many Puritans felt compelled to literally re-make or improve the world by creating a New England (in the US) out of the wilderness. Therefore for a time in the colonised parts of the US, Puritan thought, in an institutional sense, gained dominance. Thus initial religious purity, conformity to Puritan doctrine and a determined pursuit of signs of the elect gave a greater entrenchment and codified place to Puritanism in the founding of the US than took place in many other countries. This resulted in the institutionalisation of a profane pattern of individualised associations. That is, while there was a shared sense of identity through a sense of joint faith, in theory at least, individuals were empowered to individually interpret their place in God's world. This entailed a commitment to beliefs through reflexivity and rational calculation (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:156), which resulted in a specifically cognitive dimension to people's experience at the expense of the sensory body, religious ritual and communal relationships. It was an ideal typical shift from a “sacred-communal” form of sociality (Gemeinschaft) to “secular-associational” (Gesellschaft) form of sociality (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:14).

This element of rational calculation was taken further during the Enlightenment and modernity. Latour describes this process very insightfully. He claims that to be ‘modern’ involves a specific approach to scientific discovery and an equally blinkered approach to other forms of analysis. Latour notes that scientific

52 Johann Agricola (1494-1566) developed the Antinomian (Greek anti, “against”; nomos, “law”) beliefs founded on the “mystical tenets of Luther”. Agricola preached that God’s “grace freed the faithful from legalistic obedience to civil laws”. The Antinomians also believed that the “good life did not come from simple obedience but from the Inner workings of the Holy Spirit which progressively reforms the individual until the attributes of God becomes the individual’s attributes. The Holy Spirit harmonises and makes humans one with the divine” (Rust, 2004:85).
endeavour is focused on separating phenomena into two “ontological zones” (Latour, 1993:10). One of these zones was defined as ‘nature’ and the other, ‘culture’. The purpose of defining phenomena in this way was to identify which laws should be applied in order to control such phenomena. On the one hand, objects in the zone of ‘nature’ were controlled by laws that existed regardless of human understanding. Controlling ‘nature’ could only be done by identifying and working with these laws. On the other hand, as ‘man’ created the laws of ‘culture’ or ‘society’, the laws could be controlled and even eliminated through human will (Latour, 1993:35).

Moderns believed this approach would free society from myth, fiction, and superstition by correctly identifying to which zone a phenomenon belonged. Latour calls this the “process of purification” (Latour, 1993). Early moderns made a number of useful scientific discoveries using this framework. Over time, this dualistic thinking solidified into hierarchical organised and self-defining pairs, such as good and bad, mind and body, man and woman, pain-free and painful. What moderns systematically ignore is that not all phenomena can be easily ‘purified’. For example, is God part of ‘nature’ and therefore his laws will continue regardless of mankind’s acknowledgement, or is He part of ‘society’ in which case humans are capable of killing him and living without religious/Christian belief? Furthermore, the body is not entirely natural and neither is the mind entirely social. For example, the blinking eyes and movement of the jaw after a painless guillotine death (Smith, 2003:39) led to the questioning of whether, or not, pain was natural (which was not possible if the body was dead) or social (again not possible if the body was dead). Accordingly these inconsistencies threatened to destabilise the framework and as a result they needed to be managed. This could be done because Western society (for a period of time) was increasingly focused on the communicative power of discourse, and in discourse challenges can be silenced.

Discourse is the notion that underlying the ability to perceive meaning from words (linguistic symbols) are “historically produced, loosely structured, combinations of concerns, concepts and themes … termed discourse formations” (Marshall, 1994:125). These formations construct ‘natural associations’ between words and ideas, beyond dictionary definitions of the words themselves, for example, the association between dark, evil, black and gothic. These associations were sustainable because they implied an opposite duality – light, white good, and modern. Inherent in these discursive formations is not only the
construction of ideas as opposites (which may not necessarily be opposites), such as mind and body, but also over time superior qualities were attributed to one side of the dualisms and inferiority to the other. In this way 'mind', for example, came to dominate 'body'. Linguistically this means whenever the word 'mind' is used its opposite is immediately referenced but subordinated.\textsuperscript{53}

This subordination became “violent” (Derrida, 1981:41) because it was through control of these linguistic hierarchies that the re-formed society’s difference and superiority to demons and others (usually ethnic minorities) was demonstrated. Any evidence to the contrary and any negative sides of the dualisms that defied control were removed, marginalised or silenced.\textsuperscript{54} Control of phenomena could also be achieved by equating them with negativity and as a result a tendency to create negative binary opposites was particularly acute in Puritan times. Negativity was a “rhythm of affirming by denying, distinguishing and clarifying by negating” (Ingebretsen (1996:19).

Thus while Enlightenment thought and the beginnings of the moderns believed they were carving out a freedom for knowledge from “human prejudice” (Latour, 1993:35), the processes of purification could be understood as a restatement of Puritan modes of thought. While some moderns defined God as being on the ‘society’ side of the dualism, Latour claims the critical power of the modern stance was in its ability to ‘bracket’ God for use on either side of the dichotomy depending on the usefulness of the concept (or individual belief) (Latour, 1993:41). In sum Puritans and Enlightenment thinkers “reject[ed] [the] embodied immanence” of God or the sacred (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155). Instead, as God became “bracketed” (Latour, 1993:35), the Puritan need to control evil and sin encouraged control of nature and matter through the processes of purification which silenced, rather than eliminated, God from the public world. This led to a “moral imperative” which glorified active involvement in “labour” and “production”, and also glorified individuality within the “symbolic associations” of community and the “self-made man” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155). The need to intervene, to create the perfect Puritan world, manifested itself in several ways.

\textsuperscript{53} See Salmon (1983) for an in-depth linguistically-focused explanation of this approach.  
\textsuperscript{54} Marginalisation occurred only as a concession to the negotiation of hegemony.
Human Intervention Requires Discipline

Controlling this potential division between superior and inferior and achieving the moral imperative to intervene and create a superior new world was actualised through discipline and control of society. For example, in order to create a disciplined society a number of Discipline Ordinances were passed. They were enforced by Discipline Courts which were established with “evangelical fervour” and sought to control every aspect of human affairs (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107). In New England these included the length of a man’s hair, the type of leisure pursuits, appropriate and controlled behaviour in public places (DelVecchio, 1996:124-128). Ordinances, both in the United States and in Europe, moved into spheres of life in which discipline and church, or state control, had previously been absent. For example, “church attendance became a legal matter” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107) which was much to Anne Hutchinson’s detriment (this will be discussed later in this chapter). The Puritan insistence on church attendance consolidated the significance of sermons. Sermons were a pedagogical technique which made reflexivity and cognitive apprehension critical to understanding the faith and a means to encourage a “righteous relationship with God” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:108). Strict enforcement accompanied the Discipline Ordinances so as “to create a republic prostrate before God” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:107-8). This meant that even though the institutional legitimacy of the Catholic Church was questioned, the focus on personal scriptural inspiration did not release people from Church control. Over time the law courts and police took up this role which was slowly being vacated by Ministers in their shepherding of the faithful toward correct living. This prescriptive legal approach was legitimised because laws were based on scripture (Word) of God.

At first scripture was used to justify what was prohibited, but Zwingli took a more proactive approach. He believed that the law not only curbs sin but also “reveals God’s will”, therefore the law and the gospel were united (Stephens, 2004:98). This meant that unless conduct was sanctified in scripture it should be prohibited. Therefore initially, at least, legal authority derived its legitimacy directly from the Word. As more and more everyday (profane) actions were understood as mundane events (and religion became more personalised) the legal apparatus continued to control individual’s lives (in ‘civilised’ parts) of society. In the US the rule of law became a sign of the civilised society, as the concepts of ‘civilised/law abiding’ and ‘God-fearing ‘collapsed into one discursive formation. This supported comments made by clergy against the Irish, Indians and the Western frontier. Moreover the association of law, or discipline, with
civilisation was a pattern repeated in Europe. Over time, legal authority became legitimising, whether or not the same faith in scripture sustained the already existing (scripturally inspired) laws.

**Discipline and the Body**

Discipline and legal control began to colonise the body. Puritan approaches to the body differed from the Volatile body, because God no longer communicated through the body and as a result the body was closed to tradition. This meant that tight control of the body in Puritan times was required in order to repel bodily sin because a disembodied sublime God did not communicate through the body; consequently Puritans closed the close contact senses to signs of the sacred. This was because their moral approach in discourse either framed the body as an indicator of moral worth or as a literal pathway for temptation. This tight control of the body is often interpreted by modern scholars as a dislike, disregard or disinterest in the body. However, incorporating aspects from Foucault and Freud's theories, DelVecchio argues that the Puritan's relationship with the body was one of “fascination” and “obsession” and this was based on an “ambivalence ... [between] a love of, [and a fear of,] the body” (1996:5-6). The foundation of this “obsession” was grounded in the idea that the soul was housed in the body and could tempt the soul to sin. As Calvin “taught the body reflected the state of the soul - [it] revealed signs of the souls state of depravity” (DelVecchio, 1996:4). Ingebretsen contends that “one’s soul was, in a manner of speaking, potentially monstrous and always on display; the prospects of its conversion and mystical effacement in God would always be a spectacle” (1996:xv). Unlike the medieval idea that claimed the fusion of body and soul was ‘what ought to be’ (perfect) the Protestant believed that the soul and body were separable because the soul was sacred and the body was profane. The body was considered a container for a soul. Thomas Hooker (1637), a Puritan Minister, preached that “the Lord emptie you, that Christ may fill you, the Lord humble you, that you may enjoy happinesse” (quoted in Reis, 1991:18). This separate but potentially contaminating view of the body and soul gave the body a significant role in preparation for the covenant to be made with Christ, the ultimate fulfilment of God’s will. The idea that souls voluntarily made covenants with Christ has been termed Covenant theology and (although not as harsh as in orthodox Calvinism) it is the cornerstone of American Puritanism (Reis, 1991).

Thomas Sheppard, also a Puritan Minister, mixed the symbolic (as opposed to carnal) with the idea of marriage to describe the permanence of a covenant with
God (Hall, 2004:37). He states, “no sin shall part thee and him, for Christ when he enters into marriage covenant does not suspend his love on our Grace” (quoted in Reis, 1991:18). For the Puritan then it was essential to engage in activities (works) that would satisfy divine law and to prepare the body for the covenant of Grace which allowed one to obtain salvation. To uphold these covenants and hold fast to one’s faith it was believed that physical well-being was an indispensible aspect. Ingebretsen (1996:19) argues that the centrality of these covenants to the faith set up “crisis [as] the social norm” because weaker bodily vessels, not properly prepared, could mistakenly make a covenant or pact with the Devil instead of with Christ. Hence the believer could perpetuate a reoccurring cycle of assurance, doubt, condemnation and renewed conversion in which the body became either a sign or an indicator of one’s relationship with Christ or a source for temptation and depravity.

The Body as Indicator of Saint or Sinner
As an empty vessel the body’s internal (soul) could shape its external (flesh), and thus become indicative of moral worthiness or sin. The ability of people to control their outward appearance became a sign of whether a person could, or could not, control themselves and consequently control the choice of covenant with Christ or the Devil. For example, Samuel Willard preached that it was possible to be “filled brim-full in soul and body with the [sin of] … wrath” (quoted in Reis, 1991:23) and that this could be visibly seen on the body. These views were similar to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, which stated “the Devil doth thrust them … into wretchlessness of most unclean living” (quoted in Marshall, 2003:129). These signs of sin were taken a step further when combined with Enlightenment science and often came to form the basis of theories such as those of Lombroso, an early criminologist (Lombroso [1876], (trans) Gibson and Rafter, 2006).

Lombroso measured the skulls and facial features of convicted criminals to statistically verify (through direct observation and measurement (empirical science)) that the body was imprinted with visible signs of sin/criminality. Broca (1862) also maintained that the European brain size had increased “between two epochs” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:153). The fusion between the idea of sin, the body’s form and criminality was also becoming stronger as the Discipline Ordinances conflated transgressions of appearance with signs of taking the wide path to Hell, that is, the path to criminality.
In contrast to signs of criminality on the body, the love of the body was fuelled by its ability to show signs of being among the elect. The elect were those who were chosen by God, before the time of Adam, to have a place in Heaven. This doctrine of pre-destination altered one’s relationship with Christ. Christ died for all our sins, but would only intercede on behalf of the elect in ensuring their selection for Heaven. While Credal Calvinists were those who believed the elect would ascend to Heaven, experimental Calvinists believed that “even those who seemed irreproachably godly might in reality be reprobates and fall away before the end” (Marshall, 2003:130). This doctrine meant that the experimental Calvinists became particularly concerned with the identity of the elect, and signs of their chosen-ness in this world (see Marshall, 2003:126-142).

DelVecchio (1996:74) argues that this role of the body in revealing election meant the body was not only taken as sign but as signifier. In its role as signifier the body had to be maintained and controlled to fulfil its role in the world, and people had to be seen to be making an effort to ensure that their appearance and their body were appropriate for God’s grace. Although the definition of appropriate appearance was debated, for example, the male wearing of wigs and the feminine display of flesh, agreement on the importance of the preparation of the body and its carriage for God was stressed within the Puritan new world. DelVecchio (1996:1) notes that the ability for physical appearance to reveal moral character still persists in contemporary critiques of American leaders. She cites the attention paid to John Kerry’s use of hair gel during the elections for his Governorship. More recently in the 2004 presidential campaign there were media debates and cartoons over “the size of Kerry’s hair” and a focus on Bush’s small stature (Conners, 2005:482). Taking a different perspective and returning to Dali’s painting, the viewer can see the way in which the hair-less and unblemished body of Christ reveal the new association of Christ solely with divinity – a divinity that has a ‘perfect’ (clean) appearance, including the control of his hair.

The first sign of the loss of God’s grace or election, described as a straying from the narrow (and difficult) path to Heaven, and the beginning of a journey on the wide (easy) path to Hell, was to commit a sin (a transgression of the authorities’ rules, derived from scripture). Witches, according to Reis (1991:10), epitomised the full embrace of sin because they had supposedly explicitly signed Satan’s book in blood, a bodily written covenant. Yet, while the witch’s covenant was explicit, sinners and witches were believed to differ only by a “matter of degree”
It was believed that women dominated the ranks of witches and sinners because they had weaker bodies and were less capable of repelling sin. This reflected Luther's view that women should be denied "full and equal membership" into the Church as the body of Christ because of "their overly close association with the body" (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:115). Thus, in being seduced by temptation (no matter how small), one walked the path toward Hell. Reis, (1991:2) argues that temptation often came from Satan who gave evil a human form and was known as the tempter or as the deluder. "Satan could not force one to lead a life of sin he could only tempt" however he could reveal sin through his possession of the body which then "remained barren of all grace and goodness" (Reis, 1991:122).

The Body as Pathway and Source of Temptation

In addition to the indicative use of the body in Protestant/Puritan discourse, the fleshy body itself was not merely a sign of saint or sinner, but also a literal pathway for temptation and an "impediment to the Word of God" (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:123). It was believed that temptations were sent by the Devil through the sensuousness of the close-contact senses of taste, touch and smell. For example, as Lewis Bayly argued in 1622:

> meat and drink are but as Physick, or means, which God hath ordained, to relieve and cure this naturall infirmitie and necessitie of man. Use therefore to eat and to drink, rather to sustain and refresh the weakesse of Nature than to satisfie the sensualitie of delights of the flesh. Eate therefore to live, but live not to eate (quoted in DelVecchio, 1996:126).

While the overarching belief in temptation from the body guided Puritan society, the piety or otherwise of particular 'earthly pleasures' was heavily debated. For example, while sport was at first condemned, when Governor John Winthrop found a correlation between sport and piety it was encouraged. He claimed:

> I grewe unto a great dullnesse and discontent: which being at last perceived, I examined my heart, and findinge it needful to recreate my minde with some outward recreation, I yielded unto it, and by a moderate exercise herein was much refreshed (quoted in DelVecchio, 1996:135).

The awakening of his spiritual commitment after exercise allowed him to claim a lawful reason for it; but only for men. In fact "Mary Leonard of Essex County was fined for watching men (including her sons) swimming" (DelVecchio, 1996:137). Another debated topic was dancing. Despite the religious purpose of sport, dancing was believed to hold no such redemptive feature. “By 1646 the General Court of Massachusetts had enacted a law against dancing” in which it was stated...
“nor shall there be any Dancing in Ordinaries upon any occasion” (quoted in DelVecchio, 1996:140).

In addition to the sensory body being a source of temptation, the open close-contact orifices, such as the nose and mouth (amongst others) were a pathway along which evil could penetrate the body's containment. For example, during the possession of Elizabeth Knapp, Samuel Willard ([1671] 1996:146) wrote “her organs were visibly made use of in order to make her bark like a dog and bleat like a calf”. Willard also claimed that the Devil spoke through her body, and he notes she claimed that the devil entered her body through her mouth. This literal invasion of the body, recognising its physicality, was not encouraged by elite sermons. For example, in his written description of this event, Willard distances himself from Elizabeth’s statement about Satan, by noting that these were “her words” (Willard, [1671], 1996: 150-151).

But to suggest a binary distinction, between elite and laity thought would be inappropriate given the vacillation of various understandings and the changes over time, particularly after the witch-trials ended. Nevertheless, in general, sermons and literature maintained an abstract understanding of the Devil’s role in tempting the body. In contrast the laity maintained a very tangible and corporeal existence with the Devil. Conversion narratives, “the oral testimonies of Puritans seeking church membership”, described “sin as a literal bondage with Satan, ... [who] was not merely a tempter”, but also a possessor of souls (Reis, 1991:9). This meant Satan’s physical and symbolic presence framed action in Puritan America, shaping attitudes on the way in which one managed the body.

Within this milieu Puritan elites did not displace laity understandings of physical bodily Satanic possession because the focus the elite propagated was on the spirituality of the event not on the sensorial bodily impact. For example, “Satan asserted himself most visibly in witchcraft episodes, spiritual bouts that assumed physical shape” (Reis, 1991:4). This physicality and the inability to control non-conformity was a tension that loosened the Puritan grip on the world. However,

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55 These ideas are foundational in the term ‘abjection’ which was coined by Julia Kristeva. Inherent in the abject is the concept that when we are confronted with it, we both fear and identify with it while at the same time we are drawn and repelled by it. The open wound, blood, excrement, and vomit is a biological reaction to it, and terror, horror and adrenalin recognise its presence (Kristeva, 1982:9). Overall “the abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them” (Kristeva, 1982:15).

56 Willard wrote about Elizabeth Knapp’s ‘illnesses’ in his diary. This eventually was sent to Increase Mather. Drawing from Willard’s writing Increase Mather wrote an account of this incident in his Illustrious Providences (see Rust, 2004:130).
the dominant institutional responses to routes to knowledge maintained by ministers and legal authorities was that the physicality and materiality of the body needed to be controlled in order to ensure that it was neither tempted into sin or exhibited to others that it was capable of sin. A healthy body was a sign of moral worth. Thus the perfect body of Christ in Dali’s painting situated well above the temporal world of temptation reinforces divine perfection, turned away from the material world of sin and dis-ease/illness.

**The Importance of Sight**

For the Puritan, contact with the fleshy body was likely to be contaminated by temptation. As a consequence, the distant-contact senses, sight and, sometimes, hearing, were awarded paramount significance because it was believed that perception was not contaminated by contact with the flesh. In this view, the close-contact senses, “touch, taste smell, sight and even hearing” were often pathways to “heretical knowledge” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:134). This distancing created a space in which people could visually and aurally monitor, judge and anticipate natural and social phenomena before making close contact with them. In this way it was soon ‘forgotten’ that sight was a bodily sense. This resulted in a “tendency to conflate ‘seeing’ with ‘knowing’ [for example] when we ask ‘do you see?’ when we mean ‘do you understand?’” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:6). In this way objectivity and scientific methodology focused on observation-based (sight) phenomena and surveillance was common. This placed human perception at the centre “as a sovereign Observer or Judge” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155). In Dali’s painting, for example, this sovereignty is awarded to the viewer who is separated from the narrative and is free to judge or analyse both Christ and the figure (traditionally interpreted as Mary) at his feet.

The distance contact sense of sight, as the determinant of judgement, was of paramount importance because it was through sight that individuals could access the Word/scripture. This sense provided a direct link with the cognitive processes of rationality, reflection and calculation without the contamination from contact with the profane flesh. Words did not need to be made flesh; carnal knowing was no longer significant. The importance of sight elevated the status of visual evidence and writing in particular. It led to the Puritan practice of writing diaries, journals and biographies (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:58-60). It also meant evidence took written form, as laws were published and the Bible, written in the common tongue, was distributed far more widely than in previous
eras. The role of the printing press and increasing literacy aided this importance. In addition, visual images of religion, paintings, stained glass windows and churches built in New England took on a relative degree of plainness. Art and its role in communicating religious messages, in the main, lost its religious function. Art began its division into elite and popular art.

In elite art, paintings became visual records of a man’s acquisitions and property. This recording reinforced his profane social position and status in society (McLuhen, 1996: Video recording). It also displayed his unblemished life/appearance, which had the potential to be interpreted as a sign of election. Thus the body, as a profane object, played an actual and indicative role in living the saintly life and consequently its discipline and control was central to Puritan and Protestant lived experience. As a result, far from achieving the ideal of bodily irrelevance within the ‘profanisation’ of everyday life, the successful control of both profane bodies and other material things became a sign of election. This is because temptation from profane objects like the body could, to a certain extent, be controlled and when they were controlled they often took on symbolic significance. Hence, a type of disciplined obsession developed in which the body was loved for what it could represent, as well as feared, for what it could induce. Thus the two sides of the homo duplex nature were always in constant tension. The Puritan habitus never removed the body but kept it very much alive as a reminder of the ability of the profane to pollute the sacred. The purpose was not, as in medieval times, to cure evil but to repel evil by “cauterising [the cognitive] consciousness” (Halpern, 2002:53-54) into regulating and disciplining itself (through the body) and maintaining its purity. Puritan thought re-formed somatic significance from a carnal route to knowledge to that of engendering threat and fear through cognitive routes to knowledge. This served to compel conversion and at the same time pious Puritans could flaunt the body’s control as a sign of election and godliness. The effect of these influences was the stress put on the importance of scripture, and the importance of discursive symbols apprehended through sight. This symbolic and abstract understanding of the body as a path for, and a sign of, sin had consequences for the moral imperatives that controlled and managed the body-in-pain.  

57 Puritan thought and especially its tight regulation over society eventually gave way to more moderated views. In its moderation it was the elite’s view that focused on a symbolic understanding of sin, the body and the devil that gained greater dominance in the development of American thought. However, extreme versions of the ‘orthodoxy’ serve to strengthen the development of the ideal type, and marking the boundaries of acceptable belief and behaviour.
Conquered and Anaesthetised Pain

Within this Sinful Body there was a moral imperative to control the body in order to ensure that its potential for dual signification (sign of election or sinner) showed only the signs of election. However the body was classified as profane, hence pain had no sacred meaning. The body was a transmitter of temptation, and therefore the body’s communication, especially when further weakened by pain, was not to be trusted. As a result, the suffering and infliction of pain, at an institutional level, had no purpose.

For the pious minority, pain and illness remained an infliction from God, a sign of sin and therefore a time to rethink one’s relationship with God. However, this offered no consolation from suffering. The religious poetry of Anne Bradstreet and the sermons of Cotton Mather were commentaries on the way in which individual wilfulness and disobedience was responsible for deserved painful punishment. They also clarified the idea that a searing consciousness, based on guilt, was the best strategy for ensuring the reduction of and thereby future pain. For example Cotton Mather wrote, “Sickness is to awaken our Concern, first, for the Pardon of the Maladies in our Souls” (quoted in Caton, 1989:494). This meant that the meaning of pain shifted from its medieval moral imperative to identify with the suffering Christ (and the community) and to learn from pain to ‘seeing’ pain as a condition unrelated to God who was both invisible and unfathomable. This imperative toward pain meant it could only be reduced through God’s (unknowable) predetermined judgement (Halpern, 2002:32).

Luther, in separating people from a Church which had provided comfort from pain, “unleashed an avenging individual conscience” which owed “dual obedience to ... external authorities” and internal “desires” restrained by a “cauterising conscience” (Halpern, 2002:53-54). In this sense God was physically distanced from the individual and this invisibility meant He was “unable to be in any way measured, accounted for or counted on for a response” (Halpern, 2002:36). The effect was to remove a this-worldly justification for pain or a sacred meaning in pain. Pain was no longer able to integrate a sense of community or promise an

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58 Anne Bradstreet (1612-1672) immigrated to America in 1630 as part of the Winthrop Fleet. Her father and her brother were, at different times, governors of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. She was the first women within the colony to have her work published. It has been argued that this was done to show that godly and educated women had no need to compete with men in order to follow their calling (quoted in Henley, 1967). Cotton Mather (1663-1728) was the son of Increase Mather and a third generation minister. Both were influential in both religious and political matters within the Colony and are remember for their executions sermons in relation to the Salem witch trials.
eternal salvation. Even worse, it could also indicate that a sufferer was not amongst the Chosen. In this circumstance, whatever the status of one's personal righteousness, sin was predestined. Salvation could only ever be uncertain, if not unachievable (Halpern, 2002:54).

Despite the doctrine of pre-destination, choice was given paramount significance in sermons because, it was argued, people could either choose to walk the wide path to Hell, make a covenant with the Devil or walk the narrow path of righteousness. Pain as punishment therefore became associated with the ability to control and make ‘correct’ choices. This meant managing pain also became a choice. As healthy bodies were thought to increase faith, it became a moral imperative to ensure the body remained strong and healthy enough to repel sin and disease. This construction of a subjective faith and consequent privatisation, coupled with responsibility for choice, created uncertainty and rendered human suffering “institutionally unprotected and insufficiently justified” (Halpern, 2002:55). In the dualist language of the interventionist-focused Enlightenment, the concept of pain shifted from a shared understanding of social corporeality (which included the mind) to a mysterious individual bodily issue that was apprehended and alleviated through the mind. Morris has called this the “myth of two pains” in which pain was “divided into separate compartments labelled mind and body” (1990:11-12).

In this world of combined Protestant and Enlightenment thought, the unrelieved burden of pain and its decoupling from a sacred commitment damaged its public rationale. Pain became meaningless. It created an anxiety that has negative meaning. This paved the way for modern scientific knowledge to have new power over what they called the ‘natural conditions’ that caused suffering (amongst other things). In this ‘New World’, pain was not irrelevant; but it was no longer a pedagogical technique contributing to the subject’s self understanding or the ability to ascribe meaning. In the absence of meaning, pain became another profane problem to be managed (least it show signs of succumbing to temptation); a natural consequence of having a weak impure body. Therefore, human interventionist thought created a moral obligation to intervene in order to silence pain. Pain required silencing for fear that it weaken the body and send false messages that distracted the mind. The Protestant body-in-pain was not now a sacred pedagogical technique, but an impediment to critical reflection, rational calculation and to the pursuit of God's will.
In the realm of artistic expression, this need to alleviate, manage, and silence pain meant that new material was selected for representation. Crucifixions became examples of the triumph of God-religion-man over the flesh. Dali’s painting is a classic example of the full development of this impetus to idealise Christ, freed of bodily pain or need. He even defies gravity and this reinforces his ‘otherworldly’ status, as a sign that he has overcome matter. In his Apollonian beauty he conforms to the superior sides of dualisms. As early predecessors to the full development of this route to knowledge (as displayed in Dali’s painting), the two examples below are dated from when the Sinful Body was dominant. They retain little of Grunewald’s depiction of the agonised bloodied week of the Passion. The body of Christ becomes less blemished and more isolated from the community.

![Figure 3.2](image-url) (Left) Eugene Delacroix, *The Crucifixion*, Oil on Canvas, 1853. National Gallery, London.

These paintings and others like them rotated the spectacle of Christ’s agony away from the viewer. His body is cleansed of sores, disease and pus. While blood and death may remain, pain and suffering are anaesthetised and gutted of
meaning and no longer hold the viewer to the painting’s surface. Pain without a function is, like the abject body, removed from view. As a result there is a loss of connection between the lived body and the mind, causing a lost connection between the body and the viewer. Thus the ‘I-thou’ relationship is broken and art no longer serves a function (amongst other things) of being a feedback loop that assisted viewers to identify or understand their painful bodies in relation to redemption or salvation.

Instead, science, as the dominant visible route to knowledge became responsible for addressing the issues of bodies-in-pain, as people felt morally compelled to alleviate suffering. However, in an age that prioritised sight and visible signs, the invisibility of pain to the eye, and its reduction in representation, was a problem. Its increasing invisibility made it non-existent from a discursive point of view. Its lack of value and its invisibility decisively changed the way in which it was experienced. This is because the cognitive prioritisation of the Enlightenment re-formation required that phenomena must be acknowledged as present before it could be addressed. Furthermore, the displacement and lack of materiality in the location of God also meant He was no longer visible. The machinations of modern science began to be seen as the visible provider of meaning. In response to this loss of visibility of both God and pain, what Scarry (1985) was to later attribute to the inability in the modern age to share pain, Rousseau tried to moralise about pain from the perspective of the visible spectator. He asked; how are we able to make visible the General Will in order to save people from suffering? However he sought a form of redemption without reference to the sacred (Halpern, 2002:46).

Needing to control and relieve, or eliminate, pain necessitated a new authority/institution to address the issue of moral knowledge and redemption from suffering. According to Halpern (2002:38-39), the family replaced the Church as the institution that regulated private lives. Therefore the previously embodied socialities of sin, punishment, suffering and redemption were relegated to the private sphere and enclosed within the patriarchal organisation of the family. This rendered them almost invisible as far as the public sphere was concerned. “The family became, in a certain sense, the substitute of the whole lost unity of the Christian world” (Halpern, 2002:39). This privatised the

59 The State came to replace the institution of the family; especially in countries like New Zealand where most early immigrants had no family. It also occurred in other countries to a lesser extent (see for example, Dalley and Tennant, 2004).
interpretation of sin and pain and shifted responsibility for pain from the church to the state to the family and the individual. This meant there were no “publicly certified vertical anchor[s]” (such as the frontally displayed vertical anchor of the body on the cross) for explaining public pain and this further added to its invisibility (Halpern, 2002:39). It also reinforced the difference between the invisible and the visible, the spiritual and the temporal. “Suffering changes when it is no longer public, just as when it is no longer penance” (Halpern, 2002:39). Without a public viewing, it is difficult to make pain “an object of political action” and without the idea of penance, pain is “is no longer unambiguously moral” (Halpern, 2002:39). In the absence of moral imperatives, those in pain have choices, just as individuals (supposedly) had the power to interpret scripture. Halpern (2002) claims that the tension between choices generates the modern representative political authority. This authority seeks unity, but only a unity that requires constantly competing forms of morality that represent the diverse views of the populace. In this way “choice” becomes the new catch-word (Mellor, 2004:129).

One of the choices made available when bodies are no longer carriers of divine knowledge is to investigate bodies as profane routes to knowledge without need for moral consideration. While the loss of moral authority regarding the meaning of pain closed the body to sacred interpretation, the moral imperative to control and close the body to invasion meant philosophers and scientists, such as Descartes, were able to dissect dead bodies in order to represent knowledge about life. The methodology that Descartes used to gain information about life was, paradoxically, achieved through the dissection of dead bodies that do not feel pain. Leder, referring to Descartes, notes “the living body is not fundamentally different from the lifeless, it is a kind of animated corpse, a functioning mechanism” (Leder, 1998:119).

Leder, who frames Descartes’ approach in his phenomenological discussion of the “Dysappearing Body”, argues that this mechanistic approach came to dominate intellectual thought so that “the dead body” became “the model for the living” (Leder, 1990:147). Science was conducted according to methodologies that dissected and divided dead objects into composite parts. ‘Understanding’ was defined as knowing/seeing how the parts interacted. This allowed suppositions to be made about the living and intertwined Descartes’ ontology with a “project of mastery” (Leder, 1992:20). A mechanistic world-view with a focus on dead objects allows the crucial shift from viewing life and pain as
transformative and transcendental to normatively requiring active human manipulation of nature, especially flesh without senses.

Bacon claimed “man is the architect of his own fortunes” (quoted in Caton, 1989:495) and this activism became an explicit goal of the Enlightenment. The dissection of the dead body and the goal of improvement profoundly affected the relationship between man and his body. While women always remained ‘abject’, man had the ability, through his mind, to control the body’s abject/naturalistic qualities and the body’s pain, just as man was learning to control nature. This projected mastery loosened the ties between religion, medicine and justice. Consequently it restricted the opportunities for redemption in everyday life but gave people ‘choices’ in eliminating their pain (amongst other things). Classifications of disease shifted from the patients’ experience of pain and suffering to the physical and dead body’s visible evidence of disease. This perspective of a painless (dead) body manifested itself in everyday life through changing medical and penal practices where the imperative to control the body expedited the development of technologies to reduce or hide pain (Caton, 1989).

On the medical front, within a month of Morton’s (1846) “demonstration of the anaesthetic properties of ether, [it] had been used in most major European Cities” (Caton, 1989:493). Technology in the form of drugs could now render the body corpse-like, so that it could be mechanistically treated. This facilitated the medical process of dissection, isolation and removal of diseased elements (Leder, 1990:142). Controlling and isolating abjection was a priority in healing the lived experience of the body. In addition, the privatised corpse-like body was desensitised and silenced with morphine and other later drugs, thereby making pain invisible and sense-less. Furthermore, for many forms of suffering, Freud developed the psychoanalytic approach which specifically shifted understanding of trauma from the body to the unconscious, confirming a purely cognitive approach to pain. As a result, pain was now isolated from bodies and could be managed through speech (psycho-therapy) and mental (disciplined) will (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:154).

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60 Anaesthesia was not used for women in childbirth until 1900 and debates still continue today as to the acceptability of this form of pain-relief. For example, in one study of attitudes to pain-relief only 51% of Anglo-Americans support the use of pain-relief in childbirth compared to 77% of the same sample regarding pain-relief acceptable for tooth-drilling. The same study also found that while 70% of the Scandinavians surveyed supported pain-relief for tooth-drilling only 35% of them supported it for childbirth (see Moore, Brodsgaard, Mao, Miller, and Dworkin, 1998).
On the penal front, the guillotine, invented in its present form around 1789, was promoted as a rational instrumental technology that efficiently dispatched painless death (Smith, 2003:34). For the Protestant, “the pain, mess and anguish which accompanied death” was limited and eventually made invisible (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:120). Consequently, efficient and assumed painless killing in the form of the guillotine became a pivotal icon in the complex and overlapping semiotic universes of Enlightenment. The guillotine’s proponents claimed that it facilitated painless and efficient death because it did not rely on human skill (i.e. human bodies), but on its “rational design” and mechanistic “rectangle, circle and triangle”. (Smith, 2003:34). This motif is repeated in Dalí’s crucifixion through the use of mechanistic cubes and squares in the cross, which is suspended over the abyss between human and divine. The guillotine also equalised death because both elite and laity were treated the same. It was not only a technology that “performs[ed] mundane functions” but also a technology “supported by and reproducing wider currents of meaning” (Smith, 2003:34).

So, while at the beginning of this chapter the term anaesthetised pain might have appeared to be a contradiction in terms, the embodied sociality of the Sinful Body makes clear that, because of the longue durée, bodies-in-pain could not be eliminated. However, through scientific control and observation of visible objects (bodies rather than pain), pain could be anaesthetised, silenced and managed. Thus individuals who are in pain find it socially unacceptable to publicly acknowledge it. In effect, lived bodily pain was made invisible and though discursive dualisms good and pain-free, or pain-free and ‘better’ became conflated. Consequently the only public acknowledgement or institutional response regarding pain was to encourage its anaesthetisation, enacting what Descartes described as “render[ing] ourselves the masters and possessors of nature” (quoted in Leder, 1992:20).

As an ideal type, the Sinful Body clarifies these significant changes in emphases from valuing the learning potential of pain to the conquest and elimination of pain. However, the instability of conflating the good and pain-free as well as making the elimination of pain a political, but unachievable, goal (Halpern, 2002:33) mixed the multiple routes to knowledge and embodied sociality. This created tension, uncertainty and facilitated change.
Tensions within the Sinful Body

The explanation of the ideal type so far can give the appearance of a linear development of re-forming bodies, but historical complexity and contradictory tensions are also present. For example individuality, as a principle, incentivised the search for the uniqueness of humanity and of the individual. Yet, at the same time, self-referentiality constantly broke down differentiation and distinctions. One instance of this is that although an emphasis on the community is "very real", at the same time it is also "ambivalent". This is because the community is no longer considered sacred but is based on profane human interactions. These interactions have "no ultimate morality or authenticity in comparison with the individual’s relationship with the Word of God" (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:17).

As a result, cognitive projects and objectives, rather than eliminating collective effervescence, instead sublimated it into categories that consisted of feared others who might pollute sacred relationships and this categorisation continued to challenge the boundaries of sacred and profane. This way of thinking also created choice in the manner of the achievement one’s aims, thus creating a sense of liberation. Put more prosaically, people in the Protestant/enlightened *habitus* of modernity can be seen,

as a chaos suspended over 'an abyss' whose very survival depended on prevailing over the passions and yet who knew that reason would finally have to submit before the God who was to be found in the heart (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:142).

The uncertainty and anxiety this creates, especially when multiple options appear to break down that which is unique in each individual, means that new active interventions are constantly sought to address the apparently anchorless world of "moral bankruptcy" (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:171). These new impulses will be the subject of the next chapter.

Conclusion

The demise of a this-worldly God and the emergence of the sublime God had a number of effects on the *habitus* of the emerging Protestant society. The components which Mellor and Shilling (1997) selected to construct the Sinful Body included an emphasis on cognition and a devaluation of sensual experience. This is connected to not only the profanisation of large areas of social life and the re-formation of human sociality from a sense of sacred community but also to that of profane associations and secular individual
contracts. These changes freed up knowledge making possible the development of an individual subject and a scientific knowledge which previously had been constrained by religious thought. The Sinful Body is thereby associated with the appearance of a new social activism that claims to be secular. Cognitive apprehension and the devaluation and distrust of sensual experience encouraged a distrust of the nose, mouth and hands as the routes to knowledge. This in turn elevated reason so that power was gained through an educated mind that processes information through the eye and, to a lesser degree, the ear (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:112). This created a rational organisation of everyday life with autonomous subjects and future orientated beings. It also gave privilege to a written culture based on the word of God, rather than an embodied fleshy culture of ritual.

Derived from the Protestant era, the embodied sociality of the Sinful Body ideal type is a thoroughly reflexive deconstruction. The self-belief in the freedom of scientific inquiry meant people ‘lost touch’ with their physical surroundings and discursive choice became paramount. It also created an impression that free enquiry was not bounded by any religious constraints. This ‘loss of touch’ with the sensed world contributed to a re-forming sociality and forms of knowledge. Community and ritual was no longer the centre of faith and people pursued profane relationships focused on survival rather than redemption. This meant people were free to enter and opt out of social contracts with no sacred obligations. Words, rather than bodies, were the main form of communication and were “used to distance people from their surroundings and make language [and scripture] the route to individual knowledge and inspiration” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:38). As a result, the emergence of modernity is a particular way of looking at the world which “privilege[s] ... the visual as science rather than [as] ... art (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155).

The aspect of the sensory body which was developed in this chapter and entitled Anaesthetised Pain linked the idea that God now played little part in community affairs, especially in sending messages to the community via bodies-in-pain - pain lost its sacred meaning and thereby its transformative referent. This meant the body could no longer be trusted to provide signs of God’s divine guidance and was necessarily closed to ‘barbaric’ forms of unnecessary pain and suffering. Furthermore, the transformative lesson of the Mass was no longer supported by a worldview that allowed for matter to have the ability to transform. In light of this view, it was up to humans to intervene in order to improve their own
situation and this intervention did not require a divine catalyst, such as pain. Consequently pain no longer served any useful function. It was silenced and eliminated. Where elimination was not possible, with advances in technology it was in the main, anaesthetised.

In the differing contexts of Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain it is possible to see how Dali could paint his crucifixion as a deliberate antithesis of Grunewald’s suffering Christ yet in contemporary society both representations are accepted as portrayals of the Crucified Christ’s bloodied and tortured body-in-pain. The overall change in emphasis in relation to the Protestant relocation of the sacred, forms of sociality, knowledge created a re-formed Christian worldview. However the boundaries around the acceptable treatment of pain remained within a Protestant Christian framework which highlighted a problematic link between sin, punishment and pain and original sin in the Garden of Eden.

Figure 3.3 (Left) Dali Corpus Hypercubicus (1954). (Right) Grunewald’s Crucifixion (c1515).

Placing these paintings side by side visually illuminates the two bodies-in-pain ideal types - Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain. They encapsulate
the framework that will be used in chapters six and seven to compare and contrast the change in emphases regarding the display of bodies-in-pain in contemporary times. However, before doing this it is necessary first to analyses the contemporary era to see what happens when the social forces or impulses within these ideal types compete with each other and with the secularisation thesis. In other words what happens to the body-in-pain when the ideas of the Protestant Reformation clash with the Counter-Catholic Reformation’s use of the Baroque, Enlightenment progress and new developments in technology? This is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

AMBIVALENT BODIES: THE TORN BODY-IN-PAIN

“My own voice was the voice of the dead, for the dead had contrived to leave textual traces of themselves, and those traces make themselves heard in the voices of the living” (Greenblatt,1988:1).

The previous chapter outlined the Sinful Body and developed the bodily aspect entitled Anaesthetised Pain. That chapter was important because it broadly illuminated the way in which a cultural shift from the Catholic body to the Protestant Body re-organised the hierarchical structure of the senses which in turn re-formed the way in which knowledge was gained and the sensory body was represented. More particularly it emphasised the way in which Anaesthetised Pain was constructed as profane and understood as something to be controlled and where possible, eliminated. In this chapter the aim is to develop the bodily aspect of pain which I have entitled Ambivalent Bodies: Torn Pain (hereafter Torn Pain). As in previous chapters and as the title of the ideal type indicates, I again draw from Mellor and Shilling’s third re-formed ideal type which they entitled Ambivalent Bodies. Torn Pain as developed in this chapter is significant for two reasons. Firstly it is significant because as an ideal type it will be used in the second part of this dissertation as a framework to describe the idea that bodies are torn between competing dual impulses of the previous re-forming ideal types. Secondly it will illuminate how this competition occurs in an environment which is dislocated from its sacred referent and as a result radiates in myriad manifestations as people settle towards a common terrain (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:162). This interplay is captured in Graham Sutherland’s painting, Crucifixion (1946).

59Perhaps it is worth mentioning again that from the beginning to the end of their study, Mellor and Shilling develop crucial links between the changing “character and location of the sacred in relation to social life” (1997:161) a shifting hierarchy of the senses and the re-formation of the body. It is the foundation upon which I build my understanding of bodies-in-pain.
Sutherland stated that he had tried to capture “the most tragic of all themes yet inherent in it is the promise of salvation” (quoted in Hayes, 1980:24). This duality is reflected in the competing sources of inspiration that Sutherland drew from. He took inspiration from the Isenheim Altarpiece and Grunewald’s Crucifixion by retaining not only Christ’s gnarled fingers reaching out for God but also the barbed crown of thorns painfully piercing Christ’s head. Sutherland also turns the perspective back to a traditional iconic frontal display of the Crucified Christ and in so doing re-establishes an emotive connection between Christ’s pained suffering body and the thinking body of the faithful, those simply viewing the painting and those suffering from pain. Sutherland’s Christ endures visible pain, however this pain is not the oozing, abject human pain illuminated in Grunewald’s Crucifixion. This suggests that Sutherland’s Crucifixion is not simply an embodiment of Valued Embodied Pain, but neither is it an embodiment of the Anaesthetised Pain.
Sutherland’s work can be viewed as an embodiment of Anaesthetised Pain and as similar to Dali’s *Crucifixion* because Sutherland provides a limited context in which to give meaning to Christ’s pain. Although the narrative potential of the painting is lost as the Crucified Christ is returned to the I-thou position and is anchored in this world, he is still alone and isolated between a high wall and a ringed barrier. The link between the thinking bodies of those viewing the painting and Christ’s body is broken, distanced and detached - any sense of close-contact is lost. This is similar to viewing Dali’s *Crucifixion* because it also encourages reflection rather than participation. Added to this is the rationality of the controlled geometry inherent in the cubes on the walled world behind Christ and the lines of blood that flow in a straight line from his hands down to the ground. However because these geometrical shapes are partially constructed from blood that comes from inside the body this abjectness distinguishes Sutherland’s work from that of Dali.

A further dissimilarity between the two paintings is that Sutherland incorporates a Baroque aesthetic with the conjunctural time of World War II. Drawing from photographs of the Nazi concentration camps and his own experiences as an official World War II artist Sutherland presents the viewer with an allegorical experience of the emaciated figures of Auschwitz (Finlay, 1994) and, by implication, the indexical sign of human starvation. Thus Sutherland’s blue-blackish bruised-like, yet also metallic-like skeletal body of Christ, brings to physical suffering and pain the implication of denial through starvation. Starvation interacts with the body but the consequence of starvation also marginalises it, making it invisible – ultimately wasting the body to nothingness. Commenting that he was trying to reach a “point of balance” where one may “fall into great gloom or rise to great happiness” (quoted in Hayes, 1980:24) Sutherland’s epiphany occurred when he thought about the duality of a crown of thorns that at the same time wounds the body.

Thus Sutherland's description of the painting and the work itself carries a dual embodiment that I contend contains elements of both Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain. For this reason I claim that Sutherland's *Crucifixion* illuminates Mellor and Shilling's third re-formed body and the common terrain negotiated between competing social impulses of 'carnal knowing' and 'cognitive apprehension'. These competing views take inspiration from Volatile and Sinful ideal type differences in the same way that Sutherland takes inspiration from Grunewald’s work, from a Baroque emphasis on ‘naturalism’ and also from
contemporary social worlds. Consequently these competing views create a variety of bodily choices and outcomes; Sutherland’s painting illustrating but one of these possibilities. To reinforce this point I use the following quote and illustrate it using Sutherland’s painting.

While the disciplined bodies of the Reformers dislocated themselves from their natural environment ... [seen in Sutherland’s placement of Christ alone in front of a wall] Baroque culture was attempting to seduce the flesh to a renewed visually sensual experience of the sacred [seen in the emotional connection Sutherland creates between viewer and Christ] (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:135).

Accordingly this chapter is significant because the exploration of contemporary society from the perspective of both the Volatile and Sinful body as well as the Modern and Baroque body as it manifests in Torn Pain, reveals that the contradictions and ever present dualisms in contemporary society have led to a belief that there are no longer boundaries to the “spirit of free inquiry” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:144). The concept of neo-tribalism and the claimed destruction of collective effervescences have resulted, as is argued by some, in the breakdown and dissolution of the discursive symbol of ‘society’ itself (Mellor, 2004). However, through their ideal types, Mellor and Shilling highlight that while there is choice and fragmentation in society, as well as anxiety, “self-referentially, nostalgia and doubt” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:22) the inherent contradictions within this framework were established through theological debates, secular debates and various Christian practices. Consequently, while I question that the choices for dealing with bodies-in-pain are limitless; I recognise that these choices are not small in number. As Latour (1993:40) notes, the choices of modernity are not “an illusion,” but unlimited choice is “much less than an essence” of modernity (Latour, 1993:40). The apparent freedom of modernity, or what has recently been termed post-modernity, is actually constrained freedom of choice within selected tacit Christian boundaries, rather than a complete freedom to reassess morality, practice and embodied knowing in an age that has supposedly killed, or at the very least, privatised God.

Mellor and Shilling (1997) make it clear that a description such as ambivalence makes generalisations. Despite this, they argue that there is enough convergence in the ‘dominant’ routes to knowledge and embodied socialities in

60 Neo-tribalism is a concept fully explored by Maffesoli (1993) to note that the disintegration of mass culture has led to the development of post-modern tribes. For further analysis on the relationship between Neo-tribes and the “end of the social” (see Fish, 2003).
contemporary times to coalesce in a reasonably stable common terrain. While people and institutions tend toward an ambivalent framing in their approach to phenomena, the manifestations of individual negotiations within this common terrain are myriad. This means the ideal type Ambivalent Bodies is full of choices between embodied socialities and knowledge, but what Mellor and Shilling focus on is the limited nature of these choices.

The evidence I use to support claims of limited choices is varied due to the ambivalent subject matter. As a result the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section replicates the format of the previous two chapters by outlining the routes to knowledge and embodied sociality found in the contemporary habitus and how these can be combined to make an ideal type. Once again I develop this ideal type by building and developing it in three steps. Using Mellor and Shilling’s study as the foundation, the first two steps build upon their work and the third step is my systemization and account of bodies-in-pain.

1. Location of the sacred and the route to knowledge;
2. How this manifests in embodied action; and
3. Implications for bodies-in-pain.

However, in this chapter I describe the particular and different steps within the development of each of the two social impulses of the contemporary age: sensual (carnal) or banal (cognitive) embodied socialities and their relationships with pain. As mentioned previously it would be impossible and unnecessary to describe all the diversity available or even to describe all that Mellor and Shilling touch on in their study. Therefore, I limit my description to a few possibilities. Specifically I use examples which trace the anaesthetising effect of the imperatives of the sinful body to silence real physical bodies-in-pain; and at the same time highlight that pain, gore and violence, in sensual representational form (in the mediated reel world), is increasing.

In the second section, I compare the competing ideal types of the contemporary habitus with the frameworks of knowledge and bodily representation found in the Bible. This section demonstrates that despite the view that contemporary society offers freedom of choice; the choices that are commonly selected for representation in films concerning the body-in-pain were already contained within the Bible in general and within the Book of Job in particular. This is in line with Girard’s notion that the Biblical legacy has bestowed an epistemological structure on society as well as the theological outlook (Fleming, 2004:117-118). However I am not arguing that Job experienced meaningless consumerism in an
information age or any other anachronistic interpretation. On the contrary I am arguing that the limited perspectives for dealing with the body-in-pain in contemporary society were already outlined in this Biblical narrative. In other words, the ideal type which contains ambivalence as fundamental to its foundation reveals that while both the Catholic and Protestant eras articulated and consolidated particular different approaches to bodies-in-pain, both these potential approaches were already contained within the options of Judeo-Christian thought. Although competition between perspectives on pain and other technological changes impacts on the dominant approaches to pain, society has not shifted the boundaries of the interpretation of bodily pain outside of that Christian framework, regardless of the claimed ‘progress’, profanation, or secularisation of contemporary society.

In order to clarify the continuities and discontinuities in this Christian influence, the final section of this chapter, section three, combines the perspectives of chapters two, three and four into the analytical framework that will be used in Part II of this dissertation to explore the question of whether, or not, Christian approaches to the body-in-pain are still significant for the way in which contemporary Western people make sense of the body. The key objection to this argument is the notion that I am trying to impose a grand narrative on contemporary society by claiming that it is still dominated by Christianity. On the contrary, my purpose is to disclaim any such coherence and I also refrain from arguing that Mellor and Shilling’s description of the general common terrain of ambivalence or that my description of it in the display of pain is a formula for all persons. This is particularly relevant for those whose experiences of this world render them able to claim a different reality from that described in this dissertation. Instead, my purpose in developing and using Torn Pain (once it has been developed) is to investigate and clarify the location of the acceptable (socially agreed) boundaries surrounding the collective representation of bodies-in-pain.

In Part II of the dissertation I will this heuristic model as a comparative framework in order to assess to what extent bodies-in-pain can function and be identified as communicating meaning in the ‘reel’ world of fiction films. This framework provides a guideline for delineating which images and interpretations of bodies-in-pain are repetitively circulated in fiction film. Thus my intention is to begin to delineate the extent of choices and freedom for bodies-in-pain within contemporary society by establishing whether fiction films conform (for the most
part) to the boundaries and key components of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and my framework based on a systematisation of the body-in-pain.

Section 1: Janus-Faced Modernity; Baroque Modern Ambivalent Bodies

Mellor and Shilling argue that within sociological debate two social impulses or modernities can be identified. The first social impulse can be understood in terms of the Weberian concept of the rationalisation of the world that ‘naturally’ led to its secularisation. This is a world that promoted “Cartesian dualisms, Kantian reason ... and Habermas’s ‘ideal speech’ situation[s]” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:131) which in turn helped to “[empty] a sky ... of angels” and opened it “to the intervention of the astronomer and eventually the astronaut” (Berger, quoted in Mellor and Shilling, 1997:131). In this way the official face of modernity came to define itself in terms of rationality and reflexivity. In so doing, modernity subordinated the flesh and sensual experience of the sacred by emphasising mind over body through cognitive modes of apprehension. This control of the flesh alongside other negative binary oppositions reflected the aims of modernity, not necessarily what it achieved.\(^{61}\) As noted in the previous chapter, Mellor and Shilling (1997) use the term ‘Modern’ in their third ideal type to capture this approach.

The second social impulse can be understood in terms of a ‘gothic’ underbelly underpinning modernity. This social impulse encompasses not only “Schopenhauer’s senseless will, Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’, Baudelaire’s ‘flaneur’” but also the “re-assertion of sensuality” that arose with the Catholic counter-reformation’s “use of Baroque culture” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:131-132). Mellor and Shilling use the term ‘Baroque’, in their ideal type, to capture this approach and they use the term in its substantive, not temporal, meaning.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{61}\) Modernity is a term that has numerous definitions and contains both temporal and substantive usages. For example ‘Modernity’ was/is a term used to refer to the present age, until term Post-modernity, was used to better describe the ‘here and now’. Halpern argues that the construction of the term post-modernity allowed contemporary writers to distinguish their work from those like Giorgio Vasari who in 1550 described his age as ‘modern’ (2002:34). In relation to this dissertation because initially, it is concerned with constructing ideal types, it is the substantive use, rather than the temporal one, that most concerns me. In this respect I follow Mellor and Shilling (1997), and distinguish the term ‘Modern’ as the routes to knowledge and embodied sociality that grew out of both the Protestant Sinful Body and Enlightenment thought and the implications for Anaesthetised Pain, rather than a specific date or time period. I use the term contemporary society to describe the “here and now”.

\(^{62}\) Mellor and Shilling note that the term Baroque is used to describe a time period that started to decline after the Counter-Reformation and towards the beginning of the eighteen century but their use of the term follows Turner who uses it to describe a ‘way of thinking’. This way of thinking
Thus Mellor and Shilling use the terms Modern and Baroque to describe the embodied socialities and forms of knowledge found in contemporary times and in doing so they reveal the inherent tensions and contradiction within modernity that hindered the achievement of its “Janus-faced” aims (1997:131).

Drawing these two social impulses together then, my reading of Mellor and Shilling’s work suggests that the possibilities inherent in each ideal type body extended in various directions consistent with each body's own routes to knowledge and embodied sociality. In addition, each route to knowledge and embodied sociality also offered its own response to the particular ideal type which defines the problems of the age. In this way, the Catholic Volatile Body can be described as extending into the Baroque Body, and the Protestant Sinful Body into the Modern Body. These competing forms of embodied sociality and knowledge manifested different and diverse “attempts to manage the tension between ... the voluptuous and ascetic potentialities of the human [body and] spirit” (1997:132-3). All that became defined as acceptable action and thought was defined within these boundaries.

Mellor and Shilling also claim that between and surrounding the dimensions of the ideal types of Volatile, Sinful and Ambivalent Bodies lay numerous “fantasies and imaginings” that point to further “reformations of embodiment” in the future (1997:47). However, at this point in time Mellor and Shilling concentrate on the manifestations of the ‘Ambivalent Bodies’ (1997:161-189) of the contemporary age as this ideal type body is torn between two forms of knowledge and embodied sociality which include:

1. **Cognitively oriented bodies** = ascetic corporeality + banal associations
   (see chapter one or refer to Mellor and Shilling, 1997);

and

2. **Sensuously oriented bodies** = voluptuous corporeality + sensual solidarities (see chapter one or refer to Mellor and Shilling, 1997).\(^{63}\)

associates sensuousness with intense sensuality and “possess[es] qualities which share affinities with past, present and future” (1997:12). Similarly Ndalianis (2005) throughout her book explores the underpinning elements of the baroque style, which include “seriality”, “fragmentation” and “illusion” aimed at decimating modern assumptions. More explicitly than Turner or Mellor and Shilling, she suggests that the contemporary use of the way of thinking known as baroque ought to be labelled neo-baroque to make clear that contemporary styles use the same formulas as the temporal period labelled Baroque (2005:17).

\(^{63}\) For a fuller explanation see Mellor and Shilling, (1997) in general and chapters two, five and six in particular.
Combined these two forms of embodied knowledge and sociality create boundaries around the myriad possibilities within the term Ambivalent Bodies.

**Late Modern: Cognitively Orientated Bodies**

The power and dominance of the Sinful approach to the body grew and was consolidated within the principles of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment project informed the way in which people came to believe in the mind’s domination of the body (amongst other things). The Enlightenment process slowly supplanted God's authority as the rationale for action with scientific proofs and the notion of validity and/or reliability. This was a shift in language and discourse but it was not without its religious foundations (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:59). For example, “modern systems of governance” were still involved with the suppression of the sensuous flesh and promotion of the mind. These forms of governance were believed to be pursuing secular goals, despite the obvious “affinities with Protestantism” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:151). Accordingly the Enlightenment process institutionalised and codified the earlier Protestant routes to knowledge and embodiment, by enshrining sacred values, such as the belief that bodies are profane, as secular values.

This merging of the sacred with the secular was achieved through a “mental fantasy of being able to shut down” or intervene cognitively and discursively in controlling “human sensuality” and the “sensory body” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:154). It did this through the “extension of profane” associations, allowing institutional acknowledgement of only ‘rational’ and contractual forms of sociality and “as a consequence” by embarking on an “unprecedented form of human self-assertion” over the negative aspects of binary opposites (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:154). Human agency was the mediating force in one's social world and the *habitus* was controllable through ‘man's’ productive capabilities which focused on discursive symbols (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103-104). “Protestantism continued to emphasise the importance of the sacred but rendered it radically transcendent” and, as a result, modernity became “thoroughly profane” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:16) and confined by these same routes to knowledge, embodied sociality and Protestant values. This was because these were the routes that drove the ‘private’ lives of influential thinkers and the institutional arrangements of the private and public sphere.

Modern society also rested on the homo duplex notion that bodies might be
“born natural” but they “could be”, and should be, “made social” through “education and surveillance” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:147). While this language of the natural and social has a profane framing, as Latour (1993) suggests, it is linked to the ‘process of purification’ and “the bracketed God” (Latour, 1993:41). In particular this notion repeats Protestant anxiety and the view that, although bodies were born sinful, by “prioritising cognitive belief”, constructing discipline ordinances and encouraging religious reflection, one potentially could become pure (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:42). This has consequences for the contemporary approach to the body, but is not unique to this time period. Many scholars have noted the modern tendency to create the body as a form of “physical capital … [and a] physical and psychological frontier for armouring against other social groups” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:193). This disciplined or ‘hard body’ reproduces Protestant attempts to armour/harden the body (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:193) against invasion from the Devil. For example, the reaction to ‘junk food’ is more than an issue of health and fitness and as a result is incorporated into, and classified as, a “moral issue” (Hoverd and Sibley, 2007:391, Mellor and Shilling, 1997:193). The explicit Christian morality of the Protestant disciplined body which controlled temptation from the Devil is replaced with secular medical discourse on health and the need to discipline eating habits by controlling the temptation to eat unhealthy food.

Tracking the Protestant routes to modernity reveals that the neo-puritan desire to subject the body to cognitive control (dieting, non-smoking, healthy eating) extends the “Protestant self-made man [into] Kant’s autonomous subject” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155; 193). The autonomous and hence self-made man is believed to be “liberated from ties to groups” or religion and can participate “in those [interests] that issue from ‘conscious reflection and intelligent planning’” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:155). This way of framing the body disguises the way in which moral imperatives of cognitive control are based in a Protestant belief system. It is disguised because there is very little, and in some cases no, acknowledgement that these moral imperatives arose out of Christian values system that sought to control a desiring Sinful Body.

64 Mellor and Shilling develop the hard body through the notion of the ‘frontier body’. The ‘frontier body’’s focal point is appearance management and the power and control which reduce emotional and sensual responses to the world (1997:192-193).

Modern Anaesthetised Pain

As the body lost its sense of the sacred and became more ‘profane’ the concept of pain as God’s punishment (or the older medieval view of pain as a cure) was supplemented with an interpretation of bodies-in-pain as a profane process of physical “causes and effects” (Halpern, 2002: 231). This had consequences for the capacity of the individual to make sense of the body-in-pain. “Cause and effect”, the idea that pain was brought about by certain “physical, material, bodily, factual and historical conditions” (Halpern, 2002:32), guided the use of human productive capabilities. Medical marvels opened the discursive body, and only by extension the lived corporeal body, to visibility. This made pain-treatment (not pain itself) more visible and measurable. Given this visibility, humans had something tangible to manipulate (Halpern, 2002:32). In this sense, the sacred understanding of the value of pain was exchanged for an individual self-assertion over the problem of pain (Halpern, 2002:51; 55 forward). Another shift was to make the problem of pain something to be eliminated by medical ‘experts’ using ‘man-made’ technologies, and increasingly it became the province of the State. Modernity rewarded the elimination of pain in this world (rather than in a life after death) with a form of ‘man-made redemption’. We were saved from pain rather than sin/death.

The interpretation of pain had shifted from a future-focused delivery from pain to that of a past problem with a potential immediate cure (anaesthetisation or elimination). This search for ‘cause’ in the process of scientific endeavour is the theme of several current medical television series such as both *House* and *Medical Investigators*. Within the space of the television programme (usually one hour in total), patients, at the hands of experts re-form from deathly ill to living pain-free and smiling. According to Halpern modern people seem to have judged that this is a “good enough bargain” and perhaps better than the “eternally meaningful” (2002:33) and valued pain that medieval Catholicism had prognosticated. Eradication of pain, at least in discourse and representation, became a focus of political activities (Halpern, 2002:33) and is often a theme of popular culture.

The social impulses competing within this *habitus* manifested in diverse ways. For example they could support Alnulf Rainer’s attempts to obliterate Christ’s body by over painting many of his earlier crucifixion paintings (Crumlin, 1998:138-139). This could be said to represent the cognitively orientated body where the physical body loses its significance. Rainer’s overpaintings, including
the one below entitled *Wine Crucifix* (Fig. 4.2), are still recognised as representations of the crucified Christ despite being devoid of the body that is central to Christianity and capital punishment. Bodily response to this painting is not from a viewer’s body to either an abject or anaesthetised body, but instead the connection is to colour associations and indexical signs which hint at the body’s shape.

![Figure 4.2 Alnulf Rainer, Wine Crucifix. Oil/Cotton/Linen, 1957 (over-painted 1978). 168.5 x 103 cm, Tait Galley, London, England.](image)

These colour associations that appeal to emotional sensuality and visual stimulation in Rainer’s painting are at the height of the ideas captured in the terms Baroque and “sensuously orientated bodies”. Combined the cognitive and sensual orientation bounds the acceptable and expected parameters of the display of pain. This is an ambivalence that is also seen in the previously mentioned medical drama *House*. Although the protagonist can save people suffering from the most mysterious and often painful diseases, he is unable to
cure his own chronic pain. His damaged body is a constant reminder of the limits of medical science and the sensual torment of pain, especially as he constantly takes his pain medication, to the point of addiction. This symbiotic relationship between Modern and the Baroque features of Ambivalent Bodies is further elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.

**Baroque: Sensuously Oriented Bodies**

Baroque culture, as used by the Catholic Counter-reformation, revealed weaknesses in the certainty and superiority of the mind/body split in the Enlightenment’s profane and secular associations. Baroque culture highlighted that the unacknowledged role of the body in everyday life was alienating, isolating and encouraged “morally vacant communities” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:163). The “recovered sensuousness” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:50-51) of Baroque culture did not necessarily offer itself as a solution to these problems, although Counter-reformation Catholicism may have. While Baroque culture did challenge, manipulate and play with the profane asceticism of Protestant and modern assumptions, it mostly offered alternatives rather than solutions. It complicated situations and issues and questioned the “depth of the sacred” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 142-143). For example it incorporated a “voluptuous form of corporeality” in order to tantalise the tightly controlled, hard Protestant body. It also combined aspects of the human senses which were “seduced towards religious righteousness” in a search to fill a vacant morality while simultaneously framing the flesh as frail (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:142). This frailty rested upon the centrality of the concept of resemblance and a delight in paradox.

The aim of a Baroque mélange was to combine opposing forces in a no man’s land in which nothing was solid or knowable. While Baroque culture was deeply conservative it used fantastic images, colours and elaborate music in order to motivate a voluptuous exploration of sensuality. The idea was to seduce the body in order for the mind to follow. Thus, in his *Wine Crucifix* (fig. 4.2), Rainer could obliterate the body while seducing the viewer’s senses into a heightened sensitivity towards pain/violence/blood or horror. Caught within these dual impulses people can find the experiences “liberating ... [if they] feel restricted by their bodies”, or terrifying if they “feel overwhelmed and even threatened by the body options available” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:51). For example, although Baroque culture enabled emotional, social relationships which assisted in forming sensual solidarities, this very cure for isolationism could “also prompt a
passionate intensity, hatred and ‘bloody revenge’” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:201). As Hobbes ([1651] 1968), Beal (2002), Ingebretsen (1996), Durkheim ([1912] 1995) ... and Girard (1972)” have all noted in their different ways, “the world of the sacred is often violent, unpredictable and dangerous” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:201). I contend that pain is an integral component within this worldview.

This means sensual solidarities often are, or have the potential to be, forged in the heat of violence. The Baroque (sensually oriented) body created a space in which to question whether, or not, certain forms of bodily pain could counter the physical alienation that characterises Enlightenment modernity by forcing its victims into a state of re-formation that produced new sensations, experience and identities. This resembles the Volatile Catholic meaning of bodies in transformative pain, but lacks that particular Christian/sacred connection. Within this context, for example, Hill (in press) explores the extent to which violence and a marked, wounded body can be understood as a positive rather than the expected negative experience even without the sacred reference. This meant that, while Baroque culture has affinities with a medieval Catholic worldview, it viewed itself in a way that overlooked and marginalised its Christian and community-bonded beginning, although not the moral imperatives to sense the world around. As a result, “highly sensual forms of embodiment” and sociality are “reasserting themselves” in society today (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:50).

The addition of a Baroque bodily culture supplements modern written culture with immediacy and sensation that is specifically figural but is still overwhelmingly confined to the visual (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:135; Hill, in press). Desire is stimulated, via sensual imagery, responding bodily with full sensory immersion and as Mellor and Shilling argue can be understood as an “imposition of Apollonian order upon Dionysian passions” (1997:144). In this environment, similar to the Volatile body, the boundaries between real and imaginary break down but, unlike the Volatile body, the Baroque body was encouraged to perceive bodies as an on-going project of self-construction and self-expression, not necessarily as a divine gift.

Ambivalent Embodied Socialities and Pain
The embodied sociality of this Ambivalent Modern Baroque Body has many
permutations because of its flux and creative potential. This flux creates inherent tensions within everyday actions. For example “glorious consumption” was an integral part of the Volatile body and the need ‘to produce’ was a Protestant imperative. Both are now being superseded by consumerism which combines economic consumption with moral goodness and stimulates the senses in bodily immersion. Thus modern and Baroque bodies combine embodied socialities to shape contemporary experience and to give the appearance of diversity and choice. This constant re-establishment of one’s identity combined with a banality of representation results in both insecurity and attempts to manage the uncertainties of the body. It also stimulates innovation and change.

Mellor and Shilling (1997) note that this new *habitus*, born of dual routes to knowledge and embodied sociality, has found its common terrain by narrowing some of the routes and socialities. What has changed as a result of this is not a new location of the sacred, nor a new form of community, but instead new responses to phenomena, such as bodies-in-pain. As Mellor and Shilling write, while the Protestant response to being alienated from the fleshy experience of the sacred was to institutionalise this alienation, by developing contractarian notions of the ‘good’ civil society, the Catholic response to the reformers involved an absolutist manipulation of the senses based on nostalgia for the medieval sacred order and ‘divine rule’, [which I argue included transformative pain]. Baroque contact with the sacred was experienced less through the immanence of the close contact senses and collective effervescence and more through a seeing which was experienced as sensual but also as mediated and individualised in relation to the medieval era (1997:133).

To explore the impact these dual responses had on people’s ability to live with, see and experience pain, I discuss the work of Halttunen (1998) and Boudreau (1997) in order to highlight the changing responses to the body-in-pain as documented in the Puritan ‘New World’. Due to shifting emphasises in general, and changes in popular literature in particular, I am able to trace the way in which an institutionalised anaesthetisation of pain was supplemented by the sensual description of bodily pain and communicated in representational written form. This provides the context for how, in contemporary times, an accepted common terrain not only prioritises written words, isolation and sight, but also uses the sensual description of bodily horror and gore to evoke an emotive (negative) response.

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66 For example, Mellor and Shilling argue that in the future “body options”, with the contemporary advances in technological advances could rupture “people from much of their evolutionary inheritance” and this could lead to a re-formation and/or transformation of the thinking body (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:50).
Changing Responses to Bodies-in-pain

Halttunen (1998:1) argues that there was a dramatic change in the expected responses to the sin of murder as recounted in New World Puritan execution sermons and the crime of murder as written and illustrated in mid-nineteenth century true-crime pamphlets. Puritan execution sermons in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century served the purpose of ensuring that the community cognitively learnt lessons from the temptations and consequent experiences of the condemned sinner. The details of the sin were irrelevant to the sermon’s message of identification with the sinner and with the lessons that would combat temptation and weakness. For example, while the execution sermon of Esther Rodgers (1701) mentions her double infanticide, few details are provided of the manner, date and particulars of the murders. Instead, the sermon focuses on Esther Rodgers’ spiritual journey from an “irreligious, unchaste woman” who killed “her own child to conceal her vicious conduct” (Halttunen, 1998:8) to that of a woman emerging from prison (on her way to her execution) “Sprinkled, Cleansed, Comforted, a Candidate for Heaven” (Halttunen, 1998:8).

The emphasis of this execution sermon on cognitive spirituality was not because the authors were squeamish about the details of pain and death, something Puritan New Englanders were more familiar with than their present day counterparts. Details of sinful bodily demise in these sermons were neither read, nor interpreted, as a sacred message from God, as they had been in medieval times. As a result particular painful bodily detail or images served no purpose. Instead execution sermons served to alert the community to the characteristics which all sinners have in common and to direct them to cognitively identify with their own innate capacity for sin. An execution sermon was a process that began with the details of the sinners lesser sins and continued by revealing further detail of more serious sin(s). The purpose of the sermon was to serve as an example and warning for all. It also permitted a period of time to pass (often several months) between the trial and execution in which the sinner prepared for their acceptance into Heaven (Boudreau, 1997:252). For example in this time the sinner would prepare words for the crowd that concentrated on learning from sin (not pain). It was a form of cognitive apprehension which was intended to purify, and then reunite the sinner, and the crowd gathered at the execution, with God.

Boudreau (1997:252) notes that attendance was high at public gallows executions. Like the Mass, the ritual involved a series of preparations to ensure
the viewer of the execution was ready to see its message. Unlike the Mass, however, the congregation’s preparation was through cognitive preaching, rather than bodily immersion. The preparations began at the Sunday service prior to the execution. During the sermon, church officials gave the congregation the ‘correct’ reading of the sin and execution event. Ministers often stressed the scriptural passage of the penitent thief not through spatial and painful images as in medieval crucifixion paintings, but in words drawn from the Bible, “Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy Kingdom” (Luke 23:42). The beginning of the ritual was announced on execution day by the procession of the condemned and Minister to the gallows. The Minister led the crowd with some words to guide interpretation and support the condemned’s ‘inspirational’ speech. The hanging followed. Because literacy was high in the colony, written interpretation of the sin was also circulated to ensure the greatest impact from the ritual death. For example, broadside publications included biographies of sinners, the execution sermons and other reinforcing literature such as commemorative poems (Boudreau, 1997:252).

The evidence to this point has suggested that over time, emphasis shifted from the medieval expression through painful bodies, to a Puritan emphasis on identifying with the cognitive temptations of the sinner. By the mid-nineteenth century another shift in emphasis occurred mixing the two responses so that readers were expected to be repulsed by the crime (no longer called a sin) of murder. This occurred as the control of execution narratives moved from the clergy preaching the ‘Word’ to profiteers selling what was purported to be the written murder ‘court’ reports. These reports became known as ‘true crime pamphlets’. An example is a 1780 pamphlet which reported the night Barnett Davenport murdered his employer Caleb Mallory (Halttunen, 1998:35).

Written from the first person perspective (reminiscent of the I-thou relationship covered in chapter 2), Davenport allegedly stated "haunted and possessed with the thoughts of murder", on 3 February 1780; "my bloody, land-defiling, soul ruining and heaven-daring plan” took place (quoted in Halttunen, 1998:33). This true crime pamphlet described the murders of the employer and his family in explicit detail. It also included: the means and order of death, the victim’s resistance and horror, and the responses of people who found the bodies. Finally it outlines the way in which Davenport was caught. This transition in

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67 For more details of this crime see Halttunen, (1998: 33-35).
the purpose of the narrative - from identifying with common sinners to ‘labelling’ people as amoral aliens - created a new way for isolated individuals in the modern contemporary world to collectively respond to sin/crime. According to Halttunen, “when Barnett Davenport announced a night big with uncommon horror”, it was not a reference to his “ancestors’ transcendental horror of the sinful conscience” or the sacred dread and anticipation of “hell”, but rather a profane ‘this-worldly’ terror of “pain, carnage and violent death” (1998:35) which had lost its sacred meaning. These elements of pain and carnage were now interpreted as meaningless because they were merely a profane consequence of violence and their representation and replication in true crime pamphlets was not to prepare the reader for a transformative understanding of a sacred referent, or to learn the lessons of the cognitive sinner.

This way of reporting the crime was, instead, to invoke a new way of displaying piety. People were now expected to react to these changing execution narratives in the ‘correct’ way. While, during the Puritan execution, sinners were expected to identify with the condemned, by the mid-nineteenth century, murder provided the opportunity for the pious to display horror and dismay which created “an emotional state that mingled fear with hatred and disgust” (Halttunen, 1998:3). The particular narrative form and realistic graphical illustration (diagrams/images) within these pamphlets were designed to leave one “speechless and unable to assign meaning to the event” (Halttunen, 1998:3). This *habitus* predisposed people to respond to pain, (not only sin), with horror and revulsion. If one did not display these appropriate horrified reactions to these wounded bodily displays then one was considered to be outside the Puritan value system, - a monster. Those who did respond to these narratives with a pious and ‘correct’ display of revulsion and disgust demonstrated that they knew right from wrong and, in doing so, announced that they were among the chosen (elect) for Heaven. This created a response to open wounded bodies that was private and individual. Revulsion at pained bodies became the public expression of piety.

By institutionalising the connection between pain and revulsion the sacred element was lost (unless as an individually chosen connection), giving the appearance that revulsion at the sight of pain is a secular/natural response. Over time this construction became so ingrained that in today’s society these reactions to certain forms of sin and especially ‘horrific’, often graphic and/or painful, crime is considered “natural [and] instinctive” when they are indeed
“historically contingent” (Halttunen, 1998:6). This ‘historically contingent’ embodied form of sociality and collective representation is seen in Dury’s response to medieval Crucifixion paintings. As described in chapter two, when viewing paintings like Grunewald’s he writes: “anybody can see [it] only with feelings of horror” (1999:ix). This response conflates Protestant values of bodily containment with what are now believed to be ‘natural’ responses to body-horror, and are defined as part of ‘humanity’. In this way revulsion was constructed as a ‘secular’ standard of morality for witnessing pain.

Therefore, despite the body’s marginalisation in discourse, its pained display (preferably in contained representations) was necessary to display piety and secular morality. This meant that the body-in-pain could not entirely disappear from sight. Consequently, ‘real’ sensory bodies-in-pain were made ‘invisible’ by concealing them in families, hospitals, or hospice care (Lawton, 1998:121) and silenced through anesthetised pain, least they weaken those around them. At the same time discursively represented bodies in art, photographs and later cinema and television could display some details of body-horror or plastination. In this way, there was a resurgent interest in images as a form of communication in the US (among other places).

These images had another impact. Because Baroque contact with the sacred was experienced less through the “immanence of the close contact senses and collective effervescence and more through a seeing that was experienced as sensual but also as mediated and individualised in relation to the medieval era” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:131), the physical, bodily and carnal details contained within the pamphlets and drawings not only ‘seduced the senses’ into the appropriate Protestant response of revulsion, but also into a morbid fascination. In this way Modern and Baroque combine in Ambivalent Bodies in written culture. Reading isolates people, even though there was wide circulation of identical texts on murder. Both the criminal and the reader were disconnected from any form of collective effervescence, ritual penance and the community’s responsibility in the crime (Hill, in press). This shift meant individuals reacted to pain and sin alone and responded not only in ways that isolated them from the community, but also in ways that aroused the individualised senses and fascination with forbidden things. The fascination was encouraged in

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68 In London in March 2002 an anatomical exhibition featured corpses whose fluids had been replaced with special plastics. Their creator/preserver, Dr Gunter von Hagens, referred to this method of preservation as “Plastination”. These corpses were odourless and dry and could be positioned into different “doll-like” positions http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=363.
“pathological public spaces” (Seltzer, 1997:3) where wounded open bodies and the abjectness of pain and gore could be represented in a ‘voluptuous sensual form’ particularly in the mediated ‘reel’ world. Consequently, while Baroque culture and visual imagery kept the Protestant prioritisation of sight as the key route to knowledge, it also bombarded the visual with sensory details that appealed to the sensual body and in this way questioned the existing boundaries of modernity. As a result, the Baroque imagination that created space for (the right/correct) emotional responses as expressions of either piety, or humanity, encouraged the focus on image (and signs). Thus, a shift in the location of the sacred and these changes in the routes to knowledge and embodied sociality altered people’s responses towards pain and suffering.

A general insight that can be garnered from these changing responses to the body (both the condemned and the witnesses), to the sin and crime of murder and to execution is that there is a ‘Janus face of modernity’ (discussed earlier in this chapter) in which multiple frameworks compete in order to stabilise the sign of sin, the condemned and murder. What Mellor and Shilling draw attention to is that these competing frameworks are derived from a form of ‘recovered sensuousness’ (a re-formed engagement with the Volatile body) and the “continuing importance of a modern prioritisation of the cognitive” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:47). This means contemporary bodies are located in an ambivalence which I claim manifests in both an acceptance of the communicative ability of pain, its ability to incite fascination and its ability to incite fear and revulsion. Ambivalent Bodies are an ideal type designed to identify that which remains from the past and that which is a new variant. As Mellor and Shilling note, that which distinguishes Baroque modern bodies from their Protestant modern counterparts is a tendency towards an emotional and aesthetic framing ... Rather than being a matter of mainly cognitive doubt the baroque modern body confronts and experiences this paradox through a resurgence of fleshy passions and somatic anxieties which are intimately related to sensual imagery (1997:51).

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69 For example Seltzer suggests that “Murder is where bodies and history cross” (1998:2). He claims that the body is a contested signifier that represents the “national malady of trauma and violence” (1998:6) and in the “Pathological Public Sphere” the body’s vulnerability to corporeal and compulsive violence is displayed. He continues this concept by arguing that the “spectacle of the wound” and its sociality impacts on the boundaries between private and public spheres. The agency of representation is in the “the notion that representations of violence cause acts of violence (‘monkey see, monkey do’)” and this idea is conflated with something else: with the violence intrinsic to the penetration of representation into real life” (1998:262). Consequently” pathological public spaces” are those where wounded bodies participate in public (1998:146).

70 This is discussed in more depth in Mellor and Shilling (1997) study particularly in chapter four and five.
By tracing these choices, Mellor and Shilling's ideal typical analysis makes visible that despite these ‘choices’ they are still all connected and/or linked and are based in specific routes to knowledge and embodied sociality begun by the movements of medieval Catholicism, the Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter-Reformation. From this perspective then the body-in-pain can be ‘seen’ as both transformative and/or as revolting. This ambivalence is the basis of Torn Pain.

Section 2: Biblical Bodies and Ambivalence

Whilst recent scholars of post-modernity look for the uniqueness of the post-modern age, my purpose in this section is to reveal the continuities and the relationship between current choices, the interpretation of bodies-in-pain and biblical narratives. In order to do this I will use Mellor and Shilling's Volatile, Sinful and Ambivalent bodies as a framework alongside different scholarly interpretations of the story of Job to stipulate the choice of perspectives in relation to bodies-in-pain as indicated within this story. I am not seeking to analyse what was, or was not, intended when this story was recorded. Instead I explore the way in which various scholars have interpreted pain as depicted in this biblical narrative. These choices, which I have categorised as Valued, Anaesthetised and Torn Pain, have been available as interpretations of bodies-in-pain since (at least) Christianity became a key political and social force. These three options have also played a part in limiting the different ways of interpreting bodies-in-pain over the longue durée and thereby can reveal the continuity of both rational and “tacit dimensions of knowledge” as bounded by Catholic and Protestant re-forming bodies.

Mellor and Shilling are not the only theorists to note the ambivalence of the contemporary era. Ingebritsen (1996) and Beal (2002) explicitly argue that current ambivalence stems from an ambivalence which can be detected in the Bible. Giving the idea of ambivalent tangibility, Beal (2002) studies monsters rather than bodies; nevertheless his analysis could be equally relevant to embodied forms of knowledge and sociality. For example Beal (2002:6-7) argues that the negative interpretation of monsters, which has been integrated into Puritan/Enlightenment dualisms, is drawn from the Bible. He also reasons that the biblical ambivalence towards monsters is the basis of a transformative potential that not only creates but also threatens the currently normalised
hierarchies such as good/bad and right/wrong. Following Beal, I claim that the same can be said for bodies-in-pain. Bodies-in-pain are linked to monsters because both are assessed as being on the negative side of binary oppositions and this discursively (at least) links bodies-in-pain to de-formed monstrosity and abjection. Moving forward to unpack these claims then, I shall begin with an overview and exploration of the Book of Job.

The Book of Job (Wisdom literature from the Books of Poetry)

Gordis (1985:189) claims that Job’s story “is concerned with one of the oldest problems known to man [sic], the suffering of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked.” In response to this problem, or question of theodicy, there are different perspectives. For example, Beal (2002) argues that despite the existence of evil the Job story suggests an intimate relationship between bodily experience and an understanding of the world. He claims that “the voice of pain” in the Book of Job “is an eruption of chaos in the order of creation” and an “exhaustion of wisdom” as understood in “Torah piety” (Beal, 2002:36). Ehrman (2008) asks the question “Does suffering make sense?” and he argues that the Book of Job answers this in two different ways (2008:159). Dailey contends that biblical wisdom literature and “its approach to theological issues follows not from sacred traditions of the patriarchs and prophets but from the lived experiences of believers who speculate the meaning of God in their own lives” (1999:280). He argues that the Book of Job (Job 1-42) “portrays a developmental view of religious wisdom” (Dailey, 1999:278) and central to this is Job’s quest for a meaning in life.

This quest is essentially a painful journey of moral transformation that includes:

1. Job’s test as discussed and carried out by God and Satan (Job 1-3).
2. Job’s defence of, and response to, the pain and suffering in relation to this test. Job’s three friends counsel him (Job 3-31).
3. Job’s justification of himself and the counsel of a fourth friend, Elihu (Job 32-37).
4. Job’s audience with God (speeches from the whirlwind), his contrition, repentance and deliverance. God rebukes Job’s friends. From God Job receives twice the blessings he previously had as well as a renewed family (Job 38-42).

The Book of Job informs us that Job is a pious man living in idyllic happiness. He
is acknowledged by God as his most faithful servant and as a result Job became the subject of a controversy between God and Satan. In this story, under “panoptic gaze of God” (Beal, 2002:36) Satan plunges Job into a whirlpool of despair and torment and herein Job’s theological quest begins. He suffers catastrophic events such as the loss of wealth, social position, severe health deterioration, and the death of his children. Rather than experiencing the awesome side of God, as a pious person would expect, Job is ‘touched’ by the ‘awe-ful’ hand of God. He experiences physical and abject pain through inflictions such as pus-filled weeping body sores and cracked skin that peeled and bled. He also experiences broken relations, “psychological torment and spiritual anguish” (Rockett, 1988). Understood in this way the thinking “body in pain is an embodiment of chaos” (Beal, 2002:36) and this is evidenced not only in the violent physical and mental attack on Job but also in the way in which he manages his pain. As a result, I contend that because of this embodied volatility and disruptive uncertainty in relation to the sensory body, Job’s body-in-pain can be classified within Mellor and Shilling’s ideal type - the Volatile Catholic and Baroque Body.

The Volatile Catholic and its Extension into the Baroque Body

Recapping the key elements of the Volatile Catholic Body, this body interacted in a physical world on a daily basis with God, spirits, monsters, devils and angels. Within this enchanted, “unpredictable and dangerous” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:201) world, identity, consumption and routine were church-mediated standards of God’s divine and sometimes awesome/aw(e)ful glory and inscrutable wisdom. The Volatile ideal type is characterised by: a form of embodied carnal knowing, an engagement in highly sensuous ‘body regimes’ and through the consumption of sacramental relationships made real through the close-contact senses such as taste and touch. This body was immersed in an intense and passionate physicality that included various levels of bodily wounding that provided the source of religious truth. This “opened” the medieval body to the enchantment of sacramental ritual and a world completely filled with sacred meaning (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:32).

Words permeated this uncertain world but were only significant when they facilitated contact with the sacred or held power in magical transformation. An example of this is the ritual of the Mass which emphasised a carnal embodiment rather than a cognitive “fusion ... between experience and awareness” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:56). As a result these influences when “connected to people’s
senses and sensualities” immersed the open medieval body in sacred feedback loops in which the social whole not only enforced the mind’s location in the sensory fleshy body “which is itself affected by material conditions and social relationships” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:56) but also embraced an incarnational way of knowing their world. In this way the medieval thinking body was shaped by, but also shaped, social relationships and material conditions within everyday (daily) interactions (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:58). Medieval Catholicism did not encourage the development of what a modern person would regard as a “distinctive individual self” instead it “subordinated cultural ideas to religious experience” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:62).

Overtime, although there was a “gradual shift in the post Reformation world to a position whereby the prominences of the word meant that people tended to orient themselves to the world through cognitive apprehension” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:58), the “Catholic Counter Reformation’s use of the Baroque” extended and reshaped the Volatile Body within a “recovered” and voluptuous sensuousness. Merging within these Baroque sensibilities the Volatile Body challenged closed systems by manipulating accepted Protestant practices and confusing the stability of category systems. Encountered in this way, Volatile and Baroque sensibilities not only demonstrated the stimulating potential of destabilising elements such as illusions and fragmentation but also maintained the normative role of transformation by emphasising an inability to explain or justify social worlds. As a result the Volatile Baroque side of Ambivalent Bodies was able to capture a sensual “aesthetic of repetition” (Ndalianis, 2005:33) and to use the “paradoxical personification” of monsters to reveal both “otherness within sameness” and the “outside that has gotten inside” (Beal, 2002:4).

Understood through this Ambivalent body Job’s communication with God is directly and inescapably related to his open “wounded body”. The pus in Job’s sores, the poison in his blood, and the buzzing in his ears all communicated the “impossibility of nothingness” and a “suffering from which there is an absence of all refuge ... [or] retreat” (Levinas, 1989:40). In this theological horror Job’s speeches are passionate because his theodicy is embodied (Job 6:4). Raging against God, Job questions God’s wisdom. He asks question like: why is not God in control of a well-ordered universe that rescues deserving subjects? Why does

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71 For analytical purposes Mellor and Shilling draw attention to distinct patterns of embodiment, knowledge and sociality but they do maintain that “they are inevitably, to a certain extent, overlapping” (1997:17).
God choose to enthrone himself over a surface calm while his “awe-some” and “awe-ful” chaos churns just beneath the surface? And worse still, why does God allow this chaos which can be felt bodily in the painful piercing of skin and in the purging of boils through the eruption of pus, blood, and mucus? Beal (2002:47) argues that Job’s pain steers him towards desiring, identifying with and eventually embodying the “primordial chaos” and Leviathan-like monsters within God’s world. In so doing Job reforms his relationship with his body, the monstrous and with God. Job may not be able to shatter the divine order but in his quest for bodily relief and understanding, he embodies the monstrous abjectness of God’s “awe-ful” vision in a world in which his body is likely to be destroyed. Although Job’s quest and his sensory body-in-pain expresses elements of the Volatile and Baroque sensory body, (one boundary of Ambivalent Bodies), it also expresses and justifies Job’s pain in relation to ‘cause and effect’. As a result Job’s quest as a sensory body can also be classified within Mellor and Shilling’s ideal type - the Protestant Sinful and Modern Body (the other boundary for Ambivalent Bodies).

The Protestant Sinful Body and its extension into the Modern Body

In contrast to the voluptuous attitude within a baroque habitus Job’s story also reflects an ascetic attitude found within a Protestant habitus. For example Job seeks to distance himself from his pain and to conquer it. According to Beal, in moments of suffering and pain, victims cry out to the sublime God to transform the universe, and “restore the right order of things” (2002:44). Mellor and Shilling argue that this desire for order, rationality and cause/effect became ‘hegemonic’ as the Protestant Sinful Body extended into the Modern Body.72 In a Protestant habitus, knowledge coalesced around a Sinful objectified Body that had re-formed the Catholic Volatile Body (1997:127). Over time the Protestant Sinful Body, unable to maintain its social contract mentality or homo duplex nature within Apollonian orientation, and reacting against the sensuality and somatic manifestations of the Baroque, gradually extended into the Modern habitus of banal associations and cognitive factors that were no longer necessarily anchored within the sublime. Merging with Modern sensibilities, the Sinful Body, rather than becoming “immersed in nostalgia for the sacred” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:144), maintained its form of cognitive reasoning and the distant non-contact senses (sight and hearing) as the key components of knowing oneself and one’s community. It prioritised individual commitment,

72 Drawing from Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony, here I refer to “the role of the private and non-state levels of the superstructure ... to maintain social order in capitalist societies” (Marshall, 1994:213).
social activism and tangible evidence as the means to intervene in, and control, nature and the world (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:144). Encountered in this way Sinful/Modern characteristics demonstrated that many Protestant components have not disappeared but have “become dislocated from their traditional referents” and have relocated in the rational organisation and the “progressive loss of sense” within banal associations. This form of sociality includes (amongst other things) the “individuating tendencies of law and choice”, prolific “information flows”, “discursive communication” and it also “promote[s] reflection upon reflection” (1997:166-170).

The Book of Job, although not dislocated from a sacred referent, not only displays a respect for rational arguments, individual choice, and the word to control the self but also encourages “reflection upon reflection” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:170). Dailey argues that in “the prologue (Job 1-2) the world of Job is “startlingly similar to the real world of Generation X” (1999:278). He argues that before the speech from the whirlwind, Job’s method of seeking wisdom is not through penitent confession, but through evidence (1994:134) and I extend this to add cognitive apprehension and self-reflection. Job’s friends or “wisdom’s guardians” (Beal, 2002:37) maintain that Job’s sudden change in fortune must be connected to his sinful body and his individual actions. Although Job’s story expresses his struggle to reconcile pain with a belief in a good and just God, Job’s friends looked for signs of Job’s transgression just as the Calvinists were to look for signs of election such as living in idyllic happiness. This evidence-based form of argument and cognitive use of sight was the Sinful Body’s method of acquiring knowledge and the concept of cause and effect was the Modern Body’s key method of confirming knowledge.

Beal (2002) and Dailey’s (1999; 1994) studies reveal the two social impulses (Volatile/Baroque and Sinful/Modern) which border Ambivalent Bodies. In this way contemporary analysis, such as these, are bounded by conventions which are considered acceptable in relation to discourse about the body-in-pain. These two studies of the Book of Job oscillate between an engagement with sensual sacred objects, rational explanations and control of profane objects. Yet, within the Job story there is another interpretation which I will explained in the following way.

73 According to Dailey (1999:277) Generation X refers to “those born in the late 1960s and 1970s ... [it is ]“more than a chronological label” it encompasses the “experience of those who have suffered a harsh existence, one that threatens not only their unknown (X) identity but also their continued well being”.
As Job’s pain continued any balance between the two boundaries is disturbed. At first Job tries to find a solution by following the organisation and pattern of the Sinful Body. For example he refuses to accept his pain as Divine Wisdom and against his friends ‘wisdom’ he faces his pain alone within his faith and proclaiming his innocence. Eventually misfortune and pain continues and his cries for a mediator are ignored, any form of control, discipline or rationalism begins to dissipate as Job becomes disoriented by pain. He initiates a form of human intervention and social activism by calling on the Leviathan (a biblical monster) to first, destroy God, and then demands some form of destruction to obliterate his abject (out of control) body-in-pain (Job 3:3-8). Mellor and Shilling (1997:148) claim that fear of the body and, by extension, the need to eliminate the body, signals a reshaping of the disciplined Sinful Body into the Modern Body. Modern sensibilities demand the use of control to order sensibilities, and in this case, that means using the negative side of the binary oppositions, such as monsters, to cause the destruction of ‘other’ negativities, such as pain. Yet in the world of modern control the stubbornness of bodies in general and the sensory body-in-pain in particular cannot be completely silenced. As a result tension develops between the cognitive need for control and obliteration, and the tenacity of bodies. Therefore despite a strategy of obliteration the final resolution within Job’s story, Dailey argues, can only be fully understood as a melding of “penultimate mysticism” and a “rational pursuit of an experiential world” (Dailey, 1994:181). Accordingly I argue that this aspect of Dailey’s perspective is captured in Mellor and Shilling’s third ideal-type and the social impulses found within the Ambivalent Bodies.

Ambivalent Bodies are torn between the competing social impulses of (amongst other things) Valued and Anaesthetised Pain. Ambivalence is created because the homo duplex nature of a thinking sensory body simultaneously negotiates between cognitive control, “voluptuous corporeality” (see Mellor and Shilling, 1997:134-136) and a sense of manipulation and illusion central to Baroque culture and this ambivalence was already contained in God’s answer to Job. Beal argues that God speaking “from the whirlwind” (2002:48) symbolises chaos, change, destruction and movement and is the beginning of Job’s theophany. Rather than using the goodness of divine order to quieten Job’s rage, which might be the expectation of the Volatile Body, or the reasoned explanation of punishment for sin as the Sinful Body might expect, God engages both Job and the Leviathan to reveal what Rudolph Otto (1950) might explain as the “mysterium tremendum” or a “non-rational” “religious experience” (Beal, 2002:53) between the “awesome and aw[e]ful” glory of timelessness, chaos and
order. The truly aw[е]fulness surrounding this pain is that “God ... rouses it, ... stirs it up, ... [and] revels in it (Beal, 2002:55).

Schlobin suggests that the frightening climax in Job’s story is that “the unmaking is followed by an unnatural and unholy making that no one, reader or character, can understand or coerce” (1992:28). Alternatively Beal argues that the climax “is a divine self-revelation from the whirlwind” (2002:54) which is a process in which Job moves “beyond [a] sense of disestablishment ... into a radical inversion of meaning” (Beal, 2002:54). Through this, Job finally experiences the totality of God’s Divine Wisdom. He realises his God is the God of Creation, but not a creation that establishes light over dark for all time. Instead it is an environment filled with chaos, pain and violence (Genesis 6:11) in which the currently normalised hierarchy of light over dark, mind over body, and consequently any other dualism can be brought into question. This is how Latour is able to claim that modernity gives the impression it can justify “anything - and its opposite” (1993:38).

Understood through the lens of Ambivalent Bodies, Job re-forms his rational form of knowledge and sociality in relation to the sacred and the world. What appeared to be demonic pain and chaos is now valued as deified divine revelation with the potential to remake the world through the sensory painful body. This return to valuing chaos and pain communicates bodily fear as well as fascination. Pain can be seen as prelude to a different, yet unrealised creation. In this way fear of pain and God, as well as actual pain and God himself, resurrects as awe with "spiritual and material" "benefits" (Dailey, 1994:170). These competing interpretations of Job’s story provide new insights into bodies-in-pain in that it blurs subconsciously accepted modern boundaries. The modern era was not the first era to debate these competing perspectives.

The point being made here is that ambivalent perspectives, in relation to pain, are integral to a Jobian story. For example the Devil's rationale for inflicting monstrous pain on Job’s flesh is that Job’s point of view cannot change until his embodied mind changes. Pain is the catalyst for this transformation. This corporeal perspective destabilises the ordering process in which stability (painless) is good and chaos (painful) is evil. Collapsing and blurring categorical boundaries in this way disorients the modern reader’s taken-for-granted or doxic
realm of hierarchically ordered ‘normality’. Unpacking dualisms challenges the contemporary normative assumption that ‘man’ should strive to control the body and eliminate pain. That is, that the right course of action is always to eliminate and neutralise the body's forewarning. Job’s story and Ambivalent Bodies treat pain, suffering and violence as a constitutive element of the body within everyday life. As a result, inherent in Job’s narrative are the social impulses central to contemporary bodies-in-pain. For ease of understanding these can be summarised in the following way:

1. **“Carnal Knowing” + “Sensual Solidarities”**: Bodies-in-pain are valued as helping transform relationships between people and God and are salvational; and

2. **“Cognitive Apprehension” + “Banal Associations”**: Bodies-in-pain are punishments for sin, sent by God whose wisdom is unknowable and uncertain when inflicted on the isolated individual (Mellor and Shilling, 1997).

Combined these two orientations (social impulses) form the boundaries surrounding Ambivalent Bodies. This means Torn Pain can transform pain and chaos into life-affirming and constructive elements. Horror lives in the idea that while binary oppositions may be unfounded, inaccurate and unstable assumptions. Equally Baroque manipulation may also be an illusion. In accordance with this, Mellor and Shilling conclude that contemporary bodies are “internally differentiated, prone to all sorts of doubts and anxieties and to be arenas of conflict” (1997:47). Nevertheless these “doubts and anxieties” are still contained within a Judeo-Christian framing that provides choices but choices which are limited within these boundaries.

**Section 3: Analytical Framework**

While Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types are a useful starting point for analysis, as noted previously they lack specificity in relation to pain. This makes it difficult to

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74 One could add that a Jobian theme of pain and wounding is a *figura* that reveals that stability is only skin-deep. “The hide, the skin,” (Beal, 2002: 71) that makes internal organs and blood invisible, is the surface calm of modernity, and the *Book of Job* reminds us that hidden below the skin is all that is abject.

75 This is an example of the use of the word ‘man’ which in this sentence is specific. In this mode of thinking it was only men that could control themselves (being more rational) and indeed women in activities such as childbirth were/are not encouraged to control their bodies with pain relief technology.
apply their ideal types without narrowing and systematising them. Consequently in the following section I will summarise the way in which I have systematised Mellor and Shilling’s re-forming ideal types in relation to pain and outline the framework which will be used for analysis in Part II of this dissertation. I begin this section by condensing and representing the framework in the following table:

Table 4.1: Ambivalent Bodies: Modes of Re-forming Ideal Type Bodies-in-pain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Volatile</th>
<th>Baroque</th>
<th>Sinful</th>
<th>Modern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>God intervened in the world</td>
<td>God, illusions, mystery all remain alive but distanced</td>
<td>Abstracted God</td>
<td>God is dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lived experience/carnal knowing</td>
<td>Animal/human; Visible and sensory knowing; not bodily</td>
<td>Cognition; Transactional relationships</td>
<td>Discourse; Isolation; Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociality</td>
<td>Embodied pain facilitates sacred meaning, communication and transformation</td>
<td>Pain displayed and transformative, not necessarily meaningful</td>
<td>Silent controlled and cognitively mediated pain</td>
<td>Eliminated or hidden pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embodiment</td>
<td>Representational Pain displayed</td>
<td>Pain conquered</td>
<td>Pain anaesthetised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valued Embodied Pain</td>
<td>Pain displayed</td>
<td>Pain conquered</td>
<td>Pain anaesthetised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ambivalent Bodies are torn between all and are in pain

The italics represent my interpretation of how the different ideal types incorporated pain.

Table 4.1 outlines a simplified linear re-formation process but in the complexity of everyday life linear re-formations are never as simple. This is because Modern and Baroque concepts sustain each other. Moreover, the two dominant Ambivalent Bodies - Modern and Baroque - find themselves torn between competing symbiotic social impulses. This means choice is never sure or certain. For example, in circumstances where pain cannot be eliminated, people cannot be sure if any of the apparent options are the right or correct approach to take in relation to either understanding or doing something about pain. Alternatives might be found in the Baroque world. However because the Baroque habitus encompasses multiple viewpoints, or ways of seeing, it may not always provide certainty. Furthermore a Baroque viewpoint, particularly in the contemporary age, although it nostalgically looks back to tradition, it reappears as a voluptuous sensual way of seeing rather than as sensory carnal contact. It is a
'loss of touch’ which can prohibit close-contact with everyday bodies-in-pain. As Mellor and Shilling argue “the tension between cognition and carnality ... [remain at] the heart of the advanced modern experience of the world” (1997:157).

This creates multiple “body projects” that extend both the Volatile or Sinful project beyond their original intent (boundaries). However, for the most part they keep their Christian boundaries regardless of whether this is explicitly recognised. Within these shifting associations, relationships and divergent forms of knowledge a common terrain developed (see Diagram 4.1) and this terrain has become the dominant framing within the contemporary era. As such Ambivalent Bodies: Torn Pain is an ideal type that:

1. Accepts the distant and isolated God and self and accepts profanation of large areas of material life.
2. But at the same time attempts to seduce the senses to a reorientation back to the sacred/sensual by focusing on the sensory body/soul.

![Diagram 4.1 Contemporary Bodily Choices of Orientation and their Christian Boundaries](image)

This diagram reflects that many Catholic and Protestant beliefs, practices, social behaviour and values are overlapping and at the same time have space for multiple forms of knowledge and socialities as well as giving rise to Ambivalent Bodies. It also illustrates that a common terrain of contemporary Ambivalent Bodies forms between the continuum that stretches from one boundary (pure
Volatile Bodies) to the other (pure Sinful Bodies), represented by the \( |-| \) shape. Examples in this common terrain can include: people who may predominantly know the world through their voluptuous sensory body but understand their relationship with pain is an isolating phenomenon. It may also include people who may not believe in God or the sacred but they regard material signs of success as meritorious. Alternatively, although written instructions may dominate the way a person values, receives and gives information; this type of receptivity will not negate the ability of the person’s sensory body to learn from images such as photographs and films. Furthermore it is this common terrain that on the one hand allows Sutherland, a Catholic convert, to paint his *Crucifixion* (see Figure 4.1), as a painful crucified Christ for the adornment of the wall of St Matthew’s Anglican Church in Northampton, England, or on the other hand Rainer’s *Wine Crucifix* to be displayed in a modern art gallery (Tait Gallery, London).

**Tensions Inherent in Re-forming Bodies**

As mentioned earlier, in common with the previous ideal types, the contradictory and mutually exclusive, as well as overlapping approaches of Modern and Baroque styles create tensions in the lived experience of these ideal types. This constantly threatens to re-form bodies again (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:49) and raises the spectre of mental fragmentation and ‘bodily pollution’. This tension between ideal types creates the impression that the modern/contemporary *habitus* allows “anything - and its opposite” (Latour, 1993:38) and by extension performs everything. This flexibility and fragmentation may also contribute to the very reason why the conceptualisations of modernity have not yet fully explored the potentiality of modernism and have instead taken the path of post-modernism.

However a focus on pain within this milieu gives context to why those who have studied pain have tended to suggest multiple competing paradigms for understanding contemporary approaches to pain, but have often refrained from either acknowledging or exploring the foundations for their competing interpretations. For example Bendelow (2000) notes that the only pain that is really considered seriously in contemporary times is pain caused by visible tissue damage. Scarry (1985) claims pain is unable to be shared. Glucklick (2001) does develop multiple typologies of sacred pain, but has a more psychological approach than sociological. Morris (1991), furthermore, acknowledges what he
has called the ‘myth of two pains’, highlighting the appearance of ‘two faces’, but marginalises the thinking body and does not develop a methodological approach to further analysis. Due to these limitations, I contend Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types in general and Ambivalent Bodies: Torn Pain in particular reveals a unity and continuity within these apparently different standpoints regarding the body-in-pain. The Baroque Modern impulses within this ideal type emphasise a competing plurality, as Latour argues “anything - and its opposite” (1993:38), and hence a tension, within social understandings of the body-in-pain but only within a limited Christian-inspired framework. Nevertheless, this tension generates potential possibilities for bodies to re-form.

**Conclusion**

As will now be clear, the framework developed in chapters two to four is not well suited to studying “Goddy[-ness]” (Bailey, 2003:58) in contemporary society. Instead it is a framework well suited to studying the ways in which Christian beliefs about the location of the sacred and the body shape the apprehension of ‘valid’ knowledge. Based on this, I have developed three ideal types of valid and acceptable routes to knowledge in order to understand bodies-in-pain. This framework explicates that the source of these bodies-in-pain is the Christian-inspired routes to knowledge and embodied sociality that dominated bygone eras. This is despite, as Nietzsche claimed, the demise of the legitimating authority (God), and hence the assumption that in an institutional sense these bounded routes to knowledge are no longer justified.⁷⁶ Accordingly society remains Judeo-Christian in its routes to knowledge and embodied sociality, but categorises these orientations as ‘secular’ and natural. This means bodies are torn between competing social impulses. For example, for the most part, pain in real bodies will be primarily dealt with within institutions. That is, the real body in physical and mental pain will be hidden (institutional care). At the same time, pain is also experienced in ‘pathological public spaces’ in imagination and discourse in much more bodily, but representative, ways. Doubt, fear and anxiety inhabit this complexity and contradiction.

In conclusion, the previous chapters in general have drawn on Mellor and Shilling’s ideal-typical analysis in order to trace the Christian origins of contemporary impulses and orientations toward bodies-in-pain. Continuing

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⁷⁶ This is not to say that individuals no longer have faith, nor that institutions are not shaped by Christian values, but that the legal, medical and political arrangements no longer claim to be arranged in ways that serve or please the Christian God.
Christian constraints on routes to knowledge and embodied sociality have been painstakingly traced. These themes have been exemplified in this study through the use of overtly religious/Christian paintings from various historical *habitus*. The greater potential of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and my development in relation to pain, however, is to illuminate the way in which in contemporary times, these Christian-based ideal-types continue to compete and circulate within Western culture. If the same (ambivalent and multiple, but limited) messages of embodied sociality and knowledge are apparent, this would suggest that Christianity remains significant for the way in which people in the Western world not only connect with and make sense of the body but also organise and intervene in their world. Amongst other things this will demonstrate the way in which the Sociology of Religion remains relevant to both the discipline of sociology and the study of culture. This is not because it reveals or confirms secularisation or people’s religious beliefs but because it demonstrates the continuity and discontinuity of tacit Christian boundaries and the way in which that effects and affects our contemporary society.

In this context Part II of this dissertation will consider whether, or not, these social impulses or ideal types are circulating in feature films by focusing on the male body-in-pain as portrayed in three successful box office films *Se7en* (1995), *Minority Report* (2002) and *Cape Fear* (1991). However before this analysis begins the question arises, why use film?
CHAPTER FIVE

FILM, NEO NOIR AND ITS RELEVANCE

Even though God is claimed to be dead, Nietzsche warns “there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown” (Nietzsche 1882, The Gay Science)

“Films are powerful vehicles for communicating religious meanings, stories and values to millions of people” (Ostwalt, 1995:157)

It has been unusual to select film as a case study in a sociological dissertation. Sociological analysis of genre film as case studies has been limited in general and the horror, neo-nor and thriller genres in particular. Indeed, scholars from other disciplines that have used horror or thrillers as data have often begun their books with a defence or justification for their selection. These defences are not focused on the value of the insights their analysis offers, rather they are aimed at persuading the reader both, that studying Hollywood films has merit and that film is not a trivial diversion for “a scholar who should be really doing something else” (Miles, 1996.ix). While Miles made this statement in 1996, it is supported by many scholars since (see for example, Franklin (2006), Lowenstein (2005) and Barker et al. (2001)). In my own academic life I have also experienced this kind of marginalisation at both national and international conferences. Furthermore, I have met academics that put this label on themselves. Very recently I was presenting at a conference at Oxford University when a follow presenter, an Associate Professor of Theology, lamented that the prestigious location of the conference had encouraged many of her students to ask what the paper she was presenting was about. She noted that they had never asked her about her papers when they covered a ‘serious’ and/or ‘proper’ area. However, they had asked this time and she had felt embarrassed to tell them that her paper related to popular culture. Although the paper raised a serious and important question, (how do we portray our Gods in fiction television and what does this say about our belief(s) in (the Christian) God?), it appeared that she had internalised a belief in the ‘trivial’ nature of the case study (not, I suspect, the question she asked).

Various scholars have speculated on the source of this attitude. Dowd, (1999:324) and Denzin (1989), for example, have argued, in different ways, that this occurs for two reasons. The first is that people do not believe works of fiction have the complexity of the lived world. The second is that popular films
are considered so ideologically loaded that they are irrelevant to sociological inquiry. I suggest that it is also partly related to the remaining influence of ingrained ‘enlightened’ dualistic hierarchies of modernity that oppose fact and fiction, real life over ‘mere stories’ and high and low culture. What the worldview of Ambivalent Bodies makes clear is that in a society that prioritises sight, stories are intangible and therefore have invisible effects. As a result there has been limited sociological interest in developing methodologies to tackle invisible research problems (like stories, or pain for that matter). Regardless of this embedded privileging of certain research sites over others (Barker et al. 2001:146-147), I intend to take seriously the intent of this dissertation to overcome the privileging of sight and particular sites. To do this, it is necessary to judge the appropriateness of using film as a case study on whether, or not, the case study improves the sum of knowledge about collective representations of bodies-in-pain. It is not to be judged on its conventionality. As suggested in an interdisciplinary e-book I co-edited for Rodopi Press on the topic of Fear, Horror and Terror (Hill and Smith, in press), it is time to address the boundaries that confine our expectations, with all the fear and trepidation that that entails. It is time to challenge the ways in which we study our subject matter as well as the subject matter we chose.

In taking up this challenge, I juxtapose something unusual with something conservative. The conservative element is the selection of ideal types as the method for this dissertation. From a sociological perspective, ideal types have a very long history and I use and systematise an aspect of an ideal type construction that was developed from two notable contemporary scholars, Phillip Mellor and Chris Shilling (see Chapter One). In the previous chapters I developed and systemised an aspect of their re-forming ideal types to produce three heuristic models of re-forming bodies-in-pain: Valued Embodied Pain, Anaesthetised Pain and Torn Pain. To do this I utilised a series of known research sites such as paintings, execution narratives and sociological, theological or philosophical texts. As a result my particularly original contribution to knowledge is to apply my models (framework) to a case study that is not normally selected in sociology. The merit of this approach should be judged on whether, or not, the findings regarding the role of Christianity in shaping bodies-in-pain has added to the knowledge on pain, and addressed Kilwein’s (1998) concern that opened this dissertation, to further explore the limited studies of the cultural aspects of pain. Accordingly, my aim in this chapter is two-fold. First, it is to explain my reasons for using film. Secondly, it is to make transparent the methods I use in conjunction with my ideal types to
analyse the selected films. To organise this material, I ask two questions: (1) Why investigate fiction film in general and *neo noir* in particular? (2) How will it be investigated?

**Why investigate film and *neo noir* film?**

Academics and scholars debate the nature of the relationship between film and society and some deny that an academically interesting connection exists at all. Rather than rehearse the breadth and depth of these well worn arguments, I will instead use one story and one academic insight to represent the reasons it is so important to study the varied aspects that relate to the practices of representation and the political economy of film. Subsequent to that, I outline the three reasons I chose film over other more conventional research sites for studying pain, such as hospitals, fine arts and advertisements.

The first comes from Martin and Ostwalt study *Screening the Sacred: Religion, Myth and Ideology in Popular American Film* (1995) and their claim that the ways Hollywood reinterprets, appropriates, invents or rejects inherited archetypes, mythic stories, ritual acts, symbolic figures and spiritual values will teach us a great deal about religion in the contemporary United States (1995:6). They argue that this is because most Hollywood film is similar to other *recognised* art-forms because it can ‘inspire’ and thereby shapes the *habitus* by changing behaviour and action. For example, in the introduction to their work Martin (1995:1) describes his own inspiring journey and the way in which he was, at first, ‘surprised’ when *Rocky* (1976), as a product of the mass media, inspired his colleague to re-form his bodily ways and develop what Frank might termed the “disciplined body” (1991:36-102) which I would suggest is a predisposition of the Protestant *habitus*. Martin finds the existence of iconic Christian imagery and symbolism in this film even more surprising when he finally sees it “years later” (Martin, 1995:1). Ostwalt concludes their study with the argument that all types of films “establish a world that makes sense and gives people a feeling for their place in the scheme of things” as they “introduce what the world means and how it means” (1995:156). Different scholar’s support this concept that films make Gods flesh, or at least make contemporary issues, flesh, in different ways and can represent the *habitus* of a nation.

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77 For more information on these competing perspectives, see Bauer, M, Atkinson, P. and Gaskell, G. (2000); or Miller, T (2001).
78 Simplistically ‘practices of representation’ refer to the processes of “embodying ... ideas, concepts and emotions” into meaning making symbolic and recognisable forms (Hall, 1997:19).
A further insight I draw upon to encapsulate the reasons why scholars select and study popular culture is that our imaginative stories have impact. Lowenstein (2005), a trauma studies scholar, argues that although academics tend to recognise the importance of films based on real events, such as the Vietnam War, to understand trauma, they often overlook popular culture films and fictitious stories. For example, he claims the economic value and emotional response of an audience to films such as the *Silence of the Lambs* (1991) indicates cultural values and anxieties about crime and murder. This film also raises the specific issues of 'fantastical' serial killing and (I argue) eating disorders, such as cannibalism (Lowenstein, 2005:1-15; Franklin, 2006:16).

These two insights and stories are indicative of range of authors advocating for the importance of studying fictitious Hollywood films. Apart from this general sense of film’s importance as a research site, I have chosen this site to answer my research question for three reasons. First, is that film has an emotional impact and in part this impact is related to watching bodies in action. I claim film is an excellent site to study my research question not only because film has the potential to transmit memory as Enders (1999) demonstrates regarding theatre, but also because film, as a social activity, capitalises on modern technologies to display narratives that combine visual, aural (senses) and emotive (carnal) communication. As Denzin notes, film “fascinate[s] the observer and draw[s] him into the drama … The forte … is in their emotional effect” (1989:232). Although Enders (1999) has demonstrated that films are not the only medium with transmission and emotional effects films do display constructed scenes that can replicate every detail of reality (if the director and producer so chose) and the mis-en-scenes instantly bombard the senses with a seemingly complete picture. Examining the construction of these images that are often presented as ‘reality’ will be pertinent to my dissertation’s research question.

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79 For various perspectives see for example David Thompson (British film critic), M. Darroll Byrant (academic), Woody Allen (director), Martin Scorsese (director) Deacy (academic) and Margaret Miles (academic), all have claimed in different ways, film does not just inspire, but can re-form society. Franklin (2006) argues that American fiction films, to a point, represent the socio-political culture in American. Nelson’s *Your God Is Alive and Well and Appearing in Popular Culture*, (1976) discusses the impact of making Gods, or evil, or redemption, flesh on screen, “close to the heartbeat of present culture” (Martin, 1989:159). In line with these approaches Denzin, a sociologist concludes that films consist of both ‘informational’ and ‘emotional’ forms of communication (1989:229). He also argues that “visual representations of society are both methods of research and resource or topics to be studied in their own right” (1989:211). Howell reinforces the sentiments above. He argues that many film directors and scholars believe that film can encapsulate the ‘spirit of the age’. He gives three indicative examples from Germany, America and the UK (Howell, 2003:196).
The second reason is based on the two way process by which film shapes and is shaped by the *habitus*. I intend to examine whether Christianity is playing a role in the film’s selected representations or mediations regarding the body-in-pain. If films contain collective representations that replicate previous Christian approaches to the body in general, and the body-in-pain in particular, then Christianity remains significant for the way contemporary Western people make sense of the body. For example, if film stimulated Martin’s (1995:1) colleague’s into developing a ‘disciplined body’, then this is a replication of both the film *Rocky*, and a replication of Protestant routes to knowledge and embodied sociality about what it is good and right for the body to do. This is regardless of whether, or not, his colleague understood his inspiration in Christian terms, or had even heard of the Protestant work ethic. In enacting the hard disciplined body, the colleague’s repetition, along with other responsive people, further shapes the *habitus* (either through repetition or resistance). Furthermore, given the serial nature of much popular culture, the same debates are often perpetuated. For example in the case of the series of *Rocky* films, the 2006 addition, *Rocky Balboa*, may put this filmic work ethic into a new perspective. It may re-inspire the older generation who saw the original screenings of these movies, but now grapple with new bodily challenges. Or, it might motivate a younger generation seeing this movie for the first time, to see the originals and to take on the concept of Frank’s (1991; 1995) “disciplined body”.

Finally, the third reason for selecting film is that films can be viewed as social activities in which visual and aural senses are used to communicate, not only with individuals, but also in circulating repetitious collective representations to mass audiences. In this way, films can be approached as “social event[s]” (Barker *et al.*, 2001:27) and this approach will ensure that this dissertation is more than a study of the ‘practices of representation’. A film communicates a message to individuals, but this message is relational as it is received and interpreted by people from the moment they see it advertised or hear about it, to how, why, where, who and what time they chose to see it, or chose not to see it. The key aspect of this process that I examine, and which Barker *et al* (2001) describe as the “tricki[er]” aspect, is that the “actual watching is permeated by learnt and shared ideas and assumptions, wishes, hopes and fears that arise from [the audiences’] social history” (Barker *et al.*, 2001:27; or see Sobchack, 2004 for a similar perspective). I argue this shared social history encompasses the routes to knowledge and embodied sociality. That is, because “peoples knowledge … [is] shaped by their senses [and they] acquire information *through* their bodies” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5) it can be argued
that the embodied viewer’s route to knowledge determines which images/objects and which senses count in the acquisition of valid comprehension and education. Accordingly films are likely to “act similarly on ... [audiences] who share a particular form of embodiment” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:5).

To study both this shared history and the impact on bodies immanent in the hermeneutic structuring of mediated representations, it is useful to study collective representations. This ensures this dissertation does not repeat Mellor and Shilling’s (1997:5) concern that “previous studies of representation” [of the body] “usually fail to account for what it is about the body that allows it to be depicted and constructed in certain ways” (1997:5). This is why, in following them, I place so much emphasis on Durkheim’s idea of the collective representation. Each collective representation of bodies-in-pain is formed through a social process that shapes, and is shaped by, interacting human actors and objects, and can be explicitly seen in films. These three reasons together make film the ideal site for studying the ways in which films can be approached as stories (knowing), enacted in ritual (embodied sociality) and also as repetitive images that transmit knowledge (embodiment). Denzin’s only caveat to the usefulness of studying film is that the researcher must acknowledge the approach taken to selecting (and rejecting) particular films and research themes (Denzin, 1989:232). Therefore, before proceeding into the methods that will be combined to study film in this dissertation, I outline my reasons for selecting neo-noir as the genre of analysis and further elaborate (from the Introduction) on why I have chosen to study male bodies.

Why Investigate the ‘Noir’ Genre?
The term film noir is credited to the French film critic Nino Frank. While noir film literally means ‘black’ film, this term denotes the genre’s pessimistic outlook more than its use of “chiaroscuro lighting” (Schwartz, 2005:ix; x). This negativity or fatalism associated with film noir is attributed to the genre’s conscious and unconscious Nietzschean foundations. In classifying certain films as ‘noir’, scholars have debated the degree of the genres pessimism however a consensus regarding the classification of the following films has generally been reached. Sunset Boulevard (1950), The Big Combo (1955), The Night of the Hunter (1955), Psycho (1960), Harper (1966) and Chinatown (1974) are all
considered to be examples of this genre. More recently films in this genre have been entitled *neo-noir* and this has then been divided in to subsets such as *techo-noir*. However in this dissertation, for ease of reference, I refer to *film noir, neo-noir and its subset* collectively as *noir* film.

Stoehr (2006) is one scholar that deliberately makes Nietzschean connections in classifying *noir* films. He claims that the experiences of *noir* film characters are imbued with “shadowy alleys of passive nihilism” or “alienation” (Stoehr, 2006:28). In the *noir* world, things are done to characters who are experiencing a break down in society’s stable binary oppositions or (Christian) values and sometimes a voice-over is inserted to highlight the “bleak stoicism”. Characters either emphasis their own sense of “not belonging”, or the plot and *mise en scene* highlight their isolation. In this way values become derived or instrumental concepts, that are only useful in supporting “unbridled ambition” (Palmer, 1996:4). Consequently, *film noir* expresses a “nostalgia ... dread ... meaninglessness” (Schrader, 1996: 105) “anomie” (Palmer, 1996:4) and “estrangement” that denotes a scepticism of “traditional institutions” (Stoehr, 2006:28). Nietzsche foretold of this collapse when he claimed a madman streaked across the town square proclaiming that “God is Dead” and “Man has killed him” (Nietzsche, [1882] (1974) 125, 183).

This opportunity, which the madman announces or forewarns of (a *figura*, perhaps, of the society to come) is not the inevitable secularisation of society (as many ‘hardline’ secularists argue). In this combined performance of sacrilege and crime mystery-revealed, the madman foreshadows the end of the legitimate authority of norms, values and moral codes that had been previously justified by God’s wisdom. According to Nietzsche, ([1886] (1989:204) there are two potential futures for individuals in this world. One type of individual is freed by the possibility of reinventing moral codes. This first future is labelled the superman or master. The other future is for those who are enslaved by the lack of moral guidance (passive nihilists). The passive nihilist searches for certainty within this vacuum and cannot respond. The active nihilist or ‘master’ seizes the momentum and creative opportunity to take actions of “self-surpassing”

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81 Neo-noir has been debated as a conscious genre, a movement or a style. For examples, see Hirsch’s (1999) work. He suggests that neo-noir in its various forms is very difficult to pin down. Schwartz’s (2005: xiii) contention is that “neo-noir is an accepted critical signifier and identifier of many crime films post-1960 that embrace the former film noir style”. Chopra-Grant (2006:189) uses the word ‘genre’ as the collective word for these films for “convenience”. Conrad’s (2007) edited book analyses neo-noir from a philosophical perspective. For an alternative viewpoint, see Porfiro, 1996:115).
Nietzsche was not interested in the question of whether God is real (or dead), but the consequences of man’s belief that he has killed God. In a world that believes God is dead, the development of superman and slave has the opportunity to take place free of Christian routes to knowledge and embodied sociality.

How does this relate to noir film? Classification of particular films as noir is contested because locating films that take on this entirely pessimistic viewpoint is not always clear cut. This contestation however does not undermine my selection of the noir genre for this dissertation because it is not the film’s classification that is important. Rather the significance lies in the act of classification. Filmmakers and critics have classified the films that I investigate here as belonging to the noir genre. When the filmmaker or critic associates a film with the noir label, it signals the film’s pessimistic outlook and in this way they have an affinity with Nietzsche’s worldview which lacks a this-worldly or other-worldly transcendence.

This association with Nietzschean amorality – or rather non-Christian morality - would suggest noir film, with its potential to discuss the negative sides of dualisms such as the body and pain, as the genre most likely to shed Christian sensibilities. By implication, associating the films with this genre means these films are the least likely to repeat Christian iconography or to suggest to the audience a tacitly Christian solution to uncertainty and anxiety. Yet in noir film tacitly, Christian solutions to characters’ problems such as redemption, have been found (for example, Deacy, 2001, Grimes, 1995:19-30). For the purposes of this dissertation, I move beyond looking for signs, such as the moral resolution of the film or concepts such as Christian redemption, to investigate Christianity’s significance in film. Instead I examine the more subtle impact of Christian embodiment in noir films. I suggest that if noir films use routes to knowledge framed by Christian views of the body in response to the base subject matter of noir film – pain – then it reveals that even in genres claiming to hear Nietzsche’s nihilist warning, Christian embodiment is still the dominant way of approaching bodies-in-pain.

82 Some scholars define film noir as a distinctive film genre while others see it as an umbrella term which encompasses films of diverse genres. French authors Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumonton (1996: 76), early definers of the genre, suggest that it has one unifying tension - that of alienation and “disquiet”.

83 For classifications of Cape Fear as noir film, see Scorsese, 1992; Deacy, 2001; for Minority Report see Spielberg, 1997; for Se7en see Swallow 2003:84; and for Crash (1996), see Cronenberg, 1996.
I have chosen to compare the tacit Christian-inspired bodily orientations in one genre and one type of body (male) so that the comparisons I make are focused on changes in the representation of the same subject matter (the male body-in-pain) and the same style of representation (*noir* film). This is important because changing a variable such as gender has consequences. By holding certain variables, such as genre and gender constant, I am seeking to show that changes in representations of bodies-in-pain are related to something other than the genre, or the gender and ethnicity of the characters in the films. Among other things, I suggest that this 'something other' may be related to the competing Christian impulses of modern and baroque bodies.

**Noir film and Mellor and Shilling’s Ideal Types (1997)**

The link between *noir* themes and Mellor and Shilling's Christian ideal types can be seen in Mellor’s claim that “while Western societies [after the Reformation] became ‘post-Christendom’ societies ... they never became fully ‘post-Christian’: indeed it is possible to see Western ‘modernity’ as the creation of Christianity rather than its secular aftermath” (Mellor, 2004:186). Drawing together this point and the earlier points would suggest that Christian routes to knowledge and embodied sociality are so ingrained within our culture that directors, actors and critics can incorporate them into the identity of characters in *noir* film regardless of the potential freedom Nietzschean and secularisation thought could have opened up. Nietzsche’s warning needs to be re-evaluated. That is, if members of a society are no longer conscious of the Christian foundation of their *habitus*, their routes to knowledge and embodied sociality will remain Christian. If that remains the case then they will simply replace ‘divine wisdom’ with man’s ‘rationality’ as the justification for those already existing routes to knowledge without actually re-evaluating them. Nietzsche’s mad man also warns that with a belief in God’s death society will overlook the foundation of their normative values, and consequently they will remain normalised regardless of any changed legitimate authority. Mellor takes it further to note that there are consequences when “Christian underpinnings are not simply unacknowledged but firmly denied” (Mellor, 2004:158). Therefore by exploring Christian framings in the representation of bodies-in-pain in the research site of film noir, I am able to explore and to assess how limited and limiting the current options are for dealing with pain. This will now be addressed in relation to the way in which film is investigated in this dissertation.
How Is Film Investigated in this Dissertation?

Film is an ideal site for studying routes to knowledge and embodiment, and also the role of Christianity in structuring that knowledge. However, given the limited sociological attention paid to film in general and film as part of the sociology of knowledge in particular, there are few models to follow. As a result, below I canvass the ways in which sociology has approached film in the past, so that I can take the strengths from, and minimise the weaknesses of, the previous approaches. This literature overview also includes research techniques from outside the discipline of sociology which can also be capitalised on in order to incorporate the richness of interdisciplinary methods that use fiction film as a site for research.

Literature Overview

Sociology of Film

The late 1920s saw rising public anxiety over the effects of films on American youth. This resulted in the unprecedented formal coalition of sociological and psychological experimental attitudinal studies to definitively ‘solve’ the problem (Black, 1994:151, Peterson and Thurstone, 1933, Blumer, 1935). Becoming ingrained over time, this approach was further explored by theorists such as Leavis, Eliot and also those of the Frankfurt School who frequently began analysis with the assumption that mass culture was designed for consumers who were viewed as ‘cultural dopes’. Popular culture gained a reputation for being such a restricted form of communication that any educated critic could see its ideological perspective and its artifice (Hill and Gibson, 2000:189). According to Tudor (1974 and 1999) in the 1940s and 1950s views, such as these, formed explicit boundaries around the way the social scientist was expected to study film.

Consequently the multi-layered messages and structures in many mass communication texts were overlooked and audience diversity was not a centre of investigation. This meant the complexity of ‘doing’ movies was lost. Exceptions included Rosen (1941) and Powermaker’s (1950) social approach to the film industry’s peak, and Mayer’s (1945) qualitative research regarding film experiences. Huaco’s (1965) work on

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84 The term “cultural dope” is designed to classify those people who reproduce the normalised values and dominant expectations of a habitus by conforming to a very narrow set of commonly accepted societal behaviours. This term was widely used in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, usually it is assumed that ‘cultural dopes’ are unable to resist society’s dictates and this is the basis of social order (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994:250).

85 For a more in-depth analysis of the origins and arguments, see Swingewood, 1977.

86 Exceptions included Rosen (1941) and Powermaker’s (1950) social approach to the film industry’s peak, and Mayer’s (1945) qualitative research regarding film experiences. Huaco’s (1965) work on
1960s this limited and limiting approach came under increasing criticism. Psychoanalysis, post structuralism and semiology were presented as solutions (Wollen, 1969 and 1998). These approaches and theories were initiated and film theory flourished and matured under the influence of the journal *Screen*, (Jowett and Linton, 1989). By the 1970s a new dominance was consolidating around the ‘formalism of structuralism’, and ‘semiotic approaches’ that focused on the film text.

Among the pioneers of film semiotics were Metz (1974), and Woollen, (1969, 1998) who argued that film communicated within three types of sign: “the icon”, “the index” and “the symbol”. For example, by dividing the film into ‘grammatical’ units, Geertz’s hermeneutic methodology which has distinct semiotic foundations was used to examine the symbolic messaging of film and to explore its cultural meaning. Interpretative semiotics took account of images as well as written or spoken text. What was unique about this perspective, particularly as implemented by Adorno, Horkheimer and others, was that the “subject is constituted through and by the film text and is thereby caught in ideology” (Tudor, 2000:189). Marxian ideology and structural psychoanalysis, was combined with semiotic analysis to incorporate signifying systems such as dreams, language and culture and became the foundation of much cultural and film studies methodologies (Althusser, 1971 and Metz, 1982a and 1982b). Criticisms of purely Marxist approaches were expanded upon to consider the repetitious use of patriarchical relations and denigrating ethnic stereotypes. As a result ideological approaches to film tended to mean that the study of class, gender or ethnicity in film were the only sociological variables considered.

In time, a UK research centre, (referred to as the Birmingham School) contested that these variables were the only basis of an individual’s interpretation of film (Hall, 1980, 1982.; Morley, 1992). They argued audiences are more active in consciously and pre-consciously mediating and critically reviewing texts and that a film which attracted both numerous and repeat visits was a sign that the site was of cultural interest. With this ‘cultural turn’ new approaches were developed to recognise human agency in the study of film (what was later to be termed cultural studies). This gave impetus to studies that looked at meaning-making strategies. As a result, by the 1980s this ‘turn’ had the effect of beginning to undermine the belief that only ‘elite’ art was academically worthwhile. A

‘art film’ by passed the negative attitude to popular film.
minority of scholars from various disciplines started to undertake analysis of popular texts such as feature films, television (and more recently, internet spaces and internet gaming). Nevertheless, the methodology for approaching these innovative sites swung back to traditional interview and reception studies based on attitudes (Turner, 1990, Stout and Buddenbaum, 1996). Few of these scholars were sociologists and even fewer asked questions about the construction of knowledge in film. Denzin is one of the few sociologists who tried to promote the use of visual sociology and film to enhance sociology in general and sociological teaching in particular (Denzin’s approach is further elaborated upon later in this chapter). A journal entitled *Teaching Sociology* also took up some of these concerns.

**Religious Studies and Film**

Despite Denzin’s contribution, the limited sociological analysis of popular film was predominantly studied in relation to production, consumption or, as mentioned, ideology and variables such as class, gender and ethnicity. This narrows the availability of sociological models to be used in my dissertation. In order to look beyond class, gender and ethnicity as the basis for a sociological analysis of film, I turned to religious studies scholars to see what models they used to study religion and popular, outwardly secular, films. There too, there has been comparatively little interest. For those who have focused on film, the methodology and also subject matter has tended to focus on the “Goddy” (Bailey, 2003:58) in society through consideration of the ‘film as text’, within the social, political and cultural matrix in which film is produced and distributed (Miles, 1996; Martin & Ostwalt, 1995; Lauders, 1996: Forbes & Mahan, 2000; Meer, 2001: Johnson, 1995: Smith, 2001). Other scholars have analysed the religious implication of film within broad cultural and interpretative frameworks in order to provoke discussion of religious themes and/or ethical reflection (Marsh and Ortiz, 1997; Valenti, 2000). Lauder (1996) directs attention to the presence of the divine in human interaction and how it is powerfully defined on screen. In a similar vein, sociologists Bergesen and Greeley (2001) have shown how movies make visible the body of God. Some theology and English literature scholars have used an approach that incorporates and re-presents Biblical ideas, themes or motifs alongside literature and film (Cooper & Skrade, (ed) 1970; Hurley, 1970 and 1978; Campbell and Pitt 1981; May, (ed) 1992; Kreitzer, 1993 and 1994). A number of studies have dealt with topics such as:

1. the Biblical epic (Forshey, 1992),
2. the Jesus movie (Christologies) (Babington & Evans, 1993; Tatum, 1997; Reinhart, 2007, Malone, 2007)
3. themes in Pauline theology (Jewett, 1993 and 1999) and  
4. themes of redemption in film noir (Deacy, 2001).

This literature overview is a glimpse into how film has been studied from a sociological and religious studies perspective. However, this literature provided very little insight into how to use film in order to reveal embedded structures of knowledge in society (beyond class, ethnicity, and gender). What can be taken from the works supporting this overview instead are a number of concepts that can be combined to ensure that I study both the emotive effect of film, the consequences of its medium, and its role in shaping, and being shaped by, society.

**Why Use Ideal types to Investigate Film?**

Looking for Biblical epics, Pauline theology, or Christologies, Christ-like motifs or Jesus films is one way to show continuity in Christian influences from both medieval and Protestant eras (Tatum, 1997 and Deacy, 2001). However, rather than repeat subjects that have already been well studied, my contribution to this area of scholarship is to show that popular films both represent and use Christian routes to knowledge and embodied sociality to engage with the sensory body of the characters in the film and the audience watching the film. Because films are composed of images and sound, ideal types are very useful for comparing routes to knowledge and embodied sociality in both the reel and real world.

Ideal type models provide a method for doing this because they have an affinity with expression in film that results from ideal types and films both being “one-sided accentuations” of particular characteristics designed to clarify meaning. According to Fulton, Huisj, Murphet and Dunne (2005:126), characters in films communicate in "types" (hence typecast) rather than as individuals that are uniquely different. This gives them mass appeal and means their actions are given context in relation to “social values” (Fulton et al. 2005:164), and societal position, which I contend is visibly displayed through their bodies. Furthermore, acting involves making motivations, emotions, and feelings visible to the audience and is done through gestures, bodily expressions, use of the body’s senses and only sometimes in conversation, consequently this makes the bodies of actors and the feelings of characters “public” and “social” (Fulton et al. 2005:110). As a result, film characterisations are enfolded in the “social order” and are not unique constructions of the individuals making the films (Fulton, et al. 2005:110). Consequently, characters and actions in films can be interpreted
as collective representations because filmmakers use recognisable forms of communication in order to tell their stories. This creation of types is particularly interesting in conjunction with ideal types, because film makes visible and simplifies its characters and ideas in order to convey particular messages. This means that if the same “one-sided accentuations” are present in the ideal types I use, and also present in different films, then those types are circulating and known forms of communication and could indicate that collective representations of pain are still influenced by Christian underpinnings.

**Combining Approaches to Research Film**

Despite their potential, ideal types alone cannot ensure that they fully explore either the worldview the film is communicating nor its bodily effects. This means the ideal type framework needs to be supplemented with some concepts and techniques derived from the literature overview in order to make certain that this study of film capitalises on its ‘medium as well as its message’. Social semiotics is one approach that advocates for the combination of methods and frameworks to ensure academic study is cognisant of the complexity and interrelationships between social communication and collective representations.

Jewitt and Oyama, (2001:134-5) argue that the study of signs, as initiated by the “Paris school of structuralist semiotics” is too prescriptive to clarify the origins, outcomes of communication and “meaning potentials”. Instead they advocate a “social semiotics” approach which analyses objects as social “resources” (2001:134). These resources are analysed using “visual social semiotics” and descriptive dimensions such as “points of view, distance and contact” (Jewitt and Oyama, 2001:138). They maintain that this approach means that artefacts cannot be studied as fixed signs or codes of communication and therefore representational meaning should be studied in combination with other theories about society. For example, Jewitt and Oyama combine a visual social semiotic analysis of male positions in advertising with gender analysis to ensure they study both what is portrayed in the image as well as the ways in which society either supports, or rejects or reinforces particular positions (2001:136-139). What I utilise from their social semiotic approach is their claim that it is imperative to study the feedback loop between the encoded historical and local meanings of cultural objects and the way in which those cultural objects actively participate in teaching and transmitting semiotic interpretative meanings (Jewitt and Oyama, 2001:136). Therefore to explore the feedback loops inherent in an ideal typical analysis I add this form of semiotics as a
research method. As a result the methodology in Part II takes a three pronged approach which includes a visual cultural and a social semiotic approach by combining an examination of filmic images through signs (semiotics) and Mellor and Shilling's ideal type re-forming bodies and my systemisation - bodies-in-pain ideal types. In this way I use a plurality of methods to ensure the analysis is as robust as possible.

Approaches to the Study of Visual Culture

As noted alongside the ideal type models and semiotics, I also use a visual approach drawn from the work of Denzin (1989) and Howells (2003). After a brief introduction to their work and concepts in relation to the medium of film and its potential, I will draw this discussion together under two key headings (1) film as story and (2) film as image repeating tool.

Denzin (1989:232), one of the few sociologists who lament the limited attention paid to the visual aspects of film in sociological inquiry, argues that because film is not only a communication tool but also a method of investigation, it offers numerous potential for sociological analysis. He claims that understanding the interaction between film production (one-sided accentuations) and transmitted messages appears to be at the foundation of all forms of sociology. Yet, despite this open-mindedness toward Hollywood film, even Denzin assumes the study of Hollywood in this regard will be from award winning films such as “Fatal Attraction” or the films of acclaimed directors (Denzin, 1995:143). Nevertheless, following his suggested method of research visual sociology, rather than his assumption of film selection, I use some of his concepts as a resource because he recognises that films “simultaneously” explore “the grammars of vision, perception and interpretation” (Denzin, 1989:210). Denzin’s approach to films as multilayered stories takes account of film’s ability to shape and be shaped by the habitus and reveal the construction of meaning through collective representations. Therefore, to capture these levels and perspectives as well as the way their presentation is structured, I consider films as both stories (content and discussion) and as a form of presentation that repeats the same or very similar images over time (image-repeating tools). My dissertation pulls both story and image together in order to ensure the entire feedback loop is followed, that is words/story and images are ‘seen’ for the persuasive power they can have on the emotions of audiences.
Film as Image Repeating Tool

What Film Studies analyses well, according to Howell (2003), is the ontology of the image. This means the study of the emotional impact of film’s ‘grammar’ and its components of ‘shot and edit’ on the individual is well considered. Howells claims that film, when reduced to its basic level is “photography at 24 frames per second” (2003:172). Film, therefore, “depends on the ontology of photographic image” and appropriately exploits visual forms of communication. Sound and moving image together react with the ‘real’ and ‘reel’ sensory body and evokes emotional impact. The medium of film uses it ‘grammar’ to create realistic looking phantoms (regardless of the story content) that control the audiences voluntary suspension of autonomy through feedback loops that move people “from a physical state to psychological insight” (Howells, 2003:190) and back into a new physical state. In this way, the seemingly realistic appearance of film is an illusion. The audience, as participant rather than spectator (or voyeur as Denzin (1995) claims), is “drawn into a “fantastically crafted construction and, while always intellectually cognisant of its artifice ... emotionally manipulated by its apparent realism” (Howells, 2003:191).

According to Howell (2003) what is not well studied in this process, is the way in which the repetition of particular images reinforces particular viewpoints or perceptions at a societal level. The technology of the camera (whether in still or moving images) facilitates the repetition of identical, and recognisably similar, images over time. While the image will have different impacts in different contexts and viewing spaces, it will always be imbued with previous memory. So much so, for example, that Crowe, the Director of Vanilla Skies (Crowe, 2001 DVD Special Features), explicitly made the ‘happiness’ scenes in Vanilla Skies replicate certain Beatle’s vinyl/LP covers from the 1960s. These enduring album covers still exist to be seen/screened today, and now this film repeats and re-forms these images as visions of idyllic happiness, just as they were intended to be in the 1960s. This means a film is a tool that identically repeats a fixed combination of sound and image constructed through shot and edit. There are two aspects to the repetitive nature of the images that are important to my analysis; these are their global mobility, and their longevity.

When compared to live performance, “the ontology of the photographic image”, means it has perfect global mobility. Filmic technology means that, regardless of the country in which it is screened, the particular use of bodies and the sensory
construction of the film will be identical at each screening.\textsuperscript{87} Context may change in each new location but with the wide circulation of American film, identical images of bodily sensory experience are repeated both inside the country that created them and outside that country. This means studying these films in NZ is just as relevant as studying them in the US. Audiences may not always interpret the films and images identically; for example, the significance of the eagle at the start of \textit{Cape Fear} may have less resonance as a signifier in NZ because viewers rarely see this symbol and its associations. Nevertheless the repetition of Christian-inspired bodily orientations still make it a globally circulating resource, which, if reinforced with other tacit and explicit Christian symbols will mean American films are effective transmitters of selected and mediated knowledge.

In addition to global mobility, the replication of images is repeated over time. The same images appear whether it is in the movie theatre when the film is new, on prime time television a little later, or on late night television when the film is ‘old’. It may have re-runs at the cinema, depending on its classic status, and it may be made into an advertisement, video game, or amusement park ride (Ndalianis, 2005:254). The cinematically literate know both Luhrmann’s \textit{Romeo + Juliet} (1996) and McG’s \textit{Charlie’s Angel’s II: Full Throttle} (2003) pay homage through visual reference to Cady’s tattooed back in \textit{Cape Fear} not only because they may have remembered the image since \textit{Cape Fear’s} first screening in 1992, but also or instead because they may have seen it yesterday or last week on television or DVD. In this way images repeat through time, albeit in different contexts, but always imbued with previous memory, which is the reason Crowe’s use of album covers is effective in perpetuating particular views of happiness in \textit{Vanilla Skies} (Crowe, 2001 DVD Special Features). This is equally relevant for new audiences when initiated into ‘happiness’ scenes and also for those familiar with the album covers. Consequently films that represent bodies-in-pain to embodied audiences are likely to propagate memory, fuel imagination and stimulate identification thus reproducing imitation (see for examples, Howells, 2003 and Miles, 1996).

\textsuperscript{87} It is possible to have slight variation in film experiences. For example \textit{Se7en} was shot on a type of film that is designed to be shown in large screen theatres (Fincher, \textit{Se7en} DVD Special Features). The full impact of the lighting/images does not occur each time the film is screened in smaller more commercial cinemas. Nevertheless the construction of the images generally repeats regardless of screening location.
Having noted the importance of the photographic approach to film studies, Howells also contends that film has an important difference. He notes that what moving images add to static images, such as photographs, is “transitions in time” and in this sense films are more similar to novels than to photographs or even the theatre (Howells, 2003:174). Many models exist for studying novels (stories) and some have been applied to film. However, before outlining how this applies to this study, it is worth considering this from the perspective of the Sinful Body. Following the methods used in the study of novels runs the risk of marginalising images and bodies. I claim that cognitive apprehension as discussed within the Sinful Body and its privileging of words has shaped approaches to studying novels which isolate discursive significance from the visual component. Studying bodies within a film’s story can overcome this, if the film is considered as both story and image repeating tool, including its material constitution in embodied film viewers (see Howells, 2003:175; Bergesen, 2006:115).

**Film as story and as enacted ritual**

Midgley (1997:54) notes stories and myths establish connections with the way our minds grasp reality. In this respect I have taken three aspects in this process from various scholars, including Denzin and Howell, to structure how I will approach the stories I study. My concern is to make visible the feedback loops between fiction films, society and collective representations of bodies-in-pain. These are the:

1. collective nature of story creation in film;
2. layered potential understandings of stories; and
3. collective nature of story interpretation/enactment.

**The Collective Nature of Story Creation in Film**

Film creation is a joint effort. While auteur theory gives primacy to the director, many directors acknowledge the significant input of screenwriters, actors, family members and test audiences in the production process to ensure at least some of the intended encoded messages are intelligible (Spielberg, 2002 DVD Special Features). In addition, filming and acting do not always go as planned. For example, *Se7en* is filmed mostly in the rain, because filming in the rain was least disruptive to the short production schedule. More complex motivations can also alter intended portrayals. For example, in the filming of *Saving Grace* (2006), New Zealand actor Jim Moriarty intended to perform a scene where he claimed to be Jesus Christ in a sceptical manner, suggesting that the character was
mentally ill rather than Jesus himself (Hardy, 2003). However, during filming he believed that a spirit did enter his body, and it took on the iconography of Christianity, regardless of his sceptical views. Consequently the film that was released repeated Christian understandings of the spirit of God and this interpretation was more akin to Christian belief than the director and actors originally intended (Hardy, 2003). In a similar way, Robert De Niro in a physically painful scene in Cape Fear altered the original script immediately prior to filming to include biblical references in a scene which is now dominated by his sermon to Sam Bowden about the power of God/humans. For whatever reason (the shaping of the habitus or the existence of God), these kinds of unplanned changes based on the tacit dimension of knowledge have resulted in collective productions that communicate in collective representations, making other portrayals rarely seen or invisible.

The Layered Understandings of Stories
As a result of the discrepancy between intentions, collective will and final production, Denzin (1989:229) makes a distinction between what can be seen on the screen as the "surface appearance" (Denzin, 1995:127) and the second story that is "inferred" (1989:232). "A film does not speak to the universal feature of the human condition but to limited versions of human experience, those captured by the filmmaker[s]" (Denzin, 1989:230). Applying this distinction to my dissertation, I argue most of the films in this dissertation contain overt mention of Christian concepts (surface appearances). These are passing references that move the plot along. For example, the protagonist in the film Cape Fear (1991) is told to look to the Book of Job, thus foreshadowing the pain to come. In the film Se7en (1995), a Christian sermon on the seven deadly sins is painfully delivered. Yet, none of these explicit references to Christianity is acknowledged as being linked to the protagonist’s denouement in the film, its arrangement of knowledge or even how the characters or the audience are expected to perceive and interpret their sensory body or worldview. These more subtle connections can be inferred, once knowledge of Christian embodied sociality is clear. Inferred meanings do not need to be explicitly perceived by audiences as there is “never a correct reading of a visual text only multiple interpretations” (Denzin, 1989:232). However, even without understanding these connections at the ‘rational calculation level’, both levels of meaning are significant and invoking Polanyi, I argue, influence the tacit as well as rational dimensions of knowledge. Denzin argues any text should be studied for both surface and inferred meanings, so this dissertation discusses both aspects in each of the case studies in the following chapters.
The Collective Nature of Story Interpretation/Enactment

Barbour (2007:125) notes that stories that make sense of the world, will need to be told, and will also be enacted because stories help construct identity. As a result, stories are also embodied pedagogical techniques that transmit memory. In this way, enacted stories teach moral values, right and wrong and also how to be embodied in the world. This enactment is not just in film (viewing and listening) but of film (learning and replicating). For example this can be seen in the enactment of Jedi religion as a result of Star Wars (Possamai, 2005:72-75), or in the more subtle desire to exercise the body after watching Rocky which actualises the active nature of listening to and learning from stories. Given the actualisation of stories and their role in memory, stories need sensory bodies to play a role in that enactment. Thus as Elkington (2001:50) argues, “the introduction of mobile elements such as acting and the spectator moving through the film with the action of their eyes [and sensory body] converts the film” into an embodied space. For this reason it is necessary to study not only the stories’ causal moral resolutions and ideas of right and wrong but it is also equally important to study film’s engagement with the body of actors and spectators. In this way the structure of knowledge which the film facilitates is important to the way in which it is perceived. In other words, film communicates its message through the prioritisation of particular senses that will impact on the audience’s bodily response. Hence the importance of choices in colour/image (sight), music (hearing) and the display of touch, the image of taste or the body of the actors’ reaction to smells will all affect the audience’s body and interpretation. The selection of which sense to speak through (which route to knowledge) impacts on what the audience’s bodily response will be and what it is that they will recall they have seen. Consequently, this dissertation focuses on the routes to knowledge in the film and use of bodies, rather than the approach the films take to ideas such as justice, revenge, and murder.

Cognisant of all these angles to the study of film, this study investigates the selection, mediation and also the marginalising and silencing of images and stories told through collective representations. It also combines this investigation of stories with the power of the image repeating tool in film. I do this because both bodies and minds are involved in the creation and interpretation of these images and stories. Consequently, it is necessary to tell an integrated story because it is both minds and bodies together that facilitates memory and contributes to the construction of the habitus.
Conclusion

Having articulated the reasons for selecting noir film and male bodies I have also outlined how I will combine social semiotic and visual analysis of contemporary film through Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and my development of them. This approach will provide insights into the way in which a formerly Christian habitus still shapes film representations of the body-in-pain. It will also show that the expected repetition of these collective representations means that embodied Christian routes to knowledge and embodied sociality are repeated in films that have no overt or proselytising Christian purpose.

Because this study only looks at a single concrete phenomenon, male bodies-in-pain, in the cultural world of fiction noir film, it cannot claim an Enlightened approximation of truth about societal comprehension of the sensory body, even if such a single truth exists. Nevertheless by analysing film I begin to unearth not only Bergesen’s (2006:116) encouragement to acknowledge the power of the cultural object to make assertions but also the frameworks that people use to interpret the assertions made by the cultural object. This study also contributes to overcoming the negative reaction from academic who “decry the degeneracy of American film” by recognising the importance of revealing connections between popular culture, societal practices (Franklin, 2006:2) and Christian boundaries.

Therefore, this dissertation does not enter the debate as to whether, or not, film ritual has a religious purpose (the search for the “Goddy” (Bailey, 2003:58)) or whether, or not, it is capturing the complexity of a nation’s spirit. It does not debate film’s role in shaping or being shaped by the habitus and although the investigation of film as a social activity means the dissertation is ideologically aware, instead it concentrates on meaning-making strategies and constructions of knowledge. Applying a collection of academic approaches to this end, in Part II of this dissertation, I use film as a case study because it has the potential to both inspire and represent the habitus and it is precisely this dual embodied role or feedback loop that gives film its place in shaping, and being shaped by, the social significance of Christianity in the lived experience of believers and non-believers alike in our contemporary world.
PART II

INTRODUCTION

“We experience pain and suffering ... as we interpret it. It senses us as if with an unseen hand, but we too capture and reshape it” (Morris, 1991:29)

In Part I of this dissertation I described Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) re-forming Christian ideal type bodies in relation to their analysis of ‘embodied sociality’, the ‘changing location of the sacred’, the ‘organisation and hierarchy of the senses’ and the ‘contrasting ways of representing and gaining knowledge’ in the Western world. In order to use this analysis as a model or framework for further use I narrowed and systemized their ideal types in relation to bodies-in-pain in general and male bodies-in-pain in particular. Finally I concluded Part I of this dissertation with a chapter that both revealed, and highlighted, an affinity between the methods used in an ideal typical analysis, social semiotics and visual analysis as well as films as case studies.

Moving forward into Part II then, my purpose here is to use these bodies-in-pain ideal types as a lens through which to see (investigate) whether, or not, Christianity remains socially and institutionally significant for the way in which people make sense of the body. To accomplish this, in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight, three fiction films - Se7en (1995), Minority Report (2002) and Cape Fear (1992) - are the case studies that will be used as evidence for this investigation. The use of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types in conjunction with my systematisation provides the overall framework in which to look past both explicit and implicit Christian themes (such as, Goddy-ness) and widely known symbols (such as, the cross) to see the way in which Christian routes to knowledge have become so ingrained in the bodily orientations towards the hierarchy of the senses that these routes to knowledge are frequently replicated and often without conscious awareness.

The final chapter, although not leaving the world of film completely, does bring this dissertation back to the real world by concentrating on the controversy or the ‘moral panic’ surrounding Cronenberg’s film Crash (1996). Given that this

88 Moral Panic is a term coined by Stanley Cohen in his study Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1971). It is a concept found within the sociological perspective of Symbolic Interactionism and contributes to
film incited so much emotion, the purpose of this chapter is to examine whether, or not, the boundaries that surround the body-in-pain ideal types are violated. This chapter is not a reader response analysis in its strictest sense. Rather it is an approach that not only utilises the work of different scholars who have analysed this film but also the British Research Council’s funded audience response research project which resulted in Barker, Arthurs, and Harindranath’s book *The Crash Controversy* (2001). Using this approach also necessitates that I draw out and discuss some of the images in this film in order to clarify the arguments being made. The overall aim is to discover to what extent the forms of embodied knowledge and sociality as illuminated in each of the ideal type body-in-pains is a significant contributing factor not only within the organisation of fiction film but also within the everyday life of the contemporary Western world. This will be elaborated upon in the dissertation’s concluding remarks.

Part II is important because films make particular connections between distal objects and proximal knowledge. In doing so, they do not traverse all the possible connections and information that pertain to their subject. Nevertheless the argument made in this study is that the repetition of the same connections and selected information relating to a subject in the reel world assists in conditioning automatic connections between distal and proximal in the real world. In particular the following chapters highlight how Protestant and Catholic structuring of routes to knowledge and embodied sociality influence the routes to knowledge used in reel stories. By studying the embodied performance of the *habitus* in film it is possible to see that even within competing Christian and non-Christian symbolism of contemporary films, the bodily orientation of the sensory body within film manifests in particular Christian-influenced sensory orientations toward the body-in-pain. This repetition thereby contributes towards limiting options for knowing/dealing with pain. To demonstrate this, the aim in each of the following chapters is to compare Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and my systematised ideal types of pain with the film text and images to investigate the way in which different dominant embodied socialities and bodily orientations influence how the film communicates pain.

There are two possible critiques that need to be discussed before beginning the following chapters. The first is that I have not connected the ideal types of Labelling theory. More specifically it refers to:”the process of arousing social concern over an issue – usually the work of moral entrepreneurs and the mass media” (Marshall, 1994:341).

89 This sentence uses Polanyi’s language, and Denzin’s concept that films make causal connections between two subjects (X and Y) and overlook connections with Z (Denzin, 1989:232)
Christian embodied sociality to the religion of the directors. For example, although the director of *Minority Report*, Stephen Spielberg, is Jewish, I firmly claim this film has a Protestant framing. Equally Martin Scorsese, the director of *Cape Fear*, describes himself as a lapsed Catholic, yet I claim his film has an ambivalent framing. There are two responses to a critique of this sort. The first is to reiterate the overall argument in chapter five, which is that films are collective productions of stories created by multiple people with multiple backgrounds and who therefore have multiple viewpoints. Consider, for example, Spielberg’s comment that, in the making of *Minority Report*, he held numerous ‘focus groups’ on the ‘reality’ of the future world he was conceptualising. He also tells of the valuable input he had from the screenplay writer, script writers, cast and crew (*Minority Report*, 2002, DVD special features). In this way films, inevitably, have multiple viewpoints and I contend that in this film they are predominantly consolidated around a Protestant Modern orientation to the body. This example from the production of *Minority Report* is equally relevant to the production of all the films in this dissertation.

The second response to this critique extends from the idea that films contain collective representations. Ideal types make clear that the *habitus* imbues logical connections between certain routes to knowledge and embodied sociality and using these already accepted and therefore expected connections is one way in which films make the ‘reel’ *habitus* knowable. To make the worldview of the film consistent, the causal connections believable, and for the film to operate within expected norms, the dominant organising principles must be self-supporting. They may have lost their explicit Christian referents, but the hermeneutic and theoretical guidance which originally stemmed from Biblical texts, doctrines and practices still influences organising principles of bodily orientations regarding the sensory understandings of pain. For example, if *Minority Report*, which I claim uses a Sinful Modern Body to know pain, had communicated its theme through carnal knowing, it would not have been possible for it to sustain an approach that distances people from their bodies. Equally the graphic somaticism of *Se7en* would not support an ending that relied on the mental re-formations of its protagonists without reference to their bodily experiences.

The second standard critique of film interpretation is that there can never be a single interpretation or that academics see more in the film than directors intend (Denzin, 1989:229). This criticism is could not be levelled at this study because
I am not claiming that my interpretation is the intended or only interpretation. For example, the director of *Se7en*, David Fincher, certainly intended to create an impact on his audience. His selection of a somatic and sensory approach to the film, and especially the role of the body in communicating, had that intended impact. However, that impact went further than Fincher intended. For example, many viewers have claimed that it is unnecessarily graphic to 'see' the decapitated head of the protagonist's wife at the end of the film. Fincher is amazed each time this criticism is made, because the head is never shown. Fincher concludes that those that think they see it are responding to signs, not to a 'real' head (Fincher, 1995, DVD Special Features). My argument that films replicate the same sensory bodily orientations is based on the suggestion that those who think they see the head are connecting a somatic portrayal of bodies with graphic bodily images, not what their eyes actually see on the screen. Somatic/carnal knowing is outside the current dominant worldview, so it is shocking to its audience (Hill, forthcoming). However, this does not mean Fincher or anyone else charged with an influence on *Se7en*’s creation intended to portray the Volatile (medieval) Catholic Body or to make people think they saw things that were not there. Rather, my dissertation highlights that these routes to knowledge and embodied sociality are circulating regardless of whether people are conscious of them or not. Finally, this means even though Christian routes to knowledge have become tacit dimensions of knowledge they are nevertheless significant for how people make sense of the body-in-pain in the real world.
CHAPTER SIX

APPLICATION TO THE FILM Se7en

‘The Act itself has meaning’

Se7en

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain ideal type with the habitus and bodily orientations of David Fincher’s 1995 film Se7en to reveal whether, or not, it contains traces of the medieval Catholic past. In order to accomplish this I use the means-ends chain reproduced from chapter two:

Table 6.1: Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Volatile Catholic Body

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes to Knowledge</th>
<th>Routes to Embodied Sociality/Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God dwelt and actively intervened in this world and within the body. The search for knowledge was confined to that which supported faith.</td>
<td>Incarnational experience: Lived bodies and action activating the faith were required and the world/body was known simultaneously as literal and allegorical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words Made Flesh: People were responsive active participants in ritual that engaged with their surroundings and experience literally and symbolically.</td>
<td>Carnal relationships with the world yielded knowledge. Communities of knowledge acquired understanding through images, oral traditions, bodies, action and ritual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived ritual was performed and resulted in reformation of material and sacred objects. Bodily integrity and instability resulted in contradictory positions and responsive uncertainty.</td>
<td>Pain accepted as communicative, natural and meaningful as well as potentially reformatory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Se7en was promoted as a Hollywood thriller about a serial killer and his eventual capture by New York detectives. The stars in the film and the director are not known for their religious beliefs and furthermore, a sacred referent, specifically God, is neither overtly used to justify nor explain the film, its action or even its resolution. This film is neither presented as a Christian film seeking inspirational conversion nor as a vehicle for the strengthening of faith, and the protagonists (those with whom the audience are usually supposed to identify) are not overt in their religious beliefs. In this respect, the film lacks an overt sacred referent and aligns with Mellor and Shilling’s prediction that contemporary society is ruptured from its traditional “sacred referents” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:17). However,
the film is not only about a serial killer, it is also about his method of victim selection and death through means of enacting the seven deadly sins. The seven deadly sins are recognisable Christian tenets and are marketed to the audience at both pre-screening and throughout the film. While viewers will have greater and lesser degrees of knowledge about what these sins are and their exact place in theology and in practice, their portrayal in film means they have not entirely disappeared from society as some secularists have claimed. However, the existence of Christian symbolism in films (such as the seven deadly sins) competing with other non-Christian meaning-making systems would not in itself be enough to claim Christianity remains sociologically significant to the way in which people make sense of the body. My analysis in this respect, then must look further to see how this film has chosen to communicate its messages about the body and pain and what its moral framing of bodily knowing is. Therefore in this chapter, the analysis seeks to show a linked means-ends chain that begins with incarnational and figural experience, which occupies Cell 2 in Table 6.1 and flows through to valued embodied pain.

The thesis of this chapter is that the film *Se7en* is underpinned by this linked means-end chain toward Valued Embodied Pain even though the film’s *habitus* does not explicitly use a ‘this-worldly’ Christian God as its rationale for interpreting bodies-in-pain in the specific ways seen in this film. The evidence for this assertion comes from following several of the methods promoted by Denzin (1989) and Howells (2003) to compare film, as both story and as image repeating tool, with the sensory aspects of organisation, story, signs, images and resolution. To demonstrate this, I structure the chapter by showing the way in which the following elements of the ideal type are present in the film:

1. *Figura*
2. Lived faith through responsive active participation in ritual
3. Carnal knowing
4. Open bodily possibilities
5. Valued and transformative embodied pain

In linking the selected mediations on these elements in this film to a particular bodily orientation, my aim is to show that although this embodied sociality was previously dominant in the medieval ages, the same moral approach toward bodies-in-pain still impacts on the way in which some contemporary stories are told. This applies whether, or not, audiences recognise or even realise that there are tacit Christian approaches to the body-in-pain. This is important because
this dissertation is designed to show that, despite a belief in the secularisation of public life which results in a reduction of Christian influences, some circulating stories, such as films, still make sense of the body using the frameworks of Catholic carnal knowing and transformative valued embodied pain. Obviously the context of viewing has changed as viewing a film is not the same as viewing a play that is part of the ritual of Mass. However, my point is to highlight that continuities do exist in the way that normative linkages are made. This has implications for the secularisation debate.

A criticism of this argument which I must pre-empt is that although I claim the Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain is dominant in this film; this is not by any means the only interpretation. For example, Halttunen (1998) and Gill (2002) express two different interpretations. Halttunen argues that the two protagonists of Se7en, Somerset and Mills, are juxtapositions of Puritan and secular man. This claim is based on the juxtaposition of Mills and Somerset’s acceptance of innate sin/monstrosity: Somerset, on the one hand, accepts each person as a sinner and therefore whatever action a person takes is predictable – no matter how ‘extreme’ (as the lawyer describes John Doe’s serial killing). Somerset claims “even if John Doe [the serial killer] is the Devil himself, he just might live up to our expectation. But he’s not; he’s just an ordinary man”. Mills, on the other hand, states he is “very comfortable” to label John Doe insane and his actions incomprehensible. It is this aspect of incomprehensibility which Halttunen (1998:238) argues is scientific and secular. She maintains that the dramatic tension of the film is in the contrast between these two worldviews. Gill (2002) takes a contemporary secular approach. She argues that the clash in Se7en is between two genre-based characters and the inability to interpret “people and events” in the same way (Gill, 2002:53). Somerset is the typical disillusioned hero of film noir and Mills is the impulsive, but usually successful hero of action films and in particular “buddy cop films”, such as Beverley Hills Cop (1984) or Miami Vice (2006). Gill claims Mills’ demise results from his character being slightly outside the expectations of his genre (Gill, 2002:51).

90 For further perspectives of Se7en, see Dyer, 1999.
91 Halttunen’s (1998) apparent but unstated definition of Puritan man is equivalent to that which Mellor and Shilling call the Sinful Body; and secular is similar to that which they describe as the Modern Body.
Valued Embodied Pain and Its Role in *Se7en*

Both these perspectives may be present in the film because this film was produced in contemporary times where multiple interpretations and social impulses compete. My interpretation is that the organising principles of *Se7en* most closely conform to Mellor and Shilling’s ideals type the Volatile Catholic Body and the systematised Valued Embodied Pain (Hill, in press). Halttunen focuses on the Puritan acceptance of innate sin, but does not consider the way in which the Puritans communicated, that is, their focus on words and symbolic expression, which Mellor and Shilling describe as cognitive apprehension. Furthermore, Halttunen did not look far enough back in history to realise that a focus on the route to bodily knowledge that Mills displays is neither uniquely contemporary nor secular. Her description of a resurgence of carnal embodiment where corporeal communication is important reflects a continuing trace from the medieval era, which is apparent in the framing of Valued Embodied Pain. As a result we may not be as “removed from medieval forms” as we like to think (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:36). Moreover, Gill’s perspective overlooks the tacit Christian viewpoint of the film altogether.

Alongside Gill’s and Halttunen’s perspectives, I argue that the Christian based embodied sociality that links bodies and pain as sacred pedagogical techniques in this film is important. It is not simply a mechanism that progresses the plot or competes with other symbolisms. Carnal knowing in this film is the sensory hierarchy that is the basis of communication in this film. Somerset’s acceptance of pain and the bodily communication that ritualistically connects bodies (even through media-ted ritual) is integral to the film’s organisation and message. Somerset reads the body, listens to his bodily responses, and sees in its totality the literal act, the metaphor, the symbolism and the allegory. Mills enact his bodily responses through his interpretations of right and wrong. It is John Doe’s carnal *habitus* that makes both Mills and Somerset strangely alien (or from another perspective, knowable). The trinity of the three men’s interaction and participation moves *Se7en* through an integrating ritual on to its dramatic conclusion. Valued Embodied Pain, while not necessarily the only ideal type in the film, has a dominant place. The body is a form of communication in this film and pain plays a role in teaching moral lessons. As a result, in light of potential multiple interpretations of films, I will begin my analysis with a plot summary.

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92 While my analysis concentrates on my development of the ideal type Valued Embodied Pain it must be remembered that it cannot be understood in isolation from the forms of knowledge and embodied sociality found in Mellor and Shilling’s Volatile Catholic Body which are circulating within a particular habitus and time-scale perspective (see Chapter Two).
before exploring the way in which *Se7en* performs and integrates into its presentation the five elements that I have selected from the Valued Embodied Pain ideal type.

**Film as Story and Enacted Ritual**

*Plot Summary*

*Se7en* is the story of two detectives, William Somerset (Morgan Freeman), who is about to retire, and David Mills (Brad Pitt), who is newly transferred to an inner city precinct. On Monday, Mills, in his first full day in the job, is partnered with Somerset and both detectives are called to a crime scene. They find a dead obese man face down in a plate of food. He has been forced to eat continuously until his stomach has burst and this had been hurried along with a helpful kick from an unknown entity. Eventually, both detectives realise this is a performance of the sin of Gluttony and its deadly consequence. By Tuesday a different grotesque murder, depicting the deadly sin of Greed (also known as
Avarice), is discovered. In this performance, reminiscent of Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, a lawyer has had a pound of flesh cut from his body and as he bled to death the killer weighed and measured out the pound of flesh on a set of scales. Despite Somerset's insistence that the murders are just a beginning and part of a larger spectacle, professional tension over their differing investigative styles results in Somerset and Mills pursuing the investigation as an individual case each in their own way. However, by Thursday, with the help of Mills' wife, their differences are put aside and together they are called to the scene of yet another grotesque murder. This time it is the performance of a third deadly sin, Sloth, in which a violent criminal, whose sins include an attempted rape on a child, is found in a state of putrid decay. As it turns out in this enactment of Sloth the victim has been tied to his bed and barely kept alive for one year and, although still alive, it is only in body. It is now obvious to all that this killer was preaching a sermon and performing his murders through the morality of the Seven Deadly Sins. He would continue killing until his sermon was finished and community apathy was converted into action. By Friday, the two detectives discover the apartment and the name of the killer.

The killer is John Doe from personal choice, as he has no fingerprints and no overt connection to modern institutional systems of surveillance (such as bank account, drivers' licence, or social security number), but he does have a library card. Through this the detectives are able to bring together a suspect's name and address and locate their suspect, John Doe, outside his monastic cell-like abode. Mills, within inches of catching and arresting John Doe, is beaten to the ground and momentarily put out of action. This gives John Doe an opportunity to escape. However, the detective's intrusion into John Doe’s private sanctuary forces him to move up his schedule. On Saturday the detectives find Lust (Lechery), embodied in a man who has been forced to penetrate a prostitute with a knife-like prosthetic penis. Hours later they find Pride (Vanity) embodied in a beautiful model whom John Doe has disfigured and left holding the phone in one hand and a bottle of sleeping pills in the other. She has a choice - deformity or death. She chose death.

John Doe, covered in blood, turns himself in, confesses to the murders and volunteers to take the two detectives to uncover the bodies at the scene of his final execution narrative - the embodied sins of Envy and Wrath. In this desert-like place, devoid of life, the head of Mills’ wife is delivered. John Doe admits that he is the embodiment of the deadly sin Envy - he was envious of Mills’
normal life. He deliberately provokes and incites Mills towards Mills' embodiment of Wrath (Anger). Despite Somerset’s pleading with Mills, Mills fully embodies the deadly sin and shoots John Doe in the head. The final scene has Mills handcuffed and in the back seat of a police car with Somerset deciding that rather than retire he will remain a detective. Thus, in the process of this detection and performance/narrative of the Seven Deadly Sins, the audience hears many perspectives on apathy (an element of Sloth). The audience is left with a voiceover of Somerset's version of a Hemmingway quotation from *For Whom the Bell Tolls*: “the world [might not be] a fine place, but it is worth fighting for”.

Keeping this story in mind, this chapter turns to some of the key elements of the routes of knowledge and embodied sociality of the Volatile ideal type, to show how they organise the film *Se7en*.

**Introductions to Final Things: Figura**

As noted in chapter two, the medieval *habitus* is based on *figural* and carnal knowing. *Figura* is where the literal act and the symbolic forewarning contained in the act are crucial in the composition and expression of meaning. In this vein, Somerset when confronted with the deliberate and patient murder of an obese man states that the murder is a beginning. As more evidence comes to light he soon realises that the perpetrator is preaching a sermon and thus the sermon and the film are an allegorical treatise on the sin of Sloth. Seeing the permeations of Sloth throughout the film is difficult because Sloth is a “mental, spiritual, pathological and physical” sin (Lyman, 1989:5). Therefore I will look as this permeation below, beginning with the physical body.

John Doe’s literal victim of Sloth, Victor, is tied to a bed for one year and has, according to the attending doctor, “experienced as much pain and suffering as I have seen, give or take”. Victor is personified as Sloth through motionlessness. Sloth is often associated with “sleepiness and remaining in bed through the morning hours” (Lyman, 1989:7). The SWAT team who raid Victor’s home assume he is asleep and taunt him to rise, by feminising him and calling “rise and shine, sweetheart”. This associates him with the gender that is supposed to be the weakest, the one most in need of rest, and the least likely to ‘work’. Being “motionless” is the element of Sloth that is usually associated with “laziness, idleness” and “a passive, inert or sluggish mentation” (Lyman,
The SWAT team’s hunt culminates when they draw back the bedcovers. In this act, their bodies react to Victor and they are marked with the living sight of an immobile Sloth.

Yet, this forced inactivity is only one element of Sloth. Victor, a violent criminal, was not idle before his “forced contrition” as Somerset describes it. The etymology of Sloth is found in acedia which, in Latin, means ‘without care’ (Fairlie, 1978:113). Lyman argues that acedia is a sin of “affectlessness, a lack of any feeling about self or other, a mind-state that gives rise to boredom, rancour and apathy” (1989:6). He also emphasises that “emotionally and cognitively the evil of acedia [Sloth] finds expression in a lack of feeling for the world, for the people in it, or for the self” (1989:5). This results not only in the capacity to commit evil but also to allow the progress of evil acts. As Chaucer points out, Sloth is an “enemy of every source and motive for [good] work” (Lyman, 1989:7). This supports the adage ‘idle hands are the devil’s work’. Moreover Gregory I claimed that acedia, when in conjunction with tristitia (melancholy), not only created “malice, rancour, cowardice, despair” (Gregory,

93 This is how Somerset describes Victor’s punishment. Somerset then explains that forced contrition is a forced confession and penance for sin.
94 Chaucer was one of the medieval authors Somerset researches in his search for John Doe.
[ca. 540-604] 1850: 490), but also ‘wrawnesse’, which is often understood as ‘peevishness’ (Lyman, 1989:6). This sin allows Victor “without care” to commit horrific acts for which he was punished by John Doe.

John Doe’s sermon is about more than merely Victor’s literal sin. It is also figurally about Somerset’s malaise and the key reason that John Doe is able to ‘get away’ with his own sins/crimes (Hill, in press). As Somerset states, people have made “minding their own business, a science”. This lack of caring, according to Chaucer included man:

holding back, refusing to undertake works of goodness because he tells himself, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of good are too grievous and too difficult to suffer (quoted in Lyman, 1989:7).

In the final sequence of the movie John Doe is even more explicit than Somerset, in replicating Chaucer’s point of view. He states, “there is a deadly sin on every street corner, and we tolerate it. Not anymore, I’m setting an example”. Thus John Doe’s route to knowledge is figural, incarnational and volatile. Within his understanding, the means-end chain of embodied sociality between the natural and the sacred links into embodied moral action. Meaning in his world is apprehended through an interaction with close-contact senses of the body (both his and others) in which pain has a valued role and links cure, deterrent and punishment (see Table 6.1). Therefore John Doe enacts a moral system centred on the seven deadly sins and the role of the body. As a result, John Doe's understanding and use of pain and suffering is a flight into physicality that repeatedly performed morality by marking the body as a forewarning. Sloth is not John Doe’s personal sin; nevertheless, Se7en is a ritualised performance and execution narrative against embodied sin in general and Sloth in particular.

In the prologue of this film Mills and Somerset begin a debate between the desire to do good and the energy and effort it takes to achieve it. For example, on the one hand Somerset asks, why would someone fight to join an inner city policing precinct? On the other hand, Somerset’s Police Captain presses Somerset to explain why he is leaving policing. Somerset’s answer is melancholic, he does not ‘understand’ anymore. The Captain’s retort is that “it has always been like this”. Somerset could be likened those religious extremists who sought isolation to focus on God but lost their commitment in the process. Vagrius (d.c. 400AD), believed to be a ‘father’ of the development of the Seven Deadly Sins, is concerned that the devout are particularly susceptible to
“melancholy” (Lyman, 1989:6). This melancholy results in removing one’s active will and gifts from God’s work and it is this tendency that the police Captain tries to alert Somerset to by saying “you were made for this work”. Mills takes up the argument again, later in the film. Stating he does not believe that he will not make a difference, indeed he “can’t” believe it, implying that the consequences of believing in hopelessness are too terrifying. Mills also states that Somerset does not believe action is futile, or “the world is all fucked up”. Mills states that Somerset just wants to believe it, to justify his resignation from the police force. After Mills’ insights, Somerset is left restless, unable to sleep. He destroys his metronome, the regular passing of time, in order, perhaps, to halt time. It is the first scene of disturbance, or violence, in the sanctity of Somerset’s ordered home. Then he practices his aim, perhaps looking for a new aim in life with the repetitive action of throwing a switchblade into a dartboard.

By the fifth day (the biblical day birds and sea life were created/procreated), Somerset learns from Mills’ wife, Tracey, that she is expecting a child and is hesitant about continuing with the pregnancy. Somerset reminisces that he was once going to be a father. He recalls that for the first time he felt “real fear”. Consequently he struggled to have the pregnancy terminated. The withdrawal of care from other people and his inward cowardice, which stems from Sloth, significantly impacted on Somerset and his relationships then and now. He advises Tracey, if she keeps the baby, to spoil it every chance she gets. That is, she should ‘care for it’, to be ‘with care’ and discharge that duty. In this way each sin is not about the individual act and its consequences, it is about relationships between people, communities, the past and the future. John Doe turns sinners into figural eternal texts that have meaning in order to predict the future. For example, as one witness to the crime of Sloth notes, “and [they] still have hell to look forward to”.

Furthermore, the carnal approach of the Volatile Body relies on literal events and bodies in order to communicate. This is a key element in the means-ends chain (Table 6.1). As mentioned previously, John Doe’s performance is not only a discursive treatise against Sloth but also a literal inscription on bodies as a forewarning in memory (figura). As with the ritual of the Mass, John Doe does not simply commemorate the sin/crime of his victims through punishment, he re-performs it through the body and at the same time, through the bodies of spectators (including the film’s viewers), just as the medieval executioners did. Each sin can be read from the manner of the death and the inscription upon the
body. John Doe’s performance transforms the understandings of its participants because physical bodies are transformed. In this way, John Doe’s “complete act”, as he describes it (the serial murder of seven people and the subsequent investigation), is literal, symbolic, allegorical and metaphorical. The detectives and the whole community, including the film’s audience, are involved. In this way John Doe and the film Se7en utilise the lens of figura.

John Doe literally makes people re-live their sins and at the same time stimulates the memory of earlier sins which can be found in various forms of cultural literature and history. Somerset shows the audience snippets of this history though pictures and text from works such as the Bible, Chaucer and Dante as well as the morality plays and cautionary tales. From the audience’s perspective this is then supplemented with their own varied forms of knowledge. John Doe’s acts are pedagogical techniques which encompass inquisitorial methods, execution narratives/sermon, and the trial by ordeal that marks the body in a ritualised performance. People also see that the film’s denouement reinforces the potential cyclical nature of this participatory ritual when Mills, now following the path to incarceration, has the opportunity to embody Somerset’s sin of Sloth and to finally agree that the world is “all fucked up”. Alternatively, he also has a choice to refuse to embody this sin and instead, actively participate in the world regardless of what that world is like.

Gill’s analysis of Se7en and its conclusion is that Mills’ ‘failure’ is his inability to ‘fit his genre’ (2002:56). However when viewed from the perspective of the Volatile Body, Somerset’s transformation is a triumph. As was noted in the plot summary, once John Doe’s final performance was completed, Somerset, although not necessarily agreeing with the first part of Hemingway’s quote (that the world is a fine place), does agree with the second part (that it is worth fighting for). He abandons his inertia, which is his embodiment of Sloth, to “be around” for continued police work. Equally the potential for Mills to reconsider his life in his new environment is also an open possibility. Bodily demise, pain and emotional distress are the very things that active participation is designed to stimulate in order to better serve God. As Chaucer writes:

against this horrible sin of sloth and the branches of the same, there is a virtue that is called fortitudo or strength, that is, a devotion through which a man despises harmful things (quoted in Lyman, 1989:10).

Consequently Se7en demonstrates a worldview that derives itself from figura and is integral to Valued Embodied Pain. This film utilises the contemporary
social activity of film ‘watching’/seeing along with a neo-noir genre to draw its viewers into a Volatile and sacred world of execution narratives, skilfully enough for them to ‘magically see’ heads that are not there. To do this, it utilises figural/incarnational routes to knowledge, to embody and make visible literal punishment for sin, in particular Sloth and its varied dimensions, as it forewarns of the present/future state. As John Doe prophesised, his act will be studied (and thereby re-lived) “forever”. He can be so sure about the time-span because he lives simultaneously in the past, present and future of the incarnational worldview. John Doe might even claim he is a prophecy (figura) of God’s Wrath on the Day of Judgement. This film then, encompasses routes to knowledge that require active participation through incarnational/carnal-embodied sociality and re-lived embodied performance of old acts, biblical interpretations and medieval rituals. Consequently I next turn to the part of the means-end chain that focuses on active participation in ritual (Table 6.1) in the film Se7en.

Lived Faith through Responsive Active Participation in Ritual
As noted in Chapter Three, the Sinful Body focuses on cognitive apprehension and active intervention in a world controlled by individual humans. In contrast, however, John Doe’s sermon is a bodily performance that incorporates the responsive participation of bodies in the community. An enactment of the Mass alone could not fully bring people into union with Christ without the aid of art, images, plays, rituals and participation. John Doe also needs to prepare the community which had made ‘minding its own business a science’ for his final act (that is, either his act, or symbolically the last days). The community John Doe selects in Se7en includes the two detectives, but it also includes the press, the police staff, SWAT, and other city dwellers, including sinners (who might be and ostensibly are any one of Se7en’s film audience). John Doe’s sermon do not function at the commemorative level but at a re-formative level where bodies become sites of sin, punishment and reintegrated renewed understanding (refer back to chapter two for this detail). This performed ritual creates fresh and sometimes interrogative worldviews as some of the embodied participants turn to God to understand their ‘new’ world. For example, the ‘John’ who is forced to commit the murder related to Lust cries ‘God help me’. In his painful lesson his worldview is transformed. After each killing, many of the witnesses are at a loss, as if the painful act has made them reassess what to do, and in this way may be interpreted as curing their complacency, in the same way that medieval painful punishments were interpreted as cures for evil. For example, after Mills shoots John Doe, the aircrew watching the incident cry - “call ... somebody ...
call ... somebody”. They are at a loss; they do not know how to act. Yet a few minutes earlier, when a box arrived (unbeknownst to them with Tracey’s head inside), they were clear and in command - we have box, call the bomb squad”.

John Doe expects and incites active participation. He watches and uses people’s senses, emotions and sins in order to reveal their involvement in the world as a community (Hill, in press). In the first meeting between John Doe and Mills, Somerset comments “it is impressive to see a man feeding off his emotions”. While Somerset’s remark can be taken as sarcastic and disapproving (Gill, 2002:56), it is laced with nuanced understanding. Somerset’s malaise (or Sloth) prevents him from feeding and feeling. Mill’s Wrath keeps him actively participating in society, consuming its intensity; literally tasting its potential, just as medieval Catholics were taught to ‘taste’ the blood of Christ (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 79).

The sin of Wrath is not a sin stemming from a lack of participation. In Speculum Ecclesiae of Saint Edmund from the thirteenth century, the sin of Wrath and Pride are contrasted. Wrath isolates “man from himself”, (Lyman, 1989:111) not from his community, while the sin of Pride alienates “man from God” (Lyman, 1989:137). Murderous rage, which Chaucer claims is the source of homicide and Pride, was always distinguished from righteous anger. As Bloomfield argues, carnal and spiritual anger are “one evil, the other good” and the Book of Matthew is usually used to support this belief (Bloomfield, 1967:165).

Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time. Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without cause [spiritual] shall be in danger of the judgement: ... but whosoever shall say, Thou fool shall be in danger of hellfire (Matthew 5: 21-11)

Mills’ quick temper but, nevertheless, engaged struggle to do good work, is displayed throughout the film. His first interaction with Somerset is almost confrontational. Then, during their first case together, Mills tries to argue with the reporting officer about sloppy procedures. When Somerset asks what the point of the confrontation is, Mills is at a loss to explain. In Mills’ first interaction with John Doe he is angry with him just for being there. When he encounters the press he states “they piss me off”. He is antagonistic toward Somerset, especially when he thinks his ‘worth’ is questioned. Lyman (1989:125) argues
that the ‘Story of Achilles’ demonstrates that the sin of Wrath is a response to dishonour and a defence of the injured self, in other words self-esteem.\textsuperscript{95} John Doe demonstrates, in his provoking of Mills self esteem, that as early Christians argued Wrath grows out of wounded Pride (often called the first or prime sin). To overcome the injury to self and wounded pride, Mills constantly reiterates his credentials and experience to Somerset. He is angry when Somerset makes him question the neighbours as he considers this to be a job beneath his status/rank. However, as Somerset knew, it was a task that would have provided Mills with invaluable knowledge of his new precinct (community).\textsuperscript{96}

Finally when John Doe is being taken to the final crime scene, Mills insults him, calling him crazy and insane; arguably ‘thou fool’. This is despite Somerset’s earlier assertion that to call John Doe a fool or insane is dismissive and denying John Doe’s agency hides more than it reveals. As Somerset states, John Doe’s worst ‘quality’ is the Virtue of Patience, because this quality makes him very effective. At first John Doe tolerates Mills’ insults and tries to explain that it is “comfortable” to label and dismiss him as insane. To do otherwise would be to admit the audience’s role in the ritual, to admit each and every person into the performance, and to give them a role to play in allowing him to ‘get away’ with his crimes/sins (Hill, in press). Mills does not let up, and possibly Somerset’s more insightful comment regarding the pleasures of martyrdom disturbs John Doe enough for him to lash out at Mills, insulting his detective skills. John Doe notes that he was only caught because he voluntarily gave himself up; he provokes Mills by asking why it was that they had not caught him earlier, and asks ‘were they toying with him’? John Doe then notes that even in his earlier encounter with Mills, he had gained the upper hand. He had allowed Mills to live and for that, Mills should be grateful. These comments incited Mills’ ire; he yells at John Doe to “sit back and shut his mouth”. Mills’ Wrath is aroused long before the denouement of the final scene of Envy and Wrath. Moreover, Lyman argues that the key motivator of Wrath, and especially “unbounded Wrath”, is the “appropriation of another’s sexual property” (1989:117). This is certainly John Doe’s view as he goads Mills into killing him by discussing the way in which he tried to appropriate Mills’ life and his wife. This comment reminds both Mills and the audience that Tracey had rung Mills, but he hadn’t returned her calls, and

\textsuperscript{95} Perhaps in an intertextual affinity with \textit{Se7en}, the character of Achilles in Wolfgang Petersen’s version of \textit{Troy} (2004) was played by Brad Pitt.

\textsuperscript{96} Precinct is a term used by Americans to mean policing areas, but at the same time has the dual meaning of being “an enclosed or clearly defined area around a cathedral” (Trumble and Stevenson, 2003:2317).
her calls had prompted the Wrath of the desk assistant who had received them and regarded them as wasting police time. One suddenly realises those calls were probably a call for help and the audience recollects Somerset’s claim that minding one’s own business is a science.

Following the delivery of a box, which the characters do not initially realise contains Tracey’s head, Somerset rushes to protect Mills ‘from himself’. Still John Doe keeps taunting Mills and in turn Mills actively responds and eventually completes his embodiment of the sin of Wrath by shooting John Doe. The ultimate completion point comes as John Doe reveals to Mills that his wife was pregnant and that he has killed both mother and child. Perhaps it was the death of his wife coupled with this new knowledge of the death of his unborn child that tipped the scales. Perhaps it was hurt Pride that activated Mills because John Doe knew more about his family than he did. Whatever it was that motivated Mills’ volatility in the literal, carnal and embodied enactment of Wrath, Mills shoots and kills John Doe. Mills did not heed Somerset's warning. Instead he labelled John Doe ‘thou fool’ and, as a result, is absorbed into the ‘hellfire’ that would follow the underestimation that comes from such labelling. From the perspective of the Volatile Body, then, Mills remains in the Volatile Body’s ‘genre’ and his active participation is linked to an immersion of “the sensory body” and particularly the close contact senses in knowing the world (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3-4). The way in which *Se7en* communicates knowledge through carnal knowing is the next aspect of the means-ends chain (Table 6.1) and is discussed below.

**Carnal Knowing: Full Use of the Sensory Body, Images and Words**

*Knowing through Full Bodily Sensing*

In *Se7en*, sight does not outweigh other routes to knowledge, but the full sensory body and the gift of signs are deliberately left behind at each crime scene in order for the detectives to understand the mystery. In the first crime scene, the sense of taste/eating is significant. This is because an autopsy of the first victim reveals that the victim has been forced to eat linoleum scrapings. Following this lead/sign, Somerset returns to the scene and discovers that the linoleum scrapings are from pulling the fridge away from the wall in the victim’s apartment. On the wall behind the fridge written in grease is the word ‘Gluttony’. Starting with the sense of taste or eating as a sign, Somerset comes to realise that this is not what it seems – a random murder. Instead sinful
people and the morality of the seven deadly sins are being enacted as literal execution narratives. That is, in this scene a killer has preached his sermon by forcing a sinner to embody the sin of Gluttony. This is the first. There are six more to come (Greed (Avarice), Sloth, Lust, Pride (Vanity), Wrath and Envy).

The second murder is discovered and the victim embodies the sin of Greed. In this embodiment, the killer uses the sense of sight to convey new clues. At this scene, although Mills is so distracted by the media-ted world of television and the press that he nearly steps in the bloody carnage (physically feeling it, before seeing it), he notices a photo of the victim’s wife whose eyes are circled in her husband’s blood. Eventually this is recognised as a sign left behind in order for the detectives to discover the next body/Sin or narrative. The detectives, knowing the significance of these signs, encourage the (Greed) victim’s wife to ‘re-live’, that is re-perform her husband’s sin and death by making her focus on the details of the crime photos to find the next clue. She is able to see that the sign they are looking for is in relation to an abstract painting hung upside down on the victim’s office wall. The sign is behind this and cannot be seen by the eye. Obviously then this is not as straightforward as the initial focus on the sense of sight might have made it appear. The painting’s orientation is an indication that this sense of sight was not embodied in the cognitive apprehension of the Puritan, nor in the word. Instead it is a way of seeing that “Medievalists called vision” (Erickson, 1976:19).

Medieval vision “erased the line between the known and the unknowable, the discoverable and the revealed ... they made visible the unseen” (Erickson, 1976:28). It is Somerset who reveals the mystery through the use of fingerprint dust. He makes the invisible sign visible, which leads to the next sin/body, or as John Doe prophesied, another layer of Dante’s hell. It is not surprising that it is Somerset who has this vision and detects this clue. It was he who realised the Greed victim’s wife was not being targeted for what she had seen, but for what she would see. Somerset might be a Puritan at heart, as Halttunen claims, but he still understands a world in which bodily communication is transformative – full of possibility for future acts; not merely a commemoration of the past, or a focus on what people have seen (lived). Somerset ‘sees’ more widely and realises that the clue is *figural* – it is not what has been seen but what she will see. It is a mark on the represented body that forewarns. In comparison Mills has only the Sinful Modern worldview, so he believes matter is static and language merely commemorates past events, it cannot be transformative so it
could only be about that which she had seen (her husband), not what she will see (the upside down picture).

Having received a clue through vision, the sense of touch is also needed to locate the next victim. This is because the invisible sign now made visible revealed that John Doe had pressed the next victim’s finger to make spell out the words ‘help me’. Mills reads this statement as a cry for help from the victim. However from the perspective offered by the Volatile Body it might be seen not only as a literal request for help from the next victim, but also as an allegorical request from John Doe himself for active participants and witnesses in the ritual sermon. For example this leads to a SWAT team accompanying the detectives to the new victim’s abode. Consequently they are all actively involved in the ritual and those participating are all marked by the horror of what they see and smell in the decaying embodiment of Sloth.

Smell visibly permeates the finding and viewing of every body, but is also connected to the finding of John Doe’s location. Although he is found through the tracing of his reading habits - therefore through the word - Mills describes the ‘snout’ who provides the library information as “stinky man”. The next victim to be discovered before John Doe gives himself up is an embodiment of Pride and she is found through the sense of hearing. That is, John Doe rings the police and they hear this crime being reported. The thinking body in 
Images and Words
Similar to the Sinful Body’s cognitive apprehension, there is a tendency in 
to focus on words. Somerset’s response to the sermon is to read the background material (Dante and Chaucer). His response to John Doe’s house is to read his notebooks. His ability to find John Doe is through his reading habits. However, does not focus on the words alone, just as medieval society did not focus on the words ‘this is my body’ alone in the Mass. The Mass required more than words, and so does an understanding of John Doe’s sermons. In addition to Somerset’s word-based approach, Mills focuses on the photographs of the crime scenes images and John Doe’s house.
Mills also constantly refers to popular culture to understand John Doe’s world. While Gill (2002) claims Se7en shows the inadequacy of the pop-culture approach to understanding the world, I argue differently. Mills does not always realise the knowledge he gains through his popularist world, but Somerset unlocks many clues through Mills’ so-called ‘flippant’ statements that are derived from television and the movies. For example, it is Mills’ statement – “just because a man has a library card that does not make him Yoda” which triggers Somerset into finding John Doe through his reading habits. In another scene John Doe leaves a quotation from Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. Mills states: “I haven’t seen it”. From Gill's (2002:56) perspective, this displays his ‘ignorance’ of what is considered to be classic written literature. However it also reminds us that The Merchant of Venice was a play written in the late medieval/Renaissance period, designed to be watched and seen and in the ‘seeing’ it provided messages about the sin of Greed (amongst other things). The idea that Mills “hasn’t seen it” is precisely John Doe’s point. The moral framing of Valued Embodied Pain is that people need to see and live the demonstration and punishment of sin to know it. Consequently John Doe’s sermon requires the use of all the senses, particularly the close-contact senses, in order to participate in and to purge sin (solve crime).

In addition to photographic images, each crime scene is also filled with symbolic, profane and sacred imagery. For example, the Gluttony scene is decorated with Andy Warhol’s repetitive images of Campbell’s soup cans. The literal temptation of the stomach fills this scene. At the same time, the ruptured stomach and

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97 This is a reference to a wise ‘religious’ leader in several (George Lucas) Star Wars films and may imply the medieval thought, reading is not enough to be knowledge – one must act on the faith.
spilled intestine in the medical examiner’s room has a symbolic association with Judas (Acts 1:18). In this verse Judas’ “bowels gushed out” as punishment for being a traitor who took 30 pieces of silver; that is, chose the material option. Furthermore, Warhol’s literal picture of food is also symbolic of the gluttonous consumption of popular culture and consumer products. The repetition of the tins of soup is also analogous with the repetition involved in serial crimes.

The association between food and consumption is also reminiscent of Dante’s Inferno. Kilgour (1990:62-63), following Durling, argues that Dante’s Inferno is incarnationally about both the literal descent into Hell and Lucifer’s fall. The belly of Hell, Lucifer’s body, is the ultimate descent into pure materialism and literalness. Descent into Lucifer’s belly is the sin of Gluttony and Gluttony is the sin that subsumes all knowledge into pure materialism. Thus it also signals that the descent into gluttony, the bottom of hell, is the start of Mills and Somerset’s own pilgrimage. As John Doe writes at that crime scene – ‘long is the way, and hard, that leads out of hell’. He leaves nothing to chance. He makes sure that his audience knows they are in the literal and metaphorical belly of hell, and about to begin a journey.

Images and signs at another crime scene teach a different story. At the crime scene of Greed, the images and references range from the sacred to the profane, from the Bible to modern art. One of these signs is that his body is found on the second day; the day the heavens were created (Augustine, [ca.397-401] 1961:8). A media interview with the police chief outside Greed’s building takes place within the frame of an arched ceiling, reminiscent of a church and the stars ordered in the heavens. A newspaper headline tells the tale; “Murder has an uptown address”. Accordingly Greed’s office is spacious, white and bright and displays the ‘cultured’ signs of abstract art and his sin is written in blood. This is in stark contrast to the Gluttony crime scene which is a dirty, dingy and small inner-city apartment, with Andy Warhol ‘pop’ art adorning the walls and the victim’s sin written in fat. However, the equalising message John Doe reinforces is that all people have bodies, an inherent sacred capacity to enact sin and the potential to purge and be cured by pain/death.
The contrasting colours - light versus dark - between the two crime scenes are also illustrative of the symbolic use of colour. Colour was used in medieval plays to symbolically indicate virtues and sins and can also be interpreted symbolically. For example, Lust’s victim/sinner is a prostitute who works in a place lit by red, yellow and green light. Green is the colour of envy or “what exists”, yellow of wealth, and red is ambivalent. On its negative side it is associated with pride, ambition, blood and violence (Harris, 1992:147). The prostitute is also photographed in black and white, perhaps death and purity (Harris, 1992:146). Contradiction is also possible in this symbolism, ensuring the body remains open to possibility because colour also had a dual signification in medieval times, and could signify virtues as well as sins (Harris, 1992:147). Consequently, there are
a number of murder scenes that have a white light, which might be interpreted as purity but may also be interpreted as superbia/Pride.98

Early Catholicism, derived from “Jewish Kabbalistic mysticism” made a distinction between the “light” “of creation” and “the light that did not contain thought” (Lyman, 1989:8). Light that did not contain thought was “self-absorbed ... passive” and stifled “innovation, growth and change emanating from its twin” (Lyman, 1989:8). In the lived world the drama of the two lights is played out literally and symbolically. For example, the literal light of creation might be seen in the brilliance of ‘pure’ sunlight, which descends on Mills when he describes the death of a fellow policeman and partner. In this scene Mills can remember the marks on the officer's body, the manner of his death, the entry point of the wound, and his own physical reaction; in other words he knows him carnally but he cannot remember his name - his symbolic identity - seems to become irrelevant within the white halo-like light all around. This white light contextualises the policeman’s death as something sacred, but equally other spaces in Se7en have white neon lights: the sex-device shop, the strobe light at the brothel, and the white light of the supermodel’s home. These white lights might represent “light without thought” which was considered a “source of evil” (Lyman, 1989:8).

Colour is also used for its positive associations. Red especially is used to focus on the choice between righteous anger and wrath. On its positive side then, red was positively associated with energy, strength, power and military righteousness (Harris, 1992:147). Perhaps this ambivalence is the reason that red is the colour that dominates John Doe’s apartment. It is also “both Adam and Cain’s colour in The Play of Adam” a medieval play (Harris, 1992:147). Green is associated with truth in the gloves that the police detectives wear – unlike the usual white of the CSI-type detective television shows. Or perhaps colour is used to demonstrate the possibility of false signs. Maybe John Doe’s apartment is red because of his violent sin; maybe the police undertake their sterile inspection of the crime scenes in green gloves because they envy the direct justice that John Doe exacts. The white lights of the SWAT team might cause pause for thought regarding its signification. Swallow (2003:70) suggests that “Se7en is at its brightest visually while approaching its darkest moments

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98 This association of white with pride is found in eighteenth century manuscripts describing medieval associations (Bloomfield, 1967:208).
narratively”. In the medieval era the signs from God delivered through the body were an open possibility for good or evil.

Another sign, the Christmas tree, is used by John Doe to augment his sermon at two crime scene locations. The Christmas tree is a sign associated with Christ’s birth and Christ as the tree of life (Restad, 1996:57; Ritchey, 2008). At one location, the entrance to the performance of Sloth is full of Christmas trees which impede the vision and path of the SWAT team, thus forcing them to see the image. They find that Victor’s body is bound under the Christmas trees in the shape of a cross, repeatedly suffering for his sins. His left hand, the side of the Devil, has been severed and his fingerprints are used to locate him. His flesh is decaying, while he is still alive and this is a medieval sign of his sin/guilt. Reinforcing this association between left and pain, impenitent behaviour and hell, there are a number of ‘lefts’ in the movie. For example, Victor’s left hand is dismembered, the left path is taken to the final crime scene and co-incidentally, perhaps, Mills, is left-handed. The symbolism of the left, and its association with the death of the impenitent thief, brings up the death and volatile uncertainty of the body in the medieval era. In this era instability and bodily pain could be transformative and this is the next step of the means-ends chain in this ideal type (Table 6.1) and is discussed below.

**Bodily Instability and Possibility**

The *habitus* of the medieval ages was volatile and uncertain and bodies were a source of instability (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:39). In particular, through the symbolism of the medieval execution, I have already highlighted the uncertainty of death, even in the face of an apparently dead body. Not only can each body be literally and symbolically resurrected, a body may not be actually dead. The *Chronicle of Lanercost* reports many cases where dead bodies had been discovered and, after prayer and sacrifice, life returned to them (Anon, [ca.1275] 1913:95). In *Se7en* this same bodily insecurity is ever present.

Mills is the first to show concern with bodily insecurity. At the first crime scene, even before seeing the body, Mills wants certainty that it is dead. He begins an altercation with the reporting officer. The officer’s carnal retort is that the guy has “been sitting in his own piss and shit for at least three quarters of an hour, if he weren’t dead, he would have got up and left already”. When Somerset intervenes to end the argument, Mills states as an aside, “How many times has
Barney Fife found bodies that weren’t dead?” Gill (2002:54) derides this comment as Mill’s reliance on popular culture to understand his world. Yet Ingebretsen reminds us that contemporary horror (popular culture) is scary precisely because of Christian bodily concerns with uncertainties like death and damnation (1996:xvi). Mills references to popular culture which I argue are well-versed in taken-for-granted Christian signs, remind us of the uncertainty of death (in the medieval worldview). Yet in this first scene he is prepared for the dead body to be alive whilst the audience is visually confronted with signs of certainty. When we do see this body, the audience feels reassured that they can recognise a dead body when they see it (as could the reporting officer). We return from the scene with a sense of bodily security, knowing the difference between life and death.

However, in the Sloth scene the audience watching/viewing the film in the ‘real’ world, as well as the witnesses, the SWAT team and the detectives, in the reel world are once more reminded of the complex uncertainties of bodily demise. As the SWAT team break into Victor’s home they expect him to be alive, but having pulled back the bedclothes they discover a putrid, decaying and motionless body strapped to the bed. Again they assume they know a dead body when they see it and proceed to engage the detectives in an enactment of the ritual of a murder scene, not an arrest.

Despite this assumption of a dead body (the certainty of death), one of the SWAT team members still decides to talk to the body, telling the dead man he deserves it. This results in a response from the supposed corpse, and everyone realises the body is still alive. The trigger-happy response to this bodily insecurity may easily have resulted in his death from gunfire. Nevertheless, this is one situation where Mills' earlier questioning and checking would have been useful. The resurrected body, named Victor, returned the SWAT team to a state of alertness, triggers ready, due to the living bodily uncertainty. They also needed the aid of medical attention to confirm this resurrection of Victor’s body. As is revealed, Victor did not get up from the bed not because he was dead, but because he was strapped down. Neither his motionlessness nor his decay was a sign of his death. We later learn that John Doe has used modern medicine (antibiotics) to keep the body alive (the doctor confirms the mind ‘turned to mush long ago’). And the live body has chewed off its own tongue when it could still function.
Contrarily, just when Mills would like bodily insecurity/uncertainty the most (that is, he needs to believe that his wife may still live and not be dead), John Doe gives us certainty by presenting Tracey’s decapitated head, a medieval sign of final death. There is no coming back from decapitation, even for saints, in the medieval worldview (Lupton, 1996:53). Tracey’s head arrives in a box - almost on a platter, conjuring an image of John the Baptist - thus the symbolic finality of her death is complete. No one questions whether she is still alive, or whether she may be re-born through miraculous modern medicine. Tracey has paid for her sin of fear and uncertainty over God’s gift of a child. The Christian execution symbolism of the severed head resonates behind the impact of this scene. Even though her severed head is never shown in shot, some audience members still think it was included in the film and in this way they have made her pain real, present and visible (regardless of whether, or not, it was represented on screen). The final step in the means-ends chain is concentrated on the valued, embodied and transformative role of pain (Table 6.1) and is explored below.

Valued and Transformative Embodied Pain

The medieval era did not need pain to be visible to mean that it had a valued place in society. It was meaningful because it had a transformative purpose (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:93), just as John Doe’s actions were meaningful and transformative in his (and the film’s) worldview. In this worldview, the body in pain does not simply make and then “remake the world” once pain subsides, as Scarry (1985) suggests. Instead it unmakes the world so that people will remember the pain and suffering of Christ for our sins. It has a dual purpose. It literally warns us, that is, telling us through the body, about suffering and at the same time reminding us about potential sin, such as Wrath (separating us from ourselves). It also has the symbolic purpose of re-membering the community of Christ and our participation in the ritual life of the community of God on earth. Consequently the *habitus* of the Volatile Body views the pain of each sin and the subsequent death of the sinner as painfully reminding each participant, of the ritual, of their own sin and their ability to reform both themselves and the community through pain. In *De Baptismo* Tertullian wrote “this *figura* of bodily healing told of a spiritual healing, according to the rule by which carnal things come first as a *figuram* of spiritual things” (quoted in Auerbach, 1959:33). John Doe’s execution narrative is both physical and painful because he believes he must cure the science of “minding your own business” and in his carnal worldview this can be done only through the transforming of bodies, through carnal knowing which incites bodily connection and empathy. As suggested in
chapter two, Cicero might have seen this as the use of images of painful bodies to give agency and adhere most to memory.

Whether or not the film is interpreted in such an explicitly medieval Christian way, the re-formative effect of pain permeates the film. The accumulating pain of each thinking body progressively affects the participants not only in John Doe’s ritual but also in the ritual of film watching. In this ritual, Somerset is transformed out of his melancholy, Mills is transformed into Wrath, and John Doe both physically and emotionally affects each of the participants in his sermon. This medieval understanding of knowing by doing requires that bodies participate in order to be re-formed. Words alone are not enough. John Doe’s ‘Chronicles’, which the police find in his apartment, explain that he demonstrated (almost unconsciously – he notes), the ‘banality’ of a man’s conversation with him, by vomiting on him. John Doe expresses himself carnally. He responds to banal associations with sensual engagement. This is not because the majority of the contemporary Western population is illiterate, as was the majority of the medieval population, but because the Volatile Body’s worldview and its aspect Valued Embodied Pain is communicated through a carnal embodied sociality; engagement with the mind through symbols and image, with the body through active participation, and transformation through re-membering the pain and suffering of Christ (both physically and symbolically).

Accordingly the epitome of the visibility of pain in the Volatile Body can be seen in the credit sequence at the beginning of Se7en. The discordant music coupled with the background of sequential images and symbols on which the prologue credits are presented foreshadows the volatility and carnage of John Doe. The images are intermittently distanced and juxtaposed with each other, through a series of ‘cut shots’. It is a kaleidoscope of fragmented and scratched images dispersing pain in a covenant of blood: dismembered hands, a hand binding a book with needle and thread, pages with words scratched out, a razor blade shaving a man’s fingertips, erratically come and go across the screen. This credit sequence and its fractured background music sensorially demonstrate and introduce the Volatile Body’s habitus. Words (cognitive apprehension) are present and important, but they cannot tell their story alone nor are they the defining feature. Images and bodies that responsively and actively participate are essential. Pain is valued for the potential life-changing perspective it can teach through the Christian interpretations which underpin it. It is a valued pedagogical technique.
In sum, collectively *figura*, lived faith, carnal knowing, bodily possibility (insecurity) and valued embodied pain work together in this film to organise its subject matter and communicate with audiences through the body in a particularly medieval way. This completes the means-ends chain that underpins the Valued Embodied Pain ideal type (Table 6.1). I have also revealed how closely this film conforms to this communication style. Before finishing the chapter, however, as Howell (2003) and Denzin’s (1989) note (covered in chapter five), it is also necessary to examine how films repeat and circulate recognised images. Accordingly the remainder of the chapter considers the way in which *Se7en* repeats specific images and spatial depictions that trace back to the medieval *habitus*.

**Film as Image Repeating Tool**

Just as Mellor and Shilling (1997) claim that the medieval *habitus* was eclectic, so too is *Se7en*. Gill argues *Se7en* mixes genres, plays with suppositions and confounds expectations (2002:47). I agree it does not sit solely within a neo-noir genre. I also add, despite how closely it follows the routes to knowledge of Valued Embodied Pain, that the film’s worldview is not entirely confined to the medieval past. Perhaps this is because its makers and audience are not fully schooled in the participatory ritual or medieval embodied sociality and thus could not apprehend it. Perhaps too, it is because a power of the carnal approach is in its ability to negotiate contradictions, in this case contradictions within the twentieth century routes to knowledge which have been schooled in the expectations of the Sinful and the Modern body. However *Se7en* communicates somatically through carnal knowing so that the body is prepared to receive the message whatever the audience’s religious orientation or whatever its expectation of right and wrong. *Se7en* also recollects images from medieval morality plays.

For example, to perform his final act John Doe takes Mills and Somerset out into the wilderness. He lures the detectives there with the promise of a resolution of the mystery. He also threatens to publicise that the detectives refused the opportunity to ‘find the bodies’ if they do not take him. This quest for the bodies is reminiscent of the medieval chant “*Quem quaeritis*” (Kobialka, 1999:208). Simplistically, since the tenth century this chant explains the three Mary’s quest to find Christ’s body. At the sepulchre an angel asks them what they seek and then demonstrates that, as predicted, Christ has arisen. This chant, performed
on Easter Sunday, illuminated the literal finding of Jesus’ empty tomb by three women (Kobialka, 1999:208) as well as the symbolic connection of the three Marys and the residence of angels on earth. In many medieval re-enactments when three participants were accompanied by an angel, it was interpreted as an Incarnational association with the Resurrection. It was a “practice of a production of the presence itself ... another site of the production of the body that would finally be present” (Kobialka, 1999:208). John Doe insists that his re-enactment has three people (himself, Mills and Somerset) and in this scene they are also accompanied by a helicopter full of policemen, in touch through listening devices with those on the ground (reminiscent of the angel). John Doe takes the men out of the city into the wilderness, reminiscent of Jesus’ journey of temptation and self-doubt. Yet as the Bible is interpreted, or as Scorsese’s portrayal of it on film displays, Jesus returns from the wilderness renewed and purified. However, John Doe’s sinister insistence that the way to the wilderness is to stay left and keep turning left is a forewarning (figura) that a different outcome is possible, for at least one of the participants. Once out of the city and in the maze of left turns, this direction becomes even more symbolic.

The road to the final scene takes the car and its ‘angel’ into the south-west. Se7en replicates the stage directions of The Castle of Perseverance (c.1425). This play is one of the few surviving medieval morality plays, which still contains stage directions. It maps out location and symbolic space for the audience, who were not confined to a single spot, as in modern theatre. This play demonstrates a link between spatial location, temptation and balance of good and evil forces. King (1994:245) claims spatial location is “effectively a map of the play’s action”. This is because the medieval worldview located God on this earth; therefore space had both a literal and a symbolic significance (figura). In medieval terms, the North is literally as well as symbolically home to the Devil, and the South is the temptations of the flesh, the West is home to the World (everyday life), and to the Gates of Hell, while the East represented the Gates of Heaven. The chaos and stereotyped ‘god-lessness’ (along with the empowering but terrifying thought of endless freedom) of the American West contains traces of this medieval connection between the West and the Devil). The Devil, Flesh and World are seen to make an “evil Trinity” (Cavenaugh, 2004:232) against the East, the place of the rising sun (and risen Son), and the gates of Heaven. This spatial architecture was repeated in medieval churches and some town designs.

Women sat in the North, their weaker flesh associated with the Devil. Men sat in the South, where their temptation is of the flesh. In *The Castle of Perseverance* the action of transformation occurs in the North East, which was explicitly associated with Covetousness, or Envy. King (1994:245) claims that the reason Envy is given its own geographical space, disturbing the symmetry or cruciform of the scaffold, is because envy is the sin in the *Castle of Perseverance* that the protagonist will “find irresistible”.

In the final scene of *Se7en*, John Doe requires Somerset and Mills to accompany him to a place that takes them all south of the city, into the sins of the flesh. Once they arrive he makes them veer off the north/south road, into the setting sun at a 45-degree angle. Apart from the setting sun as a very clear indicator of West, (and the Gates of Hell as the sun sets – or as the Summer sets), Somerset alerts all that are attached by wireless transmitters that the courier van bringing Tracey’s head comes from the north (the devil and the place of women). John Doe takes Mills into the southwest – half way between hell and the flesh/body, and turns him around, making him face north-east, the place of Envy. This is an elaborately staged crime scene that replicates the medieval spatial associations of the north-east with Envy, as the sin which chillingly overpowers both the key characters in *The Castle of Perseverance* and in *Se7en*.

![Figure 6.5 Mills and John Doe in the final scene of Envy and Wrath](image)

Medieval plays linked time and space in literal and repetitive symbolic understandings of past, present and future. Whether audiences realise it or not,
Se7en repeats those same organising principles, displaying a contemporary take on the way in which the Volatile body continues to be seen within the spatial coordinates of contemporary times. In this habitus John Doe, the link to the Volatile Body, has not forgotten the bodily insecurity of medieval anxiety, nor the valued role pain plays as a pedagogical technique.

Conclusion

Se7en draws people in far enough for them to ‘see’ the alternative worldview, just enough to be disturbed by the potential reality and just enough to visualise a crack in the constructed assumption that pain and Christianity have been removed from modern society. It also draws them in just enough to be a critical and commercial success. In order to do this Se7en provides a ‘middleman’, William Somerset, to both, penetrate and make surprisingly normal the worldview of Dante, Chaucer and the seven deadly sins, while at the same time making David Mills’ reactions appear strange and ineffective – although at times useful. This middleman makes visible the linked means-ends chain that approaches pain as valued and transformative.

John Doe’s moral message and interpretative approach to the body-in-pain is that people (bodies and minds) are not living the intended life; they are so much less than they, could be or more significantly, ‘ought to be’. Se7en as an artefact of popular culture addresses the same fundamental questions of eschatology as do many other more elite Christian communications. Despite Gill’s disdain for the claimed simplistic treatment popular culture affords fundamental questions, Se7en introduces the modern cinematic audience to a medieval perspective and its implications for the carnal thinking body (often in pain) in contemporary society. Whilst the medieval age and Se7en are criticised for their “Visions of Excess” (Bataille, 1936) and normative violence, it is a worldview in which the moral stance toward the body-in-pain means that it cannot be either forgotten or marginalised. The route to knowledge shapes what is ‘seen’, and an implied severed head appears real, because the Volatile Body requires active participation in John Doe’s sermon/execution narrative, not only by the actors in this film but also by the audience at the film. Once involved, these bodies are marked both literally and symbolically, so that severed heads

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100 Somerset might even be a forewarning (figura) of the lapsed Catholic commentator (Colin Farrell) provided in Minority Report to make alien the worldview of that film, which is the subject of the next chapter.

101 Eschatology: the science of the four last/final things: Death, Judgement, Heaven, and Hell.
are memories of pain and bodily forewarning. The message we are left with, which is traced from medieval stories and plays, is that the suffering of pain within the world is, and will be, of our own making if we continue to act 'without care' (Sloth) for our bodies, ourselves, and others.

In the next chapter I will examine what happens to representation when society shifts its moral focus away from the body so that it loses touch with the world and each other, as well as God, and the effect this has on understanding and representing the body-in-pain.
The previous chapter showed the way in which the elements of the Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain organised the film Se7en and at the same time showed the way in which the sensory aspect of pain could be interpreted as valued and transformative in that film. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the Sinful Modern (Protestant) Body: Anaesthetised Pain ideal type with the bodily orientations in Stephen Spielberg’s 2002 Minority Report in order to reveal whether, or not, this film contains traces of the Puritan approaches to the body-in-pain.\textsuperscript{102} The evidence I use is derived from comparing the means-ends chain of Puritan traces reproduced from chapter three and outlined in the summary table below (Table 7.1.) with the story and images of the film.

Table 7.1 Routes to Knowledge and Embodied Sociality within the Sinful Protestant Body

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes to Knowledge</th>
<th>Routes to Embodied Sociality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An abstract God dwelling in a perfect external (other-worldly) imagined world</td>
<td>Abstract and actual human intervention into the imperfect profane world through social control and regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive apprehension through discursive symbols, as opposed to lived experience, and elevation of sight as an 'uncontaminated' form of perception</td>
<td>Importance of text (in particular Scripture) coupled with a devaluing of oral traditions and image-based communication, and sanctioning of individual choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A negation and devaluation of physical relationships with the profane world, including the body and thereby distancing of physical sensations due to bodily weakness</td>
<td>Silencing and removal of pain through anaesthetisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the same format as in the previous chapter, the exploration of this chain of traces but within the context of the film Minority Report revealed the

\textsuperscript{102} The full title of Sinful Modern (Protestant) Body: Anaesthetised Pain encapsulates the embodied sociality as well as the approach to pain, for ease of reference in the rest of the character I will refer to this whole concept as Anaesthetised Pain.
rupture of contemporary society from its overt reference to the Christian God. Therefore the analysis of this film begins with an abstract imagined world portrayed through the use of space and light in the film. The heading for this section is Film as Image-Repeating Tool. Then, under the heading Film as Story and Enacted Ritual, I use the linked means-end chain outlined in this table to consider the relationship between the film and traces of the Anaesthetised Pain.

The thesis of this chapter is that *Minority Report* follows this linked means-end chain toward the anaesthetised approach to pain even though the *habitus* of the film does not link its moral approach to pain explicitly with Christianity. Therefore the purpose of this chapter is to link the selected mediations as seen in *Minority Report* to its *habitus* and bodily orientation and to reveal the way in which specific traces of Anaesthetised Pain are influencing interpretations of bodies-in-pain as portrayed in this film. This applies whether, or not, audiences apprehend the underlying tacit Christian morality regarding the body-in-pain. As a result this chapter is important because this ideal type is linked with the moral imperative to make pain invisible. Within the *habitus* of the Sinful Body, pain becomes something to be eliminated or silenced, rather than a somatic experience to be heard for its potential message. Instead of being communicative, the body is seen as a source of temptation or weakness and must be controlled. This framing has consequences for the value of pain, and clearly the solution for various characters in *Minority Report* is a “flight away from the body” (Shilling, 2003:191) into a mind that demands anaesthetised pain and control/discipline of the ‘fallen flesh’.

The aim of this chapter therefore, is to clarify the way in which this framework limits how pain can, and is often seen, in both the ‘reel’ and in the ‘real’ world. In the ‘reel’ world of *Minority Report*, pain is not valued and therefore there are limited strategies for dealing with its long-term effects, even if it is a constant “absent presence” (see Shilling, 1993; 2003). That is, even though the characters experience painful events and bodily wounding, this is very rarely displayed, discussed or visibly represented on the character’s bodies. Pain in this film is a constantly inflicted but is an invisible (absent) presence.

The evidence I use in this chapter compares the images and themes within the film *Minority Report* with those of Anaesthetised Pain. I demonstrate that at the literal, and at the surface, level (see explanation of Denzin, 1989 in chapter five)
*Minority Report* is about a world that can predict and thus solve the problem of murder. At the same time the film is also making a causal (problematic) connection between a system of perfect technical prediction and human weaknesses. Moreover, at a deeper level, the obscured relationship which is not directly referred to (see explanation of Denzin, 1989 in chapter five) is the underlying Calvinist lesson that despite appearances, those that seem Godly may in reality be reprobates and not ascend to Heaven. In other words, the path to Hell is wide, but we all have to the choice to either walk it or not.

Pain in the *habitus* of *Minority Report*, is missing as a point of discussion, despite the film being predicated on the undoubted pain of several characters (as a result of murder, abduction and physical violence). All face their pain alone and in an isolated manner. This route to knowledge links to the belief that the body is profane and is managed through discipline, control and surveillance. Therefore pain cannot be interpreted as communicative, the body does not teach lessons nor is it listened to as a source of knowledge. Instead, in this film, the body-in-pain is anaesthetised with legal and illegal drugs so that any sensation/lesson is no longer felt. It does not induce anyone to ‘see’, to cure or to re-form anything as the pain is controlled and sublimated.

One potential criticism (as a result of this sublimation), that needs to be addressed before continuing is that, in contrast to the film *Se7en*, there is only limited use of bodies, or pain, to tell the story. Similarly *Minority Report* rarely, or even directly, refers to bodies or pain. In response, I agree that pain itself is not given explicit exposition in this film. The characters, given their life events, are in emotional pain and receive physical wounding during the film. Yet despite this ‘presence’ of emotional and physical pain – pain as a concept is not visibly displayed and the characters rarely acknowledge its role in their lives (this is elaborated on later in the chapter). Therefore my point in this chapter is to highlight that pain exists and influences the characters in the film but it is deliberately marginalised. This “absent presence” is significant because it is this marginalised treatment of physical and emotional pain that is one of the ways in which *Minority Report* organises the sensory body around the traces of the Sinful Body. Pertinent to this ideal type is control of the sinful flesh and one crucial way of achieving this is the elimination of the signals sent directly from the body. I focus on the “absent presence” of pain in this chapter in order to highlight the concept that the silencing of the body-in-pain signifies a continuing Protestant
framing of bodies-in-pain and this framing is the bodily moral imperative that currently dominates institutional arrangements in contemporary everyday life.

**Anaesthetised Pain and its Role in *Minority Report***

*Minority Report* was not particularly favourably reviewed (see Karounos, 2002 or Rowland, 2003) yet, as an exploration of the Sinful Body ideal type, *Minority Report* brings to life many of the underpinning principles of the Protestant and Puritan embodied sociality and route to knowledge. *Minority Report* even provides a lapsed Catholic character with a lens to view and act upon the alienation of the body present in the film and in this way is able to illuminate the aspects of religiousness in the apparently profane actions of the bodies-in-pain in this film. Consequently *Minority Report* as a case study is the ideal vehicle for revealing elements of the Sinful Body in relation to the cultural understandings and treatment of pain.

![Images of the Main Characters and the Director of *Minority Report*](image)

**Figure 7.1:** Images of the Main Characters and the Director of *Minority Report*
Plot Summary

*Minority Report* is a neo-noir crime film that is set in a future time (2054). In this era the freakish side effects of a new drug have enabled three children, referred to collectively as the pre-cogs (short for pre-cognition), to accurately predict future murders. Advanced computer technology has been developed in order to turn their mental dream-like predictions into ethereal photographic evidence of how, when, by whom and where the murders will take place. This evidence is used within a policing strategy and government programme called Pre-Crime.

This programme has been operating as a pilot in Washington DC for 6 years. At the start of the film a referendum is about to be held to turn the pilot into a national programme. In the build-up to the referendum a Justice Department investigator, Danny Witwer (Colin Farrell), former Catholic priest and homicide policeman, is sent to find weaknesses in the perfect system of pre-Crime. His main focus of investigation is on John Anderton (Tom Cruise), the policeman in charge of the programme. John, whose son was abducted (presumed dead) more than 6 years earlier, is a drug addict who is still dealing with the presumed death of his son, and the fallout from his subsequent divorce. During the course of the investigation, the pre-cogs’ ‘gift of sight’ is used to frame John Anderton for a murder that he will later commit (albeit accidentally). The filmic narrative moves forward with the struggles between John and Danny and their search to ‘find the truth’ and ‘resolve the mystery’ about the pre-cogs, the pre-Crime programme and the programme’s Director (creator/father), Lemar Burgess. What is discovered towards the end of the film is that Lemar has learnt to use the system in order to commit and cover up his crimes of murder. He uses the tendency of the pre-cogs to see the same murder over and over in order to disguise a second seemingly identical murder. He uses the fallibility and weakness of human interpretation to put himself above the law and control the destiny of others.

Agatha, one of the three pre-cogs, tries to alert John Anderton to this because the murder victim is her mother, Anne Lively. In order to eliminate this problem, Lemar pays an ex-convict, Leo Crowe, to pretend he is a paedophile who has abducted and killed Anderton’s son Sean so that Anderton will murder Crowe and be arrested by the pre-Crime team (effectively silencing him). In the process of investigating why he would kill a man he has never met, Anderton discovers through Sarah, the (earth) ‘mother’ of pre-Crime, that although there
is a dominant pre-cog vision, there is also sometimes a minority report - an alternative future - should the perpetrator so choose. This introduces doubt into the pre-Crime system. Armed with this information, Anderton abducts Agatha from her temple-like tank effectively shutting down the programme, and confronts Leo Crowe. Agatha constantly reminds Anderton he has a choice and, after confronting Crowe, Anderton changes the future and arrests Crowe instead of killing him. However, because Crowe has made a deal with Lemar that his family will receive a pay-out when he died, Crowe struggles with the arrest and the gun discharges, killing Crowe. Danny Witwer discovers the partial truth of what has happened, so Lemar kills him. In this way Lemar actively intervenes in his own destiny, and demonstrates that Danny is no longer “safe and free” without the protection of pre-Crime, Lemar’s de facto child.

Anderton is eventually caught and ‘hallowed’. That is, in order to anaesthetise the mind of prisoners (and in this case Anderton) they are committed to and imprisoned in a jail which suspends murderers in cryogenic animation by handcuff-like white tubes which operate through their connection to the temple. However before John was captured he told his wife Lara of his suspicion that he was framed but was at a loss as to who did it. Lara later confirms that in addition to the earlier weakness of human fallibility, there is also a further weakness in fallible human interpretation. This second weakness is based on the assumption that the pre-cogs see only what a person will do, they are unable to see intention. Therefore, the police ‘know’ Anderton’s confrontation with the paedophile impersonator is a pre-meditated murder, and therefore they assume Anderton (as the killer) conceived this pre-meditation. Even Anderton, who by now has so naturalised the infallibility of his own interpretation of the system’s images, cannot understand how this could have happened. The denouement of the mystery reveals that it was Lemar who masterminded the murder. Consequently Lara helps her ex-husband to escape from jail (unfair justice) and he confronts Lemar publicly. Lemar is given a choice; either confess the human weaknesses that have subverted the system, or die (be murdered). In the end Lemar commits suicide. The audience is given a sense of closure, through John Anderton’s exoneration (along with all the other criminals, whom the pre-cogs predicted would commit murder). And, it appears, pre-determination is put in doubt through Agatha’s resurrection of choice. The pre-cogs are separated from society to live in rural idealism, ‘free from their gifts’. John and his wife also return to matrimonial bliss and conceive another child.
Film as Image-Repeating Tool

Before examining the way in which the film’s story and bodily orientations use the traces of the Sinful Modern Body and Anaesthetised Pain to communicate, I will look first at the way in which the construction of space in *Minority Report* repeats the Enlightenment hierarchies of good and bad, light and dark, healthy and ill. Spielberg notes that he is trying to create two worlds within this film through the binary visual association of clean with dirty (Spielberg, 2002, DVD Special Features). The clean world is the one that is perfectly free of murder, (Washington DC, and Georgetown in particular). It has children playing in parks and shopping malls which provide perfect mini-climates within which people are always perfectly dry. In this world crime is sanitised and controlled. These visual scenes, like Dalí’s Crucifixion, are structured and monolithic. For example, none of the deaths in this area could be termed a mediation on the palatable unbearable. They are neither abject nor particularly graphic. They are also clean – ‘matter is [not] out of place’ (Douglas, [1966] 2002). For example, Anne Lively is drowned, with no breaking of boundaries or abjection through blood or gore. Even when Danny Witwer is shot, he dies a good Protestant death without loss of control. Furthermore, the condemned criminals are all punished by controlling them in clean white capsules, in a form of stasis, anaesthetised of pain and knowing. Clothes and uniforms reinforce uniformity and cleanliness. The only bloody murder is the one that is prevented. In this murder a husband repeatedly stabs his wife as he reminds her that she thinks he is blind without his glasses (so blind that he does not see the affair she is having). Nevertheless even this murder, which is seen through the pre-cogs’ visions, is muted in brown/grey tones. The richness of red blood is marginalised, in effect, silenced. These clean and light spaces can be seen in the following frames from the idealised Washington DC of the future.

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103 Danny’s blood does seep across the floor after his murder suggesting a merging with the Sprawl (discussed further into this chapter), this is fitting for his liminal position in the film.)
At the same time a binary opposite is created with the geographic area known as the ‘Sprawl’, an area that by name association cannot stay within its boundaries and will soon potentially contaminate the civilised boundaries of ‘uptown’. In this space, the places are dark and messy with bodies that are deformed and wounded. It is crowded and significantly the illegal acts that are not solved are almost all carried out in this seemingly dark and blind place. In the Sprawl, the audience sees the deformity of a man with no eyes, who reminds Anderton that in the ‘land of the blind, the one-eyed man is King’. In this space, which Anderton visits to indulge his bodily weakness and probable addiction to the drug Clarity, he sweats and joins the unclean bodies that surround him. Spielberg (Spielberg, 2002, DVD Special Features) notes he deliberately made these two areas opposites, but does not comment on whether he deliberately enshrines the Enlightenment dualisms, or whether he thinks it is ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ to associate the elements of darkness, filth, mess, crime, deformed bodies and perversion as signalling one world, while light, perfect bodies, cleanliness, crime solution, justice and transparency should inhabit another. The contrast between the light spaces of Washington DC and the dark dangerous chaos of the Sprawl are seen in the frames from the Sprawl below.
Furthermore, Spielberg does not give a reason for why he made the third space of the film, the temple in which the pre-cogs are stored, dark but clean. The pool of water where the bodies are stored is small, enclosed, and dark, except for the white light that floods the pool when the visions come. The temple's hidden space may resemble what Latour (1993:41) calls “the bracketed God”. This restricted sacred space removes the sacred from the community, ensuring it remains hidden and unknowable. And, while the populace is encouraged to personally have faith in the programme of pre-Crime, they are not encouraged to understand it or to carnally know the bodies in it.

The division of space in the film is multi-dimensional. It shifts from urban to rural, from the upper and clean city to the lower and dirty Sprawl. Nevertheless it repeats the Sinful Body’s spatial determining with the use of signs of clean and light to indicate ‘chosen’ and ‘good’ while at the same time reinforcing images and associations of dark and dirty, with evil. Within this symbolic space, Spielberg tells a story through embodied sociality and routes to knowledge associated with Anesthetised Pain.
Film as Story and Enacted Ritual

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, this section demonstrates the way in which the Sinful Modern Body organises the story and bodily orientations within *Minority Report*. Below I outline the four elements of the Sinful Body’s traces encapsulated in the means-end chain in Table 7.1 which are considered in this section of the chapter:

1. Abstract, imagined (idealised) worlds and the will/compulsion for human intervention in a society, which enshrines dualisms as right and natural;
2. Cognitive apprehension, and the paramount role of sight as the route to knowledge and the profane role of social relationships and bodies;
3. The importance of scripture and the written word in determining righteousness, as opposed to carnal knowing; and

Abstract, Imagined (Idealised) Worlds and Human Intervention

According to Mellor and Shilling, abstraction and individual engagement characterised the Protestant worldview. Interaction has a tendency toward imagined and idealised relationships through each individual connection to an “imagined community” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:111). This overtly divided space and objects into sacred and profane. From this perspective, the body and social relationships were profane, while the mind made a direct connection with God and thus was sacred. This division was reinforced in Enlightenment thought by “violent hierarchies” (Derrida, 1981:40) which tried to ensure that regulation and control prevented the profane from contaminating the sacred. As a result, at least in discourse, it was possible to eliminate any acknowledgement of the profane negative sides of the dualisms. This meant the profane world was no longer constrained by God’s plan and it was opened to human intervention and control through this remaking of the world. A single caveat was that, despite human endeavour, Calvinists believed their selection for the Kingdom of Heaven was pre-determined.

In the world of Minority Report, through the ‘gift’ of the pre-cogs’ vision (sight), this pre-determined future is knowable to ‘man’-kind. God is not referred to directly in this *habitus* but, as Danny Witwer points out to the policemen, they call the place where the pre-cogs are kept the ‘temple’, implying they think the gift of knowing the future is a sacred gift. This gives the impression that the policemen think in terms of cause and effect. That is, they think the pre-
cognitions were caused by the drugs but at the same time they classify this situation as sacred, treating the pre-cogs and their visions as sacred objects (which reveal signs of the chosen). Nevertheless they do not think of themselves as religious, as they believe they work in a secular environment. One of the clearest rules of the temple is that no profane policemen should touch (contaminate) the pre-cogs. This privilege is solely reserved for the deserving, pure acolyte who administers drugs to elevate the pre-cogs’ minds, thus confirming the sacred/profane split.

By seeing the future, the pre-cogs make an ideal (perfect) world visible and knowable and this fact opens this world to human (police) intervention. In order to give the visions of the pre-cogs’ the power of evidence that allows incarceration of a person who has not committed a crime, the pre-Crime programme must establish the infallibility of pre-determination. Accordingly, to allay doubt, the policemen in the film purport to demonstrate this ‘inevitability’ by rolling a ball off a table and claiming it is guaranteed that the ball will hit the floor, if it is not caught first. Their method of proof is the direct visual observation (a confirmation of the prioritisation of sight) of tangible phenomena and then the application of that rule to social phenomena, in much the same way as Descartes used dead bodies to develop rules for live ones.

Based on this perceived logic of ‘infallibility’ pre-Crime claims to make people free. They believe they live in the idealised world of certainty, which can be guaranteed by pre-cognition (uncontaminated sight). The certainty of this ideal future means that in Minority Report the police have taken on the role of religious leaders in guiding the flock toward righteous action and stopping transgression. Also, the Judges now take on the role of witnesses in each case because they witness the appearance of the pre-cogs’ visions in filmic images and also in the inscription in wood of the names of the victim and the guilty criminal. The names of the judges who watch John Anderton’s reading of the clues are significant in indicating that which the world of pre-destination claims to offer. The first judge is called Catherine, meaning ‘pure’, and the second Frank, meaning ‘free’. This idealisation is expressed in the Pre-crime motto: ‘Pre-crime – It Works’

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104 See http://www.thinkbabynames.com for the meaning of other names in the film.
This motto does not only apply to the particular service that the pre-cogs offer, but also to the world of Re-formation ideals which separates sacred and profane. These ideals are expressed in the abstract. For example, there is no physical touching/contact between the pre-Crime witness and the visions, the policemen or the pre-cogs. Even those elect who see the pre-cogs’ visions, that is, the judges who ‘witness’ the murders, do not do so in person. They appear as electronic images, their view of the visions is through isolating electronic transmission and they do not (literally) see/witness the pre-cogs as part of these transmissions/communications. Also, there is no physical contact between the public and the pre-cogs. This means knowledge of the pre-cogs is communicated in the *habitus* of *Minority Report* through symbols and imagination. The pre-cogs are known through the triangular symbol that represents the tank in which they are stored (see figure 7.4). The triangular symbol has both scientific associations of triangulated well-supported evidence as well as reference to Christian symbolism, such as the holy trinity or the three Marys. Popular mythology in the film defines the pre-cogs as three ordinary people with special talents. Nobody, except the elect (police) elite, sees the pre-cogs’ captivity and even, Danny Witwer is encouraged to think of them as special disembodied minds rather than as humans. Emphasis is placed on the mind as distanced from physical bodily sensations.

Yet as the film progresses it slowly tears down the illusions of success, to reveal that even those with the gift of apparent grace are not perhaps the chosen ones
after all. This reminder of the potential for Hell in a world of Calvinist pre-
determination is a strongly Puritan notion. Despite its abstract and ideal world,
this film maintains an underlying current of fear linked to physicality from the
undisciplined body. This is communicated both by reference and implication,
especially given that John Anderton’s world is not made perfect through the
human intervention of pre-Crime. As Ingebretsen notes, just because the
Puritans sought perfection, they never forgot their other possible future - “for a
people bent on Heaven, Hell, too, was a very popular place” (1996:19).

Cognitive Apprehension: The Importance of Sight – Can You See?
Cognitive apprehension, along with the prioritisation of the sense of sight and, to
a lesser extent, hearing, is the paramount route to knowledge underpinning
Minority Report. The female pre-cog, Agatha, initiates this focus. She
poignantly, but insistently, questions – can you see? This question, permeating
the film as it does, combined with the haunting theme music that accompanies
this question and also Anne Lively’s death (Agatha’s mother) inexorably sears
this question into the audiences’ consciousness, with each repetition actively
reinforces the importance of sight. For example, the evidence that convicts
criminals is gathered and analysed by seeing. That is, mental images of future
realities (murders) are perceived by the pre-cogs and transmitted through
fragmented film snippets that are projected onto transparent screens. Anderton
can view and then discard these images as he sorts through relevant and
irrelevant details for clues. As Bott and Wilson note in another context, these
snippets “functions as a scar in time freezing the moment when the mortal being
becomes ‘other’ [dies]” fusing body and image into a second “technological
surface” (quoted in Chaudhuri, 2001:69). The policemen in Minority Report use
these electronic snippets of death as profane detective clues. Below are pictures
of the transparent snippets of film as John Anderton manipulates them to extract
clues.
The only physical and bodily contact made during the policing in the film is when the suspects are caught and even then technology still separates the perpetrator from the police. This means physical, bodily contact is unable to contaminate the sacred pre-cogs, or the interactions of the police with the citizens. Reinforcing this focus on the visible and the importance of seeing, Spielberg notes in his commentary on the spaces and places of the film, that he was attempting to create a transparent and visually 'seen' world. The architecture of the precinct house, the use of glass and reflection, are all used to imply a world in which nothing is hidden, because everything can be seen (Spielberg, 2002, DVD Special Features). This also reinforces the effect of cleanliness, a sign of purity in the Puritan era.

*Minority Report* extends not only the Puritan dependence on sight but also the profane engagement with the body. Body parts, such as eyes, are markers of identity and interchangeable resources as well. Everywhere people go their eyes are scanned. People are identified by their eyes and named by machines that know their consumer history. In addition, these electronic signals are used to
‘watch’ the public and are transmitted to law enforcement officials. When John Anderton needs to disguise his identity, he needs new eyes. To modern sensibilities, the removal of John’s eyes especially in the unclean environment of ‘the Sprawl’ creates two forms of abjection and degradation as “matter out of place” (Douglas, [1966] 2002).

Figure 7.6: John Anderton’s Eyes, Stored in a Plastic Bag.

The first is that the image evokes a form of queasiness as John Anderton’s identity is being literally cut out of his face. Eyes have been markers of identity and have appeared as being inviolate parts of bodies. Yet, here, in this world where sight and eyes literally mark identity, eyes can actually be dislocated from bodies. The eyes are only valued for their use-value, and thus their relationship with the body is made profane. They can be stored in plastic bags and carried as accessories. Following their removal, John Anderton’s eyes no longer look upon his soul. This is the ultimate devaluation of sacred relationships not just between bodies, as experienced by the Volatile Body, but within the intact symbol of a bounded, disciplined body. Even the reason that John keeps his eyes in a plastic bag is because they perform another profane function for him. They open doors that only he can access. But the door he now opens, with his detached eyes, is to ‘the temple’ of the pre-cogs and in entering sacred space, sacred relationships are hinted at, but not explicit. Both the sacred and also bodies are present in this world, but they are separated and distanced and therefore are not the dominant route to knowledge or method for responding to the profane habitus.
The second aspect in relation to “matter out of place” (Douglas, [1966] 2002) in this sequence is that the removal of John Anderton’s eyes further dislocates his identity. When automated shopping mall assistants scan his second-hand eyes and address John Anderton by a Japanese name, the assistant does not name John Anderton and his past, but that of another man whose body and mind are now absent, only this other man’s eyes and the computer records of his shopping history remain. Therefore, as much as *Minority Report* is about seeing, it is also about what is not seen, as McHoul suggests, the “not-signs’ of the times” (1996:55). For example, when shown a picture of Agatha out of her tank, dressed as a civilian, in the room in which it is predicted that John will murder Leo Crowe, the policemen who have been using the pre-cog’s services (in profane associations) for six years are unable to recognise her. Her physical form, her temporal body and its fleshy constituents are not known/seen by the policemen, and as such they cannot recognise her body in a new context. Because the dominant route to knowledge is not through the body, the policemen are out-of-touch with their bodies and the bodies around them; consequently they have never noticed Agatha's body, her face or what she is like as a ‘person’. Their profane engagement with her visions means her body is irrelevant to their embodied sociality. The outsider, with fresh eyes (and training in the ways of the Volatile Catholic Body) is the only one able to see/recognise her.

The concept of blindness or screened marginalisation is reinforced when Lemar reminds Danny Witwer that when pre-Crime is deactivated, society is blind. He states that without pre-Crime his murder of Witwer will go undetected. However, this film questions whether, or not, society was blind even with the pre-cogs. For example, Anne Lively’s murderer (Lemar) escaped and, had things gone according to Lemar’s plan, John Anderton would have been incarcerated for a pre-meditated murder he actually never intended to commit. The film reveals to its audience that the discrepancies were there to see. For example, both unresolved murders occurred later than the pre-cogs predicted. The murder executed by John Anderton occurred at point blank range, suggesting a struggle, not the cold-blooded end to a man’s life the pre-cogs originally saw. Did anyone really see? The film offers a critique of over-reliance on sight, and on the doctrine of pre-determination. Choice is offered as a counter to pre-determinism. Choice is offered in walking the ‘wide path to Hell’. Agatha, purported to be the most gifted of the three pre-cogs, is clearest about this aspect of choice. As the ‘mother’ of pre-Crime advises, while the pre-cogs
always see and predict an accurate future, they may disagree about the way in which it will transpire.

**The Importance of Scripture and Words – Reduction of Carnal Knowing**

There are a number of ways in which *Minority Report* demonstrates the marginalisation of the body and elevates the importance of written scripture or words as the main pedagogical technique. The first point to consider is that Agatha’s primary pedagogical technique throughout the film invariably involves the use of words, especially after she is released from stasis. She does not focus on the whole embodied person or sensory body. She constantly tells of mentally imagined images of possible futures with a “flight away from the body” (Shilling, 2003:191). For example, she tells John Anderton to leave the scene where he is to commit murder. But in his assertion of his chosen-ness, secure in the knowledge of his own mental goodness and disciplined control, he claims he will not kill someone he does not know, and he continues to walk the ‘wide path to Hell’. The word-based descriptions and preached lessons have limited effect on John Anderton’s actions, but it is the only technique Agatha uses. So, while at the last minute he listens to Agatha and chooses not to kill Crowe and rather to arrest him, his bodily presence in the room with Crowe and a gun makes Crowe’s accidental/deliberate death possible. John had a choice long before he got to that point, as Agatha said many times.

Reinforcing the significance of written words in *Minority Report*, the evidence for the crimes and the instruction as to the guilt and innocence of the perpetrator and the victim is enshrined in writing. For example, the names of the killer and victim are literally ingrained in wood. Once ingrained these words become commands – in the case below, the command is that Howard Marks must be arrested as soon as his name is visible.

![Figure 7.7 Perpetrator and Victim’s Name Ingrained in Wood](image)

**Figure 7.7** Perpetrator and Victim’s Name Ingrained in Wood
The names themselves are also significant. Names as words mark and communicate identity in this film. Each name has a meaning relevant to its character’s function. For example, Leo means “brave as a lion”, and he is the one who pretends to be a paedophile so that upon his death his family will benefit. John Anderton’s name means “favoured by God” and even Lara’s name implies “victory” (derived from Laurel).\(^{105}\) It is she who realises the truth and frees her husband. Audiences themselves may not be aware of the meaning of the names, however, if the actions and associations of a particular name are repeated across films and other media (intertextually) it reinforces an association between the name and the type. For example, as noted earlier, audiences neither need to know who Gideon was in the Bible nor do they need to know his role in Christian faith ( Judges 6:11-8:35), provided that Gideon, the prison warder in *Minority Report*, performs the same function as his namesake (see middle picture Fig. 7.2 to see Gideon giving his counsel). Any character given this name in future media (such as Gideon in *Criminal Minds*) has the potential to repeat associations between the name Gideon and wise counsel, regardless of whether the source of this framing is the Bible or more recently fiction film.

The only time when words are not the most significant form of communication is the scene in which modern technology is used to turn the pre-cogs visions into transparent filmic snippets. These film/photographs are shaped similarly to the squares in Dali’s Crucifixion and in the similar vein are used to distance the bodies of characters from carnally knowing their subject. These snippets are not read as stories with layered incarnational meaning and interpretative possibilities, instead they are seen as two-dimensional realistic representations which are treated as profane pieces of evidence. The assumption underlying this evidence is that it will tell one story that is correct and this will direct knowledge about the guilty and the innocent. They are sorted, dissected and read as words by human (male) intervention. The witnesses also see and confirm the sight of the pre-cogs’ visions along with their expert male interpreter through electronic transmission of the events, not in an embodied person. John Anderton is the reader of a photographic scripture, the prophecy, which comes from God regarding those who will break his commandments. This need to accompany the photographs with words is reminiscent of early twentieth century debates about the role of visual evidence (such as x-rays) during a trial. Golan notes that

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\(^{105}\) See a popular website for baby names, www.my baby name .com, I use this reference to highlight that these meanings are circulating as people search for baby names.
human experts were required to personally speak (use words) to the x-rays in order to make them admissible (Golan, 2004:490-491).

Further dependence on scripture is seen in the pre-cogs persistence in revealing murder but not other crimes. This fulfils the Puritan insistence that ‘murder will out’ (Halttunen, 1998). The Puritans believed ‘murder would out’ because they believed God would reveal signs of those who broke his written commandments, which underpinned the basis of Puritan law (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:99). The police in Minority Report repeat this logic (without the sacred referent) in their answer to the question of why the pre-cogs only see murder. They state that murder so disturbs the social fabric that it must come out. According to Halttunen (1998), by 1750 feelings of repugnance towards the murderer came to dominate ways of understanding the crime. The idea of abhorrence in “a culture deeply fearful of sudden, unprepared death” (Halttunen, 1998:10) developed into a view “that murder would out” because the shocking evilness of the crime would be displayed by God for all to see.

Yet the certainty of the policemen’s rationale about murder and other Sinful Modern assumptions is challenged upon Agatha’s release from the state of stasis or anaesthetisation. When she can feel her body, she is able to see/know far more than merely her supposed ‘calling’ in the predictions of murder. The focus on the sight and scripture of the pre-cogs’ vision conceals that which Agatha offers, and the powerful regenerative revelation her message could ignite. Through Agatha’s release from stasis, the audience (and John) learn that she has powers of sight beyond murder. She can predict the weather, movement of people, the way to escape, and later the life of love that would have been possible for John Anderton’s son Sean. She is also the repository of one important lesson that underpins Puritan pre-determination – that people have a choice. The path of the elect may be narrow, and the path to Hell is wide, but when faced with temptation humans always have a choice, according to Agatha (and also to some American Puritan doctrines).

Mirroring the Puritan disjunction between the elite and the laity beliefs about the corporeality of temptation and sin, in the ‘reel’ world of Minority Report a widely held lay belief is that the pre-cogs can see more than just scripturally (legally) prohibited murder. For example, at the sight of a pre-cog, Rufus T Riley, a minor character who manages a local virtual reality games parlour, is suddenly
compelled to confess and distance himself from various ‘sinful’ thoughts by commenting that they were ‘only thoughts’. He clearly assumes pre-cogs see more than the sin of murders. This type of anxiety as experienced by Rufus is a desired consequence of Puritan teaching, according to Ingebretsen (1996:19). He claims “crisis was the social norm [the Puritans] sought to inculcate”. In Puritan times, fear of hell and damnation through corporality was just as important as the aim of living a righteous life (see Ingebretsen, 1996:19; 1991).

**Disciplined Bodies and Anaesthetised Pain**

So where are bodies-in-pain in this futurist Puritan world of pre-cognition? Before addressing Anaesthetised Pain directly, I will answer this question by way of the Sinful Body and how it frames the treatment of the body in *Minority Report*. The Sinful Body ideal type views the body as a source of temptation and weakness (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:98-130). *Minority Report* takes this same approach. For example, Witwer focuses on John Anderton’s pain and his drug addiction as signs of human weakness. He concludes that the weakened state of Anderton’s body means that he must be the weakness in the system because Anderton is already on the wide path of temptation (murder). Yet, what we actually learn is that the one who had appeared to have the gift of grace (Lemar) is really the weakness. This film locates the ‘weaknesses’ of pre-Crime in human intention and action. The absence of a flaw or weakness in the (sacred) parts of pre-Crime, which are unrelated to human interpretation and intervention, reinforces the Puritan belief that God is divine, yet, distant and unknowable even though He is apparently communicating so specifically through the pre-cogs’ visions. This means that the resolution of this film does not challenge the idea that God’s kingdom is perfect and God’s wisdom is divine and all-knowing. The idea that justice prevails in the end because technical (sacred) perfection ‘will out’, is made clear, and the warning is equally clear, human understanding is where the weakness will be. Consequently, regardless of the religious background of its creators, this film leaves intact the ideas of original sin (human innate weakness) coupled with a basic Puritan belief in the weakness of the body. In addition to its fairly overt Christian warning regarding temptation, this film does not challenge the notion of a perfect system, allowing room for continuing faith in technology-based systems, such as face and optical iris recognition. Consider, for example, the amount of power society as a whole continues to give to ‘recognition software’ that relies on correct (human) interpretation of electronic images of individual people on a screen each time a border is crossed (for example, see Gordon, 2007).
The Disciplined Body

In order to manage these human weaknesses, intervention, control and discipline of the body were paramount in Puritan times (Mellor and Shilling, 107-108). Consequently, neither the body, nor pain, is engaged with at a somatic level in Minority Report – even the film’s resolution is through mediated action (threat of death by sniper delivered by cell phone). Even this threat that ends embodiment is not delivered through the physicality of an embodied person. Another example is the use of modern medicine in the form of legal drugs to ensure the docility of the pre-cogs’ bodies in order to heighten their minds’ skill in seeing the future. The only value the pre-cogs appear to be given is due to their minds but the concept of their minds is honoured and revered.

People’s bodies are also controlled at a distance through surveillance that is taken for granted. The law intrudes into all aspects of everyday life owing to the presence of mechanical three-legged ‘Spyders’ that can and do penetrate every room, floor, ceiling and passageway to pursue human bodies. They scan the eyes in search of specific identities. The film implies a greater degree of privacy in this futuristic world, as policemen wait outside a person’s apartment, only entering when the Spyders have identified a specific set of eyes. Yet, in order to do this, we see that the Spyders intrude into the whole gamut of a person’s life from using the toilet, having sex, or domestic arguments right through to the teaching of children to submit to the Spyder’s scan. This is reminiscent of granting freedom in individual interpretation of scripture, while at the same time increasingly regulating profane action and behaviour through (discipline) courts. Furthermore, we see the normalisation of the Spyders’ intrusion, as part of socially accepted practice, because it is only the children who are frightened by this event and try to resist. As children are taught to submit and become docile bodies we are reminded of the Puritan belief that bodies were born sinful but could be disciplined into submission and the Enlightenment/Modern belief that people were “born natural” and were “made social” through “education and surveillance” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:147).
In addition, any police contact with criminals is minimised. The concept of brutality is removed through the use of weapons which disrupt sound waves, leaving bodies intact. In the dirty Sprawl area sick-sticks are used as a means of control. These sticks are used to induce vomiting in preference to the use of bullets which penetrate the flesh. This technology actualises the belief in painless punishment. In this world there is no state sanctioned killing, neither in the capture of criminals nor as a capital punishment. These futuristic jails suspend people in cryogenic anaesthetisation rather than killing their bodies.

**Anaesthetised Pain**

The *habitus* of the Sinful Modern Body has no place for pain (or any of the carnal negative aspects of the binary oppositions) (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:93). Therefore a moral imperative to intervene promotes the desire to eliminate pain. Latour (1993) points out the impossibility of eliminating many of the negative dualisms and consequently they are often present but unacknowledged. In *Minority Report* pain follows this model. It is ever present, like the
“Dysappearing Body” (Leder, 1990:69), and motivates the key character (John Anderton), but is hidden below the surface. Pain is a motivator, but its presence fades into the background as a reminder of alternative pre-destinies or minority reports. For example, John Anderton experiences emotional pain in the loss of a child, a wife and by implication a happy work/life balance. He relives this happiness through translucent videos of his wife and child, thereby anaesthetising his pain. His screened solution is to work too hard (bury the pain in other people’s problems) and to take Clarity, an illicit drug, in order to dull and deaden the pain. Interestingly, the film maintains present day distinctions between the illicit and the legal use of drugs. The cocktail of drugs that are drip fed to the pre-cogs to maintain them in a permanent state of waking/sleep and in this way elevate their minds has no illicit connotation. Yet, John’s search for drug-induced Clarity is illegal or non-sanctioned. The name of the illicit drug John uses to anaesthetise his pain is also significant. The name Clarity implies a focused mind, clearing vision, an ideal of Protestant society. Through Clarity John Anderton’s body and pain are sublimated or anaesthetised so his body cannot communicate. Yet through the use of Clarity he never confronts either the pain itself, or the reason for its occurrence or even the effect it has on his life. In this film, anaesthetisation allows him to keep producing (working) - a Puritan requirement - but it never actually eliminates his pain which returns when the drug’s effects wear off. It is not a permanent solution.

Furthermore, John’s wife also silences her pain. She claims she divorced John because he reminded her of her abducted little boy. He reminded her of what she didn’t have and the consequent pain this caused. This silence regarding pain is a key element of Protestant doctrine. For example, pain is not considered to be an experience that communicates meaning or offers a transformative cure, as in the medieval era (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:93). Comfort for grief was found in scripture, in words, in prayer, and in Church pamphlets. This inability of Puritan doctrine to provide relief or understanding in a time of grief even affected the faith of Luther. He claimed to have had a temporary loss of faith following the death of his daughter (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:120). Therefore, the film neither asserts that John Anderton will find Clarity in anaesthetisation, nor that John’s pain is potentially transformative. At the end of the film, his life is restored, as are the lives of hundreds of others who have been incarcerated by pre-Crime. This resolution, however, is unrelated to the body-in-pain because pain has been so marginalised throughout the film. It is an absent presence because it has been present throughout and influenced the characters lives and decisions, but this influence has never been acknowledged or openly discussed.
Furthermore, because pain is marginalised, there is no hint that anyone learnt any lessons from these painful experiences, or that lives changed as a result of an understanding of the pain. Instead, it appears that society will be returned to its pre-Crime existence, not with a new understanding of the world that Job, for example, rejoices in, but with the simple message that a particular government programme failed, because people’s cognitive abilities are not yet divine and have weaknesses.

The Body and Pain as Tempter

In addition to the silence regarding potential lessons learned from pain, the father of pre-Crime, Lemar, selected someone already in pain and proceeded to use that pain to run pre-Crime, and use that pain to motivate him to commit the crime Lemar sets up for him. This use of the signals that the body sends to the brain is at the heart of Puritan understandings of temptation. Through weakened flesh (pain), the devil becomes the ‘deluder’, tempting John to commit murder and this is the reason bodily control is so important in this film. Yet despite Lemar’s incarnation as the tempting Devil, he also plays a vital part in this story of John’s redemption. Pain assists the deluder to weaken and control John, but through the restoration of John’s clarity, gained through resisting his painful fate, he sees who the deluder is. This means redemption only occurs in the (sacred) mind, without contamination from the profane weakened body, therefore in this way redemption is cognitive, however, its circumstance was originally stimulated by embodied pain. Puritan doctrine did not deal easily with this dual role of pain and temptation in regenerative revelation and salvation. Although illness could be a gift in terms of stimulating pious reflection, for the minority (for example, see Anne Bradstreet’s work reproduced in Hensley, 1967); it could, conversely, be seen as a punishment for sin and hence not always viewed positively. In Minority Report this tension is downplayed by making pain invisible, as John Anderton’s social activism in confronting Lemar (not in person, but by cell phone) is the dominant route to the final end of the film.

In this way John Anderton’s story can be interpreted as a modern reflection on the Job story. In similar vein to Job, John loses his wife and family, only to have it restored after trial and tribulation. In John’s case he confronts himself (as he faces the man he believes abducted his son) and he confronts his illusions about pre-Crime. He overcomes his drug-induced absent-minded faith in the deluder. His reward is a return of his wife, a new baby, and the role he played in exposing
the fallibility of pre-Crime. Yet, as a modern (not contemporary) reflection this story is not one in which the flesh is attacked (apart from the voluntary loss of John’s eyes). John Anderton’s body does not suffer (compared to his other mental torments, or compared to the suffering bodies in Se7en, for example). This film is not without its fear of pain, death, the body and Hell, but these destinies are only hinted at, communicated through symbolic and abstract forms. The abjection is ever present, as is the body-in-pain, but the audience’s view of it is distanced, it is known symbolically, not graphically portrayed. The body does not tell its own story, nor is the Word made flesh. These are the trials of Job played out in the mind. He is in pain, but he does not engage with this pain. Instead, through cognitive reflection John and his wife chose to detect the cause and effect of control and weakness and use it to overcome temptation. In this world lessons are learned in the abstract – pre-Crime does not work and people need to choose the right path. This is a Jobian-like journey of cause and effect with rational explanations of problems. The resolution that finally takes place is through correct rationally planned action. This means pain is present and active in communicating with participants, but they chose to silence this communication and mentally address their perceived cognitive problems instead.

Conclusions
Rowland's analysis of Minority Report states: “it is a very strange film. Unlike most films that raise complex philosophical issues, there's not a lot of graphic violence in it” (Rowland, 2003:121). Rowland typifies how ingrained the embodied sociality of the Sinful ideal type is. The Sinful Modern Body: Anaesthetised Pain is not without its complex moral issues, not least of which is the role of the Sinful Body in the areas of free will, temptation and the role of pain in contemporary society. Nevertheless Rowland’s assumption that violence (presumably against the body) is the only way to question ingrained cultural understandings indicates just how distanced people are from the marginalised body and the complexity its very marginality raises. It is true Minority Report does not shock modern senses. It is not aimed at bodily sensory knowing or carnal routes to knowledge. It communicates with minds and encourages self-reflection. It comments on a number of doxic connections (and important organisations of social liberty, such as free will, surveillance and state control of the body), which are currently so ingrained as normal and natural that they can
be represented without (much) comment. Rowland’s perspective appears reinforced by the limited academic attention on this film’s complexity.\textsuperscript{106}

Furthermore, even within this limited attention, the tacit Christian framing of the body is so ingrained and accepted (taken for granted) it is not seen.\textsuperscript{107} Nevertheless, just because this sensory organisation has been constructed as natural does not mean it is not based on Puritan orientations to the body. In this film, I claim Puritan views of the body-in-pain are shaping modern sensibilities, moral imperatives and bodily orientations. In addition, these views impact outside the ‘reel’ world, for example, the views about evidence in this film shape modern choices, such as what counts as evidence in the real court room. Films that repeat these Puritan inspired views of the body-in-pain reinforce particular conceptions of appropriate treatment of the body whether, or not, they directly refer to God or the sacred. Repetition of the image of the body as weakness and the moral imperative to control and remove pain will have practical effects on the regulation of society. For example, this attitude shapes the belief that pain is unable to, and should not, be shared, and this in turn shapes both hospice practices which isolate bodies that are dying in undisciplined/disintegrating (abject) ways, and shapes debates and trial around the appropriateness of painful and/or televised (screened) capital punishment (see Lawton, 1998, Smith, 2003, Lesser, 1993).

Continuing the Protestant routes to knowledge and embodied sociality without explicitly re-evaluating their moral underpinnings will mean these debates will primarily be bounded by Christian routes to knowledge. That is, a fiction film that repeats reflections on the Sinful Body as that of a person who is tempted through the fleshy body, who is controlled through discipline and punished painlessly, will continue to encourage isolating attitudes towards the everyday ‘seeing’ of real bodies-in-pain. Furthermore the bodily orientations in \textit{Minority Report} continue to be left ‘unremarked’ upon in academic discourse because the Sinful Modern approach to the body and Anaesthetised Pain is now ‘normal’ and ‘natural’. This does not help people living with chronic bodily pain or phantom limb pain, for whom anaesthetisation is not a relevant solution and thereby

\textsuperscript{106} At most I could source seven articles or chapters in books and only two explicitly dealt with the film; the rest mentioned it as a passing reference to illustrate a point usually about surveillance or the panoptical gaze of the state. Of those two that had a reasonably lengthy analysis (more than 2 pages) the topics of analysis were either surveillance or free will. (See for example, Rowland, 2003, Gordon, 2007 or Karounos, 2002, Valverde, 2006)

\textsuperscript{107} The one exception to this is Karounos, but even he describes the theological grounds of the plot’s denouement as “surprising” (2002:online).
modernity is inadequate (for example see Glucklich, 2001 and Lawton, 1998). Consequently, to better understand contemporary treatment of bodies-in-pain there is a need to reassess the tacit Christian moral imperatives that influence these interpretations. As is becoming clear, Christian interpretations in general and Christian interpretations of bodies-in-pain in particular have not died within so-called secular contemporary society but are re-forming and are repeatedly encountered in fiction films. This occurs at the level of overt rational calculation and also through the tacit dimension of knowledge. This means that Christianity is still significant for the selection of screened images and bodily orientations. This shapes our views on acceptable treatment of bodies-in-pain. In this particular example of fiction film there is limited reference to God and no reference to America’s Puritan forefathers, but Biblical motifs and themes, the founding fathers of Protestantism such as Calvin and Luther, and the teachings of the early Puritan clergymen such as Winthrop, Shepard, Hooker and Mather about the vileness of sinful bodies and the need for control are seen throughout this film.

While the Puritan clergymen may have been clear in their moral certainties about bodily weakness and pain, is this significant within contemporary society? In the next chapter I ask what happens to representations of pain in film in contemporary times when both Valued Embodied and Anaesthetised Pain compete?
CHAPTER 8

CAPE FEAR: THE BODY TORN BETWEEN BOUNDARIES

“If [Sexus by Henry Miller] was no good, it was true; if it was not artistic, it was sincere; if it was in bad taste, it was on the side of life.” www.kirjasto.sci.fi/hmiller.htm

The previous chapter identified the Sinful Modern Body and Anaesthetised Pain as the dominant organising principle in the film Minority Report. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the Ambivalent Body: Torn Pain ideal type with the bodily orientations in Martin Scorsese’s 1992 film Cape Fear in order to reveal the way in which the competition between the dual social impulses and collective representation of re-forming bodies-in-pain are re-presented. ¹⁰⁸ For ease of reference, below I have reintroduced the diagram from Chapter Four in order to illustrate the framework of Torn Pain and the way in which it facilitates, and restricts, choices between competing bodily orientations.

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¹⁰⁸ As I have noted in previous chapters each ideal type of Pain is built upon the embodied sociality developed by Mellor and Shilling, which means the accurate title of the ideal type (in this chapter for example), should be Ambivalent Bodies: Torn Pain, however, for ease of reference I have reduced this title, not its conceptualisation, to Torn Pain.
contribute toward a sense of “fracture and contradiction” in contemporary society (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:161). Therefore, unlike my approach in the previous two chapters, in this chapter I resist a comparison of the film's general bodily orientation with Ambivalent Bodies: Torn Pain. Instead I use the Torn Pain ideal type as a framework to compare what happens when the two main male characters are faced with competing approaches to pain. My aim for this comparison is to make visible the tacit Christian influences on the bodily options and re-formations of sensory male bodies in the film. To do this, after an introduction to the chapter and a plot summary of the film *Cape Fear* (1992), this chapter will be divided into three distinct sections:

1. **Section 1: Linear Bodily Re-formation**: Sam Bowden, Modern and Profane Man re-formed into Baroque Carnal Knowing, and Sensual Solidarities.

2. **Section 2: Virtuosity in Re-formation**: Max Cady, Volatile and Baroque Body-in-Pain with Modern manipulations and profane illusions.

3. **Section 3: Film as Image Repeating Tool**: Both a linear and fragmentary filming style that complements the ambivalent routes to knowledge embedded in *Cape Fear*.

The thesis of this chapter is that if these normative positions (see sections 1, 2, and 3 above) are represented in this film then they are most likely to be the influence of tacit dimensions of knowledge in relation to collective representations of bodies-in-pain. Stated more theoretically, if collectively, Modern and Baroque elements combine in *Cape Fear* to highlight the way in which contemporary responses to pain are torn between competing painful bodily orientations, then the framework reveals a continuing social significance of Christianity. I argue that the characters in *Cape Fear* are torn between “a flight away from [and also a] flight [into] the body” (Shilling, 2003:191) as they attempt to resolve their conflicted approach to a painful world, community and social interactions. These perspectives and bodily orientations give a false appearance of unlimited choice but the use of the Torn Pain ideal type makes visible the Christian framing that limits these choices.

As in the previous two films, there is explicit use of Christian symbolism in this film, but that is not the basis of my argument. Christian symbolism is present and at times is crucial to an understanding of the encounters between Cady and Sam. It is not the overt Christianity that is of interest, given that the creators of this film did not intend to make a proselytising film, or an artefact to promote
conversion. Instead I concentrate on whether, or not, the organising principles of the film, and the bodies in the film, conform to Christian normative positions of the body-in-pain.

Clarifying the actual and imagined choices of “Janus-faced Modernity” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:131) is important because, as Mellor and Shilling claim, Ambivalent Bodies is the dominant organisation and formation in this contemporary age. In Cape Fear audiences are given the opportunity to experience one way in which the ambivalence of Torn Pain can be, and often is, played out. In this case, the film is generally framed in the belief that pain is a visual mode of learning (the Baroque Body), although ambivalence remains because the audience is left debating whether, or not, the protagonists saw the experience as teaching them anything or whether they preferred instead to continue anaesthetising their pain.

As evidence, in this chapter I compare the images and themes portrayed through the two principal male characters in order to illustrate that at the literal and surface level each character has a dominant habitus and resultant approach to pain. However, it becomes apparent that each character uses pain differently to live in and learn about the world around them. Again, following Denzin's (1989) approach to film study, I show that when the characters are brought together, the role of pain is the missing element that is only ever acknowledged by one character. The limiting worldview of the Sinful Body results instead in the other character denying any potential role for pain in modern life (despite its somatic impact on his, and other bodies, in the film).

Before continuing with this chapter there is one possible criticism which I will deal with now. That criticism is that I have selected a narrow focus on two characters instead of covering the range of variables which the Torn Pain ideal type affords. In response I maintain that the Ambivalent Modern Baroque Body is very complex, having multiple manifestations that stem from extended versions of both the Volatile and Sinful Body and the coalescence of the combinations and clashes of these bodies. Therefore it is difficult to address the many references and implications or even to separate the effects of the bodies in this film. Furthermore there are many other sociological variables worthy of consideration in the film, such as family, sexuality, gender and class but these have been ably treated by other scholars, so the reason I concentrate on the two
male bodies is to give the analysis sufficient depth to draw out the links between Christianity and the body in this film.  

Introduction: Film as Story and Enacted Ritual

The importance of the concept of ambivalence in Cape Fear is evident from the audience’s introduction to one of the character who is trying to design a symbol or logo that combines the elements of movement and progression with stability and trust. A second character is interested in the task when it is uni-directional – when it is a symbol for progression and movement. However she becomes sceptical when the contradictory element of stability is added. Finally she gives up on the task upon discovering that the symbol must also be “pleasing to the eye”. This scene gives the audience insight into the contradictory potentiality, and negativity, as well as the need to negotiate the common terrain at the heart of Mellor and Shilling’s Ambivalent Body (1997:135).

Plot Summary

Despite the significance of bodies and Christianity to Cape Fear, plot summaries usually obscure both the pain of being torn between approaches to embodied sociality and also any Christian messages in the film. Instead they focus on the revenge and terror of the film's protagonists. For example:

This film is the tale of a lawyer, Sam Bowden (Nick Nolte) and his family, who are menaced by a vengeful ex-con, Max Cady (Robert DeNiro). Sam Bowden had defended Max Cady 14 years earlier. Cady, dissatisfied with this defence, has, upon his release, set in motion big plans for Bowden, his wife and especially his daughter, Danielle (The Movie Guide, 2002).

Despite these kinds of superficial depictions, this chapter will uncover more than a tale of revenge and fear provoked by a serial rapist/killer through his morally monstrous behaviour and the bewildering persecution of Sam Bowden and his family. Reminiscent of the story of Job, Cape Fear is not a simple tale (Hill, 2002). It is designed to be disturbing to its audience and I argue using the Torn Pain ideal type as an heuristic tool draws attention to this unsettling disturbance which results from the film’s implied responsibilities, the questioning of boundaries, and the lessons literally learned through the flesh. A more complex/nuanced re-reading of the plot summary might advise the reader that:

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109 Stern, (1995) for example, explores what she calls the ‘misogyny’ of Scorsese’s films. A similar analysis of this film using re-forming bodies-in-pain could be used as a framework through which to explore the influence of Christian constructions of gender in relation to the sensory bodies of the women characters (Leigh and Danni Bowden). Such an argument could reinforce the main points of this study, but due to the focus in this dissertation this area of research will not be covered here.
Cape Fear is a tale which begins in a typical noir style with a voice-over. In the voice-over, Danni Bowden is heard reminiscing about the day ‘real life’ “came crashing into” the “tranquil summer nights” spent on a river, “mystifyingly” named Cape Fear. On this day, a man, heavily tattooed with both secular and sacred imagery, is released after a 14-year prison term for rape and battery. This is Max Cady (Robert De Niro) who, as he leaves the prison gates, walks menacingly toward and seemingly into the viewer/watcher’s space – torn between the ‘reel’ and the real world. This challenging act of defiance is the beginning of a relentless and seemingly unstoppable pursuit of, and eventual murderous attack on, the Bowden family. The motivation for this current attack is Cady’s obsession that Danni’s father, Sam Bowden, had not adequately defended him at his trial. Cady believed that Sam had suppressed the evidence of the then 16-year old victim's promiscuity. Cady warns that Sam is going to learn about loss, and sets out to take Sam on a Job-like journey. This includes: killing the family dog; raping and assaulting a woman with whom Sam is on the verge of committing adultery with; seducing Sam’s daughter; killing his maid as well as a private detective hired to protect the family; putting Sam on trial for his dereliction of duty; announcing his intention of raping Sam’s wife and probably his daughter; running them out of town and finally attempting to execute Sam. While the resistance of the Bowden family combined with the weather (an act of God - the Jobean whirlwind perhaps?) intervenes to prevent Cady from realising his ultimate (enlightened?) goals, the Bowden family embarks on an unwilling journey of loss and pain. They learn about themselves, their worlds and their connection as a family unit. Below are pictures of each of these main characters.

**Figure 8.1 Main Characters and Director**
*Cape Fear*, Scorsese’s remake of the original film by the same name, has received academic attention not only because of its departure from the black and white (literal and figurative) filming of the original, together with its more contemporary portrayal of the family, but also in relation to its themes of redemption and justice (see Deacy, 2001; Morgan, 1992, Thompson, 1998). However, limited attention has been paid to Scorsese’s use of the body in *Cape Fear*. The importance of this distinction is seen in a comparison between *Cape Fear* and *Minority Report*. Removing bodies from *Minority Report* would only impede small areas of communication in the film. Whilst disembodied, but talking minds, could have moved the story in *Minority Report* forward, this would substantially impede the communication in *Cape Fear*. The relative importance of the body in each film recognises the relative importance of the body-in-pain in each of the ideal types. *Cape Fear*, when separated from its dialogue, is told through the passionate interaction of homo duplex bodies which are internally motivated and externally textual, for example, through the use of tattooing, exercise, secular and sacred imagery and pain. *Cape Fear* is about what happens to people when and how they are tempted, taught and manipulated through the body (pain, loss, sexual desire). And finally it is a story which questions man and God’s impact on, and control of, the body.

**Section 1:**

**Linear Bodily Reformation: Sam Bowden**

**Modern Man to Baroque Carnal Knowing**

Sam Bowden’s character begins the film as a Sinful Body, with a Modern extension. In chapters three and four of this dissertation, some of the salient features of the Sinful and Modern Body were described as:

1. God is dead but signs of election in the form of material success remain as signs of goodness;
2. Imagined worlds, abstract relationships;
3. Human intervention and technology;
4. Cognitive apprehension: the role of scripture and sight;
5. The power and illusion of the conquered body, human intervention and mastery;
6. Simultaneous understanding of the discursive body as a sign of election and the physical body as source of temptation; and

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110 See Stern (1995) for an exception; her focus is on Robert De Niro’s virtuosity as an actor - which is discussed later in this chapter.
7. Engagement in “body projects” and the distancing of anaesthetised pain.

God is Dead but Material Success Remains

The audience’s first impression of Sam’s body is that it displays signs of election and living in idyllic happiness. Sam believes that these signs are secular achievements of success, but as Weber established, they are derived from Calvinistic understandings of predestination and a “Puritan morality” (Weber, [c.1905] 2002:77). Sam is contextualised as a man who is good at his job, in the highly respected legal profession. He has a wife and family, a dog, a high income and material assets. He is presented as being in charge of his body by disciplining it as well as “concealing and controlling” it in “business suits” (Longhurst, 2001:91). He is clean and by implication so is his life. He exercises and is fit. This is a man with a certain and singular set of prioritised sensory orientations and worldview. He has confidence that his embodied knowledge is ‘right’ because he conforms to the superior side of binary oppositions. The audience can be comfortable that it has found the ‘good’ guy.

Figure 8.2 Sam and his Modern World

Imagined Worlds and Abstract Relationships

Protestantism abstracted a sublime God from people’s day-to-day life. Christianity came to be understood and expressed as “cognitive ideals” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103). As a consequence (amongst other things), Protestant forms of sociality became profane and one’s understanding of God, while still sacred, became distant and abstract. Sam’s world conforms to this description where profane associations are naturalised. This is seen by his lack of deep and
committed personal relationships. Sam and his wife Leigh do not appear to have a close and intimate relationship. This is made apparent by her continuous taunting and seemingly random insults concerning his job, and by his reaction to this. In addition, their daughter barely communicates with them, nor does she reveal the pain that their arguing is having on her. As a result of these estranged relationships, scholars have both praised and critiqued Cape Fear’s discussion of the modern nuclear family and its inability to communicate (see, for example, Stern, 1995:181). As Halpern argued, the family has replaced the community, but as it does so even family relationships are transactional and functional (Halpern, 2002:51 and Mellor and Shilling, 1997:113-116).

Cady endeavours to make Sam realise that these profane ‘contract-like’ relationships are not ‘natural’ or inevitable by stating that Sam is going to learn about loss. This is perhaps a metaphor for “the loss of publicly shared meanings” that characterise “banal associations” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:167). Cady’s first method is to verbally describe abstract intangible people in a state of unhappiness as they pursue both their careers and the achievement of worldly success. This is similar to Agatha’s verbal method used to warn John Anderton in Minority Report (2002). In this scene Sam is enclosed in his modern certainty; he completely misses Cady’s abstract warning which relies on the listener’s imagination to make sense of ‘happiness’. He does not see that the “sensual separation of people minimises what they have in common and emphasises their isolation as individuals” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103). During the course of the film, however, Sam learns that he and his family need to face Cady together, but he does not know how to bring this about. He tries to tell his wife of the contractual benefit of facing Cady’s threat together (after she believes she has discovered, yet again, another affair), and ends up being banished to the couch. His violent and possessive insistence that his daughter must not ‘connect’ with Cady further distances Danni from her father. Both Leigh and Sam also prevent Danni from truly understanding the situation by keeping from her the details of Cady’s violence, so that she mistakenly believes she is in no more danger than that of being flashed, something that she claims to have experienced before. She is left to imagine his presence, and hence she does not understand her parents’ concern and their restrictions on her movements. Sam’s embodied sociality and routes to knowledge do not allow him to hear Cady’s volatile warning.
Cognitive Apprehension: The Importance of Scripture and Sight

Perhaps the reason Sam cannot hear this aspect of Cady’s communication is because the Protestant sensory body prioritises learning through scripture rather than through figura (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:103). Sam misses Cady’s forewarning about the relationship between pain and human happiness, but when he is instructed to read the Book of Job he does so. Sam believes that he can, and should, read the Bible silently and learn. By not sharing the forewarning with his wife, Sam stands alone. Even when she asks him what he is doing he only summarises the plot/action of the Book of Job; he does not discuss it. This keeps him isolated from those around him and he still fails to see any other sense or perspective.

The prioritisation of the sense of sight and surveillance in this worldview also means that Sam is very concerned about Cady watching or seeing his family. Sam is disturbed when he believes Cady is watching his family in a public place, such as a 4th of July parade which reinforces the importance of the “imagined community” of America. He is equally concerned when it occurs at their home; Sam obsessively shuts all the blinds, and tells his wife and child to stay inside.

The Power and Illusion of Conquered Bodies, Human Intervention and Mastery

The Sinful Body developed in a time of great uncertainty and major change. In order to create certainty in this environment, the modern drive toward progress increased human interaction with technology. As Latour argues, the unacknowledged “proliferation of hybrids” of both “human and non-human” sustained modernity through control of the inferior aspects of dualisms (1993:1). It was a world which created an illusion of safety through discursive and technological control. This certainty in an ideal world was reinforced as technology was decreasing the death rate, the number of incurable and fatal diseases and workplace injury (Thomas, 1971).

Sam has faith in this modern illusion of power, control, self-mastery and safety. He lives in a world that he believes he controls. It is a world disciplined by law, and he is a legal expert. He appears to be hurt when his wife implies his is a ‘dirty’ world, analogous to dirty bodily fighting - all negative sides of binary oppositions. This brings into question his doxic confidence in his clean, pain-free self-image. For example, Sam’s current case, a divorce case, is one in which an unknown son-in-law has hidden money owed to the wife/client and Bowden’s job.
is to stall the divorce proceedings in order to allow time for the wife to find the whereabouts of the money. It is a world of deception, but not one in which skin is ripped or bodies torn, and neither will it restore bodily connections to the world. Not only is Sam in control of an unseen woman’s financial future (she is represented by her father and thus subsumed back into her family, which became the institution responsible for managing pain within the Sinful Body ideal type), but Sam is also seen to be winning the battle on her behalf by mastering his assailant in legal protocol.

In addition, Sam is a body-in-time. He divides time into safe times (daylight) and unsafe times (night-time). While the association of night with evil was not solely a product of Puritan America, and is reminiscent of medieval understandings, modern technology makes night surveillance and night ‘seeing’ and therefore ‘knowing’ possible. The prominence of sight has led to technological advances that can illuminate surveillance over night spaces, and telescopic lenses to maintain visual but not physical contact. This means that it is possible for Sam to hire a private investigator to ‘watch’ Cady at night. Consequently he is outraged when Danni meets Cady in person not only during the day but also at school, a place and a time that he had assumed to be safe.

Once legal control slips from Sam’s grasp, he then turns to other forms of control. First, he chooses technology, and decides to purchase a gun. As a ‘modern’ man who can master the world, he believes that by learning to operate a weapon he will make him and his family feel safe. Following Latour (1993) I claim Sam’s modern belief overlooks that a man using a gun is a hybrid which sometimes has painful consequences. Sam merely focuses on the consumption of the weapon. What the private investigator selling the weapon brings to Sam’s unwitting attention is that “owning a gun and using a gun are very different things”. The consequences of using the weapon, both to successfully kill, or unsuccessfully losing the weapon to one’s opponent (Cady) are profound. Once these implications have been brought to Sam’s attention, he is more cautious about his idea of employing hybrid technological solutions to his problems. Applying Latour and Mellor and Shilling’s analysis to this situation, the private investigator might be seen as the Volatile Body that is in tune with the material, social and consequential effects of employing a hybrid, such as, man and weapon together. Sam as a modern man is disconnected from any acknowledgment that this kind of hybridisation occurs and discursively manages this disconnection with an assumption of human control.
Understanding of Both the Discursive Body as Sign of Election and the Physical Body as a Source of Temptation

According to Mellor and Shilling (1997:99-100), Puritans lived in fear of their bodies because temptation reaches the soul through the flesh. One of the key indicators of this in *Cape Fear* is Sam’s inability to control his sexual desire for women. His Sinful Body is not perfect. He has sinned in the past (carnal/bodily desire) and is seen to be controlling potentially sinful desire for the future. During a game of badminton with a potential extra-marital affair partner, Lori, he claims he is helping her with her badminton technique. She quickly highlights the potential to read the sexual overtones in his actions with a reference to dancing. Recalling the early Puritan distrust of exercise and dancing as symbols and signs of amorous desire, in this scene Sam’s body is marked by signs of his potential sin through "matter out of place" (Douglas, [1966] 2002); sweat and dishevelled hair.

In addition to sexual temptation, Sam is tempted through his empathy with broken bodies. He claims that the reason he did not defend Cady to the letter of the law was because he had imagined that Cady’s aggravated battery crime had been committed against his own daughter. Sam’s excuse, an appeal to his emotive response to the pain and damage done to Cady’s victim, is not enough for his boss to relieve him of the guilt of his “cauterising conscience” (Halpern, 2002:27). His boss reminds Sam that he did not do his job, perform his oath, or follow the word of the law.

Sam also reads the body as a sign of election. In the nineteenth century, theories of deviance drew upon ideas of the presence of bodily and innate differences in the criminal mind. This separated ‘good’ people from ‘bad’ people (Lombroso [c1876], Gibson and Rafter, 2006). In this context, and in modern times, criminals were primarily constructed as “moral aliens” (Halttunen, 1998:57). Sam subscribes to this idea of moral deviance and ‘innate’ revulsion to broken and bloody bodies, by constantly categorising Cady as a ‘criminal’. Sam’s profane association mean that he has marginalised not only the body of Cady but also any bodily temptation of sin and pain. Sam understands and constructs the modern world as manageable through intervention. He does not expect pain, suffering or loss to happen to him, because he is not a ‘criminal’. After all the modern American Puritan no longer needs to remember to check for signs of being among the elect - he merely asserts he is right rather than chosen. Early Puritans were amazed that Christians, in the new regulated land
were capable of vicious conduct. These ideas have clearly found acceptance with Sam as he feels a sense of outrage when he is unable to control his situation. He cannot construct Cady’s advice as meaningful, he cannot learn from it, and, even in the end, Danni’s voice-over implies that the Bowden family sees these events as endurance rather than as an ordeal that resulted in a re-formation of self-understandings.

**Painful Re-formation**

Despite’s Sam’s sense of righteousness and his cognitive approach to problem-solving through intervention, the audience watches Sam undergo a painful moral and physical re-formation from Modern to Baroque. The audience knows that Sam is capable of sin, but his worldview is challenged only when Cady inflicts pain, on Sam’s body, on the bodies of his possessions (mostly his women) and on his life. This is reminiscent of Satan’s insistence to God that Job’s worldview will not change without the infliction of physical pain. Satan argues that the loss of wealth, children and status is not enough to re-make Job’s world (Job 2:4-5). Like Job once inflicted with pain, Sam quickly makes contra-legal choices, aligns himself with violence and in the end seeks to kill Cady with a jagged and brutal rock. Morgan states, Sam’s

image of himself as a lawyer is antithetical to recognising his inner self or developing personal relationships. It prevents him from acknowledging his actual limitations; when he has to call on his inner strength to protect himself in a life-threatening situation, he discovers to his horror that that is one resource he does not possess. Instead he finds himself increasingly plagued by self-doubt, fear and an attraction to violence (1992:6).

When situated within Mellor and Shilling's framework, each of Morgan’s observations can be seen as signs of Sam re-forming into the Volatile Baroque Body. As Sam Bowden re-forms, his body displays all the signs that a Puritan would expect as signs of a covenant with Satan. Building on his earlier sins of "matter out of place" (Douglas, [1966] 2002), his hair moves from dishevelled to uncontrollable, his sweat becomes blood, his clothes are torn, he wallows in the muddy banks of Cape Fear’s river system, he cannot protect his family and he tries to murder Cady by brutally smashing his head.
In his pain, Sam discovers he has little personal strength under his mask or illusion of control. He has no framework for understanding his pain, no ability to see it as anything other than wrong, evil and something to be eliminated. As Mellor and Shilling argue, “incorporation of the Word into the flesh constantly threatened to stain, muddy and bypass the abstract channels for human interaction” (1997:132). Sam has two responses. The first is a modern attempt to create surface control through the body’s containment – in this case Sam decides to confine his daughter and wife to the house. The second is a volatile project to use painful and abject violence to communicate with Cady. This reforms Sam’s response from modern to a resurrection of carnal communication through (near) physical contact. Sam hires three people to beat Cady in order to “send a [painful bodily] message” that his insight is not welcome. This is reminiscent of Job’s wish to use “chaos monsters” (Beal, 2002:36) to obliterate his body (Job 3:1-26).

In the denouement of the film, although Sam does not succeed in killing Cady, it is not through any conscious choice on his part (such as that made by John Anderton to discipline his body and behaviour in Minority Report), but through an ‘act of God’ or ‘coincidence of nature’. A storm destabilises the boat that Cady is on and he falls into the river. In a Volatile moment of uncertain death, Cady
does return three times from the depths of the lake, but finally he drowns and
the audience can relax. God/nature will not only prevail but also overcome.
With Cady’s demise, although an external threat of pain is ended, Sam, with
arms outstretched, sinks to his knees realising that he has reached the lowest
depths of lost control. However, his hands reveal the mark of stigmata - a
poignant scene of blood, pain and suffering and sign of divinity, redemption and
salvation.

**Sam as a Torn Body-in-Pain**

In summary, pain is the catalyst that tears down the modern illusions of goal-
acquisition, mastery and control. In his pain Sam’s *habitus* no longer supports
him. Cognitive apprehension alone is insufficient to live in this bodily painful
world. This is reminiscent of Job’s story where pain plays a significant role in re-
formation. Despite the potential Jobian lesson, Sam continues to strive to live in
the modern world. Even after his illusions have been shattered, he cannot
recognise the positive re-formative potential of pain. As Danni implies in her
final voice-over regarding the experience, the Bowdens did not speak of this
incident to each other ever again. So, for some bodies which remained
dominantly modern, pain continued to be isolated, isolating and anaesthetised.
Sam appears to feel the pain of being torn between worlds, but cannot
acknowledge the hybrids that threaten to shatter his illusions. Nevertheless his
body is still re-formed during the experience (even if he reverses the re-
formation at the conclusion). The audience is left questioning whether or not
Sam really was the ’good guy’.

**Section 2:**

**Virtuosity in Re-formation: Max Cady**

**Max Cady as Volatile and Baroque Body-in-Pain**

Max Cady, the man responsible for using carnal pedagogical techniques to tear
off Sam’s legal mask, is not an exact opposite of Sam Bowden. In terms of ideal
types Sam’s dominant characteristics conformed to the Sinful Bodies approach to
the world. That is, his worldview was a linear progression into an intensification
of the Sinful and Modern Body, until his path of anaesthetised pain was disrupted
and it veered on a new linear re-formation, that of the Baroque Body and Valued
Embodied Pain. Cady is different. Cady, in baroque style, can use both baroque
and modern elements to manipulate and play with the modern world of Sam
Bowden. He creates choices and illusions. Of the volatile and baroque
characteristics covered in previous chapters, the following are the ones that most strikingly demonstrate Cady’s ability to manipulate others into learning his incarnational baroque lesson:

1. Resurrection of overt Christian messages, confession, penance and community (crucifixion as performance);
2. Mastery of spectacle and image;
3. Resurrection of an intensified form of carnal knowing; and
4. Use of pain to communicate/teach.

Resurrection of Overt Christian Images, Messages, Confession, Penance and Community (Crucifixion as Performance)

The first scene of the movie, after the voice-over, is of muscles rippling as a tattooed back rises up, into and out of frame in the rhythmical process of performing press-ups. This naked back, with its tattooed crucifix balancing the scales of truth and justice and weighing the Word of God against the knife, is a semiotic introduction through Max Cady’s body into his volatile, baroque and Christian worldview. Cady is seen through movement, reforming from unfit to fit, from prisoner to free man. This embodied performance makes the Word flesh through permanent modification of his skin in the form of tattoos.

Figure 8.4 Cady in His Cell.
Cady is explicit, through his bodily ornamentation and in his use of this Christian worldview, that his actions teach his religious values, by making the Word flesh. Whether, or not, we agree with his (or John Doe’s) interpretation of the actualisation of God’s Word, both protagonists in their respective roles actively experience and live out their interpretations of God’s Word, both in Scripture, image and bodies. Not only does Cady live on a tattooed cross - a daily performance of suffering - he also makes real and meaningful a world in which confession and sacrifice are performed. Cady gives Sam the opportunity to learn about loss, as he tells it to Danni, in order for Sam to repent of his sins (crimes). In his final attempted execution of Sam, Cady gives him the opportunity to confess, and then offers him the opportunity to enter the Promised Land as Cady is (symbolically baptised) and dies in the turbulent waters of Cape Fear.

In addition Cady is a Baroque Body that is visibly associated with the negative elements of the binary oppositions; for example, the confines and discipline of prison cells and dictatorships, the stabbing and blood of a knife, images of grotesque horror through intertextual association with Stephen King’s It, the serial killer John Wayne Gacy and the ‘rough’ masculinity of tattoos and emotional suffering from the depiction of a broken blood-red heart seared into Cady’s chest. His body has marks of a bear claw, the SS, or perhaps a sign indicative of Jesus’ wounded side. Moreover, Cady’s cell is framed by images of Saint Sebastian. This saint suffered considerable pain and experienced attempted execution several times before finally dying. Cady’s deliberate, purposeful and painful modification of his body through extreme exercise and tattooing informs our understanding of his worldview. Thus with this scene opening the film, and immediately immersing the audience in both secular and sacred images, the Catholic Christian sensibilities of suffering and pain are introduced. These sensibilities resurrect and re-form understandings of God’s material presence in the world.
Spectacle and Image
Merback (1999) comments on the importance of spectacle (including sight), to the medieval era, as does Ndalianis (2005:156), when referring to the (neo) Baroque. Mellor and Shilling (1997:135) note that the common terrain between modern and baroque is the elevation of the sense of sight. Using the importance of sight, Cady fills that sense with images, which cause emotive responses to his somatic body, and this in turn seduces all the senses into reassessing their assumptions and their relationship with God. For example, during a strip search of Cady, the imagery and the words on Cady's body combined with his animal print underwear render the detective and Sam momentarily speechless. Although they are studying him through the one-way mirror, Cady's marked body reaches through this barrier and succeeds in 'getting under the skin' of the detective and of Sam. The detective states he does not know whether to “look at him or read him”.

Following this lead, I will continue by both reading and looking at Cady's body in order to understand the ‘Janus-faced’ way in which he uses the body to communicate. The first is to read the body as words/inscription. That is, to read his body as God’s Word made flesh in the textual sense. This gives Cady's body and actions a Christian context and meaning. When Cady talks about his body modifications (what he describes as desecrations of the flesh), such as tattoos, smoking and exercise, he comments that these were his ‘saviour’ while he was in prison, in effect a performed ritual of Christian devotion. A similar scenario is echoed in the story of prison inmates in New Mexico State Penitentiary. In a study by Rubin (1988), several inmates commented on the “therapeutic value of their tattoos” (1988:210). For example, one inmate stated: “without [my
tattoos] I could never have gotten out of the joint psychologically” (Rubin, 1988:210). For this prisoner, his tattoo was a way of sensing Christ’s painful ordeal. He claimed:

in prison I could understand better what Christ must have gone through as victim and prisoner”. [A Christian] tattoo represents the quest for freedom that everyone in the joint must feel (Rubin, 1988:210).

Figure 8.6 Tattoo from a Prisoner in New Mexico State Penitentiary (before closure of the prison)

According to Durkheim,

the first Christians had the name of Christ or the sign of the cross imprinted on their skin [and] groups of pilgrims who went to Palestine also had themselves tattooed … with designs representing the cross or monograph of Christ (Durkheim, [1912] 1995:233).

However, Christian institutions have never adopted tattooing as a practice and the Book of Leviticus is often cited as the reason. The lack of institutional acceptance of tattooing creates a space, within contemporary culture, for Christian images as tattoos to be used as a sign of resistance to modern power and sensory prioritisation structures. According to De Mello (2000:79), Christian tattoos are signs of protest against state control and literally mark the body with independence. Using Mellor and Shilling’s framework suggests that power hinges on the resurrection of carnal knowing. A real world example of this might be the tattoo of a small cross on the hand of some American gang members. The tattoo is a symbol of belonging and reinforces camaraderie, reflecting sensual solidarities within “postmodern tribes” (Fish, 2003:273). However, a tattoo, to
those outside these tribes, often signals the threat of crime and violence – a bodily mark of deviance from the norm (the ‘sinful’ perspective of the unblemished body of Christ).

This negative response to the tattooed body brings us to the second part of the police inspector’s juxtaposition - the look of the tattooed body. As Levi-Strauss claims, “the unmarked body is a raw, inarticulate mute body. It is only when the body acquires the ‘marks of civilisation’ that it begins to communicate and become an active part of the social body” (Vale & Juno, 1989:158). In the case of Cape Fear, Cady’s articulation is to make his skin into God’s Word. That is, we look at the flesh made Word as Cady displays to his audience his bodily image inspired by the aspects that are captured in Volatile and Baroque ideal types as well as in Torn Pain.

This interactive connection with spectators makes the body a communication device, and recognises the body as an instrumental symbol. Permanent body modification, such as tattoos, jars the modern view of appropriate unblemished bodies. It is subversive because the “permanence” highlights the impermanence of the body’s process of ‘becoming’ (Sweetman, 1999:58-59). Voluntary tattoos challenge the certainty or stability of the modern worldview which stigmatises non-voluntary marks such as wrinkles and scars as “matter out of place” (Douglas, [1966] 2002).

In addition, a tattoo violates the integrity of the body, thereby contravening many cultural boundaries both literally and metaphorically. Receiving a tattoo requires “visibly defiling boundaries, mixing ink with skin, shattering frames” (Aaron quoting Seaton, 1999:18). This infiltration of the body with lifeless (profane) liquids challenges the boundary of the enclosed self which in turn questions binary distinctions. According to Douglas ([1966] 2002, this disquieting effect of “matter out of place” challenges social order and signals a state of possible danger to social and individual systems and therefore must be morally sanctioned; hence tattooing is an illegal activity in some prisons (Phillips, 2001:373). However tattoos also have ambivalent meanings. Certain forms of tattoos might equally be argued to reinforce a sense of strength and belonging to a ‘masculine’ community such as in the military (DeMello, 2000:20). In Cape Fear Cady tattoos are an ambivalent resource. For example, he proudly displays his tattoos for Mrs Bowden and discusses them as a means of conveying a sense
of threat and dominance, but hides them when seducing Danni.

This seductiveness is part of Cady’s mastery of spectacle and image. In combination it draws on deeply embedded medieval understandings of the ability of active ritual performance and also the ability of the neo-baroque use of body modification to communicate. In particular Cady flaunts carnal knowledge as a subversion of conventional power. His body links the knower to the known through the visual confusion of the body’s boundaries, just as Grunewald and Sutherland did with the iconic frontal display of Christ. His ambivalence is underscored by the violent modification of his body and skin and people’s expected response to it. Cady’s virtuosity, a key baroque skill according to Ndalianis (2005:152), is in his ability to use that symbolism and lived experience in order to teach his lesson. In addition, Stern argues that it is not only that the character of Cady that displays his virtuosity but also that Robert De Niro, who plays Cady, is more than “a method actor” (1995:208). De Niro’s success in the role is precisely because although we know that we are watching Cady; at the same time we know that we are watching De Niro. We know we are watching an illusion, but we are also watching a man/actor (Stern, 1995:211). In this interplay between reality and illusion we become even more unsettled because although we know De Niro is neither a serial killer nor a former prisoner, we also know that De Niro/Cady has based his tattooed body and character on that of real American prisoners. His story could be their stories; this story could be our story.

Resurrection of (a limited) Carnal Knowing

In the real world of movie watching, Cady, not only seduces the audience through their senses into watching his body but also, he stimulates them emotionally into following Sam’s mental and physical trial by ordeal. Cady also stimulates, both intentionally and unintentionally, sensual responses of people in the 'reel world'. For example, when Sam hires a private investigator in order to bully Cady into leaving town the private investigator states that he does not want to “see”, “hear” or “smell” Cady in the vicinity. Cady also intentionally incites desire in Danni. He covers his tattooed body and seeks to gain her trust through committing both a bodily and a cognitive sin with her (smoking marijuana) and by encouraging her to assert her freedom. He neither condemns her parents, nor does he openly tell her to disobey them. Instead, he seduces her by approaching her gently and awakens her desire through touch, taste and
eventually through kissing her. Resurrection of carnal approaches to knowledge opens a place in which pain can communicated.

**Use of Bodily Pain to Communicate and Teach**

Cady neither attempts to obliterate nor to hide his pain as is the expectation of the Modern Body; he confronts it and forces the audience to confront the images. In doing this, the audience gets a sense of the pain he has experienced confined under the weight of the cross while at the same time he emanates a sense of risk, fear and danger. In this sense his body can be described by the use of Mellor and Shilling’s terms Baroque and Volatile. That is, his body displays somatic acceptance and reformation through the Word. Yet his virtuosity is demonstrated by his knowledge that in the modern world, he can hide or cause his pain, his body, his Christian route to knowledge to be either ignored or accepted. Nevertheless, even in ignoring it, Cady can use all three to attack Sam’s certain world of right and wrong, light and dark, pain-less and painful.

**Reformative Pain that Highlights Modern Inadequacy**

Despite the audience carnal introduction to Cady, unlike Sam he is not merely a linear body on a progressive path toward an intensified ideal type, nor is he solely a religiously informed Volatile Body. Cady, as does baroque culture, plays with the ‘real’, especially in its modern form. Cady intentionally displays the inherent potentialities of the modern. This requires not only a display of skilful manipulation, but also helps to actively define what is possible in the modern *habitus*. Cady’s mastery of spectacle and his discipline of the sinful body, his ability to read and manipulate the law, and at the same time remain an apparently ‘good citizen’ all display his virtuosity in understanding the way in which to use contemporary bodily understandings to his advantage. The Modern Body is often overlooked when it sits side by side with the Baroque, given the spectacle and illusion of the Baroque. Nevertheless Cady also inhabits and skilfully manoeuvres himself within a modern *habitus*. There are many ways that Cady manifests this in this film, but for reasons of succinctness my focus, in the following sections, is primarily on the way in which Cady uses the concept of the disciplined body in order to achieve his goals in a modern *habitus*, especially in the courtroom.
Cady as Modern Man: The Disciplined Body

Cady’s embodied performance of chaos and pain also displays both internal and surface control. While the initial introduction to Cady was through his tattooed body and rippling muscles during press-ups, this scene also has modern features. The audience see him as completing an exercise workout that confirms his physical strength and diligence. The Sinful Body might accuse him of extreme exercise in its preference for moderation, but control of his physical body conforms to Puritan ideals of the disciplined body. Nor does he sweat during his exercise regime. He puts his shirt on and bodily fluid does not absorb into its material. His body might be seen as a modern day “body project” (Shilling, 2003:188-189). While Puritans might not have approved of tattoos, tattoos are also associated with military culture and a signification of precision and allegiance. Cady claims he is genetically pre-disposed to control his body and his reaction to pain, thus he hints at a scientific approach to his body. He demonstrates this by lighting a flare and watching it melt and drip onto, and over, his hand. Homage may have been paid to this scene in the film *Fight Club*, where pain from an acid burn is also used to teach bodily control.

Furthermore, as he prepares to face the outside world, Cady’s hair is slicked back with hair gel as form of control. Cady’s appearance is reminiscent of Puritan Governors who used signs of their controlled appearance, such as neat hair, to signify their election (DelVecchio, 1996:1). In this sense Cady is everything a Puritan might search for as a sign of pre-destination for the Kingdom of Heaven. Consequently, he can be classified into Mellor and Shilling’s Sinful and Modern Body. This ordered body should put modern sensibilities at ease. Yet the broiling sky on his release from prison does not allow us to forget that which is concealed beneath the ordered exterior of conservative clothing. Worse still, Cady’s surface control is symbolic of the skin’s control of volatile body fluids and the hidden potential for chaos and pain (with the undercurrent of the anxiety that chaos and pain can be seen as a divine revelation).

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111 As the police detective points out later in the film, Cady is not a vagrant and thereby has not committed any serious crime. If he has killed a dog as Sam alleges the penalty is merely a fine.
In addition to body control as a sign of election and the significance of sight, Cady recognises the importance of scripture (written biblical texts). He has learnt to read in prison, which demonstrates another Puritan virtue – he did not waste time while incarcerated. He can quote from what he reads and he can use the philosophical construction of learned arguments. He states ‘I am the Lord God’ and quotes the origin and date of the statement. He uses all the violence and hatred directed towards him to his advantage. He is not only a formidable foe, but he also lets his victims know that he is playing with them. He states, after he has bested three hired violent thugs, ”I can out learn you... Out philosophise you”, focusing not on physical prowess, instead, he prioritises the mind and the word. He can move in and out of dualisms almost supernaturally. The audience is given a figural precursor to his supernatural skill the first time that Sam notices Cady sitting in his car watching the Bowden
family and then bewilderingly Sam experiences the impossible mystery of Cady’s disappearance - perhaps the no-body of Rainer’s painting.

Cady also uses the Sinful/Modern understanding of bodily/emotional temptation and weakness to manipulate those around him. He uses the sight of the dead dog’s collar in order to invoke an emotional response in Leigh Bowden. He also weakens an airline steward’s resolve to follow the correct procedure in relation to withholding passenger information by appealing to her empathic response to his beaten body (but clinically bandaged and thus hidden). In this way he achieves his ends through manipulation of emotional empathy. He also uses bodily desire as a source of temptation for Danni.

**Cady as the Ambivalent Torn Body**

Physical violence and painful attack on the body is, as it also is for Sam, the catalyst for the clearest re-formation of Cady from Baroque to Modern. Subsequent to Sam’s hiring of three men to pulverise Cady, he presents himself to the professional legal system for a trial that will determine Sam’s guilt in the assault. Cady’s body is presented as an anaesthetised, cleansed body, although with bandages as reminders of the sublimated pain and Sam’s loss of control. The legal system, embedded in Puritan and Modern ideas of the naturalised requirement for self-control, condemns Sam for losing control and physically/somatically communicating with Cady. The destruction of the illusion that the law will protect Sam’s re-forming body brings about the final unmaking of Sam’s modern worldview. Cady has used Sam’s area of expertise and knowledge - the law - against him.

![Figure 8.8 Cady’s Modern Body](image)
This opportunity to express horror at Sam’s lack of control and to display the naturalised response of revulsion means that Cady has given the watcher/viewer (both in the real and ‘reel’ worlds) the opportunity of affirming their concept of the ‘natural’ response to pain. Yet he also subverts the idea that bodily control will conquer these uncertainties. His super-human (almost Nietzschean superman) ability to control pain, during his attack and later when a flare is burnt in his hand, demonstrates an extreme virtuosity with modernity’s dualisms. Thus he challenges the assumption that his body is necessarily inferior to the mind because of its somatic acceptance. His is a simultaneous “flight away from”, and “into”, his body (Shilling, 2003:191).

While we may never sympathise with Cady, he poses a theological justification for the infliction of pain. Cady’s aim is to teach or cure Sam and the lessons only become bodily when he refuses to listen and learn from the abstract verbal messages. In effect, this film reinforces the viewpoint that the body must become carnal to change the modern cognitive *habitus*. Cady claims that until people follow the messages found in Jobian discourse by taking responsibility for their own role in their pain and also in the pain of others, they will remain unhappy. As the audience gets to know the Bowden family, its opinion of Cady may not change, but the possibility that he might have a point also becomes clear.

Cady is most disconcerting because he fluently and fluidly moves between worlds and bodies, opening up possibilities in Sam’s closed and certain world of right and wrong. This disturbs the immutability of dualisms by showing the negative consequences of superior elements and the strength in inferior elements. Also by showing how control can be turned against the self, leading to illusion, despair and nostalgia, Cady brings into question the foundations of modern progress. Cady’s response to Sam’s insistence on the superiority of certain sides of the dualisms is like God’s voice “from the whirlwind”; Cady does not crush Sam - instead Cady “out-monsters him”, showing just how terrible and how “awesome” dualistic boundaries can really be (adapted from Beal, 2002:55). Cady demonstrates/lives the limitations of modern control. He shows Sam that the law is constructed on misplaced assumptions of bodily control and anaesthetised pain. By anaesthetising his body Cady performs apparent obedient submission to the “dead hand of instrumental reason” and in this way exposes Sam’s limited understanding of the world in which he thought he was an expert and therefore superior to Cady. In addition, Cady shows Sam the illusion
of bodily coherence, which he systematically shatters throughout a night of terror and pain (Hill, 2004).

**Film as Image Repeating Tool**

*Cape Fear* is a film about the ambivalence that facilitates re-formations between baroque and modern bodies. In addition to the ambivalence present in the story, it is also directed and filmed in an ambivalent manner.

**Baroque Style Filming**

Ndalianis claims baroque style “extend[s] both into the material confines of the two-dimensional surface *and* into the space of the audience” (2005:163). *Cape Fear* exemplifies this, as the action is not always centre frame. Audiences cannot see around the edges of the action. Zoom-ins and close-ups restrict that which the audience knows to exactly that which the character knows. In *Cape Fear* the audience is not given the omnipotence to anticipate the way in which the characters will act or react. In addition, Cady invades the space of the viewer, and the audience is positioned below the rock that Sam intends to use in order to obliterate Cady. The viewer is kept to the film’s surface through engagement with the character’s pain and re-formation. This disorientates modern viewers/readers and creates a sense of fragmentation.

Ndalianis argues that another quality of baroque style is seriality (2005:33-36). She acknowledges the production and global economic incentives of the serial but also claims that seriality is a deliberate and expressive response to the self-referentiality born in the modern age (2005:43). Films that repeat the same characters and themes, such as the seriality of *Rocky* films, and films which repeat earlier films, or remade films, open “narrative spaces [that] weave and extend into and from one another” (2005:33). The serial may make money but this does not preclude its ability to begin and to continue conversations that cinematically literate audiences are expected to understand. Bergesen argues that blockbuster films are “not [designed] to educate” (2006:1), but this does not mean that they do not reference and recycle other popular and elite art works. For example, although *Cape Fear* is described as the most commercial of Scorsese’s films, its seriality is not merely a result of the profit-seeking motive. *Cape Fear’s* (1992) seriality is advertised to consumers through publicity material that describes it as “Martin Scorsese’s remake of the 1961 film directed
by J. Lee Thompson, also entitled Cape Fear” (www.amazon.com/Cape-Fear-1961-1992). In addition, the narrative in Cape Fear is far more complex than one movie serial/remake. Cape Fear began its journey as a book before it was turned into the first film Cape Fear (1961). In turn, Cape Fear (1961) intertextually references the themes, and uses some of the same actors from the earlier noir film Night of the Hunter. Similarly Cape Fear (1961) was remade using two of the same actors from both Cape Fear (I) and Night of the Hunter (see Stern, 1995:170-173). This re-made Cape Fear (1992) also directly, and intertextual references other texts such as the Book of Job, the literature of Thomas Wolf, Henry Miller’s Sexus, Hitchcocks’ “Psycho”, Nietzsche’s “Thus Spoke Zachariah” and the film “Problem Child” (1990) (see for example, Stern, 1995).

Extending Ndalianis’ argument, I claim that the repetitive nature of seriality reinforces certain key patterns, and certain organising principles of routes to knowledge. This approach demands an audience that is educated in popular culture and also further educates that audience, with the self-referentiality that allows for the development of hybrids. Far from being “cultural dopes”, the mainstream audiences of today’s blockbusters and neo-noir genres are cinematically literate and film directors have an expectation that their audiences will make connections both within the ‘reel’ world on screen and the real world of daily life. Ideas about serial killers in films are feedback loops. They draw on various resource such as the ideal-type framework of bodies-in-pain while also making intertextual references to the fictional characters like Hannibal Lecter and implicit references to the ‘real’ Sweeny Todd, as well as the re-make of the film Sweeny Todd (2008). At the same time they also reference the real experiences of death through serial killers such as Jeffery Dahmer, and John Wayne Gacy, who are predominantly learnt about through the media.

Audiences may see more of the real experiences of death if televised capital punishment becomes normalised beyond the Internet executions of Saddam Hussein or the graphic details of body horror that appear on websites such as LiveLeak.com. In this mediated way audiences come to know and to interpret these ideas and stories in order to use them to know and to experience new portrayals of killers and murder themes. As a result of this polycentrism, the meaning in the films is not left behind in the cinema but re-played and repeated over time. For example, Cady’s body, the Cape Fear film and many of its signs are referenced in other films, such as Luhrmann’s Romeo and Juliet (1996),
McG’s Charlie’s Angel’s II (2003), The Butterfly Effect (2004) and a 1998 Seinfeld episode (No. 9.17). This repetition reinforces images of embodied sociality and routes to knowledge.

Modern Conventions

Simultaneously Cape Fear is also a modern film. Aspects such as the linear structure, cause and effect relationships and an ending in which the ‘good guy’ is both identifiable (to a point) and safe, are all accepted conventions of modern Hollywood films. This combination of modern and baroque makes the style of Cape Fear an excellent example of the torn ambivalence between the “Janus-faced” embodied socialities of the contemporary age (Mellor and Shilling, 1997). The importance of the use of these seemingly doxic modern conventions will become clearer in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The embodied socialities and sensory organisation of bodies in the film Cape Fear force attention on pain and suffering as part of everyday living. In Cape Fear you are relentlessly reminded not merely that pain exists, but that life is full of choices which involve pain and suffering. This chapter has discussed the re-formations, catalysed by pain in Cape Fear, in a social scientific urge to unravel the film’s complications, complexity, and its very ambivalence. Yet by its very name, the Ambivalent Body is unstable and, by its design and genre, Cape Fear seeks to show the fluidity of baroque style. It seeks to terrify in its action and plot, and it does this through the questioning of the stability of our dualistic understandings, the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, civilised and uncivilised, modern and backward and human and animal oppositions. Just as Sam is directed to the Book of Job, Cape Fear directs its audience to question the same theological points that theologians have debated in the Book of Job for centuries.

Mellor and Shilling’s framework demonstrates that Cape Fear’s semiotic universe is deeply embedded in historical Christian and Enlightenment dualisms and the contemporary competition between re-forming Christian-influenced bodies. This film not only resurrects a biblical story like the Book of Job, it also uses the sensory and bodily organising principles of both Catholic and Protestant routes to knowledge. It exposes a fragmented and contradictory nature of the
contemporary age that exists underneath an anaesthetised gloss that creates the appearance of unity or stability. For the success of Cape Fear (both in terms of box office sales and its power to be thought-provoking) coherence and incoherence are both able to be maintained as Ambivalent: Torn Bodies. Cape Fear provides coherence because its ambivalence is bounded by the existing Christian-influenced bodily orientations of the common terrain between carnal knowing and cognitive apprehension. Pain is either anaesthetised and the body distanced or pain is accepted for its reformative potential and used as a pedagogical technique. This ambivalence gives the appearance of choice only because it challenges modern certainties.

As Mellor and Shilling (1997) discuss, while appearing to provide choices, the Volatile and Sinful Body and their extensions into the Ambivalent Bodies in Torn Pain are all still limited by their original Christian framings. Even though these choices are now described in mostly secular language, pain as anaesthetised or pain as valuable are both Christian perspectives which spring originally from different biblical interpretations and emphasis. Cape Fear is an attack on both the extreme modernism of anaesthetised pain as epitomised by Sam and an attack on the excesses of carnal knowing and painful re-formation as epitomised by Cady. Nevertheless Cape Fear, as a representation of ambivalence, never steps outside those Christian-influenced embodied socialities and routes to knowledge. From this conclusion a sociological question arises - how does society react when choices are not confined within an ambivalent Christian framing? That is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER NINE

THE CRASH CRITIQUE

Cronenberg, the King of Disquiet, ... loves to draw the spectators into unknown territories and disturbing fantasies (Anon, Le Figaro, 17 May 1996).

The previous chapters, using the ideal types of bodies-in-pain which were developed in Part I, have revealed that in contemporary society there is a tacit dimension of Christian-inspired bodily orientations toward pain (Volatile and Sinful). The embeddedness of these two distinct orientations is explained in Chapter Four: Table 4.1 or illustrated in Chapter Eight: Diagram 8.1. and this illustrates that there are certain choices. One dominant choice is that the body-in-pain communicates valuable messages about living (in the world with God) and is therefore potentially reformative (Valued Embodied Pain). A second dominant choice is that pain is perceived as an alien concept that needs to be actively healed, silenced or anaesthetised (Anaesthetised Pain). In addition fragmented forms of embodied knowledge and sociality oscillate within these boundaries capturing a myriad of choices (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:3). Nevertheless there are also choices made outside these boundaries. Therefore the purpose of this chapter is to examine what it is that happens when a choice does not encapsulate one, or other, of these two approaches to bodies-in-pain. The aim is to make visible an “absent presence”, or “tacit dimension of knowledge” which is both shaping and being shaped by the western contemporary society.

The case study chosen for analysis is Cronenberg’s 1996 film Crash (1996). This film depicts a meaninglessness or senselessness that, in the ideal type framework, would normally be expected to accompany an anaesthetised view of pain. Instead, in Crash (1996) senselessness accompanies some of the characters who seek visual and sexual stimulation in somatic painful wounding, scarification and in death. This representation of bodies-in-pain created a variety of responses from both secular and non-secular commentators. In England, and in America, Crash (1996), upon its release, created a huge public outcry. In England for example, the Evening Standard’s disparaging articles relating to Crash (1996) were made manifest in the headline “Beyond the Bounds of Depravity” and this became the “most recurring quotation” of the media event and ensuing moral panic (Barker, Arthurs, and Harindranath, 2001:1).
This media event (in Britain) produced at least, 400 press releases and articles, multiple debates between and amongst politicians and interest groups as well as extensive “television and radio coverage” (Barker, et al., 2001:1). Even today, in New Zealand, when researching this chapter I discovered that this film is still difficult to view because not only is the importation of the DVD complex but also web-marshals can block access to sites about, or containing, images of this film. These limitations and negative responses immediately pose questions such as what is it about the film Crash (1996) that stimulated such intense feelings and moral panics when other films, including those in this dissertation, have revealed significant violent insights but failed to attract the same kind of protest.

Barker, et. al.’s (2001) study of Crash (1996) which they entitled The Crash Controversy, concluded that overall the media event was a “terrain of debate” (2001:12).112 Their evidence for their study included an analysis of American, French, and British newspaper reviews; reactions from institutional representatives such as central government politicians, journalists, local councils and the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC); and responses from a focus group that were formally surveyed, and then interviewed (Barker, et al. 2001:160-163). Their findings revealed that the responses to Crash (1996), fluctuated from the “negative”, to the “positive”, to the “ambivalent”. However, what really surprised Barker et al. was the variety of reasons for “why and how ... [the movie was] so judged” (Barker, et al. 2001:24). An overall conclusion they made was that Crash (1996) left the majority of people “unsettled” (Barker, et al. 2001:127).

It is my suggestion that the reason for this “unsettled [ness]” is that the audiences of this film did not have a coherent framework for judging, or fully understanding their reaction to this film, because in a society that promotes choices, and believes it is emancipated from a public acceptance of religious values and bodily orientations, it is difficult to classify, or even condemn, Crash (1996) except on the highly dubious grounds of harm to ‘society’s vulnerable’. I contend that this is because bodily orientations which are outside the dual Christian perspectives (Catholic and Protestant, or Volatile and Sinful) are so

112 The British Economic and Social Research Council in 2001 funded Barker, Arthurs and Harindranath’s book-length study, The Crash Controversy: Censorship Campaigns and Film Reception. It was based on research that included print and electronic media surveys, viewer response to specific screenings of the film gained through surveys and follow-up interviews and interviews with various experts involved in the classification and commentary on the film (for more detail see Barker et.al., 2001:160 -163).
rarely portrayed, audiences are left confused or “unsettled”.
I maintain that viewers are “unsettled” because they do not know
the reason for their uneasiness and have no legitimate authority
to turn to for certainty about the right interpretation of the film and its
intentions. This contributes to feelings of “uncertainty” “doubt” and “nostalgia” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:26-28; 142).
Therefore, my argument is that the “unsettledness” felt by many people is related to the ways in which the film challenges the boundaries of Mellor and Shilling's re-formed ideal types and my bodies-in-pain. More specifically the inability of many of the audiences to ‘frame’ Crash (1996) and the ease at which it invokes negative responses is, in part, because the representation of bodies-in-pain in Crash (1996) are outside socially acceptable boundaries, rather than torn between the Christian based boundaries, established by Volatile/Baroque and Sinful/Modern bodies-in-pain ideal types.

This research into “unsettledness” (Barker, et.al. 2002:127) is important, and hence so too is this chapter, because it helps delineate where the boundaries of the habitus lie in relation to bodies, Christianity and pain in contemporary society. Despite “Cronenberg’s claim that, the film is not politically dangerous so it must have been the images that caused the controversy” (Craven, 1998:242), I suggest that the challenging viewing experience (images and narrative) underpins a deeply subversive narrative story.\textsuperscript{113} It is subversive because it defies the Christian-inspired boundaries of dualisms and the accepted understandings of the place of pain in society. This congruence between challenging filmic technique and subject matter reinforces the sense-lessness or ‘normlessness’ of the film and its challenge to Modern and Baroque assumptions of normality.

To simplify and develop this argument further, this chapter is divided into two sections. After a brief introduction, Section I outlines the way in which Crash (1996) conforms, or not, to the expectations of the Valued Embodied and Anesthetised Pain parameters. Section II focuses on examining the findings of a audience response study in light of these challenges to expected boundaries. Overall Crash (1996) is analysed according to its position in relation to the boundaries that surround the ideal types and under the headings 1) film as story and as 2) image-repeating tool. In Section I and II the evidence used for this analysis is drawn from different scholar’s interpretation and analysis of this film.

\textsuperscript{113} The way in which the images are subversive will be elaborated upon in the section: Film as Image Repeating Tool.
I also utilise the findings from Barker, et al.’s (2001) United Kingdom Government-funded study into the “unsettled” audience responses to Crash (1996). In addition I select images from Crash (1996) in order to illustrate the way in which a combination of these different responses either fit within, or fall outside, the boundaries of the volatile, sinful, modern and baroque body and Torn Pain.

Introduction
The release of Cronenberg’s film Crash (1996), based on James Ballard’s 1973 novel, resulted in a moral campaign against the film. Christopher Tookey of the Daily Mail claimed that Crash (1996) was a film at which “even a liberal society must draw the line” (Barker, et. al., 2001:1). This campaign and media event began after its first viewing at the Cannes Film Festival and resulted in limited release and screenings as well as a partial banning of the film in the UK. The Westminster City Council, for example, banned the release of Crash (1996) and cancelled the West End opening which was the expected protocol for a new release. 40 different Councils across Britain privately viewed the film before permitting its release in their areas. Four Councils prohibited screening of the film using legislation dated 1912 (Barker, et. al., 2001:2). In the “United States, media mogul, Ted Turner’s appalled reaction to the film delayed its release” (Lowenstein, 2005:167). In her article in the Weekend Australian, Herd characterised Crash (1996) as “a fairly unsavoury little film depicting all kinds of sexual permutations and mutations including near-necrophilia, sadomasochism, fetishes involving handicaps and deformities, homosexuality and lesbianism” (1996:23).

In order to understand this campaign, the media event surrounding it and “unsettled [audience] responses” (Barker, et al., 2001:127) - it is, to a degree, necessary to have some knowledge of this film. To this end I utilise Young’s reproduction of the “Production Notes of Crash distributed by Fine Line Features” (1999:386). Like her, I use this plot summary (below) to represent the film’s narrative because as she notes both the studio and director agreed that it was the best introductory information in relation to the marketing, audience choice and consumption of this film (1999:386).
Plot Summary

TV commercial producer James Ballard (James Spader) and wife Catherine (Deborah Unger) have constructed a baroque marital sex life that is emotionally detached and relies heavily on their shared knowledge of each other’s adulterous affairs. When James is in a near-fatal car accident with Dr. Helen Remington (Holly Hunter), he reawakens to the possibilities of his own body and is drawn into an exploration of the links between danger, sex and death. The Ballards and Remington become involved with Vaughan (Elias Koteas), a renegade scientist obsessed with the erotic power of the crash, as witnessed by his head-to-toe scars. Vaughan introduces them to a strange crash survivor subculture. In addition to watching test collision films, Vaughan and his cohorts stage re-enactments of famous collisions, the cars charging each other like gasoline-fuelled matadors.

Among Vaughan’s acolytes is Gabrielle (Rosanna Arquette), who sports the physical mementos of her accidents (scars, leg braces, a full-body support suit) like fetish gear. In various cars and on various highways, Remington and the Ballards are steered toward a sexuality that gains potency from its head-on confrontation with mortality and the knowledge that mortality must ultimately win out. Vaughan dies when his tire blows out during his rear-end crashes against the Ballard’s car on a fly-over and his car goes over a guardrail and crashes on top of a bus in the street below. James has Vaughan’s car repaired and drives it to ram Catherine’s car from behind, eventually running her off the road and down onto the verge. As she lies there James comforts her: “May be the next one, darling…..May be the next one” (Young, 1999:304).

Figure 9.1: The main characters and Director of Crash (1996)
Although this plot summary alerts the audience to that which the director/studio released the appropriate interpretation of, and response to, *Crash* (1996) was heavily debated. To elaborate on the basis of this contention, firstly I will begin by discussing the ways in which the story is subversive.

**Section 1:**

**Film as Story and Enacted Ritual**

**Bodies-in-Pain – Subversive Representations**

Despite the moral panics surrounding *Crash* (1996) some scholars have tried to redeem it by exposing its ‘religious’ meaning. For example, Bertolucci, the director of films such as *The Last Tango in Paris*, called *Crash* (1996) a “religious masterpiece” (Craven, 1998:217). In a more functional definition of religion, Brottman and Sharrett claim that *Crash* (1996) seeks to “reinvigorate society (or at least a marginal sector [of it (car crash victims)] ... through the creation of a new mythology appropriate to a secular, post-industrial environment” (2001:203). From a different perspective, Young argues that because suffering “has been banished by the pursuit of happiness in this – the American-century, it is easy to miss *Crash* (1996)'s ... essentially religious statement and instead to stress the psychopathology” (1999:316). Understood from the perspective of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types Young could be claiming that *Crash* (1996) is a sacred (religious) baroque critique of modernity. However, Scorsese, the director of the 1992 film *Cape Fear*, sees little that is religiously reformative or redemptive (not that this diminishes the film in his opinion). Scorsese outlines the positive and negative magnetism of Cronenberg’s films:

> Sometimes I don’t even want to see his pictures when they come out. But I finally get there, and it’s a cathartic experience for me to go through. Cronenberg is twentieth century. *Late* twentieth century. Cronenberg is something that unfortunately we have no control over, in the sense that we have no control over the imminent destruction of ourselves. That’s what is so clear about his work. So frightening. So upsetting (quoted in Rodley, 1997:xxiv).

Certainly compared to the reformative (good and bad) experience of characters in *Cape Fear*, bounded by Torn Pain and its Protestant and Catholic interpretation, *Crash* (1996) appears to give viewers little to die for or even to live for. Although this challenge provides much material for academic analysis, in this chapter I focus only on the Christian-inspired bodily orientations and implications for pain in this film, as this has received limited academic attention.
Bodily Subject Matter

There are two ways in which Crash’s (1996) bodies can be described as ‘beyond’ Christian inspired boundaries of pain. The first is that Crash (1996) extends Modern and Baroque Ambivalences to their extremes. In this sense, Crash (1996) contains the predictions of social change contained within Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types, that is, that the Modern and Baroque Body will extend beyond itself possibly creating something new (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:200-201). The second is that Crash (1996) arguably shows a sense-lessness or mental numbness (signifying the evidence of an anaesthetised mind) combined with a visible bodily carnage that is outside the accepted boundaries of the continuum that Mellor and Shilling establish between Modern and Baroque bodies. It is this disjunctive, rather than integrative, appearance of elements inside and outside the Sinful Modern and Volatile Baroque Body that challenges the bounds of an acceptable display of bodies-in-pain. As Nietzsche predicted, the era that has killed God will “collapse under the weight of its own senselessness” or ‘headless’ moral system (Hollingale, 1999:33). In order to consider this in more depth, below I will describe the way in which Crash (1996) displays the extremities of the Modern and Baroque, within the boundaries of Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types before discussing the way in which Crash (1996) can be considered to move beyond the ideal type’s boundaries.

Within the Bounds

Extremely Modern

Crash (1996) is a film that “functions on many different levels” (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:201). It builds a world that is extremely modern in its approach to pain - that is, in this film pain is isolated and incommunicable as Scarry (1985) claim is required in modern life. Lowenstein (2005:165) notes that Cronenberg’s signature gore and bodily interiors - that which I would call open Volatile Bodies: Valued Embodied Pain, are missing in the sterile hospitalised environment of prosthetics and bandages. The use of this body-in-pain ideal type reveals that this world of prosthetics is a Sinful-Modern perspective, which closes the open body’s pain and deformity away from the community. In this environment bandages and prosthetics deliberately hide pain while anaesthetising suffering and loss.

Lowenstein notes that in this world of “scars and prosthetics” (2005:165) Cronenberg’s title “Baron of Blood” (2005:165) “barely registers” (2005:166). He seems to suggest that this presentation of pain and suffering cannot possibly
invoke the response that bodily gore is indicative of in a society that has deliberately distanced itself from pained but bandaged bodies. This response, when it is physically possible isolates bodies and viewers through a permanent state of anaesthetisation. In *Crash* (1996), James and Catherine personify this Anaesthetised Pain. They are living examples of literal sense-less corpses; reminiscent of the dead bodies Descartes used to develop his understanding of the living body (see Leder, 1998:119), and Catherine and James are actualisations of Morton’s anaesthesia which was designed to render the body corpse-like.

The intended purpose of medical marvels, such as anaesthesia, was to ensure that the body functioned better in life, as abject bodies and their problems could be medically ‘solved’ or eliminated. However, instead of giving Catherine and James infinite happiness in their pain-free material success, they are living in a corpse-like state, a permanent senseless-ness/lifeless-ness in which they feel nothing at all. In this extreme version of modernity, anaesthetised pain becomes anaesthetised life. The only release is death. However a reliance on death as being the ultimate reformation relies on making sense of death and knowing what it means. This requires a degree of faith in a God that has been killed by the very generation who need God’s certainty regarding the afterlife. Consequently there is an element of doubt that ultimately even death might not be an answer to the permanent lifeless-ness in this extremely modern world. As Stephen King notes, it does not matter how terrible the ghosts are, the belief in life after death is optimistic (quoted Ingebretsen, 1996: xi).

*Crash* (1996) is a film that “functions on many different levels” (Brottmann and Sharrett, 2001:201), therefore I will continue by using three specific examples of the elements of extreme modernity to discuss the way in which it interacts with the location of the sacred and the sensory body. The first example is isolated relationships; the second is the use of discursive symbols, human intervention and projected mastery; and the third is the Puritan notions of good and evil, renewal and degeneration.

Turning first to isolated relationships, Cronenberg examines isolation by looking at the way in which love is regimented by technocracy, technology and anaesthetisation. In an interview Cronenberg states that his film is “an existentialist romance”. Rather than producing a film that concentrates on the
visible such as pornography, in *Crash* (1996), James personifies the marriage sacrament ‘death do us part’ (Cronenberg, 1996). Young, agreeing with this interpretation, maintains that James is “knowingly harrowing hell for ... his beloved’s pain” (1999:318). Young states this because James stays with Catherine in her extreme pain. She also claims this self-sacrifice is “utterly romantic” (Young, 1999:318) particularly so because James consoles Catherine in opposition to Catherine’s isolating receptivity. Following Cronenberg, Young also argues that it is this kind of reading that many reviewers do not ‘see’. Extending Young’s idea and describing it in terms of the Sinful Body and Anaesthetised Pain; it could be maintained that Catherine is looking outside this world, staring past James into space, possibly looking for a sublime God, while James, who rammed her car off the road which caused her to be thrown out of her car, still comforts Catherine’s injured painful body.

![Figure 9.2: James and Catherine after He Has Rammed Her Car off the Road](image)

Young claims that a “the classic perspective [would] see [James] ... as master”, (which I classify as modern), and “the romantic sees him as victim of his environment” (1999:318), (which I classify as baroque). Throughout *Crash* (1996), James is learning about an extremely modern alternative to the isolation of Catherine’s pain. James is being shown how to use modern technology and isolation in order to stimulate arousal. Vaughan shows him a form of active nihilism, which recreates modern values of control, but in this instance these values are achieved through deliberate bodily stimulation of pain. This process extends the Sinful Modern Body outside the bounds of the Puritan discipline.
which aimed to control ‘temptation’. This is a representation which is rarely selected for screening fiction films.

The second example I draw from *Crash* (1996) is related to the way in which human intervention/control and projected mastery is examined in *Crash* (1996) through discursive symbols. The extreme use of discursive symbols highlights the way in which *Crash* (1996) is ‘extremely modern’. Symbolism can be seen in *Crash’s* (1996) association with the genre of road movie. Road movies are usually discursive symbols of escape, freedom and control (the successful achievement of Bacon’s “project of mastery”). According to Brottman and Sharrett *Crash* (1996) not only examines the “cult of adventure, journey and discovery that has animated” the road movie genre but also uses it to explore “the exhaustion of the civilising process and of the final expenditures ... that drove this enterprise” (2001:200). They claim that the genre road movie can be seen “as a story of birth and regeneration” (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:209). Using the language of psychoanalysis, they note “the car can easily be read as a symbol of a claustral (womb-like) environment within which its driver feels safe and secure” (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:209-210). This confined space, however, also motivates “an ambivalent urge to escape” (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:210). *Crash* (1996) creates an expectation - cars should be symbols of transiting positions on the way to freedom, or the way to ‘becoming’. Instead what is constantly repeated in *Crash* (1996) is wounding and death. The traditional psychoanalytic expectation of birth and regeneration is not met. Consequently Brottman and Sharrett view *Crash* (1996) as “a narrative of abortion” (2001:210) and this reinforces the concept that cars and sexuality are impotent, because they do not lead to renewal. It is “the road movie of the apocalypse” (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:211). In *Crash* (1996) the potential freedom of the discursive symbol is not used to master creation but as a display of destruction. This extends modernity beyond the “project of mastery” that is usually achieved in symbolic discourse. In contrast to many ‘reel’ and real road journeys, *Crash* (1996) acknowledges that life and journeys of escape necessarily end in death, because all life ends in death. Rather than discursively mastering the Sinful Body, this deliberate engagement with pain and wounding is used to display that our only mastery is taking our own life - we have no other omnipotent skills to master the world. Again this extends the use of discursive symbols beyond what is commonly represented in mainstream film.
The third example is Cronenberg’s conscious use of a Puritan symbol in order to conform to modern (sinful), albeit extreme, expectation. Cronenberg notes he “deliberately showcase[s] rear-entry and anal sex to express its practitioners’ disconnectedness from, and defiance of, the world” (Grundmann, 1997:27). Brottman and Sharrett (2001:204) argue that Cronenberg is using “the Puritan notion of anality as death and waste”. This is because the dominant sexual positions in the films are either rear-entry sex or oral sex, neither of which are reproductive. Given that these sexual acts do not always (literally) result in orgasm, or symbolically, result in rebirth, Brottman and Sharrett claims the rear entry sex metaphorically stands in

for a profoundly degenerate attitude toward human life. The pursuit of satisfactions in Crash is the pursuit of a Sadean void; ... anality becomes an emblem of the transmogrification of transgressive sexuality. ... Crash ... liken[s] this taboo - almost as a pun - to the dead end of human experience (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:204).

Consequently these modern people (Cronenberg’s characters) live in a “dead end” technological world that is not only bleak but also a “gaping expanse” or abyss (Brottman and Sharrett, 2001:201). It is portrayed as if this is a situation in which further progress is impossible. Whatever one thinks of this psychoanalytic analysis of the absence of reproductive life as being a dead world, the purpose I have in highlighting this example is to raise the idea that whether or not it is correct, the Puritan association that reproduction must accompany sex as the only ‘correct knowledge’ or real experience and this is repeated in Cronenberg’s film, repetitively reinforcing a Christian-inspired metaphor about the body, sex and death.

Those critics or academics that argue that most viewers would not copy Crash’s (1996) characters seem to do so from the perspective that Crash (1996) reveals the inadequacy or shallowness within this Sinful and Modern approach to an Anesthetised Body. This type of critique of modernity is a Baroque characteristic. The exposure of modernity’s failings is what Baroque virtuosity and illusion does best. Baroque corporeality also “seduces the flesh” or senses (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:135), just as Crash’s (1996) characters attempt to stimulate their senses. This point moves my analysis into the way in which Crash (1996) conforms to the boundaries of Baroque approaches to bodies-in-pain, even, if it is at an extreme level.
Extremely Baroque

In this section I will draw four examples from the Volatile and Baroque ideal types as developed and used in previous chapters. Although these examples merge into each other in this section they will demonstrate the way in which *Crash* (1996) stays within the boundaries of the baroque framework and the way in which it extends into new extreme ambivalences. These examples include: the way in which the baroque style reveals modernity and its underbelly, the use of carnal knowing to display bodies-in-pain, the use of carnal knowing to elevate the importance of touch, and baroque virtuosity in relation to the use of scripts.

Starting with a key feature of the baroque style which is its ability to critique modernity, *Crash* (1996) demonstrates the need for modernity to be established (through James and Catherine’s modern life) before it exposes the futility of their attempts at existence. As Young writes:

> If *Crash* (1996) is a film about the disintegration of civilisation - for ultimately a civilisation based on individuals pursuing death has its drawbacks - it must also be seen as essentially sympathetic to disintegration. The world that is, fails to be adequate (1999:326).

For example, Catherine finds her extreme modern body inadequate. She has been described as a clean and proper ... [femme fatale of the film noir and she epitomises the star system with] immaculately drawn thin lines of dark eyebrows and red lips, the absolutely unblemished skin, the wisps of golden hair carefully combed down over her forehead, the cautiously enunciated consonants of her speech (Young, 1999:311).

Yet when Catherine discusses “the other man, the dead man” whom James had killed in a careless auto-accident, “she laments that they bury the dead so quickly; they should leave them lying around for months” (Young, 1999:311). Catherine articulates a desire for a form of painful participation in the decomposing body and its stench. Catherine is in a state of melancholy, and in effect reminisces about the era of the medieval Volatile Body where bodies and pain communicated meaning. Catherine is nostalgic for a return to the volatile communication of bodies that is normally hidden in her extreme modernity.

Vaughan takes this celebration of the body a step further than Catherine. He does not merely critique modernity; he actively searches for the sight of wounded bodies (which are normally successfully hidden in institutions) in the hospital – his ‘art gallery’. Vaughan uses modernity’s elevation of sight but he
focuses that gaze on wounded bodies-in-pain. Thus Vaughan’s art gallery is a prime example of the Baroque use of carnal knowing in *Crash* (1996). This is because in Vaughan’s world pictures of the wounded body stimulate arousal.

![Vaughan's Photos at the Hospital](image)

Vaughan never states he is a doctor (because he is not) but people respond to his white coat and interest in their wounds as if he must have a medical reason for such close inspection.

*Figure 9.3 Vaughan's Photos at the Hospital*

The third example is revealed when Vaughan, who worked as a traffic controller, had a motor bike accident and as he lost control he was wounded. This influenced his current interest in combining technology with representation in order to photograph highway crashes and smashed bodies. In this way, through the use of modern technology, the importance of sight is used to witness the pained body. In baroque style, Vaughan makes use of sight to enact sensual expression. He makes bodies visible in ways that modern society invariably represses. He witnesses wounded bodies that become sexual objects to be glorified in their pain. Thus it could be argued, that this is the result of the “technology culture” that Shilling and Mellor claim objectifies the body “as a standing reserve for technologically driven demands of efficiency in
contemporary society” (Shilling and Mellor, 2007:532). Vaughan is trying to add an experiential use to this body of technology and that is sexual gratification.\(^{114}\)

The fourth example is when Vaughan introduces James to carnal knowledge through the sense of [painful] close contact touch. In addition to the sense of sight, baroque sensuousness re-elevates the importance of touch to knowing and living in the world. When Vaughan first appears in this film, he quivers with excitement at the sight of James’ “metallically restructured [and wounded] leg” (Lowenstein, 2005:166). He lusts with his hands. His grasp is his primary erotic connection to the world. Vaughan physically searches to make sense of bodies, and therefore of the world, through touch, bodies, embrace and finally connection. There is something he is trying to grasp, literally. This contrasts with Agatha’s question in *Minority Report* – “can you see?” It also contrasts with the detective’s question in *Cape Fear*; “do I read him or look at him?” Vaughan’s answer is that you ‘touch’ him. In Vaughan’s world carnal knowledge is also enacted through ritualistically re-enacting car crashes. Collectively carnal knowledge, re-enactment and playing with modern values, such as the importance of script, combine and highlight baroque virtuosity and conform to Baroque combinations.

In *Crash* (1996), while Vaughan’s focus on carnal knowing draws him into a world of touch and (photographic) images (pictorial representations of physicality), he also preserves the Puritan interest in written script. He loves the wound as a by-product of conjoined metal and flesh. Conjoined metal and flesh is a visible but unacknowledged hybrid of nature and technology, which harms the body (automobile accident) and sustains it (prosthetics).\(^{115}\) He believes the wound makes this knowledge visible and knowable. It is an inscription marked upon the flesh that is unread by others. A wound caused by auto-accident, he claims, has “magical power as it is flesh transformed by cataclysmic contact”. This is seen and described by Vaughan as “benign technology”. In a display of baroque virtuosity Vaughan takes his faith in the importance of written words from the Puritans, yet, in a twist of medieval execution, he transcribes it on the body in an act that brings death. Vaughan wraps his worldview in one of Valued

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\(^{114}\) Least the selection of frames chosen for display in this dissertation is taken as indicative of all the frames in *Crash* (1996), I need to note that I have not displayed any of the particularly graphic scenes that show open and wounded bodies. If you would like to see these images, please watch the film and pay particular attention to the death of Helen Remington’s husband and the re-enactment of Jane Mansfield’s death (including the dis-integration of the Chihuahua).

\(^{115}\) Similar perhaps to the ideas of cyborgs; for further analysis of this subject see Donna Haraway, 1991.
Embodied Pain, which has a rhetoric of liberation and a redemptive transformation. Whether, or not, Vaughan believes in his rhetoric, the possibility of this spectre is suggested. However, this suggestion is not by any means the end of the film’s challenging discussions. It also moves beyond these modern and baroque bodies.

**Beyond the Bounds: Affect/Effect-less Ambivalence**

Mellor and Shilling’s Ambivalent Bodies, in what is often termed the post-modern age, give the impression of choice. Nevertheless, these choices are (by unspoken and invisible agreement) commonly restricted. For example, in *Minority Report* the expectations that ‘murder will out’; that good will overcome; and that pain will be a temporary, un-communicated issue; are fulfilled. In *Se7en* and *Cape Fear* physicality and pain are represented as reformative tools that seduce the body into learning. *Crash* (1996) juxtaposes these two viewpoints (extremely modern and extremely baroque) but also goes a step further. *Crash* (1996) also makes physicality and pain visible but not because it is reformative. In *Crash* (1996) visible pain is described as pleasurable by some characters but it is mostly effect-less. I suggest *Crash* (1996) is subversive not necessarily because it reverses the hierarchy of binary oppositions and displays the power of body horror, as *Se7en* does (although it may do this), but more importantly because it places Modern and Baroque Bodies side-by-side for critical examination in effect-less confrontation. Modern and Baroque Bodies both have equal importance and significantly equal power to impact on the actors and audience, yet neither dualism in this case has the power of effect nor the power to affect the characters. There is no tension in being ‘torn between’ nor any competition of impulses. These alternatives are not often selected for viewing as ways of representing the body-in-pain. As Alistair Dalton the film critic of the *Scotsman* wrote, “without the hype, *Crash* (1996) would be a low-key art-house film that few people would recommend to their friends” (Barker, et. al., 2001:19).

**Binary Opposites: Cause and Effect v. Effectlessness**

According to James Ballard, the author of the novel on which *Crash* (1996) is based, “the most terrifying casualty of the century: [is] the death of affect” (quoted in Varga, 2003:266). In *Crash* (1996), Volatile Bodies are extreme, but they are not solutions to the inadequacy of modernity. If, as Young claims, “Cronenberg is ... on the side of the disease” (1999:326), *Crash* (1996) is not a cure or solution to Anaesthetised Pain. It merely shows alternative extreme
experiences, none of which re-animate James or Catherine. Varga (2003:270) argues *Crash* (1996), combined with an understanding of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), “offer[s] a means of engaging ... beyond the frame of the social”. In addition, I argue that the boundaries of the social are made clear in Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types coupled with my focus on bodies-in-pain. *Crash* (1996) is beyond the Catholic and Protestant interpretations of bodies-in-pain. And in baroque style, it lays these boundaries out in “glorious Technicolor” (Duffy, 2004:66), as if it were re-presenting idyllic versions of love, the family and the good life.

In order to “engage ... beyond ... the social” (Varga, 2003:270) *Crash* (1996) sets up an expectation that it will challenge binary opposites in a similar way to *Cape Fear* or *Se7en*. For example, *Crash* (1996) makes visible the tolerance of, and outrage at, the road toll as well as the attraction of damaged vehicles and bodies on the side of the road. However, instead of repeating the embodied sociality of *Cape Fear* (1991) or *Se7en* (1995) it reveals that part of this magnetism toward the wounded body and especially the wounds of the celebrity is that binary thinking constructs the celebrity and violent sudden death as opposites and therefore incomprehensible. The celebrity body is idealised and viewed as a public symbol of societal success. Its untimely demise shatters modern certainty but also opens the possibility that the supposedly chosen ones may be reprobates. In contrast to the use of material success in *Cape Fear*, in order to identify the ‘good guy’ in *Crash* (1996), celebrities are representations of disastrous ends, distanced and known only through news items focused on dissected details and images of dead bodies.

At the same time, in baroque-style performance Vaughan uses these icons of modern success and re-presents them in ritual displays of final ends by reproducing the spectacle of ‘celebrity car crashes’. Vaughan states that the auto accident re-presents a benevolent psychopathology that beckons towards us ... The crash is a fertilising rather than a destructive event, a liberation of sexual energy ... mediating the sexuality of those who have died with an intensity that’s impossible in any other form (*Crash*, 1996).

He reproduces carnal knowing, but this is neither a “recovered sensuousness” to “seduce” the body (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:12; 135) toward the sacred nor is it banal in its associations. Vaughan defies ideal type boundaries. He neither re-
presents the Sinful Modern Body, anaesthetised and painless in hospital whites; nor does the open, bloody and pained body learn a lesson embodied in the crucified God. Instead Vaughan actively interacts and opens bodies, trying to merge literally and figuratively with them. Vaughan juxtaposes the world of material success with the open-ness of highways and bodies. He uses previous celebrity accidents as a figura for the present day accidents of his acolytes. Vaughan actualises Nietzsche’s active nihilism that reinvents morality, an extreme baroque sensibility. In its discursive form, the juxtaposition of success (celebrity) and failed mastery (death) is particularly symbolic. This is demonstrated by the continuing interest in James Dean or Princess Diana (Simpson, 2002:123, Black, 2002).

What stops Crash (1996) from simply being an ambivalent critique of binary opposites is that baroque sensibilities are not presented as a way to regain bodily contact and thereby are not a possible solution to modernity’s inadequacy. Indeed, Cronenberg fights against a causal explanation for Crash’s (1996) action by deliberately alienating the audience through camera angles (amongst other things). For example Vaughan’s scenes are not shot in emotion-inducing close-ups that seduce identification, nor do camera angles draw us into this world (Chaudhuri, 2001:65). Instead Cronenberg’s direction maintains an observer’s distance. He denied requests from American agent for “a voice-over commentator who” would make sense of the movie for viewers or at the very least show some direction toward its interpretation (Barker, et. al., 2001:5).

While the voice-over technique is a common feature of the noir genre, Cronenberg refused because “he wanted what Ballard [the book’s author] identified as an absence of a moral frame around the film” (Barker, et. al., 2001:5). Cronenberg insisted that the audience should exist in “uncertainty and self-scrutiny”. In this non-interpretative format, Crash (1996) re-presents the technologically progressive world that is symbolised by highway traffic but does so without cause and effect. Viewers and characters are torn between revulsion and attraction. That is, they are ambivalent in their moral stance, not because James and Catherine are actively torn between worlds (they would need to be de-anaesthetised for that) but because the characters give limited consideration to either morals or impact and equally their actions create little effect/impact on the world, symbolised by the droning highway system.
This effect-less *habitus* is more than being torn between stable alternatives such as modern and baroque. Brottman and Sharrett (2001:211) call it “a compulsive nightmare, a film about the end of culture and of history, the road movie of the apocalypse”. This journey toward a death that is not re-forming is outside either Catholic or Protestant framing. Therefore by using Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types and my systemisation of the body-in-pain, *Crash* (1996) can be seen as a film of ambivalent bodies who are being torn between unsatisfying ends, rather than finding a common terrain in the continuum between Valued Embodied and Anaesthetised Pain. Consequently “it is full of those premonitions of the disaster [sensed] ... by James ... as he sits at home ... watching ... [distant traffic] through his binoculars ... determined to spot the first signs of the end of the world by automobile” (Brottman & Sharrett, 2001:211).

In this way, *Crash* (1996) “peels back the skin of the already present“ freeing us to reconsider our expectations in a variety of ways (Varga, 2003:271). As a result, Cronenberg can describe Catherine and James as deeply in love, while Brottman (2001:203) labels them “emotionally barren”. I suggest that this could be considered to be that which Scorsese calls the “inevitability of late twentieth century destruction” (Rodley, 1997:xxiv). *Crash* (1996) gives rise to myriad ambivalent interpretations because survival in *Crash* (1996) is not found by shifting along the continuum between Modern and Baroque, as Sam Bowden did when his legal mask was torn off. *Crash* (1996) reveals a perspective on the hollowness of the Modern and the Baroque as well as the absent legitimate
authority ("the bracketed God", Latour, 1993:41), which had previously defined the boundaries of lived pain. Instead Crash (1996) represents bodily options which are outside the usual selection of representations and in this way challenges normalised boundaries.

So while Crash (1996) contains modern and baroque elements, it neither explains their integration nor re-formation of bodies-in-pain. Therefore it fails to reinforce the commonly selected images of pain that is either anaesthetised or sensualised and also fails to provide the expected response (lessons learned or revulsion and confusion). Crash (1996) does however embody a juxtaposition of opposing concepts that are not normally put together in fiction film, but which still fails to have an effect on its characters. It is a visual representation not only of pain, blood and gore, but also of hospital whites, sterilisation and distance that can be discursively controlled, but it chooses neither a project of mastery nor a lesson of re-formation. Furthermore, it is not ambivalent because its rationale for pain is not torn between mastery and re-formation. Instead it is a hybrid movie (neo-noir/road or genre/art) that functions to display hybridity in dualisms, for worse or for better, and portray a world devoid of effects.

This section has outlined the ways in which the narrative story and display of bodies-in-pain is subversive. The next section will consider the way in which Crash (1996) uses images as tools to communicate repetitive and subversive imagining.

**Film as Image Repeating Tool**

In addition to its challenging moral frame (or lack of moral frame), Crash (1996) is also story-telling through images that lacks a linear narrative or other modern techniques. This is unusual in films that are made for contemporary sensibilities. Nevertheless, Crash’s (1996) filming style reinforces the film’s subversive challenge. Because Cronenberg was not trying to create a genre or Hollywood film he could trial new imagery that some commentators have suggested distracts or outrages audiences (Chaudhuri, 2001:65). Although the unmet expectations Crash (1996) sets up may feel like, or be perceived as, distractions, I argue that on the contrary his imagery and filming technique reinforces the subversive challenges which I have described previously. Watching the film in images, or for narrative story, or for the grammatical units of edit and shot
reveals the repetitious building of an unmet expectation. Each time the expectation fails to be met, the film questions the foundation of audience’s expectations. For example, Cronenberg deliberately challenged his audience at the pre-release screening. As he (Cronenberg, 1996) states:

The film begins with three sex scenes. For most people that will mean that it is a pornographic film; they have never seen a movie that began with three sex scenes before. And instead of watching to see what I’m really doing with that, they just react the way they normally do – which is to switch off and wait for the movie to get going – but it doesn’t get going because the sex scenes are the movie, so if they resist watching them for narrative, for character development, for the texture, for other things that are there - they don’t get the movie. [As audience response] I got a card that said ‘a series of sex scenes is not a plot’ and my reaction to that was ‘why not?"

I suggest the reason for this type of audience response is that, in using bodies Cronenberg resurrects the Volatile Body’s use of carnal knowing to tell stories through watching the body. However, as this route to knowledge is not commonly represented in contemporary society, audiences struggle with its story-telling potential. Another way in which Cronenberg defies expectation is in the shot and edit (grammatical units) of the film. He states that while Crash (1996) is designed to imitate Hollywood and uses Hollywood actors “nothing about it works like a Hollywood movie and even the dialogue does not do what it’s supposed to do in Hollywood”. Cronenberg notes that although Crash (1996) “sets up a handsome, upper middle class adulterous couple, it does not go on to behave like Fatal Attraction” (Young, 1999:318). For example, James is contextualised by putting him in his office; this signifies his material success, similar to the choice to situate Sam Bowden in his (more impressive) office. However, this time, the office has no windows into the outside world. Furthermore, as previously noted “high camera angles” ensure the audience cannot identify with “the emotion of the characters” which Chaudhuri argues is the expected portrayal (2001:65). Chaudhuri states “there is no cut to a conventional reaction shot ... [that] is perturbing for the viewer” seeking meaning (2001:65). These anomalies clarify the way in which Cape Fear is conventional and modern in comparison to Crash (1996). As mentioned in Chapter Eight, Cape Fear challenges binary oppositions by reversing them to ask whether pain is an entirely bad thing, but its story telling images are linear and have expected plot development. This means that Cape Fear challenges oppositions but it does not disconnect the binary opposites in the way that Crash (1996) does. Because Crash (1996) disconnects and reconnects different associations, it is difficult to classify. In turn this difficulty leads to questions
about whether, or to what extent, *Crash* (1996) is a genre or an art film (amongst other things).

**The Genre v Art Film Debate**

Cronenberg is often read from a perspective that holds genre and art films to be binary oppositions (Lowenstein, 2005:164-165). This is another dualism and assumed normality that is found to be inadequate in Cronenberg’s *Crash* (1996). One of the conventions for identifying an art film, according to Lowenstein, is that “a concept of authorship ... unifies the text” (2005:165). This means “the competent viewer watches the film expecting not order in the narrative, but stylistic signatures in the narration” (Lowenstein, 2005:165). As Lowenstein highlights one aspect of this convention that Cronenberg conforms to is that he maintains the name of the novel’s author, James Ballard, as the name of the main character. However Lowenstein (2005:165) asks “where are ... the gristy metaphors made flesh?” (Lowenstein, 2005:165). Lowenstein cannot equate “the visceral convergence of human, housefly and telepod in [Cronenberg’s 1986 film] *The Fly*” with the sterilised medicalised distant human and metal bodies in *Crash* (1996). Lowenstein even notes that although James’ sexual penetration of Gabrielle’s (Rosanna Arquette) thigh wound and Max Renn’s (James Wood) slit stomach in *Videodrome* (1983) have the potential to be equally “explicit”, Cronenberg instead only hints at the abjectness through various camera angles in *Crash* (1996) (2005:165-166).

![Figure 9.5 Gabrielle’s Wound and her Leg Braces Worn as Fetish Gear.](image)

116 Cronenberg’s hand in James Wood’s stomach is seen in Fig. 9.1.
Lowenstein solves this dilemma by arguing that which “unites” Cronenberg’s films are “the presence of deliberate friction between genre and art elements geared to strain viewer expectations and frustrate genre/art categorisations” (2005:166). Cronenberg’s films, in general and *Crash* (1996), in particular are certainly known for their ability to confound expectations. From a different perspective, however, I argue that there is a clear unity between the graphic somatic portrayals in Cronenberg’s earlier work and *Crash* (1996). Using the continuum I have outlined between Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain (Diagram 8.1) I argue that elements of Cronenberg’s previous films consider the body-in-pain through one end of this continuum while the aspects of *Crash* (1996) that conform to extreme modern expectations is the mirror opposite at the other end of the continuum and hence unifies Cronenberg’s work.

On the one hand previous Cronenberg films, such as *Videodrome*, used a Volatile Baroque bodily form of communication, as indicated by references to the stench of blood, gore “spectacle and violence ... [as well as] psychological depth” (Lowenstein, 2005: 166). On the other hand, the “normal” signifiers (Chaudhuri (2001:65) in *Crash* (1996) are of the Sinful Modern Body. Cronenberg tells a similar story of embodiment and technology as his other films, but he does this using the other end of Mellor and Shilling’s continuum. He brings graphic and deliberately prolonged painful wounding and technology into a relationship which is familiar with an embedded wound culture that despises, but at the same time is fascinated, by the wounded body. This use of the Sinful Modern Body in order to communicate about wounding and death is not the typical juxtaposition generally used to make these comments. Therefore in *Crash* (1996) the audience sees that the Sinful Modern Body can be used to communicate. However the inability of many commentators to see this unity between Volatile and Sinful Bodies reveals how ingrained but separated these viewpoints have become. Using the Sinful Modern Body and Anaesthetised Pain to communicate not only tells a different story but also incites a different reaction from contemporary sensibilities.

In similar vein to Oliver Stone’s 1994 film *Natural Born Killers*, which uses a media product to critique media production, *Crash* (1996) uses technology to make visible the use of technology to deaden life. In this way Cronenberg is representing the anaesthetised state of the Modern Body as a communication about isolation, pain, loneliness and alienation. He tells the story of Cartesian disintegration as graphically displayed in the ‘body horror’ (flesh/mind) approach
of his previous films, but conversely this time from the side of the Sinful Modern Body (mind/flesh). Adapting a quote from Young, I argue that in *Crash* (1996) Cronenberg, as in some of his other films, is still “on the side of the disease”, but the difference is that in *Crash* (1996) modern “life” is the pain-less “dis-ease” (1999:326). Furthermore Cronenberg shows that this results in the loss of the stability of cause and effect. Following Nietzsche and Descartes I suggest that nothing can effect/affect these corpse-like dead and, if God is dead, there is no hope of resurrection. As a result, “melancholy”, “doubt”, “nostalgia” and “uncertainty” (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:142;25-26) pervade the film. This evokes the question: how do audiences respond?

### Section 2:

**Audience Response**

Not to be confused with studies using audience reception theory because I have not interviewed the subjects, nor were the questions asked in relation to my study; however this section examines a number of different responses to *Crash* (1996). I investigate to what extent these responses support or dispute the connections I have made in relation to the ideal types. I begin by recapping the expected responses to the various ideal types of bodies-in-pain and note that the expected response of revulsion and confusion at the sight of pain became a learned response within the *habitus* of the late nineteenth century (see Halttunen, 1998). This response was shaped by Puritan values and marked a shift from communal integrated understandings of sin/pain to the individualisation of sin and therefore pain. Thus pain became use-less. Strong reaction to Cronenberg’s film establishes that 100 years later, without God’s traditional ‘legitimate authority’ to support either communal understandings of pain as valued sacred messages, or the newer Puritan response of revulsion, *Crash’s* (1996) characters consider the idea of bodies, pain and death as effect-less. Consequently what research has found when it looked past the words of out-spoken politicians was that the majority of responses to *Crash* (1996) were feelings of being “unsettled” (Barker, et al., 2001:127) rather than specific rejection or acceptance of any one part of the film.

The Barker et al. (2001:160-163) study, which traversed over 400 print media reports, 63 in-depth interviews and nearly 200 survey responses to initial screenings, as well interviews with 14 journalists, several experts and those involved in the film’s classification in Britain, found that different audiences
reacted differently often with conflicting tendencies. For example they might be ambivalent about the way the film portrayed intercourse, confused over the film’s purpose, undecided in the films framing or felt a combination of these and/or other senses. Equally film critics and reviewers had completely opposing opinions. For example, the *Daily Mail* negatively portrayed *Crash* (1996) as "pornography" (Barker et al., 2001:16). Lesley Dick posits instead that *Crash* (1996) is "not a pornographic text, *Crash* is rather a text on pornography, a cool, detached look at sexual obsession itself" (Barker, et al., 2001:17). In assessing the temperature of *Crash* (1996), Rodriguez claims it “radiates a cold heat” (Barker, Arthurs, and Harindranath, 2001:22) but Beard calls it an “ice-cold savage” (Beard, 2001:xii) film. From a different perspective entirely, another reviewer stated *Crash* (1996) “appeared to make no big statement about society’s obsession with sex and car crashes” (Barker, et al, 2001:19). This reviewer appeared to be looking for expression, sensuality and for “action” in the gothic/baroque subject matter of sex and death. I claim it did not meet his expectation because instead he saw the medicalised/anaesthetised pain model that dominates the Modern ideal type.

Barker, et al (2001:147) are “surprised” that there is a “virtual absence” of methodological research into how to “make sense of” the various forms of unsettledness that their research revealed. Nevertheless I argue that this is not really surprising given the limited number of films which deliberately seek to unsettle, particularly, at the subversive level of *Crash* (1996). For example Scorsese may challenge the Cartesian dualisms in *Cape Fear*; however he does it within the framework of the Ambivalent Bodies, using one side to question the other. Consequently a framework for fully understanding the impact of *Crash* (1996) on audiences is yet to emerge. However, by defining the boundaries of what is expected in relation to forms of embodiment and "corporeal constituents of" modernity (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:1), Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types provide a model that is useful in understanding this aspect of the contemporary *habitus*. Developing and using such frameworks will make better use of qualitative audience research as Barker, et al. have advocated (2001:146-147).

This approach supplements the Barker, et al., analysis of the political economy of *The Crash Controversy* (2001). What Mellor and Shilling’s ideal type models together with my focus on bodies-in-pain makes visible is the way in which modernity’s ambivalence gives the appearance of bodily choices (Valued or Anaesthetised). The public reaction to *Crash* (1996) reveals the limited range of
these choices. Cronenberg has made visible normalised and habitual blind-spots. This is more than the idea of “we see what we [expect to] see” (Bergesen, 2006:116). It reveals that underpinning our expectations are Christian interpretations primarily of good and bad and thereby right and wrong ways in which to understand bodily pain. Challenging this assumption is not a frequent or expected fiction film approach.

The typically limited representations of bodily pain also allow commentators from all political persuasions to speak for “the average viewer” (Barker, et al., 2001:8) against the “dangerous ... minority” or fearful others (Barker, et al., 2001:8). The debate in Britain centred on the idea that the problem with Crash (1996) was that the “dangerous ... minority” might associate the “sexually attractive, independently minded, interpersonally powerful, effective and tenacious” characters (2001:8) with innate moral goodness because they are materially successful (that is, show signs of election). This Judaeo-Christian interpretation led to an unusual coalition of opinion, such as that between the Daily Mail and Islamic groups who had never been “among the Mail’s preferred moral opinion-leaders” (Barker, et al., 2001:2). Mellor and Shilling’s framework gives a language to this debate and I would suggest that the fear for this “dangerous ... minority” (Barker, et al., 2001:8) was that they would confuse a value system that falls within Sinful Bodily boundary (such as the expectation that James and Catherine should be the ‘good guys’ that the audience emulates) with one that operates outside of the Sinful Body (that of the Crash (1996) character’s actions).

This argument is predicated on “a shared assumption that the sheer act of showing the behaviour, that it will be seen, is itself dangerous” (Barker, et al., 2001:7). The risk of making visible the negative side of the dualism is that, with the public death of God, noir film (or the “dangerous ... minority” (Barker, et al., 2001:8)) can step outside previous moral stances and re-evaluate them. For example, revealing and making visible the consequence (not the effect) of deadening anaesthesia may cause other dualisms to collapse. That is, Crash (1996) conflates pain and pleasure into wound and orgasm. Scarry argues that “pain is itself negation” (1985:52) and Craven argues orgasm is associated with plenitude (1998:225). While this means that pain and orgasm are usually normalised as opposites, Crash (1996) is an unconventional spin on this form of Cartesian logic, suggesting sex and pain/death have a symbiotic relationship. As Craven notes,
This intensity momentarily brings then a jolt of reality in the midst of their scripted world. ... The intensity of the *Crash* (1996) frees its participants from their world of simulacra: it “breaks through” with a moment of the incommunicable (and, therefore unmarketable) (1998:225-226).

Craven claims that “there has never been anything like it” (1998:238). I argue this is because it is so rare for fiction film to step outside the bounded continuum between Valued Embodied and Anaesthetised Pain.

Whether, or not, one agrees with this logic or morality, *Crash* (1996) represents that this is one possible logic that extends from Modern and Baroque Bodies, if audiences can only free themselves from the traces of Christian-inspired signs and symbols of good and bad, right and wrong. In addition, the binary opposites need no longer play a role in defining the civilised and elect. More significantly, if God is dead, what is death? I contend that the outrage at this film’s visibility is not only because of the lifestyle that *Crash* (1996) purportedly endorses, but also because these characters live outside the existing interpretations of pain and in this way challenge the “violent hierarchy” (Derrida, 1981:41) of binary oppositions. Furthermore the effectless-ness of the film leaves a degree of confusion when tacit expectations of Christian framing are not forthcoming, such as “murder will out” Halttunen, 1998:106) or pain should be avoided, and so on.

As Mellor and Shilling (1997) claim, a re-conceptualisation of the limited nature of modernity’s corporeal choices adds a new perspective and I argue that this makes the rationale for the prolonged ‘*Crash* (1996) controversy’ clearer. As Nietzsche warns, without unpacking these hidden and normalised ideas, we cannot assess their effect on modern life and contemporary society. This inability (or refusal) to unpack these reactions (the tacit dimension of knowledge) means that the success of the “screaming” tirades against *Crash* (1996) rather than actual public debate will be more understandable than Barker, et al. can believe (2001:15). A place to begin to unpack this is to utilise Mellor and Shilling’s ideal types together with my bodies-in-pain ideal types, because it is an excellent avenue for revealing ingrained tacit Christian influences. More analysis is needed in order to understand the consequences of “unsettling” people.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the diversity of the audience response to Crash (1996) coupled with the many strong and negative opinions of some community leaders and politicians suggest that something that does not conform to known dominant ideal types “unsettles”. In the same way that abstract art removes many markers of interpretation (Bergesen, 2006:109), Crash (1996) also exists both inside and outside the extreme edges of modern and baroque tendencies. There are aspects of it that are torn between boundaries and can be interpreted in ‘normal’ ways. At the same time, Crash (1996) also exists ‘beyond the boundaries’ of that which is considered ‘normal’. However, by exposing the fragility of binary oppositions and Hollywood filmic conventions as well as by using some of the techniques of the baroque and modern, of art and genre, of pornography and mainstream film, Crash (1996) confuses as much as it questions, making the resolution of the feelings of ‘unsettled-ness’ difficult. It is not surprising that there are few methodological studies about the ‘unsettled’ viewer as most movies conform to some or all of the ‘normal’ dominant embodied socialities.

Crash (1996) challenges the Catholic and Protestant boundaries of binary oppositions and in particular challenges the acceptable ways of representing the body-in-pain. It offers up the subject of wounded bodies-in-pain for new methodological analysis. The importance of this in terms of collective representations and actions is that the controversy over Crash (1996) in Britain resulted in low ticket sales compared to world attendances (Barker, et al., 2001:6-7). Yet, in many countries which did allowed screenings of Crash (1996) numbers were high despite the subject matter. As Rodriguez states, at one level, Crash will seem ridiculous. What makes the difference is to perceive Crash filmically - in which case it turns from ‘cold’ to ‘hot’ ... and becomes subversive. And this is precisely through being that combination of ‘strange’ and ‘disturbing’ and ‘beautiful’: it’s frightening ... because it gets so deep under your skin’ (quoted in Barker, et al., 2001:22).

In this way Rodriguez has highlighted the corporeal effect of Crash (1996). Mellor and Shilling’s framework together with my focus on pain has offered a means for exploring this corporal (Christian) effect in the so-called ‘post-modern’ secular world. In doing so, the ideal types unpack the Christian underpinning behind Crash’s (1996) ‘unsettling’ nature. Mellor and Shilling’s framework
demonstrates what it is that made *Crash* (1996) ‘beyond the bounds’. Cronenberg’s bodies are Protestant and Catholic, and their extensions - Modern and Baroque - but at the same time they also expose other possibilities. The film is also shot and edited in order to jar existing conventions of genre. Cronenberg shows us alternative representations of pain that are not futuristic fantasies, but extensions of present day ‘reel’ and real bodies. He demonstrates a pessimism that accompanies God’s death, but, as outlined in previous sections, the film coolly, painlessly and deadenly also displays:

1. the death of cause and effect;
2. the hidden dichotomies of hybrid and purification; and
3. the levelling of violent hierarchies.

*Crash* (1996) represents bodies that conform to both Descartes’ preference for mechanical corpse-like bodies and the baroque hedonistic encouragement of sensual bodies that intensify their painful sensations. However, it neither solves nor masters the world in life or in death. Nor does it commune with any transcendent power. *Crash* (1996) brings us face to face with the question: what if there is nothing after death? What if God really is dead? In asking these questions I am not trying to give *Crash* (1996) a religious overtone. However this analysis prompts us to ask whether, or to what extent, society is moving away from the tacit Christian routes to knowledge and embodied socialities, such as commonly expected/accepted ways of representing the body-in-pain? As noted at the start of this chapter, this is not only politically dangerous, but being beyond the bounds contributes to the *Crash* (1996) critique. My framework makes these boundaries visible so that, in the future, the movement of society beyond the boundaries might be measured. In the meantime, it is enough that my framework demonstrates that Christianity is still significant for how people make sense of collective representations. My framework of bodies-in-pain is a new perspective that can be used to explain, in this instance, the ‘unsettledness’ of audiences. It is a new research method that has the potential to be used to enhance our understanding of these kinds of societal debates (or “screaming” tirades).
CONCLUDING REMARKS

“Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (William James, 1887:446)

While the film Crash (1996) highlights what happens when a film represents bodies-in-pain in ways that fall outside the boundaries of Christian embodied sociality, the majority of this dissertation focused on delineating the commonly accepted boundaries of mainstream images of pain. I demonstrated that while there are choices within the commonly accepted range of representations, these choices are still confined within Christian boundaries. People are not necessarily conscious of these confines but, as James, ([ca.1905], 1976:135) noted more than a century ago, habits perpetuate ideas and patterns regardless of conscious decisions and overt denials.

In the face of overt denials proposed by hard-line secularists, the development and analysis in this dissertation has concentrated on answering the question: is Christianity still significant for how Western people make sense of the body? The ideal types were useful in this endeavour because they made visible a number of the continuing Christian modes of thought and bodily-being-in-the-world (in its diversity and scope). They illuminated that not only do Christian symbols exist in fiction film but also that Christianity has a continuing influence in the way in which we structure orientations towards the body. Ideal types, in containing all the logical connections of ideas without the complexity and contradiction of everyday life, also highlighted the way in which contemporary representations of pain have, in many respects, lost the sacred referent as the context for interpretation. Nevertheless, even though the sacred referent has been lost, the ideal type means-end chain highlights that the shift in the location of the sacred continues to affect society’s approach to the body and informs the contemporary habitus. Furthermore the study of fiction film revealed the doxic representations of how people make sense of bodies and the way in which they communicate sensory constituents of everyday life. The use of film made visible sociological insights into the selection, mediation and reception of bodily knowledge and orientation and the ways in which the body shapes, and is shaped by, lived experience, production and consumption.
The comparison of film with the ideal types demonstrates that (generally and particularly) three distinct responses to bodies-in-pain circulate in fiction film. The best way for this conclusion to summarise what has been continued and what has been discontinued, in relation to the Catholic and Protestant re-forming ideal type bodies-in-pain, is by using them as the framework for a comparative analysis of three frames from each of the non-controversial films. To do this I have selected three filmic representations of each of the male characters immediately following a physical altercation. I begin this analysis with a frame from; Se7en, followed by Minority Report, followed by Cape Fear.

**Valued Embodied Pain**

David Mills, in Se7en, is a manifestation of Volatile embodied sociality and Valued Embodied Pain. He is not of Grunewald's time, his body is not left to bear the bloody, fetid rotting flesh, yet he still bleeds through his head bandages, as his body responds to active participation in a sensual experience of the world. In the contemporary *habitus*, all films have degrees of the competing social impulses of Modern and Baroque, yet the primary bodily orientation in Se7en most closely resembles an embodied all-sensory approach to a world that is known carnally.

This Volatile Catholic Body: Valued Embodied Pain is based on known dominances in medieval religious practices from a time when Catholicism was the dominant social force. Bodies-in-pain were religiously interpreted and thus
unified the community in a spiritual and moral matrix that was building towards a unified approach to judgement and bodily salvation. Bodies-in-pain were connected to redemption and an eschatological end. This connection was made through physical contact and carnal knowing. Pain was to be lived and in some cases celebrated as it carried sacred portend. It was also guaranteed to be temporary because life was temporary. Pain was a literal, symbolic, metaphoric and allegorical "prelude to ... the consolation of heaven or the endless terrors of damnation" (Halpern, 2002:32). This meant the entire body, that is, the mind and the sensory body (a thinking body), actively engaged in knowing the world and actively participated in ritual communication of that knowledge. It was an overtly embodied sociality which required active but responsive participation in the sacred community. Pain was a pedagogical technique that unified and reinforced community knowledge and identity. This is why the audience needs to see Mills’ pain, blood and broken body. In direct contrast, bodies-in-pain have no such usefulness and consequently no such visibility in Minority Report.

**Anaesthetised Pain**

In Minority Report John Anderton participates in a violent, full-contact altercation with his rival, Danny Witwer, equivalent to the fight in Se7en between John Doe and David Mills that left the latter so beaten. Yet John Anderton receives only one small cut on his forehead to signal the several facial punches and numerous falls. Furthermore, minutes later he is completely healed; he has no bruising, no swelling, no damaged skin and certainly no need of bandages. He is the literal
picture of health. These two representations of Mills’ and Anderton’s injuries highlight the way in which the Volatile and Sinful Body each manifest different representations of bodies-in-pain. To reiterate; the anaesthetised sensibility introduced during the Protestant Reformation re-formed embodied sociality and its connection with the sacred. This embodied sociality then consolidated by the Enlightenment, anaesthetised the body-in-pain, privatised and disciplined emotions and sensations and removed pain’s moral value or usefulness. It also removed any literal view of it (hence pain and its marks are removed from John Anderton’s skin). Sensory interpretation of the world was confined to cognitive apprehension, which prioritised sight over other senses. In return for this removal of sensation and feelings, modern people were given choices and an explanation called ‘cause and effect’. What could not be eliminated in actuality (such as chronic pain) was managed through discourse by defining people as isolated disembodied subjects. It was also done by removing those who defied painful boundaries from view (the home or hospice care in real life) and by silencing and making invisible the view of bodily pain in Sinful Modern films. Together the two contrasting images of Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain, find an ambivalent common terrain in the body of Max Cady in Cape Fear.

**Torn Pain**

![Figure 10.3](image)

Max Cady appearing in court after being beaten by men

This representation of the male body-in-pain from Cape Fear highlights the blending and ambivalence that Mellor and Shilling (1997) argue permeates
contemporary society, giving a semblance of choice. Max Cady, manifested here in his modern, cleansed form, is nevertheless not as perfect as John Anderton. He was not miraculously healed after his physical confrontation with gangsters hired by Sam Bowden. Instead, he may seem remarkably similar to David Mills in Se7en. Both have bodies that do not heal immediately. Both have hurt their visible extremities, their faces and left arms (the side of weakness/devil). Although their injuries do not prevent them from continuing to participate in the action around them, they still signal through bodily damage the on-going pain of being wounded. Yet, in Cady’s ambivalence, unlike Mills, the bruising on Cady’s face never seeps blood through his skin, which would have been read as a disruption to the boundary of the body. He is marked by his physical confrontation, but not in any abject way and certainly not in a way that is designed to incite revulsion for modern sensibilities. Indeed, the level of control/discipline (of pain) Cady displays is designed to evoke sympathy. In this way, Cady epitomises Ambivalent Bodies.

In contemporary times, Valued Embodied Pain and Anaesthetised Pain have extended into what is termed the ‘Janus face’ of modernity and exist as Modern and Baroque social impulses. These social impulses, albeit embedded with Catholic and Protestant framings, are cast adrift from their sacred referents and described in secular language but peppered with occasional Christian symbolism in competition with other forms of symbolism. They compete for a common terrain which Mellor and Shilling (1997) have termed Ambivalent Bodies. In terms of pain, this means that the body is torn between isolation and sensual experience thus creating banal associations and sensual solidarities. Ambivalent Bodies have myriad manifestations which give the appearance of choice (between David Mills, John Anderton and the different permutations of Max Cady). While these are choices, they are more apparent than real, because they are choices confined within Christian boundaries. I demonstrated this by showing the way in which the cultural objects of films assert their messages from within these Christian-inspired boundaries, resulting in limited censorship and minimal public outcry regarding the messages of the films and no calls to ban them. Yet, Crash (1996) is treated differently. When it displays a deliberate choice to prolong the display of pained bodies, without the justification of a re-formative outcome, and it revels in the sensual pleasure/stimulation of these wounded bodies, this film is classified as ‘beyond the bounds’. It motivated a moral panic or at least a censorship ban that ensured cinema could return to ‘expected’ representations that I maintain fit neatly within Christian boundaries.
In looking at and analysing the construction of moving images of the sensory body-in-pain across different films, I have demonstrated that Mellor and Shilling’s approach combined with my concentration on bodies-in-pain gives rise to a consideration of “what it is about the body that allows it to be depicted and constructed in certain ways” (1997:5). This approach also considers how people who, with similar experiences of a ‘habitus’ and forms of embodied sociality, interpret sensory information in similar ways. Accordingly I contend that these tacit Christian-inspired moral imperatives toward bodily orientations remain significant in both shaping, and being shaped by, audiences, as audiences make sense not only of the films they watch, (such as seeing heads that are not there in Se7en) but also as they make sense of bodies-in-pain in the daily time of their real world.

In this dissertation I do not argue that the confinement of the representations of pain to Christian boundaries is necessarily the intended interpretation of directors and actors nor even that Cronenberg necessarily intended to subvert Christian boundaries (although he did intend to provoke thought). Moreover, the argument has not relied upon a claim that my interpretations of these films are the only interpretations. Audiences, critics and academics all analyse films, as cultural objects, in different ways. Where it is relevant I have outlined or provided references for the different ways in which the films have been ‘seen’. At the same time with respect to bodies-in-pain I have shown the way in which these films fall within, and beyond, the boundaries, of Mellor and Shilling’s framework and my further development of it.

The notion that my interpretation is valid regardless of other interpretations is crucial to my argument. There is no necessity for either the audience, or the director, to understand and interpret these messages as bodily orientations bounded by Christian routes to knowledge. Rather, in order to be effective, my argument relies on the notion that with repetitive circulations of particular bodies-in-pain that generally fall within the boundaries of Protestant and Catholic embodied sociality, they have now come to be expected and accepted as the only appropriate ‘boundaries’ for the viewing of bodies-in-pain. As a result these ideas have become normal, (doxic) and in this way this repetition reinforces the shared social history of audiences and filmmakers as well as underpinning and shaping the production of new films.
Looking at both the shared social history and the power of the cultural object to make assertions in the interpretation of film draws attention to feedback loops in existing routes to knowledge. Studying feedback loops extends this study of collective representations beyond a narrowly ideological investigation of film messages and contributes to better conceptualisations of the origins of those tacit Christian routes to knowledge. Embodied film watchers respond to the sensorial information in different ways. *Crash* (1996) may either challenge or reinforce boundaries (and classification systems) in the real world, but for the purposes of research, the response to *Crash* highlights the significance of the role of the sensory body in society and how limited its representation can be. Because these Christian boundaries are often tacit and ingrained, despite the odd rupture through overt Christian symbolisms, the dominant audience response from those not committed to a particular Judeo-Christian, or any other religious viewpoint, is to be “unsettled”. This is especially relevant when interpreting films like this which are outside the boundaries and yet, in effect, are tacit Christian boundaries for those people who are unsettled. In this way, the *habitus* shapes what can be defined as real, normal and natural about pain and the way in which it should be responded to, because only a limited selection of options has been chosen for representation.

It may seem esoteric to be considering the limits of represented pain in film as opposed to everyday bodies-in-pain, but these limits will and do have flow on effects on real bodies. This study has been confined to a discussion of selected artworks and film, but as I have pointed out this argument applies more widely than merely to these specific cultural objects. Consider, for example, the contemporary prisoner on death row who may not consider it merciful to have a stay of execution in order to reflect on dying well, or the person who is shut away and made invisible to most other people because their body is disintegrating into an abject mess as they slowly die. This dissertation is not arguing that pain should be valued as a pedagogical technique as it was in medieval times. Nor is it saying that anaesthetisation is necessarily the answer, especially when marginalising pain can lead to many modern inadequacies. Instead in this analysis of the limited extent of collective representations of bodies-in-pain I have focused attention on those limitations in order that the origins and boundaries of what is considered ‘acceptable’ bodies-in-pain can become clear. Once the pervasiveness of these Christian boundaries are acknowledged, the medieval and Protestant predispositions and habits of thought and representation can be reassessed as being either useful, or not, in
contemporary lives. This may lead to more effective ways of conceptualising and dealing with pain for real, and ‘reel’ people.

To be more specific, there are at least three areas of everyday life and policy development that are affected by these approaches to, and interpretations of, pain. For example, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, as the overt organisation of society around Christian perspectives broke down, it unravelled the ties between religion, medicine, and justice. Nevertheless these themes still continue in areas of policy. In medicine, people in chronic pain, or with pain from phantom limbs (see Glucklick, 2001), are rarely offered institutionally accepted ways for understanding their pain beyond a framework of Anaesthetised Pain and this is rarely a solution for them. In New Zealand this is reflected in the dual systems employed in the treatment of spinal injuries. If the injury is caused by an identifiable incident (such as a fall, sports injury or car accident – regardless of fault) the government funds a reasonable degree of both treatment and rehabilitation. If however the cause of the injury is undetermined or self-inflicted (birth defect, slow-onset back pain, or attempted suicide), then the government funding is reduced for treatment and depending on the specific injury, funding is either not provided, or is severely reduced, for rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{117} It may be useful to analyse these specific distinctions in health funding prioritisation through the framework offered in this dissertation. It may be that these funding priorities are deemed to be appropriate for the New Zealand population. However, the general belief that religions and especially Christianity no longer affect public policy-making means that these types of policies are never critiqued or even analysed from the dual perspective of Protestant and Catholic approaches to the body-in-pain.

Furthermore, despite the dominant conformity to the ideal type of Anaesthetised Pain within institutional responses to real bodies-in-pain, in potentially "pathological public sphere[s]" (Seltzer, 1998:253), such as films, pain can be visible and bodily as long as it has a reformative outcome. This is not helpful to those in real chronic pain, but is nevertheless available for viewing in films such as \textit{Se7en}, contributing to a societal fascination and mediation with ‘reel’ pain rather than real pain. It provides a stoic counter to modern theories of cause and effect. This influences perceived concepts of pain and bodily injury and also informs debates as diverse as:

\textsuperscript{117} For further information on these policies refer to the website of the Accident Compensation Corporation, www.acc.govt.nz.
1. the validity of different types of evidence in court, or
2. the showing of the execution of Saddam Hussein on the internet or
3. the televising of state executions in the US.
Yet, these debates have not generally been analysed for the way in which their
Catholic and Protestant framing bounds the debate, thus preventing the
discussion of alternatives.

Wider than the current debate around televising executions, any debate
surrounding censorship and rating classifications has not yet been explored in
terms of the portrayal of bodies-in-pain in order to ascertain whether, or not,
tacit Christian bodily orientations are continuing to influence censorship policy.
One exception might be the references to overt Christian belief systems (and
other religions) in some of the debates surrounding the reason for the banning of
_Crash_ (1996). A study of the influence of Christian bodily orientations would be
particularly interesting in the light of the end the US Production Code in 1967
which had explicitly ensured that religion could not be treated negatively

A conclusion to a study of this sort is therefore necessarily ambivalent. It is not
intended to be an eschatologically final work. Rather I have taken a
methodology that combines Mellor and Shilling’s (1997) ideal type method with
Bergesen’s (2006:115) focus on the independent messages of the cultural
object. As such it opens opportunities to incorporate an interpretation of the
social forms and traces operating within a culture, which either enables or
disables beliefs and is particular to the; “long duree”, “conjunctural time” of the
‘habitus’, “daily time” of everyday life (Mellor and Shilling, 1997:18-22) and the
social circumstances of a particular era. It also makes clear Vogel’s (1982) and
Bendelow’s (2000) claim that art, and I add fiction film, provides more insights
into the body-in-pain than the sociological concentration on medicalisation.

Moreover assessing this dissertation in terms of methodological strengths, it is
clear this approach has revealed some tacit bodily orientations that firmly assert
themselves in fiction film. It has shown that these tacit influences provide
boundaries for commonly accepted representations of pain. The delineation of
these boundaries provides opportunities to reconceptualise modernity. This
dissertation opens up an area where the sociological imagination can be used in
order to conduct an analysis of the explicit audience knowledge of Christian
frameworks and their understandings of the routes to knowledge and embodied sociality on display in each of the films considered. It also provides an opportunity for further research on the question of how these implications can have differing impacts on gendered sexual bodies and diverse ethnic or class groupings.

Finally, what I have sought to accomplish in this dissertation is to show that over time, bodies have re-formed their pedagogical techniques and thus collective representations have changed in respect to the way in which the collective representation is designed to influence different sensory and emotional capacities and capabilities. Re-forming bodies influence the experience of pain and suffering and how it can and should be selected for representation. Whether pain is represented as potentially re-formative, or represented as invisible and anaesthetised, these two choices are confined by Christian-inspired interpretations of sensory bodies. I maintain that it is time to make visible these embedded value orientations towards the sensory body. It is also time to reassess the way in which the repetitively circulated cultural representations of bodies-in-pain are limiting and making possible particular lived experiences of pain. In other words, literally shaping, and being shaped by, the way in which we make “sense” of the body. Torn between the boundaries of Catholic and Protestant routes to knowledge and embodied sociality, it is time to reassess both the positive and negative impact this has on our everyday life, in order ensure the habits of several centuries do not remain the only reason for our positive and negative experiences of pain.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


