Oil, terrorism and China: is there a new securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa?

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments..................................................................................................................3

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................4

Section 1: Introduction, theory and context...........................................................................5

Introduction ............................................................................................................................5

Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory....................................................................9

The Securitization of Africa: oil, terrorism and China.........................................................14

  Energy security ....................................................................................................................17

  Terrorism ...............................................................................................................................22

  The China Factor ................................................................................................................25

Normative dimensions of securitization ..............................................................................29

Section 2: Nigeria and the U.S..............................................................................................32

History of the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship: evidence of change and securitization .......32

  The Cold War: 1960-1991 .................................................................................................32

  Post-Cold War: the 1990s .................................................................................................33

  After 9/11: A new securitization? ....................................................................................36

Securitizing factors ..............................................................................................................43

  Nigeria and oil ...................................................................................................................43

  Terrorism ...............................................................................................................................47

  China ....................................................................................................................................52

  Why does this matter? .......................................................................................................55

Alternatives to Securitization ...............................................................................................60

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................67

Bibliography ..........................................................................................................................71
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Abstract

This thesis explores the question of whether there has been a “new” securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa since the late 1990s. It follows a stream of literature and real-world evidence suggesting that U.S. engagement with African countries has taken on a more securitized tone in the years since the end of the twentieth century. This thesis suggests that there are three key factors behind this securitization: oil, terrorism and the rise of China. I explore these factors in the context of wider U.S.-Africa engagement before examining in greater detail the case of the changing U.S. relationship with Nigeria. As one of Africa’s major oil producers as well as a site of terrorist activity and Chinese expansion, the case of Nigeria demonstrates how securitization has occurred and what effects this has had on the country and the wider African situation.
Section 1: Introduction, theory and context

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether there has been a renewed securitization of United States (U.S.) foreign policy since Africa in the late 1990s. There has been a strand of literature and a stream of real-world evidence suggesting that U.S. foreign policy in Africa has become more and more securitized in the years since the late 1990s and early 2000s, mimicking the shift in U.S. engagement with Middle Eastern countries following the Second World War. The Middle East moved from a peripheral position in U.S. foreign policy to centre stage in a matter of years as factors like energy security and terrorism came to the fore. The recognition by the U.S. of the strategic value of oil in and around the Arabian Gulf and, later on, the danger of terrorist groups emerging in this region, caused the U.S. to focus on building relationships with key countries based on security and defense. The foundation of the post-war alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia, for instance, was the security guarantee provided by the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia as well as the United States’ willingness to provide the Saudis with advanced weaponry, military technology and training. In return, the Saudis granted the U.S. preferential access to their oil (Askari et al., 2009, p.102). This thesis aims to examine whether a similar situation is playing out now in Africa, where alongside energy security and terrorism, the rise of China have resulted in U.S. engagement taking on a more securitized tone. I will explore these claims in relation to the wider African context before testing them in depth based on a case study of U.S. engagement with Nigeria.

Why have I selected the United States, Africa, and Nigeria? Firstly, the United States is the world’s largest consumer of oil and also has the world’s largest military budget. Despite the so-called ‘rise of the rest’ (the increasing military, economic and diplomatic weight of countries like China, Brazil, and India) the United States remains the world’s preeminent power and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. No other country is as globally engaged as the United States, and its actions will therefore have consequences that are felt the world over. If a securitization of U.S. policy in Africa occurs, the effects will be felt not
only on the African continent, but in other distant countries. Furthermore, thanks to the effects of globalisation and rising interdependence, “even distant disorder can have effects that hurt, influence, or disturb the majority of people living within the United States” (Nye Jr, 1991); events taking place in faraway Africa can have profound consequences not just for the United States but the rest of the world as well.

Secondly, Africa is home to several of the world’s fastest growing economies, such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Niger, the Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia and Liberia (CIA). Many of the world’s future economic powerhouses will be located on the continent thanks to growing trade and abundant natural resources. As economic power grows so does hard power and the capacity to have an impact on world affairs. Yet Africa still remains conflict-stricken and plagued by poverty, corruption and poor governance. What happens on a continent that will be so important to future world prosperity is worthy of study.

Finally, Nigeria was selected as a test case because it is a key country in Africa. It has the continent’s largest population, second-largest economy, and is a leading producer of high quality light oil and gas. It has played a central role in peacekeeping and stability operations throughout the region, in countries such as Togo, Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Cote d’Ivoire (Ploch, 2007, p.15). Nigeria is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) and is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). One senior American foreign policy officer stated that “No country’s fate is so decisive for the continent. No other country across a range of issues has the power so thoroughly to shape outcomes elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa” (Ploch, 2007, p.1). For these reasons, the United States’ relationship with Nigeria and the consequences of this engagement are important in terms of the future of the African continent as well as the global economy. This is especially true given that Nigeria faces numerous challenges to its stability which have helped to justify the securitization of U.S. engagement with the country. Despite enormous oil revenues, much of the country remains chronically underdeveloped. Poverty levels are very high and weak governance and corruption has obstructed the
development of critical infrastructure, social services and broad-based economic
growth. Much of Nigeria's history since independence has been shaped by
military rule and competition for control between northern and southern elites:
the government was dominated by Northern military leaders until the first
democratic elections were held in 1999 (Ploch, 2007, p.2). Given this legacy,
human rights remain an issue, particularly among government security forces,
and ethnic and religious conflict remains common (Ploch, 2007, p.2): the
International Crisis Group estimates that approximately 8000 Nigerians were
killed in sectarian clashes between 1999 and 2002 alone, and a further 6000 may
have been the targets of ethnic or religious killings (Ploch, 2007, p.6).
Furthermore, China's involvement in the continent has risen exponentially in the
2000s as its appetite for natural resources, new markets, and political support
has grown. The U.S. relationship with Nigeria could be extrapolated to other
African states which share similar characteristics such as abundant valuable
natural resources, high incidences of terrorist and sectarian violence and interest
from other countries like China. This could include places like Angola, South
Sudan, Gabon, Algeria and Niger.

The main argument of this thesis is that United States policy in Africa has become
increasingly securitized since 2001 due to three key securitizing factors. Prior to
this U.S. engagement was for the most part restricted to the economic realm,
particularly the energy industry as well as development and aid (although as will
be discussed, even then national interest always took precedence over other
needs). Since 2001 however, there has been a marked shift towards emphasising
the security and defense side of the relationship. Trade and development issues
are still important of course, but there is evidence that they are being eclipsed by
the needs and objectives of the Pentagon and the U.S. national security
establishment. The creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in
2007 at a time when the U.S. military presence in other parts of the world was
being cut back and the Department of State and Agency for International
Development (USAID) were suffering from budget cuts is indicative of this shift.

There are three factors which I will argue contributed to this new securitization.
The first, oil dependency, has been a constant concern of the U.S. since the 1970s,
but achieved a new sense of urgency in the 2000s. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001 and subsequent upheaval in the Middle East caused by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq cemented the importance of diversifying oil suppliers to reduce dependence on oil from the Arabian Gulf. Countries like Nigeria offered the capacity to balance out the decline in Iraqi oil production and provide a long-term alternative if their capacity to produce oil could be protected. This leads into the second securitizing factor, that of terrorism and intra-state conflict. The 9/11 attacks launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and highlighted how a small group of violent extremists on the other side of the world could pose a very real threat to the United States. It also showed how failed and weak states could harbour not only terrorists but other violent insurgent groups that could threaten the stability of the state as well as the wider region. In Nigeria, terrorist attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru as well as the guerrilla campaigns waged by groups like the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) threaten its cohesion as a country and the stability of the wider West African region. This means that Nigeria has been caught up the GWOT and, as such, much engagement with the country has been shaped by the security concerns of the Department of Defense.

The third securitizing factor at play in the U.S.-Nigeria relationship (and also in wider U.S.-Africa relations) is the rise of China. As China’s economic weight and international influence has increased, it has become more heavily involved in Africa, particularly in countries like Nigeria which can provide the natural resources it needs to maintain its economic growth. Chinese investment in Nigeria’s energy industry, combined with its willingness to sell arms and provide military training, has engendered a sense of threat in the U.S. The threat is that China may be attempting to “lock-in” resources like oil for its own use and potentially use these resources as an “oil weapon”, as the OPEC states did in the 1970s. Given the importance of oil not only to the U.S. but its allies, this is deemed a threat which justifies the expansion of military activity in Nigeria and other African states in order to protect U.S. interests and counter China’s influence.
Why should we care about these developments? Why does it matter if the U.S. military is exerting greater control over U.S. Africa policy? The reasons we should care can be divided into three main categories: development and governance issues, human rights concerns, and environmental problems. A focus on security issues rather than development or governance problems only serves to prolong underdevelopment and in the case of many countries, worsen the situation by diverting much-needed resources into the security sector. Furthermore, most would agree that the United States’ involvement in the Middle East has done little to promote human rights values or build politically stable regimes: most would in fact argue that it has been counterproductive in these respects. A similar outcome is to be expected if U.S. policy follows the same path in Africa. Furthermore, the overwhelming focus on oil as an energy resource makes it hard to develop alternative clean energy solutions that would be better for the environment. This point will be returned to in section 2.

The thesis follows the following structure. First, I will present the literature on securitization theory and how it relates to the U.S. engagement in Africa. I will then examine the three factors which I will argue have contributed to the securitization of U.S. policy towards Africa: oil, terrorism, and the rise of China. I will then present some of the arguments why such a securitization might be a bad thing, particularly in the context of development policy. Following this general examination, I will turn to a more in-depth case study of these three factors in relation to U.S. engagement with Nigeria, focusing on how the relationship has changed, in particular since 2001. Next I will discuss the negative aspects of the securitization of U.S. policy in relation to Nigeria specifically, and what an alternative policy would look like before presenting some final conclusions.

**Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory**

This section will outline the theoretical framework used in this thesis, that of securitization theory. It will then provide background and contextual information about the securitization of Africa in U.S. foreign policy, focusing on the three
factors that I argue have driven this transformation (oil dependency and energy security, the rise of China, and terrorism).

The key theoretical framework I will employ in this thesis is that of securitization theory. It is a theory which attempts to understand how and why certain issues, states or groups of people come to be deemed security threats and what effects this has. It is applicable to my thesis question as it allows me to examine what effect the security-oil nexus has had on U.S.-Africa relations and more specifically the U.S.-Nigeria relationship by using the lens of securitization as a way to assess how the relationship has changed, why, and what the possible implications of this are.

Securitization theory, associated with the Copenhagen School of political theory, was formulated in the 1990s as a middle ground between traditional security studies (which argued that security should only be concerned with war, military power and the state) and critical security studies (which wanted to widened the concept of security to issues beyond war and the state, and argued that security should be emancipatory) (Vultee, 2010, p.34). Securitization theory aims to examine how and why some issues become security issues and others do not, and what this “securitization” actually does. Something becomes a security issue when it poses (or is presented as posing) an existential threat to a particular referent object (traditionally the state). Any public issue can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized to politicized to securitized; securitization is a more extreme form of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p.23). Exactly where an issue is placed on the spectrum varies from state to state and across time. Successful securitization involves three steps: 1) the identification of an existential threat; 2) emergency action; and 3) a change in inter-unit relations due to the breaking of rules (Taureck, 2006, p.55). When an issue has been securitized, it means that a political actor with sufficient standing (securitization is closely linked to power (Taureck, 2006, p.55)) has presented it to the relevant audience as an existential threat that places the “physical, cultural, or social health of the community” in danger (Vultee, 2010, p.33). However, simply because an issue has been presented as an existential threat does not necessarily
mean that such a threat genuinely exists. The discourses of security from which securitization arises are not objective assessments of threat, but are rather the “products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them” (Lipschutz, 1998, p.5). It has been debated whether a disruption in oil supply, for example, truly counts as an existential threat to the state, but what matters is that it has been presented as such and generated accompanying extraordinary actions because of its historical association with war and national security (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24).

That is why I believe that securitization theory is a fruitful avenue for exploring the policies of the United States towards securing oil in Africa: when it comes to theorizing resources in international relations, much work is hampered by disagreement over whether threats to the supply of resources like oil are truly security threats. By employing securitization theory, the question is shifted from whether oil supply is a security issue for the United States to how and with what effect it has been presented as one. Furthermore, securitization theory offers an avenue to examine new sectors in security studies, in this case energy, which more traditional security theories (primarily realism and its variants) are ill-suited for. Security threats have traditionally been portrayed as mainly military in nature because of their potential to completely overthrow the existing political entity of the state. If political or economic means, however, could be employed to bring about a similar threat to the survival of the state as an independent, sovereign political unit, they will also be security threats (Waever 1998). In this thesis I plan to employ a slightly altered securitization theory than that originally laid out by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1998), following the suggestions of Matt McDonald and Rita Abrahamsen.

Abrahamsen suggests that “the process of securitization is [...] better understood as gradual and incremental, and importantly an issue can be placed on the security continuum without necessarily ever reaching the category of existential threat” (Abrahamsen, 2005, p.59). I believe that this will be a more useful way to think of securitization theory, as in the case of U.S. engagement in Africa there
has been no single defining moment where developments on the continent suddenly became portrayed as an existential threat, yet I will argue that it has clearly been placed on the security agenda. Similarly McDonald has argued that securitization theory is too narrow, and would be more useful if certain aspects were broadened. First, he argued that the form of the act constructing security was too limited to the speech of dominant actors, excluding other forms of representation (such as visual images) and actors who may not be deemed institutionally legitimate but who still have a stake in contesting security. In the case of oil production in Africa, for instance, the very vocal calls by international oil companies for greater security in the Niger Delta, the Gulf of Guinea and other oil producing regions have played a significant role in placing oil on the security agenda of not only African states but the companies’ home governments. Secondly, he argued that the context of securitizing acts is defined too narrowly, focusing only on the moment of intervention and not addressing the potential for security to be constructed over time. Again, this point is especially relevant in the case of African oil, as the shift towards seeing it as a security issue does not have one dramatic, defining moment, but can be traced over a number of years. (McDonald, 2008, p.564).

So what actually happens when an issue moves into the realm of security politics? Security issues are traditionally defined by their capacity to pose a threat to survival, therefore the use of extraordinary measures that go beyond the normal range of political procedures is justified (Buzan et al., 1998, p.21). Such extraordinary measures may include the use of fast-track decision-making and legislation, secrecy, a lack of opportunities for deliberation or public input, or the use of military and/or security agencies rather than civilian actors. Securitization institutionalizes speed, which puts into question “the viability of deliberation and a contest of opinion” and supports “strengthening executive-centred government” and suppressing dissent (Roe, 2012, p.251). For this reason, securitization has negative connotations for many scholars. As Roe writes:

“Rather than debate and deliberation, securitization calls for silence and speed. Security policy is the privilege of the elite, and scrutiny is neither

Page 12 of 83
feasible nor desirable [...] Securitization’s negativeness, therefore, lies in
its disruption – or indeed complete abandonment – of open and
accountable government. In other words, securitization is bad for
democracy.” (Roe, 2012, p.252)

This point is especially pertinent for countries like Nigeria, where democracy is
still relatively recent and fragile. In this context, securitization has taken to form
of a reliance on military agencies and resources rather than civilian actors.

Waever also argues that securitizing an issue does not necessarily result in
greater effectiveness or optimal outcomes (Roe, 2012, p.253). National security
policy making tends to focus on short-term problems requiring short-term
solutions that can be implemented rapidly, and is therefore unsuitable for issues
which require greater latitude, such as development, poverty, and environmental
problems (Roe, 2012, p.253). This does not mean that every issue will be better
addressed if it is not securitized: judging whether or not securitization is positive
or negative depends heavily on the issue in question. Some adhere to the thesis
that if the security of the many rather than the few is improved, securitization is a
positive thing (Roe, 2012, p.253). As will be discussed in a later section, however,
this is demonstrably not the case in Africa.

This section has presented securitization theory as it will be applied in this
thesis. Securitization is the process by which an issue in the public domain is
presented as an existential security threat to the referent object, in most cases
the state. This has the effect of justifying the use of extraordinary measures and
bypassing the normal rules of politics to combat the threat. In the case of the U.S.,
Africa and Nigeria, the issue of ensuring the continued production of oil has
become a security issue, a process which has been taking place in small
increments since the 1970s but which has accelerated since 2001. The following
section will examine this process in greater detail.
The Securitization of Africa: oil, terrorism and China

The securitization of Africa was a gradual process that spanned the Cold War. Throughout the 1940s Africa was barely on the radar of the U.S. and was excluded from the U.S. military command structure. In 1952 several countries in North Africa were added to the responsibilities of the European Command due to their historic relationship with Europe, but the majority of the continent, including Nigeria, was not incorporated into any geographic command at all until 1960, when the Cold War competition for influence over the newly independent African states prompted the U.S. to assign responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa to the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). Responsibility shifted once again in 1962 to the newly created Strike Command (STRICOM) until its responsibility for Africa was removed. This left sub-Saharan Africa once again outside the U.S. military command structure until 1983 when Cold War priorities once again drew attention to Africa (Ploch, 2008, p.12).

After the end of the Cold War, Africa gained an increased strategic importance to the United States for three reasons: the Global War on Terror; fears of an impending energy crisis; and China’s growing presence on the continent (Keenan, 2008, p.16). In accordance with the version of securitization presented by Abrahamsen and McDonald, this securitization did not occur overnight. It has instead been a slow process which Jeremy Keenan argues began to gather speed in 1997. This year saw the founding of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neo-conservative think tank that promoted the use of U.S. military might abroad in order to ensure that the U.S. maintained its position of global leadership. Its members wound up in several key positions in the administration of George Bush Jr and its ideals came to heavily influence the government’s policies, especially in relation to national security and the Iraq War. Its views were bolstered as in 1997 the level of U.S. dependence on foreign oil reached the “psychologically critical level of 50%” (Keenan, 2010, p.28). This gave PNAC ammunition to make energy security into a national security issue, prompting Bush to establish a National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group under Vice-President Dick Cheney immediately upon taking office in 2001. The report produced by the NEPD Group made dire predictions about the future of U.S. energy security, projecting that energy use would continue to soar while oil...
output from Saudi Arabia appeared to be plateauing. Oil was defined by the Bush administration as a “strategic national interest: and thus was a resource which justified the use of military force to control” (Keenan, 2010, p.29). Identifying continued reliance on Saudi oil as a national security threat, the report recommended diversifying the sources of America’s oil supply. President Bush stated in 2006 that is was his goal to “to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025” in order to enhance U.S. energy security (Ploch, 2008, p.14). Sub-Saharan Africa was singled out as a key future source of oil for the U.S., particularly states in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea: in 2001 the U.S. was already importing 14% of its oil from Africa, rising to 22% in 2006 (Keenan, 2010, p.28). In 2004, included in the list of Pentagon priorities in Africa was assuring “access to strategic resources”, alongside more traditional concerns such as disrupting terrorist activity and stopping the spread of WMDs (Keenan, 2010, pp.32-33). Because Africa had re-entered America’s worldview as an important source of oil, anything which threatened its capacity to fulfil this role was dangerous and perceived as a potential threat to U.S. national security.

The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 report placed a number of African countries, including Nigeria, at a risk of state failure given the range of challenges they face1 and their relatively limited capacity to deal with them. Because of this fragility and the potential for destabilizing groups to take root, the U.S. military is becoming more active in the region, primarily through AFRICOM (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.329). AFRICOM was set up in 2007 (coincidentally the same year that U.S. oil imports from Africa peaked (Brown, 2013, p.45)) and reached full operating capability as a stand-alone command in 2008 under General William E. Ward, replacing the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) as the military command responsible for Africa. This reflected a shift in strategic thinking motivated by the recognition that Africa, with its vast oil deposits, was a tactical prize that could not be left to be lost to state failure. EUCOM’s resources were being stretched due to the stability and security challenges presented by Africa: in 2006, EUCOM’s staff were spending more than

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1 Such as poverty, corruption, sectarian violence etc.
half their time on Africa issues, a huge increase from just three years before (Ploch, 2011, p.2).

AFRICOM’s modus operandi is to advance regional peace and security, and to do this the command focuses on three main areas “(1) countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs); (2) supporting maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; and (3) strengthening African defense capabilities” (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.327). Its overarching goal on its creation was to “promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy” through military-to-military programs and operations (Ploch, 2008, p.2 n.3). Stability operations are a priority for the new command on par with combat operations, due to the recognition that instability and failing states threaten the interests of the U.S. and its allies: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Ploch, 2008, p.5). In 2009 the Obama administration requested a significant increase for security assistance to African countries (such as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme) as well as for AFRICOM’s operations (Keenan, 2010, p.39). An increase in funding was also requested for counterterrorism operations in Africa through the Peacekeeping Operations programme, including increases in funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (Keenan, 2010, p.39). AFRICOM also works to improve maritime security and protect the “free flow of global commerce” (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, pp.327-28), supporting the strategic objective of enhancing economic growth, trade and investment.

The United States military has also been acquiring facilities such as air bases and ports since the 1990s, and today has access to “lily-pad” bases in a number of countries including Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia that are used to support counter-terrorism operations and protect sea lanes (Ploch, 2008, p.9). The base on São Tomé y Príncipe has been described as similar to Diego Garcia, the U.S. facility that has enabled it to control and defend Middle Eastern oil supplies since the Cold War. America has also investigated the possibility of building similar facilities in
Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria, Ghana, and Mali (Vine, 2012). In Niger, a drone base for dispatching Predator drones was established in March 2013, along with an agreement with the Niger government providing judicial protection for U.S. troops stationed in the country. This gives the U.S. military an important strategic foothold in Western Africa, as Niger borders the unstable, volatile states of Mali, Nigeria, and Libya (Whitlock, 2013).

The gradual securitization of African issues by the United States was reflective of the recognition of non-traditional security threats in the 1990s. As the Cold War ended, it became obvious that inter-state war was no longer the primary threat facing states. Instead issues such as energy security, terrorism and failed states, and fears about shifts in the global balance of power came to the attention of the defense establishment, leading to increasingly securitized engagement with African countries culminating with the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. These factors, which contributed to the securitization of Africa, will be considered in greater detail in the next section. All three are factors on their own merit, but the rise of China and terrorism are also closely interlinked with energy security, and I believe it is this connection which has made the situation in Africa appear to be a greater threat to the interests of the United States.

**Energy security**

The first factor contributing to the securitization of Africa in United States foreign policy is energy security, or more specifically, oil security. Energy security has traditionally been defined as “the availability of sufficient supply at affordable prices” (Luft and Korin, 2013). For the most part this refers to oil simply because oil is the most widely used energy source in both the economic and military realms, and also because oil is the one energy source that has historically been subject to the most insecurity.

Although states have long recognised the importance of a secure and affordable supply of oil to their national security, in theoretical terms International Relations scholars did not seriously consider such “non-traditional” security issues as national security threats until after the Cold War. During the 1980s, nuclear weapons, the arms race and deterrence theory dominated discourses of
security, but after the Cold War ended there was a growing awareness that “war was disappearing, or in some cases had disappeared, as an option in relations amongst a substantial group of states” (Buzan, 1997, p.6). At this time Security Studies underwent a schism of sorts between those who believed Security Studies should remain concerned only with military issues, those who argued for a widening of the security agenda to include things such as energy security, and those who questioned the entire conceptualization of security at its roots (Buzan, 1997, p.5). Traditional Security Studies scholars argued that widening the security agenda by including things like energy, human rights, poverty and so forth only served to make the meaning of security incoherent (Buzan, 1997, p.5). However, things that had traditionally been seen as “low politics”, such as the economy and the environment, were becoming increasingly securitized whether scholars agreed or not (Buzan, 1997, p.7). With regards to the economy, for instance, securitization was spurred by factors such as the relative decline of the United States in the economic realm, the increasingly liberalized nature of the global economy, and a growing dependence on imported oil (Buzan, 1997, p.7). These things raised concerns about the capacity of the state to “maintain independent capability for military production in a global market” and the possibility of dependency (such as oil) being exploited for foreign powers (Buzan, 1997, p.8). With regards to these new security issues the state was no longer the only relevant actor, although it mostly remains central. New “referent objects for security and sources of threat” emerged, such as firms, communities, and terrorist groups (Buzan, 1997, p.12).

The security of an affordable oil supply became linked to national security during the First World War, when the British and American navies begun to transition from coal to oil as a primary source of power. By the time the Second World War erupted in 1939, every navy on the world was dependent on oil, as were the majority of land forces. As soon as conventional military forces became reliant on oil in order to operate effectively on the battlefield, obtaining and maintaining access to a secure supply of oil became a national security issue. Britain, for

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2 Although the U.S. military in particular (having recognised this) is undertaking research into how it can reduce dependence on oil. No realistic alternative has been found thus far, however. See Closson, S. The military and energy: Moving the United States beyond oil. *Energy Policy.*
instance, had large coal supplies of its own, but had to negotiate access to oil from foreign powers (Dahl, 2001, p.51). It had to devise means of securing a steady supply in order to avoid repeat incidents of the oil shortages in 1917 which severely constrained the mobility and usefulness of the Royal Navy (Dahl, 2001, p.55). Because most states, like Britain in World War One, are not self-sufficient in oil and cannot take for granted the ability to buy oil freely from global markets, especially during wartime, expectations about military and essential fuel needs in wartime influences countries strategic calculations and thus their foreign policies (Kelanic, 2013, p.6). During World War Two, for instance, both Japan and Germany had to tailor their foreign policies and war strategies to secure oil supplies: Germany pursued alliances with Europe’s two largest oil producers at the time (Rumania and Russia) while Japan was driven into invading the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (Kelanic, 2013, p.1).

Oil did not, however, diminish in importance just because the war was over, both due to the military competition of the Cold War and oil’s increasingly obvious economic importance. In the post-war years oil became essential to the functioning of a modern economy, making it vital not only for military security and the waging of war, but also national economic security. Those states that can retain access to adequate supplies of energy will flourish, whereas those that fail to do so will face hardship and decline. The drive to secure foreign oil supplies had roots in immediate post-war years. The United States ceased to be a net exporter of oil in 1947, when growing consumption outpaced domestic oil production for the first time, creating lasting issues of supply and turning the U.S. into a net importer of oil (Ross, 2013). Although the U.S. was able to act as a swing producer for a time by limiting production in the East Texan oil fields, in 1970 production finally peaked and the only countries left with spare capacity were the OPEC nations (Ross, 2013). After the numerous interruptions to oil supply of the 1950s and 1960s, and when combined with the 1973 oil embargo, the stage was set for the Carter Doctrine of 1980. This explicitly stated that defending the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was a U.S. vital interest and that any attempt to interfere with the flow would be met with all necessary force (Klare, 2001).
There have been several significant incidents between the end of the Second World War and the dawn of the 21st century which have contributed to the securitization of oil by highlighting to states how easily global supply can be disrupted and how severe the consequences can be. The 1953 British embargo of Iranian oil, the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the Arab oil embargo following the Six Day War in 1967 all highlighted the necessity of keeping global oil flowing and preventing disruptions to production or transportation (Ross, 2013). The second Arab oil embargo was another major turning point in the securitization of oil. In 1973 the Arab members of OPEC voted to raise their benchmark oil price by 70%. Over the next few months the Arab producers cut production and stopped shipments of oil to the United States and other countries that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War: by 1974 the price of oil had quadrupled, hitting oil importers with enormous fuel costs and sparking economic recessions. The embargo was especially harmful as U.S. oil production had peaked in 1970, and it was no longer able to boost production at home to make up for international shortfalls (Ross, 2013). The Gulf War in 1991 was another important moment. Most accounts of the Gulf War argue that the main reason Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait was because of oil. Similarly, one of the most cited reasons that the United States retaliated was also because of oil: had Iraq gained control over Kuwait’s oil it would have had the leverage to force Saudi Arabia and smaller Arab states into cutting their oil production and increasing world oil prices. Higher oil prices would have had two effects on the U.S.: a larger import bill and depressed economic activity due to higher oil prices and similar recessions in other countries. Even though the U.S. at the time only imported around five percent of its oil from the Gulf, the world market as a whole was far more dependent on Gulf oil. Economic interdependence meant that rising prices which hurt other countries economically would also harm the U.S (Nye Jr, 1991).

Interestingly, until the 1990s most of the threats to oil supply stemmed from state actions: it is only towards the year 2000 that non-state actors became the primary threat. As will become clear, non-state actors are one of the key factors

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3 The price of a particular crude oil (such as West Texas Intermediate or Dubai) which sets a reference price for buyers and sellers.
in the securitization of Africa as they pose the main threat to oil supply on the continent.

Even though the United States’ dependence on imported oil may today be declining once again thanks to increases in domestic production of shale oil, it still imports more in “absolute and relative terms” than it did thirty years ago (Johnson, 2014). Therefore security policy is still concerned with protecting oil, especially in key producing regions such as the Middle East, as a severe disruption to the flow of oil would destabilize world economy given that for the most part the rest of the world still depends on imported oil. A reduction in oil supply without a parallel reduction in demand would drive up world oil prices for everyone, regardless of supplier (Luft and Korin, 2013). As the world’s only superpower with relations spanning the globe, the U.S. has relied on the Gulf oil producers, particularly Saudi Arabia with its excess production capacity, to keep fuelling the global economy and maintain stable oil prices. So even if the U.S. oil imports are not as high as they once were, other countries, especially in U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, remain as dependent as ever. The U.S. will therefore remain committed to ensuring the safe transport of oil from key producing regions. Furthermore, despite technological revolutions which have increased production of shale oil in the U.S., the long-term viability of shale oil production is not yet certain due to the high production costs and the rapid depletion rate of shale wells. The sudden production surge has by no means made the U.S. energy independent: in 2013 it still imported approximately 40 percent of its oil needs (Rahman, 2013). On top of this, despite advances in discovering alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar, oil is still the most widely used energy source (making up approximately 34 percent of world energy usage in 2010) and is likely to remain a central energy source for many decades to come (EIA, 2013a, p.2). A U.S. army official, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, argued at a conference in December 2013 that despite the resurgence in U.S. oil production, the situation is not as rosy as it appears. An International Energy Agency (IEA) report found that despite an increase of some 200 percent in investment in the oil industry, oil production has only risen by 12 percent since 2000 (Ahmed, 2014). The IEA also argued that the emergence of shale oil had not changed the long-term picture of oil’s future (Klare, 2014).
Finding new sources of oil has therefore been of great importance, and Africa has emerged as one such source. Oil (and gas) exploration is taking place or is planned in at least 51 out of 54 of the countries on the continent – by 2011 Africa had 132.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, an 154 percent increase over the 1980 estimate (Brown, 2013, p.xi). The United States Geological Survey estimates that West Africa alone contains around 120 billion barrels of undiscovered oil (Brown, 2013, p.3). Because of this, Africa has emerged as a crucial player in the diversification strategies of the major economies, especially China, Japan, and Europe (Brown, 2013, p.xii). In 2002, thanks to rising demand for oil in Asia and volatility in the Middle East, President Bush called West African oil a "strategic national interest", a securitizing label that presents a justification for “the use of force to secure and defend such interests if necessary”. At the time, militants in the Niger Delta had been waging a months-long sabotage campaign that had reduced Nigeria’s daily oil exports by a quarter and contributed to a rise in global oil prices. The collapse of Nigeria was judged by the National Intelligence Council in the U.S. to be the most serious threat facing Africa as it could produce a domino effect and destabilise the entire continent (Motlagh, 2006). Furthermore, although African oil today may not be as vital to America’s energy security as it is to, say, China’s, it is still important to the United States’ broader national security. Africa is the source of huge trade and investment opportunities for America, including in the chronically underfunded oil and gas sectors. Huge amounts of American money have already been invested in the energy sectors of 22 countries in Africa and this amount is likely to grow (Brown, 2013, p.xiii).

**Terrorism**

"Islamic militancy in Africa is part of a broader, global ideological current. In some cases, this includes links to like-minded organizations outside Africa (Østebø, 2012, p.3)."

The second factor which has contributed to the securitization of Africa is terrorism. Terrorism has become the overriding security concerns of the United States since 2001, not just because of the threat posed to the U.S. homeland but also because of the danger posed to the stability of key oil-producing states, which more often than not are already relatively unstable. Although there is no
legal or academic consensus on the exact definition of terrorism, widely agreed characteristics include the use of violence, or the threat of violence, to intimidate or coerce a population or government in the pursuit of political aims. Using this definition, terrorist groups can include Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, which use violence to coerce the government into creating an Islamic state, as well as groups like MEND, which uses violence to change government policy regarding oil production.

Since the 1990s and especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, weak and underdeveloped states have been increasingly portrayed as security threats to the world beyond their borders. They are viewed as potential breeding grounds for terrorism, insurgency and instability that can spill out and affect the lives of people on the other side of the world, as Osama Bin Laden’s use of Afghanistan as a staging ground for the 9/11 attacks demonstrated (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.678). In 2012 over 15,000 people were killed in approximately 8500 terrorist attacks around the world. The majority of these attacks took place in just eight countries, including Nigeria. The other countries were also all located in the developing world (Hansen et al., 2013, p.4). Statements which link Africa to terrorism have a “potentially profound impact on how policies towards Africa are formulated and implemented” (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.680) and demonstrate the extent to which Africa has become securitized in United States foreign policy. In 2003 for example, the Sahara was described a “swamp of terror” and a “terrorist infestation” by the Deputy Commander of EUCOM (which had responsibility for much of Africa at the time). Terrorism and insurgency push already weak states even closer to the point of collapse (as with Somalia, where American forces have deployed for the first time since 1993 in an attempt to curtail the influence of al-Shabaab (Whitlock, 2014)), endangering wider regional stability and threatening the free flow of oil and other important natural resources.

The launching of the GWOT following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 provided ample opportunity for the incorporation of regions of the world under a national security rubric, even if they were not directly related to the GWOT (such as Africa). The emphasis and intensity of U.S. engagement with countries on the
continent changed, as will become evident when the case of Nigeria is examined in greater detail in the next section. Evidence of this began to emerge in 2002, when the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) moved several of its facilities from Saudi Arabia to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti in East Africa. Camp Lemonier thus became the main base of the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (which is made up of approximately 1500 military and civilian personnel) as well as the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (Keenan, 2008, p.17). In early 2004 500 anti-terror troops were deployed to Mauritania and Mali alongside as well as 400 Army rangers in Chad and Niger (Keenan, 2008, p.17). These troops were deployed under the auspices of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which would later expand into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) and today involves eleven nations: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

In 2006 as part of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1206 for the first time provided the Secretary of Defense with the authority to “train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces” for the purposes of carrying out counterterrorism operations and supporting military and stability operations carried out by the U.S. armed forces. Prior to this, the Department of Defense only trained and equipped foreign militaries under the authority of the Department of State: Section 1206 was the first time responsibility for this had been placed solely with the Department of Defense (Serafino, 2013, p.1). Some government officials believe the Section 1206 has been used as a replacement for the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, especially given the insufficient FMF funds available to meet all foreign security assistance needs (Serafino, 2013, p.4). Furthermore, some have argued that Section 1206 gives the Department of Defense unwarranted influence over U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy as well as weakening “congressional oversight” and “human rights protections”. From this perspective programs such as Section 1206 indicate a creeping militarization of U.S foreign policy that is harmful to U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. image with foreign populations (Serafino, 2013, p.17). The bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja by Boko Haram, for example, was in part justified by
referencing the U.S. collaboration with the Nigerian security forces, which were targeted due to their heavy-handed campaign against the group's members in the north (Ploch, 2012, p.15).

Africa received the second greatest amount of Section 1206 funding in FY2011 and FY2012, receiving $158 million compared to $71 million for the Middle East and South Asia. Four of the largest individual recipients were also from Africa, all receiving over $20 million each: Mauritania, Yemen, Uganda and Burundi (Serafino, 2013, pp.5-6). This money covered things such as “CT training, aircraft modernization, mine detection, logistics support, communications enhancement, vehicles, and maritime equipment” (Serafino, 2013, p.7). The amount of Section 1206 funding allocated to Africa has been much greater than the FMF funding allocated to that same region. In FY2009, for instance, Africa received just 2 percent of FMF funding ($8.3 million out of $4.6 billion) compared with 14 percent ($48.7 million out of $339.9 million) of Section 1206 total funding (Serafino, 2013, p.16).

The threat of terrorism destabilising an already fragile continent and disrupting the free flow of oil, even more important due to the upheaval in the Middle East, has contributed to the securitization of the United States’ relationship with Africa, particularly countries which are deemed to be especially vulnerable to terrorism or other forms of violent insurgency. This has manifested in the form of increased military aid, the provision of military equipment, and enhanced military training.

**The China Factor**

The third factor which has contributed to the securitization of Africa has been the rise of China. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, China has emerged as an enormously important and influential international actor. China is already the world’s second largest economy, and by most accounts will overtake the United States in the not too distant future (BBC, 2013). With a growing economy comes an increasingly voracious appetite for raw materials, especially oil, most of which can be sourced in the developing world. Since the 1990s, China has been working to increase its diplomatic and economic influence
in these countries, using its significant financial resources to fund infrastructure projects, resource development and investments by Chinese companies in some of the world’s poorest countries. Such financial assistance in Africa has by and large gone to just four countries: Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia, all of which are significant oil producers (Winton, 2013, p.12). Five of China’s top seven African trading partners are also oil exporters: Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Algeria and Congo (Brazzaville) (Brown, 2013, p.62).

China’s presence in Africa is certainly expanding rapidly. Two-way trade rose from US$1 billion in 2000 to over US$50 billion by 2006, and in the same period China’s share of Africa’s exports rose from 2.6 percent to over 9.3 percent (Alden, 2007, p.8). The World Bank estimated that China’s investment in roads, power, railways and other infrastructural projects Africa rose from under $1 billion a year from 2001-2003 to over $7 billion in 2006 alone (Tattersall, 2008). China’s activities in Africa have been focused on resource acquisition and commercial ventures, a marked change from the ideologically-based engagement of the 1960s and 1970s (Alden, 2007, pp.8-9). Besides economic investment, China has also been making arms sales to Africa that were around $500 million per annum between 2003 and 2006, making it Africa’s third largest arms supplier (Hofstedt, 2009, p.84). Although China is not the largest arms supplier to Africa, it has actively targeted pariah regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe while they are under sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union (Alden, 2007, p.25), gaining influence by selling to countries that others will not. Between 2006 and 2010 Nigeria was one of the top five countries to whom China sold arms, alongside important Chinese allies like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Venezuela (Mayer and Wübbeke, 2013, p.279). Sudan has received F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, T-62 light tanks, anti-aircraft systems, and trucks, among other weapons. Angola has ordered eight SU-77 fighter aircraft, and Algeria has received C-802 ship-to-ship missiles from China. The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) explicitly stated that it aims to take advantage of the “spillover effect” of military trade” to increase access to oil for its subsidiary, ZhenHua Oil, in places such as Angola (NORINCO).
At the same time, however, U.S. arms sales to Africa have also been increasing, from US$39.4 million in 2001 to over US$87 million in 2005. Funding for military assistance has also increased, doubling from $296 million in 1998-2001 to $597 million in 2002-2005.

This increased economic and military interest in Africa began to develop in 1993, when China transitioned from an oil exporter to an oil importer. In 1996 Jiang Zemin's visit firmly emphasised that future relations with Africa would be based on a mixture of self-interest and shared experiences and development goals rather than ideology (Alden, 2007, pp.15-16). There was a recognition that China would need to find new, secure sources of energy to fuel its economic growth. For China, ensuring oil supplies is a national imperative. China's internal stability and the security of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) depends on guaranteeing that a shortage of energy, particularly oil, does not constrain the economic growth needed to prevent social unrest (Yergin, 2012, p.194). The Middle East was, and is, viewed as an unreliable supplier due to political instability (especially post 2001), and so Africa has gained greater prominence (although as will be discussed, instability remains an issue).

China's growing presence in Africa threatens traditional Western dominance in Africa's economies and reflects the disillusionment felt towards the West and its attempts to "help" the continent. This has engendered suspicion on the part of the United States and other Western countries as to China's true motivations, as well as concerns that China's policy of non-interference and no strings attached aid will undermine human rights and democracy in the target countries (Lum, 2009, p.1). A 2005 Department of Defense report argued that China's dependence on foreign supplies of oil is shaping China's strategy and policy, factoring into China's relations with a range of "pariah" states such as Angola, Sudan, Iran and Venezuela. The blocking of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation's (CNOOC) attempt in 2005 to purchase the Unocal Corporation, an American oil and gas producer, by Congress is an indication of the distrust felt towards China and its energy industry and the level of competition felt for control over energy assets (Klare, 2006, p.183). China's foreign aid and investment practices
exacerbate this, with direct economic linkages to China’s economic development needs being commonplace. Nearly all economic assistance is aimed at facilitating the supply of raw materials such as oil, minerals, timber, and agricultural products (Lum, 2009, pp.1-2). Chinese investment is also more attractive than its Western counterparts because of the Chinese practice of linking investment to other projects to improve physical infrastructure such as ports and roads (Alden, 2007, pp.12-13). The Chinese government also provides backing to these projects through the China Development Bank and the China Export Import Bank, as well as becoming directly involved through a strategy of locking-in access to resources in developing countries through government-to-government agreements (Alden, 2007, pp.11-12). Furthermore, China is also edging in on other areas of traditional U.S. dominance, such as Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have increasingly been turning to emerging markets such as China and India to find buyers for their oil. In 2005 King Abdullah made his first official visit to China, assigning energy and military cooperation agreements. Chinese President Hu Jintao made reciprocal visits in 2006 and 2013 (Ottoway, 2009). Having said that, in 2010 Angola overtook Saudi Arabia to become China’s largest crude oil supplier (Brown, 2013, p.62). It is this drive to acquire valuable and increasingly scarce natural resources in regions of the world that has been counted as a potential threat to the security interests of the U.S.

America’s view is that reliance on foreign oil is made into a greater security threat because the rising influence of emerging powers and their national oil companies (NOCs) in Africa (and other locations) threatens the openness of global oil markets on which the U.S. depends. NOCs control approximately 85 percent of global oil reserves, and if the NOCs of countries like China, with whom the U.S. has an uncertain relationship, come to control a significant portion of these reserves and this the global energy market, it will be increasingly difficult for the U.S to maintain energy security (Andreasson, 2014, p.4). From the American perspective, China’s involvement in African oil production is intended to “aid and abet African dictators, [and] gain a stranglehold on precious African natural resources” (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.305). From China’s perspective, attempts by the United States and other Western powers to discredit and blocks
its involvement in African energy is viewed as part of a larger strategy of containment (Xianping, 2013), which only serves to exacerbate tension and the sense of competition:

“The US aid programmes and military initiatives described above are aimed principally at combating terrorism and containing local threats to the safe flow of oil. But the very act of building military ties with African governments and providing them with arms and military assistance has already evolved into a kind of low-level military competition with China for the loyalty of local elites. China, too, appears to be seeking ties of this sort, through its own modest military aid programmes.” (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.306)

China’s growing presence in Africa has generated suspicion in the United States, combined as it is with China’s growing influence in other areas of the world traditionally deemed the sphere of influence of the United States. This suspicion is exacerbated by China’s interest in acquiring natural resources, the same resources which the United States and the rest of the global economy are also in need of. The United State appears to feel a compulsion to counter China’s economic and security cooperation in Africa with intensified engagement of its own, including an increase in military cooperation. What makes Chinese political and economic links with Africa threatening is the fact that Beijing “has not been co-opted in the U.S. led international order”. China is fiercely independent in its foreign policy and its goals do not necessarily match up with those of the U.S, making it worrying that its wealth allows it to buy influence at the expense of U.S. interests (O’Reilly, 2014).

**Normative dimensions of securitization**

Many argue that securitizing an issue often only makes the situation worse and does not help in providing solutions. In the case of the U.S. and Africa, securitizing U.S. policy has the effect of crowding out development agencies like USAID, side-lines policies aimed at democratization, human rights and good governance, and has in many cases contributed to the preservation of authoritarian regimes. Government officials, academics, human rights groups and
journalists have all expressed concern that that many African governments which received counter-terrorism and other security assistance from the United States have poor human rights records. Extrajudicial killings, torture, corruption and the use of excessive force are common complaints against the militaries and security forces of countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Burundi. Combating terrorism and maintaining stability are thought to be used as convenient justifications for governments to use security forces to quell dissent and stay in power (Ploch, 2010a, p.37). Given the much higher proportion of the government budget that is spent on defense rather than development/diplomatic operations there is concern about how the Pentagon may have influenced the direction of U.S. Africa policy away from civilian agencies and towards military and security actors (Keenan, 2010, p.36).

The fear essentially is that U.S. engagement with Africa will be dominated by programmes and policies that relate to a set of narrow security concerns rather than being focused on helping to achieve broad, long-term development and humanitarian goals (Copson, 2007, p.110). For instance, two United Nations resolutions which were essential to the goal of long-term peace in Africa, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Arms Trade Treaty, were resisted by the United States. The U.S. successfully lobbied several African governments to block the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which had the potential to obstruct American claims on Africa’s resources, and was the sole vote against the Arms treaty, which could have removed the justification for a U.S. military presence in Africa by making it harder or impossible for local armed resistance groups to arise (Keenan, 2008, p.19).

One could argue that securitization is not necessarily a bad thing, as it can give an issue an increased level of urgency and draw the attention of high-level

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government officials towards formulating a response. With regards to Africa, securitization could help reverse the “marginalization” of the continent’s plight and help to justify increased development assistance to a citizenry at home already facing government cutbacks and economic recession (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.682). For instance, U.S. aid to African countries declined sharply in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War and the end of competition with the Soviet Union for influence on the continent (Copson, 2007, pp.6-7). However, although securitization may be able to attract funding and attention, discourses of security are more often than not underpinned by an “us vs. them” dichotomy and a “logic of threat” which twists the goal of engagement away from development goals towards the goal of achieving greater security “for us” regardless of the effect on “them” (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.682). This can lead to overlooking of human rights and corruption issues in countries which are deemed to be important to the U.S (Copson, 2007, p.7). In Nigeria, for instance, the police have been accused by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture of using torture as a central tool in law enforcement operations (Ploch, 2010b, p.26). Furthermore, the “us” in question nearly always refers to the state, conferring upon the state the primary role in addressing the security threat in question, which is not necessarily beneficial to the situation (Wæver, 1998).

Security has become intertwined with development even at the level of global development policy, although this trend stems from a more altruistic place than concerns about oil. Symptoms of underdevelopment, such as poverty, are held to be the root causes of “new wars”, international crime, and terrorism. This has resulted in a radicalisation of development policy and a shifting of responsibility for engaging with these issues from civilian to military actors in order to deal with this new security framework (Duffield, 2001, pp.15-16). This first signs of this vis-à-vis U.S. policy in Africa was the 1999 National Security Strategy released by the Clinton administration, which emphasised the importance of conflict resolution in Africa. After the emergence of violent extremist groups in Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel and Mali, increasing incidents of piracy, smuggling, and bombings, and the ongoing effects of the Arab Spring, Africa has increasingly
come to feature in U.S. security policy as key part of the global strategic environment (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.325).

To summarise this opening section, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether or not there has been a new securitization of U.S. policy in Africa. Literature and media are both telling us that there has been an increasingly security-focussed tone to U.S. engagement in Africa, shifting away from the more developmental and economic focus of the 1980s and 1990s. For many, for many this is a negative development as it exacerbates human rights abuses, poverty, and authoritarian governance. Having provided some empirical evidence to suggest that this securitization is in fact occurring in Africa, I will now test this claim in greater detail by examining the case of U.S. engagement with Nigeria.

Section 2: Nigeria and the U.S.

Having outlined the theoretical basis of the claim that U.S. policy in Africa is becoming more securitized, this section will provide a history of U.S. relations with Nigeria from the time of Nigeria’s independence in 1960 until 2001. It will then consider how the relationship changed after 2001, before examining in greater detail how the three securitizing factors presented in the previous section precipitated this change.

History of the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship: evidence of change and securitization

The Cold War: 1960-1991
In the early years of Nigeria’s independence$^5$, it featured very little in U.S. foreign policy, even though it was (and remains) the most populous country in Africa. The only reason it was a factor in U.S. considerations at all was in the context of competition with the Soviet Union for influence with unaligned states. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, however, things changed and Nigeria

$^5$ Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960.
(and the rest of Africa) began to feature more heavily in U.S. foreign policy considerations in its own right. Carter had campaigned vigorously against the previous President Ford’s Africa policy, and with the help of his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, moved towards a new approach that downplayed the threat of communism and East-West competition as a framing factor in shaping U.S.-Africa relations (Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.117-18). The new importance accorded to Nigeria, was indicated by the visit in October 1977 of Nigerian head of state General Olusegun Obasanjo and the reciprocal visit of President Carter to Nigeria the year after, the first visit by an American president to a black African country (Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.120-21).

Why did Nigeria suddenly assume greater importance in American foreign policy? The 1970s saw the birth of fears about energy security after the Arab oil embargo and subsequent oil shocks in 1973, and in 1980 the Carter Doctrine explicitly demonstrated the importance of oil to U.S. national security. In 1977 around half of Nigeria’s oil went to the United States, making Nigeria the U.S.’s second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia and a vital buffer against instability in the Middle East (Ogunbadejo, 1979, p.122). Nigeria’s oil was what strengthened its position in world affairs, not its enormous population, large army, and leadership efforts on the African continent (Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.125-26). The relationship did not extend beyond much more than commercial contact, however, until after 2001. Even when the Cold War ended in 1991, Africa as a whole received relatively little attention from the United States, viewed for the most part as an addendum to relations with Europe (Keenan, 2008, p.16) and not part of the U.S.’s security world view.

Post-Cold War: the 1990s
During the 1990s U.S. relations with Nigeria plateaued. On the one hand, Nigeria was still a major and reliable oil supplier, guaranteeing its importance to the U.S. On the other, major concerns were raised about the human rights abuses the military regime was accused of carrying out. The U.S. was forced to try and strike a balance between maintaining access to much needed oil suppliers, and upholding its reputation as a defender of human rights and democracy.
In 1993, the Nigerian National Defense and Security Council annulled the results of the presidential election, which had given victory to Moshood Abiola, instead handing power to an interim government chosen by the retiring president General Ibrahim Babangida. Despite promises that the country would be returned to civilian rule, General Sani Abacha took power and dissolved all existing organs of state, effectively setting up his own military regime (BBC, 1999). This subversion of the electoral process resulted in widespread civil unrest, including strikes from the country’s oil workers. There were widespread arrests and harassment of human rights leaders, opposition groups and politicians including former president Olusegun Obasanjo, who was much admired in the West (Hoffman, 1995, p.151). Many foreign observers predicted that there would be a civil war (Hoffman, 1995, p.148) although this fear proved to be unfounded. The U.S. President at the time, Bill Clinton, was forced to choose between defending human rights and recognizing the importance of Nigeria as a partner for the U.S. The execution in 1995 of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the nonviolent Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) put increased pressure on the United States to cut ties with the military dictatorship of General Abacha, particularly after Saro-Wiwa was depicted as a martyr by Greenpeace thanks to his opposition to pollution caused by Shell Nigeria (Corry, 1999, p.25). However, Nigeria was a consistently reliable oil supplier that had not participated in the 1973 Arab oil embargo, despite being a member of OPEC, and the potential for growth of U.S. investment in Nigeria’s energy sector made the Clinton administration reluctant to completely cut ties with the Abucha regime (Hoffman, 1995, p.149). Nigeria’s size and regional dominance also complicated matters. It had a vast population and an economy second only to South Africa’s. Nigeria was a major contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and assumed a leading role in negotiating an end to the Liberian civil war. Its oil wealth and extensive political involvement in African affairs make it resistant to pressure from foreign governments, making it hard for the U.S. to bring about internal change even if it had wanted to. In the end, Clinton did suspend military assistance, including joint exercises and training, as well as institute a review of all defense related exports, suspend all non-security related foreign aid except for humanitarian and democracy assistance, and deny visas to members of the
Nigerian government (Hoffman, 1995, p.155). Oil imports were not halted though, and these measures did not have much effect on Nigeria’s policy towards jailed political opponents (such as Moshood Abiola and Obasanjo) and did not precipitate a return to civilian rule.

The halt on U.S. security involvement did not last long, however, and by 1999 military cooperation had resumed, paving the way for the intensified security relationship that would follow the September 11 terrorist attacks. This early cooperation was aimed at modernizing and professionalizing the military and cementing civilian oversight of the Nigerian armed forces. The action plan for U.S. military assistance had three components to it. The first was to create an institution similar to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to increase civilian oversight of the military as well as working with the Nigerian military to identity concepts of the role and missions of the military and the force structure that would be required. The second component involved enhancing the capacity of the Nigerian military to project force, mainly through providing updated tech manuals and specialist maintenance training for Nigeria’s fleet of C0130 cargo aircraft. These were vital for Nigeria to participate in regional peacekeeping. The final component of the plan involved providing training aids and equipment for the Nigerian military. It was acknowledged that Nigeria’s armed forces had proven both willing and able to participate in peacekeeping missions, and Operation Focus Relief aimed to train the militaries of Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal in peacekeeping operations. In Nigeria it had a dual purpose of repairing relationships with Nigeria’s military after the transition to civilian rule in 1999. It included a $66 million military aid package, including $20 million that was set aside for training as well as equipment such as “communication systems, rifles, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and light-wheeled non-combat vehicles” (GlobalSecurity).

This brief history of U.S.-Nigeria relations prior to 2001 shows that U.S. policy towards Nigeria has never been entirely altruistic: it has always varied as to how much of an influence trade, energy and geopolitical rivalry exerted on the determination of policy. During the 1960s and 1970s, the drive to secure oil
supplies through diplomatic support and trade agreements dominated the relationship. In the 1980s the dictates of the Cold War determined Nigeria’s importance, emphasising its role as a battleground for influence with the Soviet Union. Moving into the 1990s, human rights concerns and a distrust of foreign entanglements following the disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia led to a cooling of the relationship, although by 1999 relations had by and large returned to their pre-coup levels. The next few sections will show to what extent U.S. policy towards Nigeria became even more intensely securitized in the 21st century.

*After 9/11: A new securitization?*

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Nigeria’s importance to the United States became more complex. Nigeria’s capacity as an oil producer became even more important due to the unrest and instability in the Middle East which followed the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. From this point the United States had two main priorities in Nigeria: to secure the oil resources of the Niger Delta, and to pre-empt the development of another front in the war on terror (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.297). Countering the rise of China in Africa would soon emerge as a priority as well.

The most obvious change that took place after 2001 was the launching of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This increased Nigeria’s importance in the context of U.S. national security, both because of the threat home-grown terrorist groups posed to Nigeria’s capacity to produce and export oil, and also because of the possibility of terrorist groups finding safe-haven in Nigeria and the Sahel. During a 2002 visit to Nigeria, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner, was quoted as saying that “‘African oil is of strategic national interest [...] and it will increase and become more important as we go forward” (Crawley, 2002). From 2002 U.S. oil imports from Africa (particularly Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria) increased greatly as reducing dependence on Middle East oil supplies became a strategic priority. However, violence in Nigeria and the spread of terrorism across the Sahel and into northern Nigeria and Chad was also a rising concern and damped some of the hope for Africa’s emergence as a replacement supplier (Taylor, 2014, p.11).
In the years after 9/11, the intensity of security cooperation between the United States and Nigeria increased exponentially. A number of military assistance and training programmes were set up, far more than in the previous forty years of relations between the two countries. At the beginning this increased assistance was mainly to ensure that the U.S. would retain access to the oil resources of the Niger Delta, which were particularly important as Middle Eastern oil supply was insecure after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (one of the world’s major oil producers). In 2006 the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations noted that Nigeria held huge importance “as a leading supplier of petroleum to the U.S.” and that a “disruption of supply from Nigeria would represent a major blow to the oil security strategy of the U.S” (Onuorah, 2013). The arms sales, technical assistance and training programmes were aimed at enhancing the capacities of recipient states, like Nigeria, so that they could better contain the internal instability and conflict that threatened on- and off-shore oil production. The main channels for the provision of arms and military equipment are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMF) programmes, as well the direct sales from U.S defense contractors through the Commercial Sales programme (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.299) and the funding provided by Section 1206 of the NDAA. Under Section 1206, Nigeria received over US$18 million in training and equipment, both on its own and in conjunction with neighbouring states in the FY2006-2010. The money covered things such as counterterrorism capacity building for the military, providing light infantry Vehicles and communications equipment, civil-military relations training, information-sharing network establishment, and Gulf of Guinea Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Aid (Serafino, 2013, p.27).

The watershed moment in this intensified military contact was the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. This was a key marker in the changed relationship between both the United States and Nigeria, and with Africa as a whole. The Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was highly supportive of the decision to create a dedicated Africa Command, despite opposition from civil society and other Africa countries, arguing that it would help African governments maintain peace and security (Ploch, 2008, p.25). Under AFRICOM command U.S. Army Africa has, for
example, conducted military-to-military intelligence sharing and training, such as in the use of biometric collection systems that will help the Nigerian armed forces and law enforcement protect their borders and other areas where extremist groups are active (U.S. Army Africa, 2013). AFRICOM has also sponsored training exercises such as Exercise Flintlock, which is one of the main examples of military cooperation between the U.S. and Nigeria. Flintlock is an annual exercise held among U.S., African and European counterterrorism forces and has taken place since 2006. It includes both ground and air forces operating across the Sahel region. The aim is to improve the capacity of African states to provide stability to North and West Africa and to reduce safe havens and support for violent extremist groups. Flintlock 11 in 2011 built on previous exercises, developing cooperative relationships among the armed forces of the TSCTP states “by strengthening security institutions, promoting multilateral sharing of information, and facilitating informal network building”. Flintlock is run by Special Operations Command Africa’s (SOCAFRICA) Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara and aims to improve “military interoperability and capacity-building” in U.S., Canadian and European partner nations in north and west Africa. In 2011 around 800 military personnel were involved from the U.S., Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal (U.S. Army Africa, 2008). Other exercises include Exercise Africa Endeavour, which was held in Nigeria in 2008 (U.S. Army Africa, 2012b), Exercise Maritime Safari in 2008 (Poplin, 2008) and Exercise Obangame Express (U.S. Army Africa, 2012a). Most recently, the AFRICAN WINDS training programme took place in October 2013, and involved training in combating oil theft and piracy. It involved teams from the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands as well as the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force, who trained alongside troops from Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Cameroon (ThisDayLive, 2013).

On a smaller but no less important scale, according to Captain Robert Smith of the Naval Special Warfare Group 2, the Navy elite quick-response team NSWU 10 (commissioned by SOCAFRICA in 2011) has been involved in strategically important countries such as Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda. The unit’s former commander, Captain J. Dane Thorleifson, stated that its tasks included “building
critical host nation security capacity; enabling, advising, and assisting our African CT [counterterror] partner forces so they can swiftly counter and destroy al-Shabaab, AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], and Boko Haram” (Turse, 2013). Furthermore, in January 2014, the Nigerian army announced the establishment of an Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) after a bilateral Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned Exchange held between Nigeria and the U.S. Early indications suggest that NASOC will have forces positioned in the north to combat Boko Haram, in the south to deal with security problems in the Niger Delta, an expeditionary force for external use, and a central command to deal with hostage rescue. It has been confirmed that AFRICOM, SOCAFRICA and Office of Security Cooperation in the U.S. Embassy in Abuja would be providing training and equipment to help get the newly created NASOC operational (Warner, 2014).

The U.S. Navy has also increased its presence in the Gulf of Guinea since 2003, conducting joint exercises with Nigeria and hosting conferences on maritime security in the region (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.301). Nigeria has been a participant in most of the training exercises run by the U.S., such as a training programme involving over 200 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard members partnering with eleven Gulf of Guinea states (Nigeria, as well as Angola, Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Togo and Cameroon) to improve their navies and maritime security forces ability to combat piracy, terrorism, smuggling and illegal immigration (Gilmore, 2007). In 2008 the Africa Endeavour military exercise was held in Nigeria. The exercise was focused on communications interoperability and was co-sponsored by EUCOM and the Nigerian Ministry of Defense. 21 African nations were involved, as well as the African Union (AU), the U.S., Sweden and ECOWAS, all working on command, control, communications and information systems integration and interoperability, which helps militaries to work together (Miller, 2008). Also in 2008, a bilateral exercise between the Nigerian Air force and Navy and the U.S. Navy was held in Lagos, focused on search and rescue, aircraft maintenance and maritime safety (AFRICOM, 2008).
Some specific examples of the kinds of programmes that the U.S. has initiated with Nigeria since 2001 include:

- **Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP):** The TSCTP kicked off in June 2005 with Exercise Flintlock, replacing the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which ended in 2004. The TSCTP aims to improve on the PSI both in terms of funding and the number of countries that are involved (Miles, 2005). The TSCTP expanded the scope of the PSI to include Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The aim of these two programs was to train African militaries in military tactics, border security, drug trafficking and counter-terrorism throughout the Sahel region. It is specifically designed to prevent the expansion of terrorist activity and extremist groups in West and North Africa. The main goals of the TSCTP are to enhance trans-Saharan cooperation on counterterrorism, to continue the “specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)”, public outreach programmes, community development, democracy strengthening programmes, and military-to-military cooperation. The TSCTP is led by the State Department, but works in concert with USAID, the Department of Defense, AFRICOM, the FBI and the Department of the Treasury. A large portion of TSCTP activities are carried out by the Department of Defense, which works with AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA on Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), working with partner countries to prevent terrorism and enhance regional stability. OEF-TS is the military component of the TSCTP and aims to increase stability and security in West and North Africa. It includes “train and equip missions [...] partner nation staff information training and mentorship programs, numerous Joint Planning and Assistance Team (JPAT), and Military Information Support Team (MIST) missions, as well as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events and is currently building information sharing that can be used by all of the OEF-TS countries” (AFRICOM, 2010b). By “improving border security, promoting democratic governance, and reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties” and assisting in public diplomacy efforts to counter extremist ideology, OEF-TS is aimed at
combatting violent extremist organisations in North and West Africa (AFRICOM, 2010a, p.25).

- **African Partnership Station Programme:** The African Partnership Station Programme is a U.S.-led initiative in which American ships are maintaining a “persistent presence” in the Gulf of Guinea in an effort to prevent oil theft as well as illegal fishing people and drug smuggling, and piracy. Training of local military officers is also an important aspect of the programme. Although the United States says that oil is not the primary motivation behind the programme, it does not deny that it is a factor (Peel, 2010, p.138). Nigeria is viewed as a safeguard against unrest in the Arabian Gulf, but production is often shut down in the Delta for security reasons. This means that often other countries, such as Angola, come out as the top producers in Africa even though Nigeria’s reserves are four times greater (Peel, 2010, pp.138-39). Theft of oil from Nigerian offshore platforms in the Gulf is also a significant problem, as is the use of the Gulf by thieves to transport oil stolen from the Delta (Peel, 2010, p.142). Sabotage is also an issue. In 2008, for example, MEND launched an attack on the Bonga oil field, owned by Shell, closing it down for three weeks and causing national production to drop by 10 percent. Part of the training provided by the United States under African Partnership Station has been based around defending offshore platforms from attack, even though officially the U.S. is not involved in protecting oil installations (Peel, 2010, pp.142-43).

- **African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA):** In 2004 the African Crisis Response Initiative (which had been set up in 1996) was renamed the ACOTA programme. ACOTA provides training and equipment to improve African militaries capacity to undertake multinational peacekeeping operations. ACOTA is linked to the Joint Combined Arms Training System (JCATS) training centres, which are an inexpensive method of providing officer training. Nigeria is the only country besides Canada which has JCATS software, and has had the system since 2003 (Abramovici and Stoker, 2004, p.688-89).
- **State Partnership Program (SPP):** The SPP links U.S. National Guards with partner countries with the aim of supporting EUCOM (now AFRICOM)'s security objectives and assisting partner countries in making the transition from authoritarianism or military rule to democracy (Jones, 2005, p.20). Nigeria was partnered with the California National Guard in 2006.

As well as increasing training exercises and enhancing intelligence cooperation, the United States is also fortifying military infrastructure and seeking access agreements for a series of “lily pad” bases (officially known as emergency operating bases) access North and West Africa (Emerson, 2006, p.258). The U.S. has agreements allowing it to use international airports as refuelling centres in 29 countries, including Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, Nigeria as well as maintaining fuel bunkers in Lagos and 9 other locations. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2013, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly spent $48 million on construction projects in 33 countries, including Nigeria (Turse, 2013). In 2011 the U.S. Navy funded the instalment and training in the use of two Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) radar sites, one in Lagos and one on Bonny Island (Arvind, 2011).

In summary, prior to 2001 Nigeria-U.S. relations fluctuated from cordial to strained depending on the government in power. At times of military rule, human rights abuses made it difficult for the U.S. to engage closely with Nigeria. However, throughout all this time economic connections, particularly the oil trade, were emphasised and protected. After 2001 and the launching of the Global War on Terror, U.S. relations with Nigeria moved beyond the economic sphere to encompass military and security cooperation as well. This was particularly true after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, perhaps due to fears over stability of global oil supply. 2003 was also the time that Boko Haram emerged in Nigeria’s north and threatened the stability of the country and oil supplies by diverting security forces from the Niger Delta, where unrest also blossomed. A second surge in engagement with Nigeria occurred in 2007, the year in which AFRICOM was formed, oil imports from Nigeria peaked, and the number of U.S.
troops in Iraq increased by over 20,000 due to increasing guerrilla attacks and instability (Beaumont et al., 2007). Post-2001 also saw the phenomenal growth of China’s economy and its rapidly expanding overseas investments and influence in resource-rich countries.

Securitizing factors

*Nigeria and oil*

“Nigeria is the United States’ fifth largest source of imported oil [...] Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low-sulphur content, and Nigeria’s proximity to the United States relative to that of oil producing countries in the Middle East makes Nigeria’s oil particularly attractive to American interests.” (Ploch, 2008, p.21)

The first factor in the securitization of oil in Africa in countries such as Nigeria stems from the status of oil as a vital strategic commodity in terms of both military and economic power, as discussed in section one. The actual and feared disruption of world oil supplies caused by the chronic instability in the Middle East following World War Two (such as the Arab oil embargo) prompted policy makers to start looking in less conventional places to put in place a safeguard against further upheaval. Events in the Middle East in the 1990s (especially the Gulf War) brought about fears of a return of oil price spikes. This fear was compounded after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Yetiv, 2004, pp.2-3). One of the locations which came to the forefront was Africa, where significant reserves of not only oil but gas and valuable minerals were finally able to be exploited after the chaos of decolonisation in the 1960s (Shelley, 2005, p.1). Particular interest was paid to states such as Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Libya, Gabon, Cameroon, Sudan (now Sudan and South Sudan) and Chad6. Recognition of these countries’ importance as an alternative supply of oil in the face of continuing instability in the Middle East has led to an increasing amount of

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attention from not only the United States but also rising powers such as China (Volman, 2009, p.7).

Between 2004 and 2008, rising world oil prices (Reuters, 2013) increased the importance of Nigeria and other West African oil producers to Washington and other importers energy security policies, who were eager for a buffer against instability in the Arabian Gulf (Peel, 2010, xvii). As of January 2013 Nigeria had the second largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa, second only to Libya. These reserves are mostly concentrated in the Niger River Delta region and offshore in the Bight of Benin, and Bight of Bonny and the Gulf of Guinea. Currently exploration projects are focusing on deep and ultra-deep offshore oil fields, in part due to the security risks associated with on-shore and shallow water fields (EIA, 2013b). During times of full production, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and is one of the top ten exporters in the world, exporting around 2-2.6 million barrels per day (compared with mega producers like Saudi Arabia, which produces up to 8.53 million barrels per day). Nigeria is in the same category as other medium producers who are also subjects of great geopolitical interest, such as Venezuela, Kuwait, and Iran (Peel, 2010, p.6). Historically, half of Nigeria’s oil has gone to the United States where is has made up approximately 10% of U.S. imports. Nigeria’s oil is important to the United States for three reasons. Firstly, the quality of Nigerian oil is very high and is easily refined into gasoline. Second, it is physically closer to the United States than the Middle East, reducing shipping costs and the risks of piracy. Third, the Nigerian government is, for the most part, friendly to the United States and is at least nominally a democracy (Peel, 2010, p.6).

This new “scramble for Africa” has manifested in a reliance on expanding military ties and military assistance in order to ensure the security of the continent’s oil supplies (Volman, 2009, p.22). This securitization has removed African oil from the normal realm of political and economic relations, and extraordinary measures such as the deployment of military forces have been justified to deal with it. Considerations of oil supply have moved from the category of the market/supply/demand to a category of risk and threat. Ensuring oil flows from
Africa has been deemed a security problem rather than an economic or political one. This has resulted in the United States treating oil supply as a zero-sum game in which it is in competition with other states, particularly China. As discussed earlier, a similar trajectory has been observed in the Persian Gulf (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.302), where the “unimpeded flow of oil” has been declared a national security interest and followed by arms for oil agreements, weapons sales, military aid and training, military bases, and even the deployment of military forces (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.298).

However, Nigeria’s capacity to reach its full production capacity is hampered by corruption, poor infrastructure, and instability caused by terrorism and insurgency. Piracy, sabotage and oil theft, for instance, are significant problems for the oil industry in Nigeria. Both on- and off-shore production and distribution networks that are owned and operated by companies such as Exxon, Chevron, Shell, Total and Eni are highly vulnerable to sabotage and theft (Peel, 2010, p.6). In 2003, for example, a report commissioned by Shell estimated that as many as 685,000 barrels of oil (a third of total production) was being stolen each day (Peel, 2010, p.15). This poor security environment has resulted in a trend of international oil companies selling off their stakes in onshore and shallow water projects in the region. Between 2010 and 2013, for example, Shell sold its shares it eight onshore licenses and is considering selling its stakes in major pipelines running through the Delta (EIA, 2013b). Many international oil companies, like Shell, have been forced to declare force majeure\(^7\) due to attacks on infrastructure and oil theft. For example, leaks caused by oil thieves damaging pipes prompted Shell to declare force majeure on exports of Bonny Light crude oil in October 2013 (Kent, 2013). Unrest in the oil-producing region of the Niger River Delta dates back to the 1990s, when protests staged by MOSOP against Shell’s activities in the area prompted a harsh military crackdown and led to the summary executions of the group’s leaders, including the aforementioned Ken Saro-Wiwa (Peel, 2010, p.7). Periodic outbreaks of violence by new protest groups have been commonplace since then, such as the attacks carried out by MEND, which have repeatedly cut Nigeria’s oil production by as much as a quarter and had a knock-

\(^7\) A legal clause freeing both parties from a contractual agreement due to events outside their control that prevent them from meeting their obligations.
on effect of increasingly world oil prices (Ploch, 2012, p.17). Agitation for independence or autonomy for the Delta is viewed with trepidation by foreign oil companies and their governments, which sees the Delta’s oil as a safeguard against the volatile Middle East (Peel, 2010, p.9). The security crisis caused in the north of the country by terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Ansaru are compounded by the problem, as they threaten the very fabric of the Nigerian state, stretching the government to the breaking point and threatening the country’s capacity to keep functioning and sending oil to the outside world. There is a very real fear that Nigeria will turn into another Sudan, torn apart by civil war with its oil production crippled and presenting a perfect breeding ground for terrorism.

Supply problems in places like Nigeria and Sudan matter not because the United States is dependent on supplies from those particular countries, but because they make oil more expensive than it should be by taking supply out of the global pool. These disruptions across Africa and the Middle East have essentially removed the production gains made by the United States recently in shale oil (Johnson, 2013). This has the effect of reducing spare production capacity in places like Saudi Arabia, which have to pump more to make up the global shortfall, stymieing economic growth in countries around the world, and generally making the oil market unstable and subject to sudden price spikes (Johnson, 2013). Due to the interconnectedness of the global economy this has a knock-on effect on the U.S. economy, which as I discussed earlier is central to the survival of the state as an autonomous entity. Therefore, even though the United States may be importing less oil from Nigeria (down to 4% in the first half of 2013), other countries still reply on such producers. European imports of Nigerian oil, for instance, increased over 40 percent between 2011 and 2012 (EIA, 2013b). Ensuring that Nigeria’s oil keeps on flowing has therefore become a security problem for the United States, and fostering friendly relations with the Nigerian government and helping it to combat the instability within its borders is therefore a high priority for the U.S. As I have shown, one way it has done this is by offering assistance in the fight against Boko Haram, Ansaru, MEND and other violent insurgents in the form of military equipment and training, often under the rubric of the Global War
on Terror, the next factor which will be discussed in the securitization of U.S.-Nigeria relations.

**Terrorism**

The terrorist threat in Nigeria is twofold: on the one hand there are terrorist groups which will be familiar to most people who read the news, Islamic groups like Boko Haram and Ansaru. On the other, there are groups which are specific to Nigeria and its particular domestic situation, like the anti-oil MEND and NDVPF. Terrorism of both kinds is an increasingly severe problem in Nigeria. Although there have been attacks since the 1990s, in the years after 9/11, and especially after 2007, the problem worsened. Nigeria rose from 16th out of 158 countries on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2008 to 6th in 2011, with around 168 terrorist attacks in 2011 alone. Boko Haram was the main cause of this surge, but other groups were also involved such as MEND. With over 160 million people, a huge youth population, and the 6th largest Muslim population in the world Nigeria is of high strategic importance to the global Jihad movement (Sodipo, 2013, p.2). This importance has been recognised by the United States: the President of Nigeria was the only African leader invited to discuss the crisis and officially received by President Bush following the September 11 attacks, despite the strong support offered by other African heads of state (Dagne, 2002, p.3). The problem is compounded by the lack of trust in the Nigerian security forces, who have been accused of human rights abuses and indiscriminate killing in the course of combatting these groups (Sodipo, 2013, p.1). The violence is also driven by opposition to the operations of international oil companies in the Niger Delta. Examples of the kinds of attacks, kidnappings, theft, and murders that have plagued Nigeria since 2003 include an attack on a naval base in 2003, the murder of five people (including two Americans working for ChevronTexaco) and the kidnapping of 16 oil workers in Bayelsa state in 2004, and a shootout in 2006 in the Niger Delta which killed 14 soldiers and cut Shell’s oil output by 115 BPD (Undp, 2006, p.113).

The question is, why does the United States care about Nigerian terrorism? In the grand scheme of things, extremist Islamic groups such as Boko Haram and Ansaru are not global terrorist threats on the scale of Al Qaeda, even though Boko
Haram’s tactics and rhetoric indicates that its attention and reach has spread far beyond its original base in north-eastern Nigeria. For example, Boko Haram fighters were reported to be fighting alongside AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Ansar al-Din in northern Mali in 2012, returning to Nigeria after the French intervention with improved weapons and tactics learned on the battlefield (Raghavan, 2013). Nigerian nationals have been arrested fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored the attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner on the 25th December 2009 (Ploch, 2010b, pp.20-21). Together with clashes between Nigeria security forces and Islamist sects in the north and the spreading of Sunni Islam movements, fears have arisen that Nigerian citizens may be radicalised into carrying out farther attacks against targets in Nigeria or abroad (Ploch, 2010b, pp.20-21). It may be transforming into a transnational threat, although whether this inclination was more felt by those who split into the Ansaru group has yet to be seen (Ladislaw, 2013, p.1). The sophistication of the attacks and the indications of tacit support for the group among Northern elites (such as the failure of the government to act decisively despite an abundance of reports and recommendations on the group) are cause for concern (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.74). This potential complicity is exacerbated by the weakness and corruption of the Nigerian state (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.74). Given that Nigeria hold Africa’s largest oil reserves and is the most populous state on the continent, Boko Haram threatens wider political, economic and security interests in Africa: instability in Nigeria would have “continent-wide, possibly global, implications” (Ladislaw, 2013, p.1). As of yet, however, the only attack by Boko Haram that would fit such a category was the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in 2011 (BBC, 2011). Other attacks have targeted Nigerian government officials and military and religious leaders rather than Americans.

The fear, therefore, is not so much that terrorist groups will launch an attack on the United States, but more that they will destabilise the region and jeopardise the flow of oil from Nigeria and the surrounding countries (such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Benin). Initial predictions stated that by 2015 the
United States would be getting around 25% of its oil from Africa (Taylor, 2010, p.131). Nigeria is the key to stability in West Africa, and if major terrorist groups were able to take root here, such as AQIM, the capacity of Nigeria and other West African states to maintain stability and keep up the flow of oil would be severely tested (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.287). In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, Nigeria was described as an anchor state in Africa, along with South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya (Obama, 2002, p.10). Attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru in the north of Nigeria have the potential to destabilise the entire country despite its diplomatic weight, economic size and strong military. The U.S. has therefore been very interested in assisting Nigeria with its counterterrorism efforts, imparting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.327). The recognition of the threat posed by the spread of terrorism across West Africa and the trans-Saharan region, led the U.S. the implement a “pre-emptive and integrated strategy” that addresses the multiple causes of conflict and extremism in the region (Emerson, 2006, p.258). If violent terrorist and extremist groups gained a foothold in the north of Nigeria, the consequences could be severe not only for the rest of the country but also for West Africa, the Pan-Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.293).

Attention to Islamic terrorism in Nigeria has been reignited by a resurgence of attacks by Boko Haram, which has been waging a low-intensity conflict with Nigerian security forces since 2003 (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.74). Although mostly concentrated in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram threatens the stability of Nigeria as a whole as well as the wider sub-Saharan region. Violence intensified after the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, was killed by police in 2009. The group re-emerged in force, and between 2009 and 2012 over 900 people were killed and thousands wounded in terrorist attacks. Security forces, traditional rulers and religious leaders were particularly targeted: Yusuf’s teachings condemned all government institutions and personnel for incorporating Western values (Akinola and Tella, 2013, pp.71-72). From the starting point in the northern states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno the attacks spread across the country. The Nigerian state met violence with violence, and over 700 people died during battles between Boko Haram and the security forces.
Boko Haram was also responsible for the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011, as well as numerous attacks on police stations and churches (Østebø, 2012, p.2). In June 2011 a Joint Task Force was set up by the federal government, consisting of the army, navy, air force, Department of State Security and the police. The borders between northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries were also closed (Solomon, 2012, p.7).

On November 13th 2013 the United States government announced that Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru had been formally designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Ansaru split from Boko Haram in 2012, and has been responsible for attacks against civilians and security personnel. Both groups are thought to have links to AQIM in the form of financing and training (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Both Boko Haram and AQIM have also issued statement pledging mutual support and commending the other on their actions (Ladislaw, 2013, p.5). The results of these designations include an asset freeze against Boko Haram and Ansaru as well as a prohibition against deliberately providing material support to either organization.

The decision to put these two groups on the list was the result of a debate that has been raging since the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011. Individual Boko Haram leaders (Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakur Kambar) had been designated as an individual terrorist in June 2012, and Nigeria's President Jonathan designated both groups as terrorist organisations in June 2013, a month after declaring a state of emergency in Nigeria's north-eastern provinces. The decision by the United States to follow suit suggests a closer alignment between Nigeria and the United States (State Department officials described the move as notifying the world “that the United States and Nigeria are jointly combatting the extremist violence of Boko Haram and Ansaru” (U.S. Department of State, 2013)), although some argue that such a designation has no practical effect and may in fact reduce the scope for United States potential involvement in a future political resolution of the conflict (Campbell, 14 November 2013). The State Department, however, claimed that the designation will help the United States to assist Nigeria in developing a
comprehensive approach to addressing the terrorist threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The reasons provided by State Department officials for the designation were that Nigeria is an important strategic partner of the United States, it is Africa's most populous country, provides thousands of soldiers and police for peacekeeping missions, and is a crucial global oil supplier (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Nigeria’s capacity to keep producing oil is clearly stated as being a contributing factor in the decision to declare Boko Haram and Ansaru a terrorist threat.

Beyond Islamic terrorism, terrorist activity is also a concern in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. At the root much of this domestically targeted terrorism is poverty, political disempowerment, frustration with the environmental damage caused by oil production, and anger at the unfair distribution of oil revenues (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.293). Violence in the Niger Delta region more directly threatens Nigeria’s capacity to produce oil; local militias steal hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil every day, reducing the global supply of crude oil and providing funding for rebel groups like MEND (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.288). The unrest in the region largely stems from the efforts to draw attention to and stop the environmental damage caused by oil production (Ploch, 2007, pp.12-13). Militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, launched Operation Climate Change in 1998, resulting in violent clashes with the military and disrupting oil production. In 2004 another rebel group emerged demanding autonomy for the Niger Delta, the NDPVF, which carried out attacks on government forces and threatened foreign oil workers. Amnesty International estimated that 500 people were killed in September of that year alone. There has been vandalism and sabotage of oil production infrastructure, widespread production theft (known as oil bunkering), kidnappings, and protests (Ploch, 2007, p.13). Since 2006 conflict between the Delta’s militant groups and the Nigerian military have escalated, and the number of kidnappings of foreign oil workers has increased. MEND emerged in 2005, and utilised the kidnappings as a means of drawing international attention to the situation in the Delta. Attacks by these groups cut oil production by an estimated 25% in 2007, as well as threatening deep-water production (Ploch, 2007, p.14).
In May 2009 a renewed offensive against militant groups was launched by the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF), which had originally been set up in 2004 to restore order to the Niger Delta. Thousands were displaced in the fighting between the JTF and militants as well as by air and land strikes launched against militant camps. Despite this, sabotage by MEND and other groups increased in mid-2009, reducing oil production by around 273,000 barrels per day (Ploch, 2010b, p.23). An amnesty declared in October 2009 led to over 15,000 militants turning in their weapons and oil production increasing, but analysts argued that without addressing the root causes of the conflict the ceasefire would only be temporary (Ploch, 2010b, p.23). U.S. military assistance does little to improve the situation.

**China**

The third factor which has played a role in the securitization of U.S.-Nigeria relations has been in expansion of the Chinese presence (both economic and military) in Nigeria. Chinese multinationals have invested significant amounts in Nigeria’s oil industry. In 2006 CNOOC acquired a 45 percent stake in a major offshore oil field in Nigeria work $2.7 billion. CNOOC was backed by a US$1.6 billion loan from the Chinese Eximbank to support its operations in Nigeria, indicating the level of support the Chinese government offers to its oil companies overseas (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31). In May 2010, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) signed a $23 billion agreement with China to build three new oil refineries and a petrochemicals complex. This was especially beneficial for Nigeria at the time as two of its existing four refineries were only running at 60 percent capacity (Ploch, 2010b, p.4). Chinese companies have been involved in Nigeria’s oil industry since 1997, when the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began exploration in the Chad Basin. A year later CNPC purchased two blocks in the Niger River Delta region (Downs, 2000, p.22). Although the true extent to which the Chinese government controls these companies is uncertain, the government owns very large stakes in such companies (in the range of 80-90%) and selects the companies’ leaders. Chinese banks provide low-interest loans, and Chinese diplomats are often found smoothing the way for company operations (Klare, 2006, p.182). Beyond direct
investment in oil fields and oil companies, China has also been funding the infrastructure upgrades necessary to transport oil and improve the efficiency of the energy sector. In 2008, a Chinese engineering firm signed a $1 billion deal to construct a road in Port Harcourt, the hub of Nigeria’s oil industry. Port Harcourt is the capital of Rivers state in the Niger Delta, where poor infrastructure, lack of investment, and slow economic growth has fuelled violent unrest; the Nigerian arm of the German construction firm Bilfinger Berger pulled out of the region due to security concerns. Developing infrastructure is one of the government’s solutions to the unrest in the region, now assisted by China (Tattersall, 2008).

The intervention of the Chinese government in the expansion activities of Chinese oil companies reflects global competition for oil and concerns about the potential for “resource wars” as demand in emerging economies increase. The worldwide energy industry’s ability to meet the needs of existing industrial powers, let alone newly industrialising states in Africa and Asia, is in doubt (Dobransky, 2010, p.355). States such as China and the United States can, and do, use government-backed investment, arms sales and other forms of cooperation as leverage to obtain favourable access for their companies as well as help boost the capacity of producers to maintain order (Dobransky, 2010, pp.354-55).

In 2001 China gave $1 million to Nigeria to upgrade its military facilities, arguing that it was part of China’s “contribution to the development of democracy in Nigeria” (Chou, 2007, pp.38-39). In 2004, the Chinese defense contractor Poly Technology announced a partnership with the state-owned Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria, which has since resumed production of small arms, grenades and ammunition for the Nigerian army after years of neglect (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.305). Nigeria has also increased arms imports from China, receiving 15 F-7 fighter aircraft in 2005 for a reported $251 million (Volman, 2009, p.10) and received another $2 million worth of military equipment as a donation. Chinese military personnel were also pledged to provide training in “computers, air field sweeper vehicles, emergency navigational and light vehicles, and deep sea diving equipment” (Chou, 2007, pp.38-39). In 2006, Nigeria criticised the United States for not providing sufficient protection for the
country's oil infrastructure from terrorist attacks in the Niger Delta. Congressional interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the delta region bred frustration. Nigeria claimed that promised deliveries of military equipment from the U.S. were slow to arrive, and that Nigeria had increasingly turned to China instead for military supplies (Mahtani, 2006). Nigeria purchased fighter jets and missiles along with guarantees for training of Nigerian satellite technicians from China, which coincided with the awarding of oil contracts to Chinese firms in 2005-2006 (Alden, 2007, p.26). In 2013 the China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company (CSOC) was contracted by the Nigerian Navy to upgrade its naval facilities at Port Harcourt so that the base will be able to carry out maintenance work on ships and construct offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). This follows from a contract for China to build two OPVs in 2009: the upgraded naval dockyard will allow it to complete the construction onsite in Nigeria (Nkala, 2013).

The U.S. has, however, provided Nigeria with a number of naval vessels, such as a number of inshore patrol vessels, ex-Coast Guard Hamilton class cutters like the NNS Thunder and the Gallatin, and survey ships (Nkala, 2013). The U.S. has also been establishing military bases across the content, the prominent being Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which serves as the headquarters for America's counterterrorism activities in Africa. The U.S. Navy has been spending an increasing amount of time patrolling the coast of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, leaving their traditional stomping grounds in the Mediterranean (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.22). In this sense they are leaving China far behind, as it has no military bases on the African continent at all - or anywhere else for that matter (People's Daily Online., 2013).

Although this expansion of Chinese activities and influence in Nigeria does not necessarily make it a threat to the United States, this is how it is being interpreted as it plays into broader fears of the potential challenge China might post to U.S. hegemony in the coming years. As Xu Yi-Chong argues, China's economic power is changing the “strategic and economic playing field in Africa” and is “part of its move to the global stage” (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31), which has
generated uncertainty about the future of the global and regional balance of power. Its growing demand for oil and other natural resources has brought this move to the forefront, especially as it has coincided with a resurgence in America’s interest in Africa due to the war on terrorism and concerns about energy security (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31). Unless America and China learn to cooperate and respect each other’s interests in Africa, the potential for conflict remains, as it does in other regions of the world where their interests are clashing.

**Why does this matter?**

As discussed in section one, securitization is not always beneficial. In the opinion of many, it can lead to increased human rights abuses, prop up authoritarian regimes, worsen environmental damage, and reduce the resources that could otherwise be spent on poverty alleviation, good governance, and democracy. When policy becomes securitized, the array of strategies which are considered when assessing a situation is narrowed, and the situation may in fact end up being exacerbated. In many instances, outside intervention such as the introduction of more arms into a conflict serves only to prolong the fighting or instability, severely harming a country’s development prospects by damaging institutions and infrastructure, displacing civilians and forcing investment partners to withdraw from the country. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, prolonged armed conflict has led to an increase in police and military expenditure while reducing funding for health and education (UNDP, 2010, p.58). In the Central African Republic, insecurity, political instability and damage to the country’s administrative and economic infrastructure caused many organizations and development partners to leave the country, harming its capacity to meet development goals (UNDP, 2010, p.57). In Nigeria, decades of civil war and misrule by military regimes has left millions in poverty (a 2010 estimate placed 84% of the population living on two dollars a day), with corruption rampant and government institutions failing (Afrodad, 2005, p.iv). Security is a concept which brings with it its own history and connotations⁸, and

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⁸In historical terms security is the field “states threaten each other, challenge each other’s
at its heart still contains a concern with defense and the state. Placing an issue under the rubric of security "still evokes an image of threat-defense" and gives the state the main role in resolving it, which as has been shown is not always beneficial (Waever 1998). There are concerns that governments with less than exemplary human rights records such as Nigeria, whose security forces have been accused of human rights violations when dealing with violence in the Niger Delta and terrorists in the northern states, will be embraced by the U.S. so long as they continue to cooperate in the GWOT, and in Nigeria's case, continue to pump oil. Efforts towards peaceful resolution of the disputes between terrorists and insurgents and the government, as well as towards reaching development goals risk being pushed aside in favour of narrow security and stability concerns (Dagne, 2002, pp.4-5). It has been argued that U.S. military interventions in North Africa and the Sahel (as well as elsewhere) have only served to reinforce authoritarian methods of governance through "the provision of more high-technology surveillance, weapons and security systems" as well as by reinforcing the role of government security forces above civilian actors. This entrenches undemocratic regimes and government practices and impedes the growth of civil society (Keenan, 2008, p.19). This, it is, feared will have the knock-on effect of creating greater unrest and dissatisfaction among local populations, resulting in fertile breeding grounds for extremism and militancy, as has been seen in the Sahel and with the rise of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali (Keenan, 2010, p.36).

Nigeria is a case in point. The military has been accused of indiscriminate killings and retaliations in response to attacks by Boko Haram on security forces. Soldiers have been accused of destroying homes, indiscriminately executing civilians alongside militants, arbitrary arrests and detentions and extortion (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Human Rights Watch (HRW) claims that around half the 4700 deaths associated with Boko Haram so far have been caused by the Nigerian security forces, including civilians caught in the crossfire. The government has been matching violence with violence; in April 2013, for sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on". While the overwhelming military connotations of the term have faded somewhat, the ideas of defense and defending state sovereignty have remained central (Waever 1998).
example, the military attacked the village of Baga in north-eastern Nigeria after claiming militants were using the town as a refuge. Over two hundred people were killed and hundreds more wounded, with witnesses describing civilians being shot as they ran from their homes (Verini, 2013). The Nigerian army refuted the claims, saying that only six civilians had died along with thirty Boko Haram members (Nossiter, 2013). After the incident, the U.S. pledged to use diplomatic measures to pressure “the Nigerian government and military to make the protection of civilians a cardinal policy of its anti-terror Internal Security Operations”, but there was no mention of suspending military cooperation or other security assistance, despite the U.S. being barred from providing such assistance to countries that violate human rights. Secretary of State John Kerry made a statement condemning the violence, saying that “We are also deeply concerned by credible allegations that Nigerian security forces are committing gross human rights violations, which, in turn, only escalate the violence and fuel extremism” (Kerry, 2013).

Although the U.S. government has measures (such as the Leahy Amendment⁹) in place to prevent security assistance being provided to security forces with known human rights abuses, the State Departments', lack of resources relative to the Pentagon, may prevent thorough vetting of foreign security personnel being carried out (Ploch, 2010a, pp.37-38). Furthermore, training of internal security forces by the U.S. military may blur the lines between the roles of the military and the police as well as undermining the role of civilian authority in matters of internal security (Serafino, 2013, p.19). Some have also argued that the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by the United States acts as an endorsement of the current tactics being used by the Nigerian government and does nothing to quell human rights abuses by security forces (O’Connor, 2013). U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued that “military action should be subordinate to political and economic efforts to undermine extremism” (Tyson, 2008), which is the exact opposite of the trajectory Nigeria is currently following, encouraged by U.S. military and security assistance.

⁹The Leahy Amendment prohibits the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense from providing military assistance to armed forces with records of human rights violations.
The administration of Goodluck Johnson has responded to the worsening security situation by strengthening the role of the security forces and the military. The Terrorism Prevention Act was signed into law in 2011, and in the 2012 budget, security received double the funding of education and healthcare (Okogu, 2012, p.18). The armed forces were deployed to the northern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in 2013 after the President declared a state of emergency, but the increase in troop numbers has done little to prevent attacks from occurring (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.75). In fact, the security services and military have been accused of arbitrary, extra-judicial killings of both actual and suspected members of Boko Haram as well as of civilians (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.76). The worst violence takes place in the most socioeconomically underdeveloped regions of Nigeria: the north, where Islamic groups like Boko Haram challenge what they view as a state corrupted by the West, and the southeast, where environmental degradation from oil production has destroyed livelihoods, resulting in pipeline sabotage, oil bunkering, kidnappings, bombings and other violent acts (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.76).

Beyond violent reactions again the heavy-handedness of the security forces, one of the core causes of unrest in the Niger Delta region is the enormous environmental damage caused by oil production. Poor environmental protections are increasingly being recognised as violations of human rights: “pollution of water, soil and air” can result in “violations variously of rights to an adequate standard of living, to adequate food, to water, to adequate housing, to health and to life” (Amnesty International, 2009, p.12). The area’s fragile “riverine ecosystem” has been severely harmed by numerous oil spills, not only causing irreparable harm to a valuable ecosystem, but also damaging the livelihoods of the local people who rely on the river. Much oil production infrastructure is located close to “home, farms and water sources” (Amnesty International, 2009, p.11) in the Delta, making any pollution that much more severely felt. Besides oil spills (the World Bank estimates that 300 major oil spills occur every year in the Delta and Rivers states; an estimated 1.1 million barrels were spilled between 1975 and 2005 alone (Agbiboa, 2013, p.451)). There are also gas flares which cause acid rain and air pollution, the depletion of fish stocks, the destruction of
mangrove forests, and the contamination of fresh water supplies. Whether the majority of oil spills have been caused by oil theft and illegal refineries or poorly maintained infrastructure and operation failings remains hotly debated. What is not debatable is the land, air and water pollution caused by the spills, regardless of who is to blame, destroying fish stocks, contaminating drinking water and rendering arable land unusable. It is also a major cause of unemployment as the majority of the population are farmers and fishermen who have had their livelihoods destroyed by oil pollution and gas flares (Agbibo, 2013, p.451). In Ogoniland, for example, where many of the region’s militant groups originate, it has been estimated by the United States Environment Program that the damage done to the environment by over fifty years of oil production could take up three decades to remedy, assuming oil production were to cease (EIA, 2013b). The emergence of militant groups like MEND and the NDPVF has been blamed on the combination of environmental degradation, lack of economic opportunities, and years of government by a military regime (Okonta, 2006, p.711): one of MEND’s stated goals is to achieve a more equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth and to obtain reparations for decades of environmental damage (Agbibo, 2013, p.457).

Amnesty International argues that oil production has severely degraded living standards in the region, violating the local population’s basic rights (Amnesty International, 2009, p.13). Environmental protections are a key part of poverty reduction programmes in places like the Niger Delta where most of the population relies on the environment to live. It was in fact included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which Nigeria pledged to fulfil: MDG 7 states that states should work to “reduce environmental degradation arising from natural and manmade causes” (UNDP, 2006, p.73). The focus on oil production blinds the government to other opportunities which could be exploited in the Niger Delta in order to address many of the grievances which have caused militants to take up arms in the first place. This could include the creation of “agro-based and allied businesses, other industries and tourism” to generate sustainable development, reduce unemployment and help to mitigate conflict (UNDP, 2006, p.155). The emphasis on Nigeria’s oil sector which is
reinforced by the attentions of the United States only serves to prolong the unbalanced and corrupt Nigerian economic state of affairs. It is estimated the over $380 billion has been stolen by political and military elites in Nigeria since oil exports began in the 1970s. Oil money has strengthened the corrupt elites who have ruled Nigeria unaccountably for decades, leaving millions in poverty and vulnerable to diseases and death (Ploch, 2010b, pp.15-17).

The emphasis placed on oil production by the Nigerian government and by the international community, exemplified by the security resources dedicated to protecting it, makes it difficult to ensure environmental protections are put in place and observed. There is no incentive to increase human rights protections, shift resources to development, establish environmental standards or to make a concerted effort to mitigate the harm that has already been done in the decades of oil production, as Nigeria is gaining military equipment, training and funds as well as a sense of diplomatic importance to the United States as long as this is portrayed as a security issue. A reliance on military means to control the situation in the Delta does nothing to address the underlying causes of conflict and more often than not only serves to exacerbate the situation. MEND, for example, is one of the rebel groups fighting the oil industry in the Niger Delta and has been responsible for theft, kidnapping, sabotage and other forms of guerrilla warfare. In 2006 it stated that oil companies must “Leave our land while you can or die in it … Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil” (Agbiboa, 2013, p.458).

Alternatives to Securitization

What would U.S. policy look like were it not securitized? How would U.S. engagement with countries in Africa? This is not an abstract question, as securitization efforts can fail, and issues can be desecuritized. For example, during the Cold War, the administration of President Ronald Reagan attempted to securitize the relationship with Africa. African countries that were part of the “Third World, were viewed as vital strategic assets in the competition with the Soviet Union for influence. The Reagan administration attempted to argue that the Soviet Union was trying to gain control over Africa’s strategic resources as a
way of blackmailing the Western bloc. Viewed through this securitized lens, the U.S. supported the apartheid regime in South Africa, as South Africa was an important ally against the spread of Soviet influence and ensuring the West's continue access to Africa’s resources. However, there were counter-discourses framed around issues of human rights which challenged the discourse presented by the U.S. government and were eventually more successful in creating the dominant frame that shaped U.S.-African relations at this time. This view held that Third World conflicts had little if any impact on U.S. national security and that this rubric facilitated an “overmilitarisation of civilian conflict” that would be counterproductive in the long run by producing greater instability and hostility towards the U.S (Marsh, 1998). This example shows that attempts by actors to securitize an issue can indeed fail (Vultee, 2010, p.34).

When framed as a humanitarian or development issue, policy towards Africa becomes the primary responsibility of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State. Framed as a security problem, in contrast, places responsibility for formulating policy on the Department of Defense (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.680). Furthermore, the way in which problems are approach differs depending on the frame used. For instance, from a development rather than securitized perspective, the conflict in Nigeria from Boko Haram, Ansaru, and Niger Delta militants is best combatted by reducing poverty, growing the economy, strengthening the rule of law, and building transparent and accountable government institutions. This could include greater engagement with civil society (such as young people, entrepreneurs, local communities) rather than just dealing with the government (Wharton, 2011), funding programmes to support gender equality, supporting agriculture and food security, and building social safety nets (MDG Africa Steering Group, 2008, pp.5-8) rather that spending funds on police forces and military training. This is not to say that the U.S. does not provide any development aid to Nigeria, only that development priorities tend to be subsumed to defense and security needs rather than the other way round.
If U.S. engagement with Nigeria and other African countries were not securitized, we would expect to see the majority of U.S. funding going towards development (such as governance, poverty alleviation, infrastructure and human rights) projects rather than towards military training and equipment. Were the trajectory of U.S. engagement the same as it was before 2001, the Department of State and USAID would have adequate resources and the requisite influence to carry out policy in Africa, rather than the current unbalanced situation of today, which sees the Pentagon with the lion’s share of both resources and influence. There would be a greater focus on sustainable economic engagement rather than an overwhelming fixation on oil and other extractive industries as well as efforts to make trade fairer for the African continent. Ideally what we would see would be the fruition of the “whole of government” 3Ds\textsuperscript{10} approach which has been much discussed in U.S. government. The 2010 National Security Strategy, for example, wrote that one way to prevent the emergence of conflict was to strengthen the development agenda and employ a whole of government approach that spans the 3Ds (President of the United States, 2010, p.27). It explicitly discussed underdevelopment as a security threat that needs to be managed as well as the use of development as a tool to strengthen alliances with key states: “We are focusing on assisting developing countries and their people to manage security threats [...] Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks [...]” (President of the United States, 2010, p.15).

Global development practices, such as that carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, recognises that the rule of law is “the cornerstone of economic growth, security and poverty eradication” (UNDP, 2012, p.1). The UNDP does a lot of work towards building functioning legal systems in which every citizen is subject to the same laws and that are non-discriminatory and respectful of international human rights standards. This approach to security reflects a concern with individual human security rather than that of the state, recognising the importance of “protection and empowering

\textsuperscript{10} Defence, diplomacy and development.
people, at the individual and community levels” (OSAA, 2005, p.2). The UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report outlined this concept of security that went beyond narrow military concerns (OSAA, 2005, p.40). Intra-state instability and conflict has, according to this view, weakened the concept of state-centric security, as it highlights the connected nature of security, development and human rights issues. You cannot simply focus on one, as state-centric security does, and expect to be successful in preventing conflict and building lasting peace (OSAA, 2005, p.2). Broad strategies are required to address the causes of armed conflict as well as political and social crises, such as by “promoting sustainable development, poverty eradication, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights” (OSAA, 2005, p.5). The proportion of national budgets and foreign aid allocated to military expenditure should therefore be limited in recognition of the fact that other factors may be more important in addressing the underlying causes of conflict and promoting human security and development (OSAA, 2005, p.28).

U.S. development policy under President Obama was set out in two policy documents: the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which sets out policy guidance for all U.S. government agencies, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which explicitly addresses the question of how the leverage civilian power to meet development objectives. The approach to international development outlined in these policy documents has three features: an emphasis on sustainable development; a focus on effectiveness, results and collaboration among donors; and a whole of government approach to development that works to utilise capabilities across multiple government departments (OECD, 2011).

At a press conference in 2013, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of State, Bruce Wharton, laid out the U.S. government’s policy in Africa. He outlined the five pillars of the Obama administration’s Africa policy: democracy promotion; economic growth; health care; conflict resolution; and transnational challenges. These five pillars represent an interesting mix of
security and development objectives. Democracy, economic growth and health are all traditional development goals and have equivalents in the MDGs. Conflict resolution and transnational challenges (such as smuggling, piracy and terrorism) fall more towards the national security end of the spectrum (Wharton, 2011). The aim of providing peace in Africa is one area where the links between development and security become the most blurred. President Obama said in 2009 that as “long as parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by war and mayhem, opportunity and democracy cannot take root” (Obama, 2013). Providing security in such an environment almost inevitably involves the use of armed force and requires the presence of the American military in Africa, which changes the dynamic of engagement immediately.

USAID is the government agency charged with formulating and carrying out U.S. development policy and as such would be expected to take the lead on Africa policy, along with the Department of State. Like many other government aid agencies, since 2000 it has drawn on the MDGs in creating development programmes. At a global level, foreign engagement with and assistance to Africa has been in large part centred on these MDGs. For members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are the two main guiding points for engagement with African development countries. USAID, however, is chronically underfunded and understaffed. Although government policy statements may laud the importance of development to security, actual funding and resource allocations suggest other priorities. USAID is not the only provider of U.S. foreign assistance, however, which has resulted in a “complex web of foreign assistance programs, agencies and earmarked funding” (Blue et al., 2011, p.v) that is subject to political influence from Congress and domestic interest groups (Blue et al., 2011, p.vi). Poverty reduction is not, in fact, an “explicit overarching objective of US development co-operation”, although some programmes are oriented in that direction (such as programs focused on food security and health) (OECD, 2011, p.12). Other important government agencies are the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, Defense and Treasury.
Another area which President Obama’s Africa policy has focused on and should be assigned greater economic resources is economic growth, trade and investment. Economic growth in Africa is a win-win situation for the United States, as new markets for American businesses increases economic growth and jobs at home as well as in Africa. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is one result of this policy: the act is the cornerstone of U.S. trade policy with Africa and has created thousands of jobs in Africa (Carson, 2013, p.319). Energy is another important aspect of the economic side of the U.S.-Africa relationship, and not just oil. The State Department has led energy delegations to countries in East and West Africa, and the U.S. government’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) allocated US$1.7 billion to Africa in 2012 to help promote clean energy projects across the continent (Carson, 2013, p.319).

Some examples of programs, policies and initiatives that would take greater priority under a desecuritized Africa policy are as follows:

- Feed the Future: this programme aims to address challenges to food security and nutrition such as developing climate-resilient cereals, combating pests and diseases and producing nutritious and safe foods (Shrier, 2013). US$3.5 billion was allocated by President Obama to kick-start a green revolution must like the one which transformed agriculture in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s (Carson, 2013, p.322).
- The Global Health Initiative, which builds on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to construct a more comprehensive health program that addresses other major disease threats such as malaria, tuberculosis and hepatitis, as well as strengthening and expanding the reach of Africa's medical institutions (Carson, 2013, p.322).
- Trade Africa aims to promote trade, market driven economic growth and investment. The aim of the program is to increase internal and regional trade in Africa as well as trade with the United States. It aims to address global trade imbalances that have left Africa with less than three percent of world trade, most of which is concentrated in oil, gas and natural resources (Carson, 2013, p.322).
- The partnership between Chevron, USAID and the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative Foundation set up by Chevron to help address social and economic challenges in the Niger Delta region. According to the agreement, USAID and the Foundation will each contribute USD 25 million over four years to “promote economic development, improve the capacity of government and civil society institutions, and help reduce conflict in the region” (OECD, 2011, p.37).

- Power Africa – an initiative that aims to double access to electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa through U.S. government investment and partnership with the private sector (Obama, 2013).
  - This initiative recognises the limitations that a lack of transport, power, water, sanitation and communication networks place on economic growth and poverty reduction across Africa. Electricity, for example, is vital to achieving economic growth and thus reducing poverty, yet 35 countries in Africa are still experiencing a power crisis with frequent interruptions. Funding for projects like Power Africa will be a significant help in meeting the MDGs and other development goals (Group, 2008, p.16). It builds on the energy program initiated by the State Department in 2011, which aimed to bring American private sector companies in contact with the growing commercial opportunities in the power industry in Africa. Power Africa will initially work with six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania) to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. government (contributing $7 billion) will partner with private companies such as General Electric (expected to contribute $9 billion over the next five years) to increased reliable access to electricity for over 20,000 households across Africa (Carson, 2013, p.323).

- Investing in institutions rather than dictators: building strong justice systems, stamping out corruption, encouraging transparent and accountable government, and fostering civil society (Obama, 2013). For instance, rather than increasing funding and training for the armed forces, investing in strengthening the governance systems and the rule of law
through assisting poor and marginalized people to access the legal system, supporting the establishment and implementation of rules and laws, creating efficient, accountable and legitimate security institutions, and so on (UNDP, 2011, p.1).

- Focus on “broad-based economic growth” rather than on the extractive sector alone: investing in infrastructure, encouraging entrepreneurship, creating hospitable business environments, promoting open markets, and lowering trade barriers (OECD, 2011, p.25).
- A more comprehensive view of security that goes beyond military concerns and the absence of war. This would focus on human dignity and human life, and the development of individual people and communities rather than the state as a whole (OSAA, 2009, p.4). This concept of human security includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (OSAA, 2009, p.7).

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to answer the question as to whether there has been a new securitization of U.S. policy in Africa, using the example of Nigeria as a test case. I have argued that a degree of securitization has taken place since 2001, enough to make a noticeable difference from U.S. engagement prior to this. I have further argued that this has been due to three securitizing factors: concerns about oil security, fears about the potential disruption caused by terrorism and insurgency, and the rise in China. To research this question I first examined the general trend of U.S. engagement with Africa as a whole before turning a more detailed analysis of U.S. engagement with Nigeria from 1960 (when Nigeria became an independent country) to the present day. I looked at sources such as official statements, development aid, economic relations and military cooperation, and compared the type of engagement that took place from 1960 to 2001 to that which took place from 2001 to the present. I found that prior to 2001, U.S. engagement with Nigeria was primarily concerned with trade, particularly oil. There was very little political or military engagement, especially in the 1990s when Nigeria was ruled by a military dictatorship. After 2001 and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, however, U.S. engagement with Nigeria noticeably intensified and took on a militaristic overtone. It has taken the
form of increased military aid (such as training programmes, joint missions and the provision of military equipment) as well as the founding of AFRICOM in 2007. The securitization of Africa has been slow but steady, especially since 2001, and increased in intensity in 2007. By 2014 it is expected that the number of U.S. troops in Africa will reach 5000, which is brigade level strength, and will be active in “38 out of Africa’s 54 nations” (Stewart, 2014).

Having said that, it does seem clear that a securitized aspect to U.S. policy in Africa is not a completely new occurrence. Development and diplomacy have always competed with defense for influence in shaping U.S. foreign affairs, and Africa policy has been no exception. During the 1970s for example, oil scares led to the dominance of more national security-oriented concerns in U.S. policy. In the 1990s however, human rights concerns took precedence, and for at least part of the decade national interest was partially subsumed to the more altruistic notion of upholding human rights in Nigeria. This competition between different interests and motivations mean that the securitization process has not been uncontested. Despite the boost given to defense concerns by the GWOT, development and human rights concerns remain relevant in U.S. foreign policy making. This may be because opposition to further involvement in foreign countries by the military is still strong both within and without the U.S., meaning that the U.S. has had to proceed carefully and downplay any potential role for the military in Africa. AFRICOM’s headquarters, for example, are located in Stuttgart, Germany, given that “no African nation has agreed to host the full U.S. command” (Stewart, 2014). Counter-discourses remain, for the most part propagated by the development community, including government agencies like USAID. Attempts to enhance the role of diplomacy and development in Africa to balance the role of the military have been made, but due to budgetary constraints have not been overly successful.

However, since around 2005-2006 the rhetoric justifying the growing role of the U.S. military in Africa began to shift from an emphasis on the GWOT and energy security to include a greater focus on humanitarianism and the development-security nexus, a “security-development” discourse similar to that which guided the development policy of the New Labour government in the United Kingdom.
This new emphasis focuses on the development of civilian capacity on the continent and may be a reflection of negative feedback from the greater visibility of the U.S. military in Africa given the negative publicity generated from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Underneath though, whether the U.S.’s policies and goals have truly changed is another question (Keenan, 2010, p.31). Keenan proposes that these new mission statements, publications and stories could be just another aspect of Washington’s ‘information war’ rather than a sign of a “paradigmatic shift in US military thinking” (Keenan, 2010, p.32). Outbreaks of civil unrest or ‘insurgency’ are still being dealt with by military means, often with the backing of American military forces. U.S. forces killed an unknown number of Somali fighters and civilians trapped between U.S., Kenyan and Ethiopian forces (both of whom had American training and assistance) in 2007, for instance. Counterterrorism also clearly remains a high priority for U.S. military operations in Africa, with three VEOs being of particular concern: AQIM in the north and west of Africa, Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru in Nigeria and al Shabaab in Somalia (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.327). For example, in 2006, General James L. Jones of EUCOM stated that “The growing use of the Trans-Saharan region in Africa by terrorists threatens the security of the United States and our European Allies” and that stability in Africa was a “global strategic imperative”. Furthermore, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review noted the emergence of terrorist threats in northern and western Africa as a cause for concern for the U.S. (Copson, 2007, p.115).

The securitization of Africa was demonstrated by an in-depth examination of the U.S.’s relationship with Nigeria. Nigeria was chosen because it is a major oil producer, is vulnerable to terrorist activity, and has been the site of considerable Chinese activity, making it an excellent exemplar of all three of my securitizing factors. It would be interesting for future research to compare the situation in Nigeria with other states in Africa, perhaps those that do not hold valuable oil resources or that have not faced the threat of terrorism, to see which factor is the most relevant in the securitizing process. Is this securitization process likely to continue into the future, or will the civilian agencies of the Department of State and USAID regain control of U.S. policy? Much depends on the impact that U.S. shale oil production has on world energy markets, as this will impact on how
much it matters to the U.S. if Nigeria collapses. Swing producers like Nigeria may well resume their importance in the U.S. world view if shale oil fails to be the panacea many claim it to be and competition for oil continues to intensify.
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