FROM REVOLUTION TO ‘REFOLUTION’


A Thesis

Submitted to Victoria University of Wellington in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Strategic Studies

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2011
Abstract

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a part of an international network organization called Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). The organization is commonly portrayed as an “anti-system” movement that seeks to overthrow democracy and revives the past transnational rule of the khilafah (caliphate). This view is justified by the doctrine of HT that promotes a revolutionary strategy of non-participation and envisages a political change outside the parliamentary process of democracy. Based on this ideology, many see the future of HT in its role of radicalizing Muslims that eventually lead to violence.

This study evaluates the consistency of HTI in following its revolutionary strategy of non-participation. It argues that HTI is undertaking a strategic shift from a total non-participation to a selective participation. It establishes a strategic balance between revolution and reform by taking part in the democratic system for stirring opposition toward the existing political system. HTI focuses on challenging the legitimacy of democracy while at the same time engages with the supporting institutions and actors of the democratic system. This strategy resembles the model of political change called by Oxford University’s political scientist, Timothy Garton Ash, ‘refolution.’ It aims to overthrow the existing political system without overthrowing the political regime. It seeks entry into the system to covert key elements of power holders and to persuade them to undertake a fundamental change from democracy to an Islamic government based on shari’ah law.

This change is inevitable for HTI to adjust itself to the democratic context of Indonesia that integrates the majority of Muslims in the democratic system. This presence of Muslim actors in the system has created a perception of political opportunity for Islamization that prevents HTI from confronting the existing political process. This stance betrays HTI’s revolutionary doctrine that requires it to uncompromisingly undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system and propagate political detachment. However, HTI understands that opposition to the Muslim involvement in the democratic process can isolate it from its most potential allies.

Based on this, this study calls attention to the trajectory of HT outside the box of violent and revolutionary activism. The above path is especially likely for HT that operates in the context of Muslim democracies. HTI offers an alternative strategy to
violent activism and the moderate trend of Islamist movements. Evidence shows HTI is building support bases for the establishment of a pro-shari’ah or anti-system politics, either in the form of starting a new party or in creating a coalition between the existing parties.

To support this argument, this study analyzes the nature of HTI’s activities and its attitude toward the democratic structure. It is primarily based on a content analysis of HTI’s discourse and activities recorded in two of its main publications: *Al-Islam* weekly bulletin and *Al-Wa‘ie* monthly magazine. These sources cover HTI’s activism from 2000 to 2009.

Methodologically, it follows references and activities relating to key elements of Indonesian democracy (such as state ideology, democracy, election, the government, House of Representative, and political parties) and elements of Muslim society that are part of the democratic system. Drawing on the theories of political change, the analysis is based on the scope of change and the degree of opposition it promotes. Cases are analysed on a scale of 1 to 3 that represents *moderate*, *radical* and *extreme*. The finding shows mixed attitudes with a significant portion of *radical* character. This confirms the character of ‘refolutionary’ strategy: it focuses on challenging political system over political institutions and combines political participation with anti-democratic campaign.
Acknowledgements

My first thank goes to my supervisor, James (Jim) Veitch. I have benefited greatly from his experience and analytical sharpness. His passion allowed me to knock on his door almost daily for over three years. I thank him for his critical and careful reading of my draft that was essential in the structuring and sharpening of my thesis.

I am indebted to my second supervisor, Douglas Van Belle of the Media Studies Department of Victoria University of Wellington. His expertise in content analysis was critical in the methodological development of this study. His critical reading of my draft has been most valuable. I also thank Professor Doug for connecting me to the Social Science Automation, Inc. in Columbus Ohio. My training on computer-based text analysis in the company has enriched the methodological aspect of this study.

This study is not possible without the cooperation of many HTI activists. I specifically thank M. Rahmat Kurnia, Hafiz Abdurrahman and Harits Abu Ulya of HTI Central Board for sparing valuable hours of their time for interviews and correspondence. I thank Erwin Permana of Gema Pembebasan (HTI university student organization) for spending time with me after his hectic time organizing a Muslim student congress in Jakarta. I am very much indebted to Mr. Sunarman for helping me compiling issues of Al-Wa’ie magazine, Al-Islam bulletin, and other important publications of HTI. I thank Jalaluddin Patel of HT in Britain for spending time with me despite his busy time in Jakarta. I cannot thank more to many HTI activists in local areas of Indonesia including Ibnu Alwan of HTI in Yogyakarta (for a series of personal training on HT ideology, an access to HTI leadership meeting, and lending
me some key publications of HTI), Malik Anas of HTI in Malang, and Fitriyaman of HTI in Kendari.

Particular thanks go to Muhammad Al-Khathath of Hizbut Dakwah Islam, Ickwan Syam of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), Professor Bahtiar Effendy, Sydney Jones, Khamami Zada, Noorhaidi Hasan, Luthfi Tamimi of Sabili magazine and a number of former activists of HTI (whose names I cannot mention here) for sharing their valuable views of HTI and political Islam in Indonesia in general.

This study is possible by the generous funding of the New Zealand Aid (NZAID) International Doctoral Research Scholarship. I am grateful of NZAID funding that covers my study, research and living allowance for over three years. I would like to specifically mention the role of Mr. David Strachan of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and my colleague Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir of the Centre for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies of Gadjah Mada University for initiating cooperation between the two institutions. The cooperation has encouraged me in applying for the NZAID scholarship.

I thank the kind supports of the staffs at the School of Government of Victoria University, especially professor Amanda Wolf, Dawn Yeabsley, and Lyn Todd.

My lasting and deepest thanks go to my beloved wife, Mercy Ramadhani, and my children, Abrar K. Ramadhan and Aisyah N. Karima for their patience and accompany. They have to sacrifice some of their holiday times to support my study. I feel blessed to have such a wonderful and supporting family.
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Glossary

AKKBP : Aliansi Kebangsaan Kebebasan Beragama dan Keyakinan (National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief)
BBM : Bahan Bakar Minyak (Oil Fuel Energy)
DDII : Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council)
Depdagri : Departemen Dalam Negeri (Internal Affair Ministry)
DKU-FUI : Dewan Kesatuan Ulama-Forum Umat Islam (United Council of Ulama-Muslim Ummah Forum)
DMI : Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Indonesian Mosque Council)
DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative/Lower House)
DPRD : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional House of Representative)
FIS : Islamic Salvation Front
FMLN : Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
F-PDU : Fraksi Persatuan Daulah Umat (Union of the Ummah Sovereignty)
FPI : Islamic Defenders’ Front
FUI : Forum Umat Islam (Muslim Ummah Forum)
Gerindra : Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Movement for Greater Indonesia/party founded by Prabowo)
Golkar : Golongan Karya (Functional Group Party)
Golput : Golongan Putih (Political abstention in election)
Gusdur : Abdurrahman Wahid
Hanura : Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Feeling/party founded by Wiranto)
HDI : Hizbut Dakwah Islami
HMI : Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Union)
HT : Hizb al-Tahrir
HTI : Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICG : International Crisis Group
ICMI : Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Scholar Association)
ITB : Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
JI : Jemaah Islamiyah
KAMMI : Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Action Commitee of Indonesian Muslim Students)
Kesbangpol : Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Ministry of Internal Affairs’ unit for national and political unity)
KHI : Kitab Hukum Islam (Islamic Legal Code)
KISDI : Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Comitteee for World Muslim Solidarity)
KPPSI : Komite Persiapan Penerapan Syariah Islam (Preparation Commitee for the Implementation of Shari’ah)
KPU : Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Election Commitee)
KUHP : Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (Criminal Law)
KUII : Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (Congress for Indonesian Muslim Ummah)
LDK : Lembaga Dakwah Network (Campus Dakwah Association)
LIPI : Lembaga Penelitian Indonesia (Indonesian Research Agency)
LPPI : Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (Institute for Islamic Reserach and Study)
MB : Muslim Brotherhood
MMI : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)
MPR : Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly/Upper House)
MUI : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council)
MUN : Musyawarah Ulama Nasional (National Ulama Congress)
NAMRU : Naval Research Unit [in Indonesia]
NKRI : Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)
NSDAP : Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party)
NU : Nahdlatul Ulama
PAN : Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Pansus : Panitia Kerja Khusus (House’s Special Committee)
PBB : Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)
PBR : Partai Bintang Reformasi (Crescent Reform Party)
PD : Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party)
PDIP : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Perda : Peraturan Daerah (District Regulation)
Persis : Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)
Perti : Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islamiyah
Pilkada : Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Local Election)
PK : Partai Keadilan (Justice Party/former PKS)
PKB : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKK : Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (Turkey)
PKS : Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity and Justice Party)
PPP : Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PSII : Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Association Party)
RUU : Rancangan Undang-Undang (Draft of Law)
SBY : Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono
Sisdiknas : Sistem Pendidikan National ([Law on] National Education System)
SKB : Surat Keputusan Bersama (Internministrational Letter/Instruction)
TDL : Tarif Dasar Listrik (Basic Power Tariff)
UGM : Universitas Gadjah Mada 9Gadjah Mada University)
UNAIR : Universitas Airlangga (Airlangga University).
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Thesis Overview

This thesis seeks to understand the trajectory or the model of political change sought by HTI and to examine the role of the democratic context of Indonesia to HTI’s choice for the path. Toward answering these questions, this thesis proceeds as follows:

Chapter one starts with a literature review and sets out significance of this study. This is followed by a summary of the arguments, a sketch of theoretical framework and an explanation of the framework used to develop the arguments. Discussions on the methodology and limits of the study close this chapter.

Chapter two presents background information about Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), its revolutionary ideology and its emergence in Indonesia. Of particular importance is the elaboration of HT’s revolutionary ideology, which serves as the parameter of HTI’s faithfulness to the revolutionary mandate.

Chapters three and four presents the quantitative findings of the research, where chapter three focuses on the discourse aspect of HTI and chapter four discusses the action aspect.

Based on these findings presented in chapter three and four, chapter five presents the analysis of HTI’s third path (called political radicalism or the ‘revolutionary’ trajectory). This chapter answers the first argument of the thesis on the pathway of HTI.

Chapter six is devoted to answering the second argument of this thesis; it discusses the role of democracy in relation to HTI’s inconsistencies in implementing its revolutionary doctrine. It focuses on the way HTI responds to political opportunities within the democratic framework.
This thesis concludes with a brief summary of the arguments and of their implication for the future of political Islam and democratization in Indonesia.
Chapter 1

Introduction

A. Background

Soon after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 that brought a political freedom not seen for more than three decades, a new Islamist group named Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) emerged from the shadows after a decade of intensive cell-based mobilizations.\(^1\) Now another decade on since it began its public engagement, HTI shows its prominence as a key player in the advocacy of the Islamic state or the shari’ah in Indonesia. As many Islamist movements now show a trend toward moderation, HTI appears to be the last bastion of Islamic state ideology which has been unsuccessfully fought for by various Muslim groups since the founding of the nation.\(^2\) HTI is now the only Islamist group that openly calls for the creation of an Islamic state or what it calls khilafah.\(^3\) As a new contender, HTI has made an impressive appearance in recent years. It has created a more awareness of the once peripheral idea of the khilafah. HTI’s progress is apparent from its expanding presence across the nation. Even though it remains a tiny minority compared to moderate mainstream Muslim organizations, it has been able to express

\(^1\) The transition to public campaign or what HTI calls tafa’ul maa al-ummah (interaction with the ummah) was officially launched in 2000, two years after the fall of Soeharto, in a conference on khilafah in Jakarta under the name of ‘Syabab Hizbut Tahrir’ (Hizbut Tahrir Youth) before officially used the name Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

\(^2\) Other groups hold strong the Islamic state orientation but they either adopt softer term such as ‘formalization of shari’ah’ as propagated by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) or openly calls the creation of an Islamic state but within underground struggle like Jemaah Islamiyah and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). For reading about Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia see Ahnaf (2000), for reading about Jemaah Islamiyah, see International Crisis Group (2003, 2007, 2008) and Barton (2005), for reading about NII, see International Crisis Group (2005) and Ridwan (2008), for reading about the history of Muslim failure in the struggle for an Islamic state since the founding of Indonesia, see Boland (1982), and for reading about the genealogies Islamic radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, see Bruinessen (2002).

\(^3\) Throughout this thesis, I use the Arabic word, khilafah, which is also commonly used in Indonesia. Other works in HT uses the Anglicised word caliphate.
its aspirations loudly, often louder than the mainstream. Intense social mobilization, public appearances, and media propaganda have rewarded it with a growing public presence.

Brought to Indonesia in 1983, HTI is a part of the international movement called Hizbut al-Tahrir (HT) founded in Palestine in 1953 by Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977). HT started with the revolutionary goal of restoring the past imperium of khilafah while at the same time claiming the principle of non-violence. The *raison d’etre* for the founding of HT is al-Nabhani’s disillusionment with the political Islamic movements that failed because of their participation in secular systems on one hand and violent strategies that caused state repression and Muslim antipathy on the other. Al-Nabhani rejected both the reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the militance of violent Islamists (Taji-Farouki: 1996: xi). He offers an alternative strategy of uprooting the legitimacy of the existing system and mobilizing political detachment to persuade powerful elites to transform the secular state into a khilafah government extra-parliamentarily and non-violently.4

In Indonesia, HTI revived the idea of an Islamic state which has never won support from the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. It challenges democracy and demands its replacement with the trans-national government of the khilafah. Unlike many other political Islamist groups that have given up the Islamic state ideal and compromised their demands into a limited use of the shari’ah within the existing democratic framework,5 HTI’s doctrine sets out to change the course of Islamic

4 For discussion about the strategy of HT, see chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 51-66.
5 The prominent Islamist groups like the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) and Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI) do not use the rhetoric of Islamic state, and rather choose word the implementation of shari’ah. For a reading about FPI, see Al-Zastrouw (2006). See also the transformation of the Tarbiyah Movement (that followed the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood) into a moderate political party in Rahmat (2008); for exploration about FUI’s activities, see www.suara-islam.com. This is not an official
movements by emphasizing the necessity of capturing the state as a means to implement the shari’ah. It seeks to break through the failing struggles for an Islamic state by offering an alternative strategy to violent or democratic struggles.

**B. Studies on Hizb al-Tahrir: Beyond Two Least Likely Extreme Ends**

There has been a growing interest in the study of HT or HTI. Puzzled by the combination of HT’s revolutionary ideology and its non-violent principle, current studies on the organization are largely focused on two extreme outcomes: violence or the revolutionary struggle for the khilafah. One prominent analysis in the argument on the violent potential of HT is the widely cited work of the Nixon Centre’s analyst, Zeyno Baran, who sees HT as a “conveyor belt” toward terrorism. She argues that even though HT’s activists constantly claim that its organization is non-violent, it has never condemned the violence perpetuated by terrorist Muslim groups. She believes HT’s extreme ideology will bring about radical behaviour among its members that is likely to transform into violence with or without official support. Baran supports this argument by identifying existing and ex HT members who have been involved in various violent activities (Baran: 2004: 11; 2005: 68).

Ariel Cohen agrees, drawing attention to HT’s potential for violence by underlining its staged strategy. He argues that HT is most likely to become violent once it gains the level of support it needs to take over power (Cohen: 2003: 3). Others take the view that violence is inherent in HT’s doctrine of jihad and anti-semitism. Its doctrine of Islamic expansionism supports the use of war to conquer countries that refuse to submit to a Muslim ruler. Even though theoretically HT’s doctrine only

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website of FUI, but is run by its prominent figure leader, Muhammad al-Khattath, that publicises FUI’s activities. To the best of my knowledge, there has been any research focusing on this growing organization.
supports violence after a khilfah government is in place, in practice HT’ leaders have made statements that encourage violence prior to this, such as the call of HT’s amir Atha Abu Rustho for war as the only way to deal with Israel (Raziq 2009). Earlier Rosbalt news agency even predicted that HT would replace Al-Qaeda in the future (Martirosyan: 2003). An ex-member of HT in Britain, Ed Hussein, strengthened this view through his book that describes the secretive nature of HT and its role in radicalizing Muslims (Hussein: 2001).

This focus on HT’s potential for violence is however dismissed by observers like Hanif (2007a), Mayer (2004) and Krause (2008). Mayer argues that such an analysis is merely based on speculations that serve the needs of political lobbyists to invent threats that resonate with the global war on terror. This speculation, according to Mayer, lacks empirical foundation as it is mostly based on HT’s confrontational statements that do not necessarily lead to physical violence (Mayer: 2004: 8). Similarly, Krause counters the argument that links HT with violent groups like Al-Qaeda by comparing the membership structure, ideological base and establishment of HT and Al-Qaeda. She finds differences between the two that lead her to suggest that it is highly unlikely that HT will resort to violence (Krause: 2008: 27-43). Hanif (2007a) goes further by suggesting that HTI is a phantom organization serving the interests of the US and Britain in the cold war against Russia and China.6

I share this criticism of the assumption of HT’s inherent violence. Much of the argument on the eventual violence carried out by HTI is based on the expansionist ideology that legitimates war to conquer opposing countries (Baran 2005; Raziq

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6 The phantom perspective is also suggested by a Turkish journalist, as quoted by Ali Bulac in his blog comment, who made an allegation that “What al-Qaeda means to the US is exactly what Hizb ut-Tahrir means for Russia.” This implies a suggestion that Hizb al-Tahrir in central Asia is helping Russia to destabilize the region in order to justify Russian intervention (Bulac 2005).
2009). For HT, the waging of war by authorities other than a khilafah government is illegitimate. The representation of HTI in a violent framework therefore overlooks this belief system and its dominant practice of non-violent activism. It might be true that there were individual members or ex-members of HTI who were involved in violent activities, but these isolated incidents are insufficient to support the argument that the group will eventually resort to violence. This is especially true with HT in Indonesia. The group has been operating in the country for more than two decades with no record of even small-scale violence.

The works of those (Mayer: 2004, Krause: 2008, Hanif 2007a) who dismiss a violent link to HT however fail to provide satisfactory answers to the “so what?” question. This type of analysis suggests that a movement with a revolutionary ideology will necessarily embrace a revolutionary path. It is unimaginable that HT will be able to achieve the goal of establishing the khilafah. Understanding HT’s direction beyond this utopian objective is therefore critical.

The intent of this study is to fill this void in understanding the course of HTI beyond the khilafah ideal in the specific context of Indonesia – an open democracy and home to 205 million Muslim or 84 percent of total population (240 million). Analysis of HT’s direction with reference to this context is essential because even though HT is an international organization, different contexts are likely to cause different character.

C. Indonesia’s Unique Context: Political Freedom and Political Opportunity

The promotion of HT’s revolutionary ideology in Indonesia is greeted with two unique contexts. First, unlike in other places in the Middle East and Asia where HT
struggles under repressive authorities, in Indonesia HTI enjoys remarkable political freedom. Despite the fact that on paper HTI is a potential threat to the Indonesian constitution, it has been able to operate freely. Second, Indonesian democracy offers a different opportunity to Hizbut Tahrir’s goal than in non-Muslim democratic countries like Britain and Germany. In these countries, political freedom does not co-exist with real political opportunities. It is highly unlikely that HT’s theocratic aspiration will resonate in predominantly non-Muslim populations. In contrast, HT in Indonesia may have the opportunity to capitalize on its political freedom among the large majority-Muslim audiences. If a total change is not possible, opportunities for wider state accommodation on moral and religious issues may make way for HTI’s ideological shift.

These contexts have brought about different shapes of HT. In Muslim countries such as Jordan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, HT continues to have a fairly low profile under repressive government. In non-Muslim countries where it enjoys political freedom but without effective political opportunity, HT, according to Taji-Farouki, tends to tout its revolutionary message by using the countries as diplomatic spots to make direct attacks on secular ideologies (Taji-Farouki: 2004: 343).

HTI in Indonesia presents an interesting case for studying the transformation of a revolutionary movement that gains both political freedom and political opportunity - especially since HTI has raised its profile and moved toward a public campaign. The fact that the majority of Islamist groups in Indonesia have surrendered the Islamic state ideology to the democratic political system gives a significance to this study about HTI. As one of few organizations that still openly calls for the creation of an Islamic state, HTI is a critical test of the capability of democracy in
demobilizing or taming revolutionary movements. This thesis intends to shed light on the trajectory of HTI with a particular interest in examining the effect of Indonesia’s democratization on its maintenance or abandonment of its revolutionary commitment.

D. Arguments
This thesis makes two arguments:

**Argument One:**
HTI is undertaking a shift from its revolutionary doctrines of non-participation and non-cooperation toward a strategy that combines anti-system campaigns with political participations. It is seeking a balance between sustaining its revolutionary orientation of establishing the khilafah with engagement in reformist politics. By this strategy HTI hopes to secure the political freedom to expand social mobilization against the existing political system and to seek political entry in order to plant seeds of opposition within the system. The likely outcome of HTI’s success in this endeavor is neither violence nor revolution in the form of the overthrow of the existing government and political order, but the establishment of extreme right forces that propagate sectarian polarizations (Islamic versus secular blocs) within the democratic system. This may take the form of the establishment of a new party or the creation of a pro-shari’ah coalition in the parliament. HTI’s success may resemble the success of extreme right parties in Western democracies where small right wing parties gain political significance.

In this way, HTI offers an alternative path to violence extremism and the moderate trend of major Islamist movements in Indonesia. HTI may be not strong
enough to cause democratic breakdown, although this is desired, but its success in mobilizing public support may change the course of democratization in Indonesia so that it becomes more receptive to the influence of political Islamism.

Argument Two:
HTI’s shift toward the above trajectory is the result of its adjustment to the democratic environment of Indonesia. This is because HTI’s mobilization inevitably requires its engagement with elements of the political establishment. This naturally makes HTI less committed to its revolutionary doctrines of political detachment and more tolerant or supportive of the existing political system, although it remains critical, of political participation. In this way, HTI, which started as a revolutionary movement, survives democratic challenge by transforming into a “political radicalism” that combines anti-system campaign with political participation.

In this case, this thesis argues that democracy does not necessarily destroy nor moderate revolutionary movements as some suggest, but motivates revolutionary movements to manipulate democratic opportunities for political radicalism. The impact could be mutual. While HTI has been changed by democracy, it also has the potential to change democracy so that it becomes less liberal. The performance of democracy that strengthens its legitimacy and empowers political moderation is therefore antithetical to the rise of the right wing politics sought by HTI.

E. Tasks and Procedure of Arguments
Based on the arguments above, the aims of this thesis are twofold. The first is to demonstrate the shift of HTI from a revolutionary orientation toward political
radicalism. The second is to demonstrate the role of democracy in the chosen pathway of HTI. The first task is carried out by evaluating the faithfulness of HTI in following revolutionary principles that are parallel to HT’s theories for change. As for the second task, this study follows the theoretical debates on the impact of democracy to revolutionary movements. It especially adopts the arguments about the aspects of democracy that are arguably moderating in nature to assess their relationship to the changes of HTI. Discussions below show the uses of these theories to develop the arguments of this thesis.

**E.1. Argument One: Theories of Political Changes, Beyond Revolution and Reform**

Scholars and activists of political change have admitted the limit of the dichotomy of revolution and reform (Foran 2003; Farhi 2003; Goodwin 2003). Explanations of political change into an either/or categorization of revolution and reform arguably fail to capture the political transition that falls in between both these extremes. Following this nuanced characterization of political change, this study attempts to explain the orientation of HTI in three categories of political change: *revolution*, ‘*refolution*’ and *reform*. By including the third path of ‘*refolution*’ in the centre of the spectrum, this study broadens the perspective of the alternative model of political change sought by HTI in facing the democratic context of Indonesia.

In this study, I follow Jeff Goodwin’s state-centered approach in understanding revolutionary movements. In this perspective, Goodwin defines revolution as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine authorities" (Goodwin 2001: 9).
Although this definition mentions mass mobilization as the cause of revolution, Goodwin acknowledges that a revolution can be carried out by small powerful elites (‘revolution from above’). But a political change in terms of regime change, according to Goodwin, is not a sufficient characteristic of revolutions. A revolution also requires “more or less rapid and fundamental social, and/or cultural change during or soon after the struggle for power” (Goodwin 2001: 9). This definition is different to those who argue that a revolution can only take place through a violent struggle and in a sudden or rapid process of political change (Skocpol 1979: 4; Huntington 1968: 264; Giddens 1989: 605; Colburn 1994: 5). In short, a revolution may take place in either a violent or non-violent manner or in rapid or less rapid processes of change. What is clear is that revolutionary change is characterized by an overthrow of a political regime followed by the introduction of large scale change in various sectors of life.

This scope of change, including both the intellectual (political system) and institutional (structure) aspect of the state, distinguish revolution from reform. A reformist change means addressing critical problems without overthrowing the regime and altering the fundamentals of the political system.

An alternative scenario of change, between reform and revolution, however is not impossible. Garton Ash and Kis call this scenario ‘refolution,’ which means a hybrid combination of revolution and reform (Ash 1990:3; Kis 2001: 319). They argue that a movement may seek a revolutionary outcome through non-revolutionary actions. In this scenario, a large scale transformation of the political, social and economic system, including the amendment of the constitution, takes place without the collapse of the present political power-holder. This may happen in a situation where popular movements cause a crisis of legitimation to the power-holder and
therefore, because of unbearable pressures, changes in favour of popular demand are then made. In response to this situation, the ruling power comes to the table with the opposition party to negotiate large-scale transformations of the political, social and economic system while maintaining the legitimacy of the power holders. Garton Ash connects this model with the processes of political change in Poland and Hungary in which a fundamental transformation of the state system, from totalitarian Marxism to democracy was made while maintaining the legitimacy of the former power-holders (Ash: 1990; Kis 2008).

State legitimacy is the key to distinguishing this model of change from the other models. There are two components that need to be emphasised: namely the legitimacies of the power holder (authorities) and the existing political system (democracy). Reformist change maintains both forms of legitimacy; revolution seeks to overthrow both legitimacies and replace them with a new political power and a new political system; refolution entails overthrowing the existing political system without overthrowing the existing power holder. The achievement of refolution thus requires the crisis of legitimation of the existing political system (rule) that will put pressure on the political authority (ruler) to carry out a transformation from the existing political system to a new one. Kis compares refolution to revolution and reform as follows:

“Like revolutions, this type of change [refolution] is invariably marked by the presence of legitimation crisis. But, unlike revolutions, it does not proceed through the collapse of the state and a multiple-power situation. On the contrary, as with reforms, it is marked by a conscious strategy to preserve coordination. Unlike reforms, it does not preserve coordination by relying on the authority of institutional power-holders. Coordination is maintained by combined efforts of institutional power-holders and groups belonging to extra-institutional opposition” (Kis 2008: 319).
Such a distinct model of political behavior (between *revolution* and *reform*) is similar to the term “radicalism” used by Pappas (2008). In the continuum between revolution and reformism, he defines radicalism as:

“any movement or political party that explicitly aims at legal, customarily non-violent subversion of an existing institutional framework to replace it with a new, allegedly better one. Subverting an already solidified institutional framework may involve drastic constitutional change, alterations in the relations of production and the engineering of profound economic redistribution among social groups, shifting international alliances, and any other measure from which claims to a new legitimate authority may be deduced” (Pappas 2008: 1119).

The amount and type of change distinguishes these three models. Unlike revolution that aims at a complete overthrow of the existing political system and reformism that seeks gradual and incremental changes in policies within the existing political framework, radicalism aims at a systemic change by using the existing political process. A revolutionary movement is therefore characterized by opposition to the existing system and the strategy of detachment (non-participation) from the existing political process. Radical or revolutionary movements are defined by participation in the existing political system as a way to undermine the system from within; reformist movements are typified by their participation and acceptance of the existing system despite the demand for change.

**E.1.i. Attitudes toward the State as a Unit of Analysis**

To this end, it is clear that the attitude toward the state, both its intellectual (political system) and its institutional (political structure) aspects, is crucial in understanding the political change orientation of a movement. The revolutionary or non-revolutionary nature of a movement is characterized by its attempt to create the breakdown of the
state in order to seize political power and introduce a new constitution. The nature of a movement therefore can also be measured by its aim to create situations that will lead to the breakdown of the state.

Because in Indonesia HTI is seeking to overthrow democracy this study follows Lipset’s proposal of the three requisites for the stability of democracy, including: economic development, legitimacy and effectiveness (Lipset 1959: 75-98). The revolutionary and non-revolutionary nature of HTI therefore can be characterized by its effort to undermine these requisites of democratic stability, regardless of the strength of the effort. Due to HTI’s non-military nature this study is focused on the effort of the movement to undermine two of the key elements of democracy, namely legitimacy and effectiveness. The other factor, economic development, is an external aspect that is beyond HTI’s role.

The *first* factor is legitimacy, which refers to a belief that democratic political institutions are the most appropriate mechanism to govern society (Lipset 1959: 86; Dahl 1971: 40). The task of an anti-democratic movement is therefore to uproot public consent in the elements of the democratic system. This feature may appear in the discourse of HTI. The *second* factor deals with the effectiveness of the democratic institutions to perform their political roles. An effort to undermine this aspect of democracy may appear at the action aspect (activities) of a revolutionary movement; this is the way it mobilizes political detachment or disobedience among the people. A major indicator of the legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy according to Lipset is the degree of political entry (Lipset 1959: 8). The higher the number of people that enter into a political system the more legitimate and effective a democratic system. As illustrated in figure 1.1 below, the strongest democracy is the one that possesses both
characters of legitimacy and effectiveness (country A in diagram in below). A democracy that lacks both of these aspects is unstable and likely to break down unless it is held by an authoritarian government (country D). Illegitimate but effective democracy (country C) or an ineffective but legitimate democracy (country B) may survive, but has the potential to lose both factors. Lipset’s diagram below illustrates this variation (Lipset 1959: 90):

![Figure 1.1: Degrees of legitimacy and democratic stability (Lipset 1959: 90)](image)

This diagram suggests that ‘legitimacy’ relates the degree of public support to the political system and ‘effectiveness’ refers to the performance of the political institutions. The characterization of the strategy of HTI in this study is based on the assesment of its attitudes towards these two aspects of the state. This study holds the position that revolutionary movements seek to take away the legitimacy of a political system and to undermine political institutions. In contrast, reformist movements seek political change but with a commitment to maintaining the existing political system and institution. Mixed attitudes may indicate a different orientation between revolution and reform, which is referred to in this study as ‘refolution.’ This variation looks like the following figure:
This study looks at the attitude of HTI toward key elements of Indonesia’s democratic system. The political system includes Pancasila as the state ideology, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/NKRI) as the state ideology, the written constitution, democracy and elections. This system is implemented by various state institutions that include the legislative institutions (the higher house or the consultative people’s assembly [MPR] and lower house or the House of Representatives [DPR]) and executive institutions (the government bureaucracy; the police and the military). It also includes the political parties as a key element of democracy.

Additionally, as the inability of the state to assimilate the public into the democratic system is the key to democratic breakdown (Lipset 1959: 8), this study also examines the attitude of HTI toward Muslim participation in the democratic process; this represents their assimilation into a political system. Islamic politics may be expressed formally through political parties, their participation in government and

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7 The unitary model of Indonesian political system contained in the term “NKRI” is compared to the federal model state like United States. The difference lies in the degree of authority of the regional government in which central government in a unitary state has a larger control over regional government than that in a federal state. Indonesia’s use of the unitary model is motivated by the reality that the high degree of diversity in the archipelago. A large degree of autonomy in the model of federal system is feared of generating national disintegration. After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia introduced the decentralization policy to give more authority to local government through the local autonomy law (Law No. 22/1999). However, there has been debate about the possibility of Indonesia turning to a federal government in order to strengthen capacity of regional government. For a discussion about this issue, see Ferrazzi (2000). Additionally, the word “republic” in the term “NKRI” also implies that Indonesia adopts democracy as a political mechanism.
by becoming pressure groups. Therefore, in addition to the democratic system and institutions, this study also follows HTI’s attitudes toward political parties, examining different attitude toward Islamic and secular groups, Muslim organizations or actors and instances of their advocacies within the democratic framework. In the next discussion this aspect is called ‘Muslim participatory politics.’

E.1.i.i. Discourse and Action Matter
The gap between theory and practice is crucial in understanding the dynamic of political movements. Tucker, for example, identified such a gap as the hallmark of the de-radicalization process of Marxist movements in Europe (Tucker 1967). To capture this dynamic, this study analyses the character of HTI at the “discourse” and “action” level. It assumes that revolutionary and reolutionary movements can be equally challenging to the political system. However, unlike a revolutionary movement that needs to confront the State (political institutions) in order to undermine it, a reolutionary movement avoids confrontation with the State to open the space for undermining the State from within. Likewise, while reolution and reform attempt to seek changes within the arrangement of the existing system, a reolutionary movement needs to delegitimize the consensual support of the State at the discourse level to gain support for a systemic change.

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8 Here I use the term “discourse” to refer to written and spoken language as an interaction between speakers and addressees or writers and readers. This is different to an extended use of the term to refer various forms of expression including written, spoken, images, body, signed language (Fairclough 1992: 3). Considering that a discourse represents an interaction between multiple sides, it is true that discourse can be considered an action. However, in this thesis I limit the use of the term discourse to language or rhetorical form of action; and therefore I differentiate it from “action” to refer actual activities that represent the translation of theories or rhetoric.
The relational attitudes of different models of movement toward the State are shown in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Elements</th>
<th>Revolution Discourse</th>
<th>Revolution Action</th>
<th>‘Refolution’ Discourse</th>
<th>‘Refolution’ Action</th>
<th>Reform Discourse</th>
<th>Reform Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Institutions</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.3: The role of discourse and action for change

**E.2. Argument Two: The Impact of Democracy on Revolutionary Movements**

Clashing views dominate debates on the relationship between revolutionary movements and democracy. The majority of the discussion centres on the question of whether or not democracy tames the revolutionary movements. Three theses stand out.

**E2.i. First Thesis: Democracy is by Itself Counter-Revolutionary**

Following the declaration of the end of the Cold War (‘the end of revolution’) (see Nodia: 2000, Snyder: 1999), some scholars believed that the advance of democracy, in addition to globalization, was a critical factor in the decreased possibility of revolution. The first factor is concerned with the nature of democracy that provides different channels of social conflict other than revolution. This view is held for example by Jeff Goodwin (2001; 2003) who argued that the proliferation of democracy in the post-Cold War era has made struggles for fundamental changes obsolete. Democracy becomes a “barrier” for a revolutionary movement because it encourages the institutionalization of social and political means through political institutions. By allowing diverse lines of political process, democracy eliminates the
incentive for revolution (Goodwin 2003: 66). In the words of Seymor M. Lipset (Lipset 1960: 7; Lipset & Lakin 2004: 35) democracy ‘institutionalizes’ conflict through the democratic mechanism.

The second argument looks at the challenge of mobilizing a broad-anti-regime coalition as a necessary aspect of a revolution (Huntington 1968: 275; Dix 1984: 423-46; Wickham-Crowley 1987: 473-99; Tilly 1978; Brinton 1965; Skocpol 1979). A broad anti-system (anti-democracy) and anti-regime movement is only possible when the regime has narrowed its support base significantly, creating an opportunity for revolutionary recruitment. Typically such a situation does not happen in a democratic political system because the government is formed by a single majority party or a similar coalition parties. Additionally, when social conflict disperses into struggles through political structures such as political parties and pressure groups, revolutionaries are unable to build an extensive following outside core militants.

The impact of democracy on revolutionary movements is considered more severe to those participating in democratic systems. In the words of Alan Dawley (1976: 70), the “ballot box is the coffin of revolutionaries.” While the democratic impact on non-participating movements is demobilization, theorists believe that participation in democratic institutions and processes can turn the extremists into moderates. The transformation toward a moderate direction is driven by three reasons.

The first is the need to attract voters (Dawns 1957). Dawns’ argument relies on the need of a political party to persuade a majority of the population to support them. As the majority of a population is usually moderate the revolutionary party is forced to at least partially redirect its campaign toward the majority needs. This effort will force them to depart from their original extreme views. The second is the oligarchic nature
of organization that requires addressing practical needs and this tends to drive organizational runners away from revolutionary activities (Mitchels 1999). The operation of a political party, according to Mitchels requires formal organization that is capable of running campaigns, political mobilization and organizational sustenance. The short–term organizational management demands overcome the party’s long-term ideological objective (Mitchels 1999: 277). The third is the need to satisfy people’s demand for concrete outcomes over long-term fundamental change (Macmillan 2006). The need to satisfy constituents will leave the party activists with little time for rigid, ideological rhetoric. This will eventually drive the party away from its original revolutionary objective.

The proponents of this thesis refer to the post world war transformation of Leftist movements to justify this argument. The emergence of terms like ‘Post-Marxism’ (Therborn 2008), ‘New Left’ (McMillian & Buhle 2003) and ‘Post-Islamism’ (Roy 2004; Bayat 2007) refer to the transformation of revolutionary movements in such a direction. Goodwin points out that the revolutionary organizations like El-Savador’s ‘Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front’ (FMLN) and South Africa’s ‘African National Congress’ are now seeking to reform capitalism rather than overthrow it. Marxists who participate in elections such as the ‘German Communist Party’ and the ‘Italian Communist party,’ are also in crisis as they are constantly unable to win sufficient support to significantly alter the political system they are participating in (Goodwin 2003: 70). They therefore believe that de-radicalization is the fate of 21st century revolutionary movements.
E.2.ii. Second Thesis: Democracy Drives the Metamorphosis of Revolutionary Movements

Challenging the ‘end of revolution’ thesis (see Nodia: 2000, Snyder: 1999), some scholars (Garton Ash: 1999, Farhi: 2003, Jost: 2006) argue that democracy does not necessarily end the mobilization of revolutionary movements. Instead of ending revolutionary ideals, democracy transforms revolutionary movements into a new model. Unlike the traditional models of revolution, the newer thesis identifies a less confrontational tactic of revolutionary movements. Following Antonio Gramsci’s notion of “passive revolution” or ‘war of movement,’ these scholars believe that globalization and modernization have made revolution in the conventional model impractical. However, that does not mean that the idea of a fundamental systemic change, which is the essence of revolution, is obsolete. According to Farhi (2003) the democratic turn has changed the direction of revolutionary movements from past violent methods to something more gradual or non-revolutionary. This may sound like an oxymoron. However, Farhi insists that this represents various groups that continue maintaining their objective of systemic change. While in the past revolution took place in a violent and sudden manner, today revolutionary movements take a more

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9 An example definition of revolution that is much shared by conventional theories especially those referring to the Great Revolution” one comes from Forrest Colburn, that says: “sudden, violent, and drastic substitution of one group of governing territorial political entity for another formerly excluded from the government, and an ensuing assault on state and society for the purpose of radically transforming society” (Colburn 994: 6).

10 According to Gramsci, the advance of capitalism makes a frontal attack to the state, through rebellion and strike, vulnerable to state repression. A revolution or what he termed “war of movement,” in the sense of the takeover of political power, needs to be preceded by a “war of position,” which can be done by constructing an alternative hegemony in opposition to the state hegemony. Such counter-hegemony can be achieved through intellectual and moral reforms of civil society by a party (movement) with direction, discipline and militancy. A true revolution, according to Gramsci, is not about taking over the state, but about winning over society by establishing institutional, intellectual, and moral hegemony of society or subaltern that is autonomous from the state. It is believed that once a revolutionary movement is successful in gaining position in the society, it already exercises a leadership in opposition to the state, and with this leadership a revolution is imminent (Adamson: 1980: 222).
gradual and non-violent strategy toward the desired transformation. The means may be non-revolutionary, but the end can be revolutionary (Farhi 2003: 31).

Most notable examples of this non-revolutionary revolution are political changes such as Poland and Hungary in 1989 as described by Timothy Garton Ash (Ash 1990). It is argued that the Polish and Hungary experience blurred lines between reform and revolution. They show a fundamental transformation of political regimes through the rules of the democratic game. The implication was no less fundamental than great revolutions. In the interpretation of Farhi, this model of revolution “combines an insistence on non-violence, or the well considered use of violence, with the creative use of civil disobedience guided by an opposition elite, calculated pleas to world public opinion through the use of electronic media, attention and pressure from the outside world, and ‘readiness to negotiate with power holders while refusing to be co-opted’” (2003: 31).

The successes of the Fascist and Nazi parties in overthrowing democratic government in Italy in the 1920s and Weimar Germany in the 1930s and the recent rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2008 illustrate that democracy is not immune from revolution. These examples bring about the term “legal revolution (Cappocia: 2005: 7) in which anti-democratic parties exploited the freedom and the right for participation leading to the collapse of democratic governments. In contrast to the first thesis, scholars in this rubric believe de-radicalization is not an inevitable fate of revolutionary movements that operate in a democratic context.
E.2.iii. Third Thesis: Weak Democracy Incubates Revolutionary Movements; Strong Democracy Makes Them Obsolete

Taking a modest stance between the above two positions, this thesis does not assume a blind confidence in democratic counter-revolutionary power. Sheri Berman (1997, 2003) proposes a differentiation between weak and strong democracy. She argues that only states with weak democracy are vulnerable to democratic revolution. This is because a weak democracy that only satisfies political elites can give a sense of “no other way out” (Berman 2003: 11). This revolutionary potential is particularly key because democracy does not always bring prosperity.

Berman compared the behaviour of communist parties in Europe between war years, focusing on countries with different levels of democracy. During this period, democratic systems in countries like Germany and Italy were weak and were blamed for the national crisis. As democracy became dysfunctional the communist parties accelerated their anti-systemic activities. There is little evidence that participation tamed communist radicalism. The communist party during this period, in Berman’s view:

“maintained its non-compromise doctrine, preserved anti-systemic ideology, and although they occasionally supported practical policies viewed as beneficial to the everyday lives of their constituents, communist parties never wavered in their belief that no real improvement could come without a violent revolution” (Berman: 2003: 11).

A contrast appeared when European democracy improved in the post-war era. When democracies such as France became stronger and contributed to political stability and the economic growth of the country the French Communist party began to evaluate its radical stance. In effect, Berman notes, “all communist parties underwent a complete transformation- dropping their sectarian appeals in favour of a
mass, cross-class coalition orientation, abandoning their organizational Leninism…and committing themselves fully to democracy and gradualism” (Berman 2003: 11). This led to the communist claim in 1962 that democracy is ‘an essential step in the struggle for socialism’ (Berman 2003: 12).

Conveying careful confidence in democracy, Berman concluded that “without strong states able to enforce democratic rules of the game and punish the extremist forces, and without large, robust parties fully committed to democracy and therefore able to make others pay an electoral and political price for sectarianism and anti-system activity, the revolutionaries face few incentives to abandon radicalism” (Berman 2003: 15). This line of argument therefore suggests that only established democracies are immune from the threat of revolution. While strong democracy is counter-revolutionary, weak democracy in contrast encourages revolutionary struggles.

Learning from these theories, this study seeks to analyse the impact of democracy on HTI’s revolutionary or non-revolutionary direction. In doing so, it follows the two arguments on democratic counter-revolutionary capacity. First, it looks at the way HTI responded to political opportunities within the democratic framework. The availability of democratic channels other than non-democratic revolution is essential to counter the revolutionary argument of ‘no other way out’ (Lipset 1960; Goodwin 2001). HTI’s attitude with regard to democratic opportunities is therefore crucial to define the impact of democratization on HTI. Second, following the argument that the integration of diverse political forces on the democratic system deters the formation of a revolutionary coalition this analysis looks at HTI’s character when attempting to address diverse groups. It specifically examines the consistency of
HTI in challenging democracy and in propagating a political detachment in its interactions with diverse groups, especially those of Muslim actors integrated within the democratic system.

The impact of democratization on HTI is derived from its attitude in terms of its abandonment or its commitment to the revolutionary campaign in situations when political opportunities appear and coalition building is in progress. This helps to understand whether HTI is ‘strengthening’ or ‘softening’ its revolutionary goal in different political situations.

F. Data and Methods

G.1. Primary Sources and Analytical Tools

This study primarily draws on the content analysis\(^{11}\) of two of the major publications of HTI: *Al-Wa’ie* (monthly magazine) and *Al-Islam* (weekly bulletin).\(^{12}\) Using these two sources has two advantages. *First*, due to their currency they represent the dynamic of HTI’s campaign, its responses to existing political and social realities. *Second*, because of their regular publication they have been consistently published since HTI’s transition to a public campaign in the early 2000s both official documents offer a significant account of HTI’s propaganda (discourse) and mobilization (activities). Combined, the two sources document the dynamic of HTI over a ten-year period beginning from the early period of the Reform era in 1999 until 2009; this period includes three election periods. This ten year period enables HTI’s responses to

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\(^{11}\) I follow a more general definition of content analysis proposed by Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Ogilvie (1966: 5) that says “any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specific characteristics within text.”

\(^{12}\) In addition to these publications, HTI produces various other publications. Some of them are officially affiliated to the group such as the monthly newspaper called ‘Media Ummat,’ books and booklets published by HTI. There are also other publications by publishers that are not officially affiliated to HTI but propagate HT’s ideology and political propaganda. The most productive of them is Pustaka Thariqu Izzah book publisher.
be tracked to different political circumstances which are essential for examining the impact of democracy on its behaviour as a political movement.

Units of analysis follow my previous discussion on attitudes toward the state in defining the revolutionary or non-revolutionary nature of a movement. As previously stated, the state consists of two elements – the political system and the political institutions. With regard to the political system, I look at the key elements of Indonesia’s democratic system including, Pancasila, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), the constitution, democracy and election. In the area of political institutions, I select elements of Indonesia’s trias politica and party system that are most relevant to HTI propaganda and mobilization, which include government (local and national), the lower and higher houses of parliament (DPR/MPR), political parties, the police and the military. Additionally, to capture HTI’s attitude toward Muslim participatory politics which is essential in characterizing HTI’s faithfulness to its revolutionary doctrine, the analysis also includes some instances of HTI’s attitude toward key Islamic political issues such as the Jakarta Charter, the opposition to alleged anti-Islamic heretic sects, pornography, and shari’ah inspired district regulations. It also follows HTI’s attitudes toward actors of Islamic politics such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, the Islamic Defeders’ Front (FPI), the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).

This study follows references of analysis to Al-Islam and Al-Wa’ie. To avoid any redundant analysis, I adopt Altheide’s procedure of qualitative or ethnographic content analysis called ‘discourse tracking.’ This approach focuses on following themes or subjects rather than words in the content of documents (Altheide 1996: 68). Therefore I treat a discussion on a subject in one source as one case despite the
multiple mention of words related to the subject or theme. Similarly, one document may contain multiple subjects or cases because of their multiple elements. For example, when an edition of *Al-Islam* discusses democracy, this is considered one case or reference to democracy. But it may also contain multiple references on other subjects related to the democracy such as entities or actors mentioned because of their attitude toward democracy.

Further, analysis is divided into two levels of attitude-discourse and action-and categorized into the nature of the attitude that follow the three models of political change: *revolution*, *refolution* and *reform*. The discourse aspect comes from relevant materials in *Al-Islam* and *Al-Wa’ie*, while the action aspect is from the *Ahbar* (activity news) section of *Al-Wa’ie* that contains information about a significant number of HTI’s activities across the nation.

The categorization of *revolution*, *refolution* and *reform* is based on their implication to the ways a movement addresses the state. Throughout this study, I also use the terms *extreme*, *radical* and *moderate* to substitute for revolution, refolution and reform because the terms more explicitly describe the spectrum of attitude.

Based on the implications of how a movement’s desired model of political change correlates with its political attitude, this analysis is based on the following categorization:

1. **Moderate**: This refers to references to institutions, groups, individuals described in ways that are supportive, affirmative or critical yet hopeful. This stance often includes proposals that are executable within the existing democratic system. This stance accepts participation in the democratic system to advocate policy changes, rather than a change of political system.
2. **Radical**: This refers to the representation of subjects as incapable, illegitimate or inherently dysfunctional, yet avoids explicitly suggesting disengagement. This stance tolerates participation to advocate policy changes within the democratic process. But unlike moderate stance, participation is carried out here as a means to expand mobilization and to propagate a change of the existing political system. This often occurs in the form of lending legitimacy to democratic institutions by demanding policy changes while at the same time campaigning for a comprehensive change.

3. **Extreme**: This refers to the representation of subjects as dangerous, anti-Islam, the enemy and other expressions that indicate suggestion to total replacement, elimination or disengagement. This stance delegitimizes the capability of the existing system to carry positive changes and discourage any form of participation in the democratic system.

G.2. Secondary Sources

In addition to *Al-Islam* and *Al-Wa’ie* this study also makes use of other internal sources of HTI including books, press releases and the organizational statute submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It also makes use of external sources such as news agencies that covered the activities and leaders’ statements of HTI. Literature on Indonesian politics and Islamic political affairs is also essential in supplying information about the context of HTI’s activities. Understanding the context of HTI’s character is particularly important in understanding the impact of the democratic environment on the strategic choices of HTI.
In order to gain direct interaction and clarification about HTI, I also conducted a series of semi-structured interviews\textsuperscript{13} with more than 12 HTI leaders at central and local levels, former members, relevant Muslim actors, participated in few HTI’s workshops, seminars, rallies and took a series of personal sessions on HTI’s ideology with a leader of HTI in Yogyakarta. The interviews with HTI leaders were primarily aimed at revealing their interpretation of key events in conjunction with the doctrines of HTI. The interviews with outsiders (former members and Muslim leaders) were focused on clarifying and investigating the claims of HTI activists. This fieldwork took place in six months from July to December 2009 in which I travelled to Jakarta, Bogor, Malang, Padang and Kendari to conduct the interviews and participant observations. Jakarta, Bogor and Yogyakarta constitute a ‘leadership city(ies)’ for HTI because of the amount of activists from these cities who sit on the central board of HTI; the rest represent locality. These locations enable me to capture variants of HTI’s activism from the central to periphery and from the areas where it gains more to the areas where it makes less progress.

G.3. Data Analysis

This study combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis is employed to determine the dominant nature of HTI’s attitude toward the state both at the discourse and action levels. Data on the nature of behaviour is numerically coded into 1, 2 and 3, in which each represents moderate, radical and extreme character. Frequency and aggregate analyses are carried out to determine the dominant nature of the character on the different levels and units of analysis mentioned previously.

\textsuperscript{13} For a description about the application of semi-structured interview in social movement research, see Kathleen and Taylor (2002: 92).
The qualitative analysis is applied to examine the correlation between the specific HTI attitude toward political opportunity structures that define the impact of democracy on the behavior of HTI. To do so, this study selects cases of HTI’s attitude that corresponds with instances of political opportunities. In this way, this study determines the nature of the character, which reflects the result of HTI’s interactions with different political opportunities and diverse audiences. Finally, this study also makes use of interviews and field observation to support arguments developed from content analysis.

G. The Limits of Study

This study primarily relies on the observable aspects of HTI as reflected in its open or public documents and activities. One factor that cannot be covered in this method is the inner dynamic of HTI that could reveal the most accurate reality of the movement’s orientation. Information on this can be gained by an extensive study of core activists or policy makers of the organization, subject to their sincerity in providing information. Unpublicized internal statutes (internally called idary) and circulars (nasyroh) are also essential in understanding the movement’s strategy and orientation. Gaining such access and information is however not easy because it requires a more intense degree of involvement and trust that can only be achieved with long-term research. I did manage to interview a number of HTI’s key leaders. Short meetings with these leaders are however insufficient to dig deeper into the organizational strategies and plans of action because of the short term period of my fieldwork. I therefore have to admit that compared to this ideal method, this study is at a relatively superficial level. Nonetheless, I believe that my analysis of the discourse
and practice of HTI reveals the character of the organization at the actual level. In this way, it provides a close analysis of its trajectory based on the pattern of its activities. This method offers a better understanding of the nature of the movement than many studies that are merely based on inductive analysis of isolated activities or are based on the doctrine of the organization.

Another disclaimer is that this work is a case study of HT in Indonesia. I believe different social and political circumstances lead to different implementations of HT ideology. As stated earlier Indonesia’s social and political context is unique compared to other countries where HT operates. I do not intend to argue that the direction of HT in other countries will be similar. However the pathway of HTI may not be a unique case or can only happen in Indonesia. This study offers a model of how HT adjusts its doctrine in the context of a democratic Muslim country. HT in similar a context (Muslim democracy) like Egypt and Bangladesh may embrace a pathway similar to HTI.

Finally, this study covers a limited period of HTI’s activity in Indonesia from 1999 to 2009. The earlier period of the organization’s semi-clandestine activism during the Soeharto era that defines the formation (tathqif) stage of the movement is beyond the scope of this study. A comparison between the activities of HTI before and after the transition to public campaigning can also be helpful in understanding the transformation of HTI and the impact of democracy in shaping the character of the movement. As for the aftermath of 2009, this study makes some references to the incident in 2010 (such as HTI’s participation in the Indonesian Muslim Congress/KUII in April 2010), but does not take into account most of the developments after 2009.
H. Terminology

Some key terms used in this study are contentious. Those that need clarification are the terms ‘Islamism’ or ‘Islamist’ and ‘radicalism’ and/or ‘political radicalism.’ The term ‘Islamism’ refers to an understanding of Islam as an ideal comprehensive rule or laws to govern all aspects of life. This implies the necessity of the integration of Islamic teachings into both state and social affairs. The term ‘Islamist’ is therefore used here to refer to actors or groups that uphold an aspiration for the adoption of Islamic laws or shari’ah by the state that is larger than the current adoption of Islamic family laws into the Indonesian Islamic court system.14 Islamists are however not monolithic in terms of strategies and the degree of their vision for political change. Some Islamists use heavy arms such as bombs and firearms, others occasionally use small scale violence such as damaging the property of minority groups. Others focus on the political struggle, some do not condemn violence by other Islamists, and others are commited to non-violent struggles. In terms of the degree of change, some Islamists demand a comprehensive change of political, economic and social orders and others seek partial changes in sociaties and in the political arena.

The term ‘radicalism’ is used here to refer to a political aspiration that demands fundamental changes to political, social and economic systems either by violent means or by non-violent struggles. Radicalism is therefore not necessarily violent. Throughout this thesis, I also use the term ‘political radicalism’ to refer to a movement that seeks a systemic change by political, not violent, means. This differentiates radicalism from extremism. Both extremism and radicalism aspire to

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14 This follows a broad definition of “Islamism” proposed by Fuller as “the belief that the Koran and the Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet’s life) have something important to say about the way society and governance should be ordered -- remains the most powerful ideological force in that part of the world” (Fuller 2002).
fundamental change, but unlike the extremists that reject political participation and justify the use of violence, radicals may tolerate political participation as an alternative to violence. Radicals are also different to the moderates in the way that both accept political participation. But unlike the moderates who are fully committed to the existing system, the radicals sustain an aspiration for systemic change.

I. Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates the significance of understanding the nature of HTI’s character (in both discourse and action levels) in defining the model of political change it envisions. A comparison between the nature HTI’s character and its doctrine is essential to define changes of strategy undertaken by HTI to adjust to the democratic context of Indonesia. Before discussing the nature of the behaviour of HTI, the following chapter elaborates the revolutionary nature of HTI’s ideology.
In order to evaluate the faithfullness of HTI in the path of revolution it is essential to understand the revolutionary nature of its ideology. Following literature published by the mother organization of HTI, this chapter elaborates on the original ideology of HTI, including its theory and strategy for change, and shows the revolutionary nature of its ideology despite claiming non-violent methods. Before starting this discussion, it is useful to explain the emergence and growth of HTI. This discussion is kept brief to avoid distraction from the main focus on the revolutionary doctrine of HTI. A more informative discussion about the emergence of HTI is available in other sources.  

A. The Origin, Emergence and Growth of HTI

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) follows the ideology of Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an organization founded by the Palestinian jurist, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, in Palestine in 1953. HT is now active in more than forty countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. It is banned or restricted in most Muslim countries including, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Malaysia and in some Western countries such as Germany, Russia and the Netherlands. Despite political containment HT however, maintains its presence in

15 For other works on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, see for example Fealy (2007), Rahmat (2005), Salim (2005) and Mohamed Osman (2010)
these countries. In contrast HT enjoys political freedom in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia although no official recognition is granted. In Indonesia, HTI secured official recognition from the government as a social organization despite being a self-proclaimed political party.

Although the extent of the relationship between HTI and HT needs further investigation, the ideological relationship is clear from their shared objective, literature and visits of HT’s leaders to HTI’s events in Indonesia. In 2003, HTI reported that the *amir* or *qiyadah* (supreme leader) of HT, Atha’ Abu Rustha attended its conference in Jakarta (*Al-Wā‘ie* 40: 31). Another prominent leader of international HT who has visited Indonesia is named Abu Mahmud who was sent by the previous HT *amir*, Abdul Qazim Zallum in 1998 (*Komunitas Mantan HT*, 28 August 2009) to supervise the transition of HTI from the formative period to open campaigns. The spokesperson of HT in the United Kingdom, Imran Wahid, was scheduled to attend HTI’s conference in Jakarta in 2007 but was denied entry by Indonesian authorities (*Detik*, 12 August, 2007). The conference was attended however by delegates of HT from different countries. Recently, in July 2009, HT organized another high-profile conference in Jakarta that brought together international delegates, including the chair of HT in Britain, Jalaluddin Patel.¹⁶

The first cell of HT started in Indonesia in the early 1980s at a time when President Soeharto tightened political restrictions in order to prevent the growth of extremists from both the left and right. At this difficult time, Islamic revivalism grew in major university campuses, partly instigated by the Iranian revolution in 1979. In this growing atmosphere of revivalism, HT came to Indonesia joining forces with

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¹⁶ I interviewed Patel in Jakarta one day after the conference.
older Islamist movements such as Salafi, the Muslim Brotherhood (in Indonesia it is associated with *tarbiyah* movement) and the Campus Da’wah Network (LDK). The shared interest to avoid government repression overcame the inherent differences of strategy and ideology between the groups. Only after the loosening of political restrictions following Soeharto’s fall from power did conflict between the groups occur forcing them to establish their own identities. Students of al-Nabhani’s ideology in Bogor, West Java, were among those who started forming the distinct new group that is now called HTI (Rahmat 2005: 125).

The transmission of HT’s ideology to Indonesia was made possible by the role of an influential leader of a local Islamist organization, *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*/Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council (DDII), named Abdurrahman bin Nuh. Little is known about how bin Nuh encountered al-Nabhani’s ideology, but he might have read the books of al-Nabhani given to him by his son, Mustafa bin Abdurrahman, who studied in Jordan, the birth place of HT. In 1981 Bin Nuh also visited Australia and met a Jordanian HT activist there named Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi (Rahmat 2005: 101). Bin Nuh then brought al-Baghdadi to Indonesia to teach at his Al-Ghazali Islamic boarding school in Bogor, West Java (Salim 2005: 25).

The coming of al-Baghdadi to Bogor has some significance. The city is one of the hotbeds of Islamic revivalism centered on the campus of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB).\(^\)\(^1\)\(^7\) The first students of al-Baghdadi were students of this university. These early activists of HTI taught the ideas of al-Nabhani through the activities of the Islamic student association at IPB located at the campus’ mosque. Even though the first *halaqoh* (cell) has established in 1982-1983, it was not until 1984 when a leading

\(^\)\(^1\)\(^7\) The use of the term ‘hotbeds’ here does not mean that the radicals have stronger influence than the moderates in the location. The moderates are still a predominant majority across Indonesia, but some cities like Bogor have become the learning centres of many radical leaders.
figure in the circle of the campus revivalist movement, Muhammad Al-Khattah, joined the *halaqoh*, that the group found its shape. Al-Khattath had a significant role in the formation and expansion of the young group. His past role as a leader of a campus Islamic student association (*Badan Kerohanian Kampus/BKK*) that served as a melting pot for various revivalist groups enabled him to find space for the group’s early operation. Al-Khattath used his inter-campus da’wah network to run the Campus Da’wah Movement (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK*), which later became an umbrella institution for revivalist student activities from different strands.\(^{18}\) Under the name of the LDK, HTI’s activists spread al-Nabhani’s ideology to major campuses in other cities in Java including most prominently Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Malang (Salim 2005: 25-26).

After years of cell-based activism under the guise of the LDK, in the early 1990s as Soeharto begun adopting a friendlier policy toward Islamist movements, HTI began reaching out to the public by organizing open seminars and by publishing more of al-Nabhani’s writings in Indonesian language. In 1994 HTI introduced its major mouthpiece, the *al-Islam* bulletin.

Two years after the fall of Soeharto, in May 2000, HTI openly launched its organization through a conference on the ‘khilafah’ held in Jakarta, which was attended by about 5000 people. This marked the transition of HTI from its formative period, it calls *tathqif* onto the stage of open campaign or interaction with the ummah (*tafa’ul ma al-ummah*). This new stage is characterized by the introduction of the official name of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, increasing programmes to address the public through seminars and publications, and more aggressive efforts to approach

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\(^{18}\) As discussed in later part of this thesis, internal difference has made Al-Khattath leaving the organization in 2008 and started his own organization called Hizbut Dakwah Islam (HDI) that publishes Suara Islam weekly newspaper.
mainstream Muslim organizations. In 2007, HTI attempted a major push to demonstrate its standing through what it calls the international conference on khilafah which was held in Jakarta’s national stadium mobilizing a crowd of about 80,000.

To secure its increased social mobilization, in 2006 HTI sought and was granted official recognition by the government as a social organization.\(^\text{19}\) This official status as a social organization however contradicts HTI’s self-proclamation as a political party. In its book that introduces its ideology, “Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir” (Introduction to Hizbut Tahrir and Its Da’wa Strategy), HTI defines itself as follows: “Hizbut adalah partai politik yang tegak berdasarkan Islam. Politik Menjadi aktifitasnya, Islam sebagai ideologinya” (Hizbut Tahrir is a political party based on Islam. Politics is its activity, Islam is its ideology). (Anonim 2008: 200). To avoid contradiction between its legal status and real ideology, HTI classifies its publications into two categories: official (mutabanat) and unofficial. Many publications about HTI’s ideology are unofficial and for this reason HTI denies responsibility despite the fact they were written by its leaders. The above introductory book about HTI’s ideology is a good example. HTI uses the title “Hizbut Tahrir” in this book. This differentiates it from HTI’s official name as a social organization, “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.” The author of the book is made anonymous, but it was distributed and circulated by HT (Anonim 2008). Is expectable therefore that despite official recognition, HTI discloses little of its internal workings and structure, and remains a largely secretive organization.

\(^{19}\) The official letter the Government recognition of HTI as social organization provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs was issued on 22 June, 2006. The copy of letter was circulated among bloggers. I was able to get confirmation from the Ministry officers about this letter. Despite this status HTI still publicly call itself a political party.
After gaining official recognition, HTI has begun disclosing its organizational structure. HTI’s openness however, is not at the same level as other Muslim organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and even radical groups like the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).

HTI never officially released information about its organizational structure. Unlike social organizations in general, HTI does not hold a general assembly to form organizational statute, programs and structure that is open to the public or media. Nonetheless, the following names and positions are mentioned in various publications of HTI: Hafiz Abdurrahman (chairman), Ismail Yusanto (spokesperson), Harist Abu Ulya (head of Department of Political Affairs or \textit{Lajnah Siyasiyah}), Rohmat S. Labib (head of department of civilizational affairs or \textit{Lajnah Tsaqafiyyah}), Farid Wadji (head of department of information or \textit{Lajnah I’lamiyyah}), Muhammad Rahmat Kurnia (head of department of leadership relation or \textit{Lajnah Fa’aliyah}), Riza Rosadi (head of social affairs or \textit{Lajnah Maslahiyyah}), Hasyim Mustafa (department of preachers and mosques or \textit{Lajnah Makatib and Masjid}), and Febrianti Abbasuni (spokesperson of women of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). HTI also introduced its student wing organization, Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation) headed by Erwin Permana, a post-graduate student in public policy at the University of Indonesia (UI).\footnote{These positions and names are based on the mentions on HTI’s official publications until the time of writing of this thesis.}

Additionally HTI publicised the structure of its organization, a structure commonly adopted by many Indonesian organizations including (from top to bottom): a Central Board (DPP), a Provincial Board (DPW), a District or Municipality Board (DPC). This structure does not include the lower level structure, which is not officially
publicised including university branches (called chapter) and study circles (*halaqoh*).

See figure 2.1 for an illustration of this organizational structure.

Now, more than two decades after its emergence, HTI has a presence in almost all provinces of Indonesia, including non-Muslim majority provinces like Papua. It is however difficult to determine the importance of these and other branches because founding branches do not require a large number of members. Theoretically, the founding of a DPW requires a minimum of 50 members, and consists of 10 core

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21 The terms and hierarchy of DPP, DPW and DPC are not known in HT’s organizational structure. Compare this structure to the structure of HT as reconstructed by Taji-Farouki (1996: 116).
activists each of whom supervises five members (novices). This number is sufficient to maintain an organizational presence, which mainly takes the form of the distribution of organizational publications, organization of seminars and running study circles.

It is difficult to establish an exact number of HTI’s members. Based on the distribution of the Al-Islam bulletin, in 2006 Ismail Yusanto estimated an optimistic figure of one million. This claim however should be seen as Yusanto’s ‘bandwagon’ strategy that deserve scepticism. This possibly refers to a diverse audience ranging from members, sympathizers to those who are only curious to read its publications and attended its activities. The actual members of HTI must be much lower. There is an estimation of approximately 15,000 members. This is because HTI uses a strict process of recruitment. A novice or student has to go through a deep discussion and intensive study before formally becoming a member. Members (syabab) should attend many of HTI’s activities. What is clear is that HTI has already established a geographically extensive presence in Indonesia. In numbers, it is still inferior to other Islamist groups like Salafi and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). However, HTI is gaining better publicity. Dialogue on TV about religious issues often includes HTI’s leaders who represent the conservative segment of Muslims. More importantly, HTI adheres to a ‘vanguard’ movement model that emphasizes recruiting highly committed individuals as core activists to achieve goals of the leadership in society. Thus, even

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22 These figure is an adaptation of the finding of Taji-Farouki (1996:116). HTI does not publicise the structure of its organization.

23 This is based on my conversation with Yusanto in September 2006, before I conducted this research.

24 ‘Bandwagon’ is one of techniques of propaganda that aims to mobilize support by creating the impression of wide support. Propagandists use the tendency of individuals to ‘follow the crowd’ (Sproule 2001: 136).

25 The 15,000 figure comes from the Director of International Crisis Group in Southeast Asia, Sydney Jones (personal communication). This estimation was made in 2009; and it is likely that the membership of HTI has grown since then.
though the number of its members is important, the strength of HTI should be seen in its ability to influence society rather than in the actual number of its members.

B. The Objective: Reviving the Transnational Rule of Khilafah

The ultimate goal of HTI is to establish a khilafah government in a Muslim country that adheres to no law except the shari’ah, leading eventually to global Islamic rule, which it claims stood since the era of Prophet Muhammad until the fall of the last Ottoman government in Turkey in 1924. It believes that the establishment of the khilafah is the only way to continue the Islamic way of life (istinaf al-hayah al-islamiyah). This idea of khilafah is however not the original goal of the founder of HT, al-Nabhani. Before establishing HT in 1953, al-Nabhani was active in various Arab nationalist movements including the Ba’th party in Jordan. In this period, the major concern of al-Nabhani was the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity to expel Western Colonizers. This is apparent from his early books published in 1950, including Inqadh al-Filastine (Saving Palestine) (al-Nabhani 1950a) and Risalah al-Arab (The Message for the Arab) (al-Nabhani 1950b), which make no suggestion about the necessity of the khilafah to liberate Palestine and achieve Arab unity.

Unlike al-Nabhani’s later emphasis on Islamic ideology, the Ba’ath is a leftist movement that carried a secular Pan-Arabist ideology, aimed at creating a revolutionary change in Arab lands by toppling the monarchical government of the Arab states and replacing them with a socialist government and thereby uniting all Arab countries. According to Taji-Farouki- who has conducted the most comprehensive research on HT- in 1949 al-Nabhani took part in a plot by the Ba’ath to topple King Abdullah of Jordan but failed. His involvement in the Ba’ath was
intense. His primary role included ensuring communication between the leader of the Ba’th in Jordan with the leader of Syrian Ba’th party during the coup attempt against the Jordanian ruler (Taji-Farouki 1996: 3; 1994: 368-372).

After the encounter with the Ba’th, al-Nabhani found a weakness in the secularity of the Ba’th Pan-Arabist ideology. Al-Nabhani begun emphasizing Islam as an ideology and started preaching khilafah as a religious duty and as a political goal. Al-Nabhani convinced a number of his colleagues in Palestine, including As’ad and Rajab Bayyud Tamimi dan Abdul Qadim Zallum, to establish a political party he called Hizb al-Tahrir. In 1952 they made attempts to gain official recognition from the Jordanian government, first as a political party and then as a social organization, but was rejected because the khilafah objective ran counter to the Jordanian constitution. Without legal status, al-Nabhani and his colleagues promoted HT’s ideas through religious services and by secretly distributing leaflets. In March 1953, the party activists declared the establishment of HT in its weekly publication of Al-Sarih. It did not take long for the new movement to grow. Only one year after its declaration, in 1953 it was successful in expanding its presence to neighbouring countries like Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 7; Samarah 2003: 16-35).

Now, more than 40 years after its founding HT has a presence in more than 40 countries including, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Uzbekistan Tajikistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Chad, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Germany and USA. It operates under state repression in most of the Muslim world, except in few countries like Indonesia, but it enjoys political freedom in some Western countries such as the Britain and Australia. Even though the current Amir (central leader) of HT, Atho Abu Rustha, lives in an unpublicised location in the Middle East, HT’s wilayah
(country branch) in the UK is central in the organization of HT internationally, especially in the production of HT literature. The Khilafah publication house that published many of HT’s literature in English is based in the United Kingdom.

The founding of HT was followed by the publication of a series of books to justify the khilafah cause and describes al-Nabhani’s unique strategy to realize it. HT emphasises that the fall of the Ottoman Empire was the “most disastrous calamity” that happened to Islam and this led to the further decline of Muslim societies and therefore re-establishing the khilafah is the only way to resurrect Muslim supremacy (Zallum 2000: 187). The appeal to the return of the glory of the khilafah signifies the more revolutionary character of HT compared to other Islamist movements. Even though HT shares the goal of other Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in bringing the rule of God to earth (justified in the doctrines of tahkimiyah), the international orientation of khilafah differs from the political objective of other Islamist movements by advocating terms like ‘shari’ah application’ and ‘Islamic state.’ Al-Nabhani’s khilafah ideology, according to Taji-Farouki, signifies the radical and unique character of HT. She puts it this way:

The caliphal state theory and the political discourse of Nabhani represented a specific juncture in the radicalization of the discourse typified by Al-Banna and the ‘old’ MB [Muslim Brotherhood] from the 1950s. Indeed his overall conception of Islam rests on theoretical assumptions reflecting a way station between the two distinct camps of Islamic reformism and Islamic radicalism. The reform tradition was shaped by modernist intellectuals such as Jama Al-Din Al-Nabhani and Muhammad Abduh, culminating in Al-Banna and the ‘old’

26 The location of HT’s headquarter is a contentious issue. The claim that HT Britain presently serves as HT’s headquarter is made by Cohen (2003) and Karagiannis (2006). During al-Nabhani era, HT headquarter moved from one country to another. In the beginning it was based onal-Nabhani’s resident in Jordan, but when he moved to Damascus he relocated the headquarters with him (Cohen 1982; Taji-Farouki 1996).
The radicalist trend was formulated in its comprehensive ideological expression by Qutb (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 71-72).

To support its argument for khilafah, HT refers to an historical account of the decline of Islamic civilization. It believes that the fall of the khilafah has a significant role in the decline of Islamic supremacy. It sees the khilafah as an institution that protects Islamic rule. Therefore Western forces targeted this institution as a way to control the Muslim world. To achieve this goal, the West started with attacking the intellectual foundation or ideology of Islam that supports the ruling of a state based on Islamic law. Al-Nabhani refers this to an Islamic understanding that connects Islamic thought (fikroh) and method (thariqoh). This is the reason that Muslims fail to understand the necessary linkage between Islamic rules (also explained in the concept of fikroh) and their implementation by the state (referring to the concept of thariqoh). This implies that Islamic law cannot be implemented without an Islamic state (al-Nabhani 2001a: 5).

He believes the West was aware of this vitality of Islamic ideology. Therefore they launched cultural and missionary invasions to introduce secularism that promoted the separation between state and religion. According to al-Nabhani, this agenda of the West was made easy by the intellectual decline of the ummah; a side-impact of the growing military supremacy of the Ottoman Empire. Military achievement distracted the attention of the Caliph to Muslim intellectual decline. The closing of the door for ijtihad (juristic reasoning) led to the decline of creative thinking among Muslim. As a result, they tended to understand Islamic laws in accordance with the claims of the Western scholars. In his words, “Islam is understood in a way that satisfied the accuser [the West]” (al-Nabnahi 2001a: 10). They accepted principles influenced by Western way of thinking like that that says “it is not prohibited to change the rules
according to the changing of the time” and “ Tradition is the arbiter” (which means Islamic law should be implemented in accordance with local tradition) (al-Nabhani 2001a: 6). This flexible way of thinking, for al-Nabhani, set the standard for the success of Western intellectual attack that led to Muslim neglect of the importance of an Islamic state (al-Nabhani 2001a: 11).

In HT’s view, the Western intellectual invasion was followed by a series of political invasions. In his book, How the Khilafah was Destroyed (2000), that provides a detailed account of the process toward the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Abdul Qadhim Zallum (the second leader of HT after the death of al-Nabhani) argues that after weakening the ideological base of Islam the West incited separatist political tendencies in the territory of the khilafah. Provinces (under the Ottoman Empire) like Turkey, Persia and some areas in Europe served as the gates of Western political invasions. The West supported separatist movements in states like Serbia and Malta and then exported that strategy to Arab countries. In 1798, through its agent, Muhammad Ali Pasha (also known as Mehmet Ali Pasha), who was the governor of Egypt, France succeeded in invading Egypt and marched into Palestine, Lebanon and Syria (Zallum 2000: 5). HT argues that in the 19th century France extended its occupation to Africa and India. Britain and France divided Muslim lands in the secret agreement named Sykes-Picot. The pact granted Britain control over Haifa and France gained Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It believes that it is this agreement that established the current borders of the Middle East (HTI, 13 July 2007).

HT’s argument about the role of the Western intellectual invasion that destroyed the khilafah provides a critical footnote for the association of Islamic fundamentalism and the Islamic puritan movement, Wahabism. HT claims that
Wahabism was part of the Western conspiracy to create division in the khilafah government. It argues that the founder of Wahabism, Abdul Aziz Ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, was a British agent who assisted the British force in its attack on the khilafah from within. Wahabism is also seen as a part of the Western support for tribal leaders like ibn Saud in his effort to establish an Islamic state within the khilafah (Zallum 2000: 5).

Zallum argues that the success of the West in dismembering the khilafah government relied on the influence of missionary groups and the founding of secret organizations to raise the sentiment of nationalism within the khilafah territories. Central in these operations were the cities of Istanbul and Beirut, which stood at the heart of the khilafah government. In Istanbul, France supported the founding of a nationalist organization named “Young Turks.” The group’s success in mobilizing nationalist sentiment among the people caused a major blow to the government of khilafah. A key leader who was born from the group was Mustafa Kemal. Irrespective of Kemal’s role in the Turkish struggle against the British, Zallum believes that history shows the clear motivation of Kemal. He was a traitor to the khilafah (Zallum 2000: 90).

Zallum claims that Kemal was actually a Jew who served as an agent for the British. To justify this claim, Zallum cites stories that demonstrate the relationship between Kemal and the British. For example, he wrote that when Kemal went to Syria with a goal of fighting the British force, he betrayed Syria which fell into the hands of the British by pulling his troop from Anatolia (Zallum 2000: 90). For HT, this is not a surprise because Kemal has repeatedly stated his intention to separate Turkey from the

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27 This argument is based on the city origin of Kemal, Thessaloniki (now part of Greece), that had a large Jewish population. However, according to historian Andrew Mango, Kemal’s parents were Albanian Muslims (Mango 2002: 27).
government of khilafah. The alliance between Kemal and Britain is also based on a frequently cited statement, which according to HT, was made by Kemal. The statement says: “Was not it because of khilafah, Islam and ulama that made Turkish farmers went to war and died for centuries? It is time for Turkey to take care of its own affairs and ignore Indian and Arabs. Turkey has to separate itself [from khilafah] to lead Muslims.” With the help of Britain, Kemal assumed political power in Turkey in 1942 and officially abolished the khilafah government (HTI, 13 July 2007).

Based on this account, HT argues that the key factor of the decline of Islamic supremacy was the division of Muslim societies based on the nation-state system planted by the West. Therefore, HTI asserts that establishing a universal government of Muslims as modelled by the khilafah should be the main goal of the Islamic struggle. The establishment of the khilafah is considered a matter of life and death because it is the only political institution that can uphold the implementation of Islamic laws, revive the ummah and establish the supremacy of Islam over all other religions (Zalum 2000: 187). Zallum wrote:

> Establishing the khilafah is conclusively a vital issue, because in addition to being a method to transform our lands from Kufr homeland into an Islamic homeland, its establishment is also aimed at destroying the Kufr systems (Zallum 2000: 202).

To justify this goal, HT elevates the level of khilafah establishment from a means to implement God’s laws into a necessity by arguing that the establishment of the khilafah is a communal obligation (fardlu kifayah) of the Muslim ummah. Like other Islamists, HT draws on to verses in the Qur’an about the obligation for Muslims to implement God’s laws (e.g. QS. 5: 48-49). However, HT interprets this command with reference to the post-Muhammad era when the executor of God’s laws was a caliph. Using the basic principle in Islamic jurisprudence (ushul al-fiqh) that “what is
required for implementing a duty (wajib) is by itself a duty (wajib),” (ma la yatim al wajib illa bih, fa hua al-wajib), HT argues that the establishment of the khilafah is necessary to implement God’s laws (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 27). This argument is also supported by HT’s understanding of the doctrines of bay’ah (allegiance) and imamah (leadership), which are based on several sayings of the Prophet (hadiths). Two of the most frequently cited hadiths are (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 25-26):

Whosoever takes off his hand from allegiance to Allah, will meet him on the Day of Resurrection without having any proof for him. And those who dies without any bay’ah (allegiance) on his neck (to a Khalifah) he dies a death of jahiliyah (ignorance)

He who pledges allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart shall obey him as long as he can, and if another comes to dispute with him you have to strike the neck of the man”.

For HT, the obligation to have a bay’ah refers to the practice of bay’ah as a mechanism in political succession in the khilafah era, which was practiced by the Prophet’s companions after his death. The first thing that the early generation of Muslim did after the death of the Prophet was to appoint Prophet Muhammad’s closest companion, Abu Bakr, as caliph. This story, for HT, indicates a political leadership (imamah)-- interpreted by HT as khilafah-- is a crucial matter. Despite the suspicion that these stories were cited to support political establishment in the khilafah period, HT claims that establishing a khilafah government is a communal duty (fardh al-kifayah) - a consensus of Sunni ulamas (mu’tabar ulama). In support of this view, HTI quotes the following citation from Imam al-Qurtubi’s interpretation of a Qur’anic verse (2: 20) on the matter of imamah (HTI, 20 June, 2009):

28 Lengthy argument the obligation to establish the khilafah can be founded in Zallum (2000: 191-206) and Member of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (2000: 24-32).
“…this verse states that having an imam and khalifah (caliph) to be heard and obeyed and to reconcile opinions and implement it, through khilafah, and the laws on khilafah. There is no dispute on this obligation among the ummah and the imams except what was narrated by al-Ashaam…

...He said: if the necessity to have an imam is not a duty for the Quraysh and others, why was there discussion and debate about imamaah? Indeed people would say: Imaamah is not a duty for Quraysh and others, why did unnecessarily you debate on something that is not a duty?

He then said: Therefore it has been decided that imamaah is a duty based on sharia’ah, not logic. And this is very clear.”

Further, HT believes that the return of khilafah is divinely destined because this is the promise of God. It suggests that the Prophet Muhammad foretold the return of the khilafah after its destruction, suggested with reference to the following hadith:

Prophethood will last with you for as long as Allah wants it to last. Then He will end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will be Khilafah according to the method of prophethood, and things will be as Allah wishes them to be. There will be a hereditary rule, and things will be as Allah wishes them to be. Then He will end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will be an oppressive rule, and things will be as Allah wishes them to be. Then he will end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will be Khilafah according to the method of prophethood” (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000:116).

In reference to this hadith, HT asserts that oppression against the da’wah movements is indicative of the near coming of the khilafah. It holds the belief that the Prophet has foretold that there will be a period of hereditary or tyrant rule before the return of the khilafah. Further, it cites ‘messianic’ prophecies mentioning that the khilafah will return before the end of the world as a culmination of the battle between the followers of God and Disbelievers. More specifically it believes that the Prophet predicted that the khilafah will arise again from Bait al-Maqdis (al-Quds) in Palestine (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 117).

Answering those who downplay the khilafah ideal as utopian, HT claims that the inevitable return of the khilafah is not only recorded in prophecies, but has also
been admitted by Western scholars and intelligence agencies. It repeats arguments about the endless effort of the West to destroy and prevent the return of khilafah as an indication of their fear of its return to revive Muslim dominance. After the fall of communism, HT accuses the West of seeing the return of the khilafah as the most serious threat to Capitalism. HTI’s most recent argument to justify this claim refers to a report of the US-based National Intelligent Council (NIC) which discusses the return of a ‘new caliph’ as a scenario for a future world.29

To strengthen this cause, HT argues that Islam has provided a complete political order to replace democracy and other secular systems. HT proposes a draft constitution for a khilafah state that adopts the principles outlined in al-Nabhaní’s book *Nidhaam al-Islam* (The System of Islam) (an-Nabhaní 2002). It also published books about different aspects of the khilafah system.30

While the khilafah message is the hallmark of HT, it is not the only unique character of HT. It also offers a revolutionary strategy that it claims is an alternative to failing Islamic movements. The following section discusses this.

C. The Theory of Change: Reviving Islam As A Political Ideology

Al-Nabhaní’s theory of change underlies the profound roles of Muslim intellectual stagnancy and corruption leading to the fall of the khilafah. This intellectual problem takes the form of the Muslim inability to understand the nature of true Islamic thought (*fikroh*), methods to implement this Islamic thought (*thariqoh*) and the interconnection

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29 The report says the rise a ‘new caliph’ is one of four worst scenarios in 2020, including the expansion of US-dominated world (Pax-Americana), a world led by China and India, and a world dominated by the proliferation of weaponry and terrorism. The report suggests that in any these scenarios the US will remain dominant (National Intelligence Council: 2004: 83).

between them. The *fikroh* is a comprehensive description of the relations between life, the universe and God. Such an understanding necessitates the view that all aspects of life are controlled and directed by the laws of God. The true Islamic *fikroh* will show that the laws of God provide extensive solutions for all the problems of humanity. The *thariqah* is the method of implementing the laws of God in managing human life. The combination of *fikroh* and *thariqah* forms ideology (*mabda*). Based on this argument, the task of HT is to rehabilitate the true understanding of *fikroh* and *thariqah*, signify their interconnectedness and their combination as an ideology (an-

Understanding Islam as an ideology is crucial in HT’s narration because it sees the Western intellectual and cultural invasion as a ‘war of ideas’ (*ghazw al-fikr*) that has stolen the ideological character of Islam. This ‘de-ideologized’ Islam takes the form of a partial understanding of Islam, which separates religion from the state. As a part of the Western offense to Islam, Muslims are driven to accept the division between Islamic court (*shar’ai*) that deals only with family issues and the civic court (*nizami*) that administers all other aspects of life. Islam as a complete system manages all affairs of human life is erased from the Muslim mind. The *ummah* is taught to see Islam only as a religious or spiritual matter. The ideological perspective, seen as the *élan vital* of Islam, is buried by corrupted ideas of anti-Islamic colonial power (an-

To deal with this intellectual invasion, the task of HTI is therefore to assume the intellectual leadership of Islam (*al-qiyahad al fikriyah fi al Islam*) by reviving the

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31 HT’s translation of ‘*mabda*’ into ‘ideology is similar to popular concept of ideology that refers to a comprehensive set of ideas, worldview or goals of how society should work and provides foundations for political and social action (Blackburn 2005: 178). By using this conception, HT draws Muslim attention of Islam as a political ideology, more than mere spiritual and social teachings.
understanding of Islam as an ideology (an-Nabhani 2002: 33). In other words, HT works on the ‘ideologization’ of Islamic knowledge or the Muslim understanding of reality, and this is to teach the ummah that the establishment of the khilafah is a vital issue and therefore the work toward its realization is urgent. Al-Nabhani therefore emphasizes the role of HT as an intellectual leader of the masses. This is similar to Lenin’s theory of change, identified by Taji-Farouki as follows:

Al-Nabhani used the metaphor of ‘fusing in a crucible’ to describe how the party would purge the ummah’s intellectual make-up and make it one with the party ideology. The early Leninist notion of the party as the elite, vanguard, educator of the masses and an organization of professional revolutionaries echoes throughout his discussions of the character and role of Hizb al-Tahrir (Taji-Farouki: 1994: 372).

Al-Nabhani’s past experience with the Ba’ath party was influential in shaping this vision. This is apparent in his familiarity with the “vanguardist model” of movement reflected in his theory of change set out in his book ‘Takattu al-Hizb’ or ‘structuring a party’ that centres on the idea of ‘kutla’ (circle) (an-Nabhani 2001b). He argues that raising the awareness of the ummah needs a group of committed individuals (fi’a or vanguard) who will work as a group or party. The vanguard will form a first cell that will assume an intellectual leadership in the ummah by moulding public opinion in favour of the party ideology. The primary character of the vanguard is the ability to understand and present realities from an ideological perspective with understanding and commitment to maintain the purity of the party ideology, and sensitivity toward the potential influence of foreign thoughts that pose obstacles for the party objective. Called fi’a muhtara mumtaza (most highly sensitive group), the vanguard needs an ability to present a clear elaboration of the party’s ideology. With commitment, consistency, and ideological purity, the vanguard forms the first cell (al-
khalqah al-ula) which will develop into a party (al-kutla al-hizbiyah). Al-Nabhani believes that the multiplication of this process will eventually create a new awareness in society that will challenge the legitimacy of the existing order. He suggests that like a living organism this process will eventually develop into an embryonic force that cannot be blocked even by a powerful and repressive regime (an-Nabhani 2001b: 26-32).

The focus on this task of preparing vanguards is important for the future mobilization that will seize power and initiate total change. The movement should not be distracted with attempts at making gradual or partial changes. It only accepts a comprehensive and immediate application of Islamic law, “without delay, postponement or graduation... The gradual implementation contradicts the rules of Islam totally, and it renders those who implement some of the rules and abandon some of the rules, sinful before Allah, whether they were individuals, groups or a State” (Hizb ut-Tahrir: 268)

Arguing against gradual approach for change, al-Nabhani sees the problem faced by Muslim societies as fundamental and therefore the only solution is a fundamental or systemic change (inqilab shamil). He believes that the change toward the revival of the ummah must start from changing the present system of unbelief. As cited by Taji-Faoruki (1996: 76), al-Nabhani proposed this revolutionary vision as a critique to the reformist movements in Muslim societies. He wrote:

The Islamic world today is a Domain of Unbelief, having abandoned Islamic government. Consequently most Muslims view it as corrupted, and hold that it is in need for reform. However, reform signifies eliminating corruption from prevailing situation. This is inappropriate because the Islamic world really needs a comprehensive and radical transformation (inqilab shamil) that will eradicate the rule of unbelief and strive to establish Islamic
government: reform actually perpetuates the corruption”
(translated by Taji-Farouki from al-Nabhani (1953: 45).

Al-Nabhani sees the state and its system as an entity that consists of various elements; and therefore efforts to oppose the system should be carried out by an equal entity - society as a whole. He believes that it is the change of society that will change the individual, not the reverse. In his words: “Aslih al-mujtama, yaslih al fardi wa yastamiru islahiha” (Reform the society, this will lead to reform of the individual constantly) (an-Nabhani 2001a: 61).

To illustrate the primacy of society in his theory of change, al-Nabhani uses a metaphor of a boiling kettle:

Society is similar to water in a large kettle; if anything that causes the temperature to drop is placed beneath the kettle then the water freezes and transforms to ice. Similarly, if corrupted ideologies are introduced into the society then it would freeze in corruption and continue in deterioration and decline. However, if a contradictory ideology were introduced into society, then contradictions would appear in it, and the society would struggle with these contradictions and instability will prevail. However if flaming heat was put under the kettle, the water would warm and then boil and effuse an intense stirring vapour. Similarly, if the correct ideology was introduced into the society it would be a flame whose heat would transform the society to boiling point and then to a dynamic force... (Ideology) is the fire and light which will burn and enlighten, know that society is in a state of transformation and it will definitely reach boiling point and the points of movement and dynamism (an-Nabhani 2001a: 62).

Even though the role of the masses is important, HT is aware it cannot move a large mass of people because this limits its role to that of a ‘political educator’ rather than a social activist. HT therefore seeks to baypass the road toward mass influence by approaching elites within Muslim societies. Once HT has gained the leadership of the elite then it seeks to draw the masses into its ideology and programmes like boiled
water in a kettle until it is ready to explode; HT will then lead a revolutionary movement to establish the khilafah.

**D. The Strategy to Change: Mobilizing Political Detachment**

HT’s heavy emphasis on intellectual struggle is not without practical outcomes. The significance of intellectual work to educate the ummah lies in the goal of creating a political instability that will justify HT’s campaign for systemic change. The education of the people is part of the goal of undermining the legitimacy of the existing political order. To achieve this goal, HT rejects violent methods and instead advocates the strategy of political detachment.

This orientation is encapsulated in several key concepts on the conduct of the relationship with the state, including ‘kasyf al-khuttath,’ (exposing the failures [of the rulers]) (al-Nabhani 1958: 5), ‘dharb al-‘alaqoh’ (attacking existing bonds in societies and between societies and the state) (al-Nabhani 1958: 3-5) and ‘mufaroqoh’ (separation [between societies and government]) (Al-Wa’ie 6: 12-16). These doctrines are based on an understanding that a society consists of ideas (mafahim), rules (maqayis) and a submissive attitude toward rules (qana’at). The combination of these three elements forms a system, which requires implementation by a ruler and submission from the people. It is believed that the key to destroying the system is therefore eliminating the consent (thiqoh) or submission (wala’) of the people to the other two elements of the state, the political system and the ruler (Al-Wa’ie 58: 42).

The following paragraph in HT’s training manual, *Dukhul al-Mujtama* (Entering Society) (Hizb al-Tahrir 1953), elaborates this strategic vision:

> [the activities of the party are aimed at] attacking all forms of interaction in societies in order to influence their relationships is
not enough; but all interactions between rulers and their people have to be shaken with a full strength...in this way it can influence all forms of relationship in societies...as long as the hand that hold power to rule societies is not beaten in full strength and in a continuous way, societies will not understand their failures and the necessity for changes...Therefore it is imperative for party members to focus on attacking all forms of relationship between rulers and their people (Hizb al-Tahrir 1958: 3).

More practically this vision is further elaborated in a book published by HT that equals Lenin’s “What is To Be Done” titled “The Method of Hizb al-Tahrir for Change.” The central themes of the book include the principles of non-cooperation and non-participation.

The strategy of non-cooperation is reflected in HT’s emphasis on political activity and its principle of rejection to undertake social activities because they are seen as strengthening the legitimacy of the existing system. HT criticizes Islamic movements that focus on social and spiritual goals (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 31). This refers to groups that aim to improve the status of Muslim societies in non-political areas like education, social service, morality, and spirituality. Although this argument does not make reference to specific Muslim groups, this characterization could be applied to Muslim social organizations. These include, for example, the Salafis and Wahabis who focus on reforming Muslim belief (aqidah) and Muslim social organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia that operate in spiritual, social and educational areas. For HT, the absence of political orientation makes them uncritical of the established non-Islamic system. It sees that Muslim activities in these non-political sectors are not helpful in uprooting the existing secular...

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32 This book is not written by al-Nabhani but is originally a lecture paper of the delegate of HT for a conference of Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 22 December in 1989 in Missouri (Al-Wa’ie 78: 63). The paper was published in a booklet and republished in Bahasa Indonesia by a publisher associated to HTI, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, entitled “Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir” (1997). The name of the author is not revealed.
system. This is reflected in its policy not to help them to create economic, educational, social or moral reforms. This is because to provide this type of service is a form of support to “tyrants” and helps prolong the life of their corrupt and Kufr system” (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 31).

Parallel with this non-cooperation doctrine, HT advocates the path of non-participation in both government and parliament. Even though HT declares itself to be a political party, its opposition to the present system leads to non-parliamentary activism. It considers participation in a non-Islamic system as a trap that will only strengthen the status quo. Except in a few cases in its early stage when few HT leaders ran for parliamentary election in Jordan, extra-parliamentary activism has been a dominant feature of HT. The book that specifically elaborates this strategy of the organization clearly sets out this principle:

The party also does not accept participation in the ruling system of the government, because it is based on the ruling of Kufr (Disbelief), and this is a matter that is forbidden for Muslims (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 23).

Likewise, participation in elections and the legislative process are considered a justification of the existing “infidel” system. A book on the method of HT published by HT in Britain states “it should be clear that any attempt at utilising the democratic structures that currently exist either through holding ministerial posts in governments that ruled by Kufr would be prohibited…Similarly putting forth bills that attempt to apply some aspects of the Shari’ah rules and then voting on them would definitely be prohibited as this would be making the decision of man sovereign over the Hukm of Allah” (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 23).

To implement these principles, al-Nabhani emphasized the importance of an uncompromising stance in order to maintain the purity of ideology. Any slight
deviation is considered dangerous for the movement. Such a stance is essential because, in HT’s view, the influence of Western intellectual and cultural invasion into the Muslim world is acute. The most serious threat to the purity of its ideology, according to al-Nabhani, is the argument coming from those who claim to work for the application of Islamic laws but have fallen into the trap of the reformist approach promoted by the enemies of Islam. HT sees the temptation to adopt this reformist approach as an intellectual corruption planted by the West to detract Muslim attention from its most important goal of resurrecting the khilafah (an-Nabhani 2002: 74).

A helpful way to understand this confrontational principle is to compare it to the theory of ‘minority influence’ proposed by social psychology theorist, Serge Moscovici. In contrast to the conformist view that influence flows from majority to minority, Moscovici argues that a consistent or uncompromising stance has the potential to exert influence on the majority. The minority group has the ability to change the majority group if members of a minority group have an agreed viewpoint (synchronic consistency) and maintain this in a determined manner. By being active and vocal, the minority group makes its presence felt and by being visible with an uncompromising stance it will create instability and conflict. The majority, faced with this ‘stubborn’ radical minority, will inevitably realize the necessity to negotiate with the minority in an effort to maintain harmony and stability. However, a consistent stance by the minority will block the effort for negotiation. In this situation, Moscovici argues that restructuring the majority view in conformity with the minority
group will take place. Members of the majority will make an unconscious shift toward the minority side (Moscovici: 1976).³³

Parallel with Moscovici’s notion of “synchronic consistency,” Al-Nabhani uses the term ‘stubbornness’ to describe the characteristic of HT activists, especially in dealing with opposing groups. This paragraph from al-Nabhani clearly commands a non-compromising stance:

It is obligatory that the da’wah be open and challenges everything, the customs and traditions, the incorrect thoughts and the distorted concepts; challenging even the public opinion if it is wrong, even if it has to struggle against it; challenging the false creeds and the false deens regardless of the stubbornness and bigotry of their adherents. Therefore, the da’wah based on the Islamic ‘aqeedah, is distinguished by frankness, daring, strength, thought and the challenge to everything that disagrees with the Fikrah and the Tareekah and exposing their fallacy, irrespective of the consequences and circumstances and of whether the ideology agrees or disagrees with the masses, and whether the people accept, reject or oppose it. The carrier of the da’wah does not flatter the people, nor compromise with them. He does not praise the ruler or influential people in the society, nor does he court them, rather he adheres to the ideology and to it alone, without giving any account for anything else (an-Nabhani 2002: 74).

Al-Nabhani warns HT members that temptation for compromise can come from two factors; first the desire for security in relation to the ruler, both in the effort to avoid repression or to satisfy worldly interest and second, a compromise to utilize gradual or partial change. He reminds his followers that HT will only be satisfied by the immediate and total transformation of the secular system into an Islamic system. Al-Nabhani teaches:

Delivering the da’wah requires a concern for a complete implementation for the rules of Islam without the slightest concession. The carrier does not accept any truce nor concession,

³³ It is unlikely that HT’s ideology has learned from this theory of change. The parallel of this theory to HT’s approach is not not neglected by an HTI’s leader I met. He seemed happy when I compared this theory to HTI’s character (Interview with Erwin Permana, Jakarta, 19 September 2009).
negligence or postponement. Instead, he maintains the matter as a whole and definitely settles it immediately...” (an-Nabhani 2002: 75-76).

He is aware that this uncompromising stance will potentially cause tension not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to society. In relation to society, he anticipates two difficult options: consistency in facing the anger of the ummah or deviation to avoid this anger (al-Nabhani 1953: 50-51). Al-Nabhani argues that both options are dangerous and suggests dealing with the situation by holding onto the ideology of HT alone:

It is imperative for the hizb members to adhere to ideology alone even though the hizb will be subject to ummah’s resentment. But this resentment is temporary; the hizb consistency will win the ummah. There should be no deviation, even slightly. Ideology is the life of hizb and its guarantor of survival. (The party) always make the hizb points clear, exposing the colonialist plots, and remain populist (an-Nabhani 2001b: 48; see the Arabic version in al-Nabhani 1953: 51).

E. Actions toward Change: Six-fold Agendas

HT sets out a framework of action that categorizes its activities into six objectives, namely (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 29-35):

1. Concentrated education (tathqif murokkaz), which is aimed at recruiting new members (syabab). This programme is carried out through study circles or training programmes that target limited audience from Muslim communities.
2. Educating the masses (tathqif jama’i) to create public awareness of the necessity of the khilafah and to develop sympathy with the organization.
3. Intellectual struggle (shiro al-fikr) to challenge ideas or thoughts in society that are deemed harmful to the goal of resurrecting the khilafah.
4. Political struggle (kifa siyasi) to undermine an un-Islamic system both in kufr or Muslim countries. This political struggle is not limited to challenging the
intellectual aspect of the state, but also refers to challenging military, economic and political structures.

5. Caring for the affairs of Muslim societies (tabanni masalih al-ummah), which means presenting Islamic solutions on issues of the interests to the ummah in a way that confronts them with the policies of the existing government.

6. Seeking support (thalab al-nusroh) that is aimed at securing political support and protection from powerful men, including elites in societies and most prominently military when they are opposed to the ideology of HTI.

This six fold agenda serves the double moves envisaged in al-Nabhani’s notions of ‘dharb al-’alaqoh’ (literally ‘breaking relationship’) (al-Nabhani 1958: 3-5) and ‘kasyf al-khuttah’(challenging the rulers) (al-Nabhani 1958: 5). Dharb al-’alaqoh can be considered moves toward societies aimed at breaking their loyalty to the state and the kasyf al-khuttath represents the move against the state in the form of exposing the inherent failures of the government and the political structure in general.

The relationships between these double moves with the above six categories of agendas are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they overlap and are interconnected. Nonetheless, this categorization gives a perspective for understanding the roles of the different types of HTI’s activities. In this picture, the agendas of concentrated education (tathqif murokkaz), public education (tathqif jama’) and caring for the issues of the ummah (tabanni masaloh al-ummah) primarily serve the move toward social mobilization against the state (dharb al-’alaqoh) while intellectual struggle (shiro al-fikr) and political struggle (kifah siyasi) are primarily aimed at attacking the legitimacy of the state (kASF al-khuttath). Both of these moves are mutually interdependent. At the intersection between these double moves lies the endeavour to seek support (thalab al-nusroh) from elites in society and the leadership of the state.

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(ahl al-quwah). Success means gaining support from elites in societies that may foster mass mobilization. Support from elites in the state would deter the ability of the state to repress the opposition and eventually start a political crisis. Figure 2. illustrates the places of HT’s plan of action in its strategy.

![Diagram showing HT’s plans of action](image)

**Figure 2.2: HT’s plans of action**

This outcome is similar to what Charles Tilly calls ‘revolutionary situations,’ which are characterized by three conditions: the appearance of contenders competing to control the state, commitments to the claims by a significant section of the population, and the inability of the state to deal effectively with the first and second conditions (Tilly 1978: 192). HT seeks to create these situations by uprooting the legitimacy of the established political system, mobilizing non-participation, and presenting itself as a legitimate and potential contender. In the process of creating these revolutionary situations, HT seeks to secure political support or protection from powerful elites (ahl al-quwwah), especially from the military to back the force of change.
Figure 2.3: Revolutionary strategy of HTI
Each of the six agendas of HT has its role, which can be categorized into two aims. The first aim includes programmes to educate the people that consists of public education (\textit{tathqif jama’i}), intellectual opposition (\textit{shiro al-fikr}), political opposition (\textit{kifah siyasi}), and using key social issues to demonstrate government failures (\textit{tabanni masalih al-ummah}). These endeavors may bring about (a) mass opposition against the system and (b) political detachment (non-participation and non-cooperation). The second aim includes programmes that target a specific audience and include concentrated education (\textit{tathqif murakkaz}) that can (c) increase the number of members and therefore strengthen its role as the leader of political contention; and seek support (\textit{thalab al-nusroh}) for the purpose of (d) mobilizing backing from powerful leaders. In a situation of political crisis resulting from the existing system, HT seeks to play a leading role in initiating a political transition from democracy to khilafah. Figure 2.3 above illustrates the roles of HT’s plan of action in promoting a revolutionary change.

\textbf{F. The Process of Change: Nusroh and Non-violent Transfer of Power}

HT sets out three stages of change. It starts with the formative period (\textit{tathqif}) in which it produces core activists. The main agenda at this stage is running unpublicisized or clandestine study circles. After gaining sufficient activists, HT moves toward an open campaign or public education (\textit{tafa’ul ma’a al-ummah}). The objective in this period is to encourage the public to oppose the existing system and enable HT to establish an influential position in society and to secure support or protection from powerful elites. In the final stage, HT looks to seize power. It believes that in revolutionary situations when the established political system has lost
legitimacy and political crisis is taking place, power-holders will voluntarily submit to the force of change led by a popular political leadership (HT), which is supported by the masses and backed by powerful elites, especially the military. In this way a political transition toward the installation of the khilafah (istilam al-hukm) can take place in an extraordinary (extra-parliamentary) process like the Egyptian revolution in February 2011.

This idealist vision is however lacking a historical basis. The leaders of HT had attempted to bypass this long process by inviting individual Muslim regimes to establish a khilafah government in their respective countries, and eventually serve as a point of expansion. This strategy was used in 1979 when the party leadership proposed a caliph position for the Iranian leader Ayatullah Khomeini but he ignored the offer (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31). HT also attempted to persuade Libya’s leader, Mu’ammar Qadafi, to adopt the khilafah but he responded the call by sending HT activists in Libya to prison.34

Another possible form of political transition sought by HT is a coup.35 This is reflected in HT’s emphasis on thalab al-nusroh (seeking support from powerful elites) as an ideal process for political change. This vision is also confirmed by the fact that al-Nabhani has taken part in several coup attempts during his life, including plots to overthrow the Jordanian regime in 1968, 1969 and 1971 and against authorities in Southern Iran in 1972 (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 27-28). In Indonesia, HTI claims that coup is not an option until it has secured sufficient support from the people.36 Without this

34 In 1978, HTI held a four hours meeting with Qadafi and issued a communiqué calling Qadafi to adopt the khilafah (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 9 September, 1978)
35 Coup attempts were mentioned in the biography of al-Nabhani translated into Bahasa Indonesia by an HTI’s leader, Shiddiq Al-Jawi, but the paragraph that contains this information was removed in the last edition of the book (Samara: 2002 and Samara: 2003).
36 Interview with Muhammad Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 24 July, 2009.
any attempt to seize power is considered unsustainable. While the options for the process of political transition can be postponed until the movement is ready to launch an attempt at seizing power, the focus of HT at this time is on creating the prerequisites for revolutionary situations as discussed above.

G. Conclusion

HTI is the Indonesian version of the transnational organization (HT) that carries the revolutionary doctrines of al-Nabhani. The foremost revolutionary character of HT is its call for the establishment of a universal government of khilafah. This represents HT’s challenge to other Islamists movements that participate in the existing un-Islamic system. HT opposes a reformist or (islahi) or a gradual (tadarruj) approach for change. Its doctrine teaches that only an immediate and total change (inqilab syamil) is acceptable.

HT’s strategy for revolution is however dissimilar to the conventional model of revolution that advocates the use of violence to bring the state down. As an alternative to violence, HT focuses on the strategies of non-cooperation and non-participation in order to uproot the existing political system and to undermine the state. For this purpose HT applies a double-move strategy. On one hand, it works to educate the masses about the failures of the state and provoke political opposition and detachment (dharb al-’alaqoh). As an integral part of this move, HT seeks to establish an influential position in society to prepare a future role in political mobilization. On the other hand, HT works to undermine the legitimacy of the state by exposing its failures and danger (kasyf al-khuttath).
HT’s theory of change emphasizes the importance of actually changing societies — rather than changing individuals – in order to delegitimize the existing system. It assumes that by provoking mass opposition it will be able to persuade the power-holders to co-operate with the demand for a fundamental change. HT envisages a revolution from above. At the end of the day, it believes that it will be powerful people who will play a critical role in facilitating fundamental change. Therefore, HT emphasizes the agenda of thalab al-nusroh (seeking support) to find a political patron and secure backing from elites in society and the state, especially the military. This vision by implication leads to the coup model for political change. HT however believes that by combining social mobilization against the existing political system and securing support from powerful elites it can achieve a peaceful transition toward the establishment of the khilafah.
Chapter 3

Discourse:

Deligitimation and Conciliation in the Battle of Thought

There is a reason why Nixon Centre’s analyst, Zeyno Baran, titled her contentious work on Hizb al-Tahrir ‘Fighting the War of Ideas’ (Baran 2005). Discourse is a major part of HTI’s fight for the khilafah. This serves its goal of undermining the legitimacy of the intellectual aspect of the existing political system. For HTI, a political system (democracy) cannot stand without the consent or trust (thiqoh) of the people. It therefore seeks to carry an intellectual battle against democracy by continuously exposing the failures of the State and arguing that the only solution is to replace democracy with the Islamic political system of khilafah. This chapter analyses the discourse aspect of HTI to understand the degree of its commitment in challenging the democratic system. To evaluate HTI’s consistency in opposing democracy, it follows references to various aspects of democracy in its publications. They include: the political system (state ideology or Pancasila, state form called Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/NKRI, the constitution, the democratic system and election process), the political institutions (the government, the House of Representatives, political parties, the police and the military), and the instances of Muslim non-party participation in democratic processes.

The analysis follows the spectrum of orientation for change as discussed in chapter one (pages 26-27) that consists of three categories: moderate (political integration/participation), radical (critical participation), and extreme (political
disengagement). Cases are analysed in a scale of 1 to 3 that represent the three categories. Based on this, it presents frequency and average analyses to identify its level of opposition to different aspects of the State.

A. The Discourse on the Political System

There are 80 references to key aspects of political systems including Pancasila (state ideology), the 1945 Constitution (also called Undang-Undang Dasar/UUD 1945), democracy, elections, and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/NKRI (the form of the state). Overall, the discourse on political system has never been at each end of the spectrum: extreme or moderate. On sensitive or fundamental elements of Indonesia’s democratic system such as Pancasila and the NKRI, the language tends to be moderate. In contrast, HTI’s is highly opposed to democracy and election. Discourse on these two interconnected aspects of the political system is however not consistent. The nature of the discourse on democracy is more extreme than the discourse on election. Between these different trends, a fair mix of extreme, radical and moderate discourse appears in the references to the Constitution (see figure 3.1).

![Figure 3.1: The frequency and nature of discourse on political system](image-url)
Democracy is the most frequent discussed subject. The nature of the language is almost consistently *extreme*. Being a dominant subject, the large amount of *extreme* language on democracy drags the overall nature of HTI’s discourse on the political system toward an *extreme* position at the average score of 2.4. Out of 76 references, 49 *extreme* representations outnumber nearly 13 *moderate* and 14 *radical*. Figure 3.2 summarizes the spectrum of the nature of HTI’s discourse on the political system. The proportion suggests that HTI’s strong opposition to democracy is not consistent with its discourse on other aspects of the political system that combine both challenging and conciliatory discourse.

**A.1 Conciliatory Discourse on Pancasila and NKRI**

HTI’s discourse on these two fundamental elements of Indonesia’s democratic system demonstrates its avoidance to confront them. This is shown in the rare reference to them when it criticized the political system. These are only 12 references to these elements out of 76 references to the political system. This lack of reference to these core aspects of the political system suggests that HTI wish to avoid confrontation. This is confirmed by the dominance of *moderate* representations. HTI however could not always hide its opposition to Pancasila and the NKRI. Occasional challenges occurred in one *extreme* representation on NKRI and three *radical* representations on
Pancasila. This combination forms the average nature of the discourse on these subjects as 1.7 for Pancasila and 1.6 for NKRI (see figure 3.1 and 3.2).

HTI’s opposition to Pancasila is clear. Its goal to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state contradicts the essence of Pancasila that became the foundation for Indonesia as a non-Islamic state. This stance is sometimes clear in the publications and public statements of HTI’s leaders. In *Al-Wa’ie*, for example, Ismail Yusanto, criticized Pancasila as insufficient for managing society. He argued that Pancasila is only “a set of philosophical ideas” that lacks practicality and therefore it has been understood and implemented in different ways by Soeharto and Soekarno (*Al-Wa’ie* 87: 41). In 2004, during the parliamentary session to reform the Constitution, HTI raised its call for a reconsideration of Pancasila as the foundation of the nation (*Al-Wa’ie* 24: 8). In 2007, it opposed the idea to reinforce Soeharto’s “asas tunggal” (sole basis) policy that forced all political and social organization to adopt Pancasila as the foundation of their organizations (Republika, 13 September 2007).

However, such public opposition to Pancasila was rare. Its discourse on Pancasila was often uncritical and even legitimating. This is reflected in its opposition to the *asas tunggal* policy. HTI carefully limited its rhetoric to challenging the policy, a common position of many Islamist groups, instead of attacking Pancasila itself. HTI countered the view suggesting that the use of Islam as a basis of organization is a threat to national disintegration. It argued the reverse. The enforcement of the *asas tunggal* policy is a threat to national integration. For HTI the *asas tunggal*, not Pancasila, is part of the Western conspiracy to eliminate Islam (*Al-Islam* 373). Instead of challenging Pancasila, HTI often referred to Pancasila to justify its arguments. For example, to counter the view that the implementation of the shari’ah in Indonesia is a threat to Pancasila, HTI argued that the idea of implementing the shari’ah should be
accommodated by the first pillar of Pancasila, “belief in the oneness of God” (Al Wa’ie 71: 4). This suggests that Pancasila is compatible with the implementation of the shari’ah.

When comparing other ideologies such as capitalism and socialism with Islam, HTI did not make the same argument about Pancasila despite the fact that in Indonesia it is considered a national ideology. To avoid being seen as anti-Pancasila, HTI cleverly positions itself as an opponent of the West and of capitalism. To do so, it resorts to the argument that the demand for the shari’ah and the khilafah means to save Indonesia from the threat of capitalism as a rival ideology (Al-Wa’ie 87: 14). HTI’s restraint from promoting the argument about the incompatibility of Pancasila and Islam is also clear in an article written by an MUI’s leader, Ma’ruf Amin, published in Al-Wa’ie. The article promotes the application of shari’ah under the framework of Pancasila (Al-Wa’ie 71: 28).

HTI adopted a similar stance in its discourse on the NKRI. In nearly all of its references to the NKRI, HTI used conciliatory and even affirmative language. Out of eight references, seven are moderate and only one is extreme. HTI opposition to democracy and its campaign for a khilafah political system in which a caliph holds highest and almost absolute authority naturally contradicts the republic form of the NKRI. However, HTI has been keeping its opposition to the NKRI close to its chest. This stance is especially important for HTI because public support of the NKRI is high. In recent years there has been an increasing sentiment to defend the NKRI from the threat of secession in non-Muslim majority provinces because of the fear of the rise of pro-shari’ah regional regulations.\footnote{37 On the report about this concern, see Tempo (2006).} Publicly attacking the NKRI is likely to result in HTI being seen as a national threat.
A question about HTI’s commitment to the NKRI arose when it gathered a crowd of about 80,000 people in its international conference on the khilafah in 2007. To counter the accusation that its khilafah campaign poses a threat to the NKRI, the chairman of HTI at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, wrote a comment in *Al-Wa’ie* entitled ‘KKI 2007 Mengkokohkan NKRI’ (the 2007 khilafah conference strengthens NKRI). In the publication, Al-Khattath made a comment that HTI shares the common view stating that the NKRI is final. He however carefully worded the statement to avoid contradicting its goal to establish a trans-national government of the khilafah; this means that HTI actually opposes the NKRI. He clarified that his support for the NKRI referred to the territory of Indonesia. He claimed that HTI has shown it stands for the NKRI and was opposed to the threat to national unity posed by separatist movements in Aceh, Papua, and Maluku. Further, Al-Khattath argued that the interest of HTI is not only in defending the NKRI but also in expanding the territory of Indonesia under the khilafah system (*Al-Wa’ie* 85: 6). This conciliatory view on the significance of protecting the NKRI did not mean that HTI recognized the republic form of the state. In the same paper, Al-Khattath could not hide his advocacy for a change in the political system by suggesting that the NKRI is not unchangeable (*Al-Wa’ie* 85: 5; *Al-Wa’ie* 47: 3). Still, HTI restrained itself from openly calling for the abolition of the NKRI doctrine.

In spite of this clarification of what NKRI means for HTI, it is clear that HTI did not attempt to delegitimize the position of the NKRI in the public mind. The language of HTI suggests that there is little conflict between the khilafah and the NKRI, at least publically. This paradox indicates the way HTI compromised the demand to maintain the khilafah identity, on one hand, and the need to avoid oppression and isolation on the other. Sometimes the goal of expanding its audience
overshadowed the argument about the khilafah. This was the case when HTI joined an ulama meeting held by MUI that issued a declaration that includes a commitment to protect the NKRI (Al-Wa‘ie 72: 7).

This constraint from challenging Pancasila and the NKRI demonstrates the importance of securing and maintaining political freedom. The fear of being seen as a threat to the State, according to Al-Khattath, became one of the reasons for postponing HTI’s plan to participate in elections.\(^\text{38}\) It is for this reason also that in 2007 HTI sought state recognition by submitting an application as a social organization to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. HTI gained legal status in 22 June 2006.\(^\text{39}\) The statement of the paper submitted by HTI includes an explicit recognition of Pancasila and the NKRI. In defining the nature of organization, the statute states: “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is an Islamic-based da’wah movement within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.” This statement however should be seen as HTI’s effort to gain official recognition because this contradicts its self proclamation as a political party (Anonim 2008: 200) and the inherent contradiction between the khilafah ideology and Indonesia’s current political system.

### A.2. Mixed Discourse on the Constitution (UUD ’45)

In response to an extraordinary meeting of the Indonesian parliament in 2004, scheduled to discuss constitutional reform, Al-Wa‘ie took the occasion to launch attacks against the Constitution. A suggestion that the Constitution be replaced was

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\(^\text{38}\) Interview wih Al-Khattath, Jakarta, 16 October 2009.

\(^\text{39}\) A copy of the letter of approval of HTI as a social organization is circulated in a blog of a former member of HTI. I visited Ministry of Internal Affairs (Depdagri) in 15 October 2009 and received a conformation of this matter. An officer at the Depdagri argued that the decision to approve HTI’s application was taken with the goal of accommodating social organization. As the government approved the legality of other radical Islamic organizations like FPI, HTI should not be different. However, the officer also raised a concern about threat of radical Islamic organization like HTI. This information is based on my conversation with an officer from Depdagri’s unit of national and political unity (Kesbangpol).
represented by the title of the 24th edition of *Al-Wa’ie*: “De-sacralization of UUD 1945.” This edition criticized both the contents of the Constitution and the effort by the MPR to amend it (*Al-Wa’ie* 24).

HTI characterized the Constitution as a “human product” because it gave parliament an authority to create legislation and to produce laws. By recognizing the sovereignty of the people it contradicts the sole sovereignty of God. HTI specifically criticized the adoption of the republic form of the state, which it saw as secular and part of the Western conspiracy to destroy Islamic political ideology (*Al-Wa’ie* 24: 8-9). The Constitution of Indonesia actually gives a special place to the role of religion in State affairs stated in the Chapter 19 of the constitution as follows: “the state is based on belief in the Oneness of God.” However this did not satisfy HTI. This clause on “belief in God” does not make Indonesia a religious state. Such a general principle, in the view HTI, is insufficient in promoting the role of religion because it lacks the required mechanism of how the state will adopt religious laws (*Al-Wa’ie* 24: 8-9).

As the Constitution was considered secular, HTI criticizes efforts at reforming it. It was skeptical of the political process in parliament to amend the Constitution. It saw no sign that the agenda included an option for the revision of the position of Pancasila, the unitary republic form of the state, and the presidential model of government (*Al-Wa’ie* 24; 8).

HTI’s opposition is however not total. Paradoxically, HTI also indicated the possibility of supporting the political process to amend the Constitution if it opened the possibility for a total revision. HTI required the process to allow a large scale participation of the public and it must be open to an alternative proposal of a draft of the Constitution (*Al-Wa’ie* 24: 7-8). While this demand can be considered naive due to
its impracticality, it should be seen as HTI’s effort to break the taboo of discussing alternatives to state ideology and existing political system.

The less *extreme* but not affirmative discourse on the Constitution appeared in the context of an earlier parliamentary meeting to reform the Constitution in 2001. Even though HTI maintained the demand for a total amendment, it endorsed the effort of a few Islamic parties to reinsert the so-called ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter (*Al-Islam 19*). The seven words refer to the discarded phrase of chapter 29 of the Constitution stating that the State is based on belief in the “Oneness of God.” The erased ‘seven words’ follow this sentence, “with the obligation to follow shari’ah for Muslims.”

Tolerating a gradualist approach to reform, HTI supported the reinsertion of the Jakarta charter because it saw that this clause might open a door for the wider adoption of the shari’ah. To protect this interest, HTI did not criticize the secularity of the Constitution. HTI further justified its support to the ‘seven words’ by identifying them with the Muslim role in the founding of Indonesia (*Al-Islam 73*).

HTI’s *moderate* discourse on the Constitution did not only occur in its campaign for the adoption of Muslim interests, but also in its advocacy for non-interests of the public. It for example used the Constitution, in addition to Islamic doctrines, as the basis of arguments to criticize the government’s privatization policy. In *Al-Islam* it argued that:

> From an Islamic perspective, the privatization of Pertamina (state’s petroleum company) and other public companies is a betrayal of God’s laws, [the words of] the prophet and [the interest of] ummah in general. From the perspective of the UUD [constitution]…, this policy clearly violates chapter 33 of the constitution that mandates the control of government on natural resources … for the benefit of people (*Al-Islam 26*).

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40 For historical accounts about the process toward the omission of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter form the Constitutions, see Boland (1982) and Anshari (1981).
Given these instances of non-confrontational references to the Constitution, HTI’s overall discourse about it is far from extreme. Nonetheless most of the references can be considered oppositional but not confrontational. This is indicated by seven radical and four extreme representations compared to four moderate representations (see figure 3.1). The combination of this mixed representation is reflected in the average score of 2.0.

A.3. Confrontational Discourse on Democracy

Regarding aspects of the political system that are less identified as symbols of the state, HTI’s discourse is more extreme. This is especially the case in HTI’s view on democracy. Out of 33 references to democracy, 32 are extreme and only one is radical. This makes the average of HTI’s view of democracy a score of 2.9.

Democracy is the most frequent reference to the political system. This suggests that democracy was the principal enemy of HTI. It described democracy as a part of the Western conspiracy to destroy the Ottoman Empire in the early period of the 20th century (Zallum: 2000). A number of Al-Wa’ie editions used confrontational titles such as ‘The Collpase of Democracy’ (Al-Wa’ie 42) and ‘Democracy: the Infidel System’ (Al-Wa’ie 104). HTI challenged the argument that justifies democracy with the concept of shuro (consultation) in Islam. Among the fundamental differences between democracy and Islam highlighted by HTI is the fact that democratic decisions are made by majority voice. This, according to HTI, is contradictory to the Islamic concept of shuro in which a consultation to produce policies is based solely on the laws of God, not the voice of the majority (Al-Wa’ie 104: 32).

Because it believed that democracy is not only un-Islamic but also anti-Islam, HTI criticized Muslim participation in the democratic process. It specifically referred
to the concept called ‘theo-democracy’ that it claimed was adopted by the Pakistani Islamist ideologue, Abu al-A’la al-Maududi. It argued that even though Maududi recognises the supremacy of God’s sovereignty, his opposition to democracy is half-hearted because it tolerates the democratic process when it favors the Muslim chance to win. For HTI, such an argument is dangerous because there should be no place for compromise between democracy and Islam (Al-Wa’ie 42: 19).

Nevertheless, amid this typical hostility toward democracy, once at least, HTI was tolerant of democracy when it came to the defence of its interest. This occurred for example in HTI’s protest to some members the House of Representatives (DPR) who demanded that the government act against shari’ah-based regional regulations. HTI argued that the regulations were produced by a democratic process and therefore no one has the right to challenge them on behalf of the Constitution. A paragraph in Al-Islam states:

The (Islamic) regulations were produced by the House of Representatives and local government in democratic process. If democracy is a mechanism putting people’s aspiration into laws, then those regulations are legitimate because they are the outcomes of the democratic process (Al-Islam 311: 2).

Such an affirmative discourse is however uncharacteristic and insignificant. Overall, HTI discourse on democracy was consistently confrontational.

A.4. Delegitimizing Discourse on Elections

While the discourse on democracy was toward extreme end of the score (2.9), paradoxically HTI’s representation on elections was less extreme (2.5). Out of 16 references to the subject, the large majority (12) are extreme in nature in which they suggested non-participation in the process of election. But HTI’s language of about elections was ambiguous and less confrontational compared to that about democracy.
HTI is sometimes tolerant of election to the extent of supporting participation under certain conditions (see figure 2.1 and 2.2).

The *extreme* discourse was most prominent in the period around the 2004 election. That year, three editions of *Al-Wa’ie* took the issue of the election and/or democracy as headlines and set out arguments challenging Muslim participation. For HTI, the view that Muslim participation was important to prevent the rise of anti-Islamic forces in power was misleading. It saw this justification for participation as a benefit-based (*maslahah*) argument that contradicts Islamic teaching. It boldly argued that elections per se are prohibited (*haram*). The fact that it sometimes appeared helpful to advance Muslim political interests did not make it permissible (*halal*). The sitting of Muslim politicians in the House or in Cabinet, in HTI’s view, did not necessarily guarantee the protection of Muslim political interests (*Al-Wa’ie* 41: 10).

To illustrate its skepticism, HTI highlighted the failures of Islamic parties to advocate the supremacy of the shari’ah. It reminded Muslims that the accommodation to specific Muslim interests in the existing system did not justify participation in elections; the nature of such accommodation was only partial. It suggested that Muslim acceptance of partial adoption of the shari’ah would only sustain the legitimacy of the established system (*Al-Wa’ie* 41: 10). The idea of establishing an Islamic state through parliamentary struggle made no sense from HTI’s perspective. HTI directly challenged the following logic: “Run in elections, gain majority seats and then amend the constitution to make an Islamic state” (*Al-Wa’ie* 41: 49). It argued that the success of Islamic parties in elections did not necessarily help the goal of establishing an Islamic state. The case frequently referred to in order to justify this argument was the annulment of the victory of the Algerian Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). HTI believed that when Islamic parties democratically won an
election, Western countries blocked it from implementing the shari’ah on the premise that this will preserve democracy (Al-Wa’ie 41: 11).

HTI therefore urged Islamic political parties to cease expecting political change in favour of Islam unless social awareness in favor of a systemic change can be created. It was not rare for HTI to encourage ‘non-participation’ in elections by pointing to the rising number of abstentions (golput; literally means white block) in elections, even though it denied that it was actually promoting this practice (Al-Wa’ie 41: 26).

Despite these arguments, HTI’s views of election were not totally extreme. At times, it recognized elections as one of methods adopted during the period of khilafah rule. Ignoring the different contexts between the khilafah and democratic systems, HTI viewed elections as an optional tactic (uslub); and they can be legitimate. Using this argument HTI did not therefore completely rule out the option of taking part in an election. HTI is open to participation in legislative elections given the possible role of parliament as a vocal place to promote shari’ah alternatives (Al-Wa’ie 41: 27-29).

The shift toward a more open position on elections occurred around the 2009 election. In March 2009, a month before the election, HTI issued a circular (nasyroh) encouraging support for Islamic parties and pro-shari’ah candidates. In the nasyroh HTI compared elections to the Islamic concept of wakalah or contractual representation. It argued that wakalah is permissible if it meets a number of requirements that include: (a) a direct and clearly defined contract between the actor (muwakil) and the recipient (mutawakil) to represent them, (b) both the actor and the recipient of wakalah must be authorized and capable, and (c) the purpose of representation is a matter permissible in Islamic law (Al-Wa’ie 41: 47-48). Like wakalah, casting ballots in elections is permitted if the voters and candidates meet
these requirements. The last point (c) of these requirements is significant. As the
subject of wakalah must be matters that are legitimate from the shari’ah point of view,
HTI allowed support for candidates who openly and consistently campaign for the
implementation of the shari’ah. It believed that this commitment must be clear in the
candidates’ daily life and attitude (HTI, 26 March 2009, Al-Islam 448).41

The condition of contract between the actor and the recipient of representation
(wakalah) is less essential than the candidates’ commitment to a shari’ah campaign.
This suggests HTI’s desire to participate in elections was meant to undermine
democracy from within the process itself. This orientation is confirmed by Ismail
Yusanto’s call for the adoption of a ‘winner takes all’ system in elections as a
condition for participation. This means that winning an election as a means to gain
power to make fundamental changes, including the abolition of democracy, should be
the prime reason for voting. For this reason, Yusanto demands the removal of a clause
in the election regulations that prohibit political campaigns that question Pancasila and
the UUD ’45 (Al-Wa’ie 47: 8).42

In addition to this ultimate goal, the more tolerant discourse about elections
occurred in 2009 advocating using the election as means for education the public. For
this purpose, HTI described elections as a good moment rather a danger. It stated:

Pemilu tahun 2009 adalah momentum penting untuk meningkatkan
upaya-upaya dakwah guna membina umat agar memiliki jiwa dan
pemikiran Islam, wawasan politik Islam, dan aspirasi politik Islam
serta menjadikan sistem ideologi Islam- baik dalam bidang ekonomi
maupun sosial- sabagai satu-satunya alternatif (Al-Wa’ie 93: 7).

This 2009 election is an important momentum to intensify
propagation to educate the ummah with the Islamic spirit and thought
as well as with the political aspiration to demand the adoption of

41 See also Yusanto’s comment on the question of using democracy and election for shari’ah advocacy
in HTI’s website (HTI, 26 March 2009).
42 This refers to the1999 law on election chapter 47, article 1.a. that states “In election campaigns, it is
prohibited to question Pancasila and UUD ’45) (National Election Commitee).
Islamic ideological system as a sole alternative, either in economic, political and social system.

Even though the aim to bring about a total change was reasserted, HTI gave special conditions for participation. Instead of advocating a boycott, it called for Islamic parties to use the election to establish Islamic identity. This can happen when candidates advocate the adoption of the shari’ah in their campaigns (*Al-Wa’ie* 93: 7). In this way HTI sought to mobilize a sectarian (religious) divide in politics through the election process. This stance also gave HTI the flexibility to back parties or candidates in elections who agree to carry its agenda.

More pragmatically, HTI also described elections as an opportunity. This is apparent in the statement of Yusanto in 2005. After highlighting many problems surrounding local elections, he still saw the possibilities that might come out of local elections:

Dalam era otonomi daerah, pemilihan kepala daerah bisa memberikan kesempatan untuk penerapan syari’ah islam di level daerah. Apabila didukung oleh DPRD niat itu akan lebih mudah diwujudkan seperti yang terjadi di semuamah daerah. Di kabupaten Bulukumba misalnya telah dibuat peraturan daerah tentang busana Muslim, pemberantasan buta huruf al-Qur’an, larangan minuman keras yang berhasil menekan kriminalitas hingga 85% dan perda zakat yang mampu mendongkrak PAD yang sebelumnya hanya 9 milyar rupiah menjadi 90 milyar atau 10 kali lipat (*Al-Wa’ie* 59: 44).

In the era of local autonomy, elections for local government can give opportunities for shari’ah implementation. If supported by the regional House of Representative (DPRD), the implementation of this goal will be easier. This has happened in some regions. In the district of Bulukumba, for example, regulations have been made on Islamic dress, Qur’anic literacy, prohibition of alcohol that have reduced crimes by 85 percent and the ruling of *zakat* that has increased local income by 10 times.

Yusanto maintained the view of the importance of fully applying the shari’ah. Yet, along side this assertion, he also accepted the gradual application of shari’ah, as reflected in the following part of his comment:
Perda itu tentu masih sangat jauh dari mencukupi untuk penerpaan shari’ah islam secara kaffah. Tapi dengan pemimpin yang pro-shari’ah (bupati Bulukumba meski dari Golkar, ia sangat bersemangat untuk menerapkan syari’ah) dan dengan dukungan DPRD serta rakyat secara keseluruhan peluang penerpana shari’ah Islam tentu lebih terbuka” (Al-Wa’ie 59: 44).

Those Perdas are still far from the ideal goal of the comprehensive application of shari’ah. But the presence of a pro-shari’ah leader (the district head of Bulukumba who, even though he comes from the Golkar party, is very enthusiastic in implementing the shari’ah and with support from DPRD [regional House] as well as people in general, chances for shari’ah application will become larger.

The overall nature of HTI’s discourse on elections was delegitimizing, but it is clear that, unlike its consistent opposition to democracy, HTI was not totally against elections. This suggests an effort to maintain the balance between sustaining opposition to the political system and an interest in securing political opportunities. Even though the extra-parliamentary process of change was still the ideal in the minds of HTI’s leaders, they also have begun to see elections as an opportunity to challenge the political establishment and an opportunity to mobilize sectarian politics. A parliamentary struggle is thus not totally ruled out.

B. Discourse on Political Institutions

I followed references to elements of political institutions that are essential for the functioning of the democratic system. These key democratic institutions include the government (pemerintah), the House of Representatives (DPR), political parties (including major Muslim-based and nationalist parties), the courts (Supreme Court, court, and Islamic court), the police, and the military. It appears that HTI’s discourse on political institutions was nearly parallel to its discourse on the political system. Out of 207 references, the average view is radical with a tendency toward an extreme stance illustrated by the score of 2.2. This is slightly less extreme than the discourse
on the political system, which is 2.4. The discourse on both the intellectual (political system) and institutional aspects of the state is not over extreme, but is overtly radical. As illustrated in figures 3.3 and 3.4 below, the following discussion shows different attitudes of HTI toward different elements of political institutions.

![Figure 3.3: Discourse on political structure](image)

![Figure 3.4: Spectrum of discourse on political structure](image)

**B.1. Challenging Discourse on Government and the House of Representative**

HTI’s line of relationship with the State is represented by the concept of *dhurb al-‘alaqoh* or “attacking illegitimate bonds in society” and “breaking the relationship between the ummah and the state.” It assumes that the standing of the State depends on the commitment or trust (*thiqah*) of societies to maintain their relationship.
(‘alaqah) with the State. Therefore the key for a fundamental change is removing this trust or commitment (thiqah) to the State; something that will ultimately foster the breaking up of social obedience (Al-Wa’ie 58: 42-46).

This revolutionary objective was translated in the challenging, yet not confrontational, discourse on the Government and the House of Representatives. HTI’s discourse on these two institutions was a mix of radical, extreme and sometimes moderate language. Extreme views appeared more frequently in the discourse on the House of Representatives, while radical discourse is dominant on the references to the government. In aggregate, the discourse on the Government (2.1) is less extreme than that on the House (2.6), but both are considerably radical (see figure 3.4). This indicates that despite its criticism of both institutions, HTI tended to be more engaging in its attitude toward the government than toward the House.

**B.1.a. Discourse on the Government**

There are 86 references to the Government. The majority of the discourse on this subject is radical with 40 occurrences – compared to 29 extreme and 17 moderate (see figure 3.3).

The extreme discourse appeared in the form of discussion of the Government for its failures and its identification with “evil characters” or ideas such as the West, “infidels,” secularism and liberalism. In Al-Wa’ie, HTI confronted the government with negative labels such as ‘komprador’ (puppet), traitor and tyrant (zalim) in references to cases such as the alleged inability of the government to challenge US wars in Muslim countries and its adoption of capitalism or liberalism in the economy (Al-Wa’ie 95; Al-Wa’ie 82: 9-12). It accused the Government of permitting Western un-Islamic ideas to take root. This referred to the Government’s adoption of human
rights covenant, its inaction against Islamic liberal organizations, and its approval of the operation of Western NGOs and companies. To demonstrate the government’s evil character, HTI often referred to the government’s policies it claimed favouring foreign agendas such as the regulation of ‘healthy reproduction’ (that it considered encouraging sex before married), the legislation of law on domestic violence, and the permission granted to the US’s health research unit and the Naval Research Unit (NAMRU) to operate in Indonesia. Using these cases, HTI argued that the Government has colonized its own people (Al-Islam 412) and led the country into a failed state (Al-Wa’ie 96: 3-4).

The extreme nature of this discourse is the description of the Government as not only incapable, but also inherently dangerous or evil. It therefore demonized the Government by indentifying it an evil character mentioned in a Prophet Muhammad’s saying (hadith):


The economic, political and social policies of the government are increasingly unfriendly to the people. They [the government] only implement policies set up by foreign states and their puppets. The people meanwhile increasingly suffer. They [the government] are the zalim [tyrants] described by the Prophet as people with cow’s tail looked lash.

The term ‘people with the cow’s tail looked lash” referred to a description of a tyrant regime mentioned by the Prophet Muhammad in the following hadith:

At the end of the world there will be some people from the ummah who carry “cow’s tail-looked lash” to hit people. From the morning through the evening they are always angry and hateful to Allah.

With this reference, HTI elevated its opposition to the Government into a ‘transcendence war’ between the forces of God and the forces of evil.

Based on this, HTI suggested that the government was not worth supporting. Its failure to be a good Muslim Government meant that the people have to work to undermine its legitimacy and refuse to obey or collaborate with it (Al-Wa’ie 6: 12).

Such an extreme position was however, not always taken. The majority of HTI’s language about the government is radical; it was criticized, but is hopeful. In this model of discourse HTI extended hopes that the Government would take measures on specific issues while at the same time it maintained the call for the shari’ah and the khilafah.

HTI’s response to the case of the mining operation of the Freeport Corporation in Papua is a good example of this type of discourse. HTI criticized the government’s unwillingness to end the contract made by Soeharto. HTI accused the Government of neglecting its people and giving away national resources to foreign interests. But despite this criticism, HTI demanded Government action on the matter, which included the following policies: ending the contract deal with Freeport, ending the capitalistic management of natural resources and applying a just management of the natural resources based on the shari’ah (Al-Islam 295).

In a fewer number of references to the government, HTI used moderate language. It addressed the Government advocating policy changes without suggesting the necessity of a systemic change or the establishment of the khilafah. This view usually occurred in HTI’s efforts to encourage the government towards favouring HTI’s campaign against perceived foreign enemies. Within this rubric, HTI for
example, demanded that the government continue subsidies on fuel and power in opposition to the foreign demand for economic liberalization (Al-Wa’ie 30: 31). It encouraged the Government to take over the management of mining and power industries from international and private corporations, and to eliminate the separatism in Aceh, Papua and Maluku (Al-Wa’ie 81: 42; Al-Islam 203). In the context of its confrontation with human rights and liberal Muslim activists, HTI also demanded that the Government ban NGOs associated with so called ‘liberal activists.’ HTI claimed that foreign funding of such NGOs served foreign interests that are harmful to Indonesia and therefore deserve elimination (Suara Merdeka, 19 June, 2006). HTI’s attempt to persuade the Government to favour the Muslim side and confront its enemies sometimes included a symbolic demand that contradicts HTI’s principles. For example, despite the typical argument that shari’ah laws are only effective when implemented in their entirety, HTI paradoxically demanded that the Government apply the Islamic punishment of “an eye for an eye” called the qisash law against the Christian perpetrators of the Ambon conflict, despite the fact that such a law is not recognized in the Indonesian legal system (Al-Wa’ie 79: 8).

Another pattern of HTI’s friendly discourse on Government occurs in the form of its endorsement of Government polices in favour of a desired Islamic political agenda. For example, it praised the policies of the local government in Tanjung Jabung district in Jambi for providing free education and health services. HTI’s leader at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, hailed these policies as the implementations of

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43 Even though HTI demands that the government take over international companies, it tries to avoid an association with socialism, which it opposes. HTI therefore denies the allegation that it endorses a form of nationalization that is identical with socialism. It argues that the khilafah policy of the government’s sole authority to explore natural resources is based on an Islamic teaching that is dissimilar to the socialist model of nationalization. HTI for example condemned a draft of law on foreign investment. Having said this, HTI also asserts that, unlike socialism that requires nationalization in all sectors, Islam promotes nationalization of public poverty, but allows privatization of personal property (HTI, 28 Maret 2007).

44 This view is offered by Muhammad Al-Khattath who was the leader of HTI at the time. The policy after Al-Khattath’s departure is however, not dissimilar.
the shari’ah, regardless of its partial nature (*Al-Wa’ie 74: 7*). In these cases political reforms leading to a desired outcome was considered better than no reform at all. The number of this type of friendly or moderate language is very low compared to radical and extreme languages (see figure 3.3). To combine radical and extreme discourse, compared to the moderate discourse, the dominant pattern of HTI’s discourse on Government is oppositional. However, it is clear that it also not confrontational. This is shown in the significance number of radical and moderate discourse. Despite their different degree of opposition, both stances are characterized by recognition of the government’s capacity to make positive changes. This indicates the willingness of HTI, when self interests is in mind, to sacrifice the revolutionary need to challenge the government.

**B.1.b. Discourse on the House of Representative**

HTI’s discourse on legislative institutions tends to be extreme at a 2.6 score (see figure 2.3). I followed references to two aspects of legislative institutions, the lower house commonly referred to House of Representatives (DPR) and the upper house that refers to the Peoples’ Consultative Assembly (MPR). Out of 24 references, extreme discourse is dominant, with 19 references. Radical discourse occurs 4 times, and rare moderate discourse occurs only once (see figure 3.3).

Like those examples of extreme discourse on the government, HTI’s extreme discourse on the House takes the form of identifying it with foreign powers. The House was characterized as a ‘foreign agent’ in references to a number of laws passed such as the alleged pro-liberalization laws on the management of the power industry and the exploitation of natural resources and foreign investment (UU No. 4, 2009) and the law on the national management of education (UU No. 9, 2009), which in HTI’s
view, favours the interests of non-Muslims at the expense of Muslims (Al-Wa’ie 95: 11). It also described the House as incapable of acting in the interest of the people because of its unrepresentative nature. HTI argued that members of the House do not represent the people because their successes in elections were made possible by their money than their role in society. This, according to HTI, led to the tendency of the members of House to serve the interests of the elite rather than that of the people (Al-Wa’ie 42: 7-12). To emphasize the un-Islamic nature of the house, HTI usually compared its current political system to the idealized political system of the khilafah.45

Despite these criticisms, HTI was not always sceptical of the House. This stance was taken in the context of its advocacy of the Muslim political interests. For example, in the context of parliamentary sessions to discuss constitutional reform in the early 2000s, HTI joined the campaign with some Muslim groups that demanded that the House re-insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution (Al-Islam 19). HTI often called for the House to confront Western influences. HTI identified itself with the House in its campaign for the law against pornographic activities in order to confront human right activists (Al-Wa’ie 73: 8).

Even though in aggregate the nature of HTI’s discourse about the House is 2.6, the number of this type of conciliatory or moderate discourse is significant. There are only eight references on the house, and a half is moderate. This indicates that in spite of its extra-parliamentary doctrine, HTI also saw opportunities for change taking place through the House. This is reflected in HTI’s argument casting doubt on the House’s members elected in 2009. One of the reasons for the doubt is the dominance of the secular parties in the House, not the illegitimacy of the institution.46 This indicates a

45 For a detailed illustration of the perspective of HTI on the differences between political process in democracy and in Islam see Al-Wa’ie (41: 21-22)
46 In the 2009 election, as in previous elections, parties with Islamic backgrounds in Indonesia lag behind the nationalist parties. The top three nationalist parties including Demokrat, Golkar and
desire to push for more Islamic parties in the House and to use the House as a vocal point for shari’ah and khilafah and campaigns.

**B. 2. Mixed discourse on political parties**

HTI identifies itself as a political party (Anonim 2008: 200), but emphasizes that it is different from the existing parties in two ways: first it rejects participation in the secular democratic process and second it considers the existing political parties as lacking an ideological credibility and therefore sees them as unreliable. Logically, it is mandatory for HTI to oppose political parties because it is the existence of these parties that defines the legitimacy of democracy.

To investigate HTI’s discourse on this key aspect of democracy, I followed references to major political parties and categorized them into Islamic and non-Islamic or secular parties. 47 Non Islamic-based parties include the Democratic Party, Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), and two new parties that passed the parliamentary threshold in the last election of 2009, namely the Gerindra and the Hanura. As for Islamic-based parties, I followed the five top parties including, the Prosperous Justice Party/PKS (including its previous name, Justice Party/PK), the United Development Party (PPP), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). Islamic-based parties are parties that originate from Muslim organizations or movements. Some of these like PPP, PAN and PBB, formally adopt Islam as an organizational foundation and originated from groups that historically advocated for the State to adopt the shari’ah. Others like PKB and PAN chose to adopt Pancasila and were less vocal in advocating

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47 For the use of this categorization, see Suryadinata (2002).
the shari’ah and were more inclusive of non-Muslims. This difference however, does not always translate into practice because politics increasingly blurs ideological boundaries. This study nonetheless uses this categorization to anticipate HTI’s preference for certain parties over others. In addition to tracking references on the names of parties, this study also followed references to general terms such as ‘party’ and ‘Islamic party’ to capture HTI’s discourse on party politics in general.

The survey result showed that HTI’s discourse on political parties was not overly challenging. HTI’s combination of extreme, radical and moderate discourse on political parties raises the question of its seriousness in challenging this key element of democracy. In parallel to its discourse on elections that is less extreme than the discourse on democracy (see figure 3.2), HTI’s discourse on political parties is slightly less extreme than its view of elections. There are 69 references to these subjects, out of which 44 references are extreme. The extreme discourse is dominant; but the number of radical discourse that occurs 19 times is not insignificant. Additionally, the reference to political parties is occasionally moderate - occurring 6 times. Overall, HTI’s discourse on political parties (both Islamic and secular parties) is overtly radical as illustrated in the average score of 2.4. Although it is not extreme, this clearly demonstrates HTI’s strong challenge of the legitimacy party politics (see figure 3.3).

The core of HTI’s extreme discourse was based on the view that the party system is a modern invention of the West; and this system is incompatible with Islam. The Western model of political parties centres on ‘winning an election’ as the primary task of political activity. This model contrasts with HTI’s view of politics (siyasah). Siyasah means “activities to address public issues.” The goal of Islamic politics, in HTI’s view, is promoting the shari’ah as the sole foundation of the management of
public affairs. HTI therefore defined political parties in Islam or an Islamic political party as an association where a group of people works to achieve this goal of enforcing the shari’ah in public affairs. Based on this, HTI excluded elections as the primary role of Islamic political parties. Its ‘map of action’ (see page 60-61) defines the ideal roles of Islamic parties; they include: (a) the intensive recruitment to strengthen a party’s structure, (b) public engagement to create political awareness about the importance of the shari’ah, (c) challenging un-Islamic ideas and laws, (d) educating the ummah about the danger of Western ideas, and (e) supporting the role of the shari’ah over public affairs with the shari’ah in all aspects of life (*Al-Islam* 159). Contrasting its version of party activism, HTI argued that unlike the existing parties that focus on gaining votes in an election, HTI emphasized that the main task of a political party is to “educate the masses” (*Al-Wa’ie* 41: 34)

HTI’s strong opposition to political parties was set out in the third issue of *Al-Wa’ie* published in November 2000. The question and answer section of this edition took as its theme the issue of the legality of Islamic advocacy in parliament. The answer was boldly negative; it stated: “[with no doubt or *qath‘i thubut* and *qath‘i dilala*] it is prohibited (*haram*) to participate in a government that implements un-Islamic laws, both as members of the house or as a member of the government” (*Al-Wa’ie* 3: 25). In its *extreme* language, HTI hailed the dangerous nature of political participation by referring to an alliance of Christians and Jews with Muslims, which was addressed in the Qur’an (5: 51).48

HTI therefore openly accused Muslims who take part in party politics as committing what is prohibited (*haram*). This is clear in the paragraph in *Al-Wa’ie*:

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48 The verse states: “Oh you, who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are (in fact) allies of another. And whoever is in ally to them among you- then indeed he is (one) of them. Indeed Allah Guides not wrongdoing people.”
Memang penguasa di negeri Muslim sekarang bukan Yahudi ataupun Nashrani. Namun mereke itu berwali kepada kaum kafir tersebut. Oleh sebab itu siapa saja yang berwali kepada orang yang berwali kepada orang Yahudi dan Nashrani maka ia telah berwali kepada yahudi dan Nashrani. Tidak dapat dikatakan bahwa menerapkan hukum kufur itu bukan berarti memberikan loyalitas wala (loyalitas). Sebab loyalitas itu harus ditunjukkan dengan hati dan perbuatan; termasuk menentang pemerintah demikian itu (Al-Wa’ie 3: 25).

Even though the present rulers of Muslim countries are not Jews and Christians, they ally with those infidels. Therefore everyone who allies with these who ally with the Jews and Christians allies with the Jews and Christians. It is not true that implementing infidel laws is not a form of loyalty [wala] (to the un-Islamic system). This is because loyalty should be demonstrated by faith and action, and this includes challenging such a Government.

There is a tendency that HTI avoids mentioning the names of parties when attacking political parties. At times it refers to specific party names (see for example Al-Wa’ie 41: 7-8, Al-Islam 47). For example, a few months before the 2004 election, HTI focused on criticizing the role of Islamic parties in the election. An editorial in Al-Wa’ie titled “Parpol Islam; Apa yang Kamu Cari?” (“Islamic parties, what are you looking for?”) countered Muslim arguments for participation in elections. HTI challenged the view that political participation will open opportunities for the application of the shari’ah. It argued that, as history has shown, democracy will never accommodate Islam. It therefore urged Islamic parties to realize that the presence of Muslims advocating Islamic norms in democratic systems only serves a ‘democratic game’ that preserves the political establishment (Al-Wa’ie 41: 4). HTI also rejected the argument that Muslim participation in the democratic process is beneficial for preventing the rise of anti-Islamic leaders. It argued that “preventing evil” cannot be supported by committing what is prohibited. As democracy was seen as the tool of the infidel to destroy Islam, participation in democracy was considered a major sin (Al-
In this criticism to Islamic parties, HTI did not make reference to the names of the parties.

This suggests that HTI’s attack was focused more on the way Islamic political parties behave rather than on the parties as organizations. This is illustrated by the fact that HTI’s language was sometimes hopeful of the role of Islamic parties. This is apparent in its recurring call for Islamic parties to compete in elections with non-Islamic (nationalist) parties.

The differentiation between Islamic and non-Islamic parties is interesting not only because it is inconsistent with HTI’s opposition to a party system, but also because in reality the ideological differences between Islamic and non-Islamic parties is often blurred. This differentiation appears in HTI’s language about Islamic and nationalist or secular parties. The 69 references on political parties can be divided into 46 references to Islamic parties and 23 to nationalist parties. The amount of conciliatory discourse is higher in the references to Islamic parties than it is to nationalist parties. Figure 3.5 below demonstrates that even though extreme discourse is dominant in describing both Islamic and secular parties, the combination of moderate and radical discourse on Islamic parties is nearly equal to extreme discourse. In contrast, extreme discourse on secular parties is largely dominant over the combine number of moderate and radical discourses. This makes the average discourse on Islamic parties less extreme than the discourse on non-Islamic parties-2.4 over 2.7. This means that even though HTI was highly critical of both Islamic and secular parties, it tended to be more engaging toward Islamic rather than secular parties.
HTI’s *moderate* discourse on Islamic parties occurred mostly in the context of their support of the Islamic political agenda. When the *radical* and *moderate* discourse on Islamic parties is combined into a conciliatory category based on their optimism toward Islamic parties, the conciliatory discourse appears 21 times, only one less than the *extreme* discourse. This is especially significant because the extreme discourse mostly appeared in general phrases terms like “Islamic parties” rather than explicitly referring to the names of the parties. This means that in spite of the dominant nature of HTI’s challenge to political parties it tended to avoid confrontation with Islamic parties.

A good example of HTI’s conciliatory discourse on Islamic parties is when it criticized Islamic parties like the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) for their rejection of the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution during the parliamentary session in 2001. In the same edition of *Al-Islam* that published this criticism, HTI praised other Islamic parties like PPP and PBB for their campaign in favour of the reinsertion (*Al-Islam* 19). This demonstrates HTI’s
expectation that Islamic parties will play a major role in the campaign for the implementation of the shari’ah. This is, however, not without conditions. HTI suggested that a partial campaign in favour of the shari’ah is tolerable so long as it is carried out while campaigning for a comprehensive change (*Al-Wa’ie* 41: 53). That is why the core of HTI’s criticism of Islamic parties is largely directed toward their lack of ideology rather than their participation in the democratic process.

B.3. Conciliatory discourse on the police and the military as ‘*ahlul quwwah’*

Compared to the dominance of challenging discourse on the other elements of the state institutions, the discussion of the role of the police and the military is much more conciliatory, with an average score of 1.4. Figure 3.3. shows 16 references to these subjects in which the majority of them are *moderate*. This reflects their special (especially military) place in HTI’s appeal for support.

HTI focused on seeking support from the military more than from the police. This is based on the view that the military has a crucial role in political transitions. In HTI’s view, the process of the government transition in 2001 from Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) to Megawati is an example of the key role played by the military. It argued that when Gusdur issued a decree to dissolve parliament, it was military insubordination that prevented the decree from being effective (*Al-Islam* 195). HTI’s concept of *ahlul quwwah* (power holder) applies to diverse groups of elites in societies including religious leaders, Islamic political parties, national leaders, intellectuals, as well as the police and the military. However HTI believed that the real and most critical holder of power (*ahlul quwwah*) is the military. This is reflected in its specific mention of the military when discussing the importance of *ahlul quwwah* in the

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49 This view is partially true, but ignores the fact that without a wide scale of support from major political forces, it was unlikely that the military would have taken insubordination.
process of political change \( (istilam\ al-hukm) \). HTI was however sometimes critical of the military as shown by its reaction to the rise of Megawati to the presidency and the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon in 2000. But such negative language has been directed to specific units in the military rather the institution as a whole \( (Al-Islam\ 63; Al-Wa’ie\ 79: 7) \).

HTI envisaged the military will support efforts at seizing power after it had successfully moulded public opinion in favour of shari’ah. It believed that the existing regime and international powers would prevent the rise of Islam to political power; so it saw the vital role of the military as necessary to protect the forces of change. This vision was set out as follows:

Jika dukungan mayoritas terwujud, opini umum untuk tegakkanya Islam terbentuk, organisasi/parpol Islam ideologis (read: HTI) yang memimpin perubahan hidup di dalam masyarakat ditopang oleh para ahlul quwwah, maka penerimaan kekuasaan \( (istilam\ al-hukm) \) dari rakyat oleh orang-orang yang dipercayainya akan menggantikan Islam—sosialisme-komunisme dan kapitalisme....Di sisi lain fakta sejarah menunjukkan bahwa rezim lama maupun pihak luar negeri tidak akan berdiam diri. Untuk itu, mutlak adanya dukungan kalangan pemilik ahlul-quwwah dari berbagai kalangan, termasuk militer \( (Al-Wa’ie\ 62: 23) \).

If majority support is gained, public opinion for the establishment of Islam is moulded, and an ideological Islamic organization/party [read HTI] that leads change of life in societies is supported by ahlul quwwah [power holders], then there will be a transfer of power \( (istilam\ al-hukm) \) from the people to those they trust. [The new leader] will replace socialism, communism and capitalism with Islam...On the other hand history shows that older regimes or foreign powers will not stay quiet. Therefore the support of ahlul quwwah from various segments, including the military, is by necessity.

It is therefore understandable that while many pro-democratic groups feared the return of military to politics, HTI in contrast desired it. For HTI the political role of the military is especially relevant in the context of fundamental change. It suggested:

TNI memang tidak terlibat lagi dalam kegiatan politik sehari-hari. Tapi dalam menyangkut kepentingan-kepentingan strategis, seperti
perubahan konsitusi, perubahan bentuk negara, dan pemilihan kepala negara, TNI harus tetap berperan (Al-Islam 69).

Even though the military is no longer involved in political affairs it has to take a part in strategic affairs such as changes of constitution and form of the state, the appointment of military commanders and the appointment of the head of state.

C. Ambivalent Discourse on Muslims’s Participatory politics

What I mean by “Muslim participatory politics” here is Muslim activities that advocate Islamic norms or the shari’ah applied within the democratic framework. This includes a range of agendas, from a less political demand for Islamization of the educational system and minor demands for enforcing anti-heretic regulations to a wider demand of the adoption of a shari’ah economy and the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution. To investigate HTI’s views on this model of Muslim politics, I followed references to Muslim organizations, Islamic political parties, Muslim leaders, and issues of key significance in Indonesian Muslim politics. Because of HTI’s anti-systemic doctrine, its view on participatory politics is essential if it is to challenge democracy. Its doctrine requires it to oppose involvement in political participation because it can undermine its goal of exposing the failures of the existing political system (see page 56-69).

In spite of this doctrine, HTI’s discourse on various forms of Muslim politics appears ambivalent. On the one hand, HTI asserted the importance of a total change. On another hand however, it did not only tolerate reforms, but also joined reformist Muslim groups to proactively advocate state enforcement of specific cases of Islamic norms. The inconsistency of the discourse on participatory politics is especially obvious in the variation of HTI’s representations on unspecified and specified cases in Muslim participatory politics as discussed below.
C.1. Challenging Unspecified Participatory Politics: Islahi and tadarruj

Based on its doctrine of non-participation, HTI called for Muslim attention to what it saw as an anti-Islamic conspiracy. Citing a report written by Ariel Cohen about the role of Muslim participation in democracy to tame Islamic extremism, HTI urges Muslim leaders to see the point that Muslim participation in democracy is a Western trap to destroy Islamic movements (*Al-Wa'ie* 78: 3).\(^{50}\) To discourage Muslim participation in democracy, HTI distinguishes two models of change: ‘thariqah islahiyah’ (partial reform) or *tadarruj* (gradualism) and ‘thariqah taghyir’ (fundamental change). Reformist change can only take place in a legitimate political system. But when the fundamental aspect of a problem is not legitimate, such that in the case of democracy, then *islahi da’wah* or “propagation of changes” within the framework of the existing political system is considered illegitimate (*Al-Wa’ie* 6: 17-20).

To call attention to the importance of a fundamental change, a leader of HTI in Yogyakarta proposed an analogy to *da’wah* (proselytization). He argued that when the target of *da’wah* is a non-Muslim, the purpose of the *da’wah* should be to persuade the person to embrace Islam. Persuading non-Muslims to perform *sholat* (prayer) or *zakat* (alm giving), for example, was considered useless because *sholat* and *zakat* are only an obligation for those who already embrace Islam. Likewise, because Indonesia does not adopt Islam as a political system it was considered a non-Islamic state. Thus the purpose of *da’wah* in the country should be first directed at converting the country to embrace Islam or to become an Islamic state. Only after the state adopted the

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\(^{50}\) Cohen’s report is available at Cohen (2003). His recommendation to support democracy and political participation as a way to counter the influence of HT is one of four recommendations he proposes.
shari’ah as a constitution would it be legitimate for islahi da’wah.\textsuperscript{51} On this basis, HTI attacked Islamic movements that work within the framework of the existing system by accusing them of “clothing” an anti-Islamic system with an Islamic cloth:

Gerakan-gerakan Islam yang cenderung pada system yang ada dengan melakukan aktifitas islahiyah telah melakukan kompromi dengan system tersebut ...mereka berkeinginan mewarani system tersebut dengan waran Islam, walaupun sebatas kulit, sementara pada saat yang sama mengekalkan bagian pokok yang kontra Islam tetapi berbaju Islam (\textit{Al-Wa’ie} 6: 20).

Islamic movements that embrace an existing system by islahiyah [reformist] activities means that they have compromised with the system...They colour the system with Islamic colour though at the surface level. At the same time they strengthen the fundamental aspects of the system that are against Islam with an Islamic cloth.

HTI also described Muslim participatory politics as a boomerang that could kill the struggle for an Islamic state:

Ketika sebuah gerakan Islam menerima ide bergabung dengan penguasa yg kufur seperti masuk dalam cabinet, ikut membuat hukum..maka apa yang dilakukannya sama dengan menusukkan belati beracun ke rah jantungnya sendiri. Artinya gerakan Islam yang melakukan tindakan demikian pada dasarnya sedang melakukan tindakan bunuh diri (\textit{Al-Wa’ie} 9: 33)

When an Islamic movement accepts an idea to participate in a kufr [infidel] government by becoming a cabinet member and taking part in law making...that means stabbing a poisonous knife into his own heart. This type of action by an Islamic movement is suicidal.

In a lengthy discussion of the concept of \textit{tadarruj} (gradualism), \textit{Al-Wa’ie} provides examples of Muslim gradualist approaches deemed harmful to achieving a fundamental change. These include the idea of establishing an Islamic state that is limited to a one nation state, and starting changes from the level of the individual,

\textsuperscript{51} This argument was delivered in a programme called HIRO (“Halaqoh Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin”Forum for Islam for the Good of Mankind) held in the State Islamic University (UIN) of Yogyakarta on 8 August 2009. The workshop targeted selected Muslim leaders from different organizations. Even though the conference was framed around an inclusive topic “Bersinergi Wujudkan Islam Penebar Rahmah” (cooperation building for the realization of Islam that spreads social good), the speakers who all come from HTI spoke uncompromisingly about the necessity of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. My presence in the workshop was made possible by the permission of a good friend who is a leader of HTI in Yogyakarta and who was a speaker in the workshop.
family, and society before creating the Islamic state. HTI saw this approach as a betrayal of the Islamic opposition to democracy (Al-Wa’ie 45: 24). Likewise HTI did not see the rise of Islamic study groups among urban people, the booming of shari’ah banking, Islamic fashions, and Islamic programmes on radio and in the media as positive developments for the khilafah campaign. HTI was aware of the delegitimating potential of such activities. It focused on starting with an Islamic state and described activities as “ironical Islamic enthusiasm” that were irrelevant to the Muslim political interest (Al-Wa’ie 78: 11). HTI asserted that the implementation of the shari’ah, especially for those in the area of public affairs (ri’ayah su’un al-ummah), is the sole authority of a khilafah government (Al-Islam 261). Therefore, no individual, group, or States in the current world has the right to implement shari’ah. With this argument HTI challenged the implementation of shari’ah by non-khilafah states like Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (Al-Wa’ie 11: 14-19).

HTI however refrained from demanding that Muslims stop participating in this form of politics. It suggested that da’wah for moral and spiritual development is not to be left aside but to be used proportionally to support the campaign for total change (Al-Wa’ie 45: 27). Likewise, HTI refrained from urging Muslims to leave parliament. It argued that da’wah through parliament is legitimate so long as it is aimed at using the parliament as a vocal point for da’wah to correct government misconducts and legislate for the laws of God to be implemented (Al-Wa’ie 45: 29).

This restraint is in line with the ambiguity between HTI’s challenge on unspecified Muslim participatory politics and its support or lack of criticism in specific instances when Muslims seek political accommodation. HTI’s criticism of what it called ‘ironical Islamic enthusiasm’ is a good example of its ambivalence on this matter. The column criticized the da’wah model that focuses on individual
morality (referring to a popular TV preacher, Aa Gym) but it avoided making direct judgments on people and organizations. The name of Aa Gym or his organization, Qalb Management, are absent from the discussion (Al-Wa‘ie 11: 14-19). As discussed in the next section, HTI’s response to specific cases of Muslim politics is paradoxically both uncritical and yet supportive.

C.2. Limited Support for Specified Participatory Politics

The democratic struggle for shari’ah in Indonesia provides HTI with a context for its argument on the illegitimacy of enforcing shari’ah within a democratic political system. Even though the adoption of the shari’ah in Indonesian legal system is not as extensive as in Saudi Arabia, an Islamic court is available to resolve family issues based on the shari’ah. Some aspects of criminal law against gambling, alcohol, prostitution and others have been passed by some local governments. HTI was often critical and skeptical of partial shari’ah enforcement in Indonesia. However, when dealing with specific cases of Islamic political aspiration HTI tended to be supportive of Muslim advocacies for the partial adoption of the shari’ah.

![Figure 3.6: Discourse on specific issues related to Muslim interests](image)

Issues surveyed include comments on to the following issues: Jakarta Charter, alleged heresies or blasphemy against Islam, immoralities (most notably pornography issue), sharia’ah banking,
To investigate HTI’s views on instances of Muslim participatory politics, I surveyed references to key issues of Islamic political affairs. Thirty-eight references occur on various issues including heresy, Islamic morality (maksiat), the Jakarta Charter, Islamic banking or the shari’ah economy, zakat collection, and various pieces of Islamic legislation. The dominant pattern of HTI’s discourse on these subjects is critical but non-confrontational. Falling under this category are 10 moderate and 13 radical discourses. This means HTI has mostly been supportive in specified cases of participatory politics. However, it also demonstrated an effort to avoid appearing reformist or moderate by sustaining the argument of systemic change. HTI’s extreme discourse on specific cases of participatory politics is not rare. It occurs 15 times - only lower when the moderate and radical discourses are combined (see figure 3.6). Most of these extreme responses refer to “far enemies” such as Western governments or media (Al-Islam 256, Al-Islam 262, 287). This is understandable because attacking foreign enemies is safer for HTI than confronting the Indonesian Government or Muslim communities. In aggregate, the nature of HTI’s discourse on this aspect is radical at 2.1. This indicates HTI’s aim is to sustain its anti-systemic opposition without being isolated from the Muslim struggle for the shari’ah through a democratic process.

The Jakarta Charter is a draft of a constitution proposed in the early period of Indonesian independence in 1945. The seven words about the obligation for Muslims to observe shari’ah are included in the draft as a form of Muslim compromise to the agreed status of the state as a unitary republic, not an Islamic state, which was originally demanded by Muslim leaders. But in the next session of the meeting to discuss the constitution, the would be President Soekarno asked Muslim leaders to defer the adoption of the clause for national integration arguing that in the later stage such a political aspiration could be realized if Muslim gained majority seats in parliament. But this never happened because Islamic parties never gained majority of votes. Later mainstream Muslim organizations including Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah declared their commitment to democracy and Pancasila that further put the Islamic state aspiration into the periphery. For further reading on the history of the Jakarta Charter, see Boland (1982) and Saefuddin Anshari (1981).
Unlike its persistent rejection of a gradualist approach at the normative level, HTI supported a range of initiatives and policies in favor of Muslim political interests.

This includes legislation that can open a wider adoption of the shari’ah in a legal system such as its advocacy for the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter (Al-Islam 19), the inclusion of specific aspects of Islamic morality in the revision of Indonesia’s criminal law (KUHP) (Al-Islam 175) and the inclusion of the Islamic legal code (KHI) in the criminal law KUHP.\textsuperscript{54} HTI was not reluctant to defend or support minor scale legislation or Government policies that favour Islamic political interests. Some examples of Islamic political issues endorsed by HTI include government regulation of deviant Islamic sects (Al-Wa’ie 63, 94), pornography laws (Al-Islam 287, 288), inter-ministrial regulations on religious buildings (Al-Islam 272), health regulations that ban abortion (Al-Islam 271), laws on a national education system (known by the acronym Sisdiknas) that require all schools to provide Islamic lessons (Al-Islam 147), the enforcement of caning as a punishment for crime in Aceh (Al-Islam 261), and various regulations about Islamic morality in local government (Al-Islam 331, 336).

In addition to the extreme tendency in its discourse on “foreign enemies,” HTI’s most consistent extreme discourse appears on the subject of zakat (alm giving). Following the doctrine of the caliph’s authority in the enforcement of shari’ah, HTI argued that the collection of zakat by either the government or Muslim charity organizations is illegitimate (HTI, 24 September, 2009). It is interesting that HTI selectively applied the doctrine on the caliph’s authority in the context of zakat collection and abandons the same doctrine in other cases of Islamization. The reason for this could lie in HT’s anti-social work doctrine. Involvement in social work is not recommended because it is considered supportive of the established system. The

\textsuperscript{54} At present, The KHI is applied only to family issues in Islamic court (Al-Wa’ie 52: 38).
distribution of zakat is especially seen as providing direct support to Government’s social services and thus strengthens the legitimacy of the system. Unlike the direct contribution of zakat, HTI sees the adoption of the shari’ah law in other aspects like the law on pornography and abortion as opportunities to demonstrate the viability of the shari’ah. The exemption of zakat could also be motivated by HTI’s policy that encourages members’ financial contributions.\(^55\)

In spite of this case, the dominant pattern of HTI’s discourse on specific instances of Muslim politics is supportive of participation. This reflects the prominence of the struggle for gaining recognition. The fact that HTI tended to adopt extreme discourse in the context of relationship with “far enemies” in contrast to the dominance of moderate or radical discourse in dealing with “near entities” is indicative of HTI’s objective to avoid isolation. HTI often reasserted its call for the khilafah or comprehensive change after delivering its support for Muslim participatory politics, but this has to be seen as its effort to sustain anti-systemic identity without sacrificing its chance to exert influence.

C.3. Actors in Muslim Participatory Politics: The “Bandwagoning Strategy”

Antara HTI, NU dan Muhammadiyah ada kespahaman dan pembagian tugas. NU fokus pada pembentukan akhlaqul karimah masyarakat, Muhammadiyah...fokus pada penguatan ekonomi umat. HTI fokus pada penguatan politik umat. Secara berkelakar saya sampaikan, dalam masalah politik biarlah suara NU dan Muhammadiyah diserahkan kepada HTI (Muhammad Al-Khattath in Al-Wa’ie 89: 8).

There is a sense of common understanding and job description between HTI, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Nahdlatul Ulama focuses on educating the ummah about Islamic conduct, Muhammadiyah...focuses on the economy of Muslim society. HTI focuses on the political education of the ummah. Jokingly I said, in

\(^55\) In the organizational statue of HTI submitted to the Internal Affairs Ministry, members’ contributions consist of obligatory (iltizamul maaliyat) and optional contributions (tabarru’at) (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2007: 5).
politics let the political affairs of NU and Muhamamdiyah be taken care of by HTI.

This statement comes from Muhammad Al-Khattath when he was still with HTI after a seminar in Kalimantan on 8 December 2007 where he sat on a panel with Said Agil Siroj from Nahdlatul Ulama and Anwar Abbas from Muhammadiyah. Although Al-Khattath claimed that the statement represents the view of the two leaders, this is hardly the case. A number of leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah have not only asserted their disagreement of HTI’s khilafah policy, but also have raised concerns about the aggressiveness of HTI. Rather than a description of reality, this statement is more a representation of HTI’s strategy of what is described by Hanif (2007b) as “bandwagoning on the influence of other movements.” As a new organization with the new and controversial idea of the khilafah, HTI’s influence is limited. Its ability to gain influence is also challenged by its doctrine that emphasizes political education and considers social activities running counter to its opposition to the existing system. HTI is more a movement of words than a movement of action. To gain influence in societies, HTI seeks to identify with larger Muslim organizations to create the perception that its objective is parallel to the mainstream.

It is therefore understandable that HTI’s discourse on Muslim actors has been dominantly conciliatory regardless of their acceptance of the established political system. Under the second stage objective of interaction with the ummah, HTI targets a wide range of Muslim communities, including those in the mainstream. It appears that HTI was hard on the issues and soft on the actors - both individual leaders or

56 The concern over the aggressiveness of the mobilization of HTI is for example reflected in Aula, an East Java-based journal associated to NU that accuses HTI of taking over the control or management of many Mosques originally founded by NU’s ulama. To prevent a further damage from this allegation, HTI made a clarification notes rejecting the accusation (HTI, 11 November, 2007). A member of NU regional board in Java, Ghazali Said who has been a vocal critics of HTI in East Java suggested that HTI has been systematically aiming to seize control of mosques by encouraging its members to seek housing or accommodation in surrounding mosques (Interview with Ghazali Said, Surabaya, 30 October, 2009). HTI itself due to its non-co-operative doctrine, focuses on political struggles and discourages social activities and does not attempt to build its own mosques.
organizations. This is obvious in the far more *moderate* nature of the discourse on Muslim non-party actors (1.1) compared to the discourse on Islamic issues (2.1) (see figure 3.7). The same pattern occurs in HTI’s less *radical* discourse on specified political parties and party politics (see figure 3.8).

![Figure 3.7: Discourse on Muslim actors and Islamic issues](image-url)

![Figure 3.8: Discourse on Muslim non-party actors](image-url)

There are 81 references to Muslim organizations that include a dozen prominent organizations, ranging from Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, the Ulama Council (MUI), and a number of minor Wahabi and Islamist groups such as Persis, Al-Irsyad, Hidayatullah, the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). Out of this number, a large
majority of them (68) are *moderate* in nature compared to only a small minority *radical* (10) and *extreme* (3) (see figure 3.8).

The Indonesia Ulama Council is the organization most frequently referred to by HTI. With 25 occurrences, it is far above the 15 references on the FUI in second place and 13 references on Nahdlatul Ulama in third place. Given the fact that the dominant nature of the representations are *moderate*, the prominence of MUI in HTI’s target of mobilization is interesting. Rather than focusing on building a coalition with ideologically closer groups like FUI, FPI and MMI, mainstream groups are the central target of HTI’s mobilization. MUI is a semi-government Muslim organization that includes representatives of diverse Muslim organizations. Delegates from major organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah normally hold a dominant position although small organizations, including HTI have also gained representation in recent years. MUI has been fighting for more adoption of Islamic teachings about the value of shari’ah economy, *halal* food certification, and the protection of Islamic theological teachings. Nonetheless, the dominant role of the delegates of the two largest organizations in the organizational structure of MUI and its status as a quasi-state organization maintain MUI’s stance within the framework of state ideology and the Constitution. MUI is keen to push the development of Islamic accommodation, but this is carried out to the extent that it does not pose a serious threat to national unity. Therefore MUI would not support larger scale legislation, such as the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution that can become a threat potentially threatens religious harmony.

Despite its pro-establishment nature, in recent years MUI has become inclusive to more radical Islamists. MUI’s support for Islamization may have motivated the leaders of HTI to target MUI’s support. As a result HTI is now happy to
see two of its members sitting on the organizational structure. Its penetration has also taken place in MUI’s regional offices. This presence in MUI is beneficial to HTI in two ways. First, the fact that MUI is an inter-group organization, which is often seen as a legitimate representation of Indonesian Muslims, provides a foundation for HTI’s politics of presence. Recognition by MUI would boost HTI’s place in Muslim communities. This is especially crucial for a new organization like HTI that carries the radical agenda of the khilafah. Identification with the mainstream is expected to facilitate HTI’s penetration into Muslim communities. It was not rare for HTI to use its affiliation to support its activities. Second, as a melting pot of diverse Muslim strands, MUI is seen by HTI as a venue to break the traditional “cleavages” of Muslim communities. Established organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis normally have a deeper hold on their members because of their long-term roles in education, spiritual and social activities. By emphasizing Islamic identity over organizational affiliation, HTI attempted to develop a new bond among Muslim communities that emphasizes Islamic unity and supremacy over the traditional Muslim schism. Inter-group organization like MUI, are good venues for this campaign.

This interest in breaking old religious affiliations is also shown from HTI’s effort to gain roles in other Muslim inter-group organizations, such as the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), a new coalition group aimed at defending Islamic political interests and coordinating the shari’ah campaign. HTI’s leaders took a leading role in the founding of FUI. Although the new organization does not carry HTI’s khilafah objective, its strong support for the shari’ah plays into the hand of a HTI campaign for a comprehensive application of the shari’ah. The FUI is the second most frequently

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57 Confirmation about these two members is given by the secretary general of MUI, Ikhwan Syam. These two members are Ismail Yusanto and Fanani who are members of research department (divisi pengkajian) of MUI (interview with Ikhwan Syam in Jakarta, 17 October 2009).
referred to group after MUI. Like MUI it also facilitated HTI’s politics of presence and supported its objective to develop a new identity among Muslims that transcend the older traditional affiliation with major Muslim organizations. Until August 2008, HTI was very closed to FUI.  

The high number of conciliatory references to MUI and FUI does not mean that these two groups are the primary target of HTI’s mobilization. The recurrent alliances between HTI and these two organizations were largely made possible by HTI’s close relationship with FUI and the MUI’s more inclusive policy toward hardline groups. In fact, HTI also targeted mainstream groups like NU and Muhammadiyah for support. This is primarily carried out by presenting a public show of support and affiliation with the NU and Muhammadiyah. HTI often quoted leaders of these organizations to support its ideological stance. When successful in recruiting members from the two organizations, HTI emphasized this affiliation with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The most notable and controversial effort of HTI in targeting the mainstream was a banner raised during the khilafah conference in 2007 saying “Warga Nahdliyin Dukung Khilafah” (NU People Support the Khilafah). The prominence of moderate discourse on actors in Muslim politics is also the case with references to Muslim leaders. There are 23 references to prominent Muslim leaders including Hasyim Muzadi and Gusdur from NU, Dien Syamsuddin and Amien Rais from Muhammadiyah, Hidayat Nurwahid from PKS, and Aa Gym. Moderate discourse appears 18 times and there are four examples of radical discourse. In

58 In August 2008, HTI decided to abandon its affiliation with FUI. This is shown in an internal instruction (nasyroh) that required its members to leave affiliation with external organizations unless they are able to gain control. Individual participation in external organization is however permitted (Solihin, O. 10 October, 2008b).

59 A picture of the banner was adopted in a blog that echoed the claim, but was eventually removed from online because of its counter-productive effect. One of such backlashes is the formation of facebook forum named “Warga Nahdliyin Dukung Pancasila Tolak Khilafah” (NU People Support Pancasila, Reject Khilafah) that portrays HTI as a threat to national integration and echoes NU opposition to HTI and its khilafah campaign.
contrast to its repeated criticism of Muslim participation in democracy (Al-Wa’ie 9: 15), HTI was uncritical of the above pro-democratic leaders.

The fact that HTI’s discourse on Muslim actors is far more moderate or conciliatory than the discourse on Islamic parties has a significant value in the nature of HTI’s politics. A comparison of figures 3.7 and 3.8 shows that discourse on Muslim actors is far more moderate than the discourse on Islamic parties at a value of 1.1 compared to 2.4. *Even though HTI does not totally reject party politics, this indicates HTI’s emphasis more on non-party politics than party politics."

**D. Conclusion**

The da’wah based on the Islamic ‘aqeedah’ [faith], is distinguished by frankness, daring, strength, thought and the challenge to everything that disagrees with the Fikrah [thought] and the Tareekah [method] and exposing their fallacy, irrespective of the consequences and circumstances and of whether the ideology agrees or disagrees with the masses, and whether the people accept, reject or oppose it (al-Nabhani 2002: 74).

This quote represents the doctrine of HT that mandates a confrontational stance against elements of opposition. In HTI’s battle of ideas, discourse is aimed at challenging the state and the elements of the political establishment by exposing their inherent fallacies and failures. Evidence, however, suggests that HTI has failed to maintain consistency in achieving this goal. Its discourse was critical and often challenges aspects of the state, but was never totally extreme. HTI’s discourse on both elements of the state (system and structure) shows the prominence of political radicalism, or a combination of delegitimation and conciliation attitudes.

With the average score of 2.4, HTI tended to be overtly radical at the discourse level. The discourse on different elements of the state and related aspects of political establishment is however not consistent. The variation follows these patterns:
First, HTI tended to be more challenging on non-sensitive elements of the political system such as democracy and elections. It was more confrontational about these ideas because attacking them was less dangerous to its freedom. In contrast, HTI’s discourse on more sensitive elements of the political system, including Pancasila and NKRI, was much less confrontational and often conciliatory. It is for this reason that the discourse is characterized by a more persistent campaign for the khilafah and the shari’ah rather than confronting the elements of the existing political system.

Second, HTI was more challenging about elements of the state that were less likely to become allies or to have no direct effect on its political freedom. For this reason HTI’s discourse on the House of Representatives and secular parties is more challenging than those on the Government and Islamic parties. For the sake of mobilization and penetration, HTI’s discourse on the Government is ambiguous. At the normative level, it is hostile to the government as far as identifying it as a puppet of the anti-Islamic West. Overall representation of the Government is however far from extreme because HTI often lent legitimacy to the Government by demanding that it accommodates Muslim political interests and to join its side in confronting “far enemies.” The same pattern occurred in HTI’s discourse on the House of Representatives.

Third, HTI tended to be challenging at the normative level but more conciliatory at the practical level. This is apparent by the fact that HTI presented stronger opposition to unspecified practices of participatory politics than those of specific cases of Muslim participatory politics. Normatively HTI often continued reiterating its doctrine against gradualism and the danger of Muslim participation in the process of government and Parliament. However, when it came to the real issues
related to Muslim political interests, such as advocacies for adoption of the shari’ah in regional regulations and campaigns against anti-Islamic developments in society, HTI was tolerant or supportive to participatory politics. Such a discrepancy is also apparent in the fact that HTI was more confrontational about democracy than elections.

Fourth, the discourse of HTI demonstrates its tactic of being harder on issues and softer on actors in order to maintain a balance between anti-system campaigns and the opportunities for mobilization. This is obvious in the far more moderate discourse about actors than issues of Muslim participatory politics. The target of mobilization is especially directed to non-party actors of Muslim politics as shown by the more moderate discourse on specified leaders and social Muslim organisations than on Islamic parties.

These ambiguities represent the strategy of HTI in solving the dilemma between the ideal goal of delegitimizing the state and the pragmatic need for conciliation in order to secure political opportunity.
Chapter 4

Action:

From Non-Participation to Participatory Radicalism

As an alternative to violence as a means to undermine the State, HT employs the strategy of “non-participation” in the existing democratic system. In addition to its intellectual battle to uproot the legitimacy of the existing political system (as discussed in the previous chapter of HTI’s discourse), the doctrine of HT also requires its members to encourage public detachment from Government and the political process in order to disrupt their function (see pages 55-60). Creating a crisis of Government and challenging the political process is essential for HT’s argument for an alternative political system. To evaluate the degree of HTI’s faithfulness in following this strategy, this chapter analyses the nature of HTI’s activities recorded in *Al-Wa’ie* in the period of 2001 -2009.

This chapter shows two different patterns of the action. On one hand, HTI demonstrates a strong opposition to the State when interacting with societies. This pattern is shown in the discussion on the form of HTI’s action, and thus shows the prominence of a *radical* character. On the other side, it demonstrates a positive attitude toward participation when interacting with various aspects of the democratic state, including political institutions (Government, House of Representative, and political parties) and non-state actors in democracy illustrated in examples of Muslim
participation in democratic process (here called ‘Muslim participatory politics’). This ambiguity represents the shift of HTI’s strategy from total non-participation to selective participation that guarantees political freedom and sustains the social mobilization against democracy.

A. Forms of Action

In addition to publications that are central in its activism, HTI runs various kinds of activities. They can be categorized as follows (for discussion about key terms used in HTI’s agendas, see pages 60-61):

1. Mass rallies. This programme is important to demonstrate HTI’s presence. HTI uses public issues to raise its call for the khilafah or the shari’ah and to address authorities to take favorable policies. This fall into HTI’s agenda of educating the masses (tathqif jama’i).

2. Seminars. This includes various forms of public forums, from classroom discussion to seminars that attract a large number of people. Seminars usually address public issues and are open to the public. Like rallies this also supports HTI’s goal of educating the masses (tathqif jama’i).

3. Training programmes. This programme is more intensive than seminars and usually targets a specific audience. It is usually not open to the public. Among the targeted audience recorded in Al-Wa’ie include students, Muslim journalist, housewives, female teachers (mubalighoh), Friday preachers (khatib), and Muslim clerics (ulama). The topics of training are usually about the importance of the khilafah and the strategy of HTI, which are framed according to the need of audience. Within the framework of specified education (tathqif murakkaz), this programme is mainly aimed at recruiting new members. An important part of this
agenda is the study circle; but since this programme is usually unpublicized, this is not covered in this study.

4. Leadership meetings. HTI seeks to approach influential leaders from different segments of society (including political leaders, government officers, religious leaders, and military officers). It runs this programme in two ways: visiting the leaders in their offices or inviting them to HTI activities. This programme serves the key agenda for ‘seeking support’ from the elites (*thalab al-nusroh*).

5. Advocacies. HTI sometimes initiates or takes part in activities to advocate shari’ah-based policies. This ranges from visiting law makers, meeting with government officers, to drawing up petitions and lawsuits. This program is part of HTI’s agenda of ‘caring for the issues of the ummah’ (*tabanni masalih al-ummah*).

6. Religious gatherings. HTI seeks to make presence by organizing religious services and public sermons. They are usually organized for the celebration of Islamic holidays. This programme helps HTI in educating the public (*tathqif jama’ai*) and promotes its own importance.

   In the period of 2002-2009, *Al-Wa’ie* recorded more than 560 activities.\(^60\) Seminars and other similar forms of discussion forums are HTI’s most frequent activities. Occurring 193 times, this programme has been the hallmark of HTI because of its multipurpose nature. It serves both the objectives of educating the masses and challenging the State. The record of HTI’s activities also demonstrates the prominence of *thalab al-nusroh* (seeking elite support). Within this framework, HTI approaches elites through leadership meetings and visits to influential figures and institutions. Out of 560 activities, this type of action appears 101 times. Leadership meetings are

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\(^60\) *Al-Wa’ie* started publication in 2000. It was not until June 2001 (*Al-Wa’ie* 10) that it started including news reports on the activities of HTI. This is because at this stage, HTI was still in transition from the *tathqif* (formative) stage toward a public campaign (*tafa’il*) stage.
organized locally to promote khilafah and establish alliances based on common interests such as support for the shari’ah or opposition to alleged anti-Islamic incidents. In 2009, the public education and leadership meetings in local areas culminated in the organization of a series of national leadership gatherings in Jakarta. Learning from the impact of the 2007 international conference in Jakarta in term of publicity, each of these gatherings was designed to attract leaders from different segments of the Muslim community. These include national conferences on ulama (Muslim leaders), Muslim students, and women preachers (mubalighoh). In addition to targeting Muslim leaders, HTI emphasizes the number of participants that normally attracts a few thousand people at a minimum. This is to support HTI’s claim that these gatherings demonstrate wide-scale support. Even though the true motivation and commitment of participants to join HTI are not necessarily represented by HTI’s claim, the presence of the large number of participants at conferences is useful for propaganda purpose.

Other significant forms of actions are mass rallies and training sessions that occurred 55 and 43 times respectively. Mass rallies are aimed at both challenging the

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61 See HTI’s coverage on the conference in Al-Wa’ie 85.
62 This gathering was held in July 21, 2009. This programme was bolstered the title of “National Congress of Ulama” (MUN) and brought around 6,000 participant from across the country. For HTI, coverage of the congress, see Al-Wa’ie 108.
63 This programme was organized by HTI’s student wing, Gema Pembebasan, and was called the congress of Indonesian Muslim student (KMII). It was held in October 18, 2009. The programmes was planned to be held in basketball hall of Jakarta’s Bung Karno’s stadium, but due to organizer failure to secure police clearance, the meeting was moved to the parking lot of the hall. The organizer claimed it was attended by 4,000 students from across Indonesia (Republika 19 October, 2009).
64 This programme was bolstered by the title of ‘The Congress of Indonesian Mubalighoh (Women Preachers)’ and HTI claimed it was attended by 6,000 participants from across the nation (Era Muslim, 9 April 2009).
65 I met with some leaders who were invited for the conferences. Many claimed that the major motivation for many participants, especially those from outside Jakarta, is to be able to come to Jakarta. Many of those from remote districts are coming to the capital city for the first time. They come to Jakarta for free because HTI provides accommodation and airfares. Many also come to satisfy their curiosity about HTI (Interviews with Ikhwan Syam of MUI’s central board on 17 October 2009, Nidhom Hidayatullah of MUI Malang on 28 October, 2009, Zuhdi Mulkian, senior leader of Muhammadiyah in Kendari on 30 October 2009, Abdullah Umar, great imam of Jami Mosque in Kendari on 30 October 2009, and Hadid of MUI Kendari on 30 October 2009). It however should not be neglected that many also come becuase of their perception that HTI is struggling for the interest of Islamic supremacy (‘izz al-Islam).
State and gaining social leadership. Therefore, issues central to the public such as the price of fuel, economic liberalization, and anti-Westernism are frequently used by HTI to raise anger toward the State. HTI also sees this model of action as a part of the agenda to expose the failures of the state (shiro al-fikr) and propagate the superiority of Islamic alternatives (tabanni masholi al-ummah). HTI’s rallies however do not always serve the goal of inciting raising anger toward the state. Many of them instead lend legitimacy to the Government and other State institutions by seeking their adoption to Islamic interests. The demand that the Government accommodates Islamic interests implies an acknowledgment of the capability of the State.66

While mass rallies serve the goal of attacking the State, HTI’s training programme is primarily aimed at recruiting supporters. Anti-state discussions are however normal in the training session. To encourage participation, HTI normally adopts more inclusive titles of programme such as “Islamic study” (dirasah Islamiyah), “comprehensive Islam” (kaafah), “how to be a good student,” and “creating an Islamic family.” HTI rarely uses the word “khilafah” in the titles of its training programmes even though their content emphasize the necessity of adopting Islam as a complete ideology that necessitates the establishment of the khilafah.67

The character of HTI’s activities is varied. Its most extreme action appears in the realizations of the tathqif murokkaz program that takes the form of training sessions. Because this type of action tends be closed and independent it facilitates the

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66 For example, in June 2003, HTI held a rally in front of the House of Representative’s building to support to passing of a draft of law on the national education system (Act on Sisdiknas) that forces schools (including those run by non-Muslim institutions) to provide religious classes by teachers of the same religion. HTI sent a delegation to meet the House’s committee that worked on the law (Al-Wa‘ie 35:30).

67 For example, in a workshop in Yogyakarta on 8 August 2009 that brought Muslim leaders from different organizations, HTI framed the programme with an inclusive topic of “Bersinergi Wujudkan Islam Penebar Rahmah” (co-operation building for the realization of Islam that spreads social good), but the speakers who all come from HTI spoke uncompromisingly about the necessity of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state of khilafah within the unique methods of HTI.
formation of an anti-system awareness and movements. Out of 54 cases, the nature of HTI’s training programmes is extremely oppositional to the state with the score of 2.9. Compared to the training programme, HTI appears less oppositional in its open programmes such as leadership meetings, mass rallies and seminars. These programmes are not *extreme* because of their frequent engagement with the government and other elements of the political system such as the House of Representatives and political parties. This takes the form of demanding elements of the political system to take action favorable to HTI. However these programmes can be categorized as *radical* or not *extreme* because the persistent campaign for khilafah as an alternative system. The natures of the opposition degree of these programmes range 1.9 to 2.6.

At the other end, HTI tends to be moderate in translating the programme of *tabanni masalih al-ummah* into advocacy and social work. The advocacy work is moderate because it engages with elements of the political system in a conciliatory way. Likewise, social work is equally moderate because instead of undermining the role of the State, it supports the State by helping it with social services (see figure 4.1).

![Figure 4.1: The frequency and nature of HTI’s activities](image_url)
Overall, HTI’s action tends to be radical with an average score of 2.3, almost an equal stance with the discourse aspect that scores 2.4. This means opposition to participation in the democratic system has been a dominant message of HTI’s activities. However, tolerance of participation and engagement with State institutions are not infrequent. As shown in figure 4.1, the majority of radical and extreme aspects of HTI’s action appear in its interaction with society. In contrast, most of the moderate aspect of HTI’s action takes place in its interactions with elements of democratic institutions (the Government, the House of Representatives, political parties) and ‘Muslims participatory politics’. The following section discusses this more positive part of HTI’s behaviour.

B. Interactions with government: Engaging the tyrant (zalim) regime

Following its doctrine of non-participation, HTI published an article in the early edition of Al-Wa’ie (published in 2000) explaining al-Nabhani’s doctrine of *mufaroqah* (separation or detachment). In the context of interaction with Muslim regimes, HTI suggests the application of this doctrine in three ways. The first is the rejection of co-operation with a government that implements un-Islamic laws. This is specifically carried out in the context of governments in Muslim countries that reject the struggle to implement Islamic law. The second is by calling Muslims to avoid “entering palaces,” which implies a suggestion for non-participation in government structure. And the third is urging Muslims not to praise the Government as a way to expose the inherent failures of the regime (*Al-Wa’ie* 6: 12-16).

However, as soon as HTI attempts to implement this doctrine it faces the reality that regimes in Muslim countries cannot be identified in the stark binary fashion of *dar al-kufr* (battling countries of infidels) and *dar-al-Islam* (countries under
a Muslim rule). Even though the Indonesian government does not implement an Islamic order as it desires, most officials are Muslim and the authorities adopt some aspects of Islamic law and this deters HTI from implementing the mufaroqoh doctrine. As a result, HTI differentiates between a zalim (tyrant or oppressive) regime and a kafir (infidel) regime. The mufaroqoh policy is applied to a zalim Muslim regime or a government that does not implement Islamic laws. This model of mufaroqoh is considered less extreme than the ideal attitude toward a kafir regime that suggests an overthrow or a regime change, as stated in this paragraph:

“Terhadap imam yang jahat, zalim dan fasiq, syari’at memerintahkan kepada kita untuk mufaroqoh (memisahkan diri); tidak condoong kepada mereka, tidak membantu mereka dalam melakukan kejahatan, serta tidak memberikan pengakuan dalam bentuk apapun terhadap sikap dan tindakan mereka di hadapan umum. Bahkan tidak cukup dengan mufaroqoh terhadap mereka, tetapi kita pun harus melakukan upaya sungguh-sungguh untuk memperbaiki atau mengubah mereka. Namun, terhadap penguasa, kaum Muslim—sebagai sebuah prinsip—tidak boleh rela dipimpin oleh orang kafir di negeri mereka sendiri. Jika hal ini terjadi, kaum Muslim harus melakukan perubahan, tidak sekedar mufaroqoh” (Al-Wa’ie 6: 11).

To a tyrant, zalim and fasiq imam, shari’ah orders mufaroqoh (separation); [we should] not rely on them and not assist them in committing crimes, and not give them any form of public recognition for its public services. And mufaroqoh [separating] ourselves from them is not sufficient, we should also seriously endeavor to remind or change them. But to a Muslim government, it is not allowed to submit to a kafir in their own countries. If this happens, Muslim should attempt to seek a change, not only mufaroqoh)

HTI therefore uses the terms ‘correct’ in addition to ‘change’ in dealing with a zalim regime, compared to the sole use of the term ‘change’ to a kafir regime. This suggests that the objective to overthrow is more applicable in the context of its relationship with a kafir rather than with a zalim regime. If we follow HTI’s differentiation between khilafah and non-khilafah governments, a zalim regime can
only exist in the context of a khilafah government. However, paradoxically HTI identifies the Indonesian government as a zalim regime rather than a kafir regime and therefore an overthrow of the Government is not a desired goal.

Because of this differentiation, HTI’s attitude toward the government is ambiguous. There are 27 activities that address the government, both in terms of policy or officials. Out of this number, 18 cases are critical (radical) of the government but none of these are extreme in terms of suggesting mufaroqoh (disengagement). The conciliatory tone of the actions is strengthened by 9 cases that can be considered moderate. The absence of extreme action or suggestion for disengagement with regard to the government makes the overall pattern of HTI’s attitudes toward the government conciliatory, with the score of 1.6 (see figure 4.2).

This is far less radical than the discourse on government, which scores 2.3. Instead of mobilizing non-participation, HTI shows not only a willingness but also pro-activeness in engaging with the Government. This is shown by the fact that many of HTI’s activities were held in Government related offices or facilities. The uses of Government buildings as a location for activities are essential because they are typically only used with the co-operation of government officers or agencies. HTI’s activities took place in Governmental facilities 80 times out of 327 recorded locations of HTI activities. This is only slightly lower than the use of Islamic houses such as mosques and Islamic centers; many of the Islamic centers belong to the Council of Ulama (MUI) that is partly funded by the Government. These activities took various forms including seminars, leadership meetings and participation in festivals organized

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68 Examples include HTI’s co-operation with government workshops on reproductive health with office of education ministry in Ngawi, East Java (Al-Wa’ie 81: 38), screening of the video on khilafah conference in the official residence of the governor of Southeast Sulawesi (Al-Wa’ie 86: 37), joint programme with Malang Metropolitan police on anti-drug campaign (Al-Wa’ie 82: 38), and co-operation with office of Education Ministry in Bogor, West Java, on training school teachers of Islamic history (Al-Wa’ie 87: 38).
by local government. More independent locations include hotels and other private venues (44 times), universities and schools (53 times), and the facilities of external Muslim organizations (20 times). Additionally, Government is a frequent target of either mobilization or alliance. It is not rare for HTI to seek meetings with the Government agencies to advocate government adoption of specific Muslim political interests. Figure 4.3. below shows the share of HTI’s mobilizational targets and location of activities.

Figure 4.2: HTI’s activities related to the state

Figure 4.3: Locations of HTI’s activities

HTI’s critical actions against the Government take different forms including mass rallies, seminars and other forms of public forums that openly criticize government policies on public issues such as liberalization, the rise of fuel and food
prices, attitude toward Western governments, and other policies it sees as unfriendly to the Islamic movement. These challenges however are not an application of the *mufaroqah* campaign because they are limited to speeches in seminars and rallies rather than actual effort of, for example, campaigning for public disengagement from support for the Government. Moreover, it is not uncommon for HTI to engage the Government in an attempt to accommodate its demands. For example, when opposing Government policies to increase fuel and food prices, HTI held a series of rallies to condemn the policy. However, instead of marching to mobilize public distrust for the Government, HTI’s rally in Surabaya, East Java, ended up around a shared table in a government office to demand a cancellation of the policy, rather than calling for a systemic change from the street (*Al-Wa’ie* 30: 31-32).

HTI’s engagement with the Government is not extraordinary. In 2006, it submitted an application to the Government to gain official recognition as a social organization. It did so by recognizing Pancasila and the unitary and Republic form of the state (NKRI) in its organizational statue. Despite the fact that HTI’s goal to establish the khilafah runs counter to State ideology, Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs accepted HTI’s application.69 Given HTI’s self-proclamation as a political party that seeks to replace democracy with an Islamic government of khilafah, this move should be understood more as strategy to secure political freedom rather than a genuine recognition of the democratic system. Nonetheless this also represents HTI’s willingness to engage the Government rather than confront it.

Another instance of HTI’s inconsistency in implementing the *mufaroqah* doctrine in its relationship with the Government is the reality that many members of HTI work as civil servants; as university lecturers, bureaucracy officers, and experts

69 A copy of the letter of the acceptance of HTI as a social organization from the Internal Ministry and organizational statute submitted by HTI to the Ministry are included in appendices.
in national research agencies (LIPI). HTI’s policy prohibits its members from occupying positions that support (wasilah) a prohibited conduct (haram) such as bank interest and legislation of un-Islamic laws. Included in this category are employment in banks, insurance companies, and being members of the House of Representatives.70

For this reason, HTI justifies professions such as lawyers and judges on the condition that they only make decisions based on shari’ah laws regardless of the fact that this is unrealistic because judges in civil courts are bound by national laws. In reality HTI has used the service of a lawyer to defend Muslim rights within the parameters of the current laws in Indonesia (HTI, 1 January, 2010).

Al-Nabhani’s doctrines of dharb al-‘alaqoh and mufaroqoh imply a call for the ummah to choose non-participation from the state in order to undermine its legitimacy. This policy of non-participation does not entail illegal activities that are harmful to the security of the organization such as involvements in acts of terrorism, riots and boycotts (Al-Wa’ie 54: 29). In other words, the policy of non-participation is implemented when the ummah has a legal choice to do so. However, in reality HTI does not always implement the non-co-operation doctrine even when doing so is safe. The choice to allow members to work in professions that require participation and adoption of the current system are examples of HTI’s inconsistency in implementing the non-participation doctrine.

Such a tolerance toward participation is inevitable for HTI to expand the audience of its message, including officials in government bureaucracies. Entry into bureaucracies was often made possible because of shared interests between HTI and the Government officials. The Government itself uses Muslim audiences to gain

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70 Interview with Malik, head of HTI in Malang, East Java, 25 October 2009.
legitimacy. Meanwhile, for HTI, the Government support is essential for its freedom to mobilize support and attract supporters from among government officials.

One of HTI’s most successful stories of its positive interactions with Government is its repeated co-operation with the Governor of South Sumatra, Mahyuddin, a medical doctor and a politician of the ruling Democratic party. Mahyuddin was notorious for his banning of the Islamic sect, Ahmadiya (Kompas, 1 September 2008; see also Syababnews, 5 September 2008). Aside from this, Mahyuddin has no record of implementing shari’a friendly policies. But HTI has collaborated with the Governor on a number of occasions. For example they collaborated to bring representatives of Muslim organizations, local companies, and government agencies to a seminar on the exploration of natural resource based on shari’ah (Al-Wa’ie 86: 37) and organized a town hall meeting between Government and Muslim leaders (Al-Wa’ie 82: 37). Both programmes took place in the Governor’s office. On another occasion, HTI also took benefit from its relationship with the Governor’s wife to hold a seminar on the political roles of Muslim women, which was sponsored by the Government (Al-Wa’ie 82: 37). The background of a political leader targeted by HTI does not seem to bother it. Aside from the policy to ban Ahmadiyah, Mahyuddin was a politician in the ruling Democratic party and a nationalist.

Even corruption does not prevent HTI from taking an opportunity to engage with a Government leader. An example of HTI’s actions with this type of leader is its interaction with Ali Mazi, former governor of Southeast Sulawesi who during his period in office was temporarily removed because of a graft charge relating to the management of Indonesia’s national stadium in Jakarta. Ali Mazi was removed from office in 2006, but regained his position in 2007 after the court failed to prove the
The engagement took place in 2007, after the international khilafah conference in Jakarta. HTI organized a series of promotional programmes based on the result of the conference in many cities across Indonesia. In Southeast Sulawesi, HTI gained support from Ali Mazi to organize a screening of the video of the khilafah conference in his office that brought together representatives from various Muslim organizations (*Al-Wa’ie* 86: 37). When Ali Mazi was temporarily inactive due to the corruption charge, HTI approached his deputy, Yusron A. Silondae. Knowing that Silonde was preparing to run as a candidate for governor in the next election, HTI paid him a visit and suggested that he initiate the application of shari’ah once in power (*Al-Wa’ie*: 39).

In other places, HTI joined government campaigns and used them to expand its audience. Through this strategy, it seemed to gain successes in infiltrating school systems in several cities. In Bogor, for example, HTI co-operated with local offices of the Ministry of Education to hold a series of training sessions on teaching Islamic history for school teachers and principals in the region (*Al-Wa’ie* 87: 37). This provided HTI with an audience to preach its version of Islamic history that focoses on the importance of the khilafah.

Similiar progress occured in Pasuruan, East Java, where HTI was successful in gaining permission from the local office of the Education Ministry to organize Islamic study groups in schools (HTI, 11 March 2009). Sometimes the topic offered by the government is unusual or contradictory to HTI’s views. In Ngawi, East Java, HTI collaborated with local office of Education Ministry to hold a workshop on ‘healthy reproduction’ (*Al-Wa’ie* 82: 36), a campaign it usually sees a part of Western propaganda (*Al-Wa’ie* 64: 9-14).

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71 For information about the charge against Ali Mazi, see Indonesian Corruption Watch (6 November 2006).
Another model of HTI’s engagement with the government takes the form of involving officials in its activities. HTI often hold leadership meetings using government’s facilities and bringing in representatives from the government to deliver opening speeches (see for example Al-Wa’ie 49: 31; Al-Wa’ie 35: back cover). In contradiction to the mufaroqoh doctrine that requires opposition to regimes in Muslim countries, HTI’s support of government policies in favor of Islamic political interests is not uncommon. This attitude for instance occurred in HTI’s participation in a parade organized by government and Muslim groups in Bandung in which HTI carried a banner with the words “supporting and encouraging the government of Bandung to develop Bandung as a religious and shari’ah adhering city” (Al-Wa’ie 35: back cover). On the banner HTI chose to use the conciliatory word ‘mendorong’ (encouraging) rather than terms such as ‘menuntut’ (demanding).

Through engaging with the government in this way the benefits to HTI were various: gaining recognition from the government, avoiding governmental repression, exerting influence on governmental officials, and gaining an advantage in terms of a ‘war of position.’ However, the cost of this endeavor is also substantial. In contradiction to the mandate of breaking the relationships between society and the Government (dharb al-alaqoh), HTI instead is often bridging the relationship between societies and the government.

C. Engaging the House of Representatives: The ‘Arena’ of da’wah

In contrast to its overtly radical discourse, HTI’s interaction with the House of Representative is no less friendly than its interaction with the Government. The interactions take various forms including rallies to address the house, meetings with
members, seminars, workshops and leadership meetings where house members are invited as guest speakers and activities that take place in the house’s venues.

The nature of HTI’s interaction has never been extreme in the sense of demanding the dissolution of the House or suggesting that the public eschew their support for the members of parliament. It sometimes demonstrated a radical stance by attacking the laws produced by the House and yet it then maintained the demand that the House implement the shari’ah.\(^{72}\)

However, the dominant nature of HTI’s interaction with the House is moderate in the sense of expecting the House or its members to side with HTI in its campaign for shari’ah-based policies without calling for a change of the existing political system. It is typical to see HTI meeting House members to demand specific legislation. Issues that are close to HTI interest include the usual issues such as Islamic education, heresy and pornography and the Jakarta Charter and less sectarian issues such as opposition to economic liberalization and the privatization of national energy companies (Al-Wa’ie 95: 32-37). Sometimes, HTI’s engagement with the House is part of a larger Muslim effort to advocate for Islamic Muslim political agendas. HTI, for example, joined a petition of Muslim leaders to support the legislation against indecency delivered to the members of the House (Gatra, 19, May 2006). Instead of strengthening argument against the failure of the House, HTI’s presence in the House was often aimed at demanding the House to takes its side in opposing government policies (Al-Wa’ie 85: 31; 34: 31; 68: 73; 70: 73).

\(^{72}\) In 2008, for example, HTI organized a series of rallies in major cities in Indonesia to criticize the liberal tendency of the House of Representative citing legislation on foreign investment and fuel price that favor economic liberalization. However despite this criticism, HTI seemed to acknowledge the House by calling it to take policies favoring the ‘nationalization’ of power companies and to oppose government policy to increase fuel price. One of the common banner carried during the rallies said: Tolak Liberalisasi Migas, Dengan Syari’ah Menuju Indonesia Lebih Baik, Batalkan Kenaikan BBM, dan Nasionalisasi Perusahaan Migas Asing (Oppose liberalization of oil and gas companies with shari’ah for a better Indonesia, can fuel price rise, and demand the nationalization of foreign oil and gas companies) (Al-Wa’ie 95: 32-37).
With the absence of extreme attitude, the average HTI interaction with the House tends to be moderate with 1.3 points (see figure 4.2). HTI nonetheless denies the view that its engagement with the House contradicts its extra-parliamentary ideology. It argues that coming to the House follows the method of the prophet Muhammad who delivered da’wah (preaching) to everybody regardless of his/her background. This includes da’wah to unbelievers to invite them to embrace Islam. If unbelievers could be a legitimate target of da’wah, the members of parliament who are the Muslim majority are a legitimate audience (Al-Wa’ie 26: 32).

This comparison however neglects the different context of the Prophet’s da’wa and HTI’s struggle. While the Prophet Muhammad preached to unbelievers to embrace Islam so to support the establishment of a new government, HTI’s interaction with the House is aimed at persuading members to adopt Islam within the framework of the existing democratic process.

This evidence suggests that what HTI means by an “extra-parliamentary struggle” is the avoidance of direct participation in the parliamentary process which requires it to become a political party. This does not mean demanding that those in parliament leave the perceived ‘dirty job’ of participating in the democratic system. It is therefore understandable that HTI is not troubled by the presence of its members in the House working as a staff for an MP. This is illustrated by the profession of the president of HTI’s student wing, Gema Pembebasan (literally means echo of liberation), who works for a member of the ruling Democratic party.  

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73 I found the co-ordinator of Gema Pembebasan after he invited me for an interview in his workplace in the house. A day before the interview he led a massive gathering of more than 3000 students from different cities in Indonesia (Interview with Erwin Permana, 19 September 2009).
D. Military and Police: *Ahl al-Quwwah*

HTI sees the military as a key power holder (*ahl al-quwwah*). Its role in future political change is crucial, especially when it has to take the extraordinary position that HTI prefers (see pages 64-65). It is therefore not surprising that HTI’s interactions with these institutions are mostly positive. Direct interactions with military and police occur 9 times. These include joint programmes and visits to military officers. The joint programmes include for example, working in partnership with the military in relief work for the Aceh tsunami victims (*Al-Wa’ie* 54: 30), partnership with the Malang metropolitan police (*Polresta*) and the Central Java regional police (Polda) in campaigns against drug abuse (*Al-Wa’ie* 82: 38) and a visit to the military commander in Yogyakarta (*Al-Wa’ie* 77: 37). Sometimes HTI visited law enforcement officers such as the police to encourage its pro-active role in implementing Muslim policies favoring Muslim interests. For this reason HTI paid a visit to the head of the East Java regional police to demand the enforcement of the recommendations of the Ulama Council (MUI) to ban Ahmadiyah (*Al-Wa’ie* 51: 33).

There are a few retired generals who frequently appear in HTI’s activities. The most notable of these are former army commander, General Tyasno Sudarto,\(^74\) and Colonel Herman Ibrahim, former head of the public affairs office of the regional military commander III Siliwangi (*Suara Islam*, 28 September 2009). There is no evidence that these two figures formally joined HTI, but their support of HTI is clear. In addition to being regular speakers in HTI’s rallies and seminars, Tyasno Sudarto, for example, is quoted as publicly endorsing HTI’s manifesto (released in June 2009).

\(^74\) Retired general Tyasno was known as a pragmatic and Maverick general. He was close to Wiranto in the early period of Reform era, but later moved closer to former president Abdurrahman Wahid who ran against Wiranto. After the impeachment of Wahid, Wiranto was known as one of active or retired generals closed to Megawati who eventually replaced Wahid.
that outlines a comprehensive concept of HTI’s alternative of the khilafah government (HTI, 3 Jun, 2009).

There is also speculation that the influential retired general, Wiranto, secretly backs HTI. This comes from a leader of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in Malang, East Java. He claimed that he has witnessed HTI’s representative attending a public gathering of Muslim leaders along with Wiranto. The evidence that may be used to confirm this speculation is HTI’s implicit support for Wiranto when he ran for the presidency in the 2004 election. With the purpose of seeking out potential pro-shari’ah leaders, HTI went to meet two candidates out of six running in this election. They were Amien Rais whose running mate was a nationalist Siswono Yudohosodo and Wiranto who run with a Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Solahuddin Wahid. HTI managed to meet Amien Rais, but the meeting with Wiranto was cancelled due to a clash of schedule (Al-Wa’ie 47: 31). The speculation about HTI’s relationship with Wiranto however cannot be substantiated as there is no concrete evidence to confirm it.

The evidence does show that HTI has a strong desire to gain the support of members of the military or at least retired military leaders. While the same support from the military has not occurred, what is essential for HTI is not the direct support from military or police, but also presenting the image that HTI is not a threat to the State in the eyes of the military. In the short term, the absence of opposition from the military is essential for HTI’s continued operation. In November 2006 HTI for example illustrated some situations that it claimed showed progress. One is the claim that HTI is able to exercise political freedom without disruption or repression from the security forces. HTI sees this as a sign of support from the military and it believes

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75 Interview with the secretary general of MUI Malang, M. Nidhom Hidayatullah, 25 October 2009
this will eventually turn into real support (\textit{nusroh}) for the installation of a khilafah government (\textit{Al-Wa’ie} 75: 20). Before an actual attempt at seizing power takes place, support from the military cannot be more concrete than the absence of the military restriction, and this is essential to secure its success.

\section*{E. Political Parties and Leaders: Targets of an Alliance}

HTI’s actions relating to political parties and leaders demonstrate its eagerness to positively engage Muslim actors in the democratic process. The party system is often seen as the core weakness of Indonesia’s democracy. Because of the lack of ideological distinction between political parties, pragmatism has been the dominant factor in party politics. Political parties often fail to recruit leaders that represent the people (Centre for Electoral Reform, 2009). In spite of this reality, the nature of HTI’s actions relating to political parties tends to be \textit{moderate}. This is different to the overtly radical discourse about political parties.

The nature of HTI’s actions relating to political parties has never been extreme. \textit{Al-Wa’ie} records 20 cases of HTI’s interactions with political parties and leaders. The majority of them (16) are \textit{moderate}. A few of them are \textit{radical} and those take the form of discouraging support for political parties. However, HTI tends to present a friendly face when directly interacting with political parties or leaders. While some forms of participation by its members were justified, it should be no surprise that HTI was even more tolerant of the political participation of other people in the political process.

A good example of HTI’s positive engagement with political parties is its partnership with a major Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP) to organize a seminar to initiate the founding of the Riau Syari’ah Council (Dewan Syari’ah Riau) \textit{(Al-Wa’ie}, 76: 38; Riau Online, 5 December 2006). Mutual but not
necessarily common interests were essential to achieve this friendliness. In HTI’s point of view, the programme was not only an opportunity to raise public awareness of the importance of the shari’ah, but it was also a part of the effort to gain a position at the centre of the Muslim struggle to implement the shari’ah. PPP however, did not share HTI’s view on the khilafah nor its opposition to democracy. Historically committed to Pancasila, the likely interest of PPP was more of tapping into Islamic emotions for political mobilization by appearing pro-shari’ah rather than a systematic programme of advocating shari’ah as an alternative system to democracy. That the aim of the programme was to form alliance organizations to advocate the partial adoption of the khilafah by local government or law makers shows that the nature of the alliance was not equal to HTI’s opposition to the democratic system.

HTI’s friendliness with Islamic parties sometimes went as far as providing campaign forums for their candidates in elections. This is reflected in a seminar organized by HTI in the remote district of Wahyuni Mandira in the province of Lampung. Even though the title of the forum promoted the shari’ah and the khilafah, interestingly, two candidates in the local election were from a “Muslim Brotherhood” party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Wiranto’s nationalist party, Hanura party, were brought to speak in the session (Al-Wa’ie 104: 73). This is further evidence that despite its opposition to democracy, HTI does not always demand Muslims cease participation in elections. Moreover this indicates an attempt to build an alliance with political leaders running in elections with the aim of persuading them to support shari’ah campaigns in the political arena.

HTI’s interaction with political parties also demystifies the perception that HTI and PKS are arch-rivals. Evidence for this occurred prior the 2004 election, when a number of HTI’s top leaders visited the headquarters of the PKS. Abandoning the
typical rhetoric attacking the pragmatism of Islamic parties, HTI’s news reports about the meeting emphasized a common interest to strengthen the Islamic da’wah, Islamic supremacy (‘izz al-Islam) and to sustain a brotherhood relationship between them (Al-Wa’ie 47: 30). Paradoxically the report about this visit is in an edition of Al-Wa’ie entitled ‘the danger of political pragmatism’ that strongly criticized Islamic parties because of their lack of ideological integrity (Al-Wa’ie 47: 13).

The above involvement of an election candidate from the nationalist Hanura party indicates that this did not limit it from seeking alliances with Islamic parties. On another occasion HTI visited a ‘nationalist secular’ party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) (Al-Wa’ie 80: 40). However this is uncharacteristic because Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) are the most frequent allies sought by HTI. Out of 20 activities that address political parties, either as the only target or part of multiple targets, only 3 activities concerned with secular parties; this includes the visit to PDIP (Al-Wa’ie 80: 40), and the presence of the leaders of Hanura, Golkar and Demokrat parties in some of HTI’s discussion forums (Al-Wa’ie 95: 39; Al-Wa’ie 104: 73). This preference is understandable because they are closer to HTI in terms of ideology regardless of their other differences. This indicates the orientation of HTI to Islamic parties is to encourage their unity and to emphasize Islamic identity. That the discourse on Islamic parties is less radical than those on secular parties confirms this pattern. This is also in line with HTI’s ‘secular versus Islamic parties’ categorization (Al-Wa’ie 106: 44-47).

HTI’s appeal for support from political leaders sometimes appears desperate by going as far as, for example, to suggest that the PKS’ leader, Hidayat Nurwahid, was qualified to lead Muslim countries as a caliph. The suggestion was made by
Ismail Yusanto in a joint rally with PKS to condemn the US war in Iraq. In the context of the nomination of Hidayat Nurwahid to run in the presidential election in 2004, Yusanto endorsed Nurwahid to be a leader of Muslim countries. Yusanto attempted to keep from distinct khilafah message by emphasizing the role of uniting transnational Muslim countries. Nonetheless, the endorsement that occurred when Nurwahid was nominated as a Presidential candidate is inconsistent with HTI’s opposition to democracy and party politics (Hafez.wordpress, 26 May, 2007). While there might be a question of whether or not this compliment to PKS’ leader truly represents HTI’s views, it demonstrates HTI’s effort to play a bridging role between Muslim parties.

HTI typically justified its engagement with the elements of the political system, including political parties with the goal of delivering da’wah to diverse audiences indiscriminately. In this logic HTI engagement with those within the system was meant to incite internal dissent. The above evidence shows HTI also engaged political parties and leaders to seek policy changes favoring Islamization. Both the revolutionary goal of gaining position in society and the reformist objective of playing an indirect role in pushing gradual Islamization have led HTI to tolerate party politics; this policy deviates from the mandate of non-participation.

F. Election and participatory politics: opposition and indirect participation

Apparently HTI’s tolerance of political participation is also justified by the international leadership of HTI. This comes from the chairman of HT in Britain, Jalaluddin Patel during his visit to Jakarta to attend HTI’s ‘National Ulama Congress’

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76 Grown from the same movement of LDK, HTI and PKS took opposite directions. HTI rejects the belief in democratic process and takes non-participatory path, while in the other direction PKS embraces democracy and grows as a centrist party. Many PKS leaders sees HTI anti-democratic stance as a threat to PKS constituency, while at the same time hostility to PKS is normal among HTI activists. For further reading about the role of Tarbiyah and LDK to the emergence of HTI, PKS and other Islamist movements, see M Imdadun Rahmat and Khamami Zada (2004: 30).
(MUN) in July 2009 that gathered around 6000 Muslim leaders from across Indonesia and international delegates. Patel defended HTI’s policy supporting the partial adoption of the shari’ah as a part of the campaign to demonstrate the superiority of the shari’ah. Patel however saw this as a strategy to gain acceptance. For Patel, this strategy is unavoidable because of HT’s goal of gaining leadership in societies. He suggested that HT should not think of launching a coup to seize power unless support from the majority of population had been first secured. Without extensive support from the people, a political change was seen as unsustainable.77

Seeking wide scale support is however problematic for HTI. Indonesian society is shaped by participation in the democratic system by a wide range of political and social means, including those advocating Islamic political agendas. Here HTI faces the dilemma. On the one hand, following the flow of Muslim participatory politics hurts its anti-systemic opposition; on the other hand, distancing itself from Muslim participatory politics can isolate HTI from the centre of Muslim political struggle, which means eroding its chance for attracting support from the populace. The answer to this dilemma for HTI is reflected in Patel’s suggestion to support the partial legislations of the shari’ah. He argued that this should not be understood as the legitimation of the current system, but must be considered as a means to present examples of the viability of shari’ah in contrast to the failures of the present system. In order to sustain opposition to the system, it was recommended that the campaign for smaller changes should be carried out along with the constant call for a total change that can only happen in the form of establishing a khilafah government.78

The most visible aspect of HTI’s anti-system stance is its extra-parliamentary struggle. Since launching the public interaction stage (tafa’ul am’a al-ummah) in

77 Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, 23 July 2009.
2000, HTI has witnessed two elections in 2004 and 2009. At the discourse level, HTI has been largely opposed to elections. During election periods HTI would typically raise skeptical arguments about elections to discourage the public from hoping for improvement through the democratic ritual. Although it avoided campaigns encouraging people to abstain from voting (also called ‘golput’ that literally stands for white group), an explicit opposition to voting came from an HTI leader in Lampung before the 2004 election (Gatra, 26 April, 2004). The typical argument of HTI’s campaign against elections was a legal, not Islamic, view suggesting that voting is an individual right, not an obligation. People have a choice to take or not to take their right to vote. HTI challenged party politics by highlighting the alleged increasing number of voting abstentions (See for example Al-Wa’ie 97: 9-13, Al-Islam 440, 441, 426). HTI usually emphasized that the major reason for voting abstention is the absence of political parties that advocate a strong ideological stance. During election periods, HTI usually organized public forums to bring public attention to political crises caused by political parties and to emphasize what it called “non-ideological” political parties or coalitions.79

This, however, does not mean that HTI fully rejected participation in the democratic process. A former leader of HTI, Muhammad Al-Khattath, admitted that in 2007 HTI was considering submitting an application to become a political party, but this did not materialize because of media reports about HTI’s international conference that cast fear of it being a threat to Indonesian Constitution and national ideology.80 A different source suggested that HTI’s restraint from officially being a political party was also caused by a lack of internal confidence about its ability to

79 For HTI’s criticism of Islamic parties, see Al-Wa’ie 47: 7-17; Al-Wa’ie 41: 32-35.
80 Interview with Muhammad Al-Khattath, Jakarta, 16 October, 2009.
provide sufficient structures required by the election committee. Nevertheless, while direct participation in the process of forming a political party has not materialized, HTI has demonstrated a willingness to play indirect roles not only during election periods, but also when Islamic political interests are at stake. To justify this behavior, the head of HTI’s department of leadership relations (lajnah fa’aliyah), Muhammad R. Kurnia, argued that organizationally HTI does not take part in Islamic advocacies and social activities, and does not prohibit personal participation in the political process. This paradoxical argument represents HTI’s defence of its supportive attitude toward Muslim participatory politics and an attempt to sustain the ideal strategy of non-participation. This strategic ambiguity is reflected in HTI’s actions in regard to elections and other forms of Muslim participation in the political process, demonstrating the mixing of opposition with indirect participation.

This position took precedence both in the 2004 and the 2009 elections. Before the 2004 election, HTI tested the water by visiting a number of Muslim Presidential candidates including Amien Rais and Wiranto and PKS (Al-Wa’ie 47: 30-31). The goals of this were to propose HTI’s political orientation, to persuade political leaders to adopt the shari’ah in their campaigns and to suggest the formation of an Islamic political alliance. Such a move was not only attempted in the context of the national elections, but also in local elections. For example, prior the governor elections in Jakarta in 2007, HTI organized a meeting called ‘Muslim convention’ to seek candidates who would “lead Jakarta with shari’ah” (Al-Wa’ie 81: 36). Speaking to the press about the goal of the conference, the organizer from HTI did not challenge the viability of the local election; instead he spoke about abstract objective of removing “capitalistic, opportunistic, hedonistic, individualistic and materialistic [elements]

81 A former member of HTI admitted that the idea to become a political party has occurred since 2004, but was met with internal resistance (Interview with anonymous source, 22 August 2009).
82 Interview with M. Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 1 August 2009.
from Jakarta” (Detik (8 April 2007). Rather than urging political leaders to cease participation in elections, the conference invited candidates competing for election to attend the convention but no candidate bothered to attend (Al-Wa’ie 81: 36).

After constant failure in making real political progress in previous elections in persuading political leaders to adopt a shari’ah campaign, a new approach of indirect participation was made in July 2008 to anticipate the 2009 election. This was when HTI raised the idea of building an “Islamic alliance” (poros Islam). The initiative was raised in a high profile seminar in Jakarta entitled “Building an Islamic bloc in the 2009 election.” It appeared that only small Islamic parties such as the National Ulama Awakening Party (PKNU) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) were interested in the idea. The goal to create a coalition between Islamic parties is clear from the fact that those invited to speak in the forum were representatives of Islamic parties and Muslim organizations. However in order to avoid appearing too conformist to party politics, Yusanto argued that the goals of the initiative were to “advocate the implementation of the shari’ah in Indonesia so that Indonesia is led by a leader who is willing to submit [to the obligation] of implementing the shari’ah” (untuk memperjuangkan syariat Islam agar bisa ditegakkan di Indonesia dan Indonesia nantinya dipimpin oleh para pemimpin yang mau tunduk dan menjalankan syariat Islam) (Antara, 21 July 2008).

The definition of ‘poros Islam’ (Islamic bloc) was left open to avoid making a concrete or explicit suggestion about creating a coalition between Islamic parties, although such an outcome was likely to be welcomed. This carefulness was necessary because the chance for success was small. History has shown that uniting Islamic parties is a tremendous task. Not surprisingly, the initiative was neglected by major

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83 The term “poros Islam” (Islamic block) was first used by Amien Rais in 1999 when he supported the rise of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency by defeating Megawati who was supported by mostly nationalist parties.
Islamic parties, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) that is historically closer to HTI in terms of ideology. Nonetheless, such an outcome was not the only target. No less important, this strategy was a political statement of HTI to show its role in the Muslim struggle for the shari’ah—something which is essential for its effort to success in mobilizing support for its campaign.

Despite this failure, the evidence shows that HTI was not only tolerant in supporting but also in proactively taking indirect roles in elections. This move can help HTI tests the willingness of Muslim leaders to adopt the shari’ah. If an immediate fundamental change was not feasible, an intermediate outcome in the form of the formation of an Islamic block in parliament would be welcomed by HTI. If such a block could build significant power in parliament then there is hope for a constitutional amendment in favor of the adoption of the shari’ah in a larger scale. The indirect role that HTI can offer is a mobilization at the social level. This strategy is contained in a report published in Al-Wa’ie after the visit of HTI leaders to the PKS before the 2004 election. Opening the possibility for a future alliance it described the meeting positively as follows:

The meeting between HTI and PKS that proceeded in a warm situation has produced an understanding that both parties will continue improving Islamic brotherhood and communication and information [sharing] in order to strengthen da’wah

Pertemuan (between HTI and PKS) yang berlangsung cukup hangat itu melahirkan kesepakahan, yakni kedua belah pihak akan terus-menerus meningkatkan jalinan persaudaraan Islam dan komunikasi, dan informasi sehingga tercapai penguatan dakwah (Al-Wa’ie 47: 30).

Outside election periods, HTI’s attitude toward Muslim participatory politics was sometimes even more direct. Before August 2008, HTI’s participatory politics was primarily carried out through its intense involvement in an inter-group alliance called the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). The fact that HTI’s leaders in that period,
especially Muhammad Al-Khattath, played a leading role in the founding and operation of the FUI suggests that HTI was using it as a vehicle to gain a position in society through a combination of advocacy for Islamic policies and the call for the establishment of the khilafah. Such an impression was also confirmed by the fact that HTI’s leaders frequently appeared in the media delivering FUI’s statements.

A monumental event was a meeting held at Darunajah Islamic school in Jakarta on June 28, 2008, in response to the violent clash between Islamist groups and the nationalist alliance in Jakarta Monas Square. Driven by the shared antagonism to so-called liberal Islam, the meeting involved about 200 Muslim leaders and HTI claimed it was a ‘historical day’ for the role of Islam in the nation.’ The meeting produced an agreement called the “Darunnajah Declaration” that includes four recommendations: support for the purification of the Islamic faith; the co-ordination between Islamic movements; the defense and protection of Islamic da’wah, and the adoption of the shari’ah-all solutions to the problems of the ummah. More practically, the meeting also supported the formation of a movement called the United Ummah Committee of the Islamic Ummah Forum (DKU-FUI) and it recommended the founding of the FUI at the local level (Al-Wa’ie 96: 7-8, 39; HTI, 2 August 2008).

The nature of this movement is clearly reformist or participatory. This is reflected in the central role of the Muslim leaders from MUI, Ma’ruf Amien and Nazri Adlani in addition to other Muslim leaders from different spectrums as well as representative from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Al-Wa’ie 96: 7-8). Critical issues that united the leaders were: opposition to Islamic liberalism and support for the unspecified concept of shari’ah. Because of the diverse nature of the alliance, HTI had to accept the reality that the khilafah proposal was not included from the list of

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84 The role of HTI in founding FUI is for example apparent in the launching of FUI in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi (Al-Wa’ie 79: 38)
recommendations (HTI, 2 August 2008). Nevertheless what matters for HTI is gaining recognition in Muslim society through taking part in “participatory politics.” By doing so it hoped to exert dominant roles in the movement in order to allow the inclusion of the khilafah message at the practice level.

Through this network, HTI initiated the founding of pressure groups called the ‘shari’ah task forces’ to pressure the Government to adopt the shari’ah in many cities such as Bogor (Al-Wa’ie 69: 63), Kediri (Al-Wa’ie 80: 39), and Surabaya (Al-Wa’ie 87: 37). These groups however, did not live for long because they could only be mobilized in support of sporadical issues sensitive to Islamic morality. None of these initiatives brought about a concrete result in the form of the Government’s adopting the shari’ah. This involvement is however important for HTI to gain role and exert influence among Muslims.

Not only did these initiatives fail to deliver concrete outcomes, HTI eventually realized that trying to form a dominant role in a wide range of alliance groups was unrealistic. For this reason, HTI decided to leave the Islamic Umah Forum (FUI) in August 2008. HTI’s leader at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, who occupied a strategic position at FUI as a secretary general, was given the options to choose between FUI or HTI. Al-Khattath chose the FUI and his position as the chairman of HTI was taken by Hafidz Abdurrahman.

Since leaving the FUI, HTI tended to work alone. It focused on mobilizing its sources by persuading Muslim leaders to join its campaign although it did not totally leave the political arena. Because FUI has been the channel of HTI’s reformist politics, the attention on specific issues of Islamic significance seems to be less

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85 The succession was marked by the replacement of a regular column of Al-Khattath in Al-Wa’ie by Hafizd Abdurrahman.
86 The reason for the departure from FUI, see the appendix on the takmim (internal circulation) of HTI regarding FUI.
intense. However, the departure from the reformist FUI did not mean that HTI was becoming more revolutionary or disengaging from reformist politics. As individual participation is permissible, HTI activists continued seeking active roles in participatory politics. A recent example is HTI’s attempt to block the appeal for judicial review to the Supreme Court by a nationalist coalition to annul the blasphemy law (*UU No 1/PNPS/1965*). HTI’s involvement in this case was intense as it played a prominent role in a Muslim coalition by appointing a team of lawyers.  

A shift towards a more tolerant attitude to participatory politics is also obvious in HTI’s implementation of the *tabanni masholih al-ummah* agenda. Under this framework, HTI is mandated to present Islamic solutions to social problems. It appeared in practice that this goal was aimed at promoting the Islamic alternative to confront the government’s secularity, but it is also an opportunity to promote its version of Islamic solutions to issues to be adopted by the Government. Such an attitude was apparent during my interview with the chairman of HTI in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi. Discussing the problem of poverty, the chairman, a civil servant who works as an advisor to the Rector of a State University in Kendari, offered HTI’s typical solution on land problems of opening unused lands for landless people. When asked about the possibility of advocating the adoption of this model of land reform by the Government along with other social organizations, the chairman answered without hesitation, ‘why not?’ This reflects the openness of HTI’s activists to gradual change.  

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87 To support its argument against the request to annul the law, HTI wrote a counter-argument paper, see HTI (02 February 2010). The role of HTI in delegating the defence for the law to a lawyer team is mentioned in Hukumonline (02 February 2010).  
88 Interview with Fitriaman, spokesperson of the Southeast Sulawesi branch of HTI, Kendari 28 October 2009.
G. Conclusion

The core of al-Nabhani’s theory of non-violent revolution is the objective of separating the people from the State. Ideally this goal can be achieved by mobilizing social distrust as well as advocating non-participation in the Government structure and political process. However, the translations of this doctrine to the action level are unmatched with this orientation. Many of HTI’s activities tend to be directed at the structures of the alleged secular political system. HTI’s participatory politics took various forms from persuading or pressuring the State institutions to taking measures in favor of Islamic political interests to friendly interactions with the elements within the political system. This engagement occurred in HTI’s activities that frequently took place within the State institutions. By doing this, HTI did not undermine the State or drive Muslims away from participation in Government and in the political process but in contrast often it helped bridge their interaction with the State.

HTI’s commitment to operate within the legal framework to secure its operation in the democratic environment limits its choices for undermining the state. By ruling out boycotts and violent mechanisms to disrupt the stability of the democratic state, HTI relies on legal options. But this clearly is not the orientation of HTI. Not only did HTI abandon non-participation doctrines when such a behavior was harmful to its political freedom, but it also allowed its members or other actors to participate in the State when non-participation was legally possible. From the legal point of view, people, for example, have the right to seek professions outside the Government or parliament. But this was not advocated by HTI. Instead it chose to infiltrate political institutions in order to trigger internal battles and it does this by allowing its members to seek professions within the structure of the State.
So far, the limit of HTI’s participatory politics is in regard to direct participation in elections. But this indirect role can be a stepping stone toward a direct participation in the form of becoming a political party. This is not impossible as HTI’s doctrine allows participation in legislative elections with the condition that shari’ah- oriented candidates are allowed to compete. However, its tolerance to participation should be seen as part of its strategy to mobilize support and to create an environment favorable to its long term goal of undermining democracy and creating a support base for an Islamic political system. This is shown in the prominence of the radical character in HTI’s activities. The significant of this varied attitude of HTI to its ‘refolution’ is discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5

The Quest for a Third Path

The Establishment of ‘Refolutionary’ Politics

A. Introduction

HTI’s mixed character of radical, moderate and extreme as elaborated in the previous chapters demonstrates its inconsistency in challenging the democratic system it seeks to destroy. A prominent pattern of this is the discrepancy between theory and practice. In theory, HTI opposed democracy, challenged gradual approaches for change and criticized party politics. In practice, it engaged with the democratic system by building positive interaction with the players of democracy (the Government, the House of Representatives and the political parties), justifying elections as a means to propagate the shari’ah and supporting Muslim advocacy for shari’ah-based policies within the democratic framework.

Following this tendency, one may suggest that HTI is undertaking a process of de-radicalization. Such an account may come in light of the “de-radicalization” theory proposed by Robert C. Tucker, an expert in the transformation of Communist movements. According to Tucker one of the hallmarks of movements that have undergone de-radicalization is the discrepancy between revolutionism in theory and reformism in practice. Deradicalized movements do not necessarily transform into a totally new movement because they maintain some aspects of revolutionary character. But this, in Tucker’s view, is a tactic to preserve internal integrity and prevent disunity. This type of movement tends to reassert its ideological revolutionism at the
time when it increasingly engages in reformist politics (Tucker 1967: 350). He described the process of de-radicalization as follows:

> Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further efforts in the direction of social change (Tucker 1967: 348). 89

Tucker is right in arguing that such a discrepancy is an indication of a movement's departure from its revolutionary ideology. HTI has settled down and adjusted itself into the democratic environment of Indonesia. It failed to carry out its revolutionary doctrine that requires it to consistently undermine the legitimacy of the system, challenge its supporting institutions and mobilize movements to disrupt the stability of the system by advocating political detachment or non-participation. Instead HTI engaged with the democratic institutions it aimed to destroy.

However, Tucker’s argument suggesting that this type of movement is becoming reformist or de-radicalized is inapplicable to HTI. Focusing on the non-revolutionary character of the movement is misleading because it ignores the significance of the radical and extreme characters of HTI compared to those that are moderate. Instead of seeing the movement’s persistence in some aspects of its revolutionism is a way of covering deviations from the movement’s ideology, as suggested by Tucker (1967: 35), I argue that this combination is part of HTI’s translation of its ideology into a different model of what some scholars called

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89 The term ‘radical’ used by Tucker refers to movements that reject existing orders and seek to overthrow the order to establish an alternative ideology that will create a perfect or ideal world (Tucker 1967: ). Given the characteristics of comprehensive change and an overthrow of the existing order sought by such movements, the term ‘radical used by Tucker is equivalent with the term ‘revolutionary’ used in this study. That is why in other parts of his paper, Tucker also characterizes radicalism with revolutionism.
“contentious politics.”\(^9^0\) The shift toward non-revolutionary behaviour is merely tactical. The end goal remains the same but the method of how to achieve it is altered to adapt with changing situations. In this way, HTI seeks to establish an alternative path between revolutionarism and reformism that is close to a model of political change called by Garton Ash ‘refolution’ or a hybrid combination of revolution and reform (Ash 1989: 3). The core of refolutionary politics is for a fundamental change without taking necessary steps to overthrow the existing ruler. The main objective of refolutionary politics is changing the political system rather than the political ruler. Instead of attempting to overthrow the government, it seeks to persuade or to mobilize pressure on the ruler to abandon the existing political order and share power with the emerging contenders to initiate a change in the political order (Ash: 1989: 3-10). This matches with HTI’s tendency to focus more on attacking the legitimacy of the political system than attacking political institutions. It engages with actors within the institutional elements of democracy to force them to abandon the democratic system and encourage them to adopt the khilafah as an alternative.

The following discussion shows how the different characteristics of HTI contribute to its strategy of a ‘refolution.’

**B. The Quest for a Third Path: Between Al-Baghdadi and Al-Khattath**

A key illustration of the path that HTI embraces is the dismissal of two of its former leaders who played central roles in its early period. The two are Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Muhammad al-Khattath. Al-Baghdadi was one of the trio-founders of

\(^9^0\) The term “contentious politics” is used by prominent theorists of social movements such as Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow (2001). Tilly defines contentious politics as "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly: 2008: 5). This definition covers a wide spectrum of movement from a mere protest group that demand policy change on specific issues to a revolutionary movement that seeks a fundamental change of political order.
HTI. With the support of local activists, Abdullah bin Nuh and his son Mustafa bin Nuh, Al-Baghdadi set up the first HT cell in bin Nuh’s boarding school. Current leaders of HTI such as Hafiz Abdurrahman and Ismail Yusanto were among the first pupils of Al-Baghdadi. There is no report of the date of the dismissal of al-Baghdadi, but it is clear that he has not been active in HTI since the early 2000s when HTI began launching the second stage of interaction with the public. He has not represented HTI since this time.

In 2008, the first national chairman of HTI, Muhammad Al-Khattath, was asked to leave by other members of the central board. The dismissal of al-Khattath related to an internal note (takmim) that required its members to leave an Islamist alliance group called the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). The circulation stated that it does not prohibit its members to associate with other organizations, but this has to be carried out on the condition that they are able to make HTI’s role prominent. Affiliations with external organizations and succumbing to the others’ agendas are not allowed. HTI’s leaders, especially al-Khattath, played an instrumental role in the founding of FUI and it is clear that HTI founded this group to expand its own influence. However, it appeared that HTI was not always dominant. Its leaders then

91 The reason of the dismissal of Al-Baghdadi has never been officially revealed by HTI. Different sources gave different accounts on the matter. A former member of HTI’s propaganda house, who was himself dismissed, denied that claim of HTI leaders that al-Baghdadi resigned from the organization. He claimed that al-Baghdadi was fired because of his criticism of HTI’s deviation on understanding a number of Prophet hadiths (Prophet tradition). He however, does not reveal the disputed hadiths (Interview with a former of HTI in Bogor, 22 August, 2009). Other sources said that al-Baghdadi is no longer in HTI because of his disagreement on the decision of HTI to launch public mobilization in early 2000s. A contradictory account was given by an external source, the director of a traditionally pro-shari’ah magazine Sabili, who said that al-Baghdadi’s departure was driven by his opposition to HTI’s affiliation with the international HT. Al-Baghdadi insisted that HTI should become a local organization instead (Interview with Luthfi Tamimi, Jakarta 13 October 2009).

92 The complete reduction of this point from the takmim in Indonesian language states “Tidak ada larangan membangun hubungan baik dengan jamaah atau forum-forum lain, tetapi kita harus menjaganya pada batas-batas ketentuan syara’. Namun, kita tidak boleh meleburkan diri di dalam jamaah atau forum ini, sebaliknya badan (syakhshiyah) kita tetap jelas menonjol ketika melakukan hubungan baik dengan pihak lain.” This is unpublicized circulation, but was leaked by a former member of HTI in his blog (Solihin, 18 October, 2008b). But interestingly this policy does not apply to many of current leaders of HTI who are still affiliated with MUI, including Ismail Yusanto.
asked its members to choose between FUI and HTI. Al-Khattath opted to stay in his position as a secretary general of FUI. Like al-Baghdadi, the role of Al-Khattath in the transformation of the first cell into a network movement that developed into a legal organization was significant. Al-Khattath’s past experience as an activist of the Campus Da’wah Network (LDK) was essential in the success of HTI in using the premise of the LDK’s network for mobilization during its formative stage.

Considering the significant contributions of these two leaders, their dismissals introduced a critical period in the direction of HTI. Apart from personal matters that could have possibly contributed to their dismissals, al-Baghdadi and al-Khattath represented different orientations to the movement’s strategy. Given the direct interaction of al-Baghdadi with the founding leaders of HT in Jordan (Rahmat 2005: 101), it is likely that al-Baghdadi aspired for a revolutionary direction as required by al-Nabhani. The timing of his dismissal in the period when HTI began the shift toward the second stage of its struggle supports the argument that his dismissal was driven by his insistence that HTI continues clandestine activities by focusing on the recruitment of core activists. This position is discussed in an article in 2009 entitled “Is it true that Muslims’ da’wah cannot progress without an Islamic party?” He criticized the policy for channeling da’wah through other political parties. Although the article does not make a specific reference to HTI, his criticism about what he calls a ‘political

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93 When some of HTI’s leaders were still dominant at FUI, more moderate members of the groups begun questioned the use of HTI’s symbol, including its flag and banners on khilafah, in FUI’s activities. This led to internal resistance to the role of HTI at FUI. This could be an indication of HTI’s lost of dominance at FUI. Information about the resistance to the use of HTI’s symbols among more moderate members of FUI was given by the secretary general of MUI, Ikhwan Syam (Interview with Ikhwan Syam, Jakarta, 17 October, 2009).

94 Al-Khattath claimed that he never resigned from the group and has never been given the reason for the dismissal (Interview with al-Khattath, Jakarta 16 October 2009).

95 Salim provides a brief profile of prominent leaders of HTI, including al-Khattath. Salim records his leadership positions in campus da’wah network. See sub-chapter on “The Founding of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the Emergence of organized leaders” in Salim’s thesis (Salim 2005).

96 Interestingly this article appeared on the website of ‘Suara Islam’ (the voice of Islam) ran by al-Khattath. The criticism of HTI that is implicitly suggested by the article might have motivated the publication of the article by al-Khattath.
party with a khilafah label’ makes a clear inference to HTI. Al-Baghdadi criticizes the contradiction in the behavior of this ‘anonymous’ political party that prohibits its members from participating in elections but allows participation when it has its own legislative candidate. He wrote:

Di arena berpartaian, ada partai politik yang berlebel ‘khilafah Islam’ dan berpanji hitam yang melarang anggotanya mengikuti pemilu, kecuali jika sewaktu-waktu partai sudah punya calon legislatif, maka fatwa berubah sehingga yang haram bisa menjadi halal (baca:mubah), meskipun caleg yang dicalonkan oleh partai tetap dilarang mengakui sistem pemerintahan sekuler yang ada. Mereka bermimpi akan berhasil menegakkan Negara Islam (khilafah), dan begitu yakin hanya merekalah yang akan berhasil menegakkan pemerintah Islam bukan yang lainnya..! Maka mereka mewajibkan atas setiap muslim ikut berjuang bersama partai tersebut, sebab perjuangan tanpa partai adalah sia-sia dan tidak akan berhasil..! (Suara Islam, 26 Mat 2009, Benarkah Dakwah Islam Dan Umat Islam Tidak Akan Maju Tanpa Partai Islam?!).

In party politics there is a party with the label of “Islamic khilafah” carrying a black flag that prohibits its members from participating in elections; but in situations when it nominates legislative candidates, the fatwa is changed to turn what is prohibited (haram) into something permitted (mubah) although it prohibits the candidates from recognizing the secular system of existing government. They dream of establishing an Islamic state (khilafah), and are so confident that only they can establish the Islamic government, not others. Therefore they call for all Muslims to join their struggle, because [they claim] that a struggle without a party is useless and will not succeed!

This account can be traced to statements of HTI’s leaders and publications that considered election as an optional tactic (uslub) (Al-Islam 448). This view opens the possibility for HTI’s participation in future elections. Al-Baghdadi’s opposition to party politics suggests that he represented an extreme position in regard to the debate on the orientation of the movement.

In contrast to al-Baghdadi, al-Khattath drove the organization more toward involvement in reformist Muslim politics, especially through the FUI. This does not mean that the current leaders of HTI reject involvement in reformist politics. The
attitude of the movement after the departure of al-Khattath demonstrates its continuing tolerance to participatory politics. The difference between al-Khattath and HTI’s leaders may lie in the nature of reformist politics. HTI encouraged its members to be proactive in seeking involvement in external social and political activities yet it required its members to exert a dominant influence by upholding its khilafah ideal and its basic opposition to the present political system (Al-Wa’ie 73: 23). Contesting al-Khattath’s heavy involvement in FUI’s reformist struggle, the current leaders of HTI however saw that a full involvement in Islamist participatory politics would overshadow its own opposition to the present democratic system.

Instead of embarking on either a fully extreme or reformist position, HTI’s leaders envision a path between the two poles. On the one hand, in contrast to the suggestion that it focuses on the mobilization of revolutionary vanguards and inciting public opposition toward the state, HTI engages with the state and thereby promotes its own influence. On the other hand, HTI rejects full support of reformist politics that focuses solely on pressuring the existing political establishment to gradually adopt the shari’ah without addressing the inherent failure of the established system. HTI therefore supports participatory politics as an intermediate goal or an instrument to stir rebellion against the established political system both in society and within the elements of the government bureaucracy.

This policy is illustrated in two tendencies of HTI: (a) the prominence of its radical character and (b) the discrepancy between its attitude towards the state and its attitude towards society.
B.1. The Significance of Its ‘Radical’ Character

As elaborated in chapter one (page 27), the term ‘radical’ here refers to a position of ambiguity between opposition and participation. On the one side of the coin it is oppositional in the sense of suggesting the illegitimacy and inherent failure of the rejected political system. However, on other the side, it does not advocate detachment from the opposed system and instead engages with the supporting elements of the system, accepts changes with the framework of the existing system while at the same time promoting a fundamental change of the system.

A significant pattern of HTI’s attitude toward different aspects of the democratic system of Indonesia is radical in this sense. The following table illustrates this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-confrontational rhetoric (discourse) on the fundamental aspects of democracy, Pancasila and the NKRI.</td>
<td>Ambiguous rhetoric (discourse) on election Oppositional rhetoric (discourse) democratic institutions (the Government, House of Representatives, political parties)</td>
<td>Confrontational rhetoric (discourse) on democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement (actions) with democratic institutions (the Government, House of Representatives, political parties)</td>
<td>Oppositional activities in engaging the public (seminars, leadership meeting programmes).</td>
<td>Confrontational rhetoric (discourse) on unspecified practice of participation in democratic process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Muslim advocacies for shari’ah-based policies within democratic framework.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activities that encourages non-participation Training (tathqif murakkaz) activities that encourage political detachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: The distribution of the characteristics of HTI
This table shows HTI’s tendency to employ a moderate or non-oppositional stance on aspects that can affect its political freedom, hampers its chance for penetration and limits its roles in society. This is illustrated in its moderate rhetoric on the sensitive aspect of the democratic system, namely the state ideology (Pancasila) and the republic form of the state (the NKRI). Publically attacking these key symbols of the state will give legitimacy for oppression from authorities on grounds of treason. HTI’s non-confrontational activities relating to democratic institutions are important to help it gain accesses into the democratic system to advocate the shari’ah alternative among the key actors of democracy (the political and military leaders). In the same vein, it supports Muslim advocacies for shari’ah-based policies through the democratic process. This is unavoidable for HTI because its absence from Muslim politics will isolate it from the pro-shari’ah circle and therefore reduce its chance to exert influence.

However, this attitude should not be seen as the genuine aim of HTI to integrate itself into the democratic system. This is because it tends to employ an oppositional and confrontational stance in situations that do not directly affect its political freedom and its opportunities for mobilization. This is apparent in the radical and extreme aspects of HTI’s character. HTI continues its confrontational discourse on democracy even though it takes part in the Muslim democratic struggle for shari’ah-based policies. It however limits its participation to cases that are central to Muslim politics such as the opposition to Amadiyah, the support for Jakarta Charter and the enforcement of the Blasphemy law. Because short-term policy changes are not the main goal of HTI, it does not involve itself in the systematic effort to advocate shari’ah-based policies within the existing legal system.
Likewise, although HTI is often non-oppositional when interacting with the democratic institutions or actors, it shows a tendency to employ an oppositional (radical) attitude toward them at the discourse level. This signifies its ambiguous stance. On the one hand, it emphasizes the failures of the democratic institutions and asserts its call for a fundamental change, but on the other side it does not encourage non-participation by calling them to adopt pro-shari’ah polices and the khilafah.

To apply the theoretical formula explained in chapter one (page 17), HTI’s mixed attitude toward the state is better placed in the middle path of ‘refolution.’ At the discourse level, it shows an ambiguous attitude toward the intellectual (political system) and institutional aspects of the democracy. At the action level, it shows a conciliatory attitude toward the democratic institutions. This is illustrated in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Elements</th>
<th>Revolution</th>
<th>‘Refolution’ (HTI)</th>
<th>Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative/ Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Institutions</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive/ Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2: The revolutionary position of HTI’s attitude toward the state

B.2. Discrepancy between Attitude toward the State and Engagement with Society

In addition to the significance of the radical and extreme attitude toward the state, the ‘refolutionary’ character of HTI is also clear in the contrast between its attitude toward the State and its engagement with society. The targets of HTI’s activities can be categorized in two directions. The first moves toward mobilizing supports within the State. For this purpose, HTI often eschews its anti-democratic stance in its
interaction with the democratic institutions. The second move aims to mobilize support in Indonesian society. In this endeavour, HTI tends to play anti-democratic stance and often encourages non-participation in the democratic system. This is illustrated in the prominence of the *radical* and *extreme* character of HTI’s social mobilization programmes such as seminars, trainings, and leadership meetings (see figure 5.2 below).

![Figure 5.3: The spectrum of HTI’s attitude toward the state and society](image)

This shows that HTI’s inconsistency in undermining the legitimacy of the state is more part of its “strategy of ambiguity” than its genuine intent to integrate into the democratic system. In this way it tolerates selective participation in the democratic system to expand opportunities and sustains its mobilization for the support of a future political change towards the khilafah.
Despite this intent, the outcome however, can be different. Changing emphasis on the different character of HTI can lead toward different outcomes.

C. Outcomes: Nusroh, Political Radicalism, Destruction or Moderation

This varied character of HTI can be defined in three categories: (A) political engagement that takes the form of a positive interaction between HTI and state structures, political actors (especially Islamic parties) and the critical participation in the democratic process; (B) an anti-system campaign that primarily takes place at the social level in which HTI continues educating the masses to raise anti-system awareness and emphasizes a pro-shari’ah identity; and (C) the mobilization of the elite (thalab al-nusroh) that appears in HTI’s focus on targeting supports from political and social leaders. (C).

These desired outcomes may lead to different trajectories. With different degrees of likelihood, the impacts of these outcomes may lead to three different results as follows (see figure 5.4 for an illustration):

C.1. Nusroh

The first outcome is the realization of the doctrine of nusroh (‘support’) for an extra-ordinary political change. The combination of successfully mobilizing support from the elite, especially the military (C) and the anti-system campaign (B) — necessarily made possible by the occurrence of political crisis and a failing state — will motivate HTI to initiate extra-ordinary political change, including the option of a coup when it is supported by the military (see figure 2.3 in page 63).
Figure 5.4: The trajectories of HTI
Nusroh is the most desired outcome. It is based on the da’wah model of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. It believes that the key for the success of the Prophet in building a new government was supports from elites in societies. With the support of the leaders of the ‘Aws and Khazraj tribes in Medina, Prophet Muhammad was able to establish an Islamic Government in Medina (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain 2000: 103). Following this model, HTI targets the support of powerful people (ahl al-quwwah) including influential leaders from different segments of society from political Muslim leaders, political leaders to military officers. However, HTI emphasizes the importance of support from the military, which in turn indicates the desirability of a coup as a way of making the political transition. This is confirmed by the fact that the founders of HT, including al-Nabhani, have attempted several coups in the Middle East (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31). HT also sought nusroh from authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries by asking them to accept the offer of the role of a caliph if they are willing to adopt HT’s political concept of khilafah. Political leaders who were approached by HT include Iran’s Khomeini (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31) and Libyan leader Mu’ammar Khadafi. 97 All ignored the offer.

However, in reality the leaders of HTI seem to rule out an actual coup as an option. A biography of al-Nabahni translated into Indonesian by a publisher associated with HTI, Al-Azhar Press, removed a paragraph from the earlier edition of the book that contained information about coup attempts by al-Nabhani.98 Declining to acknowledge a coup as an option, one of the heads of the central board of HTI, Muhammad R. Kurnia, spoke about a political change similar to the processes that

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97 In 1978, HTI held a four hour meeting with Qadafi and issued a communiqué calling Qadafi to adopt the khilafah (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 9 September, 1978).
98 This publication is an excerpt from a book by Ihsan Samara “Mafrūmat Al ’Adalah Al Ijtima’iyah fi Al Fikri Al Islami Al Mu’ashir” (Samara 1991), translated into Bahasa Indonesia by Muhammad Shiddiq Al Jawi who is currently a member of the central board of HTI. The paragraph about al-Nabhani’s coup attempts is mentioned in the earlier version of the book (Samarah 2002: 13). This paragraph is however not found in the later version of the book published in 2003 (Samarah 2003).
led to the fall of Soeharto and the Iranian revolution. He used these cases as examples of the feasibility of a political change through a process outside the existing political system. He argued that both changes took place after the regimes lost legitimacy and people-led protest successfully demanded political transitions.\textsuperscript{99} However, the two situations are very difficult although there was a common fact; both Pahlevi and President Soeharto were authoritarian rulers. The difference now is that Indonesia has introduced a democratic structure where the President is elected by the people and can serve in office for only two periods. This makes Kurnia’s view very unlikely.

In addition to the efforts by HTI in mobilizing elite support, political and economic crises are necessary conditions for this path to succeed. Such situations are however unlikely to occur because support for the existing political system in Indonesia is still high.\textsuperscript{100} In addition to a movement’s attitude toward the State, the State’s attitude toward the movement is also essential in shaping the behaviour of the movement. As suggested by Goldstone (1998: 128) a revolutionary direction or outcome is only likely when the State represses a movement. As long as the State remains neutral and makes no effort to eliminate the movement it will motivate a group to evolve into a social movement that seeks changes in policy or power relationship rather than a revolution that seeks to change the social or political order. Therefore, even though a political transition in the form of a seizure of power through mass revolt or a \textit{coup} is the desired outcome, this is unlikely for HTI.

\textsuperscript{99} Interview with M. Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 1 Agust 2009.
\textsuperscript{100} Undoubtedly post-Soeharto democracy that is no more than a decade old still faces many problems. In spite of this, however, some surveys show that the majority of Indonesians are committed to Pancasila (69.6 percent compared to 11.5 percent support for a Middle East modeled Islamic state) (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia 2006) and 82 percent support for compared to only 5 percent of disagreement to democracy (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2006).
C.2. Political Radicalism

As the prospect of HTI’s success in achieving nusroh is not promising, political radicalism is more likely, even if it is not the desired outcome. This trajectory can come from the prominence of two of the three aspects of HTI’s characteristics: anti-system campaign (B) political engagement (A). The opposition to the existing political system shapes entry into political institutions. This takes the form of efforts at establishing an anti-system party that plays a democratic game to undermine democracy from within the system. Achievements in elite mobilizations that are unlikely to materialize into the nusroh model of political change can strengthen this objective. The ultimate goal is to create a coalition united by its aim to implement the shari’ah. The minimum outcome of this strategy is the increase of shari’ah-based legislation and policies. If this change continues to grow, it can develop into a new political coalition that may be strong enough to manipulate the democratic process and then amend the constitution and eventually replace democracy with an Islamic government (see figure 5.4).

This process resembles the model of parliamentary or democratic intervention with the aim of fostering a breakdown similar to the process followed by the rise of Hitler in Germany and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. In Germany, Hitler seized power by transforming his small party, the Nationalist Socialist Party of Germany (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/NSDAP), into one of significance that was capable of breaking the dominance of the older parties. The breaking up of the established parties allowed Hitler to gain a position in government as Chancellor with the support of just one faction of the old order. He was then able to alter the democratic process by manipulating elections to facilitate the establishment of his

101 This goal is reflected in HTI’s attempt to broker a coalition between Islamic parties, see discussion about this in page 140.
absolute power and to destroy the Weimar republic.\textsuperscript{102} While Hitler used a political party, the NSDAP, as his vehicle to seize power, in Venezuela, Chavez came to power as an independent candidate in a presidential election. In a situation of economic and political crisis that delegitimized the two dominant parties (partyarchy), Chavez won the election and manipulated his support to create a new constitution that granted him absolute power and that eventually destroyed the structure of democracy in the country (Raby 2006). These cases from Germany and Venezuela show that destroying democracy by manipulating the existing democratic process is not impossible.

Even though the democratic route is a less than an ideal path compared to \textit{nusroh}, there are indications that the leaders of HTI find this route more feasible. The desirability of this transformation is indicated by four characteristics of HTI:

1. HTI is more open to legislative elections than Presidential elections because to destroy the existing system is only logical in parliament. This is because the position in bureaucracy is seen as the executor of polices within the un-Islamic system; in contrast being a member of parliament gives an opportunity use to the parliament as a vocal point to mobilize opposition toward the existing political system without necessarily taking part in the legislation of un-Islamic laws (see page 80-81).

2. Despite criticism of the established parties, HTI allows support for candidates who consistently campaign for the shari’ah (see page 82).

3. HTI demands the removal of a clause in election regulations that prohibits political parties or candidates from questioning the national ideology and the constitution in their election campaigns (81).

4. HTI demands the adoption of a ‘winner takes all’ system in legislative elections, which means allowing the winner of an election to replace the existing constitution with a new one; if they have the required majority (see page 81).

\textsuperscript{102} For a good analysis on the transformation of Hitler’s party, NSDAP, from a small party into a vital party, see Mommsen (1989: 318-357).
An illustration of this approach occurred in 2008 when HTI welcomed the idea of the leader of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), Rizieq Syihab, to found what was called ‘partai Islam ideologis’ (the ideological Islamic party). He envisioned the founding of an Islamic party that emphasized a ‘shari’ah-guided politics’ over ‘interest-based politics’.

Internal HTI sources admitted that the aspiration for becoming a political party had been raised. HTI had its opportunity, but declined because it did not have sufficient structures in local areas throughout the country. The situation today is however different as HTI has made its presence felt in most provinces in Indonesia; this has given it more confidence to start a new political party. The requirement for participation in elections is for parties to have branches in more than half of the provinces. HTI now has a presence in more than a half of the provinces and cities across the country even though this presence may include only a handful of highly committed members (syabab). The challenge for HTI as it transforms itself into a political party is to include people outside its core membership (syabab) as party administrators.

HTI does not appear to be worried about objections from the HT international leadership should it registers as a political party. Recently after a large conference organized by HTI in Jakarta (in July 2009), the chairman of HT in Britain, Jalaluddin PatelPatel, indicated his support for the transformation of HTI into a political party by

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103 This was related to the idea to transform FPI into a political party during the congress of FPI in December 2008 (Front Pembela Islam, 11 December 2008).

104 This is based on unverified information from a blog discussion of a self-declared former member of HTI. The posting includes a letter it says has in an internal mail group called “partai islam” that is no longer active. The letter stated that the idea to file an application for a political party occurred in 1998, soon after the fall of Soeharto, when a courier (mandub) of Abdul Qadim Zallum named Abu Mahmud visited Indonesia. Mahmud suggested applying for recognition as political party or nominating members as independent candidates. The idea did not go forward because of election regulations that prohibits opposition to Pancasila in political campaigns and because HTI has limited presence at the local level (Mantanht, 2 August 2008)

105 This is stated in 1999 law on election chapter 39, article number 1.a. (National Election Commitee).
arguing that the strategic, not ideological orientation of HT is close to the anti-establishment politics of the Irish Nationalist Party, Sinn Fein. While the ideological nature and the extent of the change demanded by Sinn Fein and HTI are not comparable, the reference to Sinn Fein indicates a common desire for a parliamentary route. HTI’s strategy confirms the desire to establish a party like no other, whose goal is, in Daalder’s definition an anti-system party, to “participate in order to destroy” (1966: 64).

For HTI, starting a new party is however a difficult step because of the election regulations on parliamentary threshold that requires parties to win at least two percent of the vote to gain seats.

Alternatively this evolution may also take the form of seeking an indirect role by pushing a coalition of Islamic parties or political leaders that will support the pro-shari’ah campaign. This vision for shari’ah-oriented coalitions between Islamic parties was apparent in Al-Wa’ie prior the 2009 election. A paragraph of a colomn by HTI’s leadership in Al-Wa’ie states:

Umat yang bergerak dengan dasar akidah dan kesadaran politik—bawah segala persoalan hidup ini harus diselesaikkan dengan hukum syariah—ini akan menjadi kekuatan politik yang luar biasa….partai-partai Islam pada tahun 2009 nanti para jurkam tidak lagi sekadar mengeksploitasi emosi umat dengan simbol-simbol agama, tetapi betul-betul melakukan paparan solusi syariah yang komprehensif... Massa pun tidak sekedar takbir serta memberikan applause, tetapi memberikan respons yang cerdas dengan pandangan-pandangan yang ideologis (Al-Wa’ie 97: 7-9)

The ummah that has been moved by faith and political awareness that all problems have to be solved with shari’ah will become a powerful political force …The campaigners of Islamic parties in 2009 will not only exploit the emotion of the ummah with [the use of] religious symbols, but also genuinely promote the value of comprehensive solutions of shari’ah…[Similarly] the masses will not only respond with

the *takbir* and applause, but with smart responses to put into action the ideological views.

This strategy however did not become a reality because other Islamic parties were not interested in adopting the shari’ah in their campaigns. The challenge for HTI is to create support for pro-shari’ah movements. If anti-democratic sentiment among the people is strong enough to persuade Muslim political actors to adopt the shari’ah agenda then it will be successful. The success of democracy in Indonesia is therefore essential to this aim of HTI.

C.3. Destruction or Moderation

HTI’s strategy of political radicalism may end up with the least desired outcome of either destruction or moderation. This can happen in a situation of the strengthening legitimacy of democracy in Indonesia. In a situation of a high support for democracy, HTI’s anti-system argument of replacing democracy with an Islamic system of the khilafah will become irrelevant. In these circumstances, HTI will have to either choose a path of moderation or face organizational destruction. A move toward moderation will give it a chance to survive and empower the role of political Islam in influencing the ‘colour’ of democracy in Indonesia. This can be carried out by emphasizing the *political engagement* aspect of its character, eschewing its anti-democratic rhetoric (including renouncing its khilafah message) and more genuinely integrating itself into the democratic system.

In contrast, if HTI responds to the democratic progress confrontationally by maintaining its anti-democratic opposition it can be isolated from the pro-shari’ah circle that is integrated into the democratic system. This choice can lead HTI toward destruction.
However, the deficiencies of the Indonesia democratic system could motivate HTI to maintain its anti-democratic rhetoric while at the same time embrace the democratic process. Indonesia’s ‘democratic deficit’ is evident in the declining confidence of the public in democratic institutions. Surveys by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia/LSI) found some alarming facts. In general public support for democracy is still high. According to the survey in 2008, 69 percent see democracy as the best political system for Indonesia (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2008). However, public support for the President dropped from 85 percent in 2009 to as low as 45 percent in 2010 (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2011).

The post-Soeharto multi-party system also reveals its weakness. The survey (by the Lembaga Survei Indonesia) found that people are increasingly sceptical of political parties. This is shown in the declining electability of some parties, both opposition and ruling parties. This makes the number of abstentions as high as 31.1 percent (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2011). It is therefore understandable that some political observers predict the continuing instability of the Indonesian party system because of inter-party competition (Tan 2006: 98).

The deficiency of democracy in Indonesia also appears in its shortcoming in delivering economic prosperity. In spite of recent economic growth there is growing disillusionment of the economic condition. The level of public satisfaction dropped from 56 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2010. It is not surprising therefore that more people are happy to return to the Soeharto era. This is evident in the earlier survey by the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) in 2006 that found 62 percent of respondents think the economic situation under Soeharto was better than that of the current administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia 2006).
HTI’s persistence in its anti-democratic opposition can also be energized by the rise of a pro-shari’ah feeling in society. Even though political polls indicate the continuing decline of Islamic parties and of the interest in shari’ah ideology, social developments over the last ten years indicate a rise of religious intolerance among Muslims. A survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) indicated that Muslims tend to oppose living along side people of other faiths (Jakarta post 19 September, 2009).

Similar recent surveys have also indicated the rise of favourable attitudes toward the shari’ah as an alternative to the shortcomings of Indonesia’s current legal system. Forty percent of the population in the survey of Roy Morgan Research in March 2010 believe that the shari’ah should be implemented in their areas (Roy Morgan 2010). Support for derivative aspects of the term ‘shari’a’ such as the law on stoning, hand chopping) are however slightly lower than the support to the general term of ‘shari’a’ in the findings of Roy Morgan Research. Another survey conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in 2007 found 34 percent support for the shria’ah based law of hand cutting and 43 percent for stoning. More strikingly, LSI survey also found 31 percent of support for an election specifically designed for the implementation of Islamic teaching (lembaga Survei Indonesia 2007). This indicates that a significant number of Muslim desire the adoption of the Islamic law at the state level. The survey question ‘about the implementation of shari’ah’ as offered by Roy Morgan Research (2010) implies support for rule a shari’ah type government. This suggests to HTI that people are becoming more in favour of Islamization.

This development is assisted by the weakness of Indonesia’s ‘Hate Crime’ law. Article 156 (a) of Indonesia’s Criminal Code targets those who “deliberately in public, express feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt against religion with the
purpose of preventing others from adhering to any religion, and targets those who disgrace a religion” (Ministry of Law and Human Right, 1965a). Related to this article is a presidential decree (No. 1/PNPS/1965) on the prevention of Blasphemy and the abuse of religions that prohibit ‘deviant interpretation’ of religious teachings (Ministry of Law and Human Right, 1965b). This clause, however, has been used largely to justify the Muslim persecution of minority groups and neglects monitoring intolerant speeches by radical leaders of all religions. This already weakened understanding of the ‘Hate Crime’ law is further affected by its inconsistent enforcement by authorities who often appear to ignore violence perpetrated by radical Muslim groups against minorities.107

This situation provides HTI with the supportive grounds to carry on with its strategy of ‘refolution.’ The problems in Indonesian democracy that encourage the use of sectarian issues for political mobilization motivate HTI to embrace the democratic system as a means of undermining the legitimacy of democracy. The pendulum however does not move between ‘refolution’ and revolution. HTI may move toward a reform model of change if democracy in Indonesia improves.

**E. Conclusion**

HTI offers a unique political path. In the spectrum of most to least violent, HTI embraces a non-violent approach; but in the continuum stretching from reformist politics to revolutionary politics, HTI is at neither extreme end. Figure 5.5 illustrates the unique position of HTI compared to other Islamic movements in Indonesia. Its opposition to the existing political system prevents HTI from being either moderate or reformist like the majority of Islamic movements in Indonesia. However, its

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107 I have discussed this argument elsewhere, see Ahnaf (2011).
willingness to take part in a democratic process indicates the non-revolutionary nature of the movement. As an alternative, HTI offers a third path that envisions entry into the political system to stimulate a struggle from within. HTI seeks to participate in order to find support to enable it to destroy democracy in this way. There is evidence for the possibility that HTI will translate this strategy either by establishing a new party or by pushing Islamic parties and leaders to form a pro-shari’ah coalition. This outcome is likely not only because of HTI’s desire to do so but also because the political reality is unfavourable to the realization of its ideal path of revolution. Possible support for implementing the shari’ah from within the existing democratic process is likely to force HTI into penetrating into this process and becoming a ‘political party.’ This model of political activism is similar to what by Garton Ash called ‘refolution:’ a fundamental change is achieved by participation in the political process and without overthrowing the existing political regime.

Figure 5.5: HTI in the spectrum of Muslim organizations in Indonesia
Chapter 6

Democratic Opportunities and Challenges

The Impacts of Democratization on the Trajectory of HTI

A. Introduction

An often overlooked consequence of the fall of Soeharto in 1998 was the end of Soeharto’s so-called ‘de-politization’ strategy to counter the mobilization of political radicalism. Combined with his militaristic approach, the strategy was successful in keeping radical movements, left and right, on the fringe of the political arena. Unlike many other political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy that were followed by the decline of social movements (Hipsher 1998: 152-154), post-Soeharto Indonesia seems to confirm the success of Soeharto’s strategy in demobilizing, though

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108 The strategy streamlined channels of political activities by simplifying political parties and controlling social organizations. These limited channels allowed tolerable sectarian advocacies but justified repression against anti-establishment movements. The success of this strategy in demobilizing political Islamic movements took the form of the inclusion of Muslim leaders and activities in the political institutions provided by the regime. Muslim political struggles were accommodated in parties like the United Development Party (PPP) and Golkar and social activities were channeled into many government-associated organizations like Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association (ICMI), the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and the Mosque caretakers association (DMI). The placements of the regime’s agents in the leadership of these parties and organizations ensured government control that prevented dissidents from using the channels for the advancement of Islamist political agendas beyond the tolerable limit. The regime for example allowed the ‘Islamization’ of bureaucracies but portrayed the idea to implement shari’ah as subversive or anti-Pancasila that was put in the same group of Communism. The marginalization of Islamic extremism was also shaped by the support of the regime to Islamization projects, for example, by increasing the number of Muslims in bureaucracies, government funding of mosques and government facilitation of Islamic charity. This incorporation policy created a sense of recognition among Muslim communities and therefore reduced the appeal of arguments for shari’ah adoption or the creation of an Islamic state. For further readings about Soeharto’s “de-politization strategy,” see Porter (2002). I have also discussed this argument elsewhere, see Ahnaf (2011).
not eliminating, Islamist movements. The beginning of the Reform era in 1998 that ended the above mechanism against the extreme right was followed by the emergence and re-emergence of a large number of political parties and diverse social movements, including those advocating the adoption of the shari’ah. Many Muslim activists who were jailed by Soeharto because of their alleged radicalism now entered the political arena and revitalized previously banned social movements. Others created new organizations whose objectives ranged from specific issues such as fighting against immorality, heretic groups and Christian proselytization to more fundamental demands like transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. Instead of demobilizing Islamist movements, democratization seemed to encourage their proliferation.

In this environment, countering the mobilization of Islamist radicalism relies on the role of democracy in demobilizing or moderating political extremists. As discussed in the first chapter, the view that democracy is naturally counter-revolutionary is based on the availability of different channels of social conflict other than revolution. This opposes the revolutionary argument of ‘no other way out’ (Goodwin 1998) and therefore deters the ability of revolutionaries to mobilize a broad anti-regime coalition which is required as a necessary precondition for a revolution (Huntington 1968: 275; Dix 1984: 423-46; Wickham-Crowley 1987: 473-991; Tilly 1978; Brinton 1965; Skocpol 1979).

If not demobilization the impact of democracy on revolutionary movements may also take the form of moderation. This is especially true when revolutionary movements turn to participation in the democratic process. The transformation toward a moderate direction is driven by different factors including the need to attract majority or plural electoral voters (Dawns 1957), the oligarchic nature of organization that requires addressing organizational management over an ideological battle
(Mitchels 1999) and the need to satisfy the constituents’ demand for concrete outcomes over a long-term fundamental change (Macmillan 2006).

The history of Indonesian politics indicates the merit of these confident views of democracy. The trend for moderation among Indonesia’s political Islamic groups is shown primarily in the decreasing significance of shari’ah-related issues. Parties with an Islamist background like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party (PPP) have dropped their original ideology of demanding a specific place for Islam in the constitution and instead turned to inclusive issues such as creating “clean government” and “national integration.” However, even by doing so these parties are still unable to break the dominance of the secular parties. A few parties like the Crescent Star Party (PBB) maintain “shari’ah” in their political platform but this did not prevent the drop in its electoral popularity below the parliamentary threshold of 2 percent in the 2009 election. Similarly, non-party Islamist groups, like the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) and the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), became increasingly policy-oriented by concentrating their attention on specific issues of Muslim political interest rather than challenging the established political system. Other groups that remain determined in demanding a system change such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) are losing strength and divided. Non-party Islamists, like Salafis, are relatively more stable if not growing by staying away from the political arena.

109 For discussions about the decline of Islamic parties, see Mujani & Liddle (2009), Effendy (2009) and Steele (2006).

110 Under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) gained popularity as the front runner of the Islamic state ideology. However, in 2009 the organization split over the authority of Ba’asyir as a supreme leader (amir) Existing leadership of MMI, most prominently Irfan Awwas and Muhammad Thalib, denied Ba’asyir’s absolute authority. Ba’asyir then left MMI and founded his own organization called Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), see International Crisis Group (6 July, 2010, pp. 1-2).
Compared to this de-radicalization trend, the ‘reformationary’ orientation of HTI is unique. This chapter confirms the merit of the argument in support of the counter-revolutionary strength of democracy. However, as HTI was resilient to the trend of de-radicalization by combining participatory politics and anti-system campaigns, the impact of democratization on it remains limited. In the case of HTI, this study argues that democratization “de-revolutionizes,” but does not “de-radicalize it.” Given the problem of political representation in the prominence of pragmatism in Indonesia’s party system, HTI manipulates democratic means to mobilize ideological rebellion against the established political system. In this way, HTI is able to progress its mobilization and continue to politically challenge the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

This transformation confirms the argument of scholars like Selbin (1998), Farhi (2003) and Jost (2006) that democracy does not necessarily demobilize revolutionary movements. Adjusting to democratic circumstances revolutionary movements may metamorphose into a new model of movement that adopts a less confrontational tactic, sometimes by playing democratic games, to challenge the established political system.

To support this assessment, this analysis follows the two arguments for the confident theory about democratic counter-revolutionary capacity. First, it looks at the responses of HTI toward political opportunity structures, which defines the democratic institutionalization of social conflicts. The availability of democratic channels other than non-democratic revolution is essential to counter the revolutionary argument of ‘no other way out’ (Lipset 1960; Goodwin 2001). The model of HTI’s behaviour in regard to democratic opportunities, either formal or informal political institutions is therefore crucial for defining the impact of democratization on HTI.
Second, following the argument of coalition building as a unique challenge of a revolution in a democratic context, this analysis looks at HTI’s behaviour when attempting to address diverse groups. The conclusion on the impact of democratization is derived from HTI’s behaviour, in terms of the abandonment or persistence in revolutionary campaigns, when political opportunities appear and coalition building endeavors are in progress.

B. Political Opportunity Structure

Kitschelt (1968: 58) defines political opportunity structure as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.” More specifically, Tarrow (1983: 26-34) identifies three components of the political opportunity structure: the openness of access to political institutions, the availability of allies and support groups, and the stability of political alignments. It is believed that in addition to the internal factor of organizational doctrine, the political opportunity structure plays a significant role in shaping the behaviour of social movements. It is a response to a perceived or actual opportunity structure that shapes the path of social movements.

Because HTI is currently not a political party this exploration of the political opportunity structure for the mobilization of HTI focuses on the first two components identified above by Tarrow. The first is the openness of access to political institutions, which refers to the formal mechanisms of the democratic process such as elections and the legislative processes. The second is the availability of allies or support groups that refer to the historical precedents for social mobilization. For this purpose, this study selects a number of cases within these two categories. These cases refer to
political opportunities for reform in favour of Islamist mobilization rather than opportunities for a fundamental change because, as suggested by Kitschelt (1968: 58), the political opportunity structure facilitates the mobilization of social movements in some ways, but constrains them in others. In the context of HTI, political freedom and opportunities provide opportunities for reforms but their adoption may constrain the mobilization for a fundamental change. Therefore the presence of potential allies or support groups that characterize an opportunity structure at the social level includes groups or leaders who favour reform rather than fundamental change. This choice of historical precedent for opportunities in favour of the partial adoption of the shari’ah allows assessment on the extent of the democratic role on the political behaviour of HTI. Following the “confident theory of democracy,” which values the availability of political channels as a key for the democratic counter-revolutionary strength (see pages 16-19), this discussion is aimed at characterizing the nature of HTI behaviour when interacting with the political opportunity structure. These opportunities occur at the level of the formal political institution and the occurrence of potential allies for social mobilization.

B.1. Openings of Political Institution

B.1.i. Constitutional Reform, 1999-2002

As soon as HTI shifted to a public campaign two years after the departure of Soeharto in May 1998, it saw the political opportunities that came out of a series of annual sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 2000, 2001 and 2000 which discussed a rare agenda of constitutional reform. For advocates of the shari’ah, the sessions were seen as a momentum to reopen the debate about the Jakarta Charter that
gives Muslims the right to observe the shari’ah in all aspects of life. From the Islamist perspective, the key focus of the debate concerned Article 29 of the constitution, which declares that ‘The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.’ Supporters of shari’ah implementation demanded the addition of the seven words suggested in the Jakarta Charter into this Article to become “The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God and the obligation of Muslims to observe shari’ah.” Even though the translation of this statute into law would potentially spark debate over diverse understandings of the shari’ah, pro-shari’ah activists saw this as a stepping stone toward extensive shari’ah rule.

As the debate over this provision was forbidden during the rule of Soeharto, many Muslim groups see this new period as a golden opportunity to generate political support for the constitutional adoption of the shari’ah. Past fear of military intervention or presidential decree was no longer an issue. Movements to support the cause were mobilized. Outside parliament, various Muslim groups advocated the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Article 29. For example, the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI) mobilized thousands of people in a rally in front of the parliament building. For the same cause, in 2000 the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) gathered hundreds of Muslim leaders from different organizations in a congress that issued a declaration demanding the implementation of the shari’ah by the State. Inside parliament, few Islamic parties including the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and an amalgamation of small Islamic parties that joined a coalition called the Union of the Ummah Sovereignty (F-PDU), lodged the proposal to amend Article 29 and to reinsert the Jakarta Charter (Hosen 2005: 425). However, towards the end of the process most of the parties, including the

111 For information about the Jakarta Charter, see page 116.
Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Justice Party (PK), removed the word “shari’ah” from the demand.\footnote{Nadirsyah Hosen interviewed leaders of PBB and PK about this decision. They said that the time is not right to demand the adoption shari’ah. They were skeptical that the shari’ah campaign would gain enough support at that time (Hosen 2005: 427).} PPP was later left the only party that kept the proposal for Jakarta Charter in the 2000 session, but it eventually declined the demand following a session in 2001 after its chairman, Hamzah Haz, was picked as the Vice of President Megawati from the nationalist party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) (Salim 2008: 89). With a lack of support from parliament members, the Jakarta Charter was ruled out again.

HTI’s attitude toward this political process is unique. Despite the fact that the Jakarta Charter does not imply a comprehensive application of the shari’ah in all aspects of life, it did not challenge or criticize this democratic struggle. From 2000 to 2002, several editions of HTI’s Al-Islam leaflet were devoted to responding to the process, and it was supportive of the Jakarta Charter. This was for example reflected in its regret regarding the decision of Islamic parties other than the PPP including the PK (the previous name of the PKS), the PBB and the F-PDU (Al-Islam 19) during the MPR session in 2000 not to pursue the matter. While admitting that the Jakarta Charter does not represent the khilafah model of Islamic government, HTI stated that the Jakarta Charter should be respected because it is part of the struggle for the adoption of the shari’ah by Muslim leaders during the founding of the nation. Any effort to reintroduce the Jakarta Charter was therefore seen as a “noble endeavour” that must be supported (Al-Islam 73). By this position, HTI did not see any contradiction between the reformist nature of the Jakarta Charter advocacy and its demand for a total replacement of the constitution with an Islamic one. This attitude is reflected in this paragraph of Al-Islam in response to the PPP’s proposal to reinsert the Jakarta Charter:
It is clear that the effort to reinsert Islamic faith and the shari'ah laws to become the constitution and laws of social life in the Muslim world is a noble endeavor that has to be seriously fought for. Muslims have to support it even though they have to struggle for an amendment of the whole 1945 constitution, from the beginning to the end, and from the foundation to the roof.

This statement demonstrates HTI's attempt to sustain its aspiration for a comprehensive amendment of the constitution. However, it was clear that in spite of this desire, HTI supports the Jakarta Charter that deals only with the introduction section of the constitution. This is reflected in the fact that on the ground HTI joined other Muslim groups to lobby parliament members from Islamic parties to support the Jakarta Charter. Together with prominent Islamist groups such as the MMI and the FPI, HTI lobbied the Islamic coalition in parliament, the Union of the Ummah Sovereignty (F-PDU), to support the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter. In August 2002, it also signed a petition prepared by those organizations to support the charter.\(^{113}\)

However, unlike other Islamic groups and parties like the FPI, the KISDI (Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity), the PPP and the PBB that specified their demand for the reinsertion of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter into the Article 29, HTI stressed the importance of a more comprehensive change. But HTI saw the Jakarta Charter as a minor issue compared to the more urgent demand of

\(^{113}\) The participation of HTI in the groups that met with F-PDU was based on the interview of Arskal Salim with Asnawi Lathif, member of the F-PDU from PKNU. However, Salim does not mention the date of the meeting (Salim 2008: 98)
constitutional replacement. As a part of its effort to define its unique opposition to the system, HTI proposed an alternative draft of the constitution based on its understanding of the government system of the khilafah. HTI sought to deliver this draft to the chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien Rais, and the Islamic parties (Tempointeraktif. 4, November, 2001). Although HTI joined other groups in pressuring parliament members to support the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter it used the momentum to raise public skepticism for the political system, including the process of constitutional amendment. For this purpose, HTI did not join another rally by a coalition of more than a dozen Muslim groups that demanded the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution (Basalim 2002: 140-154, in Rahmat 2008: 51). Instead, HTI organized separate rallies on November 4, 2001 and August 3, 2002 under the campaign title of ‘Save Indonesia with Shari’ah’ (Tempointeraktif. 4, November, 2001). Unlike other Islamic groups that did not question the legitimacy of the Constitution (UUD ’45), during the rallies the chairman of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, stated that the demands of HTI were not only for the adoption of the Jakarta Charter but also for the replacement of the constitution with an Islamic one (Tempointeraktif, November 4 2001). Yusanto’s use of the words ‘not only’ is significant. It reflects HTI’s strategy of supporting reformist change while at the same time campaigning for the necessity of systemic change. In this case, however, the anti-system campaign is more prominent than the support for changes within the framework of the existing system. This was most probably caused by the reality that the chance for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter was slim.

Therefore, even though HTI did not reject partial advocacy it put more emphasis on its anti-system opposition. This is reflected in the efforts by HTI to raise public skepticism for the process of constitutional reform. Several issues of Al-Wa’ie
stressed the unreliability of shari’ah application under an un-Islamic system (Al-Wa‘ie 11: 14). In spite of its participation in other group efforts to pressure parliament members to support the inclusion of the seven words of the Jakarta charter into Chapter 29 of the constitution, at times, HTI also considered the current process of constitutional amendment illegitimate. It believed that it needed to open up the possibility for the total replacement of the Constitution by inviting wider public participation to propose an alternative draft of constitution. HTI suggested that any constitutional amendment should question the fundamental aspects of the political system such as Pancasila, the republic form of the state and democracy (Al-Wa‘ie 24: 7-8). HTI was skeptical that the current process in the parliament could deliver this desired outcome. Speaking to the media during a rally in response to the parliamentary session in 2001, Ismail Yusanto said that HTI’s rally was not aimed at achieving a specific political goal. He argued that the strong presence of nationalist parties in parliament made the goal of the parliamentary adoption of the Jakarta Charter unfeasible. HTI was therefore concerned more about the political opposition to the shari’ah rather than the prospect for a constitutional amendment. The focus of HTI’s discourse in this period was in challenging arguments against the shari’ah. Because it does not see the amendment as a way toward a total change, he emphasized the interconnected nature of shari’ah laws that necessitates their comprehensive application (Al-Islam 102).

This fact reveals two tendencies of HTI. On one hand, it shows that in response to political opportunities HTI was willing to abandon totality in its non-participation policy that requires it to challenge gradualist campaigns when responding to political opportunity. Such a stance was taken even though the chance of success was slim. On the other hand, it demonstrates that what was most important
for HTI is not achieving policy changes; in this case it was the constitutional adoption of the Jakarta Charter. The primary goal was using the case to raise public awareness about shari’ah. This goal is reflected in Yusanto’s assertion that instead of aiming to achieve a specific political goal, the target of the rallies was “to bring forward and uphold the discourse on shari’ah application in a clear and strong manner” (Tempointeraktif, November 4 2001).

B.1.ii. Elections: The Rise and Decline of Islamic Parties

HTI has witnessed two national elections in the post-Soeharto era that took place in 2004 and 2009. After the marginalization of Islamist politics by Soeharto through the fusion of Islamic parties into a single and controlled party, the United Development Party (PPP), post-Soeharto elections became a central arena of Muslim politics. Islamic parties, those that originated from Muslim communities and those that officially use Islam as a political platform, proliferated. After gaining only a minority of votes in the 1999 election, optimism among political Islamic activists rose as the Prosperous Justice party (PKS) surged into one of the top parties with 6.3 percent of votes in the 2004 election. Even though PKS’ change towards a more inclusive platform was crucial for the surge, there was a belief that the rise of PKS represented the growing support for political Islam or at least the moderate right (see figure 6.1 and 6.2).

In the 2004 election, “secular parties” like Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) were still dominant. However, the combined vote of Islamic parties was not insignificant. Moderate and far right parties or those that adopt Islam as political ideology like PKS, PPP, and PBB gained 20.7 percent of votes that granted them 114 seats out of 550 seats in the house. If this figure is
combined with central right parties or parties that originate from Muslim organizations but adopt Pancasila as a political ideology instead of Islam, the strength of Islam would almost double. The combined vote of two parties in this category, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), is 18.8 percent or 104 seats. With 39.5 percent of votes or 218 out of 550 seats in the house the gap between Islamic parties and secular parties is reduced to about 13 percent (about 76 seats). The combined votes of secular parties within the parliamentary threshold, including Golkar, the PDIP and the PD (Democrat Party), were 53.37 percent (294 seats) (Indonesian Election Committee 2009). This gap is still higher than the most successful achievement of Islamic parties in the 1955 election when the combined votes of Islamic parties, the Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (PSII) and the Union of Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) was approximately 43.5 percent.114 The strength of the combined votes of Islamic parties in 2004, however, could be more significant when the votes of secular parties are divided. With a total vote of 37 percent, Islamic parties could outpower Golkar (23.27%) and the PDIP (19.8%) (see figures 6.1 and 6.2).

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<tr>
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<th>1999 Seats</th>
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<tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>23.27</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
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<td>30.6</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<td>Islamic parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
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<td>9.45</td>
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<td>9.45</td>
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<tr>
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<td>58</td>
<td>10.54</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 6.1: Major Islamic parties compared to major secular parties in 1999-2009 elections (compiled from different sources)

114 For discussion about the result of the 1955 election, see Suryadinata (2002: 19-42).
Theoretically, an effort to strengthen the Muslim force in parliament can be carried out by breaking the potential opposing coalition between secular parties. However, an Islamic confederation could also include Golkar, which is often considered an Islamic friendly party (Baswedan 2004). The inclusion of Golkar in this possible scenario is not without a reason. There is a record of support for Islamic legislation and policies from many Golkar politicians.

The trace of political Islam in Golkar emerged during the Soeharto era. When Soeharto launched a policy of accommodating Islamic interests, he opened the door of Golkar for many Muslim activists of the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia/HMI). Some of HMI’s elements in Golkar aspired for the mobilization of Islamic interests. It is therefore not a surprise that many Golkar politicians at the local level have shown openness toward accommodating the Islamic aspiration of attracting Muslim political support. This for example took place in South Sulawesi’s district of Bulukumba where the bupati (the head of the district government) from Golkar, Patabai Pabokori (no longer serving as the bupati) implemented several forms of shari’ah-based Perdas (regional regulations).

115 For discussion about Golkar accommodation of Islam, see Makrun (2009: 205-323).
116 For reading about his role in the implementation of shari’ah-based regulation in Bulukumba, see Buehler (2008).
Adding the potential of the inclusion of Golkar to Islamic advocacy and other secular but inclusive parties competing in the 2009 election such as Hanura and Demokrat, a powerful central right coalition could be built with approximately 78 percent of the seats in parliament (see figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Continuum of parties’ ideologies competing in the 2009 election (Adapted from Baswedan [2004: 681])

Even if a formal coalition with Golkar does not happen, an Islamic block that combines right and central right parties can attract desertions from religiously committed individuals within Golkar and can potentially receive the remaining votes of Islamic parties that fail to meet the parliamentary threshold.

HTI’s attitude toward elections is not unchanging. After the legislative election in 1999 that resulted in the defeat of the Islamic parties, HTI reasserted its skeptical view of elections by suggesting that elections in democracy were not designed to prepare for a fundamental change. HTI’s discourse on the election and on Islamic parties in 2004 was extremely critical. HTI highlighted the contradictions between

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117 New parties in 2009, Demokrat, Gerindra, and Hanura, are added as they are not included in Baswedan’s use of this continuum for the results of elections in 1955 and 1999. The inclusion of these parties in the ‘secular-inclusive’ category is tentative due to their recent formation.

118 Two nationalist parties, PDIP and Golkar were largely dominant with 33.74 and 22.44 percents of votes respectively. The combined votes of Islamic parties, including those inclusive ideologies (PKB and PAN) are under 30 percent. This shortage of votes discouraged Islamic parties to uphold sectarianism in politics.
elections in democracy and the khilafah (Al-Wa’ie 41: 19-22), emphasized the failures of Islamic parties (Al-Wa’ie 41: 3-4), drove people’s attention to the prominence of political pragmatism (Al-Wa’ie 47: 7-12) and reasserted its non-parliamentary approach for change (Al-Islam 196). However, it appeared that although its discourse on elections was highly skeptical, HTI had not totally lost hope. In January 2004 (a few months before elections), HTI published a circular (nasyroh) on the matter of participation in elections that distinguishes between participation in legislative and executive (presidential) elections. It allowed participation in legislative elections on the condition that candidates advocating the shari’ah were available (Al-Wa’ie 41: 27-28). Even though it admitted elections as a method for political succession during the khilafah period it strictly discouraged participation in executive elections because executive elections in Indonesia are based on the democratic system. It argued:

Proses pemilihan kepala negara dalam format sistem demokrasi sekuler, sama artinya dengan mengkokohkan sebuah sistem yang bertentangan dengan sistem Islam secara diametral) (Al-Wa’ie 41: 28-29).

The process of election for a head of state within the framework of secular democracy means strengthening a system that is diametrically contradictory to the Islamic system.

In May 2004, HTI also issued a circular (nasyroh) on the subject of “electing a head of state” (kepala negara), in which, although it did not encourage boycotting the presidential election, it emphasized the difference between the head of state in democracy and in Islam (HTI, 31 May 2004). In this period, HTI made it clear that “[running for a parliament] if it is aimed at using parliament as an arena for da’wah (preaching)... is permissible” (Al-Wa’ie 45: 29).

However, this distinction became blurred when HTI faced political reality. In response to the tendency of Islamic parties to build coalitions with nationalist
parties, HTI raised the idea of creating a ‘shari’ah coalition’ that combines Islamic parties (*Al-Wa’ie* 47: 19-21; *Al-Islam* 200). HTI was unhappy with the tendency of Islamic parties to build coalitions with secular parties. It reminded them that:


If this condition [coalitions between Islamic parties and secular parties] happens, the struggle for the shari’ah, even though only at a substantial level-- not with the formalization of shari’ah-- will have unclear direction.

Even though HTI seemed to be more encouraged by the coalition between Islamic parties, it was also aware that many of the leaders of the secular parties are also Muslim. Therefore, it suggested that a coalition (*wala’*) between Muslims (regardless of its parties) is permissible as long as it is aimed at creating an Islamic government (khilafah) (*Al-Wa’ie* 47: 18-21). Due to the fact that these publications were made after the legislative elections and prior to the presidential elections, this implies that, although the ultimate goal of khilafah was upheld, HTI was interested in the creation of a shari’ah-oriented coalition in either presidential or legislative elections.

In practice, this aspiration was carried out by visiting a number of political parties and presidential candidates including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Amien Rais who was nominated by the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Wiranto from Hanura (*Al-Wa’ie* 47: 30-31). HTI was also unable to distance itself from the political move of Muslim candidates like Amien Rais by taking part in a coalition forum of diverse Muslim groups and leaders from Islamic parties. They organized a

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119 In 2004, nationalist parties that dominated the top three in the result of legislative election competed to build coalitions with smaller parties, including Islamic parties. PDIP for example, initiated a coalition called the ‘nationalist coalition’ that included Islamic parties such as PPP and PKB (Detik, 8 September 2009).
gathering in the Al-Azhar mosque in Jakarta that was supportive, though not explicitly, to the candidacy of Amien (Tempointerktif, 4 July 2004). The choice of Amien Rais was not without reason. Building an Islamic coalition had been the tactic of Amien. In the early 2000s, Amien led a coalition called ‘central axis’ (poros tengah) in parliament that combined Islamic parties to support the rise of Gusdur to the presidency (Barton 2002: 275). He was portrayed as Muslim figure competing against Megawati who came from an “ultra-nationalist” background. While other Islamic leaders such as Hamzah Haz and Hasyim Muzadi embraced coalitions with secular parties, Amien, who himself was nominated by a Muslim party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), assembled support from a number of Islamic parties including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Star Crescent Party (PBB), the Star Reform Party (PBR) and was endorsed by high profile leaders such as Din Syamsuddin of Muhammadiyah, Zainuddin MZ, and Aa Gym. This support was shown in the Al-Azhar gathering one day before the presidential election which HTI attended. The reality that Amien was competing against Megawati gave significance to HTI’s publicised opposition to the candidacy of women (Al-Islam 200). Likewise, HTI’s campaign against the idea of Islamic-nationalist coalitions (Al-Wa’ie 47: 5) and the campaigns against secular leaders (Al-Wa’ie 47: 31) implied an opposition to Amien’s competitors, specifically President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who has been portrayed by HTI as a liberal in economic policies.120

Prior to the 2009 election HTI’s tolerance of presidential elections was more explicit. On 2 July 2009, it issued another circular (nasyroh) entitled “Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tentang Pemilihan Presiden 2009” (The statement of Hizbut

120 This portrayal is clear in an edition of Al-Wa’ie (October 2009) with a cover title “New Government: More Liberal.” The cover shows the pictures of President SBY and Vice President Budyono (Al-Wa’ie 110) suggesting that they continue and strengthen Soeharto’s policy favouring economic liberalism.
Tahrir Indonesia on the 2009 presidential election). Unlike the earlier circular in 2004 that used the term “head of state,” in this later release HTI compared the law of presidential elections to the process of selecting a head of state (nashb al-ra’is) in Islam. This was meant to signify the difference between a “head of state” in the Islamic political system and a “president” in a democracy. In contrast to the doctrine that prohibits participation in executive elections, this statement did not discourage people from casting ballots in the election. Instead, like the earlier circular, the statement urged people to only elect a presidential candidate who has a commitment to replace the existing secular system with a comprehensive application of the shari’ah (HTI, 2 July 2009). Of course there was no candidate with such a character. However, the fact that HTI did not campaign for abstention from voting, in spite of the absence of an ideal candidate, implies that it was not challenging elections per se. Such a stance is important for HTI if it intends to participate in future elections.

It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that in 2009 HTI was more pro-active in seeking indirect roles in the election process. As discussed earlier, after the failure to establish its own party in 2007, prior to the 2009 election HTI encouraged the formation of a coalition of Islamic parties. It did so not only with word, but also in action through an initiative to establish an Islamic block or “poros Islam” (Antara, 21 July, 2008). For this purpose, HTI organized a series of visits to Islamic parties including the PPP, the PAN, and the PKS. Sometimes HTI could not be restrained from explicitly calling for voting for Islamic parties. For example, after meeting the leaders of the PPP, the spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, spoke to the press: ”HTI mengeluarkan bayan atau penjelasan kepada khalayak, kader, dan simpatisan untuk menggunakan haknya dengan sebaik-baiknya dengan memilih partai berasaskan
Islam," (HTI issued a clarification to its members and sympathizers to use its right for voting by voting for Islamic-based parties) (Antara, 1 August, 2008).

The results of the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections were disheartening for candidates of Islamic parties. Seven, out of ten Islamic parties in 2009, according to Fealy, can be considered Islamist in the sense of supporting the application of the shair’ah. But these parties only managed to gain 19 percent of the total votes. This indicates very limited support for the shari’ah (Fealy 2009). The idea of an Islamic based coalition proved ineffective. Indonesian politics, according to Platzdasch, shows “the triumph of political logic” over ideological ideals. This was apparent in the fact that after losing in legislative elections, they gave support to presidential candidates from various ideological backgrounds (Platzdasch 2009: 264). In 2004, the PKS supported Amien Rais who was paired with a nationalist leader, Siswono Yudohusodo, the PBB supported a nationalist combination of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party (PD) and Jusuf Kalla of Golkar, and the PPP nominated its own leader Hamzah Haz who ran with Agum Gumelar who did not have Islamist background (Carter Centre 2005). In 2009, almost all Islamic parties including the PKS, the PPP and the PKB and the PAN supported President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his running mate Vice President Budiyono (Indonesian Election Committee 2009b).

However, the outcome of a coalition is not the only objective of this move. More significantly, the discourse and initiative for a shari’ah coalition is also useful to push for political polarization along sectarian lines. In spite of the declining votes, the presence of Islamic parties in government coalition, according to Fealy, demonstrates that the role of Islam in Indonesian politics is not “diminished” but is “changed” in nature. The winning party cannot neglect the power of Islamic parties and this
maintains the influence of Islamist aspirations (Fealy 2009). Therefore, in response to this situation, HTI was quick to argue that the loss of Islamic parties and candidates was the result of a Muslim reluctance to uphold the shari’ah as a political platform rather than an indication of the irrelevance of the shari’ah in real politik (Al-Islam 441).

HTI’s strategy in pushing sectarian politics was not limited to the effort to develop Islamic versus secular fragmentation in political arena. This distinction does not always represent the reality in Indonesian party systems because of dissimilarities between Islamic and secular parties in terms of platform, personnel and action. Many secular parties are led by Muslim leaders who often mobilize support based on Islamic symbols. It is therefore understandable that even though HTI’s idea of a shari’ah coalition often means a coalition between Islamic parties, it could not isolate Muslim influential figures from the secular parties. For this reason, HTI sought to persuade retired General Wiranto from the Hanura party to adopt the shari’ah in his campaign for the presidency (Detik Bandung, 9 June 2009). Wiranto did not seem to respond to this call positively as his party strengthened its “secular” stance.

It is interesting to compare HTI’s behaviour during the elections in 2004 and 2009. From the Islamist perspective, the 2004 election gave more optimism than the 2009 election because of the rise of Islamic parties in 2004 compared to their decline or stagnant performance in 2009. The 2004 election could appear as a brighter political opportunity than the 2009 election. Nonetheless, in spite of this difference, HTI’s behaviour during these two periods was not dissimilar. While criticizing elections and party politics, HTI does not explicitly discourage non-participation in elections; and instead it typically called for parties and candidates to adopt shari’ah as
This indicates the objective of HTI to use elections as a chance to push for political fragmentation based along religious lines. HTI does not totally reject party politics. Instead it embraced party politics through the election process as a means of mobilizing political support for the shari’ah. From the perspective of HTI, creating a political divergence based on religious lines is more important than securing a political position or the adoption of the shari’ah through the parliamentary processes, as these are less feasible. The polarization is essential in HTI’s struggle to develop relevance for its call for the shari’ah and the khilafah and ultimately in deligitimizing the established political and legal system. From this point of view, the seemingly ambiguous behaviour of this engagement with party politics and of opposition to the democratic system is not the paradox it seems.

**B.1.iii. Institutional Opening in Local Politics**

One of the most profound aspects of democratic reform after the fall of Soeharto is decentralization. Introduced in 1999 through the passing of the local autonomy law (Law No. 22/1999), the decentralization process overhauls Soeharto’s centralized polity in two ways: it introduced local elections and it expanded the authority of local governments (Bunte 2009: 117). An undesired outcome of the decentralization is the rise of communalism. To target Muslim constituents especially in areas where Islam is a strong aspect of communal identity such as in West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and West Java, many local political leaders use morality arguments and adopt symbolic politics by appearing to accommodate Muslim political interests. While the formalization of the

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121 See discussion on HTI’s discourse on election (in pages 77-82), its engagements with political parties, political leaders and elections (in pages 133-142).

122 For examples of violence related to local elections, see International Crisis Group (8 December, 2010).
shari’ah at the national level has been rejected this pattern of local elections is seen as a political opportunity by Islamist activists. This has created a new enthusiasm among Islamist leaders who aim to shift the focus of the struggle for the shari’ah from the national to the regional level. The goal is to surround central government with an increasing number of shari’ah bylaws at the local level to give examples of the viability of the shari’ah and thus to gather support and perpetuate the adoption of the shari’ah at the national level. As a part of this orientation some Islamic groups formed operational units to pressure or lobby local authorities to adopt the shari’ah. An example of this move was the formation of the Commitee for the Preparation for the Implementation of Shari’ah (KPPSI) at the provincial and district levels by the network of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI).

This campaign has intensified local demands for the adoption of the shari’ah, which played an important role in the rise of the number of shari’ah friendly regulations in local areas. The modus was that local authorities collaborated with Islamist groups to introduce shari’ah-friendly bylaws on the basis of the local autonomy law. Since 1999 there has been an increasing number of provincial and district regulations (also called Peraturan Daerah [Perda]) that adopt specific aspects of Islamic law. Compiling data from various sources until 2008, Bush records 78 regulations in 52 districts and municipalities out of 470 districts and municipalities in Indonesia (Bush 2008: 2). At least until 2008, these regulations have cast fear of a growing Islamization at the regional level (Marshall, 5 April, 2004). However, as concern rose over the negative impact of the laws on women and minorities, opposition to the regulations also raised questions about their compatibility to the national constitution. Additionally, due to the nature of the regulations that were

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123 For further information about this development, see Tempo (2006)
124 For a reading about the Preparation Committee for the Implementation of Shariah (KPPSI), see Ramly (2006)
produced by a marriage of convenience between the Islamists and opportunists, local authorities found most of the regulations unsustainable and ineffective. As a result, by 2004 the number of these type of bylaws, according to Bush, began to drop (Bush 2008: 174-191).

In spite of this recent setback, decentralization has given a sense of political opportunity to Islamic groups. HTI’s attitude toward this political change has also changed. In the early period of the introduction of the local autonomy law, HTI was extremely skeptical toward the law. In January 2002, Al-Wa’ie took the issue as a focus with the cover title ‘Local autonomy law: solution or problem?’ (Al-Wa’ie 17). HTI’s answer to this question was negative. It described local autonomy laws as “poison” rather than a “medicine” to the problems of local societies (Al-Wa’ie 17: 11). It saw the extension of authority of local governments as triggering the misuse of local autonomy laws for the political interests of elites. HTI challenged this law by arguing that the competition between local governments to raise incomes has led to conflict over borders and resources. Instead of strengthening regional commitment to the national government, it argued that the local autonomy has bred separatism. National disintegration is also arguably threatened by conflict over resources between neighboring districts. The interest in short term economic incomes was seen as a factor of the openness of local government to foreign investments, something that undermined national sovereignty (Al-Wa’ie 17: 7-11; Al-Islam 84). In this period, HTI described decentralization more as a threat rather than an opportunity.

However, in 2005 when local elections (Pilkada) were first implemented, HTI’s attitude toward decentralization became ambiguous. On the one hand, in line with its view of elections, HTI was skeptical of Pilkada. It described Pilkada as a
“dangerous event.” This is reflected in the following statement of Ismail Yusanto in an interview with Al-Wa’ie:

It is true that the local autonomy law gives larger authority to local government. Therefore Pilkada can be dangerous when the conspiracy of evil power (gamblers, corrupt regime and black rulers) combined with foreign support succeeded in elections. ...The most serious danger is that it makes people forget about the true change this nation need. [it is] that in addition to the producing a good leader, it also needs a good system, ... that is Islamic syari’ah.

On the other hand, in spite of this highly critical view of Pilkada, Yusanto also saw a prospect for change by admitting that Pilkada could be instrumental in the advocacy of the shari’ah. He argued:

In the local autonomy era, election of a local government can create opportunities for shari’ah implementation at the local level. This goal can be more easily realized when supported by DPRD [local House of Representative] as has happened in a number of districts....Those perdas [shari’ah inspired bylaws] are still far from enough for the goal of comprehensive application of the shari’ah. But with pro-shari’ah leaders (like head of Bulukumba district who even though coming from Golkar but is very enthusiastic in implementing shari’ah) and with support from DPRD as well as people in general, chances for shari’ah implementation is surely larger.
HTI’s instruction with regard to *Pilkada* was not totally negative to elections. Yusanto for example called for Muslims to play pro-active roles in local elections by encouraging the participation of candidates with a commitment to the shari’ah. Yusanto stated:

> Umat Islam tidak boleh lagi sekedar menjadi pendukung calon kepala daerah tanpa jelas hendak kemana yang didukungknya itu akan membawa mereka. Tegasnya, umat Islam harus berani berkata bahwa mereka hanya akan mau mendukung calon kepala daerah yang amanah dan yang mau menerapkan syariah (*Al-Wa’ie* 59: 44).

Muslims can longer support candidates for regional government without clarification of their orientation. Unequivocally, Muslims should dare to say that they will only support candidates who are trustworthy and committed to implement the shari’ah.

This implied HTI’s desire to capitalize on the opportunity of decentralization to push for the creation of local governments that are supportive of the Islamist cause. This orientation was in practice demonstrated in some instances by HTI’s engagement with local government. As discussed in the previous chapter, HTI has been successful in building a relationship with the South Sumatra governor, Mahyuddin. This progress is a good example of the way HTI seized political opportunities that come out of decentralization. The primary purpose of this move, however, is different to other Islamist groups that focus on the government’s adoption of specific aspects of shari’ah as for example carried out by Islamist pressure groups such as the Preparation Committee for the Application of Shari’ah (KPPSI) and the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI).

The primary agenda of HTI is to tap into local governments to use their power to expand its presence. This is reflected in the choice of activities taken up by HTI in seizing the opportunity provided by the South Sumatra governor’s attempt to use Islamic sentiments to gain support from Islamic groups. These activities include a seminar on shari’ah-based resource management (*Al-Wa’ie* 86: 37), a seminar on the
political roles of women (Al-Wa’ie 82: 37), and a Muslim leadership gathering in the
governor’s office (Al-Wa’ie 82: 39). However none of these activities was practical in
pressuring the government to adopt shari’ah-friendly regulations as advocated by
other Islamist groups. The topic of the seminar on shari’ah-based resource
management was too theoretical to be practical as an economic policy. Given HTI’s
typical assertion that economic policy requires an Islamic economic system in
opposition to capitalism, HTI should have realized that expecting the governor’s
adoption of its alternative proposal for shari’ah-based resource management was not
feasible. Nevertheless, HTI accepted this topic as an opportunity to use the local
government government’s status for delivering its campaign (for an alternative
system) and for attracting recruits from among government officials.

Rather than focusing on tangible or short-term outcomes in the form of
government regulations on Islamic morality (though this orientation is often
unavoidable) HTI chose activities that could support its own interests of propaganda
and mobilization. Like other Islamist groups, HTI saw decentralization as a political
opportunity, but HTI’s perspective of the opportunity is more of a long-term strategy
of penetration rather than the short-term production of Islamic policies.

B.2. Informal Politics: The Importance of Allies
B.2.i. Mobilization Momentum: Uproars against Indecency and Blasphemy

In the recent period no other issue has united more Muslims across the spectrum than
the call for government action against pornography and allegedly anti-Islamic
heresies. Some see this development as representing the rise of radicalism and the
decline of moderate Islam (Khalik 2008) or as an indication of the increasing
influence of Islam on Indonesian politics (Tanuwidjaya 2010).
Elsewhere, the argument against pornography may be a non-sectarian issue. In Indonesia however, the issue is a unique demand by conservative and hardline Muslim groups. The campaign has been portrayed as anti-pluralist that threatens civil rights, and expressions of art and culture. The demand is therefore strongly opposed by the non-Muslim majority in provinces like Bali and Papua (Tempointeraktif, 3 November 2008; Kompas, 14 September 2008; Kompas, 3 November 2008).

Likewise, opposition to Ahmadiya is an ideal issue for HTI’s campaign. Ahmadiya is an offshoot of Islam whose members venerate the founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and believe in his prophecy. Muslim groups accuse Ahmadiya of teaching beliefs and practices that deviate from the true teaching of Islam. The religious aspect of the issue makes it an ideal target for HTI to develop sectarian arguments. Additionally the opposition of mainstream Muslim groups to Ahmadiya helps HTI identifies itself with the mainstream.

While support for the campaign against these two ‘enemies’ has came from diverse Islamic segments, including members of the mainstream Muslim groups, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiya, Islamist groups were mainly responsible for publicly raising and advocating the issues. The success of mobilizing public and government favour for the campaign has given political credit to the Islamist groups.

After months of campaigns that combined the strategies of political lobbying, rallies, petitions and repeated violence against Ahmadiya and alleged pornographic

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125 For a historical record of Indonesian Muslim opposition to Ahmadiya, see Triyana (2011).
126 In the analysis of International Crisis Group (ICG), the essential role of Islamists groups in pressuring the government is indicated by the list of organizations referred to support a recommendation draft of a team appointed by the government in 2005 to evaluate the legitimacy of persecuting Ahmadiya. These organizations include Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Indonesia; Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), Syarikat Islam, Ittihadul Muballighin, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Umat Islam, Al Irsyad, Institute Tarbiyah al Qur’an Jakarta, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah and LPPI. Of these organizations only Muhammadiya represents the mainstream Islam (International Crisis Group 2008: 2-3).
media by various Islamic groups, the Government took accommodative action. On 9 June 2008, the government issued a joint-ministerial decree that considered Ahmadiya a heretic group and ordered its followers to stop disseminating its theological teachings (Kompas, 9 June, 2008). A few months after this, the Government showed another friendly gesture toward Islamists. Faithful to his course of non-confrontation with the religious majority, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed in December 2008 the anti-pornography bill, ratifying a law that criminalizes any “sex-related material” deemed as violating public morality (Republika 10 December, 2008).

The outcome of the government ruling however did not fully satisfy the Islamists. The decree on Ahmadiya fell short of banning Ahmadiya as demanded by the Islamist groups and the provisions in the pornographic bill were vague in order to protect cultural expression. Nonetheless, this accommodation energized Islamist groups and raised their optimism for potential support. From their perspective, the most welcomed aspect of the process was the participation of the members of mainstream Islamic groups, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). This raised the possibility among observers that the influence of radical groups was on rise (International Crisis Group, 7 July 2008). Muslims were becoming more accepting of structural Islamization. A favorable or tolerant attitude toward Islamist aspirations did not only come from mainstream Muslim community. In some cases, the ability of minority Islamist groups to mobilize polarizing discourse with regard to Government rulings on Islamic morality attracted support from the so called “secular parties.” On issues like Ahmadiyah and pornography, the fear of being seen as anti-Islamic prevented the parties from totally opposing Islamist aspiration (Tanudjaya 2010: 42).
The regulations on pornography and Ahmadiya were not the only reason for Islamist optimism. Various other developments are also seen as indications of the increasing support for the introduction of the shari’ah in public affairs. These include the occurrence of shari’ah-friendly regional regulations, various surveys indicating high support for shari’ah implementation and alleged government tolerance for Islamist prosecution against minorities and liberal Muslim activists.

HTI’s role in these campaigns is apparently intense. With regard to the government ruling against Ahmadiya, the International Crisis Group (ICG) gives a special attention to the role of HTI in addition to other organizations like the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI) and the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI). While MUI, a semi-govermental body that represents diverse Muslim groups provided the institutional role in pressuring the government, HTI in conjunction with the FUI connected MUI to street protests (International Crisis Group 2008: 8-15). This mass support was essential for MUI’s advocacy because mainstream organizations, like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, usually choose a less confrontational approach on the issue.127 Muhammad Al-Khattah who, at that time, represented HTI and FUI, was a key figure in the mobilization of the masses through rallies and ulama gatherings to demand the banning of Ahmadiya. But Al-Khattah was not the only one from HTI to play a role in providing MUI with large-scale support. The spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, was frequently involved in various anti-Ahmadiya rallies and ulama gatherings. It is clear that HTI was heavily involved in the anti-Ahmadiya advocacy. This stance has unavoidably made HTI more supportive to a gradualist approach to change. In spite of the Government response that was not fully satisfying for the Islamist demand of banning Ahmadiyah,

For example Hasyim Muzadi, head of NU in this period, while endorsed the government decree on Ahmadiya, condemned FPI’s illegal persecution of Ahmadiya and suggested dialogue to persuade members of Ahmadiya to return to the true teachings of Islam (NU Online, 3 June 2008.)
HTI responded positively. In a dialogue on national television, TV One, in response to the decree on Ahmadiya, Yusanto stated: “As a process, the interministerial decree (SKB) on Ahmadiya should be appreciated. However, this SKB does not address the substance of the problem that requires the banning of blasphemy against Islam” (Sebagai sebuah proses, SKB penting diapresiasi. Namun, SKB tidak menyentuh masalah subtansial, yakni pelarangan atas penistaan dan penodaan Islam) (Al-Islam 409).

Nonetheles, it is clear that what is most important for HTI in its opposition to Ahmadiya was not Government action against Ahmadiya, but its ability to exert influence and gain sympathy from Muslim communities. This is reflected in a note by Yusanto published in Al-Wa’ie in response to the unsatisfying decision of the Government on the matter:


Although unsatisfying, the issuance of the interministerial decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB) is a major political victory. One day before the SKB was issued a political observer talked to a high level officer and leader: “if this SKB is issued it can be dangerous [because] it can raise the political bargaining of Hizbut Tahrir” (Al-Wa’ie 97: 7-9)

Events such as public opposition to Ahmadiya also became valuable momentum for HTI to create sectarian polarization and it identifies itself in the same pole as mainstream Muslim communities.

A similiar attitude was undertaken in the anti-pronography campaign. In response to the debate in the House about the proposed bill on pornography, HTI organized rallies across the nation that called for “clean Indonesia from pornography
and ‘pornoaksi’ [porn expression] with the shari’ah and the khilafah” (HTI, 27 October, 2008). In some of the rallies, HTI criticized the democratic process in the house that used voting on the matter. This view is explicitly forbidden in Islam (HTI, 22 October, 2008). It further sought to explain that its position was neither to support nor to challenge the anti-pornographic law but to call for the elimination of pornography and porn-related activities with the shari’ah and the khilafah (HTI 29 October, 2008). However, it appeared that HTI could not restrain itself from taking part in pressuring the House to pass the law on pornography. In a rally in front of the House in Jakarta, this demand was delivered explicitly (HTI, 28 October, 2008).

Furthermore, HTI went to meet members of the House of Representatives’ Special Committee (Pansus) on the law to push for its revision on pornography in accordance with the shari’ah (HTI, 30 October, 2008). It argued that the issue of pornography is evidence of the relevance of its campaign for the shari’ah, as stated by Yusanto in a media interview:

Di sinilah pentingnya penerapan syariah di tengah masyarakat. Karena syariah akan memberikan pengaturan tentang berbagai hal, termasuk menyangkut masalah pornografi dan pornoaksi, dengan jelas dan konsisten untuk seluruh masyarakat...Semuanya tentu bisa diwujudkan, jika syariah diterapkan secara kaffah di bawah naungan Khilafah. Dengan cara itu, kerahmatan yang dijanjikan dari penerapan syariah itu bisa diwujudkan (HTI, 31 October, 2008).

Here lies the importance of the application of the shari’ah in societies. The shari’ah will provide clear and consistent rules for all issues including pornography and porn actions that apply for all people. This can be realized if shari’ah is implemented comprehensively within the institution of khilafah. In this way the good aspects of shari’ah can be realized.

Following the pattern of using popular issues to create sectarian divide, HTI also identified the saga on the anti-pornographic law as part of a continuing battle between Islam and secularism. In this regard, an issue of Al-Wa’ie headlined on the subject with the cover titled “RUU Pornografi: Pertarungan Islam versus
Sometimes the effort to gain sympathy and expand mobilization forces HTI to abandon its opposition to the political system. This is, for example, obvious in an official statement released by HTI in response to the issue of pornography and Ahmadiya. The content of its press release only presented reasons to support the passing of the laws on pornography without suggesting the necessity of a comprehensive application of the shari’ah and the khilafah as it typically demands (HTI, 19 May, 2006).

Likewise, the statement on Ahmadiyah was a full of endorsement of MUI’s argument for the banning of Ahmadiya without implying that the total application of shari’ah is the only solution to eliminate heretic groups (HTI, 24 December, 2007). In this context, the interest in identifying itself with the Muslim political struggle has made HTI tolerant of minimal outcomes. After the passing of the law that was not satisfying to the Islamist demand, HTI was critical but responded rather positively by arguing “it is better to have a rule rather than to be without any rule” (lebih baik tetap ada aturan daripada tidak ada sama sekali).128 Nonetheless, this more moderate gesture is only part of HTI’s policy. In general HTI’s strategy in this period remained overtly radical because of the combination of political engagement or participation and campaigning for comprehensive change. Overall, the discourse and action of HTI in 2008 was radical or closer toward the extreme pole. From 2005-2007 HTI’s discourse tended to be less radical with an average score of 1.6 to 1.7. In 2008, the discourse became more radical with an average score of 2.5.

128 This quoted reaction was cited in the official publication of PKS’s South Jakarta branch, PKS South Jakarta (PKS Jakarta Selatan, 24 October 2008). Even though this statement could not be verified, the fact that HTI ceased the advocacy for pornography after the passing of the law is parallel with this statement.
Similarly, the average score of HTI’s discourse from 2005-2007 was between 2 and 2.4 and then turned toward a slightly more extreme direction with the score of 2.5. This means that in the interests of seizing political opportunities that placed it in a favorable position to expand its influence, HTI was willing to momentarily leave its revolutionary objective to one side. This tactic was tolerated because HTI believes in other occasions it has made its anti-systemic argument clear in the eyes of the public.

B.2.ii. MUI’s Accommodation of Islamism

Another post-Soeharto social change in favor of Islamization is the changing character of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). The Council was founded in the early period of the Soeharto administration in 1975 as a consultation body of diverse Muslim organizations. Muslim organizations are therefore represented in the organizational structure of the Council in which representatives from the two largest organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, traditionally occupy leadership positions. The establishment of the council, however, cannot be separated from Soeharto’s effort to exert control on Muslim communities. During the period of Soeharto administration, the Council was state-oriented. Even though it is formally a non-governmental organization, it received funding from the government and played a role in issuing fatwas to support Government development programmes. According to Nur Ichwan (Ichwan 2005), after the fall of Soeharto, the Council appeared to shift from state-oriented to ummah-oriented. Even though it is still enjoying funding from the government, but has been given authority to manage Islamic charities and halal certification which increases its financial capability, it became increasingly more independent from state influence. MUI still assumes a bridging role between the
government and the Muslim community, but is moving closer to the societies rather than merely serving the interests of the Government (Ichwan 2005).

As a part of the effort to approach the ummah, the Council is becoming more involved in Muslim politics. In the 1999 election for example, the MUI released an advice (tausiyah) favoring Islamic leaders who were opposed to non-Muslim candidates (Ichwan 2005: 56-58). The MUI also became more intense in its advocacy of state-aided Islamization. This transformation is often seen as a part of the process of a move to the right by the Council. The most notable indication of this is the widening of MUI’s membership to include activists from new groups including those with radical orientations including HTI (Ichwan 2005: 49). With representatives from Islamist groups in MUI’s internal structure, MUI facilitated the formation of Muslim inter-group alliances, such as Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (the Islamic Brotherhood Forum) and Forum Umat Islam (the Islamic Ummah Forum), which play instrumental roles in fostering the state-aided Islamization of public affairs including the campaign for shari’a-friendly regulation in localities.

The extent of MUI’s accommodation of Islamist politics is however limited. MUI’s commitment to the state ideology or Pancasila, democracy, and the interest of preserving national inter-religious harmony and national integration remain the differentiating line between the MUI and the Islamist groups. Nevertheless, this shift has created a sense of optimism among Islamists. The connection between MUI and Islamist groups is, stronger than before, which is demonstrated by the increasing appearance of MUI leaders in Islamist activities.

As a part of this development, HTI has been actively approaching the MUI to deliver its campaign to Muslim communities. As elaborated in the previous chapter, MUI is the most frequent ally sought by HTI in its activities (see figure 3.8 in page
An example of HTI’s engagement with MUI is its participation in the Congress of the Indonesian Muslim Ummah (KUII) organized by the MUI, especially the fifth congress in May 2010. This congress aimed at facilitating the creation of a common strategy in the Muslim struggle in various sectors of life within the context of the State of Indonesia. The first and second congresses were held in 1947 and 1952. Under the Soeharto administration the congress was stopped. It resumed again in 1998, when the MUI was given responsibility for the organization. With the purpose of co-coordinating a common agenda for Muslims, the congress accommodates all strands of Muslims by inviting representatives of diverse Muslim organizations. The MUI and mainstream Muslim organizations however play the central roles. Because of its consensus-seeking orientation, the Congress for the Indonesian Muslim Ummah (KUII) has never produced concrete outcomes except in 1947 when the congress initiated the founding of Masyumi, an Islam Islamist organization, which later became the only Islamic party competing in elections until 1955 (Jaringan Islam Liberal 2005).

With the resurgence of the demand for the implementation of the shari’ah after the fall of Soeharto, it increasingly became a central subject in the Congress arena. According to Bahtiar Effendy, who served as a member of the Congress steering committee in 2005, the surge of the call for shari’ah implementation in the congress was due to the diverse nature of its participants, which include those with radical and conservative views. The vocal presence of these segments echoed the aspiration for a strategic formulation of shari’ah implementation (Jaringan Islam Liberal 2005). Given the openness and extensive nature of participant recruitment, Islamist groups saw the Congress as a place for campaigning for the Muslim alliance to foster the implementation of the shari’ah. This is reflected in a note from the secretary general
of the Muslim Ummah Forum (FUI), Muhammad Al-Khattath, who expected that the congress would pave a breakthrough for the development of a shared concept of shari’ah in various aspects of life and commitment to campaigns for its adoption by the State (Suara Islam, 8 May, 2010)

It is no surprise therefore that HTI saw the Congress as a “strategic forum” (HTI, 8 August 2010). For this reason, it proactively sought participation in the Congress. HTI expressed its disappointment to a statement of a plan from the organizer to exclude so called controversial organizations that included HTI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) in the last congress in 2010 (Suara Islam, 9 April 2010). This sparked anger from the MMI and the FPI who demanded an apology from the organizer.\footnote{MMI sent a protest statement to MUI called “Tazkiroh Majelis Mujahidin to MUI’ that demands MUI’s apology for the ‘controversial’ charge (Era Muslim, 25 April 2010)} But in an effort to maintain the opportunity for participation, HTI chose to take a less confrontational reaction by lobbying the committee to accept its presence. Despite the involvement of the Government in the congress represented by scheduled speeches for the President and the Vice President, HTI expressed its interest to participate in the Congress. The organizer finally revoked the plan to exclude the three organizations. While this change did not persuade the FPI to accept the delayed invitation, HTI in contrast welcomed the invitation and expressed its commitment to participate and support for the Congress (HTI, 22 April, 2010).

In the fifth KUII in 2009, HTI was successful in getting five of their members into the Congress arena. Two of them, M.R. Kurnia and Harist Abu Ulya came as representatives of HTI, while the other three were HTI members who represented MUI’s branches in the provinces of Riau, Bangka Belitung and Banten (HTI, 8 June 2010). HTI prepared a concept draft on the relevant aspects of the shari’ah to be
proposed as a discussion topic at Congress sessions. Such a proposal however, was not always upheld. For example during the session on Muslim leadership, a delegate of HTI, M.R. Kurnia, proposed four criteria for a political leader. None of them explicitly required a commitment to adopt the khilafah. Instead, Kurnia promoted characters that resonated with the common aspiration of the audience such as possessing an Islamic personality, defending Islamic teaching from heresies and liberal ideas, a commitment to advocate the shari’ah and an ability to unite the ummah (HTI, 9 May, 2010). The demands for the Islamic state or opposition to democracy is absent in this proposal. HTI accepted the neutral or less specified terms of the resolution and left aside its doctrine that requires calling for the ummah to challenge and disengage from the government and the existing political system.

On another occasion, a local leader of HTI from Riau, Muhammadun, mentioned the khilafah during the session. He suggested that “a leader should be integrated into government leadership to be able to enforce shari’ah.” Because a leader has to play a role at the national and international level, he said “that type of leadership is called khalifah (caliph)” (HTI, 9 May, 2010). HTI’s leader at the central board, however, chose a different tone. In a note in the aftermath of the congress, Ismail Yusanto admitted that propagating the khilafah was challenging because of resistance from the audience. HTI claimed that its proposal in other aspects, especially in economic issues that demanded the government disengage from its capitalistic system and the adoption of shari’ah as an economic system was welcomed (HTI, 8 August 2010).

The outcomes of the Congress were minimal compared to HTI’s goal of steering public opposition to the established political system and the campaign for the khilafah. The Congress produced a document called the Jakarta Declaration 2010 that
consists of six recommendations that are in nature “integrationist” with regard to the relationship with the government and political system. They include:

1. A commitment to unite the thought and strategic action in facing the challenge of the ummah and the state as an integral part of the development and supremacy of the Muslims and the state of Indonesia.
2. A commitment and responsibility to contribute in the progress of the state and nation of Indonesia.
3. A commitment to strengthen leadership that follows the sunnah (model) of the prophet and the empowerment of shari’ah economy for the prosperity of the ummah, state and nation.
4. An endorsement of the view of the importance of ummah leadership to implement the doctrine of *amr ma’ruf nahy munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil) as a part of the effort to implement shari’ah in all aspects of life.
5. Support for the formation of an implementing body for the above recommendation
6. MUI is responsible to organize and elect a committee for the implementing body (Indonesian Ulama Council, 11 May 2010)

Only resolution number four that upholds the importance of “the shari’ah law in all aspects of life” is close to HTI’s proposal even though there remains a lack of practicality. The resolutions also include a call for the strengthening of “shari’ah economy,” but this does not include criticism of the current economic system and economic policies of the President who is considered liberal-minded by HTI. Opposition to capitalism - one of HTI’s most frequent targets of attack - was not included in this point. Similarly, even though the recommendation on shari’ah is paired with the phrase ‘in all aspects of life,’ it does not indicate which concept of shari’ah should be adopted and how it should be implemented. A central question on whether the existing political system should be replaced by a shari’ah based political system, is not addressed in the resolutions.

These unspecified and “integrationist” recommendations were uncritically accepted by HTI. In *Al-Islam* published in the aftermath of the Congress, HTI praised the outcome:

In the KUII V, ulama and Muslim leaders have demonstrated their responsibility. They responded to current political realities and provided directions for the ummah.

HTI however manipulated the results by describing them as an evidence of the response of the ulama to the failure of the existing political process. It also added an explanation to resolution number four suggesting that this means a call for the ummah to select candidates as leaders who possess an Islamic personality (Al-Islam 506). This delegitimizing view of elections is not the official stance of the congress, which did not oppose democracy or elections. This point is not mentioned in the declaration published in the website of the MUI (Deklarasi Jakarta 2010).

Several points can however be considered as achievements for HTI. First, it gained a place to address a wide audience to campaign for the khilafah and to expand its membership. The most apparent aspect of HTI’s manipulation through its involvement in the congress was its use of a corner of the venue to display banners and circulate publications (HTI, 8 May, 2010). Second, it allowed HTI to identify with mainstream Muslim groups and to exert influence. This in itself helps defend HTI from the negative labeling of “radicalism.” Third, it allowed HTI to push for discussion on the application of the shari’ah as an alternative to national problems. The point ‘shari’ah implementation in all aspects of life’ in the recommendation can be considered progress for HTI. Such a recommendation can be used to argue that its syari’ah and khilafah campaign is in line or endorsed by major ulama represented at the Congress for Indonesian Muslim Ummah (KUII).

This effort to gain recognition was however taken without an impasse. In order to gain acceptance and to appeal to a diverse audience HTI had to adopt a less
confrontational rhetoric and attitude toward the Government and the established political system. For this purpose HTI emphasized the call for the shari’ah and occasionally for the khilafah but left aside its opposition to democracy and other key aspects of the political system including Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In contrast to the doctrine of *dharb al-alaqoh* (attacking relationship) that requires a constant struggle to separate Muslim people from the Government, HTI made no effort to challenge the Government involvement in the congress that took the form of speeches from the President, Vice President and the presence of Government officials; although it was critical of the contents of the speeches (HTI, 7 May, 2010). Finally, HTI was uncritical of the resolutions of the Congress that were integrationist in nature as reflected in resolutions encouraging Muslim contribution and participation in Government programmes.

C. The Democratic Impact: De-revolutionized, Not De-radicalized

HT’s theory of revolution is dissimilar to the conventional Western model of revolution that necessitates violence as a strategy to boycott or undermine the stability of a political regime. As an alternative to violent strategies, HT’s theory of revolution emphasizes *non-cooperation* and *non-participation* as a strategy to undermine the legitimacy of the democratic political system and government. It seeks to mobilize a wide social opposition and disengagement from the established political system to persuade elites to support a revolutionary transition from democracy to khilafah. As part of non-participatory and non-cooperative strategies, HTI emphasizes the extra-parliamentary struggle but does not reject the parliamentary process as a means to foster the delegitimation of the political system.
In reality however HTI has been largely inconsistent in following its non-participation and non-cooperation strategies.

Operating in the democratic structure of Indonesia’s Muslim majority environment has led HTI to tolerate participatory and co-operative politics. This suggests that HTI has been de-revolutionized by the democratic context of Indonesia. Two aspects of the “political opportunity structure” provided by democracy are essential in HTI’s deviation from its non-participation and non-cooperative doctrines. These include institutional openings favoring limited Islamization and the presence of allies within the system. HTI’s opposition to democracy is clear but when political opportunities occur it is willing to take a part, direct or indirectly, in the democratic process in favor of the partial accommodation of Muslim interests. The above cases of political opportunities illustrate this transformation, which include the following points:

1. HTI supported and was involved in advocating the adoption of the Jakarta Charter in constitutional reforms.

2. HTI’s shift from total opposition to executive elections prior to the election period to openness for supporting a pro-shari’ah candidate in the presidential election. This changing attitude cannot be separated from the changing political situation as this connects with the idea to create an Islamic coalition for the presidential election of 2004. The precedence for this political opportunity was the candidacy of Amien Rais to whom HTI gave implicit endorsement.

3. HTI was originally opposed to the local autonomy laws. But its view and attitude toward this particular instance of political change became more positive after it discovered that local autonomy offered an opportunity for
the introduction of shari’ah-friendly regional bylaws and the changing attitude of some local governments toward a more friendly relationship with Muslim societies. HTI was co-operative with local government when it saw this as an opportunity for increasing its political influence.

4. HTI’s reaction to the Ahmadiyah case demonstrates its support of a gradualist approach to change. This is driven by its desire to use opposition to gain sympathy for its ideas and expand its membership. But by doing this HTI tended to abandon the revolutionary mandate of constantly challenging the central elements of the political system such as the existence of the Government and the House of Representative.

5. The case of HTI’s participation in the KUII V is evidence that it wishes to restrain from revolutionary rhetoric when addressing a diverse audience. In this case, HTI restrained from its usual attack on the political system and government. Instead it accepted the integrationist recommendations of the Congress with regard to the relationship between the ummah and the state.

This cumulative evidence confirms the argument of the counter-revolutionary nature of democracy. The availability of democratic mechanism for change counters the aspiration for revolution that requires an extra-parliamentary process to overthrow the existing political system. The incorporation of a significant portion of Muslim political actors into the existing political system is the key to this. The fact that many Muslim leaders who could be HTI’s most potential allies embrace the democratic struggle as illustrated in the above six points and has made HTI tolerant or less confrontational toward participatory and co-operative politics. The presence of allies within the system has become a unique democratic challenge for HTI because it is sometimes difficult to draw a clearly defined line between the forces of change and its
enemies. It is the interest in gaining support from potential allies within the system that encouraged HTI to take a less challenging role toward the established political system. As shown by Ryan, in his analysis of the impact of democracy on revolutionary movements, it is the challenge of mobilizing a broad anti-regime coalition that leads to the surrender of revolutionary movements to the democratic system (Ryan 1994: 34). HTI’s lack of confidence in mobilizing an anti-system or anti-regime coalition motivated it to choose an alternative path to the revolutionary struggle.

This does not mean that HTI is becoming moderate. The core of HTI’s strategy remains radical because of its use of political engagement as a means to expand anti-system mobilization. Evidence shows that HTI’s involvement in participatory and co-operative politics is driven by its goal of gaining political roles in the Muslim community. Unlike reformist Islamists, HTI did not seize democratic opportunities merely for short-term and concrete gain. Its change to a more participatory attitude is a part of strategic ambivalence especially constructed for the following purposes:

1. To gain roles and recognition in the Muslim political struggle and to enhance social networks. As a new group with a radical agenda, HTI is doing this as an attempt to move itself from the periphery to the epicenter.

2. HTI’s support of the partial advocacy of the shari’ah is driven by an interest to create sectarian fragmentation and encourage sectarian division. The rising support for the shari’ah would serve HTI’s “bandwagon” politics for it to create a perception that the shari’ah has become a public demand. With the claim of strong support for shari’ah, HTI aims to push Islamic parties toward an extreme right direction by upholding the shari’ah
on political platforms. This situation supports HTI’s goal of embarking on parliamentary politics to undermine the system from within.

3. By supporting the partial adoption of the shari’ah, HTI aims to present examples of the viability of the shari’ah, though this should not be seen as its primary objective. When the partial adoption of shari’ah failed to create a positive impact, HTI manipulates the situation to challenge the system. It is this strategy that leads HTI to tolerate minimal outcomes as illustrated by its positive reaction to the Government ruling on the Ahmadiya issue.

In short, the democratic environment of Indonesia has become both a challenge and an opportunity for HTI.

The constant occurrence of political opportunities for democratic struggle to foster Islamization and the inclusion of Muslim leaders within the system are the antithesis of HTI’s aim to undermine the established political system. However, HTI’s willingness to depart from a stubborn revolutionary struggle has rewarded it with opportunities for political freedom that allows it to maneuver in order to mobilize support bases inside and outside the system. Given this political freedom, HTI exercises a strategy of ambivalence in which it is continuously propagating the khilafah in an effort to undermine public support for democracy; while at the same time it manipulates democratic struggles to gain sympathy, expand membership, and ultimately create an environment that empowers sectarian politics. Its reluctance to move further toward moderation is driven by what Tezcur, in his study on the radicalization of Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, calls “dynamic of competition.’

Political competition under democracy that challenges the political hegemony of radical movements motivates them to radicalize in order to survive (Tezcur 2009:
2). Competing with the trend of moderation among the majority of Muslim social and political actors, HTI may see political radicalism as an identity for mobilization. As suggested by Tezcur, political opportunity marginalizes the revolutionaries’s potential for support: “the survival of the organization [PKK] necessitates radicalization rather than moderation” (Tezcur 2009: 2). The ‘dynamic of competition’ in Indonesian politics that makes parties play down the shari’ah has motivated HTI to uphold the shari’ah as a political identity. To challenge this moderating tendency, it therefore promotes the argument that the electoral decline of Islamic parties is the result of their departure from the shari’ah campaign rather than the reverse (Al-Islam 441).

The success of this strategy however, depends on the performance of democratization and the changing attitude of Muslims toward the shari’ah. The failure of party politics and the inability of the Government to deliver prosperity could create a political and social crisis that will give relevance to HTI’s campaign. If an actual revolution is obsolete, the failure of democracy to deliver will give HTI an opportunity to foster political fragmentation based on sectarian lines thus dividing Islamic and nationalist factions, and planting seeds for the development of extreme right politics in Indonesia. The aspiration to become an anti-system party could be HTI’s materialization in this situation. This goal could also be energized by the view that the Prosperous Justice party (PKS), as a prominent Islamist party has lost many of its core constituents since its move toward the centre. HTI may see this as a momentum to gain support from Islamist voters who are increasingly disillusioned by the moderate tendencies of the PKS. To sustain this orientation, HTI however relies on favorable situations at the social level which includes the rise of support for Islamization by the State and the relative acceptance of mainstream Muslims by HTI. Opposition to HTI’s arguments about the obligation of the khilafah that necessitates
challenging the established political system has led HTI to retreat from its revolutionary direction. The opposition of mainstream Muslims to HTI’s khilafah ideology could therefore be crucial in pushing HTI from radical to more moderate politics.

D. Conclusion

This case of HTI provides a nuanced understanding of the debate about the impact of democracy on revolutionary movements. *This chapter confirms the thesis that democracy, regardless of its performance, is counter-revolutionary* (see pages 17-19). However, this does not suggest that the counter-revolutionary impact of democracy means the destruction or demobilization of revolutionary movements. The growth of HTI in its operation under the different democratic circumstances of Indonesia illustrates this tendency.

This study also reveals a different finding to the theory suggesting that weak or minimal democracy encourages movement radicalization in term of the intensification of totalitarian rhetoric or anti-systemic opposition (Berman 2003; see pages 22-23 of this thesis). The contextualization of HTI in the democratic environment of Indonesia is closer to the argument proposed by Farhi (2003; see pages 20-21 of this thesis) who argued that *democracy encourages the transformation of a revolutionary movement into a new model that adopts gradualist and non-confrontational tactics to advocate anti-systemic opposition*. The persistence of HTI for political radicalism suggests that this is especially the case in a situation where democracy is weak.

The impact could be more severe to HTI if democratization in Indonesia is more deliberate—this is the key to its legitimacy. The strong support for democracy means that the majority of Muslims are supportive of the existing political system.
This situation will make HTI’s anti-systemic campaign irrelevant and will therefore potentially foster its future toward either demobilization or moderation. *Stubbornness toward anti-system politics in a situation of high support for the political system could result in either demobilization or destruction of HTI.* Alternatively, HTI could transform into a more moderate stance by abandoning its aspiration to overthrow democracy and fully participate in democratic politics in order to at least survive in a situation of flourishing democracy. This could take the form of establishing a new party or joining an existing party that is fully committed to democracy or deepen its integration with other social movements that work as a pressure group for reforms in favor of Islamization.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

At the end of each chapter I have added a section entitled conclusion. I will not repeat these conclusions but draw from the thesis as a whole a number of findings. I will then discuss the implications of these finding and bring the thesis to end.

A. Summary of Findings

In this thesis I have argued that HTI is seeking an alternative path to revolution and reform. HTI advocates a strategy of ‘political radicalism’ that combines opposition to the democratic system with selective involvement in the democratic process.

This orientation presents a different view to existing studies of HT that focus on its extreme directions, including its role in providing an ideological foundation for violent extremism and the suggestion that its revolutionary ideology will necessarily promote a revolutionary path.

This strategy departs from the revolutionary doctrine of al-Nabhani that requires the movement to consistently undermine the legitimacy of any un-Islamic system by advocating political detachment or non-participation (dhabb al-‘alaqoh). Al-Nabhani’s theory for change focuses on inciting public anger toward the (democratic) existing system (kasyf al-khuttath) and mobilizing support (nusroh) from powerful elites (ahl al-quwwah) to initiate a political change toward the establishment of the khilafah through an extraordinary political process (pages 55-60). In contrast to this, HTI seeks entry into the democratic system by engaging with democratic
institutions (such as the Government, the House of Representatives, and political parties) (pages 121-137).

Instead of fostering scepticism about democracy, HTI often lends legitimacy to these institutions by seeking their support for shari’ah-based policies. Rather than advocating political detachment from the democratic system, HTI tolerates ‘democratic concessions’ by taking part in Muslim programs in support of the shari’ah within the democratic framework (pages 137-145).

However, this does not mean that HTI is becoming moderate. It rejects full support of reformist politics that focuses solely on pressuring the existing political establishment to gradually adopt the shari’ah without addressing the inherent failure of the present political system.

HTI supports democratic struggles for the institution of the shari’ah as an intermediate goal or as an instrument to stir rebellion against the established political system both in the nation and within elements of the bureaucracy. This is reflected in HTI’s continued calls for the khilafah to be instituted, its continued opposition to democracy, and its criticism of gradualism (pages 100-103).

HTI’s non-confrontational approach to democratic institutions has awarded it with political freedom without which it cannot expand its mobilization. Its involvement in Muslim policies in favor of the shari’ah helps it in gaining influence in society and thereby establishes a variety of support bases for future political mobilization.

*This pathway resembles the model of political change called by Timothy Garton Ash, ‘refolution’* (Ash 1990). Learning from the political transitions from communism to democracy in Poland and Hungary, the revolutionary model of change takes place through a process of incremental change that leads to a fundamental
change of the political and the economic systems. Unlike revolution, this model of change takes place without overthrowing the old regime. Instead, the opposition persuade the ruling regime to share power in a new Government to bring about the fundamental changes that are required. The focus of the struggle is to challenge the legitimacy of the political system more than attacking the political structures.

HTI envisions two routes to change.

The first and more desired path is the extra-parliamentary change by which HTI will offer its political resources to elites in the military or to powerful and influential leaders to initiate a coup or other forms of political change that pave the way toward transition from democracy to an Islamic government (pages 64-66). However, as HTI’s effort to find a powerful patron (nusroh), especially the military, has not been successful, the second path of democratic struggle is more feasible.

Evidence indicates that HTI envisions the creation of a genuine Islamic party, which is similar to European anti-system or extreme right parties, to use parliament as a vocal point to promote shari’ah and Islamic legal and political system as an alternative. This path is not explicitely declared by HTI; but it is indicated by several characteristics of HTI, including: (a) a combination of an anti-systemic campaign that tolerates participatory politics, (b) the justification of participation in legislative elections over participation in executive elections, (c) the call for political leaders or candidates of Islamic parties to uphold the shari’ah in political campaigns, (d) the demand for the removal of a clause in election regulations that prohibits opposition to the state ideology in political campaigns, and (e) the support of a ‘winner takes all’ system in elections to allow the winning party to introduce a new constitution (see pages 78-81).
Establishing a new party is however not an easy task, although this may be the ideal. The key to the transformation into a participating party is largely an issue of gaining sufficient structure at the local level rather than maintaining an ideological and public debate about the legitimacy of participating in the democratic process. The current discussion in parliament to raise the parliamentary threshold from two to five percent if realized could make this task harder for HTI.

While working on mobilization to increase the chance of gaining sufficient support to start a new party, the alternative option for HTI is to push Islamic parties to build an “extreme right” coalition in parliament.

This strategy has been demonstrated by HTI in its call for Islamic parties to unite and become what it calls an ‘ideological party’ by strengthening Islamic identity, upholding the shari’ah in campaigns and prioritizing the education of Muslim constituents in favour of the establishment of the shari’ah over electoral pragmatism (see page 80). For this purpose HTI encourages Islamic parties to create an Islamic bloc or ‘poros Islam’ in parliament and presidential elections (pages 140-141). We may therefore anticipate that HTI will lend its political resources to a party or a coalition of parties that are willing to shift toward right-leaning politics.

So far however, HTI has not been able to offer significant resources to persuade existing parties to do so. So we can expect HTI’s efforts in the interim to increase the chance of bringing about the birth of an anti-system party by continuously creating an ‘educated market’, in which Muslims are distrustful of the democratic system and receptive to the installation of a shari’ah-based Government as an alternative. Parallel to this we may see HTI continuously tapping into sensitive issues regarding Muslim political interests to create a polarization that unites Islamic forces to oppose so called secular or liberal forces. In the short term, the success of HTI can
be measured by its ability to mobilize new anti-democratic enclaves in Muslim communities and in the state apparatuses that strengthens ideologisized Islamic bonds over the traditional bonds of mainstream organizations.

This evolution of HTI cannot be separated from the democratic environment of Indonesia. The aspects of Indonesia’s democracy that effect HTI most are political freedom and opportunity (chapter 6).

Political freedom allows HTI to expand its influence without the threat of state repression. Meanwhile the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s population is Muslim provides HTI with opportunities for political accommodation through the democratic process. The presence of a political opportunity for pro-shari’ah mobilization has reduced the interest to maintain the idealist path of revolution. The revolutionary doctrine of ‘no other way out’ other than the immediate establishment of the khilafah challenges the political channels used by other Muslim political activists. The fact that many Muslim leaders who could be HTI’s most potential allies also embrace the democratic struggle has made HTI tolerant or less confrontational to their involvement in the democratic process. The presence of allies within the system has become a unique democratic challenge for HTI to draw a clearly defined line between the force of change and its enemies. It is in HT’s interest to interact with and infiltrate into the parties of its potential allies within the system that will cost HTI’s consistency in challenging the elements of the established political system.

This study shows that democratization has de-revolutionized HTI as an organisation, but it is yet to de-radicalize HTI as a movement.

The defects of democracy in Indonesia, as reflected in the increasing public disillusionment with democratic institutions such as the House of Representatives and the modus operandi of the political parties, encourages HTI to continue to campaign
for a systemic change. Further change of HTI toward a moderate or deeper integration into the democratic system therefore depends on the process of democratization.

If people’s confidence in the democratic process is strengthened as the result of the Government’s democratic ability to deliver prosperity and political representation, HTI’s opposition to democracy will become irrelevant. In the situation of high support for democracy, HTI’s chance of survival depends on its willingness to integrate itself into the democratic system by eschewing its anti-democratic rhetoric. Otherwise, if HTI responds to the increased legitimacy of democracy with persistent radicalism in the form of continuing its opposition to democracy, HTI faces destruction as an organization. The survival of HTI is unimaginable without adapting to the new situation.

B. Implications of Findings

Post-Soeharto Indonesia is what some scholars call the era of ‘post-Islamism’ (Roy 2004, Bayat 2007). In spite of the rise of religious piety among Muslims, political Islam is unable to raise great interest in shari’ah-based politics. Islamist parties have become increasingly integrated into the democratic system that they set out to destroy. In Indonesia, even though many Islamic parties avoid the sectarian rhetoric of the shari’ah in order to appeal to a wider audience, they cannot break through the dominant influence of ‘secular’ parties.

HTI attempts to change this situation. Despite the fact that Islamist parties that continue upholding the shari’ah in their platform are at the bottom among Islamic parties in terms of influence, HTI sees their decline as connected with their renunciation of the shari’ah as a political ideology. HTI aims to bring the ideology
back into the political arena. It uses the democratic context to mobilize social support for the shari’ah and thereby to persuade political leaders to return to the shari’ah as a political platform. HTI encourages Islamic parties to focus on educating the people about the supremacy of the shari’ah and to set up a continuing shari’ah faction in parliament.

It is unimaginable that HTI will be successful in achieving its goal of overthrowing democracy and of establishing the Islamic state of the khilafah. This is because such a process will require a wide-cross section of coalition support against democracy.

Post-Soeharto Indonesia is not like ‘authoritarian democracies’ such as Egypt and Tunisia that motivated the uprisings leading to ‘revolutions’ in 2011. A president in Indonesia can only be re-elected for two terms. As an open democratic country, Indonesia provides institutions that may accommodate the Muslim demand for the shari’ah within its democratic framework. HTI’s objective of undermining the legitimacy of democracy is not only tamed by the presence of Muslim actors within the democratic system, but also by its own tendency to enter and to participate in the system.

However, HTI’s political radicalism that advocates the creation of the basis for the sectarian ideology of the shari’ah in the political process is a critical challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia and its mobilization could bring about changes on a number of levels.

First, HTI could create pro-shari’ah cleavages in society. In spite of its radical ideology, HTI has been successful in portraying itself as part of mainstream Islam. Its focus in targeting Muslim leaders rather than the people has attracted young or non-established clerics (see pages 106-112). Many of them are part of mainstream Muslim
organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. This mobilization is made possible by the minimal opposition of the mainstream leaders to HTI. This helps HTI in building associations of Muslim leaders united by the shared-goal of establishing a political structure based on the shari’ah.

The latest gathering of HTI in Jakarta in 2009 that brought thousands of Muslim leaders from across the nations demonstrates its mobilization and financial capability. If this progress continues unimpeded, we may see the strengthening of a pro-shari’ah identity that unites politically the mainstream Muslim organizations. HTI’s success on recruiting young clerics may create a gap of ideology between the central and local leadership of the mainstream Muslim organizations. The leadership of these organisations may continue their commitment to the state ideology of Pancasila and democracy, while the leadership at the lower level is increasingly supportive of shari’ah ideology. HTI’s clear presentation of its ideology (as shown in its conceptualization of the shari’ah into detailed policy briefs) can attract members from the mainstreams who are disillusioned by the decreasing roles of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah at the social and political levels of Indonesian society.

Second, at the government level, HTI has achieved some successes in penetrating the bureaucracy. This is apparent in HTI’s ability to organize programmes in partnership with government officers or agencies. The success of HTI in gaining authorization from offices of education Ministries to organize training for school teachers of Islamic history in Bogor, West Java, and running religious session for students in various public schools in Pasuruan, East Java, demonstrates the grounds gained by HTI in the bureaucracy. Often, there is support from local political leaders to enables HTI to expand the audience for its propagation of the shari’ah as a political ideology (pages 127-129).
Third, the advances that HTI gained at the social and bureaucracy level are essential for its aim to change the political landscape. If it is to be successful in mobilizing support for the shari’ah, HTI has to convince political leaders to support shari’ah-based policies. In this way, it can play its role in advocating political polarization based on the sectarian debate of pro and anti-shari’ah. The rise of Adolf Hitler and Chavez that marked the fall of democracies in Germany and Venezuela showed that polarized politics, especially when it is based on pro and anti-system division, was crucial to the changing of the political landscape that led to abolition of the democratic system in these countries. HTI is still far from achieving this kind of outcome. One may find HTI’s dream of bringing about a khilafah based Government unlikely, but its effort to create political division based on sectarian issues is not.

Political and religious pluralism is essential to the stability of the democratic system in Indonesia. History shows that political sectarianism bred by the demand for an Islamic State has created conflict and disintegration. HTI’s campaign for the shari’ah as a political ideology is therefore antithetical to the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia

HTI’s participation in the democratic process has not yet led the movement toward a genuine integration into this process. A key to what will happen here is the continued low confidence of the Indonesian people in the performance of democratic institutions. In other word, the failure of democracy to deliver will give a chance for pro-shari’ah and anti-democratic forces to gain political power.

In an open democracy like Indonesia such an opportunity is especially significant because the repressive measures used by Soeharto to marginalize Islamist movements are now absent. The development of democracy that increases its legitimacy is therefore essential in deterring the sectarian mobilization of HTI. This
study shows that the inclusion of Muslim actors in the democratic process forced HTI to engage with the democratic system.

There is evidence that tolerance of mainstream Muslims toward HTI has helped the organization continue on its path of political radicalism. The opposition of the mainstream to HTI’s khilafah campaign is likely to inhibit HTI’s political development. Political representation that empowers the moderate Islamic mainstream is therefore essential in deterring the impact of HTI’s political radicalism.
Bibliography

This study is primarily based on readings of collected editions of *al-Islam* and *al-Wa’ie* dated from 2000 to 2009. Some editions of these publications were missed due to timeframe choice and availability. The *al-Islam* leaflet was actually first published in 1994 under different names, but the collection of *al-Islam* provided by sources from HTI uses the beginning edition from 2000. Because this study focuses on the dynamic of HTI in the post-Soeharto democracy, the content analysis is carried out to editions of *al-Islam* from this version of timeframe.

As for *Al-Wa’ie*, it covers the period from 2000 to 2009. The first edition of *Al-Wa’ie* was published in September 2000. As it is a monthly publication, the total edition until December 2009 is 112. Out of this number, 96 editions are collected. 17 editions are missed that include the following (by year order): 1, 5 (2000); 20, 21, 22, 23 (2001); 31 (2002); 51, 53 (2004); 55, 57 (2005); 90 (2008); 102, 103, 105, 109, 112 (2009).

Even though all of these editions are subjects for the content analysis in this study, only some are referred in discussions. These references are included in the list below.

The Publications of HTI and HT (Books)
The publications listed below are officially issued by HT or HTI. Publications associated to HT or HTI but published by external publishers are listed in external sources. Some of the publications of HTI are released without author name. In this case, author’s names are referred to “Hizb al-Tahrir” for those published by international HT and “Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia” for book published by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

_________________________ (1953), *al-Takattu al-Hizb*, Mansyurat Hizb al-Tahrir,


_________ (1985), *Hizb al-Tahrir* (publisher’s name and location unavailable).


The Publications of HTI (bulletin, journal, website, press releases, internal circulars)

The publications listed below are categorized into three sources: Al-Islam (referred to al-Islam bulletin), Al-Wa’ie (referred to al-Wa’ie magazine) and HTI (referred to HTI’s official website www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id and all other forms of publications such as press releases and internal circulations. The list is arranged based on dates of publications).

Al-Islam

“Kontroversi Amandemen Pasal 29 UUD 45” (Al-Islam 19)
“Hanya Sekedar Mengganti Menteri” (Al-Islam 5)
“Mencermati Kenaikan Harga BBM” (Al-Islam 26).
“Menghalalkan Segala Cara, Haram!” (Al-Islam 47)
“Ambon Masih Berdarah” (Al-Islam 63)
“Militer Kembali Ke Dalam Kekuasaan?” (Al-Islam 69)
“Antara Piagam Jakarta Dan Tuntutan Penerapan Syari'at Islam” (Al-Islam 73).
“Banyak Masalah Di Balik Otonomi Daerah” (Al-Islam 84)
‘Syariah Islam: Pilihan Akal Sehat” (Al-Islam 102)
“Mendidik Umat Dengan Syariat” (Al-Islam 147)
“Merumuskan Kembali Parpol Islam” Al-Islam 1,59
“Menggagas KUHP yang Merahmati Seluruh Alam (Al-Islam 175).
“Jangan Takut Kampanyeken Syariat Islam” (Al-Islam 195).
“Metode Mengubah Masyarakat” (Al-Islam 196).
“Koalisi’ Yang Sebenarnya” (Al-Islam 200: 1).
“Solusi Tuntas Masalah Ambon” (Al-Islam 203)
“Pelecehan al-Qur’an” (Al-Islam 256)
“Apakah Yang Lebih Baik dari Hukum Islam?” (Al-Islam 261)
“Bahaya Kebebasan yang Disungkup Sekularisme” (Al-Islam 262)
“Tolak Legalisasi Aborsi!” (Al-Islam 271)
“Mewaspadai Pemurtadan Dan Fitnah terhadap Umat Islam” (Al-Islam 272)
“’ATM Kondom’= Legalisasi Seks Bebas” (Al-Islam 287)
‘Majalah Playboy dan Serangan Budaya Barat (Al-Islam 288)
“Penambangan oleh Freeport: penjajahan Berkedok Investasi” (Al-Islam 295)
“Solusi Total Masalah Irak” (Al-Islam 331)
‘Refleksi Ahir tahun 2 Propaganda Anti-Syariah!” (Al-Islam 373)
“Kekuatan Asing Di Balik Kelompok 006” (Al-Islam 336)
“Pertarungan Islam dan Sekularisme” (Al-Islam 409).
“Jangan Nodai Ramadhan dengan Pro Ahmadiyah?” (Al-Islam 410)
“Pemilu 2009: Umat Berharap Pada Partai Yang Memperjuangkan Syariah Islam” (Al-Islam 426)
“Golput Haram?” (Al-Islam 440)
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End of Thesis