IS THERE A SHARED HISTORY?
THE ROLE OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ESTONIA

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ABSTRACT

Due to socio-political changes in Estonia in early 1990s, Russians and Estonians exchanged their social status – the previous superior position of minority Russians’ was reversed after the restoration of independence in Estonia, while the status of native Estonians changed from underprivileged to privileged. These historical developments have not only affected the adaptation of Russian-speaking minorities, but also impacted on interethnic relations. This thesis investigates the adaptation difficulties of Estonian Russians and the unsettled inter-group relations in Estonia.

The first chapter explains the unique features of the Estonian context that underpins the current inter-group situation. Previous research shows that inter-ethnic tensions have not been reconciled in Estonia, and Russian-speaking minorities are deprived in socio-economic areas compared to native Estonians.

Relevant psychological theories are discussed in chapter two as a conceptual framework for investigating inter-ethnic relations in Estonia, laying the foundation for further research. In chapter 3, Study 1 introduces a qualitative exploration of both ethnic majority and minority perspectives on adaptation of Russian-speaking minorities and inter-ethnic situation in Estonia, revealing several incompatibilities in perceptions of Estonians and Russians. Different histories were shown to be important for Estonians and Russians. The legitimacy of status relations was claimed by Estonians, but rejected by Russians. Relative deprivation and intergroup comparisons were important sources of dissatisfaction and negative inter-ethnic relations for Russians, while Estonians generally disputed the deprivation of Russians. Estonians perceived threat to the existence of their nationhood, which was absent in Russians’ perceptions.

In chapter 4, Study 2 examined the impact of contextual intergroup variables on Russians’ psychological adaptation and outgroup attitudes. In the final regression model, perceived deprivation relative to Estonians, status non-legitimizing beliefs and temporal comparisons remained significant predictors of low psychological adaptation of Russians and further mediated the effects of identity and history on psychological adaptation. Strong Estonian identity, weak Russian identity and status non-legitimizing beliefs functioned as significant predictors of positive ethnic attitudes. Assimilated Russian participants exhibited the best psychological adaptation and most positive ethnic attitudes, while the poorest adaptation was shown by individuals preferring
integration.

In chapter 5, Study 3 examined the majority perspective on intercultural relations in Estonia by investigating Estonians’ inter-ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action. Political and economic threat and status legitimizing beliefs played a significant role in mediating the effects of identity and history on ethnic attitudes. Support for affirmative action was predicted by lower perceptions of economic threat, perceived status non-legitimizing beliefs, and importance of Russian history. Estonians preferring Russians’ integration or separation showed the most positive ethnic attitudes and the strongest support for affirmative action. Estonians perceiving Russians to be assimilated or integrated had more positive ethnic attitudes and were more supportive of affirmative action in comparison to those perceiving Russians as separated or marginalized.

The final chapter consolidates the contextual factors, relevant psychological theories and key findings of this research. It emphasizes the importance of the socio-political and historical context in shaping the results and makes recommendations for future research and considers ways for improvement of ethnic relations in Estonia.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE ESTONIAN CONTEXT

World War II is more of a moral trauma in Estonia because it has different conflicting meanings beyond the liberation of Europe from fascism: Soviet occupation, loss of national independence, deportations, destroyed cities, military and civilian death as well as resistance to the Soviet Union among the Estonian Resistance Fighters.

– Siobhan Kattago (2009, p. 162)

Historical developments and perceptions of the past constitute an integral part of the present relations between ethnic majority and minority groups in Estonia. In the course of the last century, Russians who had enjoyed the highest status in society for half a century became a minority group with weakened political and socio-economic positions, while the status of native Estonians changed from deprived to privileged. The current inter-ethnic situation shows that Russians have not secured themselves a comfortable position within the society despite their substantial proportion of the population\(^1\) and long-term residency (e.g., from a few decades to a few generations) in Estonia. Nor has it given them positive social and psychological outcomes or healthy socialization patterns to the degree of the native population. It is necessary to know the historical developments in order to understand not only the adaptation difficulties of Russians, but also the reasons why the proximity and years of side by side co-existence of Estonians and Russians have not improved the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia, and how the past still affects current intergroup dynamics.

Historical and societal developments in Estonia have made the intergroup context rather unique, and thus offer fruitful grounds for explaining and understanding relatively uncommon social phenomena in intergroup relations. The next section provides a brief account of the historical and socio-political context of intergroup relations, shedding some light on the roots of current intergroup conflict in Estonia.

\(^1\) With a 25.6% representation of Russians in the Estonian population this makes them the biggest ethnic minority group, followed by Ukrainians (2.1%) and Byelorussians (1.2%). Native Estonians make up 68.7% of the Estonian population (Statistics Estonia, 2009).
Historical Context

Estonia under Soviet Rule

The Republic of Estonia was established in 1918, enjoying its independence until June 1940 when it was annexed by the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact signed by the communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1939 containing a secret additional protocol dividing Europe, Estonia fell into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Following several ultimatums from the Soviet Union, in June 1940 Estonia became fully annexed by the Red Army (e.g. Laar, 2006).

During the WWII Estonia was subsequently occupied by the German troops, who withdrew from Estonia in September 1944. This was used by Estonians as an opportunity to restore the Republic of Estonia with its newly established government. However, this lasted only for three days when the Red Army captured (or ‘liberated’ in the Soviet version) the capital Tallinn, and members of the new government were arrested (Laar, 2006).

After WWII and Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, intensive immigration of people from other parts of the Soviet Union to Estonia was initiated. High immigration periods included the post-war years, the early 1950s, the mid-1960s, and the years around 1970. As a result of massive immigration, war losses, and deportations of tens of thousands of Estonians to Siberia during the Soviet rule, the population composition in Estonia changed drastically. Estonians’ percentage dropped from 88.1% (in 1934) to 61.5% (in 1989) of the total population. The number of ethnic Russians grew from 92,656 (or 8.2% of the total population) in the pre-Soviet census of 1934 to 474,834 (30.3%) in the last Soviet census of 1989. From other nations who settled in Estonia during the Soviet time, the largest ethnic groups were Ukrainians and Belarusians (respectively 3.1% and 1.8% of the total population in 1989) (Mettam & Williams, 2001).

Importing people to Estonia was undertaken to spread industrialization in Estonia. Katus and Sakkeus (1993) argue that the establishment of new industrialization and administratively supervised migration were directed to Estonia for political and ideological purposes, whereby most of the foreign born non-Estonians settled in urban areas. As a consequence, some of the Estonian cities became areas where the native population formed less than 10% of the population, especially in North-Eastern Estonia which borders with Russia.
There were two large communities in Estonian society – Estonian- and Russian-speaking – that remained rather different from each other. Although the Russian culture was distinct from the Estonian one, Russians did not seem to encounter serious adjustment problems while living in Estonia. Moreover, Katus and Sakkeus (1993) maintain that the unified social organization practiced in the Soviet Union was more acceptable for immigrants than for the local Estonian population. Non-Estonians dominated in technical professions, and they were over-represented in the large industrial enterprises administered directly from Moscow.

Not only was there a separation in terms of inter-ethnic contacts, there was a clear economic segregation. The employment opportunities in selected industries, railways and communication were restricted for Estonians, and incomes in the areas of employment accessible for Russians were also higher than elsewhere (Laar, 2006).

Laar (2006) claims that the Soviet rule carried out its Russification policy to limit the public use of the Estonian language and achieve bilingualism among Estonians. Russian became a common language in public spheres also for other ethnic groups who immigrated to Estonia from different republics of the Soviet Union. For the Russian-speaking population there was no actual need to learn Estonian in their everyday life. There were Russian-speaking kindergartens and schools, and university level education was available in Russian. Although Estonian was taught in Russian schools, it was regarded as an unimportant subject by many (Velliste, 1995). In interpersonal communication it was expected that Estonians would switch to Russian when needed. In this situation, it was possible to live comfortably in Estonia without knowing Estonian at all. Furthermore, Katus and Sakkeus (1993) argue that even the majority of the second generation immigrants, who were born in Estonia, seemed to follow the behavioural patterns of their parental home regions rather than the patterns common to Estonians.

As the Russian language was needed in official working life, Estonians had to learn Russian. Data show that the Estonian population demonstrated 5–6 times greater knowledge of the Russian language than vice versa. This fact shows that the local population had to adapt to the behaviour of immigrants (Katus & Sakkeus, 1993). Estonian contemporary historian and politician Mart Laar (2006) emphasises that, “Living in the Soviet system required adjustment, which over time became adaptation” (p. 189).

However, the inter-ethnic relations did not remain unaffected as a result of
Russification policies on top of ongoing political repressions. Laar (2006) refers to the number of violent conflicts between Estonian and Russian youth, and to the survey results conducted in 1986-1987 which reveal that only 4% of Estonians and slightly over 10% of Russians considered normal relations with the outgroup possible.

**Socio-political Changes after the Restoration of Estonian Independence**

After Estonia regained its independence in 1991 the situation for non-Estonians changed radically. Estonia restored its independence on the basis of legal continuity from the first independent Republic of Estonia (Ministry of Interior, 2010). The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 was recognised as illegitimate, which simultaneously discredited the former official story of Estonia joining the Soviet Union voluntarily as proliferated in Soviet discourse. Public recognition of Estonian annexation into the Soviet Union changed the status of Russians – they, who formerly had the highest status, became illegal immigrants and colonizers (Ehala, 2009).

Abolishing the consequences of the Soviet era, establishing democratic institutions, implementing market reforms and ensuring the legal continuity of Estonia “belonging” again to the titular nationality (Estonians) became a part of a nation-building project (e.g. Csergo & Goldgeier, 2004; Lauristin, Vihalemm, Rosengren, & Weibull, 1997; D. J. Smith, 2008; Vetik & Helemäe, in press). As part of the nation-building process continuing from the pre-Soviet time, the Citizenship Law of 1938 was reapplied in 1992, according to which only persons who held Estonian citizenship before June 1940 and their descendants were automatically considered to be Estonian citizens. Others had to go through a naturalisation process. As a consequence, in 1992 approximately two-thirds (68%) of the population held Estonian citizenship while 32% consisted of persons with undetermined citizenship. The strict restorationist approach has been justified by fear of the future among Estonians, considering the sizeable Russian minority and the close proximity of neighbouring Russia (e.g. Vetik, 1993).

It was hoped that Russians would return to their homeland (Ehala, 2009). A substantial number of non-Estonians left during the next few years, among them Soviet army officers with their families and Communist Party administrators.2

However, many decided to stay in Estonia. For some, economic difficulties or

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2 From 1990 to 1994, 88,000 people left Estonia, 90% of whom moved to the former territories of the Soviet Union (Vetik, 2000).
other reasons reduced the possibility of remigration. For others, like second generation immigrants who were born in Estonia, there was no place to go (Katus & Sakkeus, 1993).

The restoration of independence brought the reorganisation of the economy, which included restructuring industries that were formerly represented mostly by Russians. In addition to the changes in the labour market as a result of the societal reforms that affected the Russian-speaking population most, Russians lacked an essential human capital – Estonian language proficiency (Helemäe, 2008b; Lindemann, in press). Helemäe (2008b) notes that knowledge of the Estonian language began to influence individuals’ prospects in the job market. The proportion of non-Estonians in leading positions decreased remarkably during the first years of the independence because of the language requirement. Knowledge of the Estonian language is also currently an important capital for occupying a leading position, as will be discussed later on.

The requirement of the Estonian language at an elementary level also became obligatory for obtaining Estonian citizenship as part of the naturalisation requirements. The lack of citizenship deprived Russian-speaking minorities of voting rights in national elections and access to leading public positions. Helemäe (2008b) points out that the lack of Estonian citizenship does not legally restrict people’s opportunities in the job market, but in some positions of public administration (that is in above average positions in the hierarchy of job market) Estonian citizenship is requested.

These changes increased the feeling of psychological insecurity for immigrants – with uncertainty about their future, with the fear of losing their former status, job, or home, and not being granted Estonian citizenship (Aasland & Fløtten, 2001). In the changed situation, a higher degree of integration was required for the immigrants to adopt the Estonian language, customs, traditions, behavioural norms, and value orientations. They faced many difficulties because their knowledge of the local culture and language was insufficient, and most of their relatives as well as their parents lived outside of Estonia (Katus & Sakkeus, 1993).

Additionally, discovering oneself to be an illegal immigrant in a newly independent state was not easily accepted. According to Kymlicka (2000), people perceived themselves to be moving within one country – the Soviet Union – and therefore did not consider themselves as a ‘minority’ or as ‘immigrants.’ Despite the ideology-motivated immigration by the Soviet authorities, on the individual level it can
be suggested that the majority of people were more likely migrating on personal rather than political grounds. This means that they were probably motivated to go to places with better economic prospects to increase one’s quality of life and well-being, rather than pursuing any political goals. Therefore, they felt that becoming an object of blame for Soviet wrongdoings was unjustified.

*In summary,* this section has shown that the current intergroup situation stems from two historical developments: (1) the Soviet occupation in Estonia, which brought a large proportion of Russians and other ethnic groups to Estonia, and (2) socio-political reforms carried out after Estonia regained its independence. The next section sheds light on the meaning and progress of integration in Estonia; how socio-political changes are evaluated among Russian-speaking minorities; what the most recent major social and intergroup indicators for Russian minorities and native Estonians are; and what potential for improvement of inter-ethnic relations exists.

**The Current Socio-political Setting**

**Integration Efforts**

The majority of Estonians adopted pragmatic attitudes about integration of Russian-speaking minorities when it became clear that a substantial number of them intended to remain in Estonia (Ehala, 2009). Alternative views (e.g. Downes, 2007) suggest that the preparations for EU accession played an important role in state decisions regarding the ethnic minority population; as following the requirements from EU institutions, Estonia had to make some concessions in its strict ethnic policies.³ The preparations for launching the state integration programme started from the mid-1990s. A large scale integration programme “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007” was adopted in 2000 consisting of three major areas of integration: linguistic-communicative integration (increasing Estonian language proficiency), legal-political integration (increasing loyalty and Estonian citizenship acquirement) and socio-economic integration (reducing socio-economic inequalities).

As part of the integration priorities, over the years the Estonian language

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³ Additionally, Estonia was requested to comply with reports on the implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
acquisition among Russian minorities has improved, as the proportion of individuals not speaking Estonian at all has decreased, while the number of those speaking Estonian actively has increased (T. Vihalemm, 2008). However, this has not reduced the ethnic segregation that remained from the Soviet time (Vetik & Helemäe, in press). T. Vihalemm (2008) notes that the symbolic meaning of language acquisition in creating a common sphere and trust between the Estonian- and Russian-speaking populations that was high in 2005 has significantly decreased in 2008. For example, while in 2005 64% of Russians believed that with Estonian language proficiency there is no difference whether a person is Estonian or not; in 2008 the same belief was endorsed by only 23% of Russians. T. Vihalemm emphasises that the acquisition of the Estonian language is not considered sufficient for achieving mutual trust and equal position with Estonians, especially in the opinion of Russian speakers.

There has also been progress in the naturalisation process (Vetik, 2008c), and more people previously defined as ‘stateless’ have obtained Estonian citizenship. As of July 2010 (Ministry of Interior, 2010), the proportion of the population with undetermined citizenship decreased to 7.3%, which makes in absolute numbers slightly over 99,000. At the same time, the share of the population with Estonian citizenship has increased to 84.1%, and citizens of other countries (mainly of Russia, a total of 96,000 inhabitants) make up 8.6% of the total population. However, the self-indicated preference for acquiring Estonian citizenship among residents with undetermined citizenship dropped in 2008 (Nimmerfeldt, 2008b), after showing a growth trend from 2000 to 2005. For example, while 74% of Russians with undetermined citizenship desired Estonian citizenship in 2005, this dropped to 51% in 2008, the lowest since 2000. On the other hand, the attractiveness of Russian citizenship has steadily increased from 2000 to 2008 (19% wanted to obtain Russian citizenship in 2008). Nimmerfeldt (2008b) reports that the main reasons for not acquiring Estonian citizenship among the Russian-speaking population are related to the naturalisation conditions, which are considered difficult in terms of language acquisition, passing the citizenship exam, and the citizenship exam itself being humiliating.

In evaluations of integration by individuals, ethnic minorities (mainly Russians) are more critical than Estonians. Kruusvall (2006) reports that integration was evaluated more positively among Estonians than Russians in 2000 (39% and 22%, respectively), 2002 (34% and 26%, respectively), and 2005 (45% and 31%, respectively). Although the relative proportion of respondents who considered integration to be successful increased
from 2000 to 2005, in 2005 integration was perceived unsuccessful by 36% of Estonians and 57% of Estonian Russians. Lauristin and Vihalemm (2008) argue that the biggest discrepancies in the evaluation of integration occur in legal, political and socio-economic spheres (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2008).

Vetik (2008c) concludes in the 2008 integration monitoring\(^4\) that until 2005 the integration attitudes were showing improvement, but in 2008 there was a considerable drop. He emphasises that integration attitudes have become more oppositional – natives and minorities see integration in terms of requests and expectations towards the outgroup, rather than for the development of the society as a whole. Vetik (in press) argues that because Estonia’s current circumstances have changed by being a member of EU and NATO, the adopted nation-state model that was justified in the 1990s is not suitable in its original form for contemporary societal challenges, and is limiting further integration progress.

Other authors (Brosig, 2008; Downes, 2007) have criticised the integration programme mainly because of its ‘one-way’ integration (not involving ethnic Estonians), absence of participation of minorities in the programme development, lack of consideration for regional needs, and disproportional emphasis on linguistic-communicative integration. Brosig (2008) argues that the legal-restorationist influence of the state integration programme is partly responsible for re-enforcing inter-ethnic alienation.

The understanding of integration in the Estonian context differs markedly from its discussion in the psychological literature. In John Berry’s (Berry, 1970, 1980) well-known bidimensional acculturation model, maintenance of ethnic culture and identity is equally important as participation in the wider society for integration. This strategy is related with most positive psychological and socio-cultural adaptation indicators. This idea has not been considered in the Estonian integration programme.

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\(^4\) Integration Monitoring is a nationwide survey launched periodically by the Integration Foundation to examine integration processes in Estonia.
Relative Deprivation of Russians

Socio-economic status

Sociological research with representative samples of the Estonian population published in recent years demonstrates the economic inequalities and the relative disadvantage of the Russian minority when compared to native Estonians (e.g. Kasearu & Trumm, 2008; Leping & Toomet, 2008; Lindemann & Vöörmann, 2010). These studies indicate that between the early 1990s through to 2008, Russians’ income has been considerably smaller than the Estonians’ one, with approximately a 10-15% income gap in favour of Estonians. Kasearu and Trumm (2008) argue that the lower average income of the Russian-speaking population derives mostly from the considerably smaller representation of Russians in the highest income group (e.g., in 2006 23.5% of Estonians and 12% of the Russian-speaking population). The differences in income and economic opportunities between the two groups appear to be smallest among the Russian-speaking population holding Estonian citizenship, and highest among people with undetermined citizenship.

Based on the results of the integration monitoring, Helemäe (2008b) argues that even the economic growth in Estonia in the beginning of this century did not bring changes to the distribution of risks and opportunities across the ethnicities. Although the unemployment risk decreased significantly for non-Estonians, the consequences of the economic growth turned out to be more favourable for Estonians, with the Estonian unemployment rate decreasing much faster. In 2001-2007 the unemployment rate of non-Estonians was on average twice that of Estonians.

The rate of non-Estonians occupying leading positions has slightly increased during the years of economic growth (15% and 19% in 2001 and 2007), but has always been lower than for Estonians (31% and 29% in 2001 and 2007). The rate of underemployment (i.e. having a job that requires a lower level of education) has been two to three times higher among Russians in comparison to Estonians during 2001-2007. Helemäe (2008b) emphasises that belonging to the ‘wrong’ ethnicity becomes an obstacle mainly in the distribution of better jobs. The equalization of opportunities has been more successful at the lower levels of the job ladder.
In the Estonian Human Development Report, Lindemann and Saar (2009) note that Russians with the Estonian citizenship, especially Russian youth, show similar expectations to Estonians. However, their actual outcomes in labour market competition still remain lower than the Estonians’ ones in the same age group. Thus, young Russians with Estonian citizenship and language proficiency experience the highest mismatch between expectations and reality in the job market. The authors conclude that limited chances for mobility have led to a critical evaluation of equal opportunities for Russians in the labour market.

Studies focusing just on the second generation indicate the same trends. The recent study on integration of the second generation in Estonia conducted in 2007-2008 as part of a larger project The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) demonstrates that structural inequalities in economic and social opportunities continue to exist between the second generation of Estonian Russians and Estonians (Vetik & Helemäe, in press). Lindeman (in press) indicates in her analysis that although being raised and educated in Estonia, Russian youth have limited chances to obtain higher occupational positions compared to Estonian youth.

Further, it has been shown that the proportion of those employed is lower among Russian youth; they are overrepresented among low-paid employees; their earnings are smaller in comparison to Estonians; their prospects of being promoted in their current jobs are smaller than for Estonians; and they express more dissatisfaction with their careers in comparison to Estonians (Lindemann & Võõrmann, 2010; Võõrmann & Helemäe, in press). Võõrmann and colleagues conclude that being born in Estonia does not guarantee the same labour market opportunities as for native Estonians, except for when country-specific human capital is high (i.e. excellent language skills and possession of the Estonian citizenship).

Differences in labour market outcomes between ethnic groups are also reflected in subjective assessments of individuals. The research shows that success indicators of the job market are perceived differently by Estonians and non-Estonians (Helemäe, 2008b; Kasearu & Trumm, 2008):

- In 2000, 67% of non-Estonians believed that the chances of success for Estonians are better, compared to 19% of Estonians, and
- Nearly half of Estonians (48%) disagreed that it is easier for Estonians to achieve success compared to 11% of non-Estonians;
In 2008, the majority of Estonians (60.8%) claimed that Estonians and Russians have equal opportunities to achieve economic well-being, but the majority of Russians (59.9%) believe that Estonians have better opportunities. Saar (2008) demonstrated that Russian-speaking respondents do not perceive that their educational opportunities are equal to Estonians. For example, approximately 60% of Estonians perceive that the educational opportunities between Estonians and Russians are equal, while the proportion of Russians who think the same is three times smaller. In fact, over half of Russians believe that the educational opportunities of Estonians are much better than those of Russians. The research conducted by the University of Tartu and research company SaarPoll in 2007 shows that inequality is perceived to be strongest in the political sphere (Kallas, 2008; Lauristin, 2008a):

- The majority of Russian-speaking (~80%) and Estonian-speaking respondents (~60%) perceived Russians’ opportunities to participate in political activities or to find employment in governmental offices to be worse than those of the Estonians.
- However, Russians appear to be more upset (52%) than Estonians (12%) about the socio-economic inequality in Estonia.

Perceived inequalities are markedly reflected in job and economic satisfaction. According to integration monitoring from 2000 to 2008, job satisfaction is higher among Estonians compared to non-Estonians (Helemäe, 2008a; Trumm & Kasearu, 2009b). Kasearu and Trumm (2009b) indicate that Estonians are more satisfied with different life domains compared to non-Estonians. However, perceptions of Russians with the Estonian citizenship do not differ significantly from Estonians. The largest differences between ethnic groups appear regarding economic situation:

- While 85% of Estonians are satisfied with their economic situation, only 31% of non-Estonians assert the same;
- The Russian-speaking population (38.9%) claimed to be experiencing more difficulties than Estonians (26.2%) at coping with their present income.

The authors (Kasearu & Trumm, 2008; Trumm & Kasearu, 2009a) show that evaluations of one’s own economic well-being appears different between the ethnic groups even if the objective economic situation is the same, which leads them to
conclude that the subjective assessments of one’s economic situation may play a more important role in one’s well-being and general quality of life than the real situation.

The evaluation of economic inequalities by Russian minorities is closely related to the perception of their position in the society. Helemäe (2008a) suggests that stable assessments of differences in position and opportunities between ethnic groups over the years are part of perceiving general status differences between ethnic groups in the society. According to integration monitoring data in 2005 (I. Pettai, 2006):

- 73% of Estonians and 87% Estonian Russians perceived the position of Estonians considerably or somewhat higher;
- 19% of Estonians and 12% of Estonian Russians regarded their positions to be equal.

The feeling of being a second-class member of society is more wide-spread among Russians, particularly among non-citizens (Trumm & Kasearu, 2009a). Additionally, different reports (Kallas, 2008; Kasearu & Trumm, 2008; Masso, 2009; Trumm & Kasearu, 2009a) show that Russians claim higher perceived discrimination and social exclusion (i.e. beliefs of being unable to protect their interests or influence society) than Estonians.

**Health and well-being**

Poor economic well-being has taken its toll on the general health situation of the minority population, as the differences in health indicators have shown Russians to be at a disadvantage as well. Kunst, Leinsalu, Kasmel, and Habicht (2002) noted in the report of the Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia that ethnic differences in health related behaviours have increased during the last decade. Russians more often experience mental health problems (depression and emotional distress) as compared to Estonians, especially among women. Russian men and women also have higher mortality than Estonians in all age groups but especially among men aged 15 to 39 years. As compared to Estonians, Russians have higher mortality from nearly all causes of death, and especially from alcohol poisoning and homicide. Russian men have higher addictive behaviours (use of strong spirits, daily smoking) than Estonians.

Aaviksoo (2009) discussed the significant differences in the development of life expectancy of Estonian and non-Estonian men during the last decade. Life expectancy of non-Estonian men decreased noticeably (by 3.2 years), while the corresponding
decrease among Estonian men was much smaller (0.8 years), and women experienced a small improvement (an increase of 0.6 years) across both ethnic groups (Aaviksoo, 2009).

Russian-speaking populations are also most affected by drug use and HIV infection. Different reports demonstrate that injecting drug users in Estonia are predominantly represented by the Russian-speaking population (Talu, Abel-Ollo, Vals, & Ahven, 2008), who also suffer from drug-related mortality the most. For example, 81% of the drug-related deaths in 2006 were among ethnic Russians, the majority of them being young men (20-34 years) (Abel-Ollo, et al., 2007). Related to injecting drug use among young Russians is the high proportion of HIV positives in Estonia. Since the initial outbreak of the Estonian HIV epidemic in 2000, HIV-positives have been disproportionately represented by the young Russian-speaking population (Downes, 2003, 2007; Drew, et al., 2008; Rüütel & Uusküla, 2006; Uusküla, et al., 2008). Downes (2003, 2007) relates drug addiction resulting in HIV infections among Russian youth to socio-economic problems such as high unemployment, high level of early school leaving, social marginalization, and the general low social status of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

Considering the above, it is not surprising that Russian minorities also exhibit lower psychological well-being such as life satisfaction and perceived quality of life in comparison to native Estonians. Masso (2009) analysed the data from the 2006 European Social Survey, looking at the individual satisfaction and feelings of happiness across 25 European Union countries. This analysis shows that in the European context Estonia is distinctive because satisfaction evaluations of individuals are strongly related to their ethnic background and citizenship. A comparison of the aggregate evaluations of ethnic majority and minority groups in 25 European countries shows that Estonia has the greatest gap in the evaluation of life satisfaction between the majority and minority groups – members of ethnic minority groups are noticeably less satisfied with life than Estonians. The differences in the assessments of life satisfaction between the ethnic majority and minority groups do not decrease in the younger generation. Realo (2009) reports elsewhere that the Estonian citizens have a nearly 20% higher life satisfaction rate than the Russian citizens and a 10% higher satisfaction rate than individuals with an undetermined citizenship (holders of an alien’s passport).

In their analysis of quality of life among Estonians and Russians, Trumm and Kasearu (2009b) found that the largest difference in quality of life appears with
ethnicity. High quality of life (based on economic opportunities, satisfaction with one’s dwelling, general material means of one’s family, family life and relations with friends, one’s own security, perceived social position, and perceived social involvement) is achieved by 43% of the Estonian-speaking population, whereas the same is true for approximately only 25% of the Russian-speaking population. Almost half of the Russian-speaking population (48.4%) belongs to the ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘low quality of life’ category, while the same is observed only for one fourth of Estonians (25.5%). A lower quality of life of the Russian-speaking population compared to Estonians appeared in all of the observed dimensions with the largest differences being in the categories of social involvement (perceived alienation) and personal security.

**Identity**

In the early years of Estonian independence the identification with the ‘Soviet Man’ (‘sovjetskij tchelovjek’), formerly employed by the Soviet regime as a forced assimilationist strategy (Galtung, 2001), was one of the most important social identity categories for Russians. Over the years it has reduced significantly, and other ethnic and national identity categories have become more important (see T. Vihalemm & Masso, 2007). Russians’ national identity has fluctuated and shows different developments over time. According to several reports (Ehin, 2009; Kallas, 2008; Lauristin, 2008a), in 2005 three quarters (74%) of the Russian-speaking population defined themselves as belonging to the Estonian nation in the constitutional sense. In 2007 this figure decreased to 68%, and in 2008 only half (52%) of the Russian minorities felt that they were part of the Estonian nation. National identity is shown to be somewhat weaker if it is measured as identification with the citizens of Estonia (also called civic identity). In 2005, collective identification with Estonian citizens was indicated by 61% Estonian Russians (Hallik, 2006). More recently, as reported in the second generation TIES study (Nimmerfeldt, 2008a), only 32.5% of Russians (52% among Estonian citizens) indicate a strong or a very strong sense of belonging as Estonian citizens, while 33.5% have moderate identification (36% among EC), and 25.8% of Russians report weak or no sense of belonging at all. The feeling of being part of the Estonian society is indicated by 56% of young Estonians (Nimmerfeldt, in press). A sense of belonging to the

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5 Overall, this is compatible with the findings by Vetik (2008b) who distinguished 43% of Estonian Russians as having strong or somewhat strong national identity using a different conceptualization of national identity (i.e. sense of belonging to the Estonian state and sharing its core values and symbols).
Estonian nation, Estonian citizens or Estonian society is typically indicated the highest by Russians with Estonian citizenship, and the lowest by individuals with undetermined citizenship.

Additionally, just about half of Russian minorities consider Estonia to be their one and only homeland, and an additional 20% see both Russia and Estonia as their homeland (Hallik, 2006; Lauristin, 2008a). The perception of homeland has remained stable from 2005 to 2008. Estonia being homeland is claimed most by Russians with Estonian citizenship, and least by Russian citizens.

In general, ethnic and national identity is shown to be stronger among Estonians than Russian-speaking minorities (Kallas, 2008; Nimmerfeldt, 2008a). However, Korts and Vihalemm (2008) argue that in terms of the sense of belonging Estonians and Russians show similar patterns – both prioritise ethnic and local identity; for Russians civic identity (as Estonian residents) is additionally important. From the ethnic categories, the Russian-speaking population prefers to be identified with ‘Russians’ followed by the ‘Estonian Russian-speaking population’ and ‘Estonian Russians’. The least preferred category for Russians’ self-identification is ‘non-Estonians.’

Ehala (2008, 2009) points out that while a strong connection between identity and history was clearly revealed for Estonians from the beginning of Estonian independence, Russians did not see history as an important part of their identity during the 1990s. At that time history could not provide them with a source of positive ethnic self-esteem because the old Soviet history was associated with communist crimes, and Estonian history did not allow for any positive role of Russians in it. The change emerged through Russia’s new identity project, that made victory in WWII the most important part of the Russians’ identity (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Ehala, 2008). Although an emphasis on the ‘great victory over fascism’ and ‘liberator of Europe’ has been seen to serve geopolitical ambitions for Russia, the representations of WWII in which Russians played a major role have become an essential part of Russians’ social identity (Ehala, 2009; Zhurzhenko, 2007). After the identity confusion regarding their past following the collapse of the Soviet Union, victory in WWII became a new ‘well’ for Russians from which to draw their ethnic pride and strength.

Because there were no successful attempts in creating a positive and inclusive

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6 These claims are instrumentalized for the purpose of showing Europe that Russia is ‘the true protector of European values,’ getting access to ‘the club of world powers’, and legitimizing its new status and sphere of influence in Europe (Vetik, 2000).
social identity for Russians in Estonia (apart from becoming Estonian citizens, which
did not necessarily remove ethnic barriers), this positive identity gap was filled by
turning to Russia. The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII in Russia
in 2005 not only showed a strong association between Russians’ victory in WWII and
their ethnic pride (Ehala, 2008), but also indicated that this association was clearly
supported among Estonian Russians. This was shown by the observation that the Soviet
memorial, the “Bronze Soldier,” started to attract more Russians and especially more
young Russians particularly around the dates related to WWII. More recently, a cross-
cultural value survey indicated that for Russian students in Estonia the most important
value in value hierarchy was ‘life without war,’ which did not even make the top ten
among ethnic Estonian students; the ratings of Russian students in Estonia were much
more similar to Russian students in Russia than Estonians in Estonia (Sutrop & Kraav,
2010).

The Bronze Soldier becoming more important for Russians’ identity by carrying
the meaning of ‘the end of WWII’ and ‘life without war’, confronted the alternative
interpretation of ‘beginning of the occupation’ represented among ethnic Estonians.
Strengthening Russians’ ethnic identity on the basis of historical narratives that were
conflicting with Estonians’ narratives was not positively received by the majority
population and started to create additional inter-ethnic tensions.

Intercultural Relations

Ethnic riots

Since 2005, tensions began to increase around the interpretations of WWII and
its symbolic representation – the WWII war memorial the Bronze Soldier. The more
nationalistically oriented individuals from both sides gathered next to the Bronze
Soldier showing their identity and versions of history with corresponding symbols, the
more inter-ethnic tensions it caused. Although initial ‘identity dialogues’ on the scene
were held among relatively small groups, they were boosted by the media that turned it
quickly to a nation-wide public issue (Ehala, 2009).

7 Sociological research shows that Estonian Russians are aware of events in Russia through the
consumption of Russian media on an everyday basis (T. Vihalem, 2008).
8 The Bronze Soldier located in the city centre of the capital Tallinn was the first Soviet memorial in
Estonia, and the only one remaining in the independent Estonia.
The Estonian government decided to relocate the statue from Tallinn city centre to the Defence Forces Cemetery outside of Tallinn in April 2007 before the anniversary of the end of WWII celebrated on the 9th of May to prevent possible inter-ethnic conflicts. However, this was carried out secretly without prior notice. When ethnic Russians discovered that the Bronze Soldier had been removed, this caused the first large-scale ethnic riots in the capital Tallinn, with one person killed and over 1,000 consequently arrested. Many detailed accounts of the events and background of the Bronze Soldier have been recently published (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Burch & Smith, 2007; Ehala, 2009; Kattago, 2009; Petersoo & Tamm, 2008; Saarts, 2008; D. J. Smith, 2008).

The most shared opinion is that this conflict sharply brought to surface the differences in historical beliefs between Estonians and Russians, and mutual uneasiness about it. Lauristin (2008a) reports that different historical beliefs are among the upsetting factors in the inter-ethnic relations: being very upset about the interpretation of occupation and war experiences is equally represented by 30% of native and ethnic minority populations. However, different interpretations of history between the ethnic communities have been noted earlier. For example (see Vetik, 2006), in 2002 43% of the Russian-speaking population believed that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily, while 32% agreed that it was occupied. In 2005, the proportion of individuals who believed in the former increased to 56%, while those who believed that Estonia was occupied remained about the same (30%).

However, the oppositional meanings related to the interpretation of WWII events were not the only reasons for this conflict (Ehala, 2009). Ehala (2009) concludes that the time was ripe for Russians to raise collective demands for their societal recognition and higher status. He argues that despite the increased ‘integratedness’ of Estonian Russians according to the formal integration indicators in Estonia, their status had not substantially improved. Ehala emphasises that “Quite a large number of Russophones went through an integrative shift in their identities and wanted to be culturally recognized in Estonia. However, the removal of the Bronze Soldier was a powerful sign of rejection of one of those claims” (2009, p. 155), and “They have a right to ask what have they done to deserve being treated like this” (2008, p. 7).

Other authors have named additional factors that have affected ethnic riots and may have contributed to the aggravation of further inter-ethnic tensions; that is the influence of Russia on Estonian internal politics (Vetik, 2008a), structural factors such
as two similar right-wing parties competing about “the hardest nationalist line;” and socio-political factors, such as the reaction to ‘forced Europeanization’ consisting of reluctantly implemented reforms and compromises imposed upon Estonia’s accession to EU and NATO (including ‘concessions’ regarding Estonian Russians, which forced ‘integration and multiculturalism’) (Saarts, 2008).

**Ethnic relations**

Previous research refers to existing tensions in the everyday inter-ethnic relations. Korts and Vihalemm (2008) indicate that Russians report the existence of tension and caution in inter-ethnic relationships slightly more than Estonians (see Table 1.1). The same trend appears with assessment of hostility and unfriendliness in their mutual relations.

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Inter-ethnic tensions are perceived from a young age. In a study among primary school pupils (Kruusvall, 2006), 46% of Estonian pupils indicated that relations between Russian and Estonian pupils are characterised by hostility and picking quarrels. Lack of social interaction and mutual avoidance was pointed out by one third of pupils, and 12% observed mutual anxiety and fear in inter-ethnic relations. However, one third of pupils reported getting along with each other satisfactorily at events and during extracurricular activities. Less than one fifth of respondents indicated that young Estonians and Russians become friends and spend free time together. Some support was found for a positive relationship between inter-ethnic contacts and a lower negative evaluation of inter-ethnic relations; however, the author emphasises that the existing contacts are not sufficient to substantially change the most widespread notion of inter-ethnic hostility among young people.
The TIES study (Schulze, 2008b) with the second generation Russian minority and their Estonian counterparts (age up to 35 years), found that only 15.4% of Russians and 16.3% of Estonians describe inter-ethnic relations as friendly; 31% of Russians and 23.6% of Estonians find inter-ethnic relations unfriendly; and the majority of the respondents remain indifferent (59.3% of Estonians, 53.6% of Russians). The study revealed the tendency for younger respondents to describe the mutual relationship as more unfriendly. The evaluations in terms of change of inter-ethnic relations over the past five years among both ethnic groups showed similar trends; 19.9% think that there has been some improvement in inter-ethnic relations, one third (34.9%) of respondents found that the relations have worsened, and the majority (44.5%) considered that the relations have remained the same. In a further analysis by Schulze (in press), inter-ethnic friendships were shown to have a stronger effect on viewing inter-ethnic relations and the outgroup positively for Russians than for Estonians. Living in an ethnically mixed neighbourhood had an opposite effect for these groups – for Russians it increased the positive perceptions, but for Estonians it increased negative perceptions of inter-ethnic relations. Vetik and Helemäe (in press) suggest that even close contacts might not be able to bypass the ethnic hierarchy created in the public sphere.

I. Pettai (2006) showed in her analysis that preferred social distance between Estonians and Russians is somewhat larger among Estonians. The proportion of individuals who are willing to accept ethnic outgroup individuals in their social space is approximately 20% lower among Estonians compared to Russians. However, the attitude of rejection has decreased among Estonians from 1999 to 2005 in all social situations. For example, while nearly half of Estonians considered it unacceptable to work under the management of an Estonian Russian superior in 1999, only one third did not wish to do so in 2005. The share of Estonian Russians who were willing to live side-by-side with Estonians and work together was already very high in 1999 and increased to nearly 90% in 2005. In general, only 3-11% of Estonian Russians reject social interaction.

More recent data (Korts, 2009; Korts & Vihalemm, 2008) have shown that Estonians prefer more distance than Russians. In different samples, 55-62% of Russians are open to share one’s personal space across several social situations (while 5-6% are rejecting or intolerant); among Estonians, an open or tolerant attitude is represented by 23-28% (while 26-35% has rejecting or intolerant attitudes). Korts (2009) emphasises further that the level of intolerance is remarkably higher (40%) in the capital city.
Tallinn (where both groups are of almost equal size) than in the rest of the country (22%).

The perception of threat has been an integral part of the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia - especially for Estonians in terms of survival of their nation - although over the years its strength has varied. Studies (Kruusvall, 2006; I. Pettai, 2006) show that in 1999 and 2002 over two-thirds of Estonians considered a large number of Estonian Russians to be a danger to the survival of the Estonian people. However, in the later years of economic growth the sense of threat among Estonians diminished. In 2005, only 16% of Estonians considered Russians living in Estonia to be a threat to the future of Estonians, and 11% respectively felt threatened by an increased use of the Russian language. In 2005, Kruusvall concluded that Estonians do not perceive local Russians and the speaking of Russian as threats for their future in comparison to other societal threats (e.g. alcoholism and drug addition, poverty, and unemployment).

Russia is seen as a source of threat by Estonians: 41% of Estonians feel concerned about Russian politics, while only 11% of Russian minorities indicate the same (Lauristin, 2008a). Additionally, Estonians perceive threat from Russia to Estonian independence, inter-ethnic relations, and Estonian economic growth much higher than Estonian Russians do (Vetik, 2008b). Vetik and Helemäe (in press) emphasise in their recent edited volume that continuing tensions between Estonia and Russia have enhanced the perceptions of threat among Estonians, which is considered one of the most important issues in inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. Kruusvall (2008) reports that while 80% of Russian speakers claimed that they are loyal to Estonian state and support its development in 2000 and 2008, only one third of Estonians agreed with this statement (36% in 2000 and 32% in 2008).

According to integration monitoring (Kruusvall, 2008), inter-ethnic differences that are regarded as upsetting have increased over the years. Estonians seem to be more upset about the differences than Russian speakers. In 2008, 31% of Estonians perceived upsetting differences in behaviour and way of life between Estonians and Russians, while 18% perceived that differences are not upsetting. The proportion of Russians who perceive inter-ethnic differences upsetting is half that of Estonians (14%); most of Russians (43%) perceived differences not upsetting. The large proportion of Estonians remain steadily upset (81%, 75% and 80% in 1996, 2002, and 2005, respectively) about Estonian language deficiency of ethnic Russians in Estonia (Kruusvall, 2006).
Evaluations of Changes in the New Socio-political Context

The New Baltic Barometer data from 1993, 1996 and 2004 reported by P. Vihalemm (2009) reveal that even if Russians’ assessment of the new political and economic regime has become more positive over time, it is still evaluated less positively than in the former (Soviet era) economic and political regime. Estonians, however, have been assessing the new economic and political system more positively in comparison to the former systems. The comparisons between the Estonian and Russian-speaking populations show a stable trend that Estonians give substantially lower ratings to the former political and economic system in comparison to the Russian-speaking population. The evaluations of Estonian Russians might indicate the relevance of temporal comparisons that provide them with an anchor for evaluating life in the new socio-political context.

The University of Tartu research has shown over the years that the majority of Estonians report that changes in the Estonian society make them ‘happy’ in contrast to ‘sad’ (P. Vihalemm, 2009). It can be noted from Table 1.2 that the proportion of Russians who claim that societal changes make them happy has been considerably smaller than that of Estonians, while the opposite can be observed for Russians who claim to be ‘sad’. Although being ‘happy’ about societal changes slightly increased among Russians in 2005, it has dropped in 2008 again reflecting the events around the Bronze Soldier. Similar results have also been found in the Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2008 (P. Vihalemm, 2009), showing that while 61% of Estonians are pleased by the changes during the last three years, only 29% of Russians report the same. Over half of Russians (57%) report that they are actually saddened by the changes during the last three years, while among Estonians the same is indicated among one-third of population (34%).

Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>happy</td>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian-speakers</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sad</td>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian-speakers</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A survey carried out in the spring of 2008 also shows a gap in trust in the political institutions between Estonians and Russian-speakers (Ehin, 2009). Ehin (2009) reported that only one fourth of Estonia’s Russian-speakers trust the Estonian state and slightly more than a tenth trust its principal political institutions – the parliament, the government and the president. Additionally, 62% of Russian minorities find the politics of the Estonian government very disturbing while 11% of Estonians find it disturbing (Lauristin, 2008a).

The data from integration monitorings (Hallik, 2006; Nimmerfeldt, 2008b) clearly indicate a discrepancy between Estonians and Russians’ perceptions regarding the legitimacy of ethnic policies, especially the current citizenship policy. In 2008, 76% of Russian speakers indicated that the citizenship policy is too strict and violates human rights, while only 5% of Estonians agree with that (see Table 1.3). The citizenship policy is considered strict also by the majority of the Estonian citizenship holders of other ethnic origins (69%). At the same time, 65% of Estonians report that it is adequate and corresponds to the international standards, while only 12% of Russian speakers share the same belief. The extent of this asymmetry has remained virtually the same since 1994. The citizenship policy is considered too mild and harming interests of the Estonian nation among 15% of Estonians in 2008, while among Russians this view is not supported at all. Among Estonians, however, this indicates a substantial change in comparison to 1994 when 36% of Estonians (or 24% in 1997) considered the Estonian citizenship policy too mild. Hallik (2006) suggests that these perceptions depend on and reflect the sense of security of Estonians, “Russian danger” and general representations in political discourse.

Lauristin (2008a) argues that the distribution of the citizenship status among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia is indicative of different adaptation levels and different coping strategies in reaction to the norms, limitations and opportunities in Estonian society. Russians with Estonian citizenship are more active, confident and positive, and have a better adaptability than non-citizens. The author emphasises that Estonian citizenship policy has functioned as strengthening the ‘natural selection’ by providing more opportunities to more capable individuals and restricting the opportunities of others. However, despite the objective advantage and better resources in comparison to their ethnic ingroup, Russians with Estonian citizenship share many
negative emotions and disappointments of their ethnic group, including distrust and a sense of alienation.

Table 1.3.

*Evaluations of the Citizenship Policy in 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>All Russian-speakers</th>
<th>Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship</th>
<th>Russian-speakers with undetermined citizenship</th>
<th>Russian-speakers with Russian citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal, in accordance with international standards</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too strict, it violates the human rights of non-Estonians</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too lenient and damaging to Estonia’s national interests</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outlooks: Multiculturalism and Acculturation**

Recent studies have shown that until now there are disparities between Estonians and Russians in terms of future integration goals (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2008). Lauristin and Vihalemm (2008) report that Russians emphasise more political and socio-economic indicators of integration, such as lessening inequality, advancing tolerance and inter-cultural understanding, participation in the social life as a citizen and an accepted member of the unified Estonian nation. Estonians, on the other hand, put an emphasis on language and cultural factors in the integration policy and describe integration as rather a language and education policy project (including teaching history as a priority), and as an institutionalised activity. The authors note that consensus is difficult to achieve in the current state of affairs and thus it requires a mutual effort and willingness to find shared principal values from both sides – ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking community.

Kruusvall (2008) reports that both the Estonian and Russian language communities – with Russians (~90%) slightly more than Estonians (~70-80%) – have shown supportive attitudes towards a multicultural society from 2000 to 2008 (e.g., agreement that different ethnic groups in society can get along and cooperate, and that diverse cultures enrich the society). Approximately 40% of both Estonians and Russians
agree that the presence of different ethnic groups in society is good for the economy (Schulze, 2008b).

However, the second generation TIES study (Schulze, 2008a) shows that Estonians are almost equally divided between those who believe that cultural diversity is a threat to the Estonian language and culture (39.7%) and those disagreeing with that (38.4%). The majority of Estonians (51.4%) indicate agreement that the Estonian culture should be protected from the influence of the Russian language and culture, with just 19.4% disagreeing. Estonians also consider living in an ethnically diverse environment slightly more threatening than Russians do. While for 30% of both ethnic groups living together with people of different ethnic backgrounds is considered enriching, approximately 40% of Estonians and only 13% of Russians find diverse living environments threatening. Over half of Russians (55.8%) indicate indifference to this issue compared to a quarter of Estonians (26.5%).

Almost twice as many Estonians (62-63%) than Russians (33-35%) consistently believe that the conflicts are inevitable in society with different ethnic groups, as deduced from the data in 2000, 2002 and 2008 (Kruusvall, 2008). The 2008 data show that half of Estonian and Russian-speaking respondents agree that Estonians and non-Estonians lack the willingness to cooperate, which has increased by 12% for both groups since 2000. Perception of threat also varies within the population.

In terms of acculturation attitudes, the TIES study (Schulze, 2008a) shows some symmetry between the acculturation expectations of the majority group and their perceptions by the ethnic minority group. For example, while the largest group of Estonian respondents (47.4%) disagree with the need for complete cultural assimilation of Russians, a similar proportion of Russians (42.8%) do not feel pressure for cultural assimilation. The discrepancy appears to a certain extent: 21.3% of Estonians would like to see cultural assimilation of Russians, while 30.5% of Russians perceive pressure for cultural assimilation.

The majority of Estonians and Russians believe that integration requires more efforts from the Estonians’ side than thus far (Kruusvall, 2008). However, there has been a noticeable drop among Estonians who agree with this statement (86% in 2000, while 61% in 2008; for Russians 88% and 80% respectively). The second generation

---

9 Item for Estonians: “It would be best for Estonia if all the Russians living here would forget their own ethnic culture as soon as possible and adapt to Estonian culture”

10 Item for Russians: “I don’t feel any pressure to give up Russian culture and replace it with Estonian”
TIES study (Schulze, 2008a) shows that Russians expect more government support and intervention than Estonians. For example, the majority of Russians expect that the government should do more to improve the position of non-Estonians (70.4%) and promote ethnic minorities’ languages and cultures (81.9%), while the share of Estonians who agree with these statements remains around 45%. The vast majority of Estonians (88.6%), however, favour the idea that Russians should make more of an effort to adapt to the Estonian society (only 2% disagreed). This idea was supported somewhat less, but still by the majority of Russians (56.3%), with only 28.2% disagreeing.

In summary, despite their long term residency and substantial numbers, Russian-speaking minorities are relatively deprived in socio-political and economic areas compared to native Estonians, as assessed by both objective and subjective indicators. The societal ills and lack of healthy socialization are disproportionally skewed towards the Russian-speaking population. For Estonians, the perception of threat seems to take a much more important place in the evaluation of the intergroup situation than for Russians. Living in close proximity to each other does not particularly increase intercultural understanding and rapprochement. On the contrary, ethnic differences create tension and a desire for greater social distance. Inter-ethnic contacts seem to ease inter-ethnic interactions and perceptions to some degree, but they are not sufficient to improve the intergroup situation on the whole, especially for Estonians.

Although there are some positive indicators, it can be concluded that in general inter-ethnic relations have not been settled in Estonia; the adaptation of Russian-speaking minorities is problematic despite the official integration efforts; and perceptions of intergroup issues are often not compatible. The large-scale ethnic riots around the WWII war memorial in April 2007 are a clear indicator that integration has not been going in the expected direction. Such a large-scale ethnic confrontation can be considered both as an outcome of the existing integration process and the cause of deterioration of intergroup relations (see also Korts, 2009).

The Estonian historical background of inter-group relations – where change of the political system has re-arranged the position of ethnic groups on the status hierarchies, so that those who were the superior majority became the less powerful minority group – is quite unique. In this thesis I would like to pay a particular attention to the contextual factors associated with current inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. The following section reveals the aims and organization of this thesis.
Thesis Aims and Outline

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the adaptation difficulties of Estonian Russians and the unsettled inter-group relations in Estonia. This work integrates specific contextual factors with psychological research on intergroup relations and acculturation. Relevant psychological theories are reviewed to guide the examination of the intergroup relations in Estonia. At the same time, the Estonian context provides a unique, real-life context of a puzzling intergroup situation that will contribute to and expand the existing knowledge of intergroup relations in the realm of social psychology and acculturation research.

In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of inter-ethnic phenomena in Estonia, this research applies qualitative and quantitative methodologies and includes minority and majority perspectives. Ultimately, adding to the growing knowledge of the intergroup phenomena in Estonia increases my hope that it will improve mutual inter-ethnic understanding and acceptance in Estonia.

The thesis consists of six chapters and three empirical studies (a short overview is presented in Table 1.4). Chapter two includes relevant theoretical frameworks in which the subsequent empirical research will be situated. The general aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the multiple theoretical perspectives in social psychology and acculturation research that form the conceptual basis in this work to aid the understanding of intergroup relations in Estonia.

Chapter three offers an extensive analysis of the qualitative study to uncover the underlying phenomena in the intergroup situation and the adaptation of Estonian Russians from the perspective of both the ethnic minority Russians and the majority Estonians. The findings are analysed and integrated with theoretical concepts and used to guide the development of subsequent studies.

The next two chapters include two studies (Study 2 and Study 3) largely designed and conducted on the basis of the findings of the qualitative study. Both chapters provide a theoretical introduction to the research questions under the investigation. Chapter four presents Study 2 conducted among Estonian Russians, and it is divided into two sections. The first section examines how ethnic and national identities, views on history, comparisons, relative deprivation, and evaluations of the minority status legitimacy affect the psychological adaptation (i.e. subjective well-
being) of Estonian Russians. The second section explores how the same variables affect attitudes towards Estonians.

Chapter five reports Study 3 investigating inter-ethnic relations from the perspective of the majority Estonians. This study reflects the previous studies by (1) offering a complementary view to the minority perspective in predicting ethnic attitudes, and (2) mirroring the adaptation difficulties of ethnic Russians in the investigation of Estonians’ support for affirmative action. The study aims to examine the influence of national identity, importance of history, status legitimizing beliefs, and perceived threat on Estonians’ attitudes towards Russians and affirmative action on supporting Russians’ integration.

The final Chapter six integrates the main findings of the empirical studies including their limitations and contributions in terms of explaining Estonian inter-group relations and in relation to the existing literature. Finally, applications and suggestions for future research are discussed.
Table 1.4  
*Overview of the empirical studies in the thesis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY 1</th>
<th>MAIN GOAL</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY (MAIN ANALYSES)</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigate how Estonian Russians and Estonians regard the situation of Russian-speaking population in Estonia and what they think of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia</td>
<td>Qualitative study with an open ended questionnaire (Thematic Analysis)</td>
<td>Russian- (N= 42) and Estonian- speaking (N= 36) respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY 2:</th>
<th>MAIN GOAL</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY (MAIN ANALYSES)</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Investigate perspective of minority Russians on: their adaptation (subjective well-being); inter-ethnic relations (outgroup attitudes)</td>
<td>Quantitative study with a structured questionnaire (Hierarchical regression, path and mediation analyses)</td>
<td>Ethnic Russians (N= 190)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY 3</th>
<th>MAIN GOAL</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY (MAIN ANALYSES)</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigate perspective of majority Estonians on inter-ethnic relations (outgroup attitudes and affirmative action)</td>
<td>Quantitative study with a structured questionnaire (Hierarchical regression, path and mediation analyses)</td>
<td>Ethnic Estonians (N= 388)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN INTERGROUP RELATIONS

This chapter provides a bridge between the previous chapter on the Estonian historical and socio-political context and the following empirical chapters by presenting relevant theoretical frameworks in which the empirical research will be situated. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of theories that offer a conceptual framework for understanding and interpreting intergroup relations in Estonia.

In general, intergroup relations have been mainly investigated from the two research directions – individual differences and the group/intergroup perspectives. The first perspective attributes the reasons for intergroup conflict to individual characteristics, while the second emphasises the role of the situational characteristics for predicting intergroup conflict. More recently, since the development of the Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997), acculturation research has also focused on intergroup relations (Ward & Leong, 2006), investigating acculturation orientations of minority and majority ethnic groups in relation to intergroup relational outcomes. This thesis investigates the contextual aspects of intergroup relations, and therefore focuses on intergroup relations and acculturation perspectives.

Bearing in mind the Estonian context described in the first chapter, not all concepts and theoretical frameworks are equally important for minority and majority groups. Some are more applicable for minorities, whilst others are more relevant for majority groups. Table 2.1 presents an overview of which theories will be applied to the minority and majority groups.
Table 2.1

Summary of theoretical approaches to the study of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majority Estonians</th>
<th>Minority Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Social Representations of History</td>
<td>- Relative Deprivation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social Identity and Social Categorization Theory</td>
<td>- Intergroup Comparisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- System Justification Theory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Integrated Threat Theory</td>
<td>- Acculturation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Instrumental Model of Group Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Historical Perspectives**

The theory of *social representations of history* (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005) serves as a useful framework to understand the role of history in the intergroup situation in Estonia. According to Liu and Hilton (2005), “History provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going” (p. 537). Liu (1999) argues that the underlying principles of how historical perceptions become part of the social representation of history are derived from social representations theory (Moscovici, 1981, 1988), in which social representations are seen as collectively held and reproduced knowledge of social reality. In line with this, Liu and László (2007) suggest that “Social representations of history structure the ‘objective’ situation through a process of selective interpretation, biased attribution, restricted assessment of legitimacy and agency, and by privileging certain historically warranted social categories and category systems above alternatives” (p. 87). Social representations of history operate on the collective level, which influence individuals’ beliefs and attitudes regarding history on the individual level (Liu & László, 2007). Social representations of history can lay a foundation for forming or strengthening one’s social identity (Ahonen, 1997; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Rüsen, 2004).

Similar ideas about collective interpretations of the past are discussed in literature on *collective memory*, which is defined as a “representation of the past shared by members of a group such as a generation or nation-state” (Wertsch, 2008b, p. 120).
Collective memory tends to reflect subjective accounts of the past by a group in the present, and is also believed to be fundamentally tied to identity (Wertsch, 2008a, 2009). Wertsch (2009) emphasises that “by coming to know and believe the narratives of collective memory, we come to know and believe things about who we are today” (p. 238). Because collective remembering is part of some “identity project” it supports narratives that reflect positively on a group image (Wertsch, 2008a).

Both concepts – social representations of history and collective memory – are suitable for the current analysis; with their emphasis on the selective interpretation of history, it is suggested that alternative views of history are possible as long as they are shared within a group.

Although most modern states are motivated to produce an official history that provides accurate accounts of the past, they are also interested in promoting collective remembering to produce loyal citizens in the society (Wertsch, 2009). Similarly, Ahonen (1997) argues that the creation of positive historical representations in a society can be politically motivated for the sake of positive national identity among its members. Political regimes can hold ideologically loaded representations of history that may be substituted with new representations when the political context changes (Ahonen, 1997). For instance, upon the achievement of independence, post-Soviet countries were faced with the task of finding new narratives of history and institutionalizing their national memory (Merridale, 2003; Zhurzhenko, 2007). For Estonia – plagued with inherited colonial legacies (Kuzio, 2002) – it seems that the representation of Soviet history was relatively quickly replaced with Estonian historical narratives at this time, as part of the consolidation of the new state and national identity.

Before new identities are consolidated around new historical representations, members of the society can experience an identity crisis. Kattago (2009) emphasises that “When social identities are fragile and unstable, the past becomes a treasure chest to be ransacked” (p. 163). After the break-down of the Soviet Union, the crisis of identity was strongly experienced by minority Russians in Estonia, as the new official representation of history in Estonia did not leave any space for Estonian Russians’ to feel positive about their identity. Therefore – as discussed in the previous chapter – history was not perceived as an important part of Russian identity in early years of Estonian independence (Ehala, 2009), until Russian history was ‘ransacked’ to find positive elements in their history to restore their ethnic self-esteem.

Wertsch (2008b) suggests that embarrassing historical facts may lead to
revisions of collective memory, but shows that this has not been the case for Russia. Russians experienced a narrative rift in the late 1980s in Russia when historical events such as secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (MRP) became publicly known and caused awkwardness and disjointedness about the old Soviet account of historic events. However, new narratives soon emerged in support of Russian national identity. This narrative repair acknowledged the MRP’s secret protocols, but asserted that the Soviet Union was forced to agree on these protocols to avoid the possible war between the Soviet Union and the threat-imposing Germany. This account ignores other historical accounts of Russia’s long-term motivation to expand its territories that previously belonged to the Russian Empire, which were part of official representations in Estonia and other Baltic countries. Wertsch concludes that deep collective memory is conservative and resistant to change even if exposed to the objective information, illustrating its importance for positive social identity. The new representations of the Soviet history emerging under Putin’s presidency refurbished the Soviet narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and the victory in World War II became the founding myth of the new Russia and a source of positive identity (Zhurzhenko, 2007).

This leads us to conclude that parallel and incompatible social representations of history can coexist. Social representations of history distinguish between different levels of consensus among people or groups. Social representations in general (Moscovici, 1988), and social representations of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005) can be hegemonic, emancipated or polemical. Hegemonic representations entail unity and consent between the members of the group regarding their understanding of history. When alternative interpretations of history emerge between different subgroups, yet being complementary, these are called emancipated representations. When notions of history are not shared in the society as a whole, and are accompanied by social conflict and antagonism between groups, these constitute polemical representations.

During the Soviet time there was one official representation of history, which was upheld by different institutional and symbolic means (Raudsepp, 2008). However, alternative representations existed in the private sphere such as at home and in peer groups in Estonia (D. J. Smith, 2008; Tulviste & Wertsch, 1994; Wertsch, 2009), although they were officially repressed. After the restoration of independence, the official representations changed from socialist to nationalist representations (Ahonen, 1997). However, Soviet representations remained valid among a substantial part of the population (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Raudsepp, 2008). The conflicting
interpretations of WWII in Estonian society, which strongly rose to the surface during the April 2007 crisis, demonstrated that parallel dialogues prevailed in society, indicating polemical representations (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Ehala, 2009; Kattago, 2009; Raudsepp, 2008; D. J. Smith, 2008; Vetik, 2008a).

The problem is that the contrary meaning of WWII for Estonians does not support Russia’s representation of WWII in Estonia. Kattago (2009) suggests that by relocating the Bronze Soldier the Estonian government not only demonstrated state power to represent national history, but also presented a symbolic gesture to show that the former Soviet and current Russia’s ideological version of history was not accepted in contemporary Estonia. Kattago suggests that the different and conflicting representations of WWII made this event a “moral trauma” (p. 162) for Estonians. Estonian cultural and historic events are represented for Estonians through the narrative template of ‘The Great Battle for Freedom,’ which is one of the main underlying stories of Estonian cultural memory (Tamm, 2008). Undoubtedly, Russians do not fit into this narrative template.

Representations of history shape current intergroup relations (Hilton & Liu, 2008). Paez and Liu (in press) argue that memories of the past intergroup violence can inhibit current intergroup relations, for example, in the form of ingroup favouritism or intergroup hatred. The Estonian case provides an example in which past conflict remains important for the present conflicts through the collective remembering of past (Paez & Liu, in press). The unique aspects of Estonia include unstable representations, where Soviet era representations have been overturned and undermined, but Estonian representations are only recent and not well accepted by Russians. The different representations of history on the same or parallel events, and mutually delegitimizing narratives can provide potential grounds for conflict and other issues in intergroup relations between Estonians and Russians.

**Social Identity and the Socio-political Context**

The issues related to identity and socio-political context are viewed through the prism of social identity, social categorization, and system justification theories.
Social Identity

The social identity perspective is one of the leading and most powerful theories in the area of intergroup relations (Hornsey, 2008). By emphasising context, group status, permeability and meaning in investigation of intergroup relations, social identity theory (SIT) offers a detailed account of conditions under which membership of the group may convert to intergroup bias and conflict (Huddy, 2004). Hornsey (2008) stresses further that “It is almost impossible to think or write about group processes and intergroup relations today without reflecting on core constructs within the theory, such as categorization, identity, status, and legitimacy” (p. 217).

SIT places significance on social identity as an underlying factor to understand collective behaviour. This assumption is further elaborated in the social categorization theory (SCT) (Turner, 1999). Social identity is conceptualised as part of person’s self-definition on the basis of the membership in some social group that also includes value connotations and emotional significance related to that membership (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Tajfel (1978) believes that individuals use categorization in order to systematize and simplify their social environment. He posits that “social categorization can be understood as the ordering of social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual. It helps to structure the causal understanding of the social environment and thus it helps as a guide for action” (p. 61). Additionally, Tajfel states that social categorization provides a system of orientation that allows individuals to determine their place in society.

According to Turner (1999), self-categorization occurs when people define themselves as members of a shared social category, which results in ingroup members being perceived as similar and outgroups as different on relevant dimensions. Essentially, Turner argues that self-categorization involves self-stereotyping and the depersonalization of self-perception. It is the basis of collective behaviour and orientation towards others, so that individuals are expected to perceive and act in terms of a shared collective understanding of self. Group membership does not only indicate the content and value of this membership, but also has specific prescriptions regarding appropriate attitudes, emotions and behaviours for certain contexts (Hornsey, 2008).

Social categorization produces a shared social identity that explains the occurrence of dichotomies of social categories such as ‘us’ versus ‘them’, or ingroup
versus outgroup (Turner, 1999). Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that with more serious intergroup conflict, individual members of opposing groups tend to relate to each other as representatives of their groups rather than on the basis of their individual characteristics or relationships.

One of the core ideas in SIT is that individuals strive for positive and distinctive social identity, such as belonging to groups that provide them with satisfaction from group membership (Tajfel, 1978). According to Tajfel (1978) the interpretation and meaning of the social identity is obtained through social comparisons. For example, group status becomes meaningful in terms of differences between groups and the value attached to these differences. Comparisons between ingroup and outgroups may result in both positive and negative outcomes for their social identity. SIT posits that if outcomes are negative, people undertake actions to make their social identity more positive. Motivation to maintain a positive identity and distinctiveness of one’s ingroup in relation to relevant outgroups is assumed to underpin the occurrence of intergroup differentiation and outgroup derogation, as the function of differentiation is to uphold superiority over an out-group (Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

It is apparent that for low status groups it is not an easy task to achieve or maintain positive distinctiveness in relation to other groups. SIT distinguishes between individual or collective strategies that can be undertaken to restore one’s positive social identity. Tajfel (1978) argues that if group membership does not make a positive contribution to one’s social identity, people may attempt to ‘leave the group’ unless this is virtually impossible or it involves value contradiction to one’s self image. If ‘leaving the group’ becomes unlikely, individuals develop strategies such as changing the comparison dimensions in favour of the ingroup, engaging in social competition, or employing defensive tactics (e.g. ingroup bias, negative outgroup attitudes) to cope with negative consequences to their social identity.

SIT and SCT are considered important theories for the Estonian context because Estonians and non-Estonians, or Estonians and Russians are widely used social categories in public discourses in Estonia. Statements either on a personal or state level often involve the whole group, especially when talking about minorities or non-Estonians or simply Russians. Ethnic identity seems to be highly salient for both groups. For Russians, history has become part of positive identity making, as a tool to achieve positive distinctiveness (e.g., “we helped to win the war”).
Socio-political Context

The social identity perspective is additionally important for this analysis because of its emphasis on context for understanding social conflict, which includes the historical, social, economic and political structure of society (Turner & Reynolds, 2004). According to SIT and SCT, intergroup attitudes are assumed to be the outcome of interplay between how people define themselves socially, and their understanding of social structure of the intergroup relations (ibid).

According to Hornsey (2008), SIT originally proposed the idea of hierarchy between groups, identifying that groups hold different levels of status and power. These status hierarchies or socio-structural relations are evaluated in terms of legitimacy, stability and permeability. Tajfel’s idea, that people’s judgments of their position in status hierarchies shape their intergroup behaviour, has found support in empirical studies showing that these socio-structural variables predict the degree of intergroup bias (Hornsey, 2008). Structural conditions also influence which strategy is used for maintaining the positive distinctiveness. For example, an individual strategy such as social mobility or ‘leaving the group’ is possible only if society is flexible and permeable, allowing individuals to move from one group to another and achieve higher status. However, if society is characterized by strong stratification that does not allow individuals to change their personal status, individuals are unlikely to take individual strategy, and will rather act as members of the group in attempt to induce social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

If the status of the ingroup is considered illegitimate and/or unstable, people are more likely to be more hostile towards the relevant outgroup, and biased towards their in-group (Hornsey, 2008; Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003). Tajfel and Turner (1986) posit that “perceived illegitimacy and/or instability provide new dimensions of comparability that are directly relevant to the attitudes and behaviour of the social groups involved, whatever their position in the system” (p. 289). The authors suggest that when the social system is seen as stable and legitimate – even with distinguishable superior and inferior groups – it may create the situation where these superior and inferior groups do not show much ethnocentrism.

Jost and Banaji (1994) have related the SIT concepts of stability and legitimacy to what they call ‘system-justification,’ which refers to the psychological process by which people legitimise existing social arrangements. Measures for system-justifying
ideologies often entail beliefs in system legitimacy and permeability (e.g. Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998).

Status hierarchies and inequalities of wealth or status can be legitimised, as can authorities or institutions (Zelditch, 2001). Tyler (2006) claims that group inequalities and differences in economic or social status automatically involve system-level legitimisation processes. Individuals judge the social or economic standing of people or groups against criteria of legitimacy, especially in the case of differences. Differences in status automatically generate questions of legitimacy of the social system where these differences might arise.

By summarizing arguments of legitimacy theories and empirical evidence, Tyler (2006) argues that beliefs in the legitimacy of the system are helpful for rule-following and decision acceptance, and are especially valuable in times of crisis as legitimacy involves loyalty and provides support for the system or authorities in unstable times. Therefore, possible doubts in the legitimacy of the system or social order is a risk for the society; and if they can be directly related to the life satisfaction of individuals, it becomes even more critical as it can weaken support for the system and trigger protest actions.

Judgments about the social structure of intergroup relations, especially how legitimacy is viewed by Estonians and Russians, are important concepts in the Estonian context and contribute to the understanding of intergroup conflict. Since the status of Russians is shaped by official policy, Estonians are likely to view it as legitimate, but this view may not be shared by Russians. It is expected that Estonians would be driven to defend the current state of affairs and perceive it as legitimate, while Russians desire their status to improve and thus would view the current social structure of intergroup relations more illegitimate. The historical context in terms of power reversal is expected to be related to how legitimacy of the current social structure is seen by Russians and Estonians. In particular, Russians are likely to be less willing to perceive current state of affairs as legitimate given that they have experienced an alternative state of affairs that was ‘better’ for them.
Dynamics of Intergroup Relations

Perceived Threat

Two main theories are used in this thesis to investigate the perception of threat in intergroup relations: Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) and the Instrumental Model of Group Conflict.

Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) integrated threat theory (ITT) integrates previous work on threat and intergroup relations, distinguishing between four types of threat: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. Realistic threat incorporates central principles of realistic group conflict theory, while symbolic threat is similar to symbolic racism (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Realistic threat in ITT consists of threats to the existence of the ingroup, such as threat to political or economic power, or physical or material well-being (Stephan, Lausanne Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). Symbolic threat in ITT arises from perceived differences in morals, values, beliefs, and attitudes between groups (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The authors emphasise that the main idea of ITT is that threats to a group’s existence or values causes prejudice.

In the Estonian context, realistic threat is likely to be most pertinent for understanding intergroup conflict, especially in terms of political power. Recent experience and still vivid memories of occupation might keep people alert to historical dangers and increase desire to reinforce the power of the independent state.

Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong (1998) propose the instrumental model of group conflict, which builds from the theory of realistic group conflict (Campbell, 1965; R. A. LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), considering conflict between group interests as an underlying reason for the prejudice and discrimination. According to the instrumental model of group conflict, perceived group competition for resources is at the core of intergroup conflict and derives from (1) resource stress and (2) the salience of a possible competitive outgroup.

Firstly, resource stress entails the perceived limited access to resources for some groups which can be economic resources (money, jobs, etc.), or power. The perception that access to resources is limited depends on the scarcity of resources, unequal distribution of resources (i.e. some groups have limited access to resources), and support for an unequal distribution of resources among higher status groups. These
three factors create the perception that resources are under stress and are not equally or sufficiently available to all groups.

The authors emphasise differences in perceptions between lower and higher-status groups. For example, lower-status groups are likely to be aware that they have limited access to the societal resources. Higher-status groups, however, may be aware that they might lose access to the resources currently available to them if status hierarchies change. Therefore, they also place value on having access to those limited and valuable resources.

Secondly, a potentially competitive outgroup is likely to be one that is salient and distinct from the ingroup (e.g., large size, different appearance and behaviour). Additionally, such an outgroup may show interest in taking the shared resources, and possess qualities (e.g. skills) that would allow them to obtain resources – this is called similarity of the relevant dimension for obtaining resources.

In sum, pressure for resources and perceived outgroups that can have hand on the resources determines the perception of group competition. Esses et al. (1998) further distinguish between cognitive and affective components associated with perceived group competition. A cognitive component consists of beliefs that the more one group gains access to the resources, the less is left for the other one – these are called zero-sum beliefs. An affective component may consist of anxiety and fear linked to those zero-sum beliefs.

The authors further argue that a group will be motivated to remove the competitiveness of other groups by employing different strategies, which is the reason why they call their approach an instrumental model of group conflict. Negative attitudes towards a competitor are instrumental as they intend to show a little value of a competitor in order to reduce its competitiveness.

Esses and colleagues (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, et al., 1998) provide support for a link between perceived competition for resources and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration from correlational and experimental research. They note that discrimination and rejection of social policies which are likely to enhance competitiveness of other groups might be common strategies to serve the same purpose. Other strategies involve enhancing actual or perceived competitiveness of one’s group or creating the physical distance with the other group.

According to Esses et al.’s model, Russians might be salient and distinctive for Estonians in terms of their high numbers in the country. This adds to the experience of
competition and may motivate Estonians towards competition-removing strategies. Russians might be perceived as a competitive threat to Estonians who try to protect their group interests in terms of their political position. The instrumental model of group conflict could explain Estonians’ support for – or opposition to – social policies regulating Russians’ position. It suggests that Estonians might oppose policies giving more rights to Russians to suppress their competitiveness, especially in political domain.

Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984) is pertinent for the current research, as it has been formulated to understand disadvantages and inequalities between people and groups. The concept of relative deprivation has been employed to explain both intra-individual phenomena, such as well-being and mental health (e.g. Dion, 1986; M. Schmitt, Maes, & Widaman, 2010), and phenomena related to intergroup relations such as prejudice, nationalistic attitudes, group militancy, and protest movements (Abrams, 1990; Dubé & Guimond, 1986; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, & van Dick, 2008).

In Stouffer and colleagues’ (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) original definition, relative deprivation involves two conditions: (1) desiring something that one does not have and (2) comparing oneself with a relevant target who has this desired ‘something’. The outcome of these conditions is that one is deprived relative to a relevant target (i.e. measured as being better or worse off than a target). Runciman (1966) argues that relative deprivation is not an objective estimation but should indicate a sense of deprivation of a person and always involves a comparative reference to a person or group. An individual or a group can also feel deprived relative to their past (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

Walker and Pettigrew (1984) note that there are cognitive and affective components to the concept of relative deprivation. The cognitive component entails a rational judgment of one in comparison to relevant others, while the affective component is the feelings attached to the belief that one is relatively deprived (e.g. how angry or satisfied one is about one’s own or one’s group’s situation) (Tropp & Wright, 1999). Although Walker and Pettigrew suggest that the effects of the cognitive component on behavioural outcomes should be mediated by the affective component,
these two are often combined together as an indicator of relative deprivation (e.g. Tropp & Wright, 1999; Zagefka & Brown, 2005).

The previous chapter clearly indicated the relative deprivation of Russian-speaking population in socio-economic and political domains in comparison to Estonians and to their previous (pre-independence) position. This is an important factor to consider when investigating the psychological adaptation and intercultural relations of Estonian Russians.

**Relative deprivation (RD) and perceived discrimination (PD)**

The RD framework has often been employed to assist the examination of the effects of perceived discrimination, although there is also separate literature on perceived discrimination that has not been positioned under the umbrella of RD framework. Although the terms relative deprivation and perceived discrimination are often used interchangeably, their conceptualizations are not identical. Perceived relative deprivation necessitates a comparison group (therefore RD measures ask people about their situation/states in comparison to certain targets),\(^\text{11}\) whilst perceived discrimination includes the evaluations of being treated unfairly (either on personal or group level) because of social group membership (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). Although comparison referents are not explicitly included in investigations of perceived discrimination, an implicit comparison process in discrimination judgments has been suggested by some authors. For example, Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, and Young (1999) suggest that the ratings of personal discrimination are primarily based on interpersonal comparisons, and the group ratings are primarily based on intergroup comparisons even though they are not explicitly asked.

The (only) study investigating the concepts of RD and PD together with distinct conceptualizations conducted by Koomen and Fränkel (1992) found that experiences of individual discrimination have about the same effect on judgments of personal and group deprivation. Discriminated individuals appeared to compare themselves to their ingroup members resulting in personal RD, and as group members to another group resulting in group RD. Perhaps the reason why relative deprivation and perceived discrimination have been used interchangeably lies in their common focus on people or

\(^{11}\) This is not always the case in empirical studies, but the best measures of RD should include comparisons as emphasized by Smith and Ortiz (T. Vihalem, 2008).
groups in disadvantageous states (because of perceived unfair treatment or outcomes), and their similarity in terms of the predictions; as both, when ‘present’ are expected to have aversive effects on psychological and behavioural outcomes. Therefore, a relative deprivation framework is adopted in this research to integrate individuals’ perceptions of their relative deprivation and perceived discrimination under one umbrella.

**Relative deprivation: Personal versus group-level phenomena**

Runciman (1966) distinguishes between personal and collective (or group) relative deprivation, which he calls ‘egoistic’ and ‘fraternalistic’ relative deprivation respectively. Personal relative deprivation occurs as a consequence of evaluating an individual’s situation in comparison to other relevant individuals, while group relative deprivation is created through evaluating one’s group situation in comparison to another relevant group. Walker and Pettigrew (1984) argue that personal relative deprivation is based on intra- or interpersonal comparisons, and should lead to individual-level behaviour, while group relative deprivation should lead to group-level behaviour.

According to Runciman’s (1966) original proposition, group deprivation derives from generalising experiences of personal deprivation. Although some authors propose to treat these two orthogonally (e.g. Ellemers, 2002), empirical evidence has found support for Runciman’s view by demonstrating that personal and group deprivation have significant positive correlation with each other, and that effects of personal deprivation on outcomes are often mediated by group deprivation (Beaton & Tougas, 1997; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Pettigrew, 2002; Pettigrew, et al., 2008). Additionally, experimental studies have demonstrated that feelings of collective deprivation can be readily disregarded if individuals experience personal advantage (H. J. Smith, Spears, & Oyen, 1994).

Generalization of perception of inequalities from an individual to group is believed to result through identification and a sense of belonging with the group (Dibble, 1981; Dion, 1986; Tyler & Lind, 2002; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972) suggest that the salience of group membership influences the substitution of individual concerns for collective concerns. Walker, Wong, and Kretzschmar (2002) suggest, for example, that evaluating outcomes in terms of comparisons between ingroups and outgroups (i.e. group relative deprivation) is applicable in the context where there are salient historically opposed groups. According to Wright and Tropp (2002), strong group
Relative deprivation is revealed in the context where there is a distinguishable advantaged outgroup that is held accountable for the disadvantage of the ingroup.

A large body of empirical research shows that in assessments of person/group deprivation or discrimination, people actually minimise their personal disadvantage in comparison to the disadvantage of their group (e.g. Pettigrew, et al., 2008; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Tropp & Wright, 1999). Explanations of differences between individual and group perceptions suggest that different identities are triggered and different motives are involved for personal and group ratings (e.g. Postmes, et al., 1999). Postmes et al. (1999) emphasise that “at the personal identity level, people benefit emotionally from seeing themselves as more privileged than disadvantaged overall and as better off than other members of their own group in particular” (p. 322). Therefore, the personal ratings are subject to self-serving biases and motives to see oneself positively. Group ratings resulting from intergroup comparisons however, can function to promote positive social identity and group aims, which may include the desire to draw attention to its problems or to change its status.

This research is interested in individuals’ social identity and their concerns about the status of Russians as an ethnic group (i.e. group-level motivation), therefore these concerns would be reflected in group rather than personal level ratings.

Intergroup Comparisons

The concept of social comparison originally proposed by Festinger (1954) in social comparison theory is a central part of many social psychological theories. The main idea of social comparison is that people need others as a reference or standard for evaluating central aspects of their own life (Rupert Brown & Zagefka, 2006). These comparisons do not happen by chance, rather they are actively looked for as a relevant source of information (Olson & Hazlewood, 1986).

As previously discussed, the meaning of one’s social identity and deprived status is derived from comparisons with other groups. Tajfel (1978) emphasizes that “No group lives alone – all groups in society live in the midst of other groups” (p. 64).

The major societal and political changes in Estonia have evidently brought changes in people’s life and identity. When people’s life circumstances substantially

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12 This has also been found in the recent study in Estonia showing that while 50% of second generation Russians perceive hostility and unfair treatment regarding their ethnic group, only 8% report the same when considering their personal experience (Vetik & Helemäe, in press).
change, this may elevate the salience of comparisons in general. Intuitively, one could expect that group-level comparisons would be especially relevant in the Estonian context since shared social categories such as Estonians and non-Estonians are readily available and could be employed to elevate the issue of general intergroup inequalities. Knowledge from previous research could help distinguish in what circumstances group level comparisons would be likely to occur.

Research has found that intergroup comparisons are made less frequently than interpersonal comparisons (e.g. H. J. Smith & Walker, 2008). However, the tendency to make intergroup comparisons is more likely when the majority group is relevant for minority groups (Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; J. M. Levine & Moreland, 1987); minority group identity is salient (Brewer & Weber, 1995; H. J. Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999); status relations are perceived as illegitimate (Tajfel, 1978); and interests in equity and justice are at the forefront (H. J. Smith & Walker, 2008). Where structural changes about the position of groups in society are desired, intergroup comparisons and collective deprivation are more important than personal in- or outgroup comparisons and personal deprivation (e.g. Runciman, 1966; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). These factors are all applicable for the Russian minority in Estonia, indicating the importance of the intergroup comparisons.

Besides social comparisons, research has highlighted the relevance of Albert’s (1977) temporal comparison theory for intergroup comparisons. Temporal comparisons involve the evaluation of group at different points of time which have been shown to be important in evaluating the group, its status and outcomes (Rupert Brown & Haeger, 1999; Rupert Brown & Middendorf, 1996; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Although a study by Brown and Haeger (1999) indicated that spontaneously made group-level social comparisons were predominant, group-level temporal comparisons were also readily made. Research by Brown and Zagefka (2006) demonstrated that past temporal comparisons involving the ingroup were as prevalent as intergroup comparisons in three different intergroup contexts, indicating that group members tend to assess changes in group situations over time. Research has also indicated that individual temporal-past comparisons are reported as frequently or more frequently than social comparisons (Wilson & Ross, 2000).

According to the temporal comparison theory, temporal comparisons become more relevant in situations that entail change and adjustments. The same is proposed by de la Sablonniere and Tougas (2008), who argue that individuals especially need to
asses the situation of their group at times of radical social change. Their findings also show that the well-being of ethnic groups is impaired by instability (up and downs) of the group’s situation over time.

For the Estonian context both social and temporal intergroup comparisons could be relevant, especially for Russians to evaluate their current group’s position in society. After the major political change Russians’ position has been reversed and downgraded in comparison to Estonians and to the Soviet time, which may affect their adjustment and perception of intergroup relations.

Acculturation

Acculturation theory is useful for this work because it concentrates on the process and outcomes of inter-ethnic contact. The previous chapter noted that the integration or non-integration of Russian-speaking population in Estonia is typically studied in terms of their citizenship status and language proficiency. However, it is clear that Russians struggle with opportunities to be culturally represented and appreciated in Estonia. Therefore, citizenship and language proficiency may be insufficient indicators of ‘integration.’ Acculturation theory considers integration in a broader sense, looking at how preferences and expectations for cultural maintenance and participation in the majority group culture affect adaptation and intergroup outcomes.

Acculturation occurs when people from different cultures come into continuous direct contact that leads to subsequent changes in the cultural patterns of either or both groups (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). The most prominent model in the acculturation literature is the bidimensional acculturation model proposed by John Berry (Berry, 1970, 1980). Berry identifies two underlying distinct dimensions that ethnic groups are oriented to – orientations towards one’s own group and towards other groups. The first dimension displays a relative preference for maintaining one’s heritage culture and identity, and the second a relative preference for having contact and participating in the larger society along with other ethno-cultural groups. The combination of positive or negative (“yes” or “no”) views about these issues defines four acculturation strategies (see Figure 2.1). When individuals are oriented only towards interaction with other cultures and are not interested in maintaining their
cultural identity, the *assimilation* strategy is defined. Conversely, when the non-dominant group values only their original culture, and at the same time prefers no interaction with others, then the *separation* option is delineated. When individuals desire both maintaining one’s original culture and having daily interactions with other groups, *integration* is the preferred strategy. Finally, when there is little interest in having relations with one’s own or other groups then *marginalization* is distinguished (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002).

Bourhis et al. (1997) recommend reformulation of the second dimension to reflect the importance of adopting the culture of the dominant group. They delineate five acculturation strategies for migrant groups as an outcome of considering these two dimensions simultaneously. The three acculturation strategies – assimilation, integration and separation – resemble those proposed by Berry. However, Bourhis and colleagues suggest a refinement of the marginalization option, which is represented by such orientations such as anomie (culturally alienated individuals) and individualism (i.e., individuals preferring to identify themselves as individuals rather than as members of the ethnic group).

**Figure 2.1.** Acculturation strategies

Acculturation theory has typically been utilised to examine immigrants’ adaptation to another culture since John Berry’s debut work on acculturation of minority groups in early 1970s. This research has established specific patterns between different individual level phenomena for migrants, such as relationships between acculturation strategies, language proficiency, personality, well-being, and adaptation in
general.

However, by definition acculturation is not a one-sided phenomenon – it entails changes not only to minorities but also to majority groups, who also have acculturation preferences. The dominant focus on the acculturation process of minorities is justifiable as minorities often have a weaker position in society and the consequences from contact thus have more impact on them. However, as they are in a weaker position, migrant minorities may have limited ability to influence the situational factors and broader context which can impact on their adaptive outcomes compared to the majority group (Ward, Fox, Wilson, Stuart, & Kus, 2010). It is also important to know attitudes of majority group because usually they are in a better power position to influence the acculturation process of minority groups (Berry, 2009).

Although the value of the majority perspective and their attitudes has been suggested in earlier acculturation research (e.g. Berry, 1970; Berry, 1980; Mayadas & Elliott, 1992; Sayegh & Lasry, 1993), it is only in the last decade – since Bourhis et al. (1997) presented the Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) – that more empirical studies have taken this perspective into account (Bourhis, Barrette, El-Geledi, & Schmidt, 2009; A. Kosic & Phalet, 2006; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Piontkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Rohmann, Florack, & Piontkowski, 2006; Rohmann, Piontkowski, & van Randenborgh, 2008; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

Berry (1974, 1980) has defined four acculturation orientations of majority group members: multiculturalism (equivalent to integration), melting pot (assimilation), segregation (separation), and exclusion (marginalization). Bourhis and colleagues (1997) have later identified integration, assimilation, segregation, exclusion, and individualism as majority group acculturation orientations.

By presenting the IAM, Bourhis et al. (1997) extended the previous acculturation research not only by integrating acculturation orientations of immigrant groups with acculturation expectations of host community towards the immigrant minorities, but also by incorporating the outcomes for interpersonal and intergroup relations resulting from the combination of two. IAM thus has extended previous acculturation research by integrating it with the intergroup relations perspective. In addition to the previous focus on adaptive outcomes for minority group, the research has started more systematically to investigate the factors reflecting the relations between the cultural groups, including existing multicultural ideology, expressions of ethnic prejudice, stereotypes, attitudes and perceived threat.
As a consequence, there is a substantial body of research that has focused on the interplay between acculturation preferences of host majority and immigrant minority groups, and its consequences on the intergroup relations. This type of the research usually includes examination of the ‘fit’ or ‘concordance/discordance’ of acculturation attitudes between minority and majority groups. Indexes of ‘fit’ usually compare personal acculturation preferences with the perceived preferences of the outgroup (Piontkowski, et al., 2002; Rohmann, et al., 2006).

A number of studies position acculturation preferences as predictor variables of various psychological or relational outcomes, such as attitudes towards immigrants (Leong, 2008); ingroup bias, perceived quality of intergroup relations and perceived discrimination (Zagefka & Brown, 2002); life satisfaction, perceived intergroup relations and tolerance; psychological adjustment and family functioning in bi-cultural environment (Cheung-Blunden & Juang, 2008), or acculturation as antecedent of multicultural ideology (Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008). Additionally, Kosic and Phalet (2006) examined if the perceived acculturation preferences of large immigrant groups predicts ethnic over-categorization bias. Several studies have investigated majority member evaluations or reactions to acculturation strategies adopted by the minority population (e.g. M. Kosic & Caudek, 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998).

The main advantages for employing acculturation theory to analyse the Estonian inter-ethnic context in this work are as follows: (a) it shows that integration is only one of several strategies or preferred options in intercultural contact; (b) it recognises the importance of cultural dimensions in inter-ethnic contact; (c) the dimensions of both cultures are equally important for distinguishing acculturation strategies (including integration); (d) acculturation strategies or preferences can be distinguished for both ethnic majority and minority groups; and (e) it considers relationships between acculturation strategies and psychological and intergroup outcomes.

**In summary,** this broad overview of theoretical perspectives intended to show how different theoretical concepts assumed to be relevant for the Estonian context are manifested and interlinked in order to facilitate the investigation of intergroup conflict and adaptation of the Russian minority in Estonia. The proposed theoretical frameworks converge to provide understanding of contextual factors that are central for analysing intergroup relations in Estonia.
As the ultimate endeavour of this work is to determine which factors explain and contribute to the psychological adaptation of Russians and to positive inter-ethnic relations, first it is important to map these factors, and then investigate the relationship between them. Therefore, a qualitative study, presented in the next chapter, is undertaken to explore native Estonian and Estonian Russian representations of social reality in terms of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and adaptation of Russian-speaking minorities.
CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1
INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ESTONIA: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

While the adaptation difficulties of Russian minorities in Estonia have been known since the societal changes in the 1990’s (Aasland & Fløtten, 2001), a serious conflict in inter-ethnic relations came to the surface only during the ethnic riots in 2007. Prior to that, apart from a silent distrust and preference for social distance, mutual relationships were considered generally peaceful. The development of peaceful inter-ethnic relations in Estonia received a lot of attention from different sectors since a possibility of a violent inter-ethnic conflict similar to the former Yugoslavian republics was feared (G. Feldman, 2005; Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002; V. Pettai & Hallik, 2002). Although, the issues related to minority adaptation had been addressed by social scientists before the riots, they were not part of larger public debates nor were they accorded adequate attention in the society. Therefore, the ethnic riots were completely unexpected and eventually instigated many public debates between Estonians and Russians. Thereby, the inter-ethnic relations gained an increasing attention in the academic literature after the ethnic riots, especially the issues related to the transfer of the Bronze Soldier (Brüggemann & Kasekamp, 2008; Burch & Smith, 2007; Ehala, 2009; Kattago, 2009; Petersoo & Tamm, 2008; Saarts, 2008; D. J. Smith, 2008; Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima, 2009).

My decision to study the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia was made before the ethnic riots. The low socio-political status and the adjustment difficulties of the Russian-speaking population after the change of the political system and the power reversal were the reasons that triggered my initial interest. My original aim was to investigate the acculturation and adaptation difficulties of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and at the same time to examine a wider social context that reflects the views of the majority population. Naturally, the “Bronze Night” affected my work as well – as the planned data collection coincided with the “Bronze Night” events. Thereafter, the choice of what would be the best way to investigate this heated topic had to be carefully made.
Consequently, the mixed method approach (Goodrick & Emmerson, 2008), combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was selected in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the inter-ethnic phenomena in Estonia. This chapter introduces the qualitative study on ethnic majority and minority perspectives with the following broad research aims:

1) to explore the perceptions of the adaptation problems of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia;
2) to examine the quality of the inter-ethnic relations between Russians and Estonians;
3) to investigate the inter-ethnic tensions between native Estonians and Russian-speaking minorities in relation to their changed social statuses; and
4) to apply the findings for designing the subsequent quantitative studies.

The specific objectives of the study were to compare both groups’ perspectives and distinguish: (a) the differing or conflicting perceptions between the Estonian majority and minority groups that may cause difficulties in the interactions and adaptation of Russian minorities; and (b) the perceptions that are common or shared by the two ethnic groups that can contribute to positive inter-ethnic relations.

**Method**

**Rationale for the Methodology**

A qualitative framework using an open-ended questionnaire was adopted for this study. The decision to conduct a qualititative study was based on two arguments. Firstly, after the ethnic riots in April 2007 in Estonia, the topic of the inter-ethnic relations was heatedly discussed in private circles and in public domains such as media and internet forums. Violent demonstrations were presented by the Russian minority as an outburst of a long accumulated dissatisfaction. These actions were perceived as outrageous by native Estonians. On the one hand, the troubles of Russian-speaking minorities were not recognized by the majority. On the other hand, native Estonians were shocked by the destructive behaviour of rioters and the extent of the riots. A few full analyses have
been published recently on the immediate commentaries in internet forums (Raudsepp, 2008) and on the articles in printed media (Petersoo, 2008) related to the “Bronze Night.”

A study with well-established measures would have not been able to capture the underlying processes of the minorities’ dissatisfaction and relations between the majority and minority groups. Thus, I searched for such qualitative methods that would allow the participants to openly express their opinions on inter-ethnic issues. This would hopefully lead to unravelling critical topical issues and new concepts that better represent the Estonian context, and the results could be used for constructing quantitative measures for the subsequent studies.

Secondly, I acknowledge that the inter-ethnic issues in Estonia have become a politically-laden topic and recognize that if the participants were not provided an opportunity for anonymous responses, I would have encountered difficulties in obtaining honest answers. Indeed, this concern was later confirmed by the reactions to the online survey advertisements, wherein the members of online forums wrote about their apprehension: “bitter experiences regarding talking too much on these topics”, “we are afraid to be open, that is why we are not ready for dialogue,” or “hopefully you are not from the security police.”

Compared to conducting face-to-face interviews, surveys with open-ended questions are a better solution for participants to talk anonymously about sensitive and troubling issues. An open-ended questionnaire is more structured and is closer to more traditional means of data collection in psychology in comparison to other qualitative methodologies (Madill & Gough, 2008).

**Materials and Procedure**

Identical open-ended questionnaires (with the exception of one question removed from the Estonian version) were constructed for the Russian- and Estonian-speaking participants. I initially translated the questionnaire from English into the Estonian and Russian languages, for the Estonian and Russian participants respectively. My translations were later verified by two independent Russian and Estonian native speakers.

Both Russian and Estonian versions informed the participants that the study intended to investigate their (Russians’ or Estonians’) perceptions of the Russian-
speaking minorities’ situation and the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. Guided by the main and specific research objectives as well as by the conceptual framework, the questions focused on the following: the participants’ views on the ethnic riots; reasons for satisfaction/dissatisfaction of Russian-speaking minorities; Russians’ social status before and after the Estonian independence; Russians’ identity; important areas of Russian cultural maintenance and Estonian culture adoption; the participants’ views on the current ethnic policies; and their preferred state approach for the multi-ethnic population. Demographic information was asked at the end of the questionnaire. The study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington. The English version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A1.

Two data collection methods were used for the study – firstly, by distributing hard copies, and secondly, through online versions of the surveys. Initially, the online survey participants were recruited through advertisements posted in either Russian-speaking (in the Russian language) or Estonian-speaking (in the Estonian language) internet forums and discussion boards in Estonia during a four month period (between September and December 2007). The advertisement contained an explanation of the study aims, an invitation to participate in the study, and an opportunity to receive a token of appreciation for participating. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. The online forums visitors who read the advertisement and were interested in participating were redirected to the survey by clicking the posted link. In the new link, they were provided with complete information on the nature of the research. Participants were also informed about an opportunity to receive a token (a chocolate bar) for their time and effort. If they opted to receive a token, they were directed to a separate page (with no direct link to their survey responses) at the end of the study to complete their details. The survey was hosted by SelectSurvey.NET8 and the participants’ answers were saved on the Victoria University of Wellington server.

In the second data collection method, the hard copy versions in the Estonian and Russian languages were distributed by three research assistants who came from different regions in Estonia and who were also members of both ethnic communities. Similar to the online surveys, the participants were given an opportunity to fill out a separate form with their contact details after completing the questionnaires if they wished to receive a token. The tokens were later sent by post to the participants who submitted either online or hard copy contact information.
Participants

Overall, 91 individuals participated in the study. The number of the participants with complete answers was 78, including 48 females (61.5%) and 30 males (38.5%). Thirteen participants had missing demographic data (14.3%). There were 42 responses in the Russian (53.8%) and 36 in Estonian (46.2%) language. The Russian sample consisted of 54.8% females (N=23) and 45.2% males (N=19), while there were 69.4% (N=25) females and 30.6% males (N=11) in the Estonian sample. The majority in the Russian sample (74%, N=31) held the Estonian citizenship; seven were Russian citizens, three participants had an undetermined citizenship, and one participant claimed to hold both the Estonian and Russian citizenship.

Thirty three (43.6%) full responses were received via the online collection, and 44 (56.4%) were collected through the hard copy questionnaires. The majority of the Estonian responses (58%) were obtained by the online version, while the majority of the Russian sample (69%) completed the hard copy versions.

Analytical Procedure

I translated into English the original data received in the Russian and Estonian languages. Translations for both languages were verified by other bilingual colleagues who were well-versed in each language to ensure the congruence of translations. Additionally, the help of a native English-speaking professional linguist was employed. All English translations were reviewed which included the verification of the text and ensuring the best corresponding match in English for culturally specific expressions.

The Estonian and Russian data were analysed separately because inter-ethnic issues might be perceived differently within each ethnic group as indicated in the first chapter. The data corpuses of the Russian and Estonian responses contained were 17,000 and 17,800 words, respectively. The verified translations of the written answers to the open-ended questions were subjected to a thematic analysis. The specific research aims (including an explorative nature of the investigation, aiding to the design of the subsequent quantitative studies), the nature of the data (i.e. translated responses) and the realist approach throughout this thesis determined the choice of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis was chosen after a thorough consideration of alternative methods and
other qualitative techniques, such as content analysis and discourse analysis. While content analysis uses predefined analytic categories for the analysis of the data and therefore would not fit with the explorative emphasis of this work, discourse analysis would have been rather problematic to run on the translated data (Maydell, 2010) and potentially difficult to combine with the subsequent studies based on the positivist and critical realist framework.

Thematic analysis permits the researcher to organise data in rich detail and at the same time it presents a flexible research tool which is compatible with different analytical approaches and types of research (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis has been used across various areas of qualitative research into social phenomena, including topics similar to the current investigation such as inter-ethnic relations or experiences of migrants (e.g. Diego-Mendoza, 2010; Hanke, 2009; Livingstone, Spears, & Manstead, 2009; Maydell, 2010). Thematic analysis is used in this work as a technique tool to represent the participants’ perceptions and their experiences and thus give an account of their ‘reality.’

According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p. 79). The semantic approach was applied to identify the themes, that is the explicit content of the participants’ comments was analysed and similar patterns or overlapping content were combined to form a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I used the inductive or ‘bottom up’ approach by looking at the data without attempting to place them into already existing coding frames while identifying the themes. However, it was obvious that some emerging themes were directly related to the questions the participants were asked. The research was interested in some specific concepts (e.g., social position) and processes (e.g., inter-ethnic relations) that were reflected in the questions and as a result influenced the developing deductive or ‘top down’ themes.

In the analysis of the data, I followed the guiding principles set by Braun and Clarke (2006) in identifying common themes across the entire dataset. Before systematically starting coding the extracts, I became familiar with the data through the transcribing and translating process and subsequently reading through all the answers, what helped me to distinguish some general patterns across the data. Then, I coded all data extracts, one by one, in an Excel file, and in this way collated the data according to the meanings, what brought me to a long list of initial codes. I analysed the prevalence of the codes at the level of a data item, looking at how often this keyword appeared
across all the responses. It was not objective per se to count the keywords, but it gave a good overview on how prevalent some themes were in the entire data set. Braun and Clark argue that ideally the theme consists of a number of instances across the data set, but more instances do not necessarily indicate that the theme is more important. Subsequently, I grouped similar instances under potential themes. After reviewing potential themes in relation to the coded data, the final themes and their subthemes were defined. An inter-rater was engaged to verify the themes on the fraction of the data and after that potential changes were discussed and modifications made. After completing the initial analysis, I verified the initial coding and the themes for their consistency. The modifications were made in the grouping of the themes under the overarching topics, but no major changes were made at the coding level.
Table 3.1

*Summary of the themes and overarching topics for Russians and Estonians*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RUSSIANS</th>
<th>ESTONIANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position of Russians:</strong> State of affairs of intergroup relations (4)</td>
<td><strong>Position of Russians:</strong> Justification of status quo of intergroup relations (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Mixed perceptions of inter-ethnic relations</td>
<td>▪ Perceived satisfaction of Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Valued and devalued identity</td>
<td>▪ Discrimination – moderate awareness versus denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ General (in)equality and discrimination</td>
<td>▪ Legitimacy of ethnic policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Unequal chances in career and economic plane</td>
<td>▪ Personal responsibility for adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Mixed perceptions of inter-ethnic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians) (7)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians) (6)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Illegitimacy of ethnic policies</td>
<td>▪ Reversed power position and Russians’ nostalgia of the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Failed integration programme</td>
<td>▪ Perceived threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Political incompetence</td>
<td>▪ Different meanings of history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Separated communities</td>
<td>▪ Separated communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Cultural differences</td>
<td>▪ Cultural differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Different meanings of history</td>
<td>▪ Language proficiency – obstacle and condition for adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lack of Estonian language proficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russians’ preferences (Possibilities for change) (3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Estonians preferences (Possibilities for change) (2)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Russian language maintenance versus Estonian language adoption</td>
<td>▪ Estonian culture adoption versus maintenance of Russian culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Estonian culture adoption versus maintenance of Russian culture</td>
<td>▪ Affirmative action (suggested state approaches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Suggested state approaches and expectation of affirmative actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis and Interpretation of the Themes

Fourteen main themes among Russian’ responses and thirteen main themes among Estonian responses were obtained subsequent to initial coding and grouping the codes. Following the guidelines by Braun and Clark (2006), similar general patterns of themes were observed for both Russian and Estonian data, namely–the themes that point out the current situation and position of Russians, themes that reflect the barriers for positive inter-ethnic relations and adaptation of Russians, and themes that discuss possibilities for change and preferences for the mutual co-existence. Similar patterns of themes created the basis for organizing them under three overarching topics. The final structure served the purpose of simplifying the presentation of Estonians’ and Russians’ understanding of the inter-group situation and adaptation of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia that was in line with research aims and objectives. See Table 3.1 for the complete thematic structure and overarching topics for Russian and Estonian responses. The results represent the detailed account of the total data set with only minor themes left out due to space restrictions. The analysis and interpretation of the themes are presented first for the Russian and then the Estonian respondents, followed by the general discussion. Where participants’ quotes are presented, their gender (F – female, M – male) and age are indicated in brackets. For the Russian participants their citizenship status is also included.

The Analysis of the Russian Responses

After the initial coding of the Russian language responses, fourteen themes were obtained that captured similar meanings within the data. The themes were organised under three overarching topics, namely: 1) Position of Russians: State of affairs of intergroup relations; 2) Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians); and 3) Russians’ preferences (Possibilities for change).

The Position of Russians: The state of affairs of intergroup relations.

Under the first overarching topic, four themes that described and evaluated the
general inter-ethnic situation and the position of Russians in Estonia were integrated to represent the state of affairs of intergroup relations and the position of Russians. These four themes were: different perceptions of inter-ethnic relations at the interpersonal and intergroup levels, valued and devalued identity, general (in)equality and discrimination, and unequal chances in career and economic plane.

**Mixed perceptions of the inter-ethnic relations**

The opinions about the relationship between the two ethnic groups were very diverse ranging from rather positive to strong negative ethnic stereotypes. A minority of the participants reflected the relative nature of the inter-ethnic relations by claiming that the quality of the relationship was not a matter of ethnicities but rather of personalities, people’s ethnic attitudes, and levels of education that makes it difficult to generalize. Even though few participants emphasized the reciprocal nature of the inter-ethnic relations placing the responsibility of the quality of relationship on individuals from both ethnic groups, the majority of the participants had relatively concrete views about the mutual relationship, describing it as either positive or very negative.

Many participants claimed their personal experiences, especially with neighbours and acquaintances, to be rather positive or “normal”. The relationship was described by several participants as friendly, neighbourly and even benevolent. No ethnic division was made or everyday nationalism observed by a few participants; for example, “I do not usually encounter a negative attitude, because Estonia is my motherland and Estonians are fellow countrymen (co-nationals) and colleagues at work” (F24 Estonian citizen). Disagreements were believed to occur only “if the issues are about politics or the competition at work,” as argued by one participant. The participants, who claimed that at the everyday level they do not face any problems relating to mutual understanding or interaction with Estonians, the majority of them perceived, however, the negative influence from the state level. The participants believe that behind the ethnic problems were the politicians who they held responsible for making the inter-ethnic relations worse.

However, many negative evaluations regarding the inter-ethnic relations were presented separately. The relations were portrayed from simply being “unsatisfactory” to the existence of “silent hatred” between the two ethnic groups; for example, “There is no love lost between each other. Both sides consider their nationality ‘superior’.
However, sometimes commercial relationships can be normal and everyone forgets ‘who is who’ (F53<sub>Russian citizen</sub>).”

The inter-ethnic relations were additionally described by the presence of the following features: mistrust, suspicion, prejudice, distain, enmity, hostility, intolerance towards another, and the lack of mutual understanding or wish to compromise with each other.

There were also strong opinions reflecting different stereotypes about both ethnic groups and prejudice towards Estonians.

A Russian person is worth more than many Estonians. Estonians are more constrained within the boundaries of a small country and bad government than a Russian person with a big heart (M21<sub>Estonian citizen</sub>).

Estonians consider themselves as a highly cultural European nation, but Russians as Asians and savages. Russians consider Estonians as retarded fools, not wishing to work, but themselves as representatives of the great nation (M39<sub>Russian citizen</sub>).

For a few participants, Russia being a big world nation shaped the perception of the inter-ethnic relations. Often, the participants expressed positive in-group versus negative out-group perceptions. The negative actions by Estonians, such as attempts to humiliate Russians, were attributed to “the complex of small nation” (F45<sub>Estonian citizen</sub>) or their fear of Russians.

Estonians have a superiority complex, their actions are short-sighted, they lack logic in their behaviour. Russians are a big world nation with the rich cultural heritage, that they attempt to humiliate and put-down in all kinds of way (F54<sub>Estonian citizen</sub>).

The majority feels that Estonians are afraid of Russians and therefore they attempt to humiliate them in any way or to provoke them into an inadequate behaviour. This is done by Estonians in order to “put Russians down” and thereafter blame them for their own failures and all “sins” (F51<sub>Estonian citizen</sub>).

**Valued and devalued identity**

Two main facets of the Russian identity were described. On one hand, the Russian participants had a lot to say about the positive traits that they believed to be characteristic of Russians when they talked about their identity. These traits were patience, compassion, solidarity, big sociability and emotionality, and skill to work.
They believed unity to be main characteristics for all Russians in general. When comparing themselves to Estonians, some participants mentioned that “Russians are more relaxed and able to make a compromise” or “Russians in Estonia are more patient and reserved in comparison to Estonians.” They perceived some characteristics as arising from their minority position in the society.

It seems to me that Russians here are more reserved and even more assiduous because one has to struggle through as being in some sense foreigners. (F24 Estonian citizen)

Besides the positive traits, “the consciousness of the huge Russian cultural population” was considered by the participants as one of the main aspects of the Russian identity. Being an “enormous” world nation with the rich cultural heritage was important and constituted a source of pride for several participants.

However, the participants made the distinction between Russians in Estonia and in Russia. They emphasized that Russians in Estonia differ from Russians in Russia, and there were no Russians in Estonia with the Russian mentality. Rather, local Russians were patient, peaceful, and well-balanced. Further arguments referred to the identity shift of being Russian; for example, “Russians in Estonia are neither Estonians nor Russians (M19 Undetermined citizenship).” Similar statements included:

There are no pure Russian features. Neither Russians, nor Estonians. This becomes evident when people go to Russia (M26 Russian citizen).

It is difficult to say who is a Russian person who was born and lived all his life in Estonia. Probably you cannot call him Russian anymore (F26 Estonian citizen)?

The other side of the coin of Russian identity encompassed the negative perceptions of what it means and how it feels to be a Russian in Estonia. The statements of Russians having a lower social status in the society, being in a minority position, and being ‘second class citizens’ reflected the devalued identity of Russians. These descriptions were related to the Russians’ perceptions of their inferior position as a whole ethnic group.

The perception of Russians’ having an overall low position in the society was expressed in a wide range of terms. The statements varied from a more neutral acknowledgment of Russians holding the position of an ethnic minority to more intense expressions such as “Russians are nobody,” “Russians feel themselves as slaves,” “Russians are last in line,” their position is similar to “position of refugees,” they have
an “inferior” position, they are “a step lower than Estonians,” they have “extremely low social status” or simply the position of Russians is “not normal.” In several cases, the perception of a low position was linked to the lack of the Estonian language proficiency and in few cases to their limited political rights because of not having citizenship. Some participants pointed out the change of status after Estonia regained its independence; for example, “Before the restoration of independence Estonians considered themselves as a national minority and ‘subordinated,’ and now they are the national majority and dominate” and “Russians and Estonians have exchanged their social statuses.”

One of the most frequent phrases that was used concerning the Russians’ position in the society was about their feeling of being “second class” people; for example, “Russians, even those who were born in Estonia, feel themselves as people of the second class.” For the majority of the participants this feeling emerged in relation to the perception of their rights not being fulfilled and unequal economic opportunities in the society. The indication of the internalization of this inferior position can be seen in the following extract:

The majority of Russians feel themselves as people of the second class. Many of them have accepted it and take it for granted. This can be explained by the absence of Russians in high politics, tiny subsidies for the Russian culture, and often a complete ignorance from the state towards the problems of the Russian cities (M22 Estonian citizen).

In several instances, the participants referred to Estonians as the “titular nation” and saw themselves not belonging to this ‘group;’ for example, “Russians are declared as a non-titular nation” or “Russians will keep having the status of a non-titular nation, that is the people of the second class (M42 Estonian citizen).”

Another aspect of the Russians’ devalued identity included their perception of being disrespected. Feelings of disrespect for Russians living in Estonia and towards the Russian language were reported as a general reason of dissatisfaction of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia. It was also brought up in relation to the transfer of the Bronze Soldier. For the Russian participants, this incident was a clear example of the state’s lack of respect for the fallen soldiers in WWII and for the whole non-native population in Estonia. This was considered as one of the underlying reasons of the riots.

A number of the participants took a similar position about being humiliated or offended, especially at the government level. They either reported general feelings of
being humiliated or they claimed directly that Estonians try to humiliate Russians.

The participants’ perceptions of the Russians’ current position in the society were associated with feelings of uncertainty and loss of confidence in general and about the future. This was especially highlighted as one of the important differences prior to the Estonian independence. During the pre-independence era, some participants claimed that “Russians felt themselves more confident.” Confidence disappeared for Russians not only in terms of temporal comparisons, but also regarding social comparisons as few participants noted they feel “unconfident” in comparison to Estonians. The loss of confidence was often related to insufficient language knowledge and limited economic possibilities, which will be discussed in the subsequent themes.

**General (in)equality and discrimination**

The issue of equality pertained to the past, present and future. The Russian participants viewed their current position in the society as unequal to Estonians, which made the situation for them very different compared to the past. The equality in terms of their position, rights and opportunities was highlighted by the majority of the participants when they referred to the differences between their current position and the one they had had before Estonia regained its independence:

People were not divided on an ethnic basis. Societies and enterprises were interested in high-class specialists, and not in Estonians or Russians. There was political and social equality of opportunities (F39 Estonian citizen).

“All nationalities were equal,” “everyone had equal rights,” “there was political and social equality of opportunities” or “Russians and Estonians had the same position” were additional illustrations of the past situation (prior to the restoration of independence of Estonia). These opinions were commonly shared among the participants who were mostly over thirty years old.

In terms of the present time, concerns about general discrimination against the Russian-speaking population appeared across all responses. In several instances, discrimination was explained through the notion of their rights; for example, the participants emphasized that Russians were deprived of many rights or they argued their rights were reduced, restrained, infringed or not fulfilled. These concerned mostly political (electoral and language) rights. The main concern was that many Russians
without an Estonian citizenship were deprived of political rights; that is they do not have the right to elect deputies in the national parliament that could protect the interests of this group of people, and they were excluded from the state governance.

Many are deprived of the right to vote at the national elections, deprived of the right to take posts in the government or state responsibilities (M58 Estonian citizen).

Among more general indications of discrimination, the participants also wrote about the “unfair treatment of the Russian-speaking population” or that “Russians are oppressed.” The context, in which the discrimination was most often referred to, was related to the sources of dissatisfaction and to their feelings in terms of inter-ethnic comparisons.

**Unequal chances in career advancement and economic outcomes**

Many Russian participants commented on their dissatisfaction with work and career opportunities. Estonians were observed to have an easy access to employment, while more Russians suffered from unemployment. Limited career opportunities were illustrated by the comments that “many educated Russians collect recyclable bottles and cans and exchange them for money. Many Russians “work as check-out operators, cleaners …,” “Russians get the most difficult and dirty work,” or “Russians can get work mainly as a labour force.” The participants emphasized that for a Russian person “it is not realistic to have a management responsibility” and that “the attitude in the work place is initially prejudiced,” “it is hard to make their way through to the state positions” or “Russians are pushed out from leading positions.”

Several participants argued that it was the ethnicity factor that counted in obtaining a job. The participants stressed that an Estonian was given employment first and by not being an ethnic Estonian or because the “surname was not right”, it was “impossible” to reach more prestigious or top positions. Unequal chances were observed regardless of the sufficient language proficiency:

Even if a person speaks the language to perfection and is loyal to the Estonian authorities, it is very difficult for him to occupy any key position (F51 Estonian citizen).

If a person has a higher education and the Estonian language proficiency in the highest category – he has the right to count on the same salary as a specialist of the Estonian nationality. Unfortunately, it can be often observed that money is paid for the
profession “Estonian” (F53 Russian citizen).

Russians have to constantly prove their knowledge, but with a Russian surname one cannot achieve much. Estonians have more privileges because they are simply Estonians. Young people are leaving because in the west if we are smart, it is possible to achieve something equally with others, whereas in Estonia it is not possible (F54 Estonian citizen).

Discontent was also expressed in terms of the economic inequality, such as differences in wages wherein Russians were perceived to have lower incomes compared to Estonians.

Incomes of Russian-speakers are below those of titular citizens. There is higher unemployment, death rate, drug addiction among Russian-speakers. The representation of Russian-speakers is disproportionately small in the parliament and in key state positions.... It is all statistics! (M32 Without citizenship).

**Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians)**

There were seven themes that commonly described the reasons for the dissatisfaction of Russians and poor inter-group relations. These themes discussed the underlying issues that were causing the problems in adaptation among Russians and in the inter-ethnic relations as perceived by the Russian participants. Therefore, they were incorporated under the overarching topic of barriers for positive intergroup relations and adaptation of Russians. These were: illegitimacy of ethnic policies, failed integration programme/assimilation pressure, nationalistic attitudes/political incompetence, separation of the communities, cultural differences and stereotypes, different meanings of history, and the lack of the Estonian language proficiency.

**Illegitimacy of ethnic policies**

Most of the participants voiced their criticism and dissatisfaction towards the current Estonian citizenship policy. By stressing that the citizenship act is ‘not fair,’ ‘incorrect,’ ‘incomplete’ or even ‘absurd,’ it was clearly seen as illegitimate.

I was born in Estonia in the days of the USSR. My mother was born in Estonia, my grandfather was Estonian. But after regaining independence, it appeared that I was a person of the second class, and I do not have the right, unlike the pureblood Estonian,
to receive citizenship. I should obtain first of all a residence permit, pass exams, testing and only then can I receive citizenship. But also after that I shall not be a high-grade citizen! Unlike the pureblood citizen, if necessary, I could be deprived of citizenship according to the law (M32 Without citizenship).

I consider it wrong that the zero version of citizenship was not accepted. People should not suffer from the politics that happened long before their birth. How is it possible to explain the fact from a perspective of a democratic civilization, that the person born in this country does not receive citizenship only because his ancestors did not live here until 1940? But they have lived here after that, worked for the development of the country, and work now, pay taxes but are limited in their civil rights (M42 Estonian citizen)?

The participants regarded the legislation regarding gaining citizenship as a source of discrimination and/or oppression regardless of whether they themselves held the Estonian citizenship or not. Discontent was expressed on behalf of their whole ethnic group. The situation was considered illegitimate since even people born in Estonia and with the long term residency still lacked the citizenship of the country.

Dissatisfaction is about the fact that Russians are oppressed. People who were born and lived their whole life in Estonia are not citizens of Estonia, as they lack the citizenship of this country (F22 Russian citizen).

The majority feels as if they were on a visit. They are deprived of citizenship in spite of the fact that they were born here or have lived here for many years (F26 Estonian citizen).

Although the citizenship policy was in general regarded as unfavourable, the participants distinguished between ‘newcomers’ and those who had lived in Estonia prior to independence. The current policy was considered to be unjust for those who were born or lived in Estonia before the Estonian independence, but it was agreed that it was applicable to new migrants.

Considerably democratic for those who arrived in Estonia during the years of its independence. But why has it a retrograde effect for those who have lived here in the Soviet time (F46 Estonian citizen)?

Similar ideas were expressed regarding the Language Act. Although a few participants acknowledged the necessity of learning the Estonian language, there were practically no statements justifying or giving any positive assessment to the current language policy. Most of the responses were general statements such as “it was a source
of discrimination” or ‘violence towards Russians.’ A few participants mentioned that the language requirements were too high and their attitude towards constant language checks at the workplace was negative. Language requirements were seen as threatening people’s professional careers because the language knowledge was considered more valuable than their professional skills.

Fear of losing your job – the fact itself, that irrespective of how you manage work responsibilities, you can lose your job because your knowledge of the Estonian language seems insufficient – is humiliating (M42 Estonian citizen).

A few participants were negatively disposed to the language policy because it conveyed a more symbolic meaning, for example “Estonians put themselves too high but do not treat Russians as people” (M21 Estonian citizen).

There were only very few statements that accepted the legitimacy of language requirements when comparing Estonia to other countries; for example:

This is so in any country - in America it is necessary to know English, in China Chinese, in Hungary Hungarian. Therefore everything is relative… now many Russian children go to the Estonian schools, and there is nothing strange about it (RF26).

Failed integration programme

“The unsuccessful integration policy” was brought up in several contexts as a source of inter-ethnic problems. Most of the participants affirmed strongly that either the integration policy had failed because it was absolutely ineffective, or it simply did not exist. The participants claimed that it had not brought any results, had not promoted the vital interest of minorities, and it was present only in words.

It is missing as such. Integration should take into account the interest of the integrating nation, but this has not been the case and is not currently either (M28 Estonian citizen).

Integration policy is half-baked, inconsistent. Especially for the adult population who has been living here already before the restoration of independence in Estonia (F39 Estonian citizen).

The responsibility for the ‘ineffective’ integration policy was placed on the state. Additionally, some efforts from the state and the majority population were expected in the integration process.

In my opinion, the state does not make an effort in this area. Otherwise how to explain
that a big part of the Russian population has no idea about many integration programmes (M42, Estonian citizen)?

Russians were not only forced to learn the language, but in parallel to know their place. However, for normal integration it is necessary to work not only with Russians, but also with the titular nation, to teach them tolerance and equality (M58, Estonian citizen).

Several participants claimed that the integration policy failed because it was reduced to checking the proficiency of the Estonian language at workplaces by language inspectors, but it should not deal solely with language problems.

In relation to attitudes towards the integration policy, a number of the participants stressed that there was assimilation instead of integration. The following quote reflects the perception of imposed assimilation: “Estonians attempt to alter Russians, to make Estonians out of them.” There were some differences among the participants in the way they reacted to the attempts of assimilation that was perceived to be the state approach. One difference was encapsulated in the responses of two participants. Assimilation was regarded as inevitable by one participant who admitted that “Russians are slowly going over to the Estonian culture, so to say estonianificating,” whereas another expressed the fear of losing their cultural identity saying that “Estonians want to force Russians to forget the Russian language in the next generation.” On some occasions assimilation was seen as absolutely unattainable; for example, “Russians cannot become Estonians, likewise Estonians cannot become Russian.”

**Political incompetence**

The statements about the political incompetence, hostility and nationalistic attitudes towards Russians from the government were seen as the sources of dissatisfaction that eventually lead to problems in the inter-ethnic relations. Many participants view that the ethnic problems were initiated by the ruling coalition, and over the years they only became worse due to the Estonian government. The following statements were the explicit examples of shared beliefs in relation to the negative interventions at the state level:

At an everyday level the mutual relationship between these two ethnic groups are more or less normal. But the up anti-Russian campaign constantly brought by the government
and some politicians, leaves its mark, and a Russian-phobic generation is growing up (M32_Estonian citizen).

At the state level there is a division between Russians and Estonians, and constantly Russians are pushed away from Estonians and Estonians from Russians. /…/ A lot of negativity comes from the rulers who benefit from dividing the people of Estonia. The Inter-ethnic differentiation is sowed by the government (F75_Estonian citizen).

Discord is inflamed by the politicians and state, some politicians build their career on it (F45_Estonian citizen).

The participants expressed a lot of general criticism toward the ruling power such as incompetence, foolishness, short-sightedness or even for the “disgusting” behaviour of the government, again in the context of the decision to transfer the Bronze Soldier monument, which subsequently led to the ethnic riots. Several responses also reflected that the transfer was part of political and selfish interests of certain politicians. Although some participants considered the monument transfer as the cause of the riots that should have not been removed, most of the participants questioned the legitimacy of that action in terms of means. The participants highlighted two main issues regarding the method of the transfer by the political forces. Firstly, the time chosen for the transfer was seen as inappropriate – just before May 9 when Russians celebrate the end of WWII. In addition, several participants emphasized that the transfer had been planned in secret so that no explanations were given beforehand, and Russians’ opinions were not considered. The participants perceived being deceived as it was contrary to what was promised by the government:

It was a barbarous move, a stab in the back, if you want to know, because it was promised that at least until May 9 it would remain in its previous place (M26_Estonian citizen).

The authorities were saying one thing, but at the same time were preparing something totally different (on the eve of a very important holiday for all Russians), the transfer was carried out at night like a robbery (M39_Russian citizen).

The participants expressed their general dissatisfaction by saying that Russians’ opinions or interests had not been taken into account and there was no dialogue with them from the state’s side. This was particularly voiced in relation to the transfer of the monument, which was seen not only as disregarding Russians’ interests by the state, but also as one of the reasons for the ethnic riots. The responses indicated disappointment over the lack of understanding between “the power and the people.” Criticism and
dissatisfaction towards the state and politicians were expressed about more general cultural understanding such as “incomprehension of the mentality, the ways of life of other nations by Estonian state officials,” as well as specific cultural morals such as “unwillingness of politicians to understand a simple issue: one should not disturb the remains of the deceased no matter who they are.”

**Separated communities**

Several participants expressed that Russians and Estonians lived as different communities in Estonia. The separation of communities and “moving away from each other” were negative indicators and presented as the barriers to good inter-ethnic relations, although exceptions were acknowledged; for example, “Mutual relations are steady, but cold. Two planets – each is on its own orbit. However, there are exceptions.”

Exclusion and splitting of the communities were perceived to be characteristics of the present society, which differed in the participants’ descriptions of the situation before Estonia had regained its independence. The participants emphasized that prior to the restoration of the Estonian independence the attitude toward Russians was as to “friends” and “neighbours.” There was no distinction between native and non-native ethnicities or “between ‘ours’ and ‘not ours.’” Estonians were perceived to be more tolerant towards the Russian culture and more accepting of it. The division was also expressed through the feelings of “insiders” and “outsiders.”

Previously, people were freely moving from place to place and everywhere it was their home, everywhere they were “insiders”, but now, after the re-establishing of independence, they have found themselves to be superfluous and “outsiders” (F54 Estonian citizen).

Often, this separation appeared not to be the Russians’ choice as many participants reflected the feeling of being not fully accepted by the native population. They perceived the native population’s attitude towards them as if they were still in a “foreign country.” This is why they did not always feel as though they were in their motherland even if they were born in Estonia.

In my opinion, Estonians are always going to think that they are doing Russians a favour. It will be always stressed to the ethnic groups living here that this is our home,
but you will remain forever as visitors here. Earlier people were kinder, considered themselves as one family (F54Estonian citizen).

A large part of them were born here or have lived a big part of their lives here, considering Estonia their home. Currently they are constantly told that they are here as visitors (F46Estonian citizen).

The lack of the feeling of belonging to their motherland and an unfulfilled desire “to be part of one’s own native land” not only interfered with the positive perception of inter-ethnic relations, but it also affected Russians’ psychological well-being. The participants pointed out that one reason of dissatisfaction was the sense that they were not welcomed in this country no matter how much they tried. However, they wished to feel as if Estonia was home, but in their perception it was “not allowed” despite the fact that the majority were born in Estonia or have lived the most part of their life here.

The participants also believed that the events around the Bronze Soldier had separated communities even more and affected the nature of mutual relationship between Russians and Estonians. The way the Estonian authorities handled the transfer of the monument brought a shift in the Russians’ attitudes towards integration, as some participants claimed that the desire to integrate into the Estonian culture has disappeared after the “Bronze Night.”

Cultural differences

Many participants regarded Estonians and Russians as two different nations with two different cultures reflected in different traditions, religious beliefs, mentalities, languages, histories:

Russians have their own particular characteristics rooted in the traditions developed over the centuries, the same with Estonians. Often, unfortunately, these peculiarities are opposite (F26Estonian citizen).

Cultural difference is enormous. Russians have in their background a big cultural heritage (literature, ballet, movies, music). Estonians do not have that. Maybe that is why they experience a complex of a small nation and are trying to increase their confidence by humiliating local Russians’ (F45Estonian citizen).

Cultural differences were, however, expected to fade away with time as argued by one participant: “after 10–20 years those who stay in Estonia will not differ much
from Estonians.” Some participants referred to the different “information space” of the two ethnic communities as a source of the ethnic problems:

Although people live in the same country, the sources of information are different, and coverage of the same events is absolutely different, brainwashing of the consciousness is happening (M58\textsuperscript{Estonian citizen}).

Actually, all difficulties in a multinational society result from the information space in which communities live. To be specific, from their difference. The same information can be presented to the Russian and Estonian audiences completely differently, based on which absolutely different views and opinions are formed in both communities (M39\textsuperscript{Russian citizen}).

Only a handful of the participants did not recognize any cultural differences between Estonians and Russians. These participants explained that both were Christian civilizations, and there were not as strong cultural differences between Estonians and Russians as between Estonians and Turks or Chinese. Even if it was accepted that they had different customs or celebrated some holidays differently, it was argued that “no-one dies from that.” For another few participants, cultural differences did not matter as it was the question of the level of education of individual representatives of Russians and Estonians claiming that “a civilized person will always accept the other person of any culture with all his distinctive features, as he understands clearly the value of the particularity of each culture” (F51 \textsuperscript{Estonian citizen}).

**Different meanings of history**

History was claimed to be an important part of the Russians’ ethnic identity and it was essential for the participants to preserve knowledge of their history and to maintain such symbols as historical monuments. In parallel, only three participants acknowledged the need to also learn the Estonian history. Some participants argued that the history of Russia had a much longer time span in comparison to the Estonian history. The participants not only pointed out that the histories of the two nations are different, but also argued that Estonians and Russians have different views on history. The most controversial opinions are recognized concerning WWII. For many participants, it went beyond the judgment that Russians and Estonians had simply
different views on history as they stressed that there were “attempts to rewrite history” from the Estonian side:

But by no means, should one start a discussion with the Estonian-speakers about the Second World War. Apparently, Estonians have heard only about the Independence War /…/ With idiotic "history" books by Mart Laar, it remains only to go to a monastery, as even Isaac Asimov has not seen greater fiction /…/ The difference in cultural values and in objects of honour cannot go unnoticed. A lot of literature was re-edited, and much of it was edited during the "sovereign" state. Attempts to rewrite history and the blind envy of unity of the Russian-speaking population does not leave titulars in peace (M26 Estonian citizen).

This issue was most often brought up in the context of the ethnic riots. The monument’s transfer was represented as a violation of the historical memory of the Russian nation. Such phrases as “the memory of victims should not be insulted,” “one should not tell lies when it concerns the memory of victims,” or “this is a mockery of the remains of the Soviet soldiers, a violation of the memory of millions of our fathers and grandfathers. It was not the monument that was stolen, but the memory, and this is holy” indicated that important cultural values concerning the past had been infringed. Honouring the ancestors, especially those fallen in WWII, was seen as a common national value. Some participants stressed that the Estonian authorities could not accept that the Russian-speaking population “comes so united to honour the memory of the fallen.”

It was the view of some participants that the Estonian “history” books are fiction. The participants justified and explained their understanding of history with the personal level arguments. Their knowledge was based on the experiences of their ancestors as illustrated in the example given below. This seemed to be a valid argument not to recognize the Estonian official version of history or ignore the Estonian history textbooks.

I think that the very important aspect is our history, which is history of our nation, it should not be taken away from us, or rewritten... I understand, that the Estonian and Russian people assess the same events differently... however, our ancestors experienced it exactly this way and did exactly what they did – why should our children (their descendants) assess their acts from the point of view of the Estonian historians (M42 Estonian citizen)?

It is clear that Russians protect their relatives who gave their lives so that Estonia could
be as it is today, but Estonians are simply brain-washed by the local Estonian mass media and the government (F24 Estonian citizen).

The memory of the Second World War was pointed out to be important for the Russian participants. However, the communist past was regarded as a separate issue. Placing the responsibility on the Russian minorities in Estonia was regarded unfair and problematic. The participants’ concern about Russians being blamed for the historical past was explicitly emphasized in several responses. “There are attempts on the part of the Estonian-speaking society to place the blame for crimes of the Stalin regime on the Russian-speaking population,” “Estonians try to impose on Russians morally that they were occupiers of this land,” or “constant rubbing in the face that you are the children of occupiers” were expressed as disturbing factors that did not allow Russians to feel comfortable living in Estonia.

The participants emphasized, however, the importance of resolving past issues and expressing their expectations toward the majority population. For overcoming the barriers coming from the past it was essential in the participants’ view “not to cast fault for the past on ethnic groups,” “to stop digging in the past” or “to treat local Russian-speakers not like occupiers or aliens from outer space.” The desire for a dialogue was emphasized: “To solve issues about the communist past our authorities should listen to the opinion of the whole population.”

**Lack of the Estonian language proficiency**

The issue of the Estonian language was central throughout the majority of responses. In most cases, it appeared to be the Russians’ Achilles’ heel. Even after a decade of independence the language issue remained a painful topic since many participants acknowledged the source of their problems and their low social status to be due to the lack or poor knowledge of the state language.

Previously discussed deprivation in economic opportunities and their inferior status were often attributed to the lack of sufficient Estonian language proficiency among Russians; for example, “Many considerably smart and educated Russians cannot fill leading positions, only because they do not have the state language proficiency at the corresponding level.” Besides economic disadvantages, Russians who lacked a sufficient level of language knowledge were perceived to have fewer possibilities to
participate in various activities and more limited tertiary education opportunities in Estonia.

The feelings of uncertainty, discomfort, and inferiority in the situations of the inter-ethnic comparisons or interactions were indicative of negative psychological consequences due to the insufficient language proficiency. The participants’ responses showed that the language proficiency affected the economic, social and psychological well-being of Russians:

Due to the average knowledge of the Estonian language we feel uncertainty, we hold on to our workplaces, the living space, we are less mobile in search for work, frequently we have low-paid work and the comfort of our life is lower than that of the titular nation (M42 Estonian citizen).

The participants expressed their dissatisfaction not only regarding their lack of the Estonian language proficiency per se but also because of limited language learning possibilities:

The lack of the Estonian language proficiency as there are no possibilities for learning language free of charge and voluntarily by adult population. Even in schools many children have to pay money for private tutors to be able to reach a certain level of language proficiency. Moreover, not everyone has a talent to acquire a foreign language like not everyone has musical hearing (F51 Estonian citizen).

Even if the need for knowing the language was generally acknowledged, the participants drew the attention to several obstacles to its acquisition. Some of the named reasons were: “expensive language courses,” “it’s hard to learn,” “especially hard for older people” or “many Estonians’ unwillingness to ‘help’ to speak Estonian, to help with studying the language.” The problem was, in the participants’ words, worse in the Russian-speaking regions, where there was an absence of any possibility for language practice.

**Russians preferences (Possibilities for change)**

This overarching topic included three themes that presented the participants’ accounts of their preferences regarding the domains that should be kept and/or changed for their adaptation and positive inter-group relations. These domains included aspects
of the Estonian and Russian cultures and expectations for appropriate state approaches for the Estonian inter-ethnic situation.

*Russian language maintenance versus Estonian language adoption*

The Russian language was the main focus for the participants when they talked about maintaining their culture. The Russian language was unequivocally claimed to be one of the salient aspects of the Russian identity for most of the participants. The preservation and good knowledge of the native language and transmitting it to the younger generation of Russians were highlighted by many participants. They expressed the desire that “The Russian language would be respected equally with Estonian.” Dissatisfaction was expressed regarding the absence of the “official status” of the Russian language and feelings of “disrespect” towards their language.

There were a number of suggestions from the Russian participants in maintaining their native language. Approximately every third Russian participant stressed the importance of receiving education in their native language. Learning the Russian literature and culture in schools should also be a part of education in the view of some participants. “Losing the right to study in their native language” was considered illegitimate, but most of all it reflected the fear for children losing their ethnic identity.

Education in Russian, otherwise children lose their identity. It is evident from life examples, that Russian children, who graduate from Estonian schools, do not know who they are, do not know the history of their historical native land, do not know Orthodoxy. Respectively, to preserve all this, Russian schools are needed, albeit with financing from the Russian Federation with a lot of hours of Estonian language (M32 Estonian citizen).

A few participants emphasized the necessity of mass media to be in the Russian language, including a local newspaper published in the Russian language. In addition, the participants expressed the need for all Estonian laws and acts to be translated into Russian and requested the possibility of receiving information in all state institutions in Russian. These claims were justified through the unique situation of Russians’ migration to Estonia arguing that Russians indeed “did not move abroad” referring to the specific migratory patterns during the Soviet era. The following extract illustrates
the justification of their claims due to the historical immigration situation:

An opportunity to explain yourself in state institutions in the native language, as, in fact, they (Russians) at some stage did not often arrive here of their own will (they were NOT moving abroad) (F54 Estonian citizen).

Introducing bilingualism (i.e. Estonian and Russian were both requested to be official languages in Estonia), was observed as the most common suggestion on improving the status of the language and the general inter-ethnic situation in the country. The majority of the participants claimed that it was important to legalize the status of Russian as the second state language, if not nationwide, then in the regions that are densely populated by Russians. The participants argued that the bilingual approach should be accepted the same way as it was common in some European states. To validate their argument, they referred to the closest neighbour Finland where Swedish was introduced as an official language alongside Finnish. Many participants also attempted to justify their claims by underlining the proportion of the Russian-speaking population, which was sometimes declared to be over 40%. For example, “With 40% of the Russian-speaking population, the state is obliged to have two state languages” (M25 Estonian citizen). With these claims the participants tried to confirm the legitimacy of bilingualism suggested for the state.

Additionally, some participants stressed the general benefit for the inter-ethnic relations if bilingualism would be introduced; for example, “After that very many, if not all, problems would disappear” and “with bilingualism everyone would do something for maintaining a multicultural sphere.” The following extracts illustrate the perceived benefits of bilingualism in particular for peace and harmony:

In order to prevent the opposition in the society in Estonia, I would suggest the second state language – Russian. This would “calm down” the ambitions of the Russian-speaking population (F54 Estonian citizen).

Legalizing two state languages would be the best way for Estonian citizens, for the peace of the population. The economy of the country would only benefit from it. This is the opinion of the majority of people living in Estonia, I guess (F18 Undetermined citizenship).

At the same time, a lot of the participants emphasized the need to know and learn the Estonian language. It was considered the basis for understanding people with whom one lives alongside.
The knowledge of the local language is the basic aspect, without that all the rest is meaningless. With knowledge of the language there will come, if not full understanding of the Estonian culture, then, at least, the possibility of learning and exploring it (M39Estonian citizen).

The participants acknowledged that “the Estonian language has a higher status” and having language proficiency provided them with better and greater opportunities in the society. It was definitely considered as an asset. The opinions ranged from admissions that the ability to speak the Estonian language makes them comfortable within societal circles to suggestions that Russians who are proficient in the language are serious competitors to Estonians in jobs.

Most participants, however, stressed that there should be a better system of teaching the Estonian language for the adult population. The current system was considered absolutely ineffective as “people are not taught the language, but have to pass the exam for the language category.” The expectations of Russians can be illustrated by the following quote:

Good quality instruction of Estonian not for the sake of tests but for everyday human interaction. Joint activities for Russians and Estonians, starting from a young age (F46 Estonian citizen).

While the Estonian language is a part of the curriculum in schools, the adult population is concerned that they could not take part in such opportunities. The participants suggested that Estonian language courses should be more accessible in terms of price for all interested people, in fact many stressed that learning should be free of charge, and with a better quality of instruction. The participants believed that this would stimulate language learning, and there would be more interested people. It was suggested that there should be no pressure.

I agree that one must learn the Estonian language. But it should not be done by the pressure from the top. Let everyone who is willing to learn the Estonian language free of charge and there should be no exams. This way it would be more efficient (F52 Estonian citizen).

*Estonian culture adoption versus maintenance of Russian culture*
Aside from the significance attached to learning the Estonian language, a small number of the participants also noted the importance of learning the Estonian culture, understanding its traditions, following the Estonian media, respecting the Estonian holidays, participating actively in the life of the county, and interacting with Estonians. A few participants believed that Russian people have already adapted to the lifestyle in Estonia.

Apart from adaptation to the national culture, the participants’ responses gave an indication of their stand in terms of their national identity. The data showed that especially for the young generation born in Estonia, they considered Estonia as their native land, expressed loyalty and love, and claimed that they had developed the Estonian national identity.

It is important to understand that Estonia is the motherland, one’s own country. Whom to fight here (F24 Estonian citizen)?

Love towards Estonia like to your own country – this is most important. We live, study, have friends here and we do not want somebody to set us against each other (F18 Undetermined citizenship).

Next to the importance of adapting to the Estonian culture, the participants also asserted the importance of “never forget your own, Russian culture.” Maintenance of the Russian traditions and cultural heritage in Estonia was considered not only essential but also normative. Celebrating Russian holidays, keeping the Orthodox Church were next to language as the most important means of maintaining their culture. However, the expression of the ethnic culture was believed to be limited in Estonia:

Russian people have rich cultural roots going back many centuries, but in Estonia they are not manifested. Estonians have an independent culture that has no place for the Russian-speaking culture (M27 Estonian citizen).

Additionally, several participants noted an antagonism between the Estonian and Russian cultures, and even no need for Russians to adapt to the Estonian culture because “Russians have their own broader culture.” The particular value of Russians’ own culture was stressed in many instances:

Russians have always been the carriers of a broad culture that has been formed throughout the centuries by numerous nations settled in Russia. But Estonians are a “small nation” that tries by all means to maintain its originality (culture) and is capable
of doing a lot for that sake (F39 Estonian citizen).

To remember one’s own roots, to honour one’s own ancestors, be proud of one’s belonging to the big Russian nation, and not to become a minor Estonian (M25 Estonian citizen).

A few participants pointed out a conditional aspect in adapting the Estonian way of life and culture. The Russian participants voiced their willingness to integrate if there was pressure- and offence-free attitude towards Russians from the majority population.

Not to humiliate and offend Russians, then Russians themselves will have a motivation to adapt to the Estonian culture and way of life (F75 Estonian citizen).

If Russians’ rights will not be infringed upon, then it is necessary that there were Estonian and Russian customs (M21 Estonian and Russian citizen).

Every nation should be free even on the territory of another country, but it does not mean that it (the nation) has any right to impose its customs and traditions onto anyone (F51 Estonian citizen).

A Russian person is inquisitive and many-sided, and he gladly learns the Estonian culture, customs, if only he would not be pressured as it is happening now (F53 Russian citizen).

Several participants reflected resistance in their reactions to possible assimilation and wished to maintain their cultural identity even stronger.

Not to give in to the attempts of assimilation and not to lose your own roots. To stop being passive and not allow your children to forget your culture (M19 Undetermined citizenship).

It was also emphasized that the riots of April 2007 had a negative influence on their motivation to adapt to the Estonian culture; for example, “April events showed that there is currently no point to adapt to the Estonian culture and way of life” (M28 Estonian citizen).

**Suggested state approaches and expectations of affirmative action**

With the current state of affairs, the majority of the participants shared opinions regarding the desire to change their perceived low position or “at least in terms of the representation of their interests in the parliament and other governing institutions in the
country (at the moment, it is totally missing)” (M19Russian citizen). Some participants underlined, though, that Russians cannot change the situation themselves, stressing again that the status of “non-Estonians” is lower than the status of “Estonians.” It was argued by one participant that “this initiative should come from the top, not bottom; only in this case a compromise is possible” (M19Undetermined citizenship). At the same time, opposite opinions were expressed as another participant claimed that “Russians would like to and could change their position under the condition of greater activity from Russians themselves” (M32Estonian citizen).

The consideration of the Russians’ interests and the need for a dialogue were expressed as the expectations towards the state. Russians expected that the government would listen to the problems of the population, the policies should include at least some reciprocity in the inter-ethnic relations, and there should be a two-way dialogue between the state and the people.

The Russian participants expressed repeatedly their wish to be accepted by Estonians “instead of being looked at with disdain.” A compromise was expected from Estonians as stressed in the following quote:

Estonians should make steps towards the compromise with Russians living in Estonia. We would like to feel ourselves peaceful and confident in our motherland (F39Estonian citizen).

Mutual respect was viewed as the basis for good relations between Estonians and Russians. Russians would like to receive more respect as an ethnic group and as individuals regardless of their ethnicity. The participants stressed the importance of accepting a multilingual and multicultural Estonia by the native population:

First of all, it is necessary to recognize, at the state level, that the country is not mono-national (as it is written in the Constitution), but there are officially more than one third of people of other nationalities who should have the same rights and conditions as the titular nation (M32Undetermined citizenship).

Understanding and realization that the Estonian language is not native for 30% of the Estonian population. And to move from the mono-cultural policy to the multi-cultural one (F39Estonian citizen).

At the state level the population of Estonia should not be divided into Estonians and Russians. State politics should originate from the fact that the country is multiethnic (F75Estonian citizen).
Several suggestions were offered specifically on ethnic policies. Most of the statements claimed that there should be an easier way of obtaining citizenship for Russians who had been born in Estonia. The participants stated that every citizen who was born, lived, and worked in Estonia “has the right” or should receive citizenship “automatically,” without any additional examinations and conditions. The opposite was considered unfair and “abnormal” if the people who were born in Estonia had to “prove their belonging” to the country.

The current citizenship law is one-sided. Clearly, it is set for the preservation of nationality - Estonians, but people who lived all their life on this land, have given their best years to this country should have the rights to receive citizenship "concessionally" (M32 Estonian citizen).

All people born in Estonia should automatically be citizens of Estonia, as they do not even “theoretically” have another motherland (F51 Estonian citizen).

The Russian participants showed agreement that receiving citizenship "by a zero approach" should be made possible for all those people who were living in Estonia during the restoration of independence. However, a different approach was suggested for the new migrants:

The zero approach, that is all people, who were living in Estonia and had a residence permit before 1991, receive citizenship automatically. Those, who arrived later, take the exam for citizenship in 5 years, or they simply take the loyalty oath to the state (M58 Estonian citizen).

It was also stressed that the integration programme should be focused on “promoting human relationships among the whole population, upbringing youth in friendly and respectful relations (F57 Estonian citizen)” and suggested an inter-ethnic contact from early ages:

Mixing Russians and Estonians starting from kindergartens and finishing in the workplace, so that there would be no division of nationalities (F24 Estonian citizen).

In summary, the Russian participants’ suggestions indicated a need for affirmative action from the majority population.
The Analysis of the Estonian Responses

Thirteen themes presenting similar patterns were obtained while analysing the responses from the Estonian-speaking respondents. These themes were arranged under three overarching topics, as follows: 1) Position of Russians: Justification of the status quo of intergroup relations; 2) Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians); 3) Estonians’ preferences (Possibilities for change)

Position of Russians: Justification of status quo of intergroup relations

Five themes were collated under this overarching topic that indicated the Estonians' justification of status quo in the intergroup relations. These themes were: the perceived satisfaction of Russians, discrimination – moderate awareness versus denial, the legitimacy of ethnic policies, personal responsibility for adjustment and mixed perceptions of the inter-ethnic relations.

Perceived satisfaction of Russians

In general, the Estonian participants perceived that the majority of Russians had settled and arranged their lives successfully in Estonia and were satisfied with their lives; for example, “The majority of them are currently quite well off and do not complain.” Those participants who knew Russians personally as friends or neighbours emphasised that the latter were coping well and that no difference could be seen compared to Estonians hence there should be no reasons for any dissatisfaction. Mostly, the participants noted that Russians were satisfied with the state of the Estonian economy, and Estonia’s belonging to EU provided them with freedom of movement except for non-citizens, who do not have the same privilege.

A comparison with life in Russia was the main point used by the participants to argue that Russians are satisfied with their lives in Estonia. They claimed that Russians should be satisfied because Estonia has a higher standard of living than Russia, the state system is considerably better, and there is more freedom and democracy. According to a few participants, Russians would have gone back to Russia if the attitudes towards them were too negative in Estonia.
Satisfaction – life here in general is better than in Russia. Hopefully, they earn more here than it would be possible in Russia, and the living environment in Estonia is generally better. There are more of all kinds of opportunities, and the quality of life on the whole should be higher than in Russia. /.../ Additionally, as Estonian citizens, they can easily travel to the EU countries. And here we have democracy and the “civil society” that in principle should take (more) care of each individual. /.../ Outside Estonia the Estonian Russians (especially the younger ones) are certainly proud that they have come from Estonia. As a state, the Estonian reputation is good, whereas Russia’s is not. /.../ Estonia is associated with progress and Europeanness, the quality of life is known to be better here, although local Russians have their own problems … but in any case their life here is better than that of Russians in Russia (F28).

Having Russian-speaking schools in Estonia was also stressed as one of the incentives for satisfaction: “Satisfaction is because they can learn in Russian schools in Estonia that many countries do not offer apparently!” The privilege to be able to speak their native language in their public spheres was also emphasized by some Estonian participants.

Estonians have made a lot of concessions. At the doctor’s they can still get by with the Russian language. Most of the institutions have compromised with the Russian-speaking population. They receive information in their mother tongue, but in fact it gives them an additional satisfaction (F30).

**Discrimination – moderate awareness versus denial**

The Estonians’ responses showed that only when compared to the past, they recognised that the Russians’ position had declined or was not as good as before, but when compared to Estonians in the present time, then no difference in status was admitted by the majority of the participants (with some exceptions like language proficiency that will be discussed in the following themes). While the reversed situation was recognised, Estonians argued that Russians had not been oppressed after the change of regime.

Prior to the restoration of the Estonian independence everything was easier. Estonian Russians felt themselves here like in their own country, Estonianism and Estonians were oppressed. Everything belonged to Russians, because Russia had occupied us.
Now the situation is reversed, only with the difference that no-one oppresses anyone (F31).

Most of the participants perceived Russians to be equal to them in terms of their social status and inter-ethnic comparisons; however, some added “but they still have the mentality of a big nation.” Several participants argued that there was no difference made on an ethnic basis. The majority of Russians felt good and secure when they compared themselves to Estonians as “there is no reason to feel bad.” If Russians continued living in Estonia, it was an indicator for Estonians that Russians feel good about themselves in the inter-ethnic comparisons.

They feel themselves equal to the Estonian citizens. At least, this became apparent during the Bronze Night when all claimed that they were kicked out of their native land. They perceive Estonia as their home (F26).

The participants were generally aware that Russians raised the issue of discrimination, commenting that “it seems that they think that they are not treated equally here.” However, Estonians would often disagree that there was discrimination against Russians.

Several participants emphasised that Estonians did not treat Russians differently than the representatives of any other ethnic groups. The participants referred to them as “the majority of Russians,” who considered themselves as full citizens and did not think that they experienced discrimination. In other cases, the reasons for discrimination were simply not regarded as valid.

Many feel themselves discriminated against, that they are treated badly. Most of the times it is made up, maybe it is a kind of defence mechanism. /…/ Estonian Russians occasionally feel themselves exaggeratedly discriminated against (F38).

Their social status is in my opinion equal to Estonians. I have not noticed any discrimination in relations with Russians (F30).

On a few occasions the situation of Russians in Estonia was even viewed with sarcasm as if paraphrasing Russians: “We are oppressed – as we cannot do everything suitable/ pleasant for ourselves anywhere anytime.” The participants also remarked that at any opportunity Russians would express their dissatisfaction and make claims, and think that they “are loved less everywhere.”
Only a few participants acknowledged that Russians have somewhat lower social status in the society at the present time and that they have limited options in job opportunities, in their incomes and in social networks. Even if this lower position was acknowledged, it was not considered something unique if compared to the migrants’ position anywhere, implying that the migrants’ social status is universally lower compared to the majority population in any country.

Any examples of the participants’ recognition that Russians experienced discrimination were rare. Few participants admitted that at the beginning of the independence, the new regime was not welcoming for Russians, who mostly had migrated to Estonia through organised immigration programmes, and their adaptation was not made easier from the side of the new state.

After the independence, Estonian Russians had to begin to prove themselves and make a real effort in order to survive and be successful. Estonians became masters, and their attitude towards Russians was like towards unwanted immigrants. It was indeed desired that Russians would leave Estonia, and would go “back home,” and it was not desired to give them Estonian citizenship, and most of all to those who did not speak the language (F28).

However, it was pointed out that this period was over, when Russians considered themselves “secondary.” Only one participant noted that despite the sufficient cultural resources such as language proficiency, ‘Russian’ itself could be used as an offensive label. Additionally, she admitted the possibility of own-group preference in employment (i.e., Estonians employ Estonians).

It depends on how integrated a person is. If one speaks the Estonian language and has a proper job, then absolutely fine, otherwise rather bad. But even then when everything is fine, they might feel themselves bad deep inside because of their Russian origin, as ‘Russian’ is for some (not very smart) Estonians a term of abuse. But these are rather people with an inferiority complex, I guess. /…/ Even though the Estonian language proficiency opens doors, I still believe that their road is a bit narrower than for the Estonians. However, those who make an effort, and are Estonian-minded, should not have big problems. But it depends on a person and on each case. /…/ However, I do not know what it is for an Estonian Russian to find a job and friends here in Estonia. I assume that employment is given first of all to Estonians (in Estonian companies/organisations), and only then to a person of the Russian background, unless this Russian is some top specialist (F28).
Further on, the same participant added that having a personal perception of discrimination was a sufficient reason for dissatisfaction.

If Estonian Russians feel themselves discriminated against in whatever sense and are also discriminated against in reality, then it is also very frustrating. Those, who are not integrated into society, cannot be quite happy. The family circle only is not satisfying for everyone, in a broader sense, a person would like to be accepted at every level and participate actively in the surrounding life. It is known that Russians are not well-integrated here (F28).

Most participants did not acknowledge that there is discrimination since the expectations toward ethnic minorities regarding meeting the language requirements and adjusting to the state system were considered legitimate:

I simply think, that Estonia has become (and should be by right) more Estonian-minded than it was before the restoration of the independence. I personally think that there is nothing wrong with the position of Estonian Russians, they are treated equally with Estonians. In order to live in Estonia, one must, naturally, speak the Estonian language, melt into the Estonian-minded environment. Therefore one cannot talk about discrimination (F21).

**Legitimacy of ethnic policies**

In the opinion of the majority of the participants, different acts concerning ethnic minorities were considered justified, fair and in accordance with any sovereign state policies regarding the non-native population. The participants were either protective of the Estonian state and culture, arguing that “These acts are strict, but are important from the perspective of the continuation of the Estonian state, Estonian culture and language,” and “it would be worthless to give our own country away to the incomers just like that,” or exclusive by highlighting that “it is too early to let immigrants elect our parliament,” and “No citizenship without language knowledge.” The demands of knowing the state language were considered especially legitimate and normative; for example, “The Estonian language should be kept and maintained, all people living in Estonia must know the state language and be able to communicate in it, and the Russian language as the second state language would not be acceptable.” It was commonly declared that “it is normal that every citizen speaks the state language,” and
the legitimacy of these claims was often confirmed by comparisons to other countries; for example, “a law about knowing a state language is established worldwide. Here one must not make a concession.”

Estonian laws are in accord with international legislation and democratic principles. It is incomprehensible for Estonians that many non-Estonian-speaking people do not understand that Estonia has already been an independent state for 15 years and, not a part of the USSR or Russia or their vassal. If those people lived in some other European or world state, they would have to pass the language exam, know the history of that country, its culture and be loyal to that country. Job there would also depend on language the proficiency (F59).

Some participants emphasized that the citizenship and language acts are more lenient in Estonia than in many other countries:

Our Language Act is more liberal than in most of our neighbouring countries. In several countries citizenship and language acts together are much stricter than in Estonia. Foam that is stirred up is caused by the fact that Russia does not give up what she considers hers” (M38).

Although there were some opposing views regarding the recent education policy,13 most of the participants very strongly supported the Estonian language of instruction in schools, and argued that many Russian-speaking schools in Estonia were not particularly Estonian-friendly; for example, “I support that it is established by law that the Estonian language education be compulsory and other conditions that would make one consider the fact that one lives in the Estonian Republic” or “The language of instruction in schools – Estonian.” These participants saw it as a positive phenomenon because this would help young people not only learn the Estonian language better, but also adjust to the local culture.

However, there were several participants who favoured an idea that there should remain an opportunity to study in one’s native language. Alternatively, the participants believed that the school reform should be implemented only with the consent of Russians and should not be unilaterally enforced. In the case of Russian’s lack of motivation, it would be a waste of resources and might cause additional tensions. It was voiced by few participants that the implementation was premature and not yet

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13 The education policy concerned the transition to a partial subject instruction in Estonian in upper secondary schools with the Russian language instruction, launched from September 2007.
manageable as there were not enough teachers and students were not well prepared for it. However, the positive side of the reform was also seen by few sceptical participants; for example:

This is a complicated issue. Indeed. Perhaps it was still too early for that!? At the same time, these are the children born in the 90s who have had a possibility to grow up as bilingual, and this should not be difficult for them … but those who have not received good enough instruction of the Estonian language before or during secondary school, what happens to them? In general, I support the education in one’s own native language until the end of secondary school, because it gives the possibility to acquire it to 100%. On the other hand, the Estonian language Gymnasium opens doors to university and better jobs. So far, many Estonian Russians have not gone to university, at least not in Estonia … the coin with two sides, as usual (F28).

On a few occasions, the current legislative acts were considered to facilitate adjustment to the Estonian way of life; for example, “immigrants must be pushed in a positive sense – otherwise nothing would change,” or “I believe that current acts and other legislation also facilitate the situation of Russians themselves as they make it clear what and how one should act in order to manage life here and that all would be equal” (F21).

There were only a few general remarks that the requirements for receiving citizenship were too strict, and the act should be lenient when it comes to requiring strict language proficiency from older people. The same general comments were presented regarding the requirements of the Language Act that they could be made a bit easier.

**Personal responsibility for adjustment**

This theme emerged from the responses that emphasize an individual’s willingness and ability to achieve a higher social status. First of all, several participants differentiated between different types of Russians, emphasising that there were different Estonian Russians.

There are different Russians. Some, who have knowledge and desire, would go far. Others, who do not have a desire, do not reach anywhere. Those are the majority, I guess, they are unwilling to learn the language, and they just growl without a reason (M33).
Many participants placed a lot of emphasis on the personal responsibility regarding the well-being and the status that Russians occupy in the society. It was stressed that, those who think positively were also treated accordingly, and those who made an effort, and who have an Estonian-mind set, did not have big problems.

One, who has wanted, has reached somewhere and is satisfied as we are. But who do not want … they feel themselves oppressed (M33).

The majority is satisfied with life, and, in my opinion, have adjusted well. As to those who are dissatisfied, the main reason for their dissatisfaction is an inability to adjust to their surrounding conditions and also the lack of desire for this (M38).

Dissatisfaction with this and that, and also with life is mostly related to a person himself. If you complain all the time, do not want to study in school, do not hold on to any job position – of course it will make you dissatisfied, especially towards successful people and also the state (M62).

For many participants the position of Russians in the society depended on the level of their adjustment – that is Estonian Russians who were well adjusted, had the same position as Estonians; for example, “I believe that those Estonian Russians, who are well adjusted, are satisfied with their position.”

The same arguments were presented regarding the inter-ethnic comparisons. The way Estonian Russians felt themselves in comparison to Estonians, depended on a particular person and his/her position or “integratedness.” Estonians stressed that there were many who “have melted” into the Estonian life and their ethnicity did not play a significant role:

The majority thinks definitely that they are not equal to Estonians. I personally think that this is not the case. If one acquires the Estonian language, tries and wants to melt into the Estonian society, then they are all equal to Estonians. Their own attitudes should be positive, and they should acknowledge that in fact they live in Estonia and not in Russia (F21).

Estonians considered that everyone’s adjustment was in their own hands. Hence, it is the question of their willingness and mindset because no obstacles on an ethnic level were seen.

There are no direct reasons for dissatisfaction. Who is willing to adjust to the society, can do it very successfully, and there are no obstacles created on an ethnic basis. Those,
who consider themselves Russians of Russia (not Estonian Russians) and therefore are
more under the influence of Russia, have a reason to be dissatisfied. Therefore, the
reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction depend first of all on a person’s mindset and
desires (M32).
In general it seems to me that those who are positive themselves and towards Estonia,
who have good will, then there is nothing wrong with their life here. Everyone must try
and make efforts anyway. We have our own Estonian Russian stars who have a very
good position /…/ I think they are well recognised and appreciated by Estonians. But
among “ordinary people” it is apparently not that easy regarding achievement of a
social status. Although well-known people have earned themselves their position, not
all are as talented as them, but still the same people who need an accepted position in
the society (F28).

A few participants held Russians responsible not only for their failure to
integrate but also for the ineffectiveness of the integration programme. The opinions
ranged from rather sarcastic comments like “too high requirements in comparison to
Russians’ learning capability” to simply indicating the lack of motivation from
Russians’ side; for example, “I think that they would not make an effort to change
themselves and integrate in our society” or “Very slow progress, it seems that it has
only one-sided efforts. No-one can be dragged along if one does not have a desire to
integrate.” Russians were expected to make an effort themselves to integrate into the
society. The participants believed that a lot has been done from the side of the state and
it was time for those involved to take steps from their side as well.

Mixed perceptions of the inter-ethnic relations

Many participants claimed that on a daily basis the relationships between
Estonians and Russians were good or normal, and some stressed that there is no
differentiation between ethnicities in personal level interactions:
In most of the networks (especially among educated youth and in several work teams)
the interaction on an everyday level is normal. In some social groups there are
misunderstandings and non-acceptance of each other. Middle-aged and elder Russians
often have problems with an insufficient level of the Estonian language, which is
hindering their normal communication with Estonians, especially when the latter cannot
or do not want to speak Russian (M30).
Left aside extreme cases like neo-Nazis and others, I have not seen any conflicts on an ethnic basis in Estonia. The last clashes between Estonians and Russians go back to 1980s, and they were also minor mutual tussles. So, the nature of the relationship is good. The main characteristics are peaceful co-existence and no differentiation between ethnic groups. P.S. If a Russian has the Estonian language proficiency and has totally melted into society, it gives him more value in the eyes of Estonians (M32).

Mutual respect was considered to be the basis of good relationship, implying that if a person treated the other one with respect and understanding, then there should be no hostility between them. Some participants considered Russians as even more respectful than Estonians:

Those Russians, with whom I interact, are respectful towards Estonians. In general, Russians are more respectful than Estonians, especially towards those who also treat them respectfully (F30).

I do not know a single Russian who would treat me badly only because I am Estonian (F30).

Aside from the perceptions of neutral or positive relationships, more opinions endorsing the opposite were expressed, especially in regards to general inter-ethnic relations in the society: “Among the grassroots people the relationships are good but generally speaking the relationships are in fact hostile.” Both sides were held responsible for the negative relations; for example, “Estonian Russians’ intolerance towards Estonians” versus “Estonian open and hidden hostility” or “Estonians simply hate Estonian Russians”.

Several participants referred to the negative relationships by stressing that relations had become more intense, so that there were more criticisms, stronger antagonism, and an increase in the direct ill-natured attitudes. Some participants stressed explicitly the separation between “native people versus those who arrived/ were brought in after WWII.”

In the context of the inter-ethnic relations, many responses reflected the ethnic stereotypes and certain traits that characterise one or the other ethnic group. Among the neutral or positive characteristics, Russians were considered by Estonians to be more extraverted, straightforward, open, communicative, brave and fearless than Estonians. The character differences were regarded to be part of the cultural differences highlighting that “Russians are full of zest, joyous and cheerful, whereas Estonians are
inert, slow and introverted.” However, there were far more negative characteristics associated with Russians; for example, they were characterised by Estonians as being noisy, obtrusive, stubborn, aggressive, disorderly, lazy, rootless and having a desire to dominate.

Real Estonians are more peaceful than Estonian Russians. Estonian Russians are arrogant and think too much of themselves (M35).
In general, both ethnic groups keep to themselves. It seems that Estonians are by dint of previous habit a bit more tolerant than Russians (M38).

The differentiation between the younger and older generations was also made:

The characteristics of the relationship are such: young Estonian Russians fight, shout and vandalise, therefore they do not have the best relationships with the Estonian youth due to their behaviour. Older people are more peaceful and stable, at least I have met a polite and helpful Russian (from the older generation) (F18).

The “Bronze Night” did not pass without leaving a mark on the relationship between Estonians and Russians. The riots were a clear indicator for the Estonian participants that the inter-ethnic relations were not good. Several Estonians emphasised that a real underlying issue was not the transfer of the Bronze Soldier per se but rather that Russian people had unleashed the long held anger and aggression towards Estonia.

The Bronze Soldier was seen by some Estonian participants as a valve that had released the long accumulated tension. It was suggested that the transfer had been ill-timed since the current relationship between Estonians and Russians has become worse. Russians wanted to show that Estonia is their motherland and they also have rights. It was believed that if the Bronze Soldier had been removed many years ago, there would not have been such a scandal. By the time of the removal, the Russians were already negatively minded and were showing their opposition to the society.

The smashing and vandalising were considered to be more related to the rebellion than to the Bronze Soldier itself; for example, “Actually, Estonians have been calm about this soldier issue. Russians cannot hold their fists still, and they fight not because this soldier would mean something for them, but just to be able to vandalise.” On one occasion, it was simply stated that the Russian temperament is quite powerful and explosive.

Several participants referred to the agitation of inter-ethnic tensions, especially
regarding the ethnic riots, in which the Bronze Soldier was seen just an excuse to foment the ethnic hatred:

The real reasons for the riots were not related to the transfer of the monument. This was given as an excuse (an opportunity to take an advantage of the suitable heated situation between Estonians and Russians), in order to be able to rebel. The violators had a perfect opportunity for smashing, fighting to show their dislike towards Estonians and against how badly Russians are treated in Estonia (F21).

It was the right time for some political forces to use an opportunity to publicly confront Estonians and Russian-speaking populations (F38).

Some participants noted that after the April events, both sides felt uncomfortable. The views of the general Estonian population about Russians after the riots are summarized by the following participant, although she indicated that this was the opinion of “less intelligent Estonians:”

Worse than that, after the Bronze Night many (less intelligent Estonians) think apparently that Russians are indeed savages and rebels, who insanely destroy what should be their home. From that perspective it is much harder for them now to live in Estonia / have a position. (F28).

At the same time, many hoped for the improvement of relationships as indicated by the same participant:

However, there are also many of those, who think that after the April events “everything is over” now. But I believe that this was, on the contrary, in some way an awakening and that time can heal the wounds. If people become anyway more reasonable and open in today’s globalising world, then there is hope for the improvement of relationships between Estonians and Estonian Russians, which could be called a real progress. Currently, we do not socialise with each other much … (F28)

**Barriers for positive intergroup relations (and adaptation of Russians)**

Six themes were collapsed under this overarching category that represented the barriers or obstacles for positive intergroup relations and/or adaptation of Russians in Estonia. These were: Russians’ non-adjustment to power reversal, perceived threat, different meanings of history, separated communities, cultural differences, and issues of
language proficiency.

_Reverse power position and Russians’ nostalgia for the past_

While in general Estonians perceived Russians to be satisfied and found a basis for this, they acknowledged the latter’s dissatisfaction mostly due to the reversal of the Russians’ previous superior position. The Estonian participants acknowledged that the Russians’ status had changed compared to the one they had during the Soviet time. In the participants’ perceptions, Russians previously considered themselves “the masters of the house” in the political sense, but after the restoration of independence they suddenly became an ethnic minority and recognised that their power position had been lost. It was emphasised that previously Russians had felt themselves equal to Estonians or even superior, which did not encourage their efforts to adapt to a new cultural context, while after the collapse of the Soviet Union their position declined and that raised the need for a change and adjustment to the surroundings.

Prior to the restoration of independence they had the position of power in Estonia, there was no necessity to adapt to the surroundings, because it was possible to adjust the surroundings according to their wish, but currently the situation is reversed and they should adapt to the surroundings (M38).

Estonians recognised the Russians’ resistance to such a transition highlighting that an average Russian-speaking person thinks that the previous status had been lost unjustly. Due to the past, Russians are perceived to consider themselves in the small Estonian state as the representatives of the nation of a great state. Estonians view that Russians are dissatisfied because being former representatives of the big nation they are now “forced” to live according to the Estonian laws. Some participants described it as “the inferiority complex” due to Russians shifting from being “the master race to ordinary people after the collapse of the USSR and unacceptance of that.” Prior to the independence, Russians felt more protected and their self-esteem was higher due to the “illusory support from their ‘real motherland,’” but after the change of the regime the “pride and self-esteem common to the subordinates of a big nation got a big blow,” and they felt humiliated.

With such statements as “They are not satisfied with the Estonians’ desire to be a master in their own state,” Estonians admitted Russians’ dissatisfaction but did not
agree on these reasons as they felt that Russians did not want to accept the legitimacy of the current state of affairs due to the change of the political regime.

Many Estonians emphasised that Russians had better opportunities before the restoration of independence because of political reasons, that is they had been represented in many leading positions, especially in the state administrative areas, which was opposite for Estonians. Estonians were perceived to have fewer opportunities back then. Many Estonians perceived that the major difficulties of Russians were related to adjusting to the new political context and experiencing nostalgia for their former superior status in “good old Soviet times.” In views of Estonians, some Russians wished Estonia to be part of Russia again and considered the events of 1991 leading to the Estonian separation from the Soviet Union as unfair. Comparisons with the old times, however, were seen as the main obstacle for the Russians’ adaptation and good inter-ethnic relations.

The descendants of the former Russian military men who have stayed to live in Estonia and also those, mostly the Russian-speaking population, who came to live in Estonia during the directed immigration period, have difficulties adjusting to being citizens of the new state that has a completely different political approach. The big Russian soul was used to the fact that Estonia was only a tiny part of a big country. Since the restoration of the Estonian Republic this has been an internal obstacle for this bit of people, who has not been willing in principle to learn the Estonian language, and therefore blamed Estonians for their discrimination. However, this bulk of people cannot be considered to be unable to learn. Most of the Russian-speaking salespersons working in markets are able to speak Finnish with Finnish people (F56).

In the Estonians’ view, the Russians’ adjustment depended in many respects on whether a person had accepted the changes of the state regimes or still lived in the past. Those who were still full of internal resentment due to the change were perceived to have problems.

If they were used to their lives being directed by Moscow but now feel they have to obey to the Estonian government, then they feel themselves pushed aside. However if they show the support for the government, then life should be beautiful (F58).

I think that the majority of Estonian Russians who comprehend the changes of 1990s, have adjusted and feel themselves as full members of the society. This smaller part that are prone to manipulations, however, “fight” in the name of the restoration of the USSR without understanding the actual nature of the situation (F59).
Perceived threats

Relating to the Russians’ nostalgia for their former status, many participants pointed out that Russians would like to change their current status by gaining back their previous superior position, so that they will be again in the first place and all services will again be in Russian. Russians’ desire regarding the restoration of their former status was encapsulated in the participants’ expressions such as “Russians would like to ‘seize’ the power,” “to take the position of Estonians,” or in the following comment: “Currently, the leaders of Estonia are Estonians, but Estonian Russians would like to have those positions for themselves.” Russians’ desire to change their status was seen even if the status difference between Estonians and Russians was not recognised; for example, “The position of Estonian Russians in the Estonian society is the same as that of Estonians. They would naturally like to change it because they are the superior nation. That is what they think” or “Sometimes it seems that they would like more rights and better status than Estonians.” These perceptions clearly indicated that Estonians did not trust local Russians. The awareness of the Russians’ willingness to re-establish their former position endangers the current power status of Estonians and thus challenges inter-ethnic relations in general.

Furthermore, Russia was perceived as a serious source of threat for the inter-ethnic relations and the integration of Russians in Estonia. The Estonian geo-political location, with the Russian Federation as its north-east side neighbour, on its own fuelled the perception that Russia is dangerous, especially considering the fact that the north-east region of Estonia has a high concentration of Russian-speaking minorities.

The influence of Russia on the local Russians due to its proximity and indirect ‘presence’ was reflected in the responses of the Estonian participants. The most substantial interference from Russia was seen in relation to the ethnic riots around the Bronze Soldier. Several participants believed that the initiators of the riots were related to Russia:

I think that the transfer of the monument leading to the April events was just an excuse to initiate the riots that were actually directed by Moscow. It is clear historically that Moscow (Russia) does everything to discredit Estonia in front of Europe and the rest of the world. The Kremlin cannot forgive that Estonia slipped away from their fingers in 1990 (F59).
Additionally, participants saw constant interfering from their “big eastern neighbour” as one obstacle for the integration of Russians in Estonia; for example, “Problems have arisen from the issue that people listen to and believe the anti-Estonia propaganda coming from Russia” or “A big obstacle of integration in Estonia is the widely available Russian TV-channels and other media, through which the majority of local Estonian Russians consume the Russian propaganda on an everyday basis.” Thus, it was highlighted by few participants that Russians living in Estonia act upon the information and suggestions coming from Russia. Some participants perceived Russia’s influence on the behaviour and attitudes of Estonian Russians; for example, “Russians are more pretentious, because they sense that they have the whole of Russia at their back.”

**Different meanings of history**

The participants noted that Russians did not know about the Estonian history before or during the Soviet time and were currently still unaware as to continue justifying the deeds of the Soviet Union. From the Estonians’ view, the history that Russians taught during the USSR time portrayed them as liberators and superior to all, and many had not re-assessed those beliefs; for example, “They have been taught history that does not have information about the war between Russia and Estonia … in our history it is very present.” As a consequence, it was highlighted that “part of the older generation still feels themselves as liberators of Estonia from fascists,” and the Bronze Soldier was considered to be a symbol of war victory.

The riots of April 2007 were a clear indication for Estonians of local Russians’ insufficient knowledge of history (including the Estonian and Russian histories). The views of the Estonian participants about Russians’ different perspectives or lack of understanding of the historical events are illustrated by the following quotes: “being unfamiliar with the history. The Russian-speaking population is taught a history that does not correspond to the truth. It was revealed after the April events” or “most of the Russian Estonians’ inability to look back at the events of the first half of the last century (WWII) soberly and calmly.”

The participants showed concern about teaching history in schools since the riots were an indication of a deficient understanding of Estonian history by the Russian youth who were the main rioters. Influence was also seen to be coming from their
families where the mindset was believed to be transmitted through generations.

The influence of history on the inter-ethnic relations was also expressed by several participants. The nature of the relationship was generally considered conservative, as from the Estonians’ side there was a “certain subconscious attitude” that comes from the history; for example, “The elder generation of Estonians does not find interaction ‘relaxing’ as 50 years of occupation have been tiring for them.” A different historical background was named as the main reason why Estonians and Russians did not mix during the Soviet time.

Only a few participants saw the Russians holding different views on history out of self-protective reasons; for example “I can understand from the human point of view, that no-one would like to recognise/accept that ‘I am an occupier or their descendant’.”

Separated communities

Many participants highlighted positive and negative aspects in the inter-ethnic relations, but several of them stressed that most often the relationships were actually tepid. Even if the relationship was perceived as positive, it was superficial and was not regarded as a true friendship. The reason for that was argued that both ethnic groups live in “two different worlds.”

It seems to me that people are mostly superficially friendly. Simply polite in the bus or on the street, they say hello to their neighbours and sometimes exchange a couple of sentences, but as far as I know, this kind of communication will never develop into a more close interaction or friendship. Only those Estonian Russians with a very good Estonian language proficiency have a chance for something like that. Estonians, in my opinion, are slightly rejecting Russians in that sense. But I don’t know if Russians themselves would have any interest. /…/ Certainly, there are also many Estonians who do not want to have anything to do with Russians, and in the same time certainly also Russians, who do not regard Estonians well either. This is something like ignorance. /…/ People live side by side, but do not interfere with each other – there are two different worlds. I don’t actually have any friends of the Russian ethnic origin. And I don’t even know why…. I guess I have not come across with Estonian Russians, which in turn means that we indeed live in two different worlds (F28).

On several occasions it was stated by the participants that in general both ethnic groups kept to themselves and did not socialise with each other. Estonians were
perceived to prefer to interact with Estonians and Russians with Russians, that is members of their ethnic groups, with whom one shares a common language, customs and culture.

On several occasions Russians were perceived to keep their distance by choice, what thereby placed the responsibility upon the Estonian Russians themselves; for example, “More often one can encounter Russian-speaking people who live in seclusion and do not wish to interact with Estonians”, or “The Russian community has lived too secluded in Estonia, and they lack the understanding about how Estonians think and why they think this way.” Some participants, however, perceived separation to be the case only for the ‘non-integrated’ or non-assimilated individuals, who are perceived to live in their own state:

Those Estonian Russians who have melted into here have very good relationships with Estonians, but those who have not, they interact rather with their co-nationals and do not want to hear anything about Estonians or even despise them (F31).

*Cultural differences*

Common statements were made regarding Estonians and Russians having different cultural backgrounds. The participants view that the cultural differences revealed themselves in language, religion, way of life, habits, celebrating different holidays in their own fashion, different customs in family relations, different clothing (Russians value appearance, while in the choice of clothes Estonians are viewed more as modest):

The cultures are in fact very different. Russians are already known from the old times as good traders and businessmen. They are a rather nomadic nation. Estonians are more settlers (M62).

Russians and Estonians have different temperaments. Different literature is read, different television is watched, different memories are heard at home as cultural influence factors. Tastes are different (e.g. choice of colour) (F28).

Having different holidays and different ways of celebrating holidays were particularly highlighted by several participants:

Definitely, the celebration of several holidays is different. There are events, that Estonians celebrate and Russians do not, and vice versa. Also, the celebration of holidays at different times (e.g. Christmas). This comes from different religions, I
guess. Russians have in fact their own customs and traditions that have become rooted despite the fact that they live in Estonia. (F21).

Some participants stressed that differences come from different state powers, also the size difference of the cultural heritage of a big and a small nation. The example can be seen in the following quote.

Language and literature and all ethno culture deriving from it (on the other hand we know each other’s language and literature to a lesser or greater extent and this is also a meeting point at the same time). Customs and practices that every nation holds are different; temperament, behaviour – I wonder where it comes from. Why are Estonians and Russians so different in this aspect?! And then in this context another issue is, that many Estonian Russians have, is that they have a sense of one more motherland somewhere else, a connecting point, a provider and carrier of the culture – Russia – big and powerful. Estonians, however, have always been a slave nation and suffered a lot and ought to fight for their freedom, and their biggest dream has been to become the master in their own land. Thus history also influences what we are. And also whether we come from a big or small nation… (F28)

The same participant stated, however, that the familiarity with each others’ languages and literature, which she considered the sources of cultural differences, was the unifying point of both ethnic groups.

*Language proficiency – an obstacle and condition for adjustment*

In the Estonians’ view, language proficiency was often used as a criterion for defining the Russians’ level of adjustment. It was considered as a main conditional aspect for the well-being and satisfaction of Russians as well as a prerequisite for good inter-ethnic relations. Good language proficiency was believed to offer Russians equality with Estonians in terms of a social position and career opportunities. Estonians recognized that insufficient language proficiency restricted receiving the Estonian citizenship and had implications for employment, so that it reduced Russians’ chances of finding a job or they usually got worse or less paid jobs. Downward mobility due to insufficient language ability was noted by a few participants who pointed out that many highly educated Russians worked as cleaners or in construction companies after the transition. However, participants believed that if a person of a Russian ethnicity spoke
the Estonian language, he or she had no difficulty finding a suitable job. In addition, claims were made that if the state language was acquired, then there was no difference whether one was an Estonian or an Estonian Russian. Estonians believed that the sooner Russians realise that one should speak the state language, the sooner their problems and discrimination claims would disappear. Those who spoke the Estonian language were regarded better, their social status was considered to be at par with Estonians, and they were accepted better.

A few participants criticized that “some Russians would still like others to speak only Russian to them, and they would not even try to learn the local language, despite the fact that they were born and grew up here.” Such expressions as one “does not want to,” “is not interested” or “is unwilling to learn” the language were rather common as explanations for their maladjustment.

The lack of language proficiency was an indication for Estonians that Russians were not motivated to make an effort to be part of the society:

The main reasons for satisfaction are among those Estonian Russians, who have language proficiency, have received a good job, have nicely adjusted to the Estonian environment, those are obviously satisfied with all aspects of their life. The other group consists of those, who do not have language proficiency, being lazy to do anything themselves, have come here to search for better life and discovered that it is not that easy, but are not willing to make any effort themselves. Such Estonian Russians are dissatisfied with everything, they blame the government that it does not legalise the Russian language as the second state language, and they are dissatisfied that they cannot find jobs because of their lack of language proficiency and they are dissatisfied about everything, because according to them, it is not their fault but [blame] Estonians and Estonian state (F31).

Some participants admitted that Russians without language proficiency are not accepted by Estonians that in turn makes them withdraw from the native population.

Those who do not speak the Estonian language, their position is not very good. They are alas even hated by some of the people, and others just do not accept them. Many relate to them neutrally because they simply do not pay any attention to Estonian Russians. But a cold and distanced attitude is in my opinion also bad and sad. /…/ One, who does not speak the language, inevitably lives exclusively in the Russian community and consumes only the Russian media and this isolates them from the Estonian society even more, and all this makes them in some sense outsiders here. In
that context nothing good can happen to Estonian Russians (F28).

Language proficiency was also named as a criterion for good inter-ethnic relations. The Estonian participants highlighted again that if Russians’ language proficiency in Estonian is sufficient, it makes relationships easier, while the lack of language knowledge is hindering good relationships.

Often language becomes an obstacle in the interaction. Especially the younger generation [of Estonians] cannot speak Russian and also Russians (especially elder) do not make an effort to acquire the [Estonian] language. But if one speaks the language and people can understand each other, then the relationships are also good (F21).

Estonians claimed that migrants in any country have to learn a local language. They were discontented that in Estonia one can still manage with the Russian language, which does not motivate many Russians to learn the Estonian language. Estonians were discontent that in the service industry one can encounter Russian-speaking workers, whose knowledge of the Estonian language was not adequate. The participants argued that Estonians as a native population do not want to be compelled to speak other than their native language in their home country; for example, “An Estonian does not want to speak Russian in his own home, I think, and requests language knowledge from incomers (F28),” or “Estonians have difficulties understanding why they should speak Russian in their land and this creates resentment for Estonians and tensions in interactions with Russians (F30).” It was suggested that the “too indulgent” integration policy should be changed so that a person “could feel oneself as an inhabitant of Estonia (F68).”

Language was considered the most important domain for ethnic minorities in adapting to the Estonian culture and way of life, that is “Acquiring the Estonian language is primary. The rest will follow. Speaking the state language is essential.” In order for Russians “to melt into” the society, the participants also stressed that it was important for Estonians to speak to Russians only in Estonian. Language proficiency was considered as a barrier to adaptation, but also as a desired outcome. For this reason this is also closely related to the next overarching topic.

Estonians’ preferences (Possibilities for change)
The Estonians’ expectations concerning the acculturation of Russians and their preferred state approach for a multi-ethnic society were combined under the overarching topic of the Estonians’ preferences. The first theme was derived from the Estonians’ views regarding to what extent they preferred Russians to adopt the Estonian culture and to what extent they preferred Russians to maintain their own culture. The second theme describing the Estonians’ preferred state approach included some indications for affirmative action, thus offering the possibilities for change in the current state of the inter-ethnic affairs.

Estonian culture adoption versus the maintenance of the Russian culture

In different contexts Estonians voiced their complaints that Russians lack the understanding about the way Estonians think, do not have any interest in the Estonian culture, and have difficulties adjusting to the surroundings. Regarding the Estonian culture adoption Estonians held contrasting views, emphasising on the one hand a normative aspect – the Russians’ obligation to adopt the Estonian culture and way of life in all areas if they want to live in Estonia, and to realise that they live in a different cultural space. On the other hand, other participants stressed that the Estonian traditions and way of life cannot be forced on others, and what matters most is that Estonian Russians show comprehension, acceptance, and respect for the Estonian culture and traditions. A few participants were more practical in saying that the Estonian way of life should be adapted only to the extent that Russians had a possibility of participating in the economic sphere and receiving an education:

Russians should accept the Estonian culture, but they have no obligation to adapt to it. Regarding the way of life, one should inevitably adjust to it to a certain degree, otherwise it is very difficult for them to cope with their lives here (M38).

Typical areas of culture adoption besides the language were the knowledge of history, watching the Estonian language media, and participating in cultural events. A particular emphasis was placed on respecting and celebrating the Estonian holidays and festivals such as singing celebrations.

State holidays – Independence day or Victory day. If they live here, then it is their home and this home is the Estonian Republic. In principle, she feeds and shelters us and we have to respect her. If a person is a Russian or even Soviet minded, then Estonia is not,
according to the idea, the right place to be. In general, they should adopt the Estonian culture more for continuing self-education, self-enrichment, integration. For example, to go to the Song Celebrations, midsummer night celebrations, Estonian theatre, exhibitions, and to know the Estonian cultural history, the history of the country they live in. And all of this of course in the context of our exciting history, where they are themselves also the participants. We live at the crossroads of the East and the West, in the sphere of influence of many cultures, in a very unique and special place (F28).

It is definitely difficult to adopt traditions, because these are deeply rooted for each nation. If one strongly believes that Christmas is not celebrated on December 24, then it is very difficult for that person to do that. I think, however, that there are many events that Russians living in Estonia should celebrate; for example, the events related to the independence, etc. It is important that one feels happy about the country one lives in (F21).

There were few participants arguing that there was no need for adopting the Estonian culture, because traditions and culture were quite mixed. Other participants said that Russians had already adapted relatively well, especially to the Estonian holidays stressing that there were Russians who celebrate Christmas at the same time as Estonians.

In terms of the Russian culture maintenance, the majority of the participants expressed tolerance towards Russians’ preserving their ethnic culture in Estonia and passing it from generation to generation. Russians were seen as a great nation with their own language, culture, customs, and cultural heritage. Russians were considered richer since their history and culture were more extensive. It was emphasised by several participants that one should not forget the heritage and customs of one’s nation, but cherish them; for example, “In general, the culture, way of life and beliefs of every ethnic group should be maintained. This is inherent and it cannot be changed much,” or “Culture must remain, especially this openness, temperament and communication ability.” The spheres of ethnic cultural maintenance, besides the most frequently mentioned issue of language, included ethnic traditions (drinking tea, wedding and burial customs), literature, art, music, movies, religion (churches), theatre, and media.

At the same time, the participants highlighted the importance of knowing and respecting everything that was created in the same spheres in Estonia:

It is definitely important to maintain your own culture and the way of life that is common to Russians, even if they live in Estonia, and speak Estonian, but their roots
are Russian. I think what is most important to maintain are for example celebration of the Russian holidays, issues related to religion and religious beliefs (which remain within the frames of decency and are accepted in the Estonian society). However, regarding all Russian-minded events (for example, Russian occupation in Estonia), one may pay attention to it, but without big noise and importance. After all, it is Estonia, and one must consider what is appropriate and significant (F21).

They do not have to become Estonians or Christians. Let them celebrate Christmas in their time or be Orthodox. However, by living here they could from their side consider Estonians and estonianism, accept local people and culture and, if needed, follow it. In general, we could learn from each other and become richer this way. If the Russian and Estonian cultures are in conflict, it should be solved somehow via compromise, not by one running over the other by force. At the same time, it is not always possible – sometimes one must still suppress oneself in order to give a preference to the other. The Estonians’ opinion is of course that their culture is supreme in this country and Russians should not protest but behave according to the Estonian customs and rules (F28).

Treat their culture and way of live with respect by respecting the culture of other nations. They should not forget their own culture. This must be done in accordance with the Estonian state. Every culture is different and it should be preserved for next generations (F61).

The knowledge of the Estonian history was considered an essential part of adapting to the Estonian culture; for example, “Comprehension of Estonian history, including not being proud of the Soviet occupation, but also not to feel oneself inferior because of their deeds,” or “They should be taught the Estonian history in schools the way it was. To introduce movie nights, if necessary, it should be translated, so that they would understand completely, how they got to live here (F30).”

However, there were some exceptions to the general support of the ethnic culture maintenance as a few participants remarked that “such a big culture does not fit in such a small state” or “I think that one must not maintain anything here. I think that with their temperament they are capable of maintaining their culture and the way of life as long as they are around.”

Few participants distinguished between private and public spheres of acculturation suggesting that Russians could maintain their culture only within their family; for example, “Every family has its own traditions and customs and I think
Estonian Russians should maintain them inside their family, while outside they should in fact melt in with Estonians.” The same idea was expressed also regarding the language, that the home language can be Estonian or Russian, but in other spheres they should be able to speak Estonian.

Suggested state approaches – possibility for affirmative action

The majority of participants expressed their support and agreement with the current state approaches. They underlined that the Estonian state’s policies have an accepting approach and should be continued although not liberalise it too much. Alternative options were not seen as suitable: “There is no choice. Confederation would destroy the Estonian Republic in a few decades. Therefore, unitary state.” Estonian cultural resources were not perceived to be sufficient to facilitate Russians’ integration:

No-one admits it, but the Estonian culture is actually so small and fragile, that for us, Estonians, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to raise the motivation and support among local Russians to “completely integrate” them into our society through their interests in this culture. It is easier and more practical to attract them with the EU “social security” system, incomes etc. and to show what is happening in Russia (M39).

However, many participants agreed that integration should be the desirable approach for the state in dealing with ethnic minorities. Few participants showed no appreciation of the current situation between Estonian and Russians, e.g. “I am sorry about the current state of affairs of Russians living in Estonia. E.g. we could have been without the Bronze Night. I am sorry that Russia is carrying out a very harsh derogatory propaganda against Estonia.” Since Estonians view that Russians in Estonia are still under the influence of Russia, the participants argued that Estonia needs a strategy to connect other ethnic groups to the Estonian information sphere. As a solution, it was suggested that controversial matters should be approached through education and through information drives on Estonian history and culture:

I suggest a flexible state approach: one should make Russians (I never use term Estonian Russians regarding the Russians living in Estonia) trust and believe the Estonian state. Russians living in Estonia should not be an object of manipulation by Russia (F28).

I personally suggest that by showing reason and benevolence to explain to Russians
what and how one must behave, what to consider etc in order to cope in Estonia. To explain them the importance of Estonian language. Difficult to say what measures one should use for that. As it appears, the current actions have not helped much and brought good results – there is still a lot of complaining and dissatisfaction among the Russian-speaking population. However, one can notice that the younger Russian-speaking population accept the Estonian society more and would like to melt here better, to learn the language etc. Perhaps one should approach the issue through education – by teaching and educating young people to be Estonian-minded, it would help to influence their interactions and attitude (F21).

Some alternative means and additional explanations were also suggested.

There could be also something that would also create social networks between Estonian and Russian families that would enable Russians to find friends among Estonians. To show them that other countries also have national minorities who acquire the local language and adapt to the local culture while maintaining theirs. This is difficult but possible; this would make their own lives much easier. It is necessary to acknowledge the current situation and not to weep for the old times (F28).

Desire for a friendly co-existence, mutual understanding and tolerance, solving all problems together or by compromise, and including the Russian-speaking population in the decision-making were voiced by several participants. Equality and willingness to be equal was especially stressed by few participants:

Equality first of all. Surely, the status of a citizen and non-citizen cannot be quite equal. But there should be no advantages or restrictions for different ethnic groups regarding the satisfaction of basic needs, employment, education, child-care, medicine etc (F30). That none of the ethnic groups would be constrained on the basis of culture, language, religion or folklore (M51).

Efforts from the Russians’ side and their loyalty to Estonia were emphasised for harmonious co-existence.

It is important not to change the Estonian Republic to a state where two distinctive ethnic groups, Estonians and Russians, exist. One state language, Estonian, should be maintained and one must consider the traditions, customs and needs of the local society. In order for Russians to feel themselves equal to Estonians, they should contribute from their side and have a sensible attitude (F21).
Discussion

This chapter aimed to present the analysis of the qualitative data including the perspectives of the majority Estonians and minority Russians about the inter-ethnic situation and the issue of adaptation of Russian minorities in Estonia. Following the main research objectives to compare both perspectives and distinguish shared and different perceptions on intergroup issues between the Estonian majority and minority groups, the main findings are discussed in this section. The theoretical frameworks outlined in the previous chapter are also used for the interpretation of the main results of this study. Relevant findings known from previous research including Estonia are incorporated into the discussion.

Summary of Themes

The first overarching topic about the position of Russians and description of intergroup situation was represented through rather different issues by Russians and Estonians. Only the general evaluations on inter-ethnic relations ranging from positive to negative were common for both groups. For Russians, their devalued identity, concerns about their low status, and relative deprivation were the major factors describing the current state of affairs. For Estonians, the description of the state of affairs reflected the justification of the status quo as they perceived more reasons for Russians to be satisfied, acknowledged Russians’ deprivation/discrimination as minimal or non-existent, emphasised personal responsibility for success, and supported the legitimacy of ethnic policies.

The legitimacy of the socio-structural relations was supported by Estonians but was totally rejected by Russians which proved to be a major obstacle to the latter’s adaptation and positive intergroup relations. Together with ethnic policies considered illegitimate, the political incompetence was also emphasised only by the Russian participants. Several factors such as barriers for positive intergroup relations and adaptation of Russians, however, were similarly outlined by both groups. These were the perception of different histories, separation of communities, cultural differences, and lack of language proficiency. Different from Russians, Estonians were alert to political threats. Russians’ nostalgia for their former status, which was closely related to the perceived threat for Estonians, was additionally seen by Estonians as a barrier to the
adaptation of Russians.

In terms of the future, there was some congruence in acculturation preferences – the exclusionist views with only ingroup favouring solutions were rare. The differences appeared rather in the degree of support for the Russian culture maintenance and Estonian culture adoption.

**Inter-ethnic relations**

The data showed that there is variability in the evaluation of inter-ethnic relations since opinions of the participants from each group about the other group would range from positive to very negative. However, the participants in both groups more often expressed negative perceptions and attitudes towards the other ethnic group. Also, previous studies in Estonia have shown that there are considerable variations within ethnic groups in their inter-ethnic perceptions and attitudes (e.g. Lauristin, 2008b; Raudsepp, 2008). However, the opinions about strong negative influences from the state and politicians, who were believed to exacerbate the inter-ethnic relations, were uniformly found among the Russian participants.

**Identity and inferior position**

In the context of the Estonian inter-ethnic relations, being Russian in Estonia itself carried negative connotations for Russians and had negative implications for their general well-being. When discussing Russian ethnic identity solely, the Russian participants pointed out many positive attributes, descriptions characteristic of Russians, and pride associated with these qualities. However, whenever they talked about their ethnic group in relation to Estonians or about their position in Estonia, it elicited almost exclusively negative associations. The majority of the Russian participants considered their identity as completely devalued and their position in society as undoubtedly inferior, i.e. Russians as people of ‘second class’.

Describing one’s group as ‘second class’ people is not a unique phenomenon among lower status groups. For example, it has been found previously that after the unification of East and West Germany, the majority of East Germans tended to evaluate themselves as ‘second class citizens,’ which was mainly linked to their lower economic status in comparison to West Germans (e.g. Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink,
Tajfel and Turner (1986) emphasise that “Subordinate groups often seem to internalize a wider social evaluation of themselves as ‘inferior’ or ‘second class’, and this consensual inferiority is reproduced as relative self-derogation on a number of indices that have been used in the various studies” (p. 280). These perceptions were the source of dissatisfaction and low well-being for Estonian Russians.

**Representation of history**

Different representations of history are evidently one of the main reasons why Russians cannot feel positive about their social identity. The representations of history are used as the foundation for defining and managing one’s social identity (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that on the grounds of historical representations, the identity of one group can be positioned or imposed by another group. This can be observed in the current study wherein the label of Russians as ‘occupiers’ was perceived by the Russian participants as an involuntary and imposed social category that was a source of discomfort. This coincides with concepts of identity threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and value threat (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

Views on history were considered as one of the main sources of inter-ethnic conflicts such that both groups agreed that there was no common understanding regarding history between Estonians and Russians. Russians claimed that Estonians attempted to rewrite history, whereas Estonians pointed out that Russians’ knowledge of history was not sufficient. As noted in the previous chapter, social representations in general (Moscovici, 1988) and social representations of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005) in particular can be hegemonic, emancipated or polemical.

This study supports the previous notion (e.g. Raudsepp, 2008) that social representations of history in Estonia seem to be polemical – shared representations among one ethnic group are challenged by the other group because they have their own shared representations of the history. There is a different level of consensus regarding social representations of history among people or groups. For Russians, the victory over Nazis in WWII was the source of pride, but also a duty to honour the people who fought in the war. The events around the Bronze Soldier disturbed the Russian participants primarily because their memories of the history related to WWII had been offended and disrespected. Estonians, however, voiced their concern that Russians had not adequately
acknowledged the historical events related to the Estonian independence (Independence War) and the Soviet occupation in relation to WWII.

Similarly, Korts (2009) showed in a recent qualitative study in Estonia that historical references about the occupation and WWII were underpinned as a source of conflict and negative attitudes between Estonians and Russians. Paez and Liu (in press) argue that WWII is an important event for collective memory as this memory is still alive through the living grandparents and therefore has a significant influence for the present time in public and private spheres.

**Relative deprivation and intergroup comparisons**

For Estonian Russians, many reasons for their dissatisfaction emerged from evaluating their current situation *vis-a-vis* their previous status. Therefore the temporal comparisons served a meaningful point of reference for Russians in Estonia. The Russian participants perceived that there had been more equality between ethnic groups and friendlier inter-ethnic relations without any ethnic distinctions during the Soviet time. However, at the present time discrimination and deprivation of rights and opportunities were commonly expressed by the Russian participants and more so when comparing their situation to Estonians.

The main principles from the relative deprivation theory (RDT; Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966) help to understand the underlying mechanisms of expressions of discontent among Russians. Runciman (1966) argues that “A person’s satisfactions, even at the most trivial level, are conditioned by his expectations, and the proverbial way to make oneself conscious of one’s advantages is to contrast one’s situation with that of others worse off than oneself” (p. 9). According to the RDT, the frame of reference is the primary factor that affects people's reactions to their situation (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002). From this theory, it could be implied that Russians’ satisfaction would depend largely on the subjective comparisons they make. There were two main types of comparisons observed in this qualitative study that play an important role for Russians, affecting their life satisfaction and inter-ethnic relations. These were social comparisons with the majority group and temporal comparisons (Albert, 1977) in terms of current time versus the Soviet time.

Conversely, Estonians pointed out that Russians previously had a superior status in Estonia, with no obvious need to adapt to the environment. This led to adaptation
problems after Estonia regained its independence since previous status of Russians changed. Estonians argued that during the Soviet times there was oppression of Estonians, whereas they normally denied any discrimination against Russians at present time. The problems of Russians were attributed to their unwillingness ‘to get over’ the past and their lack of language proficiency.

Overall, Estonians saw more reasons for Russians to be satisfied with life in Estonia than Russians themselves indicated. In general, the dissatisfaction or disadvantages that Estonians acknowledged for Russians were attributed to individual characteristics, and achieving success in society was believed to be a personal responsibility. Estonians’ emphasis on the individual’s responsibility for one’s position and well-being represented the ideology of individualism which, according to Crocker and Quinn (2004), “encompasses a variety of beliefs and values, all focused on personal responsibility, freedom, and the power of individuals to work autonomously and achieve their goals” (p.132). Responsibility placed on an individual is also communicated in negative attitudes and stereotypes expressed by Estonians. According to social identity theory, negative stereotypes are meaningful and functional and are often used when it is necessary to legitimise the actions of the group (Hornsey, 2008). It may be implied in the Estonian context that if one group strongly justifies the current intergroup situation and wants to keep it unchangeable, negative attitudes become functional for that purpose.

**Status legitimizing beliefs**

The legitimacy issue of status relations carried extreme meanings for Russians and Estonians, either seen as the barrier for good inter-ethnic relations for the former, or the means of justification for current status relations for the latter. The Russian participants considered the ethnic policies as unjustified and unfair towards ethnic minorities in general and Russians in particular. The unfair ethnic policies were not only the reason for general dissatisfaction but were additionally seen as the source of Russians’ deprivation. As perceived by the Russian participants, this was due to the requirements of the citizenship and language acts that put Estonians in an advantageous position with respect to cultural “superiority” and better opportunities in the socio-economic sphere. It is possible to infer that, as the legal acts concerning ethnic minorities were initially seen as unfair and impermeable by the Russian participants,
they did not believe that their chances to achieve success in society were the same as for Estonians.

The association between relative deprivation and the legitimacy of the status relations or social justice has been discussed in the literature (e.g. Runciman, 1966; Wright & Tropp, 2002). It is agreed that besides the perception of deprivation, inequality must be perceived as illegitimate in order to cause psychological or behavioural reactions (Jost, 2004). For the Russian participants, their perception of deprivation and claims about legitimacy were expressed in relation to their general dissatisfaction.

For Estonians however, legitimacy beliefs had no association with deprivation or discrimination. Strict ethnic policies were considered as completely justified as they were seen as crucial for preserving the Estonian state. The Estonian language and citizenship were both seen as important constituents of the Estonian independent state, and to not validate their importance was akin to invalidating the Estonian state.

Although legitimacy beliefs were conflicting for Estonians and Russians, both groups’ views were similarly embedded in historical accounts. The legitimacy of the socio-political structure of the society is often supported or defended by the accounts of history (Lehti, Jutila, & Jokisipilä, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Merridale, 2003). It can be argued that the historical legacy with their experience during Soviet occupation has supported Estonians’ feelings of distrust and threat, thereby justifying the established conservative ethnic policies that enable to protect and strengthen the current status relations. The legitimacy claims for Estonians could be a reflection of a need for security and protection of the state or simply a desire to hold onto the current status relations. Thus, a strong underlying need for security and protection of the state or a fear of losing one’s position (implying a strong endorsement of legitimacy beliefs) would be closely related to the perception of outside threats.

Perceived threat

Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations of history often involve realistic conflicts between groups. For example, if the history involves war, its narratives would include the distinction between allies and enemies and the definition of the mission of the group. The realistic conflict in this study reveals itself mainly through the political threat to Estonian nationhood, which corresponds to the realistic
threat in the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

For historical reasons, Russia cannot be trusted since it is perceived to pose a threat to the Estonian nationhood and domestic peace. The Estonian geo-political location, with the Russian Federation as its neighbour from the north-east side, adds to the perception of Russia as being threatening. According to Laitin (2009), a high concentration of Russian-speaking minorities in north-east region has also heightened the perception of the Russian-speaking population as dangerous in Estonia. In Laitin’s words, this proximity gives the Russian-speaking population in Estonia “the imaginary possibility of an expanded Russian border that would incorporate a population that was nearly 95 percent Russian-speaking in 1991” (p. 47).

In the view of the Estonian participants, Russians have nostalgic feelings about their former position and are wanting to restore it if possible; therefore they were not completely trusted. The current actions of Russia and its influence on Russian minorities in Estonia were perceived by the Estonian participants as an obvious threat for the current intergroup situation in Estonia. Similarly to other threats, concerns about survival of the Estonian nation and language were additionally expressed by Estonians but not Russians.

**Acculturation**

Similar to any other minority group, Russian minorities in Estonia face the issues of balancing between the Russian and Estonian cultures: to what extent it is important for them to maintain their culture and way of life, and to what extent they desire to adopt and participate in the Estonian culture and way of life. Acculturation theory addresses these questions and offers a valuable framework to explain, from the minority (their preferences) and majority (expectations and perceived preferences) perspectives, what the optimal balance between the two cultures is. This has implications for the adaptive outcomes for the minority group and intergroup relations more broadly (e.g. Berry, et al., 2002; Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001).

Both ethnic groups acknowledged the separation of communities which served as an indicator and explanation of unsatisfactory inter-ethnic relations. While Estonians tended to see Russians as living in isolation by choice, Russians insisted on the opposite, arguing that they were not fully accepted in Estonia and were treated as if Estonia was not their motherland.
The desire for maintaining the Russian language was firmly articulated by most of the Russian participants. The importance of the Russian language maintenance went beyond being just able to speak the native language in private sphere. Expectations involved the possibility for native-language education and even introducing Russian as the second state language in Estonia. Many Russian participants believed that legalising two state languages would be the most beneficial solution for inter-ethnic relations as it would assure peace and harmony in the country. The Estonian participants, however, argued against the possibility of establishing bilingualism in Estonia. The knowledge of Estonian as the state language was considered imperative without exceptions. On the other hand, the importance of learning the Estonian language was also recognised by the Russian participants. However, they expected some improvements in the current system such as providing better opportunities for Russians to learn the Estonian language and free language education for the adult Russian population. Regarding cultural traditions, the Russian participants generally agreed with the importance of keeping both Estonian and Russian cultural traditions. While the opinions regarding Russian culture maintenance were mostly shared among the Russian participants, the importance of Estonian culture adoption generated more diverse opinions including agreement, conditional agreement and rejection. The conditional agreement is most important to be emphasised here because this was the reaction to the perceived assimilationist state policies. Several Russian participants voiced their reluctance to integrate into the Estonian culture and society as the consequence of perceived assimilation pressure from the state.

Similarly, the Estonian participants generally showed the acceptance of Russians’ desire to maintain their culture, although their expectations regarding the Estonian culture adoption were expressed more profoundly. For many Estonian participants, preserving the Russian culture was acceptable if Russians simultaneously participated in the Estonian culture, indicating also a conditional aspect in their acculturation preferences for Russians. Although several Estonians expressed integration as the desired way of acculturation for ethnic minorities, there were also many others who expected Russians to “melt into” the Estonian society and culture, which implies assimilation rather than an integration preference. Estonians also expected loyalty and efforts from Russians.

These findings are in line with previous acculturation research (though mostly drawn from quantitative studies) that ethnic minorities often express higher preference
for maintaining their culture in comparison to adopting or participating in the national culture (e.g. Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002). At the same time, the majority population show a stronger preference for minorities to adopt the majority culture than to maintain their own (e.g. Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). A few Estonian participants distinguished between private and public spheres (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003) of acculturation emphasising that Russians could maintain their culture only within their family.

**Desired changes – affirmative action?**

In general, Russians preferred the multicultural state approach and expected that at the state level there would be an acceptance that Estonia is multi-ethnic and multilingual. Russians emphasised their desire to be respected, their opinions to be considered, and to be included in the dialogue between Russian minorities and state representatives. They think of Estonia as their motherland and they want to be fully accepted in this country. The Russian participants considered it difficult to change their situation to better themselves due to their lower power status and thus desired top-down state initiatives. These included, for example, making ‘concessions’ in terms of granting citizenship to Estonian-born Russians and allowing the representation of Russians in governing institutions.

Conversely, the Estonian participants generally supported the current state approach without suggesting any major changes. Only some Estonian participants expressed willingness to include more Russians in the decision-making processes. However, ethnic separation in the country was not seen as ideal either and more positive inter-group relations were desired by Estonians as well. The Estonian participants suggested that the improvements for inter-ethnic relations should be made through education and explaining the Estonian history and culture to Russians.

**Conclusions**

In terms of shared and differing perceptions of intergroup issues by Estonians and Russians, it can be concluded that there are many incompatibilities. For example, although issues relating to history and legitimacy are similarly important for both
groups, they differ on the content level. Histories that are cherished by Estonians and Russians are different. The legitimacy of socio-structural relations is claimed by Estonians, but rejected by Russians. Legitimacy is associated with relative deprivation for Russians while for Estonians it has links to perceived threat. Relative deprivation and intergroup comparisons are important sources of dissatisfaction and negative inter-ethnic relations for Russians, while Estonians in general do not acknowledge any deprivation of Russians. Estonians perceive a threat to the existence of their nationhood where Russia is represented as the major source of this threat, while in Russians’ perceptions this is absent.

This study also showed that Russian minorities expressed their desire to maintain their culture more strongly than their preference for Estonian culture adoption, which was contrary to Estonian participants’ expectations. Both ethnic groups expressed conditional aspects, for example, the preference or expectancy for ‘our’ culture first, and only then ‘theirs.’ However, on a positive note, these preferences were not mutually exclusive. Additionally, minority group’s suggestions on how Russians’ adaptation could be facilitated and whole intergroup situation improved by the majority group were also expressed by Estonians. To a certain degree, Estonians indicated willingness to initiate and promote better inter-ethnic relation in Estonia. This willingness is typically revealed through support of affirmative action.

On a more general level, this study shows clearly that ethnic identity is a salient social category for Russians in Estonia. Their personal accounts are embedded on what they believe as representative of the whole ethnic group, indicating that being of Russian ethnicity in Estonia has specific meanings shared within one social category – among Russians or Estonians. Estonians’ perceptions of Russians and inter-group relations were most likely influenced by their shared identity with Estonians. In line with the social identity and social categorization perspectives (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1999) it could be noted from this study that a shared social category (being Russian in Estonia) not only made the participants see themselves as similar prototypical representatives of their ingroup (especially among Russians), but it also increased the differences between the members of their ingroup and the outgroup in their evaluations of the inter-group situation in Estonia.

Self-categorization as Russian and salience of this identity explains the mechanism and importance of intergroup comparisons for Russians. Most comparisons in this study involved collective or group-level comparisons, e.g. ingroup (Russians)
compared to outgroup (Estonians) for social comparisons or one’s group’s present situation compared to one’s group’s past situation for temporal comparisons. The claims about deprivation naturally implied a group that might have derived from their personal relative deprivation, but not necessarily; it might also have derived from general observations in society as salience of their Russian identity would make them sensitive to notice issues related to other members of their social group. In summary, this study showed that Russians’ social identity is important in influencing them to perceive the problems of similar ingroup and to differentiate themselves from the outgroup Estonians. Secondly, group and not individual level evaluations, or fraternal instead of egoistic deprivation as initially referred to by Runciman (1966), seem to cause dissatisfaction and negative evaluations of the outgroup.

**Limitations and Further Directions**

Despite the rich data obtained in this qualitative study, the main limitation of any qualitative results concerns the issue of generalisability. It is difficult to assess in the qualitative analysis the construct validity of the thematic concepts and how common are these in a population (Castro & Coe, 2007; Firestone, 1993; Roer-Strier & Kurman, 2009). These limitations can be overcome by including a quantitative component in studying the same phenomena. Within multi-method approach applied in this research, qualitative study served an exploratory function allowing an identification of relevant concepts and shaping the hypotheses about the possible relationships between them, while a quantitative study will operationalise these concepts, verify their reliability and test the relationships between them (see Roer-Strier & Kurman, 2009). The larger samples in quantitative studies were subsequently undertaken to investigate the relationships between the main concepts emerged from this study. The general overview about the studies is presented in Table 3.2.

Chapter four investigates the issues of psychological adaptation (subjective well-being) and outgroup attitudes among minority Russians. These two dependent variables are examined in relationship with salient identity categories (ethnic and national), representations of history (Russian and Estonian), sense of ethnic inferiority, relative deprivation (social and temporal), intergroup comparisons and status legitimizing beliefs. Additionally, the effects of acculturation preferences of ethnic Russians on both outcome variables are investigated.
Chapter five investigates intergroup relational outcomes – outgroup attitudes and support for affirmative action among native Estonians. The variables expected to explain these relational outcomes for Estonians are: national identity, representations of history (Estonian and Russian), perceived threat, and status legitimizing beliefs. Acculturation effects on intergroup relational outcomes are investigated through Estonians’ expectations regarding Russians’ acculturation and their perceptions of Russians’ actual acculturation preferences.
Table 3.2
Overview of concepts in Study 2 and Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 2: Minority Russians</th>
<th>Study 3: Majority Estonians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social identity</strong></td>
<td>- Ethnic and national identifications and pride</td>
<td>- National identification and pride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation of history</strong></td>
<td>- Importance of Russian and Estonian representations of history</td>
<td>- Importance of Russian and Estonian representations of history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Devalued/inferior identity</strong></td>
<td>- i.e. Russians’ perceptions of being ‘second-class citizens’</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intergroup comparisons</strong></td>
<td>- Prevalence of intergroup comparisons</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived relative deprivation</strong></td>
<td>- Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perceived deprivation relative to the Soviet time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived threat</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- Perceived political and economic threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status legitimizing beliefs</strong></td>
<td>- Beliefs about legitimacy, permeability and stability of intergroup status relations</td>
<td>- Beliefs about legitimacy, permeability and stability of intergroup status relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acculturation</strong></td>
<td>- Own acculturation preferences</td>
<td>- Expectations regarding Russians’ acculturation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- Perceived acculturation of Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological adaptation</strong></td>
<td>- Subjective well-being</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-ethnic attitudes</strong></td>
<td>- Attitudes towards Estonians</td>
<td>- Attitudes towards Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affirmative action</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- Estonians’ willingness to support Russians’ integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Empty cells indicate that these concepts will not be applicable in the respective study.
CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2

ADAPTATION, ACCULTURATION AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: PERSPECTIVE OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIAN MINORITY

Introduction

While analysing the ‘voices’ of the participants from the qualitative study it became evident that feeling good about being Russian in Estonia is a hard task. Once the Russian people value their cultural identity, including appreciation of their history and the desire to maintain their cultural heritage, they face psychological challenge largely due to lack of support from the wider society. Russians have to deal with attitudes towards Russians prevalent in the wider social environment on both the inter-personal and societal levels. It raises the questions what psychological consequences does this have for individuals who are striving for a positive social identity in an unsupportive environment, and what are the social consequences for intergroup relations in Estonia.

This chapter presents a study conducted among members of the Russian minority group in two sections. The first section will examine how ethnic and national identities, views on history, social comparisons and understandings of the inter-group situation affect the psychological adaptation of Estonian Russians. The second section will look into how the same variables affect Russians’ attitudes towards Estonians. The relationship between acculturation, adaptation and intercultural relations will also be examined in this chapter.

Review of previous literature relevant to the research questions will be presented within the two sections with a summary of hypotheses in the end. However, before going directly to the proposed studies, I will clarify more general issues related to this research and make several important points about the sample taking Estonian context into account.

Conceptual Issues

This research is interested in looking at two relevant social categories
available for Russians to identify themselves with: ethnic and national identifications. Russians can have a different degree of the sense of belonging to their ethnic minority group (Russians) and to the national majority group (Estonians). The concept of social identification has been regarded both as an antecedent and as an outcome of inter-group relations in studies grounded in social identity theory (SIT). Basing their argument on Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) original ideas, Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1999) stress that, “ingroup identification should not merely be seen as an outcome variable, reflecting the relative attractiveness of one’s group membership given the status quo (p. 3).” They refer to the self-categorization theory emphasising that identification as a member of the group affects both perceptions of intergroup relations and responses to it. Similarly, Brown (2000, p. 748) claims, “There is no doubt that, in particular contexts, strength of ingroup identification is a powerful predictor of intergroup attitudes.”

The main assumptions of current are based on these ideas. Russians who consider their Russian identification important are in a difficult situation, as their self concept and understanding of their ethnic group is not reciprocated by the majority population. The salience of their Russian identification apparently predisposes them to be more sensitive and observant towards the position of Estonian Russians in the society and inter-ethnic relations in general. Raudsepp (2009) indicates that in Estonia, the strength of identity functions as a “regulative device in the choice and maintenance of certain belief systems” (p. 48). The meaning of social identity (ethnic and national) for an individual is assumed to affect psychological and inter-group relational outcomes (Huddy, 2004), and thus it is treated as an antecedent rather than an outcome in this research. Evidently, ethnic and national identities can be shaped by contextual factors leading to the changes over the time as identities are dynamic constructs (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Liebkind, 2006; Phinne, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001). However, current cross-sectional research cannot capture the evolution or changing nature of identities; instead it takes a ‘snapshot’ of individuals’ current identifications. These ‘snapshots’ or social identities (Russian or Estonian) are proposed to affect the perception of intergroup situation. 

Ethnic minority groups usually develop a sense of belonging both to their ethnic group and to the majority group and thus can have dual identity, ethnic and national. Multiple cultural identities can exist simultaneously or alternately, show
different levels of salience and relate differently to psychological consequences; therefore, ethnic and national identifications have often been measured in parallel (Birman, 2006; Birman, Trickett, & Vinokurov, 2002; Gong & Chang, 2007; Grant, 2007, 2008; Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009; Liu, 1999; Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002; Trickett & Birman, 2005; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). According to Raudsepp (2009), ingroup identification of Russians and Estonians has different meanings and psychological implications and show asymmetric patterns of relationships with outcomes. Based on this research, it can be suggested that Russians with strong national identification will show similar patterns of inter-relationship as Estonians, and thus the inter-relationships with national (Estonian) identity are expected to be in opposite direction than those with strong ethnic (Russian) identity. The expected asymmetrical effects of ethnic and national identities on psychological and intergroup relational outcomes are supported by previous empirical research (e.g. Birman, et al., 2002; Grant, 2008).

**Contextual Factors**

**Different histories**

Previous qualitative data suggests that representations of history in Estonia are, in Moscovici’s (1988) terms, rather polemical: they are not shared between all members throughout the society, and can be antagonistic and mutually exclusive between the members of two ethnic groups. Both groups indicated importance for different historical events and expressed dissatisfaction that it is ignored or disrespected by the other group. For example, differences appeared between what should be maintained and honoured (such as symbols of victory in WWII versus commemoration of occupation victims). However, these representations of history seem to be hegemonic within ethnic groups as they are commonly shared by its members.

Current research incorporates the different understandings of history for ethnic Russians and native Estonians in terms of importance of historical events and their representations. It is expected that the events that are known to be more important to Russians (called here *Russian history*) will form a separate factor from the events that are known to be important for Estonians (called here *Estonian*
In terms of relationships between the two, a significant negative relationship is expected between the two history constructs.

Preference of comparisons

Previous qualitative study gave an indication of the relevance of social comparisons for Russians. Social comparisons, either interpersonal or intergroup, can be made with referents of a higher, lower or similar status. On the basis of theoretical propositions (e.g. SIT), it is more common to expect that comparisons with higher status targets (i.e. upward comparisons) would be avoided out of self-protective reasons because they do not support a favourable self-image (e.g. Crocker & Major, 1989). However, previous findings show that members of disadvantaged groups do not always prefer to escape unfavourable comparisons. Several studies have demonstrated the preference or prevalence of comparison with a higher status groups (thus upward comparisons) when social intergroup comparisons were made (e.g. Rupert Brown & Haeger, 1999; Rupert Brown & Zagefka, 2006), As to the interpersonal comparisons, Leach and Smith (2006) found that ethnic minority participants compared themselves more to the ethnic majority (upward comparisons) than ethnic minority targets. Similar results have been found with negative dispositions. For example, Wheeler and Miyake (1992) showed that individuals who were feeling bad or had low self-esteem chose more upward comparisons instead of avoiding them for self-protective reasons, while self-enhancement strategy (downward comparisons) was chosen more when individuals felt good or showed high self-esteem.

These findings are contrary to the social identity propositions and downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981) according to which individuals from disadvantaged groups or with negative dispositions choose downward comparisons to protect their self-esteem. In addressing this contradiction, it has been suggested that the choice of comparison interests might be determined by different motives involved in the comparison process. Taylor, Moghaddam, and Bellerose (1989) found that upward comparisons were more prevalent among disadvantaged groups with an equity appeal motivation, which involves group’s claims for more equitable distribution of resources. However, downward comparisons were chosen most often with a group
enhancement motivation that involves the group’s desire to maintain or enhance its esteem. Similarly, Brown and Zagefka (2006) claim that choice for upward comparisons suggests that group members might be more interested in assessment or improvement of their group status than with its enhancement. Other research has also shown that upward social comparisons are preferred with self-evaluation goals or with interests in information and contact among victimized individuals (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wilson & Ross, 2000).

Brown and Haeger (1999) additionally stress that from the SIT perspective these results can be explicable when status relations are shown to be both unstable and illegitimate, and suggest taking a historical and political situation into account to provide useful explanations. Levine and Moreland (1987) posit that intergroup comparisons revealing the inferior outcomes for the ingroup may allow group members to challenge their collective status and legitimize the appeal for higher status.

The qualitative study has shown that issues of (in)equality were the evident concerns for Russian participants, and also indicated possible negative dispositions related to the devalued identity of Russians. Therefore, in the preliminary analyses, it is expected that comparisons with outgroup members (upward comparisons, i.e. with Estonians) will be more prevalent than comparisons with ingroup members (Russians in Russia or Russians in Estonia) among the Russian participants.

Additionally, for many Russians temporal past comparisons may have unfavourable outcomes for the current time (implying upward temporal comparisons) and therefore their utilization would be unlikely for self-enhancement purposes. Similar to social comparisons, upward comparisons are expected to be more frequent because of the aspiration for equality as articulated by the participants in the qualitative study. The same is anticipated with temporal comparisons: these should be more common than downward or similar comparisons (Russians in Russia or Estonia) assuming the underlying aspiration for equality for Russians.

In summary, the following hypotheses relating to contextual factors are proposed for the Russian sample:

_Hypothesis 1.1._ (a) Importance of Russian historical memory and importance of Estonian historical memory will form two separate factors and be negatively associated with each other; (b) comparisons with the higher status outgroup
(Estonians) and temporal comparisons with the past (Soviet time) will be more common than ingroup comparisons (Russians in Estonia and in Russia).

Section 1
The Role of Inter-Ethnic Factors and Acculturation in the Prediction of Psychological Adaptation of Estonian Russians

This section focuses on the psychological adaptation of ethnic minority Russians in Estonia. Psychological adaptation is typically investigated through the feelings of subjective well-being or satisfaction (Searle & Ward, 1990; Ward & Kennedy, 1992). The main goal of this study is to examine predictors of life satisfaction of Estonian Russians.

According to Diener and Ryan (2009), citizens in the post-materialistic era attach increasing importance to their subjective well-being. “Happiness” is rated as the most important life goal among individuals (Diener & Oishi, 2004; Diener & Ryan, 2009). The authors even suggest that well-being should be measured as part of public policy to monitor and provide conditions for fulfilling citizens’ needs. Recently, more attention has been paid to the consequences of subjective well-being, which include both individual (e.g. health and longevity) and societal benefits (e.g. volunteering, trust and confidence towards the government, support for democracy; for more, see Diener & Ryan, 2009).

Inglehart (2000) demonstrated the link between high levels of subjective well-being in individuals and stable democracies and argued that subjective well-being creates a foundation of support for societal regime. He also emphasized that low levels of life satisfaction among citizens threaten the sustainability of political regimes, noting the extremely low ratings of life satisfaction among citizens in the republics of the former Soviet Union (including Estonia) just a few years before its collapse. According to Inglehart, individuals’ dissatisfaction with life may bring rejection of an entire form of government. Similarly, Tov and Diener (2009) have argued that subjective well-being is the prerequisite for a successful society; such as societal trust and cooperation cannot be expected if the citizens are discontent. Diener and Ryan (2009) concluded that while the subjective well-being of people may depend on the structural factors of society, it may also contribute towards a
“more stable, productive, and effectively functioning society” (p. 393) at the same time.

The areas of focus in this investigation were derived from the results of the previous qualitative study. Based on the qualitative analysis, the following study integrates several concepts such as ethnic and national identity, history beliefs, social and temporal comparisons, inferior (devalued) position, relative deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs of Russians in Estonia to study psychological adaptation as manifested through life satisfaction of Estonian Russians.

**Correlates and Predictors of Life Satisfaction**

**Identity**

The qualitative study indicated that even when Russians expressed pride in being Russian, awareness that their ethnic identity was not appreciated in Estonia presented an important concern to them. Perception of non-appreciation of Russians in Estonia led the Russian participants to consider their position as inferior (e.g. being disrespected and a second rank people, or not being considered).

In previous research, ethnic identity has been shown to have a positive effect on psychological adaptation and subjective well-being; e.g. life satisfaction, self-esteem or lack of depression (Abrams, Hinkle, & Tomlins, 1999; Liebkind, 1996; Molix & Bettencourt, 2010; Mossakowski, 2003; Nesdale, Rooney, & Smith, 1997; Phinney, 1990; Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). This is in accordance with developmental perspectives that indicate a strong and secure ethnic identity to produce personal strength and positive self-evaluation and thus is supporting one’s psychological well-being (Phinney, et al., 2001).

However, it has been found that identification with one’s group can also be the source of vulnerability for members of low-status groups as they are more susceptible to be personally affected by the negative treatment of the group (Major & O'Brien, 2005; O'Brien & Major, 2005). In response to prejudice against their group, McCoy and Major (2003) found that women and Latinos who showed strong identification with their gender or ethnic group expressed more perceived threat and lower self-esteem compared to women or Latinos who did not strongly identify with their gender or ethnic group.
A recent review of existing studies on the positive effect of ethnic or racial identity on psychological well-being among individuals exposed to racism suggests that, although ethnic pride and belonging produced a general feeling of well-being, these aspects of identity were not sufficient enough to compensate for the impact of perceived everyday racism on distress and depressive symptoms (Brondolo, Brady, Ver Halen, Pencille, Beatty, & Contrada, 2009). Furthermore, the analysis showed that some aspects of racial identity were likely to intensify the impact of racism on depression.

Considering the perceived inferior position of Russians in Estonia, the positive relationship between ethnic identity and life satisfaction would not be an obvious hypothesis. On the contrary, as Russian identity is not appreciated in Estonian society it would be more plausible to expect strong Russian identity to exert a negative effect on Russians’ life satisfaction.

Compared to ethnic identity, investigation of national identity among immigrants – their identification with the larger society – has received much less attention (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006). Similarly to ethnic identity, Phinney and colleagues do suggest that strong identification with the larger society tends to be related to psychological well-being. Strong identification with native Estonians might indeed increase confidence and a sense of security for ethnic Russians, and is thus expected to make a positive contribution to individuals’ life satisfaction in this study. These conclusions indicate that an asymmetric relationship between ethnic and national identities and life satisfaction should be expected.

**Importance of history**

Russians’ perception of their cultural identity being not respected was also related to Russian history in the qualitative study – many Russian participants highlighted that the historical memory of the Russian nation has been violated in Estonia. Ehala (2009) argues that, like any other ethnic group, Russians in Estonia strive for positive collective self-esteem. The ideological struggle around the Bronze Soldier was an example of Russians’ attempt to claim higher status and positive self-esteem in Estonia. Zhurzhenko (2007) emphasizes that “the local Russians struggle for symbolic recognition, for their right to be represented in the national landscape of
memory” (p. 9). However, this recognition is not easy to achieve for them in Estonia, as their historical claims are not supported by Estonians. The struggle for having their historical memory recognized is likely to affect their subjective well-being. The qualitative study showed that Russians expressed dissatisfaction about their historical memory being ignored or disrespected by Estonians.

Traditionally, the importance of historical beliefs has not been considered as a predictor of ethnic minority group well-being. However, because it is essential for Russians to preserve knowledge of their history, and while at the same time this is not reinforced by Estonians, it is evident that it may assert negative influence on their life satisfaction. Therefore, a negative relationship similar to Russian identification is anticipated to apply also to the importance of Russian history and life satisfaction. However, if Russians find the Estonian historical memory important, which implies that they hold beliefs supported by Estonians, they are expected to show better psychological adaptation, i.e. higher life satisfaction.

**Relative deprivation**

In the qualitative study, Estonian Russians emphasised their limited opportunities in life, which was one of the main reasons for their dissatisfaction with life in Estonia. Limited opportunities and inequality in general were emphasised in relation to Estonians and especially in comparison to the past. Many Russians shared the perception that, during the Soviet time, everyone’s position was equal and there were no differences between ethnicities in terms of equality of opportunities. This ceased to exist after the Estonian independence, and now Russians consider their current position in society completely unequal to Estonians. This indicates that temporal relative deprivation might play a significant role in explaining life satisfaction in Russians.

This study will focus explicitly on the relative deprivation of Estonian Russians, as intergroup comparisons resulting in feelings of deprivation showed to be a significant part of Russians’ evaluations of their disadvantage in the qualitative study. In this work it is assumed that people judge their own or their groups’ situation as relatively deprived based on their experiences of discrimination either experienced personally or observed from other members of their ethnic group. These assumptions
rely on previous research (e.g. Koomen & Fränkel, 1992) and the earlier qualitative study.

Previous research has generally reported a consistent relationship between experiences of personal deprivation and psychological outcomes (individual well-being); specifically, personal relative deprivation and/or perceived discrimination has been found to have a negative effect on personal well-being, personal self-esteem, personal control, stress symptoms or life satisfaction (e.g. Bourguignon, Seron, Yzerbyt, & Herman, 2006; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Lee, 2003; Pak, Dion, & Dion, 1991; Shorey, Cowan, & Sullivan, 2002; Zagefka & Brown, 2005).

In terms of group (or collective) relative deprivation and/or perceived discrimination the results do not show such consistency. On the one hand, no significant association was found with perceived deprivation and/or discrimination and, for example, personal or social well-being, personal self-esteem or personal satisfaction (Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Lee, 2003; Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McKoy, 2007; Shorey, et al., 2002; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). These studies are in line with the differential effect hypothesis, which suggest that group relative deprivation should have group and not individual-level effects, while personal deprivation has personal and not group level consequences (e.g. intergroup prejudice, collective action) (Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Martin, 1986; Pettigrew, 2002; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Other studies demonstrate the significant associations between group level deprivation and/or discrimination and individual level outcomes which challenge the previous proposition regarding the effects of group relative deprivation on individual level outcomes. For example, both individual and group RD have been found to lead to lower levels of self-esteem, life quality and increased depressive symptoms (see H. J. Smith & Walker, 2008). More recently, Schmitt, et al. (2010) reported that personal and group relative deprivation had similar impairing effects on a person’s well-being (including life satisfaction and mental health).

Furthermore, Dion (1986) demonstrated that only group relative deprivation consistently predicted subjective satisfaction, showing a negative relationship between the two. Group relative deprivation was also negatively associated with perceived personal control. In two experiments, Schmitt, Branscombe and Postmes (2003) found that women exhibited lower psychological well-being in a context of pervasive gender discrimination compared to a context in which it was uncommon.
Further, the effects of group deprivation on personal well-being may vary depending on the group’s relative position in the social structure as suggested by Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz and Owen (2002) who found that women’s perception of gender discrimination was negatively related to their psychological well-being, while this relationship was non-significant for men.

Gee (2002) demonstrated that both individual and institutional racial discrimination significantly predicted the health status among Chinese Americans after controlling for a number of acculturation and demographic variables. A more recent study by Safi (2010), analysing European Social Survey data collected in 13 European countries across three time points, demonstrated that perceived discrimination against one’s ethnic group had a strong detrimental effect on the life satisfaction of immigrants.

Although the majority of findings report negative effects of perceived group discrimination on individual outcomes, opposite results have been obtained as well. Bourguignon, et al. (2006), for example, found that group discrimination was positively associated with personal self-esteem, which according to the authors could suggest that sharing the same difficulties lessen the negative effects of exclusion.

With this research in mind, deprivation relative to Estonians and to the Soviet time are predicted to have a negative association with life satisfaction in this study.

**Status non-legitimizing beliefs**

In the qualitative study, dissatisfaction about the current situation of Russians and their low status in Estonia were largely attributed to the state. This included evaluations such as illegitimacy of state policies which were considered unfair, unjustified or inflexible in regards to (inferior) position of minority Russians. These beliefs relate to the concepts of legitimacy and stability of the status relations and permeability of intergroup boundaries outlined in SIT and ‘system-justification’ (Jost & Banaji, 1994) which also entails views on system legitimacy and permeability (e.g. Levin, et al., 1998).

Traditionally, subjective well-being of different cultural groups has not been investigated with intergroup status variables. However, there are few studies that demonstrate links between intergroup status judgments and individual outcomes. For
example, Terry, Pelly, Lalonde and Smith (2006) have examined the effects of intergroup status beliefs and perceptions of intergroup context on predicting cultural adjustment among international students. A perceived favourable status of one’s cultural group and permeable boundaries in terms of access to resources and social activities predicted positive adjustment (i.e. low levels of depression).

Jost and Hunyady (2002) report evidence from Jost and colleagues’ earlier work that system justification is associated with decreased self-esteem and increased depression, and neuroticism for members of disadvantaged groups. Support for the ideology (e.g. meritocracy) is related to satisfaction with one’s job, economic situation and life in general. Jost and Hunyady suggest that belief in ideology carries a palliative or stress preventing function, as it allows for an individual to perceive the stability, predictability, consistency, and fairness of the social system for advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

In accordance to previous research and following the findings of the qualitative study, holding status non-legitimizing beliefs (i.e. unfair status and inflexible inter-group boundaries) is expected to be related to lower life satisfaction in the current study.

**Comparison targets**

As seen from the qualitative study, comparisons with Estonians (social intergroup comparisons) and with their situation during the Soviet time (temporal ingroup comparison) were prevalent among Estonian Russians. These comparison types imply upward comparisons, because Russians’ comparisons with Estonians result in better outcomes for Estonians rather than for Russians, and comparisons with their past situation result in better outcomes for their past rather than for present situation (see Martin, 1986; Taylor, et al., 1989). Usually, upward comparisons are expected to reflect negatively on the group’s image and well-being and therefore they are often avoided. The qualitative study gives an indication that, in the Estonian context, they indeed seem to cause dissatisfaction but they are not avoided to protect oneself from negative comparison outcomes. As mentioned earlier, upward comparisons might be motivated if the group wants to evaluate and challenge their position and appeal for better position in the society. However, the psychological
price of these upward comparisons is evident, especially if the position of the group is not improving.

However, not only has there been little research on the actual frequency of intergroup comparisons made by low-status groups, little is also known about the psychological implication of these comparisons (Leach & Smith, 2006). Diener (2009) summarizes judgment theories by suggesting that subjective well-being depends on comparison standards (e.g. people, past life, etc.) against how the actual situation is judged. Well-being is expected to result if the actual situation exceeds the standard, e.g. a current situation is better than the previous one, or a person/group is better off than the others. Diener (2009) refers to previous research indicating that social comparison is a significant predictor of subjective well-being. However, most of these studies include interpersonal comparisons. In terms of temporal ingroup comparisons, there is some indication from de la Sablonniere and Tougas (2008) that the instability of a group’s situation over time impairs the well-being of an ethnic group.

On the basis of the previous qualitative analysis, it is predicted that the more common it is for Russians to compare their situation with what they had during the Soviet time, the more negative effect this asserts on their psychological adaptation. A negative effect on psychological adaptation is also expected if Russians compare their life situation more frequently to Estonians. However, the more frequently Estonian Russians compare their life situations with Russians in Russia, the better their psychological well-being should be. Estonian Russians acknowledge that their situation is better than Russians in Russia. In this regard, the comparisons with Russians in Russia imply downward comparisons and an expected positive effect on life satisfaction would be in line with social identity propositions and downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981). The relationship between ingroup comparison interest (i.e. Russians in Estonia) and life satisfaction will remain an empirical question.

Altogether, the following relationships are expected with life satisfaction in correlational terms:

*Hypothesis 1.2.* (a) while Russian identification is expected to have a negative association, Estonian identification is expected to be positively associated with life satisfaction; (b) similarly to identification, the importance of Russian
history is predicted to be negatively associated with life satisfaction, while the importance of Estonian history is predicted to have a positive association; (c) regarding comparison targets, the frequency of temporal (Soviet time) and outgroup comparisons (Estonians) are predicted to have a negative association, while the frequency of ingroup comparisons (Russians in Estonia, and in Russia) is expected to have a positive association with life satisfaction; (d) perceived inferior position and deprivation relative to Estonians and the Soviet time are both predicted to have a negative association with life satisfaction; (e) the perception of status non-legitimizing beliefs (i.e. illegitimacy and impermeability of inter-group relations) about Estonian Russians is expected to be negatively related to life satisfaction.

Even though the above mentioned variables are assumed to have a significant direct effect on life satisfaction, they are anticipated to have different influence when all variables are combined together. This study will first examine the contribution and incremental effects of proposed variables in predicting life satisfaction in the hierarchical regression model. The same directions of relationships as with bivariate correlations are expected with the following incremental effects:

_Hypothesis 1.3._ (a) Russian and Estonian identity predict life satisfaction in the first step; (b) representations of history will account for additional variance over and above that explained by identity variables; (c) social and temporal comparisons account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity and historical representations; (d) relative deprivation related predictors explain additional variance over and above that explained by identity, history and comparison variables; (e) status non-legitimizing beliefs will account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity, history, comparison and relative deprivation variables.

**Hypothesised Mediation Model**

_A multiple mediation model_ in the prediction of life satisfaction is proposed in this study. Variables such as identity and history beliefs are expected to have indirect effect on life satisfaction via perceived deprivation and status non-legitimizing
beliefs (i.e. fixed and unfair status). To describe the predictions in the mediation model, the next part is dedicated to investigating the nature of relationships between proposed antecedent and mediator variables, and between the two mediator variables. The proposed sequence of relationships in the hypothesised mediation model is illustrated in Model A in Figure 4.1.

![Mediation models](Image)

*Figure 4.1. Mediation models*

*Note. Model A: hypothesized mediation model; Model B: alternative mediation model*

**Relationship between relative deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs**

The qualitative study showed that the perception of fairness of social arrangements in society (i.e. legitimacy beliefs about the policies regarding minorities) went hand in hand with evaluations of the perceived outcomes of these arrangements (i.e. relative deprivation of Russians as they experienced disadvantage in different life areas). Both of these factors were concern for Russians and are, therefore, expected to affect the satisfaction in this study as well.

Relative deprivation and legitimacy have been linked in previous research. In
relative deprivation theory, feelings of discontent derive from the mismatch between what the actual outcomes a group receives and what it should be entitled to (Rupert Brown, 2000). Individuals’ feelings of entitlement derive from principles of justice (Tyler & Lind, 2002). Tyler and Lind (2002) link relative deprivation with distributive justice (both are judgments on disparities in outcomes) and legitimacy with procedural justice (both are judgments on fairness of the procedures). The authors emphasise that individuals are affected by the experiences of unfair procedures (legitimacy) the same way they are affected by disadvantageous outcomes (deprivation). Empirical data have shown support that judgements on legitimacy (e.g. equality of opportunities) and deprivation or discrimination (e.g. one group more disadvantaged) are related (Grant, 2008; Major & Schmader, 2001; Tyler & Lind, 2002).

Scholars have argued for two possibilities regarding the sequential relationship of these constructs. (1) Reactions to unfair outcomes (relative deprivation, distributive injustice) can depend on fairness of procedures (legitimacy, procedural justice); i.e. disparities in outcomes are experienced as deprivation only if they derive from illegitimate or biased procedures (Bylsma, Major, & Cozzarelli, 1995; Gurin, 1985; Hegtvedt, Clay-Warner, & Johnson, 2003). In the same fashion, Tyler (2006) argues that disadvantageous outcomes would affect an individual less in the presence of procedural justice or legitimacy when in comparison, ‘distribution procedures’ are perceived to be unfair. (2) Perception of unfairness (legitimacy) can also be established as a consequence of relative deprivation resulting from unfavourable comparisons. For example, Dion (1986) found that individual and group deprivation were both significant negative predictors of perceived fairness of the societal system among ethnic minority groups.

The proposed model in this work expects the constructs of legitimacy and deprivation to be highly correlated, and as such they will be treated as same level mediators. No sequential relationship between status non-legitimizing beliefs and relative deprivation will be proposed, as theoretically they can both mediate each other.
Antecedents of perceived deprivation relative to Estonians (identity, history)

The model investigates the effects of two main constructs as antecedents of perceived deprivation relative to Estonians (subsequently relative deprivation), identification and importance of history, which both include ‘Russian’ and ‘Estonian’ dimensions.

Based on the previous qualitative analysis, it would be expected that Russian ethnic identity is positively related to perceived deprivation. To acknowledge the disadvantage of the Russian minority in Estonia, individuals would need to have a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group. The direction of the relationship between identity and relative deprivation is not that evident in previous research. A positive relationship between the two variables would be expected from SIT propositions. According to the general social identity perspective, highly identified individuals would report more deprivation than those who are not highly identified. For example, a number of studies demonstrate a positive relationship between social identity and perceived group deprivation (Abrams, 1990; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; de la Sablonniere & Tougas, 2008; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Petta & Walker, 1992; Tropp & Wright, 1999) supporting the theoretical suggestions that high identifiers are more sensitive towards the perceived deprivation of their group.

Other research has, however, found a negative relationship between identification and deprivation (Lalonde & Cameron, 1993; Tougas & Veilleux, 1988; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). Zagefka and Brown (2005) suggest that the direction of the relationship might depend on self-enhancement or equity motives. In the presence of enhancement motives, the relationship between identification and deprivation would be positive because high identifiers would ignore anything that would reduce their feelings to feel good about their ingroup compared to low identifiers. On the other hand, if individuals have strong equity motives (i.e. if they emphasise the unfair treatment of their group), high identifiers would stress deprivation more than low identifiers. Considering our previous results, the equity motives are of no doubt very prevalent among Russians.

Additionally, Doosje, Spears and Ellemers (2002) that high identifiers are
more committed to the group and perceive its unity even if the improvement of the group status is unlikely, whereas low identifiers indicate the same only if change for greater success is realistic or guaranteed. High identifiers are believed to stick to their group and to be inclined to describe characteristics of their group in relation to the out-group which involves self-stereotyping their group as disadvantaged or as privileged (Postmes, et al., 1999).

In line with these studies, it is expected in the current study that the higher the ethnic identification of Russians, the more they will perceive deprivation of their ethnic group relative to Estonians.

In terms of national (Estonian) identification the opposite is expected. Grant (2008) argues that ethnic and national identifications are “countervailing motivational forces” (p. 691), suggesting that strong national identifying individuals will be less inclined to perceive discrimination of their ethnic group, which is opposite to ethnic identification. The author demonstrated that immigrants’ national identity negatively predicted group discrimination, while cultural identity had a positive effect on group discrimination. It is expected in this study that high national identification will lead to the decreased perceptions of Russians’ relative deprivation.

Similarly to identity, the importance of Russian and Estonian history can be seen as opposing motivational forces that are expected to affect the perception of relative deprivation in opposite directions. Those individuals who value their Russian historical memory will be more sensitive in perceiving the situation of their ethnic group as more deprived in comparison to Estonians. At the same time, recognizing the importance of Estonian historical memory is expected to militate against perceiving the situation of Russians worse off (deprived) compared to Estonians.

The following hypotheses are anticipated with perceived deprivation relative to Estonians in the hypothesised mediation model:

Hypothesis 1.4. (a) Russian identification will predict greater perceived deprivation, and Estonian identification will predict less perceived deprivation relative to Estonians; (b) the importance of Russian history will predict greater perceived discrimination, and importance of Estonian history will predict less perceived deprivation relative to Estonians; (c) Russians’ social identities (ethnic and national) and the importance of histories (Russian and Estonian) will have indirect effects on psychological adaptation via perceived deprivation relative to
Estonians (*relative deprivation mediation hypothesis*).

**Antecedents of status non-legitimizing beliefs (identity, history)**

The second proposed mediator examines the effects of identification and importance of history, including Russian and Estonian dimensions on status non-legitimizing beliefs (status non-legitimization). Status non-legitimizing beliefs include issues of perceived impermeability of intergroup boundaries, fairness and justification of current status relations. Previous research suggests that depending on the status of the groups (high or low-status groups), ingroup attachment has a different effect on legitimacy beliefs. Among lowest-status groups, the more minority groups identify with their ethnic group, the less they endorse system-justifying ideologies such as system legitimacy and permeability (Levin, et al., 1998). The authors argue that this is in line with social dominance theory, which proposes that ingroup attachment is positively related to ideologies that oppose the hierarchical structure of the social system among low status groups.

Studies stemming from SIT have similarly demonstrated that higher ethnic identification is related to the perception of interethnic structure as being illegitimate, closed (i.e. with impermeable group boundaries) and difficult to change (i.e. stable) for the lower status minority group (e.g. Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008).

In the current research, strong ethnic identification is expected to lead to agreement with status relations being non-legitimate (i.e. fixed and unfair), while strong national identification is expected to lead to rejection of such beliefs.

In terms of importance of history, historical representations theory argues that there are representational components to legitimacy based on history which are not simply objective evaluations (Liu & Hilton, 2005). The importance of historical beliefs is expected to be related to how legitimacy of the current social structure is seen by Russians and Estonians. Russians are expected to be less willing to perceive the current state of affairs as legitimate if they hold historical representations similar to the Soviet time representations. In terms of ethnic identity, the importance of Russian history is expected to predispose participants to see status relations non-legitimate, whereas valuing Estonian history is expected to have an opposite effect.

In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed with status non-legitimizing
beliefs in the hypothesised mediation model:

*Hypothesis 1.5.* (a) Russian identification will predict more status non-legitimizing beliefs, and Estonian identification will predict less status non-legitimizing beliefs; (b) the importance of Russian history will predict more status non-legitimizing beliefs and the importance of Estonian history will predict less status non-legitimizing beliefs; (c) Russians’ social identities (ethnic and national) and importance of histories (Russian and Estonian) will have indirect effects on psychological adaptation via status non-legitimizing beliefs (*status non-legitimizing beliefs mediation hypothesis*).

**Temporal comparisons as an additional mediator?**

Prior research in Estonia has shown that Russians assess the new political and economic regime in Estonia less positively than the former (Soviet-era) economic and political regime (P. Vihalemm, 2009). This might indicate the relevance of temporal comparisons for Estonian Russians, where the previous state of affairs provides them an important reference point for evaluating their life circumstances in a new socio-political context. The previous qualitative study indicated the importance of such temporal comparisons for Estonian Russians. On the basis of the qualitative results, it is possible to suggest an additional meaning that the temporal comparisons might entail in the assessment of psychological adaptation.

This study cautiously suggests an alternative model (Model B in Figure 4.1) in which temporal comparisons may mediate the effects of identity and historical beliefs on psychological adaptation in addition to relative deprivation and legitimacy beliefs of status relations. It can be expected that individuals with high Russian ethnic identity and emphasizing the importance of Russian historical beliefs will be inclined to make temporal comparisons with previous ‘good times’ when their identity and version of history was supported by the wider society. Temporal comparisons in turn might remind them about the change of their current status which may lead to their dissatisfaction. With the strong Estonian identification and emphasizing the importance of historical beliefs the opposite relationships with temporal comparisons is anticipated.

The additional model is suggested cautiously as it is difficult to find any empirical support from the previous literature to argue strongly for these relationships. Some theoretical support could be found from SIT only for the link between social
identity and social comparisons. For example, salient group identities are likely to lead individuals to engage in intergroup comparisons, which can result in feelings of dissatisfaction with the outcomes (Kawakami & Dion, 1993; H. J. Smith, et al., 1999). Therefore, the alternative model (Model B) including temporal comparisons as the third mediator in the model will be additionally tested after determining its significance with explorative techniques.

Research Question 1.1. Do temporal comparisons mediate the effects of identity and history on psychological adaptation?

Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation

This section investigates the minority Russians’ acculturation preferences and their relationship with psychological adaptation (subjective well-being). As discussed in the theoretical chapter, members of an ethnic minority group are involved in an acculturation process in which both their own cultural heritage and the cultural components of the national majority group become part of their everyday life. The degree of having incorporated cultural aspects of one or both ethnic groups into one’s life can be orthogonal or related and are therefore usually treated as separate dimensions of identity (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000).

Orientations toward the cultures of ethnic minority and national majority are usually by default addressed in the acculturation research. The relationship between the two orientations (or dimensions) is not only informative in terms of individual acculturation preferences, but is also interpreted to reflect a wider context (e.g. Phinney, et al., 2001), which is receiving growing importance in inter-cultural relations research. For example, a negative relationship between ethnic and national cultural dimensions would be indicative of a society with assimilationist policies (Phinney, et al., 2001).

Generally, research demonstrates that ethnic identity and ethnic culture maintenance are important for ethnic minority groups. Ethnocultural groups usually rate their ethnic identity higher than national identity and show a higher preference for maintaining their culture in comparison to adopting or participating in the national culture (e.g. Phinney, et al., 2006; Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002; Ward & Rana-Deuba, 2000). Research conducted in Estonia shows similar results, e.g. in all age groups over half of the Russian-speaking respondents (54-72%) choose ‘to be the bearer of own nation’s culture’ over importance ‘to adopt Estonian
cultural and customs’ (7-14%) (Vetik, 2006). The following hypothesis is suggested regarding Russians’ acculturation preferences in this research given that items on both dimensions are parallel:

Hypothesis 1.6. It is expected that the Russian participants will prefer maintaining their own culture more than participating in the Estonian culture.

The research investigating an independent effect of two acculturation dimensions on psychological adaptation of ethnic minorities is rather limited. Only involvement with own ethnic culture has been found to be significantly related to psychological well-being (Ward & Rana-Deuba, 2000), or neither acculturation dimensions have been found to predict life satisfaction (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006).

In terms of how four acculturation preferences are related to psychological adaptation a substantial body of acculturation research indicates that in comparison to other acculturation strategies, integration preference has most consistently been shown to have positive consequences for the well-being of the individuals with an immigrant background (Berry, 1997; Berry, et al., 2002; Phinney, et al., 2001; Ward, 1996). For example, those individuals who choose an integration mode exhibit lower levels of stress than those who favour a separation, assimilation or marginalisation mode (Dona & Berry, 1994). Marginalisation is shown to be the least adaptive acculturation strategy, while assimilation and separation strategies are in-between (Berry, et al., 2002). Marginalisation has been found to be negatively correlated with satisfaction with life (Neto, 1995) and positively with poor psychological and somatic symptoms (Sam, 1994).

Application of these results to the current research is challenging, especially since integration cannot be expected to produce positive outcomes considering the Estonian context. Although the qualitative study found that Russian participants expressed the importance of being part of both Estonian and Russian cultures, everything related to maintaining their Russian heritage was perceived as not appreciated by the native Estonians. Estonians in principle supported integration, however their expressions about expectations for Russians “to melt into” the Estonian society and culture were more indicative of the assimilation preference. Therefore, from the Russians’ perspective, it might be more beneficial for their well-being to be involved in culture of one or the other group than making continuous efforts to successfully unite these two in their everyday behaviours. These assumptions lead to
research questions (RQ) instead of predefined hypotheses for the investigation of relationship between acculturation preferences and psychological adaptation:

*Research Question 1.2.* (a) How do preferences for Russian cultural maintenance and participation in Estonian culture affect Russians’ psychological adaptation? (b) How are acculturation strategies related to psychological adaptation?

**Method**

**Data Collection**

The original questionnaire for Study 2 was composed in English and was subsequently translated into Russian. The versions of the surveys translated by myself were verified by two independent Russian native speakers who were also fluent in English and familiar with the terminology of the study area. Ethics approval was obtained for the study from School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington.

The questionnaires were available in an online version and in hard copy which were advertised through several different channels. Among other advantages of web based research (see Reips, 2000), online data collection for the studies was undertaken mainly because of the easy access to a large and diverse population of participants.¹⁴ For the online questionnaires, an invitation to participate in the study was posted to several Russian-speaking online forums and discussion boards providing the link to the questionnaire. Online studies were also advertised by research assistants distributing hard copy versions of the questionnaire and by snowballing emails.

Self-selection can be a problem in online research, but it can be controlled by multiple site entry technique (Reips, 2000), which was used for this research. The invitation to participate in this voluntary and anonymous study briefly outlined the theme and the purpose of the research. A complete information sheet about the research was available after clicking the link to the online survey.

The study included a token of appreciation for participants’ time and effort. Participants were offered a chance to participate in a lucky draw to win one of five

grocery vouchers. Participation in the lucky draw was also possible only after completion of the survey; participants were directed to a separate independent site, where they could indicate their agreement to participate and their contact details. The survey was hosted by SelectSurvey.NET and participants’ answers were saved on the Victoria University of Wellington server.

Hard copy versions of the questionnaires were distributed by two research assistants in two main regions of Estonia (in the capital Tallinn, where the proportion of Estonians and Russians is approximately equal, and in Narva, a border city with a large concentration of Russians). Separate forms for participating in a lucky draw were attached to the questionnaires, which were returned in a different envelope from the questionnaire by interested participants to maintain their anonymity. The draws were conducted after the data collection had been finished and all the lucky draw forms collated. The vouchers were sent to winners by post.

For the data analysis, the online and hard-copy responses were collated. There is evidence that merging responses from mixed mode data collection can be performed meaningfully without measurement effects (see De Beuckelaer & Lievens, 2009 for the overview). Beuckelaer and Lievens (2009) have examined a measurement equivalence of mixed data collection modes (combining administration of online and hard copy versions) in multiple countries (16) with the total sample of over 52,000 participants. The authors argue for the legitimacy of merging the data collected by internet or hardcopy surveys in a particular country as they found no empirical evidence on differential effects between these two modes of data collection.

Procedure

As a target population, ethnic Russians residing in Estonia were invited to participate in this study. The data were collected from September 2008 to January 2009 through online and hard-copy surveys as described above.

Participants

One hundred and ninety ethnic Russians participated in this study. Originally, 148 surveys were downloaded from the online software and 107 surveys were collected from participants filling out hard copy versions. Forty-two participants (28.4% out of online responses; 16.5% out of total sample) stopped filling out the online survey after
the first page of the questions and their data were deleted listwise. Dropout in the web research is considered one of the main drawbacks of web research (Reips, 2000). However the final dropout of participants in this study remains close to the average of online studies. Musch and Reips (2000, cited in Reips, 2002) report the average dropout rate in web studies is 34% (median 35%) ranging from 1 to 87%. Ultimately total of 54, all of them online survey participants, (36.49% out of online responses; 21.2% out of whole sample), with more than 33% of missing values were excluded listwise in this study. Another 11 cases (4.31% out of initial sample) were deleted listwise because they did not fit the sampling target (3 native Estonians, 1 Ukrainian, 7 participants with mixed background, i.e. one Estonian parent).

Because multiple entry responses can be another drawback of web based research (Birnbau, 2004; Reips, 2000), IP-addresses with demographic information and other responses were checked. No identical response sets were found.

The total sample consisted of 190 ethnic Russian participants (74.5% of initial sample; 86 online and 104 hard copy responses, 58.1% and 97.2% out of initial online and hard copy responses respectively). Data were screened for the missing values. The proportion of missing values of the remaining participants ranged from 0.6 – 26.7% (M = 4.0%, SD = 5.25). The range of missing values per item was 0–6.3% (M = 1.6%, SD = 1.51), the latter was on two items measuring Estonian identity. Missing values were treated with Multiple Imputation technique which has been offered and advised to use as a good and strong statistical procedure in dealing with missing data problems (e.g. Graham, 2009; Wayman, 2003).

The final sample consisted of 54.5% of female and 45.5% male participants. The age of the sample ranged from 16–75 (M = 34.24, SD = 13.94). The majority of the participants (75.8%, N=144) were born in Estonia, while 17.9% indicated their place of birth as Russia. Those who were born outside Estonia had been residing in Estonia from less than a year to 63 years (M = 31.02, SD = 12.03). Most of the participants held Estonian citizenship (70.4%; N=133), 13.2% (N=25) were citizens of Russia, and 16.4% (N=31) were with undetermined citizenship. Participants rated their Estonian language proficiency with four language items (understanding, reading, speaking, writing) on a 5-point scale only slightly above the average (M_{items} = 3.34, SD = .95). In terms of education, 38.8% (N=73) of participants had tertiary, 48.9% (N=92) secondary, and 12.2% (N=23) basic education. The majority of the participants (67.4%, N=128) came from the Northeast-Estonia, a border region with Russia, and the capital
Tallinn (23.7%, N=45); participants from the other regions comprised altogether 9% (N=17).

**Materials**

The participants completed the questionnaire containing demographic information (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity), and predictor and criterion variables as described further (for descriptive statistics see Table 4.1). The questionnaire, the information sheet and the debriefing form in English are presented in Appendix B.1.

*Ethnic identity.* Ethnic identity was measured by *private* (assesses how individuals privately evaluate their social group), *public* (assesses how individuals believe others evaluate their social group) and *importance to identity* (assesses the role of group memberships in the self-concept) subscales from the *Collective Self-Esteem Scale* (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). After the preliminary analysis of the scale structure (originally consisting of twelve items) and psychometric properties, the final scale included 6 items, 2 items per each subscale. E.g. “I feel good about belonging to Russian nation” (*private*), “In general, others respect Russians” (*public*), and “In general, being part of Russians is an important part of my self-image” (*importance to identity*).

*National identity.* The same subscales from the *Collective Self-Esteem Scale* as for ethnic identity measure were used to measure national identity, e.g. “I feel good about belonging to the Estonian nation”. After screening of the scale items, the final scale consisted of 6 items, again 2 items per each subscale.

*Importance of history.* The participants rated the importance of preserving the memory of historical events and symbols. Six items reflected facts or common beliefs about Russian history (e.g. “To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe”), and five depicted Estonian history (e.g. “To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia”). Two indexes were composed based on two factors, Estonian history and Russian history. Scores ranged from 1 to 7 with higher scores indicating higher importance of Estonian or Russian history.

*Status non-legitimating beliefs.* Originally 18 items representing the legitimacy, permeability and stability dimensions of intergroup status relations were adapted from
the previous qualitative study and existing research (Esses, et al., 1998; Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992; Mumendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999). The sample items to measure permeability of intergroup boundaries were “No matter how much one tries, it is difficult for other ethnic groups to be accepted by Estonians”, “Russians with the same skills have the same possibilities in society as Estonians”. Legitimacy of the inter-ethnic relations was represented in items like “Estonian laws regarding the non-native population in Estonia are fair”. Stability of inter-ethnic relations was also represented: “Assigning the official status to Russian language (i.e. establishing bilingualism) is possible in Estonia”. All items were measured on a 7-point agreement/disagreement scale (1–strongly disagree, 7–strongly agree). Despite the inclusion of these three dimensions, exploratory factor analysis with Oblim rotation (see the following section on analytical strategy) revealed a 12-item one factor solution, with higher scores indicating status relations being evaluated non-legitimate.

**Perceived inferior position.** The participants assessed how common were different feelings among Estonian Russians regarding their positions in Estonian society, e.g. “feeling excluded in the Estonian society”, “feeling like ‘people of the second rank’” (1–not common at all, 7–very common). The scale consisted of 8 items with higher scores indicating higher perceived inferior position.

**Perceived deprivation relative to dominant outgroup.** The measure was composed following the relative deprivation measures in existing studies (e.g. Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Tropp & Wright, 1999; Zagefka & Brown, 2005) with items derived from the qualitative study. Participants assessed the situation of Estonian Russians in Estonia in different life areas compared to Estonians. They rated 12 items of cognitive deprivation (e.g. “Participation in political life”, “Opportunities for career development”) and one item on satisfaction on a 7-point Likert scale (1–much worse to 7–much better). The scores of the composite index were reversed with higher scores indicating Russians’ situation being considered worse compared to Estonians, thus showing higher perceived deprivation.

**Perceived deprivation relative to Soviet time.** The participants assessed their current situation in different life areas compared to what they had before Estonian independence. The participants rated the same 12 items of cognitive deprivation and one item on satisfaction as in the previous scale on a 7-point Likert scale (1–much worse to 7–much better). The scores of the composite index were reversed with higher scores indicating current situation being worse compared to past.
The targets/referents of comparisons. The participants were asked to indicate their opinion on, how often Estonian Russians compare themselves with four different targets when they talk about their circumstances in life (1–never, 7–always). The given targets included social comparisons with Estonian Russians (ingroup), Estonians (dominant outgroup), Russians in Russia (transnational), and temporal comparisons with Russians’ situation during the Soviet time (temporal ingroup).

Acculturation preferences. Twelve parallel items in six domains (way of life, language, holidays and festivals, socialisation, mass media, mentality) were constructed to measure two acculturation dimensions: maintenance of Russian culture and adoption of Estonian culture. Participants were asked to rate the items based on their own experiences and behaviour (e.g. “I celebrate Russian [Estonian] holidays and festivals like Russians [native Estonians]”) using the 7-point agreement or disagreement scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). Six items on Russian culture and six items on Estonian culture were combined into two indexes with scores ranging from 1 to 7, higher scores indicated stronger support for maintenance of Russian culture and adapting to Estonian culture, respectively.

Psychological well-being. Psychological well-being was measured by the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) which consisted of five statements about life intending to evaluate a person’s judgment about her/his overall satisfaction with life. Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher SWLS scores indicate greater life satisfaction.

Analytical Strategy

Psychometric properties of the scales were checked before conducting the main analyses. Exploratory factor analyses and internal consistencies were chosen to examine the psychometric properties of the measures (e.g. Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008). The decision to conduct exploratory factor analysis of the scales was made especially because items of many measures were constructed from the qualitative study and in case of established scales (e.g. identity measures) they were translated, thus creating a possibility of different understanding of concepts by participants than originally set to measure.

Unless there were theoretical reasons to expect factors to be independent, they
were allowed to be correlated, and thus the Oblim rotation was preferred. Costello and Osborne (2005) argue that some correlation among factors in social sciences is expected and advise use of oblique rotation, which should render a more accurate solution, especially if factors are correlated. They argue that if there is no correlation between factors, orthogonal and oblique rotation should produce nearly identical results.

Three criteria for factor retention were considered: Kaiser’s eigenvalue above one (K1) rule (Kaiser, 1960), Scree test (Cattell, 1966), and Parallel Analysis (Horn, 1965). The first two criteria are more widely utilized, however, Parallel Analysis has been considered to be the most accurate factor retention method (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). K1 criterion has been criticized as it tends to suggest retaining too many factors due to the sampling error (Hayton, et al., 2004). Parallel Analysis (PA) extracts eigenvalues from random data sets that parallel the eigenvalues from actual data with the same amount of variables and cases. Factors are retained if eigenvalues from real data are higher than the corresponding eigenvalues from the random data (Hayton, et al., 2004; Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007; O’Connor, 2000). The final decision about the retention of factors was made based on compatibility with most interpretable solution.

A detailed description of the factor analyses for different concepts is presented in Appendix B2. The psychometric properties of the final measures are presented in Table 4.1. It can be noted that ratings of life satisfaction were below the scalar midpoint. The scores on relative deprivation measures and perceived inferior position were rather high (between 5 and 6 on a 7-point scale). While ethnic identity was rather strong, national identity was slightly below the midpoint. Importance of Russian history and Russian culture maintenance were rated very high and were the only variables showing serious deviations from normality as the skew values were above 1.0 and the kurtosis values were above 2.0 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, log transformation of these two variables was performed to reduce the skewness in the preliminarily analyses. However, since the comparison of correlations between transformed variables and all other variables in a study did not show any major variations from correlations with non-transformed variables, non-transformed variables of importance of Russian history and Russian culture maintenance were used in the subsequent analyses.
Table 4.1

Descriptives of composed indices of the measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No of items</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
<th>% variance of 1 factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>57.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived deprivation relative the Soviet time (Temporal relative deprivation)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>74.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived inferior position</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>47.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of (ingroup) comparisons with Estonian Russians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of (outgroup) comparisons with Estonians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of (transnational) comparisons with Russians in Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of (temporal) comparisons with Soviet time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of history</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian history</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>44.27% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>22.30% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity (Estonian)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>36.62 (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity (Russian)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>24.38 (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual acculturation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian culture maintenance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>32.81% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian culture participation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>24.59% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status non-legitimating beliefs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>44.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological adaptation (life satisfaction)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>67.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

**Contextual Factors**

The first hypothesis (*Hypothesis 1.1a*) predicted that the importance of Russian and Estonian historical memory would form two separate factors and be negatively associated with each other. To test this prediction six items that reflected facts or common beliefs of about Russian history, and six items that depicted Estonian history were subjected to factor analysis with Oblim rotation. Three factors were extracted after submitting 12 items to factor analysis with eigenvalues higher than 1. The item “To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of fifty-year occupation of Estonia” formed singly unambiguously the third factor. Item-total correlation between this item and other 5 variables measuring Estonian historic knowledge was .09 indicating that
this item is not related to other items. After removing this item, factor analysis was run
again which resulted in two clear factors (eigenvalues above 1.0), reflecting Russian
identity (6 items, explaining 44.27% of variance, eigenvalues 4.87) and Estonian
identity (5 items, explaining 22.30% of variance, eigenvalues 2.45). The eigenvalues
obtained by PA from more conservative 95th percentile of the distribution of
eigenvalues from the random data suggested also 2-factor solution. The final factor
structure is presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Factors of importance of history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russian history</th>
<th>Estonian history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate the Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis in the Second World War (b)</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of wartime sacrifice and the defeat of fascism (f)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To honour the graves of soldiers, who fell in the Second World War (d)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 9th of May (e)</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe (a)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To recognise the Soviet army as liberator of Estonia from the Nazis (c)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia (j)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To recognise the crimes committed by the communist regime (e.g. repressions and deportations) in Estonia during the Soviet years (i)</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate soldiers who fought for Estonian freedom in the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920) (g)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge Soviet occupation in Estonia (h)</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 8th of May (k)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The correlation analysis indicated that there is a moderate negative relationship \((r = -0.32, p < .001)\) between the two history constructs. The importance of Russian history is very high \((M = 6.46, SD = .80)\) for the Russian participants. The importance of Estonian history is slightly below the scalar midpoint \((M = 3.66, SD = 1.53)\). In sum, the results support the Hypothesis 1.1a.

The second hypothesis involved comparison referents. The most prevalent comparison referents for Estonian Russians appeared to be outgroup comparisons (Estonians) \((M = 4.70, SD = 1.70)\) and temporal comparisons (Soviet time) \((M = 4.57, SD = 1.74)\). Six paired samples \(t\)-tests were performed that revealed that outgroup and temporal comparisons did not differ significantly from each other \(t(186) = 0.73, p = n.s\), but they both differed significantly from other targets, i.e. comparison with Estonian Russians \((M = 3.72, SD = 1.42; t(186) = 7.34, p < .001)\) with outgroup and \(t(185) = 6.09, p < .001\) with temporal comparisons), and comparison with Russians in Russia \((M = 4.14, SD = 1.38; t(184) = 4.67, p < .001)\) with outgroup and \(t(183) = 3.38, p < .01\) with temporal comparisons). Comparisons with Estonian Russians were less frequent than comparisons with Russians in Russia \(t(183) = -3.23, p < .01\). These results are in line with predictions in Hypothesis 1.1b.

**Correlates and Predictors of Life Satisfaction of Estonian Russians**

In the preliminary step, correlation analyses were conducted to examine the significant relationships between life satisfaction and its predictor variables. All the correlations were in the expected direction (Hypotheses 1.2. a to e) as presented in Table 4.3. Correlations showed negative relationship between Russian identity and life satisfaction, indicating that the higher the Russian identification \((r = -0.37, p < .001)\), the lower the participants’ life satisfaction. The same direction of relationship was obtained for the importance of Russian history \((r = -0.45, p < .001)\). However, higher Estonian identification \((r = 0.16, p < .05)\) and the importance of Estonian history \((r = 0.42, p < .001)\) showed an opposite trend; they were associated with higher life satisfaction.

From the comparison targets, only temporal comparisons were significantly related to life satisfaction \((r = -0.46, p < .001)\), indicating that the more the participants believed that Russians compare their life situation with the Soviet time, the lower their
life satisfaction was. Social comparisons were not significantly associated with life satisfaction.

Perceived inferior position and two perceived deprivation variables were all negatively related to life satisfaction, indicating that the more the participants feel their position to be inferior ($r = -.34, p < .001$), deprived relative to Estonians ($r = -.57, p < .001$) and the Soviet time ($r = -.41, p < .001$), the less satisfied they were with their lives. Status non-legitimizing beliefs were negatively related to life satisfaction ($r = -.55, p < .001$).
### Table 4.3

**Correlations amongst predictor and criterion measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
<th>12.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Life satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Russian identity</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Estonian identity</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.12†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Russian history</td>
<td>-.45***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Estonian history</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Comparisons with Estonian Russians</td>
<td>-.04 n.s.</td>
<td>-.01 n.s.</td>
<td>.01 n.s.</td>
<td>.00 n.s.</td>
<td>-.05 n.s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Comparisons with Estonians</td>
<td>-.09 n.s.</td>
<td>-.02 n.s.</td>
<td>-.12 n.s.</td>
<td>.14 n.s.</td>
<td>-.04 n.s.</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Comparisons with Russian Russians</td>
<td>-.11 n.s.</td>
<td>.11 n.s.</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-.11 n.s.</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Temporal comparison</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>-.13†</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Perceived inferior position</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.13†</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>-.04 n.s.</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>-.57***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
<td>-.03 n.s.</td>
<td>.13†</td>
<td>.02 n.s.</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Perceived deprivation relative to soviet time</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>-.42***</td>
<td>-.04 n.s.</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
<td>.09 n.s.</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Status non-legitimating beliefs</td>
<td>-.55***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>-.05 n.s.</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$
Multiple regression predicting life satisfaction

In a further step, analyses were conducted to examine of how much variance in life satisfaction was explained by the proposed predictor variables and what the precise contribution of each variable in the prediction was.

A hierarchical multiple linear regression was used to determine the predictors of life satisfaction. The following order of entry of the predictor variables has been established: (1) Russian and Estonian identification, (2) importance of Russian and Estonian history, (3) temporal comparisons, (4) perceived inferior position, perceived deprivation relative to Estonians and Soviet time, and (5) status non-legitimating beliefs (i.e. perceived fixed and unfair status).

Since social comparisons were not significantly related to the life satisfaction, they were omitted from further regression and path analyses. Zero order correlations between life satisfaction and demographic variables (age, gender, citizenship) and language proficiency revealed a significant relationship only with age. Therefore, the subsequent effects have been controlled for age. Age explained 7% of variance in initial step of the prediction model ($\beta$= -.27, $p < .001$). The effect of age on life satisfaction (negative association) dissolved completely in the 3rd model, after temporal comparisons had been entered.

The inter-correlation among predictor variables ranged from -.12 to .68. In case predictor variables are highly correlated with each other it might cause the multicollinearity problem making it difficult to identify the unique contribution of each variable in predicting the dependent variable. This is because the highly correlated variables are predicting the same variance in the dependent variable. As a rule of thumb, correlations above .90 cause the multicollinearity problem, but more conservative views suggest that correlations above .70 might be problematic. A problem with multicollinearity is indicated if Tolerance statistics is less than .20 or Variance-inflation factor (VIF) indicator of unstable $\beta$, is over 10 (Garsons, 2009). In the current analysis, although some predictors are moderately correlated, they were not redundant – the highest Pearson’s $r$ among each pair of predictor variables was .68 (in case of perceived deprivation relative to Estonians and status non-legitimizing beliefs) in this sample. Tolerance statistics ranged from .35 to .82, and the highest VIF indicator was 2.9, and no “abnormal” relationships were found, indicating no serious multicollinearity problem in the prediction. No cases with standard residuals in excess
of ±3.3 were identified as influential outliers in the preliminary regression diagnostics (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 128).

Table 4.4
Hierarchical regression in prediction of Russians’ life satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st step</th>
<th>2nd step</th>
<th>3rd step</th>
<th>4th step</th>
<th>5th step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Russian identity</td>
<td>-24***</td>
<td>-15*</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07 n.s.</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
<td>-.00 n.s.</td>
<td>-.01 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Russian history</td>
<td>-29***</td>
<td>-14*</td>
<td>-13*</td>
<td>-15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td></td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.02 n.s.</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Temporal comparisons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-25***</td>
<td>-26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Perceived inferior position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>-.40***</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation relative to ST</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04 n.s.</td>
<td>.00 n.s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Status non-legitimating beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.05***</td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td>.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (df)</td>
<td>(3, 186)</td>
<td>(5, 184)</td>
<td>(6, 183)</td>
<td>(9, 180)</td>
<td>(10, 179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>15.62***</td>
<td>18.27***</td>
<td>18.56***</td>
<td>17.03***</td>
<td>16.37***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Regression outputs are presented in Table 4.4. Each step was significant and accounted for additional variance in prediction of life satisfaction. In the first step, Russian and Estonian identities were both significant predictors of life satisfaction accounting for 13% of the variance in life satisfaction. Russian identification appeared to exert negative effect on life satisfaction stronger than there was a positive effect of Estonian identification. In the second step, history variables accounted for an additional 13% of the variance, indicating also that Russian identity dropped considerably and Estonian identity became non-significant. In the third step, temporal comparisons were added to the model that showed to contribute significantly to the prediction and explain additional 5% of the variance. Perceived inferior position together with perceived deprivation relative to Estonians and Soviet time were entered in the fourth step, adding 8% of explained variance. Only perceived deprivation relative to Estonians added significantly to the prediction of life satisfaction in the fourth step, and contribution of history variables to the prediction of life satisfaction become non-significant (p < .05).
In the last step, status non-legitimizing beliefs added additional 2% of the variance to the prediction of life satisfaction. These results are in line with original predictions that each step would account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by variables in the previous step (*Hypothesis 1.3*).

In the final model all variables together produced an $R^2$ of .48 ($F (10, 179) = 16.37, p = .001$) in the prediction of life satisfaction of Russian participants. Three variables were significantly contributing to the regression: being perceived deprivation relative to Estonians ($\beta = -.32$), temporal comparisons ($\beta = -.26$) and status non-legitimizing beliefs ($\beta = -.26$). The contribution of Russian identification to the regression in the final step was only marginally significant ($\beta = -.11, p < .10$).

**Hypothesized Mediation Model (Model A)**

The first step examined the zero-order relationships with proposed mediators and their antecedent variables as recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The results showed (see Table 4.5) that all the proposed relationships were significant and in an expected direction. While Russian identification was significantly related to increased perception, Estonian identification was related to decreased perception of deprivation relative to Estonians (*Hypothesis 1.4. a*). Similar, pattern was obtained for relationship between importance of Russian and Estonian histories and perceived deprivation relative to Estonians (*Hypotheses 1.4. b*).

Russian identification was associated with status non-legitimizing beliefs, while Estonian identification associated with status legitimizing beliefs (*Hypothesis 1.5. a*). Again, importance of Russian and Estonian histories showed a similar pattern to the previous, where importance of Russian history has positive and Estonian history negative association with status non-legitimizing beliefs (*Hypothesis 1.5. b*).

Additionally, it is important to note that the comparisons of correlations show that association between Russian history (or Estonian history) and relative deprivation is significantly stronger than between Russian identity (or Estonian identity) and relative deprivation (formulas based on DeCoster, 2007). The strength of relationships of Russian identity and Russian history with status non-legitimizing beliefs is only marginally different ($p = .08$). However, Estonian history is more strongly related to status non-legitimizing beliefs than Estonian identity to status non-legitimizing beliefs. In general, these comparisons show that history variables tend to be related with
proposed mediators more strongly than identity variables.

Table 4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians</th>
<th>Status non-legitimizing beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z^a$</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z^b$</td>
<td>-1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z^c$</td>
<td>-2.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z^d$</td>
<td>4.85***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Z-scores calculated for comparison of correlations measured on the same subjects (DeCoster, 2007); $z^a$ tests $r_{RI,RD} = r_{EI,RD}$ and $r_{RI, SNL} = r_{EI, SNL}$; $z^b$ tests $r_{RH,RD} = r_{EH,RD}$ and $r_{RH, SNL} = r_{EH, SNL}$; $z^c$ tests $r_{RI,RD} = r_{EH,RD}$ and $r_{RI, SNL} = r_{RH, SNL}$; $z^d$ tests $r_{RI,RD} = r_{EH,RD}$ and $r_{EI, SNL} = r_{EH, SNL}$; $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Next, the Model A was proposed to test the relative deprivation (Hypothesis 1.4 c) and status non-legitimization (Hypothesis 1.5 c) mediation hypotheses, in which the effects of the identity and history variables on psychological adaptation are expected to be mediated by perceived deprivation relative to Estonians (subsequently relative deprivation) and status non-legitimizing beliefs. As correlational analysis showed that age is significantly related to life satisfaction, it will be added as a covariate in the model where its effect through the mediator variables will be estimated.

AMOS 16.0 graphics programme was used to test the multiple mediation hypotheses. The paths were drawn as indicated in the proposed model (Figure 4.1), in which identity and history variables were expected to have indirect effect on life satisfaction via perceived deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs. The two mediator variables were allowed to be correlated. Model fit was estimated with absolute fit measures such as chi square statistics ($p > .05$), GFI ($>.90$), and RMSEA ($<.10$); and relative (or incremental) fit measures such as CFI ($>.95$) and NFI ($>.90$) (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006).

The results, presented in Table 4.6, indicated overall moderate fit between proposed model and the observed data (see Model A 1). Relative fit measures NFI and CFI showed a good fit. Although the absolute fit measure of GFI showed good fit as well, the RMSEA indicated lack of fit. Statistically significant chi square indicated also

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a poor fit. Evaluation of the model fit should focus besides on the adequacy of model as a whole, also on the fit of individual parameters in the model Byrne (B. Byrne, 2001). The parameter estimates showed that three of the paths were non-significant in this model: path from Russian identification (RI) to relative deprivation was non-significant. Additionally, Estonian identification (EI) did not have significant relationship with relative deprivation, nor with status non-legitimizing beliefs.

The model was then modified and reestimated after removing three insignificant paths. This resulted in improved fit of the model (see Model A 2) with RMSEA dropping to .088 indicating a moderate fit. All the paths in the model were significant (see Figure 4.2).

Table 4.6

*Fit indices for Model A – initial and redefined path models*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model A.1. Initial model</th>
<th>χ²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>χ²/df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effects of age, RI and EI Estonian, and RH and EH on LS are mediated by RD and SNL</td>
<td>14.122</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.824</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.981</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model A.2. Redefined model: Insignificant paths deleted</td>
<td>19.751</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.469</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI → RD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI → RD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI → SNB</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.2. Multiple mediation model (Model A)

Note. The error terms of mediators were correlated to .49. For the purpose of clarity the age effects on relative deprivation ($\beta = .32$, $p < .001$) and status non-legitimization ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$) are not presented in the figure.

Adding Temporal Comparisons to the Model (Model B)

Following the regression analysis, prevalence of temporal intergroup comparisons was significant in explaining the negative well-being of Russians. Therefore, Model B (Figure 4.1) suggested in the introduction in which temporal comparisons expected to mediate the effects of identity and historical beliefs on psychological adaptation is added to the model next to relative deprivation and status non-legitimating beliefs.

First the zero-order relationships were checked between temporal comparisons and its suggested antecedent variables. Russian identification was positively associated with temporal comparisons ($r = .25$, $p < .001$), while expected negative relationship

$^{15}$ It was argued earlier that theoretically relative deprivation and status non-legitimization can mediate each other and therefore no sequential relationship between them was hypothesised. However, both options were empirically tested given that all other paths in model remained the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$\chi^2/df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RD ($R^2 = .60$) mediates effects of SNL on LS</td>
<td>24.518</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.065</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>.951</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path RH $\rightarrow$ RD non-significant</td>
<td>19.751</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.469</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNL ($R^2 = .56$) mediates effects of RD on LS</td>
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</table>
between Estonian identification and temporal comparisons was only marginally significant \((r = -0.13, p = 0.07)\). While importance of Russian history \((r = 0.36, p < 0.001)\) showed significant positive association, importance of Estonian history \((r = -0.35, p < 0.001)\) had negative association with temporal comparisons. Consequently, the paths from two identity and two history variables to temporal comparisons and a path from temporal comparisons to life satisfaction were additionally drawn in the model. Age was again added as a covariate in the model where its effects through the mediator variables were controlled for.

All fit indices of the initial three mediator model (see Model B.1. in Table 4.7) indicate a good fitting model. However, in assessing the fit of individual parameters three of the paths (from Russian identity to relative deprivation, Estonian identity to relative deprivation and to status non-legitimization) were non-significant as in previous Model A. Additionally, paths from Estonian and Russian identity did not achieve statistical significance to temporal comparisons. Thus, these two paths were eliminated and the model was reestimated which resulted in an adequate fit between the proposed model and the observed data (see Model B.2.). The path coefficients of the final model (Model B) are illustrated in Figure 4.3.

### Table 4.7

**Fit indices for Model B – initial and redefined path models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model B.1. Initial model</th>
<th>(\chi^2)</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>(\chi^2/df)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effects of age, RI and EI, and RH and EH on LS are mediated by RD and SNL and TC</td>
<td>7.973</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.139</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>.991</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model B.2. Redefined model: Insignificant paths deleted</th>
<th>(\chi^2)</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>(\chi^2/df)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RI (\rightarrow) RD</td>
<td>14.984</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.3. Multiple mediation model (Model B)

Note. The error terms of relative deprivation and status non-legitimization were correlated to .49. For the purpose of clarity the age effects on relative deprivation ($\beta = .32, p < .001$), status non-legitimization ($\beta = .23, p < .001$), and temporal comparisons ($\beta = .18, p < .01$) are not presented in the figure.

Significance of mediations was tested with bootstrapping confidence intervals (CIs). Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommend bootstrapping as the most powerful method for obtaining confidence limits for specific indirect effects. The bootstrap estimates and 95% CI (BCa, Bias-corrected and accelerated intervals) for the indirect effects were obtained based on 5,000 bootstrap samples using SPSS version of macro by Preacher and Hayes. Mediation is demonstrated with bootstrapping method when bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals constructed around the unstandardized indirect effects do not contain zero indicating that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero.

The total initial effect of Russian history on life satisfaction was -.51 (SE = .12, $p < .001$) with other variables (Russian identity, Estonian identity and history, and age) being controlled for. None of the partial effects of covariates on life satisfaction were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2$/df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RD ($R^2 = .60$) mediates effects of SNL on LS</td>
<td>19.751</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.978</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RH $\rightarrow$ RD non-significant</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNL ($R^2 = .56$) mediates effects of RD on LS</td>
<td>14.984</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH $\rightarrow$ SNB non-significant</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age $\rightarrow$ SNB non-significant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

16 Similarly to Model A, the mediating relationships between relative deprivation and status non-legitimization were tested for Model B.
significant \((p > .05)\). The effect of Russian history on life satisfaction was reduced to insignificance \(-.13\) \((SE = .12, p > .05)\) after the three mediators had been considered in the model. The total indirect effect of Russian history on life satisfaction was \(-.38\). The specific indirect effects were \(-.14\) (through relative deprivation), \(-.13\) (through status non-legitimization) and \(-.11\) (through temporal comparisons). Bootstrapping the indirect effects demonstrated that relative deprivation (with a BCa 95% CI of \(-.30\) to \(-.06\)), status non-legitimization (with a BCa 95% CI of \(-.31\) to \(-.02\)), and temporal comparisons were significant mediators of Russian history and life satisfaction relationship. None of the pairwise contrasts of indirect effects differ significantly because zero was contained in the confidence intervals.

The total initial effect of Estonian history on life satisfaction was \(.22\) \((SE = .06, p < .001)\) with other variables (Estonian identity, Russian identity and history, and age) being covariates. The partial effects of covariates on life satisfaction were not significant \((p > .05)\). The direct effect after the three mediators were entered became statistically insignificant \(.03\) \((SE = .06, p > .05)\). The total indirect effect of Estonian history on life satisfaction was \(.19\). The specific indirect effects were \(.11\) (through relative deprivation), \(.02\) (through status non-legitimization), and \(.05\) (through temporal comparisons). Bootstrapping the indirect effects demonstrated that relative deprivation (with a BCa 95% CI of \(.04\) to \(.23\)), status non-legitimization (with a BCa 95% CI of \(.002\) to \(.06\)), and temporal comparisons (with a BCa 95% CI of \(.02\) to \(.11\)) were significant mediators of the relationship between Russian history and life satisfaction. Examination of the pairwise contrasts of indirect effects indicates that the specific indirect effect through relative deprivation is larger than the specific indirect effect through status non-legitimization (BCa 95% CI of \(.11\) to \(.30\)). The other pairwise contrasts of indirect effects did not differ significantly.

The indirect effect of Russian identity on life satisfaction was estimated only through status non-legitimization because paths to relative deprivation and temporal comparisons were not significant. With all other variables in the model (Estonian identity and history, Russian history, and age) controlled for the total initial effect of Russian identity on life satisfaction was \(-.20\) \((SE = .08, p < .05)\), which remained only marginally significant \(-.15\) \((SE = .08, p > .10)\) after three mediators had been introduced to the model. None of the partial effects of covariates on life satisfaction were significant \((p > .05)\). The indirect effect of Russian identity on life satisfaction was \(-.05\). Bootstrapping the indirect effect indicated that fixed and unfair status (with a BCa 95%
CI of \(-0.15\) to \(-0.004\) was a significant mediator of relationship between Russian identity and life satisfaction.

In summary, the results of this model indicated that all three mediators mediate the effects of Estonian and Russian history constructs on life satisfaction. The importance of Russian or Estonian histories have opposing relationships with the mediator variables, indicating that while the importance of Russian history increased the perceptions of relative deprivation, status non-legitimization and frequency of temporal comparisons, the importance of Estonian history has an opposite effect on these variables. The results of the model demonstrate that Russian identity affects life satisfaction only via status non-legitimization, indicating the stronger Russian identity the more Russians’ status is perceived non-legitimate, which in turn leads to lower life satisfaction. These results partially support status relative deprivation mediation hypothesis (Hypothesis 1.4. c) and status non-legitimization mediation hypothesis (Hypothesis 1.5. c). Additionally, temporal comparisons were found to mediate the effects of importance of Russian and Estonian histories on psychological adaptation (Research Question 1.1.).

### The Relationship between Acculturation and Life Satisfaction

The first analysis investigated the prevalence of Russian culture maintenance and participation in Estonian culture among Russian participants which were measured with parallel items representing two acculturation dimensions. A paired samples \(t\)-test revealed significant differences between the means of Russian culture maintenance and Estonian culture participation. Russians follow the domains of their own culture significantly more (\(M = 6.46, SD = .72\)) than they participate in the Estonian culture \(M = 4.23, SD = 1.21\), \(t(189) = 21.54, p < .001\), which supports the Hypothesis 6. Correlational analysis demonstrated additionally that the acculturation dimensions were unrelated (\(r = -0.03, p > .05\)).

Investigating the first research question (RQ 1.1a) regarding the effects of acculturation dimensions on Russian’s psychological adaptation, a linear regression analysis was performed. The results showed that the Estonian culture participation was not significantly related to life satisfaction (\(\beta = -.12, p > .05\)), while Russian culture maintenance had a significant negative effect on life satisfaction (\(\beta = -.33, p < .001\)).
Additionally, the interaction\(^1\) between two acculturation dimensions was significant ($\beta = -.28, t = -4.25, p < .001$).

To interpret the interaction term, the simple slope analysis (using computer software ModGraph; Jose, 2003) was conducted. The results indicated that under the condition of high Russian culture maintenance, the more Russians participate simultaneously in Estonian culture, the less satisfied they are with their lives (simple slope $= -.43, t = -3.94, p < .001$). Under the condition of low Russian culture maintenance, the more Russians participate in Estonian culture, the more satisfied with life they are (simple slope $= .23, t = 2.05, p < .05$). This indicates that the relationship between Estonian culture participation and life satisfaction can be positive but only if Russians do not maintain their own culture. This graph suggests that individuals preferring assimilation seem to have much higher life satisfaction than those preferring integration. This, however, will be seen in the next analysis.

**Figure 4.4.** Interaction of acculturation dimensions in prediction of life satisfaction

Follow-up one-way ANOVA analyses were performed to compare the scores of life satisfaction for four acculturation strategies ($RQ~1.1b$). In order to compare the level of life satisfaction for four acculturation strategies, the participants were first classified

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\(^{1}\) Before both acculturation variables were entered into the hierarchical regression, they were centred, and the interaction term between them was created.
as endorsing one of the four acculturation strategies. Initial classification was conducted on the basis of scalar midpoint split (4) of two acculturation dimensions resulting participants being scored under high/low Estonian culture participation and high/low Russian culture maintenance which were then combined. This classification resulted in participants being divided between two large groups; 53.2% (N=101) of participants preferred integration, and 40.5% (N=101) preferred separation. Assimilation was preferred only by one and marginalization by two participants, and nine participants were not classified as their scores on one or both dimensions fell on the scalar midpoint.

As the scalar midpoint split generated groups with unequal sizes, for the further comparisons a sample median split was performed on the same dimensions to enable to compare four acculturation strategies in relation to life satisfaction. ANOVA with four acculturation strategies as independent factor, and life satisfaction as dependent variable yielded a significant main effect: $F(3,167) = 22.74, p < .001$. Post-hoc test (Tamhane as equal variances not assumed, homogeneity of variance $p < 0.05$) showed that the highest scores on life satisfaction were obtained for individuals opting for assimilation ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.27$) and the lowest for those preferring integration ($M = 1.98, SD = 1.27$), which were significantly different from each other ($p < .001$). Life satisfaction for integrated individuals was also significantly lower in comparison to individuals preferring separation ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.50$) and marginalization ($M = 3.36, SD = .98$), while latter scored significantly lower in life satisfaction compared to assimilated individuals ($p < .01$). There were no significant differences in levels of life satisfaction between separated and marginalized individuals ($p < .05$). The results are illustrated in Figure. The results should be cautiously interpreted because of the use of the sample median and the extremely high ratings for Russian culture maintenance.
The main goal of this study was to examine the predictors of psychological adaptation of Estonian Russians, measured through their subjective evaluations of life satisfaction. This study found support for a number of predictions made on the basis of the previous qualitative study.

First, results related to contextual factors are discussed. As a standard for evaluating their general circumstances of life, the most prevalent comparisons among Estonian Russians were the comparisons with Estonians and with the Soviet time. These two types of comparisons entail upward comparisons because dominant groups are generally perceived to be better off, and the past situation for Estonian Russians would be perceived better than their present situation due to their status reversal. The current findings are in line with research suggesting that upward comparisons are preferred when groups are interested in challenging the legitimacy of current status relations and appealing for equal or higher status (Rupert Brown & Haeger, 1999; Rupert Brown & Zagefka, 2006; J. M. Levine & Moreland, 1987; Taylor, et al., 1989). Although motivation for comparisons was not investigated per se, support for these claims can be found in the qualitative study, and in high ratings of status non-legitimizing beliefs and perceived deprivation in this study. Correlational analyses further showed that collective temporal comparisons have a negative influence on psychological adaptation, which is a unique finding. The frequency of Estonian

Figure 4.5. Life satisfaction as a function of acculturation preferences

Discussion

The main goal of this study was to examine the predictors of psychological adaptation of Estonian Russians, measured through their subjective evaluations of life satisfaction. This study found support for a number of predictions made on the basis of the previous qualitative study.

First, results related to contextual factors are discussed. As a standard for evaluating their general circumstances of life, the most prevalent comparisons among Estonian Russians were the comparisons with Estonians and with the Soviet time. These two types of comparisons entail upward comparisons because dominant groups are generally perceived to be better off, and the past situation for Estonian Russians would be perceived better than their present situation due to their status reversal. The current findings are in line with research suggesting that upward comparisons are preferred when groups are interested in challenging the legitimacy of current status relations and appealing for equal or higher status (Rupert Brown & Haeger, 1999; Rupert Brown & Zagefka, 2006; J. M. Levine & Moreland, 1987; Taylor, et al., 1989). Although motivation for comparisons was not investigated per se, support for these claims can be found in the qualitative study, and in high ratings of status non-legitimizing beliefs and perceived deprivation in this study. Correlational analyses further showed that collective temporal comparisons have a negative influence on psychological adaptation, which is a unique finding. The frequency of Estonian
Russians’ comparisons to the Soviet time is likely to remind them of lost advantages and negatively affects their well-being. The finding that temporal comparisons increased with participants’ age further illustrates historical influences on well-being, given that older Russians experienced the privileges associated with Soviet occupation.

The qualitative study indicated that different historical events and memories are important for Estonians and Russians. This study found empirical support for the contention that events known to be part of Estonian versus Russian histories are both distinguished among Russians and negatively related. Russian participants differentiated the two opposing views of history that illustrate polemical representations of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988). These opposing representations have consequences for subjective well-being.

As predicted, the importance of Russian history was shown to have a negative influence on psychological adaptation. The same pattern was found for Russian ethnic identity. These are unusual findings given the large body of research showing that ethnic identity contributes to the positive well-being of an individual. Overall, the results clearly indicate that there are contextual factors involved in these processes. In the Estonian context, a strong ethnic identity makes Russians more vulnerable rather than providing them with a source of strength for their well-being. There are only a few existing studies that show similar results. For example, in a study by Birman, Trickett, and Vinokurov (2002) among Jewish refugees from the former Soviet Union, Russian identity was positively associated with psychological symptoms related to anxiety and depression. Further, an experimental study by McCoy and Major (2003) revealed that individuals’ depressed emotions increased with strong ingroup identification in situations of existing prejudice.

Group-level factors, such as perceiving deprivation relative to Estonians, evaluating status relations as non-legitimate and making temporal comparisons, affect Russians’ life satisfaction. These findings support the previous research (e.g. Dion, 1986; Safi, 2010; M. Schmitt, et al., 2010; H. J. Smith & Walker, 2008) which challenges the idea that group level disadvantages has group- and not individual-level effects (e.g. Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Martin, 1986; Pettigrew, 2002; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

Perceived inferior position, which additionally reflects perceptions of Russians’ status, was related to lower life satisfaction, but was shown to be a weaker predictor of life satisfaction than perceived deprivation or status non-legitimizing beliefs. Russian
participants might have internalised their inferior position based on their experiences over the past decade. It was noted in the qualitative study that Russians feel like second rank citizens, which has been accepted by many participants. Possibly, perception of their inferior position has become a more general psychological feeling for Russians of how they feel about their ethnic group. Sense of inferior position might not surprise them anymore and could be related to acceptance of the social stigma. However, their feelings of unfairness and deprivation are harder to accept. The results show that it is not merely how they feel about their position, but the judgments about fulfilment of their existential needs relating to deprivation compared to Estonians and the unfairness of the inter-ethnic situation in Estonia, that exerts a strong impact on their life satisfaction.

The influence of status non-legitimizing beliefs on well-being is in line with predictions of the “system-justification” approach (i.e. legitimization of existing social arrangements). Support of ideology usually serves a “palliative function” by making people feel better about their own situation (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Findings in this study showed that agreement with legitimate status relations related to better psychological adaptation, while those who considered status relations as non-legitimate demonstrated poorer well-being.

The overall dynamics of the inter-relationships in the mediation model revealed that intergroup perceptions such as evaluations of Russians’ position in Estonia in terms of legitimacy, relative deprivation and temporal comparisons are at the core of determining the subjective well-being of Russians. The perception of these core factors are affected by Russian identity and views on Russian and Estonian histories.

This study hypothesized that strong ethnic identity and valuing their history makes Russians sensitive to their disadvantaged ingroup situation in Estonia, which in turn leads to lower life satisfaction. Valuing Russian history affected perceptions of the intergroup situation (relative deprivation, status non-legitimization, and temporal comparisons), which led to lower life satisfaction. Russian identity was significantly related to perceptions of relative deprivation, status non-legitimating beliefs, and temporal comparisons in correlation analyses (though these associations were shown to be significantly weaker than for Russian history); however, when history variables were accounted for in path analyses, Russian identity had a direct effect on status non-legitimizing beliefs, but not on relative deprivation and temporal comparisons. This might indicate that the effects of Russian identity on relative deprivation and temporal
comparisons could be mediated by views of Russian history.

Estonian identity and the importance of Estonian history showed an opposite pattern of relationships. First, both Estonian identity and history exerted positive main effects on Russians’ psychological adaptation. Recognition of the importance of Estonian history led to lowered perceptions of relative deprivation, status non-legitimization, and fewer temporal comparisons, which in turn led to better psychological adaptation. Although Estonian identity showed significant associations with perceptions of intergroup situation (relative deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs), they were rather weak. Estonian identity did not exert any effect on the proposed mediators in the path model when Russian identity and history variables were accounted for. This might suggest that Estonian identity does not predispose individuals to perceive intergroup situation to the same degree as Russian identity or history beliefs do. Russians with strong Estonian identity might not be as observant of the position of Russians in Estonia as Russians with strong Russian identity.

The influence of the importance of historic memory on perceptions of intergroup status relations and psychological adaptation is not only a new finding but, to the best of my knowledge, has not been investigated before. The importance of historic memory could be considered as another facet of identity, and the results of this study show that this seems to have stronger and clearer consequences for intergroup perceptions and well-being than ethnic identity. Valuing Russian history makes Russians especially vulnerable as (1) they believe Russians are more disadvantaged in comparisons to Estonians, (2) they perceive the intergroup situation as more unjust and (3) they indicate more temporal comparisons among Russians, which consequently negatively affects their life satisfaction. However, having accepted Estonian history provides Russians with a resource for adjustment: Russians who value Estonian history (1) seem to perceive the position of Russians as less disadvantaged, (2) assess intergroup relations as more legitimate and (3) indicate fewer temporal comparisons, which leads to better psychological adaptation. In general, these findings show that Russians who strongly identify with their ethnic group or value their ethnic history have lower levels of life satisfaction.

Overall, this study showed that Russian and Estonian identifications, as well as the importance of Russian and Estonian histories, functioned as countervailing motivational forces (Grant, 2008) – strong ethnic identification and valuing Russian
historic memory were related to perceptions of the inter-group situation and life satisfaction in an opposite way to strong national identification or importance of Estonian historic memory (see also Birman, et al., 2002).

As a separate line of investigation, relationships between acculturation phenomena and psychological adaptation of Russians were intriguing. Specifically, results on acculturation and psychological adaptation might appear paradoxical in relation to existing acculturation theory. It is not at all typical to find results where integration produces the lowest subjective well-being; preference for integration is generally associated with better psychological outcomes for ethnic minority groups (e.g. Berry, 1997; Berry, et al., 2002; Dona & Berry, 1994; Phinney, et al., 2001; Ward, 1996). Although engagement in one’s own ethnic culture has been associated with psychological well-being in previous research (e.g. Ward & Rana-Deuba, 2000), the contrary results in this study are consistent with earlier findings; i.e. preference for Russian culture maintenance shows a negative relationship with psychological well-being in the same way as Russian identification and importance of Russian history. These exceptional findings can be explained by cultural context and the position of Russians in Estonia.

If Russians choose an assimilation strategy, it allows them to feel equal to or the same as Estonians. With an integration strategy, however, Russians need to retain their cultural identity and therefore represent themselves as different. In this way, they cannot be equal and might still feel like second class citizens, which may decrease their life satisfaction. Separation can bring better outcomes for life satisfaction than integration because separated individuals might live in denial. In other words, Estonian Russians may carry on the perceptions of Russians from the Soviet time, which may make them feel better and superior (this aspect was also found in the qualitative data), and being Russian is more valuable in the global world (e.g. “they are big nation”). Separation, therefore, might involve a denial strategy that enhances life satisfaction to a greater degree than integration.
Section 2
The Role of Inter-Ethnic Factors and Acculturation in the Prediction of Outgroup Attitudes among Estonian Russians

The main goal of this section is to investigate attitudes of Estonian Russians towards Estonians. The previous qualitative study indicated the prevalence of negative attitudes and stereotypes towards Estonians by ethnic Russians. In the situation where the individuals’ well-being has been jeopardized by an unfavourable inter-group situation, where feeling good about one’s ethnic background is not validated by the other group, negative outgroup evaluations can be a strategy to cope with this situation. However, in terms of subjective well-being having consequences for society, the same can also be argued for the inter-ethnic attitudes: that it is not beneficial for societies to have ethnic groups that relate with antagonism and hold negative views of each other. According to LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton (1993), holding positive attitudes towards both one’s own ethnic ingroup and the majority group is essential for adaptation processes and the establishment of bicultural competence. This is presumably more beneficial for society than having individuals with negative inter-ethnic attitudes. Therefore, this research aims to find out how different factors of concern raised in the qualitative study predict ethnic attitudes to better understand inter-ethnic relations from the minority Russians’ perspective.

As a core assumption of SIT relates to the idea that individuals of social groups strive for positive distinctiveness (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it offers in-depth discussions and empirical evidence about the possible ways individuals handle situations in which their positive social identity is threatened. SIT postulates that people strive for positive social identity that is established from comparisons to others, especially when their ingroup is compared to relevant outgroups. However, these comparisons may result in both positive and negative outcomes for social identity. SIT posits that if the outcomes are negative, people undertake actions to change their social identity to achieve positive distinctiveness. Depending on the structural conditions (permeability, stability, legitimacy) of intergroup relations, this may encompass individual or collective actions, e.g. ingroup bias, negative outgroup attitudes, social competition, individual mobility, or social creativity.

The current research is particularly interested in outgroup attitudes because of their wider implications for inter-group relations; this strategy carries the most potential risks for further conflict escalation. Negative attitudes towards other ethnic groups as
shown in the qualitative study might prevent a willingness to cooperate with other ethnic groups.

As in the prior section, the many predictions for this investigation rely on results of the qualitative study. Previous research is introduced with an attempt to explain Estonian inter-group relations from relevant theoretical perspectives supported by existing empirical evidence. One of the underlying ideas of SIT is that it is the nature of intergroup relations rather than individual and interpersonal processes that determine intergroup attitudes (Turner, 1999); therefore, this study leans on several ideas offered by SIT. Turner (1999) emphasises that “intergroup attitudes are always the product of an interaction between collective psychology, and social reality is assumed to be mediated by group member’s socially shared and socially mediated understanding of their intergroup relations (i.e., their collective beliefs, theories and ideologies about the nature of the social system and the nature of the status differences between groups)” (p. 18).

In line with these premises and qualitative analysis, this study aims to explain outgroup attitudes by examining the effects of such constructs as ethnic and national identity, history beliefs, social and temporal comparisons, inferior (devalued) position, relative deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs on Russians’ attitudes towards Estonians. Additionally, a relationship between acculturation and outgroup attitudes is undertaken as a separate line of investigation.

**Correlates and Predictors of Ethnic Attitudes**

**Identity**

The Russian participants with strong Russian identification (with or without simultaneous Estonian identification) are in a difficult situation, as their self concept and understanding of their ethnic group is not reciprocated by the majority population. The salience of their identification is expected to predispose them to being more sensitive and observant towards of the position of Estonian Russians in the society and inter-ethnic relations in general.

Previous research has shown that ethnic identity and outgroup attitudes are variably related. From the developmental perspectives and with the multicultural hypothesis, a positive relationship is expected between ethnic identity and outgroup
attitudes because well-developed ethnic identity provides a secure foundation for individuals to be more tolerant and positive towards people from other ethnic groups. This view has found support in a number of empirical studies among ethnic minority participants (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995; M. Kosic & Caudek, 2005; Phinney, Ferguson, & Tate, 1997; Phinney, Jacoby, & Silva, 2007).

On the other hand, a negative relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes has been inferred from the ethnocentrism hypothesis (originally derived by Sumner in 1906, cited in Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner, 2005) because of the belief in the competitive nature of groups; or as postulated in SIT, because of the need for positive ingroup distinctiveness (e.g. Rupert Brown, 2000).

SIT has been frequently used to justify the expected relationship between ingroup identification and negative outgroup evaluations, bias etc., as a possible strategy to achieve or restore positive distinctiveness (e.g. Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002). However, according to Turner and Reynolds (2001), the direct relationship between ingroup identification and intergroup attitudes should not be expected without an understanding of the social meaning of the intergroup relationship. Empirical evidence from the SIT indeed demonstrates that ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes can be negative, positive or not related at all (e.g. Hinkle & Brown, 1990); however, context has not been commonly used to explain such differences.

Different results regarding the relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes have encouraged scholars to look for explanations addressing this difference. For example, explaining their results from functionalist (realistic conflict theory; Sherif, 1966) and similarity-dissimilarity (e.g. belief congruence theory; Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) approaches to intergroup relations, Duckitt, et al. (2005) demonstrated that ingroup identification was negatively related to outgroup attitudes only among the competing (e.g. rivalry about the dominance,) and dissimilar (e.g. different languages, history of conflict sharpening the differences) ethnic groups in the South African context. Thus, these results showed that the ethnocentrism hypothesis was supported only when groups were negatively interdependent or competitive, that is mutually seen as “enemies” or “rivals”. With positive interdependence or cooperation between the groups regarded as “allies” or “friendly”, a stronger ingroup identification was related to more positive outgroup attitudes, thus indicating the multicultural pattern of inter-ethnic relations (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995). In the case of no interdependence between groups, no significant relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup
attitudes was obtained. Similar results were also found in the New Zealand context, demonstrating a negative and reciprocal relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes for Maori and Pakeha/European; ethnic groups that share historical conflict (Duckitt & Parra, 2004).

Duckitt et al. (2005) also argued that intergroup similarities and differences or intergroup competition and cooperation are especially recognized in the presence of intergroup comparisons. Similar results have been also shown by Mummendey, Klink, and Brown (2001a), which indicated that ingroup identification was related to devaluation of the outgroup only when the intergroup comparative orientations were made salient.

Results from previous research conducted in Estonia show a non-consistent pattern in the relationship between ethnic identity and outgroup attitudes. It has been found that Russians with high ethnic pride rated outgroups more positively than Russians with low ethnic pride (Valk, 2000), while more recent research showed that Russian-speaking participants with stronger ethnic identity showed more outgroup derogation and negative stereotypes of Estonians than those with weaker ethnic identity (Raudsepp, 2009).

Strong ethnic identification is predicted to be related to negative outgroup attitudes because of the following contextual circumstances: when intergroup comparisons are prevalent; when mutual interdependence is competing rather than cooperative because of the underlying struggle for power and resources; with existing dissimilarities in certain domains (e.g. different languages and historical views); and with a struggle for positive distinctiveness of ethnic minority Russians. Conversely, strong national identification with the ethnic majority group is expected to predict positive outgroup attitudes, as has been shown in previous studies among ethnic minority groups (e.g. Jasinskaja-Lahti, et al., 2009).

**Importance of history**

Conflicts between ethnic groups can result from people’s historically developed understandings of themselves (Turner, 1999). The qualitative study demonstrated that Estonians were not regarded positively (particularly politicians); Russians considered them as inconsiderate or disrespectful of the history of the Russian ethnic group.
Prior empirical research on the importance of historical memory and ethnic attitudes to guide this study is, however, rather limited. The existing research on social representations of history and intergroup relational outcomes has been focused, for example, on associations between historical representations and support for bicultural policies in society (Sibley & Liu, in press; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008), intergroup forgiveness (Hanke, 2009), willingness to fight for one’s own country (Paez, et al., 2008), and attitudes towards European unification (Hilton, Erb, McDermott, & Molian, 1996).

On the basis of the qualitative results, it may be argued that the individuals for whom the memory and recognition of past events related to the Russian history is important are likely to show more negative attitudes towards Estonians. This may be because Russians probably hold Estonians accountable for lack of public recognition of their historical memory. However, if Russians find Estonian historical events important, they are expected to have positive attitudes towards Estonians.

Thus, in the same way as identification, recognition of the importance of Russian history is expected to be associated with negative ethnic attitudes, while recognition of the importance of Estonian history is predicted to produce positive ethnic attitudes.

**Relative deprivation**

The qualitative study indicated that the perceptions of relative deprivation not only play an important role for personal satisfaction. They also can affect attitudes towards the ethnic outgroup in comparison to whom the ingroup is doing worse and receive worse “outcomes.”

According to theoretical propositions, group (or collective) relative deprivation is expected to produce inter-group (group-directed or group-level) attitudinal and behavioural responses as a reaction to perceived group inequalities (e.g. Olson & Roese, 2002). Correlational research has demonstrated that group deprivation is a significant predictor of prejudice (Pettigrew, et al., 2008; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), negative outgroup attitudes, more favourable ingroup attitudes or nationalistic attitudes (Abrams, 1990; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Tripathi & Srivastava, 1981), support for social change or affirmative action (Beaton & Tougas, 1997; Tougas & Veilleux, 1988), group militancy (Koomen & Fränkel, 1992) or protest intentions (Dubé &
From longitudinal studies there is evidence that collective relative deprivation leads to an ingroup bias as a compensatory self-enhancement strategy (M. Schmitt & Maes, 2002).

However, collective relative deprivation has not always significantly predicted intergroup outcomes. For example, collective relative deprivation was not found to have any significant effect on support for government interventions (Tyler & Lind, 2002), and collective protest (M. Schmitt, et al., 2010). Duckitt and Mphuthing (2002) found significant associations only between affective but not cognitive collective relative deprivation, and outgroup attitudes.

In the situation where individuals perceive that the members of their ethnic minority group are doing worse than the members of the majority group, it is plausible to expect that the ethnic minority individuals would have negative attitudes towards the privileged group. Temporal relative deprivation is similarly expected to have a negative relationship with ethnic attitudes as the majority group would be most likely perceived responsible for the decline of the situation of Russian minorities in comparison to the Soviet time, or because deterioration over time simply makes people turn against those who currently have power.

**Status non-legitimizing beliefs**

As already elaborated in the previous section, people care not only about the distribution of outcomes such as power and resources that underline the feelings of deprivation, but also about whether their group receives a fair treatment, that is whether the procedures by which the outcomes are allocated are fair (Tyler & Lind, 2002). Research by Tyler and Lind demonstrates that judgments of procedural fairness (e.g. minority and majority group members have an equal opportunity for success, pay, jobs etc.) can be more important for individuals than judgments of poor outcomes received due to group characteristics or membership. Fairness of procedures appeared to be a key factor that shaped support for the political policy in this research. In terms of outgroup attitudes, a positive correlation was found between illegitimacy of relative deprivation (degree to which an ethnic ingroup was unjustly disadvantaged) and negative outgroup attitudes and trait evaluations in the research conducted by Duckitt and Mphuthing (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002). Perceived illegitimacy (i.e. status relations are not justified) has additionally shown to increase majority out-group stereotypes for ethnic
minority participants (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008), and tends to involve little or no favouritism toward a high-status outgroup. Instead, low status groups favour their own ingroup (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001).

Another important structural or procedural aspect in intergroup status relations is whether or not the societies have permeable and flexible boundaries between advantaged and disadvantaged status groups. Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan and Dolnik (2000) showed that open (permeable) intergroup boundaries prompted the acceptance of a disadvantaged position in a low status group and the display of positive outgroup stereotypes compatible with its status, whereas closed boundaries instigated the collective protest and negative stereotypes challenging the position of the advantageous group. Negative outgroup evaluations and ingroup favourability among low status groups have been shown to increase if mobility, with permeable intergroup boundaries, between different status groups was difficult or not possible, whereas low status groups with open ingroup boundaries formed positive views of the outgroup (Bettencourt, et al., 2001; Scott, 1967).

Status non-legitimating beliefs (i.e. unfair and unjustifiable status relations with impermeable inter-group boundaries) among the Russian participants are expected to be associated with negative outgroup attitudes.

**Comparison targets**

It is difficult to find any empirical studies revealing the predictive function of intergroup comparisons, especially in terms of intergroup relational outcomes. This research investigates if prevalence of intergroup comparisons predicts outgroup attitudes. The prevalence of comparisons with the advantageous outgroup (Estonians) is expected to relate to negative attitudes towards Estonians. Temporal comparisons reminding ethnic Russians of their previous advantage are also anticipated to be associated with negative attitudes towards Estonians, as they might be seen responsible for the change of Russians’ status over time. On the other hand, comparisons with Russians in Russia are expected to be positively related to attitudes towards Estonians, as the Russians’ situation in Russia might be perceived to be worse than in Estonia (as shown in the qualitative study). Comparisons commonly made with other Russians in Estonia and their relationship with the outgroup remain an empirical question.

Overall, the following relationships are anticipated with outgroup attitudes in
correlational terms:

*Hypothesis 2.1.* (a) while Russian identification is expected to have an association with negative attitudes, Estonian identification is expected to be associated with positive ethnic attitudes; (b) similar to identification, the importance of Russian history is expected to be associated with negative, while importance of Estonian history is predicted to be related to positive, ethnic attitudes; (c) perceived inferior position and deprivation relative to Estonians and to Soviet time will be associated with negative ethnic attitudes; (d) status non-legitimizing beliefs (i.e. illegitimacy & impermeability of status relations) will be related to negative ethnic attitudes; (e) regarding comparison targets, the frequency of temporal (with Soviet time) and outgroup comparisons (with Estonians) will be related to negative outgroup attitudes.

*Research Question 2.* What is the association between group comparisons (Russians in Estonia and Russians in Russia) and outgroup attitudes?

This study will further examine the contribution and incremental effects of the identified variables in predicting positive ethnic attitudes in the hierarchical regression model. With the same direction of relationships as for bivariate correlations the following incremental effects are proposed in prediction of ethnic attitudes:

*Hypothesis 2.2.* (a) Russian and Estonian identity will be significant predictors of ethnic attitudes in the first step; (b) representations of history will contribute to explanation of additional variance over and above that explained by identity variables; (c) social and temporal comparisons will explain a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity and historical representations; (d) relative deprivation related predictors will account for additional variance over and above that explained by identity, history and comparison variables; (e) status non-legitimizing beliefs will account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity, history, comparison and relative deprivation variables.

**Acculturation and Outgroup Attitudes**

Acculturation and ethnic relations are two important areas in the study of intercultural relations. However, they have often been investigated in isolation from
each other, even though the relationship between the two is crucial for understanding intercultural relations in multiethnic societies (Berry, 2006). Not much empirical research is available between the acculturation preferences of minority groups and their attitudes towards majority outgroups.

In examining the separate effects of two acculturation dimensions, only the contact/participation dimension has been found to predict intergroup relational outcomes; i.e. the higher the preference for participation, the lower the intergroup bias (Zagefka & Brown, 2002), the higher the outgroup tolerance and perceived quality of intergroup relations (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006); and the more positive outgroup evaluations (Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002).

In terms of the four acculturation strategies, in a few existing studies it has been demonstrated that integration was associated with more favourable intergroup relations than any other strategy; for example, the higher the perceived quality of intergroup relations, the higher the outgroup tolerance, and the lower the intergroup bias (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006). Zick, Wagner, Van Dick and Petzel (2001) reported that minority respondents who were less supportive of integration held more negative attitudes toward the majority Germans.

Similar to section on acculturation and psychological adaptation, research questions regarding Russians’ acculturation preferences and attitudes towards Estonians are proposed instead of predefined hypotheses:

Research question 2.2. (a) What effects does the preference for Russian culture maintenance and participation in Estonian culture have on Russians’ attitudes towards Estonians? (b) Which of the four acculturation strategies is related to the most positive attitudes, and which acculturation strategy corresponds with the most negative attitudes towards Estonians?

Method

The same descriptions of procedure and participants as in the previous section apply for this section.
**Materials**

*Outgroup attitudes.* Participants were asked about their attitudes toward Estonians. Seven point agreement (7) – disagreement (1) scale was used to rate 12 statements on different qualities of Estonians, which were derived from the qualitative study, e.g. “Estonian Russians act towards others with benevolence”, “Estonian Russians’ interaction with others is hostile”(r). Higher scores indicate more positive outgroup perceptions. The survey with all items is presented in Appendix B1.

**Results**

**Preliminary analyses**

Similarly to the previous section, an exploratory factor analysis and internal consistency were chosen to examine the psychometric properties for the measure of ethnic attitudes. An exploratory factor analysis with Oblim rotation was conducted for 12 items on ethnic attitudes resulting in extraction of one factor with eigenvalues above 1.0 (explaining 55.08% of the variance, eigenvalues 6.61). The attitudes towards Estonians remained below the scalar midpoint 4 (M = 3.59, SD= 1.11). Cronbach alpha of .92 showed a very good internal consistency of the scale.

**Correlates and Predictors of Ethnic Attitudes**

Zero order correlations between ethnic attitudes and its predictor variables are presented in Table 4.8. Russian identification and importance of Russian history were shown to be related to more negative outgroup attitudes, while Estonian identification and importance of Estonian history were associated with positive outgroup attitudes. In terms of comparison referents, temporal intergroup comparisons and upward social comparisons (with Estonians) were related to negative attitudes toward Estonians. Other social comparisons, that is with Russians in Estonia and Russians in Russia were not significantly related to outgroup attitudes. Perceived inferior position and two relative deprivation variables had negative associations with ethnic attitudes, showing that as Russians perceived their position to be increasingly inferior, and more deprived relative to Estonians and Soviet time, they reported more negative attitudes toward Estonians.
Status non-legitimizing beliefs were associated with negative ethnic attitudes. These results show that all correlations were shown in the expected direction (Hypothesis 2.1).

Table 4.8
Zero order correlations with ethnic attitudes

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian identity</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian identity</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian history</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons with Estonian Russians</td>
<td>.06 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons with Estonians</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons with Russian Russians</td>
<td>-.11 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal comparisons</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived inferior position</td>
<td>-.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>-.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived deprivation relative to the Soviet time</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status non-legitimizing beliefs</td>
<td>-.51***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05; *** p < .001

Next, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was employed to predict ethnic attitudes (Research Question 2.1.). As two measures of social comparisons (with Russians in Estonia and Russians in Russia) did not show significant relationship with outgroup attitudes, they were not included in the subsequent regression analysis. Demographic variables were not included in regression model as zero order correlations between ethnic attitudes and demographic variables (age, gender, citizenship) and language proficiency did not reveal any significant relationships (p > .05).

Possible multicollinearity problem was checked with Tolerance statistics (ranging from .38 to .99), VIF indicator (highest being 2.65), and inspecting “abnormal” relationships – all indicated no serious multicollinearity problem in the predictions. One case with standard residuals in excess of ±3.3 was identified as an influential outlier in the preliminary regression diagnostics (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 128), and was thus deleted from the further analysis.

As presented in Table 4.9, each step of the regression was significant accounting for additional variance in prediction of ethnic attitudes. In the first step, Russian identification exerted negative and Estonian identification positive effect on ethnic attitudes, being both significant predictors of ethnic attitudes and accounting for 32% of the variance. History variables accounted for additional 4% of variance in ethnic attitudes in the second step and indicating that only Estonian history contributed
significantly to the prediction of ethnic attitudes. In the third step, ‘comparisons with Estonians’ were significantly predicting negative ethnic attitudes, explaining further 2% of the variance. In the fourth step perceived inferior position together with perceived deprivation relative to Estonians and Soviet accounted for additional 6% of variance. This step revealed that only perceived deprivation relative to Estonians added significantly to the prediction of ethnic attitudes and the effect of Estonian history became non-significant. In the final step, perceived status non-legitimizing beliefs accounted for 4% of the variance in ethnic attitudes showing a significant negative effect on ethnic attitudes. The effect of perceived deprivation relative to Estonians became non-significant in the last step. These results are in line with original predictions that each step would account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by variables in the previous step (Hypothesis 2.2).

In the final model all variables together produced an $R^2$ of .49 ($F (9, 179) = 19.03, p = .001$) in prediction of ethnic attitudes. Three variables were significantly ($p < .05$) contributing to the regression: Estonian identity ($\beta = .38$), status non-legitimizing beliefs ($\beta = -.32$), and Russian identity ($\beta = -.14$).

Table 4.9

Hierarchical regression in prediction of Russians’ outgroup attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st step</th>
<th>2nd step</th>
<th>3rd step</th>
<th>4th step</th>
<th>5th step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Russian identity</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian identity</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Russian history</td>
<td>-.09 n.s.</td>
<td>-.07 n.s.</td>
<td>.05 n.s.</td>
<td>.10 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.04 n.s.</td>
<td>.08 n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Comparisons with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>-.09†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Perceived inferior position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation relative to Estonians</td>
<td>-.11 n.s.</td>
<td>-.04 n.s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation relative to ST</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.08 n.s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Status non-legitimizing beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ change | .32      | .04**   | .02*    | .06***   | .04***   |
$R^2$       | .32      | .37     | .39     | .45      | .49      |
$F (df)$    | (2, 186) | (4, 184) | (5, 183)| (8, 180) | (9, 179) |
          | 44.45*** | 26.76***| 23.11***| 18.52*** | 19.03*** |

Note. † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

18 Initially temporal comparisons were also included in the third step. Since the variable did not contribute significantly to the prediction, instead elevated the power of comparisons with Estonians, it was removed from the regression model.
Acculturation and Outgroup Attitudes

To investigate the first research question of this section (Research Question 2.2. a) a linear regression analysis was performed for testing the independent effects of two acculturation dimensions and their interaction effect on ethnic attitudes. Both independent variables were centred and the interaction term between them was created which were entered in separate steps into the hierarchical regression. Estonian culture participation ($\beta = .20, p < .01$) had a positive and Russian culture maintenance ($\beta = -.22, p < .01$) had a negative effect on ethnic attitudes. The interaction between two acculturation dimensions was marginally significant ($\beta = -.13, t = -1.82, p = .07$).

The simple slope analysis (with computer software ModGraph; Jose, 2003) indicated that Russians’ participation in Estonian culture exerted positive effect on ethnic attitudes only under condition of low (simple slope = .31, $t = 3.45, p < .001$) or medium (simple slope = .20, $t = 3.08, p < .01$) Russian culture maintenance. No relationship was obtained between Estonian culture participation and ethnic attitudes when Russian culture participation was high (simple slope = .08, $t = .86, p = .39$).

![Interaction of acculturation dimensions in prediction of ethnic attitudes](image)

Figure 4.6. Interaction of acculturation dimensions in prediction of ethnic attitudes

The same categorization of participants into one of four acculturation strategies
was used as in the earlier analyses to perform follow-up one-way ANOVA analyses. ANOVA comparisons of ethnic attitudes scores for four acculturation strategies yielded a significant main effect: $F(3,167) = 12.85, p < .001$. Post-hoc test (Tamhane as equal variances not assumed, homogeneity of variance $p < 0.05$) indicated that individuals endorsing assimilation strategy have the most positive ethnic attitudes ($M = 4.35, SD = .76$) which were significantly higher from those favouring integration ($M = 3.14; SD = .99$), separation ($M = 3.05, SD = 1.26$) or marginalisation ($M = 3.60, SD = 1.04$). Ethnic attitudes were not significantly different among other acculturation strategies. The results are illustrated in the Figure 4.6.

![Figure 4.6. Ethnic attitudes as a function of acculturation preferences](image)

**Discussion**

The main goal of this section was to investigate the correlates and predictors of Estonian Russians’ attitudes towards Estonians. This study demonstrated that Russian identity was related to negative attitudes towards Estonians, which shows a pattern of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism, demonstrated by ingroup favouritism or outgroup derogation, has often been considered to be an expected outcome of social identification in social identity theory: it is a way to achieve superiority over an outgroup in establishing or maintaining positive distinctiveness and self image of an ingroup (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008; Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & Turner,
187; Van Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006). Although “ingroup love is not a necessary precursor of outgroup hate” (Brewer, 1999, p. 442), depending on the contextual factors (especially in highly segmented societies) ingroup attachment is likely to relate to distrust of, and antagonism against, the outgroups.

This relationship pattern showing support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis can be explained by functionalist approaches (e.g. realistic conflict theory; Sherif, 1966) suggesting that strong ingroup identity relates to negative outgroup attitudes if there is functional interdependence between the groups. Negative interdependence between groups is produced by competition or historical conflicts which make groups relate to each other in an antagonistic manner (see Duckitt, et al., 2005). With these factors present in the Estonian context a significant relationship between strong Russian ethnic identity and negative outgroup attitudes is not surprising. This result is comparable to research conducted with ethnic groups showing negative interdependence between each other (Duckitt, et al., 2005; Duckitt & Parra, 2004; M. Schmitt & Maes, 2002). Further, a recent study by Raudsepp (2009) showed similar results among Russians in Estonia.

This study’s finding might indicate that strong ethnic identity among Russians is not secure. As seen from the qualitative study, sense of Russian pride exists without any external recognition of their identity, and the previous section indicated that strong ethnic identity does not provide Russians with better well-being. A related line of research demonstrates that social identity can be functionally classified into secure and insecure identities; insecure identity predicting greater intergroup bias and positive evaluations of the ingroup, whereas secure identity is shown to predict lower intergroup bias and positive outgroup evaluations (Jackson & Smith, 1999).

Conversely, sense of belonging to the majority group was related to positive outgroup attitudes. This result is in line with some previous research which found that national identification among ethnic minority members predicted positive attitudes towards the national outgroup (Jasinskaja-Lahti, et al., 2009). The current finding could mean that (1) Russians’ identification with Estonians is more secure and therefore shows more positive attitudes towards the outgroup; or (2) a strong identification with Estonians may blur the ingroup-outgroup boundaries for these Russian participants. In other words, for them, Estonians are considered more as ‘us’ than ‘them’ and therefore attitudes towards Estonians imply attitudes towards a group to which an individual has a strong sense of belonging and are thus more positive. The latter pattern is similar to previous findings showing a positive relationship between ingroup identity and ingroup
favouritism (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Raudsepp, 2009; M. Schmitt & Maes, 2002). The analyses in previous sections indicated that Russians’ Estonian identity showed weak (in correlations) or non-significant associations (in path analysis) with their perceptions of Russians’ position in society in terms of their relative deprivation and issues related to legitimacy of intergroup status relations. It was suggested that Russians with strong Estonian identity might be less observant about the inter-ethnic situation in society, and they might be more oriented towards Estonians. The results of this section support this claim.

In regards to identity variables, a similar reverse pattern of relationships was obtained between the importance of Russian and Estonian histories and ethnic attitudes. Valuing Russian historical memory is related to disliking Estonians, while valuing Estonian historic memory is related to liking Estonians. As seen from the previous analyses, there are two opposing representations of history in Estonia which also have opposite outcomes for intergroup relations. There is obviously variability among the Russian participants in the degree of endorsement of these two different histories.

Similarity-dissimilarity approaches to intergroup relations such as belief congruence theory (Rokeach, et al., 1960) or similarity attraction theory (D. Byrne, 1971, 1997) could be useful to explain how dissimilar representations of history can have different intergroup relational outcomes. Similarity-dissimilarity approaches suggest that the outgroup is liked when the groups are perceived as similar in their beliefs and worldviews. According to these approaches, if Russians endorse historical views similar to Estonians (Estonian history), their positive ethnic attitudes towards Estonians would be compatible with these suggestions. Conversely, if Russians strongly value historical beliefs (Russian history) which differ from the views of the majority of Estonians, their negative attitudes towards Estonians would be more likely.

In general, these results are compatible with previous research that shows differential inter-relationships of ethnic and national identities among minority groups with intergroup relations (e.g. Birman, Trickett, & Buchanan, 2005; Grant, 2007, 2008; Jasinskaja-Lahti, et al., 2009). The inter-relationships with importance of Russian and Estonian histories add additional support to this conclusion.

The variables reflecting perceived inferior and deprived status (deriving from comparisons to Estonians or the Soviet time) were related to negative ethnic attitudes as expected. These findings correspond with previous research showing collective relative deprivation to be associated with negative outgroup perceptions (e.g. Abrams, 1990;
Similarly, the perception of status relations being non-legitimate, which also included intergroup boundaries being viewed as impermeable, increased negative attitudes towards Estonians among the Russian participants. This is in line with previous research showing negative effects of illegitimacy and impermeability of status relations on intergroup relations (e.g. Bettencourt, et al., 2001; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002; Reynolds, et al., 2000; Stott & Drury, 2004; Tyler & Lind, 2002; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008).

The prevalence of comparisons with Estonians and the Soviet time as comparison standards were related to negative attitudes towards Estonians. Possibly, comparisons with Estonians remind Russians of their status differences, while comparisons with the Soviet time remind them of the derogation of their status due to the reversal of power which both affect their attitudes towards Estonians.

However, when all variables were considered together in the final step of regression model only strong Estonian identity, weak Russian identity and the rejection of status non-legitimizing beliefs contributed to positive attitudes towards Estonians. Considering the previous qualitative study that showed wide-spread attributions for the causes of existing inequalities in Estonia to the state level (policies and politicians), it is not surprising that the perception of legitimacy of status relations was one of the strongest predictors of inter-ethnic attitudes. Perhaps the effects of historical beliefs on ethnic attitudes were mediated by the status non-legitimizing beliefs, as was the case for psychological adaptation.

Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians did not contribute significantly to the prediction of ethnic attitudes after status non-legitimacy beliefs were included. This finding is in accordance with the suggestion by Tyler and Lind (2002) that judgements of fairness (legitimacy) can play a more important role for intergroup outcomes than judgments of poor outcomes (relative deprivation). It could also be that the relationship between relative deprivation and negative attitudes is explained by status non-legitimizing beliefs. It has been found previously (e.g. Dion, 1986) that perceived fairness of the societal system was significantly predicted by individual and group deprivation among ethnic minority groups.

The examination of acculturation and outgroup attitudes indicated that Russian cultural maintenance predicted negative attitudes, while Estonian culture participation
predicted positive ethnic attitudes. The latter follows previous research showing that higher preference for contact with an outgroup among the minority group is related to more positive intergroup relational outcomes (e.g. Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Additionally, the influence of two acculturation dimensions combined showed that ethnic attitudes are the most positive among the individuals who opt for the assimilation strategy. Ethnic attitudes of the individuals preferring integration were less positive in comparison to assimilation, and did not differ significantly from those preferring separation or marginalisation. This finding departs from previous studies showing integration to be related to the most favourable intergroup relational outcomes among minority groups (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006). These results are similar to acculturation influences on psychological adaptation showing that assimilation is the ‘best’ strategy. Assimilated individuals are assumed to have frequent contact with majority group members, which would provide them with more opportunities to know them better; therefore it is not surprising that they show more positive attitudes towards the majority outgroup. Integrated individuals are assumed to have frequent contact with the majority group as well, but because they are simultaneously and actively involved in their culture, the positive outgroup attitudes from intercultural contact are perhaps not reinforced within their ethnic group.

**General Discussion**

This chapter examined the factors affecting Russians’ psychological adaptation in the first section and inter-ethnic relations in the second. The effects of ethnic and national identities, Russian and Estonian histories, intergroup comparisons, relative deprivation and status legitimacy beliefs on the psychological adaptation of Estonian Russians and their ethnic attitudes were examined. The same direction of zero-order relationships with proposed predictor variables was obtained for psychological adaptation and inter-ethnic attitudes. When all variables were considered together in the prediction models, three variables remained significant predictors of low psychological adaptation of Russians: perceived deprivation relative to Estonians, status non-legitimizing beliefs and temporal comparisons, which were further shown to mediate the effects of identity and history variables on psychological adaptation. The significant predictors of positive ethnic attitudes were strong Estonian identity, low Russian identity and status non-legitimizing beliefs.
Average ratings of ethnic Russians’ life satisfaction were below the midpoint. This may have further implications for the Estonian society; that is low life satisfaction among individuals within the society may bring to rejection of the entire form of government (Inglehart, 2000), and decrease of trust and cooperation among individuals (Tov & Diener, 2009).

It is known from previous research on subjective well-being, as summarized by Diener and colleagues (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), that external, bottom-up factors often account for only a small amount of variance in subjective well-being. Personality factors, top down processes, are shown to be one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of subjective well-being. This research showed, however, that situational factors explain a substantial amount of variability in individuals’ judgment of life satisfaction. Although this research included external factors, these were not objective but subjective assessments of external circumstances. Therefore, it can be argued that the way external circumstances are perceived can depend on the personality characteristics. This would be one the directions for future studies to investigate the ways personality affects the reactions and adaptation to different situational factors.

Similar to well-being, Russians’ attitudes towards Estonians are on average more negative than positive (below the midpoint of the scale). The findings of this study show that promoting more inclusive national identity among Russians would improve intergroup relations, as strong national identity increases more positive evaluations of Estonians. As seen in the first chapter, there are different ways national identity has been measured in Estonia (e.g. sense of belonging to Estonian nation, to Estonian citizens, to Estonian state). Some prior studies in Estonia have indicated relatively weak identification of Russians with the national category of ‘Estonians’ and disputed using the identity category labelled as a titular group (Estonians) in the measurement of national identity (Nimmerfeldt, 2009). This study has used a multi-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to measure Russians’ pride and sense of belonging to Estonians, which indicated a good predictive validity of Estonian identification in modelling intergroup attitudes. In this work, the national majority group ‘Estonians’ is seen as an available and relevant social category for Estonian Russians: identification with this category shows the degree of Estonian identity (from weak to strong) among Russians as it is measured on the continuum.

19 Nimmerfeldt (2009) argues that the national identification category ‘Estonians’ is ethnically overloaded as it refers to ethnicity and is thus exclusive by nature.
Future studies, however, could test the effects of alternative conceptualizations of national identification (e.g. Nimmerfeldt, in press) on ethnic attitudes among Estonian Russians.

Status non-legitimizing beliefs appeared to be significant predictors of both psychological adaptation and ethnic attitudes. These findings show that the more Russians do not believe in the legitimacy of status relations, the more this directly affects their well-being and attitudes towards Estonians. This might have serious implications for the society. For example, Tyler (2006) argues that beliefs in legitimacy of the system are necessary for society to ensure the loyalty and support to the authorities and power. It becomes especially crucial in unstable times, because doubts in the legitimacy of the societal order can instigate opposition and protest.

Investigating acculturation phenomena in relation to psychological and intergroup outcomes showed, in general, convergence of results for these two different outcomes. Preference for Russian cultural maintenance exerted negative influences on Russians’ psychological adaptation and on their attitudes towards Estonians. Although there was a significant main effect indicating that preference for Estonian culture participation exerts a positive effect on ethnic attitudes, the moderation analysis showed that this effect disappears when there is a strong preference for Russian culture maintenance. The moderation analyses showed similar positive effect of Estonian culture maintenance on psychological adaptation outcome with low Russian culture maintenance, while with high Russian culture maintenance, preference for Estonian culture participation exerted a negative effect on Russians life satisfaction. This indicates that preference for Estonian culture participation is variably related to outcomes depending on the level of Russian culture maintenance.

Comparing individuals on the basis of their preferred acculturation strategies demonstrated that assimilated individuals exhibited the highest adaptation and most positive ethnic attitudes. The lowest levels of adaptation are shown by individuals preferring integration, and the most negative ethnic attitudes are endorsed by separated individuals, although the scores of the latter on ethnic attitudes differed significantly only from the assimilated individuals. These results indicate clearly that the combination of two acculturation orientations in the Estonian context is dysfunctional for both psychological adaptation and intergroup relations. Although interpretation for these puzzling results was offered in section two of this chapter, knowing Estonians’ expectations for Russians’ acculturation would shed additional light on this atypical
Several *limitations* in this research should be noted. First, this study used self-reported measures. Common methods variance (CMV) when using self-reported measures can be a matter of concern, as it may cause bias by inflating or deflating bivariate relationships (e.g. Doty & Glick, 1998; Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 2010). However, Siemsen et al. (2010) concluded from their recent analysis that when a larger number of independent variables affected by common method variance are included in a regression equation, it decreases common method bias. Second, although this research conceptualizes psychological adaptation and ethnic attitudes as dependent variables and examines their antecedents, the causal relationships cannot be answered with cross-sectional correlational data. It is also possible to suggest also a reverse causal relationship, where individuals with lower adaptation or more negative outgroup attitudes might perceive higher relative deprivation of Russians and endorse higher system non-legitimizing beliefs. For demonstrating causal relationships, other longitudinal or experimental research designs would be needed. This study attempted to justify the proposed relationship by relying on the data from the previous qualitative study and existing literature. Third, this research might be susceptible to self-selection bias: “ethnically minded” individuals might have been more interested to participate in this survey, resulting in very high scores of endorsement regarding the importance of Russian history and maintenance of Russian culture. Fourth, this study focused only on group level perceptions of an inter-group situation, while including individual-level perceptions would have also merited from the theoretical point of view. Understandably, the scope of this study needed limits, and group-level factors seemed to be more central in Russians’ responses in the qualitative study.

In summary, this chapter presented a study revealing that the perceptions of intergroup situation in Estonia have significant effects on the adaptation and intergroup relational outcomes for the Russian ethnic minority group. The next chapter will introduce a study conducted among the Estonian majority group demonstrating their perspective on the intergroup relations in Estonia.
CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3
INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE MAJORITY ESTONIANS

Introduction

This study investigates inter-ethnic relations from the majority perspective, following the findings of the qualitative study. It elaborates on the previous studies in two ways. Firstly, it offers a complementary view to the minority perspective in the investigation of ethnic attitudes. Secondly, to mirror the adaptation difficulties of ethnic Russians, it investigates Estonians’ support for affirmative action. Affirmative action entails Estonians’ willingness to facilitate the integration of ethnic Russians into the Estonian society by granting them more power and access to decision-making and providing financial support for cultural learning (e.g. language and history) in order to reduce Russians’ relative deprivation. Thus, this study includes two parts, investigating the predictors of (1) inter-ethnic attitudes and (2) affirmative action.

Ethnic Attitudes

Positive mutual inter-ethnic attitudes are desired in societies with different ethnic groups. However, the earlier qualitative analysis indicated that inter-ethnic relations were viewed more negatively than positively, and were largely characterised by negative perceptions towards the outgroup. It was common for the majority group to shift the responsibility for negative inter-ethnic relations to the minority outgroup (e.g. by referring to their stereotypical traits, being influenced by Russia, and living secluded in the Estonian society).

As presented in the first chapter, the previous research on inter-ethnic relations between Estonians and Russians conducted in Estonia contains thorough sociological accounts on the state of mutual relationships which is shown to be problematic. In the majority of previous studies the intergroup situation is evaluated over time and across different social categories (e.g. citizenship, age). However, there is limited research (e.g. Raudsepp, 2009) investigating the inter-relationships of the psychological constructs that explain inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. This study addresses this gap by
considering inter-relationships of relevant psychological variables in the examination of Estonians’ attitudes towards Russians.

The earlier qualitative study showed that justification of state’s ethnic policies, perceptions of threat to the Estonian state and culture, different views of history were linked to Estonians’ negative attitudes towards Russians. Therefore, in the investigation of Estonians ethnic attitudes this study will consider aspects such as their views on the importance of history, status legitimizing beliefs, and perceived threat.

Additionally, the national identification of Estonians will be considered in this study. The qualitative study did not explicitly investigate the Estonians’ ethnic identification in relation to their attitudes towards Russians. However, Estonians indicated strong ingroup orientation by their expectations regarding the Russians’ knowledge of the Estonian history, justification of the ethnic policies defining the position of individuals on the basis of their ethnicity, and the need for defending the state and culture against possible dangers. Having a strong Estonian identification might have played a role in the Estonians’ views of the intergroup situation. Therefore, the quantitative study will take Estonian identification into account in investigating inter-ethnic attitudes. Similarly to the previous study, national identification is expected to provide participants with a predisposition to be more sensitive towards the controversial issues of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia.

**Affirmative Action**

The qualitative study indicated that reasons for the Russians’ perceived low position in terms of limited opportunities in economic and political spheres were attributed to institutional level discrimination (e.g. strict requirements for obtaining citizenship and the small representation of Russians in governing institutions). Russians expressed the desire for change in their current position but emphasised that change is possible only if it comes from the upper levels; for example, “this initiative should come from the top, not bottom, only in this case a compromise is possible” (Male, 19 years).

Additionally, Russians acknowledged their insufficient knowledge of the Estonian language, which was one of the factors preventing them from achieving success in society. In general, Russians admitted the necessity and willingness to learn the Estonian language. However, they again emphasised that there should be more top-
down support, such as providing subsidised courses for language learning.

Estonians, in their turn, strongly believed that Russians should learn the Estonian history and language, as insufficient knowledge in these domains was considered one of the main barriers to adaptation. Additionally, Estonians generally named integration as the best way for different ethnic groups to live together in the society. However, it remains a question as to what Estonians themselves are willing to do in order to facilitate the adaptation of Russians. Would Estonians consider responding to the Russians’ requests to allow them a better access to political and economic power, or provide financial support for them to learn the Estonian language and history, which Estonians prioritise themselves?

This study also investigates how much Estonians agree to grant greater political rights to Russians and allocate resources for their cultural learning. The previous research in Estonia has shown that while the majority of Russians (70% and 82%, respectively) expect government initiatives to improve the position of non-Estonians and to promote languages and cultures of ethnic minorities, these expectations were observed less frequently in Estonians (43% and 45%, respectively) (Schulze, 2008a).

To explain the nature of Estonians’ attitudes towards such initiatives, the concept of affirmative action is borrowed from research on social policies in the United States. The term affirmative action typically entails institutional level efforts (including providing resources) to prevent discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or gender and to provide everyone with equal opportunities (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003; Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006). Crosby and Cordova (1996) explain that “According to the classical definition, affirmative action occurs whenever people go out of their way (take positive action) to increase the likelihood of true equality for individuals of differing categories” (p. 34).

Affirmative action is needed in conditions where prejudice and discrimination persist because established tools and practices at the institutional level to monitor and prevent discrimination are shown to be more successful than relying on an individual initiative of the disadvantaged to stand up on their own behalf (Crosby, et al., 2003; Crosby, et al., 2006). The concept of affirmative action is adopted for this research as it is compatible with the theoretical conceptualisation of the phenomena under investigation. The affirmative action fits in with the need for institutional level intervention as voiced by the Russian participants. The general principles of affirmative action are useful to guide this research, while the content of the measure and predictions
are mainly constructed on the basis of the Estonian context.

In summary, this study aims to examine the effects of national identity, the importance of history, status legitimizing beliefs and perceived threat on (1) Estonians’ attitudes towards Russians and (2) Estonians’ support for affirmative action towards ethnic minorities. In addition, relationships between acculturation phenomena, and ethnic attitudes and affirmative action are investigated separately. In principle, similar inter-relationships are expected between proposed predictor variables and ethnic attitudes and the Estonians’ support for affirmative action towards ethnic minorities. Clayton (1996) proposes that opposition to affirmative social policies might conceal attitudes toward different groups. It has been argued elsewhere that the objection to affirmative action might be based on prejudice towards the groups these policies are directed at (e.g. Bobocel, Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998).

Before starting with the main investigation of this chapter, some relevant issues related to the Estonian context are described below.

**Contextual Factors**

Several predictions regarding the Estonian research context were tested before investigating the main research questions of the study. Two main issues regarding the majority sample context are outlined – views on history and the perception of threat.

**Different histories**

The qualitative study showed that Estonians are well aware of the Russians’ take on history and what is important to Russians, and they acknowledged the differences from Estonians’ views. Sometimes, participants noted that similar events had conflicting meanings for Estonians and Russians (e.g. regarding the Bronze Soldier). Paez and Liu (in press) note that the same historical events often produce conflicting and contradictory memories held by different groups.

The study with the Russian participants investigated whether certain events that are appreciated and emphasised by Russians could be distinguished from events that are appreciated and emphasised by Estonians. The results in the previous chapter demonstrated that the Estonian and Russian events fell into two different factors and
were negatively related to each other. The rating of importance for the same items will also be undertaken among the Estonian participants. It is expected that the events that are known to be more important for Russians (called Russian history) will form a separate factor from the events that are known to be important for Estonians (called Estonian history). The importance of Estonian history and the importance of Russian history are expected to be negatively related, indicating polemical representations of history in Moscovici’s (1988) terms.

**Perceptions of realistic threat**

Two facets of realistic threat are investigated in this research – political and economic. As it has been previously outlined, realistic threat involves a threat to a group’s existence (e.g. threat to political or economic power, physical or material well-being) (Stephan, et al., 2005). However, it has not been common in previous research (i.e. in integrated threat theory) to empirically distinguish between the different facets of realistic threat within one study.

Realistic threat has been more commonly operationalized through the struggle over economic resources. The notion of economic threat was not extensively or explicitly expressed by the Estonian participants in the qualitative study. References were made mostly to the waste of resources to support the integration programme. Yet, a recent study indicates that economic threat is important in Estonian society (Raudsepp, 2009). Furthermore, the issue of economic threat is brought up by people from across the whole spectrum of society in internet forum discussions relating to the inter-ethnic topics. An illustrative example can be presented from the following recent anonymous online comment (which was made in reference to the article by the former Estonian Population Minister Urve Palo discussing the issues of integration):

> A large share of our social problems can be ascribed to the low birth rate among non-Estonians – we, locals, have to support their pensioners, just as we have to support their criminals. We do know that they make up the main habitué of our prisons. /.../ The more media blares about their integration problems and the more the government contributes energy and our tax money to their language and culture, the more it seems that the Russian-speaking population has become for us as a troublesome and impeding ballast.\(^{20}\)

Comments circulating in public information spheres show that competition over the economic resources can be a source of intergroup tensions in the Estonian context. However, economic threat is evidently not the sole form of realistic threat underlying the intergroup conflict in Estonia. In the Estonian context, where independence of the state has been enjoyed for no longer than two decades and memories of being under the foreign rule are still fresh, dangers to state sovereignty may be considered as a realistic threat. This threat, which is called political threat in this research, was expressed by the Estonian participants in the qualitative study through concerns regarding the loyalty of non-Estonians, survival of the Estonian language and culture of a small Estonia nation, or through the constant interference of Russia. Therefore, this study expects that realistic threat would comprise of two separate facets – economic and political threat.

In summary, the following predictions relating to contextual factors are proposed for the Estonian sample:

*Hypothesis 1.* (a) Importance of Estonian historical memory and importance of Russian historical memory will form two separate factors and would be negatively related to each other; (b) Political threat and economic threat will emerge as two distinct facets of realistic threat.

## Correlates and Predictors of Ethnic Attitudes and Affirmative Action

### Identity

Previous research has shown support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis by indicating a negative relationship between ethnic majority group identification and inter-group relational outcomes. For example, for the ethnic majority group in New Zealand (Pakeha/Europeans), more positive evaluations of the ethnic ingroup and ingroup attachment were significantly correlated with more negative attitudes to three ethnic minority outgroups (Maori, Pacific Islanders, Asians) (Duckitt & Parra, 2004). In a study by Kosic and Caudex (2005), majority group members with strong ingroup identification reported more negative responses towards the outgroups than those with
weak ethnic identification. Ethnic identification of the majority ethnic group has been associated with negative outgroup feelings, attitudes and stereotypes, prejudice, rejection of multiculturalism, and lower ethnic outgroup tolerance (Gonzalez-Castro, Ubiellos, & Ibanez, 2009; Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009; Verkuyten, 2009; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). However, this relationship is sometimes conditional. For example, Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001b) found that the strong national identification and ingroup positive evaluations (i.e. national pride) were consistently associated with outgroup derogation only when participants based their evaluations upon intergroup comparisons. This was not the case if judgements were made based on a temporal basis.

A recent study in Estonia (Raudsepp, 2009) has shown that the stronger ethnic identity among Estonians is related to the distrusting and distancing attitudes towards non-Estonians, depreciating cultural heterogeneity in the society, and more restrictive views towards entitlement of political, social and economic rights for non-Estonians. As described in the minority perspective, the relationship between strong ethnic identification and positive outgroup attitudes is likely to be negative when mutual interdependence between ethnic groups is more competitive than cooperative. The power struggle and existing dissimilarities of languages and historical views create a rich ground for competing interdependence between Estonians and Russians, and therefore Estonian national identification is expected to be related to more negative ethnic attitudes. Similarly with regards to ethnic attitudes, Estonian national identification is expected to be related to opposition to affirmative action.

At the same time, according to the multiculturalism hypothesis (Berry, 1984, 2006; Duckitt, 1989), confidence in one’s social identity creates the foundation for outgroup tolerance and acceptance. Berry (1984) posits that the positive relationship between one’s identity and positive intergroup relations is expected if one’s social identity entails a sense of security and is not threatened. This suggests that national identity might have a different effect on outgroup attitudes depending on individuals’ perceptions of threat. Previous experimental and cross-sectional research has shown that high perceptions of threat exacerbate the influence of strong ingroup identity or individual predispositions (e.g. social dominance orientation, authoritarianism) on negative intergroup perceptions (e.g. Branscombe & Wann, 1994; S. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Pratto & Shih, 2000).
This study expects that the effect of identity on ethnic attitudes would interact with the level of perceived threat, so that social identity may have different effects for intergroup relations depending on the level of perceived threat. In line with multiculturalism hypothesis, this study predicts that under the conditions of low threat perception, national identity would be related to positive ethnic attitudes (identity-threat-moderation hypothesis).

**Importance of history**

The qualitative study indicated that the knowledge of the occupation and events related to the Soviet time did not allow some Estonians to hold more than just conservative attitudes towards Russians. Estonians did not appreciate the Russians’ lack of knowledge of something as important as Estonian history. Paez and Liu (in press) argue that collective memories affect the nature of present-day conflicts, as the past conflicts may further strengthen categorization (i.e. ingroup identification and boundaries) or differentiation, and enhance ingroup superiority.

Despite the lack of previous empirical findings regarding the relationship between representations of history and outgroup attitudes as mentioned in earlier chapter, several predictions can be made based on the previous qualitative study. It may be that those individuals for whom the memory and recognition of the past events related to Estonian history is important, might think of those responsible for the past painful events, and therefore would be expected to exhibit more negative attitudes towards Russians. However, if those historical events that are essential for Russians (Russian history) are important to Estonians as well, then Estonians would be likely to display more positive attitudes towards Russians. The Russian history relevant here is mostly comprised of events related to WWII (e.g. the defeat of fascism in Europe with the contribution of the Red Army). Apart from the start of the occupation following WWII, Estonians might, to a certain degree, find it important to commemorate the Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis, as many Estonians were fighting together with Russians as well. Therefore, the importance of Russian history would be expected to be associated with positive ethnic attitudes.

In terms of affirmative action, previous literature has provided support for historical representations as playing an important role in the acceptance or rejection of bicultural policies in society (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sibley & Liu, in
press; Sibley, et al., 2008). Sibley et al. (2008) showed that the negation of relevance of historical injustices was related to the opposition of the resource specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy. Further, Sibley and Liu (in press) demonstrated in a longitudinal study that historical negation causally predicted increased opposition towards social policies aiming to diminish existing social inequalities between the New Zealand European majority and indigenous Māori. These studies show that historical narratives may be used as a basis for promoting or denying social equality.

In the current research, the importance of Estonian history is expected to be related to the opposition to affirmative action towards ethnic minorities. The importance of Russian history, on the other hand, is expected to be associated with the support for affirmative action.

**Perceived threat**

The qualitative study indicated that the perception of threat is still very powerful in Estonians’ perceptions and is evidently one of the driving forces of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. Estonians were predominantly concerned with the threat to the existence of the state, fear of invasion, disloyalty of local minorities, unnecessary expenses for integration, and dangers to cultural continuity.

Different types of threat have mostly been examined as an origin of prejudice and intergroup bias. The relationship between perceived threat and negative outgroup emotions and attitudes, or lower outgroup tolerance, has been demonstrated in a number of studies (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Leong, 2008; Meeus, et al., 2009; Stephan, et al., 2002; Stephan, et al., 2005; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007; Verkuyten, 2009; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Riek et al. (2006) report from their meta-analytical examination that different types of intergroup threats, including realistic threat, have a significant negative relationship with outgroup attitudes.

Furthermore, there is also experimental evidence for the idea that the perception of threat leads to more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Esses, et al., 2001; Esses, et al., 1998; Stephan, et al., 2005). In the same way, Florack and colleagues (Florack, Pinotkowski, Bohman, Balzer, & Perzig, 2003) showed that the salience of threatening aspects of an immigrant group leads to lower acceptance and a negative evaluation of this immigrant group.

Integrated Threat Theory has previously been used to predict support for
affirmative action. For example, Renfro and colleagues (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006) argue that the policy of affirmative action might be perceived as threatening to the ingroup’s ability to maintain their political and economic advantages. The research by Renfro et al. demonstrated that realistic threat was related to and predicted negative attitudes towards affirmative action policy, and negative attitudes towards individuals who benefit from affirmative action.

In the current research, it can be argued that those who perceive threats in terms of political stability, the continuation of the state, and the allocation of resources, would object to affirmative action policies towards ethnic minorities as it can pose an additional threat to economic resources and to maintaining political power position of Estonians.

**Status legitimizing beliefs**

While the Russian sample saw the origin of troubling inter-ethnic relations in the illegitimacy of the state ethnic policies and nationalistic attitudes from the government, Estonians claimed the legitimacy of the strict ethnic policies (citizenship and language acts), as a way to protect their state and culture. Although support for rigid acts were rationalised as necessary for the Estonian state, they could also be seen as grounds for regulating power relations, mainly to keep the power position of the majority population.

From the SIT perspective, high-status groups are interested in protecting their status position and thus are willing to see it legitimate. The perception that higher status is just and deserved is associated with more value placed on the protection of the status position (Johnson, Terry, & Louis, 2005; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). Bettencourt and colleagues’ (Bettencourt, et al., 2001) meta-analysis has found that high-status groups show more bias when they perceive status relations as legitimate and intergroup boundaries as permeable. Separate studies have shown that the majority ethnic group’s endorsement of legitimacy of status relations is associated with negative outgroup feelings, status relevant and irrelevant outgroup attitudes (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008), and blatant and subtle prejudice (Johnson, et al., 2005).

Among Estonians, it is expected that the more people justify the current status relations, the more they would like to maintain the current state of affairs, be more sensitive to threats, and thus perceive other ethnic groups in a derogative light.
Legitimate status relations would justify people’s reactions to threat in a form of negative ethnic attitudes. A similar relationship is expected regarding support for affirmative action. Previous literature has shown that individuals are interested to see the current status quo (the way things are) as the most preferred state of affairs – that is, as the most fair and representative of the normative way of how things should be (Kay, et al., 2009). Kay, et al. (2009) demonstrated that the simple presentation of the status quo promoted the desire to maintain inequality and prevented willingness for social change. The advantaged groups are especially inclined to justify the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996). Thus, those who benefit more from the status quo tend to oppose to social change more strongly (Crosby, et al., 2006). Therefore this research expects that if people are motivated to see the current state of affairs as legitimate, they would be expected to oppose to any policies that would change the way things currently are.

Similarly, the perception that intergroup boundaries are permeable (beliefs that ethnic minorities have the same chances for success in the society as natives) may be threatening for the Estonians’ position in the current status hierarchy, and therefore could be associated with negative attitudes towards the ethnic outgroup. At the same time, if chances for everyone are perceived to be equal (open intergroup boundaries) individuals might not recognize the need to support affirmative action. It has been previously found that the majority group members regularly perceive less discrimination and inter-group inequality in society than the minority group members, which is one of the reasons why affirmative action is not supported (Crosby, et al., 2006; Kravitz, et al., 2000).

Altogether, the following relationships are anticipated with outgroup attitudes and affirmative action:

Hypothesis 2. (a) Strong national identification will be related to negative ethnic attitudes and less support for affirmative action; (b) recognition of the importance of Estonian history will be associated with more negative outgroup perceptions and less support for affirmative action, while recognition of the importance of Russian history will be associated with more positive outgroup perceptions and support for affirmative action; (c) political threat and economic threat will be related to negative outgroup ethnic attitudes and the rejection of affirmative action; (d) status legitimizing beliefs (intergroup relations being perceived legitimate and intergroup
boundaries permeable) are expected to be linked to negative outgroup attitudes and the rejection of affirmative action.

The study will further examine the contribution of the proposed variables and propose incremental explanations of the variance in ethnic attitudes. The interaction effects of national identity and realistic threat on ethnic attitudes will also be tested in the regression model. With the same direction of relationships as for bivariate correlations the following incremental effects are proposed in prediction of ethnic attitudes:

*Hypothesis 3.* (a) Estonian identity will be significant predictor of ethnic attitudes in the first step; (b) representations of history will account for additional variance over and above that explained by identity; (c) threat variables will explain a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity and historical representations; (d) status non-legitimizing beliefs will account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by identity, history, and threat variables; (e) significant interactions between national identity and political and economic threat are expected in the prediction of ethnic attitudes, showing that under conditions of low perceived threat, national identity will be related to positive ethnic attitudes (*identity-threat-moderation hypothesis*).

Regarding the affirmative action, the contribution of predictor variables is explored in multiple regression and no specific hypotheses are defined. On a larger scale, this investigation is interested in examining whether the factors predicting positive ethnic attitudes similarly predict support for affirmative action, and if not, what the main differences are. The following research question is therefore offered:

*Research Question 1.* Does the predictive model of affirmative action follow the same pattern as the predictive model of ethnic attitudes?

**Hypothesized Mediation Model**

This research proposes the mediation model to explain the inter-relationships of variables in predicting ethnic attitudes. Perceived threat and status relations legitimizing
beliefs are considered to be major influences on ethnic attitudes. Other variables, such as identity and history, which are also believed to be important predictors of outgroup attitudes, are expected to be mediated by perceived threat and status relations legitimizing beliefs. The next section outlines the nature of relationships between the proposed antecedent (identity and history) and mediator (threat, status legitimization) variables. The illustration of the proposed mediation model is provided in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Hypothesised mediation model in prediction of ethnic attitudes

Antecedents of perceived threat (Identity, history)

Two antecedent factors of realistic threat are examined in this study and are expected to have an indirect effect on ethnic attitudes: (a) national identification, (b) importance of historical memory (Russian and Estonian).

The relationship between identification, threat and outgroup attitudes has been conceptualised in several ways. Identity has been shown to be an important antecedent of ethnic attitudes as discussed earlier, and it has an indirect effect on outgroup attitudes via threat. Stephan and Stephan (2000) originally conceptualised ingroup identification as an antecedent of threat, suggesting that identification with an ingroup creates a predisposition for people to respond with prejudice to threat which, in turn, increases prejudice. This association is grounded in the self-categorization theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), which sees identity as the basis of perceptions of the world and
reactions to it. Therefore, the more people identify with their group, the more they are expected to be sensitive to the threats, which results in negative outgroup perceptions.

The positive association between identity and perceived threat has been identified in several studies with ethnic majority groups (Stephan, et al., 2002; Tausch, et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2009). Riek, et al.’s (2006) meta-analysis found that ingroup identification was a significant antecedent of realistic threat, symbolic threat and intergroup anxiety. Threat has been shown to significantly mediate the effects of ingroup identification on the rejection of multiculturalism, low ethnic or religious outgroup tolerance and negative racial attitudes (Gonzalez, et al., 2008; Stephan, et al., 2002; van der Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Verkuyten, 2009). Recent research in Estonia (Raudsepp, 2009) shows that strong Estonian ingroup identity is associated with higher perceptions of realistic threat (e.g. crime level) and symbolic threat (e.g. granting the Estonian citizenship without language exam threatens the Estonian nation) from non-Estonians.

In the current study, realistic threats are anticipated to mediate the negative relationship between national identification and ethnic attitudes. It is expected that strong national identification has an indirect effect on ethnic attitudes via political and economic threats.

The second proposed concept – the importance of history – has not been investigated previously as an antecedent of realistic threat. Paez and Liu (in press), however, argue that perceived or real threat plays an important role in conflicts. As seen from the qualitative study, historical legacy has clearly created the basis for feelings of threat, which is still very powerful in the perceptions of Estonians. The painful historical memories (e.g. losing independence, deportations during the Soviet occupations) are maintained in the Estonian public discourse and important historical events are commemorated on personal and societal levels. Keeping the history ‘alive’ through narratives and symbolic events may serve a function for people not to forget “where we came from” (Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 537) and to be alert to the possible dangers of the past in the present day. Members of victimized groups, especially those with strong identification, tend to disagree that they should forget past harmful events and move on (Sahdra & Ross, 2007).

This study expects that if the Estonian historical memory is important for the Estonian participants, they are expected to be more sensitive in terms of realistic threat, while an opposite relationship is expected with the importance of the Russian historical
memory. Participants who find Russian history important (the events related to winning WWII), would presumably feel some solidarity and trust towards Russians, and therefore would perceive less realistic threat.

In sum, the following relationships were anticipated with realistic threat (political and economic) in the hypothesised mediation model:

_Hypothesis 4._ (a) Strong national identification will be positively related to realistic threat (political and economic); (b) endorsement of the importance of Estonian history will be associated with greater perceived threat, while endorsement of the importance of Russian history will be associated with less threat; (c) the effect of national identity and importance of history on the outgroup attitudes will be mediated by perceived threat (political and economic) (_threat-mediation hypothesis_).

**Antecedents of status legitimizing beliefs (Identity, history)**

The effects of Russian and Estonian identification and the perceived importance of Russian and Estonian history are examined on status relations legitimizing beliefs (i.e. legitimacy and permeability), which are proposed as the second set of mediator variables in the model.

The relationship between ethnic identification and system/status relations legitimizing beliefs has shown to be different for minority and majority groups. If strong identification among minority groups is related to the rejection of system legitimacy, then, among high status groups, strong ethnic identification is related to the endorsement of the system-justifying ideologies such as legitimacy and permeability (Levin, et al., 1998). Levin et al. (1998) argue that this pattern of relationship is expected from the social dominance perspective, suggesting that, within high-status groups, ingroup attachment would be positively related to ideologies that justify or enhance the hierarchical structure of the social system. Additionally, high identifiers of high-status groups are motivated to justify their privileges coming from their favourable status position (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). The link between the strong ingroup identification in high status groups and the perception of status differences being as legitimate has been demonstrated in Bettencourt, et al.’s (Bettencourt, et al., 2001) meta-analysis and in more recent research (e.g. Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008).
History can be an important symbolic resource that is employed to support and justify present political views regarding intergroup relations (Liu & László, 2007; Sibley, et al., 2008). The distribution of power and status in Estonia was determined through the legislation involving ethnic issues at the beginning of the restoration of the Estonian independence. Evidently, the history of the Soviet occupation played its role in defining who was to be considered an Estonian and who was not, and what the conditions to become one were. A widely used categorization of Estonians and non-Estonians in the Estonian public discourse appeared as a consequence of the Soviet immigration, which was reinforced by newly implemented laws that defined individuals’ standing based on their ethnicity.

It can be argued that as much as history was a determining factor in establishing legitimate socio-structural arrangement between ethnicities when Estonia regained its independence, in a similar fashion the views of history might affect the individuals’ current beliefs of whether status relations are considered fair and justifiable. This is in line with the premises of social representations of history – historical representations are used to legitimize social and political arrangements in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005) and they may influence how legitimate social relations in society are perceived (Liu, et al., 1999).

In the current research, strong ethnic majority identification is expected to be positively related to intergroup relations being perceived as fair (legitimate) and unfixed/flexible (permeable intergroup boundaries). Estonian identity and the importance of Estonian history are expected to predispose the participants to see status relations as fair (legitimate) and unfixed (permeable), whereas valuing Russian history is expected to have an opposite effect. Additionally, perceived fair and unfixed status relations are expected to mediate the effects of national identity and the importance of history on outgroup attitudes.

Altogether, the following relationships are anticipated with status legitimizing beliefs as mediator variables and their antecedent variables:

*Hypothesis 5.* (a) Strong national identification will be positively related to status legitimizing beliefs (legitimacy and permeability); (b) endorsement of the importance of Estonian history will be positively related to status legitimizing beliefs, while endorsement of the importance of Russian history will be negatively related to status legitimizing beliefs; (c) national identification and the importance of Estonian and Russian histories are expected to have an indirect effect on
outgroup attitudes via status legitimizing beliefs (status legitimizing beliefs mediation hypothesis).

**Acculturation and Outgroup Attitudes and Affirmative Action**

This section examines the majority Estonians’ expectations for the Russians’ acculturation, acculturation attitudes they attribute to Russians and the relationship of both to ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action towards ethnic minorities.

**Acculturation – expectations versus perceptions**

Previous research has indicated that majority groups show a stronger preference for minorities to adopt the majority culture than to maintain their traditional culture (e.g. Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002). In addition to the acculturation preferences of the ethnic majority group, the perceived acculturation of the minority group is also important to understand the nature of intergroup relations. Previous research has shown that majority members tend to underestimate migrants’ preferences especially on culture adoption or contact dimension (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Rohmann, et al., 2006; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 1998; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Martin, 2007). Zagefka and Brown (2002) showed that the host society members perceived that immigrants favoured strategies that involve culture maintenance (integration, separation), while immigrants themselves preferred those strategies that involved contact (integration and assimilation). Additionally, immigrants preferred to assimilate much more and separate much less than the host population perceived it. Studies by Rohmann, et al. (2006) and Pfafferott and Brown (2006) have shown similar results: natives perceived immigrants preferring integration and/or assimilation much less and segregation much more than immigrants actually did. In a study by Van Oudenhoven et al. (1998) the majority members believed that the least appreciated strategy (separation) occurs most often among minorities, and the most appreciated strategy (assimilation) the least often, while minorities themselves preferred integration the most. Maisonneuve and Testé (2007) found that the host majority perceived immigrants to prefer integration less than desired by host majority.

In line with the previous research and taking into account the Estonian context,
the following hypotheses are suggested regarding the Estonians’ acculturation preferences and perceptions:

_Hypothesis 6._ (a) It is predicted that the Estonian participants will prefer Russians to participate in Estonian culture more than maintain their own culture; (b) however, in terms of the Estonians perceptions’ of Russians’ acculturation, the opposite is expected: that Estonians would perceive Russians to be more involved in maintaining their culture than participating in Estonian culture; (c) in terms of differences between the Estonians’ preferences for the Russians’ acculturation and the Russians’ actual acculturation perceived by Estonians, Estonians would perceive Russians to be maintaining their culture more than Estonians actually prefer, and perceive Russians participating in Estonian culture less than they desire.

**Acculturation and outcomes**

The next question is how the acculturation expectations of the majority population, either investigated as two dimensions separately or in combination, are related to the intergroup variables. Previous studies have found, for example, that the majority members’ preferences for both cultural maintenance of immigrants and participation in the host society predicted positive intergroup relations, tolerance and less ingroup bias (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Research by Zagefka, Brown, and Gonzalez (2009) found that only the majority members’ preference for the contact dimension reduced the negative affect towards the minority group. In terms of the four acculturation strategies, preference for immigrants’ integration among the majority population members has been shown to be related to the perception of better intergroup relations and a higher level of tolerance (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Zick, Wagner, Van Dick, and Petzel (2001) demonstrated additionally from the number of studies conducted among the majority German respondents that integrative acculturation attitudes relate negatively to blatant and subtle prejudice and antipathy towards foreigners. Leong (2008) showed that the rejection-oriented strategies such as assimilation and exclusion predicted negative attitudes of the recipient society members towards immigrants.

In terms of the majority population perceptions of minority acculturation and intergroup outcomes, research has shown that the host culture adaptation by minorities
is evaluated more positively among majority members than the maintenance of traditional culture. Van Oudenhoven, et al. (1998), for example, demonstrated that majority members expressed the most negative affective and normative responses towards acculturation strategies adopted by immigrants that imply little contact with majority members (separation and marginalisation), while the most positive responses were shown towards adaptation forms in which immigrants have contact with majority members (assimilation and integration). Similar tendencies have also been shown in the studies by Maisonneuve and Testé (2007) and A. Kosic, Mannetti, and Sam (2005) who investigated the host society members’ evaluations of immigrants based on their adopted acculturation strategies. The results of both studies showed that those immigrants who preferred to maintain their original culture were evaluated less positively than those who did not, whereas the immigrants preferring the host culture adoption were evaluated more positively than those who did not. Zagefka et al. (2007) found that the immigrants’ preference for contact perceived by the majority population had an inverse effect on negative ethnic attitudes.

This research is interested in investigating whether acculturation expectations of Estonians and the perceived Russians’ acculturation orientations separately and in combination would predict outgroup attitudes. The following research questions are proposed regarding acculturation expectations and perceptions, and ethnic attitudes and affirmative action:

*Research Question 2.* (a) What influence do Estonians’ preferences for Russians’ cultural maintenance and participation in Estonian culture have on ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action? (b) What influence does Russians’ actual acculturation (participation in Estonian culture and the maintenance of Russian culture), as perceived by Estonians have on ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action? (c) Which of the four acculturation strategies in terms of expectations and perceptions are related to the most positive ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action?
Method

Data Collection

The same data collection methodology as for Study 2 was undertaken but with two differences: (1) The questionnaire for Study 3 originally designed in English was translated into Estonian. The first version translated by myself was verified by two independent Estonian native speakers who were also fluent in English and familiar with the terminology in the area of study; (2) For the online questionnaires, an invitation to participate in the study was posted to Estonian-speaking online forums and discussion boards providing the link to the questionnaire.

Procedure

As a target population, native Estonians residing in Estonia were invited to participate in this study. The data were collected from September 2008 to January 2009 through the online and hard-copy surveys as described in Chapter 4.

Participants

In total, 388 native Estonians participated in this study. Originally, 540 surveys were downloaded from the online software and 52 surveys were returned by participants who had filled out the hard copy version. The participants with more than 33% of missing values were excluded listwise in this study, resulting in the deletion of 159 cases (26.9% of the initial sample). Most of the dropout of participants appeared in an online survey (153 online and 6 hard-copy samples) which can be expected from the web research (see Reips, 2000). Another 45 cases (7.5% of the initial sample) were deleted listwise because they did not fit the sampling criteria regarding ethnicity (e.g. 18 participants indicated their ethnicity being Russian, 17 participants had one of their parents’ native language as Russian). To avoid multiple entries, online responses were checked for any identical IP-addresses, whether they also had similar demographic information or other responses. No identical response sets were found.

All responses were collated for the data analysis. The total sample consisted of 388 Estonian participants (65.5% of initial sample; 364 online and 24 hard copy responses, 67.4% and 46.2% of initial online and hard copy responses respectively).
These data were screened for missing values. The mean percentage of missing values of each participant in the final sample was 3.8% (SD = 7.05). The average of missing values per item was 1.3% (SD = 1.41). The Multiple Imputation technique was applied to impute the missing values (Graham, 2009; Reips, 2000; Wayman, 2003). The final sample had slightly more male (55.9%) than female (44.1%) participants. The average age of the sample was 39.5 (SD = 14.97; range 13–82). Half of the participants had tertiary (50.0%), 44.8% had secondary and only 5.2% had basic education. In terms of religion, the majority of participants claimed to have no religious affiliation (46.1%), 30.2% were Christian (predominantly Lutherans), and 15.2% of participants claimed to be atheists. Most of the participants came from the capital Tallinn (41.1%), followed by small towns and rural areas (28.2%), bigger towns and regional centers (25.4), and larger towns in East Estonia (5.5%).

Materials

The participants completed the questionnaire containing demographic information (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity), and predictor and criterion variables as described further (for descriptive statistics see Table 5.1). The questionnaire, the information sheet and the debriefing form in English are presented in Appendix C1.

National identity. National identity was measured by three subscales from Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992): private (assesses how individuals privately evaluate their social group), public (assesses how individuals believe others evaluate their social group) and importance to identity (assesses the role of group memberships in the self-concept). All 12 items were rated on 7-point agreement/disagreement scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). After the preliminary analysis of the scale structure and psychometric properties all 12 items were combined into one composite index measuring national identity, with higher scores indicating stronger national identity.

Importance of history. The participants rated the importance of preserving the memory of historical events and symbols. Six items reflected facts or common beliefs about Russian history (e.g. “To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe”), and five depicted Estonian history (e.g. “To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia”). Two indexes were composed based on two factors, Estonian history and Russian history. Scores
ranged from 1 to 7 with higher scores indicating higher importance of Estonian or Russian history.

*Status legitimizing beliefs.* Originally 18 items were adapted from existing research (Esses, et al., 1998; Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992; Mummendey, Klink, et al., 1999) and the previous qualitative study to measure stability, legitimacy and permeability of intergroup status relations. The participants were asked to rate items on a 7-point agreement/disagreement scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). After the preliminary analysis of the scale structure and psychometric properties of all items, five items were combined to measure fairness (legitimacy) of the intergroup status relations (e.g. “The situation is not fair when the people born in Estonia have to prove their belonging to the country”, reversed), and five items comprised a measure of unfixed/permeable intergroup status relations (permeability of the intergroup boundaries) (e.g. “No matter what, Russians cannot be high-grade citizens”, reversed). On both measures higher scores indicated stronger beliefs in the legitimacy of status relations and the permeability of intergroup boundaries.

*Perceived realistic threat.* Initially, 18 items were generated to measure political and economic threats mainly on the basis of the previous qualitative study and existing literature. The participants assessed the items on a 7-point agreement/disagreement scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). After evaluation of the structure and psychometric properties of the items, political threat was measured by eight items (e.g. “Estonian Russians believe too much in the anti-Estonian propaganda coming from Russia”) and economic threat by five items (e.g. “Too much of tax money is spent on social benefits to support Estonian Russians”. The higher scores on both measures indicated the higher perceived threat.

*Preferences for Russians’ acculturation.* Twelve parallel items in six domains (way of life, language, holidays and festivals, socialisation, mass media, mentality) were constructed to measure two acculturation dimensions: maintenance of Russian culture and participation in Estonian culture. Participants were asked their opinion on how important it is that Estonian Russians participate in Estonian and maintain Russian culture in given domains (“It is important that Estonian Russians: e.g. celebrate Estonian [Russian] holidays and festivals like native Estonians”) using a 7-point agreement/disagreement scale (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree). Six items on Russian culture and six items on Estonian culture were combined in two indices with
scores ranging from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating stronger expectation for maintenance of Russian culture or participation in Estonian culture.

Perception of acculturation of Russians. Twelve parallel items similar to the above scale were presented to the participants with the only difference being that participants were asked to think of actual behaviours of Estonian Russians in relation to Estonian and Russian cultures (e.g. “Estonian Russians celebrate Estonian holidays and festivals like native Estonians”). The same 7-point agreement/disagreement scale was used. Two indices were composed, with higher scores indicating perceptions of greater Russian culture maintenance and greater participation in Estonian culture by Russians.

Ethnic attitudes. The participants were asked about their attitudes toward Estonian Russians. The same 7-point agreement/disagreement scale was used to rate 12 statements on different qualities of Russians. The items were the same as for the minority group participants with the exception of the referent group being different, for example, “Estonian Russians act towards others with benevolence,” “Estonian Russians’ interaction with others is hostile” (reversed). Higher scores indicated more positive attitudes towards Estonian Russians.

Affirmative action. The participants assessed their agreement (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree) with eight items representing different methods that can be used to support the integration of ethnic minorities in Estonian society. All items were generated from the qualitative study. Four items represented support for the increase of minorities’ civic rights (e.g. “Enabling a larger representation of ethnic minorities’ interests in governing institutions,” “Granting citizenship to those who are born in Estonia on their request”) and support for culture learning (e.g. “Providing additional resources for improving the teaching quality of the Estonian language in schools of ethnic minorities (including Russian),” “Creating free of charge Estonian language courses for the adult population”). Two facets of the affirmative actions (with inter-correlation .52) were compiled in one index of affirmative actions for this study, with higher scores representing stronger support for affirmative action.

Analytical Strategy

Before conducting the main analyses the psychometric properties of the scales were checked. Exploratory factor analyses and internal consistencies were chosen to
examine the psychometric properties of the measures. The decision to conduct an exploratory factor analysis of the scales was made especially because items of many measures were constructed from the qualitative study, and in case of established scales (e.g. identity measure), they were translated and thus may have created different understandings of core concepts among participants than those constructs that were originally intended to be measured.

Oblim rotation was preferred as factors were allowed to be correlated, except when factors were expected to be independent on theoretical grounds. As in the previous study, three criteria for factor retention were considered – Kaiser’s eigenvalue above one rule (Kaiser, 1960), Scree test (Cattell, 1966), and Parallel Analysis (Horn, 1965). The final decision about the retention of factors was made based on compatibility with the most interpretable solution. Factor analyses are described in detail in Appendix C2.

The indicators of psychometric properties are presented in Table 5.1. All reliabilities (Cronbach alphas) of the final scales were acceptable (from .72 to .92). The mean score of ethnic attitudes was slightly below scalar midpoint showing a tendency of neutral to rather negative ethnic attitudes. The scores on support for affirmative action were slightly above the scalar midpoint.

Results

Contextual Factors

First, hypotheses related to the Estonian context were tested. It was predicted that the importance of Estonian and Russian historical memory (measured with the same items as in the previous study) will form two separate factors and be negatively related to each other (Hypothesis 1a). After submitting 12 items (six reflecting common beliefs of Russian and six Estonian histories) to factor analysis with Oblim rotation, two factors were extracted with eigenvalues higher than one, and a Scree test supporting the two-factor solution. Item designed to be part of Estonian history, “to celebrate the end of the Second World War on May 8”, fell together with items measuring Russian history. Although May 8 is official date for celebrating the end of WWII in Estonia, while Russia celebrates it on May 9, it is possible that the Estonian participants associate the events relating to WWII with the beginning of occupation and might not consider it part of Estonian historical knowledge. Item-total correlation between this
item and other five variables measuring Estonian historic knowledge was .04, indicating that this item is not related to other items. This item was dropped and factor analysis was rerun again producing an acceptable two-factor structure (eigenvalues: 3.97, 2.40, .94). The parallel analysis supported two-factor solution as only the first two eigenvalues were greater than those generated by chance from random data with the same number of items and participants (generated eigenvalues: 1.28, 1.20, 1.14). The two-factor solution representing items of Russian history (explaining 36.12% of variance) and Estonian history (explaining 21.79% of variance) is presented in Table 5.2.

Table 5.1

Descriptives of composed indices of the measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No of items</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
<th>% variance of 1 factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Identity (Estonian)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>41.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian history (in 2-f solution)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>34.7% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history (in 2-f solution)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>22.0% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation for Russians’ acculturation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian culture maintenance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>37.6% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian culture participation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>25.2% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Russians’ acculturation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian culture maintenance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>20.3% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian culture adoption</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>45.2% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status legitimizing beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair status relations (legitimacy)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>12.90% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfixed/permeable status relations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>41.85% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>39.4% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>18.5% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic attitudes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>57.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic rights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>44.48% (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture learning</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>21.35% (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All affirmative actions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>44.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The range of all scales was from 1 to 7.
Table 5.2

Factors of importance of history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian history</th>
<th>Estonian history</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate the Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis in the Second World War</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of wartime sacrifice and the defeat of fascism</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To recognise the Soviet army as liberator of Estonia from the Nazis</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 9\textsuperscript{th} of May</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To honour the graves of soldiers, who fell in the Second World War</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia</td>
<td>- .12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge Soviet occupation in Estonia</td>
<td>- .24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To recognise the crimes committed by the communist regime (e.g. repressions and deportations) in Estonia during the Soviet years</td>
<td>- .34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of fifty-year occupation of Estonia</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commemorate soldiers who fought for Estonian freedom in the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920)</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean scores of the scales indicated that the Estonian participants found the importance of events related to Estonian history relatively high ($M = 5.70$, $SD = .98$). The importance of the events believed to be part of Russian history was below scalar midpoint ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 1.21$), indicating a relatively low endorsement of Russian history by the Estonian participants. The correlational analysis showed that Russian and Estonian history variables were negatively associated with each other ($r = -.22$, $p < .001$), which supports Hypothesis 1a.

The second hypothesis involved the investigation of facets of realistic threat among the Estonian participants. Originally, 18 items were subjected to factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Kaiser retention criterion of eigenvalues above 1 suggested four factors. However, Parallel Analysis indicated that only two eigenvalues (eigenvalues: 6.11, 2.71, 1.19, 1.10, .85) were greater than eigenvalues generated from random data (generated eigenvalues: 1.39, 1.31, 1.26, 1.21, 1.16), thus pointing to a two-factor solution. The Scree plot also indicated a two-factor solution. Submitting the items to the forced two-factor solution
resulted in two clearly interpretable factors, one representing threats to the continuity of the Estonian state (thus political threat), and the other one containing threats to shared resources (thus economic threat). Five items with communalities lower than 3.0 were removed as these values indicate that these variables have little in common with others (Garson, 2010). The final two factors with 13 items represented a factor of political threat (eight items, explaining 38.25% of variance) and a factor of economic threat (five items, explaining 16.69% of variance). The final factor solution is presented in Table 5.3. There was a significant moderate positive correlation between the two threat variables ($r = .36, p < .001$). The mean score on political threat measure was rather high ($M = 5.48, SD = 1.08$). The ratings of the economic threat remained below the scalar midpoint ($M = 3.36, SD = 1.18$). Overall, the results show support to the original hypothesis about two different facets of realistic threat (*Hypothesis 1b*).

Table 5.3

**Final factors for realistic threat**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Political threat</th>
<th>Economic threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia tries to interfere with Estonian ethnic affairs at every possibility</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Russians believe too much in the anti-Estonian propaganda coming from Russia</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians living in Estonia are an object of manipulation of Russia</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Russian an official state language would endanger Estonian language and culture</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Language Act in Estonia is more liberal than in many other countries</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict acts regarding non-Estonians are important for the continuation of the Estonian state</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Russians can still get by with Russian language more than they should</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many local Russians would be ready for action in case of a new invasion from Russia</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Russians put too much weight on the already fragile health care system</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many resources are spent on educational programs that benefit Estonian Russians</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much of tax money is spent on social benefits to support Estonian Russians</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Russians have more economic power than they deserve in Estonia</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Russians benefit more than Estonians from tax funded rehabilitation services</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Correlates and Predictors of Ethnic Attitudes and Affirmative Action

Correlations among all variables are presented in Table 5.4. All correlations between predictor and outcome variables were significant \((p < .05)\) and in the expected direction (Hypotheses 2 a to d). Estonian national identity showed small but significant relationships with intergroup outcome variables: higher Estonian national identity was related to less positive ethnic attitudes \((r = -.19)\) and rejection of affirmative action \((r = -.11)\). Similarly, the importance given to Estonian history was associated with less positive ethnic attitudes \((r = -.30)\) and less support for affirmative action \((r = -.20)\). Importance given to Russian history was positively related to positive ethnic attitudes \((r = .38)\) and affirmative action \((r = .39)\), indicating that the more Estonians find Russian history important, the more positively they perceive Russians and the more supportive they are of affirmative action.

Political and economic threat were negatively related to outgroup attitudes and affirmative action, indicating that the more Estonians perceive political and economic threat, the more negative were their perceptions of Russians \((r = -.54 \text{ and } r = -.45, \text{ respectively})\) and the less they were willing to support affirmative action \((r = -.41 \text{ and } r = -.46, \text{ respectively})\). Negative significant relationships appeared between status legitimizing beliefs, and ethnic attitudes and affirmative actions, indicating that the more the Estonian participants believed in status relations being legitimate and permeable, the more negative attitudes they held against Russians \((r = -.47 \text{ and } r = -.16, \text{ respectively})\) and the more they rejected affirmative action \((r = -.47 \text{ and } r = -.11, \text{ respectively})\).

Table 5.4

Zero-order correlations between the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethnic attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Affirmative action</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Estonian identity</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Estonian history</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>-.20***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Russian history</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>-.22***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Political threat</td>
<td>-.54***</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Economic threat</td>
<td>-.45***</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>8. Legitimacy</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>-.42***</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Permeability</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.03 n.s.</td>
<td>.52***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * \(p < .05\); ** \(p < .01\); *** \(p < .001\).
A multiple linear regression was employed to examine the explained variance and the precise contribution of all variables in the prediction of (a) ethnic attitudes and (b) affirmative action. The following order of entry of the predictor variables was used: (1) Estonian identification, (2) importance of Russian and Estonian history, (3) political and economic threat, (4) and status legitimizing beliefs. (5) Additionally, interactions between identity and political threat, and identity and economic threat were added in the fifth step in the prediction of ethnic attitudes. Identity and perceived threat variables were centred and the interaction term was created between them before they were entered into the regression model.

**Multiple regression predicting ethnic attitudes**

Zero order correlations between ethnic attitudes and demographic variables (age, gender, education) showed a significant relationship with gender, indicating that men have more negative ethnic attitudes than women. The subsequent effects have been controlled for gender. Gender explained 2% of variance in the initial step of the prediction model \( \beta = -.15, p < .01 \).

The inter-correlation between predictor variables ranged from .03 to .68 (between perceived political threat and perceived fair status relations). Possible multicollinearity problem was checked with Tolerance statistics that ranged from .38 to .89 remaining above the problematic minimum of .20. With highest Variance-inflation factor \( (VIF) \) being 2.6, no multicollinearity was detected. One case with standard residuals in excess of ±3.3 was dropped from the analysis as it was identified as an influential outlier in the preliminary regression diagnostics.

The results on the regression analysis are presented in Table 5.5. In the first step, Estonian identity explained 5% of the variance in ethnic attitudes indicating that the stronger Estonian identity the more negative effect it exerts on ethnic attitudes. History variables, entered in the second step, accounted for further 15% of the variance, indicating that importance of Estonian history exerted negative, while importance of Russian history positive, effects on ethnic attitudes. In the third step, perceived political and economic threat contributed 20% to additional variance in ethnic attitude. Both threat variables were shown to be significant predictors of negative ethnic attitudes, while Estonian identity and history became non-significant. Forth step was only marginally significant and accounted for 1% of the variance. Only legitimacy was an
additional significant predictor of ethnic attitudes. Permeability did not contribute significantly to the prediction model. The last step explained another 2% of variance in ethnic attitudes. This was due to the significant contribution of the interaction between national identity and political threat. The interaction between national identity and economic threat was not significant. In general, these results support original predictions that each step would account for a significant amount of variance over and above that explained by variables in the previous step (Hypothesis 3 a to d).

In the final model, all variables produced an $R^2$ of .44 ($F$ (10, 376) = 34.71, $p = .001$) in the prediction of positive attitudes toward Russians. Gender remained a significant predictor of ethnic attitudes even after all psychological variables were entered into the model. Economic and political threats remained significant predictors of ethnic attitudes as did perceived legitimacy of status relations and the importance of Russian history.

Table 5.5

Hierarchical regression in predicting Estonians’ outgroup attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st step</th>
<th>2nd step</th>
<th>3rd step</th>
<th>4th step</th>
<th>5th step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. Gender</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Estonian identity</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Russian history</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political threat</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permeability</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EI x Pol.Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI x Ec.Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ change     | .07***   | .15***   | .20***   | .01*     | .02***   |
$F$ (df)         | (2, 384) | (4, 382) | (6, 380) | (8, 378) | (10, 376) |

13.52*** 26.72*** 44.86*** 34.71*** 39.44***

Note. * $p = .06$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

To interpret the significant interaction term between political threat and Estonian identity, the simple slope analysis (using computer software ModGraph; Jose, 2003) indicated that with high perceived political threat strong Estonian identity is related to negative ethnic attitudes, although it was only marginally significant (simple slope = -.11, $t = -1.73$, $p = .08$). However, Estonian identity exerts positive effect on
ethnic attitudes under perception of low political threat (simple slope = .15, \(t = 2.28, p < .05\)). The simple slope was not significant under the medium perceived threat (simple slope = .02, \(t = .10, p = .69\)). This supported identity-threat-moderation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3e).

![Political threat moderating ID & Ethnic attitudes](image)

Figure 5.2. Political threat moderating effect of identity on ethnic attitudes

### Multiple regression predicting affirmative action

A hierarchical multiple regression was undertaken to explore the contribution of the proposed variables in explaining variance in affirmative action (Research Question 1). Zero order correlations between affirmative action and demographic variables (age, gender, education) showed a significant relationship with gender, showing that men oppose affirmative action more than women. Therefore, the gender was controlled in the following regression analyses.

The results on the regression analysis are presented in Table 5.6. Beforehand, no multicollinearity problem was detected after checking Tolerance statistics and Variance-inflation factor (VIF), which remained in the acceptable range. Six cases with standard residuals in excess of ±3.3 were dropped out from the analysis as they were identified as influential outliers in the preliminary regression diagnostics.

After gender was controlled for in the first step (explaining 4% of variance),

---

21 Reversed slope indicated that there was a significant relationship between political threat and ethnic attitudes with high and low national identity. However, the relationship between political threat and ethnic attitudes appeared to be stronger for high identifiers (simple slope = -.36, \(t = -5.28, p < .001\)) than low identifiers (simple slope = -.14, \(t = -2.02, p < .05\)).
Estonian identity was a significant negative predictor of support for affirmative action explaining 2% of the variance. The second step including history variables accounted for 13% of the variance in ethnic attitudes above the identity. This was due to the significant contribution of the importance of Russian history, showing that importance of Russian history has a positive effect on supporting affirmative action. The third step explained another 17% of the variance in ethnic attitudes indicating that only economic threat was a significant negative predictor of support for affirmative action. In the final step status legitimizing beliefs accounted for 4% of additional variance in ethnic attitudes. The more status relations were perceived as legitimate, the more rejection toward affirmative action it exerted, while the perception of permeable status relations had a positive effect on support for affirmative action.

Table 5.6

Hierarchical regression in predicting Estonians’ attitudes towards affirmative action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st step</th>
<th>2nd step</th>
<th>3rd step</th>
<th>4th step</th>
<th>4th B step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. Gender</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.18***</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Estonian identity</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-0.09†</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Russian history</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permeability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R square change | .06*   | .13*** | .17*** | .04*** | .03*** |
R square        | .06    | .19    | .36    | .41    | .40    |
\(F\ (df)\)     | (2, 379) | (4, 377) | (6, 375) | (8, 373) | (7, 374) |
12.57*** | 22.36*** | 35.84*** | 31.86*** | 35.25   |

Note. Due to the outliers N = 382. 4th B step – refit of regression model without permeability variable.
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

In the final model, all variables produced an \(R^2\) of .41 (\(F\ (8, 373) = 31.86, p = .001\)) in the prediction of support for affirmative action. Gender remained a significant predictor even after all psychological variables were entered into the model. Legitimacy and economic threat appeared to be the strongest predictors of support of affirmative action, followed by Russian history. Permeability was related to affirmative action in the opposite direction than predicted, and was also in the opposite direction of the zero order correlation results. This could indicate a presence of suppressor effect and was therefore investigated by additional analyses. The regression was performed again with
no legitimacy in the forth step which showed that permeability alone was not a significant predictor ($\beta = 0.04, p > .05$) of affirmative action. This indicates that permeability variable become significant predictor of the affirmative action only via its correlation with legitimacy and therefore can be regarded as a suppressor variable (Meyers, et al., 2006).

In sum, the results indicate that only economic but not political threat predicts significantly affirmative action, while both threat variables were significant predictors of ethnic attitudes ($RQ1$).

**Hypothesised Mediation Model**

Following the recommendations by Baron and Kenny (1986), preliminary correlational analyses were performed between independent and proposed mediator variables. As presented in Table 5.7, all correlations with identity, history and perceived threat variables were in the expected direction ($Hypothesis\ 4\ a,\ b$). As expected, national identity showed positive significant associations with both types of threat, indicating that the stronger Estonians felt about their national identity, the more they perceived political threat and economic threat. However, the relationship was stronger for political than economic threat (formulas for comparisons from DeCoster, 2007). Significant associations were indicated between the importance of Estonian history and both types of threat. Importance given to Russian history was significantly related to political and economic threat, indicating that the more Estonians find Russian history important, the lower their perceived threat. Both history variables showed a stronger relationship with political than with economic threat.

Correlations between identity, history and status legitimizing beliefs also appeared in the expected direction ($Hypothesis\ 5\ a,\ b$). Estonian identity was positively related to status relations being perceived legitimate and permeable, indicating that stronger national identity was associated with perceptions that intergroup status relations are legitimate and intergroup boundaries are permeable. The relationship with the importance of Estonian history appeared in the same direction, showing that the more the participants found Estonian history important, the more they endorsed beliefs that status relations are legitimate and permeable. The importance of Russian history showed, however, an opposite relationship: the more important Russian history was perceived, the more participants believed that status relations were non-legitimate and
impermeable. All relationships with status legitimacy were significantly stronger than with status permeability.

Table 5.7

Zero-order correlations with mediator variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realistic threat</th>
<th>Status legitimizing beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian identity</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z^a</td>
<td>4.23***</td>
<td>2.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian history</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z^b</td>
<td>7.51***</td>
<td>4.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian history</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z^c</td>
<td>6.24***</td>
<td>5.89***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Z-scores calculated for comparison of correlations measured on the same subjects (DeCoster, 2007);

- z^a tests r{EI,PT} = r{ELET} and r{EI,L} = r{EI,P};
- z^b tests r{EH,PT} = r{EH,ET} and r{EH,L} = r{EH,P};
- z^c tests r{RH,PT} = r{RH,ET} and r{RH,L} = r{RH,P};

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

The mediation hypotheses (Hypothesis 4 and 5: c) were tested with AMOS 16.0 graphics programme. The paths were drawn as indicated in the hypothesized model (Figure 5.3), in which identity and history variables were expected to have an indirect effect on ethnic attitudes via perceived threat variables (political and economic) and status legitimizing beliefs (legitimacy/permeability of status relations).

The error terms of mediator variables were allowed to be correlated, except for economic threat and unfixed/permeable status relations as no significant relationship between these variables were indicated in correlational terms. Model fit was estimated with absolute fit measures such as Chi-square statistics (p > .05), GFI (> .90), and RMSEA (< .10); and relative (or incremental) fit measures such as CFI (> .95) and NFI (> .90) (Meyers, et al., 2006).

The results, presented in Table 5.8 and illustrated in Figure 5.3 indicate an overall good fit between proposed model and the observed data (see Model 1). Relative fit measures NFI and CFI, and absolute fit measures of GFI and RMSEA indicated a good fit. Only statistically significant Chi-square indicated a poor fit (with p < .05).
Figure 5.3. Hypothesized model

Note. Dashed lines represent non-significant standardized path coefficients ($p > .05$). Curved paths signify correlations between variables. Path coefficients are standardized.

Table 5.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fit indices for path models</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2/df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1. Hypothesized model</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.063</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 2. Modified hypothesized model 1:</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.450</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>.061</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insignificant paths deleted</td>
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<td>E.Hist $\rightarrow$ Economic threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.Hist $\rightarrow$ Permeability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permeability $\rightarrow$ Ethnic attitudes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 3. Modified hypothesis model 2: Direct</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.029</td>
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<td>path included</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RH $\rightarrow$ Ethnic attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining the fit of individual parameters in the model (Byrne, 2001), the parameter estimates showed three non-significant paths. The paths from Estonian history to economic threat ($\beta = .05, p > .05$), from Russian history to unfixed/permeable status relations ($\beta = -.09, p > .05$), and from unfixed/permeable status
relations to ethnic attitudes ($\beta = .09, p > .05$) were not significant. These non-significant paths were removed and the model was re-estimated (see Model 2), revealing similar results in an overall model fit with all the paths being significant in the model. However, the modification indices (MI), indicating the possible misspecification of the model (B. Byrne, 2001), pointed to the improvement of the model by including a direct path from Russian history to ethnic attitudes (MI = 6.88). Adding the direct path from Russian history to ethnic attitudes can be justifiable – if Estonians acknowledge the importance of Russian history it can create a basis for trust towards Russians which could directly affect their attitudes to be more positive towards Russians. Therefore, the direct path from Russian history to ethnic attitudes was added to the model. The re-specified model produced an adequate match between the proposed model and the data, with RMSEA improving and Chi-square being non-significant indicating no differences between the expected and the observed values. The final model is illustrated in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4. Modified hypothesized model
Note. Only significant paths are reported. Curved paths signify correlations between variables. Path coefficients are standardized.

The significance of mediations (i.e. indirect effects) was tested with bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI), recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008). All total indirect effects of antecedent variables through mediator variables on ethnic attitudes are presented in Table 5.9. The total indirect effect of Estonian identity (with Estonian and Russian history as covariates) on ethnic attitudes was -.12, which was
significant as bootstrapping results revealed no zero in the confidence intervals (demonstrating that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero). Three specific indirect effects were significant: -.06 (through political threat), -.03 (through economic threat), and -.04 (through legitimate status relations), indicating that the effect of Estonian identity on ethnic attitudes was significantly mediated by political and economic threats, and legitimate status relations. None of the pairwise contrasts of indirect effects differed significantly as zero was contained in the confidence intervals. The direct effect of Estonian identity on ethnic attitudes of .04 was non-significant ($SE = .05$, $p > .05$) when mediators were considered in the model, showing that the effect of Estonian identity was fully mediated by the mediators.

Table 5.9

*Indirect effects of antecedent variables on ethnic attitudes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect effects</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>BCa 95% CI</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV: Estonian identity $\rightarrow$ DV: Ethnic attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permeability</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contrasts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT vs L</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT vs ET</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET vs L</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV: Estonian history $\rightarrow$ DV: Ethnic attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permeability</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contrasts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT vs L</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV: Russian history $\rightarrow$ DV: Ethnic attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political threat</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permeability</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contrasts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT vs ET</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT vs L</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET vs L</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total indirect effect of Estonian history (with Estonian identity and Russian history as covariates) on ethnic attitudes of -.15 was significant, with two specific indirect effects being significant: -.09 through political threat and -.06 through fair status relations. This indicates that the effects of Estonian history on ethnic attitudes were mediated by political threat and fair status relations. The specific indirect effects did not differ significantly from each other. The direct effect of Estonian history on ethnic attitudes became non-significant at -.05 (SE = .05, p > .05) when mediators were considered in the model, indicating full mediation.

The total indirect effect of Russian history (with Estonian identity and Estonian history as covariates) on ethnic attitudes of .16 was significant, with three significant specific indirect effects: .08 through political threat, .04 through economic threat, and .04 through fair status relations. The specific indirect effects did not differ significantly from each other. The direct effect of Russian history on ethnic attitudes of .10 remained significant (SE = .04, p < .01) after the mediators were considered in the model, indicating that Russian history exerts an effect on ethnic attitudes directly and via political and economic threats, and fair status relations.

In sum, the results of the model generally support the threat-mediation-hypothesis (Hypothesis 4 c), showing that the effect of Estonian identity was mediated by both political and economic threat. While Russian history had an effect on ethnic attitudes via both economic and political threat and had also a direct effect, the effect of Estonian history on ethnic attitudes was mediated only by political threat.

In terms of status-legitimizing-beliefs-mediation-hypothesis (Hypothesis 5 c), the results show that while Estonian identity and history have an effect on the unfixed/permeable status relations, the latter does not serve as a significant mediator to explain the effects of Estonian identity and history on ethnic attitudes. However, legitimacy was shown to mediate significantly the effects of identity and history variables on the ethnic attitudes. Thus partial support was found for the status-legitimizing-beliefs-mediation-hypothesis.

**The Relationship between Acculturation and Intergroup Relations**

The main aim of this section was to investigate Estonians’ expectations towards Russians’ acculturation, how Estonians perceived actual acculturation of Russians, and how these were related to ethnic attitudes.
Acculturation – expectation versus perception

The first part of the analyses examined the relationship and differences between Estonians’ expectations regarding Russians’ acculturation and the acculturation behaviours imputed to Russians. This analysis involved two dimensions – Estonian culture participation and Russian culture maintenance – which corresponded to each other at the item level. As presented in Table 5.10, a paired samples t-test indicated that Estonians’ had slightly stronger preferences for Russians to participate in Estonian culture ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.05$) than to maintain their own culture ($M = 5.12$, $SD = 1.16$), which is in line with the proposed predictions (Hypothesis 6 a). Estonians’ preference dimensions of Russians’ cultural orientations were negatively related indicating that Estonians would prefer Russians to be engaged in one or another culture.

Table 5.10
Comparison of acculturation orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonian culture participation</th>
<th>Russian culture maintenance</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>Pearson $r$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation for Russians’ cultural orientation</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Russians’ acculturation</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>$t(413) = 26.01^{***}$</td>
<td>$t(413) = -4.57^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson $r$</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

A significant difference also appeared in Russians’ actual cultural orientations as viewed by Estonians – a paired sample t-test showed that Russians were perceived to be significantly more engaged in maintaining their own culture ($M = 6.12$, $SD = .79$) than participating in Estonian culture ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.11$), which also supported the original hypothesis (Hypothesis 6 b). There was a significant negative moderate correlation ($r = -.40$, $p < 0.001$) between the two factors, indicating that the more Russians are perceived to be maintaining their culture, the less they are perceived to be
engaged in Estonian culture and *vice versa*. It could mean that Estonians do not perceive many integrated Russians, and it would be interesting to look further whether Estonians indeed see Russians as either separated or assimilated in Estonia, regardless of what their preferences are.

In terms of differences between expectations for Russians’ acculturation and their actual behaviour perceived by Estonians, a paired samples *t*-test revealed a statistically reliable difference between the means of Estonians’ expectations regarding Russians’ culture maintenance ($M = 5.12, SD = 1.16$) and their perception of Russians’ actual behaviour regarding maintaining their culture ($M = 6.12, SD = .79$). This implies that Russians maintain their culture in Estonians’ view more than Estonians actually prefer. Estonians’ expectations for cultural maintenance of Russians are not significantly related to what Estonians think of Russians’ actual behaviour regarding Russian culture maintenance ($r = .01$).

Regarding Russians’ participation in Estonian culture, a paired sample *t*-test indicated that Russians were significantly less ($M = 3.27, SD = 1.11$) engaged in Estonian culture in opinion of Estonians compared to what Estonians themselves would prefer ($M = 5.31, SD = 1.05$). Estonians’ expectations for Russians’ participation in Estonian culture are not significantly associated with what Estonians think of Russians’ actual behaviour regarding participation in Estonian culture ($r = -.09$). These findings support *Hypothesis 6 c*.

However, a moderate significant correlation ($r = .37, p < 0.001$) appeared between Estonians’ perception of Russians’ actual participation in the Estonian culture and Estonians’ expectations regarding Russians’ culture maintenance. The less Russians were perceived to be participating in Estonian culture, the less Estonians expressed the desire for Russians to be maintaining their own culture, which would imply the preference for marginalisation/exclusion from the side of Estonians. However, it can also be regarded the other way around, so that the more Estonians perceive that Russians are participating in Estonian culture, the more they agree with the importance for Russians to maintain their culture (conditional integration).

**Outcomes**

In the next analyses, multiple hierarchical regressions were performed to investigate how acculturation expectations and perceptions act together to predict ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action (*Research Question 2 a, b*). Acculturation
effects were controlled for gender. The results presented in Table 5.11 reveal that only the preference for Russian culture maintenance was a significant positive predictor of ethnic attitudes when Estonians’ preferences regarding Russians acculturation were entered into the model. When Estonians’ perceived acculturation preferences of Russians were entered in the next step, only perceived Estonian culture participation added significantly to the prediction. Thus, ethnic attitudes were significantly predicted by preference of Russians cultural maintenance and Russians’ actual participation in Estonian culture as perceived by Estonians. In the final model the interaction between perceived Estonian culture participation and Russian cultural maintenance was also significant.

Table 5.11

Acculturation effects in prediction of positive ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive ethnic attitudes</th>
<th>Support for affirmative actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; step</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferences for RCM</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferences for ECP</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived RCM</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ECP</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferences for ECP*RCM</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; change</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F (df)</td>
<td>(3, 384)</td>
<td>(5, 382)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ECP – Estonian culture participation; RCM – Russian cultural maintenance. Preferences for ECP was not included in the prediction of affirmative action as there was no significant bivariate correlation. All F-statistics are significant at p < .001 level. Gender explained 2% of variance in ethnic attitudes and 4% in affirmative action in initial step. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001;

The regression results regarding affirmative action showed a similar pattern of acculturation effects – Estonians’ preference for Russian culture maintenance and perception of Russians’ participation in Estonian culture significantly contributed to the
prediction of support for affirmative action. Additionally, gender remained a significant predictor of affirmative action indicating that men are more opposed to affirmative action than females. The interactions between acculturation dimensions were non-significant in prediction of affirmative action.

A simple slope analysis (ModGraph; Jose, 2003) was used to interpret the significant interaction term in the prediction of ethnic attitudes. The results indicated that when Estonians perceive that Russians do not participate in Estonian culture (low ECP), the perception of Russians’ culture maintenance increases negative ethnic attitudes (simple slope = -.18, $t = -2.41$, $p < .05$). However, when Russians’ participation in Estonian culture was perceived to be high, there was a marginally significant positive relationship between perceived Russian culture maintenance and ethnic attitudes (simple slope = .14, $t = 1.89$, $p = .06$).

![Perceived ACC & Ethnic attitudes](image)

*Figure 5.5. Interaction of dimensions of acculturation perceptions in prediction of ethnic attitudes*

Next, this research was interested in determining how Estonian expectations for Russian acculturation and their perceived actual behaviour were related to ethnic attitudes and affirmative action (*Research Question 2 c*). The participants were first classified as endorsing one of the four acculturation strategies. Two dimensions of Estonian acculturation expectations – Estonian culture participation and Russian culture maintenance – were split into two with values below and above scalar midpoint (4). The
split of two acculturation dimensions resulted in participants being classified under high/low Estonian culture participation and high/low Russian culture maintenance, which were then crossed with each other to obtain the acculturation expectation for each participant. The same strategy was used to obtain the perceptions measure.

The outcomes regarding Estonians’ preferences and perceptions for Russians’ acculturation in terms of the four acculturation strategies are presented in Table 5.12. It can be noted that while the majority of Estonians prefer integration (73%) followed by assimilation (14%), the majority of them perceive Russians as being separated (71%) and integrated (22%). The biggest mismatch was between acculturation preferences and perceptions regarding integration and separation strategies.

Table 5.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial acculturation strategies obtained with scalar midpoint split</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians’ preferences for Russians’ acculturation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. 24 (6.2%) participants for acculturation preferences and 23 (5.9%) participants for acculturation perceptions were not classified into any group as their values fell on midpoint on one or both dimensions.

As the scalar midpoint split generated groups with uneven sizes, for making further comparisons possible a sample median split on two acculturation dimensions was performed. The participants whose scores fell on the median on one of both scales were left out of the analysis (N=49 for expectations’ and N=56 for perceptions’ measure). First one-way ANOVA analyses were performed to compare the scores of (1a) ethnic attitudes and (1b) support for affirmative action (dependent factors) for the four strategies regarding Estonians’ expectations for Russians’ acculturation (independent factor). ANOVA yielded significant main effects for ethnic attitudes: $F(3,335) = 28.07, p < .001$; and affirmative action: $F(3,335) = 15.49, p < .001$.

(1a) A post-hoc test (Tukey HSD as equal variances assumed, homogeneity of variance $p > .05$) for ethnic attitudes indicated that the Estonian participants who preferred Russians to integrate ($M = 4.33, SD = .82$) or separate ($M = 4.31, SD = .80$)
had (nearly identical) more favourable ethnic attitudes which were both significantly more positive \( (p < .05) \) in comparison to assimilation \( (M = 3.29, SD = .98) \) and marginalisation preferences \( (M = 4.94, SD = .86) \). Interestingly, the participants who expected Russians to assimilate had the most negative ethnic attitudes compared to the participants preferring other acculturation strategies, including marginalization. The mean scores are presented in Figure 5.6.

(1b) A post-hoc test (Tamhane as equal variances not assumed, homogeneity of variance \( p < 0.05 \)) for affirmative action showed that the highest scores on support for affirmative action was obtained for the participants who expected Russians to integrate \( (M = 5.36, SD = .76) \), which differed significantly from those who preferred Russians’ assimilation \( (M = 4.57, SD = 1.06) \), or marginalization \( (M = 4.70, SD = .87) \). Integration expectation did not differ from separation \( (M = 5.26, SD = 1.01) \) in terms of support for affirmative action \( (p > .05) \). Participants preferring Russians’ separation were significantly more supportive of affirmative action than those preferring marginalization or assimilation. Paradoxically, the participants who preferred Russians to assimilate were less willing to support affirmative action compared to the participants preferring integration or separation strategies. No significant differences were found between assimilation and marginalization expectations. In general, this indicates the same pattern as observed for the ethnic attitudes that participants who expected Russians to assimilate had the most negative ethnic attitudes and were least willing to support actions to support Russians’ better adjustment.

Second one-way ANOVA analyses were performed to compare the scores of (2a) ethnic attitudes and (2b) support for affirmative action (dependent factors) for the four strategies regarding Estonians’ perceptions of Russians’ acculturation (independent factor). ANOVA yielded significant main effects for ethnic attitudes: \( F(3,328) = 38.72, p < .001 \); and affirmative action: \( F(3,328) = 10.88, p < .001 \).

(2a) A post-hoc test (Tamhane as equal variances not assumed, homogeneity of variance \( p < 0.05 \)) comparison of ethnic attitude means indicated that the highest scores were obtained for perceived assimilation \( (M = 4.41, SD = .74) \) and perceived integration \( (M = 4.37, SD = .89) \) strategies, which did not differ from each other significantly. However, for both strategies ethnic attitudes were significantly more positive \( (p < .001) \) in comparison to perceived marginalisation \( (M = 3.64, SD = .75) \) and perceived separation \( (M = 3.33, SD = .95) \) strategies. The ethnic attitudes did not differ significantly for the latter two \( (p > .05) \).
A post-hoc test (Tukey HSD as equal variances assumed, homogeneity of variance \( p > .05 \)) of how Estonians’ perceptions regarding Russians’ actual acculturation relates to support for affirmative action indicated that the highest scores were obtained for perceived assimilation (\( M = 5.31, SD = .83 \)) and integration (\( M = 5.18, SD = 1.09 \)) strategies, which did not differ from each other significantly. Both strategies produce significantly more positive attitudes toward affirmative action in comparison to perceived separation (\( M = 4.64, SD = 1.05, p < .001 \)). Perceived assimilation had also significantly higher scores in comparison to marginalisation (\( M = 4.70, SD = 1.06, p < .001 \)), while the difference between perceived integration and marginalization was only marginally significant (\( p = .09 \)) Support for affirmative action was not different for individuals perceiving Russians to be separated or marginalized (\( p > .05 \)).

These results appear paradoxical considering that Estonian participants who prefer Russians’ assimilation have the most negative ethnic attitudes compared to the participants expecting other acculturation strategies. Additional results show that 57% of Estonian participants, who prefer Russians’ assimilation, perceive Russians to be actually separated. This suggests a mismatch between these participants’ acculturation expectations and what they perceive is happening in reality, which may affect their
ethnic attitudes. If Estonian participants expect Russians to assimilate, but perceive that Russians are actually separated, their attitudes are not likely to be positive. To test this possible explanation, follow up comparisons were performed between individuals preferring each of the four acculturation strategies. They were compared in terms of their perceptions of Russians’ acculturation and the extent of discrepancies between their acculturation preferences and perceptions. From this follow up analysis (see Table 5.13) it appears that the participants who want Russians to assimilate:

1) perceive Russians’ participation in Estonian culture to be the lowest compared to the individuals who prefer other strategies for Russians’ acculturation ($p < .001$);

2) perceive Russians maintaining their culture significantly more than those preferring integration or marginalization;

3) have significantly higher scores on both discrepancy dimensions in comparison to individuals preferring other strategies for Russians’ acculturation. This means that Estonians with assimilation preferences perceive Russians maintaining their culture more than they desire and perceive Russians participating in Estonian culture less than they desire.

The current results showed that individuals preferring assimilation of Russians had the largest mismatch between their acculturation expectations for Russians and perceptions of reality of Russians’ actual acculturation, which could explain their more negative attitudes towards Russians.

Table 5.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonians’ acculturation preferences</th>
<th>Perceived ECP of Russians</th>
<th>Perceived RCM of Russians</th>
<th>Discrepancy ECP</th>
<th>Discrepancy RCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ECP – Estonian culture participation; RCM – Russian cultural maintenance; Discrepancy ECP – higher positive values show that Estonians want Russians to participate in Estonian culture more than Russians actually do in Estonians’ perception. Discrepancy RCM – higher negative values show that Estonians perceive Russians to maintain their culture beyond what Estonians desire.

* The difference between assimilation and separation was non-significant ($p > .05$).
Discussion

The main goal of this chapter was to offer the majority perceptive on the intercultural relations in Estonia. The study with ethnic Estonians was undertaken to investigate factors affecting Estonians’ inter-ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action.

In the initial analyses, the results relating to contextual factors offered empirical support for the hypothesis that the Estonian participants differentiate between ‘Russian’ and ‘Estonian’ histories. These two history orientations were negatively related to each other and thus gave an indication of the polemical representations of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988). Additionally, it was demonstrated that there are two facets of realistic threat for Estonians – the political and the economic threat, each playing a slightly different role in intergroup relations in Estonia.

Ethnic Attitudes

As positive inter-ethnic attitudes are desirable in any multi-ethnic society, this study examined the factors that significantly affect positive outgroup attitudes. A significant negative main effect of Estonian identity on positive ethnic attitudes indicated that with the increasing Estonians’ ingroup identity, outgroup attitudes become more negative. This was predicted given that the interdependency between Estonians and Russians is not mutually supportive – not only is there restricted access to power for different ethnic groups; the competing views on history often constitute a zero-sum structure (e.g. Ehala, 2009), adding another element to the antagonism between Estonians and Russians. With competing interdependence between ethnic groups, a strong ethnic identity is expected to exert a negative effect on outgroup attitudes, as demonstrated in previous research (Duckitt, et al., 2005; Duckitt & Parra, 2004). From the SIT perspective, this ethnocentric tendency among the Estonian participants might indicate a strategy for claiming superiority by derogating the outgroup for the sake of maintaining or enhancing positive self-image of the ingroup.

On the other hand, for participants with low perceived political threat, a strong ingroup identity exerted a positive effect on the outgroup attitudes. This is in line with the identify-threat moderation hypothesis and the expectation that with a secure identity or absence of threats to identity, outgroup derogation as a group self-enhancement
strategy may not be pursued (the multiculturalism hypothesis). The effect of identity on ethnic attitudes did not interact with the level of economic threat.

Perceived realistic threat was also predicted to mediate the effects of ethnic identity on ethnic attitudes. A multiple mediation model in the prediction of ethnic attitudes showed that the effects of Estonian identity on ethnic attitudes were mediated via political and economic threat and legitimacy. A strong Estonian identity led to higher perceptions of economic and political threat, and legitimacy of intergroup status relations, which in turn led to negative ethnic attitudes.

The importance of Estonian and Russian history variables showed asymmetrical bivariate relationships with outgroup attitudes. While the importance of Estonian history was related to negative perceptions of Russians, the importance of Russian history provoked positive attitudes. The mediation analyses demonstrated that Estonian history had an indirect effect on ethnic attitudes via political threat and legitimacy. The importance given to Estonian history had a positive effect on perceptions of political threat and legitimacy of intergroup relations, which in turn led to more negative outgroup attitudes. The importance of Russian history showed the opposite relationship – it led to decreased perceptions of economic and political threat, and intergroup relations being perceived as non-legitimate, which in turn led to more favourable attitudes towards Russians. Interestingly, the importance of Russian history had also a direct effect on positive ethnic attitudes.

While the identity effect on outgroup attitudes mediated by threat can be juxtaposed with comparable results from previous research (Stephan, et al., 2002), the effects of history variables on outgroup attitudes mediated by threat are unique. This research shows that social representations of history affect individuals’ sensitivity to perception of threat. However, the importance of Estonian history has a significant effect only on political and not on economic threat. Bivariate relationships indicated that the history beliefs in the Estonian context relate more strongly to political than to economic threat. Keeping the history ‘alive’ by memorizing the important historical events associated with the occupation and war experiences might uphold individuals’ alertness to the dangers in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005), especially relating to the independence of the state.

Additionally, the legitimacy of status relations played a significant role in mediating the effects of identity and history variables on ethnic attitudes. While a positive relationship between strong ingroup identification among majority groups and
endorsement of system legitimacy has been demonstrated before (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Doosje, et al., 1998; Levin, et al., 1998; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008), previous research has not focused on the effects of ethnic identity on ethnic attitudes with perceived legitimacy as a mediator. As to the relationship between representations of history and legitimacy, no empirical research can be found. However, historical representations theory argues that there are representational components to legitimacy based on history – historical representations may determine how legitimate social and political arrangements in society are perceived (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu, et al., 1999).

From status legitimizing beliefs, only legitimacy significantly predicted and mediated the effects of identity and history variables on ethnic attitudes. Permeability might be a controversial issue for Estonians. Permeability is typically perceived as threatening to the ethnic majority group. However, the acknowledgment of intergroup boundaries being impermeable – that is, agreeing that the chances for Russians to reach top positions in society are not the same as for Estonians – might also imply the acknowledgment of existing system-level discrimination of ethnic minorities in Estonia. The qualitative study indicated that Estonians hardly admit any discrimination of Russians in Estonia. This study showed that on average the participants agree with permeability of intergroup boundaries. Possibly, the controversial associations with permeability (threat versus acceptance of discrimination) might account for the lack of a strong relationship with outgroup attitudes. The endorsement of legitimacy beliefs of the status relations predicted negative ethnic attitudes, which matches previous research indicating that high status groups show more negative outgroup perceptions when they perceive status relations to be legitimate (Johnson, et al., 2005; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). The same authors suggest that individuals are motivated to maintain their high status if it is considered just and deserved, while negative attitudes are probably instrumental in serving that motivation.

In summary, political and economic threat appeared to be the strongest predictors of negative attitudes towards Russians. This is in line with the predictions and findings from Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), asserting that perceptions of threat create prejudice and negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities.
**Affirmative Action**

This study proposed Estonians’ support for affirmative action as the second outcome variable in the investigation of inter-ethnic relations from Estonians’ perspective. Affirmative action captured Estonians’ willingness to support policies to improve integration of ethnic Russians into the Estonian society by extending their civic rights and offering financial support for cultural learning. The majority population’s views on their willingness to contribute and facilitate migrants’ adjustment have received little attention even in the acculturation literature focusing on the perspective of ethnic majority population on inter-cultural relations. Schalk-Soekar and van de Vijver (2008) have emphasised the insufficiency of knowledge about the majority population perspective on their behaviour in adjusting to multicultural society. This study partly filled this gap by investigating the factors that predict the majority ethnic group’s support for methods that can be institutionally implemented to facilitate the integration process of ethnic minorities. The same direction of bivariate relationships was expected for the affirmative action outcome as with ethnic attitudes. However, the contribution of the variables in predicting support for affirmative action was explored, so that it would ultimately indicate the similarities and differences with predictors of ethnic attitudes.

The results of bivariate relationships between predictor variables and affirmative action were found to be parallel to those of ethnic attitudes, which provides convergent validity to the previous findings. A strong ethnic identity showed a weak but significant negative relationship with support for affirmative action. Similarly, the importance of Estonian history, realistic threat (economic and political) and status legitimizing beliefs (legitimacy and permeability) were negatively associated with affirmative action, indicating the rejection of affirmative action in the presence of these factors. The endorsement of Russian history was positively related to support for affirmative action. When all factors were considered together, support for affirmative action was predicted by lower perceptions of economic threat, disagreement with legitimacy of current status relations, and endorsement of importance of Russian history. In comparison to ethnic attitudes, political threat did not contribute significantly to predict support for affirmative action. Also, the legitimacy of status relations seemed to be a stronger predictor of affirmative action than ethnic attitudes when all other variables were
considered. Overall, these findings are comparable to a limited number of previous research on these relationships, indicating that negation of historical representation of the ethnic minority group (Liu, et al., 1999; Sibley & Liu, in press; Sibley, et al., 2008), perceptions of realistic threat (Renfro, et al., 2006), and justification of status quo (legitimacy of status relations) (Crosby, et al., 2006; Kay, et al., 2009) lead to the rejection of affirmative action policies.

**Acculturation**

Relationships between acculturation phenomena, and ethnic attitudes and affirmative action were analysed independently in this study. The comparison of parallel items comprising two acculturation dimensions indicated that (1) Estonians preferred Russians’ involvement in Estonian culture over their involvement in Russian culture. The fact that majority members want minorities to be engaged in the majority culture more than in their own traditional culture has been reported in previous research and is suggested to be related to feelings of threat – that is, it is less threatening for the majority population if minorities are more strongly engaged in the majority culture than in their own (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pfaffertott & Brown, 2006; Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 1998; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002).

The subsequent findings demonstrated that Estonians: (2) perceive Russians to be much more engaged in their own culture than in Estonian culture; (3) prefer Russians to be more engaged in Estonian culture than they are currently perceived to be; (4) prefer Russians to be less engaged in their own culture than they are currently perceived to be; (5) prefer Russians to integrate, while the majority perceive Russians to be separated. Additionally, (6) not only the Estonians’ perceptions of Russians’ acculturation on two dimensions were mutually exclusive; their preferences were also shown to be negatively related to each other – the more Estonians preferred Russians to be engaged in Estonian culture, the less they preferred them to be engaged in their own culture; similarly, the more Estonians perceived Russians to be engaged in their own culture, the less they perceived them to be engaged in Estonian culture. However, (7) Estonians supported Russians’ culture maintenance if they perceived Russians to be engaged in Estonian culture, which is an interesting result as it shows a conditional aspect for supporting the culture maintenance of Russians.
The finding that only the preference for culture maintenance of ethnic minorities was a significant predictor of positive intercultural outcomes is partially compatible with previous research that has found that preference for both acculturation dimensions or only the contact dimension predict positive outcomes in intergroup relations (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zagefka, et al., 2009). In terms of the majority population perceptions of minority acculturation and intergroup outcomes, only perceived participation in Estonian culture significantly predicted positive ethnic attitudes and support for affirmative action. This finding is in line with previous research in acculturation literature showing that migrants are typically evaluated more positively if they are perceived to be engaged in majority culture (A. Kosic, et al., 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Zagefka, et al., 2007). Additionally, a significant interaction effect between two dimensions of perceived acculturation of Russians showed that the perception of Russians’ culture maintenance exerts a negative effect on ethnic attitudes when Russians’ engagement in Estonian culture is perceived as low. When Russians’ engagement in Estonian culture was perceived as high, Russians culture maintenance appeared to exert a positive effect on ethnic attitudes (at marginally significant level, $p = .06$). Previous authors (A. Kosic, et al., 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007) have found that immigrants who prefer to maintain their ethnic culture are more negatively evaluated by the native majority members. This study shows that the effect of the perceived culture maintenance of the ethnic minority group on ethnic attitudes depends on the extent that this minority group is simultaneously seen to be engaged in the majority culture. Ethnic culture maintenance of migrants may exert different effects on the outgroup attitudes depending on their perceived engagement in the majority culture. Possibly, perceived low engagement of Russians in Estonian culture may be a matter of concern for Estonians that might be heightened with increased perception of Russians’ engagement in their culture, and thus lead to negative ethnic attitudes.

The comparison of four acculturation strategies desired from Russians by Estonians revealed that Estonians who preferred Russians’ integration or separation showed the most positive ethnic attitudes and the strongest support for affirmative action. Previous research has shown that a preference for the immigrants’ integration among the majority population members produces better outcomes for intercultural relations than alternative acculturation strategies (Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zick, et al., 2001). Thus, it is puzzling that participants’ preferences for
integration did not generate better inter-ethnic outcomes in comparison to a separation preference. Integration and separation strategies converge on the ethnic culture maintenance dimension. Support for Russian culture maintenance showed a substantial significant correlation with positive ethnic attitudes ($r = .47$) and support for affirmative action ($r = .42$). It might be that Estonians’ tolerance for Russian culture maintenance is determinative for positive intergroup relational outcomes with or without simultaneous preference for Estonian culture participation. This coincides with regression results showing the significance of ethnic culture maintenance dimension over the national culture participation dimension.

The results also appear paradoxical regarding assimilation preference as it was found to produce the most negative ethnic attitudes and the least support for affirmative action in comparison to other strategies. This finding can be related to a study by Leong (2008) showing that assimilation as a rejection-oriented strategy predicted negative attitudes of the recipient society members towards immigrants. This research additionally indicated that individuals who prefer assimilation of Russians had the largest discordance between their preferences and the perceptions of Russians’ acculturation, which could explain their most negative attitudes towards Russians. There is evidence that the lack of correspondence between acculturation preferences of majority and minority ethnic groups (as perceived by the majority group) are related to more negative outcomes for intergroup relations, such as ingroup bias, lower tolerance and quality of intergroup relations, and higher perceived threat (Pfaffertott & Brown, 2006; Piontkowski, et al., 2002; Rohmann, et al., 2006; Rohmann, et al., 2008; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zick, et al., 2001).

The results regarding the perceived acculturation strategies of Russians show that individuals who perceive Russians to be assimilated or integrated have more positive ethnic attitudes and are more supportive of affirmative action in comparison to those perceiving Russians to be separated or marginalized. Assimilation and integration strategies adopted by Russians imply their high engagement in the majority culture which is expected to be related to more positive intercultural outcomes than the strategies involving little engagement (separation and marginalisation) as shown in previous research (Van Oudenhoven, et al., 1998).
Limitations and Implications

Despite the intriguing and novel findings in this study the limitations of this work should be acknowledged. The main limitation of this study is that it consists of a cross-sectional survey containing correlational findings, which challenge the direction of proposed relationships as they can be bidirectional. Although this research tested the underlying assumptions that the perception of threat or status legitimizing beliefs lead to negative ethnic attitudes, it is also possible to conceive that disliking Russians might affect the perceptions of threat and the need to defend the legitimacy of current status relations. However, the proposed relationships were drawn on the basis of the previous qualitative study and relevant theoretical propositions. For example, integrated threat theory gave a good theoretical ground to test outgroup attitudes as an outcome variable.

The two outcome indicators of intercultural relations investigated in this study show the average ratings around scalar midpoint, which at best indicate neutral outgroup attitudes and indifference regarding support for affirmative action. It has been argued previously (Lauristin, 2008a) that due to the current inter-group state of affairs in Estonia, inter-ethnic tensions are intensified in situations of crisis in Estonia, especially for reaching agreement about mutual positions and finding peaceful and effective means for mutually satisfying solutions. Thus, situations of crisis may invoke perceptions of threat. This study showed that perceptions of realistic threat play an important role in determining outgroup attitudes and support for affirmative action and would apparently have even larger implications for the society in the situation of crisis. The current research shows that perceptions of threat are nourished with national identity and history beliefs. The specific implications of threat and history variables and the broader applications of the results of this study are discussed in the next chapter entailing the general discussion of this thesis.
CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION

The aim of this thesis was to investigate the adaptation difficulties of Estonian Russians and the unsettled inter-group relations in Estonia. While each of the previous chapters served a specific aim, they were all complementary and instrumental for the overall purpose of this thesis. This chapter summarises the key findings and offers a bigger picture of how the contextual factors, relevant psychological theories and findings of this work are consolidated under the over-arching account on adaptation of Estonian Russians and inter-ethnic relations in Estonia.

By revealing how the historical and socio-political changes have reversed the power structure between Estonians and Russians and how this has had consequences for current inter-ethnic relations and the status of Russian minorities in Estonia, the first chapter showed the importance of background context in the current research and highlighted major issues of concern. It was made clear that factors representing background context need to receive particular attention in investigation of this topic. With the power reversal, the overall setting of intergroup relations in Estonia is unique. However, the integral elements nested in this setting are reflected in several psychological theories, which were therefore employed for this research to offer a conceptual framework for investigating inter-ethnic relations in Estonia as described in the second chapter. These theoretical perspectives laid the foundation for designing and interpreting the results of three empirical studies presented from chapters three to five. Key findings of these three studies are presented subsequently with the schematic summary of main significant relationships combined from two quantitative studies being illustrated in Figure 6.1. The findings from quantitative studies are discussed conjointly with the outcomes of the qualitative study. Thereafter the contribution made to the literature, applications and limitations of this research will be summarised.
Figure 6.1. Schematic summary of main findings.

Note. Simplified presentation of results joining significant effects from separate regressions and path models.
Key Findings

Core and Distinctive Factors Driving Inter-ethnic Relations and Adaptation of Russians

Inter-ethnic attitudes which were reflected in all three studies showed notable variability but on the whole they tended to be inclined towards negative outgroup perceptions. Poor inter-ethnic attitudes were mirrored between qualitative and quantitative studies, and between Estonians’ and Russians’ evaluations. The widely expressed dissatisfaction of Russians in the qualitative study resonated with the low life satisfaction ratings in the quantitative study. This raises the question of what the driving forces for poor negative inter-ethnic relations and poor subjective well-being of Russians in Estonia are. At the core of determining negative inter-ethnic relations of ethnic Estonians were their perceptions of realistic threat and endorsement of the legitimacy of the current status relations. For ethnic Russians, the most distinctive factors underlying poor ethnic relations were disagreement with the legitimacy of the current status relations and their low identification with Estonian (national identity) and high identification with Russian ethnic identity. Poor subjective well-being of Russians was most distinctively determined by relative deprivation (with Estonians as a comparison referent), disagreement with the legitimacy of the current status relations, and temporal collective comparisons.

While status legitimizing beliefs played a significant role in explaining ethnic attitudes for both Russian and Estonian samples, their relationship with ethnic attitudes was in an opposite direction for Estonians and Russians. The more Russians perceived status relations as non-legitimate, the more negative outgroup attitudes they exhibited. The stronger Estonians endorsed the legitimacy of status relations, the more negative were their outgroup attitudes. These findings from the quantitative studies reflect back to the thematic construct of legitimacy in the qualitative study. It showed that the ethnic policies that structure current status relations were seen as non-legitimate by the Russian participants, while Estonians found ethnic policies legitimate.

Key factors for Estonians. Estonians justified the need and preference for the status quo in a form of having strict ethnic policies in the qualitative study. The findings for Estonians from qualitative and quantitative studies might be explained by what has been suggested in the previous literature: (1) advantaged status groups tend to justify the status quo, (2) a deserved and justified status raises the motivation to protect the
status, and (3) the social motive to protect the status quo increases bias and prejudice and creates the opposition to social change (Bettencourt, et al., 2001; Crosby, et al., 2006; Hornsey, 2008; Johnson, et al., 2005; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kay, et al., 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). For Estonians, the legitimacy of the status relations and justification of the preference for the status quo seem to motivate negative outgroup attitudes and the rejection of affirmative action. Therefore, outgroup derogation and opposition to social change seem to serve an ideological function – to preserve the status quo of intergroup status hierarchy (see Jost & Banaji, 1994).

The qualitative study gave an indication that for Estonians, claims for legitimacy of the intergroup situation were linked to perceived threat – in the participants’ view the Estonian state and culture need to be protected and for that reason strict policies were justified. The quantitative study revealed that perceptions of political and also economic threat were the core factors exerting effects on negative ethnic attitudes. Affirmative action was significantly predicted only by economic threat indicating that the higher perceived economic threat is, the less the Estonian participants are willing to support affirmative action. As affirmative action implies investment of economic resources for facilitating integration of the ethnic minorities, the threat of competition over the economic resources appears to be more relevant than the political threat.

Surprisingly, even after perceived threat and legitimacy variables were accounted for, there was a significant positive effect of the importance of Russian history on both outcomes of intergroup relations. This could be regarded two-ways. The importance of Russian history among Estonians produces positive perceptions of Russians and support for affirmative action. The opposite explanation would suggest that the more Estonians reject Russian history, the less positively Russians are perceived and the less support for policies to facilitate their integration is provided.

**Key factors for Russians.** In the qualitative study, for Russians, non-legitimate ethnic policies were connected to their low status, which increased not only their dissatisfaction, but also negative outlooks towards Estonians (i.e. “Estonians put themselves higher”). The quantitative study indicated compatible results, that is low endorsement of status legitimizing beliefs predicted low life satisfaction and negative ethnic attitudes. Russians might hold negative ethnic attitudes because Estonians are likely to be considered responsible for non-legitimate policies that place Russians into a disadvantageous position. Outgroup derogation might also be a defensive strategy to
gain moral superiority over Estonians to balance Russians’ non-legitimate status.

The qualitative study showed that status legitimacy beliefs were closely related to relative deprivation of Russians. Unfair and non-justifiable ethnic policies were seen as restricting Russians from achieving the same social status and economic opportunities as Estonians. The quantitative study further showed that while deprivation relative to Estonians was significantly related to negative ethnic attitudes, after the identity and history variables were accounted for, status non-legitimizing beliefs appeared to explain variance in negative ethnic attitudes over and above relative deprivation. In line with some previous suggestions (e.g. Tyler & Lind, 2002), these findings show that intergroup outcomes such as negative outgroup attitudes in the current study are more affected by judgement of fairness (legitimacy) than judgments of poor outcomes (relative deprivation).

For Russians, their social identifications appeared to make a significant direct contribution in explaining their outgroup attitudes. High Estonian identification had a significant strong effect on positive attitudes towards Estonians. It was previously suggested that since Russians’ Estonian identity showed weak or non-significant associations with Russians’ perceived position in society in terms of their relative deprivation and issues related to legitimacy of intergroup status relations, Russians highly identified with Estonians might not pay attention to the inter-ethnic situation in society, and they might be more oriented towards Estonians. This can explain why the Estonian identity of Russians was so central in predicting positive attitudes towards Estonians.

The examination of the core factors of Russians’ psychological adaptation revealed that both relative deprivation and status non-legitimizing beliefs were significant predictors of Russians’ low life satisfaction. Additionally, making collective temporal comparisons was at the core of determining Russians’ poor psychological adaptation. The frequency of comparisons with the Soviet time might be associated with the memory of their former higher status which has decreased, so it has a negative effect on their well-being. These results are consistent with the qualitative analysis that showed that the main reasons for the dissatisfaction of Russians were their perceptions of unfair ethnic policies, discrimination, and deprivation of rights and opportunities in comparison to Estonians, and the evaluations of their current situation against the one they had during the Soviet time.
Opposing Processes for Russian and Estonian Orientations

Any migrant group is exposed to at least two cultural spheres consisting of elements of the cultural heritage of their own ethnic group and of the national majority group, which may entail different languages, beliefs, traditions, and identifications. The degree of having incorporated cultural aspects of one or both ethnic groups into one’s life can be different or similar, and are therefore usually treated distinctively. In a supportive multicultural environment, ethnic and national cultural orientations and identifications may be part of individuals’ lives without conflict and integrative orientations show the best adaptive and behavioural outcomes (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006).

This research investigated the effects of ethnic and national orientations in domains of identity, history and acculturation on adaptation and intergroup outcomes. Overall, the results showed that for Russians, ethnic and national orientations functioned as countervailing motivational forces indicating asymmetrical relationships with their perceptions of intergroup relations and psychological adaptation. ‘Ethnic orientation’ in domains of identity and history beliefs increased Russians’ perceptions of intergroup situation as being disadvantageous for their ethnic group, while ‘national orientation’ was associated with lowered perceptions of Russians’ disadvantageous situation. Similarly, ethnic orientation was related to lower psychological adaptation and more negative outgroup attitudes, while national orientation showed association with better psychological adaptation and more positive outgroup attitudes. These effects were in the same direction but even more profound for the history variables. Findings in the domain of acculturation in terms of bivariate relationships revealed a similar trend that preference for own culture maintenance was related to negative, while preference for Estonian culture participation was related to positive, outgroup attitudes. It seems that for Russians in Estonia, embracing Estonian culture went hand in hand with the desire to maintain good relations with native Estonians. At the same time, those Russians who were focused on preserving their heritage customs and traditions, did not hold a favourable view of native Estonians.

Opposing processes for Estonian and Russian orientations were also reflected in the Estonian sample in their views of history. While the importance of Estonian history was related to higher endorsement of status legitimizing beliefs, higher perceptions of threat, negative outgroup attitudes and rejection of affirmative action, the importance of
Russian history showed an opposite pattern of relationships. These findings may indicate the polarisation in the society and the lack of support for multiculturalism.

**Ethnic Identity, Acculturation Findings and Low Psychological Adaptation**

The previous relationships conceal a very intriguing finding that deserves more attention in further discussion. While it was possible to explain, by employing existing theories and previous research, why ethnic orientation may provoke negative outgroup attitudes, and why national orientation may have a positive effect on adaptation and favourable outgroup attitudes, the relationship between ethnic orientation and low psychological adaptation appears to be a more difficult issue. All three different domains of ethnic orientation – strong ethnic identification, the importance of Russian history, and preference for ethnic culture maintenance – had a negative effect on Russians’ adaptation in terms of low ratings on life satisfaction. This is not a very common finding, especially in a domain of ethnic identity that in numerous studies has shown to be positively related to adaptation and subjective well-being among cultural groups. This ‘unusual’ finding can predominantly be explained by the factors present in the Estonian context. This research showed that the negative relationship between ethnic orientation (including ethnic identity and Russian history) and poor psychological adaptation was explained by the above mentioned factors reflecting intergroup status relations. Strong ethnic identification led to higher perceptions of status relations being non-legitimate (i.e. fixed and unfair), which in turn led to lower life satisfaction. The importance of Russian history made Russians susceptible to perceive their relative deprivation and non-legitimacy of their status position as worse and to make temporal comparisons more frequently, which, in turn affected their low adaptation. Overall, it shows that Russians’ higher ethnic orientation makes them sensitive to the disadvantageous intergroup situation that affects their well-being and adaptation negatively.

It is also interesting from the perspective of acculturation research that Russian orientation in terms of Russians’ preference for their culture maintenance not only affects life satisfaction negatively but it also influences how Russians’ participation in Estonian culture is related to adaptation outcomes. With low Russian culture maintenance, preference for Estonian cultural participation exerts a positive effect on Russians’ life satisfaction, while with high Russian culture maintenance preference for Estonian culture participation exerts a negative effect on life satisfaction. Other findings
indicated that when ethnic and national acculturation orientations are simultaneously important (or high) for Russians, this tends to produce more negative outcomes for their psychological well-being. Comparison of the four acculturation strategies adopted by the Russian participants showed that while assimilated individuals exhibited the highest adaptation, integrated individuals indicated the lowest adaptation. The latter is a unique finding for the acculturation research as integration preference is typically associated with the best adaptation outcomes. It clearly shows that Russians struggle to incorporate the elements of both cultures into their lives. When choosing the assimilation strategy, Russians strive to feel equal to Estonians. Integration, however, entails retaining Russian cultural identity and identifying themselves as different and therefore unequal or even as second class citizens, which may decrease their life satisfaction.

**Contributions of This Thesis**

The first and foremost contribution of this thesis is the advancement of understanding of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. Considering the contextual factors in conducting psychological research on intergroup relations in Estonia, it was an ambitious task to make the investigated phenomena comprehensible without adding too much complexity. This research integrated knowledge from previous, mostly sociological, research on the intergroup situation in Estonia, which laid an initial foundation for further investigation of the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia in the frames of this thesis. The interest of this work was to focus on the inter-relationships between psychological constructs and dynamics of intergroup relations of which there has been little previous research in Estonia. Knowledge from existing psychological theories and empirical studies was further integrated to ensure more comprehensive view of the investigated phenomena. Qualitative and quantitative findings that showed complementary and consistent results increased confidence in the validity of the findings. Overall, this helped to distinguish the core factors in determining poor inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and to obtain more comprehensive view on the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. Although the focus of this thesis was to expand the understanding of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia, employing relevant psychological theories allowed for potentially important contributions to the existing literature of these theories, as summarized below.
Contributions to the Psychology of Intergroup Relations

An important contribution was made to the theory of *Social Representations of History*. The qualitative study gave an indication of polemical representations of history in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988), which was further supported in two quantitative studies with two different samples. This work showed that Estonian historical narratives are established around the struggle for their independence. Prior research has shown that events leading up to the establishment or independence of the current state tend to be ranked among the most important events in world history for many people across cultures (e.g. Liu, et al., 2005). However, a parallel and different counter-representation of history stemming from current Russia’s ideological version of history exists predominantly among Russian population in Estonia that is consolidated around the narrative of victory in World War II (the most important event in world history found in Liu, et al., 2005). The Russian minority in Estonia is trying to construct a more legitimate position for themselves in Estonia by arguing for their people’s contributions and sacrifices in defeating fascism. It can be suggested that, in Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) terms, this is a form of social creativity. But the Russian history is more a unique kind of finding in terms of its narrative qualities. This research provided the first clear-cut empirical data on the polemical representations of history, which have not been documented in previous research (Liu & Paez, in press). Furthermore, the two opposing histories provided important predictive value in how intergroup situation is perceived, showing opposite relationships with intergroup perceptions, which gives additional support for the existence of polemical representations of history.

The findings of this research bridge social representations of history with social identity theory, integrated threat theory, relative deprivation theory, and social and temporal comparisons. Among Russians, it was shown that importance of historical memory had a significant effect on their perceptions of collective relative deprivation, legitimacy of status relations and collective temporal comparisons. Among Estonians, the importance of historical memory had a significant effect on their perceptions of realistic threat and legitimacy of status relations.

*Intergroup threat theory* (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) encourages the investigation of possible antecedent factors of perceived threat. This research has proposed and found support that certain historical beliefs can predispose individuals to
be sensitive to or disregard realistic threat. This work investigated a political threat to Estonian nationhood and found that historical representations, where the narratives of Estonian independence were at the core, predisposed individuals to perceive higher political threat, while the alternative historical representations which centered around Russians’ contribution in winning the WWII were related to perceptions of lower political threat. Russian historical representations in which Russians receive a positive role in historical arena were also related to perceptions of lower economic threat.

Evaluation of intergroup socio-structural relations through legitimacy is expected to relate to intergroup attitudes from the perspective of social identity theory (Hornsey, 2008). Less is known about the antecedents of legitimacy beliefs. This research showed that Estonian historical representations consisting of narratives of Estonian independence are a powerful symbolic resource used to justify pro-Estonian and anti-Russian policies and attitudes towards policy. This is especially the case because it can be argued that Russians usurped the Estonian state during the Communist period. Additionally, strong Estonian identity was shown to be positively related to agreement of legitimacy of status relations. However, if Estonians endorse Russian historical representations, which allow Russians to be perceived as ‘good guys’, it leads to a rejection of legitimacy of current status-relations in Estonia. For Russians, the same relationships held true between history and status legitimizing beliefs. If Russians endorsed Estonian history, which implies acknowledging Estonians’ painful loss of independence, they tended to agree on status legitimization beliefs, while endorsement of Russian history led to status non-legitimizing beliefs. This shows that endorsement or rejection of status legitimizing beliefs by both ethnic groups depended on a historical representation one held.

Additionally, the relationship between ingroup identity and negative outgroup attitudes in a sample of minority Russians and majority Estonians contributes to knowledge of the ethnocentrism hypothesis and social identity theory propositions. The relationship between strong ingroup identification and negative outgroup attitudes can be understood through the social meaning of the intergroup relations (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) and supports existing research that explains this pattern of ethnocentrism with contextual factors (e.g. negative versus positive interdependence between groups), which has been relatively scarce so far (Duckitt, et al., 2005; Duckitt & Parra, 2004).

The same historical representations among the Russian minority also influenced
their perceptions of deprivation relative to Estonians. Again, if Russian historical representations emphasizing their positive role in the recent history were endorsed, it predisposed the Russian participants to see the relative deprivation of their ethnic group higher. Endorsing Estonian historical representations, on another hand, which acknowledged historical injustices done to Estonia by the Soviets, reduced Russians’ claims of relative deprivation. This is a novel finding for relative deprivation theory. Previously, ingroup identity has been more commonly suggested to affect evaluations of ingroup deprivation. This research showed that while Russian identity was significantly associated with perceptions of relative deprivation, it did not have a direct effect on relative deprivation when history variables were included in path analyses. This suggests that the effects of Russian identity on relative deprivation could be mediated by views on history. The bivariate relationships indicated that the associations between history variables and relative deprivation were significantly stronger than those with identity variables.

An additional contribution to knowledge about relative deprivation theory was made by showing that collective relative deprivation has a predictive value for the subjective well-being of an individual. This finding is complementary to those studies (Dion, 1986; Safi, 2010; M. Schmitt, et al., 2010; H. J. Smith & Walker, 2008) that challenge the differential effect hypothesis, which presumes that group relative deprivation should have group- and not individual-level effects, while personal deprivation has personal- and not group-level consequences (Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; Martin, 1986; Pettigrew, 2002; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

This research also advanced knowledge on intergroup comparisons by showing the importance of group comparisons that do not allow enhancement of group esteem. These were Russians’ comparisons with majority Estonians and with their own position during the Soviet time, which both entail upward comparisons. This would not be an expected finding from the general social identity predictions (e.g. Crocker & Major, 1989), nor downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981), which suggest that upward comparisons would be avoided because groups are usually interested in maintaining or enhancing their esteem. However, the current findings can be understandable considering the context where the Russian minority struggles with the legitimacy of their status in a newly ordered society. Making upward comparisons becomes relevant as they point to non-legitimacy of the status relations which would allow a minority group to request for improvement of their status.
A contribution was made to *temporal comparison theory* (Albert, 1977), as frequent collective temporal comparisons were shown to have a negative effect on Russians’ psychological adaptation. It is clear that Russians’ position has been reversed and downgraded in comparison to the Soviet time after the major political changes following the breakup of the Soviet Union. This research showed that the more Russian participants indicated comparisons of their current life circumstances with what they had during the Soviet time, the more it affected their psychological adaptation in a negative way.

The findings of this research in the area of *acculturation* pose challenges to acculturation theory. It was shown that in the Estonian context an integration preference for the minority ethnic group produced the most negative adaptation outcomes. It is hard to explain these findings with what was found about Estonians’ preferences for Russians’ acculturation. Although two acculturation dimensions involving preferences tended to be negatively related for Estonians, the combination of the two dimensions indicated that Estonians preferred prevalently Russians’ integration and then assimilation. Also, their perceptions of Russians’ assimilation and integration were equally related to most positive attitudes towards Russians. This suggests that knowing the majority population acculturation attitudes is not sufficient for understanding the dynamics between acculturation and adaptation of a minority ethnic group in certain contextual circumstances.

In summary, given that many key findings of this research are distinctive in the light of previous research and theoretical frameworks, it highlights the importance of socio-political and historical context in understanding inter-ethnic dynamics in Estonia.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

Although this thesis has many strengths, it is not without limitations. As two studies involved cross-sectional data, no matter how compelling the proposed relationships might seem, this research is not in a position to declare any causal relationships between the constructs. The issues of limitations with correlational data were already discussed for both quantitative studies, therefore it is only necessary to emphasise that the previous research and theoretical perspectives were used to provide the reasons for the proposed direction of relationships. Related to this issue, this research showed that it is apparent that threat is related to legitimacy for Estonians and
to relative deprivation for Russians. However, this research was not able to test the dynamics between these constructs. Future research should employ longitudinal or experimental designs to overcome the limitation of correlational findings in making causal inferences.

Additionally, the timing of the data collections might have affected the findings. Although the data for the qualitative study was collected approximately half a year after the Bronze Soldier crisis, and the situation had calmed down somewhat, this was a big event in Estonia and it most likely affected people’s responses. The participants were perhaps more sensitive to the issues about history after the Bronze Night than if the data were collected before this event. Also, the data for the third study conducted among Estonians were collected just a few months after the Georgia-Russia crisis of August 2008, which could have elevated the perceptions of political threat for the Estonian participants.

Although this research had space limitations, it should be noted that the inclusion of other relevant concepts could have added additional value in understanding inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. For example, the neglect of perceptions of symbolic threat is an important limitation considering the language differences and Estonians’ emphasis on Russians to learn the Estonian language. Also, the different views of history could be an important source of symbolic threat. Some research has shown that symbolic threat plays a more important role in determining negative outgroup attitudes than realistic threat (Cairns, 1982; Gonzalez, et al., 2008; McLaren, 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Tausch, et al., 2007).

Applications

From what the data of this research show, the ground for further possible inter-ethnic conflict in Estonia is very fertile. As discussed previously, the low ratings of life satisfaction or endorsement of system legitimacy for a large ethnic minority is not beneficial for the society; neither would be negative inter-ethnic attitudes between the two ethnic groups. In a moment of crisis, high dissatisfaction among populations and distrust of system legitimacy might mobilize more protest by ethnic Russians. Estonians, on the other hand, appear to be sensitive to threat, and in a situation of crisis (which may not even involve Estonia directly, for example in Russia’s conflicts with its other neighbors), perceptions of threat might increase even more, which might provoke stronger negative reactions towards Russians. Economic threat was shown to play a
significant role in negative outgroup attitudes and rejection of affirmative action, even when Estonians were not strongly affected by economic crisis. It can be assumed that perceptions of economic threat might be stronger for Estonians now, as the whole country’s economic situation has decreased substantially.

This research showed that the core problematic issues in current inter-ethnic relations in Estonia are rooted in parallel and conflicting social representations of history. Although social representations of history appeared to be polemical in both samples, there was considerable variability within each sample. Those Russians who were empathetic towards Estonian historical grievances and their struggle for independence, showed a pattern of better adaptation and more positive inter-ethnic relations. Similarly, among Estonians, those who could see a positive role for Russians in the history of WWII, were empathetic towards Russians’ relative deprivation, less sensitive to threat and more positively minded towards Russians. This suggests that resolving issues around history is the key in improving inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. The common points seem to be to increase empathy among Russians about injustices of the communism rule Estonia experienced, and allow a symbolic recognition of Russians for their role and sacrifices in defeating fascism in WWII. Creation of an inclusive national identity also appears to be crucial as this relates strongly and directly to positive outgroup attitudes among Russians.


Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Kobrynowicz, D., & Owen, S. (2002). Perceiving discrimination against one's gender group has different implications for well-


Smith, H. J., & Tyler, T. R. (1996). Justice and power: When will justice concerns encourage the advantaged to support policies which redistribute economic


Appendix A. Additional information in Chapter Three

Appendix A1. Study 1 questions in open-ended questionnaire

You are invited to participate in a study about experiences of Russian-speaking minorities and interethnic relations in Estonia.

What is the purpose of this research?
This research will allow us to investigate and understand how Russian-speaking minorities regard their situation and experiences of living in Estonia. This research is interested to explore what Russians think about their identity, adaptation and interethnic relations in Estonia.

Who is conducting the research?
Larissa is a PhD student. Prof Colleen Ward and Assoc Prof James Liu are supervising this project. This research has been approved by the University ethics committee.

What is involved if you agree to participate?
If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to answer some open-ended questions about your opinion regarding issues related to Russian-speaking immigrants’ situation in Estonia. There is no right or wrong way to respond to the questionnaires; we are interested in what you think.

By completing the survey it will be understood that you have consented to participate in the research. We anticipate that your total involvement will take no more than 30 minutes.

During the research you are free to withdraw at any point before your data have been collected.

After completion of the survey you may choose a mouse or grocery voucher as a token of our appreciation for your time and effort. You will be given a separate form to complete at the end of the study to receive a token, which cannot be linked directly to your survey responses.

Privacy and Confidentiality
You will never be identified in this research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. DO NOT put your name on the survey.

Only the researchers will have direct access to your coded data. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be shared with other competent researchers.

Your coded data may be used in other related studies.

We will keep your data for at least five years after publication.

A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Larissa Kus and Colleen Ward.

What happens to the information that you provide?
Together with other data, the results of this research will be part of my thesis. Overall results of this research may also be published in scientific journals or may be presented at scientific conferences.

Results of the study will be available approximately in December 2007, they will be posted at www.vuw.ac.nz.

If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above.

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22 The example of the Information Sheet presented here was directed to Russian-speaking participants.
There are 14\(^{23}\) questions in this survey, which are divided in four major topics. Please write your answers in the box after each question. Please try to answer all of the questions on the survey as they are important to the research.

A. **THE FIRST SECTION DEALS WITH YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE RECENT TOPICAL EVENTS IN ESTONIA.**

1. What do you think are the underlying issues of the recent riots in Estonia after the removal of Bronze Soldier?

B. **THIS SECTION FOCUSES ON ISSUES OF ADAPTATION AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS.**

2. What do you think are the main reasons for satisfaction and/or dissatisfaction of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia?
3. Would you please describe what place (social status) Russian-speaking minorities now occupy in Estonian society?
   a) Is there anything Russians would like to change about it?
   b) How does this situation differ from the times before Estonia regained its independence?
4. What is your opinion about the nature of the relationship between Russians and Estonians in Estonia?
5. What do you think are the sources of cultural differences between Estonians and Russians?

C. **THIS SECTION IS CONCERNED WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT IDENTITY AND CULTURE.**

6. In your opinion, what are the most salient aspects of Russian identity in Estonia?
7. How do most Russian-speaking minorities feel when they compare themselves to Estonians? Could you please explain, why?
8. In which areas is it important for Russian-speaking minorities to maintain their culture and way of life?
9. In which areas is it important for Russian-speaking minorities to adapt to Estonian culture and way of life?
10. This survey has asked questions about Estonian and Russian cultures. Are there other cultures that are important to you and directly influence your life? Please specify the aspects of the cultures that affect your everyday life? (Applicable only for Russian-speaking version)

D. **THIS SECTION DEALS WITH YOUR VIEWS ON ESTONIAN STATE POLICIES.**

11. What is your opinion about Estonian integration policy?
12. What is your opinion about different Estonian state policies that are of concern to Russian-speaking minorities?
   - Citizenship Law
   - Language Law
   - School Reform (transition to partial subject instruction in Estonian in upper secondary schools where the language of instruction is Russian from 2013)

\(^{23}\) There were 13 questions indicated in Estonian-speaking version as question 10 was not included.
13. What kind of state approach would you suggest for dealing with different ethnic groups in a country? What would be best for the Estonia?
14. Is there anything you would like to add which is relevant to this topic?

**AT THE VERY END PLEASE ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF.**

D1. What is your gender? (tick one)
   - Female
   - Male
D2. How old are you?
D3. With what ethnic group(s) do you identify yourself mostly?
D4. In which country were you born?
   - Estonia
   - Another country, please indicate
D5. If born in another country, how old were you when you came to Estonia?
D6. What citizenship do you have? (indicate one answer)
   - Estonian citizenship
   - Without citizenship, aliens passport
   - Russian citizenship
   - Citizenship of other country, please indicate
D7. What is your education? (Indicate one answer)
   - Basic or less
   - Secondary
   - Secondary-special
   - Higher
D8. What is your occupation (main activity at the moment)?
D9. Where are you currently living? (Indicate the place)
   - Tallinn
   - Tartu
   - Narva, Sillamäe
   - Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi
   - Pärnu, Viljandi
   - Other regional centre
   - Small town
   - Rural area
Appendix B. Additional information in Chapter Four

Appendix B.1. Study 2 survey questionnaire

Information sheet

Larissa Kus                  Colleen Ward, PhD                  James H. Liu, PhD
PhD Student                  Professor                         Associate Professor
Email: Larissa.Kus@vuw.ac.nz  Colleen.Ward@vuw.ac.nz            James.Liu@vuw.ac.nz

You are invited to participate in a study about experiences of Russian-speaking minorities and interethnic relations in Estonia.

What is the purpose of this research?
• This research will allow us to investigate and understand how Russian-speaking minorities regard their situation and experiences of living in Estonia.

Who is conducting the research?
• Larissa is a PhD student, Prof Colleen Ward and Assoc. Prof James Liu are supervising this project. This research has been approved by the University ethics committee.

What is involved if you agree to participate?
• If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a survey where you will respond to questions such as “How satisfied or dissatisfied do you think Estonian Russians are with their current situation compared to Estonians?” There is no right or wrong way to respond to the questionnaires we are interested in what you think.
• By completing the survey it will be understood that you have consented to participate in the research. We anticipate that your total involvement will take no more than 30 minutes.
• During the research you are free to withdraw at any point before your data have been collected.
• After completion of the survey you may choose to participate in a lucky draw for grocery vouchers. You will be given a separate form to complete at the end of the study for that. which cannot be linked directly to your survey responses.

Privacy and Confidentiality
• You will never be identified in this research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. DO NOT put your name on the survey.
• Only I and my supervisors will have direct access to your coded data. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be shared with other competent researchers.
• Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.
• We will keep your data for at least five years after publication.
• A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Larissa Kus and Colleen Ward.

What happens to the information that you provide?
Together with other data, the results of this research will be part of my thesis. Overall results of this research may also be published in scientific journals or may be presented at scientific conferences. Results of the study will be available approximately in February 2009, they will be posted at www.vuw.ac.nz/acri.
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above.
FIRST PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF

D10. What is your gender? (tick one)

O Female       O Male

D11. How old are you?

D12. With what ethnic group(s) you identify yourself mostly?

D13. What is your religion?

D14. In which country were you born?

O Estonia

O Another country, please indicate

D15. If born in another country, how old were you when you came to Estonia?

D16. Please indicate… (please circle answer in each row)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Belarusian</th>
<th>Other (Indicate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. what is your native (first) language?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>………………………</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. what is the native (first) language of your mother?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>………………………</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. what is the native (first) language of your father?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>………………………</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D17. What citizenship do you have? (indicate one answer)

O Estonian citizenship

O Without citizenship, aliens passport

O Russian citizenship

O Citizenship of other country, please indicate
D18. **On what level is your Estonian proficiency?** (please circle answer in each row)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Very well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. understand Estonian?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. read Estonian?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. speak in Estonian?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. write in Estonian?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D19. **What is your education?** (Indicate one answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic or less</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary-special</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D20. **What is your occupation (main activity at the moment)?**

D21. **What is an estimated average monthly income before tax per one family member?**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–4000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4001–6000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6001–8000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8001–10000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 10000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D22. **Where are you currently living? (Indicate the place)**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva, Sillamäe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu, Viljandi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regional centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are 13 questions in this survey, which are divided in four sections. Please try to answer all of the questions on the survey as they are important to the research.

1. **THIS SECTION DEALS WITH YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE SITUATION OF ESTONIAN RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA**

1. In the following question you are asked to think about the situation of Estonian Russians in Estonia as compared to Estonians. Please indicate whether you think that Estonian Russians’ situation is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ compared to Estonians in the following domains. Circle the number that best describes your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Somewhat worse</th>
<th>The same</th>
<th>Somewhat better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Participation in political life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Citizenship rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Acquiring Estonian language proficiency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Access to services in one’s native language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Access to education in one’s native language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Participation in administration of the society</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Employment opportunities (i.e. receiving a good job)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Opportunities for career development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Receiving a satisfactory salary (income level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Occupying a management position in the work place</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) Access to sufficient health care</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) Moving up to the career ladder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Please indicate how ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ you think Estonian Russians are with their current situation compared to Estonians? Circle the number that best describes your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **In the next question you are asked to think about the current situation of Estonian Russians as compared to the times before Estonia regained its independence. Please indicate whether you think that Estonian Russians’ situation is now ‘better’ or ‘worse’ compared to their situation before Estonian independence in the following domains. Circle the number that best describes your response.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Somewhat worse</td>
<td>The same</td>
<td>Somewhat better</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Much better</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (m) Participation in political life | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (n) Citizenship rights | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (o) Acquiring Estonian language proficiency | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (p) Access to services in one’s native language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (q) Access to education in one’s native language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (r) Participation in administration of the society | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (s) Employment opportunities (i.e. receiving a good job) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (t) Opportunities for career development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (u) Receiving a satisfactory salary (income level) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (v) Occupying a management position in the work place | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (w) Access to sufficient health care | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| (x) Moving up to the career ladder | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

4. **Please indicate how ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ you think Estonian Russians are with their current situation compared to their situation before Estonian independence? Circle the number that best describes your response.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>Somewhat dissatisfied</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat satisfied</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **In your opinion, when Estonian Russians talk about their circumstances in life, how often do they compare themselves with the following?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>Relatively rarely</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Relatively often</td>
<td>Almost always</td>
<td>Always</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| a) other Estonian Russians in Estonia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| b) Estonians in Estonia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| c) Russians living in Russia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| d) their situation during the Soviet time | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
6. The following question is about the position of Estonian Russians in the Estonian society. Please indicate how common are the following feelings among Estonian Russians in your opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not common at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat uncommon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither common or uncommon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) they are welcomed in Estonia
b) they are a minority
c) they are respected
d) they are treated like “people of the second rank”
e) they are humiliated
f) they are not accepted in the Estonian society
g) they are “non-nitular nation”
h) they feel insecurity about future position

II. THIS SECTION INVOLVES QUESTIONS ABOUT HISTORY, IDENTITY AND CULTURAL ADAPTATION.

7. The following questions are about the importance of preserving the memory of some historical events. Please rate on a scale from 1 to 7 how important you think each event is for Estonian Russians.

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<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somewhat unimportant</td>
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<td>Somewhat important</td>
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<td>Important</td>
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a) To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe
b) To commemorate the Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis in the Second World War
c) To recognise the Soviet army as liberator of Estonia from the Nazis
d) To honour the graves of soldiers, who fell in the Second World War
e) To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 9th of May
f) To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of wartime sacrifice and the defeat of fascism
g) To commemorate soldiers who fought for Estonian freedom in the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920)
h) To acknowledge Soviet occupation in Estonia
i) To recognise the crimes committed by the communist regime (e.g. repressions and deportations) in Estonia during the Soviet years
j) To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia
k) To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 8th of May
l) To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of fifty-year occupation of Estonia
8. Please think about your ethnicity (e.g. Russian) and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about your ethnicity. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

a) I often regret being part of Russians
b) Overall, Russians are considered good by others
c) Overall, being Russian has very little to do with how I feel about myself
d) In general, I feel proud to belong to Russians
e) Most people consider Russians, on average, to be more ineffective than other ethnic groups
f) Belonging to Russian ethnicity is an important reflection of who I am
g) Overall, I often feel that being Russian is not worthwhile
h) In general, others respect Russians
i) Being Russian is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am
j) I feel good about being Russian
k) In general, others think that Russians are unworthy
l) In general, being part of Russian ethnicity is an important part of my self-image

9. Please think about you being part of Estonian nation and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about that. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

a) I often regret being part of Estonians
b) Overall, Estonians are considered good by others
c) Overall, being Estonian has very little to do with how I feel about myself
d) In general, I feel proud to belong to Estonians
e) Most people consider Estonians, on average, to be more ineffective than other groups
f) Belonging to Estonians is an important reflection of who I am
g) Overall, I often feel that being Estonian is not worthwhile
h) In general, others respect Estonians
i) Being Estonian is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am
j) I feel good about belonging to Estonians
k) In general, others think that Estonians are unworthy
l) In general, being part of Estonians is an important part of my self-image
10. Please think of your own experiences and behaviour when you answer the following questions. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) I try to get ahead by taking on the Estonian culture and way of life</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) I am acquiring (or have acquired) the Estonian language</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) I celebrate Estonian holidays and festivals like native Estonians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) I interact with Estonians</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) I follow Estonian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) I have acquired Estonian mentality (way of thinking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>g) I do not abandon Russian heritage culture and way of life</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>h) I maintain my Russian language</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) I celebrate holidays and festivals according to the Russian traditions</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) I interact with Russians</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) I follow Russian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)</td>
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<tr>
<td>l) I maintain Russian mentality (way of thinking)</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
III. THIS SECTION FOCUSES ON INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

11. The following questions are about your views regarding the social status of Estonian Russians in Estonian society. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale below. Circle the number that best describes your response.

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly Disagree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disagree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disagree Somewhat</strong></td>
<td><strong>Neutral</strong></td>
<td><strong>Somewhat Agree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strongly Agree</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The position of Russians in Estonia will remain the same in the near future.  
---
(b) Estonian laws regarding the non-native population in Estonia are fair.  
---
(c) No matter how much Russians try, it is difficult for them to be accepted by Estonians.  
---
(d) Russians are able to change their status in Estonia.  
---
(e) It is acceptable that Estonians have better position in the country than other ethnic groups.  
---
(f) Estonian society is closed and even talented immigrants find that there are barriers preventing them from moving up in the system.  
---
(g) Assigning the official status to Russian language (i.e. establishing bilingualism) is possible in Estonia.  
---
(h) Estonian society is just and fair in the opportunities that it provides to ethnic minorities.  
---
(i) Russians with the same skills have the same possibilities in society as Estonians.  
---
(j) It is difficult to improve the situation of Russian education in Estonia.  
---
(k) It is justified that Estonian language has a higher status and prestige than Russian.  
---
(l) Estonian society is open and talented people from other minorities make it to the top of the hierarchy.  
---
(m) No matter what, Russians cannot be high-grade citizens.  
---
(n) The situation is not fair when the people born in Estonia have to prove their belonging to the country.  
---
(o) Russians have the same chance to achieve success in society as Estonians.  
---
(p) The citizenship act will never allow a Russian to forget that one is a person of the non-titular nation.  
---
(q) Requirements for language proficiency language are not justified.  
---
(r) The rights for a person who received citizenship as a result of naturalization are not the same as for a person who received citizenship “by right of succession.”  
---
12. Next question is about, what you think about Estonians. Please indicate your agreement/disagreement with following statements.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>Estonians are respectful</td>
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<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Estonians’ interaction with others is hostile</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Estonians are friendly in their interactions with different people</td>
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<td>d)</td>
<td>Estonians keep to themselves</td>
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<tr>
<td>e)</td>
<td>Estonians are understanding towards other people</td>
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<td>f)</td>
<td>Estonians are in general prejudiced</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g)</td>
<td>Estonians act towards others with benevolence</td>
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<tr>
<td>h)</td>
<td>Estonians are suspicious about people different from them</td>
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<tr>
<td>i)</td>
<td>Estonians are tolerant towards the others</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>j)</td>
<td>Estonians are tense in interacting with others</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>k)</td>
<td>Estonians make no ethnic differentiation at an everyday level interaction</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>l)</td>
<td>Estonians dislike people who are not like them</td>
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IV. THIS SECTION IS CONCERNED WITH THE WAY YOU FEEL ABOUT YOUR LIFE CURRENTLY

13. Please read carefully following statements and indicate your agreement or disagreement with these statements (please indicate answer in each row)

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<th>7</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>In most ways my life is close to my ideal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>The conditions of my life are excellent</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>I am satisfied with my life</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d)</td>
<td>So far I have gotten the important things I want in life</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>e)</td>
<td>If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing</td>
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</table>
Appendix B.2. Exploratory factor analyses of the measures in Study 2

Social identities: Russian and Estonian identifications. Total of 24 items were subjected to factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Initially, a six factor solution was supported by Kaiser-Guttman retention criterion of eigenvalues above one and Parallel Analysis with six first eigenvalues generated from random data being smaller than the ones from actual data. There were substantial cross loadings between two factors and items were reduced. The most interpretable solution consisted of two factors, both consisting of 6 items (2 items from each of three original subscales). First factor consisted of items measuring Estonian identity (explaining 36.62% of item variance), and second factor involved items about Russian identity (explaining 24.38% of item variance). The factor loading matrix of the final solution is presented in Table A1.

Perceived deprivation relative to Estonians. Twelve cognitive and one affective items of relative deprivation were subjected to factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Initially two factors were extracted with Kaiser-Guttman retention criterion of eigenvalues above 1, which were not easily interpretable. Conducting a PA indicated that only first eigenvalue from the actual data is greater than the one produced from the random data, suggesting one factor solution. Scree test was also clearly indicating one factor solution, which was selected for the further analyses (explaining 57.69% of the variance, eigenvalues 7.40).

Perceived deprivation relative to Soviet time. Twelve cognitive and one affective items of relative deprivation were subjected to factor analysis with Oblim rotation. One factor was extracted with eigenvalues above 1 and PA and scree test supporting one factor solution (accounting for 74.32% of the variance, eigenvalue 9.66).

Perceived inferior position. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted for eight items intended to measure perceived inferior position which resulted in extraction of two factors with eigenvalues above 1.0. PA suggested two-factor solution as well. After examining the items, it occurred that 6 items that had negative valence loaded on

---

24 Two deprivation measures were also factor-analysed together producing initially 4-factor solution (eigenvalues above 1.0). However, scree test suggested clearly two factor solution with items falling unambiguously under: (1) perceived deprivation relative to the Soviet time (explaining 52% of the variance, eigenvalues 13.53) or (2) perceived deprivation relative to Estonians (explaining 15.21% of the variance, eigenvalues 3.96) with no cross-loadings over 3.2.
one factor (explaining 47.36% of the variance, eigenvalues 3.79) and two items with positive valence loaded on the second factor (accounting for 18.84% of the variance, eigenvalues 1.51). For the further analysis positive items were reversed and combined with the positive ones in one index of perceived inferior position.

**Status non-legitimizing beliefs.** After submitting 18 items to a principal components analysis with Oblim rotation, Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalue above one) suggested four factor solution with no clear factor content nor structure (e.g. several crossloadings). Performing additionally PA by comparing the first actual eigenvalue to the first random eigenvalue, which was repeated for the following eigenvalues respectively, the outcome showed that only 3 actual eigenvalues drawn from a sample were above those generated by PA (the mean and 95th percentile criteria) derived from random data. After two items were removed in the two separate rounds, PA resulted in two distinguishable factors. However, the second factor included items of legitimacy (of the status hierarchy in Estonia) and instability (items indicating possibility of change of Russian status), which were not readily interpretable as one factor. Secondly, the internal consistency of the second factor was poor; Cronbach’s alpha .64 was below the widely-accepted social science cut-off of alpha .70 (Garson, 2008). Subsequently, one factor solution was attempted, which was the most compatible with the indication of the Scree test as the line of graphical representation of eigenvalues largely flattened out after the first factor (6.16, 1.76, 1.49, 1.01). Arbitrary cut off of .40 in absolute value was set as the criterion for acceptable factor loading. Initially 16 items were retained with factor loadings above .40. However, after examination of Item-Total Correlations, which as a rule-of-thumb should be at least .40. (Gliem & Gliem, 2003), another 4 items were excluded. As a result 12-item-factor (explained 44.8% of item variance, Cronbach alpha .88) was obtained representing beliefs about impermeability and illegitimacy of the status relations. One-factor solution indicates that beliefs about the status relations in Estonia are for Russians simultaneously unfair and fixed (i.e. intergroup boundaries are impermeable). Although previous research has treated concepts of legitimacy and permeability separately, the have indicated positive association between them (e.g. Mummendey et al., 1999; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008), which is consistent with finding of this study. Majority of the items that were removed represented stability component of SIT. The two items that remained of the original stability items in the final solution, could be considered also as indicators of permeability, e.g. “The citizenship act will never allow a Russian to forget that one is a
person of the non-titular nation” or “No matter what, Russians cannot be high-grade citizens”.

**Russians’ acculturation preferences.** Twelve items were subjected to a factor analysis with Varimax rotation (as factors were expected to be orthogonal). Three factors were indicated by Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues 3.94, 2.95, 1.07), and two by Parallel Analysis (1.29, 1.22, 1.16) and Scree test. Three-factor solution indicated that while items representing Russian cultural orientation fell in one factor, items on Estonian cultural orientation were divided into two factors. Final 2-factor solution was chosen representing Russian (accounting for 32.81% of the variance) and Estonian (accounting for 24.59% of the variance) acculturation orientations.

Table A1. Factors of Russian and Estonian identifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Estonian identity</th>
<th>Russian identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m proud to be part of Estonians (d) [private]</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to Estonians is an important reflection of who I am (f)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[importance to identity]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, belonging to Estonians is an important part of my self-</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image (l) [importance to identity]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel good about belonging to Estonians (j) [private]</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, other ethnic groups respect Estonians (h) [public]</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall, Estonians are considered good by others. (b) [public]</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel good about belonging to Russians (j) [private]</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Russian nationality is an important reflection of who I am (f)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[importance to identity]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, belonging to Russians is an important part of my self-</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>image (l) [importance to identity]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m proud to be part of Russians (d) [private]</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, other ethnic groups respect Russians (h) [public]</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people consider Russians, on the average, to be more</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ineffective than other ethnic groups (e) [public]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % of variance | 36.62% | 24.38% |

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Appendix C. Additional information in Chapter Five

Appendix C.1. Study 3 survey questionnaire

Information sheet

Larissa Kus
PhD Student
Email: Larissa.Kus@vuw.ac.nz

Colleen Ward, PhD
Professor
Email: Colleen.Ward@vuw.ac.nz

James H. Liu, PhD
Associate Professor
Email: James.Liu@vuw.ac.nz

You are invited to participate in a study Examining and understanding how Estonians regard the situation of Russian-speaking minorities and their attitudes regarding inter-ethnic issues.

What is the purpose of this research?
- This research will allow us to examine and understand how Estonians regard the situation of Russian-speaking minorities and their attitudes regarding inter-ethnic issues.

Who is conducting the research?
- Larissa is a PhD student. Prof Colleen Ward and Assoc. Prof. James Liu are supervising this project. This research has been approved by the University ethics committee.

What is involved if you agree to participate?
- If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a survey where you will respond to questions such as “How satisfied or dissatisfied do you think Estonian Russians are with their current situation compared to Estonians?” There is no right or wrong way to respond to the questions, we are interested in what you think.
- By completing the survey it will be understood that you have consented to participate in the research. We anticipate that your total involvement will take no more than 30 minutes.
- During the research you are free to withdraw at any point before your data have been collected.
- After completion of the survey you may choose to participate in a lucky draw for grocery vouchers. You will be given a separate form to complete at the end of the study for that, which cannot be linked directly to your survey responses.

Privacy and Confidentiality
- You will never be identified in this research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. DO NOT put your name on the survey.
- Only I and my supervisors will have direct access to your coded data. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your coded data may be shared with other competent researchers.
- Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.
- We will keep your data for at least five years after publication.
- A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Larissa Kus and Colleen Ward.

What happens to the information that you provide?
Together with other data, the results of this research will be part of my thesis. Overall results of this research may also be published in scientific journals or may be presented at scientific conferences. Results of the study will be available approximately in February 2009. They will be posted at www.vuw.ac.nz/psych.
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above.
FIRST PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF

D23. What is your gender? (tick one)

O Female    O Male

D24. How old are you?


D25. With what ethnic group(s) you identify yourself mostly?


D26. What is your religion?


D27. In which country were you born?

O Estonia
O Another country, please indicate

D28. If born in another country, how old were you when you came to Estonia?


D29. Please indicate… (please circle answer in each row)

d. what is your native (first) language?  
   Estonian   Russian   Ukrainian   Belarusian   Other (Indicate)
   1   2   3   4   ..................  
e. what is the native (first) language of your mother?  
   1   2   3   4   ..................  
f. what is the native (first) language of your father?  
   1   2   3   4   ..................  

D30. What citizenship do you have? (indicate one answer)

O Estonian citizenship
O Without citizenship, aliens passport
O Russian citizenship
O Citizenship of other country, please indicate

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D31. **What is your education?** (Indicate one answer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic or less</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Secondary-special</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D32. **What is your occupation (main activity at the moment)?**

D33. **What is your average monthly income before tax?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O Under 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O 2001–4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 4001–6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 6001–8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 8001–10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Over 10000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D34. **Where are you currently living?** (Indicate the place)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O Tallinn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O Tartu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Narva, Sillamäe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Pärnu, Viljandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Other regional centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Small town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Rural area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are 8 questions in this survey, which are divided into two sections. Please try to answer all of the questions on the survey as they are important to the research.

I. THIS SECTION INVOLVES QUESTIONS ABOUT HISTORY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE.

14. The following questions are about the importance of preserving the memory of some historical events. Please rate on a scale from 1 to 7 how important you think each event is for Estonians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) To commemorate soldiers who fought for Estonian freedom in the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) To acknowledge Soviet occupation in Estonia</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) To recognize the crimes committed by the communist regime (e.g. repressions and deportations) in Estonia during the Soviet years</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) To commemorate the victims of the Soviet rule (communism) in Estonia</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 8th of May</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of fifty-year occupation of Estonia</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) To acknowledge the Soviet Army’s contribution in defeating fascism in Europe</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) To commemorate the Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis in the Second World War</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) To recognize the Soviet army as liberator of Estonia from the Nazis</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) To honour the graves of soldiers, who fell in the Second World War</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) To celebrate the end of the Second World War on 9th of May</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) To acknowledge the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of wartime sacrifice and the defeat of fascism</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Please think about your ethnicity (Estonian) and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about your ethnicity. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) I often regret being Estonian
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) Overall, Estonians are considered good by others
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c) Overall, being Estonian has very little to do with how I feel about myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d) In general, I'm glad to be Estonian
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e) Most people consider Estonians, on average, to be more ineffective than other groups.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f) Being Estonian is an important reflection of who I am
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g) Overall, I often feel that being Estonian is not worthwhile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
h) In general, others respect Estonians
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i) Being Estonian is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j) I feel good about belonging to the Estonians
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k) In general, others think that Estonians are unworthy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l) In general, being part of Estonians is an important part of my self-image
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. The following question is about how Estonian Russians should adapt to Estonia, in your opinion. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important that Estonian Russians:

a) try to get ahead by taking on the Estonian culture and way of life
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) make an effort to acquire the Estonian language
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c) celebrate Estonian holidays and festivals like native Estonians
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d) interact with Estonians
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e) follow the Estonian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f) acquire Estonian mentality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g) do not abandon their heritage culture and way of life
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
h) maintain Russian language
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i) celebrate their holidays and festivities according to the Russian traditions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j) interact with other Russians
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k) follow the Russian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l) maintain Russian mentality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Now you are asked to think about the **actual behaviours of Estonian Russians** in relation to Estonian and Russian cultures. Please indicate how common the following behaviours are among Russians in your opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonian Russians:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) try to get ahead by taking on the Estonian culture and way of life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) make an effort to acquire the Estonian language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) celebrate Estonian holidays and festivals like native Estonians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) interact with Estonians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) follow the Estonian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) have acquired Estonian mentality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) have not abandoned their heritage culture and way of life</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) maintain Russian language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) celebrate their holidays and festivities according to the Russian traditions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) interact with other Russians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) follow the Russian mass media (newspapers, television, radio)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) maintain Russian mentality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. THIS SECTION FOCUSES ON INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

18. The following questions are about your views regarding the social status of Estonian Russians in Estonian society. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each statement using the scale below. Circle the number that best describes your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) The position of Russians in Estonia will remain the same in the near future.  

b) Estonian laws regarding the non-native population in Estonia are fair.

c) No matter how much Russians try, it is difficult for them to be accepted by Estonians.

d) Russians are able to change their status in Estonia.

e) It is acceptable that Estonians have better position in the country than other ethnic groups.

f) Estonian society is closed and even talented immigrants find that there are barriers preventing them from moving up in the system.

g) Assigning the official status to Russian language (i.e. establishing bilingualism) is possible in Estonia.

h) Estonian society is just and fair in the opportunities that it provides to ethnic minorities.

i) Russians with the same skills have the same possibilities in society as Estonians.

j) It is difficult to improve the situation of Russian education in Estonia.

k) It is justified that Estonian language has a higher status and prestige than Russian.

l) Estonian society is open and talented people from other minorities make it to the top of the hierarchy.

m) No matter what, Russians cannot be high-grade citizens.

n) The situation is not fair when the people born in Estonia have to prove their belonging to the country.

o) Russians have the same chance to achieve success in society as Estonians.

p) The citizenship act will never allow a Russian to forget that one is a person of the non-titular nation.

q) Requirements for language proficiency language are not justified.

r) The rights for a person who received citizenship as a result of naturalization are not the same as for a person who received citizenship “by right of succession”.

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19. In the next question you are presented with different statements regarding Estonian Russians. Please indicate your agreement/disagreement with each statement.

<p>| | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Russia ties to interfere with Estonian ethnic affairs at every possibility

b) Estonian Russians receive information and services in Russian less than they should
c) Too many resources are spent for the educational programs that benefit Estonian Russians
d) Estonian Russians believe too much of the anti-Estonia propaganda coming from Russia
e) Making Russian official state language would endanger Estonian language and culture
f) Too much of tax money is spent on social benefits to support Estonian Russians
g) People of non-Estonian origin living in Estonia are loyal and committed to the country
h) Too much money has been spent on the integration programs
i) Estonian Russians contribute to Estonian economy growth
j) Estonian Russians consume Russian propaganda on an everyday basis through Russian TV-channels and other media
k) The Language Act in Estonia is more liberal than in many other countries
l) Estonian Russians benefit more than Estonians from the tax funded rehabilitation services.
m) Russians living in Estonia are an object of manipulation of Russia
n) Estonian Russians can still get by with Russian language more than they should
o) Estonian Russians put too much weight on the already fragile health care system
p) Many local Russians would be ready for action in case of a new invasion from Russia
q) Strict acts regarding non-Estonians are important for the continuation of the Estonian state
r) Estonian Russians have more economic power than they deserve in Estonia
20. Next question is about, what you think about Estonians. Please indicate your agreement/disagreement with following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are respectful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians’ interaction with others is hostile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are friendly in their interactions with different people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians keep to themselves</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are understanding towards other people</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are in general prejudiced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians act towards others with benevolence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are suspicious about people different from them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are tolerant towards the others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians are tense in interacting with others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians make no ethnic differentiation at an everyday level interaction</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l)</td>
<td>Estonian Russians dislike people who are not like them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

21. This section asks about your support or disapproval of the methods that can be used for the integration of Russian minorities in Estonia. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>Creating free of charge language courses for the adult population</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Providing resources for improving teaching quality of the Estonian language in Russian schools</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>Providing opportunities for learning the history of Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d)</td>
<td>Promoting mixed Estonian-Russian cultural events</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e)</td>
<td>Providing resources for maintaining Russian education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f)</td>
<td>Granting citizenship for those who are born in Estonia on their request</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g)</td>
<td>Engaging Russian minorities in decision making processes about issues concerning them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h)</td>
<td>Enabling a larger representation of Estonian Russians’ interests in governing institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C.2. Exploratory factor analyses of the measures in Study 3

National identity. Twelve items were subjected to factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Initially, a three factor solution was supported by Kaiser-Guttman retention criterion of eigenvalues above one (eigenvalues: 4.95, 1.58, 1.25) and Parallel Analysis with three first eigenvalues generated from random data (generated eigenvalues: 1.29, 1.22, 1.16) being smaller than the ones from actual data. Largely, 3-factor solution yielded three subscales of the collective identity measure; however, there were two substantial cross loadings between two factors; that is private and importance to identity subscales. As Scree-test clearly supported one factor solution, one factor was extracted to represent one identity measure for the Estonian participants (explaining 41.29% of item variance).

Status legitimizing beliefs. Initially, 18 items were subjected to a factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Initially, five factors were indicated by Kaiser eigenvalue criteria of 1 and four factors by Parallel Analysis, while Scree plot suggested one factor solution. A total of eight items were removed during several steps as they did not meet minimum criteria of factor loadings above .40 or had cross-loading above .32. The final solution consisted of two factors with two first eigenvalues (4.18, 1.29, .94) greater than eigenvalues generated from random data (1.25, 1.17, 1.11). The first factor captured the items of unfixed/permeable intergroup relations (explaining 41.83% of variance), while the second factor included items on fairness (legitimacy) of intergroup relations (explaining 12.90% of item variance). The final solution with the factor loading matrix is presented in Table A2.

Expectation for Russians’ acculturation. Twelve items on Estonians’ expectations for Russians’ acculturation were subjected to a factor analysis with Varimax rotation (as factors were expected to be orthogonal). Two factors representing Russian (accounting for 37.55% of the variance) and Estonian (accounting for 25.24% of the variance) acculturation orientations in terms of Estonians’ expectations were indicated by Kaiser criterion, Parallel Analysis and Scree test. Only the two first eigenvalues (4.51, 3.03, .94) of the actual data were higher than eigenvalues (1.29, 1.22, 1.16) obtained from random data by Parallel Analysis supporting the two-factor solution.
Perception of acculturation of Russians. Twelve items on Estonians’ perceptions of Russians’ actual acculturation were subjected to a factor analysis with Varimax rotation (as factors were expected to be orthogonal). Kaiser criterion, Parallel Analysis and Scree test indicated 2-factor solution. As in previous analysis only the two first eigenvalues (5.42, 2.44, .85) of the actual data were higher than eigenvalues (1.29, 1.22, 1.16) obtained from random data by Parallel Analysis supporting the two-factor solution. Two factors were representing Estonian (accounting for 45.19% of the variance) and Russian (accounting for 20.31% of the variance) acculturation orientations in terms of Estonian perceptions regarding Russians’ actual acculturation.

Ethnic attitudes. Twelve items were subjected to a factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. Kaiser retention criterion of eigenvalues above one suggested two factors. However, Scree test clearly showed 1-factor solution and Parallel Analysis also supported 1-factor solution. Only the first of eigenvalues (6.49, 1.12, .90) of the actual data was higher than the eigenvalues (1.29, 1.22, 1.16) obtained from random data by Parallel Analysis. The items of one factor representing ethnic attitudes explained 54.07% of the variance.

Affirmative action. Eight items measuring Estonians’ willingness to support different methods to facilitate integration of ethnic minorities into Estonian society were subjected to a factor analysis using a principal component extraction method with Oblim rotation. All three factor retention methods suggested a 2-factor solution. The first two eigenvalues (3.56, 1.71, .61) of the actual data were greater than eigenvalues (1.22, 1.14, 1.08) obtained from random data by Parallel Analysis with the same number of items. The first factor (explaining 44.48% of variance) represented Estonians’ willingness to increasing power and civic rights of ethnic minorities, while the second factor (explaining 21.35% of variance) consisted more of resource allocations for supporting the Estonian language and culture learning for ethnic minorities (see Table A3). The last item in the second factor (promoting mixed Estonian-Russian cultural events) had a substantial cross loading with the first factor.
Table A2. Status legitimizing beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status legitimizing beliefs</th>
<th>Permeability</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians have the same chance to achieve success in society as Estonians (o) [P]</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians with the same skills have the same possibilities in society as Estonians (i) [P]</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian society is open and talented people from other minorities make it to the top of the hierarchy (l) [P]</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No matter what, Russians cannot be high-grade citizens (m) [P]</td>
<td>-.71</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian society is closed and even talented immigrants find that there are barriers preventing them from moving up in the system (f) [P]</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements for language proficiency are not justified (q) [L]</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation is not fair when the people born in Estonia have to prove their belonging to the country (n) [L]</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian laws regarding the non-native population in Estonia are fair (b) [L]</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian society is just and fair in the opportunities that it provides to ethnic minorities (h) [L]</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is justified that Estonian language has a higher status and prestige than Russian. (k) [L]</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance</td>
<td>41.83%</td>
<td>12.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. Factors of affirmative action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of affirmative action</th>
<th>Increasing civic rights</th>
<th>Recourses for cultural teaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enabling a larger representation of Estonian Russians’ interests in governing institutions (h)</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granting citizenship for those who are born in Estonia on their request (f)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging ethnic minorities (including Russian) in decision making processes about issues concerning them (g)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing resources for maintaining education or ethnic minorities (including Russian-speaking) education (e)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing opportunities for learning the history of Estonia (c)</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing resources for improving teaching quality of the Estonian language in schools of ethnic minorities (including Russian) (b)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating free of charge Estonian language courses for the adult population (a)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting mixed Estonian-Russian cultural events (d)</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance</td>
<td>44.48%</td>
<td>21.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In the analyses both factors were combined in one composite index.