‘Sentimental Equipment’: New Zealand, the Great War and Cultural Mobilisation

By

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'See that little stream - we could walk to it in two minutes. It took the British a month to walk to it - a whole empire walking very slowly, dying in front and pushing forward behind. And another empire walked very slowly backward a few inches a day, leaving the dead like a million bloody rugs … This western-front business couldn’t be done again, not for a long time … This took religion and years of plenty and tremendous sureties and the exact relation that existed between the classes.

…You had to have a whole-souled sentimental equipment [emphasis added] going back further than you could remember…

This kind of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne and whoever wrote Undine, and country deacons bowling and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in the back lanes of Wurtemburg and Westphalia. Why, this was a love battle - there was a century of middle-class love spent here … All my beautiful lovely safe world blew itself up here with a great gust of high explosive love'.

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Abstract

During the First World War, New Zealand society was dominated by messages stressing the paramount importance of the war effort to which the country was so heavily committed. Reflecting the total nature of the conflict, these exhortations regularly linked individual duties to the war effort and associated that effort with larger, or higher, purposes. It is often perceived, or presumed, that the dominance of this material arose from general wartime hysteria or was the result of imposed propaganda - with all the manipulative trickery that term connotes. Either way, such perceptions dovetail with notions that the war represents a historical rupture and that wartime discourse might be characterised as insincere, inauthentic and abnormal.

Challenging this interpretation, this thesis considers wartime messages as emblematic of deeper cultural sentiments and wider social forces. Specifically, it argues that they represented the results of a cultural mobilisation; a phenomenon whereby cultural resources were mobilised alongside material resources. Consequently many pre-existing social dynamics, debates, orientations, mythologies, values, stereotypes and motifs were retained, but repurposed, in response to the war. A range of subjects illustrating this phenomenon are surveyed, including collective identity, anti-Germanism, gender archetypes, gender antitypes and social cohesion.

This study highlights two major dimensions of the phenomenon: firstly, the relationship between the pre-war social/cultural landscape and the mobilised results; and, secondly, how the ideological war effort operated by layering meanings upon wartime developments. Analysing these aspects of cultural mobilisation sets New Zealand’s military involvement in a broader context and enriches our historical understanding of the society which entered and fought the Great War.
Acknowledgements

I imagine any author writing their acknowledgements feels a need to balance two things: a sincere want to articulate gratitude towards the, inevitably lengthy, list of people and institutions who aid in completing a large research project, and avoiding Oscar night clichés. Here goes.

First and foremost I thank my supervisors, Professor James Belich and Professor Roberto Rabel. Their advice and insight sharpened my arguments and I appreciate their support and encouragement of the wide-ranging nature of this thesis.

I owe a debt to various institutions, and the staff that keep them ticking. I thank the staff of the Alexander Turnbull Library, Archives New Zealand, the Parliamentary Library, the Defence House Library, Te Papa, the Auckland War Memorial Museum, the National Army Museum and the Victoria University Library. All jumped through various hoops to connect historian and sources. I am also grateful to Louise Grenside and her successor Debbie Levy who administered the Stout Centre during my study and did their best to keep the historians up to date.

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Lastly I am grateful to those who reminded me not to live entirely in the past; it is fitting that we reflect on the war, though it does one good to remember that it has ended.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJHR</td>
<td>Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives</td>
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<td>ANZ</td>
<td>Archives New Zealand</td>
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<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australian and New Zealand Army Corps</td>
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<td>ATL</td>
<td>Alexander Turnbull Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWN</td>
<td>Auckland Weekly News</td>
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<td>DNZB</td>
<td>Dictionary of New Zealand Biography</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Evening Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOL</td>
<td>Federation of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>National Council of Women</td>
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<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>NZFL</td>
<td>New Zealand Free Lance</td>
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<td>NZG</td>
<td>New Zealand Gazette</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZH</td>
<td>New Zealand Herald</td>
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<td>NZJH</td>
<td>New Zealand Journal of History</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZO</td>
<td>New Zealand Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZOYB</td>
<td>New Zealand Official Yearbook</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZS</td>
<td>New Zealand Statutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCNZMH</td>
<td>The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODT</td>
<td>Otago Daily Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>OW</td>
<td>Otago Witness</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Protestant Political Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>Venereal disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAGL</td>
<td>Women’s Anti-German League</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Women’s Christian Temperance Union</td>
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Introduction: Cultural Mobilisation

In 1917, a sketch by a New Zealand soldier, Private Gordon Calman, appeared in a troop magazine published for the men being shipped on the troopship Corinthic from New Zealand to their ultimate destination of the Western Front. Tiki-Talk: Epistles of the Corinthians was a rather light-hearted publication, full of amateur poetry and amusing caricatures. The sights, sounds and sickness of sea-voyaging - the shared experiences of its audience - made up the bulk of the content. Calman’s sketch is in stark contrast to other submissions and shows a remarkable glimpse of one man’s expression of the act of journeying to the centre of the global crisis of the First World War. In his work, the North and South Islands of New Zealand are transformed into a grief stricken figure (fig.1). North Cape, as a waved handkerchief, bids farewell to those departing. A downward face sobs into the bosom of Taranaki, supported by an arm spanning the distance between Cook Strait and Lake Taupo. The bent knee of the Southern Ranges and the drape of the dress around Foveaux Strait display a sense of anguish and despair. The East Cape as a copy of the casualty list reinforces the heavyhearted and possibly permanent nature of the country’s farewell.

Art has a subjective element and there are several meanings that Calman’s vision might invoke in observers. Comments might be made on loss, duty, futility, fatalism, perhaps upon gender, with a motherland farewelling her sons. However, beyond the potential range of sentiments that might be stirred is the poignant imagining of New Zealand as a single entity devoted to a nationwide task; an image indicative of the relationship between nations and war circa 1917. The process of national mobilisation was, as in Calman’s work, a phenomenon that saw various sentiments mobilised and projected onto physical landscapes. The end result was a mobilised nation.

This thesis asks two major questions about the process of mobilising that nation. Firstly, what were the end results of the process in regards to the cultural messages used to justify commitment to the war effort? And, secondly, what were the means by which these results eventuated? The answer to the first question is sought in an investigation of the major messages which became intertwined with the war effort. The aim is to recognise the cultural

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Figure 1 Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL)-A-224-039, Calman, Gordon Jamieson, b 1893, ‘Roll of Honour. 1917?’.
material from which wartime messages were constructed, and to contextualise how this material relates to the pre-war cultural landscape. The answer to the second question is sought through examination of the forces which shaped cultural material to serve wartime needs: how exactly was the ideological war effort run?

**Mobilisation and public culture**

Central to this work is a broader understanding of ‘mobilisation’ to that commonly used. Traditionally, the word is associated with its physical aspects, signifying the organisation of manpower and the harnessing of capital and industry. The mass wars which developed in the nineteenth-century and blossomed in the world wars of the twentieth, saw a trend towards the extensive exploitation of national resources for war; the German term *Materialschlacht* literally describes the essence of these battles of materiel. Securing materiel in an age of mass production and mass society effectively wedded mobilisation to the capacity to organise national resources, the most significant being those of industry, finance and population.

Mobilisation, in this traditional sense, can be tracked in New Zealand’s war effort. On 5 August 1914, with the declaration of British entry to the war, the New Zealand economy adjusted to serve wartime demands. Hostilities deprived the country of some pre-war imports - rather ironically the first batches of uniforms were off-colour due to the absence of German dyes. In monetary terms mobilisation carried a high price. The New Zealand Government had determined to pay its own way through the war, an action that resulted in the doubling of government debt and a 60 percent rise in expenditure over the course of the war. The official estimate of the monetary cost of the war to New Zealand at the end of the 1921 financial year stood at £81,538,570. This price tag roughly translates into an early twenty-first century (2012) cost of $6,486,000,000. This economic burden was felt by the New Zealand people in numerous ways. Taxes and duties were established on many goods, imports and services for the purpose of revenue gathering. Strains on shipping drove up import prices and increased manufacturing costs. Consequently the latter half of the war was marked by increasing industrial unrest as wages fell behind prices; the cost of living rose by

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3 *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (NZPD), Vol.175, 24 May 1916, p.375.
6 Figure calculated using the Reserve Banks Inflation Calculator, [http://www.rbnz.govt.nz](http://www.rbnz.govt.nz).
7 Examples of how the cost of the war was passed on to the New Zealand people can be found in Drew, pp.233-243.
39.35 percent between July 1914 and July 1918. By the war’s end patriotic societies had raised approximately £5,447,991 ($471 million in 2012 terms).

However, New Zealand’s major contribution to the Materialschlacht, in terms of military contribution and significance to modern memory, was men. By the end of the war some 124,211 New Zealand men had been enlisted for service out of a total population of 243,376 individuals deemed eligible by virtue of their sex and age. 100,444 of these men embarked; the war ended before the remainder completed their processing and training. Those mobilised represented near 10 percent of the total New Zealand population, or 19.4 percent of the male population, or near 51 percent of the eligible male population. The reader, if male and aged between 20 and 45, might toss a coin to see whether or not he would serve – if the reader is not within that category they might toss with someone who is eligible in mind. Additionally, the 58 percent casualty rate could warrant another toss to illustrate the potential impact upon life and limb.

There was, however, a non-physical aspect to the mobilisation process that runs parallel to common understanding of the term. Intimately interwoven with its physical counterpart, a cultural mobilisation saw major features of the social/cultural landscape - social dynamics, communal links, value sets, abstractions, debates, stereotypes, lexicons, myths and characteristics - all translated into more martial forms. The fact that this mobilisation drew upon familiar material - what Fitzgerald’s fictional veteran terms ‘sentimental equipment’ (p.ii) - promoted acceptance of the hardships and sacrifices demanded. Conversely, those who opposed, or were perceived as opposing, aspects of the war were denounced as deficient in the virtues so closely associated with the war effort. This mobilisation acted to transform societies into more effective tools of war, functioned to lubricate the process of physical mobilisation and aimed to justify the social disruption which the demands, costs and hardships of war brought. The mobilisation of capital, production and labour therefore

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10 The Military Service Bill determined eligible men to be of an age ‘not less than twenty years and less than forty six years.’ New Zealand Statutes (NZS), 1916, No.8, Section 2.
12 New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1980s, compiled by Major M.R. Wicksteed (Wellington, 1982), p.25.
13 Within this thesis ‘myth/mythology’ denotes the laying of cultural values upon events rather than falsehood.
became projects with significant social dimensions. Recruitment was not only a mechanism to increase manpower, but a process that engaged with cultural considerations and values. Soldiers were not solely members of armies but were linked to other collectives: families, classes, denominations, regions, ethnic groups and nations. Political or military decisions did not emerge from an ideological void free from social pressures or considerations. The war was a social and cultural experience as well as a political or military event.

The public sphere provides an apt vantage point to survey New Zealand society and to consider this cultural mobilisation. According to Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere acquired force and reality through early-modern Europe as matters of public concern and common interest were publicised outside of the state, allowing mediation between the state and some elements of wider society. The concept is well summarised by John Fousek as ‘the arena in which social and political conflict is played out and in which consensus is forged, manufactured, and maintained, or not.’ The public sphere, as a site of exchange, sees diverse, inconsistent, even conflicting, ideas, with no pledge towards internal consistency, circulated; something which speaks, in part, of the existence of subcultures, fringes and peripheries that potentially possess radically different ideas and conventions to the mainstream. However the existence of ‘radical’ ideas confirms the existence of ‘orthodox’ conventions and ‘politically correct’ ideas by which divergences are defined. This dominant content is dubbed public culture and is considered as the collection of conceptions and conventions deemed ‘mainstream’, ‘proper’ or appropriate for public expression.

14 The decision to frame this arena within a national boundary runs contrary to the questioning from some quarters of whether national studies provide appropriate or even legitimate perspectives. The New Oxford History of New Zealand suggests that the genre has been complicit in the project of nation-making, ‘a euphemism for continuing colonisation.’ Proponents of transnational perspectives promote the more compelling argument that New Zealand’s past should be considered within wider international and thematic contexts, rightly observing that migration, geopolitics, telegraphs and trade reveal the porous nature of national boundaries; indeed these factors make repeated appearances in the following pages. Conversely, Graham Hucker has employed a regional focus to test some of the larger interpretations of the Great War against the experiences of wartime Taranaki. While the cases to widen or narrow focus are valid, this thesis asserts that the existence of national trends and experiences of mobilisation make a national focus both justifiable and appropriate. This New Zealand centred focus can co-exist with awareness that regional experiences can vary, reconciled with an appreciation of transnational forces and taken up without forcing the past to serve a narrative of back-patting national exceptionalism. See Giselle Byrnes, ‘Introduction: Reframing New Zealand History’, The New Oxford History of New Zealand, Giselle Byrnes ed. (Melbourne, 2009), pp.1-18, Graham Hucker, ‘The Rural Home Front: A New Zealand Region and the Great War, 1914-1926’ (PhD thesis, Massey University, 2006).

15 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, 1989).

16 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2000), p.ix. Fousek uses the term ‘public culture’ rather than ‘public sphere’, whereas I use the term in a manner detailed below.
These understandings of mobilisation and public culture constitute the two major conceptual components of this thesis. Charting the results of their interaction and the means behind that interaction provides the central objectives. The aforementioned artist of *Tiki-Talk*, Gordon (later Lance Corporal) Calman was himself a participant in and a product of mobilisation and elements of his interaction with the physical side of mobilisation are documented. Calman’s personnel file notes that he enlisted on 13 November 1916. Upon enlistment, his age (23), height (5.9 feet), weight (140 lbs) and chest measurements (34-37 inches) were recorded. Details of his personal life such as his religious profession (Presbyterian), previous occupation (schoolteacher) and his newly-wed status were noted. With no ticks in the squares for ‘killed in action’, ‘missing’, ‘prisoner’ or ‘died of wounds/sickness’ he did better than many on the Western Front and saw his final discharge on 21 July 1919. A newer addition to his record confirms that Calman survived his interaction with mobilisation; he died on 29 April 1981.\(^\text{17}\) The thoughts and forces that stand behind and intertwine with such physical records are less accessible. In that they are part of the explanation for why Calman, alongside tens of thousands of other New Zealanders, journeyed across oceans, they deserve examination.

The war in history and memory

An investigation of these thoughts and forces turns on the premise that commitment to the war effort reflects wider patterns, occurrences and historical developments. Such an assessment, however, collides with some entrenched conceptions within modern memory; namely, that the war represents an episode disconnected from the historical process. Proponents of the ‘short twentieth-century’ conceive 1914-1918 as forming one of history’s natural break points which signals a full stop to nineteenth-century trajectories and the bloody dawn of an *age of extremes*.\(^\text{18}\) Barbara Tuchman described the war years as ‘a band of scorched earth’ dividing a perceived *Belle Époque* from our existence.\(^\text{19}\)

That the direct consequences of the war - the deaths of millions, the redrawing of national borders, the collapse of empires and dynasties, shifts in the balance of power, the acceleration

\(^{17}\) Gordon Jamieson Calman’s personnel record is preserved within Archives New Zealand (ANZ)-R21891311-AABK-18805-W5530-33-0021762, ‘CALMAN, Gordon Jamieson-WW1 39948-Army’.


of technological advancement, the modernisation of warfare, the radicalisation of politics and the outbreak of revolutions - signify the disruption and upheaval of the pre-1914 order is clearly meaningful. It is worth noting that the outlook of some contemporaries suggest themes of rupture are not entirely a construction of post-war commentators. The most remembered is Edward Grey’s haunting obituary of the pre-1914 order of the ‘lamps going out’ over Europe. Where such sentiments become a burden is when understanding of the war is reduced to that of a disjointed chapter, disconnected from the flow of history. Stephen Badsey has described public comprehension of the Great War as based around the notion that the conflict was

such a uniquely terrible experience that it cannot be understood as part of any historical process or analysis. Instead, it can only be understood through the emotional response of individuals, and in particular the works of literature and art produced by participants.\(^{20}\)

Consequently the war blurs into a set of salient images and phrases - trenches, gasmasks, ‘over by Christmas’, mud, poetry, machine guns, *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*, poppies, ‘lions led by donkeys’ and endless rows of crosses - powerful, but devoid of wider comprehension or context.

If one takes the rationalist approach that imagery and emotion are not substitutes for knowledge, then the issue becomes the question of how to secure the war within its historical circumstances. The solution elected by one school of thought has been to focus on political and military decisions in an effort to contextualise events and actions.\(^{21}\) Within New Zealand historiography this route can be identified in works such as Ian McGibbon’s *The Path to Gallipoli*, which argues the consistency between New Zealand’s defence policies and goals circa 1840-1915 and participation in the invasion of a Turkish beach. According to McGibbon, ‘New Zealand’s participation in the First World War was the logical outcome of a defence policy which depended on the power of Great Britain.’\(^{22}\) However New Zealand’s cultural or ideological path to Gallipoli and the links between the public mind (rather than political mind) and events towards and into 1914 have been less plotted. This study contends that cultural routes can likewise be taken in setting the war within its historical milieu.


Over the last few decades this manner of approach has generated hearty debate within the international literature, and the study of the interaction of mobilisation and culture has produced valuable insights. The major trend has been an increased appreciation of how societies and cultures engaged with wartime conditions. Jay Winter has studied how cultures - high, mass and national - grappled with aspects of the war - enthusiasm, aims, sacrifice and remembrance. John Horne has called for a more sophisticated awareness of how the sentiments of national communities intersected with the war. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker have argued for comprehension of notions of Union sacrée, and other national equivalents, as driving forces in retaining the consent of belligerent populations to accept immense sacrifices. Christopher Capozzola has documented the war as an episode which refined physical and ideological aspects of modern citizenship in the United States (US). Nicoletta Gullace frames the conflict as an event in which the link between gender and citizenship was renegotiated within Great Britain’s cultural and political spheres. Tammy Proctor argues that the totalising nature of the war saw the crafting of modern comprehension, psychology and rhetoric around civilians.

New Zealand historiography has been far from proactive in contributing to, or considering, such developments. In her 2003 assessment of the successes and limits of New Zealand military history, Deborah Montgomerie observed a general neglect in questioning how New Zealand’s military history and social patterns relate:

many of the big questions that dominate the intersections between social history’s agenda and that of military history remain unanswered. There is still a marked reluctance to connect the history of twentieth-century warfare with the making of twentieth-century masculinity, or to move beyond consideration of the many notable achievements of the Maori Battalion and the Maori war effort organizations to an examination of military service’s impact on Maori-Pakeha relations. War’s impact on the regional and ethnic identities of all New Zealanders, Maori and Pakeha, also deserves attention. There is also a curious silence about the impact of mass military mobilization on New Zealand patterns of class relations and social stratification.

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The overwhelming feature of the historiography has been the, not illogical, convention of contemplating the Great War as a military event. The first generation of official histories, backed by the service and regional histories written through the early 1920s, largely established what has become the favoured approach of skipping to what happened ‘over there’ as soon as possible, Gallipoli in particular is something of a national focus. These works moved fast and light on the New Zealand society that raised and sent the armies and the focus upon images of national excellence - ‘instinctive’ and ‘enthused’ are the quintessential terms employed in describing reaction to the war - obscured the complexity of social interaction with the war effort; it goes without saying that dissent, industrial unrest, social unrest, anti-German activity and conscientious objection made limited features. This is not to suggest a static quality to study of the topic. Following international trends in the mid 1980s and early 1990s, a renewed burst of attention to the social dimensions of the Great War saw an increased effort to unpack the world of the battlefield through analyses of diaries, letters and interviews; it was this period in which the pioneering works of Christopher Pugsley, Jock Phillips, Nicholas Boyack and Jane Tolerton were penned. Additionally, in contrast to the first generation, more recent histories, and even sober military historians, have displayed degrees of scepticism around images of homogenous fervour greeting the war.25

The task of unpacking what happened ‘over here’ has seemingly been a less alluring assignment. Indeed a fair argument could be made that New Zealand remains the most understudied location within the study of New Zealand’s Great War. This is curious in that the home front was the location within which 90 percent of New Zealanders experienced the Great War and is a site rich with issues deserving analysis. The results of the war effort were seen on the fields and streets of New Zealand as well as the fields of battle in Turkey, Egypt and France. Moreover, New Zealand is a well situated locale for considering cultural mobilisation within belligerent societies. As the war placed extreme strains upon nations, the maintenance of consent emerged as a significant factor in sustaining an effective war effort. Well-organised and cohesive societies were able to tap deeper wells of social capital, built up from the momentum of years/generations of socialisation and civil society. New Zealand society, circa 1914-1918, with its small, tightly knit population and modernised institutions provides a suitable scale model to test wider historiographical issues and theories; here we

have an opportunity to contemplate what Great War and New Zealand history have to teach one another.

The ultimate pattern has been that of military history concerning itself with campaigns whilst social history has flirted with, rather than devoted itself to, the topic. General histories have incorporated the war and its social impacts into wider themes and developments, whereas precise home front topics have been examined in lieu of considering the whole. Indeed a respectable historiography concerning political angles and instances of resistance and dissent has grown since the first generation of histories. Postgraduate research and scholarly articles have elected to study a range of political/social/cultural topics including anti-Germanism, children’s experiences, the war effort’s impact on sport, venereal disease (VD), cartoons, photography, rural New Zealand and the dynamics of Military Service Boards.26 Lastly popular/political histories, in the mould of Chris Trotter’s No Left Turn or Stevan Eldred-Grigg’s The Great Wrong War, attempt little beyond expressing outrage about the war. Little has been done over the last two decades to revise or add to Paul Baker’s 1988 King and Country Call, which remains the landmark study in meshing various social elements of New Zealand’s Great War experience into an overarching narrative - namely the introduction and implementation of conscription. All this means that there has been extraordinarily little effort made to understand the society at war through 1914-1918 and the enormity of the physical effort stands in contrast to the questioning of just what drove, supported or justified such an effort. A 2007 assessment from the anthology New Zealand’s Great War – a notable exception to the pattern – notes that ‘New Zealand historians have not given this great national effort the attention it deserves.’27 This remains pertinent in 2013.

Modern society and grand manipulation?

Surveying New Zealand society’s engagement with the war effort, and the nature of that engagement, requires an appreciation of the major physical and cultural features of the society in question.\(^2\) The way the public sphere of the New Zealand society which entered and fought the Great War functioned reflected rapid transformations occurring within social structures. As modernisation eroded elements of an older frontier dynamic, a new society, characterised, as Erik Olssen puts it, ‘by towns and cities, bureaucracy, specialization, and organisation emerged. The social structure became more complex, the division of labour more intricate, the distinction between rural and urban more obvious.’\(^3\) The major ‘isms’ bubbling within the public sphere - imperialism, nationalism, capitalism, liberalism, militarism, social Darwinism, feminism and socialism - likewise reflect the engagement between the public sphere and the major issues of the modernising world.

The emerging power structure under modernity has attracted attention in considerations of the public sphere’s relationship with its denizens and the nature of this relationship has important implications for how the interaction between modern society and war effort is conceived. One school of thought observes that modern developments saw states realise that their legitimacy and capacity to rule rested upon a much larger body of support than in previous ages.\(^4\) That mass opinion had become a factor of political rule spoke of a wider consciousness among the general public and the attainment of not insignificant means to participate and negotiate within public debates. A liberal political tradition had seen the ballot made secret after 1870 and property qualifications abolished after 1879. The franchise expanded to include Maori men in 1867 and women in 1893. Compulsory education had been introduced in 1877 and by 1901 93.37 percent of the population could read and write.\(^5\)

Additionally, modern infrastructure and modern mediums facilitated the development of mass cultures and allowed larger shared experiences and wider cultural exchanges. Movie screening, to take the prime example of a modern medium, had started early in New Zealand;

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\(^2\) Indeed scholars have noted a need to refine Habermas’ take on the public sphere by recognising that the clubs, salons and coffee houses of his study of eighteenth-century Europe provide a particular example of the operation of the public sphere, not a universal model. See Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, Social Text, No.25/26 (1990), pp.56-80.


the first commercial screening occurred less than a year after European demonstrations, and purpose-built cinemas emerged after 1910 as the novelty evolved into a favourite form of mass entertainment. By 1915 there were 184 cinemas and by 1916 an estimated 320,000 New Zealanders frequented these theatres each week. Older means of exchange also jostled with the emerging mass culture; sporting events, advertisement and print, for instance, began to reflect the realities of mass engagement, mass consumption and mass literacy. These realities are all reflected within the confirmation of the newspaper as an indispensible feature of modern life. Indeed, when the French writer André Siegfried visited turn-of-the-century New Zealand he observed a flourishing press culture: ‘The newspaper has a very high place in New Zealand. Everyone reads it, and there are few people ignorant or old-fashioned enough not to be interested in the news.’ Records of circulation figures through the period back this observation. The variety of titles also reflects the advent of mass literacy and an expanding public sphere. Some catered to middle-class sensibilities, with the editorial lines of the New Zealand Herald and the Dominion leaning towards a conservative/establishment stance, the Otago Daily Times a more moderate posturing and the Evening Post taking a politically liberal position. At the other end of the spectrum, the Maoriland Worker emerged as a voice of the militant labour movement. Other papers looked to transcend sectional interests and the Otago Witness, New Zealand Observer and the New Zealand Free Lance sought populist appeal by focusing on sport, social commentary and illustrations. More tabloid and almost in a category of its own, the New Zealand Truth successfully built mass appeal by selling itself as a champion of the interests/values of the common man, espousing lib-lab politics and the allure of muck-racking. Cartoons appeared within the pages of many of these titles and provided another medium which circulated ideas and cultural sentiments in public space, permitting another conduit to impart ideas to the masses.

Another school of thought notes that modernity offered new opportunities to socialise, seduce, regiment and repress. State provision of education might be charged with a dissemination of official versions of history and politics; editorials and cartoons with

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34 André Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, translated by E.V. Burns (Wellington, 1982), p.323.
establishing issues as well as reporting them; mass sports and cinema with insulating and distracting crowds from reality; marketing and official proclamations with providing means to affirm individuals as citizens and/or consumers. The shape of public culture, the argument runs, is the result of manipulation as elites translate their agendas into models of mass conformity. Peter Gibbons, for instance, claims that the gentry and the urban bourgeoisie determined New Zealand’s ‘climate of opinion’ between the 1890s-1930s, establishing conventions and suppressing alternatives: ‘the ruling classes successfully projected their particular ideological views to the extent that the subordinate classes generally accepted them as the natural way of ordering and interpreting the world.’ Gibbons regards this process as one that left some social groups - notably Maori, women and the lower classes - with minimal influence.

These claims of elite manipulation feature even more prominently as this society went to war. Indeed tied to dominant conceptions of the war as a futile tragedy, notions of grand manipulators loom large in modern memory as figures deemed culpable. These villains are charged with possessing poor reasons for going to war and conducting themselves incompetently and/or wickedly during it (cause and conduct being the traditional rules of thumb for a ‘just war’). Within contemporary popular/political books Chris Trotter has summarised the aims and workings of New Zealand’s war effort to the effect that ‘fascist impulses’ saw ‘Bill Massey’s government’ ‘dispatch’ New Zealanders to the killing fields to sustain New Zealand’s protein industries. Likewise, Stevan Eldred-Grigg describes New Zealand’s wartime leaders as ‘quivering bundles of emotion, swept by passion, behaving childishly when they made up their minds to send away a murderous army.’ Similar ideas are found in the limited scholarly work on wider home front dynamics. Gwen Parsons, for example, considers social discourse in Christchurch society as dominated by a ‘pro-war elite’.

However, the literature has taken a haphazard approach to the issue of manipulation, often focusing upon dissent and resistance and veering towards perceiving consent as further

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38 Chris Trotter, No Left Turn: The Distortion of New Zealand’s History by Greed, Bigotry and Right-Wing Politics (Auckland, 2007), pp.104-106.  
39 Stevan Eldred-Grigg, The Great Wrong War (Auckland, 2010), p.73.  
evidence of the manipulation and deception of the masses. A comment made by Christopher Bayly rings true here;

Historians have often tried to have their cake and eat it. They like to argue that the peasant, the tribesman, the woman, or the working-class man have ‘autonomy’. Yet, when it comes to emotions like patriotism or nationalism, of which they disapprove, that agency is denied to ordinary people who are deemed to be dupes of the elites or automata easily stamped with the mark of state power.  

The lack of a holistic methodology has left conspicuous questions unanswered. Should elites be defined in classical notions as those who wield political power and influence? If so, how are the non-political aspects of mobilisation accounted for? Can ‘elite’ status be expanded to encapsulate press editors, the clergy, business interests and community leaders as well as politicians? If it can - perhaps under Geraint Parry’s schema of elites as defined via ‘the three c’s’ - then how was this diverse alliance formed, co-ordinated and maintained? Even more significantly, the existence of a powerful and active elite begs answers to the question of what role(s) the wider public played in accepting, rejecting or interacting with this elite? In short how should we consider public engagement with an elite-operated mobilisation process; coerced, co-opted, conformist, compliant, co-conspirators?

This is not to dismiss the task – indeed this thesis is intended to throw a hat into the ring. The above studies are prudent to question the relationship between public culture and the general public, especially in times of war. Neither are the charges baseless. In a very real way the war effort demonstrates the capacity of modern society to instil ideas and shape behaviour and was an active attempt to do so. Thus alongside their own often bellicose editorials, newspapers carried advertisements for the Defence Department. Schools disseminated patriotic lessons. Modern patronage of the cinema was exploited and lantern slides were distributed to major theatres and use by recruiters as sites for patriotic demonstrations. Perhaps as much as the machine gun or the trenches, the modern state, with its capacity to direct the energy of the nation, was an essential element in determining the shape the First World War took. Modern bureaucracy with its ability to record, organise and regulate was a crucial factor in mobilising armies, raising money, prioritising resources and shoring up

42 The three c’s are consciousness, coherence and conspiracy (connoting common will rather than secret machinations). Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London, 1969), pp.31-32.
43 ANZ-R10075019-AAYS-8698-AD82-7-56, ‘Advertising, February 1916-January 1918’.
44 ANZ-R10075029-AAYS-8698-AD82-8-58, ‘Pictures-May, October 1916’.
consensus through calling for consent or via the application of coercion. During the war there was an expansion of officialdom and increased bureaucratic intrusion into national and individual life as the state gained and exercised an array of landmark powers. Passports were introduced to restrict and regulate movement, the male population aged 17-60 was registered for military service and conscription was introduced under the 1916 Military Service Act, bringing legal power to bear on those who would not enlist voluntarily.45 Medical Boards assessed whether men were fit to fight whilst Military Service Boards determined whether they had acceptable reasons not to. A National Efficiency Board was formed in 1917 with the task of formulating how New Zealand might better organise manpower for the war effort. Its suggestions tended to focus on issues of social control, notably the restriction of amusements, the organisation of businesses and efforts to reduce alcohol consumption. Repression saw the internment of enemy aliens and an experiment to coerce 14 conscientious objectors into taking up combat roles by sending them to the frontlines in France. The results, recorded by the most remembered of those 14, Archibald Baxter, were imprisonment, starvation, beatings and field punishments. The 1918 Expeditionary Forces Amendment Act withdrew the civil rights of those on the ‘Military Defaulters List’ for ten years following the war.46 This barred defaulters from holding public employment or office and from exercising political rights as electors or as members of any public authority.

Certainly state authority was a salient and powerful force. However, while there were Kafkaesque incidences of state and bureaucratic power being wielded over the individual, the aforementioned events took place within a larger context and often involved wider forces and more deeply rooted cultural patterns which predated and outlasted the Great War. The Military Service Boards were purposely designed to have little government input and only a minimal military one, due to the belief that the public would not look favourably on a board with ‘too much of the military element on it.’47 Likewise the National Efficiency Board was composed of regional community figures. The 14 objectors sent to France were dispatched without government sanction by Colonel Potter, who acted on his own initiative.48 None of this is to deny state power as a powerful agent in the public sphere, but we need to go beyond

45 New Zealand Gazette (NZG), 15 November 1915, pp.3813-3814.
46 The Military Defaulters List catalogued those who, in the Defence Minister’s opinion, intended to permanently evade military service in the present war. NZS, 1918, No.9, Section 13.
47 NZPD, Vol.175, 11 May 1916, p.47.
this. The concept of grand manipulators in wartime society is not a hollow one but often hides humble and ordinary manipulators.

The limits of state power also need to be better appreciated. While those with authority attempted to rally, charm or threaten the citizenry to their cause(s), they were riding waves, not controlling them. Men like the Defence Minister Sir James Allen, Prime Minister William Massey and Deputy Leader Joseph Ward were pulled by various considerations and needs springing from London and locals and by competing civilian and military demands. Allen in particular appears more a prisoner of events than a Machiavelli triumphant. Acting Prime Minister for 23 months of the war, - due to Massey and Ward attending conferences in London - Allen faced 90 hour working weeks, ugly social divisions and the personal tragedy of his son’s death at Gallipoli. Allen’s personal papers are filled with correspondence from diverse figures indicative, not of state designs over passive masses, but of elements of public culture seeking to align the state within their designs - indicative that the wartime public sphere retained the capacity to transmit ideas and forces up and across as well as down the social structure. These included concerns that German neighbours were spies, requests to arm white men in case of Maori uprisings or complaints of Red Fed disloyalty. Some wrote demanding crackdowns on conscientious objectors, war profiteers or offering the names of shirkers in their district. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) asked him to post women outside brothels to shame approaching soldiers. The Women’s Anti-German League (WAGL) demanded a solution to the ‘alien problem’ in New Zealand. The press lambasted him for outbreaks of disease at Trentham training camp, for his ‘meagre’ reinforcement rates and (before mid 1916) for not introducing conscription and consequently facilitating shirkers. Effectively he became a face for New Zealand’s war effort and thus a target of abuse for the inadequacies and problems that system faced. At the end of the war a political colleague dubbed him ‘the best abused man in New Zealand.’

He seems to have survived through a fanatical work ethic and dour adherence to duty. This effort weared him and by 1919 he was considering standing down from Parliament, though he was convinced not to by Massey. These ‘grand manipulators’ often seem more aptly described in Henry

49 ‘Red Feds’ was the popular name for the New Zealand Federation of Labour (FOL).
50 See ANZ, Sir James Allen Papers, ‘Semi-official papers-record group-16145’.
51 NZPD, Vol.183, 29 November 1918, p.579.
Kissinger’s charge against Great War era European governments; they committed the ‘cardinal sin of statecraft: They lost control over events.’

The roles of consent, coercion and civil society
There are many complexities regarding the role of individual agency in both the Great War and in the societies that waged it. Notions of hegemony correctly realise that public culture is only democratic by degree. Rather than being the sum of all individual opinion, the content of the sphere reflects discourses that achieve dominance via various means. However, ‘not fully democratic’ does not equal autocratic and one should not be too quick to regard ‘mass opinion’ and ‘dominant discourse’ as without overlap. A widespread populist creed within New Zealand emphasised the expectation that the common person (at least the common virtuous, white male) should be able to secure domestic, civic and economic prospects. Barriers to social mobility or conspicuous displays of class privilege thus raised populist hackles. While few would disagree that, relative to modern New Zealand, models of conformity were robust and that race, sex and class, were significant factors in determining social experience, re-evaluations of the dynamics of agency and engagement complicate notions of a voiceless ‘peripheral majority’.

Mobilisation occurred at numerous levels of social organisation and state mobilisation was but one of these. Additionally, wartime representations did not simply emerge as a passive public culture was shaped by the forces of a vertical mobilisation. Rather they reflect a horizontal engagement that retained, but retrained, many of the images, fashions and patterns of public culture – although with increased intensity and with values asserted with more conviction and less ambiguity. An illustration of this is seen in two Auckland newspapers in the early months of the war. On 28 November 1914, William Blomfield sketched an image presenting the meaning of the war in public culture. In Blomfield’s vision the war is

54 The term ‘peripheral majority’ is taken from a section of Keith Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity (Wellington, 1986), pp.195-235.
presented as a defence of British values and traditions and the privileges and duties of citizens (fig.2). In the cartoon a citizen, defending his wife, children, property and freedoms, takes up his rifle, labelled ‘manhood suffrage’, and mans a ballot box barricade. That barricade is being stormed by a horde of prohibitionists, with their ally the Turk, who wave daggers labelled ‘intolerance’ and ‘despotism’. In an inset the composition of the scene is duplicated, but now the citizen is a frontline soldier facing other enemies of British liberty. It is noted that the British fighting stock who have gained the world’s admiration at the front have been ‘bred on beef and beer’. The caption accompanying the image completes the link between social and actual battlefield, noting ‘the cause of freedom is worth fighting and dying for’.

A little over a week later another Auckland based newspaper presented a different understanding of the connection between New Zealand society, alcohol and the war effort. On 7 December 1914, the New Zealand Herald published The Three Unspeakables (fig.3) drawn by John Collis Blomfield (William Blomfield’s brother).56 J.C. Blomfield’s work shows a ‘sober’ and ‘courageous’ Tommy, equipped with a canteen of pure water, looking sternly upon a scene of intoxicated German and Turkish soldiers committing atrocities upon women and children outside a brewery. The image was endorsed by the Auckland based Band of Business Men, a group involved in pre-war temperance campaigns. The Blomfield brothers’ cartoons, aside from displaying ambiguities about Turkish attitudes to alcohol, are something of a microcosm of larger social dynamics around ideology and mobilisation. The common message of a fight for cultural values, alongside the opposing conclusions of what was being fought for (British liberty or British purity?), together with their timing, the personal connections between the cartoonists and the similar composition in the two pieces, suggest the second was a response to the first. Certainly both were responses to established issues in public culture. This mobilisation of the wet/dry debate is indicative of how, to utterly misquote Karl von Clausewitz, war saw a continuation of public culture by largely conventional means.

56 Future references to ‘Blomfield’ refer to William Blomfield unless otherwise stated.
Figure 2 *New Zealand Observer*, 28 November 1914, pp.12-13.

Figure 3 *New Zealand Herald*, 7 December 1914, p.11.
These representations would, in many studies, be candidates for the label of propaganda. In
that they are attempts to mobilise mass opinion via emotive appeals to slogans and images,
this is not an entirely unfair designation. However ‘propaganda’ connotes more than the
dissemination of ideas. The term invokes visions of shadowy figures, crassly attempting to
manipulate or deceive. Such conceptions of propaganda as illegitimate trickery, entirely
separate from normal discourse, can take more than they give. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau
and Annette Becker have rightly noted that what is too often dismissively called propaganda
‘was not just a vertical process but also a horizontal one, even, to some extent, a great
upsurge from below, sustained by a huge number of individuals.’57 While ‘propaganda’
might be the first word on the matter it should not be the last. Indeed the way in which
aspects of public culture became associated with martial purposes is indicative of
decentralised movements and the synergies formed between war effort and various subjects
were hardly shotgun weddings. Indeed, anti-German trade campaigns were pushed by
commercial interests. Sobriety pledges were encouraged by those involved in pre-war
prohibition debates. Sobriety pledges were encouraged by those involved in pre-war
prohibition debates. Advertisements blatantly attempted to exploit society’s war
consciousness to sell goods; ‘WAR!!! May be averted! But nothing can stop the appeal
made by Morris Prices; they are like the British Fleet – Irresistible.’58 Patriotic societies were
largely led by community figures and many existing societies adopted wartime roles and
functions. Authors made cases for the cause, musicians composed marches and cartoonists
provided some of the most visible messages of the war. One study of press censorship notes
a spirit of co-operation as a major factor in determining editorial adherence to regulations.59
Pushes for religious renewal to win God’s support for the Allied cause came from the church.
One address, given during a Methodist conference, displays how theology was tailored to
marry elements of public culture to conflict. The address adapted the words of 1 Corinthians
13; ‘You may be trained in all the arts of elocution, speak with the tongues of men and of
angels, have the gift of prophecy and know all the mysteries and all knowledge, yet if have
not strong manliness, they profit you nothing [emphasis added].’ Here the word ‘manliness’
replaces ‘love’ in the original verse.60

57 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p.109, See also J.M. Winter, ‘Propaganda and the Mobilization of
58 New Zealand Herald (NZH), 5 August 1914, p.13.
59 John Anderson, ‘Military Censorship in World War One: Its Use and Abuse in New Zealand’ (M.A. thesis,
The involvement of civil society in the results of mobilisation also has important implications for the means by which individuals committed to the war effort. Recent combat studies on discipline and morale in the frontlines have noted the importance of junior officers as mediators between officialdom and the ranks. Although sometimes identified with the army through their commissions, these men were also united, by shared dangers and deprivations, with the common soldier and this intermediary position is thought to be extremely influential in determining the behaviour and attitude of troops.\textsuperscript{61} The importance of grassroots leadership can be similarly identified in the home front. The mobilisation of the influence and/or platforms possessed by, say, civic leaders, priests, university professors or parents played a comparable role to junior officers and these individuals were also often united with the rest of society through a shared risk of loved ones (See Chapter Six). This influence meant the messages of mobilisation arrived via familiar faces. Ormond Burton, the veteran turned post-war pacifist, later noted, with a touch of disillusionment, that his call to mobilise came in the form of ‘the voices of all whom I knew and respected most. Politicians and newspaper editors were then trusted by innocent young men like myself.’ He then adds a comment which highlights the significance of established connections and deeply personal beliefs in empowering the mobilisation process; ‘what counted for me most was the fact that the Church, every part of her, backed the war as a great act of Christian righteousness.’\textsuperscript{62} The mobilisation of sentimental equipment attained its power from how it related to one’s sincere and intimate beliefs.

Furthermore, the role of coercion as a means of mobilisation should be considered in less monolithic and more nuanced terms. Antonio Gramsci asserted that the establishment and maintenance of social order invariably utilises a ‘combination of force and consent variously balancing one another’.\textsuperscript{63} Thus the issue becomes where, when and how the iron fist slipped from the velvet glove? Finding a fair litmus test of the degree of consent to coercion in wartime New Zealand remains difficult. Possibilities include the fact that for every conscript in the NZEF there were near three volunteers - 32,270 to 91,941 - or that even in 1917-1918, when all ideas of ‘the great adventure’ had been tarnished and conscription introduced, 26,000 men still volunteered; if these men were coerced it was unlikely to have been by their

government. At the extreme, one might consider the lack of mainstream calls to bring troops home, the absence of civil unrest/riots and the nonappearance of the revolutions and uprisings that Russia and Germany demonstrated were among the ultimate consequences of consent being withdrawn.

The ratios of consent/coercion used to gain/maintain an agreement or acceptance of the status quo could be modelled as a tiered process. In the first stage individuals acted as they did because they expected such behaviour of themselves - what Michel Foucault would call the internalisation and normalisation of discipline. William Astore notes this as a major explanation of how the war was perpetuated; ‘naked and coercive applications of state power were unnecessary and counterproductive when men had been taught virtually from the cradle that their duty as honorable males was to fight for their communities and nations when called upon.’ The next step saw invitations to take up social roles extended with low level, informal peer pressure. This can be more indicative of groupthink than conscious compulsion. It seems to be the force behind at least one volunteer’s uncalculated enlistment; ‘There was a parade called for the Territorials and I volunteered. I don’t know why, I think it was because I wanted to be with my mates.’ At the next level these invitations were more intensely extended through recruiting rallies, parades, pamphlets, speeches etc. The next tier saw invitations blur into demands and shame used alongside encouragement. This behaviour included abusive letters to the editor, public insults, the circulation of negative stereotypes, social ostracism and violence. This is the context in which tennis champion Anthony Wilding privately commented that ‘it would take a braver man to stand down than become a soldier.’ Finally, official power and, on more than one occasion, unsanctioned physical force reinforced social pressure to conform. Major examples in New Zealand include conscription, imprisonment and the withdrawal of civil rights. This model highlights both formal and informal forces in play as well as how more extreme manifestations of coercion developed once lesser means had failed to secure conformity. One can read the case of

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64 The ratio is muddied by the uninformed consent of the first batches of recruits, the social pressure to go and that conscripts should not be automatically classed as apathetic or coerced. Figures from NZOYB, 1919, p.257, Erik Olssen, ‘Waging War: The Home Front 1914-1918’, The People and the Land, Judith Binney, Judith Bassett, Erik Olssen ed. (Wellington, 1990), p.317.


67 Christopher Pugsley, Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story (Auckland, 1984), p.34.

Archibald Baxter as revealing the full spectrum from assuming, to asking, to telling, to demanding, to threatening, to hitting.

**Conclusion**

To summarise the essence of the thesis: cultural mobilisation is a phenomenon by which commitment to the war effort was intertwined with aspects of public culture. While this process possessed vertical dimensions it also involved horizontal developments and wider engagements than have often been appreciated. The proposition is that study of the results and means of this mobilisation will be of value and interest to New Zealand history (military and social) and to wider Great War historiography.

But how should this history be approached? The intersection of mobilisation and public culture reveals a sizeable junction. Chronologically the war spanned 51 months; investigating pre-war contexts and post-war consequences widens this scope to decades. Additionally, there are numerous cultural dimensions worthy of investigation. The solution adopted is to examine six areas where mobilisation and public culture intersected. These six intersections are areas that were extensively mobilised over the course of the war and consequently provide robust examples of how, and the means how, public culture engaged with the war. Hence, Chapter One examines trends within New Zealand’s collective identity before and into the war and how negotiated notions of ‘Britishness’ went hand in hand with increased social/political commitment to the Empire. Chapter Two investigates notions of exclusion in public culture; specifically the relationship between pre-war anti-alienism and wartime anti-Germanism. Chapter Three considers the ANZAC ethos that emerged during the war as a mobilised, and named, continuation of a longer and unnamed tradition in public culture. Chapter Four examines stereotypes of contemptible masculinity in pre-war society and how such conceptions were used to fulfil a wartime cultural need during the war. Chapter Five studies the state of the pre-war female condition and its physical and ideological relationship with wartime uses of womanpower. Finally, Chapter Six examines how public culture reacted to the losses and deprivations the war imposed and investigates the interplay between such cultural forms and the wider community.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the paths which might be walked, but an effort has been made to select those which survey diverse features of the terrain. Consequently, the thesis is able to consider issues of collective identity, gender, social movements, class and
ideologies. The common ground meshing these chapters into one overarching analysis, rather than a motley gathering of home front flotsam, is the perspective each chapter lends to surveying the results and means of cultural mobilisation and the sentimental equipment of the society which entered and fought the Great War.
Chapter One

Being British: The Mobilisation of Greater British Nationalism

‘The Youngest Child of the Family!
But our duty we’ll fulfil,
And England’s foe shall quickly know
We all are Britons still.’ – Britons All (chorus)⁶⁹

In all belligerent countries, the Great War saw an intense mobilisation of collective identity. Notions that individuals were members of a collective - characterised by such things as a unique value set, culture and civilisation - formed a central feature in explanations for the demands of the war effort. Within New Zealand, wartime representations drew heavily upon a conception that New Zealand was a distinctive part of a global British order - a Greater Britain; the ‘value sets, culture and civilisation’ were near invariably designated as ‘British’. Greater Britain was, and remains, an amorphous concept with numerous nominated permutations of shape and structure. Some thinkers argued for the inclusion of the US under the Greater British umbrella. Others drew the boundaries to encapsulate the entirety of the British Empire, including its less formal holdings and interests. The most common nominations, however, tend(ed) towards association between Britain and the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa. Besides geography, racial boundaries/barriers offered implicit, and sometimes explicit, explanations for the shape and meaning of Greater Britain. The thinking behind Alfred Milner’s claim that ‘my patriotism knows no geographical but only racial limits … I am a British race patriot’ highlights the racial inclusion, and racist exclusion, within strands of Greater British nationalism.⁷⁰

Wartime conceptions were mobilised continuations of pre-war conceptions of New Zealand collective identity in which Greater British nationalism was a central feature. Greater British sentiment is, however, a concept not yet fully explored in the historiography. Within the traditional approach to the subject of New Zealand identity, the central navigated terms have been those of ‘imperialism’ and ‘nationalism’. Both terms are potentially slippery concepts, whose place and meaning in settlement colonies is observed as thrice hampered by ‘terminology, conceptualization, and ideological inflection.’⁷¹ Clear definitions might go

⁶⁹ Britons All (Wellington, 191?).
some way to managing these issues. In the bulk of the historiography ‘imperialism’ appears to signify imperial patriotism - that is loyalty to the institutions or territories of an empire. Meanwhile nationalism denotes the sentiment that a population shares uniting characteristics, defined in cultural, ethnic, ideological or historical terms.

A central dynamic has been the supposed contradictions between these categories – that they signify contending, even incompatible forces. In some accounts this has led to zero-sum games, with loyalty and identity being channelled towards one ‘ism’ at the expense of the other; ‘New Zealanders were patriotic’ but ‘not to New Zealand itself, but to the “mother country” Great Britain.’ Additionally much work on the subject was completed during an era of New Zealand history writing after the sun set on the British Empire. That that empire is now a historical subject seems to have lent weight to Turgot’s notion that colonial fruit clinging to the tree only until they ripen. New Zealand’s history is, the thinking runs, the story of a colony growing towards its destiny of independent nationhood and transcending colonial dependency. One cannot probe far into this subject without coming across the idea that the First World War represents either a watershed moment or a significant milestone towards the construction of modern New Zealand nationalism. The narrative of identity and character being forged in combat, notably at Gallipoli, is common within popular publications and contemporary sentiments.

To the modern nationalist mindset Greater British sentiment can appear undesirable, at worst tainted via association with the exploitation and chauvinism of imperial designs, at the least detracting or embarrassing to narratives of independent identity. At times sentiments of ‘thwarted nationalism’ - the notion that various machinations imposed an artificial British identity and suppressed or delayed the realisation of a more innately correct national destiny - can be detected. However Greater British nationalism is a phenomenon that needs to be approached on its own terms without the chronocentric anxieties of post-imperial New Zealanders. The influence of notions of Greater Britain is of immense importance in explaining social and political movements, including entry and participation in the Great War. We need to grasp, if not like, the reality that turn-of-the-century New Zealanders did

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not, as a rule, perceive their collective identity as an anachronistic origin point or a subordinate role waiting to be transcended.

New considerations have brought a different approach to the subject of the place of Empire in the collective identities of the Dominions. Increased comprehension of Greater Britain as constituting an informal reality has arisen within imperial, British and former Dominion historiography within the last two decades. In a sense this is a reconsideration of Victorian concepts of global Britishness expressed by writers such as Sir Charles Dilke and John Seeley – though not necessarily sharing the aspiring or celebratory tone of Victorian triumphalism. Dilke himself coined the phrase ‘Greater Britain’ to describe the global Anglo community he claimed to witness as he travelled through North America and Australasia in the 1860s. In a similar manner Seeley reasoned, in *The Expansion of England*, that the settlement colonies were organic extensions of Britain, rather than entirely separate nations or foreign regions to be ruled. To be British, Seeley claimed, was to be part of ‘a great homogeneous people, one in blood language religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space.’

This brand of thinking weighed heavily on the collective identity of the New Zealand that entered the war. Whether this identity is termed ‘nationalism’ or ‘imperialism’ is more an issue of semantics than of the reality of the time and largely projects modern perspectives upon the social consensus of the past which harmonised notions of a global Britishness and a distinct New Zealand Britishness. Rather than a zero sum game between the contradictory forces of ‘imperialism’ and ‘nationalism’, collective identity in New Zealand functioned in the manner of any imagined community. It provided a conception of inclusion within a community beyond the everyday perspective and a mythology that explained the state of things. If notions of regional Britishness are christened as nationalism (or proto-nationalism), it comes with the caveat that the Britishness it enthroned was believed to be a part of an identity shared across a global family. In turn, if this penchant for cultural links beyond the nation is dubbed imperialism, it comes with the caution that the Britishness established in New Zealand was promoted as a distinctive, perhaps superior, brand. James Belich has described something along these lines in the notion of ‘Better Britishness’ - a philosophy which maintained that New Zealanders were ‘even more loyal and closely linked to Old

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Britain than other neo-Britains, but also that they were in some respects superior to Old Britons.\textsuperscript{76}

This chapter tracks major developments in public imagining of collective identity in New Zealand society towards the Great War. These include the developments in New Zealand’s connections with the British Empire, examination of how regional identity sat with this connection and consideration of the influence this understanding of collective identity had within the wider public sphere. All these developments are crucial to comprehending the wartime representations which emerged around collective identity during the war.

**Imperial integration**

The most significant factors in the shape of New Zealand’s collective identity towards 1914-1918 are developments towards the end of the long nineteenth-century. The new phase of nationalism that unfurled across the modernising world at this time occurred alongside a process of tighter integration across the British Empire. Consequently collective identity was shaped by forces that increasing allowed the country to function as a unit as well as allowing New Zealand to function as part of a Greater British system. Both forms of integration were simultaneously unfolding processes that, rather than clashing or competing, managed to form a harmonious consensus.

This process reflects the tenets of Benedict Anderson’s classic study on the manner by which notions of community, beyond face to face contact, spread. A central notion of Anderson’s thesis is that the workings of technology, institutions and motives can bring loosely aligned peoples and territories into increased contact with centralised states, the economic processes of mass production/consumption and instil common ideas through print culture.\textsuperscript{77} These shared experiences can become the basis for formulating a collective identity, ‘an imagined community’, which engages those peoples in contact with these forces. The tenets of this thesis might be observed in modernising New Zealand where the agents of centralisation - railways, central government, improved roads, steam power, mass printing, post offices, education systems and telegraphs - allowed regions to be knitted together and hence to function as, and to be more strongly conceived, as a community. For example, discrepancies


in regional timekeeping were ended in 1869 when the Colonial Time Service Observatory established mean time. A daily signal sent to the Wellington telegraph office was transmitted to post offices and railway stations across the country by Morse code at 9 a.m. After 1876 transmissions sent from Wellington charted, not simply the time, but political decisions passed by a central government. Among the early political mandates was the 1877 *Education Act* which established compulsory mass education for New Zealand youth with standardised textbooks disseminating official versions of history and politics.

However modernisation was driving a second process as New Zealand was increasingly exposed to the wider world. For example, by the 1870s the major regions of New Zealand had been brought into near instant communication via a telegraph network. However the ‘new nervous system’ of the Empire (in the phrasing of the Canadian imperialist George Parkin) saw cable and telegraph links unfurl across the regions of the Empire through the same period. In 1877 Cable Bay was plugged directly into the wider network which delivered information across the length of Empire in hours. Among other things this allowed London news to become local news, promoting what Simon Potter has called an ‘overarching sense of Britishness.’

The economic dimensions of this integration are readily apparent. The scale and types of goods shipped between the British and New Zealand isles grew out of the developing patterns of modern consumption where a globalising British economy increasingly turned to the world’s markets. By 1881 the United Kingdom was importing near half the world’s meat exports and was the largest market for wool and cotton. Between 1905-1909 56 percent of cereals, 76 percent of cheese and 68 percent of the eggs were imported. Consumption patterns altered too. Most relevantly the amount of meat - notably beef - consumed by the average resident of the United Kingdom was 14 percent higher in 1910 than 30 years

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81 Elisabeth Airey, *The Taming of Distance: New Zealand’s First International Telecommunications* (Wellington, 2005).
previously. Once again this demand for flesh on the tables of Great Britain was outsourced to overseas suppliers.

New Zealand producers moved to exploit these demands. In 1886 New Zealand supplied 20,666 tons of mutton and beef; by 1913 this had increased to 128,000 tons. Indeed there was a great tightening of New Zealand’s trade links with the British market in the latter half of the nineteenth-century. This is best observed between 1861 and 1876, where exports to the United Kingdom climbed, with a few dips, from 37 percent to 80 percent. Conversely over the same period trade exports to ‘British colonies’ (read Australia) declined from 61 to 17 percent, while exports to ‘foreign’ destinations never exceeded 5 percent. By 1913, shipments of meat, dairy products and wool to the United Kingdom compromised near 80 percent of New Zealand exports. Alongside economic integration, this re-orientation reflects a tightening familiarity between producers and customers. Indeed a shared Britishness is apparent in the branding of goods flowing between New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which were marketed as British for British taste. James Belich has argued that the successful marketing of New Zealand lamb in London as ‘British from New Zealand’ implies a degree of Greater British comprehension in the public consciousness of both countries. Conversely the idea of British quality and style was used by New Zealand merchants to assist in selling goods originating from the United Kingdom – which amounted to 60 percent of New Zealand’s imports in 1913. These tighter links gave British imports a greater prestige within the New Zealand cultural landscape and are indicative of Belich’s ‘recolonisation thesis’, where Anglophone settler populations gravitated towards the economic and cultural pull of metropolises.

Alongside economic interests, national security provides another perspective of the process of imperial integration. Approaching the turn-of-the-century the Pacific, betraying its name, became an arena for Great Power competition. Between 1884-1900 the German flag was raised in New Guinea, the Caroline Islands, the Mariana Islands and Samoa, the US annexed

86 Hamish Fraser, p.153.
88 Prichard, p.209.
90 Prichard, p.209.
91 Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*. 
Hawaii and France and Russia were rumoured to be poised to unfurl their designs on the region. Conflicts erupted in the Pacific theatre of the Spanish-American War, the US invasion of the Philippines, the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Improvements in communication and transportation also facilitated a better local understanding of the balance of power. New Zealanders were more aware of tension between Russia and Britain in the 1880s than they were in the 1850s; the Crimean War was 96 days old before New Zealanders learnt of it, whilst details of the 1885 Panjdeh incident were piped fresh into local news hours after the event. Such observations suggested the world was a dangerous place for an isolated outpost and the Spanish-American War reinforced the lesson that an empire’s colonies might be attacked in lieu of its centre.

In the decades before 1914, the notion that New Zealand’s regional security depended on a British guarantee, and that local efforts to promote imperial unity and supplement British strength could preserve that guarantee, became core philosophies in defence planning. In this vein Prime Minister Richard Seddon proclaimed his belief that ‘our strength lies in being an integral part of the mighty British Empire and that we should help to maintain its unity intact.’ Likewise, while claiming that the British Navy was New Zealand’s first line of defence, Legislative Council member Seymour George argued ‘let us give liberally, and let us do all in our power to add to the strength of the British fleet in these waters.’ At the 1911 Imperial Conference Joseph Ward unveiled his plan for an Imperial Parliament of Defence, an entity which would be responsible for the Empire’s security and empowered to tax the whole of the Empire to meet this purpose. It would seem to be no coincidence that some of the most ardent supporters of imperial unity sprung from the smaller, most isolated and economically dependent of the Dominions.

A strategy of greater participation with Britain to secure local security was conceived at the end of the nineteenth-century and McGibbon dates the origins of co-ordinated imperial defence planning in both Wellington and London to this period. New Zealand troops were first dispatched to international destinations at this time; between 1897 and 1902 fourteen separate army contingents were raised and shipped to locations within the Greater British

93 NZPD, Vol.110, 28 September 1899, p.96.
94 NZPD, Vol.128, 1 July 1904, p.66.
world: 10 to South Africa, 2 to Great Britain and 2 to Australia. On sea as on land New Zealand’s policy was based on the notion that a strong, co-ordinated Empire and New Zealand’s interests ran parallel. With British rule of the waves being touted as fundamental to New Zealand’s defence, concern was expressed when relative strength waned; as the Evening Post soberly stated ‘Great Britain can defend the Atlantic; she can defend the Pacific just as certainly; whether she could, if pressed in both oceans, defend her possessions in each equally is a grave question.’ Efforts were made to boost British sea power, including increases to New Zealand’s annual naval subsidy to £40,000 in 1903 and to £100,000 in 1908 as well as Prime Minister Ward’s conspicuous gift of a Dreadnought to the Royal Navy in 1909.

Determining the power dynamics of these arrangements is complex to say the least. Some interpretations centralise notions of manipulation. One study of identity, for instance, notes you can look in the New Zealand newspapers during the Boer War, during the All Black tour of England in 1905, again in the First World War, and what always gets the prominence is what upper-class English twits say about New Zealanders. That’s how we came to judge who we were - by hearing what these upper-class Englishmen said about us.

Certainly thinkers in Great Britain were not unaware of how a more integrated Empire might benefit Britain. At the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference in 1884, the Conservative MP W.H. Smith remarked that ‘for all practical purposes the electric telegraph and steam have brought the most distant and remote colony into nearer relations, and certainly into greater sympathy, with the interests of Government in the capital of London.’ However imperial integration, for the white settler Dominions at least, was not simply a project of central metropolitan designs imposed on unwilling and/or extraordinary pliant peoples, but an enterprise of mutual exchange and interaction expressed in economic and cultural terms. Given that imperial links were exploited by New Zealand for advantages in British markets, British security and British prestige, any clear pattern of manipulation is blurred. The fact that Britain factored largely in New Zealand’s economic and security might make cynicism

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97 EP, 8 August 1908, p.11.
an explanation for New Zealand’s interest in empire. An economy based on the demands of the British market allowed a standard of living in New Zealand which claimed, by the turn-of-the-century, to boast average incomes among the highest in the world; a claim which modern analysis of New Zealand’s real GDP per capita validate.\textsuperscript{101} Certainly the consumption of food, drink and clothing is noted as averaging £35 per head (compared to £32 in the US and £29 in the United Kingdom).\textsuperscript{102} Likewise, ‘Ward’s Dreadnought’ and plans for imperial defence are sometimes read as knee-jerk patriotism by a fervently imperialist Prime Minister. However the act needs to be contextualised as part of an established strategy where conspicuous displays of loyalty and efforts to boost imperial strength were believed to be tied to New Zealand’s interests. In that the annual subsidy to the Royal Navy was a fraction of the actual cost of defence and avoided the financial burdens of the alternatives, namely defence co-operation with Australia and/or the construction of an independent navy, this belief was valid.\textsuperscript{103}

However cynicism, or at least cynicism alone, does not give the entire picture of New Zealand’s connections with the Empire. The expansive changes in the realm of technological capacity and parallel shifts in political thought, trade and defence intertwined with emotive and ideological ties, rather than realpolitik or business attitudes. The imperial integration functioned, in the same manner as nationalism, to tighten notions of identity and belonging across the regions being integrated. Hence alongside the actual shrinking effects of modern technology on distance were psychological equivalents and tighter economic interaction and political arrangements correlated with perceptions of familiarity and community. To modern technology oceans, rather than boundaries or barriers, were sea lanes - natural railways - which permitted the mass transit of material. As one New Zealand explanation of Greater Britain, distilled for schoolchildren, put it; ‘The British Empire may be likened to a large house containing many rooms, varying greatly in size, the access to each being through various salt water passages.’\textsuperscript{104} The emerging Greater British mythology renegotiated distance, tightened inclusion and plastered over differences in a manner that would, in other contexts, be dubbed ‘nation building’. This was the notion of English statesmen such as W.E. Forster who spoke, in 1875, of the erosion of the constraints of natural barriers; ‘science

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has brought together the ends of the earth, and made it possible for a nation to have oceans roll between its provinces.”

National development and imperial integration, therefore, were simultaneously unfolding processes and the shape of collective identity in New Zealand was fashioned by both of these forces. The resulting arrangement is witnessed in Seddon’s claims that New Zealanders were ‘a portion of the dominant family of the world - we are of the English-speaking race. Our kindred are scattered in different parts of the globe, and wherever they are, no matter how far distant apart, there is a feeling of affection.’ Such ideas were not limited to political rhetoric. A popular locally written song, The Old Flag, was originally composed in 1885 and reprinted with the outbreak of the Boer War. The lyrics demonstrate a perceived unity between New Zealand and old British forms which transcend distance.

Three crosses in the Union,
Three crosses in the Jack —
And we’ll add to it now the Cross of the South,
And stand by it back to back.

Though other skies above us shine,
When danger's tempest lowers,
We'll show the world that Britain's cause
And Britain's foes are ours!

Such sentiments merged into the everyday experiences of New Zealanders. Empire Day, for example, was established in New Zealand in 1903 - it was inaugurated in Britain in 1904 - and has been described as becoming ‘part of the political landscape, especially in schools.’

The ideology as taught to the captive audience of school children through textbooks was that ‘we keep up Empire Day just as we might keep up our mother’s birthday in the family, to show that we are still her loving children.’ Additionally rugby as a mass spectator sport was quickly linked with the international sporting contests imperial integration allowed. The

105 Bell, p.552.
106 NZPD, Vol.110, 28 September 1899, p.76.
107 EP, 21 October 1899, p.5.
first overseas rugby tour in 1884 was followed by tours in 1888-89, 1897, 1905. It has been argued that these tours, and the coveted victories over the old country, assisted in raising public awareness of other parts of Greater Britain and consequently strengthened Greater Britannic sentiment.

Such sentiments transcended the limited access of the common man to direct experience of the Greater British world. How many New Zealanders saw Dover’s white cliffs, London’s streets or the English countryside is less relevant than how familiar these locations were in public culture. Like other imagined communities belief that borders, or more appropriately that the red on the map, signifies a common community is more significant than physically pacing the territory. Indeed the rarity of travel lent a certain mystique to expeditions back to the old country or accounts thereof. It would be the Great War which would create the conditions for a more egalitarian access to the Empire. According to Christopher Pugsley the 8,574 New Zealanders who departed in 1914 remain the largest single body to depart New Zealand. An unintended effect, and a possible motivation for many of ‘Massey’s tourists’ (the early volunteers), was the opportunity to directly experience the wider world including its British landmarks.

The integration which permitted increased co-ordination between regions of the Empire was mobilised on a massive scale during the First World War. The dispersed nature of Greater Britain allowed strikes on German targets around the globe, from China, to the Pacific to Africa. Trade links meant sustenance provided by the Dominions helped keep starvation at bay. The radical surge in the demand for munitions saw Canada manufacture between one quarter and one third of the shells fired by British artillery in France in 1917. Within New Zealand this co-ordination saw a continuation of modernisation without industrialisation. Thus armaments, field equipment and services that would not otherwise be available - Maxim guns, 4.5 inch howitzers, Lewis guns and naval escorts - were secured through the British network. Eventually arrangements were made for Britain to supply New Zealand forces in

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112 Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, pp.11, 23.  
the field with munitions and supplies, first by tendering and later by direct purchase.116 Conversely war conditions made British food supplies a strategic consideration and produce traversing New Zealand’s ‘protein bridge’ provided a lifeline against starvation.117 Exports were rearranged in a series of bulk purchase agreements which commandeered the entirety of New Zealand’s primary exports. The comment of W.D.S. Macdonald, New Zealand’s Minister of Agriculture, that meat and dairy exports to Britain were ‘munitions of war’ is indicative of the ideological mobilisation occurring alongside this development.118 In 1915 the newly formed Department of Munitions and Supplies began stockpiling uniforms, woollen goods and boots in an effort to co-ordinate manufactures with the needs of the Empire. In its three and a half years of operation the Department oversaw a build up of primary and manufactured goods for the war effort including 10,840,000 lbs of meat, 4,150,000 lbs of butter, 3,469,000 lbs of jam, 364,000 tons of socks 287,000 tons of underpants and 32,000 tons of boots.119 The arrangement of primary goods flowing to Britain with industrial and financial resources flowing back was a direct continuation of pre-war economic patterns; this was butter for guns.

Furthermore a Greater British war effort witnessed a vast mobilisation of manpower with Greater Britons traversing oceans in their hundreds of thousands; 458,000 Canadians, 332,000 Australians, 136,000 South Africans and 112,000 New Zealanders had taken up arms by 1918.120 These numbers hint at the psychological dimension of Greater Britishness and the mobilisation of links of cultural exchange. In seeking to inform and inspire the public, for example, the overwhelming majority of poster designs pasted in New Zealand public space were copies of British efforts.121 While the Government Printer did produce posters to outline the requirements of the National Registration Act or the Military Service Act, the most remarkable feature of these efforts is how unremarkable they are. Their drab, wordy layout greatly contrasts with the colour, graphics and evocative phrasing used by other belligerents. Some New Zealand artists did prepare local efforts, however the elected solution was simply to reproduce effective designs from elsewhere. This included a commission to the Australian

116 Martin, p.582.
117 The concept of the ‘protein bridge’ is a central notion within Belich, Paradise Reforged.
118 Martin, p.582.
121 I am grateful here to Stephanie Gibson who allowed me to examine her as yet unpublished research on the subject.
Government to produce 100 copies of their top eleven designs and, after 1917, to acquire samples of the massive US effort - which produced more posters than all other belligerents combined. However that the vast bulk of imported posters came from Britain speaks not only of links of trade and language, but also of a cultural orientation; ‘England Expects!’ was not only linguistically meaningful but was culturally meaningful in both Plymouth and New Plymouth.

This notion of the Empire calling and Greater Britain marching was not simply a Dominion construct and examples of pan-imperial sentiment emerged in Great Britain as well. Dominion soldiers camped in England were given greater access to the British world than the restrictions placed on ‘foreign’ troops hinting at shared Britishness. One snapshot of New Zealand mobilisation from London merchants Raphael Tuck and Sons can be witnessed in Victory and Freedom - New Zealand. The postcard displays a fresh-faced New Zealand soldier striding from his dawn-capped hemisphere back into the ‘old-world’. Above the figure, an angel bears a victory wreath, while a billowing, and faulty, flag flutters behind him (fig.4).

Likewise the ties that connected New Zealand welfare with imperial unity meant a war being waged in another hemisphere was framed as a local concern and as paramount to New Zealand’s interests. The same security concerns were met with the same mentality of the pre-war period and New Zealand’s interests were considered as depending upon British strength and a common purpose across the Empire. The rallying message of Empire Day 1917 made a blunt declaration upon the theme of imperial unity:

Into one imperial whole
One with Britain heart and soul,
One life, one flag, one fleet, one throne.

122 Gibson.
124 The stars of the Southern Cross are incorrectly positioned and should be red with a white border. Additionally the Union Jack should cover the canton.
Figure 4 Matt Pomeroy Collection.
Pre-war Greater British thinking had subverted distance, bringing far-away events and places to New Zealand’s attention. In wartime the same pattern continued and destruction in Europe was made familiar. Editorials asked readers to imagine ‘Queen Street, Ponsonby Road, Khyber Pass and every street that guns can reach carpeted by slaughtered innocents! Hamilton as Louvain; Takapuna as Liege; Whangarei and the furtherest farms given up to “frightfulness!”’¹²⁶ New Zealand casualties in Europe were, reported an Auckland paper, as meaningful as if they had ‘died within sight of Auckland town.’¹²⁷ Defeat would see, it was argued, local security collapse and ‘German officers would swagger in the streets of Auckland and New Zealand women would be treated as Belgian women have been treated.’¹²⁸ One politician argued that ‘a single naval battle in the North Sea may decide for centuries our destiny. Such a battle may decide whether or not we remain a British community.’¹²⁹

The degree of commitment to a war for Empire speaks of the level of Greater British nationalism established in New Zealand before 1914. Such a worldview established cultural meaning and interest around politics and conflicts that would otherwise be events separate from local concerns. John Pocock perhaps sums it up best: ‘that these wars were European as well as imperial was understood, perhaps insufficiently but not in ways entailing any lack of self-awareness; the Dominions knew who they were and how they fitted into the system.’¹³⁰ This summation of imperial integration raises the next issue in considering New Zealand’s collective identity towards the war. If the Dominion knew how it fitted into ‘the system’, then who did New Zealanders ‘know themselves to be’?

**Regional Greater Britishness**

How did what would conventionally be called nationalism (a sense of belonging to a New Zealand community) fit with the notion that New Zealanders belonged within a Greater

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¹²⁷ NZH, 5 May 1915, p.4.
¹²⁹ NZPD, Vol.172, 29 June 1915, p.58. On this subject, one modern investigation reveals that German military planners did contemplate ‘ruthless warfare’ against Australia and New Zealand. The planners assert that raids on coastal facilities and towns would demoralise, disrupt trade and build pressure for keeping troops at home. ‘Ruthless Warfare’: German Military Planning and Surveillance in the Australia – New Zealand Region before the Great War, edited and introduced by Jürgen Tampke (Canberra, 1998). Another historian has penned a, not unbelievable, counterfactual scenario whereby New Zealand is ceded to a victorious Reich in a reverse Treaty of Versailles. Ian McGregor, ‘What if Germany had destroyed the British navy at the Battle of Jutland in 1916?’, *New Zealand as it Might Have Been* 2, Stephen Levine ed. (Wellington, 2010), pp.23-38.
British community? To frame this another way, Massimo d’Azeglio, on the subject of Italian nationalism, famously claimed that, having made Italy, ‘now we have to make Italians.’\footnote{E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York, 1992), p.44.} In the imperial integration taking place across the Greater British world, might it be asked if the residents of New Zealand were being made into Britons or New Zealanders?

To respond to one question with another, should we suppose that being British and being a New Zealander forced a decision between mutually exclusive terms? This returns us to the supposed rivalry between ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ identities where the dominance of one element required a latency or suppression of the other. Sinclair once claimed that ‘imperialism’ in New Zealand was ‘not evidence of the absence of nationalism but was itself an expression of an emergent New Zealand nationalism.’\footnote{Keith Sinclair, *Imperial Federation: A Study of New Zealand Policy and Opinion 1880-1914* (London, 1955), p.47.} Certainly, but this can be turned around; national sentiments could be expressions of Greater Britishness. It may be possible to divide ‘imperial’ from ‘national’ elements, though it is questionable how meaningful such division is; the elements harmonise and it can be difficult to determine where one starts and the other ends. Such an arrangement is comparable to modern examples where regional identities stack; California and Alabama possess distinct regional identities which can be incorporated within a more broadly conceived American identity. As one conclusion of a contemporary thesis examining national identity notes, ‘it was possible to be a loyal member of the empire as well as a proud New Zealander.’\footnote{Murphy, p.77.}

Greater Britishness had a protean quality, its meanings altering across regions. The tightened economic, political and cultural connections functioned to make each region a component of an interacting system, rather than an entirely homogenised entity. Indeed, Dilke and his ilk were remarkably vague on the precise meaning of claims that ‘in essentials the race was always one.’\footnote{Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867, Volume One* (London, 1868), p.i.} Certainly common ‘blood’, common ‘character’ and common law are mentioned, but outside these qualifiers, ‘essentials' seem essentially flexible. Thus any territory, nation or people that might be identified as belonging to the Greater British world played a part in establishing how fashionable British connections were and how they sat with local interests, identities and arrangements. Moreover gender, class, generation, politics, religion, region and just plain individuality formed further factors in this negotiation. Stuart
Ward argues that global Britishness was a non-standardised force; ‘It was a Britishness for the most part home grown, tailored to the outlook, aspirations and anxieties of a settler-colonial population, but it was also crucially an expansive concept that was believed to be shared by fellow Britons around the globe.’ Rather than collective identity being tugged, in a schizophrenic manner, between New Zealand and Empire, being British in New Zealand harmonised Greater British and regional elements in constructing collective identity. A notion that New Zealand was, or could be, an ideal Britain where rural virtue held the ills of modernisation at bay was reconciled with visions of London as the Mecca of British civilisation. Distaste for hierarchy and birth-given privilege accommodated an adoration of the British monarchy as living symbols of British tradition.

Within New Zealand this tailoring of the shape of Greater Britishness to fit local conditions can be observed in the transitions of modernity. As a settler society acknowledged it was becoming a settled society, New Zealanders reflected upon the closing pioneer era and its greater meaning for the colony. This frequently meant projecting the present back into the past and even relatively recent events were mythologised, while other historical elements, at odds with the coming present, were downplayed or laundered out. The 1906 Christchurch International Exhibition stands as one of the more conspicuous expressions of this process, functioning as something akin to a local Fredrick Jackson Turner proclaiming the arrival of modernity to the frontier. If, around 1890, awareness was growing that the pioneer era was coming to an end, then the exhibition was something of a combined wake for an old era and a baptism of a new one. The contemporary historian James Cowan was given the task of writing the official record of the exhibition and set about presenting the event as a milestone of progress made. His introduction announced the exhibition as an indication of how the British people had ‘succeeded in hewing and building the one-time cannibal islands into a peaceful, happy, prosperous State, from which the first newness of pioneering has passed.’

This theme of accomplished progress and the potential for continuing development towards abundance, prosperity and morality was reflected in the content of the exhibition. Agricultural bounty was flaunted with crates of butter, cans of tinned rabbit and cheese.

136 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p.31.
stacked into great pyramids (an organic substitute to the displays of heavy-industry that formed the centrepieces of European and American exhibitions). Modernity was showcased in exhibits of photography, cars, bicycles, telegraphs and railways. Moral and social progress was advertised by a range of state and private organisations. The Department of Labour compared New Zealand’s working conditions to those in the ‘old-world’ and advertised the laws passed by the ‘social laboratory of the world’. The WCTU manned a stall attesting to low levels of crime and the success of the female franchise. Alcohol was not sold at the exhibition, although stalls representing wineries and breweries were present - a microcosm of the wet/dry debate.\textsuperscript{138}

However the dominant notion woven around all this progress and displays of who New Zealanders were, where they were from and where, they thought, they were going, was of the British nature underpinning it. Lord Plunket’s speech during the opening ceremony noted his interpretation of the underlying purpose of the exhibition as

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 to show to their fellow citizens of the Empire what New Zealand, with a history of but a man’s lifetime, has accomplished … to demonstrate to the world that there is rising here a young nation which though furthest from the mother-country and nine hundred miles from her nearest neighbour, is British in thought and blood, happy and prosperous, standing only on the threshold of her splendid future.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

The exhibition is indicative of a wider social phenomenon within collective identity during imperial integration. As links between the regions of New Zealand and those between New Zealand and Great Britain tightened, notions of New Zealand identity, character and development were positioned more securely within larger Greater British narratives. From the 1880s, the notion of the pioneers and early settlers as founding generations had become a fad in books and speeches. The emphasised traits of these founders noted physical and mental fortitude, courageous spirits, industriousness, ingenuity and noble characters. To take one example, Auckland’s settlers were recorded as ‘adventurous pioneers, whose only resources were their own brave hearts, active brains, and strong vigorous limbs.’\textsuperscript{140} Such proclamations framed New Zealand’s founders as ideal representatives of collective identity. However this was not solely national mythology and the British origins and character of the

\textsuperscript{139} Cowan, \textit{Official Record}, p.88.
\textsuperscript{140} Thomas Hancock, \textit{A Short Sketch of Some Incidents in the Colonial Life of Mr Thomas Hancock} (Auckland, 1885), pp.67-68.
pioneers were emphasised. Such sentiment sat conveniently with the claims of the New Zealand Native Association that the pioneers had ‘laid the foundation for a great British nation.’\textsuperscript{141} Fiona Hamilton has noted such rhetoric as representing ‘a process whereby the personal and local memories of early settlers were … incorporated into larger historical narratives of “civilisation”, nation and empire.’\textsuperscript{142}

Collective identity possessed a hybrid quality which linked regional Britishness and Greater Britishness. Local accents and vernacular, distinct from the mother tongue, were observed (often with horror) in the latter decades of the nineteenth-century.\textsuperscript{143} By 1910 the kiwi, Southern Cross and fern leaf were common regional symbols. Likewise elements of Maori iconography were requisitioned as distinctive motifs to identify New Zealand internally and internationally. In short, many features existed which might be cited as indicative of an emerging national identity. However these cultural forms proved largely compatible or interchangeable with Greater British ones; a cartoonist could select either a lion cub or a kiwi to represent New Zealand. Britannia easily stood in for Zealandia; ‘Maoriland’ was a workable substitute for ‘Britain of the South’. The composition of the New Zealand ensign, officially adopted in 1902, aligned a regional emblem, the Southern Cross, alongside the Union Jack.

When New Zealanders embarked for the Boer War in 1899, many framed the action as embodying both a regional character and loyalty to Empire. The \textit{Evening Post} described the bonds between New Zealand and Empire; ‘while the Empire is their nation New Zealand is their home’.\textsuperscript{144} Seddon noted that sharing the burdens of combat would keep Greater British blood ties strong. New Zealand blood spilt on South African soil, it was announced, would mingle with ‘blood of our kindred from England, Ireland, Scotland and Australia.’\textsuperscript{145} J. Grace and Co., of Feilding published a ‘sensational patriotic song’ ‘Sons of the Empire’, which converged regional distinction, expressed in symbolic floral terms, with Empire unity.

\textit{For we’re sons of the Empire and united we will stand}

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Southland Times}, 5 February 1898, p.3.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{EP}, 21 October 1899, p.4.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{NZPD}, Vol.110, 28 September 1899, p.78.
For the honour of old England, the dear old Motherland;
The fern, the rose, the thistle, the shamrock shall entwine,
All closely bound together with the thin red line.¹⁴⁶

This synchronisation of New Zealand and Greater British elements demonstrates the pattern observed by Linda Colley in her study of the negotiated nature of British nationalism within the British Union; ‘Welsh, Scottish and Anglo-Irish individuals who became part of the British Establishment in this period did not sell out in the sense of becoming Anglicised look-alikes. Instead they became British in a new and intensely profitable fashion, while remaining in their own minds and behaviour Welsh, or Scottish, or Irish as well.’¹⁴⁷ Thus strong assertions of a co-ownership of British legacy and heritage were firmly interwoven with a sense that New Zealanders were a distinctive people; many of Seddon’s proclamations perfectly fuse, often in consecutive sentences, sentiments of deep connections to ‘Home’ with brash notions that the world might learn a thing or two from ‘God’s own country’. Rather than competing or clashing with regional customs and distinctions, elements of Greater Britishness largely complemented, supplemented or augmented identity. This is consistent with Hobsbawm’s observation that a collective identity is at its most appealing when ‘drunk as a cocktail.’ Its attraction is not just its own flavour but ‘its combination with some other component or components.’¹⁴⁸

However regional and Imperial interests did not always synchronise and formed the basis for squabbles.¹⁴⁹ Such philosophies could manifest in culture and politics and it has been noted that colonials could be ‘devastatingly critical … of the self-importance of British imperial statesmen, any indication of being patronized by a governing class, and language that referred to the immaturity or subordinate family status of the colonies.’¹⁵⁰ This might be located in a larger dynamic existing between the old and newer regions of Greater Britain. New Britons, invoking near mystical biological or environmental factors, identified themselves as more vital, egalitarian and possessing more initiative than their ‘old-world’ counterparts. Their new societies were, it was proclaimed, moving towards a future brighter than a staid,

¹⁴⁶ Feilding Star, 3 November 1899, p.2.
¹⁴⁸ Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p.163.
unprogressive and worn out ‘old-world’. This gave some perception that the colonies were superior receptacles of the best traditions and qualities of Britishness. ‘The worst feature of the British Empire’, fired one New Zealander, ‘is that there are too many Englishmen and not enough Anzacs’.\textsuperscript{151}

Old Britons proved willing to return the favour and tropes of coarse colonials, lacking maturity, refinement and manners are evident. One woman recalled being informed by an English stockbroker that one ‘could always tell a colonial girl in an hotel, because she ate two underdone chops for breakfast’…‘What can you expect from the Colonies, my dear!’\textsuperscript{152}

Travelling through the British world at the turn-of-the-century André Siegfried observed this dynamic first hand;

One must hear the Englishman speak with his air of condescending patronage of the colonial, to realise that all the imperialistic ideas in the world will not prevent the citizen of the mother country from regarding the other citizens of the Empire as … a slightly inferior class … One must hear the colonial speak in his turn of the ‘old country,’ to realise that with his filial affection, real and touching as it is, is mingled with a contemptuous pity.\textsuperscript{153}

Such expressions sometimes appear as evidence against popular imperial sentiment or of diverging identities. Hindering such interpretations are remarkable sentiments of anxiety, at times bordering on inadequacy, displayed by both old and new Britons around themselves in the face of their counterparts. Concern in Britain around the impact of industrialisation and modernity upon the nation’s health, for example, saw new Britons upheld as the standard to strive for. The idea that New Zealand was populated with a vital breed of Briton was periodically reinforced by publicity in Britain emphasising the healthy physiques of touring colonial rugby players and soldiers.\textsuperscript{154} The British Reverend W. Carlisle announced ‘it was time the English “bucked up” a bit. The New Zealanders were as hard as nails. They avoided over-feeding and over-drinking and other kinds of indulgences. England must wake up and do the same.’\textsuperscript{155} Conversely New Zealand’s ‘culture cringe’ that local style, fashion, literature and art was, by unspoken consent, inferior to old British products is a documented phenomenon.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{153} Siegfried, pp.45-46.
\textsuperscript{154} Barnes, p.143.
\textsuperscript{155} EP, 1 December 1905, p.3.
\textsuperscript{156} Matthew Wright, \textit{Reed Illustrated History of New Zealand} (Auckland, 2004), pp.232-233.
Britons (new and old) did define themselves as distinctive, but comparisons, even friction, are more indicative of sustained bonds and of the ‘reciprocal exchange’ between the centre and peripheries of the Empire than of diverging identities. One summation of both the friction and affection generated by the old Briton/new Briton dynamic observed ‘the colonial is like a man who scolds his wife but will not allow anybody else to say a word against her.’

A collective identity which meshed commitment to the Greater British ideal with a narrative of regional character would be mobilised during the Great War and the twin ideologies of colonial gallantry and imperial loyalty ran the same way (see Chapter Three). Such thinking is glimpsed in Massey’s public proclamation, as the advance guard of the NZEF departed, that ‘when the Empire calls it is for the citizens of the Dominion to respond, and when the Empire calls it is for citizens to obey.’ Similarly, Allen seems to have taken a sincere pride in New Zealand being the first to ship a contingent; ‘we are a long way ahead of any one of the Dominions.’ These were not simply the attitudes of isolated officials. The war was typically framed as a fight to defend the Empire and the civilisation it embodied. The British declaration of war was greeted by the *New Zealand Herald* as a British led crusade for freedom and is indicative of the general sentiment of the mainstream press.

Once more this England of ours, mother now of a sea-borne confederation of free dominions, head and chief of an Empire whose desire is for peace and whose love is for liberty, leads us to war for the liberties of the world.

When soldiers landed, fought and died at Gallipoli a *Dominion* editorial placed the actions within a Greater British context; ‘The South Africans are in the midst of their task of conquering the neighbouring German possessions … the Empire has been thrilled with pride by the indomitable courage of the Canadians, and now the men of Australia and New Zealand are proving they have inherited their full share of the fighting spirit of the British race.’ Among the ephemera produced to acknowledge New Zealand’s part in the Empire’s war was the postcard ‘The War Dog of New Zealand’ which fused regional and old British symbols within a British bulldog sporting a moko, wearing a tiki and feathers and standing upon the flags of New Zealand and Great Britain (fig.5).

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157 Barnes, p.78.
159 AWN, 20 August 1914, p.17.
160 Darwin, p.343.
161 NZH, 6 August 1914, p.6.
162 *Dominion*, 30 April 1915, p.4.
Figure 5 Matt Pomeroy Collection.
As the war became one of stalemate and sustained effort, it would be aspects of this collective identity that were appealed to in calls to accept the rising demands of the war. In late 1915, in an effort to determine New Zealand’s manpower capabilities, National Registration was announced; a process that many correctly predicted was a precursor for conscription. The populist paper *New Zealand Free Lance* depicted registration as an opportunity to display increased dedication to Empire, country and war effort. The title page illustration depicted Zealandia with a drawn sword and a shield bearing the Southern Cross, sounding a call to arms. A young man, standing in front of a multitude of other presumably willing individuals, salutes the anthropomorphic personification of the nation and announces ‘Take me and use me dear Mother Country’. All this affirmation of dedication and loyalty takes place under the British flag (fig.6). This depiction of the devotion to principle being proclaimed under a billowing Union Jack remained a common trope, mobilised by many towards various ends. Sacrifice too was draped with Greater British sentiment. In Auckland, on the first ANZAC Day, Bishop Alfred Averill claimed that the dead at Gallipoli had proved the ‘worthiness of the nation to take its place in the great family of free nations in the Empire.’  

Allen too made Greater British solidarity a theme of his 1917 ANZAC day speech; ‘we stand today a united people, part of a united Empire, stronger than ever.’  

This concept of regional Greater Britishness - that New Zealand was a distinct region of a global British order - together with the notion that this identity obliged active participation within the community was a dominant message during the war. Recognition of this raises the question of the relationship between the dominance of these sentiments and the attitudes of wider society.

**Contrasting mobilisations**

It is apparent that Greater British rhetoric permeated official occasions, official publications and official rhetoric. It must be asked what the relationship was between these expressions and mass opinion? At one end of the spectrum Sinclair perceives enclaves of imperial sentiment amongst apathetic multitudes; ‘imperialism’ in New Zealand was an ‘official ideology rather than a popular ideology’ … ‘the Empire belonged to an official rhetoric, to newspaper editors, to school teachers, to politicians, to Governors and Governors-General.’

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163 NZH, 26 April 1916, p.4.  
OUR NATIONAL REGISTER.

The Answer to the Summons: Here I am, right willing to serve. Take me and use me, dear Mother Country.

Figure 6 New Zealand Herald, 5 November 1915, p.3.
“The Empire” was for most people no more than an abstraction.’ Likewise Gwen Parsons argues that engagement with Empire, within Christchurch society at least, reflected class interests. Parsons identifies elites with close links to Britain as establishing dominant discourses around worldviews not indicative of mass opinion. These interpretations of minimalist engagement are difficult to square with public behaviour. It raises the question of why crowds cheered Seddon’s proclamation that New Zealanders heading to the Veldt were fighting for ‘one flag, one queen, one tongue’, whilst pelting another MP, Tommy Taylor, with rocks for his opposition to an imperialist war. More broadly, why would Seddon continually employ such rhetoric if the public was indifferent or hostile to it? William Pember Reeves summarised Seddon’s technique of holding power as ‘the result of a long and untiring effort to find out what the people did like, and then, if it was at all reasonable, to do it for them. If he was a dictator he was a dictator with his ear to the ground.’ More recent analyses observe an ‘extraordinary astuteness in gauging what the electorate wanted’ and an ‘extremely skilful’ ability to sense ‘the way the wind was blowing.’ Another commentator summarises him as ‘a walking public opinion poll’.

Likewise, in reference to media content, why would editors of mainstream, popular newspapers - presumably wishing to attract readers and advertisers - print Greater British sentiment and news if such concepts were abstractions? After the 1870s modern press systems and new journalist styles emerged alongside growing urbanisation, literacy and the capacity to acquire news faster and distribute it further. These changes, and the related growing circulation figures, shifted the nature and function of the press from that of a politically motivated venture towards that of a commercially inspired one. Additionally the term ‘rag planter’ had entered the colonial vernacular as a description for the high casualty rate of nineteenth-century newspapermen who launched papers, failed to attract

165 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, pp.173, 234.
166 Parsons, ‘Debating the War’, pp.550-568.
170 Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.130.
audiences, bankrupted and moved on.\textsuperscript{172} Few editors, unsurprisingly, aspired to the title. Success and failure then depended upon publishing material to which an audience was receptive. The turn-of-the-century press was frequently biased and partisan; however the Empire content in mainstream titles is more indicative of attempts to attract readers than machinations to indoctrinate an indifferent audience.

Wider cultural orientations also indicate mass and enthusiastic engagements with Greater Britishness. References to Britain as ‘Home’ and the Empire as ‘we’ were common conventions. Imperial icons such as the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York, Lord Kitchener and the Prince of Wales were greeted by cheering crowds and a ‘wave of jingoistic and royalist fervour’ in 1901, 1910 and 1920 respectively.\textsuperscript{173} A multitude of pro-empire organisations such as the Imperial Service League, the National Defence League, the Naval League, the Victoria League, the Boy Scouts and the Legion of Frontiersmen travelled across the imperial network to find receptive audiences in New Zealand. Advertisements, presumably designed with popular appeal in mind, linked consumer goods as diverse as crockery, cigarettes, bicycles, typewriters, boot polish, cameras, chewing gum and flour with imperialistic imagery and slogans. Boys fought over copies of the \textit{Graphic, Illustrated London News} and \textit{Boy’s Own} – titles which presented ripping yarns of plucky young British lads.\textsuperscript{174} Girls skipped to the rhyme

\begin{verbatim}
I am a Girl Guide dressed in blue,
These are the actions I can do.
Stand at ease, bend my knees,
Salute to the King, bow to the Queen,
Never turn my back on the Union Jack,
Under the archway,
One, two, three.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{verbatim}

All of this speaks of a mass penetration of Greater Britishness in mass consciousness. Indeed it becomes extremely difficult to comprehend calls urging sacrifice for the Empire and the evident responsiveness of New Zealanders to such appeals without an appreciation of the

\textsuperscript{174} Mulgan, p.6, Andrew Francis, ‘Willingly to War: British and Imperial Boys’ Story Papers, 1905-1914’, \textit{Notes Books Authors}, No.10 (2007).
\textsuperscript{175} Brian Sutton-Smith, \textit{The Games of New Zealand Children} (Berkeley, 1959), p.81.
widespread nature of the philosophy. Whilst many of the Greater British sentiments mentioned are clearly candidates for the label of propaganda, they are also candidates for Aldous Huxley’s observation that ‘propaganda gives a force and direction to the successive movements of popular feeling and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream. In a land without water, he digs in vain.’\(^{176}\) In effect there would be little point in trying to sweeten pills with Greater British sentiment if Greater Britishness lacked public appeal. That Greater British nationalism sold news, formed political currency, advertised goods, legitimatised hardships and motivated sacrifice in New Zealand backs the description of recent research that the sentiment was ‘a broadly shared phenomenon, not limited to an imperially-engaged elite.’\(^ {177}\)

Perhaps the most effective method of recognising the influence of Greater British nationalism within the wider public sphere is to contrast it to alternative mobilisations. A war framed, predominately, as a defence of Greater Britain drew consent - even enthusiasm - from across New Zealand society and the major impact of the war effort upon collective identity was an intensification of what embodying that identity meant. This was a process which tightened archetypes, eroded ambiguity and suppressed alternatives. In the words of one commentator

No British subject can sit on the rail. It is apparent to any discerning man or woman that unless the British peoples who are scattered over the world proceed to England to assist in this her hour of need they can commence to learn the German language.\(^ {178}\)

Such attitudes certainly seem to relate to a particularly intensive war effort. Among the Dominions New Zealand produced some of the highest proportions of enlistments and accepted a system of conscription to make it the highest (10.2 percent of the total population).\(^ {179}\) Additionally it appears New Zealanders were less likely than Australians or Canadians to appeal for exemptions from service – despite the fact that Australians were appealing for exemptions to military training within Australia, rather than for frontline service.\(^ {180}\) Equally revealing are the demographics of enlistees. Within the Dominions, the British-born were among the most represented groups amongst enlistees; 70 percent of the

\(^{177}\) Barnes, p.279. Indeed the possessive in Barnes’ research on the concept of ‘New Zealand’s London’ is indicative of a conception of a broadly shared heritage.
\(^{178}\) NZH, 13 January 1915, p.5.
\(^{179}\) Leonhard, p.303.
\(^{180}\) Littlewood, pp.60-61.
members of the first Canadian contingent were British-born.\textsuperscript{181} This was not the case in New Zealand where the British-born (21.6 percent of the population in 1911 [the final census year before the war disrupts statistical patterns]) constituted 25.6 percent of enlistees by November 1914 and 19.6 percent of volunteers awaiting call up in October 1915. Meanwhile the New Zealand-born (71.1 percent of the population in 1911) comprised 74.1 percent of enlistees by November 1914 and 73.4 percent of volunteers awaiting call up in October 1915.\textsuperscript{182} While the dual issues of who went and why have not yet been wholly unpacked in New Zealand historiography, it appears that being raised in New Zealand society may have been a comparable motivating factor to being British-born.

In the face of this tightening loyalty, several social elements diverged from dominant notions of what being a loyal New Zealander meant. This polarisation is most observable in the introduction of conscription through the \textit{1916 Military Service Act}. Conscription forced the question of whether or not one would take up arms for Greater Britain and thus functioned to highlight resistance. After the war Harry Holland concluded that there were four major categories into which objectors might be grouped; religious, socialist, Irish and Maori.\textsuperscript{183} In all of these categories an identity (ideological and/or ethnic) broke consensus with dominant conceptions of what being British entailed. The religious objectors perceived it as God’s will that they not fight; most were fundamentalists and few came from mainstream churches. Socialist objectors argued that the war was a fight between capitalist rulers which did not represent the working classes interests. Irish objectors protested against fighting for Britain. Maori resistance largely emerged from the impacts of the New Zealand Wars upon sectors of Maoridom - notably in Taranaki, the King Country, Waikato and the Urewera - which hampered desire to fight in a ‘Pakeha war’.

The historiography, which has focused upon dissent over consent, has produced fascinating accounts of figures such as Princess Te Puea, Rua Kenana, Bob Semple, Peter Fraser, Paddy Webb, Archibald Baxter, Mark Briggs and others. However these figures and the philosophies motivating their resistance need to be contextualised as a remarkably jagged line divides the sections of New Zealand society which served from those which offered apathy or

\textsuperscript{181} Darwin, p.336.
\textsuperscript{183} H.E. Holland, \textit{Armageddon or Calvary: The Conscientious Objectors of New Zealand and “The Process of Their Conversion”} (Wellington, 1919), p.5. Obviously there were overlaps; some derived socialist practices from religious principles.
resistance. Indeed there is a Janus faced quality to each of Holland’s categories and, while socialist and theological arguments or being Irish or Maori could form a basis of resistance, they could also be synchronised with dominant conceptions of being British.

Firstly objectors who dissented on fundamentalist grounds were an exceptional group in numerical terms. Over the course of conscription 134,632 men were balloted and, while the exact numbers are debated, between one third and one half of men applied for exemption (figures range from 43,544 to 60,000). Analysis of Military Service Board records, which heard cases for exemption, highlights the marginal nature of applications on religious grounds. In the Wellington district the 4.2 percent who claimed religious principles pale beside claims of ‘public interest’ and ‘undue hardship’. This is consistent with the results of a government survey conducted in December 1915 to investigate the reasons why 8,390 single men and widowers without dependants stated they were unwilling to volunteer for active or civil service during national registration. The results revealed that religious motivation sat well behind other factors. 3,131 cited personal reasons (health, contemplating marriage and fear). 2,237 claimed business reasons (financial/contractual obligations or employment in an essential industry). 1,739 did not state their position. 819 claimed religious/conscientious reasons. 260 noted political reasons (wanting conscription to ensure equality of sacrifice, objections to insufficient pensions, the treatment of troops or other political objections). 204 were marked as miscellaneous (willing to serve elsewhere or planning to leave New Zealand).

Obviously it is easier to observe public faces than private thoughts and the question of whether men answered truthfully is valid. If cloaking conscientious objections behind claims of hardship was more likely to win a Military Board’s sympathy then surely, the sceptical ponders, some tried it. The question becomes what margin of error should be considered appropriate when factoring in deception? A precise answer is likely to be eternally elusive but minimalist scenarios seem more likely. Theology, of the muscular Christian variety, did not hamper most enlistees (the bulk of whom identified as Protestant or Catholic). Additionally, men like Archibald Baxter and Henry Urquhart showed a willingness to suffer

185 Littlewood, pp.64-72.
great penalties and hardships to stand by their belief. Such conviction seems difficult to correlate with a widespread denial of principles.

The labour movement provides another instance of how worldviews could fit with either consent or resistance. Proletarianisation had produced a potentially potent force within New Zealand society before the war. Growing alongside urbanisation and modernity was an expanding labour movement. Some imagined themselves as heirs to Seddonism, the progressive Lib-Lab politics of the 1890s and deeper rooted notions that New Zealand provided a fair deal to the working man. Mixed within the milieu were aspects of Marxism, Fabianism and the syndicalist doctrines of organisations such as the International Workers of the World. Modernisation facilitated the organisation of likeminded individuals and permitted the wider circulation of these ideas. In 1910 the *Maoriland Worker* became a radical alternative to other major newspapers. Circulation had grown from 1,000 copies a month in 1911 to a not unrespectable 10,000 a week in 1913; certainly an improvement on soapboxes, lecture circuits and pamphleteering as a way of reaching audiences.\(^{188}\) Within the political realm, the new Social Democrat Party won two by-elections in 1913.\(^{189}\) Union membership mushroomed from around 3,000 in 1888 to reach something between 21,000 and 63,000 by 1890; by 1917 New Zealand was among the most unionised societies in the world.\(^{190}\)

How this new force might be wielded inspired concern and hope from different social groups. For instance, the FOL, founded in 1909, divorced itself from traditional industrial arbitration and argued that the abolition of poverty required the abolition of capitalism. Moreover, the unrest unleashed in the Great Strike of 1913 remains the most violent case of civil unrest in Pakeha New Zealand history and illustrates the strength of the challenge organised labour might offer to the status quo. In Holland’s rhetoric the 1912 strike at Waihi - which preceded the 1913 confrontation - was ‘but a skirmish of the advance guard in the great class war.’\(^{191}\) Doubtlessly Allen recalled this chaos when, as acting Prime Minister four years later, he was faced with threats of industrial unrest by the West Coast miners.\(^{192}\) The mix of coercion used

\(^{189}\) Olssen, ‘Waging War’, p.299.
and concessions made to maintain consensus at that time speaks of official concerns around the possibility of unrest.

However despite its potential potency the labour movement was a fragmented one. Within a broad sentiment of workers’ rights, various philosophies quarrelled. The ideological goal was blurred; was the objective to smash the system to allow the construction of a workers’ state or to reform capitalism and make it more responsive to the needs of the masses? Was the method to be the arbitration system, the political process, direct action or revolution? In this environment political labour was frequently at odds with the trade councils. Additionally most of the Independent Political Labour Party leaders were craft unionists who valued a responsible and respectable public image, believed in reform policies and were suspicious of revolutionary militancy. They were, argues a historian of political labour, ‘committed to improving the existing system … and stressed labourism, welfarism, and better wages rather than socialism and abolition of the wage system.’ The syndicalism and revolutionary socialism of the FOL generated friction with union leaders, who often prioritised regional grievances and loyalties.

While the revolutionary section of the labour movement upheld the red flag and class solidarity as an alternative to a national flag and loyalty, other sections did not see a clash between loyalty to King, country and the struggle for workers’ rights. As in pre-war Europe, New Zealand socialists claimed that a general strike would derail mobilisation and make war impossible. Also as in Europe, workers and socialists shouldered rifles in great numbers once war broke out, whether due to the notion that a country must be defended before it could be reformed, or to national sentiments overriding class consciousness. According to writer and veteran Ormond Burton ‘the majority sections of Labour parties everywhere supported the war - although with somewhat guilty consciences.’ Hiram Hunter, the President of the Social Democratic Party, met the war with the proclamation that ‘some little time ago there was trouble in this country between two parties - the workers and the employers. At that time my feeling was “My class right or wrong”. This time it is a broader basis, and I can say it is “My country right or wrong.”’ Some social theorists harnessed their ideology to the war

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196 *Press*, 7 August 1914, p.10.
effort. Professor Hugh Mackenzie, for example, argued that socialists should favour conscription as vindication of the argument that states and citizens had obligations to one another. Products of their time, working class culture and patriotism were not necessarily antithetical. Almost 14,000 unionists had struck during the Great Strike of 1913. Over 14,000 volunteered to fight in the first week of the Great War in 1914. Fit, young, working males were the key demographic in both mobilisations, one wonders what the overlap was. Certainly Holland’s son noted the spectacle of the watersiders’ band playing ‘jingo airs’, the President of the Social Democrats going ‘jingo mad’, union officials speaking at patriotic demonstrations and the involvement of men bearing scars from the 1913 strike. It is indicative that proletarianisation - the construction of a working class consciousness - and Greater British nationalism were simultaneously developing ideologies in New Zealand which were not inevitably impediments to one another.

The numbers complement this dynamic. A war for Greater Britain mobilised support across the social strata; placing volunteer numbers alongside the occupations of New Zealand males reveals no obvious pattern of occupation determining a failure to volunteer (with a possible exception for domestic workers) (fig.7). Though more work is needed in this area, one observation is the correlation between the overrepresentation of certain occupations (such as labourers) and underrepresentation in others (such as skilled craftsmen) with age (and therefore dependants), career interests and social connections. A young labourer with no dependants, an undeveloped career and whose mates were enlisting had a high ratio of pull to go against pull to stay. Conversely a tinsmith supporting a family and whose absence would harm or destroy his business had major disincentives to volunteering. Where the labour movement was mobilised for dispute or resistance, damnations of capitalism, the master class, poverty, militarism and war were well voiced. Damnations of a British connection are less apparent, except for dissent over how such an ideology should manifest itself. As such the fiery union leader Bob Semple, protesting his arrest in 1916 for sedition, claimed to have committed no offence ‘except the exercising of what I hold to be the inherent right of every

197 Hugh Mackenzie, Conscription: To Be, Or Not To Be? (Wellington, 1916), p.4.
201 The figures go up to and include the 28th reinforcements which were overwhelmingly volunteers with some conscripts in the 24th-28th reinforcements. AJHR, 1917, H-19V, ‘New Zealand Expeditionary Force’, pp.1-2.
freeborn British subject - the right of expressing his opinion. Others criticised the management of the war effort on similar grounds. Labour MPs rejected conscription on the grounds that it was an unBritish, Prussian custom and/or argued that a conscription of wealth alongside the conscription of men would represent a more democratic war effort. Additionally, as economic hardship climbed, notions that social adversity was not being fairly distributed and that profiteering threatened social egalitarianism were aired. In March 1918 a meeting on the cost of living and conscription in Christchurch drew thousands, filling the venue. Others went further than criticising the war effort and ideologically aligned the Labour movement with negotiated peace. In 1916 the Social Democrat Party issued a peace manifesto which noted that ‘The Party considers that the time for a free and frank discussion of Peace Terms is long overdue.’ In 1918, Peter Fraser claimed that ‘The Labour Party stands for Peace. It wants a Democratic Peace.’ These protests for free-speech, liberty,

204 Parsons, ‘The Christchurch Community at War’, p.22.
general prosperity and peace were affirmations, rather than rejections, of popular conceptions of what being British was supposed to bestow on New Zealanders.

The next two categories within Holland’s schema are two ethnic groups whose historic, cultural, religious, social and linguistic identities (and intertwined political motivations) potentially divided them from a dominant British identity. Being Irish or Maori certainly did underpin some resistance for involvement in a ‘British fight’. However this might be placed within a broader context.

By the outbreak of war being Irish had been imperfectly assimilated into being British in New Zealand. Separate Irish institutions such as schools and churches assisted in preserving notions of Irish heritage and identity, expressed in traditions, political issues and societies. Additionally, ‘Old-world’ antagonisms had been imported in the pre-conceptions of the migrant population and were reinforced by the imperial press network’s reprinting of stock jokes of Irish buffoons. One analysis of New Zealand children’s stories notes conceptions of the Irish as ‘quarrelsome, slow witted, drunken and clownish’ as common currency. Antagonisms around Irishness in New Zealand could turn ugly with civil unrest erupting in Hokitika in 1868 and again at Christchurch and Timaru in 1879. Such dynamics re-emerged during the social tensions the war wrought and a potent strain of sectarianism mobilised anti-Irishness attitudes. The Protestant Political Association (PPA), formed in 1917, expanded rapidly and claimed over 200,000 members and over 200 branches by 1919. The PPA touted, in sensational fashion, that Catholicism or Irishness was tantamount to disloyalty, building a case around the neutrality of the Pope, the 1916 Rebellion, the exemption of Catholic clergy from conscription and calls for further exemptions for teaching orders. Furthermore allegations spread to assertions of lower Catholic enlistment rates, alleged overrepresentation of Catholics in the civil service, Vatican conspiracies behind the origin of the war and claims of Catholic plots to establish, possibly with labour support, a new order while Protestants were occupied with the war.

However a notion of the Irish ‘Other’, entirely or extensively outside the establishment or a common Britishness should not be exaggerated. Irish-Catholics were, for example, comparatively highly represented in the police before 1890.\(^{210}\) The leaders of the two major political parties during the war were Irish: Catholic Joseph Ward and the Ulsterman William Massey. A propensity for vilifying unBritish foreigners could favour the Irish as securely within the British/European camp. During a debate upon Chinese immigration, for example, Seddon asserted that ‘to compare the Irish with the Chinese was an insult to every Irishman in the colony … there was about the same distinction between a European and a Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a monkey’.\(^{211}\) This British solidarity would be mobilised through the war in the same way friction was mobilised for resistance. Irish-Catholic public figures, newspapers and churches promoted the war as just and/or necessary in an identical fashion to other parts of mainstream New Zealand society.\(^{212}\) Neither should a ‘underrepresentation’ of Roman-Catholics in the forces be overstated. In 1911 Catholics constituted 13.53 percent of the male population over 21 (to be Catholic was effectively to be Irish; ‘even by 1945 Pakeha membership of the Church was 95 percent Irish in origin’).\(^{213}\) 11.6 percent of the first volunteers identified as Roman-Catholic and through the war Catholics constituted 12.4 percent of volunteers.\(^{214}\) Underrepresentation to a degree, to be sure, but the small discrepancy should not overshadow the major pattern.

Conversely, Maori volunteers were less forthcoming; the 2,227 volunteers in the Maori Pioneer Battalion (bolstered by a further 485 Cook Islanders and Niueans) constituted a proportional effort roughly half that of the Pakeha population.\(^{215}\) This can be interpreted as indicative of the extent to which the Maori population stood outside the Pakeha world, its Greater British identity and the social networks that circulated it. However it might also be considered, in a glass half full manner of thinking, as symptomatic of the degree to which Maori had been integrated/assimilated into British New Zealand. That Maori, who constituted 4.33 percent of the population in 1916, constituted around 2 percent of enlistees


\(^{211}\) NZPD, Vol.36, 8 July 1880, p.97.

\(^{212}\) Allan Davidson, ‘New Zealand Churches and Death in the First World War’, *New Zealand’s Great War*, pp.447-466.


\(^{214}\) The figures used go up to and include the 25\(^{\text{th}}\) reinforcements which were overwhelmingly volunteers with some conscripts in the 24\(^{\text{th}}\)-25\(^{\text{th}}\) reinforcements. AJHR, 1917, H-19B, ‘New Zealand Expeditionary Force’, Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p.361.

might be contextualised against the Canadian or South African experience, where other ethnic groups held unenthused or hostile attitudes to enlistment.\textsuperscript{216} By April 1917, French Canadians, 28 percent of the Canadian population, constituted less than 5 percent of volunteers.\textsuperscript{217} In South Africa, the 70,000 whites who served overseas were ‘overwhelmingly’ drawn from the English community.\textsuperscript{218} Most Afrikaners - 95 percent, according to John Xavier Merriman’s analysis - wanted to remain neutral.\textsuperscript{219} It is indicative of the degree to which being Irish or Maori was not necessarily an impediment for support or even direct involvement in a Greater British war.

Maori might seem to constitute the most obvious group outside or on the margins of a Greater British identity in New Zealand. In a very real sense British New Zealand sharpened itself on a distinction from Maori New Zealand. The Maori role in this narrative was to assist in favourably contrasting the Maori past with the British present. The aforementioned 1906 exhibition that had so embodied progress in New Zealand had measured such a gap, reporting that

Not so very long ago New Zealand was a very wild country … no law but Maori law – the law of the tomahawk and musket - ruled in the Islands of New Zealand until 67 years ago … To-day behold what a few short decades have wrought! Not only have the brown and white races changed places in the domination of Maoriland, but the white has succeeded in hewing and building the one-time cannibal islands into a peaceful, happy, prosperous State.\textsuperscript{220}

Scholars have noted Pakeha stereotypes of Maori as functioning as antitypes to contrast disreputable Maori traits with admirable Pakeha work routines, habits, values and hygiene.\textsuperscript{221} Local media featured Pakeha expressions of ‘coon humour’, which ranged from folksy portrayals of Maori as out of touch with the modern world to more malicious depictions of Maori as buffoons.\textsuperscript{222} Such characters were typically illustrated in an undignified manner, with exaggerated features and bodies and speaking a brand of pigeon English dubbed ‘stage Maori’ by linguists.\textsuperscript{223} The philosophy presented Maori as possessing a child-like view of the

\textsuperscript{216} NZOYB, 1919, p.257, NZOYB, 1925, pp.77, 105.
\textsuperscript{218} Darwin, p.345.
\textsuperscript{220} Cowan, \textit{Official Record}, p.7.
world; ‘“happy-go-luckyism” is the apt phrase’, with a tendency towards self-indulgence and idleness; ‘it is either a feast or a famine with him.’ Such thinking is behind the expressions a ‘Maori mile’ and ‘Maori time’ as colloquialisms for imprecise perceptions of distance and time.

Such dynamics seem to gel neatly with the level of Maori involvement in the war - Maori were unwilling to fight for a social order that maligned them. However this does not account for the number of Maori who did enlist. Again clues are found in a wider context of social perception and the diverse nature of the discourse has been noted; ‘It would be wrong to imply that there was only one Pakeha attitude towards Maoris’. Firstly, the lazy/industrious dynamic was applied to supposed deviants regardless of skin colour as Irish, vagrants, boozers and radical labour knew. Secondly, perceptions of Maori and Maoridom were complex and contradictory. The ‘lazy Maori’ image was but one stereotype forged through the decades of contact, trading, studying, fighting, assimilating and marginalising. Cutting Maori poppies short to emphasise Pakeha height was not the sole dynamic within Pakeha amateur ethnography. Indeed a competing narrative was based around the claim of ideal race relations in New Zealand. While the Maori role invariably had to fit with the dominant theme of progress, progress here was embodied by the notion of the elevation of the Maori race under British order.

Within the modernising world the construction of modern national identities grappled with deeply rooted traditions, power bases, allegiances and religious and ethnic differences. The stark newness of British civilisation in New Zealand had circumvented or skewed aspects of this process; many of the traditions were imported, the power bases were new and the population was, relatively, ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogenous. How Maoridom - with its established customs, political orders and language - was related to the emerging British order indicates the historical capacity of nationalism to bridge or conceal differences. Colley’s study of the construction of British nationalism describes a common Britishness as ‘superimposed over an array of internal differences’ across the British Isles.

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224 Irvine, p.403.
226 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p.203.
228 Colley, p.6.
A comparable superimposition can be observed across the New Zealand isles in reference to Maoridom. Consequently both Pakeha and Maori actors engaged in a project of relating being Maori with the project of being British in New Zealand.

Broadly speaking, the philosophy revolved around presenting Maori as being worthy to bear the rights and obligations of British civilisation. Manipulation of the Victorian racial hierarchy, with claims that Maori were superior to other indigenes, lent a racial foundation to the idea. James Bennett notes that ‘the image of the superior Maori or “best black” was such a powerful one that it was adopted and disseminated in overseas literature, and was a stereotype driven home repeatedly to Australians.’

A correspondent in Zealandia stated that ‘It is well known that the Maoris were naturally a more intelligent race of people than those of any other uncivilised country in the world.’ Longman’s School Geography for Australasia informed its readers that Maori were ‘the most intelligent of all natives whom the Europeans met with on the Australasian colonies.’ After touring Australasia the Victorian literary superstar, Anthony Trollope made his case for Maori exceptionalism; ‘of all the people whom we have been accustomed to call savages, they were perhaps, in their savage condition … the most civilised.’ Even the visiting Mark Twain got into the spirit. The section of his travelogue describing Maori observes that

There was nothing of the savage in the faces; nothing could be finer than these men’s features, nothing more intellectual than these faces, nothing more masculine, nothing nobler than their aspect. The aboriginals of Australia and Tasmania looked the savage, but these chiefs looked like Roman patricians.

The Roman comparison hints at the other major tactic used beside emphasising the gap between Maori and other indigenes, namely reducing the gap between Maori and European racial groups and making Maori ‘honorary members of the white tribe’. This paved the way for presenting Maori and Pakeha as equals; school lessons taught that ‘the good Maori stands as high as the good pakeha and the bad pakeha sinks as low as the bad Maori’; Kate

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Sheppard argued that historical constitutional arrangements meant that ‘Maori and Pakeha have become one people, under one Sovereign and one Parliament, glorying alike in the one title of “New Zealander”.’ Others held up cultural/character similarities; Maori were, James Cowan noted, a people ‘whose love of the sea and pride in deeds of battle show strangely close affinity to some of the dominant traits of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic race.’ Some commentators went one step further, arguing that beside, or behind, common qualities was a common origin. The most famous example is Edward Tregear’s 1885 Aryan Maori thesis which examined racial and linguistic evidence to make the case that Maori were a long lost branch of the Aryan race, now reunited with the European strain. Though certainly not without contemporary critics and sceptics, the thesis stands as a robust example of the mentality that superior natives made peaceful co-existence possible in New Zealand. Giselle Byrnes’ study of scholarly perceptions of Maori between 1890-1920 notes that claims of Caucasian descent ‘justified Maori nobility and, by implication, often directly stated, elevated the status of the Maori above that of other native races.’

The notion that Maori had a place within a British order intersected with perception of the war as a project to elevate Maoridom. Commentators emphasised how a warrior spirit could be utilised against new enemies and adopted virtues demonstrated. The Anglican Bishop of Auckland gave a public speech upon the progress Maori had made, noting the existence of Maori schoolmasters, clergymen, nurses, solicitors, doctors, Government officers and MPs. Maori soldiers - ‘assembled and anxious to stand shoulder to shoulder with their European friends and fight the foes of England’ - were presented as the latest step in this development. Wider public culture had also picked up on the idea that shared fighting highlighted both Maori development and the tightening bonds between Maori and Pakeha. As one editorial noted

There was something romantic in the attitude of the Polynesian race under the mana of the New Zealand Government, for only half a century ago the Maoris were savages or semi-savages; yet to-day they had been fighting in the cause of civilisation alongside

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238 Edward Tregear, The Aryan Maori (Wellington, 1885).
their pakeha brothers, and realising their obligations as fighters in the ranks of humanity and freedom.\textsuperscript{241}

Such progress was depicted in the \textit{Free Lance’s} Christmas Annual which contrasted the Maori condition in 1815 to 1915 (fig.8). Here rubbing noses converts to kissing, Maori totems are replaced by a British one, tribal enemies are exchanged for the Empire’s enemies and traditional costume and weapons are traded for a soldier’s uniform and rifle. The British idioms ‘Maori Johnny’ and ‘it’s a long way to Tipperary’ are apparent; the cannibalism noted in 1815 is not. Images of Maori in combat also made use of such sentiments. Blomfield for example acknowledged the deployment of Maori troops at Gallipoli with a cartoon of Turkish soldiers cowering before a Maori charge (fig.9). Behind the Maori soldier is the spirit of a traditional warrior, highlighting the connection but also the distinction between the two.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\caption{\textit{New Zealand Free Lance}, December 1915 (Christmas Annual), p.9.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Poverty Bay Herald}, 2 December 1918, p.2.
THE SPIRIT OF HIS FATHERS.

Figure 9 New Zealand Observer, December 1915 (Christmas Annual), p.21.
Such attitudes went further than the popular realm. Allen dismissed notions that Maori might be confused with Egyptians and suffer discrimination; he claimed it would be obvious to all who met them that they were very different from ‘the ordinary coloured race.’ Likewise, several Maori politicians and leaders used Maori recruitment and willingness to share burdens as opportunities to tighten bonds and obligations. Dr Maui Pomare asserted that ‘the Maoris of the Dominion have expressed as with one voice unswerving loyalty to the British throne … They recognise that the British cause is their cause; that the British King is their King; that the God of the British is the God of the Maoris too.’ He continued such discourse after the war claiming that

*Our people’s voluntary service … gave a new and glorious tradition to the story of the Maori race. It gave the crowning touch to the sense of citizenship in the British Commonwealth; it satisfied in the one fitting fashion the intense desire of the Maori to prove to the world that he was the equal of the Pakeha in the fullest sense – physically, mentally, spiritually.*

Casualties too affirmed unity. In a manner identical to Seddon’s notion that blood spilt together secured bonds, Pomare recorded that ‘I think the misunderstandings which were between the pakeha and the Maori … have been swept away forever … their blood has commingled in the trenches of Gallipoli.’ Likewise Sir James Carroll’s farewell to the second Maori contingent combined Maori/Pakeha unity with traditional notions of utu [revenge]; ‘go forth with your Pakeha brothers. Our blood has been spilt on the Peninsula of Gallipoli.’ The farewell given to other departing Maori troops by tribal elders fused old Maori traditional sentiments with newer Christian and patriotic expressions;

*Farewell young men.*
*Go and uphold the name of our warrior ancestors.*
*Fear God.*
*And honour the King.*

Christian pacifism, socialist thought and ethnic dissent produced some of the most committed opponents to the war and are indicative that the tenets of Greater British nationalism were

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243 EP, 29 September 1914, p.3.
245 NZPD, Vol.177, 8 August 1916, p.942.
246 EP, 4 September, p.3.
neither universal nor unchallenged. However study of how this resistance fits with the wider social body indicates that they might also be considered as indicative of the reach, as well as the limits, of Greater British nationalism in New Zealand. This suggests a broader consensus which extended even into groups that are characteristically cast on the periphery or outside it.

Legacy
This chapter has argued that both before and during the war New Zealand possessed a strong orientation towards Britain, expressed in cultural, economic and political terms and that this arrangement was deemed legitimate and desirable by a broad social consensus. The war effort saw extensive mobilisation of this Greater British nationalism to sustain social consensus over the conflict. According to modern myth the war spurred nationalism and shared experiences, notably the Gallipoli campaign, generated an awareness of a national character and the differences between the English and New Zealanders. There exists, it seems, a strong desire to match the Great War with a shift in collective identity. In this mode of thought a 1923 civics textbook noted that ‘In the days to come it will be seen more clearly than we see today that New Zealand grew to the stature of a nation on the cliffs and gullies of Gallipoli, the sands of Palestine, and the sacred and tumbled fields of Northern France and Flanders.’248 One soldier drew similar conclusions; ‘somewhere between the bloody ridge of Chunuk Bair in August, 1915, and the black swamp in front of Passchendaele in October, 1917, New Zealand quite definitely found individuality and nationality.’249 This all sounds very similar to more modern commentary; ‘There is no doubt that New Zealand emerged from the Great War with an enhanced identity and a new status’.250 According to a contemporary military historian;

By the end of the war New Zealand had been transformed and was in 1920 very different from what it was in 1914… Notions of duty, honour, sacrifice and Empire all suffered … As a result of the First World War, though, New Zealanders realised especially through the returning soldiers, that New Zealand and New Zealanders were different and this difference did not imply inferiority. New Zealand nationalism and a sense of identity had been born.251

It would be unfair to completely dismiss such interpretations. New Zealand soldiers did carry regional customs, habits and values with them and exposure to other peoples and cultures does appear to have made some men more aware their distinctions. New Zealand’s war effort was primarily organised through the unit of the nation. New Zealand troops fought as New Zealanders (with plans that they be subsumed into an Australasian force rejected). Additionally, through taxing, borrowing and fundraising, New Zealanders paid for their own war effort. On the diplomatic scene, New Zealand directly participated in international arrangements, including signing the Treaty of Versailles as a separate signatory. These are potential displays of national autonomy and/or determination. After the war ANZACs and Fernleaves did become icons of collective ideals (both in national and masculine terms). When a day of remembrance was debated, ANZAC Day was favoured over a proposed pan-imperial day. New Zealand soldiers, awaiting transportation home, passed time at Sling Camp in Wiltshire by carving a regional symbol in the sizable (the body is over 6,000 square metres) Bulford Kiwi into the chalk of Beacon Hill, alongside Gallipoli Road. The kiwi looms over the camp, seemingly a brazen display of a New Zealand symbol inscribed onto an old British landscape (fig.10).

However the conception of the First World War as New Zealand’s national ‘coming of age’ story, marking a distinct break from pre-war habits and arrangements has serious limitations. To begin with, it is a rerun of earlier ideas of awakening national consciousness, such as those expressed in Richard Jebb’s 1905 book about the rise of New Zealand’s ‘colonial nationalism’ after the rejection of federation with the Australian colonies:

Suddenly the people of the colony had seized the idea that they were indeed an island race apart … no longer “Britons of the South”, nor Australasians, but Maorilanders first.

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Similar dawning dawns of national distinction have been attached to Dominion Day, the 1905 All Blacks tour, participation in the Boer War, the Diamond Jubilee (national distinction seems to call for salient performances by uniformed men on distant soil) and still earlier expressions of New Zealand forms tracked back into the nineteenth-century. All these events did prompt or refine conceptions of New Zealanders as distinctive, but did not erode or even really challenge the notion of a Greater British framework in which regional distinction sat. Gallipoli veteran Captain H.K. Hatrick could state his claim that ‘after what I saw let me tell you that we are a race on our own “New Zealanders”’. But, like the pioneers, the rough riders of the Boer War and the All Blacks, the ANZAC legend formed not so much a new independent identity, which replaced or contested a Greater British one, but a refinement of an existing neo-British/colonial identity synchronised within a larger Greater British nationalism.


256 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p.170.
The Great War was to New Zealand identity a new peg on which to hang a familiar coat. New Zealand, like Great Britain, had entered and fought its war to preserve a status quo and the dominant public legacy of the First World War, for the two decades after the war at least, was an affirmation of existing values and traditions. The central comprehension was of a conflict fought by a pan-British people for the survival, or triumph, of a British Empire to which New Zealanders had contributed and in which they excelled. Regional histories formed a subsection of this message.

There was no more loyal district in the British dominions than that of Central Otago … and on the heights of Gallipoli and the plains of Palestine, Egypt, and France [men from Otago] poured forth their blood for love of the Old Land.  

On the political scene pre-war patterns continued with the Reform government retaining power in the 1919 election. Though industrial unrest and economic depression temporarily eroded its support, reducing its majority in the 1922 election, the Reform government held 55 of the 80 seats in the House in 1928 - its largest majority. Even factoring out the country quota, which added electoral weight to rural areas, Reform maintained a healthy majority of the popular vote. Massey maintained premiership of this government until his death in 1925, making him both the second longest serving New Zealand Prime Minister and the sole wartime leader still in office at the 1923 Imperial Conference. Recognition of the political skill and popularity backing these achievements has largely been overshadowed by negative perceptions of a man tagged as bigoted, unpleasant and dull. In Massey’s interpretation of New Zealand’s role at Versailles, the Dominions had not signed as ‘independent nations’, but as ‘self-governing nations within the Empire … as partners in the Empire – partners, with everything that the name implies.’ Allen’s words also tarnish the coming of age narrative; ‘these representatives spoke and signed not as individual Dominions, but as Dominions being

261 This tendency may be on the verge of modification with recent work calling for a reassessment of Massey place in New Zealand’s political history. Erik Olssen, ‘Towards a Reassessment of W.F. Massey: One of New Zealand’s Greatest Prime Ministers (Arguably), A Great New Zealand Prime Minister?: Reappraising William Ferguson Massey, James Watson and Lachy Paterson ed. (Dunedin, 2011), pp.15-30.
part and parcel of the British Empire; and that seems to me to be the method which is not likely to lead to separation, but rather to tie them more closely together than ever before.'

Mainstream cultural orientation towards Greater Britishness continued in the post-war environment. When, in 1920, the Prince of Wales - dispatched on a tour of the Empire to shore up imperial loyalty - announced ‘there is certainly no country more stolidly and unrepentantly British than this Dominion of New Zealand’, he was met with roaring approval. Likewise, when war memorials were erected across the country to proclaim what New Zealanders had sacrificed their lives for they frequently featured regional and Greater British consciousness. One analysis of the cultural beliefs behind the erection of these memorials notes 'It was a nationalism of the loyal colony, in which New Zealanders felt a pride that they had shown themselves stalwart defenders of the Empire.' In 1921 saluting the flag was made compulsory in public schools and loyalty oaths for teachers were established. These ceremonies used both the Union Jack and the New Zealand flag and the oaths were allegiances to the British King.

Lastly, the forces that drove New Zealanders to fight in foreign lands for Greater British purposes appear very much intact. In February 1920, New Zealand troops were sent to Fiji to put down a strike and restore order. In September of that same year, British authorities, facing an uprising in Mesopotamia (now Iraq), approached the Dominions regarding the possibility of military assistance. Australia and Canada proved unwilling, the New Zealand Government offered a battalion. In 1922, the Chanak Crisis saw Britain confronting a potential war with Turkey and again the possibility of Dominion contingents was raised. It took the New Zealand cabinet only a few minutes to conclude that, if necessary, New Zealanders would return to the Dardanelles. Within a fortnight over 14,000 New Zealand

263 Boyd, p.65.
268 Further details for the events mentioned here can be found in David McIntyre, *New Zealand Prepares for War Defence Policy 1919-39* (Christchurch, 1988), pp.70-75.
men had volunteered for service - near the same ratio of volunteers over time as in the first week of the Great War. In 1939 another New Zealand Prime Minister announced the need to support Britain’s confrontation of German aggression in rhetoric that more than hints at familiar themes; ‘behind the sure shield of Britain, we have enjoyed and cherished freedom and self-government. Both with gratitude for the past and confidence in the future we range ourselves beside Britain. Where she goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand.’

Greater British nationalism survived the Great War to remain a major element within New Zealand’s collective identity and public culture, demobilised not destroyed and not obviously diminished.

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Chapter Two

Being Truly British: The Mobilisation of Anti-Alienism

‘For the sake of the living and the dead help us now and stand together. To be truly British we must be anti-German.’- Ida Boeufve

One of the prominent features of the Great War, as a total war, was the intense elevation of the concept of ‘the enemy’ from a battlefield-centred notion to a concept with a wider social framework and powerful cultural dimensions. The resulting conceptions of Germans, the people most prominently identified as the enemy, in New Zealand begs exploration of the forces behind such conceptions.

Consideration of wartime anti-Germanism, in both New Zealand memory and scholarship, gravitates towards identifying officials, a wartime state and propaganda as these forces. The summation of one study of New Zealand anti-German activity notes that once the war began ‘the anti-German propaganda machine’ had ‘full reign.’ The case for powerful manipulators constructing and driving anti-German sentiment seems promising. Legal strictures around aliens were tightened through the war. An Alien Enemies Board was established on the 8 June 1915 with powers to inquire into the status, conduct and character of alien enemies in New Zealand. The 1917 Registration of Aliens Act represents a still more vigorous enquiry and led to the creation of a database of the number, location and background of New Zealand’s unnaturalised enemy alien population, allowing for better state control. Additionally state machinery and legal powers were actively exercised. There were approximately 450 interned aliens on Somes Island in 1919. At an individual level, the von Zedlitz affair is often cited as a leading example of the interaction of state power and anti-Germanism. A Professor at Victoria University who lacked formal British citizenship,

270 Hawke’s Bay Herald, 18 April 1916, p.5.
272 NZS, 1917, No.12, pp.64, 66.
273 AJHR, 1919, H-33, ‘Prisoners of War at Somes Island’, p.2. Lesser numbers were also interned on Motuihi Island and Ripapa Island (also known as Ripa Island).
George von Zedlitz was removed from his position through the 1915 *Alien Enemy Teachers Act*, which was enacted to ‘prohibit the Employment of Alien Enemies as Teachers in Public Educational Institutions’. That von Zedlitz was the only enemy alien who met the Act’s regulations and that the Act had been drafted specifically with him in mind amplifies the charge of state persecution.

A broader explanation might consider manipulation as originating beyond Wellington. A few weeks after the outbreak of war, Charles Masterman’s Propaganda Bureau, at Wellington House in London, was disseminating a wide array of articles, interviews, cartoons and photographs for the newspapers and magazines of allied nations. Certainly the Great War was a media war and accounts of German atrocities (real, exaggerated and fictional) were imported to New Zealand via the imperial network. These included some of the most (in)famous propaganda stories of the war including claims of the *Kadaververwertungsanstalten* - the corpse utilisation factories that Germany was alleged to have established to render the dead into butter and grease; a story which highlighted German materialism, depravity and desperation - and the, now debunked, accounts of crucified Canadian soldiers.

It is difficult to establish the exact relationship between the New Zealand public and such reports. Some accounts note that nearly all New Zealanders ‘believed virtually anything they were told about Germany’ or observe a ‘virulent press campaign, which manipulated a pliable public’. Certainly, examples of seemingly sensible New Zealanders believing what they were told exist; 26 year old, university educated, Millicent Brown (future wife of the pacifist Archibald Baxter) recorded hearing ‘wild stories’ about Germany (a country she had recently visited). ‘Somehow or other I didn’t think of Germany as consisting of people I had known … I didn’t think clearly about it at all, but just accepted what was in the papers.’ This would complement research that the ‘adversary’s intrinsic malignancy’ was never really questioned during the war. In other interpretations newspapers lost esteem as New Zealanders, and all belligerent populations, grew sceptical and distrustful of the ‘silly tosh’

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275 AWN, 28 June 1917, p.57, Poverty Bay Herald, 10 August 1918, p.7.
280 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, p.102.
they were told. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the sheer volume of this material and its effective monopoly of news of the wider world meant that it became socially dominant. The subliminal qualities should not be discounted either; those distrustful of the press might be influenced by reports repeated via personal and social networks.

However we need to go further than pointing fingers at grand manipulators to explain the mobilisation of anti-Germanism. Draconian, illiberal state measures and propaganda had a more complex relationship with the public sphere than simply being imposed; manipulation from above was a facet of a larger movement, not the sum of it. Additionally, reports of German behaviour, so crucial to building an anti-German atmosphere, cannot simply be dismissed as sensationalist cant and duplicitous inventions to stoke public outcry. Contemporaries were genuinely shocked by German conduct; the violation of Belgian neutrality, the indiscriminate sinking of civilian vessels - of which the *Lusitania* is only the best remembered - the bombardment of British civilians via Zeppelins and in coastal raids and the deployment of poison gas. German atrocities in occupied Belgium and France, well circulated by the Bryce Report, further shocked and begged explanation. Modern research has confirmed that the German Army did deliberately execute some 6,500 Belgian and French civilians, including women and children, and that the conditions of the German occupation were responsible for the deaths of roughly 250,000 more. As one British historian puts it, ‘the press did not initiate the process of dehumanising the enemy; the German military and naval commanders did.’

These real episodes were layered with cultural meanings, a process which speaks of wider social forces and deeper cultural sentiments. Anti-German constructions were not solely the result of a centralised and dehumanised ‘machine’ but something more akin to a mobilisation of existing cultural conceptions and the established peacetime channels which circulated them. Wartime anti-Germanism emerged from a pre-war cultural context which can, in some sense, be attributed to a larger dichotomous theme of nationalism; that inclusion and

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282 Retorts might note the wartime conditions driving such actions or note the deeds which tarnish the Allies’ halo; the Allied willingness to respond to gas with gas or the British blockade which, in effect, targeted German civilians. Modern commentators might go back and forth upon whether this creates a moral equivalence between the belligerents but this should not distract us from the fact that this does not capture contemporary public sentiment.
284 Gregory, p.69.
exclusion inherently stimulate one another. To borrow Karl Deutsch’s phrase, ‘a nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours.’

In New Zealand this can be illustrated via one of the more extreme embodiments of anti-Germanism in the wartime public sphere, the WAGL, whose motto was ‘New Zealand for New Zealanders; No Germans Need Apply.’ The League’s first meeting was held on 10 January 1916 at Gamble and Creed’s Tea-Rooms in Wellington. While it did tour the North Island in attempts to foster awareness of the ‘alien enemy problem’, it remained a Wellington-based organisation with its headquarters firmly located on the first floor of Hannah’s Buildings on Lambton Quay. The League was something of a fringe movement. Its membership grew to 1,500 in three months but plateaued at 2,000 by July 1917. It did spread its message, including into parliament via firebrand MP John Payne, however the idea that the League was composed of mischief makers was spread simultaneously. For instance, some scoffed at the League’s claims that outbreaks of infant paralysis were a German machination to sabotage the health of New Zealand’s future soldiers. Charles Wilkinson, the MP for Egmont, almost certainly had the WAGL in mind when he complained of ‘hysterical women running hither and thither in Wellington … creating a disturbance when there is no justification.’ Less amusing were intolerant calls for an exclusion of ‘dangerous individuals’ (i.e. those of German birth or descent) from civic life. In this vein, a minor scandal broke out when Lieutenant Alexander Hugh Grierson was cleared of charges of disloyalty and German sympathies – an accusation Allen deemed as ‘entirely wrong and savours of persecution’. The League described the Minister’s unwillingness to recognise the necessity of ‘purging the NZ Army of all whose presence in the ranks … is a danger to the successful prosecution of the war’ as indicating his unfitness for office. However, while it attracted sceptics and critics and never became a widespread organisation, the crux of

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286 Marlborough Express, 18 January 1916, p.2.
287 ATL-MS-Papers-5163, Graham Hucker, 1915-1919, 1991, ‘Bundling out the Hun; the Women’s Anti-German League in New Zealand during the first world war’, pp.4-5.
289 Otago Witness (OW), 16 February 1916, p.66.
290 NZPD, Vol.175, 17 May 1916, p.184.
291 *The Truth about the Grierson Inquiry* (Wellington, 1915?), ANZ-R222319681-ADBU-16145-ALLEN1-8-D4/70, ‘Minister of Defence-Anti-German League, circulars etc’.
292 ANZ-R222319681-ADBU-16145-ALLEN1-8-D4/70, ‘Minister of Defence-Anti-German League, circulars etc’.

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the League’s philosophy, as offered by one of its Vice-Presidents at a rally in Napier, was an extreme version of a wider social dynamic: ‘To be truly British we must be Anti-German.’

This idea of being ‘truly British’ - entailing the behaviour of generating internal cohesion by identifying and vilifying antitypes - was an established part of the pre-war social/cultural landscape. Anti-alienism has been noted as an established social feature in the British settler colonies; ‘all the British Dominions (save Newfoundland) were far more aggressive and relentless [than Britain] with regard to any matter concerning race and ethnicity.’ The most recent study of New Zealand anti-Germanism during the Great War identifies such thinking as a major force behind wartime intolerance; observing a ‘growing unease over continental European settlement in the dominions’ and a rising suspicion of German expansion as ‘laying the groundwork’ for wartime behaviours.

There is a risk, however, of perceiving what was being said about Germany through 1900-1914 as inevitably leading to what was going to be said about Germany through 1914-1918. The notion of a slide into war weeds ambiguity from pre-war perceptions of Germany and gives retrospective prominence to some perspectives. While predictions of a future war with Germany existed, and indicate tensions in international relations, the renegotiation of other discourses is perhaps equally revealing. In 1909 Allen objected to ‘constantly talking about Germany … There are other nations – the Japanese, the Chinese – of entirely different race from ourselves … nations which have become or are on the way to become great nations upon whose inhabitants we in Australia and New Zealand have imposed restrictions which must be very galling indeed to them.’ In July 1914 ‘forewarned’ wrote a letter to the editor warning of a Japanese/Russian/‘Hindoo’ conspiracy to infiltrate the British Empire and noted the trouble in the Balkans as part of this plot. Research has observed a period after the outbreak of war, but before British entry, when the editorials of some New Zealand papers pursued an anti-Russian interpretation of events.

293 *Hawke’s Bay Herald*, 18 April 1916, p.5.
295 Francis, *To be Truly British*, pp.4, 46.
297 NZH, 11 July 1914, p.12.
Wartime anti-Germanism is symptomatic of more than just an intensified continuation of pre-war Teutophobia. Instead wartime anti-Germanism was augmented by the mobilisation and redirection of truly British philosophies. Indeed, it should be remembered that media personalities such as ‘Tohunga’, a columnist for the New Zealand Herald, who publicised vitriolic anti-German material through the war, had sharpened his techniques with Francophobic views at the turn-of-the-century: ‘She [France] palms her flat-figured women on us as beauties, her evanescent wit as wisdom, her deadly vices as virtues, and her millinery as civilisation.’ 299 Likewise William Blomfield made the identification and vilification of New Zealand’s adversaries (or at least his perception thereof) a staple through the five decades of his career. Possibly more visibly than any other individual he, as New Zealand’s foremost cartoonist, mobilised his public ‘voice’ during the war, directing the same techniques he had used against militant labour, Mr Fat, urban fops, wowsers, cantankerous farmers, separatist Maori, non-white immigrants and others, against Germans. Recognising the mobilisation of truly British dynamics is crucial in grasping how perceptions of Germany developed. Being truly British took a more intense form, and targets changed during the Great War, but the underlying patterns and modes of thought remain remarkably unchanged.

**Identifying unBritishness**

It has been suggested that the newness of British civilisation in the Empire’s settler colonies lent intensity to mainstream conceptions of who did and did not belong. 300 Regarding New Zealand, Brian Moloughney and John Stenhouse have observed that

The mainstream, determined to build a virtuous, prosperous, cohesive and harmonious society in the Antipodes, radically ‘othered’ a variety of groups …. Constructing communal enemies helped an otherwise bondless, atomised society to cohere. 301

This cultural paradigm of boosting British solidarity via the vilification of unBritish antitypes is well illustrated in pre-war Sinophobia, a topic which has attracted a not insignificant level of scholarly interest over the last two decades. The intense and candid qualities of Sinophobia make it the most appropriate case study in tracking the ideas and orientations which were mobilised against Germany. However it should be recognised that pre-war New Zealand’s capacity to ‘Other’ was not solely an anti-Chinese activity. Indeed Moloughney and Stenhouse have argued that a historical focus upon turn-of-the-century Sinophobia - at

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299 NZH, 23 November 1901, supplement, p.1.
300 Saunders, p.23.
the expense of appreciating the wider dynamics and groups that were ‘Othered’ - is myopic.  

Comprehension of this truly British dynamic can be expanded by the realisation that other groups could be subjects of this gaze. Even Australia, a fellow white, British Dominion, was used as a, less than truly British, ‘Other’. By the outbreak of war there was an established history of considering Australians as less than truly British in stock and habits. This narrative drew on convict origins, a higher Irish demographic and a perceived vulgar manner and it has been argued that New Zealanders used this perception to frame themselves as ‘qualitatively superior to most white Australians.’ Sinclairs notes ‘a feeling of comradeship and a friendly rivalry in which the Australians regarded the “Kiwis” as genteel country cousins, while the latter professed to see the “Aussies” as coarse fellows, whose ancestry, in the interests of courtesy, should be ignored.’ Julius Vogel played to this tune in arguing for annexation of the Pacific. He noted that settlement by the Australian colonies was undesirable, as the ‘crime stained instincts’ of the population would spread, producing ‘future generations of lawless people.’ Such ideas were expressed again with the decision not to federate with the Australian colonies; an action the *New Zealand Graphic* depicted as a dignified British lady spurning the advances of an ogre bearing chains. An added element in this dynamic is how Australia, as a geographically close and culturally familiar neighbour, allowed a notion of ‘it can happen here’. Time and again Australia was portrayed in New Zealand public culture as a less loyal outpost of Britishness, lambasted for failing to reach the level of commitment to the Empire that New Zealand did or should. This shaming was directed less at Australia, which was probably paying little attention, than to encouraging sustained or increased commitment within New Zealand.

Given that a central theme of ANZAC mythology is that of a shared kinship between the Australasian Dominions, distinctive from the character of old Britons, such ideas may sound heretical. This is not so much to deny the existence of such ANZAC sentiments, as it is to acknowledge that they mixed with the ongoing efforts of New Zealanders and Australians to

302 Moloughney and Stenhouse, pp.43-64.
301 James Bennett, p.37.
304 EP, 4 December 1884, p.2.
305 *New Zealand Graphic and Ladies Journal*, 20 October 1900, p.713.
assess themselves against the other. The initial attitudes of frontline troops suggest that established notions of Australians were carried to war. For example James Bayne of the Wellington Battalion described the Australians as ‘very untidy and slovenly … we are superior to them in every way.’ Contemporary and modern Australian writers have observed similar distinctions. The war correspondent Charles Bean characterised New Zealand troops as ‘more urbane, less of a child of nature than the Australian.’ An Australian based ANZAC historian describes the New Zealand-Australian connection as a ‘love-hate relationship’ where New Zealanders weighed a respect for Australian fighting qualities against their brashness and their own feeling of underrepresentation in ANZAC ephemera.

On the home front as well Australia was used as a less than truly British punching bag. As mentioned, a major function of this treatment was to present Australia as a flawed conception of Britishness as a call for New Zealanders to close ranks. For example Australian rejection of conscription, via referendums in 1916 and 1917, sparked surges of comments from New Zealand commentators about pro-German elements, radical labour and general disloyalty in Australia. The Minister of Internal Affairs, G.W. Russell, noted that Australians ‘seem to be a different population altogether from New Zealand’ and that rejection of conscription could be attributed to a ‘convict taint’. Industrial unrest in 1916 was presented as impeding Australia’s war effort and endangering lives - depicted through a Red Fed hampering an Australian soldier’s sword arm in the midst of a battle (fig.11). Likewise, when Australia’s second conscription referendum rejected compulsion, Free Lance space was devoted to depicting the loyal regions of the Empire assisting John Bull in saving ‘home’ from the fire of German Kultur, whilst Australia poses as a quintessential model of a shirker (see Chapter Four) (fig.12). Such images emerged in a New Zealand environment where the adoption of conscription was a recent development and where the threat of industrial unrest seemed possible. In this context presenting Australia as less than truly British was an affirmation of the correct course of action (or the creator’s perception thereof).

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308 Peter Stanley, “‘Whom at first we did not like…’: Australians and New Zealanders at Quinn’s Post, Gallipoli’, New Zealand’s Great War, p.185.
Figure 11 *New Zealand Free Lance*, 10 March 1916, p.3.
AUSTRALIA'S "NO."

John Bull: Come along, Aussie, lend us a hand to save the home.
Aussie: It's your crimson crib, not mine. Do your own bully blanket work.

Figure 12 New Zealand Free Lance, 4 January 1918, p.3.
Whilst Australia made a convenient subject for a less than truly British antitype, a different approach was taken in presenting peoples deemed entirely outside the British community. This condemnation was significantly different to sneers at Australian ancestry, mockery of the manner of old Britons or the complex and contradictory perceptions of Maori. The dubious distinction of being deemed most undesirable in sheer volume of material goes to Asiatics, with Sinophobia most saliently exhibiting how notions of being British and xenophobic tendencies could complement one another. In 1896, during a debate in Parliament, William Montgomery declared ‘if this is going to be a colony that we may be proud of, and which we hope our children will be proud of, we should fearlessly say we do not want Chinamen to be here at all.’\footnote{NZPD, Vol.92, 26 June 1896, p.380.} Montgomery was a man of his time and was by no means alone in deeming the Chinese as a threat to a vision of an ideal British civilisation in New Zealand. Cartoons grouped depictions of Chinese coolies alongside rabbits, stoats and weasels under the title ‘imported pests’.\footnote{New Zealand Observer and Free Lance, 16 April 1887, p.8.} Erik Olssen has noted, in his study of turn-of-the-century Caversham, that ‘the cohesion of the community and its egalitarian ethos rested not only upon shared values and experiences but the presence of some thirty Chinese men … menacing their own vision of a new society.’\footnote{Ip, Manying and Nigel Murphy, Aliens at My Table: Asians as New Zealanders See Them (Wellington, 2005).} Certainly the nature and identity of New Zealand and New Zealanders was sharpened through contrast to immigrants and circumstances deemed undesirable. William Blomfield, for example, depicted a physical contrast between a tall, white yeoman farmer and his family and the rather sinister appearance of a Chinese gardener. Also apparent is the threat the Chinese presence, alongside the enabling Mr Fat, is imagined to pose to the domestic and economic prospects New Zealand was supposed to confer on its British settlers (fig.13).

The chauvinism captured in such discourse flared near the turn-of-the-century. Some of this was channelled into politicised societies; between 1894 and 1907 four major anti-Chinese societies were formed - The Anti-Chinese Association, the Anti-Chinese League, the Anti-Asiatic League and the White Race League. Some individuals took more direct and extreme action. The white-supremacist Lionel Terry, for example, shot a Chinese stranger, Joe Kum Yung, on a Wellington street in 1905. Terry claimed this act of violence was a proclamation that he would not allow ‘my rights and those of my fellow Britons to be jeopardised by alien

\footnote{Erik Olssen, Building the New World: Work, Politics and Society in Caversham 1880-1920s (Auckland, 1995), p.44.}
invaders. When the US ‘Great White Fleet’ visited Auckland in 1908 the welcoming fleet-week celebrations saw perceptions of Anglo-Saxon contact and kinship juxtaposed with potential Asian belligerency. In the New Zealand Herald’s words ‘blood is thicker than water; and in language, in race, in social and political conception, in religion and creed, and in all that lies deepest in human nature and in national character, the British and the Americans are one.’ Conversely, despite being allies, through the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, anti-Japanese sentiment could be conspicuous, notably after the 1905 shock Japanese victory over Russia at Tsushima. The tendency was to present Japan, an industrialising, militarised Asian state, as indicative of an awakening Asia which might challenge the European civilisation; ‘The nations of the East have awakened from a sleep of hundreds of

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316 NZH, 31 March 1908, p.4.
years. They are adopting our dress, our methods of education, and our methods of warfare.’

Whilst some conservative opinion chafed at the appropriateness of a British Dominion welcoming American ships - the Prime Minster himself claimed that ‘while we have a profound respect for our American cousins we recognise our own Old Country as the right bower for New Zealand’ - others were more brazen in their support for the projection of US might in the Pacific. The pinnacle of such thinking seems to have been reached by the Hon. Mr Hornsby:

I am thankful that Uncle Sam has come into the Pacific to keep the yellow and brown men busy if there is to be any trouble … give me the Stars and Stripes before the Dragon or the Risen Sun. I would rather live in the most abject manner under Uncle Sam’s flag than I would tolerate the monkey-brand any time.

Outside the political realm this dynamic can be witnessed in the public sphere. Ecildoune Fredrick Hiscocks depicted a young New Zealand using Uncle Sam’s spear to drive Asiatic soldiers and coolies into the sea (fig.14). All entrants to the Weekly Graphic’s competition to write a poem to welcome the fleet tended towards waxing lyrical upon the ties that bound English-speaking peoples. Many expanded this theme to include the support these ties supposed. One contestant’s final stanza read:

In time to come, our isles, mayhap,
      May be attacked by Master Jap.
      Would you appear, like a thunder-clap?
      We think you would, America.

As Ian McGibbon has noted, the lines of future confrontation in the Pacific were being laid down.

Clearly not all social embodiments of Sinophobia were as politicised and organised as the Leagues’, as extreme and violent as Terry’s, nor as public as fleet-week rhetoric. Sinophobia was never standardised in either its philosophy or its execution, appearing more as a background vibration within the wider public sphere and transcending any simple class, political or regional categorisation. As Belich has noted, Sinophobia ‘did not stem from a

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318 NZH, 19 August 1908, p.8.
320 The competition was run by the Weekly Graphic through August 1908.
321 McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p.165.
class-specific fear of competition: workers were Sinophobic but so were bourgeois and intellectuals. The diversity of Sinophobic discourse is at least partially explained by the diversity of its origins. There was a modular quality to Sinophobia where diverse elements were slotted into the discourse to confirm the conclusion that Orientals were not only outside the project of establishing a British civilisation in New Zealand, but were an active menace to it.

Figure 14 New Zealand Times, 14 August 1908, p.6.

Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.229.
For example the belief that the Chinese were a sanitation risk, due to a disposition for overcrowded housing and ‘the East’ being a land ravaged by disease and pestilence, has been noted as a popular attitude and part of public policy towards Asians in all the white settler nation’ and a threat to moral purity.323 Those supporting eugenics and anti-miscegenation reported rumours of the ‘debauching of women and children’ and ‘yellow fiends’ leering at ‘the smiling little daughters of the poor.’324 One editorial recorded that ‘there is a sentiment amongst the people at large which has almost become a watchword or motto: “New Zealand for New Zealanders.” Accordingly this translated into a wish to avoid the settlement of non-British stock, as well as desire for ‘purity’: ‘Neither are we ambitious to have a mixed race – a hybrid or mongrel in reality a mixture of all. On the contrary we are all anxious to preserve the purity of our race.325

The National Service League in pushing for universal/compulsory military training made a regular feature of Asiatic encroachment; ‘And when the myriads of Asia, with their utterly alien civilisation, troop down upon us – as they will, certainly, should we remain defenceless – what will happen to our civilisation?’326 Identical calls to protect workers’ living standards against Oriental immigration were aired in the Trade Unions, indicating a more casual (as opposed to a scientific or elitist) racism.327 Thus Mark Fagan claimed, at the 1913 Labour Unity Conference, that ‘this country must be defended from the industrial and moral degradation of the yellow races’.328 Mr Melling added that alongside a military yellow peril was the peril of cheap non-white labour.329

The belief that the maintenance of a truly British country required shielding the ideal against unBritish adversaries was a dominant philosophy which predated and survived the Great War. In 1895 William Pember Reeves made the public proclamation that ‘in order to keep this country foremost in the ranks of civilisation … the scum of the earth must be kept out.’330 Thirty years after Reeves’ statement, Truth echoed this siege-like attitude with a depiction of a menacing trinity comprised of a heavyset bolshie, a ‘Hindoo’ and a Mongolian on the

323 Otago Daily Times (ODT), 1 October 1869, p.7.
325 NZO, 27 May 1893, p.2.
326 Defence, 28 March 1908, p.6.
327 Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.143, 216-244.
329 EP, 11 July 1913, p.11.
330 New Zealand Times, 5 August 1895, p.3.
outskirts of ‘God’s own country’. The three figures bear an assortment of opium pipes, dope, bombs and axes and have flies hovering around them (fig.15). In a related fashion there was an established trait of tagging foreign/racial figures as potential threats to social order. In 1913 the Evening Post claimed that stone throwing and incitements to violence during the Great Strike to be the result of ‘violent foreigners’ and that the colonial born were not the chief offenders. During the 1932 riots the Observer (the title the New Zealand Observer had renamed itself with after the war), reported social strife within the same framework;

Figure 15 Truth, 21 February 1925, p.1.

331 EP, 6 November 1913, p.8.
a screaming woman thrust her way among the men, using oaths and filth from which far the greater majority of the unemployed men refrained. Somebody told her to keep her head. “You be -” screeched she, “I was in the 1913 riots, and I’m going to be in these.” Her straggling hair was dragged back from a forehead as low as an animal’s: dull eyes protruded in a face which bore the stamp of some Slavonic nationality. Who are these people? What are they doing in New Zealand, and what possessed the Immigration Department to let them in?  

These snapshots of from 1895-1925 and 1913-1932 illustrate the dynamic of being truly British before and after 1914-1918. It should not overly surprise that this cultural trajectory shot straight through the conflict and interacted with the mobilisation process. The modes of thought, social discourse and cultural patterns highlighted formed a network which would be mobilised against other unBritish enemies.

**The Germanic ‘Other’?**

The way public discourse concerning Germany and Germans sat within this truly British mentality before 1914 was complex and makes a vivid contrast to the single-minded certainty that appears after that year. Paul Kennedy’s landmark study of the rise of an Anglo-German antagonism during 1860-1914 begins by noting the unexpected nature of this development. Kennedy observes that at the start of the period, political co-operation and the absence of any history of military struggle stood beside ‘dynastic, cultural, religious and economic ties.’

The New Zealand-German antagonism might be observed as following the same course where co-operation and/or benign co-existence competed with rivalry and animosity. As with its British counterpart this path does not seem inevitable.

Through the nineteenth-century, and notably during the Vogel administration’s immigration and public works scheme of the 1870s, thousands of immigrants from German-speaking Europe travelled to New Zealand, with estimates of those settled ranging between 5,000 and 20,000 between 1840-1914. Despite the wide range in these estimates it is certain that immigrants from German-speaking Europe and their descendants constituted the second largest migrant group after those from the British Isles. The blurred lines of the Germanic in New Zealand are indicative of the description of German-speaking settlers as a ‘submerged

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332 *Observer*, 21 April 1932, p.5.
333 Kennedy, p.xi.
group’ which tended to integrate readily into the dominant British culture. The racial philosophies of the day often favoured the Germanic as preferential, a Northern European/Anglo-Saxon/Aryan connection making them something like honorary Britons. Immigration aside there were additional arenas for friendly and profitable contact and exchange. German ships and sailors in the Pacific in need of supplies and services brought funds into New Zealand ports. In 1890 the German Navy made its largest visit to New Zealand to resupply. Shore leave seemingly went well. The crew was noted for their ‘clean and smart appearance and exemplary conduct.’ The *Evening Post* commented that ‘it can safely be said that the officers and men have … made themselves universally popular and formed friendships which both they and the citizens of Wellington genuinely hope to renew at some future time.’

Others conceived of yet grander contact between British and German civilisation. Sir Bampfylde Fuller, the Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal, penned an essay later reprinted in New Zealand papers. Fuller argued for a potential global order based around an entente between the US, the British Empire and Germany. These Anglo-Saxon nations were considered to be ‘substantially at one in their ideals, and have together forged the habits and institutions which are the distinctive features of modern civilisation.’ Fuller’s vision of global political order is indicative of one of the popular topics of members of the intelligentsia of the age – see also Imperial Federation. However the kernel of the essay - that there were shared racial qualities between branches of the so called Anglo-Saxon race - was not unknown in New Zealand. As will be seen notions of kinship between the Britannic and the Germanic were aired by mainstream commentators right up to the outbreak of the war.

Agitating against a peaceful Britannic and Germanic connection was a complex shift in Anglo-German relations towards the end of the long nineteenth-century. Into the twentieth-century British Admirals identified Germany as the rising threat to British security – Sir John Fisher’s 1911 prediction that the war with Germany would begin on 21 October 1914 is eerie in its accuracy. To a large extent New Zealand inherited this enemy; a challenge to British economic and military power was a challenge to New Zealand’s interests. Certainly the New

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337 Ian McGibbon, ‘German Naval Visits to New Zealand’, *German Connection*, pp.15-16.
339 *Hawera & Normanby Star*, 18 July 1914, p.9.
Zealand Defence Department received reviews of the strategic situation which noted Germany as ‘our probable opponent in the next great war.’ This threat perception was imported through British news and literature and is indicative of the active cultural links between regions of Greater Britain. A recount of developments in the Empire’s centre - on naval races, industrial competition, diplomatic sparring and the content of Boys Own - before 1914 would therefore do much to explain the increase of Germanic threat perception in New Zealand. However these subjects have generated extensive literature in their own right and while events in the North Sea essentially underpinned the New Zealand-German antagonism, a Pacific dimension might be studied alongside it.

For instance, German interests in Samoa, formalised by the 1899 Tripartite Convention, had raised the ire of New Zealand imperialists who had coveted that Pacific territory. Robert Stout noted that from 1885 onwards New Zealand had looked forward to Samoa becoming British territory claiming ‘Samoa is their Alsace’. This gives some context to the enthusiasm of some New Zealanders to capture German Samoa in 1914. The Kaiser’s sabre rattling, reprints of Anglophobic remarks from the German press during the Boer War and news of Germany’s naval program did nothing to mellow sections of the New Zealand public’s perceptions of Germany. In Oamaru an Anti-German League was formed in 1902 and members pledged to boycott German goods, encouraging other colonists to follow their example. At least one other body, the Auckland Tailors’ Union, openly pledged itself to the cause. These groups were by no means overly successful. Seddon - if his opinion is taken as indicative of which way the wind was blowing - deemed that such a boycott was ‘UnBritish’. The numbers complement this attitude and indicate an underwhelming public response. New Zealand-German trade links, while never overwhelming, were growing in the 1900-1914 world. The value of New Zealand’s exports to Germany in 1914 (£456,163) was the highest then recorded and more than 10 times higher than the 1908 figure (£40,191). Likewise the value of seeds, superphosphates, dyes, toys, pianos, glassware and ironmongery

341 ANZ-R3885320-AAYS-8647-AD10-7-16/6, ‘Defence scheme, expeditionary action by territorial force, August 1912-June 1913’.
344 OW, 22 January 1902, p.49.
imported from Germany was steadily increasing from a 1900 figure of £182,074 to peak in 1913 at £687,935 - by 1918 this figure had plummeted to £684.346

However the mode of thinking and some of the broad conceptions which would later be expressed in war were established; German politics, German kultur and German manufacturers were candidates for an unBritish status.347 One correspondent in the turn-of-the-century boycott debates, ‘Britanicus’, noted that every colonist who selected English, Canadian or Australian manufacturers over German ones was a ‘Patriot’ ‘because every penny so spent will aid in the preservation of the industrial and international supremacy of our race.’348 This is a less intense, but identifiable, version of what would emerge later. The notion that German connections detracted from, or were threats to, British ones was now established, if only on the fringes of public discourse.

One witness to evolving threat perceptions over this period might be spied in the invasion literature imported, produced and circulated in the years before the war. Classic examples such as The Battle of Dorking and The Invasion of 1910 were serialised in New Zealand newspapers and local writers, aping the style and tropes, penned additional stories which saw battles in Karori and raids on Waitemata harbour. Significant examples include Julian Grix’s The Defence of New Zealand, David Luckie’s The Raid of the Russian Cruiser ‘Kaskowiski’, John Allen’s A Naval Policy for New Zealand, Colonel Morris’ Is Invasion Possible?, ‘Artemidorus’ New Zealand in the Next Great War: A Note of Warning, F. Coombes’ The Story of the Auckland Raid and the anonymous How War and Woe Came to Wellington, the Invasion of 1908.349

That the literature indicates a shift in perception regarding Germany is debatable. Germany’s Pacific interests were tagged as security threats, but the Germanic menace appears alongside Russian, Asiatic and anonymous bogeys. Additionally, aside from simply being a popular genre, invasion literature might be considered as attempts to raise public anxiety rather than as reflections of it. The stories invariably possess a moral lesson, wherein the enemy strikes an unready country only to be beaten after prolonged sacrifice which might have been less

347 Anti-German cartoons also appeared. For example New Zealand Graphic, 18 January 1902, p.97, NZH, 17 January 1902, p.3.
348 Wanganui Herald, 15 January 1902, p.3.
costly had security been less lax. Luckie’s story of the *Kaskowiski* raid is the purest example of political motives backing at least some invasion literature. The story was a reprint of a hoax instigated in 1873, wherein, in an attempt to generate pressure for defence reform, the *Daily Southern Cross* had reported that a Russian warship was laying siege to Auckland.\(^{350}\) Its reprinting during another period of defence reform is telling. The major conclusion that might be drawn from these stories is that authors believed that a German aggressor was within public comprehension.

One bizarre incident backing this conclusion was the 1909 Zeppelin sightings. Between July and September 1909 numerous New Zealanders claimed to have seen mysterious Zeppelins over locations in the North and South Islands. This incident occurred amidst concern over developments in modern warfare. A search through New Zealand’s digital newspaper archive for ‘Zeppelin’, ‘Zepplin’ and ‘airship’ between 1900 (the year the first airship was launched) and 1914 finds 8,169,485 results.\(^{351}\) Many of these articles focus on futurist thoughts of the impact of aviation on warfare and digital searches correlate well with ‘weapon’, ‘invasion’ and ‘threat’. The influence of H.G. Wells’ novel *The War in the Air* (serialised in 1907 and published in 1908) is also worth mentioning. The story imagined a scenario in which airships are widely employed in a Great Power confrontation which included a Pacific theatre. If concern was primed by such media, then press coverage of the British Dreadnought scare early in 1909 did nothing to calm the public mood about British vulnerability and danger from Germany. The public concern that British naval preponderance was being eroded was well reported and New Zealanders were familiar with the chant ‘we want eight [new Dreadnoughts built] and we won’t wait’.

It was against this background that New Zealanders demonstrated a similar concern about vulnerability, though from the skies rather than on the seas. The first report seems to have come from the Otago coast where on 11 July Kaitangata residents reported observing a mysterious light over the Wangaloa Hills, adding the possibility that it was an airship.\(^{352}\) On 24 July various schoolchildren and an adult from the Otago town of Kelso produced sketches

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350 *Daily Southern Cross*, 17 February 1873, p.3.
351 Papers Past [http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast](http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast). The digital archive is regularly adding new tiles and subsequent searches will give more results than mentioned here. It is not unreasonable to assume that Zeppelin reports were higher than the figure given.
352 ODT, 16 July 1909, p.10.
of an airship claimed to have circled over the town during the day (fig.16). Townsmen and local police took all of this seriously enough to send expeditions to search the Blue Mountains in attempts to locate the vessel or a base of operations, but found nothing. On 31 July two miners in Gore reported seeing an airship at 5 am whilst working the night shift. They claimed that it circled in the foggy sky and asserted that two figures were ‘plainly discernible on board.’ By 3 August sightings were being reported in the North Island. On that date a Waipawa man stated that a large grey, torpedo-shaped vessel had passed him whilst he had been riding his horse and that one of the three visible passengers had shouted out to him in an ‘unknown tongue’.

The forces behind the existence and the quantity of UFZ sightings might be attributed to varying mixes of mistaken sightings of natural phenomena - possibly assisted by alcohol - (Mars, marsh gas and comets were all nominated), outright fabrications spurred by political or more mundane motivations and the catalyst quality of a media hungry for interesting news. One of the few scholarly studies of this largely forgotten episode dubs the incident a ‘moral panic’. Regardless of explanations, an essential attribute of the scareship phenomena is how it reflects that a German threat was an established concept in the public sphere as well as how numerous people used the familiarity of the idea of danger for various ends. The Wairarapa Co-operative Butchery Company, for example, sought to grab attention with the headline ‘A German Invasion’ in large font before following this with the message that the above was not as important to the public as was the deception other butchers were weaving with their meat prices. Mr G. Whealer of Bluff claimed that a message had been dropped to him via an airship requesting 10,000 more cases of Gilmour & Thompson’s Scotch Whiskey. A quick search reveals that Whealer was an agent for a local liquor manufacturer. The Otago Witness reported a somewhat democratic engagement with the sightings, reporting that its office had been inundated with submissions of sketches showing figures under the influence of ‘John Barleycorn’ ‘gazing with drunken gravity at a street lamp or the town clock.’

353 OW, 4 August 1909, p.32.
356 Hawkes Bay Herald, 6 August 1909, p.7.
359 Southland Times, 2 August 1909, p.5.
360 OW, 4 August 1909, p.33.
In assessing New Zealand’s perception of Germany before 1914 it is difficult to know what end of the telescope to look down. Events unfolding in the decade before the Great War had clearly frayed ties with the Germanic but it was the outbreak of war which brought a dramatic severance and saw a truly British dynamic mobilised against it. Let us give the last words to the New Zealand Herald’s editorial line, which would be so mobilised come wartime. In 1901 it was noted that ‘any differences we may have with Germany will be some day amicably settled.’ In 1905, while grievances were acknowledged, it was noted that ‘the perverse German is at his worst a caricature of what we are ourselves’ and that ill feeling would be overcome when the average German had ‘refined his appetites and can enjoy a 6 by 8 by 1 inch cut of good red beef hot and underdone, with plenty of horseradish, instead of his barbaric sausage and sauerkraut.’ As late as 1 August 1914, with Europe mobilising for war, it was stressed that German immigrants were welcome, German cultural and intellectual achievements admired and that kinship should trump foreign policy; ‘in religion, in national aspirations, in social tendencies and in ethical conceptions, British and German are one and the same.’

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361 NZH, 2 January 1901, p.4.
362 NZH, 9 September 1905, supplement, p.1.
363 NZH, 1 August 1914, p.6.
The Hun

Writing about the rapidly changing politics and threat perceptions at the end of the Second World War, John Dower observes that ‘enemies changed, with wrenching suddenness; but the concept of “the enemy” remained impressively impervious to drastic alteration, and in its peculiar way provided psychological continuity and stability.’\footnote{John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986), p.309.} A similar dynamic is displayed in New Zealand’s entry into the Great War. Though some of the players were radically recast, the available roles remained largely unchanged. For example, the Russian bogey, which had been among New Zealand’s key antagonists through the nineteenth-century, was made more familiar, less alien. Character sketches depicted ‘Tommy’s Russian brother’ ‘Johnny’ or ‘Ivan’ as simple and stoic people. A typical example of such material noted the Russian soldier on the whole is very fine indeed … on the average he is not so tall as the English soldier, but is larger boned and broader chested … When pure and unmixed with Tartar blood, he is not unlike many of the men I have seen in the north and east of England. … Their religious character is seen in conflict, for they look on a battle, not as a sanguinary fight, but as the defence of their faith, Tsar and country.\footnote{EP, 4 January 1915, p.3.}

Likewise France and Belgium were emphasised as noble allies in and martyrs for a righteous cause. The mud slung at a neutral, materialistic, possibly pro-German, US was also quickly renegotiated come 1917. Thereafter the unity of the English-speaking peoples was emphasised with the added revisionist touch that the American War of Independence had been, not a rebellion against British rule but an assertion of British liberty against the tyranny of George III, a German monarch.\footnote{Grey River Argus, 4 July 1918, p.2, AWN, 12 December 1918, p.14.} Germany itself was recast in a role that emphasised established pre-war grievances as well as borrowing conceptions applied to pre-war adversaries (some of whom were now praised allies).

Wartime anti-alienism is a subject larger than wartime anti-Germanism, though certainly the latter is a significant part of the former. Other ‘Others’ include not only the Central Powers, but the subject peoples within those empires - Dalmatians, Yugoslavs, Armenians and Poles - who occupied a sort of ideological limbo between enemies and allies.\footnote{Andrew Trlin, *Now Respected Once Despised: Yugoslavs in New Zealand* (Palmerston North, 1979), Judith Bassett, ‘Colonial Justice: The Treatment of Dalmatians in New Zealand during the First World War’, NZJH, 33:2 (1999), pp.155-128.} One curiosity is the often charitable portrayal of the Turkish soldier. Notions of ‘the unspeakable Turk’ indicate that this should not be overstated. However, such sentiments exist alongside chivalric, if
patronising, descriptions of ‘the Turkish character’ and notions that the Turkish people were simply cat’s-paws led astray by Germany. Indeed in a war where atrocities and ‘us and them’ distinctions formed the bread and butter of representations of the enemy, surprisingly little currency was made out of religious and ethnic differences or the treatment of the Armenians. Nevertheless the major enemy targeted during the war was Germany and exploration of wartime anti-Germanism best highlights the mobilised results of pre-war cultural notions.

One of the foremost attributes of wartime constructions of Germans is the tendency to present the subject in monolithic terms. Total war had broken out in an age when the notion of ‘race’ and ‘racial character’ were common concepts. Thus war was frequently framed as one against a people, race or nation - rather than a regime, army or an ideology. Whilst the Kaiser and ‘Prussian militarism’ did become focal points of condemnation, there was often little effort made to distinguish them from wider German civilisation; ‘the Kaiser is no more responsible for the war than the casual captain of an organised band of pirates is responsible for their piracy … Every typical German has the same mania … Whether this typical German lives in Auckland or in Berlin, in the palace or in the slum, he is one and the same.’

‘Possessed by an absolutely satanic spirit, the German mind has become insensate to the codes of humanity and the aspirations of Christendom.’ ‘The Germans as a people have collectively gone mad.’ ‘The attack of Germany upon civilisation has undoubtedly been made with an enthusiastic approval of the great mass of the German people.’ In one joke the response given to a ‘peaceopathists’ assertion that there were plenty of good points in Germans was ‘The only good point I saw in the Hun was my bayonet.’ More often than not denouncement or ridicule of the Kaiser made a convenient proxy to identify the German people as a whole. One execution of this technique of making the Kaiser the pinnacle of the hierarchy of offensiveness is depicted in one of Macbeth’s cartoons (fig.17). Such conceptualisation is quite different to the presentation of Germany as an enemy power in 1939; the Prime Minister’s announcement of war was quick to note that

369 Natalie Wright, p.46.
371 NZH, 10 May 1915, p.6.
373 NZH, 7 November 1914, p.6.
374 NZO, 10 April 1920, p.18.
None of us has any hatred of the German people. For the old culture of the Germans, their songs, their poetry, and their music … We believe that there are millions of German people who want to live in peace and quietness as we do ... but we know, alas, that such a way of life is despised and rejected by the men who have seized and hold power in Germany.\(^{375}\)

In this sense at least, New Zealand’s second confrontation with Germany seems less of a total war than the first.

Alongside the mobilisation of racialist thinking was the mobilisation of ideas used to colour the Germanic. Given dynastic, historical and racialist connections there were broadly two approaches taken in framing a war against Germany. The first was to present the Germanic as a dark mirror of the Britannic. Here was a civilisation that was once great but had been corrupted. As with pre-war Sinophobia, this was remarkably modular and the list of flaws

\(^{375}\) EP, 6 September 1939, p.8.
behind Germany’s fall correlate with contemporary social concerns. Germany was tagged as having made material progress without romantic ideals; ‘Germany may be materially strong but along the way has lost her soul … it is tragically faulty when it is the animal in man that is alone strengthened and there is deliberate suppression of all in man that is most unto God.’

Others related German behaviour with militarism; ‘The German had drunk in from his very cradle the gospel of blood and iron, which was in deadly antagonism to the message of Christ, and had been educated for years with the idea that might is right.’

Still others spoke of the debauchery that had become entrenched in German life. Brutal outrages on children were reputedly rampant amongst the lower classes and sexual perversity was common in the upper levels. These brutal acts had apparently become so common that they ‘constitute unmistakable scientific ground’ for concluding that the ‘pathological state of Germany is the direct product of the imperial physical force doctrine.’

If this mode of thinking admitted historical connections between the Britannic and Germanic, broken as they were, the second major approach simply ignored or denied them, presenting a Germanic ‘Other’ which was (and always had been) utterly unBritish. In this mode of thought the use of ‘Anglo-Saxon’, as connoting a semi-mystical connection between the British and German peoples was effectively suspended. This conception was projected across time as history was enlisted to present German behaviour in the Thirty Years War, the Crusades and the raids of the Huns and the Goths on civilisation as indicative of the behaviour of an eternal historic foe. One paper noted that ‘modern Germans were continuing the pattern of their ancestors the Goths and the Huns who attacked civilisation and broke treaties’. Another concluded that German atrocities during the Thirty Year War meant that ‘Germans behaved pretty much as Germans are behaving now.’

Even more remarkable were moves to anchor this interpretation in contemporary racialist thought. In 1908, whilst arguing the threat Asia posed to New Zealand, Defence, the official organ of the National Service League, had called for goodwill between European civilisations. In regard to Germany it was noted; ‘we have no hostility to the German people … we admire their splendid qualities, their perseverance, their power of work, their love of

376 ODT, 25 November 1914, p.6.
378 Dunstan Times, 1 February 1915.
379 Manawatu Daily Times, 29 September 1915, p.4.
truth, their immense contributions to science and industry, and, above all, their patriotism and fine spirit of self sacrifice.\textsuperscript{381} These revered Victorian virtues - character, duty, order, rationality, progress and patriotism - were used to present Germany as familiar. Come wartime, Germany was shifted closer to the previous sentiments of the vices and threat posed by Asia. Indeed descriptions of Germany began to employ many of qualities stereotypically ascribed to Oriental civilisation. These included corruption, sly cunning, despotism, cruelty, debauchery, deception and irrationality. In the same way Edward Tregear had negotiated with anthropological thought for the inclusion of Maori within the Aryan race, Germans were muscled out and ‘easternised’ and paganised.

Take, for example, the findings of Lieutenant-Colonel L.A. Waddell BA, ‘ethnologist, philologist and author’, who announced his discovery that Germans were not racially Aryan or ‘even’ European. Instead Waddell concluded that Germans were ‘inexorably affiliated’ to the ‘Alpine Race’ which is ‘essentially Turanian, from Central Asia, and of the same stock as the Huns and Turks’. According to Waddell, the racial distinction of Germans and Prussians was revealed though the shape of the head. Germans were ‘all round-heads or short-heads’ which contrasted to ‘the long heads of the British and Scandinavian peoples’. Next Waddell presented a linguistic analysis that concluded that the name ‘Ger-man’ or ‘Alle-man’ derived from its original meaning, ‘wolf-man’. It was noted that ‘Ger’, ‘Geri’ or ‘Garm’ was the chief wolf which attended upon Woden/Odin. Accordingly, this made Germans members of the ‘Wolf Tribe’, a distinction it was noted they shared with Attila the Hun. Finally, symbolic investigation was presented; it was noted that the double headed German imperial eagle was not an eagle, but was instead ‘merely the conjoined pair of corpse-feeding ravens of Odin.’ From this analysis Waddell concluded that Germans were a misplaced people who had taken on ‘a veneer of European civilisation’ which was now flaking away; ‘these interesting proofs of the non-European, non-Aryan ancestry of the German “Wolf Tribe” offered ‘explanations of the existence of a wild beast race in Europe.’\textsuperscript{382}

Waddell’s efforts represent the studious approach to racial thought and anti-German philosophies; it is hard to imagine a pub debate upon the use of linguistic evidence in determining the racial origins of the German people. However those outside the intelligentsia did engage with racial conceptions in less cerebral forms and studies such as Waddell’s stood

\textsuperscript{381} Defence, 28 March 1908, p.2.
\textsuperscript{382} Thames Star, 18 July 1917, p.4.
beside more casual efforts; certainly notions and designations of Germans as ‘Huns’ were active in the popular arena. With an attitude to miscegenation more commonly applied to Asiatics, Ida Boeufve, a Vice-President in the WAGL, stated in a meeting that the British ‘race’ could not be kept pure ‘with this amount of cursed Hun blood’ in the country. Unless Germans and Austrians were excluded, Boeufve predicted that New Zealand would become ‘a country of hybrids – an un-English, spineless set of men, neither flesh, fish nor good red herring.’

That the Kaiser had urged Germans to ‘behave like the Huns under Attila’ during the Boxer Rebellion was recalled. One supposed report of a soldier recalling his combat experiences noted that ‘Germans are yellow’, ‘that’s why you hear of one white soldier taking a dozen German prisoners [emphasis added].’ Other editorials flirted with Germany’s eastern slant. For example the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 was interpreted by the Otago Daily Times as an unholy deal with a non-European, non-Christian power, something which was a ‘crime against the white races and against civilisation.’ This conspiracy was taken further a year later with the claim that the Kaiser was dispatching German professors disguised in Dervish garb to convince Muslims that he was the one and only prophet of Allah and to spur a jihad. Once again the Kaiser became a focus for the questioning of racial ancestry; ‘Rumour has it there is a strain of Tartar blood in the Prussians … Certainly, the photographs of his Imperial Majesty do betray a Tartare [sic] likeness.’

The philosophy was also used for name-calling/mocking within propaganda.

To William the Mad
Some say that there’s a Mongol strain in Prussian blood;
That when there burst from the fell East that yellow flood
Of flat-faced devils, sprung from hell’s own womb,
And Attila left Rome behind, a tomb:
The Hunnish tribesmen, raiding in the West,
Left many an Hunnish babe at German’s breast.
This is sheer legend; yet, if the tale be true,
How proud to-day were Attila of you![sic].

383 New Zealand Times, 23 June 1916, p.4.
384 Poverty Bay Herald, 20 August 1918, p.4.
385 AWN, 30 May 1918, p.14.
386 ODT, 12 October 1914, p.6.
387 ODT, 17 November 1915, p.6.
389 ODT, 3 December 1914, p.2.
This concept of ‘the Germanic Hun’ as ‘the other yellow peril’ - ironic in that the term yellow peril is sometimes attributed to the Kaiser - could be sold as a sensationalist finding of New Zealand wartime belief. However attacks on German racial pedigree should be contextualised as indicative of one dimension of a larger movement of tarring Germans as unBritish. It is symptomatic of the mobilisation of established thinking whereby the unBritish qualities of adversaries were emphasised, a dynamic in which race had a prominent place in the provision of explanations and ideologies. With the same writers, cartoonists and philosophies at work is it at all surprising that many of the same ideas were produced?

The broad idea that there was an intrinsic (in some accounts racially based) difference in morality and character between the Britannic and Germanic peoples underpinned a wider worldview based on what Paul Fussell dubs a ‘versus habit’. Here enemy nations and one’s own are contrasted in a gross dichotomy which dominates perception and expression with ‘a sense that one of the poles embodies so wicked a deficiency or flaw or perversion that its total submission is called for’. Force, therefore, becomes not only a reasonable but a necessary response for survival. An additional consequence was that loyalty and identity became a zero sum game between the Britannic and the Germanic. As one study of British nationalism during the war notes ‘by perceiving and describing one characteristic as belonging to one’s own national community, other characteristics are completely ruled out.’ In the words of one wartime pamphlet ‘there is one infallible test to be applied in all matters pertaining to the war. Let every loyal and honest New Zealander ask himself this question: “Would this or that please the Kaiser?” If it would then he knows what to do.’

This presentation of Britannic civilisation and Germanic barbarism brought a remarkable magnitude of cultural munitions to bear and religious, aesthetic, political, as well as the aforementioned racial and historic dimensions are apparent. Consequently a culture war in the home front mirrored the battlefield - as soldiers fought the enemy on the frontline, civilians must/should combat enemy influence at home.

The mentality that being truly British called for brazen rejections of anything perceived as Germanic spread into numerous areas. It can be seen in the purging of German (or perceived

German) designations which were anglicised into New Zealand labels (in British or Maori forms). For example Auckland’s Coburg Street was renamed Kitchener Street in 1916 after the recently killed imperial icon. Likewise Jermyn Street was made to atone for its pronounced sound and in 1917 it became Anzac Ave (it was actually named after Captain John Jermyn Symonds, a veteran of the New Zealand Wars). Residents of German Bay in Akaroa requested the name be ‘wiped from the map’ in favour of Takamatua Bay - the Minister of Internal Affairs supported the motion. The Franz Josef Glacier managed to retain its moniker, though this was not without debate: ‘Why should German names be any longer employed to designate the rivers and mountains and glaciers of this loyal Dominion?’

Cultural achievements had a similar experience, with a Germanic ‘Other’ being contrasted to British habits and achievements. In the arts it was reported that ‘it is all a myth about the German piano being the best. The British piano has always been the best, and, moreover, the birthplace of the piano was England, in the 13th century.’ The Liedertafel singing group in Wellington rebranded themselves as the Wellington Male Voice Choir as a result of the feeling that ‘British musical societies should be distinguished by British names.’ In terms of cuisine, the Kaiser was reported as being ‘truly representative’ of the German habit of ‘gobbling matches’. However it was noted that the German habit of consuming vast amounts of meat, chocolate and alcohol in gluttonous meals - ‘twice as extensive as an English lunch’ - were being hampered by blockades. All of this sat next to interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophies, Wagner’s music and analysis of the personalities of Wilhelm II, Fredrick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, Clausewitz and Bernhardi. Contrasts inevitably led back to Germanic debauchery against British virtue, barbarism against civilisation, paganism against Christianity, soulless materialism against romantic ideals, militarism against liberty and Orientalism against Occidentalism.

Lastly, other instances of dissent tended to be associated with the Germanic. This association vilified both subjects. Hence parts of public culture cast the 1916 Easter Rising as a German

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393 John Davenport, *Street Names of Auckland: Their Story* (Auckland, 1990), pp.18, 120.
396 *NZH*, 21 July 1915, p.10.
398 *NZH*, 1 March 1916, p.10.
plot; Maori leader Rua Kenana as a pro-German ‘Maori Kaiser’ - who, reputedly, read subversive literature, celebrated the Kaiser’s birthday and prophesied that the Kaiser would restore Maori rule in New Zealand - and branded Princess Te Puea’s opposition to conscription as pro-German.400

The varied representations of anti-Germanism are best explained as the result of the decentralised means of mobilisation. In the exact mould of pre-war Sinophobia, anti-Germanism possessed a modular quality resulting from the diverse groups engaging with the idea of a Germanic ‘Other’. The Hun as the final word in unBritishness was a bonanza for those with a cause to sell. Framing the object of one’s ire, whether that was prohibitionists, liquor interests, radical labour, Mr Fat, Satan, American business, Sinn Fein or others, as potentially in cahoots with their Kamerad the Kaiser was a popular technique (fig.2, 18-21). Anti-Germanism highlights not only the mobilisation of pre-war patterns, but how this mobilisation could be driven by diverse forces; social mobilisation was extensive as well as intensive.

Commercial interests, for example, tapped public sentiment on their own accord. It was part of a general trend in advertising where products were advertised on promises of ‘British quality’ and absences of ‘German shoddy’ a banal version of the inclusion/exclusion pattern. Underwear was sold on the premise that it was ‘woven by expert British labour, and branded the makers as a guarantee of British quality and excellence … Shun the shoddy German made Underwear and support honest British [sic] labour and brains – you will get better value for your money.’401 Likewise Wellington based A.W. Moran and Son Company manufactured and advertised the ‘inflatable dying Kaiser toy’ - ‘when blown up look full of importance. They die down and look dejected and comical [sic].’402 The commercial idiom of being truly British was succinctly expressed in the pages of the catalogue of the Anti-German Trade Campaign, War Pictures and their Obvious Lesson, which promoted a patriotism which fused notions of racial/cultural superiority with thrifty and prudent consumerism. The booklet contained advertisements of certified British manufactures and retails, war news and anti-German proclamations, all of which tended to merge. For instance it was asserted that it had

401 EP, 31 December 1914, p.5.
402 Dominion, 1 September 1915, p.1.
Figure 18 New Zealand Observer, 21 October 1916, p.12.
(Dedicated to the traitorous money-bags of our own country who are taking advantage of the war to squeeze fortunes out of the food of the people).

THE KAISER: "Thank you, my 'stout' ally, for your great help to my cause. You may be a traitor to your country, but you are a very good friend to me. For while I am fighting your countrymen abroad you are, by raising the price of their food, making it harder for their wives and children to live at home. I kill a few babies—you cause thousands to die slowly by starvation."

"Reynolds's Newspaper."
“Kamerad”

Lloyd George said: “We are fighting against Germany, Austria and Drink, and as far as I can see the greatest of these deadly foes is Drink. Drink is doing us more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together. If we are to settle German militarism, we must first of all settle with the drink.”

Now is Our Opportunity

The New Zealand Alliance Monster Petition will go to the poll. It is the duty of every adult British subject to sign the petition, which will be presented to Parliament during the forthcoming session. For many months there has been much agitation among the New Zealanders on this subject, and at the present time the question has reached the stage where it is imperative that something should be done. The petition will be presented to Parliament in the expectation that it will receive the hearty support of the Government of New Zealand and the leading men in the country.

SIGN THE MONSTER PETITION
Then get your friends to sign it!
THE NEW LANDLORD—PERHAPS!

Figure 21 Truth, 1 June 1918, p.1.
been British generosity, trade and support which had helped to make Germany ‘strong enough (in her own estimation!) to throttle our trade, challenge our sea supremacy, and threaten our Empire’s very existence.’

The solution, laid out within the pamphlet, was to insure that in future business was kept within the Empire. This line was further advanced by boycott societies which related xenophobia, patriotism and a commercial framework. This is encapsulated in the motto of the Anti-German Union; ‘No German Labour, no German goods, no German influence and Britain for the British.’

The Anti-German Union was a London based society which advertised in New Zealand papers to promote the establishment of local chapters. It was not alone in this approach; another London based group, the United Anti-German Trading League, noted ‘It is hoped that this movement will receive wholehearted support from all sections of the community in New Zealand, and thus help our Empire on to greater prosperity in the future.’ As noted, local efforts to boycott German goods had been established before the war; past 1914 the concept received a massive boost.

The Gisborne based British Protection League was established in November 1914 by local tradesmen to discourage trade with enemy aliens and encourage tariff reform for imperial preference. The members’ pledge was ‘to do all in my power to divert trade and commerce to the British Empire.’ Another example was the All-for-Empire League, which stated that ‘trade should follow the flag’ and that ‘the best interests of the country and the Empire necessitate the elimination of enemy trade and influence from our midst.’ The aims of the society fused British patriotism and xenophobia, for example calling for closer trade between the regions of the Empire whilst proposing legal barriers against aliens holding land or shares in joint stock companies in New Zealand. Conversely German manufactures were treated as tainted and the phrase ‘Made in Germany’ was used interchangeably for goods and instances of ‘frightfulness’ - the use of poison gas, Zeppelin raids, the torpedoing of shipping etc. When Truth uncovered the scandal that German made goods were being unloaded upon the public (through pre-war stocks and re-exports from neutral countries), it was reported as

403 Anti-German Trade Campaign, War Pictures and Their Obvious Lesson (Christchurch, 1915), p.25.
404 Poverty Bay Herald, 10 January 1916, p.2.
405 EP, 19 January 1915, p.3.
‘trading with the enemy’ in spirit if not in deed and therefore ‘grossly insulting to the patriotic Britisher.’

The spiritual realm followed similar trends to the commercial world in engaging with the public mood. After the war, Burton charged the church with compromising Christian theology in supporting the war; ‘all over the world Christian ministers closed their New Testaments, preached more paganism and became the recruiting sergeants of the armies.’

It must be asked why mainstream denominations committed themselves to the extent that they did, choosing an approving stance and active involvement over disapproval or neutrality. One analysis of the Methodist Church observes that many ‘saw no conflict between God’s cause and Britain’s cause’, perceiving the war’s aims - to protect the weak, to fulfil social responsibilities and to struggle against wickedness - as embodying Christian principles. Similarly, Peter Lineham has argued that churches felt the need to assure their parishioners of the nature of the war, including its cause, cost and righteousness. Certainly a major task in this was to affirm the nature of the enemy in religious/apocalyptic terms. In September 1915 a Baptist Minister noted ‘I am increasingly convinced … that Britain and her Allies are fighting not only against flesh and blood but against the wicked spirits that rule the darkness of this world.’ An Anglican editor added ‘we believe that we are on God’s side in this conflict; we believe that the real contest is between the spiritual and the material, between Christ and anti-Christ.’ Reverend J. Gibson-Smith observed ‘Germany today is the Lucifer of nations … already she has sold her soul to the powers of darkness … the real God of Germany today is Mars or Odin or Boal [sic].’

Much of this might be framed as a top down campaign run by elites, situated in the press, parliament, pulpit and private sector, with support from a radical fringe; certainly the WAGL was never a mass organisation. However wartime anti-Germanism was too complex a beast to be fully explained through a purely top down model. Given demonstrations of bigoted, xenophobic and violent behaviour from ordinary New Zealanders, we need an explanation that goes further than singling out a few self-proclaimed jingoies. Explanations of the

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408 Truth, 23 June 1917, p.4.
409 Burton, The Silent Division, p.322.
410 Ross Anderson, pp.54-55.
411 Lineham, p.474.
412 Ross Anderson, p.84.
413 Lineham, p.476.
414 Southland Times, 6 November 1914, p.3.
receptivity of the general public to anti-German sentiment might be sought in the psychology of a society undergoing economic and emotional hardship and therefore primed to find scapegoats. No doubt this assists in explaining the intensity and some of the hysteria of anti-Germanism, but it should also be acknowledged that such activity occurred in the context of a society where racialist and xenophobic beliefs could be common, even respectable, modes of thought.

Consistent with the widespread nature of this behaviour is how some of the strongest examples of emphasised Britishness arose from those at risk of being perceived as on the periphery or outside British New Zealand. William Joseph Khutze, the pioneering brewer, is indicative of those who downplayed or hid a Germanic heritage, anglicising his name to William Joseph Coutts. A more widespread engagement is revealed in the 1916 census, which showed a curious decline in the country’s German-born population, with the 1911 figure of 4,015 dropping to 2,999. The same census period saw a near doubling of the Russian-born population from 658 to 1,242. It would seem that many who previously identified themselves as German stopped doing so publicly and that many Prussian Poles were becoming Russian Poles. The irony was not lost on some; as one Polish immigrant noted ‘at home we were persecuted by the Germans and now, here in New Zealand, we are regarded as Germans.’ However designating oneself as under a British or an Allied nation’s banner was more than a reaction to officialdom, but speaks of a response to pressures generated by the wider public. Butchers who rebranded ‘German sausage’ as ‘Belgian sausage’, for example, were more likely to be pragmatically seeking to avoid public scorn and tap patriotic sentiment (while retaining the same products in all but name) than crusaders dedicated to purging all things German.

Certainly numerous companies made the effort to present their colours. The directors of Wunderlich Ltd took out a public notice denying rumours that they were a foreign company and threatened legal proceedings against anyone who gave currency to statements regarding the non-British character of the company. In a lengthy proclamation of British credentials, the British-born status of the Directors - including their ancestry going back a century -, the Britishness of the board members and the British origins of the Company’s shares and capital

were all publicised. Furthermore, in truly British fashion, it was announced that there were no alien shareholders on the company register. This was not an isolated incident. In early 1915 the Dresden piano company changed its name to the Bristol Piano Co. and took out newspaper space to announce that the old name was ‘no longer acceptable for a ALL BRITISH COMPANY [sic].’ Hallenstein Bros advertised that they wanted to ‘clear up any idea that the firm was a pro-German one.’ Schneideman Bros, ‘The Empire Tailors’, claimed they were ‘true British Subjects (formally of Riga, Russia)’.

Such salient rejections of the Germanic reflect pragmatic engagements with a social movement which largely set the pace in anti-German activity. For instance the internment of aliens was a more modest execution of public calls for a ‘clean sweep’ and to ‘inter them all’. Likewise the case of the aforementioned von Zedlitz and the Alien Enemy Teachers Act had taken place under intense public pressure and is indicative of wider forces than simply that of a draconian state. The von Zedlitz case has been noted as highlighting ‘the direct influence exerted by public opinion in the formulation of government policy’. Von Zedlitz himself noted in his memoirs that ‘the Government have done their best to protect me, but they are mostly a knock-kneed crowd … the trouble is due to members of Parliament wanting to pose before their constituents as democrats and patriots.’

A similar dynamic of authority under siege was seen in Gisborne on New Year’s Eve 1914 where an estimated two thousand citizens gathered outside Wohnsiedler’s Pork Butchery. Patriotic songs were sung and windows smashed by stones and bottles. Police struggled to control the crowd and when Mr Sherratt, the Mayor, appealed to the crowd for order he was shouted down and his car pelted with stones. A repeat performance was seen on 15 May 1915, in Wanganui, where a mob of an estimated 3,000 people gathered and vandalised German-owned and suspected German-owned businesses, causing an estimated £2,500 worth of damage. Among those businesses targeted were the newly rebranded Bristol Piano Company and Hallenstein’s. Once again police attempted, without success, to halt the destruction and, again, when the Mayor tried to restrain the crowd with appeals to British fair
play he was struck by a thrown stone. Massey responded to the Wanganui riots with a call for public order, ‘I would ask our people, indignant as they may be, to remember they are British, and act accordingly.’

These were visible mob demonstrations. Behind them were quieter cases that highlight more personal but no less spiteful activities. Anna Hardy, for example, took it upon herself to raid an Austrian neighbour’s house. In her raid she caused an estimated £130 of damage, breaking windows, smashing furniture and killing hens. The owner returned to find a note tacked to the front door; ‘Clear out, you - Germans; if not we will burn you out.’ Someone did burn down the Rongotea Lutheran parsonage in the early hours of 2 July 1917, allegedly for a £25 bet. The captain of the steamer Pakeha took his crew to court for ‘refusing duty’ when they refused to work alongside German members of the crew. The case was thrown out with the remark that ‘no law-court would convict the men.’ Press commentary on the incident added that ‘No loyal British community and no loyal colonial government would tolerate such a conviction were it legally possible.’ Numerous New Zealanders wrote to the police with accusations that German members of the community were engaged in various disloyal and dangerous activities. Archival records hold accusations of local Germans signalling to submarines, running wireless stations, spying, sabotaging and keeping homing pigeons. Superintendent O’Donovan concluded his investigation that a German in Karori was allegedly sending signals (enquiry revealed that the reported flashing light was from a evening picnic) that ‘this is a specimen of the will-o-the-wisps the police are frequently required to chase with much loss of time of men required for other really important duty.’ On the 5 November 1918, with the war entering its last days New Zealanders burnt effigies of the Kaiser, in a twist on the folk tradition of incinerating Guy Fawkes as the enemy to British order, just as they had on 5 November 1914. Grand manipulators and ordinary actors stood together in mobilising anti-alienism.

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425 NZH, 17 May 1915, p.6.
427 Truth, 19 May 1917, p.5.
429 NZH, 26 September 1914, p.6.
430 These records are dispersed across different series. See ANZ ‘communications’, ‘spys’, ‘signalling’.
431 ANZ-R21371956-AAAB-478-10/t, ‘Signalling, Karori’.
432 See correspondence sent to New Zealand Farmer, December 1914, p.vii., New Zealand Farmer, March 1919, p.376.
Legacy

When the war ended public culture had been flooded with anti-German messages for over 4 years. It is unsurprising that ideas so extensively employed in wartime shaped the peace. Certainly being German continued to sit uneasily with being British in the interwar zeitgeist. In late 1918 the War Legislation and Statute Law Amendment Bill was passed into law requiring that persons of ‘enemy origin’ apply for a permit to purchase land in New Zealand. A person of ‘enemy origin’ was defined as one who had ‘at any time been a subject of an enemy state and includes the wife of any such person.’

Interwar advertisements continued to promote products on the virtue that they were ‘not German’ whilst association with British or imperial themes remained a staple technique of promotion. A popular attitude regarded German presence or influence in New Zealand as an affront to wartime sacrifices and several instances of enduring social animosity bear witness to the fact that ideas and emotions did not disappear with the armistice. As late as 1944 Lady Miria Pomare was still commenting upon ‘the German element’ in the Waikato.

However the argument here has been that wartime anti-Germanism was indicative of deeper patterns in New Zealand society and culture, that it reflects notions that predated and indeed survived the First World War. Whilst a wartime Germanic ‘Other’ did survive as a coherent interwar figure, it was also somewhat subsumed and superseded by new figures which inherited many of its features and functions. These included Bolsheviks, radicals, revolutionaries, strikers and foreigners who were cast as enemies of truly British New Zealand.

The political zeitgeist of the interwar years certainly reflects this trend. Massey remained staunchly committed to Greater Britishness and fixed on class hatred and Bolshevism as the central threat to this order. In Massey’s view Bolshevism was ‘an awful plague’ and Bolshevik agitators were ‘busy all over the Empire doing all the harm they possibly can to the Empire of which we are citizens.’ In 1919 the Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act was passed. This legislation empowered the Attorney-General to prohibit the landing of people deemed ‘disaffected or disloyal, or of such a character that his presence in New Zealand

433 NZS, 1918, No.10, pp.77-93.
436 King, Te Puea, p.95.
would be injurious to the peace, order and good government of the Dominion.\footnote{NZS, 1919, No.44, pp.160-164.} The text of the Bill specifically mentioned subjects of Germany and the (former) Austro-Hungarian Empire as belonging within this category, but debate suggests that Marxists, radicals and various ethnic groups were included within its margins.\footnote{NZPD, Vol.185, 22 October 1919, pp.825-831.} The seizure and suppression of imported literature deemed subversive or seditious indicates the extension of this screening procedure to ideas.\footnote{ANZ-‘Subversive literature - General Black List’, R17946264-ACIF-16475-C1-152-[c 36/2 V0] to R17946280-ACIF-16475-C1-155-[c 36/2 V2].} John Cullen, the retired Commissioner of Police, had been appointed to oversee the registration of Dalmatians in New Zealand. After the war he noted Yugoslavs were prone to anarchism and were ‘not desirable persons to be allowed to remain in this Country; and I feel convinced that if serious industrial troubles should arise, they would band themselves with the disloyal element.’\footnote{Judith Bassett, ‘Colonial Justice’, p.175.} Sinophobic tendencies reasserted themselves and intersected with post-war concerns around economic slumps and notions that returned soldiers were losing work to coloured immigrants.\footnote{Philip Ferguson, p.193-248.} In the 1930s civil servants were being issued with the fourth edition of \textit{Our Race and Empire}. The text, originally published in 1926, covered the emergence and history of the British race and civilisation. The section on New Zealand noted the Dominion’s ‘stern policy in regard to the admission of Asiatics.’ This policy was noted as a response to ‘the fact’ that ‘European communities have found it impossible to assimilate successfully large bodies of Asiatics’ and the notion that a ‘big influx of Asiatics would lower the standard of living in the Dominions … to the detriment of the white workers.’\footnote{Our Race and Empire, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Auckland, 1930), pp.234-235.\footnote{A. H. Scootney, \textit{Studies in Anti-Soviet Propaganda} (Auckland, 1949).}}

Additionally, the ideas behind anti-Germanism, and the network that had distributed it, adapted to the post-war environment. One study of New Zealand newspaper articles after the war reveals the extent to which the ‘Bolshie’ antitype inherited many of the bestial, unchristian and ‘eastern’ qualities of wartime Germans (which had to some extent derived from pre-war Russophobia). Some accounts of militarism, unchivalrous behaviour and sexual perversions towards women and children (including claims that they were being ‘nationalised’) and reports of atrocities (again real, exaggerated and fictional) are nigh interchangeable with wartime anti-German material.\footnote{A. H. Scootney, \textit{Studies in Anti-Soviet Propaganda} (Auckland, 1949).} An intermediary/association stage
can be identified as the Great War wound down and Russia descended into chaos. Thus during the 1918 Wellington central election, voters were informed - via the independent Labour and Protestant candidate M.J. Mack - that ‘a vote for Peter Fraser’ was a vote for ‘the Bolsheviks, their programme and methods (made in Germany).’\textsuperscript{445} It was suggested that Russia was the puppet master behind the Chanak Crisis, manipulating the Turkish people in the same manner that Germany had.\textsuperscript{446} Likewise J.C. Blomfield depicted a brutish Bolshevik barbarian dragging a woman (drawn in the same style as abused Belgium), competing with the Kaiser, and the devil, as an undertaker of frightfulness (fig.22). Old and new enemies were blurring whilst the stance of framing loyal Britishness against unBritish adversaries remained remarkably static.

Figure 22 \textit{New Zealand Observer}, 2 November 1918, p.13.

\textsuperscript{445} EP, 28 September 1918, p.3.
\textsuperscript{446} NZPD, Vol.197, 19 September 1922, pp.77-80.
Chapter Three

‘Half a Soldier Before Enrolled’: The Mobilisation of the Proto-ANZAC Ethos

‘He’s no Absent-Minded Beggar, and he knows what he’s about…
   So never mind the singing don’t go struggling to shout…
   He an amateur soldier, but he’s gritty and he’s spry…
   But it won’t take long to turn him out the spankingest M.I.….  
   Though he hasn’t had much drilling,  
   When they start the killing  
   They’ll find him first-class fighting Infantree [sic].’ - Tiaki 447

In the public cultures of all Great War belligerents, the mass armies, which populations were so emotionally and physically invested in, became subjects of intense cultural mobilisation. One of the central tropes woven around the subject was that of the soldier as an ordinary hero. Imaginings of Tommy, Ivan, Poilu and others embodied a harmonious mix of representative individual and able soldier. The ordinariness derived from the sense that a soldier personified common traits of the society he fought for; the heroic factor was imparted through notions that soldiering represented a type of chivalric code, in which individuals fought and sacrificed for causes higher than individual interests.

The New Zealand version of this propensity is witnessed in the ANZAC legend in which heroic and supposedly typical New Zealand masculine qualities mix. The ethos presents the New Zealanders who fought at Gallipoli (and later the entire Great War and beyond) as embodying the typical/idealised features of the New Zealand male. The character profile gives prominence to physical prowess, mental toughness, courage, a laconic yet humorous spirit, a natural propensity for egalitarianism and a talent for ingenuity. With the ANZAC acronym encapsulating both Australian and New Zealand forces, there is something of a common core and a co-ownership of this stereotype across the Tasman. However national appeals to, and requisitions of, the ethos have seen different parts of the model emphasised, resulting in regional flavours; a rough seam, perhaps, of where Australian and New Zealand public cultures converge and diverge.

After the war this ethos was cemented in public culture. The official histories and first generation of popular works concerned themselves with the character, idealism and sacrifice

of the soldier. Conversely an alternative, demystifying tradition, based around capturing the experiences and environment of the frontlines, can be traced to the interwar years. Titles such as Robin Hyde’s *Passport to Hell* (1937), John Lee’s *Civilian into Soldier* (1937) and Archibald Baxter’s *We Will Not Cease* (1939) are local examples of an international trend which investigated many of the ugly and violent realities of the war and soldiering. Since then diaries, accounts and interviews with surviving soldiers have been pored over in efforts to break down myths and capture the experiences of Great War soldiers.\(^{448}\) The resulting impression of the ‘not so silent division’ - in reference to the behaviour displayed by John Stark - AKA ‘Starkie’, the Wazzar riots, the Surafend Massacre and the Sling mutiny - have been revealing.\(^{449}\)

If there is a flaw in the approach of many such works, in the worthwhile goal of attempting to capture the experiences of soldiers, it is that myth is dismissed rather than analysed. In the eagerness to demonstrate how wrong the home front had it, idealised discourse is rejected as empty propaganda or attributed in a reductionist manner to elites.\(^{450}\) The pursuit of understanding the soldier on the frontlines has seen the conception of soldiers in the home front largely neglected; why study deceitful myths when the genuine article is revealed? The implicit attitude, and occasional explicit voice, is that public constructions around soldiers were fraudulent glorifications of war, entirely divorced from the realities of frontline life (which they frequently were) and were the results of propaganda rather than indicative of genuine public discourse and attitudes (which this chapter intends to consider).

Certainly the wartime situation gave massive privilege to a system constituted of war correspondents and war offices capable of exercising control over information. The comments of correspondents such as the English Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, the Australian Charles Bean and, to a lesser extent, the New Zealander Malcolm Ross upon the ANZACs

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were given immense exposure and their words became revered within ANZAC mythology. Additional culpability springs from the circumstances under which the writing was conducted. Ashmead-Bartlett’s reports of colonial giants storming the Dardanelles during the Gallipoli landings were penned from a distant battleship; he only briefly went ashore later in the day. Lastly certain phrases were tailored in the newsroom; ‘Australia’ was edited to ‘Australasia’ for New Zealand readers. Major-General Alexander Godley wrote to Allen noting that Ashmead-Bartlett never once used the words ‘New Zealand’ or ‘New Zealanders’ and that fortunately he had been able to see them inserted whenever necessary.

However, reports about New Zealand troops at Gallipoli are indicative of cultural forces beyond a cabal of cunning journalists (though this is not to deny they were part of the means of mobilisation). Consider Ashmead-Bartlett’s report that

The colonials are great, big-limbed athletes, with not a pound of superfluous flesh among the lot. They are of amazing physique. No European nation possesses anything to compare with them.

Such remarks were not the result of whimsical scribbling. Rather they were a mobilised repetition of the type of discourse British commentators and New Zealanders had long circulated regarding colonial masculinity. Such cultural narratives are discernible back through New Zealand history; as Belich notes ‘virtually all the ingredients of the so-called ANZAC legend are clearly apparent in colonial writing on the New Zealand Wars in the 1860s’.

This cultural mythology - call it the proto-ANZAC ethos - had deep roots. It developed in New Zealand public culture in the decades before the war and was mobilised during it.

Comprehending how myth and reality relate requires recognition that there are two distinct subjects vying for the title of ‘soldier culture’, one based overseas and one in New Zealand. The former was a way of life that developed within the community of the armed forces, emerging from the circumstances of military life and the character of those serving. The latter was the conception of this life, and the cultural significance overlaid upon it, imagined

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452 Andrew, p.57.
453 Pugsley, Gallipoli, p.153.
454 NZO, 14 August 1915, p.12.
within New Zealand public culture. Where and how public mythology fits and departs from the reality of frontline culture is a subject unto itself and outside this chapter’s focus of considering the mythology’s social function and influence. A brief analysis of frontline culture, however, can serve in providing context. In a sense frontline culture could be likened to an artificial extension, or a throwback, to the crew culture lifestyle of pioneer era New Zealand. Both communities were overwhelmingly constituted by young, unmarried men and interactions were often prefabricated by task and rank; new members could be slotted into place as others departed. Behaviour altered via an on the job, off the job mechanism, which saw men working hard while on the job/under military discipline and displaying more larrikin behaviour while not. Both cultures placed a premium on qualities of physical prowess, clannish solidarity, a stoic approach to tasks and a capacity for rough behaviour off the job, with records of foul language, alcohol binging and bursts of social unrest being salient aspects of the culture. Indeed the rate of VD contraction among New Zealand troops was estimated as the highest among the Empire’s soldiers, affecting one in six men.

The divergence between soldier culture and public mythology around soldiers was partly the result of innocent ignorance of the reality of mass industrial warfare as well as cultivated ignorance through the control of information. However we should be alert to the fact that the modernising world increasingly contained (then) unparalleled abilities to overcome distance and allow awareness of things outside one’s immediate experiences. Letters home that slipped the censorship net, photography from the frontlines, the growing casualty lists, the sight of returned wounded and yellow journalism - Truth, for instance, informed the public that Wellington’s Cambridge Terrace was so thick with brothels and so popular with troops that it had been dubbed ‘Gallipoli’ - all brutally chipped away at ignorance and innocence. News photos of one-legged soldiers with their heads wrapped in bandages captioned ‘the Empire’s heroes’ may have been published with the intent of raising empathy for soldiers, but they also imparted awareness of the gruesome realities of war. One woman recalled being ‘devastated’ upon seeing the soldiers she had cheered away returning ‘all mutilated.’ The casualty lists too hinted at the nature of the war. One man observed that ‘with a daily list of

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456 Crew culture is analysed in Belich, Making Peoples, pp.424-436. Questions of discipline and behaviour are explored in Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell.
457 Bronwyn Dalley, “‘Come Back With Honour”: Prostitution and the New Zealand Soldier, at Home and Abroad”, New Zealand’s Great War, p.367.
458 Truth, 20 May 1916, p.3.
459 OW, 19 April 1916, p.39.
460 Baker, King and Country, p.27.
New Zealanders killed and wounded the horrible character of the war has been brought home to us.'461 Eric McCormick later recalled that ‘the mere sight of casualty lists in the paper brought tears to my mother’s eyes.’462 Jean Summers noted that ‘every day fresh casualty lists are published, and anxious mothers, wives, and friends wait in sickening apprehension for news of their loved ones.’463 Looking at the long columns of names and scores of faces of young men in the Roll of Honour listing the dead, the wounded and the missing, it seems reasonable to believe that many New Zealanders were experiencing similar sentiments. This supports the conclusions of one New Zealand historian that ‘a large number of those at home [were] surprisingly well informed.’464

The disparity between conceptions of soldiering and the less romantic realities speaks of pre-war cultural forces that coloured the vision of soldiering. Notably during and after the Boer War there emerged a distinct mood in the public culture of Greater Britain which emphasised valour, adventure, physical assertiveness, involvement in patriotic activities, a glorification of history and loyalty to the Empire. Common themes included patriotism and imperial consciousness, moral purity and physical development. Chivalric conceptions became the social standard for identifying ideal masculine behaviour and subsequently a code to praise or condemn by. The image of the soldier seemed to gather all of these elements and stood as a central icon of the zeitgeist, a modern knight, who embodied noble ideals, would fight for justice, display martial valour and, if necessary, sacrifice to fulfil his duty.465 New Zealand was no exception to this trend and by 1914 the soldier had gained an iconic status in public culture.

In some sense this development formed a generational feature. The ‘second generation’, born between 1880 and 1895 were raised in a country which was rapidly modernising and imagining a bold collective identity for itself. It would be the males of this future lost-generation that would constitute the majority of enlistees. Exposure to proto-ANZAC mythology formed one of the defining elements of the social/cultural landscape during this

463 Southland’s Tribute to Belgium (Invercargill, 1915), p.18.
The lessons the culture taught about the gallantry, adventure and glory of war were at odds with what some products of that culture would experience through 1914-1918. Understanding the cultural mythology tells us little about the reality of life in the trenches, but it may be a significant part of the explanation for why so many went, and kept going, to the trenches and why individuals on the home front appeared receptive to such discourse; New Zealanders swam in their mythology or at least dipped a toe in.

The position such mythology occupied in wartime representations speaks of two broad developments before 1914: firstly, a tightened association between soldiering and the character of ideal masculinity and, secondly, the entrenchment of this mythology as a familiar and popular part of public culture. These developments form two major strands of the proto-ANZAC ethos which contextualise the results of wartime mobilisation and the means behind it.

**Colonial masculinity**

In 1886 the eminent English historian James Froude observed in pseudo-scientific terms that the ‘mighty forces of nature’ could ‘quicken intellects’ and that land and inhabitants shaped one another. Froude noted that the Maori, ‘a mere colony of Polynesian savages’, ‘grew to a stature of mind and body in New Zealand which no branch of the race has approached elsewhere.’ Froude had an even greater anticipation of the crop of Britons such an environment might produce; ‘It will be in the unexhausted soil and spiritual capabilities of New Zealand that the great English poets, artists, philosophers, statesmen, soldiers of the future will be born and nurtured.’ Though one gets the impression that Froude’s prophecy spoke of masculine results, a female version also existed (see Chapter Five). Fifteen years later, a Colonel Francis was interviewed while on leave in London regarding his opinions on

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the performance of New Zealand soldiers in the Boer War. Francis asserted that ‘the training of the colonials [New Zealanders] made them more at home in the South African kind of warfare than Home-trained soldiers.’ The ‘training of the colonials’ Francis mentions was not a reference to any type of military doctrine or practice, but an application of regional lifestyles for the purposes of war.

Both Froude’s and Francis’ writings are representative of a prevalent cultural mythology that some element of New Zealand life - environmental, social, or undefined - produced a certain quality of man. Francis’ comments also speak of how the link between this masculinity and military endeavour had been tightened by the turn-of-the-century, with New Zealand men presented as possessing skill sets and mental and physical qualities which made them natural soldiers. Indeed broad features and even specific elements that the ANZAC ethos would inherit are apparent throughout the second half of the nineteenth-century. For example the nickname ‘digger’, together with some of its connotations of mateship and undomesticated masculinity was in use past the mid nineteenth-century as a tag for the stereotypical character of gumdiggers and goldminers across Australasia.

However there are regular discrepancies alongside resemblances. The digger of 1914-1918 was imagined in New Zealand public culture as a respectable, chivalric hero as well as a rugged outdoorsman. The digger of the mid/late nineteenth-century was frequently regarded as a social menace. One 1871 definition noted ‘the true digger’ as ‘a brave, high-spirited, working man, ready with his purse as a friend or his fist as a foe.’ Within living memory of turn-of-the-century New Zealanders were imaginings of soldiers as undesirable figures who used coarse language, were sexually unchaste, quaffed alcohol and brought social disorder. Such perceptions of the imperial regulars were readily apparent throughout the New Zealand Wars and Richard Hill’s history of policing and crime backs a conclusion that soldiers were often agents of social disorder. Settlers were aware of this and the New Zealand Herald’s commentary of the departing imperial troops was less than flattering.

The army as it has left our shores, has left a residuum of crime, poverty and sickness behind it … Tis true enough they do leave the girls behind them and many other things

468 ODT, 4 January 1901, p.2.
too which could be well dispended with. The sudden rise of a large number of dancing saloons attended by large numbers of loose women … as the troops departed in large numbers, forcibly drew the attention of the watchful to one legacy of crime and immorality, and hospital expenditure left by departed troops.472

Such accounts give some context to the mid-Victorian era’s complex mix of admiration and contempt the army - brave lads perhaps, but would you want one courting your daughter?

Despite some discontinuities in perceptions of soldiering, the embryos of some conceptions that would emerge as major aspects of ANZAC mythology are apparent within the image of New Zealand War era soldiers. For instance some commentators criticised European military conventions, ‘clockwork’ soldiering and hidebound traditions deemed irrelevant to the skill set required to meet the Maori in bush warfare.473 This criticism often made some distinction between British regulars and settler soldiers serving in the Colonial Defence Force, Special Forces, the Armed Constabulary, the Forest Rangers and military settlers.474 The notion that colonials, due to familiarity with bush-craft and firearms, possessed the initiative, boldness and self-reliance to take the fight to the Maori is apparent; one colonial soldier argued that the colony was not getting its money’s worth in funding the regulars and noted that ‘we can tackle the natives better ourselves. We … are on our way back from the East Coast, where, without the help of a single regular, we have smashed the Hau Haus’.475 Such claims are noted as a ‘constant theme’ within settler writings on the wars from the 1860s.476

The validity of some of these conceptions has been questioned. One study notes that ‘the only “natural bushmen” in New Zealand were Maori.’477 It is likewise questionable whether soldier settlers made more restrained soldiers. In 1868 Colonel Whitmore observed in a letter to T.M. Haultain that gallons of grog had been used ‘merely to stimulate men [the Armed Constabulary] to work on several occasions.’478 Hamilton-Browne’s eyewitness account

472 NZH, 22 November 1866, p.2.
474 This distinction is reflective of the classic differentiation in British history between regular soldiers, who were often from the lowest portion of the working class, and the higher class volunteers and militia. See Ian Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945 (Manchester, 1991).
475 G. Hamilton-Browne, With the Lost Legion in New Zealand (London, 1911), p.45.
476 Belich, Making Peoples, p.243.
477 Dalton, p.246.
478 ATL-MS-2392, Whitmore, George Stoddart 1830-1903, ca 1868-1870, ‘Correspondence to T M Haultain and D Pollen and miscellaneous correspondence’. 
described his men as ‘born marauders [who] could and did steal everything and anything that came in their way.’ Another observer described the Forest Rangers drinking habits;

it was not even vulgar, it was bestial, and for days our camp was a pandemonium, filled with drunken, blaspheming fiends who, without any joviality, wit or humour, scarcely with even an attempt at a singsong, gulped down vile doctored rum till they collapsed and wallowed in degradation.

However, leaving realities aside, conceptions that New Zealanders made distinct and effective soldiers wielded tremendous influence within Pakeha cultural mythology. The Great War contrast between plucky ANZACs, who merely needed a cause and a gun to be a naturally effective fighting force, and disciplined but passive Tommies was a continuation of post New Zealand War lore that armed colonials, tempered by lifestyle and environment, were natural soldiers.

Additionally, by the turn-of-the-century perceptions of soldiering had undergone a remarkable shift, becoming a respectable and, as the next section considers, a fashionable venture. By the time of the Boer War, soldiering was no longer openly tied to moral disrepute, but was, in an astounding about face, promoted as a road towards instilling virtues in the male population. The Boer War functioned both as a reflection and as an accelerant for this trend and the disparity between newer and older conceptions of soldiers becomes obvious. It has been observed that the image of veterans of the New Zealand Wars painted in speeches in the late 1890s ‘bore little resemblance to the image of the drunken soldier whom Pakeha towns, occupied in the 1860s, saw as almost as much a curse as a saviour.’ There was also an upsurge of ideas that the education system should be used to instil soldierly qualities in the young – suggesting that ‘soldierly qualities’ were now defined as something the young should possess. While schoolyard drilling had been provided for in Section 85 of the Education Act 1877, it was not widely enforced prior to the turn-of-the-century. Conversely the years after the Boer War saw the standardisation and expansion of cadet training. In 1910 the visiting Lord Kitchener argued for the desirable connection between soldierly qualities and civic life.

479 Hamilton-Browne, p.73.
The force must be an integral portion of the national life. The citizen should be brought up from boyhood to look forward to the day when he will be enrolled as fit to defend his country and he should be accustomed to practice those habits of self denial, of devotion to and emulation in the execution of his duty of reticence and of prompt obedience to lawful authority, which are essential to the formation of patriot and efficient citizen soldiers.  

Older conceptions of soldiers did remain close to the surface for some. Opposition to military training for boys had seen concern voiced that camp life might encourage swearing and drinking and the *Maoriland Worker* made a constant theme of the links between militarism and drink and prostitution. Throughout the Great War officials argued that wet canteens, pubs and alcohol retailers might tempt recruits and that access to them should be regulated. Editorials noted that while the ‘great majority of the troopers’ know how to ‘honour their uniform … there are some whose intemperance is risking the reputation of the whole Force.’ The WCTU campaigned on the danger of soldiers falling into the clutches of drink and foreign sirens. Anglican Bishop Thomas Sprott blamed ‘foolish civilians for luring the young soldiers into bars and “shouting” for them, excessively.’ This would suggest that the older conceptions of soldiers had not been entirely forgotten, even if soldiers now tended towards being cast as victims rather than as vectors of sin.

The remarkable shift in the modern perspective of the soldier from coarse fellow to representative hero is indicative of larger modern developments. Firstly, between 1880-1910, though in some sense extending for decades after, there was a dramatic decline in social statistics that might be classed as part of the frontier milieu (expressed in rates of homicide, assault, arrests and public drunkenness) as New Zealand society increasingly ordered and civilised itself. Thus the shift in perceptions of soldiers reflected a larger shift in social mores and respectability. Additionally the expanded engagement in civic and national life that modernisation allowed - permitted by expanding franchises, urbanisation, access to education, new forms of media, rising living standards, more intense forms of nationalism

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483 *Grey River Argus*, 10 March 1910, p.3.
485 EP, 5 October 1914, p.6.
487 EP, 5 October 1914, p.6.
and the swelling ranks of the middle classes - saw a shift in the stature and imagining of the common man. The result boosted conceptions of the ordinary citizen as a representative within the social order, as well as representative of its characteristics. Soldiers, as representatives and defenders of the national community, became a special part of this cast of reimagined common people. In Europe George Mosse has identified the rise of national consciousness during the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic wars as events which transformed soldiering into ‘an attainable and much admired profession.’ The promotion of a collective identity in modernising New Zealand appears to have played a comparable role. As the *Otago Daily Times* put it in 1900, ‘we have acquired the habit of regarding the soldier as the natural and inevitable personification of the nation’s patriotism.’ This development gives some context to why all belligerents entered the Great War with popular conceptions that their armies were stocked with men who embodied national character and virtues.

The transition from pioneering to settled society had an additional impact upon the perception of soldiering in public culture. As the pioneer era was mythologised within public memory as an era where a virtuous and vital people had broken in the land, the torch of iconic masculinity was passed to new archetypes. Martin Crotty, in examining cultural constructs of masculinity, has placed this dynamic in a larger context across modernising New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US. Crotty contends that bushmen, pioneers, farmers, mounted policeman and cowboys ‘all provided an imaginative escape from the effects of an effeminate civilisation and were employed as cultural symbols in the construction of rugged masculinity’ that was vigorously employed within public culture. The legend that those who won New Zealand from the rigours of the bush and the Maori were of a heroic quality remained a fashionable concept in the Pakeha historic record for some time. A 1901 homage to New Zealand’s pioneers claimed ‘there is warrior blood in the veins of the pioneer settlers. They are the true descendants of the sea kings and heroes.’ This is little different to the tune of a  

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491 ODT, 27 December 1900, p.4.
1930 history book which claimed that ‘those men of yore were great men; they were giants with hearts of oak and thews of steel.’

This mythology played up the propriety, vitality and heroism of the pioneering era and downplayed scandalous disorder, violence and drunkenness; the idealised man of the post-pioneer era coveted the virtues of the pioneer without his vices. Thus the rugged masculinity of the pioneers was appropriated and aligned with modern calls for respectability and the demands of modern male citizenship – that the nation’s men could be expected to fight for the country. Phillips, summarising this transition, describes soldiering as pioneering ‘stripped of its anarchic disreputable culture and now exercised in uniform under disciplined supervision.’ Like many dynamics in modernising New Zealand, old ideologies were translated into new forms, with rapid change masked by a veneer of continuity.

The character and place of rural New Zealand - despite trends of urbanisation - made one clear receptacle of this mythology and the yeoman farmer was seemingly among the worthy inheritors of the pioneer legacy. One commentator, contributing to an official report on land development, praised the pioneers as heroes while, without a pause, changing the subject to farmers. ‘I say those men who go into the forests and back country with their wives and families and hew out homes for themselves and live there their lifetime are true heroes.’

Likewise, two of the new activities of the modernising world - international sport and international war – provided additional venues where the pioneer virtues of New Zealand men could be preserved, expressed and recognised. These realms of sport and war overlapped and the character of colonial masculinity was supposed to manifest on both battle and sports field. In All Blacks captain Thomas Ellison’s words, rugby was a ‘soldier making game’.

The protean nature of the mythology is seen in discourse around the success of the 1905 All Black tour. As in Froude’s writings and Colonel Francis’ report, success on the sports field was explained with imprecise reference to the New Zealand environment. When asked to account for the fitness of New Zealand rugby players, Seddon fired a scattershot explanation which encompassed an invigorating climate, low urbanisation and uncrowded housing, the purity of racial stock (endowed with ‘British sporting instincts’), good living.

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495 Gilkison, p.179.
conditions, high quality food, high average wealth and egalitarian social conditions, including schooling, generous leisure hours and public sanitation.499

This mythology also tended to reflect the imperial integration of the age and conceptions of colonial masculinity were augmented with complementary notions that neo-Britons possessed more vitality than their ‘old-world’ counterparts. Besides the aforementioned Kitchener, there is a robust list of flattering comments made by British officialdom ‘upper-class English twits’ (p.32). The reputation of New Zealand’s Boer War Rough Riders for toughness, vitality, initiative and adaptability was noted in The Times History of the War in South Africa with the entry that they were ‘by general consent, regarded as on average the best mounted troops in South Africa’.500 General Hutton also spoke highly of New Zealand’s Boer War contingents, noting that none held ‘a higher reputation for steadiness under fire or for that dash and gallantry when the moment arrives which are so peculiarly attributes of British troops of the highest type.’501 Major General James Babington had already lodged his report containing similar conclusions; ‘In no country that I know of does so keen a martial spirit exist as in New Zealand … the percentage of Volunteers to available population … must be extraordinarily large.’502 In 1912 Colonel George Wolfe commented on a parade given by the Auckland District’s Junior Cadets.

I have never seen a finer performance wherever I have been. When one considers the dangers to our Empire at the present time, and the help that can be afforded to the Mother Country by the readiness for war of the Overseas Dominions, the hearts of all true Englishmen, Britishers, Colonials or whatever one may call them, must be bound with pride at the spectacle of last Tuesday’s Parade.503

In 1913 Godley reported ‘the general physique of the men is excellent, and their conduct is on the whole exemplary … I cannot speak too highly of the zeal, energy and goodwill which I find everywhere on the part of both instructors and recruits.’504 General Sir Ian Hamilton, visiting New Zealand in May 1914, concluded that New Zealand soldiers were ‘well equipped; well armed; the human material is second to none in the world.’505

It is likely that such complements did flatter, and may have strengthened, colonial pride and some Imperial visitors may not have been averse to this outcome. However, it should be noted that such appeals referenced established notions of colonial masculinity. Additionally, some comments might be considered as expressions of conventional sentiments that it was supposed the audience was receptive to. Furthermore, New Zealanders proved willing co-conspirators in cherishing a vision of New Zealand men as successors to their pioneer forebears, as a vital strain of the British race and as natural soldiers. Conceptions of colonial masculinity were exported to South Africa; when a doctor asked a New Zealand soldier why he wasn’t killed when he fell off a bridge into a gravel pit he replied, ‘oh New Zealanders are very tough’. Recruitment posters for Australasian mounted units for the Boer War led with the proclamation ‘Bushmen Wanted!!’ Seddon idealised the fourth contingents as ‘as fine a body of men, wonderfully even as to size, and as perfect in physique as it falls to the lot of the most favoured of our race to be.’ Lady Stout returned the idea to Britain whilst on tour in 1909, claiming in a letter to The Times that ‘we have no class of men who are effeminate in dress or intellect or degenerate in morals, as in older counties.’ Others just circulated it within New Zealand. General Hamilton’s 1914 inspection saw daily updates of where the General was in his tour and the reporting of any comments he had made. Days after the General’s arrival, a Free Lance cartoon depicted him praising New Zealand’s ‘capital’ ‘citizen army’ - ‘the Japs’ as the named threat this army was to defend against is suggestive of the direction threat perceptions were cast in the months before the Great War (fig.23). History books for decades after 1918 drew connections between the qualities of the pioneers and soldiers of modernising New Zealand. In such texts, when the call to arms came ‘the sturdy sons of the old pioneers, the boys of the bulldog breed, quickly answered the call, and in the spirit of their fathers marched away.’

Additionally, rather than simply being imposed, the mythology that New Zealand men were natural soldiers ran with the dominant cultural grain. Most significantly this meant soldiering was tied to notions of ‘citizen soldiers’ rather than openly with ideas of ‘militarism’. Whereas the latter term was used to signify hierarchal and unegalitarian principles at odds

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506 OW, 19 April 1900, p.9.
508 ODT, 26 March 1900, p.2.
509 The Times, 19 November 1909, p.10.
with British liberty, the former had classical connotations, whereby citizen armies, inspired by patriotic sentiment, were accountable to civilian authority. Visions of standing armies and pressgangs did not complement New Zealand’s ideal ‘new-world’ image and ‘militarism’ and ‘conscription’ stood as tainted words avoided by those who called for defence reform and used by those opposing it. In 1903 Colonel Richard Hutton Davies expressed his exasperation over the distaste the New Zealand public seemed to have for the deference of military life.
They seem to have got the notion into their heads that discipline necessarily means a man of higher rank making himself particularly disagreeable to men of lower rank. It is like waving a red rag to a bull to mention discipline to a great many people, especially in a country where they boast that ‘one man is as good as another and a d---d sight better.’

Such dynamics meant that defence reform always had to at least pay lip service to favouring citizen soldiers over ‘militarism’ or risk backlash. Even moves to introduce universal/compulsory military training, eventually secured through the 1909 Defence Act, which put thousands of boys as young as 12 in uniforms, was marketed by playing down militarism and playing up the rhetoric of the citizen soldier. Early in the reform debates Governor Plunket put it that ‘if the martial spirit thus ingrained in the boy is subsequently fostered and encouraged in the man, the word conscription, so repugnant to the free nation, may well be considered removed from the vocabulary of the colony.’ Other advocates such as Attorney-General Dr. Findlay argued that since the Defence Act was concerned with training and required men to volunteer for overseas service that ‘there is nothing in this Bill … which amounts in any sense to conscription.’ Whilst in London in 1913, Allen stated that the objectives of defence reform was to place New Zealand in a position to say to the Mother Country that we have always at her disposal a permanent organisation by which we can send about eight thousand men to any part of our Empire where their services may be needed.

When this report was cabled back to New Zealand the caveat that these men be volunteers was cropped, leading to controversy and debate around ‘conscripts’, ‘standing armies’ and ‘militarism run mad’ amongst the mainstream press.

Near paradoxically then, both the glorification of the soldier and anti-militarism (if ‘militarism’ is defined in the above sense) were broadly accepted ideas in public culture before 1914. Billy Hughes’ observation on Australian defence reforms in 1901 could easily be speaking for mainstream New Zealand attitudes as well. ‘I take it this country doesn’t want an offensive army, but an armed people who can shoot straight, and a regimental machine so that every man can fall automatically into his place no matter how suddenly the

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512 The Junior Cadets (12-14) were discontinued in 1912 by the newly elected Reform Government.
515 New Zealand Times, 13 March 1913, p.6.
516 ODT, 14 March 1914, p.4, Dominion, 3 February 1913, p.5, Ashburton Guardian, 13 February 1913, p.3.
trouble comes.’\textsuperscript{517} This ideal of the amateur, citizen soldier who was ‘unmilitary but exceedingly warlike’ outlived defence reform, universal/compulsory military training, conscription and even the Great War.\textsuperscript{518}

Into the twentieth-century this conception of colonial masculinity was well established in public culture. Drawing on the pioneering past (or sanitised elements of it), it promoted a widely owned and respectable mythology which presented New Zealand males as possessing a particular character and skill that allowed them to excel in certain activities. It would, come the Great War, become a central part of the ANZAC ethos.

**Fashionable militarism**

Running parallel to and interwoven with this tightened association between masculine character and martial capacity was a rise of a broad public engagement in martial spectacle. It has been noted that, towards the turn-of-the-century, ‘New Zealand suddenly became more warlike.’\textsuperscript{519} In the task of contextualising wartime representations this development is significant. As the notion that New Zealand men made ready soldiers was formulated, this development widely disseminated that model within the public sphere.

Public interest in martial mystique could be seen as growing from a mid nineteenth-century kernel. Created in 1858, the Volunteer Forces were popularly imagined as embodying an ethos of amateurism and egalitarianism. The organisation provides a good example of a public embrace of the military ephemera, rather than an imposed grip. Officers were elected by popular ballot and the emphasis in training was very much on individual and popular skills such as marksmanship and riding.\textsuperscript{520} Government provided equipment was supplemented with BYO uniform (consequently soldiers were not uniformly uniformed) and horses. Several scholars have noted an air of the sporting event and pageantry around the organisation and a propensity for dashing uniforms with feathers, braids and general martial


\textsuperscript{519} Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p.79.

\textsuperscript{520} Milburn, pp.12-15.
flair."\textsuperscript{521} Indeed when khaki was introduced at least one Volunteer complained, noting that ‘a bright uniform attracts many young men to the Force.’\textsuperscript{522}

John Crawford and Garry Clayton have noted the social and civil aspects of the Volunteers which saw them host political and religious meetings, dances and charity events and function as auxiliary fire-fighters and police.\textsuperscript{523} Stephen Clarke described the organisation as ‘more akin to a social institution than a military one.’\textsuperscript{524} Likewise, whilst commenting on the sham fights and parades the Volunteers performed to crowds, Phillips claims that through the 1870-1880s the Volunteers were ‘more concerned with ceremony and public entertainment than the serious defence of the country.’\textsuperscript{525} Some contemporaries agreed; in 1890 the Undersecretary of Defence Colonel C.A. Humfrey claimed that the Volunteers were merely looked upon in the large centres as ‘light amusement, not as a serious and practical service.’\textsuperscript{526} Lastly sporadic parade camps, non-standardised drills and the number of absences give some idea of how popular habits were favoured at the expense of military efficiency. The most extreme episodes seem to have taken place in Canterbury where no camps were held between 1873 and 1884; in 1874 when Major Gordon called a Volunteer parade, only 2 of the 29 men on the roll appeared, and one of those was reported as ‘very drunk.’\textsuperscript{527}

Towards and into the twentieth-century the amateur approach of the Volunteers would interact with the reforms of modernisation and imperial defence. The years after 1890, and notably after 1910, were ones of ‘unprecedented military activity.’\textsuperscript{528} By 1913, 5.46 percent of government expenditure went to defence, more than twice the 2.66 percent of 1909 and higher than the average expenditure of 4.2 percent across 1899-1902 when the country was at war.\textsuperscript{529} The coming to power of the Liberal government in 1891 saw a greater official interest in defence reform. Efforts were made to replace obsolete equipment, issue drill manuals and reorganise. Equipment and procedures were standardised and a national

\textsuperscript{523} Stephen Clarke, ‘Commandants’, OCNZMH, p.108.
\textsuperscript{524} Phillips, \textit{A Man’s Country?}, p.138.
\textsuperscript{525} AJHR, 1890, H-15, ‘Report on the New Zealand Forces’, p.3.
\textsuperscript{526} Christopher Pugsley, ‘At the Empire’s Call: New Zealand Expeditionary Force Planning, 1901-1918’, \textit{The German Empire and Britain’s Pacific Dominions}, p.229.
uniform was adopted during the Boer War. This activity also reflects the imperial integration of the age; a series of defence conferences between Great Britain and the Dominions organised a global strategy of imperial defence where British naval and land power was supplemented by Dominion money and men, in theory to the benefit of all. Additionally a practice of acquiring British Commandants – appointed advisors from the British Army – to appraise New Zealand’s defences began in 1892. This saw criticism levelled at the Volunteers, including a rather damning 1893 report by Lieutenant-Colonel Fox – those officers charged with inefficiency were dubbed ‘Fox’s Martyrs’. 

Also indicative of the climate was the expansion of the Cadet corps. Though the organisation was established in Dunedin in 1864, the Cadets had grown in prominence after the Boer War, receiving official endorsement in 1902 and being placed under the control of the Education Department. Roger Openshaw estimates that during 1902-1910, the period after George Hogben’s educational reforms, perhaps two-thirds of the male children in public schools aged 12 to 14 donned cadet uniforms for weekly drills and that in high schools the proportion was larger still. By 1908 there were 15,000 boys enrolled in the Cadets program before it was made compulsory in the 1909 Defence Act; by 1914 there were 25,000 Senior Cadets.

Reform gathered pace when the 1909 Defence Act abolished the Volunteer Forces, established a replacement Territorial Army and introduced universal/compulsory military training. In the original text of the Act the scheme saw boys enlisted in the Junior Cadets at age 12. At 14 they graduated to the Senior Cadets and at 18 were transferred to the General Training Section. From age 21, and until 30, they were included in the Reserve. The system insured that, in theory, future volunteers would be at a prescribed level of training and gave New Zealand a pool of martially inspired males to meet future defence needs.

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534 Ian McGibbon, ‘Cadets’, OCNZMH, p.76.
535 Ages were later adjusted. For example the maximum age of the general training section was extended to 25 and Junior Cadets were abolished in 1912.
536 Exemption was permitted upon medical and economic grounds. Though military authority could exempt boys on religious grounds, a Parliamentary vote of 44-10 rejected an amendment to extend exemption to conscientious objections. NZPD, Vol.161, 15 October 1912, p.228.
Certainly military strength doubled from 12,474 under arms in 1907-1908 to 25,902 in 1913-1914.\textsuperscript{537}

An anti-militarism movement emerged as one response to this new militarism in a curious alliance between socialist, pacifist, anti-militarist, libertarian and feminist elements.\textsuperscript{538} This diversity saw ‘anti-compulsion’ emerge as the unifying issue rather than any positive policy; some organisations supported volunteerism, others disarmament, others defence co-operation with Australia.\textsuperscript{539} Christchurch and the West Coast proved centres of this resistance and something akin to a culture war was waged. Anti-compulsionists were hounded by officials, criticised in editorials, abused by the public and meetings were broken up by anti-anti-compulsionists. Counter blows ranged from dispensing pamphlets, disrupting drilling sessions, graffiti and vandalism. Christchurch’s statue of John Robert Godley, uncle to General Godley, suffered abuse as a surrogate effigy. Another incident saw a field gun, captured from South Africa, removed from Victoria Square, painted red and rolled into the Avon River.\textsuperscript{540} Some anti-compulsionists proved willing to resist to the point of receiving fines for not attending training and incarceration for refusal to pay said fines. The act of interning objectors alongside common criminals stirred wider public opinion. Furthermore, when 13 objectors were imprisoned in Fort Jevois on Ripa Island, 400 marched on Parliament to protest.\textsuperscript{541} Although Godley labelled anti-compulsionists a ‘hopeless minority’ of ‘cranks, faddists and conscientious objectors’, the imprisonment of idealists and minors as ‘common criminals’ offended respectable opinion and widened opposition to elements of the scheme.\textsuperscript{542}

As one protest pamphlet put it

\begin{quote}
even the people who held that every boy ought to be a soldier were not prepared for that. They thought they believed in universal training, but they did not like the name - and still less the reality - of compulsory training. They wanted their omelette, but the idea that eggs must be broken had never occurred to them.\textsuperscript{543}
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{537} NZOYB, 1914, p.268.
\bibitem{539} Olssen, \textit{Red Feds}, p.55.
\end{thebibliography}
Upon release, the Ripa Island prisoners were met by a crowd of 2,500 sympathisers and subsequently toured the country talking about their experiences.\textsuperscript{544}

However if Godley is guilty of minimising dissent, some more recent evaluations have greatly inflated the influence of anti-militarism. Conclusions that ‘the whole structure of compulsory military training was rapidly becoming a shambles’ or ‘By mid-1914 CMT had lost its teeth, or rather had had them battered out by a small band of young men under the banner of the PRU [Passive Resister’s Union]’ need to be considered against a wider context.\textsuperscript{545} Consent - likely ranging from enthused to resigned - was far more common than dissent. A report of camp attendance for the 1914 period showed 57,322 attending and serving under the provisions of the Act (83.31 percent against 10.44 percent listed as absent without leave and 6.25 percent listed as absent with leave); the same report noted that 6,876 convictions had accumulated from the time of the scheme’s inauguration to 30 April 1914.\textsuperscript{546} It is also remarkable how exceptionally high resistance in the Canterbury military district was. Between the inauguration of the defence scheme and 30 April 1914, counts of absence from, or obstructions of, parades in Canterbury were twice that of Otago, counts of non-registration were more than four times higher than Wellington and counts of refusing the oath in the Territorials were nearly 17 times higher than Auckland.\textsuperscript{547} Dissent was noteworthy and raised embarrassing questions about government policy, but indicates neither a crisis of the status quo nor a mass consensus behind anti-militarism.

Indeed one can glean a larger ideological debate in the alternative ideologies aired in the public sphere. These expressions included graffiti slogans that compulsion was ‘unBritish’, pamphlets noting military influence as contrary to a democratic spirit, and leaflets claiming that ‘a good soldier is a blind, heartless, soulless, murderous machine. He is not a man … young Man, don’t be a soldier be a man’.\textsuperscript{548} Such sentiments, however, were at odds with predominant fashions of collective identity and masculinity. In this dominant ideology it was

\textsuperscript{544} Roth, ‘The Prisoners’, p.18.
\textsuperscript{546} AJHR, 1914, H-19, ‘Defence Forces of New Zealand’, pp.13, 27, 37. Roughly 78 percent of those convicted were prosecuted, with 234 sentenced to detention for refusal to pay fines.
in soldiering that loyalty, manliness and civic participation were expressed and engagement with military pomp successfully tapped popular sentiment.

The period before 1914 constituted the high water mark of peace-time militarism in New Zealand. Martial spectacle and glamour were used for mass appeal and icons of soldiers promoted commodities as diverse as biscuits, cereals, beer, boot polish and tobacco. Likewise the organisers of the 1906 Christchurch International Exhibition made extensive use of military pageantry. Among the exhibits were a showcase of modern armaments, records of historic campaigns, collections of medals and other military trappings. 5,000 school cadets camped out for a week at the exhibition.\(^{549}\) A wide selection of military contests, including gunnery and drilling competitions, displays of sword exercises and horse riding contests were held. Military parades during the exhibition included some 800-900 men from the infantry, mounted rifles and artillery, supplemented by Bluejackets from warships stationed in Lyttelton Harbour. Cowan’s record notes that such displays ‘typified all the virility, the fighting qualities of the Briton; it brought a thrill of pride to the son of this most distant outpost of the Empire.’\(^{550}\) Many officials were noted as appearing in uniform and the whole affair had been opened by a twenty-one gun salute by the Artillery Volunteers. This display was noted as notably contributing ‘to the brightness and picturesqueness of the inaugural ceremony.’\(^{551}\)

The numbers confirm that martial spectacles attracted crowds. Some of the sham fights hosted by the Volunteers in the 1870s drew crowds estimated as high as 15,000.\(^{552}\) Towards the twentieth-century improved transport and communication systems boosted participation. In 1891, for example, special train services brought crowds to watch a mock naval attack on Oamaru by the *H.M.S. Curacoa* (playing an enemy raider) and the defending Volunteers.\(^{553}\) On 21 October 1899 some 40,000 (a twentieth of the country’s population) gathered in Wellington to see soldiers departing for the Veldt.\(^{554}\) In 1908 an estimated 100,000 witnessed the arrival of the ‘Great White Fleet’ in Auckland; Parliament itself used the newly opened

\(^{549}\) Cowan, *Official Record*, p.387.


\(^{553}\) *Lyttelton Times*, 31 March 1891, p.3.

\(^{554}\) Crawford and Ellis, p.7.
The ultimate example of the connection between spectacle and crowds occurred in 1913 when the H.M.S. New Zealand visited the country. During the same period when 13,000 joined the Peace Council more than 130,000 people turned out at Lyttelton alone and it is estimated near half the population visited the ship throughout its tour.®®® Captain Lionel Halsey, commander of the dreadnought, noted the ‘intense loyalty and patriotism that is displayed all over the Dominion.’®®® The number of New Zealanders enlisted in the Volunteers gives another indicator of aspects of public sentiment. In 1899 the Volunteers stood near 6,400 strong. Through the Boer War this figure boomed, peaking at 17,000 in July 1901, after which there was a slow decrease with numbers reaching 10,800 by 1909.®®® This unplanned growth of the force was not part of any political agenda. Indeed the Commandant Colonel Penton opposed an expansion, which he argued, burdened the Defence Department without improving the strategic situation.®®® One study has noted that such engagements with militarism were ‘not imposed on New Zealand from above: in the case of the Volunteers movement, it was pushed on politicians from below.’®®®

Additionally social engagement was remarkably non-standardised and decentralised. Rather than any kind of monolithic engagement, specific agendas, target audiences and ideologies were non-synchronised and could, and did, clash. After the war broke out a somewhat flummoxed Allen wrote to the Prime Minister noting

there have sprung up various organisations in the country which represent the national feeling … each place seems to want its own name, for instance Christchurch has adopted the title “Christchurch Citizens’ Defence Corps” and apparently in another place it is the “Legion of Frontiersmen” and so on, and it really becomes a puzzle to know how we are to deal with all these varied organisations.

However, many of the organisations Allen was puzzling over predated the war as did the sentiments behind many of the new organisations mushrooming into existence. These organisations were not the fringe fantasies of a few but indicative of powerful elements in the social fabric. In the post Boer War world defence reform ran parallel with a blossoming of popular military and imperial organisations. Indeed it has been suggested that the Boer War

®®® McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p.222.
®®® Egarr, p.65.
reinforced old habits, fostering ‘the idea that the colony could be effectively defended by large numbers of marksmen’; certainly there were 204 Government sponsored rifle clubs with almost 8,770 members by 1914.\textsuperscript{562}

Many of these organisations spread through the imperial network, their themes of active masculinity and imperial engagement flourishing in local conditions. Two prominent examples are seen in the Boy Scouts and the Legion of Frontiersmen which were respectively established in New Zealand in 1908 and 1911, not long after their British inceptions of 1907 and 1904. Both organisations were founded by British Boer War veterans - Robert Baden-Powell and Roger Pocock - who argued that military virtues complemented civic virtues, although their programmes were aimed at different age groups. The Legion, drawing on a romanticised vision of the frontier, promoted the idea that imperial security depended on self-reliance, community service and the values of amateurism. Speaking on behalf of the Legion of Frontiersmen, Colonel Bell criticised defence reforms, claiming that ‘the ideal state [would exist] when the professional army would be abolished, and every man would be a citizen soldier.’\textsuperscript{563} Recruiting for the Legion of Frontiersmen commenced in Christchurch in early 1911, drawing approximately 1,700 Frontiersmen by 1916.\textsuperscript{564} The Scouts had an even greater success story as thousands of parents signed up their children; the number of Scouts reached 15,000-16,000 by 1911 and 20,000 by October 1915.\textsuperscript{565} It is hardly coincidental that the Boy Scouts found public favour during a time when public concern about the impact of the modern environment on young bodies and minds flared (see Chapter Four). However, the martial, or quasi-martial, elements of such organisations should not be discounted and youth movements have been observed as ‘extremely sensitive barometers … [which mark] shifts in public and governmental attitudes towards the military.’\textsuperscript{566}

It was this interest that was appealed to in building and promoting support for defence reform. For example, in 1910 government funds were used to send a troop of Cadets to Toronto to compete against Australian, British and Canadian Cadet Corps. Their travels,
successes and trophies (they won the rifle exercises, marching, general appearance, tug of war and physical exercises - all events except the shooting) were well reported. The souvenir-pamphlet reported that ‘as a result of their success hundreds of cadets who had been only lukewarm, and probably not a few who were opposed to the universal system, have seen what can be done by proper discipline and efficient training.’\textsuperscript{567} This should be read in the context of official concern around protests against the introduction of universal/compulsory military training.

Other militarist groups had more overtly political aims of steering defence policy. Once again these New Zealand organisations were inspired by similar movements elsewhere. A Navy League was established in New Zealand in 1896, with branches opening in Christchurch, Wellington, Dunedin, Nelson, Napier, Wanganui, Palmerston North and Invercargill. It pushed for the two power standard of maintaining British naval strength at a level equal to the fleets of the two largest rival powers. The National Defence League (known as the National League of New Zealand between August 1906 and April 1908) called for the introduction of universal training. In doing this it was careful to state the difference between ‘universal training’ and ‘conscription’. Reformed in 1920 it continued to stress that it was ‘strongly opposed to the introduction of any spirit of aggressive militarism in the country.’\textsuperscript{568} Furthermore it embraced a populist platform, claiming its goal was relevant to conservatives, liberals, radicals, democrats, socialists, employers, working men, clergymen and those for peace (through strength); ‘our first and common duty, whatever our political opinions may be, is to see that our existence is secured.’\textsuperscript{569} Both the Navy and Defence Leagues have been noted as ‘well organised, influential, [and as] drawing a membership from across the political spectrum.’\textsuperscript{570} Additionally both had supporters in the media and high places, with Seddon being a member of the Navy League and Joseph Ward belonging to both.

The grass-roots and decentralised nature of such movements is reflected in their ideological and political collisions. Indeed youth organisations faced setbacks from

universal/compulsory military training which poached concept and, more lethally, talent. It has been suggested that Cadet Officers saw Scouting as a rival organisation and freely discussed ‘absorbing and killing the Boy Scout movement.’ 7,000 Scouts left the organisation between August-December 1911 and the 1909 Defence Act empowered the Minister of Education to ‘take over the control of the Boy Scouts in such manner and to such extent as he thinks fit, and when so taken over they shall form part of the Junior Cadets.’

The same decentralised nature is witnessed in the Great War with numerous patriotic organisations writing to the Defence Minister with requests for rifles, honorary ranks, access to facilities and with requests for official recognition. This was the context of Allen’s dilemma; he persistently noted that ‘the law will not permit them [patriotic societies] to be recognised as part of the military organisation’ and that he could only suggest that such societies join or form rifle clubs.

This was the experience of the Legion of Frontiersmen who struggled to gain official recognition within the Empire. This dynamic continued into the war when the Government continuously declined offers to create a unique Frontiersmen unit, suggesting instead that legionaries enlist as private citizens or join/form rifle clubs. It has been noted that nine Rifle Clubs were formed by Frontiersmen and registered with the Defence Department. Additionally Legion members collectively enlisted as individuals in a fashion similar to a British ‘pals battalion’. Here they seemed to find a place for the Legion’s code of duty and sacrifice. Certainly, there was a high correlation between VC winners and Frontiersmen; of the eleven VC’s awarded to New Zealanders, five went to men associated with the Legion. Additionally, the high ratio of Frontiersmen who volunteered - near 70 percent of its members were on active service by 1916 - literally killed the organisation’s support.

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572 Culliford, p.18.
573 Culliford, pp.11-16, *New Zealand Statutes*, 1909, No.28, *Defence*, Section 39, p.308. Some concessions were negotiated. In 1910 an Amendment Bill permitted the formation of Boy Scout Units within the Junior and Senior Cadets. See NZS, 1910, No.21, Section 7 (1-15), p.39.
577 Burling, pp.13, 18-19.
monument to the 9,000 Frontiersmen killed throughout the Empire in the First World War still stands within Tongariro National Park.

In conclusion, in addition to spurring anti-militarist opposition, military reform before the war found and tapped popular sentiment. In some sense the public consensus which met the outbreak of war is indicative of the respective power of these developments in public culture. Though recent scholarship has convincingly challenged the notion of any kind of single, uniform reaction to the war, broad responses which met the outbreak with enthusiastic approval, expressions of high-principles or solemn acceptance might be meaningfully contrasted to responses indicating an active rejection and/or horror of the idea of war.578 While dissent or anger regarding New Zealand’s entry into the war was aired in the Maoriland Worker and in private, only two protest meetings were held – one of which was broken up by a hostile crowd.579 Conversely announcement of a state of war saw tens of thousands partake in spontaneous patriotic demonstrations across the country.580 Whereas diverse groups within the national community pledged support to the war effort, the anti-militarist consensus shattered under internal fragmentation and a changed public mood. Some anti-compulsionists shelved their differences and joined the war effort, the apparent threat to national interests overriding other concerns, while other groups converted to closed-door study.581 A few would re-kindle debates when talk of introducing conscription began.

The mobilisation of the proto-ANZAC ethos
By 1914 the notion that the New Zealand masculine character was suited to the trials of war was a widely established concept in public culture. This is the core of the proto-ANZAC ethos – that New Zealanders at war embodied collective characteristics and were therefore able soldiers – which was mobilised and named during the war. Days before British entry to the conflict, one of New Zealand’s largest selling papers could openly claim that

The average young New Zealander - and this remark applies especially to the young New Zealander who lives in the country - is half a soldier before he is enrolled. He is physically strong, intellectually keen, anxious to be led though being what he is will not brook being driven a single inch. Quick to learn his drill, easily adapting to the

581 Grant, Out in the Cold, pp.13-17.
conditions of life in camp since camping usually is his pastime and very loyal to his leaders when those leaders know their job. 582

With the start of the fighting, folksy images of New Zealand’s citizen army successfully exchanging outdoorsmanship for war became common in public culture. It was reported by Cairo correspondents and widely circulated that New Zealanders lifted the enemy on the end of their bayonets and hurled them over their heads ‘as though they were using hayforks’. 583 This technique appears in Trevor Lloyd’s panoramic imagining of the Gallipoli landing (fig. 24). Among the patriotic piano music produced was Ye Sons of New Zealand whose lyrics translated rural virtue into martial capacity (and ran it alongside Greater Britishness).

Figure 24 Auckland Weekly News, 1 July 1915, p.42.

582 NZH, 1 August 1914, supplement, p.1.
We come from the farm and the orchard, We come from the bush and the field,
We lay down the axe and the ploughshare, The weapons of death to wield.
When England’s foes creep around her, We make it our business to tell,
That when they attack the old lion, They must deal with the cubs as well.  

The links between masculinity, sporting ability and military prowess had been noted before the war. Now this ideology was mobilised with sportsmen playing the ‘greater game’. There were claims that cricket players made excellent bomb throwers, the overarm bowl translated to the task of accurately hurling grenades. According to Dr Alfred Newman, the MP for Wellington and not coincidentally the president of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union, rugby players were ‘naturally quick fine fighters with the bayonet … [a] football acquired quickness was of immense value … it enabled them to get in their stab first.’ Among the ephemera produced for the 1914 Queen’s carnival was a cartoon of an All Black translated into a soldier (fig.25). The stance, action and title of ‘game’ are encapsulated in both images, whilst uniforms change, ball is exchanged for bayonet and the opposition is fatally beaten.

Continuing long held ideas that the New Zealand environment bred distinctive men, a particular ANZAC body type is apparent in news reports. Describing the ANZACs at Gallipoli, Ashmead-Bartlett remarked ‘I had no idea such a race of giants existed in the twentieth-century.’ Also noted was the habit of removing uniforms during physical work which revealed ‘huge frames and giant limbs.’ Others acknowledged a dose of modernism and urbanisation in the Arcadian mix. Hence New Zealand troops were ‘tall, broad, deep-chested, heavy-limbed … accustomed to hard living out of doors, with the keen eyesight of the countryman and the alertness of the townsman.’ At times reports distinguish New Zealanders from the other half of the ANZACs. For example, correspondent Philip Gibbs described the Australians at Ypres as ‘lithe, loose limbed and hatchet faced.’ The New Zealanders, meanwhile, were noted as ‘in type midway between the English and the

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585 Fiona Hall.
586 Press, 6 September 1915, p.10.
587 Press, 21 May 1917, p.3.
589 Sun, 6 August 1915, p.3.
590 Press, 5 May 1915, p.11.
Australians. They are less lean and wiry, have more colour, and are of fuller build, as fine a set of boys as one could see in the whole world.’\textsuperscript{591} An exotic, ‘from the ends of the world’, motif was also utilised for the provision of distinguishing, identifying elements. When it was discovered that German propaganda claimed it was New Zealand custom to eat prisoners, and to offer tobacco to those selected for the pot (accounting for the agitation of some prisoners upon being offered cigarettes), the rumour was adapted for the purposes of amusement and identity.\textsuperscript{592} One photo shows a group of smiling soldiers outside a dug out (canteen?) furnished with a corrugated iron sign reading ‘The Cannibals Paradise Supply Den’.\textsuperscript{593} Such rumours of New Zealand dietary habits also appeared in newspaper cartoons and division Christmas cards.\textsuperscript{594}

\textsuperscript{591} NZO, 13 October 1917, p.17.  
\textsuperscript{592} EP, 1 August 1918, p.7.  
\textsuperscript{593} ATL-1/2-013460-G, 10 Aug 1918, ‘New Zealand soldiers with the “Cannibals Paradise” sign in World War I, France’.  
\textsuperscript{594} NZO, 10 August 1918, p.1.
Psychologically too, the New Zealand soldier was imagined as possessing a distinct shape and anecdotal stories of how wounded Australasian troops were admired in Britain for their ‘lack of swank and boastfulness’ were reprinted. The stereotype, given the nom de plume of ‘the silent division’, was summarised within the official histories.

With a highly developed sense of esprit de corps, the troops generally impressed the outsider as stern, dour and grim. On the march the cheerful and spontaneous gaiety of the English regiments was conspicuous by its absence. The undemonstrative reception of battalions returning after notable achievements suggested to an English observer the not inapt name of ‘The Silent Division.’ Characteristic too was a deep-rooted aversion to anything savouring of ostentation and ‘swank.’

This archetype of clannish, introspective men, uncomfortable with too much formality and ceremony around rank - a recurrent joke was that officers would faint from shock if saluted by ANZACs - is a continuation of pre-war ideals. One commentator described the egalitarian nature of the ANZACs as making them ‘not so much an army as a community come together for the job … Possibly a millionaire, a cowboy, a doctor, and a clerk are among them’ added another.

The decision to allow Maori troops to serve saw an incorporation of Maori, both in physical and mythological terms, in the war effort. Iwi who had fought for the crown in the nineteenth-century, such as Ngapuhi and Ngati Porou, were keen to serve and the corresponding ideology aired around martial Maori gives a second demonstration of how pieces of the past were spun into contemporary myth. Certainly public culture took to relating Maori warrior traditions and history (another Froudean narrative of colonial masculinity) with fashionable militarism. The outcome was an exotic but identifiable rendition of the ANZAC ethos - of Maori soldiers imagined as respectable and as embodying collective characteristics. Thus Apirana Ngata claimed that Maori were naturally half soldier too.

In regard to some of the minor requirements of a soldier the Maori is naturally well equipped. He is a natural scout, and in the matter of commissariat he is unsurpassed in this country; and if it comes to roughing it and campaigning I should say from my reading that in regard to at least 50 per cent of the requirements of the soldier he is very well equipped.

597 *Poverty Bay Herald*, 6 August 1915, p.3.
He added that the contingents offered by the Arawas and the Wairoa Natives both came from ‘warlike stock.’ Trevor Lloyd’s acknowledgement of the news that the ‘martial races of the Empire’ were to be employed was a depiction of a Maori war party readying for war (fig.26). Lloyd’s depiction of a pre-contact state - nothing in the image suggests the year is 1914 - taps the cultural conception that modern Maori, off to find ‘Te Kaiser’, were heirs to martial traditions and a warrior heritage.

Such ideas appear again and again as Maori troops were mustered, trained and shipped to war. One reporter explained that Maori were fired to go to war because ‘fighting comes as naturally to them as singing to a bird.’ Maori soldiers travelling to the Dardanelles were implored to ‘prove yourselves worthy descendants of your ancestors, and also of the glorious military traditions of your race.’ An account of a haka to mark the deployment of Maori troops took the opportunity to make use of the mythic qualities of the location, adding Maori as another layer to the strata of Dardanelle epics;

As the weird cries of the rhythmic beating of the feet upon the Turkish soil ceased, the mind ranged back a few thousand years and conjured up visions of the Armadas that have sailed these seas and the armies that have traversed these lands. The ghosts of the great dead seemed to rise again and march before us—Xerxes and Alexander, Hector and Helen, Achilles and Lysander, with many more famous in song and story. And now the coming of the Maori!

There is, in the same manner as Pakeha notions of colonial masculinity, a sense of public culture affirming mythologies around martial Maori despite, or in spite, of reality. With the stalemate at Gallipoli and the evacuation of the Allied armies only weeks away, Walter Bowring depicted Maori warriors storming cowering Turkish lines (fig.27). The depiction of two Maori, facing many times their number of surrendering Turkish troops, makes a deliberate assertion of martial quality. The size of the figures, the ferocity of expressions and traditional elements all speak of an instinctive/cultural genius for war. The contemporary enemies and equipment indicate the notion that this genius had been redirected and married to mutual racial respect since the New Zealand Wars. As a fund raising book noted, half a century ago Pakeha and Maori had fought against each other but now, working together, were

598 NZPD, Vol.169, 1 September 1914, p.662.
599 AWN, 25 February 1915, p.15.
600 Press, 6 September 1915, p.3.
601 Poverty Bay Herald, 4 September 1915, p.10.
Figure 26 Auckland Weekly News, 24 September 1914, p.46.
‘winning a reputation for soldierly qualities second to none … not surprising when you consider that the Maori was the most skilled, as well as the bravest, of the fighters the British army ever met.’602 Such ideas were cemented in post-war histories. Lieutenant-Colonel Sleeman’s volume claimed ‘in the world’s history no greater warrior race ever existed than the Maoris. A chivalrous enemy with magnificent traditions.’603 Likewise Cowan’s The Maoris in the Great War complemented such ideas, continuing themes on the racial qualities of Maori that he had begun 16 years earlier in The Maoris of New Zealand.

That the young Maori was no degenerate softened by the peaceful life was quickly made manifest … Not merely were the native New Zealanders superior to all the coloured troops – a distinguished General said that the famous Gurkhas were but children compared with the Maoris – but they proved superior to many of the white troops in directions which suited the genius of the race.604

If 1914 saw established cultural ideals mobilised in the public sphere, then the continuation of the conflict through 1915-1918 refined elements within the ethos. The salient reality the mythology faced is that soldiers fell in great numbers. Between June and September 1916 the Somme offensives nearly doubled the casualty total from 8,840 to 17,550.605 If New Zealanders entered the Great War thinking back upon the last imperial venture to South Africa, such memories would ill prepared them for the Great War experience. The Boer War sent one fifteenth of the total the Great War sent with a casualty rate of 6 percent, rather than 58 percent.606 The 230 New Zealanders killed between 1899-1902 fall short of the 372 killed during the first day of the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli and pale beside the 12,483 killed on the Western Front.607

The result was a general mutation in the ethos past the end of the war’s honeymoon. In New Zealand this might be roughly dated to May 1915. At this time the war had failed to end by Christmas, the Western Front was entrenched and news of the Gallipoli casualties drove the bloodiness of the war home – by mid May it was announced that New Zealand casualties at Gallipoli totalled 1,162 (by that time casualties were double the given figure).608 An era

603 Sleeman, p.13.
604 Cowan, The Maoris in the Great War, p.2.
605 Baker, King and Country, p.245.
608 Pugsley, Gallipoli, p.151.
Figure 27 New Zealand Free Lance, 23 December 1915, p.9.
prone to invoking romanticised imaginings of the Napoleonic Wars slowly began to come to terms with the *storm of steel* - to borrow Ernst Jünger phrase - industrial scale, attrition warfare wrought. The prevailing ethos of New Zealand soldiers as capable, egalitarian citizen warriors was not extinguished, but the demands and costs of more than four years of total war battered the relationship between individual élan and the war effort. Notably, two refined themes were emphasised as qualities of New Zealanders under arms. The first proclaimed the capacity of the New Zealand character to meet the now acknowledged costs of war whilst the second mitigated those costs, interpreting suffering as something more acceptable and meaningful (see Chapter Six). Consequently notions of a great adventure and glory winning were superseded by notions of grim, but necessary, duty and sacrifice. This is not a great ideological leap; sacrifice was a traditional virtue within chivalric codes, now it became a central virtue.

Indeed notions of duty and sacrifice were present as news of the Gallipoli landings began to be aired. It was reported that ‘there has been no finer feat during this war than this sudden landing in the dark and the storming of the heights … Raw colonial troops in these desperate hours proved worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mons, Aisne, Ypres and Neuve Chapelle’. The *Weekly Press* added that ‘Though many were shot to bits without hope of recovery their cheers resounded through the night … they were happy because they knew that they had been tried for the first time and not found wanting.’ Later ANZAC Days saw reiteration of such themes. Reverend Clarence Easton announced that war ‘tested our newest flesh and blood, soul and spirit and proved them’; Gallipoli, in particular, had been a testimony of the nation’s ‘total manhood’. Porridge was advertised with the words of an unnamed Imperial officer that ‘The self-reliance of those clear-faced happy “boymen” from New Zealand is astonishing. Robbed of their officers, they carry on without confusion – each man relies upon himself – they are independent and absolutely indifferent to danger.’

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609 This shift might be detected in the changed disposition among recruits. It has been noted that later volunteers tended to be older, lacked the near hysterical enthusiasm of ‘Massey’s tourists’, were less ignorant about the reality of the war and were not, complained one officer, ‘looking for a fight.’ The motivation for these men, rather than enthusiasm, was likely a compelling feeling of obligation to go and/or a sense of shame in not going. *Baker, King and Country*, p.37.
612 NZH, 8 May 1915, p.9.
613 ODT, 26 April 1917, p.7.
614 NZH, 30 June 1917, p.5.
Such descriptions of the physical and mental shape of the ANZACs were in popular demand across Australasia and it was this existing craving that the correspondents, mentioned at the start of this chapter, sought to feed. In the same way that aspirations around Boer War troops predated performance or papers reported British compliments, many New Zealanders now took pride in affirmations of the idea that their males made exceptional soldiers; victory at Gallipoli would have yielded an even better platform for the narrative (as it was the ethos had to emphasise effort in lieu of outcome). Polite scoffing around accounts of war correspondents might be taken as indicating disbelief or a fraying subscription to the mythology. One report of the actions of ‘colonial giants’ at Passchendaele was accompanied with illustrations, provided by the, hardly subversive, New Zealand Observer. Alongside reports that New Zealand troops ‘went up to the front gladly … they were cheerful and full of confidence’ was a sketch of a New Zealand soldier being riddled with shells, wearing a cheery grin and proclaiming ‘I do like this’. However despite some disparaging views, the mythology which deemed New Zealanders as being good at war remained popular. The Anzac Book, originally intended as a trench publication to keep up frontline morale over Christmas, quickly sold over 104,000 copies and became a household item in Australia and New Zealand. Similar patterns appear in the frontline and examination of New Zealand servicemen’s diaries indicates that some New Zealanders carried the perspectives with them to war. Very much in the model of old Briton/new Britons, some New Zealand troopers described British soldiers as lacking qualities they felt they themselves possessed; ‘I don’t think they are equipped by nature or environment, to stand up to the rough and tumble of modern war. They are the product of years of industrialism. Their bodies have been stunted and their outlook cramped.’

Legacy
Entry to the war mobilised existing cultural links between masculinity and soldiering; likewise the war’s end saw the preservation of elements of the ethos in the public sphere. The home front’s imagining of the Great War experience became a prime receptacle for the ANZAC legend, plastering over the ways that mythology deviated from reality. The official and popular histories entrenched the archetypes of colonial masculinity. Take for example Fred Waite’s volume on the Gallipoli campaign which extended the trajectory from pioneer

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616 NZO, 13 October 1917, p.17.
617 Andrews, p.62.
to soldier to interwar man, simultaneously urging future New Zealanders to imitate the example of the ANZACs and to ‘follow in the footsteps of the early pioneers’. Likewise Colonel Stewart’s volume noted that

From a young and virile people, predominantly agricultural, highly intelligent, of unusually fine physique, a race of horsemen farmers musters athletes and Rugby footballers, it was only to be expected that its manhood, already subject to a compulsory system of military training, should yield sterling material for the purpose of war.

Others set the ideology in stone; ‘the call to arms’ relief on the Wellington cenotaph captures the image of men pausing from actions of ploughing and digging and leaving saddles, axes, animals and a wooded grove to take up arms (fig.28).

Such conceptions remained live visions in public culture. 14 years subsequent to Stewart’s conclusions, Burton, in his endeavour to describe the physical and mental shape of the New Zealander under arms, continued the theme of superior, egalitarian soldiers weighing such qualities - very much in the old Briton/new Briton fashion - against English ones.

Our men were taller and stronger, deeper-chested, better muscled, capable of greater and more prolonged physical effort ... more resolute in attack, stronger in defence. Their general standard of intelligence was much higher. Among the New Zealanders it was difficult except on close acquaintanceship to pick out a man of university education from those who had not had more than the ordinary course at a primary school ... there was no dialect—either of the Oxford or Cockney variety ... Beside them the English looked like adolescent boys.

Burton was not alone in the task of presenting ANZAC as exemplary. Australasia Triumphant is described as practically becoming an obligatory award for pupils at school prize-givings. A decade after 1919 the School Journal had made a habit out of portraying the ANZACs as models of selfless, dutiful, egalitarian brotherhood to be emulated.

In the trenches all distinctions of class and creed were cast aside, and men were judged by their manly qualities alone. Here was no place for the coward, or the shirker, or the selfish man who thought only of himself. The man who found favour with his comrades was he who was prepared to do his duty at all times, and to stand by his companions, even at the risk of his own life.

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620 Stewart, p.616.
621 Burton, The Silent Division, pp.122-123.
Beyond the official tomes, tombs and lessons, the ethos became cultural currency, rallied around and used in the emerging rituals of public remembrance. The fourth verse of Laurence Binyon’s *Ode of Remembrance*, ending with the line ‘we will remember them’, is familiar to modern ears. However the entire poem is, now, infrequently aired, tied as it is to anachronistic sentiments. The third verse is particularly telling.

They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.624

Major (re)mobilisations can be witnessed during the crises of the Great Depression and the Second World War, with new generations urged to embody the ANZAC spirit. Perhaps equally or more significant is how the ethos spread beyond official and formal occasions to become part of the everyday and more banal weave of the social fabric. The ethos was subsumed within public, national and masculine culture and ANZAC archetypes and qualities, some of which had been lifted from pre-war figures, were now ascribed to interwar heroes. Take, for example, the rhetoric around the success of the Invincibles (the 1924 All

624 Poverty Bay Herald, 29 January 1916, p.2.
Black team) who were described as displaying ‘the zeal which infuses the blood of the sons of the Southern seas, the players frequently ride miles on horseback, fording rivers, and crossing mountains, to play in the back-blocks rugby match.’ 625 Their performance was announced, by the Wellington Mayor, as adding to the ‘magnificent name which was established for New Zealand in England by the members of her Expeditionary Forces.’ 626 As the pioneers were co-opted into ANZAC mythology now the ANZACs were co-opted into new myths; ‘The New Zealand soldier on the heights of Gallipoli and on the flooded fields of Flanders of 1914-18 is the New Zealand Rugby footballer of 1924, who is equally distinguished for gallantry, deportment and demeanour in Great Britain.’ 627 The notion that New Zealand men possessed certain qualities - steadfastness, solidarity and capacity to sacrifice - that made them naturally half soldier endured within public culture.

626 EP, 17 March 1925, p.5.
Chapter Four

‘Shirkers’: The Mobilisation of a Masculine Antitype

‘What is our ideal for the manhood of the nation? What do we wish it to be?’ – Dr Charles Chilton

It is possible to note a shift in belligerents’ perception and approach to the war during early/mid 1915. At this time the decisive thrusts envisioned by the German Schlieffen Plan and the French Plan XVII had ground to a halt, with hundreds of thousands dead, the Western Front earning its synonymity with stalemate and no belligerent holding a critical advantage. The southeastern front in the Dardanelles was similarly failing to bring any decisive result. In the east, Russian successes against Austria-Hungary had been hampered by factors of weather, the natural barrier of the Carpathian Mountains and German support. Likewise the German victory at Tannenberg had reduced threats of a Russian conquest of East Prussia but left no end in sight.

With no belligerent willing to concede, the requirements to stay in the game, let alone secure victory, greatly escalated and bred more totality into a total war. The mobilisation process intensified as war efforts became more systematically managed and required more from belligerent populations more of the time. This development can be measured in social/cultural terms as institutions, traditions and habits tussled with, or were harnessed to, military expediency. It is witnessed in the controls imposed upon industry, investment and labour, the intense vilification of enemy nations, the flourishing of Manichaean rhetoric, the registration of populations, the contemplation and/or introduction of conscription by those nations without the practice and the demand for unconditional loyalty; in the words of the Manawatu Daily Times, ‘‘who is not for me is against me’’ is a greater truism in the present emergency than at any other period in the world’s history.’

This phenomenon can be witnessed in one of the core activities of New Zealand’s war effort; the provision of a regular stream of reinforcements to the NZEF for the duration. The most salient change in how this objective was fulfilled was the alteration of the mechanism by

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628 Charles Chilton, Manhood of the Nation (Christchurch, 1919), p.3.
630 Manawatu Daily Times, 12 February 1918, p.4.
which reinforcements were secured. In mid 1916 conscription was introduced to augment the volunteer system, with any shortfall in enlistment from a military district topped up via balloting. However, the intensification of commitment saw a social engagement that was distinct from, though interrelated with, this retooling of reinforcement machinery. One symptom of the tightening links between war effort and public culture was an increased use of shame alongside pride - two sentiments relevant to the procurement of soldiers. Alongside the previously examined notion that soldiers represented an archetype fit for mass imitation, were conceptions of the dishonour a failure to achieve this standard represented. Hence editorials noting ‘we have full confidence that New Zealand’s manhood will rise to the greatness of the occasion and … maintain the splendid reputation won for our arms by the heroes of Gallipoli’ contained the implicit warning that alternative scenarios were unacceptable.631

Stronger still was the increased appearance of condemnatory models in public space. Depictions of disreputable figures, labelled ‘sneaks’, ‘slackers’ or ‘shirkers’, presented as harming the war effort, became common from early 1915 and made ‘a distinct, and … purposeful, contrast’ to images of soldiers.632 Examining soldiers and shirkers together imparts more understanding than observing either model in isolation; the contrasts are so dualistic that stereotypes around soldiers and shirkers are best understood as a unified expression of orthodox thinking around masculinity, rather than separate but concerted models. Mentally the apathetic or cowardly shirker was the opposite of the motivated, dutiful image of the soldier and visions of robust physiques saw their opposites in discourse of undeveloped bodies. Visibly civilian clothes contrasted nicely with the ascetic quality of the soldier’s uniform and elaborate attire suggested a want of thrift, a preoccupation with leisure and a general failure to ‘roll up sleeves.’ The charge of a fixation with trivia was often verified by the presence of race tickets and cigarettes as petty pleasures. Such models, functioning in tandem, enhanced the impact of each by contrasting appeals to pride with shame - a wartime lesson of be like ‘this’, don’t be like ‘that’.

Such messages were well circulated in wartime culture. In what is best described as a morality tale, Mr Madgitts – Rebel by A.D. Wylie appeared in a fundraising volume. The

story is set around an encounter between the narrator, a timid professional, and the heavy drinking, rural vagrant, Mr Madgitts. After an exchange of views on the meaning of the war, where Madgitts reveals his unpatriotic beliefs, the two part ways, only to cross paths a month later. Here Madgitts has been transformed; he has quit strong spirits, found his patriotism and enlisted. The rags to uniform moral of the story is made abundantly clear in Madgitts’ parting words to the narrator and the accompanying illustrations; ‘my advice to you is to take a pull, cut out the bloomin’ booze, and do a bit of real hard graft. Then someday you might be fit to fill a suit like mine.’633 The question of whether the narrator will enlist and find his own salvation in service is left open. A notable aside is how female moral support/propensity to shame (see Chapter Five) has shifted from backing the narrator in the ‘before’ shot to standing behind Mr Madgitts in the ‘after’ shot (fig.29).

Though the Countess’s fundraising volume first appeared in 1915, the social narrative of male Cinderellas being made fit for the ball was a cultural phenomenon before it was a wartime lesson. Whilst the exact purpose was new, the imagery and mode of thought was not – ‘slacker’ and ‘shirker’ can be tracked back into the vernacular of the 1860s. Indeed the themes of Wylie’s story are a mobilisation of a prominent pre-war cultural narrative. This narrative featured nineteenth-century conceptions of moral progress, more modern anxieties around a deterioration in physical health and civic virtue and hopes for, Madgitts-style, conversions. These impressions were powerfully imprinted and appreciation of the familiarity of such ideas contextualises their prominent presence in wartime public culture. Indeed realisation that social engagement with this message extended well beyond the kitsch culture of wartime pulp, aids comprehension of several home front dynamics and episodes.

Towards the modern environment
Imaginings of shirkers as social antitypes emerged in response to the rapid changes modernisation wrought in New Zealand society. Comprehension of the effects of these changes, and social perceptions thereof, contextualise notions of the shirker in public culture. From the beginning, the British colonisation of New Zealand had invoked notions of a civilising mission. Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s conception of ‘systematic colonisation’ as a means to found an ideal society in an ideal land established a lasting mythology in New Zealand public culture, even as the notion of what that mythology entailed was subverted in

633 Countess of Liverpool’s Gift Book, p.52.
Figure 29 Countess of Liverpool Gift Book, pp.48, 52.
various ways. Alongside the institution of law and order, material prosperity and social opportunity, this civilising narrative possessed a moral dimension. Consequently, certain social habits of pioneer New Zealand were often considered behaviours which the advancement of civilisation would remove. Robust antitypes around drunkenness, vagrancy, gambling and idleness were contrasted to the character of respectable working people and gentlemen; as Miles Fairburn notes, the rural transient was a folk-devil in New Zealand public culture, rather than a folk hero as in Australian public culture. One commentator referenced such attitudes in noting how the Department of Public Works, the Labour Department and the Land Department were ‘turning tramps into taxpayers.’

Such rosy attitudes to civilisation as an inevitable path to moral progress became laced with anxiety during the late nineteenth-century. Observations about the modernising world recognised that progress could include urban squalor, class conflict and social/cultural degeneration – the strife the colonial project had promised to transcend. The thoughts of another Edward Gibbons were expressed in concerns that ease might sap civic virtue and that an Empire could decline and fall if unable to meet life’s challenges. This general anxiety towards modernity mixed romanticisms of the past with gloomy forecasts of where civilisation might lead. Whilst such fin de siècle pessimism was a mood articulated across the modernising world, New Zealand specific experiences of it might be recognised.

Traditionally the interplay of New Zealand society and modernity has been read as a contradistinction of fresh colonial vitality against the deterioration of old Britons. John Nauright, for example, notes that ‘In the wider context of British society in the Edwardian age, colonial successes gave British observers [concerned about degeneration] some hope for the British race.’ Belich, Phillips and this thesis have made similar observations of the promotion of a vital, capable and manly New Zealand against an ‘over-civilised’ or degenerating Britain. Editorials spoke of ‘steadily deteriorating’ England where standards of fitness were falling as the population shifted from the ‘wholesome influences of the

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country into already over-crowded towns’. This was contrasted to the situation in the ‘young Dominion’ where ‘a very large proportion of the population is leading “the simple life” in the country … our towns are far less crowded and the conditions of life more wholesome than those which prevail in the Old-world.’ Politicians noted the inhabitants of Britain’s urban slums as ‘a race of weeds and inefficient and degenerate people.’ Such conceptions remained powerful notions in New Zealand public culture for decades. Late into the interwar period Ormond Burton’s *The Silent Division* took the time to explain the forces behind the differences between the British and New Zealander. Burton argued that the ‘steady process of industrialization under the prevailing conditions of capitalism’ had wrought in England ‘an environment, destructive to the possibility of developing the best life possible to the community at large.’ Conversely the New Zealand environment, Burton expounded, contained good nutrition, a fondness of sport, an absence of big cities and slums and an egalitarian education system which had functioned ‘to raise the general level of physique and intelligence’.

However conceptions that New Zealand possessed robust standards of fitness stood next to notions that as modernity progressed, present British conditions could become future New Zealand ones. Unease about what the condition of future New Zealanders might be is captured in Ken Ballantyne’s cartoon *Our Rising Generation*. Here the praise of General Hamilton’s 1914 inspection is contrasted with the Medical Inspector’s (Dr Elizabeth Gunn) concerns about malnutrition; a robust young man stands beside a weedy, bespectacled youth (fig.30). Thus pride in a high standard of fitness went hand in hand with the anxiety of a loss of such standards. This anxiety about just what the modern age might bring or breed formed a recurring theme in public discourse. For instance an increase of undutiful delinquents was predicted by intellectuals espousing a link between urbanisation and the fertility of ‘degenerates’. The inaugural Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Otago, Duncan MacGregor, declared that the ‘the hopelessly lazy, the diseased and the vicious who would once have been weeded out by natural selection, were eating like a cancer into the vitals of society.’ MacGregor’s views and personality were an influence on prominent public figures including Truby King and Robert Stout. Likewise, politicians

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639 Press, 5 October 1907, p.8.
643 Tony Taylor.
OUR RISING GENERATION: WHEN DOCTORS DIFFER, ETC.

General Sir Ian Hamilton, at the civic reception, was on to say that of all the inspiring things he had seen in his life, the event perhaps he had seen that was most inspiring — Daily Paper.

At the monthly meeting of the Wellington Education Board the report of the Medical Inspector (Dr. Elizabeth Grant) had great stress upon the manner in which the health of school children is neglected, as proved by the alarming number of cases of malnutrition — Daily paper.

The General: What splendid young fellows you are, to be sure.
The Medical Inspector: Ah—no—this sort of weakly physique won't do. The head's being crammed, but the body isn't being nourished properly.

Figure 30 New Zealand Free Lance, 30 May 1914, p.3.
such as George Thomson argued that the ‘second generation’ was ‘not nearly so hard or so
given to hard work and to self sacrifice as the pioneers’ and lamented that ‘the chivalrous
spirit is passing away.’

A demographic transition, starting from the late 1870s, saw anxieties around population
growth stand beside fears of quality control. In 1878 the number of live births per 1,000
married women stood at 340; by 1921 this had plummeted to less than half of that, standing at
181.6. This decline was frequently described as ‘race suicide’ as modern families failed to
produce the number of workers and soldiers some deemed necessary to keep the British
civilisation/race competitive. Correlating with this concern were fears that standards of
’social hygiene’ posed threats to desirable birth rates and visions of healthy infants. The
prospect of sterility among the Dominion’s women has been noted as ‘especially disturbing
given the currency of eugenic and neo-Darwinian thinking which portrayed the “civilised”
races of the world as engaged in a battle for racial supremacy with the allegedly more prolific
races of the East.’

A good case might be made that such discourse reflects the disciplinarian, prudish, wowser
and racist side of the Victorian character. An equally strong case could contextualise such
discourse as a response to the squalor, slums, pollution, poverty and crowding associated with
rapid urbanisation. Modern thought shares the impulse - if not the conceptual language of
eugenics or racial degeneration - that negative impact of such factors on public health are
legitimate concerns. Certainly discovery that only 1,000 out of 11,000 Manchester men
volunteering for the Boer War were fit for service seemed damning proof that industrialised
Britain was a canary in the mine and that fears that modernity could/would compromise
public (or, in the lingo of the time, racial) health and risk the defence of the Empire were
valid.

The above commentators had, within their lifetimes, seen their world remade and the rapid
emergence of the modern environment was both an exhilarating but also a potentially
distressing experience. The anxiety underlying some of the above commentary indicates a

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645 NZOYB, 1930, p.111.
646 For example Hawera & Normanby Star, 21 September 1905, p.6.
647 P.J. Fleming, “‘Shadow over New Zealand”: the Response to Venereal Disease in New Zealand 1910-1945’
disorientation induced by so much change in so short a time. Perhaps nothing is more indicative of the turbulent tempo of the colonisation and development of New Zealand than the upsurge of the number of souls in the country. The projection of immigrants from the other side of the world, aided by a high birth rate and trans-Tasman movement, saw explosive population growth. The rate at which the European population increased between 1831-1881 is so rapid as to make percentage increases near meaningless - 50,000 percent for the record. 649 Even after this period of explosive colonisation the growth rate remained impressive, with the settler population more than doubling from 500,910 to 1,002,679 between 1881 and 1910. 650

As modernity reworked social configurations, changes of type occurred beside changes of scale. While this process was a multifaceted one, with social, cultural, political and economic consequences, the broad effects were increased interaction and interconnection, both within and beyond New Zealand, and intensification of the complexity and regulation of the patterns of life. The Vogel era in particular witnessed a surge in the scale and development of infrastructure in efforts to lure migrants and to spur the development of a market economy; over 400 miles of railroad were under construction each year between 1873 and 1876. 651 Likewise, the reach and volume of the communication network boomed. The volume of letters processed by the postal service expanded from 5 million in 1870 to over 22 million in 1880. 652 In 1866 there were 13 telegraph stations in New Zealand sending 27,237 telegrams annually via 1,125 kilometres of line. Nine years later the number of stations had grown to 127, the number of telegrams to 917,128 and the kilometres of line to 4,805. 653

The private sector provides another example of how activity surged in scale and evolved in type. Between 1877 and 1895 the number of manufacturing industries rose 260 percent and the capital invested in these enterprises more than doubled from £2,447,907 to £5,096,930. 654 Those classed as industrial workers had constituted 9.1 percent of the male workforce in 1881; by 1911 this had expanded to 31 percent. 655 Over the same period the commercial

649 Belich, Making People, p.278.
650 NZOYB, 1909, p.637; NZOYB, 1911, p.567.
652 Ian Hunter, p.36.
653 AJHR, 1875, F-1a, ‘Telegraph [sic] Department’, p.11.
654 Ian Hunter, p.48.
655 Bloomfield, pp.132, 135.
sector went from employing 5.6 percent of male workers to 14.6 percent and the professional sector from 4.7 to 5.4 percent. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth-century New Zealand men were increasingly likely to be employed as shop assistants, clerks, public servants, businessmen and waterfront and factory workers. These were occupations that reflected the urbanisation and the specialisation of a modern processing economy tied to the demands of the global market.

Other aspects of life during this process proved to be equally capable of dramatic shifts. A case has been made for a shift in social conceptualisation of the passage of time as the dictates of natural cycles were modified by the rhythms of instituted routines and schedules. This transition was carried as the boundaries of modernising New Zealand, with its demands for predictability, efficiency and reliability, expanded. Gender roles were knocked into new shapes as modernisation saw the renegotiation of certain cultural links between occupations and social constructions. The emergence of waged women, examined in the next chapter, marks one such modern phenomenon. Masculine roles were also re-shaped. One example is observed by Belich in the conversion of dairy farming from an activity associated with the female domain, to a masculine occupation.

Tied to changing rhythms of commerce, labour, fertility patterns and life, was the rise of the urban environment. Explosive urban growth had seen Auckland’s denizens alone more than double from 51,287 to 102,676 between the years of 1891 and 1911. Add the other three centres - Wellington, Dunedin and Christchurch - and you list the residence of just under a third of the Pakeha population by 1911. Furthermore, by 1911 the urban population had overtaken the rural. Such demographic transitions and visions of a mechanised, industrialised world were problematic in regards to a collective identity heavily based around non-urban landscapes and activities. Social health was identified with the rural/natural environment rather than the city and with manual labour and the soil rather than industry. It is therefore unsurprising that the expanding urban environment formed a disquieting feature

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656 Bloomfield, pp.132, 135.
658 Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.150-151.
659 Bloomfield, p.57.
within modern anxieties.\textsuperscript{662} In 1911 Attorney General S.G. Findlay delivered a lecture concerning ‘urbanisation and national decay’.\textsuperscript{663} Likewise an 1899 editorial noted that ‘our population is - growing denser, and we are rapidly developing a town dweller whose stature and physical strength we ought to improve.’\textsuperscript{664} Another praised the ‘moral heroism’ of the pioneers, noting ‘theirs is not the life of ease and comfort … theirs the blood and spirit to live in the land and hold it when luxury has sapped the virility of the city-bred.’\textsuperscript{665}

One response was simply to cling tighter to familiar images despite change. As one historian has noted, the mythology of rural life ‘advanced as rural New Zealand retreated.’\textsuperscript{666} This process, as observed in the previous chapters, saw the retention and entrenchment of pioneer and rural motifs, for the purposes of collective identity and martial pride. It should be added, however, that while the rise of cities pointed the direction of modern development and the reworking of old New Zealand, a fuller context is revealed in the realisation that rural New Zealand was not dead. In 1906 535,000 out of 888,000 New Zealanders lived in towns with populations less than 5,000.\textsuperscript{667} Additionally, whilst from certain perspectives the urban environment was a brave new world, the rural and urban spheres were not without overlap. Those living within cities and towns did not lack access to the hinterlands and it was imagined that rural/colonial heritage would be preserved within rifle clubs, horse riding and familiarity with rural activities; a President of the Institute of Education asserted in 1909 that every boy in the Dominion ought to be able to harness and ride a horse, to shoot a rifle and to milk a cow.\textsuperscript{668} Indeed it has been observed that one of the first volunteers in Dunedin to pass all the necessary riding and shooting tests was James Moore, who resided in central Dunedin.\textsuperscript{669}

An alternative reaction was the exercising of colonial mythology within new activities. For instance, Phillips has argued that one of the major attractions of rugby matches in towns was a special urgency for urban men to assert their masculinity.\textsuperscript{670} Concern around the impacts of urban living adds further perspective to the connection between the Scouts’ call for the

\textsuperscript{663} EP, 25 January 1911, p.3.
\textsuperscript{664} New Zealand Illustrated Magazine, 1 November 1899, p.36.
\textsuperscript{665} Phillips, A Man’s Country, p.99.
\textsuperscript{666} Ryan, p.49.
\textsuperscript{667} Phillips, A Man’s Country?, p.15.
\textsuperscript{668} Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p.228.
\textsuperscript{670} Phillips, A Man’s Country?, p.92.
preservation of outdoorsmanship in modern youth, and the success of that organisation. As previously alluded to, the impact of modernity on youth formed a recurring theme in public culture; when two 15 year olds were found to have set 21 fires around Auckland, in order to watch the fire brigade at work. The New Zealand Observer sagely noted the impact modern literature, in the form of the penny dreadful, had on young minds; ‘unquestionably the cause of much juvenile crime.’ Conversely, the words of The Boy Scout - a ‘stirring Scout song’ - envisioned the rescue of boys from idleness via awaking the love of ‘playing the game’; ‘We were pals when I’d nothing else to do, ’cept hang around the street, like Jim and you, But a diff-ent lad of me they’ve made, Since I joined the ranks of the Scout Brigade.’

Finally, war was considered as a test which might determine the shape of masculinity modern boys would grow into. In the debates around defence reform George Thomson stated his hope that ‘the day will soon come when every young man will acknowledge that it is not only his duty but his privilege to serve his country in military matters, and that every young man who shirks that duty will be looked upon with contempt.’ Such sentiments, indicating the culture of duty, discipline and reprimand of the age, foreshadow the venom that would soon be aired within New Zealand society.

**Fitness in modern life**

It was within this emerging modern environment that notions of shirkers were refined as a masculine antitype. To some extent the stock figure was derived from older colonial ones, though reworked to reference the new, modern, environment. As Peter Gibbons notes, the swagger wandering into the cities and drifting around the streets became ‘the spiritual or actual predecessor of the “loafer”.’ This evolutionary process was continued, through 1914-1918, to reference the new, wartime, environment.

In pre-war modernity the shirker functioned as a modular stock character to which different elements could be added or removed - the subject altered whilst the script remained largely unchanged. The core features referenced concerns that modern life might breed men more sybarite rather than Spartan. Thus the shirker’s physique is degenerated and weedy and he is invariably presented as slouching. Furthermore shirkers were envisioned as unproductive

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671 NZO, 4 October 1902, p.2.
674 Peter Gibbons, ““Turning Tramps into Taxpayers”: the Department of Labour and the Casual Labourer in the 1890’s” (M.A. thesis, Massey University, 1970), p.73.
675 A female version is considered in Chapter Five.
and wont to linger, with hands in pockets, and lean against features of the urban landscape. Morally, the shirker was prone to apathy (often witnessed in slack facial expressions), cowardice and/or selfishness. Additionally the bad habits of disreputable males - idleness, gambling, drinking or general decadence - were often present. One of the most common accessories here was the cigarette as a newfangled consumable - which contrasted nicely to the mature, patriarchal air of the pipe. This dandyish connotation was becoming anachronistic as cigarettes emerged as the modern form of smoking.676

Hence a rigid notion that modernity could pose a threat to ideal masculinity was saddled with flexible notions of what constituted that threat. Consequently the model could be applied in numerous situations to criticise numerous nominated targets. Reduce the age and note that modern youths were becoming ‘slaves to tobacco’ (fig.31). Conversely add umbrellas (a visual tag of unmanliness and/or wowserism) and faddish religious tracts to depict un-muscular Christians cowering from a Japanese invasion, during the pre-war debates around military training (fig.32). The addition of overalls and workmen’s tools - the baling hook was a favoured tag - indicated a disreputable worker or their more radical kin, and made a distinct, but not entirely separate, antitype. Conversely fashionable items, such as canes, boaters and bow ties, and faux genteel vernacular - ‘bally’, ‘blanketty’, ‘what ho’ - marked the foppish urbanite.

Such constructs are indicative of a cultural touchstone in pre-war New Zealand. Indeed the notion that standards of fitness were at risk and that missions to maintain and/or build up national strength were desirable formed part of a broad intellectual zeitgeist. The influence of late Victorian thought about the place of war in modern life makes a workable starting point. The trend of Victorian romantics drawing on chivalric visions to paint the traditional imagination on the modern landscape has been described as a return to Camelot.677 Such behaviour reacted to utilitarianism, industrialism, collectivisation, political compromises, materialism and urban squalor with romantic visions of clean, heroic and virtuous individualism. Writers such as George Sorel, Heinrich von Treitschke and Fredrick

677 Girouard.
Figure 31 ATL-A-350-028, Booth, Leonard Hampden, 1879-1974, ‘Hope was lost. “Exhibition sketcher” (Christchurch), [1905].’

Figure 32 New Zealand Observer, 19 August 1911, p.19.
Nietzsche lamented peace and bourgeois material progress as decadent, hollow or dissatisfying. War, the thinking ran, offered a sublime alternative where great human and social virtues – heroism, altruism and solidarity between common citizens – were expressed. Such ideas were nudged along with implicit or explicit social Darwinist philosophies that conflict was a natural process whereby fitter nations/races/individuals triumphed over weaker ones.

How many (or more likely, how few) New Zealanders were poring through Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence* is unknown, but the broad themes of this intellectual milieu were circulated in public culture. Entry to the Boer War saw one editor note

> It would be a bad thing for the world as a whole were war abolished … We should lose our virility, and sink into unhonoured ease and sloth … does anyone imagine that if we despised war … that we would not quickly sink into the depths of luxury as the Romans did? In an age like ours which is essentially an age of materialism and money-making and pleasure-seeking, war is the antiseptic that prevents the putrefaction of the whole social system.  

Another claimed

> If there are horrors of War, are there not also horrors of Peace? - mean, crawling horrors of treachery, lechery, cheating and lies; sleek and smug villains rolling in carriages paid for with the blood of tears, and unspeakable agonies and degradations of the poor; a sycophantic and lick-spittle generation, amongst which a big bank balance is accepted as the most convincing proof of private and public worth.

The attitude that war brought purpose beneficial to civic health possessed a momentum which would continue through the Great War. The correspondent Malcolm Ross, having reported on the war for two years, and unable to claim ignorance of the effects of battle on men, wrote of the war as bringing salvation; ‘a great prosperity and a long peace were leading the nation slowly but surely towards a carelessness if not disastrous decadence’, which contrasted to the ‘stratum of solid purpose and idealism’ the war had brought about.  

Likewise the *Methodist Times* announced its pride that ‘in an age when selfishness had become so marked in so many departments of life, men in such large numbers can be found to make this supreme sacrifice.’

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678 NZH, 14 October 1899, p.1.
679 *New Zealand Illustrated Magazine*, 1 June 1900, p.673.
This broad notion that war was a natural, perhaps desirable, occurrence dovetails with endorsement of military training as a means to prepare the national body for the challenges of life. However calls for military training were part of a wider reaction that was equally militant if not necessarily military. These movements were diverse, but shared a broad progressive notion that, with the right application of information or institutional force, the social body could be improved physically, mentally, morally or spiritually. To generate such improvements proponents were willing to prescribe doctrines that were extensive and invasive in scope. To enact them they claimed concern or dominion over the entirety of the social body.

Manifestations of this prescriptive progressivism saw branches of the Eugenics Education Society established in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and Timaru which drew leading citizens to the cause of biological determinism. One of those was Dr William Allan Chapple, who advocated the sterilisation of defective citizens as desirable to improve public health. ‘Defective’ was interpreted to include alcoholics, professional paupers, epileptics, idiots, the physically deformed, mental defectives, the insane and criminals. 682 Likewise Frederic Truby King, warned that Greece, Rome and France had become second-class powers because of ‘increasing selfishness … [and] disinclination for the ties of marriage and parenthood.’ 683 The doctrines of his Plunket Society employed the rhetoric around eugenics, though his programmes for the ‘scientific’ rearing of children practised nurture over nature. These programmes were authoritative (in both meanings of the term) in efforts to instil health, discipline, selflessness and obedience in babies and attracted significant moral and financial support from the state. 684 The Scouts’ central tenets - good citizenship through participation, outdoormsmanship and social and imperial cohesion - similarly addressed the public mood.

Don’t be disgraced like the young Romans who lost the Empire of their forefathers by being wishy-washy slackers without any go or patriotism in them. Play-up! Each man in his place, and play the game … Remember, whether rich or poor, from castle or from slum, you are all Britons in the first place, and you’ve got to keep Britain up against outside enemies, you have to stand shoulder to shoulder to do it. If you are divided among yourselves you are doing harm to your country. 685

Editorials called for similar programmes to be enforced in schools; ‘no system of education can safely neglect physical training … we cannot have the *mens sana* [healthy mind] without the *corpus sanum* [healthy body].’\(^{686}\) In such a milieu it is unsurprising that Frank Milner won national fame for his views of education as a preparation for citizenship. Milner’s programme emphasised the importance of sunlight, fresh air and exercise secured by open air dormitories, vigorous physical education and a compulsory cold-water swim each morning.\(^{687}\)

It was in this context that military training was promoted as a prescriptive panacea to the anxieties of modern life. The tightening link between militarism and respectable masculinity presented military training as promoting both healthy activity and the self-discipline needed to resist modern vices. It was with the threat of modern decay in mind that some politicians noted their hope that defence reforms would be ‘no milk and water treatment’ for young people.\(^{688}\) Major-General J.M. Babington expressed a similar view that ‘every English speaking boy throughout the Empire should be trained as a cadet. Men who have been so trained are better fitted, both morally and physically for civil life.’\(^{689}\) Proponents for the introduction of universal/compulsory military training were sure to mention the virtues of military instruction as a physical and mental curative. Uniforms were envisioned as possessing a kind of alchemy which made the weak strong, the disreputable respectable and brought solidarity to the divided. The *Evening Post* claimed that the introduction of universal/compulsory cadet training would ‘take the young man before his bones are set and put him in the way of expanding his chest, developing his muscles, straightening his spine, and establishing his manhood.’\(^{690}\) The *New Zealand Herald* added that drill promoted ‘a soldierly walk and the physical development of the chest muscles’ instilling ‘a hatred of slouching gait and slouching thoughts, of shirking work and evading responsibilities, of habits which demoralise and enfeeble.’\(^{691}\) Presentations of military training as able to provide physical improvements, instil civic duty in the young, promote national unity and bestow the country with a resource for security concerns formed a tempting package at a time when such issues flared as public concerns. One consequence of this association of martial activity with strength, social order and loyalty was a precedent for linking opposition to such schemes with weakness, disunity and degeneracy.

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686 *New Zealand Illustrated Magazine*, 1 November 1899, p.36.
691 NZH, 15 December 1909, p.6.
The coveting of state power to enact these prescriptions, military or otherwise, has sometimes been interpreted as an exercise in social control where sections or classes within New Zealand society attempted to shape and regulate their peers. Richard Hill perceives the ‘ever-increasing grip’ of a ‘bourgeois Victorian morality’ upon the community which imposed an ‘emerging code of Public Morality’. Michael Bassett’s history of the New Zealand state notes ‘there could be no denying that there was an appetite for a socially active state among many of the country’s more affluent citizens.’ Robert Stout espoused a similar, if not more charitable, interpretation in 1911; ‘has organised society a duty to look after the physical and moral well-being of the members of society? The New Zealand people through their parliament give an emphatic affirmative reply.’

However ‘moral evangelism’ has been recognised as ‘a mass movement’ rather than ‘the crusade of a few do-gooders.’ The success of many prescriptive groups went beyond ability to court state fancy and indicates a capacity to appeal to wider public concerns and moods. Indeed consideration of the diversity of forces interacting within popular culture exposes a more complex interaction than an imposition of a bourgeois cultural worldview. Research upon New Zealand’s eugenics movements, for example, has revealed the ‘complicit’ interaction of feminist and eugenics ideologies. Conceptions of women as mothers of the nation, specially placed to care for the health of the population, lent an acceptable platform for women to operate from within the public sphere. In Angela Wanhalla’s words, ‘eugenics offered women a discourse of moral and social reform that fitted neatly with ideals of colonial feminism and, by extension, enabled them to participate in national debates about racial health.’

Zealand, we’ll show ‘em how we can fight.’\textsuperscript{697} Such advertising rhetoric stood next to a host of quack tonics and dubious devices to restore and reform the body; ‘MEN AND WOMEN! You can obtain the health and happiness you require; you can be made as strong, vigorous and full of life as anyone living … It will revitalise your entire system and give you back the energy and elasticity of youth.’\textsuperscript{698}

The popular culture that arose around spectator sports likewise emphasised the respectable function of sport as promoting physical and mental development. Sporting groups reported; ‘It is a regrettable fact that so overwhelming a majority of spectators at football matches are content with the mere excitement - without the exercise - of sport.’ … ‘Life itself is a great match and your success depends very much on your fitness for the struggle.’\textsuperscript{699} Rugby in particular was perceived as a gauge of national fitness. Hence George Dixon, team manager for the All Blacks, proclaimed that rugby ‘represents the manhood and virility of the colony.’\textsuperscript{700} Politicians such as William Pember Reeves attributed sporting prowess to the favouring of lively ingenuity over ponderous tactics, reporting that New Zealanders were ‘never machine-like for the sake of machinery … [leaving] a great deal to individual initiative.’\textsuperscript{701} Even literature periodicals found the space to claim that success in rugby meant there was ‘no danger of New Zealand rearing a nation of milksops, effeminate fops, luxurious dandies, empty-headed young men who live only to carry the cane, smoke cigars, and advertise their tailor.’\textsuperscript{702}

A further episode which locates ideals of social fitness in popular pre-war society is the so called ‘Sandow season’ of 1902-1903. Caroline Daley’s examination of the episode notes that Sandow embodied ideal conceptions of modern citizenship - ‘someone who was healthy, strong and hardworking.’\textsuperscript{703} Touring New Zealand through this period, the icon of physical culture Eugene Sandow found crowds of devotees and spectators curious about, or converted to, his methods of scientifically improving the body.\textsuperscript{704} Sandow was an apostle of

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\textsuperscript{697} Poverty Bay Herald, 4 November 1913, p.8.
\textsuperscript{698} OW, 19 April 1905, p.80.
\textsuperscript{699} Gallagher, p.104.
\textsuperscript{700} Gallagher, p.36.
\textsuperscript{701} OW, 24 January 1906, p.66.
\textsuperscript{702} Zealandia, 1:12 (1 June 1890), p.713.
\end{flushright}
transformation and marketed, in the same manner as the modern exercise industry, both the sizzle and the steak of his system; fitness was sold as both a desirable idea and as a desirable result. Hence alongside demonstrations of his physique, feats of strength and exercise systems, Sandow sold an ideology of transformation - that, through his programme, anyone could attain amazing results. Sandow claimed that, as a sickly youth, he had witnessed the Grecian ideal in classical statues and had been ‘fired to emulate these ancient heroes.’ He had dedicated himself to the scientific understanding of the body and took the name ‘Eugene’ (as in eugenics) as a new name to complement his new form. With an air of classical mysticism, an emphasis upon the importance of hard work and nods to modern efficiency, this was an origin story tailored to mass sentiment. Additionally the Prussian born Sandow was willing and/or crafty enough to add flattery to this narrative of transformation; he noted that the British people were superior to all other races in their power to perform physical feats. The New Zealand ‘Sandow season’ has been noted as a ‘huge success’ for Sandow, his manager and promoters. By the end of the tour he had become a household name and books, magazines and exercise equipment sales were profitable, further revealing public interest. Sandow-style schools of physical culture and imitators received a boost in numbers and provided another subject for those advocating the improvement of the nation through modern and/or scientific practices.

By 1914 debates around fitness, conceptions of shirkers and ideologies of transformation were established features in New Zealand’s cultural landscape. The location of such discourse within public life was secured via a broad engagement by diverse social groups. Indeed the significance of a discourse should be appreciated when a society’s government departments, leading citizens, feminists, sports fans, editorial lines, visiting strongmen, snake-oil salesmen and cookie sellers all invoke it.

**Shirking in wartime**

With the outbreak of war, the socio-cultural baggage contained within images of weak men unable or unwilling to fight, to say nothing of the images themselves, was prominently mobilised. As the intensity and reach of the war effort expanded, the demand for a fit, motivated and responsive citizenry saw these pre-war social anxieties become a major feature

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705 EP, 3 December 1902, p.5.
706 Ohinemuri Gazette, 6 May 1912, p.3.
within the wartime public sphere. The wartime imagining of shirkers was an intensification of established ideas and images, sharpened through unfavourable contrast with wartime archetypes. Hence comparisons were made between a rugged, capable masculinity, near invariably represented by soldiers, and an effete, languid masculinity embodied by the shirker. This shaming of deficient masculinity via contrast to visions of ideal manliness was a common feature within the public cultures of belligerent nations.\footnote{Meg Albrinck, ‘Humanitarians and He-Men: Recruitment Posters and the Masculine Ideal’, \textit{Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture}, Pearl James ed. (Lincoln, 2009), pp.323-335.} The stark differences between productive and idle figures present a dichotomous situation in which the viewer is presented with only two options and only one socially ‘correct’ one.

Thus the weak chinned fop, who cut a poor figure of a man, became a regular stock character (fig.33) and ‘parasites, drones, loafers decadents, and hangers on’ were decried.\footnote{NZO, 21 August 1915, p.3.} Complaints were aired about young and middle aged men neglecting their duty and ‘who seem to be quite satisfied with kicking their heels about town, and letting the other fellow do all the work and all the sacrificing.’\footnote{EP, 5 September 1914, p.4.} Similar tunes were played within numerous letters to the editor, indicating public engagement with questions of what exactly ‘shirker’ meant. ‘Belfast’ observed ‘the contemptible crowd on Friday night, young chaps, dressed up in the latest styles of clothes I presume, collar and cuffs, cigarette in mouth, gaping and glaring and looking for “tarts” (as they designate girls) … I would like to poke a few of them with my bayonet.’\footnote{Truth, 29 January 1916, p.3.} ‘Spartan Woman’ suggested that ‘useless males’ should be ‘enrolled, made to wear petticoats and sent out to domestic service.’\footnote{Press, 21 November 1914, p.5.} ‘Gunner’ claimed that men willing to let others fight in their stead were ‘cowardly undesirable specimens of manhood’.\footnote{Grey River Argus, 12 July 1916, p.4.}
THE COMPLETE SLACKER.

"Young man, why are you not wearing khaki?"
"But I am. Haven't you noticed my tie and socks?"

Figure 33 New Zealand Free Lance, 27 August 1915, p.4.
Jibes did the rounds and degenerates were reported to be enlisting upon hearing that the enemy was employing intoxicating gas (fig.34). Another common joke argued that shirkers were hiding behind skirts in timely marriage proposals to homely women or converting to obscure sects - soon we will have applications made by the ‘Neo Nebuchadnezzarities of Newtown’ - in bids to find excuses for non-service. Likewise patriotic poems, such as *The Song of the Shirk*, imagined the contemptible, opportunistic nature of those staying behind:

Not much – and it’s here I’ve a laugh up my coat sleeve-
    There’s a chap in our office I’ve long sought to beat,
    He’s enlisted – the fool – and I’m next for promotion.
    Let him fight – he prefers it, and thinks it a treat.

Then there’s Brown, he plays tennis, he’s too good for me yet,
    He’s gone to the front, and there are others to go,
    And when the club’s lost all the best of its players
    I’ll soon be the champion – trust me. What ho!

    Don’t you see what a fool a man is to go fighting
    When by staying at home he can have lots of fun
    Instead of cold baths, and “Jack Johnsons” in trenches
    And the horrible sham, that you don’t fear a gun.716

That visions of shirkers became clichéd speaks of tighter media constructs, their use in official rhetoric and a hardening public mood. Diverse officials and commentators linked agendas with notions of dishonourable manhood. Hence speaking for the need for increased control over prostitution, Police Superintendent John Ellison claimed that ‘one need not wonder at the number of young people wearing glasses, artificial teeth, and other evidences of constitutional weakness when female vultures are able to fatten and become wealthy while they disseminate disease in a wholesome manner.’ On the first anniversary of the ANZAC landings Allen urged women ‘not to marry a man who is going to hide behind you and so escape his duty … If any man does not think you are worth fighting for, then he is not worth being your husband.’ Similarly, the *New Zealand Observer*, an advocate for the

715 NZFL, 3 August 1917, p.8. For the record the *Military Service Bill* was so structured that neither of these tactics would have had legal bearing.
716 *The Carnival Book: Cartoons and Sketches of the Queen Carnival, the Taking of Samoa and the Dardanelles* (Wellington, 1915), p.35.
718 *Colonist*, 11 May 1916, p.4.
introduction of conscription, frequently published material noting the harm the absence of conscription was causing. To this effect a Blomfield cartoon, *The Shirker is he to be the Father of the Future?* tapped concerns that the volunteer system, by sending the dutiful and retaining shirkers, was promoting the survival of the unfit. The image depicts a straight-backed, uniformed man marching to join other departing soldiers being inattentively watched by a smoking, weedy figure who slouches with his hands and a race book in his pockets. The stereotypical Semitic features of the shirker attest to Blomfield mobilising his occasional pre-war anti-Semitic themes for a new use.\textsuperscript{719} Such vilification indicates the widespread appeal to a familiar stereotype; the disciplinarian Ellison, Allen and the populist editorial line of the *Observer* were hardly a monolithic social force or automatic allies.

\textsuperscript{719} NZO, 2 October 1915, p.1.
To go still further, accusations of shirking pierced self-perception. It has been suggested that shirking imagery was ‘irrational’ and that a contradiction existed between depicting shirkers as ‘poor specimens of manhood’ and shaming men into service; ‘if this was a truthful representation, the desirability of pressuring these men to enlist would be negligible.’\(^{720}\) This overlooks the entirely rational social function of such depictions. The issue is not whether New Zealand actually did possess gaggles of fashionable, weedy men with bad posture, but rather the realisation that an eligible man who did not volunteer recognised that such slurs might be directed at him. Shirker imagery should be considered as a powerfully resonating feature within a cultural worldview and part of the way that shame has historically functioned, as one scholar puts it, to ‘patrol the borders of normality’.\(^{721}\) As Pierre Purseigle asks, while analysing the biting humour of wartime French and British societies, ‘how many of these “home-front heroes” were left stony-faced as they looked at the sly portraits of themselves sketched in such cartoons?’\(^{722}\) Indeed examination of the effects of the idiom in action reveals it as a live force with social and cultural weight. ‘Shirker’ was a cutting insult over which blood was spilt and lives were affected.

It was in the aftermath of the sinking of the *Lusitania* and news of casualties at Gallipoli that Bishop Averill observed ‘a very strong public opinion that all single eligible men between 20 and 40 years of age should offer their services’ and that ‘those who failed to do so should be regarded and treated as shirkers.’\(^{723}\) An official complaint was lodged and upheld against a teacher at Hawera Main School who labelled a pupil a shirker for the result of his diction test.\(^{724}\) In another case a man assaulted an acquaintance he deemed a shirker in a ‘brutal and unprovoked’ attack which led to the victim’s death. In the subsequent trial, the sentence was set as 18 months for manslaughter, with the judge advising that an appeal might see a reduction of the sentence.\(^{725}\) When a returned serviceman was fined for calling a man a shirker, two people offered to pay his fine.\(^{726}\) The government, responding to requests, issued

\(^{720}\) Whitehead, p.105.


\(^{723}\) EP, 28 May 1915, p.3.


\(^{725}\) *Manawatu Daily Times*, 2 August 1916, p.4.

\(^{726}\) *Manawatu Daily Times*, 3 February 1917, p.4.
armbands to signify a man as possessing legitimate reasons for not being in khaki.\textsuperscript{727} Suggestions were made that shirkers be exposed by posting lists in public space of who had and had not volunteered.\textsuperscript{728} Some exercised further initiative and informed the state of cases they believed constituted shirking. The links between smaller localities and longer lists of names, as well as connections between accusations and pre-war animosities, have been observed – microcosms of how existing social dynamics intersected with the mobilisation process.\textsuperscript{729} Archives New Zealand also contain examples of accusations levelled at more intimate targets; New Zealanders charged their neighbours, associates, and, in at least one case a brother as shirkers.\textsuperscript{730} Some of the broader forces spurring such behaviour are considered later (see Chapter Six); the significance here is how such behaviour indicates the power of such allegations and the decentralised wielding of that power.

This decentralised engagement is further illustrated in debates of who shirkers were. As in the pre-war world, the modular quality of shirker imagery saw core concepts tailored and directed at various groups. In a continuation of notions raised during the introduction of universal/compulsory military training, the conscientious objector became an immediate target. Objectors were presented as cringing moralists with dangerously unrealistic sentiments or as cowards hiding behind excuses; ‘the fact is that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the conscientious objector is a dodger, a shirker, a cowardly “rotter’.’\textsuperscript{731} A correspondent to the \textit{Methodist Times} argued that ‘the proper name for conscientious objection is moral squeamishness … brought about by restricted operation of the moral organs.’\textsuperscript{732} One poem titled ‘How to be a Pacifist’ simply listed the duties, values and conventions conscientious objectors were tagged as violating.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
Don’t be logical. \\
Talk cowardice. \\
Discard shame. \\
Scoff at patriotism. \\
Don’t study history. \\
Misquote the Bible. \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{727} ATL contains an example of these armbands. ATL-77-067-6/12, 1914-1918, ‘World War One arm band’. Lawlor, Patrick Anthony, 1893-1979: Papers (77-067).
\textsuperscript{728} \textit{Press}, 7 May 1915, p.3.
\textsuperscript{729} Baker, \textit{King and Country}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{730} ANZ-’Territorial Force-Shirkers’, multiple records from R22429653-AAYS-8638-AD1-731-10/284/10 to R22429688-AAYS-8638-AD1-731-10/284/76.
\textsuperscript{731} NZFL, 28 July 1916, p.6.
\textsuperscript{732} \textit{New Zealand Methodist Times}, 29 April 1916, p.5.
Refuse to profit by the mistakes of others.
    Fool yourself.
Expose your sister to the attacks of degenerates.
    Gamble with the birthrights of your children.
    Take no heed for the future.
    Put your trust in sentimentalism.
    Don’t think of Belgium.
    See through a glass darkly.\textsuperscript{733}

The refusal to take up arms made objectors obvious candidates for labels of shirking. However as questions of the level of manpower required became an issue of social debate, allegations of shirking appeared around other groups presented as less than fully committed. Thus when the issue of exempting or conscripting clergy arose in 1917, \textit{Truth} (whose editorial line was not automatically synchronised with the war effort or sectarian politics) mobilised its capacity to shame those it deemed as transgressing the social mores of the common New Zealander.\textsuperscript{734} To this end it juxtaposed the common soldier’s suffering with a depiction of an effete clergymen in a poem/cartoon combo entitled ‘man the trenches or dally with the wenches’. The last verse of this ridiculing rhyme read:

\begin{quote}
    He’ll address empty benches,
    But bars digging trenches,
    He’ll preach while other blokes bleed.
    The spirit is willing,
    Till it comes to the killing.
    The poor flesh is then weak indeed.\textsuperscript{735}
\end{quote}

Similarly when an active programme of recruiting Maori began, an equivalent discourse of martial strength against racial decline and shirking appeared. Hence Maori troops at Gallipoli were told ‘your race has always been distinguished for its bravery and its martial ardour and the people of New Zealand will look to you to prove that those qualities have in no way diminished.’\textsuperscript{736} Alternatively in the face of Waikato resistance to enlistment the \textit{Auckland Star} reported that Maori kingship ‘breathes nothing of the fierce fighting spirit of old Potatau and Tawhino, but of effeminate, ease loving buffoonery’ with young men ‘slouched about

\textsuperscript{733} NZFL, 25 January 1918, p.8.
\textsuperscript{735} \textit{Truth}, 10 March 1917, p.5.
\textsuperscript{736} \textit{Press}, 6 September 1915, p.3.
with hands in pockets, and cigarettes in mouth in striking contrast to the well set up, alert, and drilled company of young fighting men from Narrow Neck [an army training camp for Maori troops].

Comparable notions of degeneration were circulated within imagery linked to C1 status. On enlisting men’s fitness was graded; A grades were fit for active service, B grades were deemed able to become fit by medical attention, C1 likely to become fit with special training, C2 were judged fit as home guardsmen and D grades were deemed permanently unfit for any service. The collision of pre-war notions of fitness with wartime developments is observable in postcard and pamphlet presentations of C1 recruits as embodying the established tropes of deteriorated masculinity - slothful stance, spectacles, poor posture, disorderly hair and an ill-worn uniform (fig.35, 36).

Lastly, the dynamic of how shirker ideology and social categories negotiated is illustrated within conceptions of second division status. A reservist, if unmarried (or married after the 1 May 1915) and without children under 16, was placed in the first division. All other reservists were placed in the second division. The Military Service Bill was structured so that no second division man would be balloted whilst first division men remained in the military district, though second division men could of course volunteer. The creation of first and second division statuses within the reserve had emerged from the social consensus that supporting a family formed reasonable grounds for a man to stay at home - intrusion into the security of the household was a disturbing notion in a society where the image of husband as the major or sole breadwinner for a family was a major creed. Certainly the state apprehensive of a greater disruption to family units, business life and demands for higher pay and pensions - sought to delay the enlistment of married men.

However the consensus that supporting dependants was reason not to enlist sat uneasily with the also robust notion that every man should be willing and able to serve if required to. Second division men were officially recorded as potential soldiers and conscription’s selection of first division over second division men delayed the issue in lieu of resolving it. In 1917, as the levels of manpower that might be enlisted were realised, a Second Division

Figure 35 Matt Pomeroy Collection.
Figure 36 Book of the C1 Camp.
League was formed and campaigned on a position that emphasised their willingness to serve, but need to secure appropriate state assistance to support dependants. Ultimately the war ended before the second division departed in large numbers, leaving the question of whether a married man’s duty was foremost to his country or his family unanswered. However the possibility of second division soldiers gave hints that shirker imagery might be mobilised against second division men. Social elements voiced criticisms of the Second Division League; ‘my only son … left a wife and five children in the early stages of the war … he did not wait to haggle over the price.’ Likewise, a notion of married men as out of training appeared and it was reported that through a resourceful use of domestic surrounding (in this case the drawing room furniture) a transition from marital lifestyle to a martial lifestyle was possible ‘as the day approaches when the married man will be called upon to join up.’ (fig.37).

Figure 37 Otago Witness, 14 June 1916, p.32.

738 NZH, 10 June 1918, p.6.
In the same manner in which the question of who shirkers were became more extensive, the question of what to do with shirkers became an intense social issue. One major strategy emerged in the notion of reforming shirkers; a mobilised continuation of pre-war prescriptive ideologies. One official engagement saw a C1 camp established at Tauherenikau with the aim of making rejected men fit through exercise, fresh air and clean thinking. It claimed a 49.1 percent success rate.\footnote{Sleeman, p.17.}

Engagements with Mr Madgitts type transformations also appeared in popular culture as mass movements, businesses and advertisements sought to appeal to such notions. For instance, Fred Hornibrook, one of Sandow’s students, offered a course at his bodybuilding school for those rejected for the NZEF. He noted that 70 men who had previously been turned down had been accepted after taking his course which promised to add inches to the pupil’s chest.\footnote{Truth, 15 April 1916, p.8.} Another advertisement claimed that ‘Over eighty of Hornibrook’s pupils are now serving at the front.’\footnote{Truth, 15 May 1915, p.10.} Likewise advertisements publicised various commodities with general associations with soldiering, fighting or victory e.g. ‘Bovril gives strength to win.’\footnote{NZH, 5 April 1915, p.3.} Others made more explicit uses of transformation ideology. Two of the most memorable include Creamoata’s breakfast cereal and Champion flour, which linked brand name and the attainment of martial potency. Hence Champion flour noted that ‘our Medical Corps at the front (in fact, always) reports that all our “Champion” Muscle Raiser Lads are impervious to Kaiser Bill’s bullets and gas. If there should be any hesitants among the public who have feeble excuses, call upon “Champion” and he will soon develop mind and body for you.’\footnote{NZFL, December 1915 (Christmas Annual), p.40.} Likewise the Creamoata jingle ran ‘Says Sergeant Dan recruiting man we’re bound to send our quota, if every man adopts my plan and trains upon Creamoata.’\footnote{NZFL, 18 January 1918, p.5.}

Other examples of popular engagement saw postcards visualise the philosophy of dandyish men remade into a more vital masculinity through camp training (fig.38). This imagery proved far-reaching; the trench publication, turned household item, The Anzac Book, for example, contains the familiar ‘before and after’ imagery of a pre-enlistment monocled gent remade into a rugged ANZAC, with the caption ‘its[sic] not what you were – but what you are to-day.’\footnote{The Anzac Book, Written and Illustrated in Gallipoli by the Men of Anzac (South Melbourne, 1975), p.42.} The same sentiment appears in patriotic poems expressing the theme of men
being transformed by the process of enlisting and the task of combat. The narrative is intensely expressed in *The Man Behind the Counter: A Transformation* (fig.39). Likewise, letters to the editor expressed the sentiment that military training would ‘save the shirker from himself … converting them into men’. Such language of transformation fused neatly with respectable militarism and mobilised uses of shame;

Military training on the Army lines very often hardens some of the aforementioned specie, and converts them into men. I have seen some very fair results. I would ask some of the clerks of Auckland whether they would prefer to carry the stigma of coward through life (and worse, have it known to their children), or accept the golden opportunity of being changed into a man?’ … ‘In the army they show you where your chest should be, how to walk, how to look a man in the eyes when you talk to him.’

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The Man Behind the Counter:
A Transformation.

(For the N.Z. Free Lance.)

If you dealt at Kirk's, the draper's, in the days before the war,
You'd have met a nice young fellow at the counter by the door,
Selling ribbon and such trifles—even penny reels of cotton.
He was such a nice young fellow you could scarcely have forgotten,
And the acme of politeness, ladylike in voice and manner;
And his hands, you might have noticed, simply made for the piano.
He was such a nice young fellow, as he tied the things together:
Well, you didn't mind the waiting as he talked about the weather.

Then 'twas "Thank you" and "Good morning," "Afternoon," or else "Good night!"
"You will find the bargain counter on the third door to the right."
He was such a nice young fellow, ladylike in voice and manner;
And his hands, you might have noticed, simply made for the piano.
But the war has brought its changes;
when I called at Kirk's again
There were not the same old faces, for the country called for men—
Called for men to fight in trenches;
called for men to do and die—
Men to go through hell when ordered, and not ask the reason why.

Men to live where shells were screaming, follow on where men were dying,
Where the shells were spreading shrapnel and the hand-grenades were flying;
Where they faced the deadly gases; where they faced the liquid fire;
Where they saw their boon companions drop beside them and expire,
And among the first to offer in that gallant army corps
Was the young man I have mentioned at the counter by the door—
Men had come from each department and responded to the call;
And I saw the roll of honour that was hanging on the wall.

As I scanned the list of wounded my poor eyes with tears were dim,
For one was killed in action and I knew that it was him;
And methought I saw a vision as in days before the war—
Once again I see him standing at the counter by the door;
And I note his graceful manner, and observe his fragile figure,
And his hands so thin and taper: were they meant to pull a trigger?
Were they meant to drive a bayonet?
Were they meant to man the guns?
To rough it in the trenches, and to battle with the Huns?

Once again he's selling cotton, measuring the dainty laces.
Then I hear the roar of cannon and the scene changes places;
And instead of shop and counter I can see the Dardanelles—
And instead of selling cotton he is serving out the shells.
I can see him, grim and wiry—he's an Anzac to the core.
Was he ever selling ribbons at the counter by the door?
Now his comrades fall around him and he does the work of three;
Was he ever selling cotton to the ladies on the Quay?

He is parched with thirst and hungry, but he will not leave the spot.
Was he always sipping ices when the weather it was hot?
Now alone the gun he's manning, and he sweats he'll see it through.
Could it be the man so ladylike that I've described to you?
But at last a bullet gets him, nobly was his duty done.
Yes, he is but one of many that have gone to fight the Hun—
Men who've never had to rough it; but the transformation's made
When the man behind the counter goes to fight with his brigade.

—J. P. Dalahuntly.
Alongside notions of reforming shirkers into fit, dutiful men was a second major reaction of wartime society to notions of shirking. If the aforementioned discourse advocated discipline as a corrective measure, then this second discourse applied discipline as a punitive force favouring retribution over reform. The mindset driving such behaviour was a heady mix of disciplinarian temperament and emotive indignation; again the forces animating this public mood are probed in greater depth in Chapter Six. Needless to say this discourse developed as the war dragged on, as attitudes hardened, as casualties mounted, as talk of lowering military age or sending married men was aired and as frustrated patriots sought targets; there is hardly an ideological chasm between wanting to ensure that dishonourable manhood was not rewarded and wanting to see it punished.

In this framework the portrayed character of shirkers darkened, with malevolence usurping apathy as the dominant motive. Rather than mocking shirkers, such depictions showed shirkers mocking the values they lacked, not least the sacrifice of soldiers. For example in pushing for conscription the New Zealand Observer warned that whilst not forced to serve ‘the slacker eats another cigarette, buys another tote ticket, surrounds another leaning post with saliva, and grins his derision.’ Similarly, correspondents expressed approval of designs to force individuals to wear medals identifying them as shirkers, adding that the scheme be modified by posting shirkers’ names in conspicuous places - ‘newspapers … post offices, railways stations, church doors and street corners. I don’t think if this was done there would be many shirkers.’ The Free Lance approved of a proposal to confiscate land owned by reservists who emigrated to avoid military service. A man who absconded was ‘10 times worse’ than a conscientious shirker. The Observer linked civic privileges with obligations; ‘If 45 percent of young men in Canterbury are unfit to be soldiers they are unfit to be citizens and morally unfit to exercise the vote of a man.’ More spectacular was the intensification of an authoritarian streak in New Zealand public culture and a curious trend for militarised expressions and mentalities. Hence Captain Chaplin Sullivan told his audience of Young Methodists that they were ‘morally obliged to fight the shirker … to the last trench.’ The Bay of Plenty Times escalated this further, noting that ‘if a man at the

747 NZO, 28 October 1916, p.2.
748 Press, 7 May 1915, p.3.
749 NZFL, 19 October 1917, p.8.
750 NZO, 16 September 1916, p.2.
751 Baker, King and Country, p.46.
front shirks his job or strikes, the penalty is death, and so it should be for every shirker at home.\footnote{Bay of Plenty Times, 3 August 1915, p.2.}

Perhaps the most salient illustration of how reactions to shirking blended expressions of condemnation and punishment is the perception and treatment of conscientious objectors. The legal stance towards objectors assumed that allowances for exemption should be minimal. Indeed the \textit{Military Service Act} initially contained no provisions for conscience-based appeals and legislators had argued against making allowances.\footnote{Journals of the Legislative Council, 9 May 1916 - 8 August 1916 (Wellington, 1916), p.32.} One typical remark stated that ‘It does not seem advisable to allow an appeal on account of religious tenets and doctrines.’\footnote{NZS, 1916, No.8, Section 18 (1) e.} In its final form the Act was slightly liberalised to allow a limited form of religious appeal. This required that the objector be a member of a religious body (and to have been one before the outbreak of war) whose tenets and doctrines declare ‘the bearing of arms and the performance of combatant service to be contrary to divine revelation.’\footnote{Peter Ballis, ‘Seventh-day Adventists in New Zealand Politics, 1886-1918’, \textit{IN and OUT of the WORLD: Seventh-day Adventists in New Zealand}, Peter Ballis ed. (Palmerston North, 1985), pp.69-70.} Under these provisions only Quakers and Christadelphians were eligible for appeal. In July 1917, after much debate and the importation of documentation from the US, the Seventh-day Adventists were added to this group of privileged sects.\footnote{O’Connor, ‘The Awkward Ones’, pp.118-136.} Some sects and individuals claimed an unwritten tradition of pacifism or a pacifist interpretation of scripture, but were rejected. In cases of recognised objection, the Act specified that the objector would be offered a non-combative role. This remained a point of contention in that non-combative work under military authority was often perceived as clashing with doctrinal regulations. The extents and limits of, legally recognised, conscientious objection reflects a notion that the burdens of service should, as much as possible, be equally shared, whilst making some allowance for those seen to hold genuine religious principles. It seems there was never much real consideration of extending definitions of legitimate objection beyond religious reasons and there was certainly much questioning of the legitimacy of a conscience based-objection not built upon religious ideals.\footnote{O’Connor, ‘The Awkward Ones’, pp.118-136.}

Once balloted an objector had the option of appealing to a Military Service Board. If an objector had his appeal upheld on conscientious grounds (i.e. religious) he was classed as a

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\item \footnote{Bay of Plenty Times, 3 August 1915, p.2.}
\item \footnote{Journals of the Legislative Council, 9 May 1916 - 8 August 1916 (Wellington, 1916), p.32.}
\item \footnote{NZS, 1916, No.8, Section 18 (1) e.}
\item \footnote{Peter Ballis, ‘Seventh-day Adventists in New Zealand Politics, 1886-1918’, \textit{IN and OUT of the WORLD: Seventh-day Adventists in New Zealand}, Peter Ballis ed. (Palmerston North, 1985), pp.69-70.}
\item \footnote{O’Connor, ‘The Awkward Ones’, pp.118-136.}
\end{itemize}
'genuine objector' and offered non-military service. If an appeal was rejected and an objector continued to refuse orders he was classified as a ‘defiant objector’. Defiant objectors were given a month’s jail time followed by a full court martial. If they still refused service, objectors faced prison sentences of between 11 months and two years and by the war’s end there were 273 objectors imprisoned. By 1918 a strain on the civilian prison system saw all but unmanageable objectors sent to detention barracks and prison camps built for the purpose.

In July 1917 Trentham Camp Commander Colonel H.R. Potter enacted a Defence Department scheme, without government sanction, and shipped 14 objectors to the front in the belief that, faced with the discipline and reality of the frontlines, objectors would abandon misguided ideals and take up arms. The results of that experiment are recorded elsewhere, most notably in Archibald Baxter’s We Will Not Cease – a book by one of the 14. In summary, attempts to make the 14 objectors conform saw psychological and physical coercion applied, escalating from interrogation, intimidation, deprivation, starvation to physical violence. Throughout the episode officials displayed attitudes that objectors would conform when confronted with the reality that they would not be accommodated. At the extremes of this confrontation both authority figures and objectors appear as engaged in a contest of wills focused upon the vindication of creeds. Baxter later recalled an incident where a Captain Phillips informed him that continued defiance would see the use of physical force to break him. On asking what use he would be if broken Baxter claims to have been told ‘that doesn’t concern us. It’s your submission we want, Baxter, not your services.’

Closer to home, episodes of brutal violence towards objectors were reported in the Wanganui Detention Barracks in 1918. There were allegations that prisoners were verbally intimidated, threatened with ‘murder’, forcibly dressed into uniforms and 80 lb packs and made to march around the ‘slaughter yard.’ Those who refused were beaten. The enthusiasm of Lieutenant Crampton, the camp commandant, in applying these punishments has been described as ‘perverse.’ One man reportedly had his head pushed against a wall while his hands were tied; afterwards he was pushed out into the yard, ordered to march, and struck

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760 Holland, Armageddon, p.149.
761 Baker, King and Country, p.194.
with the butt of a rifle.\textsuperscript{762} Other prisoners were punched, kicked and pushed, one man was pulled around the yard by his hair and another by a rope around the neck.\textsuperscript{763} It was alleged that after this treatment one prisoner’s face ‘was like a piece of steak, and drops of blood were to be seen all round the yard and on the wall.’\textsuperscript{764} One prisoner, Thomas Moynihan, recalled being beaten on failing to pick up a rifle: ‘the sergeant banged the barrel of it against the side of my face saying “will you hold it?” I did not answer. He banged me several times till blood was streaming down the uniform.’\textsuperscript{765}

The most recent study of New Zealand’s Great War objectors frames historical circumstances as pitting the defiance of conscientious objectors against a ‘militaristic, neo-colonial government that feared non-conformity’.\textsuperscript{766} However harsh sentiments towards objectors were by no means an exceptional feature of the New Zealand Government - again a historiographical focus upon top-down manipulators masks more pervasive forces and patterns. Public exposure of the above incidents saw some response that the use of violence for retribution or reform was an affront to decency.\textsuperscript{767} However to some sections of the public the state had been far too lenient and news of these episodes saw a strong streak of approval and denouncement of sympathy towards shirkers. The Rangitikei Advocate put forth that

since the shirker was little better than an animal humane punishment had no effect on him. In any case pulling a man around by a rope was harder on the puller than the pulled, and thousands of New Zealand fathers did no more with a strap to their children than Crampton had to his.\textsuperscript{768}

The Free Lance added that ‘It is hoped there will be no snivelling, canting protests against the way the lazy, cowardly so-called “conscientious objectors” are being treated by the military authorities.’ The polemic concluded with a suggestion that objectors be deported to a cannibal island to see how long their principles lasted.\textsuperscript{769} Overall public outcry was minimal, and it has been proposed that ‘strict treatment of conscientious objectors and

\textsuperscript{762} EP, 26 June 1918, p.8.
\textsuperscript{763} Holland, Armageddon, p.127.
\textsuperscript{764} EP, 26 June 1918, p.8.
\textsuperscript{765} Grant, Out in the Cold, p.19.
\textsuperscript{766} Grant, Field Punishment No.1.
\textsuperscript{767} Loveridge, p.114.
\textsuperscript{768} O’Connor, ‘The Awkward Ones’, p.136.
\textsuperscript{769} NZFL, 19 October 1917, p.8.
“shirkers” met the public mood, making it possible to close one’s eyes to condoned brutality being carried out on those who refused to compromise their beliefs.\textsuperscript{770}

The objectors themselves had little opportunity to negotiate with the worldview draped upon them and express religious principles, personal convictions or their philosophies of class conflict. Thus expressions were often reduced to symbolic acts – refusals to participate in legal proceedings out of a sentiment that this would legitimise them, offers to shake hands rather than conform to the military protocol of saluting or resistance to donning uniforms.\textsuperscript{771}

In one sense, at least, objectors had the later laugh, their pamphlets, memoirs, politics, poems and experiences attracting academic and public attention in the post-war world.

The most successful example is easily the aforementioned \textit{We Will Not Cease}, republished numerous times since its initial 1939 run and described by Michael King in his 2003 foreword as ‘a classic of anti-war literature’.\textsuperscript{772} Aside from the astonishing nature of the events recorded, the success of the text owes much to its narration and the imparted impression of Baxter’s strength of character against hostile circumstances. Although the accuracy of the dialogue must be considered - the book was first published some two decades after the traumatic events yet conversations are replicated word for word - the account, whether reflecting the reality or the retelling, remarkably illustrates the confrontation between objector and the tropes established around soldiers and shirkers.\textsuperscript{773} Two episodes demonstrating Baxter’s retorts to appeals to manliness, loyalty and pride are worth reproducing at length. The first took place when Baxter was residing in a hospital in South Africa on route to England.

\begin{quote}
The matron, middle-aged and ginger haired, came on her rounds in the morning … She accompanied different doctors on their visits to us. One of them came in with her.

‘Baxter’s a conscientious objector,’ she told him when they came to my bed.

‘How did you come to be here?’ he asked, and I told him briefly.

‘You’re far too good a Highlander, Baxter,’ he said ‘not to be fighting for your king. When you get to France you’ll be throwing Germans over your head on your bayonet.’
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{771} H.R. Urquhart, \textit{Court Martial or Post Mortem?} (Auckland, 1918), Holland, \textit{Armageddon}, p.34, Archibald Baxter, pp.70-72.
\textsuperscript{772} Archibald Baxter, p.10.
\textsuperscript{773} Additionally the role of the learned and eloquent Millicent Baxter, who was a driving force in the creation and typing of the manuscript, in shaping the content and prose of the less scholarly Archie should be considered.
Yes my ancestors fought for the king, except when they happened to be fighting against him. I’m fighting too, only I’m on a different tack. I’m fighting against a war.’

‘Oh well,’ he said, ‘they might get you a job rocking cradles.’

‘If people of your views run the world,’ I answered, ‘there soon won’t be any cradles to rock.’  

The second episode occurred in a military camp

As I went back to my escort the orderly tackled me: ‘You’re a farmer, aren’t you? Don’t you think your farm is worth fighting for?’

‘No, I don’t. There’s nothing I think worth killing men for.’

‘No, but other men are fighting for you.’

‘Are you fighting for me? Am I asking anyone to fight for me?’

‘I don't reckon a man like you is worth his salt.’

‘And I don't reckon you’re worth much, attacking a man before you know anything about him. If I were free and we were back in New Zealand you wouldn’t dare to speak to me like this.’

Such confrontations illustrate the conventional assumptions present around those who would not fight and conversely around what fighting meant. A theme of a ‘militaristic, neo-colonial government fearing non-conformity’ cuts the wider context in which such perceptions and reactions to conscientious objectors occurred. A more comprehensive framework would be to observe reactions to objectors as demonstrating a public culture capable of intolerance to non-conformity and confrontational towards social elements that could be considered as ‘shirking’.

**Legacy**

The anxieties contained within the shirker antitype remained concerns within post-war public culture, indicative of how the imagery represents underlying sentiments as well as wartime circumstances. A growing body of research attests to how issues around standards of fitness

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774 Archibald Baxter, p.77.
775 Archibald Baxter, p.102.
remained prominent for decades. The Second World War saw notions and images of shirkers reappear and new batches of objectors sent to camps.

Such demobilised continuities are apparent in the continued association of fitness and war. During the war discourse around the state of social fitness and the promise of prescriptive doctrines to reform it had been mobilised. In post-war New Zealand the wartime experience was invoked to support continued debate on the issue of standards of fitness. Hence, military-style fitness doctrines were referenced and martial metaphors retained in campaigns to move a wartime state towards a welfare state. In this regard the WCTU continued to prescribe elimination of the liquor trade, claiming a connection between liberty, greatness and victory. It argued that to retain these traits and be prepared for future wars New Zealand would have to shed the ‘colossal handicap’ of alcohol. Likewise the concluding comments within a government report on mental defectives and sexual offenders illustrate how wartime experience sat within the schema.

It has rightly been decided that this should not only be a “white man’s country,” but as completely British as possible. We ought to make every effort to keep the stock sturdy and strong, as well as racially pure … The Great War revealed that from their [the pioneers] loins have sprung some of the finest men the world has ever seen … It also revealed that an inferior strain had crept in … Surely our aim should be to prevent, as far as possible, the multiplication of the latter type.

Furthermore, the C1 camps established to raise fitness earned a mention within the official histories and it was reported that the successes in making C1 men fit gave ‘proof of the benefit which would accrue to a nation if attention were paid to this important question in times of peace.’

Lieutenant-Colonel Sleeman, the author of the above claim, was not the only one considering the peacetime potentials of such programmes. The same Dr Elizabeth Gunn who had spoken out about poor nutrition among children in 1914 had come to a similar conclusion and argued for military-style fitness doctrines for the young. Her role in the school medical service gave her the position to practise these initiatives. A biography describes her as ‘autocratic’ and

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777 Grant, *Out in the Cold*.
778 Marlborough Express, 28 March 1919, p.5.
779 AJHR, 1925, H-31A, ‘Mental Defectives and Sexual Offenders’, p.28.
780 Sleeman, p.17.
notes a ‘military bearing … occasionally reinforced by her wearing of her war medals on school visits.’ Gunn introduced ‘toothbrush drill’ into schools and extended medical inspection to pre-schoolers in ‘Dr Gunn’s Tiny Tots Parades’. The correlation of slouching and shirking was not forgotten either; ‘In some schools the more stooped and clumsy students were dragooned into one of the doctor’s ‘awkward squads’ to correct postural deficiencies.’

A pioneer in the health camps movement, Gunn proposed a scheme to improve the health of malnourished children via a well managed period of ‘country-life’ featuring fresh air, sunlight, exercise and good nutrition. Gunn brought her full military experience to bear and the camp was managed with a firm hand by a ‘commandant’. Camp life featured bugle-calls, toothbrush drills, kit inspections and a good deal of marching and flag-saluting. In this and succeeding health camps impressive weight gains were promoted as evidence of the success and potential of the endeavour. Indeed the concept was a hit and ‘set the standard’ for voluntary health camp movements across the country.

The notion of reforming slackness, especially in the young, and the effectiveness of militaristic discipline in achieving this, retained currency in New Zealand life.

Likewise the patterns, and targets of retribution, outlasted the war. Some organisations continued to campaign against those who had objected to fighting; the Rotorua RSA, for example, wanted ‘objectors on the staff of the Rotorua Hospital to be ineligible for promotion and to wear a distinguishing armband.’ Both Baxter and his wife’s writings record the lasting official and social animosity towards Baxter’s wartime objection; Millicent’s memoirs, first published in 1981, claimed that ‘nowadays people cannot realise the extent of the feeling against conscientious objectors that still existed shortly after the first war.’ Section 13 of the 1918 Expeditionary Forces Amendment Act deprived ‘Military Defaulters’ (a term which included defiant objectors) of civil rights for ten years from the passing of the Act. This barred defaulters from holding public office, employment in the service of the crown and from enrolment as an elector.

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782 Tennant, ‘Gunn, Elizabeth Catherine’.
783 Gush, p.3.
784 Baker, King and Country, p.201.
786 NZS, 1918, No.9, Section 13.
The impact of modernity on national fitness was a subject whose trajectory extended from pre-war to post-war society, interacting with wartime mobilisation along the way. In pre-war society such concern had manifested itself in conceptions around deterioration as well as within prescriptive doctrines aimed to maintain and/or improve standards. During the war this ideology flared in notions that shirkers were compromising the efficiency and/or fairness of the war effort as well as in the related issue of how this situation should be managed. This is a valuable demonstration of how the intersection of mobilisation and public culture saw existing cultural dynamics and discourse retained but repurposed in wartime conceptualisations.
Chapter Five
‘The Women’s Part’: The Mobilisation of Womanpower

‘The enthusiasm was not limited to the men, but the women of New Zealand had done their part and done it nobly.’ - William Massey⁷⁸⁷

The mass participation of belligerent populations in the war effort saw distinctive cultural engagements with conceptions of gender. The connection between mainstream masculinity and the war, explored in previous chapters, had its female equivalent in the notion of a ‘women’s part’ in the struggle. While the exact meaning of the women’s part was negotiated, the approximate definition related the war effort to conventional imaginings of femininity, a process that highlighted some of the tensions within these imaginings.

The primary question asked of the interplay of women and the war has been whether it advanced political, economic and social emancipation. Recent New Zealand historiography emphasises the limited extent to which the war altered the female condition. The female vote, the salient prize in post-war Germany, Britain and the US, had been secured two decades before 1914 and the failure of mobilisation to deliver lasting changes in employment patterns has been observed.⁷⁸⁸ The right of New Zealand women to stand for parliament was established through the 1919 Women’s Parliamentary Rights Act.⁷⁸⁹ However, the significance of this year might be weighed against other twentieth-century dates highlighting the female advance into public life: for instance, 1938 (when women could be appointed as members of the police force on the same terms as men), or 1941 (when women gained the right to sit in the Legislative Council), or 1963 (when women were automatically included on the jury roll) or 1997 (when a woman first became Prime Minister).

To approach the subject from another angle, the feminist ideal of the new woman, actively pushing the boundaries of the Victorian gender order was alive in New Zealand in the decades before the war. A number of female pioneers emerged as graduates from New Zealand universities in the late nineteenth-century.⁷⁹⁰ Furthermore, an age of typewriters,

⁷⁸⁷ EP, 20 February 1915, p.3.
⁷⁸⁹ NZS, 1919, No.16.
⁷⁹⁰ W.J. Gardner, Colonial Cap and Gown (Christchurch, 1979), pp.68-111.
telephones and bicycles permitted increases in opportunities for female organisation and public networking. The operation of the last invention may have been one stimulus for the rational dress movement, which gained ground from the 1880s.\textsuperscript{791} The movement argued the inaptness of petticoats, corsets and tight-lacing to health and daily tasks, whilst advancing the merits of bloomers, female trousers and the divided skirt. Additionally, the notion of women as political creatures was exercised en masse with the 1893 expansion of the franchise. That election saw 85.18 percent of the women registered to vote exercising their right, compared to 69.61 percent of men. The 1896 election saw another mass engagement, with 76.44 percent of registered women voting, against 75.9 percent of men.\textsuperscript{792} This was, according to the visiting Mark Twain, a lesson that ‘women are not as indifferent about politics as some people would have us believe.’\textsuperscript{793}

To some extent these new freedoms were underwritten by a falling fertility rate and a measure of economic liberation. As previously mentioned, the birth rate fell rapidly in the late 1870s with the average family size decreasing from near six children at the start of the 1880s to something closer to three by the mid 1920s.\textsuperscript{794} Additionally the 1881-1911 period witnessed a steady rise in the number of women drawing an income, as taking a paid job between leaving school and marriage became common.\textsuperscript{795} The modernising economy opened new opportunities - notably in factory work in the 1880s and white-collar work in the 1890s - and witnessed an expansion in the numbers of female teachers, typists and assistants. Most attention-grabbing though, was a number of female firsts in the professions through the 1890s. 1893 saw Elizabeth Yates elected as Mayor of Onehunga, the first female mayor within the British Empire.\textsuperscript{796} 1896 witnessed Emily Siedeberg graduating from the University of Otago as New Zealand’s first female medical graduate.\textsuperscript{797} In 1897 Ethel Benjamin became New Zealand’s first female lawyer, the first woman in the Empire to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{791} Clare Simpson, ‘Nineteenth-Century Women on Bicycles Redefine Respectability’, \textit{Sport, Society and Culture in New Zealand}, Brad Patterson ed. (Wellington, 1999), pp.149-152.  
\textsuperscript{792} NZOYB, 1899, pp.145-146.  
\textsuperscript{793} Twain, p.299.  
\textsuperscript{797} Patricia Sargison, ‘Siedeberg, Emily Hancock’, DNZB, updated 1 September 2010, \url{http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies}, accessed 14 January 2012.}
appear as counsel in court and the second woman in the Empire to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor (two months after Canadian Clara Brett Martin). 798

Hence, the women’s part in modern life was a debated issue before 1914 and suppositions that war work ‘at once challenged and enforced traditional gender roles’ can be backdated to describe the pre-war condition with ‘modernity’ substituted for ‘war work’. 799 Such conflict between ‘challenge’ and ‘enforcement’ might be located right within the philosophical heart of the feminism of the era. First-wave feminism sought social change both through efforts to expand the legal, political and economic freedoms of women as well as by linking the traditional roles of wives and mothers with public matters. The contradictions that might be supposed as arising from potentially conflicting objectives were largely reconciled in the broad consensus that economic, political and cultural reforms would better allow women to realise their potential as women and therefore allow society to benefit from the unique qualities of the female sex. This vision of the new social contract between women and the public sphere was aptly summarised at the 1895 World WCTU conference; ‘What they asked of the awakened woman was that she should be the enfranchised woman, and that of the new woman that she should be the true woman.’ 800

Thus the legitimacy of publicly active women tended to rest upon their feminine credentials. That women’s genius was orientated towards domestic affairs might be conceded, but with the assertion that the nation, as a home, would benefit from such genius; as one contemporary put it ‘the State is a hearth on a larger scale, and what is a hearth without a mother?’. 801 This widening of bridges between the traditional female sphere and the public sphere has been perceived as both a means by which women successfully negotiated a greater public role as well as a failure to challenge the patriarchal character of society and an entrenchment of conceptions that women’s nature was intrinsically domestic. Certainly first-wave feminism’s focus upon domesticity, moral influence and the affirmation of motherhood as a sacred female duty contrasts with the egalitarian emphasis of second and third wave feminism.

800 White Ribbon, August 1895, p.3.
801 Siegfried, p.291.
Raewyn Dalziel claims that accordance with the notion that a woman’s fulfilment was found in the home ‘had a strangling effect on women’s role in New Zealand society.’

This might be detected in perceptions that exposure, or overexposure, to civic life could only lead women away from domestic fulfilment. A visual example depicts the new woman ascending a staircase whilst looking back sadly at two children at the base. The steps on which she has advanced - ‘social achievement’, ‘career’ and ‘professional triumph’ - have led her to ‘loneliness’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘disappointment’ and distanced her from the stairs labelled ‘children’, ‘marriage’ and ‘love’. It was in recognition of women’s maternal destiny that J.A. Hanan, the Minister of Education, weighed the need to train girls to be teachers, clerks, dressmakers, assistants and factory workers against knowledge that in the great majority of cases such occupations are merely temporary, and that nearly all the girls soon become wives and mothers. Let us give our girls a good education, even a temporary occupation in the business or industrial world, but let us act so that we and they may realise that not even the lawyer, doctor, statesman, or merchant has a calling so richly fruitful of all that is highest and noblest in national life as the mother of a good home.

A failure to impart such lessons might, the thinking ran, allow frivolous modernity to teach women to favour baubles over babies. The President of the 1914 Australasian Medical Conference lamented the rise of the ‘commercial flapper’. Such a girl, with her ‘hair in a tail down her back’ and wearing a ‘short dress and high heeled boots’, was apparently a common sight in Auckland. The columnist for the New Zealand Illustrated Magazine ‘Alma’ warned that every intelligent woman should realise that ‘in shirking the family responsibilities, she is morally deteriorating’ and put forth the proposition that ‘the woman who cannot rear four or five children is a poor specimen of a woman’.

A more recent school of thought has focused on recognising and charting female agency within social and ideological configurations. The results increase the complexity of the picture and emphasise the interaction between colonial feminism and factors of race, class and imperial/colonial development. Thus, Marilyn Lake notes that white women in the

803 Weekly Graphic, 13 November 1912, p.45.
805 Griffiths, pp.21-22.
806 New Zealand Illustrated Magazine, 1 May 1904, pp.141-142.
dominions can legitimately be described as ‘both colonised and colonising.’ Katie Pickles argues that women were active rather than passive agents in imperial history and describes their contribution to historical processes as ‘complex and contradictory’. Anne McClintock claims that ‘white women were not the hapless onlookers of empire but were ambiguously complicit both as colonizers and colonized, privileged and restricted, acted upon and acting.’ Julia Bush’s summation of the state of white women of the Dominions also stresses these multifaceted and interactive qualities; ‘they experienced the subordination, as well as the oft-proclaimed blessings, of British rule.’

Being cast as symbols of national honour and aspiration, custodians of social traditions/standards and as nurturers of the nation’s future evidently could empower as well as restrict female agency. The question of how this power was exercised in the nation-building process - a topic traditionally delegated to the ‘white males of British descent’ camp - has emerged as a topic of scholarly investigation. It is evident that the mission of advancing British civilisation proved as attractive to many Joan Bulls as to their male counterparts. André Siegfried witnessed an instance of this in his observation of the popular consensus among women in favour of Greater British action in the Transvaal. The Victoria League opened its first New Zealand branch in Otago in 1905, four years after its 1901 founding in London and, like other patriotic societies, attracted socially active women. Additionally, in negotiating a place within the nation-building/colonial venture, women contributed to the process of imprinting new cultures onto indigenous space and archetypal female concerns of health, welfare and purity saw women’s groups make efforts to reform Maori customs and traditions. There was, argued Anna Stout, a “white woman’s” as well as a “white man’s burden”.

810 Bush, p.86.
811 Patricia Grimshaw, Marilyn Lake, Ann McGrath, Marian Quarty, *Creating a Nation* (Ringwood, 1994).
812 Siegfried, p.294.
Involving womanpower within the war effort saw the mobilisation and development of pre-existing gender norms of womanhood, the tensions within these norms and the forces acting to shape them. In investigating this process, this chapter considers three key manifestations of the women’s part in the conflict and the peacetime roots of these wartime crystallisations. The first is the idealised gender norms around femininity and their relation with masculine codes of behaviour. The second developed from established notions that women were tasked, or entrusted, with the duty of upholding social standards. The third considers the mobilisation of notions that New Zealand women could be capable compatriots and considers how social forces acted both to relate this mythology to wartime service and as a brake to this process.

**Chivalric interplay**

Constructions of idealised womanhood feature strongly within the ideological panorama of the Great War. Images of symbolic females as objects requiring veneration, protection and, particularly in the case of Belgium, rescue, reference an idealised interplay between the masculine and feminine spheres. The custom of women dressing to represent these symbols - Britannia, an allied power, or allegorical figures like ‘victory’ or ‘peace’ - in patriotic pageants represents a literal embodiment of this chivalric code in public space. In one distillation of this interplay the handbook of the Girl Peace Scouts (the New Zealand-created female counterpart to the Boy Scouts) explained the protection soldiers provided, and advised young girls that ‘every day you should send a good thought out to our Army and Navy, and pray that they may “always be ready” to protect our vast Empire.’\(^{816}\) In relation to masculine chivalry, the conventions taught that a lady should aspire to be a worthy recipient of masculine gallantry - she should inspire bravery, sustain spirits and provide that classic object of the chivalric narrative: something worth dying for. The standards of conduct stipulated the maintenance of an appropriate poise in regard to departed heroes, particularly the permanent departure of death - another classic chivalric trope. During the Great War this cultural code was enlisted and the perception of the situation as an extension of idealised gendered interplay became a reference point to judge female standards.

In this dynamic, public culture was strongly inclined to identify female representatives as mothers. One scholar observes that if the pinup girl was the ‘paradigmatic construction of wartime femininity’ during the Second World War, then the mother occupied the Great War’s equivalent cultural space. Amateur Freudianism aside, this phenomenon is reflective of both cultural and physical circumstances. To begin with the latter, the mother as a relevant figure speaks of the constitution of the NZEF. One sample survey lists 7,992 of 8,417 men as unmarried and without children and notes the average age as 23-25. By weight of numbers, mothers were the predominant female link between army and home front. This raises the question of whether or not war wives would have become more distinct or prominent figures if married men had been sent in large numbers. The French veuves blanches archetype certainly coincides with European systems of conscription, which drew upon wider cross-sections of the male population - indicating the capability of cultures to fashion responses to physical realities.

The tendency to translate womanhood into motherhood also speaks of how the mother had become ‘a cult figure’ by the end of the long nineteenth-century; the 1908 initiation of an official Mother’s Day serves as an apt sign of the times. At this time the relation between mothers and national life was an issue of social debate. The perceived importance of motherhood to the welfare of nation and Empire, for instance, prompted calls to rationalise and professionalise natal care. The 1907 establishment of the Plunket Society is the obvious example of the consideration of motherhood as too important to leave to amateurs.

The safety of nations is not a question of the gun alone, but also of the man behind the gun, and he is largely the resultant of the grit and self-sacrifice of his mother. If we lack noble mothers we lack the first element of racial success and national greatness. THE DESTINY OF THE RACE IS IN THE HANDS OF ITS MOTHERS.

To this might be added the Education Department’s moves towards gender differentiation and the development of a female syllabus intended to equip girls for motherhood.
Such efforts cast motherhood as a public role. However, the same period saw political and public issues ‘domesticated’, as women’s organisations stressed that motherhood, harnessed to public action, was a force for social progress.\(^7\) Hence the National Council of Women (NCW) sought to bring motherly influence into Parliament.\(^8\) Other organisations focused upon linking social issues and a maternal identity. For instance, the Mothers’ Union, an Anglican-based fellowship imported to New Zealand in the 1890s, dedicated itself to upholding the sanctity of marriage and awakening mothers to their great responsibility.\(^9\) Prominent feminist reformers, including Ada Wells, Elizabeth Taylor and Emily Siedeberg, supported the conception of domestic science as a specialised task and noted a need for practical training.\(^7\) Youth organisations such as the Hearth Fire Movement, imported from Canada in 1914, aimed to instil domestic skills in girls aged 12-18. Similarly, the Girl Peace Scouts aimed to create a body of ‘disciplined, capable, true-hearted, earnest-minded women to be the wives and mothers and social workers of the next generation.’\(^9\) This lends credence to the observation that, while Plunket may have positioned itself as the fount of the new scientific motherhood, ‘it was women’s organisations that worked to disseminate the Plunket message.’\(^\)\

The Great War lent credibility and urgency to Plunket’s notions of the importance of the woman behind the man behind the gun and the dominant conceptions of the chivalric interaction between mother/womanhood and masculine duties intersected with cultural mobilisation. The resulting patriotic activities were multifaceted, but arose from common ideological assumptions about conventional gender identities and their ideal interplay. Thus, the female capacity for nurturing and support was rapidly affirmed. It is, for instance, telling that when Mrs Luke, the Mayoress of Wellington, claimed that ‘all women could do something for those who had shouldered a rifle’ the subject she immediately turned to was the traditional womanly crafts of knitting/sewing; ‘Any woman who could use a needle, and who had a heart, was a coward who did not now ―do her little bit‖ for the boys who had gone

\(^{9}\) Griffiths, p.295.
\(^{9}\) Woods, pp.110-111.
to the front’.  Three days after the war’s declaration, the Dominion’s ‘Woman’s World’ section voiced Countess Liverpool’s appeal to the women of New Zealand for assistance in providing for the troops. Specifically it was noted that women ‘could not do better’ than to aid in the provision of required knitted and woven goods.

Woman-powered patriotic societies providing wartime welfare multiplied so rapidly that the 1915 War Funds Act was established to co-ordinate their efforts. Official records indicate that 120 registered organisations in October 1915 grew to 568 in March 1918. However, this figure does not include smaller branches and sub-committees and the total has been estimated to be as high as 920. Such arrangements mobilised existing class networks and social structures, with the social elite often playing public roles. For instance, Lady Liverpool sold flowers in the streets to raise money for Christmas comforts for the troops. Christina Massey, the Prime Minister’s wife, took up the position of President of Soldiers’ Wives, Mothers and Dependants’ League. The wife of the MP for Western Maori, Miria Pomare and Lady Liverpool formed a fund to provide comforts for Maori soldiers. The concerns of these societies were diverse, ranging from the welfare of refugee populations overseas, to offering support for the families of New Zealand soldiers and disabled servicemen. In terms of results it is estimated that by the end of the war, New Zealanders had raised approximately £5,447,991 for patriotic causes ($471 million in 2012 terms). To return to knitting, in the six months ending 31 June 1916, the Red Cross received 64,126 knitted and sewn items, signifying thousands of hours of unpaid labour from New Zealand women.

Such efforts can be validly read as a practical effort to assist troop welfare by mobilising skilled labourers and willing volunteers. Interwoven with such efforts, however is the notion

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831 Dominion, 7 August 1914, p.2.
835 OW, 11 Sep 1918, p.49.
836 EP, 26 September 1918, p.9.
of women serving as women. This is reflected in those organisations featuring gendered titles such as the League of Mothers, Soldiers’ Wives Club, Women’s Recruiting League and Soldiers’ Mothers League. Additionally war work often carried a supposition of the ideal relation of masculine and feminine duties. One example of this is seen in Her Excellency’s Knitting Book which served as both a convenient collection of knitting patterns as well as an affirmation of gender functions. The front-cover poem reading

For the Empire and for Freedom
   We all must do our bit;
   The men go forth to battle,
   The women wait and knit.  

Possibly even more indicative of such attitudes was Jane Morison’s A Spinning Song, written to encourage practical patriotism in schoolgirls.

We cannot all shoulder a rifle,
   But there is the spinning wheel!
   And work must be done, the war must be won;
   For home and our country’s weal.
   We cannot all enter the trenches,
   Nor fight on the battle field;
   But we can spin yarn with wool from the farm,
   The distaff and spindle wield!

   CHORUS – Tempo di Valse
   We are spinning, spinning, spinning;
   And so busily we’ll spin!
   While the World’s Great War we’re winning,
   Till the World’s Great War we win.

Contrasting to this noise are the unspoken sentiments motivating this wartime labour. Miss Bower Poynter described knitters’ ‘endless stitches’ as ‘mute witnesses of something closer and deeper – the thoughts and prayers that are wordless for fathers and sons, husbands, brothers and lovers who have taken their lives in their hands and turned to the field.’

However, whilst knitting for the cause was perceived as a means of embodying womanly qualities, notions that this could serve as a surrogate for the more fundamental duty of producing dutiful men attracted antagonism. One portrayal of the often repeated jibe of knitting for someone else’s son depicted two female tram passengers. One, observing the

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840 Annette Liverpool, Her Excellency’s Knitting Book, 2nd ed (Wellington, 1915).
841 Nicholson, p.91.
842 Southland’s Tribute, p.58.
other’s knitting, inquires whether she has a son at the front and is met with faux genteel disdain; ‘Suttin-ly not, my boys are too good for shooting and slaying! I’m doing our share for the war, you see, for other people’s boys’.\textsuperscript{843} Similarly, \textit{Truth}, in protesting the pressure placed upon men to enlist, claimed that ‘The leaders of the shemale [nineteenth-century colloquialism for an aggressive woman] soopers are mostly sour old maids and childless married women, who melodramatically express their readiness to “sacrifice” other women’s sons.’ The charge of hypocrisy around women pressuring men to fulfil a gendered duty that they themselves were ‘shirking’ was reinforced in the corresponding poem and illustration of a sinister spinster (fig.40).

\begin{quote}
The shemale shirker howls aloud
  For other women’s sons;
  She’ll “sacrifice” them one and all
  To battle with the Huns.
  She hasn’t got a son herself (She takes good care of that);
  But gladly sools the others on
  To win the praise of Fat.\textsuperscript{844}
\end{quote}

Such ridicule references the conception of motherhood as a form of national service. By producing, raising and sending soldiers, mothers confirmed a personal stake in the cause.\textsuperscript{845} Additionally, sentiments around sending loved ones converged with sentiments of losing them. The result was an acknowledgment of the personal sacrifice mothers made in the loss of their flesh and blood - a sort of martyrdom by proxy - underpinned with assurances that women should take solace from the confirmation that they and their departed had fulfilled their gendered duties. Interestingly those promoting arbitration as a means to peace, or simply favouring live sons over dead heroes, mobilised a conception of female domestic/natal instincts towards the conclusion that women were biologically opposed to militarism.\textsuperscript{846} The movement’s backbone has been described as constituted by a few dedicated and determined individuals and ‘a small minority of New Zealand women’.\textsuperscript{847} The core philosophy that gender determined political/social stances is readily apparent. As a spokeswoman for a deputation of 30 women presenting a petition against conscription explained, ‘as mothers of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{843} NZO, 10 July 1915, p.17.
\item \textsuperscript{844} \textit{Truth}, 18 November 1916, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{845} Gullace, pp.56-59.
\item \textsuperscript{847} Margaret Anderson, ‘The Female Front: Attitudes of Otago Women Towards the Great War, 1914-1918’ (B.A. Hons, University of Otago, 1990), p.94.
\end{itemize}
the nation we object against bringing lives into the world to be used, when reaching manhood, in the interests of a class which does not represent our interests.  

The links between heroic mothers and heroic soldiers had been aired during the Boer War. For example the *New Zealand Illustrated Magazine* reported that those left behind should take pride in the example set by those who had performed their duty.

Ah, loving mothers bereaved of your children, do not let your hearts be desolate because they tell you your sons have died the death of heroes! Think how, in the moment that they bravely fell, their gallant young souls leapt at one bound from all the sordid temptations of the material world to stand for ever safe upon the shining rock of honour reserved for duty nobly done. 

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849 *New Zealand Illustrated Magazine*, 1 June 1900, p.27.

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Figure 40 *Truth*, 18 November 1916, p.3.
Likewise, when the official history turned to the women’s part in the war, the topic of loss (as well as support and inspiration) was mythologised via the invocation of patriotic and classical themes.

And what can fittingly be said of the noble women of New Zealand who were called upon to make perchance the greatest sacrifice – the loss of many loved ones? Well and truly they played their part – before, during and after the war. They carried their sorrows like the heroines they were; they suffered their heartaches as did the Spartan mothers of old; and bravely smiled through their tears. They headed patriotic movements; they inspired others to do as their sons had done; they organised functions to provide New Zealand soldiers with the comforts they sadly lacked on the veldt; they wove and they spun … It was they who lightened the hearts of our troops as they said the last Good-byes, for they smiled proudly into their sons’ eyes, and gave them courage.

Such messages became prominent in responses to Great War casualty lists and illustrated established gender values and duties. Bishop Averill was not a voice crying in the wilderness when he asked ‘what greater joy can a mother experience … than the knowledge that her life and example have helped her boy to live a noble life, and, if need be, to die a noble death?’ Allen was met with cheers when he claimed that ‘the proudest honour they can have as mothers is this: to have brought into this fair land men who are willing and able and desirous of saving this dominion and of saving the Empire in its time of trouble.’ In March 1916 School Journal carried a survey upon important activities British women throughout the Empire were playing in winning the war, which included a lesson on the feminine duty to encourage masculine participation. In classic School Journal fashion, classical/Grecian ideals were wound around the message. ‘In ancient Greece mothers rejoiced that they had sons who could fight for their country, and, when they went to battle, told them that it was better to die than be beaten. This is the spirit that should move the women of the Empire.’

Equally telling is some of the poetry appearing in the popular press.

He was so tall and splendid-
So clean of limb and mind!
Pride softens grief with we who lose
I pity most those mothers whose
Strong Sons have stayed behind.

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850 ATL-qMS-1790, ‘O’er veldt and kopje Part 1’, pp.9-10. Shand, James Arthur (Captain), 1869?-1933: O’er veldt and kopje - The Official account of the operations of the New Zealand contingents in the Boer War, ca 1931. (qMS-1790-1793).
851 Baker, King and Country, p.29.
852 ODT, 1 May 1915, p.12.
854 NZFL, 6 August 1915, p.17.
Similarly the stock imagery of waiting women has been observed as an affirmation of conventional gender paradigms. ‘All of these images show women sitting and waiting while attempting to imagine a distinctly male sphere of action happening elsewhere’; a position noted as being traditionally assigned to women within ‘mythic narratives’.\(^{855}\) Also significant is the capacity of such narratives to be reshaped to encompass new realities. Hence notions of the sacrifice made in temporary geographic separation and economic and emotional hardship became notions of the sacrifice accepted in the permanent separation of death as the waiting woman metamorphosed into the *Stabat Mater*.\(^{856}\) Official recognition of this aspect of woman/motherhood as service was the subject of parliamentary debate on at least two occasions, when it was suggested that a medal or medallion be issued to commemorate the mothers and wives of soldiers.\(^{857}\) When none was forthcoming, private organisations took up the cause and the Women’s National Reserve created a ‘Mothers of Empire’ badge for mothers with sons at the front.\(^{858}\)

Winter and Prost have rightfully cautioned historians that the images and rituals of public mourning should not be assumed to reflect the total substance of the intimate subject of private grief (an issue considered in the next chapter).\(^{859}\) Keeping this caveat in mind, the public responses of some women to casualty lists do publicly embrace the aforementioned sentiments. Faced with news of the deaths from Gallipoli, one woman reported, ‘Well, I have no regrets, because he died for a just cause, and if I had a dozen sons I would not object to every one of them going to fight for their King and country and the flag of liberty.’\(^{860}\) Neither did such sentiments disappear over the war years; in 1918 the outlook of ‘Tis hard to break up our home, but it is all for the honour and glory of the Empire’ was still voiced.\(^{861}\)

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\(^{855}\) Callister, ‘Stabat Mater Dolorosa’, p.12.

\(^{856}\) *Stabat Mater* is a thirteenth-century Catholic hymn upon Mary’s suffering during Jesus’ crucifixion. The hymn emphasises the emotional anguish of loss and the empathy between those suffering and those keeping watch.


\(^{858}\) Truth, 14 July 1917, p.2.


\(^{860}\) OW, 5 May 1915, p.27.

\(^{861}\) OW, 30 October 1918, p.57.
These links between conceptions of womanhood and fighting men were confirmed in official honouring of female efforts to comfort and support the troops. The war work of several socially prominent women, among them Lady Liverpool, Miria Pomare, Lady Massey, Lady Ward and Mary Downie Stewart, was recognised in the awarding of the Order of the British Empire, created in 1917 to honour service in non-combatant capacities. Additionally the notion of the feminine as especially capable of empathy was enshrined in remembrance rhetoric, with the large presence of women at ceremonies spurring the observation that remembrance ‘has ever been a hallowed intuition of womanhood.’ As one historian has noted, the most profound effects of the war on women were likely to be personal ones as loved ones were killed or maimed; ‘In line with contemporary gender roles, this essentially private dimension of the war was projected into the public sphere during and after the war.’ The specific cultural forms utilised in remembrance ceremonies are explored in the next chapter, but relevant to the topic at hand is the position occupied by the mother. In the words of a 1924 report of ANZAC day gatherers, ‘first among the watchers is the Mother - that name forever sacred - that heroic soul who gave her heart’s blood when she sent her boy to fight and suffer.’

**Social guardians**

A second example of how the conventions of asymmetrical, yet collaborating, gender duties became related to wartime roles is the notion that women had a responsibility to monitor and regulate society. Opposing *Truth*’s scorn that women without a man in uniform should mind their own business was a deeply rooted notion that females had a social prerogative to function as ‘god’s police’ - to borrow Anne Summers’ terminology. As Dalziel has observed, the idea that women, ‘by decree of custom, tradition, and the very nature of their sex’, were purposed to uphold the moral fibre and respectability of nations was a conception circulating London as the first large group of European settlers migrated to the colony of New Zealand.

First-wave feminists cut their political teeth on this alleged obligation to preserve moral order. As Grimshaw notes ‘The struggle to make men sober proved the catalyst for

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863 Dominion, 27 April 1925, p.10.
864 Rabel, p.254.
865 NZH, 26 April 1924, p.12.
867 Dalziel, p.112.
feminism.’ This can be seen in the example of the WCTU which expanded in New Zealand through the 1880s and 1890s. Deriving its ideological tenets largely from the original US movement, the union called for the inclusion of female temperament in national life, most notably through enfranchisement, to combat social ills. In particular, alcohol and sexual expression, outside reproduction within marriage, were regarded as degrading to women and as detrimental to social purity. The WCTU linking of women’s rights and social reform laid the basis for the approach taken by later women’s organisations and lobby groups. Perhaps the most notable example is the NCW, formed in 1896. It has been noted that the women of the council capitalised on the prevailing belief in superior feminine morality as a basis for liberation; as Margaret Sievwright, a major figure in the organisation, put it

woman – sedulously trained to consider the home as her proper sphere – is evolving, through her leading minds, a passion to domesticate the whole dear home land … and is spreading her influence beyond the mere walls of the family nest, to bring the woman spirit and the home atmosphere into the affairs of the State.

Such conceptions shine through in less politicised bodies. The Peace Scouts for instance, reflected its founder’s ‘great belief’ ‘in the power and influence of women over men … if they set a standard of morality, it would result in a high moral tone in men.’

Such philosophies conferred a platform with potent social influence and saw women deputised to act as guardians and enforcers of social respectability, rather than simply framed as passive objects of chivalry. This is not to imply such authority came without restrictions. The tenet that woman set the moral pace came with the condition that they might be held accountable for lapses or breaches. As one speaker noted, ‘Men and children, you know, are very much alike. They both take their standard from you. If you are flippant, the men will sink to your level, because for the most part they are ashamed to be better than you, but they want to be as good as you.’ Under this philosophy, women were responsible for cleaning

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870 Nicholls, pp.21-22.
up after the boys and personal failings to realise this responsibility could quickly transmute ‘god’s police’ into ‘damned whores’.  

The intersection of the war effort with public life mobilised this gendered arrangement and a heightened intensity in social regulation has been observed. *Truth*, citing anecdotes of female violence, mused that women appeared to be more aggressive as of late. The *Maoriland Worker* concurred, arguing women were ‘on the whole more revengeful, more blindly passionate even than the men.’ One piece of research observes that women made up significant proportions of mobs. Baker adds that ‘the keenest and least discriminating persecutors of remaining eligibles (and conscientious objectors, and, subsequently, the most fervent advocates of conscription and opponents of exemption) were agreed to be women.’ Such claims should not be isolated from the larger social dynamic which encouraged the application of moral suasion as a legitimate part of the female war effort. Editorials suggested ‘that the young ladies form a crusade, and in the most unmerciful manner ask each and every young man who seems to be physically fit to go and volunteer at once.’ Adding social pressure to ideological zeal was the propensity for women to be deemed liable for masculine failings. As one women put it, ‘women in nearly every case are responsible for shirkers … If there were no women shirkers not a single man dare shirk his responsibilities.’

There are multiple applications of this use of mobilised womanpower which might be probed. For example, a connection between racial purity and protection of women was established in pre-war immigration debates. Women’s organisations were active in the effort to encourage Anglo-Saxon stock to settle in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, often referencing racial philosophies that these groups possessed the discipline to control instincts and thus safeguard social purity. This philosophy was extended to the conclusion that other racial groups would contaminate said purity. As one study of immigration restriction notes, the nation, in countries such as New Zealand, Canada and Australia, was often portrayed as an idealised,
white maiden. ‘Non-white, especially Asian, immigration was viewed as sullying - both racially and sexually - the moral, white, virginal, nation.’\textsuperscript{881} This ideological dynamic of ‘being truly British’ has been previously encountered in how the dynamic was reoriented towards Germany (see Chapter Two). However, the utilisation of womanpower in this process, in ideological and physical terms, can be recognised. In a June 1916 meeting of the WAGL, Mrs Boeufve announced that ‘it is now fashionable to be pro-German in certain circles in Wellington’ and told the assembled women that ‘It is your duty to make this unfashionable and your country too hot for Germans and pro-Germans.’\textsuperscript{882} Moreover when the League calculated that it had distributed forty packages of literature and 30,000 pamphlets by May 1916, it was declared as ‘an object-lesson in the power of women to do useful work systematically, continuously and well.’\textsuperscript{883}

Another dimension of this mobilisation was located in issues of social hygiene. Many late nineteenth-century reformers involved in the moral purity movement saw their project as one of publicising feminine purity and reining in male licentiousness. Hence prostitution was seen as a degrading activity fuelled by masculine lusts. The *Contagious Diseases Act* was tagged as an institutionalisation of the double standard.\textsuperscript{884} VD was claimed to be a penalty of impropriety. Prophylactics were perceived as a dangerous means of making vice safe and a distraction from the proper solution of raising a masculine population disciplined enough to resist temptations. Promoting temperance in relation to alcohol was likewise endorsed and youth organisations were taught that ostracism and shame were effective tools in carrying out this feminine duty:

The man or woman who drinks is a coward, so give the man especially no quarter … simply cut the acquaintance of the young man who drinks at all. Do not allow any considerations of love or friendship to cause you to swerve that determination … Young men, who find that their girl friends shun them because of their tippling habits, will soon give these habits up.\textsuperscript{885}

The idealism attached to the war saw a connection made between such efforts and the cause; The WCTU announced that ‘the fight has to be against the social plague as well as the

\begin{flushright}
881 Philip Ferguson, p.167.
882 New Zealand Times, 23 June 1916, p.4.
883 OW, 31 May 1916, p.55.
884 New Zealand inherited both statute and case law of the *Contagious Diseases Act* from the United Kingdom and began enforcing the Act in 1869. The Act’s capacity to intern and examine infected women and its postulation that women were responsible for prostitution and the spread of VD made it a focus for feminist activism. It was overturned in New Zealand in 1910.
885 Cossgrove, pp.149-150.
\end{flushright}

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Prussian plague’. Others were less idealistic. Godley was worldly enough to suspect what young men faced with combinations of boredom, stress, excitement, pay and distance from home might get up to. He predicted he would lose one in ten of his men to VD – though this still fell short of the actual total of one in six. The Government eventually, and tacitly, accepted results over righteousness and authorised the military to take necessary steps to deal with the problem. Arrangements were made to treat NZEF VD casualties in Australia and, at the end of 1917, the army adopted the prophylactic kits developed by social reform campaigner, Ettie Rout. In order to avoid a scandal, this effort, though publicly funded, was not publicised. Indeed, the efforts made to insulate the public mind from this aspect of the war are tribute to the potency of the issue to create controversy. In August 1915 WCTU members met with Allen to discuss ‘disquieting rumours about troopers returning badly diseased’ and to present an initiative for women patrols to deter soldiers from brothels; ‘The men would be ashamed to go in to such places if a decent woman were at the door.’

However, some of the cleanest lines of mobilisation are witnessed in the gendered/chivalric interplay that saw women presented as a crucial part of the equation in ensuring that men were ready/willing to fight. In teaching its young wards, the Peace Scouts’ guidebook distilled the philosophy down to its basic components:

The surest way to prevent war is to be well prepared for it. So encourage your brothers and boyfriends to learn drill, shooting and scouting, and when they are old enough, to join some company where they can prepare themselves to stand up for the Empire against all her enemies … no man should seek a wife until he has learned to protect her.

Before the war, campaigners for defence reform focused upon the importance of winning female support in ensuring men realised their duty: ‘we must enlist the ladies on our side – the mothers, wives, sisters, aunts, and sweethearts – and woe betide the young men who then refuse to handle a rifle in their defence.’ Anna Stout’s defence of the place of women in public life also appealed to this philosophy, noting the worth women had demonstrated during the Boer War by buckling ‘on the armour of a larger proportion of men than any other

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887 Jane Tolerton, ‘Venereal Disease’, OCNZMH, p.554.
888 Tolerton, ‘Venereal Disease’, p.554.
890 Cossgrove, p.154.
891 Colonel Morris, Is Invasion Possible? How to Defend Ourselves: a Lesson from the Boer War (Dunedin, 1900), pp.13-14.
Conversely the 1909 debates around defence reform saw sceptics question whether the gendered chain of demand was properly functioning.

Women are not bothering their heads to see that their sons and husbands possess or can even hold a gun. The sooner women spend less time in the trivialities of modern easy life and devote a few more hours to the inculcation among boys of the spirit of fighting for their country … the sooner we shall be prepared to resist an enemy and the more secure our homes will be.\footnote{Sinclair, \textit{A Destiny Apart}, p.210.}

The war saw a continuation of such discourse and recruiting made conspicuous use of female influence in encouraging men to enlist. Accounts of girls spurning men of eligible age who had not enlisted were reported.\footnote{NZFL, 20 February 1915, p.6.} Conversely, the North Canterbury Recruiting Board’s primer recognised sex appeal as an effective factor in attracting young recruits: ‘Young men won’t come to be talked at. Music can do much, speeches perhaps more, but girls can do most.’\footnote{Press, 11 December 1915, p.12.} More idealistically, some recruitment drives appealed to chivalry, inviting men to defend women and children who paraded under an ‘appropriate and effective’ banner reading ‘come fight for us’ (fig.41). Personal instances of this influence are also apparent. Thomas Seddon’s (the son of the late premier) autobiography records his mother’s behaviour in response to the British entry to the war. Thomas recalls his two brothers discussing their intentions to enlist when his mother entered the room; ‘as she looked at the three of us [she ‘quietly and intently’ stated] ―We are at war - I expect you all to go.” Gently she left us and went off to attend to house affairs.’\footnote{T.E.Y. Seddon, \textit{The Seddons: an Autobiography} (London, 1968), p.222.}

However, it is the cultural narrative encapsulated in the giving of a white feather - whereby females shamed males - that has become one of the most ingrained public memories of the Great War. The white feather, as a denotation of cowardice, originates from cock fighting. A white feather in a bird’s tail, indicating cross-breeding, was thought to be proof of a poor fighter. The derived expression of ‘showing the white feather’ was in print in New Zealand to connote cowardice in a variety of political, private as well as martial circumstances as early as 1843.\footnote{Interestingly, an alternative New Zealand tradition is found in the Maori prophet Te Whiti o Rongomai at Parihaka, where the white feather was promoted as symbolising a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution.}

\footnote{The Times, 19 November 1909, p.10.} The substitution of a physical feather for an allegorical one occurred in the later nineteenth-century - William Gladstone is said to have received some from critics of his
handling of the Mahdist War. The practice became a popular exercise at the end of August 1914. At that time the British Admiral Charles Cooper Penrose-Fitzgerald encouraged women in Folkstone to present men not in uniform with feathers as symbols of shame and contempt. The practice captured public imagination and was imitated throughout Britain and the Empire.

The lack of data around feather-giving is indicative of how such activities, while possessing a public face, frequently descend into areas largely hidden from historians. How common feather-giving was, the typical profile of givers, the factors motivating the gesture and the responses of those receiving feathers remain open questions, though some deductions can be made. It is telling that white feathers never became approved features within official campaigns, despite their willingness to shame and mine popular culture for symbols. Editorial pieces across the country - even those which regularly damned shirkers – objected


to the notion of shaming a man without awareness of his circumstances and instances where returned wounded received feathers were used as moral lessons. Others deemed the practice indecent; Joseph Ward was applauded at a recruiting drive for noting that ‘no man or woman had a right to send a man a white feather and pronounce him a coward.’\footnote{Hawera & Normanby Star, 14 April 1916, p.5.} Social tensions around the custom were displayed in incidents such as the Christchurch White Feather League being chased off the streets by other women.\footnote{Colonist, 13 May 1915, p.4.} However, anecdotal evidence suggests that feather-giving was not uncommon. One man claimed to have collected five feathers in two months; another reported he had enough to make a feather duster.\footnote{Poverty Bay Herald, 11 February 1915, p.9, McLeod, p.47.} Distribution was often co-ordinated by patriotic societies who approached their targets in public. Yet such accusations stand beside cases of feathers being delivered privately, via the post, or anonymously deposited into coat pockets or hatbands.\footnote{OW, 7 July 1915, p.48.} The motives of the givers as well can be contemplated. Doubtlessly, there was an element of novelty in an activity which permitted a public assertion of dominance and the image of self-confident women operating in public space is a prominent impression in accounts.\footnote{Ashburton Guardian, 22 February 1915, p.4, OW, 19 May 1915, p.4.} Additionally, such wartime activity likely functioned as an ‘emotional labour’, providing an avenue for anxiety or grief for sons and husbands, a dynamic further explored in the next chapter.\footnote{Scates, pp.29-49.} Lastly, the gesture clearly had an impact in some cases. In the words of one white feather recipient turned recruit, ‘I’m no hero. I didn’t want to fight, but I couldn’t stand that.’\footnote{Baker, King and Country, p.52.}

Each of these chiefly female wartime activities derived from a common origin: the belief that the woman’s part in the war effort was to uphold standards in the home front. In turn, this wartime role was an extension of peacetime notions that women possessed a cultural prerogative or responsibility to police matters pertaining to social purity.

**Compatriots**

Beyond the mobilisation of females as ideological figures, as a source of welfare and as shock troops for social movements, a hint that the war effort would see an adjustment of female roles can be detected. Womanpower was sometimes utilised in ways that might be seen as pushing the boundaries of passive, demure femininity. For instance, hundreds of
women served within the New Zealand Army Nursing Service. A broader engagement in the home front saw an adjustment of the female workforce to replace lost labour. Such activity occurred alongside the mobilisation of myths attempting to legitimise potentially unconventional female roles. However, the trend towards women taking up more active roles in national life also reflects the continuation of pre-war developments and tensions.

In both of the above wartime activities, a conception, even celebration, of the New Zealand women as embodying an especially capable womanhood is detectable. This female identity, often drawing on pioneering mythology, emphasised a potential comradeship between the sexes, based around the aptitude of the New Zealand female. The typical character sketch retained traditional feminine ideals, but placed them next to capability, vitality, intellectual capacity, a need for freedom, lively temperament and a habit of participation within masculine society. One summation, provided by the touring English-born Ernest Elkington, observed the friendlier relationship between the sexes in New Zealand, circa 1906, and declared the colonial girl to be ‘one of the most fascinating creatures in the world.’ His account is worth replicating at length.

She understands men, and is equal to them in any of their moods. She too is a creature of moods, and, like her brother, requires plenty of freedom. To-day it may take form in out-door exercise of a violent nature - a wild gallop into the heart of the bush, but to-morrow the calm of the river will please her best … You can make love to her to-day, and a more sympathetic listener you cannot find; but to-morrow do not think of love, or mention it, if you prize her companionship - the hour has passed … She is not superficial, nor is she merely ‘manly’, as some would say, for she reads much, thinks deeply, and is keenly interested in the affairs of the state. She is no mean politician, and can argue without getting cross. She has feelings deep and strong, but seldom lets them intrude or bother her. She is a type of woman that evolution has created and environment has formed.906

There is an element here of Victorian romantics seeking to find their desired visions in a far off land. However sentiments of female pluck, inherited from the pioneer environment and the qualities of foremothers, were a cherished local myth as well. The creation of a scouting equivalent for New Zealand girls, in the Peace Scouts, speaks of this conception. The organisation appropriated notions of pioneer heritage and the familiar attitude that New Zealanders possessed a natural edge over their older British counterparts; ‘Almost any colonial can teach the best English Guide a lot about the practical side of real scouting in

New Zealands [sic] undeveloped areas. These notions of colonial women as especially capable creatures were, despite occasional social uncertainties and ideological conflicts, largely reconciled with previously explored notions of true womanhood. For instance, Cossgrove hotly denied allegations that the Girl Peace Scouts were too ‘tomboyish’ in nature. ‘[They are] not tomboys, but quiet dignified young women out on serious work.’ The organisation’s manual added that ‘it is possible for a woman to be brave, self-reliant, adaptable to circumstances, ready and willing to act in cases of emergency, healthy, vigorous, and physically strong; fit to endure hardship or fatigue if necessary, and yet remain truly and sweetly feminine.’

In touting such narratives the organisation was far from exceptional. Lady Stout had similarly argued to a British audience that the female vote in New Zealand had arisen from practical feminism and the longstanding partnership between men and women forged in the pioneering era:

The pioneer settlers recognised that their wives were noble types of womanhood, who had unselfishly left home and civilisation to help their husbands to reclaim the wilderness; that but for the help of the women their task would have been impossible.

Gilkison’s *Early Days in Central Otago* voiced similar ideas: ‘those men of yore were great men; they were giants with hearts of oak and thews of steel, and the women were worthy mates of noble pioneers.’ History books for decades continued to use this motif of gendered partnership as a crucial component in nation-building and imperial loyalty. The 1940 national centenary saw several heroic anecdotes of pioneer women published such as *Tales of Pioneer Women* and *The Women of New Zealand*. Such romanticised renditions of the female experience of pioneering likely chafe with awareness of the physical and emotional hardships experienced. However, this should not hinder understanding of public familiarity of the mythology in the post-pioneering era.

In Stout’s view, this arrangement had laid the basis for a post-pioneering partnership and New Zealand’s females were presented as capable compatriots who realised their duty to aid national and imperial defence.

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908 Woods, pp.138-139.
909 Cossgrove, p.18.
910 Anna Stout, p.128.
911 Gilkison, p.179.
There are corps of girl scouts in New Zealand, and a mounted ambulance corps of women. Our New Zealand women at the time of the Boer War were ready to send their sons to South Africa to help the Motherland. They recognise the “claim” of Empire, and will always be ready to support any means by which their homes and children will be protected from foreign invasion.\textsuperscript{912}

Other women likewise linked involvement in the defence of the nation, martial spectacle and inclusion in the national community. During the Boer War several Ladies Rifle Corps emerged as women donned khaki, adopted regimental names - the Wellington Amazons, Dannevirke Huia Khaki Contingent and the Greymouth Khaki Corps - and were coached by local volunteer officers (fig.42, 43). Their efforts were displayed in military drills and exercises performed at concerts, fundraising events and recruitment drives and reportedly drew substantial crowds.\textsuperscript{913}

This mythology was appealed to during the war and was used to justify roles in the war effort in the same way it had been used to justify roles in national life. With the outbreak of war the idea of overseas service seemed to fascinate some women in the same way it appealed to some men. However, the avenue for female enthusiasm was far more restricted - presumably the woman who wrote to the Prime Minister requesting to join the British Aviation Corps was frustrated in her ambition.\textsuperscript{914} Eventually, some options became available and in early 1915 an arrangement was secured to send 50 nurses overseas.\textsuperscript{915} This commitment was increased over the course of the war and more than 600 New Zealand women would serve as nurses in the New Zealand Army Nursing Service.\textsuperscript{916} Other women served in semi-official capacities. In July 1915, the Volunteer Sisterhood was established and arranged for women to travel to Egypt to work in troop canteens.\textsuperscript{917} Moreover, individual women travelled to Britain and took up nursing, Red Cross or YMCA duties, joined Voluntary Aid Detachments or worked as members of the International Women’s Street Patrols.\textsuperscript{918} Such efforts worked to constitute something like a home front away from home … in ‘Home’.

\textsuperscript{912} Anna Stout, pp.128-129.
\textsuperscript{913} EP, 8 March 1900, p.5.
\textsuperscript{914} Poverty Bay Herald, 24 September 1915, p.7.
\textsuperscript{915} OW, 3 February 1915, p.27.
\textsuperscript{916} Peter Rees, The Other Anzacs: Nurses at War, 1914-1918 (Crows Nest, 2008), p.xiii.
\textsuperscript{917} Tolerton, Ettie, p.104.
\textsuperscript{918} Tolerton, ‘Women in the First World War’, p.614.
Figure 42 ATL-1/2-020186-F, ca 1899-1902, ‘Ladies Rifle Corps, also known as the Wellington Amazons, and members of the Wellington Militia’.

Figure 43 ATL-PAColl-6001-07, ca 1899-1902, ‘Members of the Ladies Rifle Corps, known as the Wellington Amazons’. Original photographic prints and postcards from file print collection, Box 7 (PAColl-6001).
In conceptualisations of this activity we see instances of a female version of the ANZAC ethos, whereby intrinsic characteristics were applied to wartime purposes. Hence, the capacity of the colonial women to stand amongst the best in the world became part of wartime mythology, alongside the familiar notion that new Britons were highly resourceful. These expressions shine through in wartime accounts, but were also publicised by the nurses themselves before the outbreak of war; ‘It has certainly been found that some English nurses working in the colonies appear to expect a great deal of waiting upon … on the other hand, colonial nurses at Home have been commended for their readiness to put their hands to anything.’

Interwoven with such notions is the conception of femininity as connoting a nurturing and maternal nature. The Hon. T.M. Wilford described the Red Cross as ‘the hands of the mothers of the world reached out to their sons … it is an army waging war for the alleviation of suffering and heartache.’ The Red Cross’ fundraising appeals presented the organisation as ‘The GREATEST MOTHER in the world’ who was feeding, warming and healing thousands.

Lastly, reacting to the suffering and working conditions the war wrought, the ethos emphasised the heroic duty nurses rendered. This was nicely supported by how twelve New Zealand sisters gained the Royal Red Cross decoration, first class. However, the major example occurred when ten New Zealand nurses were among the 167 lost when the troop transport Marquette was torpedoed, on 23 October 1915, on route to Salonika. Reports - using the rhetoric of 1915 and the image of martyrdom woven around the execution of the British nurse Edith Cavell some eleven days earlier - gave prominent place to the bravery, professionalism and self-sacrifice exhibited by the nurses.

The captain of a French cruiser, narrates an incident which is ‘worthy to live in the history of our Empire,’ as illustrating the capable part our women are playing. It was when the cruiser recently was assisting in saving life after an unnamed transport had been torpedoed in the Aegean Sea … When the French boats arrived the nurses with one accord, called out: ‘Take the fighting men on first!’

The Marquette tragedy spurred recognition of nursing in New Zealand and planning to commemorate the Marquette nurses started in 1916. In 1927, as memorials were being

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919 *Kai Tiaki*, October 1912, p.94.
921 *Feilding Star*, 19 August 1918, p.3.
923 *Kai Tiaki*, October 1915, p.198.
erected across the country, the Nurses’ Memorial Chapel was opened in Christchurch Hospital. The chapel’s design, carvings and stained glass weave duty and sacrifice embodied by the nurses with the major remembrance motifs established within the public cult of sacrifice (see Chapter Six).\footnote{Marquette Memorial, http://www.cnmc.org.nz/chapelwindows.htm, accessed 12 February 2012.}

However, the avenues of service secured and the cultural capital made out of them speak more of grass-roots lobbying than government enthusiasm. On the outbreak of war several women wrote to the Minister of Defence, citing their willingness and ability to serve.\footnote{ANZ-R22433127-AAYS-8638-AD-1-937-49/34, ‘Medical - Nurses for NZEF’.} Several MPs also mentioned receiving similar messages.\footnote{NZPD, Vol.169, 11 August 1914, p.503, 1 September 1914, p.668.} However, in contrast to the eagerness to dispatch an expeditionary force, females keen to get to the front faced a belated start; the recently formed New Zealand Army Nursing Service was not fully integrated into the organisational culture of the New Zealand Army. Its leaders, pointing out that Australian and British nurses had already been deployed, insisted that ‘if the sons of New Zealand were serving the Empire in the field it was only right that her daughters, who were able and willing, should be allowed to do so too.’\footnote{Rees, p.x.} It was not until 25 January 1915 that continued insistence on a means of service, and increasing realisation of the need for such services, saw an offer extended to the British War Office. This offer was accepted, apparently to the Government’s surprise, and an arrangement was made to send 50 nurses overseas.\footnote{McLeod, p.69.}

The frustration which arose from administrative uncertainty saw others gain from New Zealand’s loss. Dr Agnes Bennett left Wellington in March 1915 as the New Zealand Army had no positions for a female doctor. Offering her services to the Red Cross Society, she ended up working in Serbia, Cairo and Choubra. For her work she received the Third Order of the St. Sava and Royal Red Cross of Serbia.\footnote{Beryl Hughes, ‘Agnes Bennett’, The Book of New Zealand Women, Charlotte Macdonald, Merimeri Penfold and Bridget Williams ed. (Wellington, 1991), p.80.} Bennett’s independent approach was repeated in the cases of Dr Elizabeth Gunn and Dr Jessie Scott, who secured commissions in the British armed forces and nurses such as Jane Peter, who after being turned down because of her age (56), travelled on her own accord and served with distinction in Serbia, Egypt and England.\footnote{Rogers, p.31.}
Whether this lack of initiative in the official mind was motivated by apathy or ‘distaste’ at the idea of women on the battlefield is debateable.\(^{931}\) The persona non grata status established around Ettie Rout, however, is indicative of the interplay of forces within the mobilisation process and how officialdom could operate as an inhibitor of potential cultural mobilisations. Arriving in Egypt in February 1916, Rout quickly became aware of the high VD rate among troops. For the duration of the war she devoted much of her energies to arranging and distributing prophylactic kits, inspecting brothels, counselling soldiers who had contracted infections and argued that VD should be regarded and treated as a medical problem rather than a moral one. Rout’s efforts and successes in improving troop welfare earned her endearment and the designation of the ‘guardian angel of the ANZACs’ within the ranks and the support she offered fits neatly with ideals of capable and compassionate femininity.\(^{932}\)

In the home front, however, Rout’s work was not publicised as the practical behaviour of a woman who had recognised a problem, rolled up her sleeves and achieved results. The subject of Rout’s campaign and her support of prophylactics clashed with conventional sensibilities; even Massey and Holland evidently found some common ground in shared pious horror of ‘the most wicked woman in Britain’, as she was dubbed by a bishop in the House of Lords.\(^{933}\) It is unsurprising that this instance of capable femininity was not exploited. Instead significant efforts were taken to censor Rout’s public voice and presence; her name and activities were included under the wartime regulations, meaning any report would garner a £100 fine.\(^{934}\) Indeed, until her ideas became more conventional, Rout was largely unsung and unremembered in New Zealand. This silence makes her a salient, if exceptional, example of dogs that did not bark.

This is not to present officialdom as the sole barrier to a mythology that might have been - clearly significant sections of New Zealand society would have been scandalised by Rout’s work and philosophies. However, while controversy was inevitable, the extent of the reaction was not. While the French recognised Rout with the \textit{Médaille de la Reconnaissance française} - the rarely awarded medal created for civilians who had volunteered public-spirited

\(^{931}\) Rees, p.70.
\(^{932}\) Tolerton, \textit{Ettie}, pp.12, 13, 201.
\(^{934}\) John Anderson, pp.53, 215.
aid - there is no mention of Rout in New Zealand’s official history of the medical services. While the Australian authorities did not censor Rout’s appeals for funds, the New Zealand cabinet forbade newspapers to publish her letters.\footnote{John Anderson, p.214.} After the war Rout’s book, \textit{Safe Marriage}, was published in Australia and became a best-seller in Britain whilst it was banned in New Zealand under the 1910 \textit{Indecent Publication Act}.\footnote{Ettie Rout, \textit{Safe Marriage: A Return to Sanity} (London, 1923), p.90.}

The unsteadiness of those mobilisations of womanpower, which conflicted with traditional conceptions of female roles, can also be witnessed in ideas of a female labour force to replace enlisted males. Here as well, a larger female role in public life was hinted at and a legitimising mythology of female compatriots can be detected. As previously noted, the emergence of waged women was a pre-war phenomenon which appeared alongside other historical forces. However, the war has been seen as a period which accelerated this development.\footnote{McLeod, p.1.} Baker notes the mid-1916 extension of public service exams for women and that the number of female public servants grew from 1,826, in 1914 to 4,153 by 1917.\footnote{Baker, \textit{King and Country}, pp.55-56.}

Olssen claims young women exploited the opportunities created as men departed, noting the white-collar sector as particularly open due to market demands and the lack of unions.\footnote{Olssen, ‘Working Gender’, p.83.} Similar sentiments were voiced by women entering the professions. Doris Gordon, a graduate from Otago University’s Medical School, suggested that women ‘realised that a unique chance of community service was opening up to them. Prejudice against petticoats and preference for pants died a sudden death when the Kaiser tore up his historic scrap of paper.\footnote{Doris Gordon, \textit{Backblocks Baby-Doctor} (London, 1955), p.70.}

However, the statistical record during 1901-1921 suggests continued evolution, rather than revolution, in the size of the female workforce. One can be forgiven for failing to observe any radical change during the war years (fig.44).\footnote{Measuring the precise size of the female workforce is problematic as statistics appear to be based upon paid employment. It is thus unclear whether the labour provided by, say, farmer’s wives has been included. Bloomfield, pp.134-136.} Regional experiences also indicate an acceleration of existing movements. For instance 25 percent of the female workforce in the Taranaki province was classed as working in agricultural production in 1911, against the national average of 9 percent. By 1916 this divergence had grown, with 33 percent of
Taranaki’s female workforce employed in agriculture compared to the national average of 10 percent.\textsuperscript{942} This longer term pattern of uniform growth does mask certain developments within employment sectors between 1901 and 1921 (fig.45).\textsuperscript{943} The professional, commercial, transport/communication and primary sectors, for instance, indicate an acceleration of pre-war patterns during wartime (with the professional and commercial sectors achieving continued growth after the war). Meanwhile, female employment in the industrial sector stagnated between 1911-1916 and the number of women employed in domestic work fell (likely reflecting the exploitation of new opportunities).

The strains the war placed upon industries saw voices raised on the potential of women to shoulder some of the workload. Noting the immediate need as to sustain rural productivity, the National Efficiency Board promoted the notion of women as an untapped labour force which could solve labour supply problems and improve rural enlistment.\textsuperscript{944} In 1917 the Board reprinted a modified version of a 1916 British Government pamphlet, \textit{Women’s War Work}, which detailed how female labour could aid the war effort. Thus the women of New Zealand were urged to ‘undertake, so far as they are able, the work that has hitherto been handled by their men-folk, and thus relieve those men for other duties that cannot be easily carried out by women.’\textsuperscript{945} The Minister of Agriculture also noted that ‘the time appears to be approaching when the women of the country must be called into the agricultural ranks in no inconsiderable numbers.’\textsuperscript{946} The Women’s National Reserve had made similar recommendations since its formation in 1915. Its campaign to produce ‘an accurate register of women prepared to undertake some branch of work whereby they may set free for active service the men at present employed’ had arisen out of the restriction of the national registration to males.\textsuperscript{947} Regional branches of the reserve sprang up through 1915 and argued that the country’s efforts could be boosted by the mobilisation of female labour.\textsuperscript{948}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{942} Sarah Luxford, ‘Passengers for the War the Involvement of Women in Employment during the Great War 1914-1918’ (M.A. thesis, Massey University, 2005), pp.107-116.
\item \textsuperscript{943} Luxford.
\item \textsuperscript{945} National Efficiency Board, \textit{Women’s War Work} (Wellington, 1917), p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{946} AJHR, 1917, H-29, ‘Department of Agriculture, Industries, and Commerce’, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{947} NZFL, 27 August 1915, p.13.
\item \textsuperscript{948} Poverty Bay Herald, 24 September 1915, p.7.
\end{itemize}
Figure 44 Size of Female Workforce, 1901-1921.

Figure 45 Female Employment Patterns, 1901-1921.
It has been noted that the image of the New Zealand female war worker won support and was ‘glamorised’ within public culture.\textsuperscript{949} One \textit{New Zealand Farmer} correspondent, ‘Brown Eyed Ruby’, noted that ‘we country women and girls are willing and do endure hardships on farms now through shortage of male labour, and do so willingly. On farms you will find girls helping fence, cutting black berries, grubbing gorse, carting out feed to the cows, helping feed the pigs and other animals, and milking.’\textsuperscript{950} The National Efficiency Board promoted its recommendations with similar rhetoric. Citing the use of female rural labour in Britain, the Board asserted that New Zealand women were more capable than their British counterparts and might thus undertake a greater role: ‘the women of New Zealand are, as a whole, physically fitter and far more suited by country experience for such [agricultural] work than their sisters in the Old Country.’\textsuperscript{951} The ‘unqualified success’ of Auckland’s female bank workers was also contrasted with the difficulties that had arisen from the use of female clerks in London banks, who were reportedly unpunctual and required supervision. The New Zealand girls apparently displayed promptness, initiative and excellent work ethics: ‘I don’t know what class of worker they are dealing with in London, but it certainly must be quite different from the Auckland type of business girl.’\textsuperscript{952}

While such discourse provided some validation for wartime circumstances and likely spurred acceptance by emphasising familiar mythology, efforts to advance this mobilisation were balanced against another set of social forces and cultural values. Social responses to an expanded female workforce and the transfer of jobs to female hands collided with some of the central tenets of the established sexual order. Belich notes a streak of masculinist antagonism towards female labour as representing both unwanted competition and deviation from gender conventions.\textsuperscript{953} Similarly, Melanie Nolan has observed an entrenched male breadwinner culture, backed by state legislation, which acted to secure the masculine role as the sole or major economic provider.\textsuperscript{954} Such dispositions functioned to curb designs of women as a potential backup labour force. Olssen notes a lack of will to challenge existing patterns of gendered segmentation and that ‘deep customary beliefs and values undoubtedly

\textsuperscript{949} McLeod, p.91, Hucker, ‘The Rural Home Front’, p.244.
\textsuperscript{950} Hucker, ‘The Rural Home Front’, p.240.
\textsuperscript{952} NZH, 29 March 1916, p.9.
\textsuperscript{953} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, pp.144, 188.
\textsuperscript{954} Melanie Nolan, \textit{Breadwinning: New Zealand Women and the State} (Christchurch, 2000).
explain this situation’. Hucker’s study of the Taranaki region notes women as largely ‘overlooked … as a potential solution to the labour supply problem’. Some women expressed similar concerns that unwomanly work could damage the gender/social order. In responding to the rhetoric of conscripting female labour, the Christchurch branch of the Women’s International Peace League invoked the spectre of a fall in the birth-rate, noting that ‘women were never intended to do a man’s work … [but to] rear strong, healthy children. Indeed the promotion of female war labour often went hand in hand with disclaimers of its temporary nature and with appeals to employers to follow the Government’s example and prioritise the re-employment of returned soldiers. Such directions were advanced after the war, empowered by a sense of moral debt and active lobbying by the RSA that the returned soldier should be able to resume life at the level he had left it. The Repatriation Department, established under the 1918 Repatriation Act, proclaimed its objective was to ‘help every discharged soldier requiring assistance to secure for himself a position in the community at least as good as that relinquished by him when he joined the colours.’ Such priorities were additionally reflected in the closure of the Women’s Employment Bureau as a separate office in 1921, on the grounds that the number of engagements did not justify the expense.

As with overseas service, the employment of women is indicative of a mobilisation that did not bloom as it might have. A collection of appropriate myths and imagery remained, waiting in the wings, which might have been more intensely mobilised had events made the utilisation of female service more prudent. For example, consider the Women’s National Reserve. Although it’s proposals often represented an extreme imagining of how the social body could be reconstituted - and has been noted as ‘more written about than used’ - social responses sometimes allude to the potential of waged work to be seen as a socially accepted, even appropriate, female role. When a branch of the Reserve was formed in Khandallah, a

956 Hucker, ‘The Rural Home Front’, p.239.
957 McLeod, p.30.
Free Lance cartoonist depicted ‘Miss Khandallah’ as taking the lead in the patriotic effort (fig.46). Miss Khandallah is positively presented as an image of active, yet ladylike patriotism. She is fresh-faced and her efforts are depicted as indicative of a loyal spirit, rather than the stereotypical presentation of female activists as frumpish, dour and badgering. Indeed the sting of the piece is directed at those men left emasculated in the renegotiated sexual hierarchy as soldiers were confirmed as embodying ideal masculinity and women were seemingly poised to take up male civilian roles.

The notion of the compatriot female outranking shirking males is indicative of how the wartime environment offered an opportunity to advance a positive message of the role capable womanhood might play in public life. However, the unsteady application of this message reveals some of the tensions around how women’s part in public life was conventionally perceived. Both message and tensions speak of existing forces that were mobilised in the war effort.

Legacy
The women’s part in the war was ideologically defined and physically shaped by the interplay of two forces: the momentum of established gender conventions around femininity and an impulse for active roles in the cause. Within this dynamic the war effort spotlighted the conventional comprehensions of femininity, alongside some of the tensions within these comprehensions, and played them out in wartime circumstances. Post-war public culture continued to balance these forces and public expressions of womanly duty often continued from wartime activity. Scholarship has illustrated how patriotic societies, and the maternal function they embodied, transitioned their efforts from providing comforts for soldiers to the tasks of welcoming soldiers home and maintaining the graves of soldiers who died after returning to New Zealand.963 The notion that women were appropriate agents for this task could be seen as given precedent in the Auckland branch of the Victoria League’s 1910 effort to maintain the graves of British soldiers and ‘friendly Maori’ killed in the New Zealand Wars.964

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963 Woods, pp.96-97.
964 Pickles, ‘A Link’, p.36.
NATIONAL REGISTRATION—WOMAN SHOWS THE WAY.

A meeting was held at Emandellah to take steps for the formation of a branch of the Women’s National Reserve. The proposed national registration, compulsory for men and optional for women, was discussed, and all present expressed their willingness to register themselves, and that they were prepared to help in any emergency that might arise. Wellington "Borning Post."

Miss Emandellah (of Wellington): Now then, you timid boys, come at it boldly and you’ll find it quite easy. Surely you’ll not let me go through the hunt alone?

Figure 46 *New Zealand Free Lance*, 24 September 1915, p.3.
The outbreak of the influenza pandemic in November 1918 provides another example of how communal networks and the cultural ideas around them transitioned to new tasks. As one commentator related the campaigns, ‘now that we have completed fighting the Germans, we are now fighting the germs.’\textsuperscript{965} The impact of the pandemic upon New Zealand is often overshadowed by the events and deaths of the war. To lend some perspective, between mid September and early October 1916 the Somme Offensive saw 7,000 New Zealanders become casualties (of whom more than 1,500 were killed).\textsuperscript{966} Between late October and December 1918 the influenza pandemic killed 8,573 New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{967} Numerous patriotic committees, actively involved in the war effort, were remobilised to care for the sick. The Women’s National Reserve put itself to work organising volunteer efforts, preparing and delivering food for over 4,000 people through November 1918.\textsuperscript{968} The imagery around this volunteer effort made ready use of familiar motifs. Thus the same cast of a youthful male casualty and a dutiful female volunteer were reassigned, as was the theme of Christ-like suffering (fig.47). This is all nigh indistinguishable from the wartime vintage; indeed it is only the date, the word ‘epidemic’ in the caption and the bottle of ‘influenza medicine’ which confirms the piece as a peacetime scene.

Additionally, the continuance of discourse around how modern femininity was to fit with public life is symptomatic of ongoing tensions. Just as wartime experiences mobilised these tensions, post-war society drew upon wartime experiences in continuing the debate. For instance, political reforms in Britain which enfranchised women as electors and potential representatives spurred momentum for reform in New Zealand. One of the major justifications aired in parliamentary debate around the \textit{Women’s Parliamentary Rights Act} was the wartime loyalty and capability of New Zealand women. The Hon. Sir Hall-Jones noted that the country had firsthand knowledge that, alongside being ‘sound imperialists’ and supporters of law and order, ‘thousands of women did splendid work during the war-time, and we have our own knowledge of the fine work done by the women of this city during the pneumatic plague.’\textsuperscript{969} Ward noted that the women’s part in securing victory had ‘altered the whole aspect of the question of what was due to the women of the world.’\textsuperscript{970}

\textsuperscript{965} OW, 25 December 1918, p.57.
\textsuperscript{966} Ian McGibbon, ‘Western Front’, OCNZMH, p.602.
\textsuperscript{967} Geoffrey Rice, \textit{Black November: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic in New Zealand}, 2nd ed (Christchurch, 2005), p.203
\textsuperscript{968} Rice, p.85.
\textsuperscript{969} NZPD, Vol.185, 23 October 1919, p.758.
\textsuperscript{970} NZPD, Vol.184, 26 September 1919, pp.964-965.
FOR THE SAKE OF HUMANITY.
The work of the volunteer helpers, who are combating the present epidemic (in the face of great risk) is beyond praise.

Figure 47 New Zealand Observer, 23 November 1918, p.12.
Motherhood continued to constitute the primary basis of feminine identity in the post-war world. The retention and restoration, and debatably reinforcing, of this gendered paradigm arose as a recurrent theme in the post-war zeitgeist. Arguably, the war played a role in this, with years of total war fuelling a longing to move beyond the physical and psychic disruptions endured and to return to a state of normalcy including stable, domestic serenity. As one correspondent put it, the subject occupying the minds of all classes was ‘Keep the cradles full! Save the babies! Replenish the nation!’ Certainly the marriage rate per 1,000 shot up from 5.65 in 1918 to reach 8.33 in 1919 and 10.21 in 1920 - compared to the 1913 figure of 8.25.

Next to confirmations of feminine duty was the continued use of antitypes and warnings that modern life was distancing women from their gendered duty. The mayor of Gore warned that degeneracy could be witnessed in girls who forsook domestic work and filling cradles in favour of donning silk stockings and high heels, powdering their faces and playing tennis. The President of the Young Citizen’s League, commenting on threats to standards of morality in the community, invoked the crucial place of the mother in maintaining social/moral stability; ‘Nowadays our women are so busy with work that they make for themselves, that they have not got time to do the work which God gives them to do in this world … The moral progress of humanity depends upon our women, every man is the outcome of woman’s training.’ Truby King protested trends in women’s fashion for damaging female’s maternal capacities. High heels were condemned for damaging the alignment of the spine, pelvis and leg and thus bringing pain and ill health. Brassieres were accused of telescoping nipples and making feeding difficult. Such damage not only disabled women ‘in regard to the sacred function of complete and perfect motherhood’ but was compounded in that the victims included ‘the hapless children born to women who prevent themselves from being complete mothers.’

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971 Wanhalla, pp.163-164.
973 NZOYB, 1921-1922, p.77.
975 ODT, 4 May 1922, p.10.
976 NZFL, 23 October 1923, p.13.
977 Griffiths, p.304.
978 NZFL, 10 October 1923, p.13.
Thus notions of chivalric ideals, sacred motherhood, a distinct female character and a duty to maintain social standards clashed, negotiated and/or were reconciled with the social changes of the modern environment. Such discourse reveals one bookend whose matching counterpart is located in pre-war material. Notions of the women’s part within the war effort stand within, and reflect this longer term development.
Chapter Six

Cult of Sacrifice: The Mobilisation of Public Responses to the Costs of War

‘Men could not sustain a war of such magnitude and pain without hope – the hope that its very enormity would ensure that it could never happen again and the hope that when somehow it had been fought through to a resolution, the foundations of a better-ordered world would have been laid.’

More than 18,000 New Zealanders died on service during the Great War. Tens of thousands more were wounded, maimed and psychologically scarred. Then and now those figures, and the sentiments established around them, form some of the core features in comprehension of the war. Equally sombre, alongside the sheer scale of the butcher’s bill, is the manner by which the numbers reached the heights they did. The military realities of the Great War entailed a persistent process whereby soldiers became casualties thus requiring more civilians to become soldiers. The logic of this process saw, on average, nearly 2,000 New Zealand men take up arms for each month of the war’s duration. By the war’s end roughly one tenth of New Zealand’s total population had been shipped overseas. All this adds understanding to why the Great War has been described as ‘above all, a contest of endurance.’ What exactly sustained this endurance and kept men at, and going to, the front has been vigorously debated. Explanations have favoured factors of patriotism, shame, mateship, hatred of the enemy, discipline, courage and the allure of violence as a liberator of primal instincts from civilising restraints.

Study of the maintenance of consent sometimes sees these factors gathered and orchestrated within the concept of ‘war culture’, which might be defined as a body of meanings layered upon the conflict which offered participants some capacity to rationalise and/or respond to circumstances. Among the foremost priorities here was the provision of meanings for the realities of violence, deprivation and mass death. Tuchman’s quote at the beginning of this chapter references this ethos, which related suffering with purpose and the trust, or hope, that something would be gained from what was being lost: ‘nothing less could give dignity or sense to monstrous offensives in which thousands and hundreds of thousands were killed to

981 NZOYB, 1919, p.257.
982 Alexander Watson, p.1.
gain ten yards and exchange one wet-bottomed trench for another. These strands of war culture, which married loss to meaning and higher purpose, might be dubbed a cult of sacrifice. Instances of such discourse in New Zealand’s frontline experience have been preserved. One man recalled a chaplain’s speech to frontline troops;

He told us that wonderful things would come out of the war, that when it was over we would be free to build a new and better world. Great spiritual blessings would spring from these times of trouble and sacrifice.  

The notion that the New Zealand soldier wanted something to believe in as a response to nearly unbelievable surroundings is plausible. However sentimentalism and the sanctification of death competed with humour, callousness, fatalism, superstition, detachment, stoic indifference and corporeal comforts as coping mechanisms and responses to mortality. The location of discourses of sacrifice and how receptive New Zealand troops were to them remain questions for battlefield anthropologists to consider.

However, the hardships and losses accepted to perpetuate the war, and the cultural forms which rationalised them, extended beyond the battlefield and became part of public understanding of the war in all belligerent countries. How aware civilians were of the realities of the front forms a contested point within scholarship. Some accounts emphasise the gulf between the two worlds of the home front and the frontline and this remains a powerful impression within frontline expressions. Siegfried Sassoon’s poems, for instance, frequently dwell upon a frustration felt towards civilians unable to comprehend the soldier’s experience.

I knew a simple soldier boy  
Who grinned at life in empty joy,  
Slept soundly through the lonesome dark,  
And whistled early with the lark.

In winter trenches, cowed and glum,  
With crumps and lice and lack of rum,  
He put a bullet through his brain.  
No one spoke of him again.

You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye  
Who cheer when soldier lads march by,  
Sneak home and pray you’ll never know  
The hell where youth and laughter go.

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985 Archibald Baxter, p.156.  
Similar expressions of estrangement in the New Zealand context have been identified. Nonetheless each combatant nation forged conduits, however imperfect, between the men in uniform and the societies they fought for. Civilians were urged to consider the sacrifices being made in their names whilst soldiers were reminded of the loved ones, communities and traditions they were fighting to preserve - shoring up consent and stiffening the resolve of both parties. The cult of sacrifice grew from this complex interaction between the two fronts and it has been observed that ‘the cult of the war dead did not start in the trenches.’ Indeed, the cult drew upon the qualities the home front possessed; notably its higher degree of sentimentalism and its emotional proximity to - yet physical distance from - combat.

Within the home front, institutions and philosophies were primed to attempt to explain the costs of the war, to sanctify death and to call for further sacrifices - in short to make sense of the world at war. This search for appropriate language, themes and motifs became a preoccupation within public culture during and after the war. Thus the war’s presence had notions of trial, sin, judgement, redemption and millennialism woven around it. There can be a sense of unrealism about this gilding of mass slaughter with noble sentiments. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss such discourse as artificial or lacking social weight. This is the problem of modern audiences peering back into a period where dulce et decorum est pro patria mori could be publicly proclaimed without irony (as it is in the memorial archway at Otago Boys’ High School). Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker suggest that such proclamations should be taken at face value and claim that it is we, the modern viewers, who fails to connect with such material.

The system of representations which characterized First World War contemporaries – soldiers and civilians, men, women and children – is now almost impossible to accept. The sense of obligation, of unquestioning sacrifice … is no longer acceptable. The foundation on which the immense collective consensus of 1914-18 was based … has vanished into thin air.

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988 Mosse, p.163. The divergence between a sentimental home front conception of the dead, contrasting to a detached and pragmatic battlefield approach, is well considered within K.S. Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, 3rd ed (Melbourne, 2008), pp.81-92.
989 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, p.10.
The meanings this cult of sacrifice produced and circulated within the home front play an important explanatory role in exactly how loss remained overwhelmingly wedded with agreement or acceptance of the war. Indeed, despite the unprecedented social trauma the numbers at the start of this chapter signify, there was a remarkable retention of social cohesion; the mass consensus which entered the war was battered but intact at the end of 1918. Doubtlessly the impact of the cult of sacrifice was amplified by censorship, anti-sedition laws and the sense of legitimacy official promotion lent it. However its attraction to the popular mind should not be overlooked and the cult’s ability to meet the psychological needs of common New Zealanders should be appreciated.

In examining the results of, and means behind, the mobilisation of this cult of sacrifice three key manifestations are considered. The first considers the ways in which war deaths were publicly responded to. The seductiveness of this aspect of the cult of sacrifice fundamentally stems from the dignity and sense it bestowed upon casualty reports, as routine death was reaffirmed as meaningful through a language of duty, honour, salvation and rebirth. The second manifestation considers the interplay between the sacred meanings constructed around war sacrifice and the profane realities of everyday routines. The reach of the cult of sacrifice in the public sphere can be discerned by the friction generated between it and other social activities. Sectors of public opinion rallied against behaviours deemed affronts to the decorum of the cult of sacrifice. Various activities were tagged as indicative of ‘business as usual’ attitudes and thus unworthy behaviour. Conversely austerity was promoted to boost efficiency as well as to cultivate public worthiness of battlefield sacrifices – a sort of mostly secular self-denial. The third manifestation examined considers the notion that the burdens of the war should be distributed as fairly as possible. The resulting call for equality of sacrifice was a powerful social movement reflective of grass-roots forces and a populist social consensus. By the end of 1915 over 30,000 New Zealanders had embarked. Their friends and families had become a sizeable and growing social demographic. The results of this culture can be considered as illustrating elements of pre-war social philosophies around social cohesion, though reworked to reference an unprecedented wartime situation. Likewise the means by which calls for equality of sacrifice were advanced adapted many of the social mechanics of conformity up to and including calls for state intervention. Together these aspects of the cult of sacrifice indicate how public culture responded to the sacrifices made to wage the Great War - how they were explained, related with everyday life and reflected aspects of social cohesion.
Explaining sacrifice - responding to death

The first aspect of the cult of sacrifice considered is the way New Zealanders made sense of the fundamental consequence of prolonged, attrition warfare on the scale of the Great War: the continual presence of war deaths. Central to the cultural response that emerged was the salient divergence between established cultural conventions and the wartime experience. The fundamental differences are highlighted in Pat Jalland’s investigation of Victorian cultural mores around death. The ‘good death’ took place in the sanctuary of the home amongst family. The familiar setting offered comfort to the passing and a network to console and support mourners. This ideal mourning process was irreconcilable with the ‘sudden, violent, premature, ugly deaths of young healthy adults’ and the inability to view and place bodily remains at rest – conventionally considered to be part of the process of accepting the finality of death and coming to terms with loss. Aside from the questionable feasibility of shipping remains home, the prominence of death by artillery bombardment meant that, in many cases, remains simply did not exist.

These logistics of death established the basis by which death became a collective occurrence. This phenomenon is aptly described in Sandy Callister’s analysis of the visual impact of casualty listings. ‘The sheer number of portraits makes it difficult to contemplate the unique humanness of the individuals represented … Individual deaths blur into mass death.’ The same relationship between the individual and the collective is witnessed in the lists of names on memorial plaques, the uniform appearance of national graveyards and remembrance oaths to remember ‘them’. The representation of individual soldiers in memorial statues or within the tomb of the unknown warrior have been noted as indicative of the rise of popular democracy, mass movements and the enshrining of the ordinary citizen. However, such forms seem to openly admit that individuality has been lost. Statues stand as symbols for all soldiers and it is the unknown quality of the Unknown Soldier’s remains that make them representative of the dead rather than the death of an individual.

The pinnacle of this process of collective grieving saw the dead nationalised and communally mourned in public remembrance with a focus provided by war memorials. In the aftermath

991 Callister, The Face of War, p.79.
of the war nations debated whether memorials should be utilitarian and serve some practical function, or follow traditional forms and be purely ornamental. New Zealand makes a good example of a country where the latter view prevailed; of the 452 recorded civic memorials the small number of bridges, libraries and halls are vastly outnumbered by memorials whose sole function is to serve as reminders of the war, the dead and the ideals invoked around them. Why this is so has been a matter of debate. Some accounts have tagged New Zealand’s public culture as ‘more wedded to a genteel tradition’ and less hospitable to modernism. Other interpretations place more emphasis on the role of actors, notably Allen and William Hugh Montgomery, who argued for ornamental memorials as inspirational whilst discrediting utilitarian monuments as dishonouring the spirit of sacrifice; ‘once Allen had spoken, other fell into line’. However it becomes difficult to comprehend the enthusiasm New Zealanders displayed in dotting the country with ornamental memorials - there is roughly one memorial for every 40-50 New Zealander killed - as simply falling into line. If Allen’s power was really so potent that New Zealand society simply aligned itself around his views on extremely sensitive subjects, then he would have had an easier time navigating the social upheavals the war wrought.

Grand manipulation has been similarly nominated in explaining the shape these ornamental memorials took and the political, and apparently ‘highly phallic’, character of these monuments has been deconstructed. For instance it has been claimed that New Zealand’s war memorials were ‘deliberate and often controversial acts of propaganda and social control’ erected by certain ‘especially influential’ social groups who acted ‘with definite ideological purposes in mind.’ Again the validity of such claims is contestable. The forms of the hundreds of local memorials erected throughout New Zealand were determined through local committees. While debates revealed differences in opinion around aesthetic

993 A third option was voiced by those who claimed that money would be better spent on the living than the dead and argued that employment, care and rehabilitation should be prioritised.
997 Inglis and Phillips, p.185.
999 Maclean and Phillips, p.10.
tastes and designs, they also found a workable consensus and the accepted designs found public endorsement in fundraising, dedication and in ongoing commemoration.  

The major absence in such explanations, however, is the historical context and simple human feeling which shaped remembrance in ceremony and stone. The longing to respond to the loss of so many, to put the dead to rest symbolically if not physically, was a universal sentiment of Great War societies. Cultural historians such as George Mosse have scrutinised the widespread urge ‘to find a higher meaning in the war experience, and to obtain some justification for the sacrifice and loss’.  

The width and depth of this longing to commemorate is not surprising; a significant number of New Zealanders had brothers, fathers, sons, relatives, friends, sweethearts, neighbours or colleagues who put a face on rhetoric around loss. The most salient expression of this engagement is witnessed in the emergence of regular, highly attended public remembrance rituals. One study of interwar ANZAC Day remembrance remarks upon the crowds, the often insufficient room in gathering places and describes the ceremonies as ‘the most solemn and most widely attended day of commemoration in New Zealand.’  

Such sentiments might be tracked back to their starting points. One example of how meanings around the dead were circulated in public space is found in mainstream denominations, as notions that war sacrifices embodied a righteous cause and that the dead had received heavenly reward were actively publicised. The results, if not Valhalla, are something akin to it. The editor of Church News noted ‘we must think of our brave soldiers marching on, in advance of us, mustering in the greater world that comes next to this … They are not sadly looking back, unless it may be that we make them sad. And if your very best and dearest is among them, how would he like you to pity him now?’

During the first ANZAC Day service, Bishop Averill proclaimed that ‘the brave men who will not come back to us have not finished their life of devotion, but have gone into God’s higher training camp of service, where He has special work for each of them … As soldiers they will stand before the Great White throne of God.’ Such philosophies crossed denominations and Christchurch Catholic Bishop Mathew Brodie preached at the 1916


\[1001\] Mosse, p.6.

\[1002\] Sharpe, p.97.

\[1003\] Davidson, p.458.

\[1004\] NZH, 26 April 1916, p.4.
ANZAC Mass that ‘the lost ones, by their deaths for their country and their God, had inherited the crown of eternal reward.’

However, the role of theology within the ANZAC cult is a curious one. Christian imagery and themes were familiar and in all probability meaningful to a large section of the public; in 1916 nearly 72 percent of the population identified as Anglican, Presbyterian or Methodist and a further 13 percent as Catholic. This lends some context to the appropriation of religious/Christian sentiment on and at memorial sites. However while the cult encompassed and appropriated many concepts and functions of religious ceremony, it ultimately extended past denominational or a purely religious constitution – emphasising a theme of a united brotherhood (whether that was martial comradery, masculine, national, Australasian or Greater British) rather than potentially divisive sectarian topics. In this light John Harré has memorably observed ANZAC remembrance as ‘a memorial cult which mobilizes more people into a ritual expression of togetherness than any conventional religious observance.

Indeed public discourse on themes of sacrifice extended beyond the rhetoric of elites. Examining collections of condolence letters reveals striking consistency between private words and publicly expressed sentiment. Discourse in both spheres offered comfort to the grieving, giving central place to assurances that the death of a loved one was meaningful, often referencing both patriotic and religious sentiments. These private exchanges are consistent with wider communal exchange. Kathryn Hunter’s study of Invercargill in mourning notes that many families elected to include such sentiments within the epitaphs of local death notices; ‘for Christ, King and country’, ‘For Christ and Humanity’, ‘He answered the call’, ‘He died for our liberty’. Additional bridges from the private sphere to the public sphere appeared in town halls, churches, lodges, sporting clubs and municipal institutions as associations sought to commemorate their members. Spreading still further into the public sphere were commercial engagements with bereavement such as personalised

1005 Davidson, p.459.
1006 Bloomfield, p.115.
1010 OW, 22 May 1918, p.34, 11 November 1919, p.38.
memoriam cards. Sergeant Allan Palmer, killed in France during 1918, is one of many memorialised in such cards, his visage flanked with British flags and hope of spiritual reunion (fig.48). Again, the human feeling behind the existence of such artefacts should be considered and the significance of such photographic representations as surrogates for absent earthly remains in the grieving process has been documented in study of Great War bereavement.1011

Thus a cathartic and grass-roots engagement trickled up from families, associations and communities to national remembrance rituals and the erection of public memorials. The disruption to customs and the effort to regain some sense of control are reflected in the rituals and representations of remembrance. Individuals attended because such rituals fulfilled many of the psychological needs of the grieving process, providing individuals with public space, time and, as one historian put it, a licence to ‘publicly express their pain in a socially acceptable fashion.’1012 Thus the sanctuary bestowed - in which expressions of sorrow and pride for the dead could be given and received, a network of consolation and support for the bereaved exercised and a site of mourning established - can be perceived as an effort to re-obtain ‘the good death’. As Jay Winter observes, memorials ‘marked the spot where communities were reunited, where the dead were symbolically brought home, and where the separations of war, both temporary and eternal, were expressed, ritualized, and in time, accepted.’1013 One visual expression of this connection between memorials and masses is witnessed in 1932 when the dedication of the National Carillon saw a sea of Wellingtonians surround the memorial (fig.49). While the ceremonies and space were shared, the motivations behind attendance were likely to be highly personal; the precise reasons driving attendance could be considered equal to the number of figures.

1011 Callister, The Face of War, pp.67-70.
1013 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, p.98.
Figure 48 Front and Inside of Sergeant Allan Palmer’s Memoriam Card – Matt Pomeroy Collection.
Though this emotional history is destined to be imperfectly known, the little dramas that constitute it should be the focal point for cultural understandings of Great War remembrance and public engagement with memorials. Glimpses of this engagement were observed by a New Zealand Herald reporter at the Auckland cenotaph during ANZAC Day 1925. As at memorials throughout the country, the site became a rallying point for a community wanting to acknowledge its dead. Apparent in the report’s details is the active participation of individuals, families and communities present to place a wreath at the base of the monument for someone who was not. Thus the reporter observed a son supporting ‘a frail bespectacled little woman, who bit her lip least it should tremble’; a grey haired widow bearing a white wreath; a grandmother, covering her face with a black gloved hand; a husband and a wife, he holding her arm, she bending her head protectively; a labourer in heavy boots with a medal on his coat – there for a son, brother or comrade the reporter wondered; a small child, perhaps five years old, who walked falteringingly up to the memorial to deposit a bunch of red, white and blue geraniums before running off. Group participation was also noted; a troop of Girl Guides in uniform; a widowed mother with a tall daughter and two little girls carrying a wreath apiece; two men in Australian uniforms; six Oddfellows wearing the insignia of their order; a schoolmaster with a dozen pupils. Official wreaths were added by representatives from the Navy, the RSA, the Mayor and the Governor-General. ‘So it went on.’

Such simple human feeling plays a significant role in explaining social receptivity to acknowledging the dead. If the issue is expanded to contemplating the shape those responses took then a consideration of the wider cultural context is required. The dominant forms of remembrance can be considered as a mobilisation of cultural forms primed to relate death and meaning, both to bestow dignity upon the dead and offer consolation to the living. In both these tasks classical trappings, medieval themes, Christian theological concepts and codes of duty, sacrifice, and patriotism attempted to form a scar tissue over emotional turmoil and loss. The mobilisation of such forms is worth considering against the earlier claim of the ‘propaganda’ quality of memorials. Clearly memorials are symbolic sites intended to carry and convey messages, both through the impressions their designs evoke and the words etched upon them. However, the fundamental matter monuments were raised to acknowledge was the legions of dead and those who mourned them. It is not a matter of chance that the foremost sentiments expressed, approved and responded to, layered pride and dignity upon

\footnote{\textit{NZH}, 27 April 1925, p.11.}
the dead. Their aesthetic forms signify traditions - classical architecture, Biblical verses, national trappings – with which the dead are related. Their inscriptions, sometimes in Latin to add additional gravitas, offer assurance that the fallen had obtained some manner of immortality in spite of death - *brevis a natura vita nobis data est at memoria bene redditae vitae sempiterna* to pick one example. Some give affirmation of the nobility of the soldier’s sacrifice - ‘Greater love has no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends’ is among the most common. Indeed one does not have to examine many war memorials before the common theme of inviting the living to envision the dead as embodying a higher purpose becomes obvious. Propagation perhaps, but primarily derived from grappling with perceived expectations and extending something more tolerable than the tragedy of a brutal death. The conspicuous absences in these memorials - a great silence around physical mutilation, psychological trauma and the reality of ‘sin, sand, shit and syphilis’ - also reference this dynamic. This conspiracy of silence is no different to what goes unsaid at funerals and speaks of the difficulty of squaring a conveyance of harsh and unpleasant truths with the task of offering condolence to the bereaved.

The results of this cultural mobilisation differ from those observed in previous chapters in that the trauma it responded to was unprecedented; the deaths resulting from the New Zealand Wars and the Boer War were not comparable in scale and lacked an equivalent impact within public culture. Hence the public response to the phenomenon of Great War deaths was something new rather than a continuation of pre-war developments. Nevertheless the reaction to this unprecedented trauma still indicates a connection to pre-war cultural orientations. This is something of a challenge to the school of thought which presents the war as the episode in which traditional romantic imagery and high diction became irreconcilable with what was happening in the world. Within modern art and literature this development of traditional conventions becoming hollow, absurd or obscene is well documented. In regards to death and remembrance, however, traditional language, conventions and imagery retained meaning in public culture. Indeed, the retention of traditional aesthetics around ‘the fallen’ (the term itself a good example of this propensity) in public language and ceremony is indicative of the enduring meaning such modes of thought

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1015 ‘A short life hath been given by nature unto man; but the remembrance of a life laid down in a good cause endureth forever’.
1016 This summation of the experience of training in Egypt is provided by Bill Gammage, *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War* (Canberra, 1974), p.36.
1017 Fussell, *The Great War*. 

retained amongst bereaved populations. It is for this reason that Winter claims it to be ‘unacceptable to see the Great War as the moment when “modern memory” replaced something else.’¹⁰¹⁸

This raises the issue of how the war influenced pre-war cultural sentiments. Some have observed a sentiment that churches felt a certain difficulty in reaching congregations, and notably repatriated soldiers.¹⁰¹⁹ Lineham has gone so far as to claim that the war ‘changed the face of religion’ in New Zealand.¹⁰²⁰ The publicity of alternative practices such as spiritualism seem indicative of new doctrines rising to meet the experience of war and usurping the position of orthodox practices. One study of spiritualism in New Zealand notes that ‘stress and bereavement fertilised spiritualist soil and propagandists such as Horace Leaf and Arthur Conan Doyle expounded the faith in the 1920s during nationwide tours.’¹⁰²¹

To this it is worth considering three contextualising caveats. Firstly, and somewhat technically, spiritualism was not a new movement but had established roots in New Zealand. Spiritualism is an example of some of the heterodox movements which had been established in the colonial environment. The first widespread engagements occurred in the late 1860s and early 1870s, though publicity and novelty around the movement declined by the late 1880s. Its publicity after 1915 is indicative of revival, not an emergence.¹⁰²² Secondly, spiritualism’s appeal was its offer to satisfy the longing to reach out to the dead. One correspondent wrote in 1917 that ‘the momentous question’ of ‘where are the dead?’ was the increasing cry of the masses – ‘Tell me of the future; tell me if my son, who fell at the front, is still a conscious being, and no worse off than when he was in the mortal body.’¹⁰²³ The supposition that such longings inevitably clashed with more conventional religious perspectives is not necessarily correct. Establishment figures such as Robert and Anna Stout certainly managed to garner social respectability and status, rather than labels of heresy, whilst dabbling in freethinking. Indeed Stout’s career as an establishment figure was fruitful; he served as Premier, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chancellor of the University of New Zealand and the, mostly Christian, citizens of Dunedin elected him to represent them in

¹⁰¹⁸ Winter, Sites of Memory, p.5.
¹⁰¹⁹ Davidson, Burton, The Silent Division, p.322.
¹⁰²⁰ Lineham, p.491.
¹⁰²² Broadley, pp.5-6.
¹⁰²³ Truth, 21 April 1917, p.8.
Parliament. Thirdly, and most significantly, recognition of alternative responses should be contextualised against the continuance of traditional forms. The pre-war trend of an increasing ratio of churches to citizens continued through the war and a correlation between crisis and church attendance has been noted. Comparison between the percentage of the population identifying with various Christian denominations in 1921 (88 percent) and 1926 (86 percent) reveals little variance from the 1916 figure (88 percent), or for that matter the 1901 figure (87 percent). Some recent research argues that notions of an interwar crisis of faith have been overstated; ‘If … the Great War caused the public to lose confidence in the churches, they did not lose confidence in Christianity’.

Indeed the most obvious trend in the shape of public remembrance is one of looking backwards and seeking stability in traditional customs and familiar forms. This is perhaps best encapsulated within remembrance stained glass windows. The qualities of the medium - its association with hallowed spaces, the saintly bearing of the figures, vivid colours and, when backlit, radiant images - bestow impressions of awe around the figures and scenes. Within these pieces modern soldiers and campaigns are worked into traditional imaginings. At Victoria University’s Hunter Building, for example, a Great War soldier poses as a chivalric warrior beside his medieval counterpart (fig.50). Another piece in the Arts Centre of Christchurch depicts modern soldiers driving serpents back into the sea. Behind the line stands an ensemble of historical, heroic British figures (as well as a Maori warrior being uplifted into the family). Watching over this scene are allegorical figures labelled Action, Justice, Truth and Thought (fig.51).

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1025 Lineham, p.469, Sharpe, p.102.
1026 Bloomfield, p.115.
Figure 50 Victoria University, Hunter Building Stained Glass – Author’s Collection.
Figure 51 Auckland War Memorial Museum, Museum Library, Painting/Drawing Collection, Travers, Martin, ‘War Memorial Window, Canterbury College, Christchurch’, Auckland Museum call no. PB13.
It should be noted that such grandeur was not solely the reserve of high craft and similarly solemn and traditional elements can be located within as low a medium as the ink of three pence newsprint. One example, etched as the wounded were arriving back from the Dardanelles, draped neo-classic elements and solemn decorum around codes of sacrifice without a sense of absurdity (fig.52). Masses of injured men are depicted hobbling back from Gallipoli whilst masses more march to depart. A microcosm of this movement is symbolised by Zealandia bestowing a laurel wreath upon a ‘gallant’ wounded warrior whilst handing a rifle to a fresh soldier. The expectation of duty and sacrifice is promoted by both the statement on Zealandia’s arch and by Lord Kitchener who, in his now clichéd way, purposely gazes at the viewer while holding a copy of his recent proclamation that ‘the vital need is more and still more men’. The presence of such forms across mediums and the cultural scale is worth considering against Winter’s call to end the bifurcation of cultural history into ‘elite and popular compartments, into two registers, high and low, “cultivated” and “uncultivated”, elevated and vulgar, elevating and clichéd … When the issues are universal, so are the responses evoked to them.’

The conception of a break with the old order in the post-war world is certainly a valid avenue of thought; the patriotic lexicon of 1914 could not be used in the same manner in 1939. And yet in the task of acknowledging the dead, the lexicon and motifs of the Great War, despite some transitions, seem to possess a certain longevity. While an in-depth study is not attempted, one episode indicating the continuity of remembrance ritual in twenty-first-century New Zealand public culture is revealing. In 2004 the remains of a Great War New Zealand soldier were removed from France to be interned in a tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Wellington. The language, symbols and ceremony chosen to accompany this act of disinterring, transporting and reinterring human remains would all be comprehensible to the circa 1919 mind - though they might find the words ‘British’, ‘race’ and ‘empire’ conspicuously absent. The explanation for this homecoming, provided by the RSA website, that ‘He represents all New Zealanders who were never to return from war’ indicates the endurance of the essential significance of the ritual as meaningful or appropriate.

1028 Winter, Sites of Memory, p.227.
1029 And on the subject of change, it would be fascinating to discover when the ‘unknown British soldier’ buried at the tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abby (originally representative of the Empire’s dead), was known to not represent New Zealand’s dead.
NEW ZEALAND DOING HER SHARE.

Zealandia (to her first draft of wounded from Gallipoli): Welcome home, my gallant wounded lad; your country will prove its lasting gratitude. And you, eager recruits, go forth hopefully to join your comrades at the front; the Empire needs you.

Figure 52 New Zealand Free Lance, 23 July 1915, p.3.
Social worthiness

The artefacts fashioned to signify and recognise sacrifice can still invoke sentiments of solemnity and humility in observers. It is these qualities, and the hallowed status granted to the artefacts, that have led to debates over how other parts of public culture might interact with them. Such disputes have been recognised through examinations of political/generational clashes through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s which raised debate upon whether remembrance sites and ceremonies were acceptable locations for dissent or protest. A less considered example is how the decidedly non-sacred, indeed thoroughly frivolous, superficial or banal, elements of everyday existence fit with revered parts of public culture. At the time of writing, events in the recent past reflect the ongoing friction between the sacred and the mundane. In 2005 the observance of the 90th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings at Anzac Cove raised debates over whether a ‘tourist’ ambience dominated the occasion and if attendees were displaying appropriate respect. Complaints were raised over drunkenness, littering, rock concerts and people sleeping on soldiers’ graves. In March 2010, the issue of reverence, respect and taste was echoed when vodka company 42 Below used the National Carillon as a surface upon which to project its logo. According to the National War Memorial Advisory Council Chairman, David Ledson, the memorial should not be treated, ‘as if it’s a bit of canvas.’

Exactly how levity and gravity should co-exist was no easier to establish whilst the war raged. The rawness of social trauma lent intensity to thoughts that festivity and frivolity diminished the dignity of sacrifice. The totalising quality of the war, which readily represented the conflict in absolute terms and touted public ownership of the cause, strengthened notions that citizens’ activities, goals and manner should conform to the war effort. In the words of one editorial, ‘It is the business of every man, woman and child in the British Empire to end the war at the earliest possible moment.’ The magnitude of the war in the public mind meant petty and profane elements were tagged as distractions. For instance, when reports that Lord Kitchener had drowned were aired, one editorial denounced

1032 For examples NZH, 25-27 April 2005.
1034 NZO, 28 November 1914, p.3.
those who had attended the racecourse that day, noting ‘a racehorse crowd is always dismally gay’ and that the winner was dancing ‘a fandango on the grave of the greatest Britisher.’

There are two distinct messages apparent in such discourse. The first is a call for citizens to channel energy away from trivial activities and towards the task of boosting social efficiency and the war effort. The second is a call for the cultivation of an appropriate decorum and demeanour; a belief that citizens should strive to be worthy of the sacrifices being made in their name. In both material and non-material versions, the shirker’s pursuit of trivia and luxuries again served as an antitype. However, whilst these core messages are detectable in much of the debate upon the topic, they frequently overlap and blur; prohibitionist arguments calling for the reduction or elimination of alcohol often switch, rather effortlessly, from arguing on the grounds of efficiency to that of purity.

The origins of this connection between war and moral tone can be located in pre-war cultural narratives. Before 1914, mainstream commentators argued that the legitimacy of the British Empire rested upon its moral standards.

The English-speaking peoples may possibly govern half the world without graciousness and without system, but if they try to govern it without justice or consideration for the rights of others their dominion will on some terrible day come crashing down. Rome fell through slavery; Spain through cruelty; Louis XIV and Napoleon through overweeningness. If the new alliance is to be safe, its watch-words must be justice, mercy, and moderation.

In school textbooks as well, the strength of the Empire was tied to the morality of its subjects and it was noted that Assyria, Rome and Spain had lost their empires when they became unworthy of them; ‘If the British in their turn become unworthy of Empire, their power also will be taken from them and better men will rule in their stead.’ Furthermore those concerned that standards of propriety were waning sometimes took to perceiving war as a spur for regenerating worthiness. Such salvation narratives were aired during the Boer War when it was argued that warfare would benefit civic health.

We cannot doubt that a war which calls for substantial self-sacrifice from a community, which stimulates physical and mental energy, and steels men to endure personal hardship, perils by sea and land, and even death itself with calm fortitude, acts as a powerful and salutary moral tonic to a nation.

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1035 NZO, 17 June 1916, p.3.
1038 New Zealand Illustrated Magazine, 1 June 1900, p.27.
In the crisis of war, such lessons were recalled as indicative of the reforms the nation required to be capable or worthy of victory. Many mainstream religious commentators branded the war as signifying the failure of the pre-war order. Dr James Gibb claimed the war revealed that ‘nations have forgotten God and turned their backs on His will and commandments’, adding that as a people ‘we have ignominiously failed.’ In a philosophy that fused explanation of the nature of the war and a moral lesson upon the requirements to obtain victory, Bishop Sprott suggested:

May it not be that our God is teaching us that the battle is not always to the strong? That He wishes to teach us, who had forgotten God, that He is allowing this prolonged disappointment in order that we may learn again the secret of that prevailing prayer, which can alone set free the unexhaustible [sic] resources of the wisdom and power of God.

Bishop Averill added a similar message that victory would remain elusive until sacrifice and idealism reached required levels; ‘What must God think of us when He sees us growing weary and slack and indifferent, instead of calling up all our reserve power and religious enthusiasm to meet the present day of trial.’ Lastly, in this vein a Methodist theologian described the war as ‘a white-hot crucible that is cleansing the metal of life [of its mortal failings] … it is the fiery ordeal through which the world will pass to a finer and gentler civilisation’.

Secular commentators similarly identified a need for atonement and the hope of establishing the foundations for a better world, their words revealing their differing perceptions of that better world. Thus the New Zealand Herald’s editorial line at the dawn of the war expressed a desire for a higher commitment to patriotism and virtue:

The spilling of red blood in war is our redemption from the canker of selfish and unwholesome peace … we shall ensure henceforth that every British boy grows fit to be a fighter and that every British girl grows fit to mother men … We shall teach them to be in peace as in war, helpful to one another, loyal and loving children of a world-wide Britain that can only live while for her they are glad to die.

1039 Lineham, pp.483-484.
1040 Thomas Sprott, Christianity and War Five Addresses Delivered by Dr. Sprott, Bishop of Wellington (Wellington, 1916), p.18.
1041 Lineham, p.484.
1043 NZH, 8 August 1914, supplement, p.1.
Similarly the Empire Service League argued that material progress and urbanisation in the decades before the war had turned Britishers away from the full comprehension of their inheritance won by the pioneers and the Empire won by their forefathers.\textsuperscript{1044} Calling for harmony between social and Imperial groups, the League’s pamphlet, \textit{What Freedom Means}, argued that the forces of co-operation and sacrifice required by the war effort were the keys to higher levels of social unity and idealism; ‘we are realising our heritage by the sacrifices we are making to keep it because our lives are being purged of much that stultified our progress before the war.’\textsuperscript{1045} Likewise Ormond Burton’s wartime writings feature notions of war as lifting idealism over materialism, a trend which would bestow post-war dividends.

The travail of Europe is saving the soul of the twentieth century world. This war has given us a re-birth of wonder and mystery. There is another revival of romance, and we can see before us a great era of noble idealism and of splendid self-sacrificing devotion such as this world has not yet seen.\textsuperscript{1046}

The ex-Prime Minister and wartime deputy leader, Joseph Ward, continued his promotion of a post-war federated Empire, arguing that ‘war had been the greatest educator and regenerator the Empire had ever known, solidifying Empire like nothing before it.’\textsuperscript{1047} One curious twist on the narrative, indicating the prevalence of the process of layering meaning upon the war, is seen in certain socialist commentators who described the war as an inevitable development in the historical process which would see the collapse of capitalism and the emergence of a better, socialist, world.\textsuperscript{1048}

Notions of raising social propriety/efficiency saw a flurry of measures - targeting alcohol, prostitution, gambling, the content of cinematograph-films and the consumption of luxuries - appear within the war regulations.\textsuperscript{1049} Thus in August 1916 the practice of ‘shouting’, whereby rounds of drinks were bought for a group, was outlawed in an effort to reduce alcohol consumption.\textsuperscript{1050} Regulations banned women from entering or loitering outside drinking establishments after 6.00 pm, referencing a perceived connection between intoxication and other vices.\textsuperscript{1051} A further development in such efforts saw war regulations used to enhance the power of the police to suppress prostitution and brothels - again

\textsuperscript{1045} Witherby, p.7.  
\textsuperscript{1049} \textit{Manual of the War Legislation}.  
\textsuperscript{1050} NZG, 21 August 1916, p.2802.  
\textsuperscript{1051} NZG, 21 August 1916, p.2803.}
explanations reference both the necessity of improving morality alongside the inefficiencies caused by VD. Again the pub and the war effort collided when efforts to curb vice saw 6 o’clock closing introduced in December 1917 (it would be another 5 decades before this wartime measure was lifted).

In an endeavour to improve the co-ordination of industry and manpower, a National Efficiency Board was created in early 1917 and tasked with recommending measures to better manage the war effort. The Board’s suggestions tended to focus upon the restriction of amusements, the organisation of businesses, and efforts to the reduce alcohol consumption. The Board recommended that the number of race days be decreased, holidays reduced, that there should be no new permits for picture theatres, that there should be a reduction of ‘wastes’ such as the importation of various luxuries. As before, drives for rationalisation blur into asceticism. Suggestions for improving the economy of bread production, for instance, recommended laws banning the use of sugar, the production of fancy or currant bread as well as restrictions to insure bread stood for at least twelve hours before point of sale, on the grounds that stale bread was ‘much healthier’ than fresh bread.

A parallel evolution towards a more sober patriotism can be observed in wider public culture. One indication is witnessed in the decline of the early wartime craze for Queen Carnivals. The carnivals fused practical war relief with a festive mood where social conventions were bent or suspended, entertainment arranged and women competed in fundraisers and to be crowned Queen of the carnival. One scholar notes the carnivals as ‘most spectacular in 1915’, and observes a transition to other forms of patriotic work after that year. Whilst some popularity might have derived from the distraction these festivals provided from wartime sorrow, it seemingly became difficult to reconcile fantasy, social transgression, merriment and individualism (encapsulated in the titular event of seeking to be Queen) with the dour, serious, collectivisation the war effort promoted. This was certainly the position some commentators arrived at. One newspaper asked how many more dead and wounded

1053 NZS, 1917, No.19, pp.89-94.
1057 I am grateful here to Margaret Tenant who allowed me to examine her article ‘Fun and Fundraising: the Selling of Charity in New Zealand’s Past’ which will appear in an upcoming issue of Social History.
men were required ‘before the people of this country will awake to the seriousness of the situation and the hatefulness of carnivals … Hateful indeed must all this frivolity and gambling be to every thoughtful mind in the community.’

Another complained of being bailed up by strong young men dressed in the garb of a first prize idiot, their faces daubed with grease paint and their general appearance consistent with a lunatic’s masquerade. Now, while I do not doubt the ardor [sic], nor the idiocy, of these proceedings, I do protest that this is not the correct way of raising the necessary funds to provide for the brave boys at the front.

Indeed, approaching the anniversary of British entry to the war one correspondent to the Evening Post advocated a national 24 hour period of abstinence to mark the war’s first birthday, with funds saved to be used for soldier relief. The recommendation of ‘no smoking, no eating, no drinking - just water’ indicates the call for a more austere form of home front patriotism and sacrifice. Exactly what luxuries and leisure activities were inappropriate became a topic of social debate. The suitability of sporting events was questioned; as one commentator put it, if sportsmen were ‘able to play football they were able to go to the war.’ Likewise Art Union lotteries were denounced as encouraging gambling.

Contrasting to the glitz of the carnivals, the link between the women’s part in the war effort and the cultivation of thrifty behaviour was emphasised. School Journal noted ‘It is women’s duty … to live simply, avoiding waste in food, dress, and pleasure, and so save money to help pay the great cost of war.’ Likewise the Grey River Argus argued that the return of wounded soldiers would require the discontinuing of luxuries in order to provide for them. Consequently it advocated ‘a standardised dress’ and noted that ‘any woman who attempts to bring in new fashions should be regarded as a pro-German – as one who spent money on her back that should have been utilised in bringing the Germans to submission.’

Certainly the WCTU Oxford branch (in North Canterbury) pledged not to indulge in afternoon tea for the duration.

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1059 Truth, 5 June 1915, p.5.
1061 EP, 14 May 1915, p.4.
1062 Tennant, ‘Voluntary welfare organisations’.
1064 Grey River Argus, 10 September 1915, p.4.
1065 Tolerton, Ettie, p.104.
Other social movements mobilised their arguments for the wartime environment. Prohibitionists, for example, seized the moment to link sobriety with morality, efficiency and, accordingly, victory; making a case out of the food, manpower and infrastructure lost to alcohol production, the link between drunkenness and VD casualties and the advantages a teetotaling population could bring to the war effort. Other pre-war traditions such as the Salvation Army’s self-denial appeals were advertised as taking on a new significance in the war (this practice, still in existence, sees participants reduce consumption or abstain from an indulgence for fundraising). One editorial noted that the community as a whole should ‘strive to see what they can add to the Red Cross funds by thinking of the wounded more than themselves’ adding that ‘the idea was not so much the actual amount saved as the principle of the thing.’ Blomfield depicted the rise of restrictions imposed upon the common New Zealander by the wowser element, asking, in a semi-earnest punch-line, what precisely the public had left to deny itself on self denial week (fig.53).

Much of this could be contextualised as an extension of social patterns from the pre-war scene. Indeed the previously cited anxieties that material progress might cause citizens to become physically and morally flabby are apparent. Certainly a potent puritan streak, promoting public propriety and ascetic values in New Zealand public culture was observed by commentators around the turn-of-the-century. During his stay, André Siegfried described ‘a strange narrowness which seems anchored to the very depths of the New Zealand soul.’ Likewise domestic critics identified wowsers as waging a crusade upon life’s pleasures. The editor of New Zealand Truth, a vocal critic of wowserism, proclaimed

There cannot be, any manner of doubt whatever that “God’s Own Country” is being shamefully scandalised by gospel-grinding gasbags, who arrogate to themselves the almost blasphemous designation of “God’s Own Ministers.” The pestilent, parsonical element in this grand Dominion, is fast becoming a positive peril to popular rights and individual liberty.

This vision of wowserism as a distinct social element acting upon the rest of the social body is a conception sustained within some interpretations. Eldred-Grigg, for example, sees a ‘puritanical push’ imposed by pious middle class Christians ‘on a mass of people who in the

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1067 Press, 9 October 1916, p.6.
1068 Siegfried, p.322.
Horse racing should be absolutely stopped until the war ends.

The K.F. pledge made compulsory through all this God's own country.

And shouting a crime

The Patriotic Carnival with all its tawdry finery glitter and amusement shunned as a deadly sin.

And all moving pictures heavily censored by the church. Chapel of course.

Patriotic Carnival in aid of A.E.I. Soldiers

30,000 wanted. We must do your bit or else.

The church - but what have I left to deny?

Self Denial Week

To end up with a grand self denial week for the church.

Figure 53 New Zealand Observer, 23 October 1915, p.12.
opinion of the wowsers were “immoral” rather than ‘the enforcement of a code which everyone took for granted’. \textsuperscript{1070}

However, it is hard to reconcile reductionist notions of hollow preaching from a distinctively puritanical caste with wider patterns. Certainly, puritanical moral codes were not universal, and most champions of the code’s ideals sprung from the socially active middle class and were orientated towards perceiving vulgar behaviour as their nemesis. However what we see is not a rigid agenda to impose a coherent project, but a set of dispositions whose influence and impact on public culture is indicative of wider consensuses. Siegfried followed his comments upon the ‘New Zealand soul’ with the understanding that puritanical attitudes almost formed a social or national tradition and permeated the social structure; it was not only ‘the rich and conservative classes … but also the workmen, the small farmers, and even those democrats who are boldest in their political conceptions … the general agreement on this subject is astonishing.’ \textsuperscript{1071} While the hopes of some crusaders were never realised - alcohol, prostitution and gambling were never eradicated and moral prescriptions were questioned, subverted or quietly broken - this consensus found mass support. One 1918 petition demanding an end to the manufacture and sale of alcohol contained some 240,000 signatures and referendums to restrict drinking hours found popular support for decades. \textsuperscript{1072}

Additionally, the precise behaviour identified as conflicting with material sacrifice and decorum and the degree of moderation required were negotiated within the public sphere, rather than dictated from on high. For example some organisations like the Sports Protection League argued that sports were an important means to train the young and to maintain national morale and protested against ‘all undue interference with all reasonable recreations.’ \textsuperscript{1073} Another commentator acknowledged the importance of sport in developing physical and mental prowess, but condemned horse racing as exempt from such uplifting qualities; ‘It is undoubtedly the pluck of the sportsman that has made the British soldier what he is. But the pluck of a racing man is gauged and attested by his ability to watch a given horse run outside the money without bursting into tears.’ \textsuperscript{1074} Other sports clubs and unions decided to comply with calls that sportsmen should ‘play the game for King and country’.

\textsuperscript{1071} Siegfried, p.322.
\textsuperscript{1072} \textit{Truth}, 9 November 1918, p.5.
\textsuperscript{1073} NZO, 29 July 1916, p.8.
\textsuperscript{1074} Charles Lewis, \textit{The Sport of Kings by a Plebeian} (Napier, 1916), p.45.
The Auckland Rugby Union, for example, announced in May 1916 that it wanted to ‘show the way’ and that no player who was over 20 years of age on 1 April 1916 would be permitted to play in the union’s competition during the war. Some of the drive for austerity might be construed as making virtue out of necessity as prices rose and breadwinners enlisted. After the war, adults recounting childhood memories recalled the economic constraints and societal expectations concerning self-sacrifice as making themselves felt in various ways whether that was a lack of money for sweets, missing out on a dux medal due to a lack of funds, a sister’s birthday without a party - ‘none of us has had one since the war began. Things are so expensive, and we thought it was one of the things we could do without.’ Likewise material shortages seemingly did shape wartime fashion alongside pressures for rationality and solemnity in public dress. Lady Dot’s column in Truth, observing the rarity of silk, noted the decline in evening gowns and remarked that ‘as war progresses, we are gradually returning to the plain, straight lines in every article of dress. The extravagant fullness and flare of coats and skirts are surely passing away.’

However, public engagement with calls for decorum and material sacrifice extended beyond economic pressures. The idea of doing one’s little bit was a common sentiment, indicating a desire to participate in the struggle and to feel some connection with those on the frontlines. That this could be achieved through some manner of abstinence or material sacrifice was frequently expressed; ‘The men who have gone to the front have made considerable sacrifices, and we who stay at home should also made [sic] some sacrifice.’ Such attitudes manifested themselves in private pledges to give up an amusement or a luxury. Three men reported that they had given up alcohol, smoking, the Christmas holiday and race meetings, pictures, a quarter of their income to patriotic funds as well as ‘contributing’ eight sons to the army. Others imitated King George V and pledged to give up alcohol for the duration. Conversely, there was a general backlash against behaviours perceived as operating with a ‘business as usual’ attitude. One piece of correspondence reveals disgust at a public event: ‘some of the folks here are actually going to have a dance tonight … and at the office

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1075 NZH, 6 May 1916, p.9.
1077 Truth, 21 April 1917, p.2.
1078 NZH, 6 May 1916, p.9.
there are lists of dead and wounded staring them in the face … I hope it pours in torrents.¹⁰⁸⁰

In a protest effort to embarrass the national government, Harry Holland published a copy of
the Ritz Hotel’s menu, where Massey and Ward had dined whilst carrying out their ‘secret
diplomacy behind the backs of the people’.¹⁰⁸¹ Appealing to austerity was a tactic which
crossed the political spectrum and drew upon grass-roots support.

At the war’s end the attitude that war sacrifices should be met with appropriately reverent
behaviour was largely transferred to remembrance ephemera. Even whilst the war was
underway there had been calls to prevent the use of ANZAC as a trade term.¹⁰⁸² A Free
Lance editorial called for government intervention to ‘prevent the abuse of that sacred word,
Anzac, by a base commercialism which can only look at the noblest things in life through the
spectacles of its own sordid spirit’. Future businesses were gloomily predicted; ‘the Anzac
Fish and Chips Shop, the Anzac Slaughter Sales, and the Anzac Refined Vaudeville
Company.’¹⁰⁸³ Such legislation was secured in 1920 with the prohibition of horse-racing on
25 April and the requirement that licensed premises remain closed ‘in the same manner as
they require the closing of such premises on Christmas Day and Good Friday.’¹⁰⁸⁴ The
contemporary examples at the start of this section signify the continuation of this aspect of
the cult of sacrifice.

The tight society, equality of sacrifice and conscription

In both the yearning to respond to the dead and the drive to establish appropriate reverence
we observe a key aspect of the cult of sacrifice that merits further probing. This is the
powerful notion that the national community should be united in taking up the war’s cause
and that the costs should be distributed as evenly as possible. Indeed the notion that some
part of the social body was evading its share was an issue which threatened social harmony.
Appreciation of the social mechanics working within the drive for equality of sacrifice aids
understanding of the extensive nature of the cult.

Wartime efforts for an equality of sacrifice can be considered as a mobilisation of everyday
orientations that social costs are more readily accepted if universally borne. To take a

¹⁰⁸¹ Matt Pomeroy Collection.
¹⁰⁸² Sharpe, p.99.
¹⁰⁸⁴ NZS, 1920, No.78, p.570.

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peacetime example, John Stuart Mill observed that citizens were more inclined to regard taxation laws as fair when costs imposed, as nearly as possible, equal pressure upon all; ‘equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, means equality of sacrifice.’\textsuperscript{1085} The significance of such grass-roots dynamics within home front anthropology has been increasingly appreciated since the 1980s and 1990s, as scholars began the systematic exploration of the emergence and maintenance of social consent to the costs of war.\textsuperscript{1086} Equality of sacrifice has been described as striking a ‘deep chord among New Zealanders’ and speaks of the cohesive nature of the social body and a social contract emphasising egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{1087} The intensity of wartime demands for equality of sacrifice can be located in pre-war trends towards a more integrated social body. This trend has been described as a broad ‘civilisation offensive’ waged between the 1880s and the 1920s, with many dimensions and multiple impacts, but with a common tendency to advance sharper images of the ideal, tighter codes of conduct and louder calls for conformity.\textsuperscript{1088} The integrated quality of this ‘tight society’ was publicised at formal and informal levels, the social contract emphasising that all social elements should act, or at least appear to act, in cohesion with larger social interests.\textsuperscript{1089} This peacetime offensive intensified during the war, particularly as the costs the war might impose were realised. In this environment coercion was presented as justified to protect the common good. Surely, the argument ran, if a modern, civilised society elected compulsion over volunteerism in collecting taxes, providing education, ensuring sanitation, upholding the law and in industrial arbitration, then it was only reasonable that the means and costs of defence be socialised.\textsuperscript{1090} This cultural orientation is a major factor behind the extensive nature of New Zealand’s war effort - meaning both the extent of the population expected to shoulder the burden as well as the extent of social life it pervaded. One incident in Hastings, where eligible men received cards from a recruitment committee reading ‘will you volunteer voluntarily or have we to make you?’, neatly illustrates the continuity of language, social interaction and mentality.\textsuperscript{1091} Likewise, patriotic etchings depicted farmers, business men, women, children, the aged, politicians and workers all standing under the Union Jack and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Winter and Prost, p.162.
\item Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, p.100.
\item Dunstall, pp.68-69.
\item Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, pp.121-125.
\item NZPD, Vol.175, 30 May 1916, p.506.
\item Baker, ‘New Zealanders, the Great War and Conscription’, p.120.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
contributing to the common good (fig.54). The mixture of ages, hats (a fair indicator of class culture) and gender (we might add species if we include the bulldog) are unified in the action of donating funds for the wounded. The ‘you’ in the caption/question contains the veiled expectation that the viewer join this collective effort. The framing of social elements deemed to be in transgression of the social contract indicates a sensitivity that one group - whether that was farmers, miners, wharfies, business men, Catholics or wider class grouping – might place their own interests (individual or class) ahead of the public good. Indeed, editorials and cartoonists displayed an amazing capacity to vilify radical workers in one edition and capitalist leeches in the next as enemies of ‘the people’.

A narrative of hypocrisy appears as a theme or a centrepiece within some interpretations of calls for sacrifice. Such conceptions note the readiness of certain sections of society to demand sacrifices of others which they were not willing or able to make themselves. Thus employers sent workers, politicians sent constituents, the old sent the young and women sent men. Fatally wounding this narrative is the near inevitable connection members of a tightly knit society had to someone at the front. By the end of 1915, roughly 29,000 New Zealand men had been shipped overseas. Each one of those men left varying numbers of people emotionally connected to them within the home front - wives, parents, mates, siblings, sweethearts, children, relatives and other associates. Even with extremely conservative calculations, those with someone at the front were beginning to constitute a fair section of the home front population.

Indeed much of the commentary examined in this thesis originates from individuals who had sons in uniform. George Thomson, who had endorsed compulsory training as a means to promote self-sacrifice in the next generation (p.169) would experience the loss of his own son. Ida Boeufve from the WAGL, Bishop Sprott, Anna Stout, Bishop Averill, William Blomfield and a total of 76 Reform and Liberal MPs, including James Allen, Francis Bell and

1093 Richardson, Coal, Class & Community, pp.166-184
1094 Baker, King and Country, p.228.
1096 O’Connor, ‘Sectarian Conflict’.
William Massey, all had sons at the front.\textsuperscript{1097} By the war’s end the odds were against a New Zealander not having some connection with the front and few families were unaffected by the conflict. It is doubtlessly these emotional links to the battlefield, dovetailing with existing social orientations, which made equality of sacrifice so authoritative. Such sentiments also aid comprehension of hardened attitudes to Germans and shirkers - the near invariable line in

\textsuperscript{1097} Baker, \textit{King and Country}, p.42. One extremely useful tool in investigating these records is the Cenotaph Database – http://muse.aucklandmuseum.com/databases/Cenotaph/locations.aspx.
informants’ reports is that the author had a loved one at the front - and white feather distribution. One study, within the British context, notes that feather-givers’ frustration, anger and contempt for unenlisted men could reference their personal experiences. Conversely Trotter’s description of ‘prim little ladies’ patrolling the streets to give white feathers to shirkers, in order to ‘keep the required number of sacrificial lambs pouring through Massey’s drafting races’ entirely crops such emotional turmoil from the equation. ‘Hypocrisy’ as a label for such behaviour is less than truly accurate; this is a lesson that sincerity, as much as duplicity, can motivate spite.

Awareness of these grass-roots forces adds context to the interplay between the state and mass society as well as the place of consent and compulsion. The introduction of conscription might be considered the most salient example of this interplay in that it represents a significant move towards compulsion and might be viewed as marking where compulsion began to underwrite public support. One interpretation tags the number of volunteers (91,941) to conscripts (32,270) to non-enlisting eligibles (151,435) as indicating that authorities recognised that the war effort, if it was to be perpetuated, required compulsion to guarantee a commitment popular support would no longer provide. There are problems with this deduction. To begin with it presumes dubiously clean lines of consent/coercion, i.e. that volunteering denoted informed consent and that no conscript would have enlisted. It does not mention those who volunteered but were deemed unfit (27,417), or those who enlisted in Australian and British forces (3,370). Most significantly, pointing out that those who volunteered ‘were a minority’ and that ‘only’ 38 percent of those chronologically and chromosomally eligible successfully volunteered seems to presume that the pool of remaining non-enlisted eligibles might have all potentially volunteered. This logic measures against an impossible scenario and gives no place to the ‘dutifully reluctant’ - those involved in essential war work, those with dependants to support or those physically or mentally unable to fight.

However it is certain that the idea of conscription spurred reactions. The emergence of the modern Labour Party in mid 1916 was partly a response to the practice and several labour
leaders and a future Prime Minister were jailed for sedition.\textsuperscript{1103} Several unions threatened strikes, raising government fears of shortages, disruptions and social upheaval. Other reactions saw men attempting to place themselves beyond state reach by leaving the country, by avoiding registration or by going bush.\textsuperscript{1104} Additionally it is unquestionable that some authority figures considered coercion to be a legitimate means to compel service that would not otherwise be rendered; Massey reportedly responded to an accusation that he was driving men at the point of a bayonet by thumping a table and declaring that ‘if men won’t go of their own free will they will have to be driven!’\textsuperscript{1105} Ultimately legislation saw conscription enacted in June 1916 by an overwhelming parliamentary majority; the third reading producing 44 ayes versus 4 nays and concluded with the singing of the national anthem.\textsuperscript{1106}

However, pushes for military expediency and conformity from above probed for and found mass support and the introduction of conscription is indicative of forces beyond simple top-down coercion. The foremost study on the topic regards the introduction and application of conscription as ‘first and foremost, an expression of the popular will’ and estimates that between 60-70 percent of New Zealanders were in favour of conscription and that no more than 20 percent were opposed.\textsuperscript{1107} In early 1916 Allen noted that ‘there can be no doubt about it that the bulk of opinion in the Country is in favour of compulsion, and has been for some time.’\textsuperscript{1108} Massey was not exceptional in believing that unwilling men should be driven.

A demonstration of this is seen in the 1917 Christchurch local body elections as the repeal or retention of the \textit{Military Service Act} became the major electoral issue. The results, widely held as the first democratic test of conscription, saw an erosion of Labour’s representation as 12,103 voted for Labour’s opponents against 5,385 votes for Labour.\textsuperscript{1109} Labour support actually held solid, the deciding factor was a heavy voter turnout as 18,000, out of a roll of 26,000, went to the polls (70 percent against the 50 percent which went in 1915) and boosted Labour’s opponents. Whilst militants continued to insist that the will of the people was opposed to conscription, this result, in the heartland of anti-militarism, saw some resignation.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1103} Gustafson, \textit{Labour’s Path}, pp.105-119.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1104} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, pp.101-102.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1105} \textit{Maoriland Worker}, 21 June 1916, p.3.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1106} NZPD, Vol.175, 9 June 1916, p.786.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1107} Baker, \textit{King and Country}, pp.98, 230.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1108} ANZ-R22319698-ADBQ-16145-Allen-I-M1/15/2, ‘Correspondence with General Godley’.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1109} \textit{Maoriland Worker}, 9 May 1917, p.7.}
\end{footnotes}
that the masses had backed conscription. The *Maoriland Worker* columnist ‘The Vag’ sadly acknowledged that

It is no use blinking our eyes and wondering what has hit us, it is no use putting up this or that and the other excuse … if the fight was coming again to-morrow we could not do better … two-thirds, and more voted in favour of the Government, in favour of conscription, in favour of cheap soldiers and in favour of continuing the war.¹¹¹⁰

Labour candidate J.A. McCullough added that ‘It looks, and I suppose we must admit that there is an endorsement of conscription.’¹¹¹¹

That conscription found popular support is not overly surprising. The increasingly obvious costs of the war raised questions upon whether volunteerism would see those costs equally spread. Compulsion, the argument ran, was the fairest and most organised way of managing the war effort and of guaranteeing regular and predictable reinforcements.¹¹¹² Alongside an act of government, conscription was legitimised via a social contract sensitive to narrow interests being favoured over social interests and willing to justify decidedly illiberal measures to rectify this. In the months leading up to the introduction of conscription, the social consensus behind volunteerism was becoming unsynchronised with cultural attitudes which favoured equality of sacrifice in social matters. This shift is not indicative of a clean break, but a wearing down of one consensus and the forging of another. In early 1916, with the introduction of conscription only months away, conventional cultural narratives of volunteering as representing dutifully inspired citizenry and conscription as indicative of clockwork militarism were still prominently expressed. In March 1916 textbooks taught that ‘the Empire does not compel its sons to fight; it relies upon their offering to fight for it.’¹¹¹³ Others sought to boost volunteering by highlighting the shame of conscription. Hence, men were urged to be ‘wents’ rather than ‘sents’ and enlistment advertisements presented eligibles with the choice of volunteering - ‘Sacrifice Cheerfully Undertaken’ ‘Duty Nobly Done’ ‘Commending the Issue to God’ - and compulsion - ‘Reproach in the Eyes of your Fellow-Men and Women’ ‘Life-long Regret’ ‘Unhonoured Service’.¹¹¹⁴

¹¹¹⁰ *Maoriland Worker*, 9 May 1917, p. 7.
¹¹¹² NZPD, Vol. 175, 30 May 1916, p. 486. This position is possibly vindicated by analyses of the efficiency of New Zealand’s reinforcement machinery in maintaining division strength. New Zealand arguably possessed the strongest Division on the Western Force at the war’s end. An impressive accomplishment considering the disadvantage faced in terms of distance. Ian McGibbon, ‘Conscription’, OCNZMH, p. 118.
However, such proclamations mask shifting attitudes to volunteerism and conscription in the public sphere. One major barrier was removed as the British introduced conscription in March 1916. This simultaneously eroded any awkwardness of enacting conscription before Britain was ready and aided the ideological reframing of conscription as displaying commitment to the cause, rather than indicating shame that men should be forced to fight. Furthermore, equality of sacrifice was increasingly touted as the ranks of returned soldiers and mothers with enlisted sons swelled. These were two social groups identified, then and since, as strongly committed to equality of sacrifice and possessing an accepted moral platform to advocate from. Simultaneously, the capacity of the volunteer system to achieve equality of sacrifice came under doubt. Foremost in consciousness-raising were the results of the 1915 national registration which revealed 78,123 as unwilling to serve outside the country and 34,386 as unwilling to serve at all; this constituted 40 percent of the eligible population. These figures raised concern that increased moral hounding might be required to stimulate volunteering, that this might be ineffective in spurring the dishonourable and might function to spare the shirker at the expense of the dutiful. Perhaps one ironic outcome of frequent circulation of shirker rhetoric was the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ impression it gave the dutifully reluctant that economic, domestic, and potentially mortal, sacrifices made on their part would be to the benefit of those degenerate, immoral figures. ‘Why should I send my sons to the front to suffer and die’, asked one commentator, ‘while these miserable monkeys are allowed to strut along our streets?’ The irony of this situation is that a reluctance to enlist out of anxiety of shirkers vindicated the anxiety of other analysts.

Moreover, the probability of a continuation of, or possible increases in, the levels of sacrifice made for the war effort spurred debate upon what parts of the social body demands for equality of sacrifice should be levied against. Hence many Labour moderates, noting the proportion of workers in the ranks, favoured conscription as a means to target ‘the shirkers of the privileged classes.’ Furthermore, Labour calls for a conscription of wealth to improve soldiers’ pay and pensions illustrates another application of the notion; equality of sacrifice was lost, argued Mr McCombs, when the government failed to tax war profiteers and

1115 Allen described anti-shirker sentiment as primarily located ‘amongst returned soldiers, and the relatives of kith and kin of those who have gone.’ ANZ-R22319698-ADBQ-16145-Allen-1-M1/15/2, ‘Correspondence with General Godley’, Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.100, Baker, King and Country, p.51.
1116 195,341 men were registered, McGibbon, ‘Conscription’, p.118.
1117 Truth, 29 January 1916, p.3.
conscript the financially fit alongside the physically fit. In sectarian circles PPA propaganda claimed that Catholics were letting Protestants do the bulk of the dying to strengthen their political position, invoking a breach of equality of sacrifice. In 1917, the worldview was projected onto the world when it was discovered that New Zealand was being asked to send a larger percentage of reinforcements than Australia. Pugsley describes ‘government anger and growing public questioning of the fact that New Zealand was being penalised because of the efficiency of its reinforcement administration.’ Conversely, motivation potentially went no further than the eligible man next door. Certainly politicians labelled it as ‘cruel’ ‘that a man with four sons should send away all his sons and have to face the possibility of a childless old age, while his neighbour with seven sons holds them all back from the war.’

In this environment a guarantee that efforts would be made to equalise sacrifice seemed socially desirable. As Margaret Levi’s study of the psychology of consent notes ‘government enforcement of compliance assures those considering contingent consent that they will not be suckers … government coercive capacity assures potentially supportive citizens that there will, in fact, be relative equality of sacrifice.’ Politicians debating conscription demonstrated awareness of this social psychology; ‘I consider that the placing of this Bill upon the statute book has been the means of bringing lots of these men forward … Men were standing back, and some of them would say to you, “I am not going while So-and-so stays at home.”’ In a visual response to Massey’s appeal that men enlist to make up the shortages, Edward Mack depicted a dutiful citizen (presumably the husband and father of the wife and child behind him) assuring the Prime Minister that he is willing to serve, but wanting assurance that shirkers will be compelled, morally or legally to do their share (fig.5.5). This position, it might be recalled, appeared in government surveys of public opinion (see Chapter One).

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1119 NZPD, Vol.175, 9 June 1916, pp.751-752.  
1121 Pugsley, ANZAC Experience, p.68.  
1124 NZPD, Vol.175, 1 June 1916, p.593.
EITHER CONSCRIPTION—OR LABEL THE SHIRKERS.

The Prime Minister makes an urgent appeal to young men of military age to forego Christmas joys and enlist at once, to make up shortages in the 11th Reinforcements.—Daily paper.

The Married Recruit: Yes, Mr. Massey, I'm quite ready to give up Christmas and home and go out and fight. But it goes against the grain to fight for that crowd of shirkers over there. If you won't give us conscription then, for Heaven's sake, brand them as "I Won't Fighters."

Figure 55 New Zealand Free Lance, 23 December 1915, p.3.
The final shape of the *Military Service Act* reflects responses to the above social consensus together with the strategic interests for regular reinforcements. Alongside policies of minimal allowances for exemption and narrow definitions of legitimate conscientious objection were additional measures to assure the public that equality of sacrifice would be striven for. For instance, Section 39 made the deception of medical or Military Service Boards an indictable offence punishable by three years imprisonment and hard labour. Section 41 made the employment of deserters an offence, again subject to imprisonment. Section 42, seeking to prevent a simple method of befuddling state bureaucracy, made the act of a reservist changing his name from what he had registered as illegal (and subject to imprisonment) without express permission of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Such measures stood ready to deter and reprimand any who might upset equality of sacrifice and to assure the public that such avenues were closed.

Alongside these passive measures were active procedures endorsing equality of sacrifice. Section 35, colloquially dubbed the ‘family shirkers’ section’, allowed the Minister of Defence to give notice to households consisting of two or more brothers listed in the first division to show cause before a Military Service Board why they should not be called up for service; an active measure to try and spread the tax on lives as evenly as possible. Archival records reveal collaboration between government administrators, local recruiting committees and communities in locating families who had not sent sons and Allen announced that notices under Section 35 were being served ‘as quickly as the police can verify the lists which have been compiled by recruiting committees and Defence Officers.’

Certainly cases of ‘clause 35 men’ are not uncommon in the records of the Military Board Appeals. A possible elephant in the room is the question of why New Zealand enacted conscription whereas its geographically closest and culturally similar Tasman neighbour rejected it? Both Australia and New Zealand shared cultural attitudes around citizen-soldiers, colonial initiative and an aversion to ‘militarism’. Both countries saw wartime discourse around shirkers and equality of sacrifice. And yet, in contrast to New Zealand, Australians rejected the extension of compulsory/universal military service to overseas service in a 1916

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1125 ANZ-R10075045-AAYS-8698-AD82-8-62, ‘Section 35 Military Service Act, August 1916-March 1917’, ANZ-R10075041-AAYS-AD82-9-88, ‘Resolutions of bodies re discontinuance of voluntary system of recruiting-September, October 1916’.

referendum (1,087,557 for to 1,160,033 against) and confirmed this opposition in 1917 by a greater margin (1,015,159 for to 1,181,747 against).\textsuperscript{1127}

However, in a broader context, Australia’s rejection of conscription is more exceptional than New Zealand’s acceptance. One study of the five Anglo-Saxon democracies observes a spectrum in the institution of conscription.\textsuperscript{1128} Thus New Zealand encountered ‘the least turmoil’, Great Britain and the US were able to broker workable consensuses, Canada was able to initiate the practice after prolonged and contentious disputes, whilst Australia had the contentious disputes but without the conscription. The notable factors behind regional variation are identified as the extent to which ethnic cleavages and/or class interests are capable of solidary action and mobilising political clout; whether institutional arrangements can promote a general acceptance of policy in exchange for compromises and concessions upon particularly detested aspects; and the degree of public confidence in the state’s capacity to function as a reasonably impartial arbitrator and take interests and circumstances into account.

Considering these factors within the Australian context is revealing. Alongside a stronger Irish-Catholic presence, Australia had led the way in unionisation and was the first of the countries surveyed to have a labour party that formed governments (one was in power when the war broke out). Though, as in New Zealand, Irish-Catholics and industrial workers were proportionally represented among enlistees, working class and Irish-Catholic organisations formed potent forces which could be, and were, mobilised against conscription. Furthermore, political fragmentation gave the conscription question a unique dimension in Australia. The conflict between Prime Minister William Hughes’ promotion of conscription and the reluctance/resistance of his colleagues meant ‘the opposition had institutional power; it could affect the process by which the conscription decision was made and not just rely on protest and threats of non-compliance.’\textsuperscript{1129} These circumstances were detrimental to building a consensus for conscription as acrimonious debate raised doubts that Hughes’ government could fairly implement conscription and invoked fears that conscription would depopulate the country of white men and see them replaced with coloured labour.\textsuperscript{1130} Additionally, although

hard to measure, the ideological reframing of conscription, as connoting fairness and
efficiency rather than government compulsion, likely proved a harder task in Australia
reflecting deeper traditions of anti-statism.

Conversely New Zealand’s relative ethnic/cultural homogeneity, comparatively undeveloped
political labour, fairly unradical unionism (with extremist elements laid low in the aftermath
of the 1913 strike) and history of big government in a small country - which saw state
involvement in several aspects of public life - facilitated a consensus that conscription could
serve public expectations. The interplay of the tight society, equality of sacrifice and
conscription emerged as public awareness of the costs of the war increased alongside a
questioning of how these costs would be borne and suspicion amongst various social
elements. Conscription, seemingly promising to deliver an equality of sacrifice, was
legitimised in public culture. This re-evaluation cast the practice as a sign of national
commitment and as an equitable and efficient way to ensure that the war effort and economy
were protected from the character vices of those who might selfishly avoid service. This
change in perception was not total and anecdotal evidence hints at the retention of older
conceptions. One woman noted, in reference to her partner, ‘I’d sooner have him away now
than taken as a conscript later on’. 1131 Indeed between September 1916 and November 1918
24,105 men elected to volunteer rather than wait for conscription. 1132

Legacy
The cult of sacrifice which emerged as a reaction to this trauma resonated in the post-war
landscape. Indeed interwar New Zealand saw continued attempts to seek answers to the
questions of what the larger meanings behind the cost of the war were, and how society and
these meanings related.

Thus features of the wartime cult of sacrifice became peacetime features of interwar public
culture. At one 1919 gathering to acknowledge victory, Dr Chilton cited the wartime
message that sacrifice was necessary to generate social virtues;

In the spirit of our New Zealand soldiers … I read a promise … that when our soldiers
return their spirit will spread from them to all the manhood of the nation, to every man
women and child, and will be handed on in increasing measure and in gathering force

1131 OW, 15 November 1916, p.58.
1132 Baker, ‘New Zealanders, the Great War and Conscription’, p.563.
from father to son, so that the historian of each succeeding generation may say with
truth: “They have builded [sic] better than their fathers.”*1133

Such sentiments sound familiar and yet there is a twist in the script. If wartime New
Zealanders had been told, or had told themselves, that the cost of the war was necessary to
win a better world, now the emphasis shifts to the notion that the better world would be won,
not via the sacrifices of the dead, but built through emulation of such sacrifices by the living.
Such messages became a dominant motif as the cult of sacrifice was demobilised and
ANZAC mythology cemented. Hence one official history chose to end on the note that New
Zealand soldiers had ‘one and all made willing sacrifices for the common good. And that is
the message of the Anzac to the people of New Zealand: Place the interests of the community
before the interests of self’.1134 School lessons for the next generation similarly noted that the
Empire had been impoverished by its loss of men yet ‘purified by their sacrifice. It has
attained a higher spiritual level … In a few years its honour will be in your hands. Play your
part … so you may help to fulfil the promise of 1919.’1135

On the seventh ANZAC Day, Bishop Averill gave a sermon noting a public mood that the
Great War had failed to end war, make the world safe for democracy, wash away
antagonisms or awaken a Christian spirit in civil life. Averill argued that this failure should
not be taken as indicating the hollowness of the ideals the war had been fought for. Instead
he urged the living to take increased devotion to causes for which so much had been
sacrificed and to perceive the dead as demonstrating the hardships that could be endured in
the struggle to obtain high ideals; ‘they died with the vision of a better and nobler world
before their eyes. Do not let our disappointment destroy our vision … they had not died in
vain; they had taught us sacrifice.’1136 Such sentiments of keeping faith with the dead
became a stressed theme within interwar remembrance. The meaning bestowed upon the
fallen made them exemplars of idealism and objects which society should strive to revere. It
was this message that W. Walker, the President of the Christchurch RSA, claimed was clear.
‘We must strive to carry on the unfinished work for which they had given their all. The
challenge of Anzac was for us to live the sacrificial life.’1137

*1133 Chilton, p.15.
*1134 Waite, pp.300-301.
*1136 NZH, 27 April 1925, p.11.
*1137 Press, 26 April 1922, p.12.
Moreover, if the sacrifices required to build a better world were ongoing, then the social dynamics which negotiated their imposition upon the social body continued as well. Belich’s history of New Zealand dates the lifespan of the moral evangelism of the tight society as stretching from the 1880s to the 1930s and regards its after-effects as keeping things tight into the 1960s.\textsuperscript{1138} One curious example demonstrating the transition of wartime discipline to non-military subjects occurred in the midst of the worldwide influenza epidemic. An editorial, noting the disgusting conditions of urban slums and the health risk these posed to the rest of society, claimed the state would be justified to exercise a ‘hygienic dictatorship’ to secure the public good. Noteworthy is the reference to wartime powers in justifying peacetime measures; ‘the government has the power to compel men to become soldiers and should take the power to compel civilians to become clean, and remain healthy.’ Additionally, the declaration of a moral mandate to authorise illiberal measures is remarkably consistent with discourse upon shirking; ‘if people will be filthy they must be made clean by force.’\textsuperscript{1139} Compulsion remained a legitimate and socially justifiable means of securing the common good.

The trauma the Great War imposed had major efforts on individuals, communities and nations. However, studying the cult of sacrifice which emerged as a response to this trauma highlights how existing cultural orientations and ideologies were mobilised in efforts to navigate harrowing circumstances. Aspects of this culture - the way it attempted to respond and give meaning to loss, to maintain reverence of that meaning and to dole out the impact of loss upon the social body reveal established values and decidedly customary forces at work.

\textsuperscript{1138} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, p.157.  
\textsuperscript{1139} NZO, 30 November 1918, p.2.
Conclusion: The Results and Means of Cultural Mobilisation

The dominant representations by which commitment to the war effort was presented in New Zealand can be understood as examples of cultural mobilisation, a phenomenon which saw cultural resources mobilised alongside material resources. In studying this development two topics of analysis have been pursued: the results the process wrought in New Zealand’s public sphere and the means by which it operated.

To begin with the former, the essential conclusion must be that there is a notable continuum between wartime representations and their pre-war cultural precursors. Mobilisation saw existing ideas and established images enlisted and related to the impacts the war had upon the social body. Existing conceptions of collective identity, around both regional and global Britishness, thus became prominent features in wartime public culture. Anti-German representations drew upon pre-war anti-alien philosophies and imagery. Wartime assertions of how gender and conflict should relate reflect established archetypes around manliness and femininity. Prominent wartime antitypes likewise indicate tensions around how gendered ideals might be jeopardised by modern life. Lastly, the public response to the costs of war indicate a mining of the traditional imagination, adherence to mourning conventions and the exercising of social dynamics around conformity.

This phenomenon of existing ideas being retained and repurposed was not unique to commitments to the war effort. Critics and opponents of the war clearly engaged in their own mobilisations as they related aspects of the war – its cause, its conduct, its impact on the social body – to other ideas. This process is witnessed in theists concluding that adherence to Christian doctrine meant an adherence to pacifism; socialists who tagged the war as indicating the flawed structure of the capitalist order; women who justified their opposition under notions of biological maternalism; Labour MPs who called for the nationalisation of wealth to create fairer conditions; or in those who perceived their ethnic identity as incompatible with participation in a ‘British war’.

The subjects explored in the last six chapters do not form an exhaustive record of how war and culture intersected and the concept of cultural mobilisation might be furthered utilised in mapping wartime developments. For instance, the Government’s wartime policy of
balancing concession, compromise and coercion in negotiating with workers could be considered against the state of pre-war labour relations or compared to counter revolutionary strategies in the post-October Revolution world. It might be asked whether the surge of sectarianism during the war and James Liston’s 1922 trial for sedition represent continued, refined or distinct notions of how New Zealand society drew the boundaries of acceptable difference. The recognition of existing philosophies and forces could aid comprehension of post-war repatriation - an activity Stephen Clarke intriguingly describes as ‘a continuation of the self-help ethos of the nineteenth-century, combined with the New Zealand tradition of state assistance for the deserving.’ Cultural mobilisation cannot function as a universal guide in exploring the period, nor should it become a determinist catchall. It does, however, provide a useful conceptual tool with which to consider how the material that dominated public culture through the war years relates to wider traditions, movements and dynamics.

The answer to why and how peacetime ideas were mobilised into wartime conceptions - the second focus of this thesis - is found in the nature of both the war and the New Zealand society which waged it. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz described war as a remarkable trinity, constituted of ‘primordial violence, hatred and enmity’, an aspect mainly concerning the passions of the people; ‘the play of chance and probability’ which might be navigated by creative spirit, an aspect identified with the commander; and the ‘instrument of policy’ which subordinated these forces to reason, an aspect concerning the state. This third aspect can rightly be observed in how modern states, in seeking various outcomes, exercised their capacity to organise and repress. This thesis has not rejected the significance of top-down state directives as a significant force in cultural mobilisation. Nor does it deny that deception, censorship and repression were among the tools by which this was facilitated. The way in which the war brought higher degrees of state intervention in ‘economic management, social engineering and national efficiency’ has been rightly noted. The retention of wartime measures - passports, six o’clock closing and certain wartime sedition and censorship powers - into the peace likewise indicate an increased capacity for official involvement or intrusion in civic life.

1140 Clarke, ‘Return, Repatriation, Remembrance’, p.171.
What is contested, however, is that officialdom can be considered the silver bullet which shaped wartime culture. In Clausewitz’s philosophy, a theory that fixes ‘an arbitrary relationship between them [parts of the trinity] would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.’\textsuperscript{1144} The mechanism by which the dominant wartime messages studied in this thesis became dominant largely rests upon a complex and multifaceted process indicative of the expansion of modern mass politics and the pre-war state of political-civic relations. Modernising governments increasingly based their authority, including the authority to repress, upon the notion that their actions represented the interests and/or will of a broad-based political community. A war effort, therefore, could not ignore mass opinion as it might have in an earlier age. The involvement of civil society meant the war became perceived as a conflict of ideologies rather than a traditional struggle for power. Posters and speeches from officialdom intensified and played to this process, but engaged with ideas, emotions and rhetoric already being vented within the public sphere.

Thus mobilisation occurred on a horizontal as well as a vertical axis and notions of an active citizenry were renewed and exercised alongside the expansion of state activity. Whilst debating conscription, John Payne - pointing out that 46,000 men had departed and that a further 11,000 were in training - could say with some validity that volunteerism had produced a ‘magnificent response’\textsuperscript{1145} The engagement between the war and civil society formed the major means by which the war was layered with meanings in the public sphere. Consequently, the conflict became a cause, with any notion of diplomatic or high-political ends transcended by a struggle held to represent the distinctive qualities of a common people - their values, symbols, traditions and rituals. The forces engaged in the process of layering meaning upon the war were decidedly non-monolithic and largely underpinned by the expansion of civil society and the tightened links between ordinary citizens and public life. Hence journalists, preachers, teachers, writers, cartoonists, pamphleteers, business leaders, poets, correspondents, artists, musicians, community figures, members of various societies, clubs and leagues and union leaders stood beside authority figures in circulating ideas around the public sphere. The channels that saw these meanings circulated are likewise indicative of the mobilisation of existing peacetime structures, institutions and networks. Thus the newspaper editorial, the cable network, the letter - to the acquaintance, the editor, or the MP -

\textsuperscript{1144} Clausewitz, p.89.
\textsuperscript{1145} NZPD, Vol.175, 30 May 1916, p.515.
the pamphlet, the cartoon, the meeting hall, the song sheet, the social club and the speech remained the major means by which ideas were spread. Existing social circles and networks were likewise mobilised as established societies took up patriotic work, new societies emerged on established lines and peer pressure was exerted through community connections and family units. Broad cultural orientations, tensions and idiosyncrasies were also reflected: the tendency to take cues from developments in Britain, the populist assertion of a common community with common interests and the strong obligation to volunteer.

Understanding of cultural mobilisation, the means by which it worked and the results it wrought have several historiographical implications and the concept can play a significant role in perception of the war effort. To begin with, cultural mobilisation facilitates the consideration of the home front for what it was: namely, a complex social order where the efforts of the state and aspects of the national community could clash, compromise or synchronise their interests. New Zealand society was neither an autocratic police-state controlled from above nor a mad, jingoistic mob – though elements of it could resemble such descriptions. Individuals retained the capacity to interpret and renegotiate meanings throughout the conflict and the results of mobilisation were never entirely consistent, universally subscribed to or uncontested. Instances of this broad interplay between various elements in the wartime public sphere have appeared again and again in the preceding chapters. Pressure to send single men before married men was primarily a social concern enacted into legal structures. Public hounding of the Germanic occurred largely without official sanction. The fourth estate, though typically noted as toeing the line, was enticed by rumours, gossip and the promise of public outrage, and these tendencies ruffled the official mind. The mobilisation process, therefore, featured degrees of synergy and individuals, communities and interests functioned to shape the final results by accepting, subverting, negotiating, challenging or rejecting.

To take this implication one step further, appreciation that aspects of war culture were the results of live forces suggests that the results of cultural mobilisation should not be considered as the natural or destined face of wartime society. Rather than indicating immutable outcomes, the results of cultural mobilisation represent an ongoing balancing act between the demands the war effort placed on the social body and social/cultural factors. If

1146 ANZ-R22428976-AAYS-8638-AD1-705-8/19/93, ‘Communications-Censorship of News – “New Zealand Observer-1917-1918”’.
the demand for manpower had not been so high, then tensions around sectarianism and shirkers might not have reached the intensity they did. Conversely, if demands for manpower had increased to the point where married men were sent in large numbers, then youth might have been less emphasised in ANZAC mythology and the loyalties married men owed to dependants and country may have been redefined. Additionally if this hypothetical greater removal of men from the economy resulted in women being employed en masse, then notions that female labour represented a natural extension of colonial femininity would likely have been mobilised to a greater degree to act as a legitimising mythology.

Another major implication of using cultural mobilisation as a conceptual model to perceive the war is the assistance it lends in negotiating the rift which has opened between contemporary and modern views of the war. In the decades since 1918 the geopolitics that shaped New Zealand’s place in the world have dramatically shifted, there have been revolutions in social mores, codes around propriety and shame have been reworked, common culture has been eroded and individualism has been fortified. The New Zealand that fought the Great War - with its deference to Britain, its Victorian views on race, gender, patriotism and propriety and its stiff sensibilities around courage, cowardice and self-sacrifice - can seem very distant and difficult for modern eyes to recognise. Moreover, the perceptions that arose out of studies of the war’s impacts during the 1960s - secured and sustained in mass consciousness by cultural productions like Oh, What a Lovely War! (1963) and Blackadder Goes Forth (1989) - remains enormously influential in public memory.\textsuperscript{1147} The canon of this tradition tags the First World War as originating out of misguided hubris, as perpetuated by extraordinary incompetence, as forming a prime example of the tragedy of the human condition and as a monument to the futility and horror of war. Often reflecting the zeitgeist of the social revolutions of the time, it condemned authority figures and often the structures and values of belligerent societies. The general tendency to obscure or remove popular consensus from the equation was counterbalanced by increased emphasis upon the coercive aspects of the war efforts or contentions that consensus was the result of deception.

There is neither the space nor the desire to condemn entire schools of scholarship here. It is sufficient to note that while such interpretations have conveyed irony, anger and pathos - at times in insightful and enduring ways - they struggle to provide answers to why belligerent

\textsuperscript{1147} Bond, pp.51-73.
societies committed to their war efforts for as long and as hard as they did. It might be added that the notion of a society, not always that different to our own, consciously making immense sacrifices and justifying its efforts with appeals to core values is, in some sense, no less disquieting than the idea of a war effort run on coercion and manipulation. What is now emerging in First World War historiography, with the upsurge in cultural studies on the subject since the 1980s, the rise in global/transnational perspectives, which have seen more points of comparison made, and a school of military history which is engaged in re-evaluating the actions and context of the military mind, is an altogether more complex picture of how the war, societies and cultures interacted. The results have been the reopening of old issues, the discovery of fresh perspectives, challenges to entrenched conceptions and the modification of many conventional images.

Within New Zealand historiography the consideration of such developments appears to be at a very embryonic stage. Default assumptions and popular, though not necessarily sophisticated, sentiments remain predominant; if the most recent examination of the home front, at time of writing, is anything to go by, there is still a real tendency to view governments as operating free of constraints, to cast the public as hopelessly duped and to ask little about the war beyond whether it was a bad thing.1148 Very little space has been given to questions of how New Zealanders understood the war, why so many enlisted or encouraged their sons to do so, what motivated them to give white feathers, to assail people who had been long-time members of their communities, or how they tried to come to terms with the deaths of so many of their countrymen.

Appreciation of cultural mobilisation can play a part in the process of seeking answers to such questions and this thesis has been an exercise in that search. The results of the cultural mobilisation studied here matter, first and foremost, because they mattered to so many people at the time. Rather than ideological figleaves positioned to cover naked realities with a degree of respectability, they were conventional representations, infused with cultural significance, layered over the conflict. They are part of the explanation of why so many New Zealanders did what was expected of them, and perhaps what they expected of themselves. Bridging the gap between contemporaries and modern worldviews requires modern recognition of the scale of the contemporary commitment which shaped and sustained the

1148 Eldred-Grigg, The Great Wrong War.
war effort and an appreciation of the wider social and cultural forces in play. However, ‘recognition’ and ‘appreciation’ should connote ‘empathy’ rather than automatic translation to ‘celebration’ or ‘approval’; modern New Zealanders need not forfeit their capacity to endorse changes in social structures and values since 1914-1918 or to assess the war as a bad thing. New Zealand historiography would hardly be enriched by a hypothetical *The Great Right War* and chest-thumping triumphalism could just as easily distort historical understanding.

The capacity of cultural mobilisation to contextualise the war in the modern mind can also be used to contextualise the war within its cultural, social and intellectual settings. The war’s impact upon both the world at the time and wider historical developments has seen it worked into epochal meta-narratives – the loss of innocence, the beginning of the short twentieth-century, the rise of communism and fascism, the end of the old order, the birth of New Zealand nationalism, to name a few. That the war possesses a strong ‘before and after’ quality and had major impacts on New Zealand society and culture is unmistakable. Additionally, some tropes clearly capture some contemporary sentiments; in the words of one editorial, printed days after the armistice, ‘our whole mental outlook has changed during the last four years and we cannot simply go back to the old conditions as if the war had never taken place.’

Again the assertion is not to denounce the validity of the approach but to appreciate that grand meta-narratives risk distorting the lenses through which contemporaries viewed events as they lend perspective to posterity. If there is value in understanding the mindset of contemporaries - either for its own sake or for historical causation - then there is a need to comprehend, as Paul Fussell notes, that ‘the past, which as always did not know the future, acted in ways that ask to be imagined before they are condemned. Or even simplified.’ To contemporaries the Great War was not a bookend for the blood spilt between Sarajevo 1914 and Sarajevo 1992 or a doomed prelude for an imperfect peace - though some Cassandras gained retrospective prominence through their gloomy, and unhappily accurate, predictions. Rather comprehension of the conflict emerged from developments in the world it so disrupted - the geopolitical and strategic realities of the day, dominant cultural values around gender, nationalism, military service and the social changes the forces of

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globalisation, urbanisation, and technological advancement wrought. The advantage gained by starting the story earlier and playing events forward is a better awareness of the prominent location of such material within the cultural landscape and improved appreciation that the world in which the Great War took place was a world unto itself.

This thesis opened with one man’s representation of a small part of that world. Gordon Calman’s sketch of New Zealand captured a farewell that had become a salient part of war by 1917. In a metaphorical sense the image encapsulates the results of cultural mobilisation as existing landscapes were reimagined to give meaning to new circumstances. The act of creating and publicising the sketch is likewise indicative of the means by which ordinary people’s sentimental equipment played a part within the process of mobilising ideas and layering them upon the war.
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