FOUCAULT, BIOPOWER & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GLOBAL BIOPOWER

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ABSTRACT.

The purpose of this paper is, first and foremost, to accurately describe how biopower enters IR. It does this because so far IR theorists have inaccurately deployed the concept. Due to the tripartite nature of biopower – sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical – and idiosyncratic conceptualizations of sovereignty by predominant theorists, a number of disparate conceptualizations of biopower populate the literature, none of which satisfactorily extend Foucauldian analysis into international relations. This paper attempts to remedy this conceptual ambiguity to produce the sorts of insights Foucault was concerned with. Central to my argument is thus a discussion of sovereignty. Notwithstanding Foucault’s warnings about slavish devotion to his work, I nonetheless maintain that an accurate exposition of biopower in IR necessitates a conceptualization of sovereignty that adheres to Foucault’s methodological principles. Following a deconstruction of sovereignty that identifies a ‘history of practices,’ I maintain that state sovereignty continues to play a central biopolitical role. From this position, I then argue biopower must enter into international relations in a specific manner. I argue that global, or more accurately, international biopower should be identified according to a genealogical method stemming from the biopolitics of states first elucidated by Foucault. I proceed by investigating how ‘domestic’ mechanisms of security are becoming transnational. My ultimate argument focuses on identifying how processes of biopolitical normalization resonate with international processes, and successfully translates Foucauldian scholarship into IR by extending our understanding of how modern liberal societies are governed by norms. By showing how biopolitical normalization is becoming a transnational phenomenon, I reconceptualize ‘global biopower’ as international biopolitical normalization.
INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of this paper is, first and foremost, to accurately describe how biopower should enter IR, since so far IR theorists have inaccurately deployed the concept. The diverse ways in which biopower has been deployed are not helpful in extending Foucauldian analysis into world politics. Although some of these deployments generate important insights, they fundamentally differ from what Foucault sought to uncover. I do, therefore, begin from the position that Foucault’s insights provide an essential contribution to contemporary political analysis. A Foucauldian analysis of biopower in IR is fruitful because it points towards a program to identify how norms which relate to biopolitical governance are disseminated internationally. A central insight of Foucault’s work was his identification of the way modern societies are governed with reference to norms, and I would argue that knowing whether or not the particular process of normalization he elaborated has been extended beyond the state is helpful to further appropriate Foucauldian research in IR.

Talk of biopower in International Relations (IR) is coming into vogue. Drawing on works by Foucault, Hardt & Negri, and Agamben, IR scholars either talk of global biopower in service to some transcendent liberal regime, or existing in zones of sovereign exception. I argue that such predominant theorizations of biopower uncritically scale up Foucault’s concept, and are thus problematic. Moreover, hazy notions of empire, zones of sovereign exception, or global liberal governance are unclearly linked to the specifics of biopower, and the concept is thus ambiguously deployed to problematically theorise a number of disparate phenomena. I argue that these conceptualizations fail to accurately grasp the way biopower might be operating in the international realm. While accepting that helpful insights are generated by these deployments of biopower in IR, and that Foucault himself warned against slavish devotion to his work, I maintain that an accurate exposition of (Foucauldian) biopower in IR must adhere to the methodological principles Foucault outlined often and at great length.

The intention of this research is to reaffirm central Foucauldian insights, insights which are lost according to predominant theorizations concerning the insertion of bodies into global apparatuses of power, and the government of
modern, liberal societies through norms. Central to this project is the emphasis on what Foucault identified as a tripartite relation between sovereignty, disciplinary power, and governmentality. In particular, the importance of sovereignty to biopower is highlighted. In addition, by attempting to pin down the concept of biopower in IR, this project generates much needed conceptual clarity, and contributes to a project which might hesitantly be called 'Foucauldian IR.' I believe an investigation of biopower in international relations that subscribes to Foucault’s methodological precautions provides an ideal test case with which a Foucauldian IR can be outlined. This is because a Foucauldian IR can identify how totalizing phenomena at the global level are connected to the subjectification of individuals. I argue that global, or more accurately, international biopower should be identified according to a genealogical method stemming from the biopolitics of states first elucidated by Foucault. I will suggest how an ascending analysis of biopower can be carried out in IR by adhering to Foucault’s methodological principles. Primarily this will proceed by investigating how ‘domestic’ mechanisms of security are becoming transnational.

After elaborating on the concept of biopower, the argument points out that predominant theorizations of biopower in IR are problematic, that is, they fail to capture what is specific about the operation of biopower, and thus restrict Foucauldian insights into contemporary political order. While they all, in some way, try to account for the insertion of individual bodies into global apparatuses of power, their disregard of Foucault’s methodological precautions inevitably results in fundamentally different insights. This is not to say they are not valuable, but is instead to point out that such arguments elide the most important features of biopower. On my reading, these are as follows. Two are the most important; first, biopower operates with reference to a process of normalization, and second, due to the inability of this mechanism of rule to be comprehensive, it is backed up by a sovereign mechanism that enforces regulations when required, a mechanism that territorializes a population. A number of related points are also important; first, the constitution of norms reflects the way that the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security, and what is specific about such a domain is the way it subjectivizes individuals to exercise their freedom responsibly. Thus mechanisms of security
are informed by a liberal governmentality. Second, the constitution of norms is also a process immanent with society. That is, in a normalizing society, norms are not exogenously given, but are instead the result of an interplay that occurs within, and extends throughout, civil society. Accordingly, the sovereign capacity of the state becomes subsumed within the logic of civil society. Third, biopolitical society, that is, a society regulated by mechanisms of security, is formulated in terms of the milieu. Within the milieu, population is presented as possessing its own inherent naturalness in perpetual living interrelations with the environment. The milieu is therefore an ‘artificial’ environment created by a relationship with a population. It is that in which circulation occurs, and a link is produced between cause and effect. It is thus circulation, specifically the uncertainty of circulation that is problematized by biopolitical rationality, and by circumscribing this uncertainty the milieu generates a field of intervention.

From the milieu – after a detour through a survey of the literature – I engage the issue of sovereignty. I argue that sovereignty, specifically the scope of sovereignty, is the fundamental mechanism used to circumscribe the biopolitical milieu. A number of related insights inform this position; first, a population is constituted by the aggregation of data about it. This means the collection of data requires a certain structural constitution. Due to its history of practices, the aggregation of data has been located, centralized even, in the state. This fact is yet to fundamentally change. Even the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), an International Organization (IO) which is in important respects a statistical agency, still relies on its statistical data to be collected by state apparatuses.¹ The state, therefore, circumscribes the milieu because it circumscribes the population, and it is thus difficult to see how the link between cause and effect that biopolitical governmentality problematizes could extend transnationally. Second, the sovereign function of biopower to constitute society as a population, and the normalization of regulations within it, repudiates the idea that global civil society is a biopolitical civil society. Third, only sovereign power has the capability to enforce, when required, biopolitical regulations within a state. As well as this internal dimension of government –

¹Albeit state apparatuses governmentalized by the OECD, as membership in the OECD is partly based on a states statistical capabilities.
that is, biopolitical government, framed by a milieu, territorialized by the scope of sovereignty, and governed through a process of normalization – this argument highlights the importance of thinking about sovereignty as a power with an exterior. Accordingly, the international is a space conditioned by multiple sovereignties. Biopolitical sovereignty thus gets tied up with another art of government which is international.

The paper finally argues that global biopower should be analyzed as an extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that are located within a sovereign space, and conceptualizes this process as *international biopolitical normalization*. It thus subscribes to a methodological commitment to an ascending analysis of power relations and, I believe, successfully extends Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics. This is in contradistinction to predominant theorizations of biopower in IR which have failed to methodologically account for sovereignty so as to provide the foundation for extending Foucauldian insights beyond the territorial boundaries of sovereignty. International biopolitical normalization is identified as consisting of two analytical axes; vertically, it constitutes an extension of domestic mechanisms of security, whereby international apparatuses are ‘folded’ into a process of domestic biopolitical normalization. Concomitantly, the process of international biopolitical normalization is also evident when international apparatuses, the OECD in particular, act as a nodal point that connects these domestic processes horizontally, through an extension of biopolitical techniques that facilitate an interplay between different distributions of normality – that is, ‘normal’ states whose normality is determined by the fact that members of the international apparatus in question are sufficiently liberal states. The paper thus reaffirms central Foucauldian insights which are elided by predominant theorizations. In doing so it has provided a theoretical framework that improves our understanding of the way individual bodies are inserted into global apparatuses of power, and has extended our understanding of how the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security. It identifies how ‘domestic’ mechanisms of security are becoming transnational, and provides a window onto one of the processes through which the boundaries between the national and the international are blurring.
The paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one is an explication of biopower according to Foucault, supplemented by other key theorists. It identifies mechanisms through which biopower acts upon life, namely statistics; the manner in which these mechanisms modify the way politics structure life; and the intimate relations these mechanisms have with the practices of sovereignty. A new conceptualization of population distinct from a mere aggregation of subjects was the catalyst for a new political rationality. In chapter two, the deployment of biopower in IR by predominant theorists is critiqued. This critique will show that, from a Foucauldian perspective, the use of the concept of biopower in IR fundamentally diverges from what Foucault outlined. In particular, it shows that disparate conceptualizations of biopower in IR are the result of idiosyncratic conceptions of sovereignty. In doing so it points out that none of these deployments of biopower in IR share a similar conception of sovereignty with Foucault. More generally this chapter argues that these conceptualizations of biopower in IR fail to capture what is specific about the operation of biopower, that is, its mechanisms of normalization, and thus restrict Foucauldian insights into contemporary political order. The second part of this chapter then takes a brief detour to survey the junction of Foucault and IR more broadly, and reflects what has already been noted about the use of biopower in IR; that through a double-reading based on the existence of a supposed global liberal order, Foucault’s insights are unreflectively scaled up. The third chapter is a discussion of sovereignty from a Foucauldian perspective. It argues that adherence to Foucault’s methodological principles is essential to overcome the problems of applying Foucauldian concepts to IR, and can even provide insight into the continuing relevance of sovereignty. This sets the scene for the final chapter – the beginnings of a foray into a more appropriate analysis of biopower in IR. Here I will put forward an argument for how I think biopower enters IR. This chapter focuses on identifying how international apparatuses involve biopolitical normalization, which are situated in the context of a broader discussion about international governmentality.
CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS BIOPower?

This section explains, in detail, the concept of biopower.² It begins with a general explanation which identifies; the economic and political rationality behind biopower; its tendency towards centralization; its concomitant focus on general indicators of societal processes and the constitution of norms by novel epistemological tools; and its resultant perception of society as a dynamic population which is framed as a domain of uncertainty requiring mechanisms of security. The historical emergence of biopower is then charted. The chapter is genealogical in that it highlights a relationship in the constitution of biopower between truth, knowledge, and power. It thus intersects with the contemporaneous emergence of other historical phenomena, such as political economy, and outlines concepts that Foucault generated to explain what is peculiar about this period, namely governmentality. Foucault’s history, paraphrased here with the help of other key theorists, is an investigation of modernity, beginning with a rupture with Machiavelli. As such, it is extensive, hence the size of this chapter. This extent is, however, necessary to fully comprehend the nature of biopower. It especially helps us to appreciate the contingent nature of genealogical relationships, something we should keep in the front of our minds as we proceed afterwards to chart biopower in a globalizing environment.

According to Michel Foucault (2009), ‘biopower’ refers to “[t]he set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power”, ³ and Lemke (2010) tells us that “biopolitics designates a political economy of life aiming to administer, secure, develop and foster life”.⁴ Biopower/biopolitics speaks to a web of relations that reflect the population as an object, the individual

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² I use the terms biopower and biopolitics interchangeably, although an argument is made that they can and should be differentiated. For example, see Derek Hook, Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power, ed. Tod Sloan, Critical Theory and Practice in Psychology and the Human Sciences (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 227-230
as its correlative, and the environment within which these two objects are situated. The most important objective of biopower, its *raison d'être*, is the health of the population. However, the health of the population is not ‘governed’ for its own sake. Instead, the health of the population is “an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labour capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it [commands].”

This is a rationality which reflects the historical context in which biopower emerged. Sexual conduct, and later other naturally occurring phenomena, became subjected to regimes of institutionally centered practices which try to transform conduct into “concerted economic and political behaviour.”

Biopolitics, according to Dean (2010), also designates “a very broad terrain against which we can locate the liberal critique of too much government.”

This is because inherent in its operation is the implementation of “complex organs of political organization and centralization.” Biopower thus represents a rupture with, yet transformation and continuation of an earlier form of power which Foucault called ‘pastoral power’, a form of power that simultaneously individualises and totalises.

However, what is novel about biopower is its mode of operation. Where previous forms of pastoral power tried to intervene directly upon individuals, biopower governs in such a way as to operate at a ‘level of generality.’ This ‘level’ significantly accounts for the specificity of biopower. A number of indirect mechanisms, as opposed to more direct apparatuses, are deployed. “The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. Their purpose is not to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality.”

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6 Ibid., 26.
8 Ibid., 119.
Central to this process is the constitution of norms, and the threat to society that liberalism wishes to assuage is that of a normalizing society which succeeds “in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, between body and population” with an intrusive and potentially totalitarian array of societal regulations.\(^\text{11}\) It is within this context that ‘rights’ emerge. ‘Rights’ are “the [liberal] political response to all these new procedures of power,” a response that the traditional right of sovereignty “was utterly incapable of comprehending.”\(^\text{12}\)

Biopower operates through the constitution of norms, and reflects the way that the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security.

“[B]iopower is not typical of the [preceding] legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but that of the dispositif of security … [an] apparatus of security [that] inserts the phenomena in question within a series of probable events … [according to which] the relations of power … are inserted in a calculation of cost … [and] instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. In this way a completely different distribution of things takes shape.”\(^\text{13}\)

The emergence of biopower does not eclipse, bracket off or cancel the preceding mechanisms; the disciplinary institution and the sovereign-juridical structure remain important techniques within a liberal governmentality focused on political economy and population processes. However, “[i]t is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour; it

\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 253.
\(^\text{12}\) Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One*, 145. The tension between biopower and political economy can be seen when Foucault states: “The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security … state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population”; ———, *Security, Territory, Population*, 352-53. This implies that mechanisms of security exist side-by-side, but operate according to different rationalities.
does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm.”

Law, the expression of the sovereign’s will, does not, however, “[f]ade into the background”, within this new mechanism of security, but instead itself begins to operate “more and more as a norm … the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.”

Ewald (1990) tells us that the conception of norms facilitates the shift from the level of the micro-political evident in disciplinary institutions, where norms (distinct from previous connotations of ‘rule’) first emerged but were specifically local in character, to that of the biopolitical, evident with the implementation of insurance schemes and social security systems. Norms, therefore, constituted by new forms of knowledge such as statistics, demography, epidemiology and psychology, provide a standard with recourse to which a population can be acted upon. Combined, such disciplines, or more accurately and to differentiate from ‘discipline,’ such ‘truth regimes’ provide the conditions both for an analysis of life on the level of populations, and to govern individuals and populations by practices of correction, exclusion, disciplining and optimization, all based upon the constitution of norms. As Dean points out, “[a] norm … is not simply a value arrived at, but a rule of judgment and a means of producing that rule.” This is to say the biopolitical norm does not exist prior to interventions that act on the population. Foucault (2009) uses the terms ‘normation’ and ‘normalization’ to make a distinction between biopolitical a posteriori norm formation (normalization), and a priori norms, upon which disciplinary power is based (normation).

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14 ——, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One*, 144. Note on rationality: with raison d’état there are no longer enemies of the sovereign, but deviations from the norm.
15 Ibid.
17 This is a re-organization of something Lemke (2010) says, I have emphasized the role that norms play, and would argue that normalization constitutes a fundamental nodal point for all other techniques; Lemke, “From State Biology to the Government of Life: Historical Dimensions and Contemporary Persepctives of ‘Biopolitics,” 430.
Disciplinary normation “consists first of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of disciplinary [normation] consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm.”\(^\text{19}\) The norm is thus prior to disciplinary intervention, whereas within a biopolitical dispositif what is fundamental is “an interplay between these different distributions of normality and in acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable.”\(^\text{20}\) A ‘normalizing,’ biopolitical, society is thus distinct from a disciplinary society (even though norms still exist within discipline) because normalization, distinct from normation, sees individuals acted upon by a different and broader range of interventions.\(^\text{21}\)

This new process of normalization was made possible by a number of novel factors. First was the development of statistics, in particular the technique of determining statistical probabilities. Second was the emergence of the concept of population as a process with its own natural tendencies; whereas previous conceptions of population saw it in negative or positive terms, as being deficient or an emblem of sovereign power, biopolitical population is conceived as dynamic. This conceptualization of population as dynamic, and the emergence of new techniques of intervention based upon statistics, results in the establishment of what Foucault calls ‘mechanisms of security,’ wherein the population is no longer a mere collection of subjects, but it is instead a set of natural phenomena that “will have to be framed in such a way that they do not veer off course, or in such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind intervention does not make them veer off course. That is to say it will be necessary to set up mechanisms of security. The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security … state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population.”\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{19}\) Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, 57.  
\(^{20}\) Ibid., 63.  
Central to a mechanism of security, due to the understanding of a population as possessing its own inherent naturalness, is the idea “the population and environment are in a perpetual living interrelation, and the state has to manage those living interrelations between those two types of living beings.” Foucault thinks of this reality in terms of the milieu, as a site that, although expresses a naturalness, in that processes within it will be self-regulating, is not in itself natural; it is a phenomenon created by a relationship with the population. “The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out. The milieu is a set of natural givens ... and a set of artificial givens ... The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another.” The milieu is both a field of intervention and a site of uncertainty, and it is this problematization of governmental practices that informs biopolitical rationality.

Biopower emerges as a new technology of power focused on the problem of the population, not as a group of subjects, nor as a multiplicity of individuals, but as an object that interacts with an indefinite number of elements. This conceptualization of society, does however, make visible phenomena that occur only at the collective level, with a longitudinal temporality, thus displaying regularities or constants that can become subject to governmental rationality. The complexity of social processes leads to a new constellation of power relations. The traditional juridical-legal techniques of the sovereign, and the disciplinary techniques that emerged under a mercantilist reason, are reactivated according to a mechanism of security that attempts to regulate life, still to maximise and extract forces, but within an aleatory and unpredictable environment – the milieu. “The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space. The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold…” It is within this space that biopolitical apparatus such as statistics emerge, and thus ‘general’ phenomena are determined (a level of generality). The phenomena in question

25 Ibid., 20.
initially emerged as an effect of socialized medicine within the context of a massive demographic upswing, namely, the growing administrative capacity of an increasingly institutionalized medical apparatus. 26 Statistics played a fundamental role in the process of making visible overall phenomena. Demographic analysis is established, ratios of births to deaths are recorded, rates of reproduction and fertility statistics. Accordingly, birth control practices are introduced, working practices that had deleterious effects on life-expectancy and productivity are eliminated, medical care is coordinated, public hygiene, immunization and vaccination campaigns are launched, and so on. Other mechanisms are also introduced to deal with accidents, anomalies and old age, which supplement the traditional apparatuses of assistance: insurance and safety regulations, for example.

To sum up, biopolitics reflects the way that the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security. This represents the way in which the treatment of life in general, the life of people, has changed according to the governmental rationality of society. No longer, as it was under a juridical conception, is government merely concerned to let people live and to take life as it sees fit, it is now concerned with making people live, that is, subjectifying them according to a web of relations tied up with economic and political effects. Disciplinary power began this transformation, and biopower takes it to a new level. With discipline you have the initial capture of the individual body, a technology integral for the management of a demographic explosion and to facilitate industrial processes in service to a statist principle. Discipline logically emerged first – a localized technique, or constellation of techniques, like surveillance and training – as a direct response to particular situations and economic analyses. However, although the disciplinary institution was gradually dispersed throughout society, it nevertheless remained a fragmentary regime due to its spatial requirements. 27 Later, with the conceptualization of the living environment, including the population, and the milieu understood as a multiplicity of open relations, we have a;

27 This is not to say disciplinary effects did not escape the institution. See below.
“second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary), or at least to compensate for their effects. This is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers... Both technologies are obviously technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which the body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes.”  

Historical Context.

The significance of the emergence of the population as a variable factor of government is that it is prior, and essential, to the constitution of modern political societies. For Foucault, population is an operator (opérateur) of transformation, and its emergence is the primary catalyst for the emergence of modernity, founded as it is on the establishment of the human sciences. The identification of the naturalness of processes that are tied up with population displaces the thesis that politics is dictated by God, or his proxy on earth. Instead politics becomes about the management of open series’ of events contingent on a fluid reality. To fully appreciate what is specific about this perspective on modernity, and thus adequately prepare us for further investigation of this phenomenon, this section presents a genealogy of biopower.

Political Economy.

A genealogy of biopower, as this section shows, intersects with the emergence of political economy, which was in turn intimately tied up with the emergence of the population. The section begins with theories of raison d’état, and an appreciation of the newly introduced concept of force by mercantilism which lead to the institution of Police. Early conceptions of Police are shown to

28 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 249.
29 ———, Security, Territory, Population, 78-79
be fundamentally concerned with urbanization and circulation, whilst informed by a classical notion of economy based upon the rule of a household, a notion which lead to highly specific interventions in society. Importantly, the activity of police is seen as representing the initial colonization of sovereign power, a process which is continued from then on. The specificity of regulation carried out by Police, however, engendered powerful criticism by novel political thought which ultimately resulted in its delegitimization. In contradistinction to detailed intervention, Économistes introduced thought based on the naturalness of things in themselves, and modified *raison d’état* to be in service to the State instead of the Prince. This new statist principle leads economic reasoning towards the concept of political economy; considerations on the population echo the initial ‘unearthing’ of the naturalness of prices, and mercantilism is displaced, as artificial regulation of either is proved undesirable. The emergence of political economy is finally cemented by the modification of central power/knowledge relations within the state.

Contemporaneous and concomitant with the emergence of ‘population’ is the concept of political economy, the history of which is central to the identification of ‘population’ as an observable phenomenon. To chart the emergence of political economy, however, a genealogy must identify the mutation of thought and practice that led to its formation. This section, then, outlines in a schematic fashion Foucault’s genealogy of political economy, before exploring in more depth the links between political economy and population. Beginning with the emergence of *raison d’état* within Europe, a new governmental reason is identified that differentiates state activity from that which is tied up with Christian universalism. Within this new framework mercantilism and police science is elaborated, before critiques of this mode of government of Western states introduce a conception of society as constituted by processes possessing their own natural tendencies which must be respected. Political economy thus emerges as the major form of knowledge concerned with government, and in doing so is immanent in the constitution of population as a target for government. The combination of these two factors and the idea of mechanisms of security are then used to further explain Foucault’s elaboration of governmentality. Finally, governmentality and biopower are placed in the
context of liberalism, which is considered by Foucault to be the general framework of biopolitics, and thus liberal modernity.

For Foucault, rather than signalling the dawn of a new age of modern politics, Machiavelli represents the highest point of sovereign power, whereby the Prince’s theoretical concern with territorial control reaches its most sophisticated.\(^{30}\) However, even though Machiavelli’s thought does not possess an art of government, a prerequisite of Foucault’s for identifying governmental modernity, Machiavelli does provide a strand of continuity linking pre-modern and modern society. This strand is embedded in the concept of *raison d’état*. The ‘pre-modern’ state of The Prince begins the process of becoming modern because it signifies the emergence of a new political reality. This political reality is basically the entry of Europe into political consciousness, a field of organized competition symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia, and has two correlatives. First, as opposed to ‘pre-modern’ political organizations, the state is only organized by reference to itself, no longer subscribing to the tenets of positive, natural or divine law, which in turn denies the legitimacy and potential dictates of any external law. “In this perspective, the plurality of states is not a transitional phase between a first unitary kingdom and a final empire in which unity will be restored... In fact, the plurality of states is the very necessity of a history that is now completely open and not temporally oriented towards a final unity. The theory of *raison d’état* ... entails an open time and a multiple spatiality.”\(^{31}\) Second, the Treaty of Westphalia effectively concluded the disappearance of previous forms of universality – Empire and Church.

“We are now dealing with absolute units, as it were, with no subordination or dependence between them, at least for the major states, and ... these units assert themselves, or anyways seek to assert themselves, in a space of increased, extended, and intensified economic exchange. They seek to assert themselves in a space of commercial competition and domination, in a space of monetary circulation, colonial conquest, and control of the seas, and all this gives each state’s self-assertion not just the form of each being its own end... but also this new form of competition ... [A] state can only

\(^{30}\) Ibid. 65
\(^{31}\) Ibid. 290
assert itself in a space of political and economic competition, which is what gives meaning to the problem of the state’s expansion as the principle, the main theme of *raison d’état*.”  

*Raison d’état* is concerned with the maximization of a state’s wealth-power at the expense of the wealth-power of other states, a new understanding of government that conflates princely rivalry and statist competition. It is within this new political reality of statist competition that mercantilism emerged whereby the practice of commerce becomes a strategy, a weapon in a new game, the main instrument of the state’s power in a new field of competition. This actual practice of *raison d’état*, however, produced a new element of political reason that the theoretical texts of *raison d’état* did not formulate, an element of force; with this “new theoretical and analytical strata ... We enter a politics whose principle object will be the employment and calculation of forces. Politics, political science, encounters the problem of dynamics.”  

With the mercantilist conception of wealth-power as a zero sum game and the rationalization of force by Western societies, a new, ‘open,’ economic and political field came into being, and in response a mercantilist rationality of government attempted to organise what Foucault calls a police state, a gross regulation of society according to mercantilist principles.

The establishment of police “is absolutely inseparable from a governmental theory and practice that is generally labelled mercantilism, that is to say, a technique and calculation for strengthening the power of competing European states through the development of commerce and the new vigor given to commercial relations.” Hence, the role of the police becomes “good use of the state’s forces and a way of increasing the state’s forces to the maximum while preserving the state’s good order.” Historically, mercantilism is situated at a time of a massive demographic upswing, and a fundamental object of the state’s concern becomes the space of circulation, which encompasses all forms and components of men’s co-existence with each other and it is the function of Police to govern this fundamental object. The co-existence of men becomes problematic

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32 Ibid. 291-292  
33 Ibid. 295  
34 Ibid. 337  
35 Ibid. 315
with urbanization, when co-existence becomes dense, hence “police is essentially urban and market based.”\textsuperscript{36} It is urban because it is concerned with all the aspects of circulation that make dense co-existence problematic: health and hygiene, access to food, keeping idle hands busy, maintaining public peace; it is actually a condition of urban existence – without the regulation of cohabitation, circulation and exchange the (urban) town would not exist. It is market based because the circulation of men and goods cannot be un-coupled from the problems of the market; the problems of buying and selling and exchange are closely related to the other problems of urban life. Also, of course, because the police apparatus is put in place to manage, maintain, and increase a state’s force, “the project of the police hangs on the activity of men as a constitutive element of the state’s strength.”\textsuperscript{37} With the emergence of the economy in this way, the market becomes the site of action for a police created to facilitate the maximization of a state’s forces. Economy here, however, is yet to refer to the ‘economy’ of modernity, it continues to refer instead to the household; to “the proper way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth, like the management of a family by a father who knows how to direct his wife, his children, and his servants, who knows how to make his family’s fortune prosper.”\textsuperscript{38}

The mercantilist apparatus of police represents a new form of power; it often uses traditional methods, but in entirely new domains. The initial activity of police used modes of action that were not radically different from those of the juridical power of the sovereign, but the emergence of police activity tied up with mercantilism represented a completely different form of power than that of the judicial institution; it “is not an extension of justice, it is not the king acting through his apparatus of justice; it is the king acting directly on his subjects, but in a non-judicial form.”\textsuperscript{39} In that it is a function of \textit{raison d’état}, police is the governmentality of the sovereign acting upon itself, trying to increase its own force. Although it utilises some of the traditional methods of justice, it does so according to its own rationality, activity that will clearly distinguish it from the exercise of royal power, which takes the form of justice. The police apparatus

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. 335
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. 322
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. 95
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. 339
uses the law, but in a specific way, it dictates what must be done, not merely what is prohibited. This is important because the embodiment of a rationality not that of the king makes of police activity a permanent coup d’état; it represents the emergence of a new form of power that usurps the will and divine authority of the king and replaces the sovereign space with raison d’état. It is the modus operandi of the police, tied up with its involvement in a whole new set of domains, that sets in motion this gradual coup d’état which is effectively the colonization of sovereign power – “a specificity of police compared with the general functioning of justice” that causes itself to be involved in ever increasing involvement with human activity, “a world of indefinite regulation, of permanent, continually renewed, and increasingly detailed regulation.”

Raison d’état presupposes a world of regulation, a world of discipline. Not only the discipline that Foucault talks about explicitly, for example in Discipline and Punish, but “an attempt at a general disciplinarization, a general regulation of individuals and the territory of the realm in the form of a police based on an essentially urban model.” No longer can the sovereign take a dispassionate view of the population, instead the state makes visible a population that is potential productive capacity. The workforce is both disciplined and regulated: those who cannot work are excluded and placed in localized disciplinary institutions to be cared for; those who can are obliged to do so; and when they do so they find themselves in an increasingly professionalized sphere where, for example, regulations begin to encourage lifelong commitment to a career. The activity of regulation and discipline is to turn the mere ‘being’ of an individual’s life into ‘well-being’ and the objective of the police, therefore, “is everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s strength.”

40 Ibid. 340
41 Ibid.
43 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 341
44 Ibid. 328
Raison d’état, police, commerce, European equilibrium and competition, urban co-existence; all of these things represent a cluster of intelligible and analysable relations that emerged in the seventeenth century and together led to a fundamental reconfiguration of relations of power, and opened up a whole new field of objects for governmental intervention, thus constituting a new governmental rationality that can be generalized as the police state. The police state was ultimately related to mercantilism, a strategy which, according to Foucault, requires,

“first, that every country try to have the largest possible population, second, that the entire population be put to work, third, that the wages given to the population be as low as possible so that, fourth, the cost of the price of goods is the lowest possible and one can thus sell the maximum amount abroad, which will bring about the import of gold, the transfer of gold into the royal treasury, or in any case, in this way the country will triumph commercially.”

Hence commercial activity is reduced to a simple net in-flow equation; the cost of production must be suppressed for the greatest profits to be generated, and police becomes the instrument for the enforcement of regulations that attempt to maintain the ideal conditions required to achieve commercial success. For example, the mercantilist conception of wealth being dictated by commerce led to a prioritization of exchange and therefore of the urban environment. This rationale, along with regulations designed to suppress the price of primary inputs, notably grain, in no way identified rural or agricultural inputs to be of any significance, beyond the fact that agricultural policy set the price of grain. The agricultural component of mercantilist governmentality was maintained artificially as a constant. Thus while the emergence of raison d’état did fundamentally challenge previous thought about the functioning of (state) power, within a mercantilist rationality the problem of scarcity remained fundamental, seriously affecting the well-being of the state. The actual effects of police governmentality were later called into question by a new set of political thinkers, initially the physiocrats, but more generally the économistes, when the scarcity of

45 Ibid. 337
46 So much so, in fact, that the city became the model "of state intervention in men's lives." Ibid. 338
grain continued to remain a cyclical problem. Through a criticism aimed at police regulation of grain circulation, the économistes generated a number of fundamental oppositions to raison d’état as it was conceived at the time. This is not to say that raison d’état was replaced, but an economic reason was deployed that “gives it a new content and so gives new forms to state rationality.”

The économistes insert agriculture as a fundamental aspect of rational governmentality – no longer is the circulation of products prioritized, production itself becomes a fundamental object of governmental rationality. The insertion of production into calculations of wealth results in the thesis that for scarcity of grain to be avoided, it must fetch a high price. Not only is this in direct opposition to the mercantilist idea, but it directly affects the operation of police regulation, basically delegitimizing them. The price of grain was suppressed by mercantilist policy because it was assumed that in times of scarcity the price would rise to such profitable heights that scarcity would be compounded by the hoarding of grain by producers. The économistes counter this argument by a thesis of just price, calculating that the price of grain will not rise indefinitely but will instead settle at the appropriate level. The just price would occur according to a spontaneous regulation, while regulation of prices inhibiting this naturalness would incur a stubbornness of the natural process resulting in perverse outcomes. Therefore, “a regulation based upon and in accordance with the course of things in themselves must replace regulation by police authority.”

The économistes thesis remains in the realm of raison d’état – “in this new governmentality sketched by the économistes the objective will still be to increase the state’s forces within an external equilibrium in the European space and an internal equilibrium in the form of order” – but the relationship to other states that mercantilism cultivated is fundamentally challenged. Not only is the idea of free trade promoted, in the sense that products, like grain, will be traded at their ‘natural’ price, but trade will be allowed to occur between private individuals – “it is precisely this game of the interest of competing private individuals who each seek maximum advantage for themselves that will allow the state, or the group, or the whole population to pocket the profits, as it were, from this conduct

\[^{47}\text{Ibid. 348}\]
\[^{48}\text{Ibid. 344}\]
\[^{49}\text{Ibid. 348}\]
of private individuals.” No longer will states be independent and unitary entities in a field of both princely rivalry and statist competition, but instead a question of governmentality will concern integrating a number of states into mechanisms of regulation that function within each state. *Raison d’état*, as it was expressed before the *économistes*, began the transformation from a governmentality based upon princely rivalry towards statist competition, wherein for a time they existed simultaneously, but it was the introduction of economic reasoning that completed the transformation. With the rationale of the *économistes*, no longer is the wealth of the state still conflated with the sovereign’s wealth-power, wherein other previous forms of the sovereign’s power remain as part of the calculation of wealth-power, such as alliances and familial connections to other states. Instead, the wealth of the state is considered on its own terms, in all its intricacies, and alliances with other states become organized according to provisional combinations of interest. With this transformation, the idea of territorial expansion, at least within Europe, is displaced and the internal development of state’s forces becomes the principle of a new type of competition: *Raison d’état* begins to operate according to society, in service to a visible and analysable reality.

The analysis of issues surrounding the circulation of grain conducted by the *physiocrats* facilitated the introduction of economic reasoning as we know it today. No longer does the word ‘economy’ designate a form of government, but instead a principle of decipherment – “a level of reality and a field of intervention for government.” Henceforth, politics “has to work in the element of a reality that the physiocrats called, precisely, physics, when they said that economics is a physics.” Within this new economico-political reality a concept of population emerges that echoes the naturalness of commodity prices – as a naturally occurring phenomena with the capacity to spontaneously regulate itself. This new concept of population represents a final break with the mercantilist police state. As befits the zero-sum attitude of mercantilism, within this governmental rationality population has an absolute value; basically, there are never enough people. A large population results in greater productive capacity and suppressed

50 Ibid. 346
51 Ibid. 95
52 Ibid. 47
wages. It is the role of the police in this regime to ensure both the well-being of as many people as possible, and to maintain their docility. As with commodity prices, the police apparatus within mercantilism therefore artificially regulates the population. With the économistes, however, population takes on a relative value - with the introduction of agriculture alongside commerce, an appreciation of the rural and the urban, the économistes recognise a relationship between territory and population, whereby “[t]here is an optimum number of people desirable in a given territory, and this desirable number varies according to resources, possible work, and the consumption necessary and sufficient to bolster prices and the economy generally.”

The naturalness of society, that is, the idea that society possesses natural processes that must be respected, thus constitutes the ontological condition of possibility for a new form of knowledge to appear, political economy, a knowledge that presumes scientific rationality and argues for the rule of evidence. No longer is raison d’état simply concerned with enriching the state, but with “knowledge of processes that link together variations of wealth and variation of population on three axes: production, circulation, consumption.” In this way is scientific knowledge introduced into governmental reason, or more accurately, comes to found a new governmental reason; it establishes a new relationship of power and knowledge, on an axis between government and (economic) science. Because political economy takes society as its object, it insists on being taken seriously by the art of government, and it establishes itself in such a way that it confuses the traditional knowledge and power relationship. It constitutes itself both as a type of knowledge internal to government and as a science external to government. Government cannot escape the consequences of this new science; no longer can it justify regulatory systems of injunctions, imperatives, and interdictions on processes that will henceforth be considered natural – economic processes based on facts of population. No longer is the population a collection of subjects, but is instead a set of natural phenomena:

53 Ibid. 345
54 Ibid. 350 fn
55 Political economy embodies the knowledge/power relationship in that it is a synthesis. Or more accurately, it is a unity that is then increasingly divided between a pole of theoretical purity (economics) and a pole of government. Ibid. 351

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“The basic principle of the state’s role, and so of the form of
governmentality henceforth prescribed for it, will be to respect these
natural processes, or at any rate to take them into account, get them to
work, or to work with them... An entire domain of possible and
necessary interventions appears within the field thus delimited, but
these interventions will not necessarily, or not as a general rule, and
very often not at all take the form of rules and regulations. It will be
necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to
manage and no longer to control through rules and regulations...
Natural phenomena will have to be framed in such a way that they do
not veer off course, or in such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind
intervention does not make them veer off course. That is to say, it
will be necessary to set up mechanisms of security. The fundamental
objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security ... state
intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the
natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to
population.”

The over-arching, over-regulatory police apparatus begins to be replaced by a
mechanism of security – a constellation of apparatuses of security, of which the
police becomes one part. The police, with its dual use of regulation and law,
takes on a purely negative function, while a new governmental reason begins to
formulate techniques that can act on the population from a distance. Political
economy becomes a new governmental rationality that is constitutive of a
mechanism of security, a rationality that acts at a distance but has a hold on the
population through calculation, analysis and reflection; the economy becomes a
principle of decipherment, and political economy becomes precisely the analysis
(and ultimately government) of society (population) with reference to the
economy.

The police state becomes outmoded because with the introduction of the
naturalness of population, with nature in general, a positive conception of desire
is also introduced. No longer, as in the previous ethical-juridical conception of
government, is desire considered an evil that must be denied, it instead becomes
the expression of a natural force that must be fostered as well as managed. The

56 Ibid. 352-353
problem of government then becomes – “how they can say yes; it is to say yes to this desire.”

Political economy, therefore, is a technique of government that begins the self-limitation of an already established governmental reason, and radically transforms the basis on which governmental reason was hitherto founded. Prior to the emergence of political economy, governmental reason was based upon original right; its legitimacy was located in the past. The governmental rationality of political economy inverts this relationship and locates the legitimising effect of governmental reason in the present, whereby “[t]he economic question is always to be posed within the field of governmental practice, not in terms of what may found it by right, but in terms of its effects: What are the real effects of the exercise of governmentality?”

Ultimately, the police apparatus is suppressed so the natural economic processes of society are not. The new field of objects that political economy revealed, founded on the establishment of the population as the natural object par excellence – conceived not only as intelligible mechanisms but as natural phenomena, processes and regularities, as elements of natural law – dictate that their impediment would generate effects detrimental to the functioning of society. Hence the kernel of ‘truth’ that goes on to found a whole new regime of governmentality, the technopolitical philosophy of government based upon laissez-faire: a principle that celebrates the naturalness of economic processes, and enshrines an attitude that facilitates the removal of impediments to a supposed natural course of events. The introduction of political economy therefore engenders the emergence of a type of freedom within governmentality. No longer is freedom only spoken in a rights-based manner, freedom from the abuse of rights, but is inserted into governmental reason. The freedom of economic processes to play out naturally becomes a governmental imperative, a more fundamental principle of decipherment than the economy itself.

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57 Ibid. 73
59 Donzelot (2008) refers to this distinction when he talks about the birth of liberalism, and links both discourses of freedom as legal bases for the self-limitation of raison d'état. Calling rights based freedom the juridico-deductive approach, and freedom as a limit on governmental practice the approach of utility (a la English utilitarianism), he states that they “have remained both
The introduction of desire into governmental thought is the causal factor leading to the modification of knowledge/power relations. It is the core notion which leads to a liberalism based on the naturalness of society. Overall, this constellation of ideas is encapsulated within the constitution of civil society. The remainder of this section will explore this complex and complete the genealogy of biopower with reference to its central biopolitical feature – mechanisms of security. It continues with a discussion of Police, specifically identifying how Police is re-articulated according to a mechanism of security, a re-articulation which allows for the notion of desire. Desire is linked to liberty, and it is shown that central to a mechanism of security is a circular relation between liberty and security, a relationship which establishes a new governmentality, based on conducting individuals to use their freedom responsibly. The overturning of Police, and concomitant demise of mercantilism is traced to phenomena established precisely by this regime; the detailed administration produced an ‘avalanche of numbers’ which identified a naturalness of processes intrinsic to population itself, that in turn lead to the delegitimization of police governmentality. Following this, my own example of a mechanism of security is used to help explain the concept. This leads into a general discussion of the tripartite character of biopolitical governmentality, tying together the already discussed aspects of population, political economy, and mechanisms of security. In doing so, the intricate relationship between biopolitics and liberalism is shown to rest upon the constitution of civil society, a transactional reality that, in conjunction with liberalism, serves to governmentalize the state.

**Mechanisms of Security.**

Political economy thus introduces the idea of liberty, not as an effect of governmental practice, but as a governing technology itself. In doing so, it clashes with an already established police apparatus that envisages such a detailed level of intervention on the population as to be detrimental to society. As a result
of this clash, “the notion of police is entirely overturned, marginalized, and takes on the purely negative meaning familiar to us.”

Some of the functions of the police will be embodied in different institutions and mechanisms of incentive-regulation, leaving only a negative function of preventing disorder, and will become one of a number of components in a mechanism of security. This new conception of government framed by mechanisms of security establishes, with recourse to norms, a new distribution of things. Instead of liberty being a branch, or consequence, of security, it becomes a condition of security, and;

“[t]here is a kind of circular relation between security and liberty. On the one hand, security entails the regulation of certain individuals and groups in order to lead them to choose to exercise their liberty in a disciplined and responsible manner. On the other, this responsible liberty is necessary to the security of those natural processes of economy and population which in turn will secure the well-being of the state. The problem of \textit{laissez-faire} then is not about the retreat from regulation but to set up mechanisms of security.”

The problematization of scarcity with reference to grain put forward by the \textit{économistes} results in a new policy of “curbing scarcity by a sort of ‘laisser-faire,’ a certain ‘freedom of movement (laisser-passer),’ a sort [of] “[laisser]-aller,’ in the sense of ‘letting things take their course.’” Tierney (2008) points out that this idea is at the heart of Foucault’s conception of security. With this critique, the concept of freedom begins to take on new meaning:

“no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things. [Foucault thinks] it is this freedom of circulation, in the broad sense of the term, it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and

\footnotesize{61 Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, 354
63 Dean, \textit{Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society}. 139. See also Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}. 353
64 Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}. 41
understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses of security.\textsuperscript{66}

The transformation of the concept of population from merely positive or negative to dynamic, mentioned above, is immanent with this new concept of freedom. The political economy of mercantilism (or cameralism) no longer merely ‘advises the prince’ on how to “maintain his territory, as Machiavelli did, [it] instead argued that the sovereign should be primarily concerned with governing the subjects that inhabited the territory, as a father governs his household.”\textsuperscript{67} Within this political economy of the seventeenth century the population becomes the fundamental element of the strength of the state (and sovereign), “that is to say [an element] that conditions all the others.”\textsuperscript{68} It does this, within a mercantilist political economy, primarily by supplying manpower, but also by creating workforce competition thus ensuring low wages.\textsuperscript{69} However, while mercantilism can be credited with seeing the population as a productive force it also remains well within a disciplinary dispositif of power relations, “and considered the problem of population essentially in terms of the axis of sovereign and subjects.”\textsuperscript{70} Related policies can only be achieved through an overarching regulatory apparatus imposed from above. Instead, a mechanism of security begins to emerge when the physiocrats and économistes consider population “as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes.”\textsuperscript{71}

The concept of freedom as circulation was immanent with mercantilism because, even though it was completely top down, the overarching regulatory apparatus known as police was “an administrative system that was concerned with maximizing the size of the state’s population in relation to the natural resources of its territory, ensuring that this population was productive and healthy, and promoting the circulation of both people and goods through the creation and maintenance of adequate roads, canals, and other public

\textsuperscript{66} Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 48-49
\textsuperscript{67} Tierney, “Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78 “. 93
\textsuperscript{68} Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 69
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. 69-70
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. 70
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
amenities.” It was a result of this system of administration that statistics emerged, providing the ontological traction necessary for the elaboration of the naturalness of things in themselves. The naturalness of things in themselves does not, however, simply correlate to a biological reality. Hence policy advice centered around the concept of *laisser-faire*. As Gudman-Hoyer and Lopdrup-Hjorth (2009) point out:

“[T]he population is not merely a biological species, a group of legal subjects, or individual bodies of discipline; it also represents its own intrinsic logic, constituted as it is by different probabilities, by uncertainties and temporalities, by dangers, risks, and contingent events, in the same ways as this population varies with the climate, the material surroundings, the intensity of commerce, the circulation of wealth, laws and traditions, etc.”

It is this expansion of the concept of population, brought about as an ontological reality thanks to the practice of statistics, that explodes the police mentality of mercantilism, moving governmental knowledge relevant for biopolitics beyond such disciplines as social medicine, public hygiene and demographics to a political economy that reflects upon “a range of factors and elements that seem far removed from the population itself.” Population is, on the one hand, seen as something that, although beyond the reach of direct sovereign intervention, is penetrable through techniques of transformation informed by (‘enlightened, reflected, analytical, calculated and calculating’) political economy. On the other hand, such an appreciation of the population as an entity that possesses a nature that cannot be minutely policed simultaneously produces an inverted reality, wherein “this population is of course made up of individuals who are quite different from each other and whose behaviour, within a certain limit at least, cannot be accurately predicted.” The response to this inverse reality is what Foucault calls ‘*dispositifs* of security.’ Gordon sums this up by saying that “[I]liberalism discards the police conception of order as a visible grid of

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72 Tierney, "Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78 ". 97
74 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*. 72
75 Ibid.
communication; it affirms instead the necessarily opaque, dense autonomous character of the processes of population. It remains at the same time, preoccupied with the vulnerability of these same processes, with the need to enframe them in ‘mechanisms of security.’”

A brief example of a mechanism of security is appropriate here. Take the circulation of goods and things on roads, an aspect of circulation Foucault also emphasized. A mechanism of security around the function of roads, which are a pretty obvious and important example of circulation, can be outlined in the following way. First, consider the volume of traffic on roads. Basically, there is far too much circulation for the sovereign to impose its will on all of its subjects individually; such an attempt would break the two central principles of political economy – on the one hand, it would run the risk of governing too much and interfering with the naturalness of the circulation of processes intrinsic to population, while on the other, it would be enormously expensive, and thus not economical. Second, consider the impact of accidents on society, which is multitudinous. Not only are there direct costs to the health system, and secondary health issues concerning the emotional well-being and functionality of other members of society (i.e. un-injured participants in the accident & family members), there is also the issue of continuing circulation (i.e. accidents during peak hour), the loss of labour in the economy, increases in insurance costs, and so on. On the basis of these sorts of considerations, a mechanism of security does a number of things, almost all of which are based on statistical phenomena. First, it establishes speed limits based on a number of pertinent factors – the nature of the terrain (urban, rural, windy, frosty, etc); the quality of drivers; the quality of the national fleet of automobiles, and so on. Second, it regulates drivers and their mode of transport through examination procedures. Third, insurance schemes are established. Fourth, it attempts to generate the self-government of drivers through normalization campaigns in the media. This probably doesn’t exhaust the list, but it does highlight how a mechanism of security works. It should also be noted that the rationality which informs a mechanism of security is generated by a relationship between government agencies and civil society. The demand

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76 Gordon, "Introduction." 20
77 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 336
for norms according to which the roads should be governed is a reflective process. For example, (in NZ) many of the rescue helicopters that operate are community-funded. This sends an indication to governmental agencies, who respond in turn with complementary strategies, deploying a certain amount of police, for one thing. Then again, while there are definitely police on the roads representing the will of the sovereign (after all, sovereign power is not eclipsed by biopower), there are only so many as is feasible according to political economy, and even their presence serves to reinforce the mechanism of security, whereby the knowledge of their presence by subjects inculcates self-government. They are also on hand to a certain extent to facilitate circulation, after an accident, for example. Remember also, that the precepts of political economy which inform the amount of police on the road is tied to liberalism’s fear of the state governing too much.

Even the speed limit, which at first glance represents a concrete example of sovereign law, is, on further inspection, more closely aligned with a mechanism of security. A speed limit more accurately represents an optimum, while a bandwidth of the acceptable exists on either side. A 100kph speed limit in New Zealand is considered optimal, not only is going much faster than this considered dangerous, but also going much slowly than this negatively affects the circulation of things. In addition to this, however, there is a bandwidth of the acceptable that appreciates a certain variability in speed around this optimal point. Hence why we don’t actually get in trouble until we start going 110kph (or indeed, take Easter weekend in New Zealand, which represents a statistical anomaly due to the high level of fatal crashes in recent years, and where political economy tells us that it is economically appropriate to reduce this bandwidth, and deploy more police on our roads to enforce this reduction; or the recent introduction of lower speed limits in urban areas in New Zealand due to the statistically high number of pedestrians killed). Although this is just one example of one mechanism of security, and a biopolitical regime is made up of

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78 Taken on its own, it could be argued that such a mechanism of security might function according to a rationality based on humanitarian principles, but this idea is belied by the fact that there is an acceptable level of death on our roads (determined by the twin principles of political economy), and that the regulation of roads is not based upon the rights of individuals, but upon the government of the population, or in other words, the totalization of individuals.
many (providing greater context and depth of analysis with which to argue for the existence of a biopolitical regime), what it indicates is that biopower does not operate according to law, but according to an imperative to distribute the living in the domain of value and utility, which is construed as a mechanism of security, whereby the biological well-being of the population is surrounded by a raft of regulations – a mechanism of security; driver licensing, speed regulation, physical infrastructure, car registration, insurance, and so on. A mechanism of security is thus a “specific principle of political method and practice, distinct alike from those of law, sovereignty and discipline, and capable of various modes of combination with these other principles and practices within diverse governmental configurations.”

**Governmentality.**

Now we get to the tripartite character of biopolitical governmentality, which has the population as object; political economy as knowledge; and mechanisms of security as instrument. However, it should first be made clear that Foucault meant two things by governmentality. First is an historically located biopolitical governmentality: “[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.” This is an historically specific version of a more general sense of governmentality which deals with “how we think about governing, with the different rationalities or, … ‘mentalities of government.’” Hence, police governmentality is not the same as (contemporary) biopolitical governmentality. This broader sense of governmentality becomes important later, when I engage with biopower and international governmentality. For the time being, however, I will set it aside as I describe the emergence of biopower as a rationality of rule focused on the idea of a population.

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79 Gordon, "Introduction." 20
80 See also Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 24-30
81 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 108
82 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 24
As Dean points out, governmentality is distinct from an ‘art of
government,’ which again refers more broadly to a concern with and reflection on
what it is to govern. Confusingly, in the literature both are referred to as
governmentality, hence my repeated reference to biopolitical governmentality
throughout the paper. Biopolitical governmentality is an historically specific
version of an art of government. Donzelot (2008) sums up the biopolitical type
by telling us it was coined “in order to explain the introduction of political
economy into the art of government.” Prior to the emergence of political
economy, within mercantilism, the rationalization of the exercise of power
biopolitically was blocked – the art of government available to those who
governed was either too abstract or too narrow, being tied either to the framework
of sovereignty, or the framework of the family. The emergence of the
population via political arithmetic (otherwise known as statistics) was central to
overcoming this blockage and for political knowledge – knowledge of the state
that can be employed for tactics of government – to continue evolving.

“How in fact did the problem of population make possible the release
of the art of government? The perspective of population, the reality
of phenomena specific to population, makes it possible to eliminate
the model of the family and to re-focus the notion of economy on
something else.”

The family then appears as an element within population, fundamentally a relay
within this new art of government, and the notion of economy becomes
implicated with the polis, ontologically perceived as a population. Therefore, the
emergence of political economy, linked to the emergence of the problem of
population, constitutes the moment where it becomes possible “to think, reflect,

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83 Ibid. 26
84 This confusion is problematic in the literature; it muddies the conceptual
waters and is thus unconstructive, as will be shown in the last chapter.
85 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 24
86 Donzelot, "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence." 117. Rose (1993)
refers to the general category as a notion of government which “addresses
itself specifically to the domain of the political, not as a domain of State or a set
of institutions and actors but as a mentality of rule.” Nikolas Rose,
"Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism," Economy and
Society 22, no. 3 (1993). 288
87 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 103
88 Ibid. 104
89 Ibid. 104-105
and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of sovereignty.” 90 Connected intimately to the development of political arithmetic (statistics), this new constellation of political technologies provides the historical conjuncture necessary for the transformation of an art of government into governmentality.

Governmentality, then, implies the governmentalization of the state, and represents the jettisoning of raison d’état.91 This reflects Foucault’s argument that “[t]he nature of the institution of the state is … a function of changes in practices of government, rather than the converse,”92 which in turn implies “a transformation in the relationship between knowledge and government.93 Political economy, tied up as it is with the naturalness of population and its corresponding milieu, “inaugurates a new mode of objectification of governed reality, whose effect is to resituate governmental reason within a newly complicated, open and unstable politico-epistemic configuration.”94 Political economy thus disqualifies economic sovereignty, whereby “a ‘dialectic of spontaneous multiplication’ which unfolds in a condition of radical immanence, of inextricable circumstance and accident, [is] incapable in principle of becoming accessible to the totalizing scrutiny of subject or sovereign.”95 From this follows a liberal idea of economic government perceived in a dual sense, being both informed by economics and economic itself. Importantly, this latter sense leads to government that economises its own costs, and liberal governmentality is thus perpetually in search of new techniques to govern with less effort. The combination of this ethic with the disqualification of economic sovereignty leads techniques of government not down the path of panopticism with its dreams of total control, but instead to a decentralization of regulation, whereby existing economic structures and institutions are endowed with certain functions of a

90 Ibid. 104
91 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality; with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). Donzelot, “Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence.” 121-122
92 Gordon, "Introduction." 4
93 Ibid. 14
94 Ibid. 16
95 Ibid. 21
governmental infrastructure.\textsuperscript{96} Liberalism thus undertakes “the construction of a complex domain of governmentality, within which economic and juridical subjectivity can alike be situated as relative moments.”\textsuperscript{97} This complex domain is civil society, what is for Foucault a ‘transactional reality,’\textsuperscript{98} and a correlate to a liberal technology of government, within which technologies evolve that governmentalise the state. Accordingly, “[t]he social’ designates a field of governmental action” and the state “is no longer at stake in social relations, but stands outside them and becomes their guarantor of progress.”\textsuperscript{99} A distinction thus emerges between a state and its society, and in doing so creates a connection between the two. According to Foucault, (liberal) governmentality has a responsibility for civil society,\textsuperscript{100} a responsibility that Dean (2002) points out is comprized of a cluster of ‘folding’s’;

“an unfolding of the (formally) political sphere into civil society; an enfolding of the regulations of civil society into the political and a refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political.”\textsuperscript{101} 102

Ultimately, it is the introduction of civil society into the art of government that sums up the transformation of a sovereign regime into a biopolitical regime; due to the repudiation of mercantilism and thus raison d’état by political economy, and the theorization of a distinction between population and state that Police had been unable or unwilling to admit, civil society is constituted as a target of governmental tactics – it “is the outcome of a peculiar technique of government

\textsuperscript{96} Gordon states that this strategy has had more impact than the competing idea to reduce “governmental functions to a set of economically regulated structures and institutions” Ibid. 26
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. 22 See also Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 140-146
\textsuperscript{98} Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 297
\textsuperscript{99} Donzelot in Gordon, "Introduction," 34. See also Jacques Donzelot, "The Promotion of the Social " Economy and Society 17, no. 3 (1988).
\textsuperscript{100} Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 350
\textsuperscript{101} Mitchell Dean, "Liberal Government and Authoritarianism," Economy and Society 31, no. 1 (2002). 45
\textsuperscript{102} Donzelot identifies this responsibility as a theoretical resolution to competing claims on the proper role of the state, which ensures social progress, thus overcoming the supposed natural antagonism between workers and capitalists voiced from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Donzelot, "The Promotion of the Social". 405-425
that proceeds by autonomization of individual subjects as well as of society as a whole.”

It is important to highlight that from a biopolitical governmentality perspective, traditional liberal theory that posited civil society as residing outside and in opposition to the state is repudiated. Instead, the liberal-biopolitical state and civil society are immanent with each other; they exist in a mutually reinforcing role. Rather than fostering a disjunction between the two spheres, liberalism connects formal state agencies and programmes to civil society. The fundamental outcome of this process, this governmentalization of the state summed up by Dean’s foldings, is the constitution of society according to the nature of civil society whereby the state is “secondary and [a] derivative of ‘civil society’ outside its legitimate scope.” This point is very important to the argument developed later, as it indicates that that the sovereign capability has become subsumed within a logic of civil society, especially with reference to a process of norm constitution. This will be fully developed in chapter four. For the time being, however, this is most relevant for my upcoming critique of the way the concept of biopower has so far been deployed in IR, where I argue that sovereign means are still essential for enforcing the norms determined by civil society whenever necessary.

Problematically, predominant theorizations of biopower in IR make no reference to the concept of civil society, without which their conceptualizations struggle to maintain conceptual coherence with the history of the concept. Notwithstanding this deficiency, the following section critically investigates the three most influential theorists of biopower in IR. In addition to the lack of a civil society correlate which, I later argue, is essential to an explanation of biopolitical governmentality, an appropriate understanding of sovereignty is missing. All three theorisations are shown to have different conceptions of sovereignty, and thus deploy fundamentally different conceptions of biopolitical world politics. Such a situation is not helpful to the project of advancing our understanding of contemporary IR. This is because, following Dingwerth and

104 Dean, “Liberal Government and Authoritarianism.” 43-44
105 Ibid. 46
Pattberg (2006), concepts should be considered as the most basic tool social science has at its disposal, and hence their clarity is fundamental to our success at explaining the world. Two extremes undermine this clarity. On the one hand, new concepts should not be identified for each single observation that differs from a previous one. On the other, and most importantly, "concepts should … not group objects together that do not share similarities; in other words, a single concept should not be used for phenomena that are essentially different (polysemy)." Regrettably, the following deployments of biopower in IR do exactly this. The next section will show that the most influential accounts of biopower in IR theorize disparate phenomena due to idiosyncratic conceptualizations of sovereignty. In particular, Hardt and Negri use the concept of biopower to theorize the material and agential constitution of the whole world; Agamben uses it to theorize the increasing salience of a mode of power based on a ‘state of exception’; and Dillon uses it to theorize the operation of something called global liberal governance.

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CHAPTER TWO: BIOPOWER IN IR.

This chapter departs from an explanation of the concept of biopower and engages with predominant theorizations of biopower in IR. Due to the nature of these deployments it is inevitably somewhat of a rupture with the paper so far. Beginning with Hardt & Negri, and Agamben, who are least concerned with traditional IR, it then moves on to Dillon, one of the most prolific writers on biopower in IR. The influence of these authors is then briefly identified in a wider discussion of the literature. Afterwards, the issues raised here are tied together in a discussion which more generally surveys the junction of Foucault and IR. From this junction of Foucault and IR, the third chapter investigates the relationship between Foucault and sovereignty. In it I put forward an argument for how I think sovereignty should be conceptualized so as to extend Foucauldian insights. Armed with this conceptualization of sovereignty, I then move on to the final chapter, which is my argument explaining how biopower should accurately be treated in IR literature. The first part of this chapter identifies; a) that Hardt and Negri claim the dialectic of modern sovereignty between civil and natural realms has come to an end and subsumes biopower within a Marxist-inspired analysis that attempts to account for the material and agential constitution of the whole world; b) that Agamben locates sovereign power in an originary/foundational moment defined by the concept of bare life and claims biopower is nothing but the hidden operation of sovereignty and theorizes the increasing salience of a mode of power based on a “state of exception” and; c) that Dillon redeployds sovereign power as ‘post-sovereign’ governmental power and uses it to theorize the operation of something called global liberal governance.

The second section of this chapter then surveys the rest of the literature concerning biopower and IR. It identifies not only how these problematic conceptions of biopower in IR have influenced the broader literature, but also the few conceptualizations which reflect accuracies. While it is noted that these few examples tend to miss what I think is essential to biopower and thus international biopower, they still serve to help push my ensuing argument in the right direction. Afterwards, in the third and final section of this chapter, the issues concerning the deployment of global biopower in IR are related to more general concerns with
the use of Foucault in IR. This will lead me in to the chapter dealing with Foucault and sovereignty.

Hardt & Negri, and Agamben.

Biopower has entered IR discourse primarily through two influences; Hardt & Negri (2000), especially with reference to their concept of ‘Empire’; and Agamben (1995), with his concept of ‘Bare Life’. Both of these (sets of) authors acknowledge an explicit debt to Foucault, yet both also claim Foucault’s concept of biopower is deficient, and go on to modify it. For Hardt and Negri, Foucault’s thought was dominated by a structuralist epistemology which reintroduced a functionalist analysis that;

“sacrifices the dynamic of the system, the creative temporality of its movement, and the ontological substance of cultural and social reproduction… What Foucault fails to grasp finally are the real dynamics of production in biopolitical society.”\textsuperscript{107}

Meanwhile, Agamben finds Foucault’s distinction between sovereign power and biopower superfluous and that;

“[t]he Foucauldian thesis [needs] to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of \textit{zoē} in the \textit{polis} – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of state power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which exception becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, \textit{bios} and \textit{zoē}, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.”\textsuperscript{108}

These authors appreciate the insight Foucault generated with the concept of biopower, but ultimately find that in its original form it is unable to fully grasp

the important features of modernity. Hardt and Negri’s ‘materialist’ approach seeks to discover the originary productive forces that animate the biopolitical body, a context indicative of the “process of the constitution of the world”, that apparently Foucault’s biopower fails to comprehend. Agamben, on the other hand, seeks to explain the concept of the sovereign exception in terms of biopower, which Foucault’s distinction between sovereign power and biopower cannot accommodate.

Hardt and Negri locate the “dynamics of production in biopolitical society” within the organization of global capital. In particular, “[t]he huge transnational corporations construct the connective fabric of the biopolitical world in certain important respects.” These “great industrial and financial powers”, they argue;

“produce not only commodities but also subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical context: they produce needs, social relations, bodies, and minds – which is to say, they produce producers. In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production and production is made to work for life.”

This statement reflects Hardt & Negri’s departure from Foucault, with the reintroduction of Marxist-inspired analyses of production. They hope to account for the ‘why’ of world order, and in attempting to do so analyse biopower in terms of productive labour. They argue recent transformations in productive labour, namely its tendency in becoming immaterial, communicative, and ‘immediately social’ produces new subjectivities according to a global mechanism of exploitation. The problem with their analysis is that their attempt to rectify Foucault’s supposed neglect of agency implicitly reintroduces a superstructural component, precisely what a Foucauldian methodology seeks to avoid. As Coleman & Agnew point out, by de-territorialising the contemporary world and de-actualising the place of politics, Hardt and Negri produce a

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110 Ibid., 32.
111 Whereby “the exploitation of living immaterial labour immerses labour in all the relational elements that define the social”; Ibid., 29.
transcendent/immanent dichotomy that “implicitly reinstates a transcendental view of history – the ‘view from nowhere’ with all of its fallibilities.”

Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of the biopolitical production of empire is a response to the increasingly complex relationship between life and capitalism, an approach which expands the biological component of desire in biopower to include a psychological component. “Biopolitical production,” therefore, “entails the implication of all the body’s capacities, desire, language, affect, and style into the networks of activities productive for capital.” Hardt and Negri thus generate an idea of immanence based on production; without this productive principle, “nothing allows society to become political.” This ontology of production reveals the potentially transformative immanence embodied in the subjects of capitalism; it apparently “reveals the way in which the world is continually made and remade by the bodies and desires of the many, thus exposing the way in which the world can be made otherwise.” However, this immanence is juxtaposed with the transcendent nature of Empire, a juxtaposition that problematises the efficacy of individual agency. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire “effectively encompasses the spatial totality ... effectively suspends history ... [and] operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of the social world.” The site of Empire is therefore everywhere and nowhere at once, completely penetrating the social world, a transcendent regime that would always seem to have the upper hand.

Both Hardt & Negri and Giorgio Agamben modify Foucault’s concept of biopower according to dissimilar views of sovereignty. Hardt & Negri’s de-territorialising analysis of contemporary world order generates a global conception of sovereignty, in which the dialectic of modern sovereignty between civil and natural realms has come to an end. Agamben, on the other hand, maintains a distinction, albeit purely formal, between the inside of sovereignty,
and the outside as a zone of exception. Agamben argues that a distinction between sovereign power and biopower is a misinterpretation resulting from the historical concealment of biopower by sovereign power. His work:

“concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power. What this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power.”

Due to Agamben’s view of sovereignty, it is clear that his conception of biopower is fundamentally dissimilar to Foucault. Some go so far as to say they are not talking about the same thing. Agamben’s biopower rests on the idea that ‘bare life’ is its object, a mode of life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death via the suspension of sovereignty, a foundational practice that serves to perpetually constitute sovereign power. Bare life exists in a ‘state of exception,’ a constitutive operation that links bare life directly to sovereign power. The state of exception thus produces bare life which is the hidden foundation of biopolitics, which itself had been concealed until Foucault identified practices of government that made it explicit. This objectification of bare life is absolutely incongruent with Foucault’s subjectification of the life processes of a population. It also directly contradicts Foucault. For Agamben, sovereign biopower produces bare life to establish itself, a process that is “immensely reductive,” while for Foucault, the practice of biopower is productive – to turn the mere “being” of life into “well-being.” Ojakangas sums up the problem with Agamben’s perspective most succinctly when he says that “[b]io-power needs a notion of life that corresponds to its aims.”

The necessary correspondence between biopower and ‘more-than-life’ does mean Agamben is effectively talking about something different to what Foucault meant. Schinkel (2010) even resolves this divergence in a model based on citizenship as a technology of government. On this reading Foucauldian biopolitics is directed towards the bios, taking as its object the social body, while Agambean biopower is a zoêpolitics externally directed to persons outside the state. This is an important and helpful distinction, but it leaves unresolved what branch of biopower is most pertinent to the study of international relations. Like Hardt & Negri, the influence Agamben’s work wields within the discipline of IR forces a complete appraisal of his conceptualization, and from a perspective that hopes to extend Foucault’s insights, methodological problems upset his argument. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History Foucault eschews the search for truth in origins, whereby history becomes a handmaiden to philosophy. Agamben does not observe this methodological precaution and effectively identifies an originary moment, whereby the articulation of the concepts of zoê and bios by Aristotle constitute the birth-moment of sovereignty. Not only does this “naively and problematically [assume] that there was once a separation between zoê and bios,” Blencowe points out that this reading also de-historicises biopower in a dual sense. First it removes Foucault’s work from its contexts of concern with constructed and historical statuses, which “[forecloses] any transhistorical distinctions such as zoêbios, bare life/human life, or nature/culture”. Second, “the historical specificity of notions that are central to biological thinking, such as species, is obliterated while all thought of living physicality is subsumed under a ‘mere’ physicality.” The genealogical component of Foucault’s insight is thus completely removed, and an abstract transhistorical category –zoê – is introduced.

125 Blencowe, "Foucault's and Arendt's 'Insider View' of Biopolitics: A Critique of Agamben,” 115. Italics in original
In summary, both sets of authors discussed above commit, from a Foucauldian perspective, fundamental methodological errors. Hardt & Negri explain power relations according to a transcendent logic, and explicitly break one of Foucault’s methodological rules; “not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society.” Meanwhile, Agamben’s analysis is also anti-genealogical, in that it places the present need of explaining zones of exception at the supposed origin of sovereignty, albeit an origin that perpetually re-inscribes itself as the function of sovereignty. Yet both sets of authors have a predominant influence in the IR literature, over a dearth of more accurate Foucauldian readings. It should seem odd then, that when the shortcomings of biopower in IR literature are identified, it is Foucault that gets the blame. This is especially so when Foucault made it quite clear that, although his concepts and insights were produced to be freely interpreted and redeployed according to the directions of others’ investigations, certain methodological principles were integral to his work. I maintain that a Foucauldian IR can only be built upon a certain level of methodological adherence to these principles.

Dillon.

The direction in which Agamben, and Hardt & Negri have ultimately led biopower is best represented by Michael Dillon, probably the most explicit and prolific theorist of biopower in IR. Dillon is particularly interested in the


ramifications of Foucault’s insights into security, war, and race, and views
biopolitics from this perspective. For Dillon, the central import of biopower is
not that it is a strategy which promotes life, but that in promoting life its central
concern is to differentiate between the fit and unfit.

“Biopolitics is therefore always involved in the sorting of life for the
promotion of life. Sorting life requires waging war on behalf of life
against life forces that are inimical to life.”

War becomes a central concern for Dillon because, as Foucault first states in *The
History of Sexuality, vol 1*, biopower not only is a power that fosters life, but
concomitantly disallows life. Foucault, however, did not pursue this line of
inquiry to fully develop its implications, and Dillon’s project launches itself from
the point made by Bigo that “[t]he question of security as it relates to war, and to
international war, is not really discussed by Foucault and the Foucaultians.”

Dillon’s concern with war is founded, as it also was for Foucault, on
Foucault’s concept of race, which is much broader than race conceived as a
simply biological trait. It instead refers to the political enfranchisement of life; in
a biopolitical regime, rather than being a taken-for-granted ethnic marker, racial
fitness “is ultimately dependant upon utility measures for the promotion of life
biologically.” Dillon therefore draws on *Society Must Be Defended*, which is
effectively Foucault’s genealogy of the modern state. In this re-reading of history
the formation of states is seen as the institutionalization of the results of war,
whereby a certain conceptualization of life is promoted at the expense of others,
and modern politics is seen as the extension of (race-)war by other means. The
institutionalized warfare that is modern politics is biopolitical in that it continues
to promote a certain form of life at the expense of others, and that this biopolitics
hides its violent side by focusing on its imperative to foster life. From this
foundation, and the focus on the idea that liberal biopolitical states must

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proactively ‘let die’ to ‘make live,’ Dillon argues that there exists a regime of global liberal biopower. For example, the global effort to combat terrorism is theorized as part of global biopolitical strategy due to the necessity to make secure the type of life that biopower defends, from which the type of life ‘terrorists’ promote diverges. Dillon problematically correlates ‘international warfare’ with biopower. Centered on the idea that modern politics represents an inversion of war, his general thesis appears to be based on the idea that conflict in the international sphere is gradually being incorporated into an institutional framework that is assumed to be biopolitical. He thus exemplifies a double-reading common in the literature, also evident in Empire, whereby biopower is scaled-up in connection to globalized liberalism.

Dillon’s overriding concern with the martial expression of the imperative to ‘make live’ is linked to a discourse of value provided by capitalism. In his view liberalism is necessarily biopolitical, and global liberal governance is intimately allied with the globalization of capital. His alliance of global capitalism with global liberal governance, lies at the root of his conclusion that biopower is going global. For him, “[t]he biopolitical imperative to make live finds its expression today … in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be,” and species-life is intimately related to a discourse of value, provided by capitalism. According to Dillon:

“[i]n as much as the liberal form of rule takes species life, as well as subjectivity, as its referent object of rule, the liberal way of rule also governs by reference to species properties, principal among which is contingency… Contingency is foundational, especially to how the operations of living systems are now conceived.”

Contingency is a new epistemic domain associated with probability analysis, risk analysis, and “increasingly, a wide variety of techniques for patterning behaviour employed extensively from anti-terror surveillance, health and commercial

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132 ———, ”Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence.”
134 ———, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, 85.
135 Dillon and Reid, ”Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War,” 41.
136 Ibid., 82.
marketing to [bibliometric and informetric techniques to investigate the Internet],“\textsuperscript{137} and “allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence.”\textsuperscript{138} This perspective reflects “pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential.”\textsuperscript{139} Such life is immanently dangerous, both to itself and other life forms, and for biopower to be effective it must identify life as either of these two options, by attributing value to one, and not the other. Dillon points out that once a discourse of life is established, an discourse of value ineluctably follows, and therefore that “[s]pecies’ means classification as such, classification as living thing and classification as value, specifically monetary or capital value. These three things are locked into a very tight and radically interdependent triangulation.”\textsuperscript{140}

Dillon’s substitution of species for population, however, is problematic. His concept of species replaces Foucault’s emphasis on population, the unearthing of which provided the ontological traction for the emergence of biopower; “species-being is a biopolitical imaginary in which ‘life’ is taken as the referent ontopolitical object of governance, self-governance and rule.”\textsuperscript{141} The major conceptual implication of the use of species, instead of population, is Dillon’s position that the biopolitical question is not confined to that of territorially-constituted populations, thus setting the conceptual stage for a global biopolitics of the human race. This problematic conception of species-being as the referent ontopolitical object of global biopower is a result of his neglect of the concept of milieu, and especially the role sovereignty plays in the global milieu\textsuperscript{142}. The milieu, for Foucault, is the space that frames security; “it refers to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 85.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, "The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-Being," 7-8.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.: 2.
\textsuperscript{142} The neglect of this important aspect leads to a fundamental misreading of Foucault by Dillon, when he says, “Foucault identifies ‘circulation’ as the space of operation of biopolitics” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 268). However, the space of operation of biopolitics is actually the milieu. Along with causality, circulation is the problem of biopolitics, a problem which is at stake and addressed within the milieu: “The milieu, then, will be that \textit{in which circulation is carried out}” (Foucault 2007: 21 Italics mine).
inserted within a given space.” Furthermore, his discussion of space identifies that this space, the *milieu*, is acted upon by all three governmental regimes in his tripartite division of modern power:

“problems of space are equally common to all three. It goes without saying for sovereignty, since sovereignty is first of all exercised within the territory. But discipline involves a spatial division, and I think security does too, and the different treatment of space by sovereignty, discipline, and security is precisely what I want to talk about.”

By neglecting the concept of *milieu*, Dillon inevitably neglects, or at least misrepresents the role sovereignty plays in constituting a biopolitical regime, which in turn allows him to scale up biopower.

In an effort to link the operation of sovereignty to a global population, Dillon, drawing on Agamben, likens a continuous state of exception at the level of state sovereignty to a continuous state of emergence at the global level, claiming that “[g]overnmental power – specifically in the forms increasingly characteristic of global liberal governance – is, like sovereign power, a certain strategic ordering of power relations that derives from insisting on a state of emergency.” Like a state of exception whereby the outside is constituted through its relationship with the inside, effectively blurring the spheres of inside/outside which sovereign power claims to establish and preserve, an analogous, global, state of emergence, or emergency, as Dillon puts it, creates *zones of indistinction* subject to governmental power. This governmental power, global and liberal in nature, subjectivises states of emergency within a knowledge/power relationship that problematises them biopolitically according to the concept of *species*. Dillon thus situates biopower within a space of security that implies ‘global-liberal’ ‘security’ operations, involving international terrorism and humanitarian events, constitute the operation of biopower.

144 Ibid., 11-12.
145 Ibid., 12.
147 For an alternative critique, which examines Dillon & Reid’s reification of ‘liberal war,’ see David Chandler, “Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics.
Dillon’s redeployment of sovereign power as post-sovereign governmental power significantly modifies the tripartite governmental regime Foucault imparted to us. This is not to say that biopower can only ever remain situated within a sovereign state – such a claim would deny the transgressive nature of Foucault’s analysis. However, the methodological manner in which Dillon redeployes the role of sovereignty, thus introducing a transcendental nature, sits uncomfortably with Foucault’s methodological precaution not to theorise in a top-down manner.

Dillon’s analysis is a misrepresentation of the concept of population, which he represents as species. Senellart tells us liberalism “constitutes the condition of intelligibility of biopolitics,” whereby “subjects of right over whom political sovereignty is exercised appear themselves as a population that a government must manage.” This appearance of a population is the founding principle that Dillon evokes when he refers to the administration and production of life. However, such activity cannot be linked to a complex regime of global liberal governance, because, on the one hand and as noted above, global liberalism does not possess the requisite civil society, and on the other, it implies “complex systems of coordination and centralization” found at the level of the state. As Senellart confirms, “[b]iopolitics therefore can only be conceived as bioregulation by the state.” This statement points to the concrete practices of government carried out by the state, and is central to my argument which will be fully outlined in the following chapters. Dillon therefore elides the explicit relation posited by Foucault between the population and sovereignty constituted


148 Dillon’s (mis)use of the concept of species is perhaps influenced by Foucault’s ambiguous use of the term ‘global.’ Dillon partly justifies his global thesis with Foucault’s statement that “after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualising mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not individualising but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body, but man-as-species” (Dillon 2007: 45; Foucault 2004: 243). While it may seem like Foucault is talking about a biopolitics of the human race, the phrase seizure of power belies such a reading. Foucault uses the term global often, to refer to an overall or comprehensive space, and specifically for biopower such a space is the sovereign state or, in essence framed by sovereignty. Man-as-species actually speaks to the globalization of the human sciences rather than the globalization of biopower.

149 Senellart in Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 383.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., Society Must Be Defended, 250.

152 Senellart in ———, Security, Territory, Population, 381.
by a seizure of power, and misses the importance of the relationship between sovereign power and biopower – which are reduced to each other in Agamben’s work; in particular the fact that it was with recourse to the administrative power of sovereignty that biopolitical techniques of government – namely the use of statistics and establishment of mechanisms of security – managed to objectify population(s). Due to the blurring of inside/outside, the specific mechanisms by which populations are formed and governed – sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical – are lost to analysis.

Dillon’s conceptualization of sovereignty neglects the actual practices of a juridical-legal-regulatory apparatus that serves not only to enforce, when necessary, biopolitical norms, but also plays a central role in determining those norms. This access to and objectification of a population is a seizure of power over a population that was integral to the operation of biopower as Foucault saw it. The elision of this aspect of sovereignty is also present in the works of Hardt and Negri, and Agamben. Although Hardt & Negri’s argument that the dialectic between civil and natural realms is increasingly untenable is insightful, a considerable amount of historical practices and national histories maintain it as a concept which continues to have institutional capacity. Meanwhile, at first sight, Agamben’s conception of sovereignty may seem to have this aspect of sovereignty in common with Foucault. After all, his work is precisely about understanding who gets to live within the sovereign realm, and who does not. However, Agamben’s transhistorical conception of sovereignty pays no attention to the actual, physical activity of government – the genealogical component of Foucault’s work. Sovereignty is instead theorized according to its symbolic role only; that is, as a division between the inside and outside of political community. Again, as with Hardt & Negri, this is, in many respects, a fruitful insight, but in no way can it help us to understand how individual bodies are inserted in mechanisms of power in an attempt to transform their being into ‘well-being.’ A more accurate reading of biopower in IR, at least if we wish our work to resonate with what Foucault sought to uncover, needs to pay close attention to the continued operation of state sovereignty in biopower, both domestically and internationally. This dilemma is engaged with in the final section, but first the influence of this authors is situated in an overview of other uses of biopower in
IR literature, before I complete this chapter with a general discussion concerning the junction of Foucault and IR. This next two sections will thus tie together the themes in this chapter and set us up for the concluding argument.

**Biopower in the Wider Literature.**

The above authors have made it easy for others to take the concept of global biopower for granted. Stone (2010) uncritically accepts Hardt & Negri’s imperial re-reading of sovereignty. Edkins (2008) also takes global biopower for granted, although through association with Agamben’s ‘bare life’, by ambiguously linking a regime of global governance to the production of bare life at local levels. Following Hardt & Negri, Reid (2005) labels the United Nations, the NGO community and ‘global civil society’ biopolitical agencies “that do not simply enact a deteritorialisation of sovereignty, but rather which figurate the reterritorialisation of deteritorialising flows of immanence in the name of political sovereignty.” He argues that this process is a defining feature of the modern international system, which dangerously lends itself to the reterritorialisation of sovereignty at the global level. For him, “[t]he idea of a universally coded and legally enfranchised humanity invokes the idea and pursuit of a universal state.” Jaeger (2010) sees within the process of recent UN reform efforts, a “biopolitical reprogramming of sovereignty and global governance whose political finality is the vitality, security and productivity of the global population.” Evans (2010) argues that a “global imaginary of threat [has] allowed for the possibility to govern all illiberal life on the basis that the species as a whole would be less endangered.” This has led to a “liberal expansionism [that has] proceeded on the basis of alleviating unnecessary

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156 Ibid. 249
suffering in zones of political instability and crises.”159 The global liberal regime is therefore conditioned by a development-security nexus that imposes liberalism and justifies ‘liberal war’. All of these examples are heavily influenced by Hardt & Negri, Agamben, or Dillon, and all, in one way or another associate biopower with a global correlate.

Selby (2007) articulates this criticism. He points out that much IR appropriation of Foucault has, through a double-reading, unreflectively scaled up his insights on the basis of a supposed world order reflecting the same liberal nature that Foucault engaged with. International political relations, he notes, “are read first as liberal and, on the strength of this, these global liberal realities are analysed as the products of disciplinary and bio-political power. Without such an effective ‘double reading’, a characterization of contemporary world politics as ‘globalized bio-politics’ would be impossible.”160 Chandler (2009) furthers this argument and states that such uncritical scaling-up of biopower nullifies an understanding of international relations mediated by interstate competition, and this globalized understanding of power “becomes increasingly abstracted from any analysis of contemporary social relations.”161 As Chandler points out; theorizations of liberalism as an abstract global reality cannot account for the ad hoc and often irrational interventions of Western states and international institutions. Indeed, such readings of history go against the Foucauldian injunction to seek out and account for precisely those phenomena that do not align with the dominant framework of understanding. Furthermore, in a critique of Dillon & Reid (2009), Chandler points out that the scaling-up of biopower, which goes against Foucault’s attempts to concretely ground his conceptual categories, “denude[s] the conception of biopolitics of theory, politics and history. Instead, biopolitics becomes merely a technical expression or way of viewing the world which takes humanity as its starting point.”162

159 Ibid. 419
This is not to say that deployments of biopower in IR influenced by Hardt & Negri and Agamben have not been put to good use in developing fruitful insights. Agamben can be helpful in understanding many facets of contemporary international life. Salter (2006) and Vaughan-Williams (2009) both draw on ‘bare life’ and ‘zones of exception’ to develop an appreciation of the role of borders play suitable to contemporary political life. Vaughan-Williams, for example, uses the concept to point out how the border no longer necessarily operates at a country’s territorial boundary, but instead can be thought of as generalized throughout a sovereign space. Through a modified reading of bare life, he identifies how sovereign boundary practices occur at diffuse locations throughout sovereign space. “Thinking in terms of the generalized bio-political border unties an analysis of the activity of sovereign power from the territorial limits of the state and relocates such an analysis in the context of a bio-political field spanning domestic and international space.”

In specific reference to biopower, Salter highlights how territorial border zones actually operate according to the logic of permanent exception, a place where non-citizens are both subject to the law and have no recourse to the law (because they are not sovereign subjects). Salter’s analysis implies an international biopolitical order tied to the specific operation of sovereign states. He points out how a global visa regime administers a target population by utilising confessionary techniques to determine the viability of entry seekers to sovereign spaces, according to a number of indicators that ascertain an individuals threat to society. This is a concrete indication of an international biopolitical order not in any way linked to some sort of global sovereignty, but instead shared by sovereign states in an effort to control and ‘defend’ internal populations. This is a good example of the way shared norms operate in separate biopolitical regimes, and ultimately it does not reflect any transformation of sovereignty, focused as it is on territorial

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integrity, and thus does not indicate any fundamental change to the nature of biopolitical governmentality proposed by Foucault.

Even the most accurate account of biopolitics in IR does not imply a transformation of sovereignty. Di Muzio analyses the attempted government of global slums, framed by Goal 7, target 11 of the Millennium Development Goals. He only briefly mentions Agamben’s ‘zones of exception’ and instead draws almost exclusively on Foucault. While he freely uses the term ‘global liberal governance’, his analysis is specific and insightful. Following Agamben, Di Muzio claims slums instead of camps may soon be the true “biopolitical paradigm of the modern.” However, that is where any reference to Agamben ends, and his Foucauldian analysis, on my reading, confirms, like Salter, that zones of exception are real political spaces, but are not biopolitical. “[T]he biopolitical imperative to improve the vital chances of slum dwellers” which Di Muzio correlates with UN activity is, I argue, more accurately a project to ‘extinguish’ the exception.

Drawing on Rabinow and Rose (2006), Di Muzio discusses three elements of biopower present in the attempted governance of so-called global slums: life discourses; intervention strategies; and modes of subjectification. He notes that the problematic of slums has largely been displaced from a wholly local and national context to one of “global biopolitical importance.” That slums have become a global phenomenon is a product of UN institutional architecture which has facilitated statistical analysis that identifies the phenomenon as ‘global.’ It also acts to coordinate international initiatives. Within the UN context an official discourse defines the target population(s), another identifies the conditions of life, and a third determines initiatives to be taken to improve the quality of life within slums. Di Muzio states “the overarching goal of biopolitical interventions is to

167 Ibid. 309
169 Muzio, "Governing Global Slums: The Biopolitics of Target 11." 311
170 A fourth discourse is also identified that corresponds to Salter’s insight – of a military-strategic nature that seeks to protect those who currently benefit from globalisation from the negative effects of slums. While it reflects shared norms deployed to protect specific populations, this strategy is more
transform slum settlements into vital neighbourhoods,” and that such interventions identify public hygiene and circulation as critical issues. Both are necessary to “make live,” while fostering circulation is also a strategy used to prevent further slum formation. These undeniably biopolitical strategies, however, are undermined by the fact that, as UN Habitat admits, “more accurate and comprehensive data collection needs to be carried out if the biopolitical project to help slum dwellers is to be fulfilled.” In essence, the biopolitical project needs to have more effective sovereignty over the target population. Without the accurate collection of statistics, programs cannot be effective because the natural processes of society, their ‘level of generality,’ must be registered in order to generate appropriate programs.

The fact that the UN is operating in these environments is an indicator of ‘conditional sovereignty,’ facilitated by a state’s incapacity to govern effectively. While it may seem to indicate a modification of sovereignty, this change is normative and not operational, by which I mean that the institutional capacity of sovereignty does not change, but the norms according to which it is supposed to operate do. Conditional sovereignty reflects international norms and provides for the denial of sovereignty to state representatives who are seen as failing in their responsibilities as sovereign representatives. When this stripping of sovereignty occurs, the operational capacity of the state is turned over to, and supplemented by, international actors so as to fulfil sovereign responsibility. That is, according to liberal precepts, to successfully govern biopolitically. Once this normative component of governing has successfully been (re)instated, the sovereign capacity to act is ideally returned to national representatives. Therefore, according to conditional sovereignty, the operational capacity of sovereignty as a particular activity does not change, but is instead turned over to different actors for an indefinite period of time. The norm of autonomy is simply replaced by a norm of privilege and responsibility. As Slaughter points out, “[h]owever

accurately of a geopolitical, and not biopolitical nature, because the strategies deployed are not, as Di Muzio points out, primarily concerned with ameliorating the vital conditions of the target population.

171 Muzio, " Governing Global Slums: The Biopolitics of Target 11." 315

172 Ibid. 312

paradoxical it sounds, the measure of a state’s capacity to act as an independent unit within the international system – the condition that “sovereignty” purports both to grant and to describe – depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other states.”174 This point draws on an argument by Raustiala (2003) that international institutions “actually serve as a means to reassert sovereignty.”175

Di Muzio provides an example of how biopower becomes an IR concern, but does not show us how biopower might be becoming international. Indeed, the difficulty the UN has described stemming from data collection (i.e. inscription of population processes) problematises the ability of international agencies to effectively administer a local population. It is precisely the requirement to govern locally by capturing a population within biopolitical sovereignty that problematises the potential effectiveness of a regime of global biopower. Finally, and reflecting the idea behind conditional sovereignty, when the normative motivation behind conditional sovereignty has successfully reinstated endogenous biopolitical governmentality, then the state of exception that such locales represent will have been successfully extinguished. That is, if and when the UN successfully inculcates or rehabilitates a population so as to address biopolitical concerns, the exception which that locale represents will have been rearticulated within the sovereign fold.176 Therefore, the phenomenon which links biopower to international agencies is inevitable transitory, occurring in diverse locations and at different times without any necessary linkages between them. The international system in this sense is only biopolitically-minded haphazardly, and even then is not itself biopolitical, for the sovereignty it uses to achieve biopolitical goals is territorialized at a different scale. This idea will be built upon later, where it will be argued that biopolitical governmentality is but one component of a regime of international governmentality.

As noted above, a liberal world view infuses much of the IR literature, whereby a global liberal dispositif of power relations is uncritically presumed to

174 Ibid. 629
176 It is this aspect that perhaps most fully links global neoliberalism to biopolitics. In that it attempts to make states self-governing according to neoliberal and therefore biopolitical rationality.
dominate international relations, a self-prophesising world view that engenders globalized biopower. *Pace* Selby and Chandler, I disagree with this manoeuvre. Without an identifiable transformation of sovereignty, I argue that biopower can only remain territorially defined, and the tendency to ‘globalise’ biopower apparent in much of the literature is a development that should set off alarm bells when coming from a Foucauldian perspective. A number of phenomenon support the idea that a global liberal dispositif, necessary for global biopower to exist, is not operating. One could point to the continuing relevance of sovereign states in determining their own affairs, their capacity and intention to resist neoliberal policies encouraged by international institutions, or Raustiala’s argument that sovereignty is actually reasserted by international institutions. One could also point to persistent coordination problems between liberal states, especially concerning the implementation of *laissez-faire* policies. Finally, and most fundamentally, the lack of a correlate civil society strongly suggests a distinct lack of global biopolitical liberalism.

**Foucault and IR.**

Selby’s argument reflects a predominant criticism of ‘Foucauldian IR,’ that is, its supposed propensity to reinscribe contemporary discursive framings of power, liberal or realist. The problem is not, however, with Foucault but with the discipline itself. These accounts of Foucault in IR reflect a discipline struggling to adapt to change, a “conflation between the fluidity of the international and the frozen waters of IR that have been produced by disciplinary fiat.” Criticisms of Foucauldian IR represent an inability to overcome the universal categorization of the ‘international’ that discursively and ontologically frames IR. Following Calkivik, the strength of Foucault's work lies precisely in its ability to unsettle established accounts of the international. She asks, rather than subjecting Foucault to “the court of disciplinary reason that operates by sacrilizing [sic] its object – ‘the international’ – could one not work with Foucault

177 David Chandler, "Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault..." *International Political Sociology* 4, no. 2 (2010).
toward unravelling this ‘it’ and attending to [its] historical and political production?" Calkivik’s argument goes right to the heart of the Foucauldian method:

“I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists in saying: Let’s suppose that universals do not exist. And then I put the question to history and historians: How can you write history if you do not accept a priori the existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and subjects?”

This decision elides top-down analyses of power and encourages an approach from the opposite direction, a micro-physics, “or in other words looking in historical terms, and from below, at how control mechanisms could come into play.” Not only does this avoid interpretations of power that reinforce contemporary dominations, it also avoids issues with the ontological framing of IR by identifying the state as a transactional reality. Therefore, the primacy Foucault afforded a micro-physical approach is not, pace Selby, an ontological primacy. Instead it is precisely the micro-physical approach that obviates any ontological difficulties involved with overcoming the domestic/international dichotomy. Indeed, Foucault’s “special kind of history” itself replaces ontology.

Foucault’s elucidation of biopower was implicitly a response to criticisms that such “micro-physical architectures, techniques and procedures” are insufficient to interrogate the extent of power-relations. It was a criticism of his obviation of the state as an actor, which as I will show, we must not forget if we are to translate Foucault into IR. Extending Foucault into the realm of IR

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181 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 3.
182 ———, Society Must Be Defended, 32.
185 I propose that this criticism can be interpreted in a second and complementary way: Prior to the elucidation of biopower, Foucault's work was insufficient to interrogate all manner of subjectivation; in response, biopower identifies how 'the mainstream' of society is subjectivized, rather than just those existing on the margins of society.
therefore becomes not only possible but necessary if insights generated by Foucault within liberal capitalist societies are to be placed in a contemporary (not necessarily liberal-biopolitical) international context. Unless one wishes to claim that local realities are isolated from global processes, some instances of the micro-physical architecture of power relations will only be explained by the internationalization of Foucault. Hindess supports this position when he says that “if government in the general sense that Foucault identifies is a matter of aiming to structure the possible field of action of others, and sometimes oneself, there is no reason why the concept should not be extended beyond the limits of the state to the study of international affairs.”

There can be no argument today that power relations transcend state boundaries, and it is precisely Foucault’s micro-physical approach that allows us to trace these power relations.

This is essentially to argue that there are no ontological constraints to Foucauldian IR – it is a fundamentally transgressive philosophy, and “[i]n contrast to theories which assume given limits to their object and to explanation and judgment, Foucauldian theories emphasise the fluidity and fragility of limits.”

The deployment of Foucault in IR is therefore to be directed towards the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and international politics, and thus the continued displacement of the state as the primary site of analysis:

“[T]he Foucauldian international relations scholar will pay more attention to the sub-state and trans-state strategic relations of power through which the state is enabled to effect its appearance as a unitary actor in the international context.”

However, this investigation will not necessarily identify global biopower. It should be remembered at the outset that biopower is nothing if not a spatially and temporally specific version of governmentality. This is why Foucault’s methodological concerns should reside at the forefront of our thoughts as we proceed with an IR programme that attempts to extend Foucauldian insights.

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187 Hutchings, “Foucault and International Relations Theory,” 125.
188 Ibid., 114.
Considering the problematic of state/sovereignty is one of the major stumbling blocks of an IR theory that hopes to account for contemporary changes in international politics, Foucault’s methodological legacy is eminently suitable for IR theory. However, it should be remembered that the displacement of sovereignty does not make sovereignty a redundant category, only that it is no longer the primary prism of understanding politics. It continues to play a central, albeit deconstructed role, and the difficulties associated with ‘internationalizing’ Foucault can be directly attributed to the continuing relevance of sovereignty.
CHAPTER THREE: FOUCALUT AND SOVEREIGNTY.

The difficulty in overcoming problems in IR that are connected to the concept of sovereignty, combined with the fact that the elision or misrepresentation of sovereignty in influential accounts of ‘global biopower’ is the main causal factor leading to claims that global liberal governance biopolitically orders life, allows this investigation of biopower in IR not only to respond to a substantive debate, but also to contribute to the project of developing a productive and coherent Foucauldian approach to IR, based on an ascending analysis of power relations. Before moving on to the final chapter then, I will present a conceptualization of sovereignty from a Foucauldian perspective that will provide the foundation for my argument.

Foucault was not an international relations theorist, and his concept of sovereignty reflects his preoccupation with the internal dimensions of government. To get at this internality the predominant theorisation of sovereignty had to be displaced, which for Foucault is tied up with the juridical thought that emerged around, and then displaced, the absolute monarchical power of the middle ages. Therefore, “Foucault’s main target is the Hobbesian juridical model of sovereignty, a system of power with a single center.” 189 This juridical thought, due to its relationship with royal power, established a theory of right the essential role of which has been to establish the legitimacy of power, organized around the problem of sovereignty.

“To say that the problem of sovereignty is the central problem of right in Western societies means that the essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other… it is, in other words, ultimately an elimination of domination and its consequences.” 190

189 Andrew W. Neal, “Cutting Off the King's Head: Foucault's Society Must Be Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 4 (2004). 375
190 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. 26
Sovereignty, as described in *Society Must Be Defended*, is the outcome of a history of conflicts and represents ‘politics as war by other means,’ whereby “the binary schema of war and struggle, of the clash between forces, can really be identified as the basis of civil society, as both the principle and motor of the exercise of political power.” Foucault’s displacement of sovereignty, therefore, is justified by the belief that “sovereignty works at the level of the symbolic, while government claims to act on the real,” and that this symbolic device is a technology of government, or a performative practice. Foucault’s project, then, was to avoid the centripetal effect of sovereignty produced by its discursive and symbolic power in order to identify actual operations of government. It tries to account for the way power operates devoid of justifying claims, to account for the way modern power, when viewed as being significantly invested in state apparatuses, is really a domineering force that produces certain subjectivities. As Neal points out, the real challenge in ‘cutting off the kings head’ “is to force open the massive overdetermination of the problem of sovereignty.” To achieve this displacement of sovereignty as the locus of modern power, Foucault places it in a tripartite relation with disciplinary power and governmentality. In this way, sovereignty becomes but one regime of governmentality, that is, one way of reflecting on the practice of government, within the state, which is “nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.”

Foucault’s displacement of sovereignty is made possible by his methodological commitment to nominalism, what he called ‘eventalisation’. ‘Eventalisation’ is a procedure to breach the self-evidence of things, to make “visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all”, and then in the breach to rediscover “the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a

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191 Ibid. 18
194 Neal, "Cutting Off the King’s Head: Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty." 392
195 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*. 77
given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary. “

That is to say, eventalization unearths all of those other things that have contributed to making something that is taken for granted in a general form. In the case of sovereignty, “government by state agencies must be conceived of as a contingent political process and a singular historical event in need of explanation rather than a given fact.”

Jessop (2007) tells us that “Foucault stressed three themes in his ‘nominalist’ analytics of power: it is immanent in all social relations, articulated with discourses as well as institutions, and necessarily polyvalent because its impact and significance vary with how social relations, discourses and institutions are integrated into different strategies.” Such a process helped Foucault to account for the governmentalisation of the state, whereby the state, instead of sovereignty, became the locus and scope of the ‘conduct of conduct.’ The contingency and singularity of state formation that problematises any supposed universality leads to a number of “how” questions summed up by Lemke (2007): “How does the state come to act, if at all, as a coherent political force? How is the imaginary unity of the state produced in practical terms? How does a plurality of institutions and processes become ‘the state’? How to account for the apparent autonomy of the state as a separate entity that somehow stands outside and above society?”

In this way the state is thought of by Foucault as a transactional reality: “a dynamic ensemble of relations and synthseses that at the same time produces the institutional structure of the state and knowledge of the state.”

To get at these governmental questions, Foucault proposes an analytics of government which “goes well beyond the limits of both positivist accounts of the state and theories that dispense with the state altogether. It proposes an approach to the state that does not take for granted the idea of some originating subject that

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197 Lemke, "An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory." 46
199 Lemke, "An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory." 46-47
200 Ibid. 48
pre-exists and determines political processes and is referred to as the state; nor
do it simply denounce the statist account as an ideology or myth that doesn’t
correspond to the complexity of political and social reality.”201 Instead, an
analytics of government elevates the role of ‘political knowledge’ for state
analysis. Historically, modern states emerged intimately connected to the
establishment of the human sciences and subsequent knowledge about the
population and its individuals; “[s]tate actors and agencies used statistical
accounts, medical expertise, scientific reports, architectural plans, bureaucratic
rules and guidelines, surveys, graphs, and so on to represent events and entities as
information and data for political action”; technologies which ultimately
constituted the state.202 An analytics of government which elevates the role of
‘political knowledge,’ and devalues sovereignty, displaces metaphysical
knowledge of the state.

Foucault’s ambiguous treatment of sovereignty, necessary on his part so
as not to reaffirm its traditional centrality to political discourse, has led to diverse
readings. For some, “[a]lthough Foucault constantly challenges sovereignty as
the essential modern paradigm, it still provides the ultimate framework for his
analyses,”203 while for others, the displacement of sovereignty as prime analytical
category has invariably led to its demotion as a viable analytical category at all.
In this vein, Singer & Weir argue that:

“Foucault’s treatment of sovereignty resulted in its reduction to a
residual category, subject to historical change over the last four
centuries only through its attachment to the truth-telling of
governance. The treatment of sovereignty as residual continues
among historians of the present who, despite occasional minor
qualifications, suppose sovereignty as displaced by governance. Thus
sovereignty would appear to be of little importance; governance is
where the action lies. Sovereignty has become a hollow category in
Foucauldian work, lacking analytic specificity.”204

201 Ibid. 53
202 Ibid. 48
Approach to International Relations,” Global Society 23, no. 4 (2009). 508
204 Singer and Weir, "Politics and Sovereign Power: Considerations on
Foucault." 444

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These seem to be contradictory readings, but I argue both are valid. In Foucauldian work, sovereignty does remain the ultimate paradigm, and sovereignty has become a hollow category. This apparent contradiction can only be accounted for by situating Foucault’s treatment of sovereignty in an IR context. In this vein, Lui-Bright (1997) argues that;

“Foucault’s discussion of the state pays insufficient attention to the ‘international’ conditions of sovereignty. That is, the structural transformations that allowed the emergence of the early modern states, which by effect, enabled the features and programs of government Foucault talked about to be possible… Absent from his account of modern government is how the creation of a plurality of at least nominally independent states are preconditions for and indeed, part of the art of government.”

This thesis was produced at a time when the English-speaking world was still without translations of Foucault’s entire lecture series, and we now know that Foucault did situate his investigations in a broader historical context that accounts for the international features of modernity. However, Lui-Bright’s work remains helpful. Most importantly, he points to how (external) sovereignty “is central to the viability of an art of government” of the international state system. “Rather than a hindrance to the development of an art of government, the idea of sovereignty in interstate relations helps to secure the conditions that make the art of government that Foucault speaks of possible.”

Superficially, Foucault’s work is tied up in the inside/outside game of political philosophy/international relations theory. His work only ever dealt with power relations within states. More accurately, he was concerned with the internal dimension of government. However, he never explicitly considered relations between states, except when documenting historical transformations, and in no way did he consider biopolitical relations between states. In a world

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206 See especially Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 255-333
207 Lui-Bright, "International/National: Sovereignty, Governmentality and International Relations." 586
208 Ibid. 587
problematic by phenomena under the umbrella of globalization, his work on liberalism, biopower and the internal dimension of government has thus been rendered incomplete. If we accept that the scope of sovereignty did frame Foucault’s efforts, albeit only because of his documentation of a history of techniques, his methodological decision to focus on the subject of power causes ‘domestic’ politics to be logically predominant in his work. Not only is the individual logically more enmeshed in ‘domestic’ power relations than ‘international’ power relations, due to the fact of locality there are more domestic power relations than international power relations. What I mean by this is that locally there are two types of power relation acting on a subject, ones that eventuate and are situated locally, and also ones that do not eventuate locally yet do still come to act on an individual. The subjectification of individuals, which ultimately occurs locally even though it may be traced to terminal forms of power at a broader scale, relies on a number of technologies, some of which are discursive, but even more important, due to the concealing tricks discourses are made to play, are material technologies. Thus the effective ‘scope’ of sovereignty, identified by an analytics of government, is determined for Foucault by material practices only, that is, a history of practices, as his ultimate frame of reference. Here then we have the seeming contradiction in Foucault’s work, or more accurately, the problem with which Foucault was implicitly trying to get round: how to explain the real operation of government without mentioning sovereignty, which as a discourse is used to conceal those effects.

Foucault’s methodological precautions stem from this understanding of sovereignty as a mode of rule that conceals techniques of power that are ultimately domineering, and only by bypassing sovereignty can the effects of domination and subjugation be revealed. A number of methodological precautions he lays out to successfully investigate phenomena of subjugation and domination generally revolve around the idea of an ascending analysis of power, an analytic endeavour that seeks to more accurately reveal the operation of power in society. This is achieved empirically by “analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies” rather than from the point of view of

209 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*. 27-34
power’s own internal rationality. \(^{210}\) Therefore, rather than analyzing governmental power-relations in accordance with its own, sovereign, rationality, which might reproduce something like social contract theory, thus inscribing the supposed equality of individuals, an ascending analysis unearths ulterior rationalities, hence the displacement of sovereignty. It is with recourse to such practice that biopower, and even disciplinary power (albeit with less explicit reference to methodology), were genealogically unearthed. While much Foucauldian scholarship has in this vein gone some distance to disavow the concept of sovereignty, it also remained, at least for Foucault himself, the ‘ultimate framework.’ How is this so?

We can begin to answer this question with reference to Bartelson’s (1995) genealogy of sovereignty, whereby he deconstructs sovereignty along three axes, source, locus, and scope: “While the first question concerns the philosophical legitimacy of the state, the second concerns its status as an acting subject, while the third concerns the objective conditions of its unity.”\(^{211}\) Interpreting Foucault from this perspective, the ‘source’ of sovereignty, its philosophical legitimacy, has already been revealed as a technique for concealing power relations that he wished to uncover, and is effectively ignored to overcome its symbolic power. In doing so, the question of the ‘locus’ of sovereignty, i.e. “[w]here, and with whom, does sovereignty reside in the state?”\(^{212}\) is no longer conceived of in terms of sovereignty, but instead is conceived in other terms, as (biopolitical) governmentality, informed by a diverse range of political knowledges, the analysis of which is prioritized by an analytics of government. Sovereignty, of course, continues to function, but no longer as a central, symbolic, and unifying rationality. Instead, sovereignty has been co-opted; governmentality includes both the legitimising discourses of sovereignty, and, most importantly for my argument, the operative logic of civil society as well as the ability to both constitute a population and enforce regulations when necessary. This reflects the intentional but non-subjective nature of power relations, whereby according to

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\(^{212}\) Ibid.
Foucault, “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims or objectives” 213 and this remains true of sovereign power. However, the governmentalisation of the state means that sovereign power is now deployed according to objectives determined by a rationality not its own, a biopolitical strategy. Sovereignty has been colonized by biopower. The non-subjective nature of strategies – which are unintentional, yet institutionally and socially regularized effects caused by intentional tactics – results in the real social function of an institution being obscured by unintended consequences of action; history marred by contingency. This reflects the ‘hollowness’ of (Foucauldian) sovereignty that Singer & Weir point out, and is the result of an unintentionally produced institutional transformation. However, the ‘scope’ of sovereignty remains. The scope of sovereignty represents the actual practices of government that capture, objectify, and regulate a specific population. They are the objective conditions of its unity and represent the territorialization of the state, which “is a matter of marking out a territory in thought and inscribing it in the real, topographizing it, investing it with powers, bounding it by exclusions, defining who or what can rightfully enter.”214 A pertinent example of this can be seen in Barry’s (1996) explanation of technologies of communication. Barry notes that liberal thought, in reconciling the opaque character of society with its desire to govern, generated a dual relationship between communication technology and its governmentality. On the one hand, communication networks are essential in facilitating the “self-governing capacities of society itself.”215 On the other hand, and more importantly for the present discussion, “communications networks came to provide a necessary link between the deliberations of public authorities and the dispersed space of the national territory.”216 The facilitation of adequate communication capacity within the state was integral to establishing the feedback loop required for liberal government to work. “Thus communication networks created what Deleuze and Guattari have called a striated space: a space within

213 Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One*. 95
216 Ibid. 127-128
which movements and flows are regulated in ways which enable authorities to act.”

This is an example of how sovereign power, therefore, is essential in that it empowers the biopolitical state to frame its ‘field of vision.’ It is practices like this that frame the milieu as a site of intervention.

Bartelson’s articulation of the scope of sovereignty is, I argue, what remains of sovereignty for Foucault. Sovereignty is merely viewed according to its concrete ability to structure a territorial space, which it now does so according to biopolitical rationality. From an IR perspective, however, this is not the end of the story for sovereignty. At the international level, sovereignty cannot be displaced in the same manner as Foucault displaced it in his analyses because it is situated on a different onto-epistemological register. Instead of conditioning the social space in a superstructural relation, the global/international social space is mutually conditioned by multiple sovereignties. Whereas the operation of power within a sovereign space could be effectively explained according to biopolitical governmentality without almost any reference to sovereignty, or with only its disavowal, the same cannot be said for the operation of power across sovereign spaces, whereby biopolitical sovereignty gets tied up with another art of government. For Foucault’s domestic analyses, the state was displaced precisely as a unit of analysis, but in IR those units remain constitutive of the field. As Bartelson says, when dealing with “political phenomena that are conditioned by the presence of states, it will be necessary to presuppose some answer to the question of sovereignty in its attempt to classify and investigate those phenomena.”

When we investigate the idea of sovereignty vis-à-vis biopower in the international realm, we must not only deal with its internal dimension, which Foucault displaced, but we must also account for its external dimension. As Singer & Weir point out, government with reference to sovereignty must be conceptualized as a power with an exterior. Lui-Bright echoes this thought:

\[\text{217 Ibid. 128}\]
\[\text{218 Bartelson, } A \text{ Genealogy of Sovereignty. 1-2. Italics in original.}\]
\[\text{219 Singer and Weir, } "\text{Sovereignty, Governance and the Political: The Problematic of Foucault.}" 50\]
“Even though the principle of sovereignty was in place, securing sovereignty became a task of government. The regulatory mechanisms of interstate relations had to be invented. In their mutual relationship, the principle of sovereignty organises states’ internal and external relations. Therefore the new political order marked a gradual intensification of internal and external regulation.”

Lemke also recognises this aspect of sovereignty, whereby;

“the state is not only an effect but also an instrument and a site of strategic action. It serves as an instrument of strategies insofar as it establishes a frontier regime that is defined by the distinction between inside and outside, state and non-state. This borderline does not simply separate two external and independent realms, but operates as an internal division providing resources of power.”

Launching off from this point, the main contention of my argument, which will begin to be outlined here, is that sovereignty should be conceptualized according to a process of deconstruction which identifies its functional component, that is, its scope. This is another way of thinking about how biopower was first elucidated with reference to sovereignty, and helps to appreciate the idea that biopower remains intimately connected to a space delimited or territorialized by sovereignty. Although, as has been pointed out, an investigation of governmentality can and should proceed beyond statist assumptions, the conclusion of my argument is that biopower continues to be fundamentally connected to the specific operations of states, that is, to a history of practices based around the state form. Simply put, governmentality exists beyond the state/sovereignty, but not biopolitical governmentality. As opposed to an analysis of governmental power that is internal to sovereign power and thus disavows sovereignty, an analysis of global, or international governmentality needs to

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220 Lui-Bright, "International/National: Sovereignty, Governmentality and International Relations." 593 This ordering of affairs at the international level was only briefly commented upon by Foucault as the rationalisation of force in Europe, a process which engendered an assemblage constituted by both a military-diplomatic apparatus and a police apparatus, hinged together in a project of force cultivation and management – an assemblage which persists, albeit with a biopolitical rather than police apparatus domestically. See Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 296-306

221 Lemke, "An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory." 52
recognise the way sovereignty has a significant material role which cannot be
dissociated from its internal dimension or its history of practices, much in the
same way that Cox (1992) defines the state as a ‘transmission belt’ from the
global economy to the local.222 A couple of examples will help explain this
distinction.

Border practices are perhaps the most obvious, and can be divided into at
least three categories: human (the global visa regime); biological (the global
biosecurity regime); and economic (the global trade regime). What these three
regimes have in common is a performative function, a functionality that goes
beyond a view of the border as a simple line indicating the limits of sovereign
jurisdiction.223 ‘Border performativity’ (Wonders 2006) “takes as its theoretical
starting point the idea that borders are not only geographically constituted, but are
socially constructed via the performance of various state actors.”224 The central
insight of border performativity is that although the performance of state actors
does include law-making bureaucrats, “state policies have little meaning until
they are ‘performed’ by state agents or by border crossers”.225 Wonders
deploys this concept in the realm of migration and tourism practices, and the
movement of people more generally, however, it can equally be applied to other
border practices, such as those concerning biosecurity and trade.

What ‘embodied’ border performances represent is the actual practice of
policing a sovereign space, a territorialisation which frames a population
according to biopolitical rationality. Border performativity works to facilitate

223 It might be helpful to note that such a division is merely heuristic on my
part, as functionally they are bound to overlap.
224 Nancy Wonders, "Global Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels
of Inequality," in Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control, ed. Nancy
Wonders, Sharon Pickering, and Leanne Weber (Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 2006), 64
225 Ibid. 66
226 This statement is made in the context of migration and, more broadly, the
movement of people across borders. In addition to airport terminals, Wonders
also locates ‘border performances’ in “the offices of social workers who refuse
assistance to non-citizens, or in workplaces raided by border agents in pursuit
of illegal border crossers.” The activity of ‘border crossers’ represents the role
of non-state agents in border performativity. Activity from the ‘outside’ is an
essential component of border performativity, as it occurs at the point where
outside and inside meet. Ibid. 66
positive circulation, by preventing aspects of circulation that are counterproductive to the project of turning being into well-being. This means biosecurity of the state is not only about screening, for example, incoming people for virulent strains of contagious disease which could directly affect the health of the population, but it is also about policing biological life that may damage local biological industries, exogenous fruit flies, for example, that could devastate a local fruit industry. Border practices are thus related through the notion of ‘threat’ – “the risk of future harm that security measures seek to mitigate,” and border performativity constitutes threats as objects of thought and practice. The threat that an exogenous species of fruit fly poses to the economic well-being of a country links biosecurity operations to border performativity organized around risks associated with trading, just as the threat of someone entering a country with a virulent disease links biosecurity operations to border performativity based on the visa regime (for example, people who have visited certain ‘high risk’ places before entering a country are conducted to declare themselves). Such interconnections are constitutive of an apparatus of security rationalized by an ontological distinction between inside and outside, due to the fact that sovereignty is a power with an outside.

By arguing that sovereignty is a government with an exterior, one can also argue that sovereignty is internal to a governmentality that transcends its scope. This is because, from a Foucauldian perspective, there is no outside of power. However, this is not necessarily to argue that it is biopolitical governmentality that transcends its scope. All power relations are framed by an apparatus, which for biopower essentially includes a sovereign component. Barry Hindess helps explain the difficulty of transferring the concept of biopower into an IR context: “[I]f government, in its most general sense, aims to structure the possible field of action of others, then the modern system of states should itself be seen as a regime of government … Thus where the classical view treats the state as the ‘highest of all’ forms of community, the modern system of states reflects the emergence of a more complex form of political reason.”

227 Stephen J. Collier, Andrew Lakoff, and Paul Rabinow, "Biosecurity: Towards an Anthropology of the Contemporary," Anthropology Today 20, no. 5 (2004), 4
228 Barry Hindess, "Politics as Government: Michel Foucault's Analysis of Political Reason," Alternatives 30, no. 4 (2005), 407
form of political reason, for Hindess, indicates that “the modern art of
government” is *not only concerned with the government of populations*;

“but also the larger population encompassed by the system of states itself. It addresses this task first by promoting the rule of territorial states over populations, and secondly by seeking to regulate the conduct both of states themselves and of members of populations under their control. States are expected to pursue their own interests, but to do so in a field of action that has been structured by the overarching system of states to which they belong.”²²⁹

The fact that the international system is not only concerned with the government of populations necessarily means it does not operate, at least primarily, according to biopolitical rationality. Hindess’s analysis helps point out that, from an IR perspective, there are competing governmentalities, not just between biopolitical regimes within an overarching system, but also between this expression of biopolitical governmentality and a nation-state/international system governmentality. Perhaps an analogy can be drawn between Hindess’s insight into states possessing territorial integrity in a structured field of international governmental activity and Foucault’s insight’s about disciplinary institutions being spatially delimited while at the same time being structured by an overarching biopolitical framework. The heuristic purpose of such an exercise is to argue that although there are linkages on the one hand between disciplinary institutions and biopolitical governmentality, and on the other between biopolitical states and international governmentality, due to their existence at fundamentally different scales the rationality behind one does not lend itself to wholesale translation at the other.

This chapter has argued that what is important about sovereignty from a biopolitical perspective has not fundamentally changed. The aim of the next and final chapter is to make the argument, *contra* many of the theorizations of biopower in IR highlighted in chapter two, that biopolitical governmentality does not transcend sovereignty. It does so by investigating the internationalisation of biopower notwithstanding its essentially sovereign character. Due to the fact that what is relevant about sovereignty has not changed, the next chapter will

²²⁹ Ibid.
argue that neither has what is relevant about biopower. Instead it will be argued that what has happened is that biopower has extended its process of biopolitical normalization to include transnational apparatuses without fundamentally changing its operation. By identifying this dynamic we will be able to account for one of the ways through which the demarcation between the national and the international is becoming blurred. This chapter has pointed out that the enforcement of biopolitical regulations still remains a sovereign capacity which remains linked to the state. This is due to the fact that sovereignty is a set of performances, based on the constitution of political knowledge, which represents a history of practices. Furthermore, and due to the claim that that sovereignty hasn’t changed, the chapter argued that, so as to be able to account for an international biopolitical dimension, sovereignty should be considered as a power with an exterior. This allows us to consider biopolitical relations between states and thus to extend biopolitical insights and work towards completing our understanding of processes of biopolitical normalization. On this reading sovereignty is seen as an apparatus which conditions the international space through its multiple iterations, in that it biopolitically bounds a parcel of territory for which it effectively has responsibility. In addition, this function of multiple sovereignties indicates that there is an international governmentality, but the continuing relevance of territorially bounded sovereignty means that it effectively operates at a different scale than that of the state, and thus cannot be biopolitical. The next and final chapter begins with this idea of international governmentality, and moves towards a new idea for conceptualizing biopower in world politics.
CHAPTER FOUR: BIOPOWER IN WORLD POLITICS.

This chapter elaborates on an idea that has so far only been mentioned in passing, that of biopolitical normalization. I argue that this is what should be considered as specific to biopolitical governmentality, and thus identifying how it involves international governmentality and apparatuses is the most appropriate way for theorizing biopower in IR. Through this argument I hope to outline a new research programme for the investigation of biopower in IR; a programme that would illuminate an important aspect of the liberalization of international society. The chapter thus presents the central features of my argument. It begins with a brief discussion of international governmentality, in which I argue that if biopolitics is becoming international it must be part of an international governmentality. The governmentality to which I refer is informed by Dean’s nomos of world order. The place of discipline within international governmentality is then situated. It is noted that disciplinary power in international relations is necessarily indirect. Drawing on the argument so far, a distinction is then made between disciplinary indirect rule and biopolitical indirect rule. Due to the scale of international governmentality, indirect rule is identified as a general technique of international governmentality. Using this distinction, disciplinary indirect rule is associated with IOs such as the IMF and IBRD, while biopolitical indirect rule is identified as a rationality which is found in organizations such as the OECD, and the European Commission (EC). Having made this second distinction, biopolitical indirect rule is identified as biopolitical normalization, the idea of which is further elaborated with reference to the role of expertise and processes of socialization. This discussion is linked to an existing governmentality, unearthed within a normative governmental analysis carried out by the European Commission. It is argued that although biopolitical normalization is a process coextensive with society, and inevitably escapes formal or explicit governmental interventions, the EC paper identifies a governmentality that is attempting to formalize as much as possible the process of normalization. This identification of the desire to formalize biopolitical normalization by a governmental rationality is then used to inform a discussion of OECD practices, and more generally practices illuminated by Slaughter’s notion of ‘disaggregated sovereignty.’ In conclusion, it is argued that biopower enters
international relations through a governmentality with at least two aspects. On the one hand, it can be seen operating within transnational and supranational processes as they aim to be legitimate and effective, without recourse to sovereign mechanisms, while on the other hand, it is a rationality trying to help facilitate the contemporary liberal project of moving societies from being ‘passive’ to being ‘active.’

**International Governmentality.**

To think about international governmentality we need to return to the discussion of the way governmentality has been articulated. As has already been noted, international governmentality is not biopolitical, namely because it does not possess a requisite population. While international governmentality will necessarily embody some specificity, what this might be is yet to be determined. Therefore, we must return to the drawing board, so to say, to move forward. This means returning to the general definition of governmentality as a general ‘art of government,’ and building up an analysis from there. Following Larner & Walters;

“[t]his is an approach that explores how governing always involves particular representations, knowledges, and expertise regarding that which is to be governed. This second understanding draws attention to the complex relationship between thought and government. Whether it is the government of an enterprise, a state, or one's own health, the practice of government involves the production of particular "truths" about these entities. Seeking out the history of these truths affords us critical insights concerning the constitution of our societies and ourselves.”

I see no reason to foreclose an argument claiming that an international governmentality does exist due to the non-liberal condition of many parts of the world, or more generally, its ‘unevenness.’ Additionally, in no way does

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230 It does operate with reference to political economy. The final requisite, mechanisms of security as its primary means of government is ambiguous.

231 Larner and Walters, "Globalization as Governmentality." 496

232 For a contentious argument in this vein, see Joseph (2010). I argue that his inability to properly define the myriad actual and potential uses of governmentality severely undermines his argument. Moreover, his acceptance that governmentality is suitable for domestic-liberal societies but not
international governmentality necessarily correspond to global governmentality, with its problematic connotations. It simply, to begin with, refers to an art of government that transcends the internal governmentality of nation-states. Due to my concern with the potentiality of international biopower, the international art of government I hope to uncover specifically refers to one which transcends yet remains connected to biopolitical states.

Dean (2004) tells us that governmentality analyses should be situated within a liberal nomos of world order; that “[t]he narrative about the formation of modern forms of governmentality should … be re-situated in a narrative about the formation of the European state system.” This refers to the capacity of the system to define both the norms of state sovereignty, and to define the ‘state of exception’ as that place beyond sovereignty but still subject to its logic. This duality reflects the fact that governing is not reducible to sovereignty, that is, an internal logic, but is instead “about the subtle manipulation of the laws of production, consumption and distribution.” Thus the liberal nomos, according to Dean, embodies Foucault’s critique of the role of sovereignty, in that it “suppresses the question of appropriation within domestic government.” Therefore, through the displacement of sovereignty, and concomitant with the posing of the question of the liberal nomos, an art of government can be identified that transcends nation-states and liberal governmentality as we know it. More importantly for my purposes, it is by investigating this, admittedly nascent, art of government, that I can then show how biopower is folded into international relations.

international society because of the many instances where a governmentality approach cannot account for certain phenomenon, for example the inability of IOs to successfully inculcate liberal rationalities, elides the fact that similar shortcomings also exist in domestic-liberal, biopolitical societies. Jonathan Joseph, "The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International," European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010).


234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.

Dean goes on to say that “[i]f a ‘global governmentality’ is today propounded by multiple agencies (for example WTO, IMF, OECD), it operates through both the existing arts of government within nation-states and as an attempted extension and generalization of them across the planet.”

To situate biopower in IR, I need to explain how this happens. The discussion proceeds in the following way. First we must expand on Foucault’s brief discussion about the tendency of discipline to escape the institution. It will be shown that, outside its institutional setting discipline becomes a form of indirect rule. Drawing on research in the literature on IOs, I will show how disciplinary techniques are already being deployed by ‘liberal’ IOs. Disciplinary indirect rule is then differentiated from biopolitical indirect rule. Using the distinction between these two types of indirect rule, IOs operating within the liberal nomos will be differentiated. Whereas the operation of the IMF and IBRD are shown, at least predominantly, to subscribe to disciplinary mechanisms, OECD and EC governmentality, it will be argued, is more aligned with biopolitical techniques. From here it is argued that international governmentality founded on the liberal nomos produces a sort of division of labor. It is argued that, as well as disciplinary techniques having escaped the institution without inscribing a disciplinary regime at a scale incommensurable with such activity, biopolitical techniques have escaped the sovereign space without inscribing a biopolitical regime beyond its permitted logic. This idea is supported by an analogy with Foucault’s explanation of the complementary nature of disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms within the tripartite governmental regime of domestic liberal societies.

**Discipline and International Governmentality.**

While disciplinary effects remain most effective within an institutional setting, this is not to say they do not escape the institution. Indeed, Foucault told us that “discipline in fact always tends to escape the institutional or local framework in which they are trapped. What is more, they easily take on a statist dimension in apparatuses such as the police, for example, which is both a disciplinary apparatus and a state apparatus (which just goes to prove that

237 Dean, ”Nomos and the Politics of World Order.” 53
Disciplinary techniques had long been in existence before they were generalized throughout society, for example, in monasteries. Discipline constitutes methods that divide and control time, space and movement, and operates through three distinct mechanisms; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and examination. Although the ability to control objects of government outside of the institution is problematic for discipline, nonetheless disciplinary techniques are put to use. Importantly, within a regime of international governmentality, instead of individuals being subjected to disciplinary power, IOs subject states to discipline, and although distinct from disciplinary power to which individuals are subjected, a resemblance exists. The disciplining of states, like the disciplining of individuals, is part of a governmentality with an objective to elicit the self-government of subjects. Both are therefore a governmentality to constitute ethical subjects, by which I mean the governmentalization of both individuals and states attempts to inculcate a process of reflection upon their respective actions that conforms to normalization. However, while Foucault identified three techniques of discipline, only two techniques are effectively deployed by international governmentality; normalizing judgment, and the examination. Due to the continuing relevance of sovereignty and its effectiveness as institutional capacity to dictate what happens within a state, hierarchical observation of states by IOs is often fraught with practices of resistance. This resistance can take multiple forms and does not necessarily imply outright refusal to allow related observational practices. Falsifying statistics or economic indicators, for example, is just one technique. It should also be noted that the continuing capability of sovereignty is primarily

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238 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*. 250
239 This is to say, discipline became a mode of rule that came to organize a heterogeneous array of societal institutions, not that discipline was everywhere.
240 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. 170-194
241 It should be noted that the three types of disciplinary techniques overlap. For example, normalizing judgment necessarily also includes some hierarchical observation. When I speak of a particular technique, I am speaking of its primary rationality.
what distinguishes international disciplinarity from the disciplining of individuals, which, in turn, problematizes the effectiveness of all three techniques of discipline. Notwithstanding this caveat, normalization and examination techniques can be identified that are effectively utilized by IOs.

The establishment of non-juridical norms constitutes the most effective technique for the elicitation of self-government. International governmentality embodied in institutions such as the IMF and IBRD constitutes non-juridical norms in the form of governance indicators. Non-juridical norms are what Dean refers to as technologies of performance which constitute “the mobilisation of benchmarking rules” that are set as parameters against which (self-)assessment can take place and which require the conduct of a particular set of performances.242 The application of non-juridical norms engenders ownership of the results of an asymmetric power-relationship, because rather than benefits, that is, financial payments, being lost as part of a punishment, the negative outcome of an examination is seen as the result of the weak capacity of the examinee. “From the governmentality perspective international rating and ranking indices and reports produce the examined state as an ethical subject responsible for what occurs within its borders.”243 What ultimately makes these practices disciplinary is the way they are linked to rewards and punishments in the form of granting or withholding funds. Such incentivizing is also put into play through a further attempt to impose non-juridical norms, that is, norms associated with liberal civil society. (Neo)liberal civil society is posited as a constellation of norms, and IBRD practices in particular ‘carve out a space’ for civil society by channeling development funds through appropriate NGOs. NGOs thus come to fill this space, and their control of funds incorporates local actors into a liberal framework.244 In addition, one of the main demands made of government by civil society is a demand for transparency. Transparency is another technique that engenders rule

243 Oded Lowenheim, "Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International 'Governance Indicators',' Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008). 259
at a distance; it is a disciplining strategy that forces countries to adopt certain standards, referred to as ‘governance indicators.’

Like governance indicators, Reports mobilize particular forms of knowledge and are projected as objective truth. The Report, much like the application of governance indicators, is in truth an examination. It determines an ‘objective’ reality that presupposes a particular course of action. Due to the type of knowledge that constitutes IOs, issues, such as the establishment of sound macro-economic policies, can only be satisfactorily addressed if certain policy is prescribed. The outcome is policy ostensibly self-determined, however, the autonomy of the target country is severely eroded by a power relationship (discursively referred to as a partnership) predicated on ‘objective’ knowledge and financial resources. Abrahamsen sums up such ‘partnership’ with what Dean refers to as technologies of agency; techniques of self-esteem, empowerment, consultation and negotiation. According to Abrahamsen, such techniques “are part of an advanced liberal form of governmentality, in which ‘technologies of partnership’ reveal the will to rule ‘at a distance’; that is, partnerships involve a suite of practices which make it possible to structure, shape, and predict the operation of the freedom of the subject, without resorting to direct control or conditionality.”

Swyngedouw puts it more succinctly, for him; technologies of agency refer to “strategies of rendering the individual actor responsible for his or her own actions.”

‘Indirect rule’: Disciplinary and Biopolitical.

The above are just some examples of disciplinary rule in international relations. Disciplinary practices deployed by an international governmentality are


247 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 167-168


not, however, the only form indirect rule takes. Discipline in international governmentality is, I argue, complemented by indirect rule that resonates with biopower, both of which serve to normalize biopolitical sovereignty. By this I mean two things. First, that international governmentality is not only concerned with disciplining states that do not possess norms of institutional capacity, but is also concerned with conducting ‘mature,’ liberal states to exercise their freedom responsibly; while second, and concomitantly, that biopolitical techniques can also escape their institutional setting. To explain, a distinction needs to be made between biopolitical and disciplinary indirect rule. Basically, biopolitical indirect rule is liberal, while disciplinary indirect rule is not. Biopolitical indirect rule is liberal because of the way it resolves the conflict between otherwise competing individual subjectivities, economic and juridical; individuals’ (and states) governed in this way remain constitutionally distinct and formally independent. Within a disciplinary framework, on the other hand, individuals’ economic interests are not respected. Both mechanisms elicit self-government, but only biopolitical governmentality minimizes the need for direct political intervention. That the IMF and IBRD deploy disciplinary techniques to elicit ‘ethical,’ self-governing states, that is, a biopolitical state, can thus be seen from a twofold perspective. First, they subscribe to a model of normation whereby an optimal model is imposed from the outside. This model is, of course, that of a society based on the operation of liberal markets. Second, and related, this imposition necessarily means that no internal play of interests is respected in the process of norm formation. Finally, there is the requirement of direct political intervention to ensure self-government is elicited. This is achieved by the IMF and IBRD through the manipulative financial practices already mentioned.

All disciplinary techniques deployed by IOs are backed up by financial incentives. Direct political intervention, that is, discipline, in the attempt to elicit self-government, is achieved by the threat to withhold funds, which is a form of punishment. Biopolitical ‘rule at a distance,’ while sharing some techniques with disciplinary governmentality, does not operate in this way. Instead, biopolitical action at a distance attempts to frame the decisions of individuals and groups to engender “self-steering mechanisms” by “enrolling individuals as allies in the
pursuit of political, economic and social objectives.” These self-steering mechanisms are part of more general mechanisms of security, the combination of which allow for ‘private’ spaces to be ‘ruled’ without breaching their formal autonomy. Central to the attempt to elicit ‘self-steering’ mechanisms is the role of experts. As was implied above, knowledge production is also very important to the disciplinary techniques of the IMF and IBRD, however, without coercive mechanisms, it becomes the pivotal factor in eliciting biopolitical governmentality. It is precisely experts that have “made it possible for self-regulation to operate in a way that minimizes the need for direct political action.”

I argue that this distinction between types of indirect rule differentiates an organization like the OECD and the EU from other prominent IOs. Basically, this is because the primary governmentality of these organizations is non-coercive. The distinction can be linked to the earlier discussion between ‘normation’ and ‘normalization.’ Normation, which is a disciplinary technique, is the process by which an optimal model is constructed and then imposed upon subjects. The normal is that which can conform to this model, while the abnormal is that which is incapable of conforming. Normalization, on the other hand, is the result of an interplay between different distributions of normality, and acts to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable. The IMF and IBRD both operate according to the disciplinary model. Due to their commitment to neoclassical and monetarist economics, they infamously impose a similar set of policy prescriptions upon heterogeneous states. The goal of these policies is the inscription of liberal society, something which has been determined through techniques which serve to frame much of the input from the societies in question; all neoliberal governmentality is directed toward the creation of markets and, concomitantly, homo economicus. Even the post-Washington consensus, which ostensibly addressed the one-sided nature of neoliberal policies, ultimately continued the disciplinary character of the overall program.

251 Ibid. 15
252 See above, page 7
253 In an attempt to obviate any future responsibility for the effects of imposed neoliberal policy, the post-Washington Consensus embodied practices that
governmentality of the OECD or the EU, on the other hand, is not directed towards the creation of liberal rationalities, for membership in these organizations already indicates their existence. A secondary governmentality, directed towards non-member states, is concerned with the engendering of liberal subjectivities; however, even then its activities are not disciplinary. Instead, OECD and EU governmentality resonates with biopolitical governmentality due to their normalizing strategies. Shortly, I will explain why I think this is the case, but first I take this idea of biopolitical indirect rule and translate it into the concept of international biopolitical normalization.

**International Biopolitical Normalization.**

I begin by exploring some more this idea of normalization, minus the international context. While the general idea is comprehensible, little empirical work has been done on the subject. Indeed, the opacity and density of societal relations makes the project of identifying, in sufficient detail, processes of normalization within society extremely difficult. Dean (1997, 1994) is, again, instructive. Dean notes the sociological nature of such an enterprise, and the deficiencies of much sociological theory faced with this problem. First, I conflate my understanding of normalization with his discussion of socialization. I argue that, within liberal societies at least, they are essentially the same thing. They both focus on the way individuals are subjectified by “the more or less explicit attempts to problematise our lives, our forms of conduct, and ourselves found in a variety of pronouncements and texts, employed in a diversity of locale, using particular techniques, and addressed to different social sectors and groups.”

If a distinction is to be made, normalization is the plural of socialization, and refers to the interplay between different socialized individuals, which is in turn reflected in the variety of pronouncements etc. in which individuals find themselves. Normalization, then, is a particular understanding of how (liberal) socialization is part of a dynamic, or dispositif, that attempts to move the less favorable in line with the more favorable. Socialization is thus a process through which

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sought to make states take ownership of the policies followed. See Ruckert, "Towards an Inclusive-Neoliberal Regime of Development: From the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus."

individuals are subjectivized, which in a liberal society is also a process of biopolitical normalization. This occurs as an individuals are ‘socialized’ to the extent that they ‘fit’ into society, albeit a fit which occurs in an indefinite number of ways – according to the singularity of the dispositif of power relations that travel through their bodies.

The reason this is important is because of the way Dean talks about what is necessary for an investigation of socialization. He states:

“If we are to talk about processes of socialisation as a general way in which ‘society’ affects ‘individuals’, then we must give an account of how this ‘socialisation’ is itself constructed, the historical forms it takes, the rationalities it deploys, the techniques, mechanisms, practices and institutions by which and in which it is proposed that we work on, divide, make whole, sculpt, cultivate, pacify, contain and optimise not only our own lives, selves and conduct but the lives, selves and conduct of those over whom we claim some authority.”

Dean takes pains to highlight the complexity and immanence of processes that subjectify individuals, pointing out that the construction of individual identity, that is, its normalization, is the result of a multiplicity of agencies and authorities:

“This is clearly illustrated by the multiple and overlapping jurisdictions involving local, regional, national, international, and global authorities within which actors are located. It is evidenced by the widespread development of non-profit community and social services in advanced liberal democracies which are funded partially by the national state but run by citizen associations, and by the neoliberal use of corporations, charities, and families, to achieve governmental objectives (e.g., the provision of welfare and domestic care, the establishment of prisons, job-centres, etc.).”

To break down and analyze this complex field of social processes, Dean generates a three-way distinction between political subjectification, governmental self-formation, and ethical self-formation. He argues that what is needed is to

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255 Ibid.
account for the diversity of processes of self-formation, “in particular the autonomy and interrelationship of governmental and ethical practices in this regard, and the relation between these practices of self-formation, on the one hand, and political subjection, on the other.”\textsuperscript{257} and thus that “we should turn our attention to the very situations in which the regulation of personal conduct becomes linked to the regulation of political or civil conduct”\textsuperscript{258}

It is from this point that I would like to begin a discussion of how normalization is connected to transnational governmental practices, that is, what is specific to a process of international biopolitical normalization. Knowing full well that the three distinctions mentioned above overlap and presuppose one another, I restrict my investigation to governmental self-formation. This is not a methodological attempt to isolate variables, but is an acknowledgment of the fact that the international dimension of biopower is only reflected in governmental self-formation; political subjection remains primarily nationalized, in that the primary identity of individuals as citizens of a country is not explicitly challenged; and ethical self-formation is, of course, a primarily individualized, or self-reflective, relationship. While biopolitical normalization necessarily includes all three categories, internationally only one is present: I argue that biopower enters international relations through of practices of governmental self-formation, and with examples of transgovernmental and supragovernmental processes I will put forward an account of the way governmental self-formation transcends the state. This argument will support the conclusion that biopower is not international in the sense that it exists independent of sovereign biopolitical states. Notwithstanding this point, it will be shown that processes of biopolitical normalization are becoming connected to ‘supra’ sovereign apparatuses, and in doing so are blurring the line between the ‘national’ and the ‘international.’ International biopower is more accurately defined as an extension of biopolitical practices that are essentially nationalistic.

Dean tells us that “[g]overnmental self-formation refers to the ways in which various authorities and agencies seek to shape the conduct, aspirations, needs, desires, and capacities of specified categories of individuals, to enlist them

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid. 155
\textsuperscript{258} Dean, "A Political Ontology." 394
in particular strategies and to seek defined goals." These processes are tied to political subjectification at the level of the state; the extra-sovereign nature of these processes that I describe in no way seek to re-subjectify individuals in a political way. They do not seek to reconstitute individuals as "global citizens" or the like; they remain sovereign subjects or citizens within their respective liberal democratic states. Indeed, the nature of the processes reinforces already existing political subjectification by reinforcing already existing practices, which are "not necessarily located within the state but are constructed from practices operating from multiple and heterogeneous locales (citizen associations, charities, trade unions, families, schools, workplaces, etc.)," yet often serve to reinforce sovereignty. My analysis is necessarily one-sided; an analysis of political subjectification requires both an investigation of governmental and ethical self-formation, as well as a range of practices that exist on a continuum in between these two points; although these practices depend on governmental and ethical practices, they can also be analyzed as distinct. Governmental self-formation is critical to this paper, however, because of its intimate relation with the constitutive element of the 'doublebind' established by humanism/biopolitics.

This is because governmental self-formation is intimately connected to the role of experts; the biopolitical relationship between experts and governmental self-formation establishes a technical matrix that reinforces the spread of biopower:

"Biopower spread under the banner of making people healthy and protecting them. When there was resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of experts. A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established, the spread of biopower was assured, for there could be nothing else to appeal to: any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. We are promised normalization and

259 ———, ""A Social Structure of Many Souls": Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation." 156
260 Ibid. 156
happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies more of the same.\textsuperscript{261} Within a biopolitical regime, experts are situated between individuals and social authorities, acting as translation devices “shaping conduct not through compulsion but through the power of truth, the potency of rationality and the alluring promise of effectivity.”\textsuperscript{262} It is this strategy which allows for liberal-biopolitical rule, and it is a strategy deployed within trans-governmental processes. It is a strategy especially visible within EU processes. The following discusses an example of how EU governmentality is biopolitical. My reading of a European Commission strategy paper reflects the crucial role of expertise in making liberal-biopolitical rule operable within a context that problematizes supra-national government. The problematization of EU governmentality is a fruitful standpoint for identifying international biopower. The nature of the EU, especially the amount of effort expended by EU organizations investigating its governmental challenges, is extremely insightful. Indeed, due to the need of EU governmentality to ‘get around’ the continuing sovereign function, the governmentalization of the state is perhaps best appreciated from a governmental perspective, albeit not in those exact words, of certain actors within the EU.

\textbf{Governmental Self-Rule: The Formalization of Normalization.}

In 1997 the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission (EC) published an extremely insightful paper,\textsuperscript{263} which tells us a lot about the changing nature of government in advanced liberal states. What is most insightful about this paper is the way that it articulates a desire to institutionalize, or at least codify, the role of, governmentalization within more a formal governmental apparatus. This is framed in two ways; as a tension between functional organization and increasing societal complexity; and as a tension between functionality and democratic accountability. It stems from two conclusions; on the one hand, “the model of representative democracy and the bureaucratic state upon which

\textsuperscript{261} Dreyfus and Rabinow, \textit{Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics}. 196
\textsuperscript{262} Miller and Rose, "Governing Economic Life." 19
government action has traditionally been founded is increasingly inadequate to cope with both the scale of problems confronting it and with the emergence of new governance arrangements."\(^{264}\) On the other hand is a belief that "the process of the production and application of norms in society is changing."\(^{265}\) The biopolitical undertones are easily identifiable, especially when it uses the environment as the prime example of the difficulty of achieving coordination which can better accommodate complex interdependent problems, a description which echoes the concept of the milieu. The paper identifies how many policies have direct effects on the environment, thus requiring an approach that respects the complexity inherent in the problem. This leads to an understanding that "demonstrates the limits of traditional approaches to regulation where policies were seen to be founded on stable models upon which detailed regulatory programmes could be established and implemented. The constant production of new (and often contentious and contradictory) information about environmental issues, however, renders this approach to regulation obsolete. There is a need, then, to move from a rigid and top-down approach to regulation to a flexible and inclusive approach."\(^{266}\)

Central to this new approach to complexity is the desire to include and coordinate as many actors as possible in policy processes. As well as being what is seen as a necessarily new approach to solving problems, it is also to achieve the implementation of policies without recourse to sovereign mechanisms that do not exist, that is, a European Union (EU) constitution that can enforce policies. This is primarily achieved through the "implementation of ongoing monitoring and evaluation procedures."\(^{267}\) The paper proposes "a new mode of democratic regulation which rests on proceduralisation of the production and the application of norms, and more generally, of the co-ordination of collective action and the modes of structuration of collective actors. This mode of regulation does not substitute the foregoing substantive modes but rather represents an attempt to

\(^{264}\) Ibid. 17  
\(^{265}\) Ibid. 23  
\(^{266}\) Ibid. 10-11 Italics in original  
\(^{267}\) Ibid. 11
increase their potential by achieving a better linkage between systems of knowledge, bureaucratic, expert, social, etc.”

Due to a concern with the difficulty of imposing an “a priori formulation of public problems (let alone solutions)” the paper implicitly refers to an ideal process of normalization:

“Coupled with the consequent difficulty of organising collective action on the basis of standardized norms, this situation suggests the creation of opportunities for the formulation of problems which brings together all affected actors in settings where there is the possibility for collective or mutual learning – in other words, the contextualisation of the production and application of norms.”

The discussion becomes more explicit when it states that it “[i]nvolves affected actors in clarifying the presuppositions and hypotheses that they bring to a particular issue, the mutual critique of those positions, the consequent possibility of their evolution and thus of collective learning.” Furthermore, this process fully resonates with Foucault’s truth claims by being “not a one-off, unilinear process but rather one that involves the ongoing re-examination of the context and its reinsertion into the process (a feedback loop) means that the limitations of substantive rationality can be avoided.”

The EC paper reflects an understanding of society as existing in a milieu:

“A general theme running through the various interventions by external experts taking part in this project has been the context of complexity, diversity, interdependence and uncertainty within which governmental action must now operate.” And although it is never explicitly mentioned, it often seems that the authors are fully aware of the governmentalization of the state and seek to intervene in a way that maintains or fosters its alignment with state objectives:

“All [experts taking part in this project] pointed to a situation of increasing complexity in which the most pressing problems of society appear beyond the reach of the political programmes and the bureaucratic administrative bodies

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268 Ibid. 14 Italics in original
269 Ibid. 14 Italics in original
270 Ibid. 14 Italics in original
271 Ibid. 14-15 Italics in original
272 Ibid. 17
which have traditionally been deployed to resolve them.”²⁷³ In this vein, an important problem that their investigation into this new mode of governance seeks to overcome is the diversification of values which “threatens to render the notion of the general will which underpins the traditional models of democratically representative government redundant.”²⁷⁴ Such an approach incorporates the idea of constitutionally distinct and formally independent individuals co-existing in a world that presupposes regulatory interventions.

The EC paper focuses on the need for the contextualized production and application of norms “which stresses the need to consider problems in context, to incorporate the different perspectives and values held by different stakeholders and to accommodate the possibility of new information and emergent difficulties.” And it is a model which “has implications for all the stages of the process of governance from the formulation of problems and solutions, through the implementation of mechanisms of action, to their evaluation and revision.”²⁷⁵ It goes so far as to say that this new mode of governance represents a clear change in governmental rationality, whereby the techniques incorporated are fundamental to the understanding of government. This can be seen by the way this governmentality relies upon mechanisms of evaluation and monitoring. Such techniques elicit self-government, and the paper claims that “policy can only be understood by such evaluation and monitoring which can discover what is actually happening as opposed to relying on what is supposed to happen when a policy is implemented.”²⁷⁶

The limits of this attempt at codification of the governmentalization of the state, at least from a perspective focused on biopolitical normalization, lies with its claim that it must ensure participation by all relevant stakeholders. Referring back to Dean’s account of socialization, biopolitical normalization is far too dispersed a process to ever be formally integrated by governmental self-formation.

²⁷³ Ibid. 17
²⁷⁴ Ibid. 17
²⁷⁵ Ibid. 23
²⁷⁶ Ibid. 25
practices. However, the EC paper is insightful as an example of how a particular supranational organization is trying explicitly to get around their lack of sovereign power, which has traditionally been the nexus of political legitimacy. They therefore can be found engaging directly with ideas previously generated by Foucault, namely, the governmentalization of the state. The above shows that they are, albeit implicitly, incorporating a biopolitical framework to help with their investigations into effective government, through which they hope to achieve democratic legitimacy without formal arrangements.

The EC paper is thus part of a conscious project to governmentalize ‘Europe’, stemming from criticisms of an emergent democratic deficit concerning the implementation of EU regulations, and attempting to generate legitimate harmonization of regulations across EU member states. It does so by institutionalizing processes of biopolitical normalization and therefore is no doubt a ripe entrance point to investigate international biopower. However, the EU represents a special case, and so instead of continuing with an analysis of the EU, I will use this information to produce insights into international biopolitics that potentially affect international relations more broadly. I will thus show that what I have identified within this supranational organization, can also be found animating international organizations, and, more importantly, processes not necessarily related to formal organization. What is important to take from the previous discussion is the way formal governmental agencies are involved in practices of governmental self-formation. The above discussion shows that the EU is working towards formalizing processes that subjectivize individuals as self-governing individuals, and is trying to extend formal government activity as far as possible into those processes. Two rationalities can be identified as being intimately linked to this process which is conceptualized as the formalization of (biopolitical) normalization. First, a rationality that deploys its expertise as deeply as possible, and primarily to frame a process of normalization, echoes a continuing strategy to transform societies from ‘passive’ systems to ‘active’ ones, that is, a strategy of governmental self-rule is part of a broader strategy to

277 Its ambition of all participating meaningfully, in the face of the impossibility of this happening, perhaps represents the differences in thought between Foucault and Habermas.
inculcate ethical self-rule. Second, by formalizing normalization, governmental actors hope to generate political legitimacy and effectiveness. I will now briefly explore how these two rationalities can be witnessed in a broader international context than that framed by the EU. I will first show how Slaughter’s notion of ‘disaggregated sovereignty’ helps us to identify biopolitical normalization in transgovernmental strategies which attempt to produce effective and thus legitimate governance that transcends state boundaries, and how this strategy is tied up with a project to elicit ethical self-government. Using the OECD as an example, I will then elucidate the concept of international biopolitical normalization, and put forward some concrete examples through which this process can be identified.

‘Disaggregated Sovereignty.’

The remainder of this chapter argues that biopower enters IR through the translation of techniques of biopolitical normalization beyond the biopolitical state. I argue that for biopower to enter into world politics, the process of normalization that is immanent with (biopolitical) civil society must somehow connect to processes that occur transnationally. That means a continuum of normalization must be genealogically linked to apparatuses located outside of the state. This does not necessarily mean that biopower is transcending sovereignty and being modified from its original tripartite form. Indeed, I argue that it is not. Instead, norms that are constituted immanently with additional recourse to processes occurring beyond the state can, and will still be enforced by state sovereignty. I propose that the feedback loop that facilitates the constitution of norms has grown somewhat due to the increased capacity of communication processes. I begin by arguing that this process of normalization can be witnessed in new governmental processes summed up by Slaughter (2004) as ‘disaggregated sovereignty.’\(^{278}\)

Slaughter’s discussion of transgovernmentality reflects the processes of EC governmentality described above, that is, how new modes of governance are respecting the naturalness of processes of biopolitical normalization. It also

indicates how these processes of biopolitical normalization are becoming transnational through the institutionalization of regulatory cooperation. These regulatory networks are shown by Slaughter to, amongst other things, facilitate the flow of a certain type of information, expertise which facilitates liberal rule. Transnational regulatory networks thus facilitate networks that bypass sovereign mechanisms and inculcate self-regulation, a central biopolitical operation. The biopolitical nature of the processes she describes can be identified through an analysis of Dean’s three ‘foldings,’ which shows how the biopolitical feedback loop framed by sovereignty now incorporate actors located above sovereign spaces, in this case, the EU. Just how what she describes reflects processes of biopolitical normalization is also outlined.

Slaughter’s discussion of the nature of transgovernmental processes is broad, and not all of what she describes involves biopolitical processes. However, she points out that a major impetus for the study of transgovernmental regulatory networks has been the entrenchment of a regulatory system centered on the OECD. She also speaks of transgovernmental processes as blurring the line between national and international. I argue that for this line to be truly blurred biopolitical techniques must also be going transgovernmental, and therefore that techniques that involve biopower will be identified as occurring beyond the OECD. Also, following my earlier argument that it is with the blurring of the ‘national’ and ‘international’ that Foucault’s work will be most fruitful, then it is precisely when this claim is made by liberal analysis that Foucault should be recruited. Indeed, I argue that it is the internationalization of biopolitical processes of normalization which illuminates their blurring, and that investigation of her work, A New World Order, is fruitful because it identifies just how some of the most innovative transgovernmental processes reflect the idea that biopolitical normalization is becoming linked to transnational processes. I therefore focus my investigation of her work on what she thinks are the most interesting sites of transgovernmental activity: “networks of national regulators that develop outside any formal framework.” In particular, networks that “result from agreements between domestic regulatory agencies of two or more nations,” and that have the

\[\text{279 Ibid. 45}\]
potential to evolve, if they have not already, into plurilateral arrangements. What is specific about these agreements, and relevant to biopower, is that the institutionalization of channels of regulatory cooperation in this manner “embrace principles that can be implemented by the regulators themselves; they do not need further approval by national legislators.” It thus reflects the governmentalization of the state.

Due to the nature of biopower I therefore focus on one of her three heuristic categories of transgovernmental process; information networks (in contrast to enforcement and harmonization networks). The flow of information within an information network facilitates cooperation, but more importantly, the flow of information serves a biopolitical function, that is, expertise which facilitates liberal rule. Hence she states that “[s]imply providing information to individuals and organizations permits self-knowledge, which is the heart of self-regulation.” She expands on this to point out that transgovernmental information sharing is about a certain type of information sharing. It is about sharing the sort of information that will empower regulatory agencies, and thus facilitate transnational governance, in spite of international legal arrangements. She thus links contemporary governmentality with transgovernmentalism. First she points out that;

“Instead of deciding how individuals should behave, ordering them to behave that way, and then monitoring whether they obey, governments are learning how to provide valuable and credible information that will let individuals regulate themselves within a basic framework of standards.”

And then, that;

“If governments can provide information to help individuals regulate themselves, then government networks can collect and share not only the information provided, but also the solutions adopted.”

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280 Ibid. 49
281 Ibid.
282 Like disciplinary techniques, they overlap one another.
283 Slaughter, A New World Order. 169 Italics mine
284 Ibid. 187
285 Ibid. Italics mine
On my reading, this presents us with a direct link between biopolitical normalization and what might be called transgovernmental normalization, and indicates a process of international biopolitical normalization. Furthermore, implicit in Slaughter’s reading of the normative implications of this transgovernmental idealism is the perception of societies exhibiting an emergent character that escapes discipline and more generally command-and-control tactics. This reflects Foucauldian insights about mechanisms of control, and their ability to govern according to logics of risk. Thus she states that:

“Cooperation across borders on a whole host of old and new issues will similarly have to address fast-changing circumstances and an astonishing array of contexts, as well as the need for active citizen participation in as many of the world’s countries as possible.”

As will be shown below, talk of citizen participation can be linked to the immanence of normalization within civil society, it echoes the points made above about EU governmentality, and inculcates legitimacy and effectiveness.

One of the central points that Slaughter conveys from the literature is the importance of the credibility of information. It is precisely the credibility of information that subjectivizes the governed as allies. Speaking of information networks within the context of the European Union (EU), the credibility of information, or in Foucauldian terms, effective expertise, establishes what Slaughter refers to as a “community of views,” which generates a three-way flow of information that complements, from an IR perspective, Dean’s three ‘foldings.’ First, there is the flow of information between a transgovernmental network; there is a second flow from this network up to formal EU policymakers; finally, this information flows down to “interested members of national publics.”

Here, the first flow of information echoes government by other than formal state apparatus, in that they are regulatory rather than juridical. This accounts for the fact that policy recommendations are reached through a process of normalization, both with reference to regulators from different countries and internal norms; the second flow echoes how non-governmental regulations are

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286 Ibid. 188
287 Ibid. 189
288 Ibid.
incorporated into formal – regional – political considerations; while the third flow facilitates the normalization of governmental regulations by incorporating civil society. It is important to note that this is the second point that civil society is incorporated into the process, and hence this part of the process – the third flow of information – is linked to the first, and produces a circular relation.

The concern with citizen participation reflects the liberal strategy to empower civil society, to “integrate expert and social judgment throughout the regulatory process.” In techno-liberal parlance, it is a normative project to incorporate the widest possible range of stakeholders, and attempts to make social regulation immanent within, or coextensive with civil society. Drawing on an EU White Paper with similar themes to the EC paper discussed above, Slaughter sums up this biopolitical normalization in techno-political terms as a process of “collective learning,” and as a process which “abolishes hierarchy.” Her analysis continues to echo biopower when she notes that “what is striking is the apparent disappearance or dispersal of government authority.” Her interpretation of these processes precisely coheres with Foucault’s displacement of sovereignty to get at what is specific about the operation of power within the state;

“Government does not lay down rules or monitor their enforcement; it neither teaches nor learns. What it does is bring the network into being, constructing and animating a forum for dialogue and collective learning. Then it steps back and lets the process run.”

It is within what Slaughter describes as networks that biopolitical normalization occurs, and these networks are becoming linked transnationally to ‘blur the line between national and international.’

The process of normalization is perhaps most accurately touched upon when she talks about individuals;

“[organizing] themselves in multiple networks or even communities to solve problems for themselves and for the larger society. These

289 Lebessis and Paterson in Ibid. 190
290 Ibid. 191-192
291 Ibid. 193
292 Ibid.
networks or problem-solving groups are not directly connected to the ‘government’ or the ‘state,’ but they can nevertheless compile and accumulate knowledge, develop their problem-solving capacity, and work out norms to regulate their behaviour.”  

Slaughter’s description of these processes revolves around contemporary exigencies of government based on ideas of complexity, a perspective that fits well with Foucault’s approach to politics. This links to Foucault’s discussion of modern liberal politics as a site of intervention framed by a milieu within which cause and effect is governed with reference to mechanisms of security. Hence her statement that;

“[t]he state’s function is to manage [problem-solving and information pooling] processes, rather than regulate behaviour directly. It must help empower individuals to solve their own problems within their own structures, to facilitate and enrich deliberative dialogue. It must also devise norms and enforcement mechanisms for assuring the widest possible participation within each network, consistent with its effectiveness.”

It is Slaughter’s description of aspects of transgovernmental processes that foster these sorts of effects, and especially her description of how the communicative aspect of transnational government is linked to government through normalization, that, I argue, illuminates a fruitful avenue to investigate biopower with reference to international relations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these avenues more fully, but a number of aspects can be earmarked for future research. This includes her identification of: “mushrooming [transgovernmental] private governance regimes” that echo governmentalization; the way domestic and international society “generates the rules, norms and principles they are prepared to live by” which echoes regulation by normalization; and the new political conception of society in which “uncertainty and unintended consequences are facts of life, facts that individuals can face without relying on a higher authority,” an idea that refers both to the milieu as a site of uncertainty and

293 Ibid. 194
295 Slaughter, A New World Order. 194 Italics mine
intervention, and to the government of oneself, albeit framed by regulations that encourages individuals to exercise their freedom responsibly. Hence her belief that individuals “have the necessary resources within themselves and with each other. They only need to be empowered to draw on.”

Slaughter’s discussion of how transnational governance possesses a rationality which attempts to be effective and legitimate intimates at a governmentality that, in the least incorporates biopolitical techniques. These are techniques which attempt to elicit the self-regulation of responsibilized individuals. It is thus part of a broader process of governmental self-formation which attempts to subjectivize individuals ethically as willing participants in the project of managing society. Due to their disaggregated nature, these transnational process of normalization tend to focus on the subjectification of individuals, and they thus fall short of properly being called international biopolitical normalization. The next section continues the investigation of processes of biopolitical normalization that are of interest to the field of IR, and argues that the OECD represents something unique, and should thus be considered a privileged site for the analysis of international biopolitical normalization.

**OECD Governmentality.**

The biopolitical nature of Slaughter’s explanation of transgovernmentalism thus fully complements the biopolitical nature of supranational EU governmentality. This ‘transgovernmentality’ can be further explored with more detail through an analysis of the OECD. This analysis extends the identification of biopolitical normalization in IR by identifying biopolitical normalization as not only being linked to transnational processes, but also to international apparatuses. Let me begin the discussion about the OECD with a comment by a former Secretary-General:

“The OECD is not a supranational organisation but a place where policymakers can meet and discuss their problems, where governments can compare their points of view and their experience. The Secretariat is there to find and point out the way to go, to act as a

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296 Ibid. 194-195
catalyst. Its role is not academic, nor does it have the authority to impose its ideas. Its power lies in its capacity for intellectual persuasion.”297

Teasing apart this summation of the role of the OECD, three points – apart from the non-coercive nature of its governmentality, which has already been pointed out – require highlighting. First, the OECD is a forum in which member states come together voluntarily to compare their relative states. Second, OECD governmentality is based upon its ability to facilitate norms of behaviour. Put simply, I argue that the combination of these two factors makes of the OECD a forum that facilitates an interplay between different distributions of normality, and acts to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable. Third, the fact that ‘the OECD is not a supranational organization’ implies that OECD does not exist ‘above’ the states that constitute its membership, and therefore that its governmentality is in some way intimately related to biopolitical governmentality, that is, processes of normalization that occur within states. This section expands on these three points, and in doing so argues, notwithstanding the third point, that the OECD represents a biopolitical node which facilitates the extension of biopolitical processes transnationally.

I argue that the OECD should be considered as part of the continuum of regulation that determines biopolitical norms internally and that the OECD then connects this internal process to a process of normalization between states. It thus constitutes a prime site through which we can analyze the blurring of the ‘national’ and ‘international,’ that is, through which we can investigate international biopolitical normalization. The OECD is part of a transnational process wherein domestic biopolitical norms are constituted with some sort of link to the OECD, whose governmentality is tied up with a techniques of comparison and peer-review which immanently ties this biopolitical normalization up with the normality of other states. Biopolitical norms are thus

linked to a process of norm formation at the international level.\textsuperscript{298} This can occur according to two general processes. The first, and much more formal process, occurs when the OECD produces a report on what it deems to be an issue vitally important to the welfare of the country in question. The second is a less formal process whereby statistics and expertise produced by the OECD are used by various groups in their attempts to governmentalize society. Both of these processes can be analyzed with reference to Dean’s ‘foldings’ described in chapter one, and discussed above.

Drawing on Dean’s ‘foldings’ of the state-civil society double within liberal-biopolitical government, and based on an explanation of OECD processes,\textsuperscript{299} here’s how I posit the more formal process interacts with biopower: First, statistics – with reference to indicators and a particular issue determined by the OECD – are collected by the state and then passed on. With reference to this data, the ‘normality’ of the state is determined through comparison with other states. OECD representatives then engage with appropriate domestic representatives, both within formal state apparatus and from civil society, to prepare a draft report on the issue in question. Through political technologies, devices such as surveys, this process is framed by the OECD. Once this draft report is prepared, state representatives then participate in a peer-review process with representatives from other states. The peer-review is a very critical process, in which “the country under review [seeks] to blunt criticism, especially in domestically sensitive areas.”\textsuperscript{300} Following this, a final report is released to the public which, although significantly influenced by the OECD, typically represents a compromise. The expertise and truth claims of the OECD, in policy form and reinforced by state participation, are then conveyed to political society, through formal and informal government channels, as well as through the media, that is, through political and civil society. This then prompts responses from the correlates of liberal society – ‘civil’ and ‘political.’ These responses form a

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid. 89
feedback loop which ultimately informs the state’s response to OECD concerns. Due to the non-coercive nature of OECD governmentality, the state is in no way required to implement OECD generated policies, and domestic considerations as well as OECD concerns ultimately inform a state’s final response.

According to Dean, the three of foldings of liberal-biopolitical government represent; government by other than formal state apparatus (“an unfolding of the (formally) political sphere into civil society”); non-governmental regulations incorporated into formal political considerations (“an enfolding of the regulations of society into the political”); and the immanence of normalization in society (“a refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political”). I argue all three of these foldings are witnessed in the process above. First, you have the direct participation of civil society in the draft report formulation process. This includes participation by the OECD. Second (and perhaps most contentiously), you have the enfolding of international societal regulations into the domestic political sphere. This reinforces the claim that the OECD is part of domestic liberal civil society, which is non-governmental due to its non-sovereign nature. Third, the final response of a state to OECD governmentality is subject to the real or ideal values of domestic society, the normalization of which is only partly influenced by OECD governmentality. It is this final point, however, that problematizes the idea of the OECD possessing more formal biopolitical credentials; the OECD is only biopolitical to the extent that it is part of a feedback loop that originates from a biopolitical state. In other words, the response of a state to OECD governmentality is a result of biopolitical normalization within states, and the OECD should be considered part of states civil societies’. The OECD is part of a process of biopolitical normalization because of societal internalization of its expertise within a domestic feedback loop that determines social norms and regulation.

Although there is a formal relationship between states and the OECD, this is not what is most important to how the process of biopolitical normalization gets caught up with OECD expertise. What is relevant for this discussion is the way OECD expertise gets absorbed within a biopolitical feedback loop which serves to normalize the target populations that specific deployments of OECD knowledge are directed at. However, I argue that OECD involvement has a dual
relationship with the notion of biopolitical normalization. On the one hand, its expertise and techniques are internalized by domestic processes of biopolitical normalization. On the other hand, and from the perspective of international governmentality, states are governmentalized in such a way so as to facilitate the appropriate governmentalization of their respective societies; that is, they are governmentalized so as to make their societies more ‘active.’ The duality of this process can best be seen through an analysis of the way the OECD is involved with the governmentalization of education within liberal countries. The following section will begin with an elucidation of the first part of this duality; how the OECD becomes involved with biopolitical normalization, that is, the relationship between the OECD and an individual state. It will then move on to the second part of this duality; the way this first relationship is complicated by OECD governmentality, that is, how the OECD links this normalization process to other states. The section will thus highlight a number of avenues through which biopower is becoming international.

OECD governmentality is not biopolitical on its own, and yet the relationship between a state and the OECD on its own does represent international biopolitical normalization. This occurs when biopolitical governmentality, or internal biopolitical normalization, of which the OECD is a part, is connected to an interplay between different states, each representing a normality. This occurs due to OECD governmentality, which as has been noted above represents the diffusion of biopolitical techniques beyond the state. (States that are not part of the OECD, from a liberal-international perspective, are understood in terms of other distributions of normality, and may or may not be governmentalized by disciplinary mechanisms.) International biopolitical normalization thus exists at the intersection of two axes of biopolitical normalization, one vertical and one horizontal, an intersection which is constituted and facilitated by the OECD.

The OECD and Biopolitical Normalization

This section will show that, due to OECD expertise, the internal biopolitical normalization of societies is becoming linked to apparatuses and relations that are international. This occurs in two ways; first, there is the
relatively straightforward relationship between the OECD and a particular sovereign society; second, there is a complexification of this relationship due to the governmentality of the OECD which, as noted above, is tied in to the liberal nomos of world order, and thus tries to extend liberal relations throughout the world. It achieves this with recourse to techniques that have a biopolitical nature, namely through the technique of ranking which represents an interplay between different normalities. The section begins by providing a concrete example of the way the OECD is tied up with an internal and sovereign feedback loop which facilitates biopolitical normalization. It thus extends and substantiates the explication of this process put forward in the previous sections concerning EC governmentality and transgovernmental processes. Following this, another example of the same phenomenon is given, which is then able to be extended to illuminate the complexification of biopolitical normalization with reference to international governmentality.

The first example shows how OECD expertise becomes involved with biopolitical normalization. It does so with reference to a new regulation recently introduced in New Zealand, whereby the use of ‘booster’ seats has become compulsory for children up to seven years of age, an increase in the required age from five. It is a particularly helpful example because it extends the example of a mechanism of security, concerning the raft of regulations that govern the use of roads in New Zealand, elucidated in the first chapter. The second example discusses biopolitical techniques reflected in the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), with a particular focus on the way this programme is used not only to compare students but also countries. It thus identifies that international biopolitical normalization is reflected in a number of different processes.

In October 2012 the New Zealand Government regulated that children up to the age of seven must be restrained in cars with the use of booster seats that ensure seatbelts fit them correctly.301 This decision was partly a result of lobbying directed at the government by civil society groups concerned with the

health and welfare of children in New Zealand, and thus represents Dean’s “enfolding of the regulations of society into the political.” However, what is important to note is that part of the impetus for the lobbying efforts of certain civil society actors came from the dissemination of OECD expertise in the form of rankings. This can be seen in comments by Plunket’s National Child Safety Advisor, who states that “[New Zealand has] one of the highest child road fatality rates in the OECD. Around five children are killed or injured every week on this country’s roads. Today’s announcement by the Government is a positive step towards reducing this number.”

Thus the OECD is a part of the process of enfolding societal regulations into the political. Furthermore, it will obviously be the sovereign capability of the state that enforces this regulation, but how it intends to go about this is illuminating. First, it should be noted that OECD expertise actually specifies that children should be restrained with the use of booster seats up until the height of 148cm, which is more likely to align with children approximately 10 years of age, four years older than what the government has decided to mandate. Remember, however, that biopolitical governmentality does not operate according to the unwieldy sovereign apparatus, and while the government has been influenced this way in part by OECD expertise, this regulation will instead be governed by other than formal state apparatus, thus representing Dean’s “unfolding of the formally political sphere into civil society.” The unfolding of the formally political sphere into civil society is achieved by groups like Plunket successfully playing their part in normalizing individuals. This occurs not only through Plunket’s formal activity (Plunket staff attempts to visit every new baby and their family, sometimes a number of times up until the age of five303), but also through their participation in the communicatory feedback loop discussed above. For example, Plunket, and another civil society group, Safe Kids, speak with expertise in public forums, and thus serve to normalize the ‘fact’ that children should be in booster seats for longer than mandated by the new law. Hence the Director of Safe Kids, on


National Radio states, in conjunction with her disappointment that the new regulation ‘didn’t go far enough,’ how ―this will highlight to parents that this is an issue and that more parents and children will do this voluntarily rather than wait for regulation.‖ This, then, is an example of a “refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political.” What is more, the state’s support of this strategy can be seen in the Minister of Transport’s public comment that “even if booster seat use [up until the age of 11] is not law by 2020, he’s hopeful that parents attitudes will have changed, and children up to the age of ten will be using them without a second thought.”

This example shows how the OECD is folded into biopolitical normalization, two aspects of which should be highlighted. First, OECD expertise was part of the expertise used to determine at what height a child should be restrained using a booster seat. Second, a technique of comparison was used to argue that New Zealand falls below the norm for liberal biopolitical countries in child road safety, and thus should be further governmentalized to address this deficiency. The next example further explores this dual process, with reference to the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and focuses on the second aspect.

“The OECD has, since 1988, been funding research to define indicators of education that enable valid comparisons to be made and has been reporting the results of their application in Education at a Glance (published regularly since 1991).” The OECD has used its governmental power to promote the use of comparative statistics, and education has become a privileged sight for such techniques due to “the supposed link between education and economic prosperity.” This has resulted in the production of league tables that focus solely on the performance of 15 year old students in scientific literacy, focusing on reading, writing and mathematics. The data collected is then used to rank

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305 Paraphrased in Ibid.
308 Ibid. 80
countries, according to which the explicit purpose of this comparative technique can be identified. Individual countries are normalized through an interplay with other country’s results; an optimal bandwidth is established, to which countries below this bandwidth aspire. The explicit purpose of this comparative technique is to inform policy decisions, and serves to normalize countries by homogenizing education policy. Countries which fall outside and below the established bandwidth of normality are socialized to the extent that they modify policies to be inline with ‘well-performing’ countries, thus becoming normalized. The comparative technique, however, does not stop with the comparisons of different countries. The data collected is also used by individual governments to compare individual students. Thus, as well as normalizing countries, it also serves to normalize children, in that 15 year old students are deemed normal to the extent that they fit within a bandwidth of acceptable performance in specific subjects. This is how the OECD constitutes a nodal point of international biopower, and is thus a fruitful site for its investigation. It is a part of the internal process of normalizing children, as well as possessing an international governmentality which makes use of the biopolitical technique of facilitating an interplay between different state normalities, remembering that OECD membership indicates a type of normality.

Moreover, due to the scientific validity of the technique, backed up by OECD expertise, the technique multiplies. In 2010 in New Zealand, for example, the government introduced National Standards, designed to “set clear expectations that students need to meet in reading, writing, and mathematics in the first eight years at school.”309 New Zealand is an OECD member, and this is an extension of the OECD’s PISA program, which only focuses on 15 year olds. National Standards are an extension of the PISA program, echoing its rationality to produce comparative statistics for children from the age of five to thirteen. This extension of a rationality influenced by NZ’s participation in the PISA program serves to normalize the country vis-à-vis other countries, and constitutes a self-reflective modification of policies in an attempt to normalize the country. This can be seen to happen in a dual manner. First, it can be partly attributable to

a project to normalize children to perform well in the PISA program, which in turn helps to normalize New Zealand. Second, the extension of OECD techniques to governmentalized children at a number of different ages helps to normalize New Zealand as an ‘active’ country, that is, a country that socializes its citizens to be constantly measured, appraised, and hierarchically placed so as to subjectivize them as active citizens.

What is important is the way league tables in this manner contribute to the process of normalization, both nationally and internationally. Also, OECD governmentality is not biopolitical on its own; a relationship with an already liberal-biopolitical state is essential. It remains, however, an international apparatus, and as such serves to blur the line between the ‘national’ and ‘international.’ Although biopolitical norms can ultimately only be enforced (when such enforcement is necessary) by sovereign power, and that such enforcement necessarily reflects biopolitical norms constituted by the values of domestic society, more and more, with such activity as the OECD is part of, the sovereign mechanism continues to be devaluated. Moreover, domestic values are definitely influenced by the knowledge/power of the OECD; it is when OECD governmentality is socialized as a relevant civil society actor that it becomes biopolitical, and it is when it connects this internal process to biopolitical processes occurring in other states that biopolitics is internationalized.

One might contend, at this point, that due to increased communication channels, it is a truism to claim that domestic values and norms are influenced by international phenomena. Of course, this is true; however, I would argue that the OECD channel represents something unique. The OECD can be viewed as an organization that, although nascent in this respect, is institutionalizing a process of international biopolitical normalization, keeping in mind that it is a process which can also be seen occurring in less a formal manner.\textsuperscript{310} This claim is based upon its ability, and the methods it uses, to align the interests of all biopolitical states in the international system. As I have already stated, the OECD is not in itself biopolitical, but is instead a mechanism that involves biopower, and thus

\textsuperscript{310}To complement the discourse of ‘democratic deficit’ at the international level, perhaps we could also talk of a biopolitical deficit, whereby neither are norms of international immanent with international society.
blurs the national/international divide due to its ability to simultaneously be a part of domestic and international processes. It is a nodal point for transnational biopolitical normalization.

I argue that this chapter has successfully described a new and valid approach for investigating biopower in IR, successful because it manages to reinforce and extend Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics. It began by making a distinction between disciplinary indirect rule and biopolitical indirect rule and identified that biopolitical indirect rule can be found within the OECD, a site which is a component of international governmentality. It was then identified that biopolitical indirect rule is related to biopolitical normalization, a process which is facilitated by expertise and linked to the socialization of individuals. An attempt to formalize biopolitical normalization by governmental agencies was identified as an attempt to incorporate ‘natural’ processes of normalization within an explicit governmental program, a rationality explained by Dean’s notion of governmental self-rule. The desire to ‘formalize normalization’ was illuminated with reference to EC governmentality, and transgovernmental processes described by Slaughter. It was argued that these analyses represent a fruitful site for the internationalization of biopolitical normalization, before a third site, the OECD, was used to supplement these analyses and provide concrete examples.

The examples above show how OECD expertise is ‘folded’ into processes of biopolitical normalization that fundamentally remain connected to the sovereign capability of the state. It was shown that this occurs in (at least) two ways. First, there is a relatively straightforward process whereby the OECD becomes socialized as part of a domestic feedback loop. This relationship between international expertise and individual sovereign states is then complexified by a second process as it gets tied up with international governmentality, which is represented in this paper as techniques which rank countries. Both of these processes were illuminated by Dean’s three ‘foldings’ of liberal government. In addition to this complexification, it was also shown that these processes can either be formal or informal. Generally it was shown that biopower enters IR through two processes, the normalization of individuals with recourse to transnational and supranational apparatuses, and the normalization of
countries with specific reference to the OECD. The first process, it was argued, is witnessed in transgovernmental and supragovernmental processes that are trying to regulate individuals and societies, which operate according to a governmentality that is trying to get around their lack of recourse to sovereign mechanisms, and in doing so are involved in processes that are referred to as formalizing processes of biopolitical normalization. The second process is facilitated by the OECD due to its deployment of biopolitical techniques in an effort to governmentalise states, namely a technique of comparison which facilitates an interplay between different distributions of normality, a technique that was developed by biopolitical rationality.
CONCLUSION: GLOBAL BIOPOWER AS INTERNATIONAL BIOPOLITICAL NORMALIZATION.

This paper has argued that global biopower should be analyzed as an extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that are located domestically, that is, within a sovereign space. It thus subscribes to a methodological commitment to an ascending analysis of power relations and has, I argue, successfully extended Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics. This is in contradistinction to predominant theorizations of biopower in IR to date, which have failed to methodologically account for sovereignty in such a way so as to provide the foundation for extending Foucauldian insights beyond the territorial boundaries of sovereignty.

International biopolitical normalization is identified as consisting of two analytical axes; vertically, it constitutes an extension of domestic mechanisms of security, whereby international apparatuses are ‘folded’ into a process of domestic biopolitical normalization. Although this process effectively remains bounded by a sovereign mechanism, it intimates at the blurring of the ‘national’ and international’ and thus represents one aspect of international biopolitical normalization. The process of international biopolitical normalization is extended and complexified when international apparatuses act as a nodal point that connects these domestic processes horizontally, through an extension of biopolitical techniques that facilitate an interplay between different distributions of normality. This normality is determined by the fact that members of the international apparatus in question are sufficiently liberal states.

The paper has thus successfully achieved its goal, which was to reaffirm central Foucauldian insights which had been elided by predominant theorizations. In doing so it has provided a theoretical framework that improves our understanding of the way individual bodies are inserted into global apparatuses of power, and has extended our understanding of how the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security. It has thus identified how ‘domestic’ mechanisms of security can be thought of as becoming transnational, and has provided a window onto one of the processes through which the boundaries between the national and the international are blurring.
The identification of how domestic mechanisms of security are contributing to the blurring of the line between the national and international helps us to understand the continuing relevance of sovereignty to world politics and reinforces the argument that international apparatuses serve as a means to reassert sovereignty. It achieved this through a deconstruction of sovereignty that highlighted its ‘history of practices’ and their continuing relevance, that is, the actual practices of government that capture, objectify, and regulate specific populations. The scope of sovereignty was identified as a mechanism which bounded the internal dimension of government, that is, biopolitical government, by framing its field of vision. In addition, sovereignty was identified as a power with an exterior, and thus is internal to a governmentality with a broader field of vision, an international governmentality.

International governmentality was linked to the liberal nomos of world order which operates through both the existing internal governmentality of states and as a project to extend and generalize liberal governmentality globally. To help explain how the nomos of world order operated I generated a distinction between different apparatuses tied up in this project. This distinction drew on the fact that disciplinary and biopolitical techniques have escaped the institutional architecture which initially gave them meaning, and both have generated distinct techniques of indirect rule. It was noted, then, that IOs can be analytically distinguished as either operating with reference primarily to disciplinary, or biopolitical techniques of indirect rule. Disciplinary indirect rule was aligned with IMF and World Bank practices, while the OECD was identified as the most important IO operating with biopolitical techniques of indirect rule. This was not to claim that these IOs were either disciplinary or biopolitical, but rather that they have successfully redeployed techniques developed within biopolitical or disciplinary institutions, and thus represent sites for further investigation of these rationalities.

Before the example of the OECD was fully developed, the paper explored the processes which constitute biopolitical normalization. This was to ensure an ascending analysis of power relations; the way biopolitical normalization occurs within a state was elucidated before they were inserted into an analysis which incorporated international apparatuses. The sociological nature of biopolitical
normalization was highlighted, in particular how normalization is related to socialization, and how the process is linked to a multiplicity of agencies and authorities. This led to Dean’s fruitful distinction between political subjectification, ethical self-formation, and governmental self-formation, and it was argued that while biopolitical normalization involves all three distinctive governmental strategies, the international dimension of biopower is primarily reflected in processes of governmental formation. The fact that only one of these strategies is witnessed ‘internationally’ indicated that biopower cannot exist independent of sovereign biopolitical states, and that international biopower is more accurately defined as an extension of biopolitical practices that are essentially state-based.

Governmental self-formation was then investigated from the perspective of EC governmentality, and it was pointed out that EC governmentality seems to have aligned itself with an understanding of biopolitical normalization, and is trying to work with those processes, thus reflecting the liberal critique of politics. This was described as an attempt by government agencies to formalize biopolitical normalization. Insights generated by this analysis were then translated into a broader context than that of the EU, which represents a special case. Biopolitical normalization was first linked to transgovernmental processes as described by Slaughter, before these compounded insights were applied to the role of the OECD. An investigation of ‘disaggregated sovereignty’ and OECD governmentality provided the basis for an explanation of how a continuum of biopolitical normalization can be genealogically linked to apparatuses located outside of the state. It also reinforced the argument that biopower does not transcend sovereignty, and has not fundamentally changed from its original tripartite form. Instead it pointed out that norms that are constituted immanently with additional recourse to processes occurring beyond the state can, and will still be enforced by state sovereignty. Transgovernmentality and OECD processes thus represent the extension of a feedback loop which remains fundamentally connected to the scope of sovereignty.

Slaughter’s discussion of Transgovernmentality echoed EC governmentality in that the processes she uncovered reflected the implicit governmentalization of the state by governmental agencies in an attempt to
implement transnational regulations without involving the sovereign mechanism. This is instead strategized through the biopolitical technique of normalizing individuals by providing them with ‘credible’ information, i.e. expertise. According to Slaughter, it is precisely the credibility of information that subjectivizes the governed as *allies*. Furthermore, this strategy aimed at individuals is reinforced by a ‘community of views’ which facilitates the normalization of governmental regulations by incorporating civil society. What is striking for Slaughter, and is indicative of biopower, is the apparent disappearance or dispersal of governmental authority which is achievable because individuals are being subjectivized to govern themselves.

The discussion about the relationship between supragovernmentality and transgovernmentality, and biopolitical normalization set up an analysis of the role the OECD plays in this process. The OECD, it was argued, represents a privileged site for an analysis of biopower in world politics. This is because it is a voluntary forum that incorporates itself within sovereign processes which help facilitate norms of behavior. It thus represents a nodal point essential for the translation of biopolitical normalization internationally. Specifically, it argued that the OECD should be considered as part of the continuum of regulation that determines biopolitical norms internally and furthermore that the OECD then connects this internal process to a process of normalization between states. Biopolitical norms are in this way explicitly linked to a process of norm formation at the international level. An explanation of how this occurs was presented, which was then supported by examples.

In conclusion, international biopolitical normalization was presented as an extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that occur within a sovereign space. It thus methodologically adheres to Foucauldian ethics and produced an ascending analysis of power relations. In doing so it overcame the deficiencies noted in predominant theorizations of biopower in IR; it accurately accounted for one of the ways in which individuals find themselves enmeshed in power relations that extend globally; and it identified a new and fruitful research paradigm.
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