Security in South East Asia: How are South East Asian countries ensuring their security in an uncertain Asian security environment due to the rise of China as a regional and global power?

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ABSTRACT

The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are using a hedging strategy to ensure their security. The Philippines is pursuing a dual policy of hedging and balancing with the US. Singapore is following a policy of hedging but is verging on bandwagoning with the US. All countries are leveraging off ASEAN and its associated fora as their first line of defence. While ASEAN and its fora are adequate for dialogue they are not effective in solving disputes among ASEAN countries or between ASEAN countries and China. The uncertain military rise of China and territorial and maritime disputes with China are causing South East Asian countries to feel insecure. While China professes a policy of “Peaceful Development” its actions in 2009 and 2010 indicated a more aggressive approach to its claims over the entire South China Sea that it now states is an area of “core Interest” to China along with Taiwan. South East Asian countries are expanding or have plans to expand their defence force capability. The US is considered an important actor in guaranteeing South East Asian security and keeping China’s territorial ambitions in check in the immediate future. The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore are developing strong economic links with China but are keeping their military links at arms length while forging closer defence links with the US.
INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to answer the question how are South East Asian countries ensuring their security in an uncertain Asian security environment due to the rise of China as a regional and global power?

Since the end of the Second World War the security of South East and East Asia has been enhanced by the presence of the United States and its hub and spoke military alliance system. The growth of Japan and China, and the influence of Russia, has been held in check by a system of two triangles that have sort to maintain a balance in South East and East Asia. These have been the US, Japan and China triangle and the China, US and Russia triangle\(^1\). The end of the Cold War in 1989, and the growth of China since 1978, have altered these triangles and the balance of power that they provided. Russian influence has declined as a result of the breakup of the USSR and China’s ability to play the USSR and United States off against each other has been lessened. China has experienced significant economic growth and its economy has become intertwined with the US and global economies. China’s development has seen it become more engaged in international and South East Asian regional affairs. China is developing its armed forces and becoming more assertive over its claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, the South China Sea and border areas with India. In the South China Sea, China has disputes with a number of countries, which has caused conflict. The US continues to oppose the reunification of Taiwan with China by violent

means and will intervene if China attempts to invade or militarily intimidate Taiwan.

There is uncertainty over the rise of China and its military intent. Will China continue
to be a status quo power or will it become revisionist and possibly revanchist to atone
for the 100 years shame? This uncertainty is causing security issues for South East
Asian and East Asian countries as well as the US. ASEAN was established in 1967 to
promote the sovereignty and development of post-colonial countries in South East
Asia. While it has attempted to address security issues through its sub-fora, it does
not have a robust multilateral security organisation such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) to provide collective security.

The study of the security situation in South East Asia and East Asia is important
because of the economic importance of China and the Asia – Pacific region to the
global economy and international stability and order. Given United States’ interests
and security agreements in the region, the potential exists for inter-state conflict
between major powers and the possibility of escalation into a limited nuclear
exchange.

This paper will briefly cover the International Relations theories of balancing, hedging
and bandwagoning within the Realist School of thought. The paper will then consider
the rise of China and the possible alternate futures for China’s rise and their
implications for South East Asian security and will argue that China’s rise is causing
foreign and defence policy uncertainty for SEA countries. The United States
involvement in enhancing Asian security will be considered and the possibility of inter-
state military conflict between China and the United States as a result of United
States national interests and regional security alliances. The paper will argue that SEA countries are relying on the US to maintain the status quo in SEA and to counter China’s rise as a regional power. The paper will then consider Viet Namese, Malaysian, Indonesian, Singaporean and Philippines foreign and defence policy, relations with the US and China and military force development as a reaction to security uncertainty to see what conclusions can be reached on whether they are balancing, bandwagoning or hedging as a reaction to China’s rise.

While the paper will take cognisance of security issues in East China, it will not consider Japan’s or South Korea’s security issues in any detail. Consideration of these countries will be restricted to the impact that their security issues are having on South East Asian security. The paper will not consider in any depth the impact of international political economy on countries decisions to hedge, bandwagon or balance to address the uncertain rise of China. While ASEAN is important for the security of SEA, it will not be considered separately but its influence will be woven into the case studies used for this paper.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The main school of thought on International Relations that can be applied to an assessment of security policy in South East Asia (SEA) is the Realist School based on the work of Hans Morganthau and other Realist theorists who have built on his work. Realists have a pessimistic view of human nature, a conviction that international relations are conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war, a high regard for the values of national security and state survival
and a basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is
compative to that in domestic political life.\(^2\) Humans are characterised as being
concerned with their own interests in their competitive relations with each other and
this competitive behaviour occurs between states. International relations take place in
an anarchical world devoid of world government. There is debate among scholars
about Western political philosophy’s application to International Relations in Asia.
Scholars such as David Kang argue that there is an “Asian Way” and follows the
Constructivist School of International Relations and that this is different from the
Western experience of International Relations\(^3\). This view has some merit but it
cannot change the fact that South East Asian countries are operating in an anarchical
world based on the Westphalian sovereign state system that they have all adopted.
The existence of ASEAN and its supporting forums such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Six Party Talks
support this argument\(^4\). This argument is wrong because the ASEAN forums do not
provide a robust mechanism for dealing with serious conflict between states and have
not been effective in addressing security issues between ASEAN states and a more
assertive China. ASEAN still relies on the US to maintain a balance of power in the
Asia-Pacific through its political, economic and military presence. Underlying security
in ASEAN is a Realist approach to security centred on state survival in an anarchical
world. There are three Realist International Relations theories that can be applied to
South East Asian security and how Singapore, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the

\(^2\) Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (2007), Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches,
3\(^{rd}\) Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p60.
\(^3\) David C. Kang (2003), Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks, International Security
Vol 27 No4, MIT Press, p82.
Philippines are reacting to regional security issues, the uncertain rise of China and possible decline of the United State’s hegemony. These are the Realist School theories of balancing, bandwagoning and hedging.

Balancing is based on the Realist theory of the Balance of Power. Balancing occurs when a group of weaker states decide that the influence and threat posed by a stronger state or grouping of states is unacceptable to them. The cost of opposing the stronger state or group of states is less than the cost of allowing the dominant state to continue unopposed. The objective, according to Hedley Bull is, a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is predominant and can lay down the law to others. The chief function of the balance of power is not to preserve peace but to preserve the system of states itself. Consequently, the preservation of the balance of power requires war when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially dominant state cannot be checked. Hans Morgenthau argued that the principle means of establishing or maintaining a balance of power is through military means. To establish and maintain the Balance of Power states form alliances with other weaker states to counter the state or states that seek hegemony or domination over other states. An example of this alliance system is the alliance between Great Britain and European powers against France post the French revolution in 1789 and then against the Napoleonic Empire up to 1814. If ASEAN states were balancing one would expect the South East Asian (SEA) states to be forming a military alliance such

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as the growing NATO alliance in Europe. Such an organisation would have a permanent political and military hierarchy with set guidelines for the use of military force and command and control mechanisms to counter a threat from a larger power such as China.

The term bandwagoning was first used by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) and was reinforced as a concept by Kenneth Waltz in his, “Theory of International Politics” (1979). Kenneth Waltz argued that instead of balancing, smaller and weaker states joined or bandwagoned with the strong state that threatens them. In bandwagoning with the dominant state, weaker states do the opposite of balancing which would see the weaker states joining together to counter the larger power that threatens them. The main reason for bandwagoning is that the cost of opposing the stronger state exceeds the benefits. David Kang argues that Asian states are not balancing against China but that they are bandwagoning with China. If ASEAN states were bandwagoning with China one would expect to see the countries of ASEAN establishing closer economic and military ties with China. This system would be analogist to the tributary state system where countries kowtowed to China. The other significant indicator would be that ASEAN states would start to distance themselves militarily from the US to avoid China’s displeasure.

Hedging means that states keep open their strategic options against the possibility of a future security threat. Hedging implies that there is a condition of strategic

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uncertainty and states manage risk by adopting strategies that provide insurance against a particular event occurring\(^{11}\). States that are using a hedging strategy seek not to antagonise major states unless they become a direct threat to national interests and sovereignty. Hedging is used to try and reconcile potentially contradictory strategic policies to try and ensure that the contradictory policies achieve the aim of ensuring a state’s security. Nick Bisley claims that hedging is a part of many Asian states defence and security policies and that hedging is usually associated with their reaction to the rise of China as a major economic and military power in the Asia – Pacific\(^{12}\). If ASEAN countries are hedging the key indicators would be that states would maintain good diplomatic and economic relations with the major powers and military relations that fall short of a treaty level military alliance. However, states that are hedging would still tend to have a view on who the dominant military power is and have a closer security relationship with that power or state. The dominant power for ASEAN states is the US and this influences how they manage their relationship with China.

**CHINA IN SOUTH EAST ASIA**

**China’s Foreign Policy**

China’s foreign policy is driven by its domestic policy through the concept of “Peaceful Development”\(^{13}\). The foundation of modern Chinese foreign policy was put in place by Deng Xiaoping and has been developed by subsequent Chinese leaders. While the concept of peaceful development has been put forward, there is still confusion over

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\(^{11}\) Nick Bisley (2009), p94.

\(^{12}\) Nick Bisley (2009), p94.

China’s real security intent toward the Asia-Pacific and how it will deal with its claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea. This is affecting Asian and Western assessments of China’s true intent and future plans.

China says that its foreign policy goals are: peace and development, that it favours multi-polarity, that China will never seek hegemony, that all countries are equal and that the UN is the hope for peace and justice in the world. These goals follow the concept of peaceful development. However, Ross Terrill argues that China’s real goals are to: use international relations to shore up the one party state, build up wealth and power in a mercantilist fashion, be seen as equal to the US, supplant the US as the leading force of Asia and to make the world believe that it needs China. This view appears to be consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s Four Methods for foreign policy: behave with confidence and patience, hide our capabilities and bide our time, be good at keeping a low profile and never play the leader. China therefore, has a global face, which is seen in the present Chinese “charm offensive”, but there is underlying doubt that this is the real face of China. One, therefore, needs to look at China’s position on the US, Taiwan and the South China Seas to try to discern their real intent. China sees the US as its main obstacle to achieving its objectives in Asia. Taiwan and the South China Sea are seen as “core interests” by China and her claims to them are, in reality, non-negotiable.

15 Ibid.
Sino-US relations have been stable since the US re-established diplomatic relations in 1978. US foreign policy toward China will be considered in more detail later in the paper. China has examined the lessons of the US/USSR Cold War conflict and concluded that Russia made a large mistake by trying to beat the US in the arms race that was initiated by the Reagan Administration. Given China’s need to focus on economic growth, such an arms race is not considered an option for China. China has concluded that it will have to accept US hegemony for some time to come.\(^{17}\) Since 9/11 China/US relations have stabilized and they share many common interests. China has become involved in the Global War on Terror through its need to suppress the Uighur separatists. Problems with the North Korean nuclear weapons programme and China’s border security with North Korea have meant that it has joined with the US in trying to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The US has, since 1978, accepted the “One China Policy” with respect to Taiwan. The major factor which joins the US and China is their growing trade and economic interdependence.\(^{18}\) China’s interdependence with the US will act as a positive force. The real vulnerability in the China/US relationship is China’s policy toward Taiwan and the South China Sea.

China has always seen Taiwan as part of China. Taiwan is the 23\(^{rd}\) Province of China. In 1949, Mao Zedong threatened to retake Taiwan but lacked the military capability to do so.\(^{19}\) In 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué signed by President Nixon and Zhou

\(^{17}\) Guoli,Lui, Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy, p.555.
\(^{18}\) Guoli,Lui, Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy” p.555.
Enlai saw the “One China Principle” accepted by US. Deng Xiaoping replaced the old CCP policy of liberating Taiwan with “peaceful reunification.” However, Deng did not rule out the use of force to reunify Taiwan with Mainland China if peaceful means did not work. This policy has continued and is reflected in the Anti-Secessionist Law passed by the National Peoples Congress in March 2005. The Anti Secessionist Law states, “The use of force is still an option if the possibility of peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” The eventual reunification of Taiwan with Mainland China is seen as non-negotiable by China. While the US recognizes the One China Principle, it has signaled to China that it will not accept a forced reunification with Taiwan. The US 1979 Taiwan Relations Act calls for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China with the consent of the Taiwanese people.

Taiwan is an issue of sovereignty and revisionism for the Chinese. Taiwan is linked to the bigger issue of maintaining the Chinese Empire with implications for Tibet and Xinjiang. Taiwan also has a revisionist and revanchist aspect to it. Japan seized Taiwan in 1895 and held it as a colony until 1947. The Chinese see this as an insult to their hegemony in East Asia. There is debate over why Taiwan is so important to the US. The consensus, according to Andrew Kennedy, is that the US uses the Taiwan card as a hedge against the rise of China in Asia. China's and the US's position on Taiwan has serious implications for security in East Asia. The issue of Taiwan is further complicated by China's foreign policy over the South China Sea.

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24 A.B. Kennedy, China’s Perception of the US Intentions Toward Taiwan, p274.
China lays claim to islands and their associated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China claims that it’s EEZ expands into the EEZ claimed by Japan and disputes Japan’s ownership of the Senkaku Islands. The East China Sea is strategically important because it is assessed that it contains seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 100 million barrels of oil. In June 2008, China/Japan tensions over the East China Sea were eased when both agreed to put their claims on hold and jointly exploit the Chunxiao/Shirakba gas field\textsuperscript{25}. In January 2010, tensions were raised again when Japan accused China of exploiting the Chunxiao gas field in contravention of the 2008 agreement. The PLAN increased its activity in the area to reinforce its claim\textsuperscript{26}. However, as China’s appetite for raw materials grows and its military capability increases, this state of affairs may not endure. In the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Island Groups. China sees its southern border and EEZ encompassing the South China Sea. China’s claims are disputed by Brunei, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Viet Nam. In addition to the undersea resources in the South China Sea, the Sea Lines of Communication through the area affect safe passage for 80% of the oil needed for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. During the 1990s, China expanded its military power projection capability to defend claims to islands in the South China Sea. This was seen as a challenge to regional order and the US. In 1992, China declared in its “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” that it laid claim to Taiwan and its islands and the Spratly and


\textsuperscript{26} China’s Assertiveness at Sea : Choppy Waters, The Economist 21 January 2010.
Paracel Islands.\textsuperscript{27} ASEAN reacted with their own declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992 calling for restraint and for disputes to be settled peacefully. When the Chinese fortified Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands ASEAN countries increased their security ties to the US. The Chinese approach to the Spratly and Paracel Islands was proving to be counter-productive. In the late 1990s, China altered its approach to the South China Sea and started supporting regional efforts at institutionalized multilateralism. In 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed to ease tensions in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.\textsuperscript{28} This was followed in October 2003 with the Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and the Peoples Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This represented a move away from bilateral treatment of ASEAN countries to a more multilateral approach to find cooperative solutions to resource exploitation and a common code of conduct. However, it has been argued that China has taken this line to allow it to concentrate on Taiwan and to counter US claims that China was becoming a threat to Asian security. In 2010, China increased tensions in the South China Sea by saying that the Chinese claims to the South China Sea are a "core interest" in line with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang\textsuperscript{29}. The disquiet that this claim made on Asia–Pacific countries was not helped by the incident in which Japan arrested Chinese fishermen near the disputed Senkaku Islands. China reacted angrily and threatened Japan. During the ARF Meeting in Hanoi, 12 countries including Viet Nam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei raised concerns over China's action. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated that

\textsuperscript{27} A. Goldstien, Power Transitions, Institutions, and China’s rise in East Asia, p. 654.
\textsuperscript{29} Strategic Jousting Between China and America : Testing the Waters, The Economist 29 July 2010.
the US would support Japan and that they were concerned about disruption to sea lines of communication through the South China Sea. China softened its rhetoric but had shown its true intent in the South China Sea.

China’s approach to its claims over the South China Sea will change as its economic and military power increase. China’s military modernization, which will be covered in detail later in the paper, is making East Asian and South East Asian countries concerned for their on-going security. This lack of clarity in Chinese intent is leading to military balance of power hedging by ASEAN countries and the US.

China’s Defence Developments

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and increasing its military capability to defend the mainland and to conduct denial operations on its periphery and into the Western Pacific. These developments appear to run counter to China’s foreign policy of “Peaceful Development” and present a challenge to East and South East Asian security and US hegemony in the Asia – Pacific Region. The Realist perspective is that it is hard to discover a state’s intent so one should focus on capability. An assessment of capability leads to the need for other states to increase their military capability and to form balances of power through alliances. ASEAN is not a military alliance like NATO or even the EU. Consequently, ASEAN relies on each state to ensure its own security and negotiate bilateral arrangements with the US. A lack of clarity in China’s security intent is leading to hedging by ASEAN countries and balancing by the US. This section of the paper will examine China’s Defence policy and how it is being interpreted.

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While China’s main focus is building its domestic, economy its expenditure on Defence continues to rise. China’s GDP in 2000 was $US1.95 trillion and had grown to $US4.19 trillion in 2008. This increase in GDP has meant that more funding is available for defence expenditure. The Defence budget has grown from $27.9 billion in 2000 to $60.1 billion in 2008 and to $US78.6 billion in 2009. Between 2000 and 2009, China’s defence expenditure grew on average by 11.8% per annum. There is debate over just how much China spends on defence. Most commentators indicate that the real figure is probably two to three times what is officially declared by China. Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence for Singapore, commented at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009 that disclosure on military expenditure was necessary to provide transparency of military development and to avoid misunderstandings between states in SEA. This comment was directed at China and discloses US and Asian concern over the lack of transparency of Chinese military capability increases and the true intent behind these developments. These comments indicate that while China has openly published its defence policy in, “China’s National Defence 2008”, most countries are still not sure of China’s true security intent.

According to the China’s National Defence 2008, “China pursues a national defence policy that is purely defensive in nature. China places the protection of national

31 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009. pVII.
33 Ibid.
sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national
development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else”. The Defence
policy objectives are: to uphold national security and unity; ensure the interests of
national development; achieve the all round development, coordination and
sustainable development of China’s national defence; enhance the performance of
the armed forces with informationisation as a major measurement criteria; implement
the strategy of active defence; pursuing a self-defence nuclear strategy; and foster a
secure environment conducive to China’s peaceful development. The timelines that
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has laid down for the implementation of the
Defence policy are to lay a solid foundation for the development of the armed forces
by 2010, accomplish mechanization and major progress in informationisation by 2020
and reach the goal of moderisation of the national defence and armed forces by the
mid 21st Century. The PLA doctrine for the defence of China has moved from a
mass army designed for a protracted war of attrition in China to one of what is being
termed “active defence”. Active defence involves China, fighting short duration, high-
intensity conflict along its periphery against high technology adversaries. The Chinese
have termed these local wars under conditions of informatisation.

An analysis of the Chinese Defence White Paper 2008 indicates that for security,
China has five main goals and these goals drive doctrine and force modernization.
These goals according to Fravel are: regime security, maintenance of territorial

36 Ibid.
integrity, national unification, maritime security and regional stability. Hu Jintao, in the tradition of previous leaders, has made sure that the military is firmly under the control of the CCP through the Central Military Commission. Tiananmen Square demonstrated PLA support for the CCP is critical for its survival and hold on power.

The CCP sees the main sources of internal instability that need to be guarded against as ethnic violence, unemployment, income inequality and cross border criminal activity. The second goal is the maintenance of territorial integrity. This goal seeks to make China secure from external threats. The end of the Cold War has seen border security and the issue of unresolved border claims become more complicated for China. The third goal is National unification and is directed at preventing Taiwan from declaring de jure or formal independence. China sees the Taiwan issue as a matter of sovereignty under the One China Policy. While China is trying to achieve peaceful unification through greater interdependence in economic activity, the use of force cannot be ruled out. The fourth goal is maritime security and is centered on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas and the need to secure China’s Sea Lines of Communication in the Asia – Pacific. The last goal is regional stability in East Asia. The aim of this goal is to avoid war and economic disruption through internal control, area denial capability around China’s periphery and limited force projection capabilities. The Chinese are building military capability to pursue their defence goals that are not fully disclosed in their Defence White Paper.

The PLA is modernizing to be able to conduct active defence in a land environment. This is being achieved through mechanization and increases in command, control

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and communications systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. The Chinese have analyzed US operations in the First and Second Gulf Wars and identified the affect of the Revolution in Military Affairs on the conduct of land operations using joint forces in a Network Centric Warfare (The Chinese term for this an informationised environment). Given China’s border disputes and its need to deter a lodgment in China on its East Asia border the PLA is working to try and close the capability gap between it and potential opponents. The key area of military development for East Asia is in the expansion of the PLAN and PLAAF capabilities.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) with the PLA Navy (PLAN) is the key to China’s capability to extend the defence of its periphery. The PLAAF has acquired third and fourth generation fighter aircraft and has one regiment of 23 Su-30Mk2 Flanker aircraft that provide maritime air support from land bases. The assessment is that the PLAAF is of low quality but has quantity.40 However, China is developing a stealth fighter, the J-20 that will be capable of evading radar.41 A greater investment will be required in the PLAAF if it is to match the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN).

The PLAN is developing capabilities to extend its maritime active defence area from China’s coastal area to, initially, the first island chain (Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines) and eventually to what it is describing as the second island chain (Bonin, Mariana Islands and Guam)42. The key initial objective for area denial operations in

the first island chain is the control of Taiwan with the securing of the South China Sea and its territories as a subsequent objective. To achieve these objectives the PLAN is developing its surface and sub-surface fleets. The surface fleet is being built up with ships capable of launching Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (SLCM) and Surface to Air Missiles that would significantly threaten any maritime force. The submarine force has been built up since 1995. This force is a combination of nuclear powered attack submarines and submarines carrying SLCM. These submarines are difficult to track and increase the risk to US and East and South East Asian naval forces. The PLAN’s maritime air has a limited capability but also has an anti-ship missile capability, which is of concern to the US. The other complicating factor in the Taiwan Straits area is the growing number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles targeted at Taiwan. US assessments in 2009 are that there is some 2, 200 CCS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM aimed at Taiwan. China’s amphibious force capability is limited. China also has aspirations of building up an aircraft carrier capability. China has one Russian Kuznetsov Class aircraft carrier that is being refurbished. There are also reports that China is seeking to buy Su-33 carrier-borne fighter aircraft as part of this capability development. The PLAN has started to train pilots in carrier operations by building a mock aircraft carrier deck airfield. Carrier Task Force operations are very complicated and it will take China some time to develop this capability. The US Defence Intelligence Agency’s assessment is that China does not currently have the capability to invade and hold Taiwan.

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43 T.M. Flavel, China’s Search for Military Power, p.4.
45 Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China. p44.
China is also developing its 2\textsuperscript{nd} Artillery Force regional and strategic missile strike capability. China has a declared policy of no first strike and that its nuclear forces are a deterrent force\textsuperscript{46}. However, China has increased the survivability of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. In 2009/2010 the PLAN will bring into service a JIN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) that will have JL-2 SLBM with a range of 7,200km that will provide an independent nuclear strike capability against the US.\textsuperscript{47} The DF21D medium range ballistic missile is being developed to destroy a moving aircraft carrier at ranges greater than 1500km. The DF21D can evade the Aegis anti-missile system, which makes it a significant threat to US Carrier Groups. Admiral Willard, Commander Pacific Command claims that the DF21D has reached initial operational capability.\textsuperscript{48}

The increased capability of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Artillery Force is causing uncertainty as to China’s intent within the US and Asia. Developments in nuclear forces mesh in with strategic deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons against China that complements China’s area denial capability build-up directed at contingencies involving Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Given the lessons of the two Gulf Wars, China is building up its asymmetric warfare capabilities. These capabilities are termed the “Assassins Mace” and are centered on electronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse weapons and computer network attack. This programme extends to space operations and China’s Anti-Satellite Programme.

\textsuperscript{46} China’s National Defence in 2008, p.43.
\textsuperscript{47} China’s National Defence in 2008, p.48.
In January 2007, China successfully shot down one of its old weather satellites\textsuperscript{49}. This indicated to the US and Asia that China’s area denial capabilities had reached new heights and raised more concerns about China’s ultimate security intent. The US has reacted to Chinese military capability developments and has outlined its position clearly in foreign policy and defence policy documents.

**China and East and South East Asian Security Uncertainty**

The rise of China and what it means for security in East and South East Asia is causing uncertainty. Will China be a status quo power, a revisionist power or will it seek revenge for the “100 Years Shame”? This uncertainty is causing concern in the Asia – Pacific as countries in the region seek to either balance or hedge against the alternate futures proposed by national intelligence agencies. Two writers, George Friedman and Martine Jacques, have proposed differing views that adequately frame the options for China’s rise.

George Friedman in his book, “The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century”, argues that China is not expansionist and that it will not hold together in its current form. He argues that it will not hold together in its current form because of its internal tensions between a wealthy coast and poor agrarian interior, secessionist pressures from Tibet and Xingjian, and structural problems with the Chinese economy that will see a repeat of the weaknesses faced by the Japanese economy.\textsuperscript{50} Friedman claims that China is held together by money and not ideology. This claim fits with comments

\textsuperscript{49} Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009, p.25.

\textsuperscript{50} George Friedman (2010), The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, Black Inc, Melbourne, 95.
that if the Chinese economy growth drops below 8% GDP per annum, China will face internal security problems. President George W. Bush asked Premier Hu Jintao what kept him awake at night and his answer was the need to create 25 million new jobs per year.\textsuperscript{51} Friedman proposes that China has two courses of action for the future. The first course is that the CCP impose order through centralized control and appealing to Chinese Nationalism. The second course is that China fragments but stays together under a federal type system. Of the two courses, Friedman thinks that the second is the most likely and that China will not pose a significant threat to the Asia – Pacific Region because of this primary internal focus.\textsuperscript{52}

Martin Jacques in his book “When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World” states that China will reject the Westphalian state system and move back to the Middle Kingdom and the tributary system. This system would see the old tributary states bandwagon with China. Jacques argues that China and America will be the two main global powers and that China is a civilization state rather than a nation state. China will be a status quo state for the next 20 years but it will reject the western concept of modernity. Jacques argues that while China has not been historically an expansionist state, it’s deep rooted superiority complex could cause problems once it emerges as a global power with military capability. It is this uncertainty that is causing Asia – Pacific states to be unsure and weary of the rise of China.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} Obama in Asia : The Elephant Outside the Room, The Economist 13 November 2010, p42.
\textsuperscript{52} George Friedman (2010), p100.
While there is a lot of uncertainty over the rise of China, three themes have emerged. The first is that CCP will not allow China to be split up (the anti-splitist policy) as some commentators have prophesized. The second is that China sees Taiwan and its offshore islands (this includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) as part of China and that in time Taiwan will be reintegrated into China as happened with Hong Kong – one China, two systems policy. The third theme is that China sees the South China Sea as part of its sovereign territory and that in time it will take control of the South China Sea. China’s view of itself as a sovereign state will mean that it will come into military conflict with the US and other East and South East Asian states. The states of SEA will need to decide at some point whether they are going to balance against China or capitulate and bandwagon with China. The United States as the single Super Power in the present unipolar world, has taken the lead in trying to manage the emergence of China as a global power and to guarantee peace in the Asia - Pacific.

**UNITED STATES AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY**

The United States has been the guarantor of East and South East Asian security through a hub and spoke security system and the forward basing of US Forces in the region since 1945. This system was originally constructed to confront the growth of communism in East and South East Asia during the Cold War. The system of security agreements was directed mainly at the USSR, China, North Korea and Viet Nam. With the end of the Cold War and the break up of the USSR, the US security system in East and South East Asia has been more oriented toward China. The East and South East Asian young democracies have been inward focused as they have sort to develop their economies and political structures. The growth of China since 1978 has been of concern because of the uncertainty over China’s real intent towards the
region and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. The US has sort to
guarantee security in the region and to avoid an arms race or the proliferation of
nuclear weapons in the region as result of China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear
programme. There is, however, uncertainty in East and South East Asia over the
long-term sustainability of the United States security commitment to the region given
the 2008 global financial crisis and its impact on the US economy. This concern is
further exacerbated by the financial and moral cost to the US involvement in wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The US has moved to alleviate fears of a US disengagement
from Asia through policy statements, increased diplomacy (visits by Secretary of
State, Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates) and a visit in
November 2010 by President Obama. President Obama’s visit covered India,
Indonesia, South Korea (this visit included the G20 Meeting) and Japan (this visit
included the APEC Meeting). President Obama actively voiced his rejection of the
“Beijing Consensus” that places economic development ahead of the development of
personal liberty.\(^54\) China’s rise and the possible decline of the US will have an impact
on whether SEA countries pursue security strategy of balancing, hedging or
bandwagoning to deal with the rise of China.

This section of the paper will examine the question what is the US foreign and
security policy in the Asia – Pacific and its possible impact on the security strategies
that SEA countries may pursue to deal with the rise of China? Is the US military
posture capable of meeting security agreements with Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and
the Philippines and making other SEA countries feel secure enough to not
bandwagon with China?

\(^{54}\) Obama in Asia: The elephant outside the room, The Economist, 13 November 2010, p31.
The US is uncertain about the long-term military intent of the Chinese Communist Party as the People’s Republic of China rises as a global political and economic power and a regional military power. The United States sees Chinese military capability to deny access to Taiwan and the South China Sea as a threat to East and SEA security. This denial of access would also affect the security of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are major US trading partners. The US seeks to maintain hegemony in SEA and to maintain conditions for the continued development of democratic government, human rights and free trade. Any disputes and conflicting territorial claims between Asia-Pacific countries should be dealt with peacefully without resort to military force. The values expounded by the US are an important cornerstone to its international engagement and its security policy. The US will use military force to defend these values. The US promotes the sovereignty of individual countries and their right to develop at their own pace. The need to promote free trade is linked into the US objective of maintaining freedom of movement on Asia’s sea lines of communication to allow the free movement of energy, raw materials and commerce. The US has pursued its foreign and security policy in SEA through international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organisation and ASEAN and its connected fora. US involvement in ASEAN has allowed the US to influence regional approaches to foreign and defence policy. In the security area, the US has mainly worked through a hub and spoke system. The only use of a multi lateral alliance approach to security in SEA involving the US was the South East Asia Treaty Organisation formed in 1954. SEATO members included the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. The SEATO alliance was
terminated in 1977 because the members interests where too diverse. The present system rests on bilateral agreements between the US and key countries in East and South East Asia. While these agreements help to guarantee security in East and South East Asia, they have the potential to cause decision points that could lead to military conflict between the United States and China. US security and defence policy is laid out in the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review that link into existing US bilateral security agreements.

The Obama Administration published its National Security Strategy (NSS) in May 2010. The US signalled that it will continue to pursue comprehensive engagement and cooperation with 21st Century centres of influence including China, India and Russia on the basis of mutual interests and respect. The NSS sent some clear messages to countries, including China, that might challenge the current international status quo, “to adversarial governments we offer a clear choice: abide by international norms, and achieve the political and economic benefits that come with greater integration with the international community or refuse to accept this pathway and bear the consequences of that decision.” The NSS makes it clear that the use of military force may at times be necessary to defend the US and its allies and that the US reserves the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend the US and its interests. The NSS states that international order cannot be supported by international institutions alone but must be underpinned by bilateral, multilateral and global strategies that address underlying sources of insecurity. The alliances with Japan,

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South Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia – Pacific Region.\textsuperscript{58} The US is seeking to deepen and update alliances with Japan and South Korea to face evolving 21\textsuperscript{st} Century security challenges and to ensure a sustainable foundation for the US presence in Japan and South Korea.\textsuperscript{59} The NSS states that the US seeks a positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship with China. However, the US is monitoring China’s military modernisation programme and will prepare accordingly to ensure that US interests and allies regionally and globally are not negatively affected. The US will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security and prosperity as China’s influence rises.\textsuperscript{60} Part of this strategy is for the US to continue to encourage a reduction in tension between China and Taiwan. The NSS covers the US approach to what it calls “safeguarding the global commons”. The US will act in concert with allies and partners to optimise the use of shared sea, air and space domains. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea-lanes open, improving the detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain and ensuring the responsible use of space.\textsuperscript{61} The NSS is sending messages to East and South East Asian countries that the US will continue to guarantee security in the region. The US is also sending a clear message to China that it will not stand by and watch it develop capabilities or attempts to assert itself in the Asia – Pacific. The Chinese must see the NSS as an open threat to its territorial aspirations in Taiwan and the South China Sea.

\textsuperscript{58} US National Security Strategy (2010), p42.
\textsuperscript{59} US National Security Strategy (2010), p42.
\textsuperscript{60} US National Security Strategy (2010), p43.
The Quadrennial Defence Review Report 2010 (QDR 2010) builds on the NSS 2010 and is very pointed in its comments on China’s military developments and their potential for conflict. The QDR 2010 states that the rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will shape the international system in which the US will remain the most powerful actor. The US will need to work with key allies and partners to sustain peace and stability. The QDR 2010 lays down six key missions for the US Defence Force: defend the US and support civil authorities at home; succeed in Counter Insurgency Operations, stability and Counter Terrorist operations; build the security capacity of partner states; deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; prevent the proliferation and counter Weapons of Mass Destruction and operate effectively in cyberspace. The mission to deter and defeat aggression in anti access environments is directed at Chinese military capability developments in the South China Sea and Straits of Taiwan. The QDR states: as part of its long term comprehensive military modernisation China is fielding and developing large numbers of medium range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long range air defence systems, Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Attack capability, advanced fighter aircraft and counter space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope and ultimate aims of its military modernisation systems raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions. To counter Chinese military developments, the US is developing a joint Air – Sea Battle Concept to defeat adversaries such as China who have sophisticated anti-access and area denial

The US is also to expand its long-range strike capabilities to counter threats to forward deployed troops and bases. Command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are to be enhanced to support precision attack. In 2008 the Space Protection Strategy was developed to reduce vulnerability and rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities.\(^6^4\) This strategy was a reaction to the Chinese shooting down one of their old satellites to test their Anti Satellite Attack capability and other directed energy weapon programmes designed to kill satellites. The US justification for the development of capabilities that are directed at China is: without dominant US capabilities to project power, the integrity of the US alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing US security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.\(^6^5\) The QDR sees the need for the US to strengthen its relationships in North East Asia and South East Asia. The US will build on its bilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea and enhance relationships with Thailand, Philippines and Singapore and new relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam.\(^6^6\) The key defence relationships to address the uncertain rise of China are between the US and Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. These bilateral agreements provide the US with forward basing in East and South East Asia and allow the countries concerned to hedge against the potential threat posed by China.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America was originally signed in January 1960. This treaty guaranteed that the US

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would act to protect Japan within the framework of the United Nations and US law. The treaty also granted the US land, air and naval forces use of facilities and areas in Japan to allow the US to forward base forces in Japan. The importance of the treaty between the US and Japan was reemphasised in 1996 with the signing of the Japan – US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century by the Japanese Prime Minister and US President. The agreement declared that the US deterrence under the Treat of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security and US commitment to the defence of Japan. The continued importance of this agreement was underlined on 28 October 2010 when Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, reaffirmed the US would defend Japan against an attack on its territory as a result of an incident between the Japanese Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing boat off the disputed Senkaku Islands. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security ensures that the US will have military basing areas in East Asia for the foreseeable future and that the US continues to guarantee Japan’s security against threats from China or North Korea. This allows the US and Japan to balance against China. This incident sent a clear message to all Asia-Pacific countries and especially ASEAN, that it will ensure that freedom of navigation will be maintained and that it will not accept disputes being settled by force or intimidation. The US reaction also counters any Japanese need to re-militarise to meet threats from China. Japan maintaining the status quo, is also important for ASEAN security.

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68 ibid
The Taiwan Relations Act 1979 was signed by President Jimmy Carter on 12 April 1979 and passed by the US Congress into law. This act allowed the US to normalise diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. However, the act makes it clear that, “the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means”. The act goes on to state that any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by non peaceful means would be of grave concern to the US and that the US would maintain the capacity to protect Taiwan. The act also allows for the provision of arms to Taiwan for defensive purposes.\(^{70}\) The Taiwan Relations Act has not been repealed and has formed the basis of US relations with Taiwan that have irritated China who see Taiwan as a domestic sovereignty issue. In 1996 President Clinton reacted to threats to Taiwan by deploying two Carrier Task Forces into the Taiwan Straits.\(^{71}\) President Obama has also fallen fowl of the Chinese by agreeing to $US6.4 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan to counter increases in Chinese forces opposite Taiwan.\(^{72}\) Consequently, China cut off all higher-level military exchanges between China and the US in January 2010. In supporting Taiwan, the US and Taiwan are balancing against China and ensuring access to an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the form of Taiwan Island.

The US – Republic of Korea Mutual Defence Treaty 1953 guarantees that the US will protect South Korea from external aggression. This treaty allows the US to maintain


\(^{71}\) Ross Terrill (2004), p15.

\(^{72}\) Wary Detente Between China and America : Another Go At Being Friends, The Economist, 15 January 2011, p25.
land, air and maritime forces in South Korea under the Combined Forces Command that commands US, South Korean and United Nations forces located in South Korea. The command relationship between South Korean and US Forces Korea is undergoing change to allow greater South Korean sovereignty and by 2012 the South Korean military will take wartime operational control of forces. This treaty has been primarily directed at North Korea but also provides the US with forward basing for China contingencies.

The US and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1990 that allowed access to Singapore military facilities for US Forces. This MOU has been amended several times since 1990 to expand US access to Singapore military facilities at Paya Leba Airbase, Sembawang Ship Yard and Changi Naval Base. In 1992, the US Naval Logistics Unit was established in Singapore to support US Navy deployments in the region. In 2005, the US and Singapore signed a Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security. This agreement reinforces the 1990 MOU and takes into account new security threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation and piracy. The US is ensuring that it has forward basing areas for its Forces in SEA should the need arise.

The US military presence in East and South East Asia is considerable. The QDR 2010 indicates that even in spite of the 2008 Financial Crisis and its impact on the US economy the conventional forces in Asia will not be reduced. The US Pacific Command (PACOM) is the oldest and largest of the 10 US Unified Combat

Commands. PACOM’s mission is to protect and defend the US, its territories, Allies and interests; alongside Allies and partners, promotes regional security and deters aggression; and if deterrence fails, is prepared to respond to the full spectrum of military contingencies to restore Asia – Pacific stability and security.\(^7\) USPACOM has approximately 250,000 personnel or about 20% of the total US military strength. The US Pacific Fleet includes five aircraft carrier strike groups and the US Marine Corps Pacific possesses 66% of the USMC combat strength. The US Navy and USMC PACOM comprise more than 180 ships and 1,400 aircraft. The US Air Forces Pacific has about 350 aircraft.\(^7\) To cover defence responsibilities in East and South East Asia the US has forward deployed forces in Japan, South Korea and Guam. The US Forces Japan comprises the 7th Fleet, which has a Carrier Task Force (CTF-70) at Yokosuka, 5th Air Force and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. The 7th Fleet Logistics Group is based in Singapore. US Forces Korea comprises the 8th Army and 7th Air Force. The 7th Fleet has responsibility for commanding all allied naval forces in East and South East Asia in the event of defence of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployed forces would be reinforced by PACOM and other combatant commands in the event of war in East or South East Asia.

The US hub and spoke security system and forward deployed PACOM Forces in East and South East Asia has assisted the US to maintain its hegemony in the Asia – Pacific Region. This system has allowed the US to balance against China and for East Asian and South East Asian countries to hedge their security by sitting under the US security umbrella. The Obama Administration has signalled through the NSS,

\(^7\) ibid
QDR 2010 and high-level diplomacy by President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defence Gates, that the US is fully committed to the Asia-Pacific region and its future. The US has no doubt as to the importance of its military role in the Asia-Pacific to ensure freedom of navigation and security in the face of a rising China. To enhance its ability to manage the emergence of China as a regional power the US is developing its political, economic and military relationship with Vietnam.

VIET NAM AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY

The Viet Nam case study seeks to identify whether Viet Nam is balancing or hedging against China or bandwagoning with China to ensure its security. This section will argue that Viet Nam is passive balancing and hedging against the uncertain rise of China as a major world power. Viet Nam is not bandwagoning with China in a political, economic or military way to avoid China’s revisionist objectives in the South East Asian region. Viet Nam has a long history of conflict and competition with China. While Viet Nam has fought a war against the United States, since 1995 Viet Nam's relations with the United States have improved and this is being used to passive balance against the Chinese and hedge for the future. Chinese aggressiveness over South China Sea (or East Sea as it is referred to by Viet Nam) territorial disputes will see the Chinese push the Viet Names further into the United States security system to counter China.

Viet Nam’s Foreign and Defence Policy

Viet Nam is a single party state under the control of the Viet Namese Communist Party (VCP). There are no indications that Viet Nam has any desire to be a pluralist
liberal democratic state in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{76} The VCP confirmed Viet Nam’s present foreign policy at the VCP 10\textsuperscript{th} National Congress in 2006. Viet Nam’s foreign policy objective is to maintain its independence and self-reliance through peaceful cooperation and development. The foreign policy tasks are laid down as: solid preservation of a peaceful environment, creation of favourable international conditions for the accelerated socio-economic development of national industrialisation and modernisation and the construction and defence of the homeland.\textsuperscript{77} This foreign policy is in line with most ASEAN states who, as young independent post colonial states seek to protect their sovereignty from external interference and whose priority is the development of their economy, political institutions and society. To allow these objectives to be achieved, peace and the status quo in international relations are critical. Any political, economic or military activity that threatens the status quo must be countered. To achieve this Viet Nam is relying on its membership of ASEAN and all its associated forums and international relationship building through diplomacy. In total, Viet Nam is a member of 63 international organisations, including the UN, WTO, IMF and World Bank. It maintains relations with 650 non-government organisations and sees itself as part of the non-aligned world.\textsuperscript{78}

Diplomacy is the first line of defence for Viet Nam. The National Defence White Paper 2009 states:” Viet Nam always regards the maintenance of peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development, industrialisation and modernisation, building the socialism-orientated market economy as the top national interest and the

\textsuperscript{76} Xiaoming Huang (2009), Politics in Pacific Asia: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p140.
\textsuperscript{77} Viet Nam Foreign Policy, \url{http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cs_doingoai/} accessed 21 November 2010.
\textsuperscript{78} Viet Nam Foreign Policy, \url{http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cte_quocte/} accessed 21 November 2010.
consistent goal of its national defence policy.\textsuperscript{79} The White Paper further states, “Vietnam's consistent policy is to solve both historical and newly emerging disputes over territorial sovereignty in land and at sea through peaceful means on the basis of international laws”.\textsuperscript{80} However, Viet Nam still reserves the right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{81} Viet Nam sees the need to build a strong economy, develop a “just-enough national defence capability and develop its international relations to ensure its security. Viet Nam will build its military capability as it can afford it and put greater reliance on defence cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the region and wider world.\textsuperscript{82} On the bilateral level Viet Nam promotes defence cooperation with all countries and promotes the ASEAN Political-Security Community and forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ARF. Vietnam is using the Realist concept of hedging to ensure its security. Viet Nam’s security has been threatened by China for over 2000 years and China’s rise and uncertainty over whether it will be a status quo or revisionist power still posses a threat to Viet Nam.

**China and Viet Nam Relations**

In 111BC, China’s Han Dynasty conquered Viet Nam’s Red River Delta and ruled over the area for 1000 years. In 939 AD, Viet Nam achieved independence under a native dynasty and lived in relative peace with China until 1979. During most of Viet Nam’s long history it was a tributary state of China. Between 1954 and 1979 Viet Nam tried to balance relations between China and the USSR. However, there were

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid p12.
\textsuperscript{81} Tung Nguyen Vu (2010), Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Hanoi’s New Approach to National Security and Implications to Defence and Foreign Policies in Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defence Sector, National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan, p117.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p121.
tensions with China during the Cultural Revolution 1966 - 76 when China was critical of Viet Nam’s ties with the Soviet Union. This was further exacerbated by Viet Nam joining the COMECON in the 1880s. In 1979, Viet Nam invaded Cambodia whose Khmer Rouge were supported by China. This resulted in China invading northern Viet Nam and a bloody border war ensued in which China was defeated. In 1991, Viet Nam withdrew from Cambodia and Viet Nam and China settled their border dispute in with a Land Border Agreement in December 1999. After the signing of the Paris Agreement in 1991, Viet Nam was admitted into ASEAN and re-established diplomatic ties with China.83 Viet Nam’s major security concern is now competing claims with China over the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa) and Parecel (Hoang Sa) Islands. There have been a number of confrontations between Viet Namese and Chinese forces over the disputed ownership of areas of the Spratly and Parecel Islands. In 1988 Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces clashed in the Spratly Islands resulting in 70 Viet Namese sailors being killed.84 In 2007 – 8, China pressured foreign oil companies (2008 US ExxonMobil) to abandon their oil and gas exploration contracts with Viet Nam. This sparked anti Chinese demonstrations by Viet Namese students.85 During 2009 China has become more aggressive in its claims to the whole South China Sea, which it sees as Chinese sovereign territory. Viet Nam has tried to enhance its claims by placing new administrative divisions on some Spratly Islands, developing tourist routes and military infrastructure.86 China has again singled out Viet Nam for aggressive action that Viet Nam sees as a direct threat to its

85 Background Note: Vietnam.
sovereignty. Viet Nam does not have the military strength to successfully oppose China’s increasing maritime and air military capability. On 11 September 2009, China seized nine islands near the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) archipelago claiming that Viet Namese fishermen had violated Chinese territory. The Viet Namese Government demanded the release of the fishermen. In October 2010 the Chinese State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping released a South China Sea map that had a dotted line that took in the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Chinese territory. The Viet Namese complained that this map infringed its sovereignty and national jurisdiction over the continental shelf and 200 nautical miles EEZ. The Chinese claim violated the UN 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). While China and Viet Nam have tense relations over the East Sea both countries have taken steps to develop their relationship with the intent of maintaining peace and in China’s case trying to keep Viet Nam from getting too close to the US. In 2008, Viet Nam and China signed the Strategic Cooperation Partnership Agreement. This agreement seeks to increase cooperation between both countries and maintain good relations through the “16 word motto”, through which both sides pledged to ties of neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long lasting stability and looking towards the future and the four good spirits which imply good relations as neighbours, friends, comrades and partners. In August 2010, Viet Nam and China held their fourth strategic defence talks under the cooperation agreement. During this meeting Viet Namese Deputy Defence

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Minister, Nguyen Chi Vinh, stated that Viet Nam would follow the “three nos”: not to enter into military alliances, not to allow any country to set up military bases on Vietnamese territory and not rely on any country for combating others.\textsuperscript{89} The cooperation agreement with China reflects Viet Namese desire to maintain peace in the region but also discloses a real fear of China and what it might do to achieve its national interests. Viet Nam is reacting to these threats to its sovereignty by following a policy of hedging and cautiously developing its military relationship with the US.

**United States and Viet Nam Relations**

President Clinton’s Administration normalised relations with Viet Nam in 1995. The United States has become Viet Namese largest trading partner over the last nine years. The US Permanent Normal Trade Relations Agreement 2008 set the conditions for closer trade relations. In 2001, Viet Nam’s trade with the US was worth $US 2 billion and this had increased to $US 16 billion by 2009. The US and Viet Nam now engage over a wide range of activities in the political, economic and military spheres. The US and Viet Nam now have annual bi-lateral defence discussions. These discussions have focused on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery, search and rescue, maritime and border security, law enforcement and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In June 2008 the USNS Mercy visited Nha Trang and treated 11 000 patients. In April 2009 senior Viet Namese Navy and Air Force officers visited the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier off Viet Nam.\textsuperscript{90} The US and Vietnam held their first Defence Policy Dialogue in Hanoi on 17 August 2010. The dialogue was between Deputy Minister of Defence,


\textsuperscript{90} US State Department Background Note: Vietnam.
Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, Robert Scher. The talks focused on overcoming war consequences, seeking US Missing-in-Action personnel, exchange of military students to study English and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Deputy Minister Vinh indicated that not much time was spent on the East Sea issue but that security issues involving the East Sea needed to be resolved in accordance with international law.\(^91\) The US Viet Nam security relationship is in its early stages and will take time to develop given the history between the two countries. In October 2010, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced that the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay would be open for foreign navies for repairs and reprovisioning including submarines and aircraft carriers. This has left the way open for US Navy vessels to use Cam Ranh Bay.\(^92\) Viet Nam is hedging by remaining engaged in the ASEAN regional security process but developing a closer bilateral relationship with the US short of a formal defence agreement or MOU. In this way, Viet Nam has given notice to China that it will oppose its actions in the South China Sea without directly threatening through a formal arrangement with the US. This process conforms to the US hub and spoke security system in Asia – Pacific and sends the message to China that if it challenges the status quo and becomes revisionist that it will be opposed. Viet Namese closer relations with the US are part of its hedging strategy led by diplomacy to counter Chinese assertiveness. In line with Viet Nam's foreign and defence policy the Viet Namese Armed Forces are being modernised.

\(^92\) Ian Storey, China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive, China Brief Vol 10 Issue: 25, Jamestown Foundation, Washington.
**Viet Nam People’s Army**

The doctrine of the Viet Namese People’s Army (VPA) is still based on people’s war and people’s national defence. This doctrine combines the old Maoist ideas of guerrilla warfare and conventional main force strategic and tactical operations and the VPA force structure reflects this approach. However, the Viet Nam National Defence 2009 recognises that the security environment has become more complicated for Viet Nam. The territorial disputes with China over land and sea borders have become more complex and in particular those relating to sovereignty and national interest in what Viet Nam calls the East Sea (South China Sea). Viet Nam has commenced the process of modernising the Viet Nam Peoples Army, which includes the Navy, Air Force and Air Defence. This modernisation has been outlined in the Viet Nam Defence White Paper: Viet Nam National Defence 2009. Viet Nam will not have the capability to counter China’s military power in the near future but it is going to develop the capability to resist Chinese aggression and provoke an international response, probably led by the United States.

The PLA is organised into seven military regions. Each region has a combined arms division and independent regiment plus militia and Self Defence Force elements. The Viet Namese Defence White Paper claims that these forces are modern, light and compact with high shock and firepower capabilities. However, a review of the PLA’s weapons and equipment indicates a force that is technologically behind with old 1960s and 1970s Russian equipment. Vietnam has entered into agreements with Israeli Military Industries (IMI) to upgrade its aging Russian T55 Main Battle Tanks

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93 Carlyle A. Thayer (2009), Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization, Sultan Haji Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Brunei Darussalam, p5.
and for Ukraine to help upgrade its armoured forces and artillery.\textsuperscript{94} In an attempt to refocus, the VPA has been directed by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party to relinquish its business interests and concentrate on being a professional military by 2012.\textsuperscript{95} In 1999 the VPA passed a law to raise the standards of the VPA Officer Corps and to better educate them in changes in military doctrine and concepts as part of a plan to update Vietnamese military doctrine.\textsuperscript{96} However, it will take some time and significant expenditure and social change for the VPA to become a 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Army.

The mission of the Air Force is to protect Viet Nam’s key facilities and people and to safeguard the Homeland’s seas and islands.\textsuperscript{97} The mainstay of the Air Force is 140 Russian MIG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft.\textsuperscript{98} In 2000, Viet Nam signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement to upgrade the MIG-21 fleet. To enhance the capability of the Viet Namese Air Force has acquired four Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft, seven Su-27SK and 53 Su22M4 Ground Attack Aircraft. Exactly how many of the more advanced aircraft Viet Nam has in service is not know. Nor this their combat capability. Carlyle Thayer has indicated that Viet Nam has approached the Ukraine to upgrade the Su22 with anti-ship missiles.\textsuperscript{99} The Viet Namese Air Defence system has also been upgraded with the acquisition of two batteries of S-300 PMU1 surface to air missiles.\textsuperscript{100} The S-300 PMU1 will reinforce the older Russian air defence systems that the Viet Namese has in service. The modern Russian designed combat aircraft

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\textsuperscript{94} Carlyle A. Thayer (2009), p11.  \\
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, p22.  \\
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid  \\
\textsuperscript{97} Vietnam National Defence (2009), p71.  \\
\textsuperscript{98} The Military Balance 2010, London, Routledge, p433.  \\
\textsuperscript{99} Carlyle A. Thayer (2009), p11.  \\
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, p12.
\end{flushleft}
will give Viet Nam some capability to counter Chinese air and sea incursions into disputed areas in its East Sea (South China Sea).

The mission of the Navy is to manage and control the waters and islands of the East Sea under Viet Namese sovereignty and to counter any acts of violation of maritime sovereignty. Viet Nam has given notice in the Defence White Paper that it will equip the Navy with modern and enhanced combat power to be capable of protecting Viet Nam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and interests at sea. The PLAN has four Tarantul 2 corvettes from Russia armed with SS-N-2D Styx anti ship missiles, five Frigates and 38 patrol and coastal combatant craft. Viet Nam is also seeking to increase its anti submarine warfare capability through the acquisition of six Prokeet 636 Kilo Class submarines. This force is to counter the Chinese submarine elements that are based at Hainan Island and it is projected that the project will cost $US1 billion. In 2002, Viet Nam requested that India provide submarine training to the Navy to assist with developing a submarine capability off its two North Korean Yugo Class midget submarines. In 2008, Viet Nam acquired three Spanish EADS CASA C212 Series 400 maritime control aircraft to enhance its maritime capability.

While Viet Nam seeks to avoid direct confrontation with China in the East Sea it is serving notice that it will defend its sovereignty.

The enhancements of the Air Force and Navy indicate that Viet Nam’s defence policy is one of self-help and it is also hedging to counter current and future threats from China. However, it is clear that Viet Nam does not posses the defence capability to

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102 Ibid.
defend itself against China unaided and will rely on regional and international
diplomatic and possibly US military intervention to guarantee its security. In contrast
Malaysia does not have the historical relationship that Viet Nam has with the US and
the limitations that history imposes. However, Malaysia has a strong Muslim factor to
consider that also causes it to be cautious.

MALAYSIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY

Malaysia is reacting to the uncertain rise of China by hedging to ensure it maintains
its security. Malaysia’s foreign policy’s cornerstone is ASEAN followed by support for
the role of the United Nations. Malaysia’s defence policy is based on self-reliance but
is pragmatic enough to realize that Malaysia will not be able to deal with all possible
future threats on its own. Malaysia’s Defence Force is large and well resourced by
Asian standards but its development is being limited by the present global economic
downturn. Malaysia’s relationship with China is mainly economic and there is still
distrust of what China’s rise, as a military power will mean for Asia – Pacific security.
Even though Malaysia sees China as important to its future it is not bandwagoning
with China. To counter the uncertainty caused by China’s rise, Malaysia maintains a
good economic and military relationship with the United States. To avoid antagonizing
China and the Muslim world Malaysia is not balancing with the United States.

Malaysian Foreign and Defence Policy

Malaysia’s foreign policy has developed since independence from Great Britain as a
reaction to regional instability after independence, superpower rivalry during the Cold
War and changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the rise of China and Asia
– Pacific as the world’s economic powerhouse. The pillars of Malaysia’s foreign policy
Multi-lateralism is based on Malaysia’s support for the United Nations, British Commonwealth and the East Asia Summit and the multi national organisations that have been built off the core members of ASEAN that bring in major Asia – Pacific stakeholders and link into Europe and Latin America. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), made up of 23 Asia – Pacific nations, is focused on dealing with security issues that affect the region. ARF was meant to develop into a regional security organization with the power to coordinate responses to threats to security in Asia. ARF has not developed past Track One and some have accused it of being an ineffectual talk shop. Malaysia however, sees the ARF as useful as an organization to bring issues into the open and to put pressure on member countries to conform to the ASEAN concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This Liberal Institutionalist/Constructivist approach is seen as a way of making countries more interdependent to assist with maintaining global security. This strategy helps Malaysia to diplomatically hedge against threats from the major powers. The regionalism pillar is the cornerstone of Malaysia’s approach to foreign relations. Malaysia was a founding member of ASEAN in 1967 and is one of its most influential members. Malaysia has promoted the “ASEAN Way” that calls for consensus decision-making and promotes the concept of ZOPFAN. Islamic solidarity is maintained through membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

107 Ibid.
Malaysia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was formed as a reaction to superpower rivalry and a desire for newly independent countries to distance themselves from the US and the USSR. Since the end of the Cold War the NAM or G77 has become an organization that represents the economic interests of the G77 to the G8 and now G20.

In 1981, Mahathir launched the “Look East Policy” as part of his foreign policy reorientation from the UK to East Asia. This also signalled a change to the structure of the Malaysian economy from primary products to a manufacturing orientation. Mahathir felt that Malaysia would gain more from following Japan, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s economic model than the UK’s. Over time the Look East Policy has also meant that Malaysia has become more economically interdependent on China. Given its economic orientation and non-aligned stance, Malaysia would gain no advantage by bandwagoning or balancing with China by entering into a formal alliance with it or any of the East Asian countries. Malaysia was one of the key countries that supported the formation of the East Asia Summit to help deal with the growth of China and Japan as a hedging strategy. This hedging strategy seeks to use international institutions to counter the risk caused by the rise of China and Japan’s and the US’s reaction to it.

Malaysia’s defence policy is based on three basic fundamentals. These fundamentals are: strategic interests, principles of defence and the concept of Total Defence. The objective of the defence policy is to maintain a peaceful and stable regional and

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110 Ibid.
international environment to support Malaysia’s top priority and continued economic development.\textsuperscript{111} Strategic interests have three tiers. : The immediate area, which is the land, national waters, EEZ, Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Singapore and the air, sea gap between the Malay Peninsular and Sabah and Sarawak. The regional area is SEA, Andaman Islands and South China Sea. The global area is worldwide trade links to ensure global peace so that Malaysia’s global trade is not disrupted.\textsuperscript{112}

Malaysia’s Defence Policy is based on the principles of self – reliance, regional cooperation and foreign assistance. The concept of self-reliance calls for Malaysia to be able to deal independently with internal security problems and the immediate security area. The concept of self-reliance is the cornerstone of defence policy. Regional cooperation is based on the premise that a threat to an ASEAN country is a threat to Malaysia and bilateral defence relationships. The ARF is seen by Malaysia as a critical part of regional cooperation that has yet to be proven effective in a crisis. ASEAN has actively avoided creating a security alliance like NATO because it would be seen as provocative to China. The last principle is external assistance. Malaysia is pragmatic enough to acknowledge that it cannot defend itself against all security risks and threats. In peacetime Malaysia needs moral and physical support, military training to keep up with changes in military doctrine and technology and the supply of advanced military equipment such as fighter aircraft and submarines. The only formal military defence arrangement that Malaysia has is the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). The United Nation’s Charter forms the basis of a defensive

\textsuperscript{111} Malaysia, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1,p387.  
posture that still gives Malaysia the right to defend itself from external aggression.\textsuperscript{113}

To ensure that Malaysia is self-reliant, it supports the Realist concept of self-help by supporting the idea of deterrence. Deterrence is achieved by Malaysia maintaining a credible Defence Force with an effective war fighting capability to deter aggression. Close defence ties between Malaysia and the Commonwealth countries in the FPDA also add deterrence.

The Malaysian Chief of the Navy, Admiral Abdul Aziz Jaafar, stated that the greatest maritime security threat to Malaysia is the conflicting claims by China and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands. Malaysia claims 12 features and occupies five islands. In the 1980s and 1990s, the threat to Malaysia from China in the South China Sea was used to justify increased defence expenditure and the acquisition of FA18D fighter aircraft from the US and frigates and patrol boats.\textsuperscript{114} In March 2009, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi visited the Swallow Reef, which caused protest from China who saw the visit as a threat to their sovereignty claim over the whole South China Sea.\textsuperscript{115} In 2010, China became more assertive over its South China Sea claims and Prime Minister Najib Razak commented that China had become “more assertive than before”.\textsuperscript{116} Such action has caused Malaysia concern over China’s true intent in the Spratly Islands. Military ties with the US act as a hedge against security threats such as the uncertain rise of China assist Malaysian security as well.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Clive Schofield and Ian Storey (2009), p35.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, p36.
\textsuperscript{116} Ian Storey (2010), China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm more Offensive.
United States and Malaysia Relations

The US/Malaysia relationship has a diplomatic, economic and military dimension. The US views Malaysia as an important country that is modern, wealthy and a moderate progressive Muslim state that has a voice in the OIC. The US is Malaysia’s largest trading partner with an annual two-way trade of $US44 billion. Malaysia is the US’s 16th largest trading partner.\textsuperscript{117} Malaysia has seen the US presence in the Asia-Pacific as a positive influence on the maintenance of security in the region. Malaysia has not signed a formal defence treaty with the US in line with its foreign and defence policy and has not always supported the US’s foreign policy. However, Malaysia has allowed the US access to Malaysian military facilities and has regular military exercises with the US. Such a close security relationship does not exist between Malaysia and China. Malaysia is using the US as part of its strategy to hedge against the uncertain rise of China.

The present US/Malaysia relationship dates back to 1963 and US support for Malaysia against the Indonesian confrontation policy against Malaysia. Under Tun Hussein Onn (Prime Minister 1975 – 81) Malaysia accepted Foreign Military Sales and Military Education Training from the US in reaction to the communist domination of Indo China.\textsuperscript{118} After the US was forced to leave its bases in the Philippines at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, Malaysia allowed US surveillance flights to use Malaysian air bases and US Navy ships to use Malaysian ports to repair and maintain vessels. In 1995, Malaysia began an annual bilateral military exercise with the US titled Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training. In 2004, the annual exercise was

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\item[117] US State Department, Background Note: Malaysia, \url{http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm} accessed 27 January 2011.
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held in the South China Sea to practice combined operations and interoperability.\textsuperscript{119} This activity is in line with Malaysia’s defence policy of external assistance but sends a clear message to China that it has a close relationship with the US and that US and Malaysian forces are capable of operating together. The 9/11 Al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers in New York led to a further change in the US/Malaysia diplomatic and military relationship. Malaysia has assisted the US with its Global War on Terror through intelligence exchanges and establishing the SEA Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in 2003.\textsuperscript{120} Malaysia has also signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the US to cooperate on the prosecution of terrorist suspects.\textsuperscript{121} The US wanted to assist Malaysia with maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits but Malaysia refused. While Malaysia sees US presence in the region as contributing to security it does not want US forces operating in its immediate area. While Malaysia is using the US to hedge against China it is not balancing with the US.

**China Malaysia Relations**

Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein established diplomatic relations with China in 1974. While Malaysia had philosophical differences with China a relationship was still forged as a result of Malaysia’s non-aligned stance.\textsuperscript{122} Malaysia’s relationship with China, has been based on economics and diplomacy. Malaysia does not have a military relationship with China but seeks to engage China through the ARF to meet security objectives. Mahathir Mohamad’s, Look East Policy acknowledged that China has an important economic part to play in the prosperity of

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p45.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p38.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Lim Ten Sing (2009), Renewing 35 Years of Malaysia-China Relations: Najib’s Visit to China, East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Background Brief No 460, p3.
Asia and made frequent trips to China. Mahathir accepted the “One China Policy” and stated publically that he did not see China as a threat. In June 2009, Prime Minister Najib visited China and signed 16 different Memorandums of Understanding. The 2008 Global Economic Crisis has hit the Malaysian economy hard and Malaysia sees China as one of the few countries that can help the world out of the present down turn. Najib’s visit was aimed at getting agreement on Malaysian investment in China and Chinese investment in Malaysia. An example of Chinese investment is the $US10 billion Gemas to Johor Bahru double track railway. Malaysia’s relationship with China reflects its government’s first priority, which is the continued growth of the Malaysian economy to ensure its security. The reality is that Malaysia is still uncertain about the rise of China as an economic and military power in the region. Malaysia’s conflicting claims in the Spratly Islands and China’s reaction to Malaysia’s attempt to assert its claims have provided evidence that in the longer term China will not be a status quo but a revisionist power. This was evidenced by the Chinese reaction to the joint Malaysia/Viet Nam petition to dispute China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The petition prompted a strong response from China who had the petition to the UN overturned. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s outburst at the ARF meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 when he stated that, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact” giving ASEAN countries notice that China will exert its will over its claim to the whole South China Sea. Malaysia favours conflict avoidance by engaging China in fora such as ARF and the East Asia

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
126 Lim Ten Sing (2009), p10.
127 Ian Storey (2010), China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm more Offensive.
Summit (EAS). The South China Sea issues remain unresolved and a source of potential conflict. Malaysia is not bandwagoning or balancing with China. Malaysia’s intent with its China relationship is to have a sound economic interaction with China to ensure the continued development of Malaysia in all respects. Malaysia downplays publically any threat from China and, therefore, sees no need to form a security alliance with China. Malaysia is happy to keep hedging against the uncertain rise of China by using regional fora to discuss China/ASEAN security issues even though no tangible resolution is achieved.

**Malaysian Defence Force Capability**

In line with the Defence Policy principle of self – reliance and deterrence, Malaysia has sort to maintain a credible defence force that is capable of dealing with security threats to its immediate area. The 2009 defence budget was $US3.6 billion or 2% of GDP. Malaysia seeks to maintain its knowledge of modern war fighting concepts and doctrine through its on going engagement with the US and through the FPDA. The Fourth Dimension Malaysian Armed Forces Plan (4-D MAF) is indicative of Malaysia’s desire to retain a competent defence capability.

The Malaysian Land Forces has 80,000 Regular personnel supported by 60,000 reservists. The Army is organized into four Divisional Headquarters Regional Commands. The regional divisions are all-arms divisions, which have modern equipment. The armoured elements have Polish PT-91 Main Battle Tanks and the older British Scorpion light armoured vehicles. The infantry and armoured elements

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129 Malaysia, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p388.
are supported by modern medium and light artillery. There is an issue at the moment concerning the level of operational readiness of the PT-91 Armoured Regiments due to the current economic downturn.\textsuperscript{131} The Army maintains a Rapid Deployment Force of one parachute brigade, an artillery battalion and light tank squadron.\textsuperscript{132} The Army continues to develop its capability under the 4-D MAF and is acquiring new ACV-300 Adnan Armoured Combat Vehicles and has entered into an agreement with Turkey to develop the FNSS AV8 PARS Armoured Fighting Vehicle with a target of over 200 vehicles.\textsuperscript{133} The on-going investment in the Malaysian Army is in line with Malaysia’s defence policy of being self-reliant and capable of dealing with contingencies in its immediate zone.

The Malaysian Navy has a fleet made up of frigates, corvettes, Off Shore Patrol Craft and patrol craft armed with missiles and guns. The addition of two French built SCORPENE type submarines to the fleet is a significant force multiplier. The SCORPENE type submarine is armed with Black Shark heavy weight torpedoes and Exocet SM39 anti-surface ship missiles. The submarines are to be based in Kota Kinabalu, Saba that gives the submarines good access to the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{134} The Malaysian Navy exercises with the US Navy and FPDA Navies to ensure that it maintains operational capability and is able to defend the immediate area and operate as part of a combined naval task group for external support contingencies.

The Malaysian Air Force has 15,000 Regular personnel and 3,000 Reservists. The Air Force is divided into an Operations Command, four Air Divisions, an Education and

\textsuperscript{131} The Military Balance 2010, p383.
\textsuperscript{132} Malaysia, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p338.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p389.
Training Command and Integrated Air Defence Systems Headquarters. The combat elements of the Malaysian Air Force are two fighter squadrons equipped with MIG29N and F-5 aircraft. The MIG 29N aircraft, were meant to be decommissioned and replaced with new fighter aircraft but this has been delayed due to the economic downturn. The three-fighter/ground attack squadrons are equipped with F/A 18D, Hawk 208 and Su30MKM aircraft. This mix of aircraft makes the Malaysian Air Force one of the largest and most well equipped in Asia.\textsuperscript{135} The continued development of the MAF and the 4-D MAF Plan and a lack of a formal defence alliance but the employment of defence agreements with the US indicate that Malaysia continues to hedge against the uncertain rise of China to ensure its security.

INDONESIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY

Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world. It has a population of 220 million people living on 19,000 islands strung across the equator over an area that is as wide as Europe or the United States. It has over 200 major language and cultural groups and is the largest Muslim country in the world.\textsuperscript{136} Indonesia was a Dutch colony and won its full independence after an armed struggle in 1949. The complexity of Indonesia as an independent country and its highly developed nationalism makes Indonesia unique. This section of the paper will examine Indonesia’s foreign and defence policy, its relationship with the US and China and the state of its Defence Force – the TNI, to see whether Indonesia is hedging, balancing or bandwagoning to ensure its security.

\textsuperscript{135} Indonesia, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p390.
Indonesian Foreign and Defence Policy

Since achieving independence in 1945 Indonesia has pursued a free and active foreign policy and has sought to avoid being involved in major power rivalry.\textsuperscript{137} In 1955, Indonesia hosted the Asia – Africa Conference in Bandung, which established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM sought to allow countries to establish a separate identity from those countries aligned with the US (the 1\textsuperscript{st} World) and those aligned with the Communist States led by the USSR (the 2\textsuperscript{nd} World). President Sukarno saw the NAM as standing for the end of colonialism and wars being fought to retain colonies such as the Indo – China War.\textsuperscript{138} This independent Nationalist approach to foreign policy has remained a feature of Indonesian foreign policy to this day. In 1967 Indonesia was one of the founding members of ASEAN and ASEAN has become the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia supports the 2007 ASEAN Charter that calls for the formation of a SEA Community for greater integration of political, security, economic, social and cultural affairs.\textsuperscript{139} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs direction and strategy is for Indonesia to take on a more significant role and leadership in ASEAN and the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 and ratification of the ASEAN Charter. Indonesia is looking to take a more significant role in preserving its own national security and creating world peace. Its international objective will be achieved by encouraging United Nations reform of the UN Security Council and an active foreign policy to address world peace and security and the Middle East peace process. It seeks to improve border diplomacy to settle disputes with Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Viet Nam, Palau and East Timor. It

\textsuperscript{137} US State Department, Background Note: Indonesia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm.
\textsuperscript{138} Adrian Vickers (2005), p126.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
does not mention its dispute with China over the Natuna Islands. Indonesia seeks active regional cooperation in the Asia – Pacific and with Africa, America and Europe through multi-national fora. Indonesia seeks to achieve regional security through ASEAN and international security through the UN and ASEAN interaction with other regional bodies such as the European Union. Indonesia sees diplomacy as its main tool for maintaining security and will not agree to foreign military bases in Indonesia nor will it enter into alliances. The Indonesian Minister of Defence, Purnomo Yusgiantora at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit stated that Indonesia believes that the Asian Regional Forum will be the main feature of the Asia – Pacific region. He claimed that behind the façade of calm in Asia sit non - traditional threats, border disputes, overlapping security claims, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, piracy, crime and natural disasters. To counter these threats Yusgiantora stated ARF needs to build a political and security community based on the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The creation of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus (ADDM+) supports the ARF to ensure that security issues are discussed and resolved. This system is further supported by Indonesia’s support for ZOPFAN and SEA Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). This indicates that Indonesia is taking a Liberal Institutionalist approach to foreign policy rather than a Realist view using balancing with other ASEAN countries or bandwagoning with one of the major powers.

Since independence Indonesia’s Defence Policy has primarily focused on internal threats to the political stability and cohesion of the country. Nation building under the dual control of the government and the military has been Indonesia’s first priority. This was reflected in the Dwifungsi ABRI (the dual socio/political function of the

The main objective of Indonesia’s Defence Policy is to protect and uphold state sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity of the unitary Republic of Indonesia and ensure the safety of Indonesian people from all forms of threats and disturbances (Act No 3/2002 State Defence). The Defence White Paper 2008 lays down five main strategic goals for defence: deter all forms of threats to Indonesia and its people, defeat military aggression by foreign countries, to overcome military threats that might have adverse impacts on Indonesian sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the people; and contribute to international peace and regional stability. The concept of “total peoples war” still exists to counter an invasion of any part of Indonesia and harks back to Indonesia’s fight for independence from the Dutch and a lack of resources for national defence. Indonesia’s Defence Policy emphasise the importance of diplomacy as the first line of defence through regional and international cooperation. The Defence White Paper 2008 emphasises the need for Indonesia to improve its defence posture to uphold the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and that its main threats are still from terrorism and separatism. However, Indonesia realizes that there is a need to enhance its defence force capabilities to counter maritime security threats. Other countries in South East Asia and the wider Asia – Pacific have updated their navies and air forces. Indonesia aspires to do the same to counter breaches of territorial sovereignty, unresolved territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, protect its

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141 Sukardi Rinnakit (2005), The Indonesian Military after the New Order, NIAS Press, Singapore, p5
143 Ibid, pp9-10.
144 Ibid.
EEZ and resources. To address gaps in military capability Indonesia has developed a procurement plan that will see the TNI stay at the same size but its capabilities will be updated with new weapons, vehicles, ships and aircraft.

**China Indonesia Relations**

Indonesia has had diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China for 60 years. However, diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia were suspended for 25 years as a result of the anti-communist backlash after the 30 September 1965 coup that saw between 800,000 and one million communist sympathisers killed. China was accused of being involved in the plot. Relations were re-established in 1990 and have grown quickly in areas covering politics, trade and culture. The main area is reciprocal trade. In 2009, Indonesia – China trade was valued at $US28.3 billion. In 2007, China and Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding for China to assist Indonesia to develop its military industrial capability especially in the area of shipbuilding. In January 2008, the two countries agreed to joint production of military transport vehicles and aircraft and NORINCO (China) and PT Pindad (Indonesia) agreed to develop rocket launchers and ammunition for them. China agreed to supply Indonesia with C 802 anti ship missiles for its fast attack boats and this is linked to the China – ASEAN Free Trade Agreement CAFTA. The TNI and PLA Cooperation Committee was formed as well to coordinate military exercises and training. This committee has not progressed very far and nothing has come of it so

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145 Ibid, p11.
149 Ibid.
far. In 2010, Indonesia and China signed an Action Plan for Strategic Partnership that is again focused on the economy, trade, culture and education. China has agreed to invest more in Indonesia to help it build up its infrastructure. An example of Chinese investment is the Suramandu Bridge, which is a joint Indonesia – China project.\textsuperscript{151}

While Indonesia and China appear to have close relations Indonesia is not balancing or bandwagoning with China. The relationship is centred on Indonesia’s national interests and as a reaction to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, and the 2008 Global Economic Crisis that China has weathered well. Indonesia has followed its foreign policy of being free and active and centred on ASEAN and the UN.

Indonesia is still concerned at the changes in international and regional power structures. In East Asia the rise of China is of the most concern and uncertainty over what China’s rise will mean for Asia – Pacific security. Indonesia does not see China as a threat but does have concerns over how it intends to use its increased military capabilities to achieve its national objectives in the region.\textsuperscript{152} Indonesia claims the Natuna Islands an archipelago of 200 islands in Riau Province 800 miles north of Jakarta. The Natuna Islands EEZ contains off shore energy fields of 46 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. China has an issue with Indonesia’s EEZ claim and a 1993 Chinese map shows China’s overlapping claim. Indonesia held a major exercise in the Natuna Islands area in 1996 as a sign that it is prepared to defend its sovereignty over the area.\textsuperscript{153} In 2009, Indonesia arrested 75 Chinese fishermen in the area. China protested and claimed that the fishermen were in a traditional fishing ground.

\textsuperscript{151} 60 Years Indonesia-China Relations, \textit{The Jakarta Post}, 13 April 2010, \url{http://www.thejakartapost.com} accessed 2 February 2011.
\textsuperscript{152} Rizal Sukma (2010), p8.
\textsuperscript{153} Clive Schofield and Ian Storey (2009), p38.
China’s reaction caused concern in Jakarta. Incidents such as the Chinese reaction to the arrest of its fisherman have reinforced the need for Indonesia to enhance its navy’s capability. Indonesia knows that the TNI is no match for the PLAN or PLAAF and hedges its security by maintaining a good relationship with the US while maintaining the principles of its foreign policy.

United States Indonesia Relations

The US has had a long but not always smooth relationship with Indonesia. The US sees Indonesia as an important emerging power that sits astride critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for trade and the movement of energy supplies to the Asia – Pacific region. Post 9/11 Indonesia is seen as important in the Global War on Terror because Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and home to terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) that is linked to Al Qaeda who is a direct threat to the US. Between 1965 and 1991 the US was Indonesia’s largest source of economic aid and a key patron for the TNI as a source of equipment, training and aid. This relationship broke down in 1991 as a result of the Dili massacre in which the TNI killed 271 unarmed East Timorese in Dili. The US Congress limited IMET funding for the TNI. In 1997-98, the US tried to place pressure on President Soeharto to initiate political reform, which he resisted and this led to the International Monetary Fund withholding loans from Indonesia that contributed to the Indonesian economy crashing in 1998. In 1999, the TNI was again implicated in atrocities in East Timor that led to the death of 1,500 people and the displacement of 240,000 people. The outcome was the Leahy Amendment that completely cut military assistance to

154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
Indonesia and further delayed rapprochement. The US did not recommence military aid to Indonesia on a limited basis until 2002. The Under Secretary for Defence, Paul Wolfowitz was eager to restore relations with Indonesia as a counter weight to China and used the Global War on Terror as a reason to re-engage Indonesia. The 26 January 2004 tsunami military support to Indonesia was used to further reopen engagement with Indonesia. The US provided $US1 million in spare parts for Indonesia's C130 aircraft fleet. In 2005, the embargo on arms sales to Indonesia was fully lifted and military relations were normalized. Since this period military to military relations have increased. During a visit to Indonesia in 2006 Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice put forward the idea of a strategic partnership to promote stability in Asia. The Obama Administration followed up this policy and President Obama signed a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement with Indonesia during his November 2010 visit to Indonesia. The US has conducted over 140 exercises with the TNI and the TNI participates in the annual multi-lateral Cobra Gold Exercise. In June 2010, a Defence Framework Agreement was signed that covers security dialogue, education and training, maritime security and equipment. The military relationship between Indonesia and the US is much closer than that between Indonesia and China. Indonesia has stopped short of an alliance agreement and bandwagoning with the US but is hedging by pursuing an enhanced military relationship. While the relationship has got closer with the US Indonesia does not fully trust the US nor support all of its activities. Indonesia is wary of relying on the US for

157 Ibid, p368.
159 Ibid.
161 Ibid, p376.
162 Ibid.
military equipment and Russia is its main supplier of military equipment. Indonesia also opposed the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and sees these as attacks on Muslim countries. While Indonesia has plans to enhance the TNI it still relies on the US to help maintain security in the Asia-Pacific and hedge against the uncertain rise of China.

**Indonesian Defence Force**

The focus of the TNI has been the Army because of Indonesia’s main threat from internal security threats caused by separatist movement such as GAM and the OPM. The Dwifungsi ABRI system of the dual socio/political function of the Army has reinforced this priority to maintain national cohesion. Consequently, the Indonesian Navy and the Air Force have suffered under investment in new ships and aircraft and the maintenance of the present fleets. In June 2009, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered a review of the serviceability of military equipment after four fatal crashes involving TNI transport aircraft. The review found that 62% of Army vehicles, 31% of aircraft and 17% of navy vessels were serviceable. Defence White Papers in 2003 and 2008 called for modernization of the TNI. Law No 17/2007 laid down a long-term development plan to improve defence capability between 2005 and 2025. In the period 2005–2019 the TNI is to achieve minimal essential force to guarantee the attainment of immediate defence interests. The 2010 Defence Budget is $US4.5 billion and sees an increase in defence expenditure from 0.9% to 2% of GDP. The ultimate intent is for the TNI to catch up with the Malaysian, Singaporean and

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163 Ibid, p379.
166 Rizal Sukma (2010), p 15.
Thai Armed Forces and to protect economic and commercial interests. While China is not mentioned by definition the planned modernization would assist in countering Chinese claims to the Indonesian EEZ. Indonesia is also enhancing its defence industries to make it more self-sufficient in weapons, aircraft and ship manufacture. While Indonesia is hedging with the US and following a Liberal Institutional approach through ASEAN and the UN it is still attempting what Realists would term self-help to enhance its security.

The Army remains the largest force with 330,000 Regular troops and 40,000 Reservists. The Army is broken into 12 regional commands termed KODAMs. The KODAM is broken down into Resort Military Commands (KODIM) and District Commands (KORAMIL). These commands parallel the regional and local government organization. In 2000 reformists in Indonesia sort to breakdown the KODAM system as part of defence reforms to remove the TNI from politics as part of the development of a liberal democratic government in Indonesia. However, while the military positions in parliament have been removed the KODAMs remain and two more are planned one in Papua and one in West Kalimantan. The KODAMs are still seen as important for internal security and intelligence collection. The Army has new SS2 Rifles but most of their major equipment such as tanks are old AMX13 light tanks whose production was stopped in 1986. The Army requires major expenditure on new equipment but the focus is still internal security and peace keeping.

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167 Indonesia Defence Update, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p22.
168 Ibid, p23.
169 Robert Karmiol, Revamping Indonesia’s Defence Ministry, Straits Times, 2 February 2009.
The Indonesian Air Force has 30,000 personnel split into two commands. Most of its aircraft are aged between 25 to 40 years old and are in poor condition. The Defence White Papers have reinforced the need for the Indonesia Air Force to upgrade its aircraft. The interceptor squadrons have old US F-16A and B and F-5E fighter aircraft. The US Air Force did a survey of these aircraft in June 2010 and a Framework Agreement on Cooperative Activity in the Field of Defence was signed as a result. The ground attack squadrons have HAWK 209 and 109 aircraft and Su27SKM and Su30MK/MK2 aircraft. There is reporting that Indonesia intends to buy F-16 and C130J aircraft using the US Foreign Military Finance system. This would allow the air force to modernize at least cost. The Military Technology journal reported that Indonesia has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with South Korea to develop a 4.5 Generation stealth jet fighter the KX-F. The plan is to buy 50 aircraft that will have similar specifications to the F-16 Block 50 aircraft. This diversification in military equipment supply is in line with Indonesia’s non-aligned policy and the hard lesson of the six years US arms embargo on Indonesia.

The Indonesian Navy has 75,000 personnel. The navy has 29 principal surface combatant made up of eight frigates, 21 corvettes and 41 patrol boats and coastal combatants supported by 28 logistic and support vessels. The bulk of the vessels date back to the 1950s and 1960s and there is a serious problem with a lack of weapons and support equipment. The navy has two CAKRA Class (Type 209) submarines that were meant to be replaced by two Russian submarines under a $US1 billion credit line but this offer was withdrawn by Russia. The CAKRA Class are

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to be refurbished by Daewoo in South Korea. The Defence White Papers and procurement plans called for the acquisition of 60 ships but only 15 have been procured in the last four years. Even this growth and the refurbishment of the CAKRA class submarines indicate that Indonesia is serious about protecting its maritime EEZ and resources. Singapore is one of Indonesia’s closest neighbours but unlike Indonesia Singapore has enjoyed a good relationship with the US since its independence while at the same time engaging China to each others mutual economic benefit.

SINGAPORE AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY

Singapore is a city-state on an island of some 660 square kilometres with a population of 5.077 million people located at a critical sea lines of communication geostrategic point in SEA. It is, “a Chinese Island in a sea of Malays”. Singapore gained independence in 1965 after an acrimonious separation from the Malaysian Federation. Singapore’s independence was marked by uncertainty and threatening behaviour by its closest neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore’s geographic location, lack of natural resources and ethnicity has shaped its foreign policy and its defence policy. Both its foreign and defence policy rest on the Realist International Relations School and is overlaid with a Constructivist approach to international relations. Since the mid the early 21st Century Singapore’s approach to foreign and defence policy has been complicated by the uncertain rise of China and the move towards a multi polar world. Singapore has reinforced its relationship with the US in

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an attempt to maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific. Concurrently, Singapore maintains a balanced relationship with China as part of its hedging strategy. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is among the largest and most capable in the Asia-Pacific as a result of US military and technical aid. Singapore is not balancing with its ASEAN partners against China but pursuing a combination of bandwagoning with the US and hedging to avoid China seeing Singapore as a threat to its security.

**Foreign Policy and Defence Policy**

Singapore’s foreign policy can be divided into two periods: the Cold War survival period and the post survival period since 1991. In the Cold War period Singapore’s focus was survival, national security and economic development without external interference. This was a reaction to Singapore’s initial poor relations with Malaysia and Indonesia and Super Power conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore had a Hobbesian approach to security in an anarchic world and wanted to focus on consolidating its domestic position, resolving domestic issues and enhancing its economy, political and security strength.\(^\text{177}\) Singapore was one of the founding members of ASEAN in 1967 that was formed to increase regional cooperation to avoid becoming a victim of Super Power rivalry.\(^\text{178}\) Singapore also saw the founding principles of ASEAN as supporting its focus on political and economic survival. The threads of the Cold War period have followed through into the post-Cold War period. ASEAN and its supporting fora is the cornerstone of Singapore’s foreign policy. Singapore sees ASEAN as a successful organisation for maintaining stability and

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regional security. ASEAN is seen as providing a multi-layered approach to security. The Shangri La Dialogue provides the first level. ARF provides a forum for consultation but avoids being seen as a military alliance. ASEAN and EAS provide another level according to Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Teo Chee Hean. Singapore’s main foreign policy focus remains building and developing its economy in a stable security environment built on the concept of the sanctity of the sovereign state. Singapore’s defence policy supports its foreign policy but is still Realist based.

Singapore’s security was initially guaranteed by the presence of Commonwealth troops, which had redeployed to Singapore from Malaya on Malaysia’s independence. This situation changed in 1968 with the change in British Defence policy which saw all British forces withdrawn to the west of the Suez Canal. While the Five Power Defence Arrangement signed in 1971 between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore sort to use self-help in line with its Realist approach to foreign affairs to ensure its own security. The Nixon Doctrine of 1972 and the United State’s failure in South Viet Nam reinforced Singapore’s need to ensure its own security and a regionalist approach to foreign policy. This approach to defence policy is still reflected in Singapore’s approach to defence. Singapore’s present defence policy rests on the twin pillars of diplomacy and deterrence. Diplomacy seeks to develop and maintain good relations with other countries. Deterrence seeks to deter threats and to contribute to regional resilience. Singapore’s deterrence is designed to

make it a “poisoned shrimp” for any potential aggressor to swallow.182 Deterrence is supported by the concept of Total Defence that is made up of psychological defence, social defence, civil defence and military defence. Military defence is based on maintaining strong conventional war fighting capability to ensure that its military defence stays strong.183 While Singapore’s diplomatic rhetoric supports ASEAN for security it sees the security landscape as uncertain. The Singapore Defence White Paper states that the end of the Cold War did not see the end of conflict.184 The US, China and Japan relationship is seen by Singapore as the key factor in determining the Asia-Pacific security climate. Lee Kuan Yew, the Minister Mentor has stated, “China will cause a major displacement in the balance of power when she finally arrives as a major player on the world scene”. 185 The US presence in Asia is seen by Singapore vital to balancing the rise of China and keeping Japan in its place.

Singapore’s defence policy helps to explain its close relationship with the US and the maintenance of a strong defence force for deterrence and as part of Total Defence. While Singapore has reservations about what China’s rise will mean for Asia-Pacific security it maintains good relations with China.

**China and Singapore Relations**

The Singaporean population is 74.1% Chinese186 and it has good relations with both China and Taiwan. Having said that Singapore only established diplomatic relations with China on the 3rd of October 1990 having had informal trade relations since the

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184 Ibid, p2.
Singapore’s relationship with Taiwan has caused problems with China. In 2004, Deputy Premier Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan and China reacted by protesting and admonishing the Singapore Government and postponing a free trade agreement with Singapore. Singapore reacted by reiterating that it fully supported the “One China” policy and that it would cut relations with Taiwan if it declared independence. Since 2004, Singapore – China relations have continued to grow. Singapore and China signed the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in 2008. Singapore was the first Asian country to sign a free trade agreement with China. China is now Singapore’s third largest trading partner. Singapore has also sought to get China more engaged with ASEAN as part of its diplomatic policy to increase Chinese interdependence with ASEAN countries. The Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) was established in 2003 to manage the China – Singapore bilateral relationship. In 2008 the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation was signed between Singapore and China. This defence relationship has sought to coordinate relations that deal with counter proliferation, WMD, terrorism and maritime security. In 2010, the SAF and PLA held a joint counter terrorism exercise, Exercise Cooperation 2010. The JCBC and defence cooperation are part of Singapore’s hedging security policy that seeks to further economic relations and manage defence relations in a controlled way. Singapore is against containment of China because it thinks that such a policy would heighten Chinese insecurity and

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189 Ibid.
could cause a nationalist backlash that would destabilise Asia.\textsuperscript{191} Consequently, engagement is seen as the best policy. However, Singapore is still concerned at what the rise of China will mean for Asia-Pacific security. Minister for Defence, Teo Chee Hean warned China at the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue that it had to be more transparent when it came to military capability and intent as part of the conference theme of military transparency.\textsuperscript{192} During the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue Teo Chee Hean stated that China’s weight had grown and that this was causing strategic uncertainty because countries did not know whether China would be status quo or revisionist.\textsuperscript{193} While Singapore appears friendly with China it clearly has concerns over how China will employ its increasing military capability given overlapping and conflicting territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. To ensure that deterrence continues to work as part of its hedging policy Singapore has enhanced its political, economic and military relationship with the US.

\textbf{United States and Singapore Relations}

The US has had diplomatic relations with Singapore since its independence in 1965. The US is the largest foreign investor in Singapore and is the US’s 13\textsuperscript{th} largest trading partner. While 6.5\% of Singapore’s exports go to the US.\textsuperscript{194} Singapore seeks to maintain the security status quo in SEA and sees the US as critical in achieving this

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Amitav Acharya (2008), p105.}
\footnote{Teo Chee Hean (2009), Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, The 8\textsuperscript{th} IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, p2.}
\footnote{Teo Chee Hean (2010), Renewing the Regional Security Architecture, The 9th IISS Asian Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore.}
\footnote{US State Department, Background Note: Singapore, \url{http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ci/bgn/2798.htm} accessed 15 November 2010.}
\end{footnotes}
The US presence allows Indonesia’s assertiveness to be offset, Japan’s remilitarisation to be held in check and for China’s ambitions in the South China Sea to be managed. The withdrawal of US forces from Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines as a result of pressure from the Philippines political left concerned Singapore. Singapore saw possible US withdrawal from South East Asia as a threat to the region’s security. Consequently, Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US in 2000 to allow the US station its Commander of Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) at Sembawang Port and for US warships to use its port facilities. This included a deep-water port capable of taking an aircraft carrier. COMLOG WESTPAC is the logistics command for the US 7th Fleet that is based in Japan and is responsible for the security of Asia Pacific sea lines of communication and operations against North Korea should it attack South Korea. The MOU also gave US fighter squadrons access to Singapore Air Force bases.

In 2005, Singapore and the US signed a Strategic Framework Agreement that further develops the US/Singapore security MOU. The MOU builds on earlier agreements. The MOU increases defence cooperation through the provision of facilities in Singapore for US military vessels, aircraft, personnel, equipment and material supporting deployments of the Parties respective forces. It allows for exchanges between defence intelligence and security agencies and other cooperation as the

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196 Ibid.
Parties may agree in the future. Singapore has stopped at the security agreement and not signed a formal security treaty. This is to ensure that the US does not overwhelm Singapore with its presence as has happened in South Korea and Japan (witness on-going Japanese issues with US Forces in Okinawa). The other reason is that Singapore does not want to be seen as balancing with the US, which would be interpreted by China as an alliance against it. Singapore has chosen to use the US to hedge against the rise of a more revisionist and aggressive China. This allows Singapore to assist the US to maintain a presence in South East Asia while still being able to have a relationship and trade with China. The SAF plays a significant part in the relationship with the US and by ensuring that Singapore maintains a credible deterrence force.

**Singapore Armed Forces**

Singapore’s Armed Forces are based on a combination of the Swiss and Israeli defence models. Israeli advisors were attached to the SAF in its formative years to provide advice on organisation, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures. Consequently, the SAF is a National Service defence force. The National Service approach is evidenced by the ratio of regular force to reservists in the SAF. The RF component of the SAF is 73000 strong while the reserve component is 312000 strong. The mission of the SAF is to deter and defend Singapore against threats to its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Using the Realist model

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200 Teo Chee Hean, Meeting the Challenges of Singapore Defence in Military Technology 1/2010, p16.
Singapore has based its defence on self-help and this means that it has a balanced defence force which has all of the capabilities required to ensure its immediate security. Singapore spends 4.7% of its GDP which equates to $US7.5 billion on defence annually.\(^{201}\) The SAF is one of the most modern and advanced armed forces in SEA. The SAF is now moving into the 3\(^{rd}\) Generation SAF, which has seen the creation of five new commands, modernization of the information technology networking of units for combined and joint operations and focus on preparing personnel for non traditional operations. The Singaporean Army has a strength of 40,000 personnel and is organised into two People’s Defence Force Commands for coastal and installation defence, two Army Operational Reserve Divisions and three Regular Force combined arms divisions. The Singaporean Army is equipped with the most modern command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Its armaments are modern and well maintained making it a formidable force in SEA.\(^{202}\) The role of the Singapore Air Force is to protect the integrity of Singapore’s air space, defend against air threats and protect access to air and sea lines of communication.\(^{203}\) The Singaporean Air Force is equipped with modern US aircraft including F-5S (upgraded to F-16 avionics), F-16C/D and F-15SG aircraft. Singapore has two fighter/ground attack squadrons located in the US at Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB) in Idaho and Luke and Cannon AFB. This deployment further indicates the closeness of the Singapore defence relationship with the US. The Singapore Navy has 4,000 personnel and is also well equipped and capable. The Navy’s role is to protect Singapore’s territorial waters and keep sea lines of

\(^{201}\) Marvin Leibstone (2010), pp21-22.
\(^{202}\) Singapore, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p400.
communication open. To add to the combat power of its surface fleet made up of Formidable class frigates and Victory class corvettes and Fearless class anti-submarine patrol boats Singapore has four Challenger (ex SJOORMEN Class) patrol submarines and two Archer (Swedish VASTERGOTLAND class) patrol submarines. The SAF exercises with the US and other regional navies to enhance its operational effectiveness. While Singapore is not part of a formal military alliance balancing against China it has achieved this in a virtual way by hedging and almost bandwagoning with the US and key western armed forces in the region. In contrast the Philippines has sort to reinvigorate its close military relationship with the US while keeping its options open with China mainly for economic advantage. It military forces have been focused on internal security operations and are not capable of countering a threat from China.

PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY

The Philippines gained its independence from the United States in 1946 after being a colony of the US since 1898. The US influence on the Philippines remained high until the fall of Ferdinand Marcus and the resulting desire for the Philippines to exert its independence. The Philippines is the only ASEAN country to have a treaty level military alliance with the US. The Philippines is one of the founding members of ASEAN and its principles form the cornerstone of Philippines foreign policy. The Philippines has spent the last five decades fighting insurgencies within its own country and defeating these has been the focus of its defence policy and structure. However, conflict with China over the Spratly Islands and the growth of terrorism after

204 The Military Balance 2010, p382.
the 9/11 attacks on the US has changed the Philippines defence policy and led again to a closer relationship with the US. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are centred on the Army due to their internal security focus. New threats have highlighted the need for the Philippines to invest more in the Philippines Navy and Air Force but this has not occurred. To ensure its security the Philippines is hedging through ASEAN and balancing with the US through the 1952 Mutual Defence Treaty.

**Philippines Foreign and Defence Policy**

The principles of Philippines foreign policy are laid down in its 1987 Philippines Constitution. The three pillars of Philippines foreign policy are: preservation and enhancement of national security, promotion and attainment of economic security and protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of Filipinos overseas. These pillars are supported by the eight foreign policy realities and the key ones are: China, Japan, and the United States and their relationship will be a determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of East Asia, Philippines foreign policy decisions have to be made in the context of ASEAN, the international Islamic community will continue to be important for the Philippines, the coming years will see the growing importance of multilateral and inter-regional organisations to promote common interests, and as an archipelagic state, the defence of the nation’s sovereignty and the protection of its environment and natural resources can be carried out to the extent that it asserts its rights over the maritime
territory and gets others to respect those rights. Article II Section 7 of the constitution states that the Philippines, rejects war as an instrument of national policy and supports international law and policy of peace, equality and justice. To achieve its foreign policy objectives the Philippines relies heavily on ASEAN and its success as an organization. The original principles of ASEAN to accelerate economic growth, social progress and to promote regional peace and development are reflected in the Philippines constitution. In 2008, the Philippines ratified the ASEAN Charter to further reinforce this belief. However, as with all SEA countries the Philippines has been concerned at the economic and military rise of China and China’s more aggressive approach to contested areas in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines has tried to deal with China through ASEAN and the United Nations. The ASEAN – China Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity has become the regional context for dealing with China. The Philippines attempts to have the South China Sea disputes discussed in the UN were blocked by China. The reaction to the 1995 South China Sea incident and the lack of the ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to counter the Chinese caused the Philippines to review its defence policy and capabilities.

In 1998, the Philippines published its Philippines Defence Policy Paper. Philippines Defence policy is anchored in the 1987 Philippines Constitution and the principles in the constitution flow through to the White Paper. The White Paper acknowledged that

207 Ibid, p3.
the external defence of the Philippines had been neglected as a result of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) being focused on internal counter insurgency operations. This imbalanced needed to be addressed if the Philippines were to be able to defend its sovereignty. The White Paper laid down the national defence objectives as: secure and uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines, protect and defend Philippines national territory against external aggression and Filipino communities against internal armed threats; safeguard Filipino lives and property during times of crisis and calamities here and abroad, and support the national government’s efforts toward the attainment of political stability, economic development and social cohesion.209 The policy paper’s approach to achieving the defence goals was defence self-reliance and cooperation. This approach acknowledged that for the Philippines to maintain its freedom it would have to become more self-reliant and use the Realist concept of self-help to achieve it. However, the second part of the approach, defence cooperation acknowledged that in some circumstances the threat would be too large for the AFP to deal with. In these situation treaties such as the one between the Philippines and the US would need to be invoked. A Joint Defence Assessment (JDA) conducted by the US Department of Defence and staff from the US Pacific Command followed up the White Paper. The JDA sort to develop a plan for Philippines defence reform and a road map to implement it. The JDA has become the basis for the Philippine Defence Reform Program. The Philippines defence policy indicates that the Philippines has adopted a policy of hedging to meet its security needs by planning to increase its defence

capability but at the same time emphasizing its need to be able to call on other states for assistance namely the US through its formal alliance.

China - Philippines Relations

The Philippines established diplomatic relations with China in 1975. This recognition was mainly brought about by the Philippines desire to stop Chinese support for the Philippines Communist Party and its insurgency against the government.\(^{210}\) The Philippines relationship with China is now, primarily based on trade and investment. Bilateral trade between the Philippines and China amounted to $US20 billion in 2009 and China is the Philippines third largest trading partner. The Philippines military interaction with China is insignificant and is set to remain this way. Since 2005, the Philippines political relationship with China has increased. This engagement has been within the ASEAN framework that seeks to bring China into the region as an active member and responsible partner. This approach seeks to get China to sign up to ASEAN’s principles and the concept of SEA as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOFPAN).\(^{211}\) Since 2001 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has visited China 10 times to promote bilateral relations. Premier Zhu Rongji visited the Philippines in 1999 and President Hu Jintao visited in 2005 and Premier We Jiabao visited in 2007. In October 2009, the Philippines and China signed a five year Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation. This plan, focuses on political, economic and

trade, cultural and people to people relationships. The agreement does not increase Philippines/China military relationships. The Philippines is happy to increase contact, which meets its political aims of furthering ASEAN soft power security objectives and more importantly its economic national interests. The Philippines remains deeply suspicious of China’s intent in the South China Sea and its present “charm offensive”.

Despite increased diplomatic contact the Philippines remains concerned over the uncertainty surrounding the rise of China as a regional and world power. The Philippines and China have competing claims over the Spratly Islands and the resulting EEZ (see Appendix 1 for detail of the areas claimed by the Philippines). These competing claims have led to conflict between the two countries. In 1995, the Philippines discovered an increased Chinese presence on the Mischief Reef and reacted by deploying the Republic of Philippines Navy that proved no match for the Chinese. This was the first attack on an ASEAN member state by China. A clash over the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) occurred in 1997 in which the Philippines prevailed. In 2002, the Philippines security forces arrested 160 Chinese fishermen for illegally fishing areas of the Spratly Is EEZ. China reacted angrily and demanded their release. The 1995 incident led to China and the Philippines signing an agreement in 2000 and ultimately to the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in 2002. The main lesson of the 1995 incident was that the

212 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
Philippines needed to review its defence policy and to reinvigorate its defence relationship with the US. China sees the Philippines increased military contact with the US as a threat to its aspirations for hegemony in the region. The Philippines does not want to be forced into bandwagoning with China to maintain its sovereignty. To hedge against a more aggressive posture by China the Philippines is balancing with the US.

Philippines - United States Relations

The Philippines was ceded to the United States by Spain in 1898 under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The Philippines remained an American colony until it became a self-governing commonwealth in 1935 under the Tydings-McDuffie Act. In 1946, the Philippines gained fully independence from the US. Between 1947 and 1992 the US maintained two major bases in the Philippines at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. The 1952 Philippines and US Mutual Defence Treaty further cemented the US/Philippines defence relationship. The fall of Ferdinand Marcos and the restoration of democracy to the Philippines result in a backlash against the US by nationalists and the left wing. Consequently, in 2001 the Philippines Senate rejected the 1991 US Bases Treaty and the US was forced to close Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. This represented a low point in US/Philippines defence relations, which was not to last long. The 1995 Spratly Island incident with China and the coming to power of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo marked a turning point in the US defence

\[216\] Ibid.
relationship. The Philippines saw that China was prepared to act unilaterally to pursue its claims on the Spratly Islands. The continued economic and military growth of China meant that this potential for aggressive action would continue to be present. The AFP had proved that they could not deal with such a threat to the Philippines sovereignty. While the Philippines had always acknowledged the importance of the US presence in SEA to deter Chinese aggression it saw the need to reinvigorate its relationship with the US. In 1998 the Philippines passed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the US that saw resumption in US Navy ship visits and combined military exercises. The period 1999 – 2000, saw US carrier battle groups conduct two exercises off Palawan near the Spratly Island Group and in 2001-2004 Exercise Balikatan was conducted in the South China Sea.\(^{218}\) The Philippines interpretation of the 1952 Mutual Defence Treaty is that an attack on the Philippines over the Spratly Islands will constitute an attack on the US. The US debates this interpretation but it demonstrates that the Philippines is balancing with the US and hedging at the same time. This concept is consistent with the Philippines defence policy of self-reliance and cooperation.

US/Philippines defence relations have been further forced to converge with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism as a result of the Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York. To assist the Philippines to counter terrorist groups based in the Philippines the US has established the Joint US Military Assistance Group in Manila and Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P). JSOTF-P has task forces deployed to Mindanao, Sulu and Archipelago. The main force of 400 US military personnel is based in Western Mindanao Command to assist the AFP.

counter the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist groups. The US JSOTF-P mission is to provide advice to the AFP and not to conduct operations itself. The Philippines further demonstrated support for the US by supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq and contributed a small AFP contingent. The Philippines is the US 12th highest recipient of US Foreign Military Funding and in 2007 the US provided the AFP with $US76 million in equipment and services funding. While the Philippines aspires to self help in the military area it is clear that it still heavily relies on the US for military assistance and guarantees for its security both internally and externally

**Philippines Armed Forces**

The 1998 White Paper acknowledged that the Philippines had been involved in counter insurgency operations for 50 years and that its focus had been on internal security at the expense of external security. The Philippines lack of ability to deal independently with an external threat to its sovereignty was reinforced by the Spratly Islands incident with China in 1995. Building on the 1998 Defence White Paper and the US/Philippines Joint Defence Assessment the AFP has developed a Defence Reform Programme (DFP). The DFP seeks to develop the capability of the AFP in three phases. Phase One from 2006 to 2011, seeks to enhance capabilities to conduct internal security operations. This phase will see the acquisition of new helicopters, trucks, patrol boats, rifles and radios plus an infantry battalion upgrade programme. Phase Two from 2012 – 2017, will see a build up in territorial defence and Phase Three from 2018 – 2023, will see further enhancement of territorial defence and peacekeeping capabilities. To guarantee its ability to defend its territory
the AFP will need to develop its air and maritime capabilities.\(^{219}\) The Philippines are broken into seven joint regional unified commands. The unified commands have operational authority over all land, naval and air forces in their area of responsibility.\(^{220}\) The Land Forces have nine infantry divisions and a tenth infantry division is being raised in the Mindanao Region. The focus of the Land Forces is internal security operations in line with the DRP/ Capability Upgrade Programme (CUP).

The Philippines Navy is made up of one US Cannon Class Frigate, two Rizal Class Corvettes, two Cebu Class Corvettes and 28 patrol vessels.\(^{221}\) While the Philippines Navy can deal with internal security tasks and EEZ fisheries patrols it is not capable of defending the Philippines sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Navy would be able to act as a trip wire to provoke an international reaction if the Philippines sovereignty was attacked by a foreign power. The Philippines is still reliant on the US Navy and the 7th Fleet for maritime protection. The CUP recognizes that for the Philippines to have defence self-reliance it will need to increase its capability significantly.\(^{222}\) The 1998 Defence White Paper indicated that the Philippines Navy would need three frigates, six corvettes, 24 patrol craft, 16 patrol boats, 12 off shore patrol vessels and three mine warfare vessels to replace and enhance the present fleet.\(^{223}\) Even with these increases the Philippines Navy will still need support from the 7th Fleet.

\(^{219}\) Philippines, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p398.
\(^{220}\) Ibid.
\(^{221}\) Philippines, Military Technology, Vol 34 Issue 1, p399.
\(^{222}\) The Military Balance 2010, p385.
The Republic of the Philippines Air Force (RPAF) has also been focused on counter insurgency operations. The Philippines Air Force had F-5A fighter aircraft on its organization for battle but these were decommissioned in 2005. The RPAF has an air base on Kalayaan Island in the Spratly Islands that demonstrates its determination to defend its sovereignty. The 5th Fighter Wing has 15 S-211 aircraft and the 15th Strike Wing has 24 OV-10 Bronco aircraft and 24 MG520 aircraft. The 1998 Defence White Paper again recognized the weakness of the RPAF and it recommended the acquisition of 36 multi-role fighter aircraft, 24 surface attack aircraft and six long-range patrol aircraft.\textsuperscript{224} According to the IISS Military Balance 2010 the RPAF plans to acquire combat aircraft in 2012 – 13.\textsuperscript{225} Given the present economic downturn the CPU appears to have stalled. No orders have been placed for fighter aircraft to replace the F-5 fighter fleet as reported in The Military Balance 2010.\textsuperscript{226} Ian Storey, a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies claims that due to the present financial downturn that it is unlikely that the Philippines will be able to fund its defence procurement programme in the foreseeable future. And that this is why no major equipment orders have been confirmed\textsuperscript{227} The Philippines will continue to rely on hedging using ASEAN and balancing with the US to protect its sovereignty and its Spratly Islands claims.

**CONCLUSION**

The economic and military rise of China and its assertive approach to claims over the South China Sea are causing security uncertainty among Asia-Pacific countries. The

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} The Military Balance 2010, p385.
\textsuperscript{226} Ian Storey, Armed Forces in the Philippines, e-mail to the author dated 25 January 2011.
\textsuperscript{227} Ian Storey (2011) e-mail to the author.
\end{footnotesize}
ASEAN countries are primarily focused on growing their economies, developing infrastructure and creating social and ethnic cohesion within young and immature democratic states. The Philippines and Indonesia still have significant internal security threats from separatists and terrorist groups to deal with. All of the countries considered have overlapping and conflicting claims to territory and maritime areas within the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands that affect their relations with each other and with China. The Asia-Pacific countries are relying, in the main, on the US to maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific through its hub and spoke bilateral security system and powerful military capability in the region. The ASEAN countries are relying on the ASEAN fora and their wider membership to create interdependence in the region and to pull China into the community as a responsible actor. On the surface the ASEAN countries appear happy with this construct but underneath this there lies doubt about China’s true intent. Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are hedging by engaging with China economically for their national interest but avoiding getting too close to China militarily and getting closer to the US both economically and militarily. The Philippines has a treaty level alliance with the US and is both hedging and balancing to address a potential threat from China. Singapore is hedging and almost bandwagoning with the US to ensure its security. China’s military capability to deny US access to the “first island chain” is now at a stage where the US is concerned about its ability to intervene at will in the area and this includes the South China Sea. In 2009 and 2010 the Chinese became more assertive and aggressive over its claim to the whole South China Sea and now maintains that the South China Sea is a “core interest” to China and in the same league as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. The reaction of the ASEAN countries studied in this paper has not
been to bandwagon with China. The Obama Administration has sort to emphasis to the Asia-Pacific states that in spite of the 2008 economic crisis the US will remain engaged in the region and that it will stand up to intimidation by China. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made this quite clear to the Chinese delegation at the November 2010 ARF Meeting in Hanoi. The ASEAN countries considered in this paper are not actively balancing with the US or each other because they form military agreements with the US that fall short of military treaty level alliances. Within ASEAN and the ARF a military alliance like NATO has been avoided because of fear that China will become alienated and feel directly threatened that could see a Chinese nationalist backlash and war. Consequently, no command and control structure exists within ASEAN to plan or execute a military campaign to resist Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Any military reaction to open aggression would need to be led by the US using the Pacific Command structure and ASEAN countries putting their forces under US operational control. ASEAN countries will actively seek to avoid a situation requiring such a reaction from occurring and live in hope that the continued US presence in the Asia-Pacific will keep China in check.
Appendices:

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