Where is the West in UN Peacekeeping?
An examination of the decline in Western troop contributions to UN peacekeeping

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armed Personnel Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>C34</td>
<td>UN Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR CAR</td>
<td>Europe Union Force in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>The Implementation Force</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nation Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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UNFICYP  United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA  United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIK  United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS  United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMOGIP  United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI  United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOSOM  United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force
UNTAET  United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UK  United Kingdom of Great Britain
US  United States of America
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Thesis Abstract

This thesis explores an important aspect of the changing composition of United Nations peacekeeping troop contributions by examining the causes of the decline in troop contributions from the West. It does so by creating a theoretical framework within which the widespread decline in troop contributions from the West can be contextualized and reviewing a variety of possible arguments in secondary literature for the decline that can be considered within this theoretical framework. I assert that the constructivist concept of security communities, although originally focused on interactions between states in the community, can also be used to understand the ways in which these states respond to peace and security threats outside of the community, and that this is the reason there has been a systemic decline in troop contributions from the West.

The past, current and future peacekeeping engagements of Canada and New Zealand will be explored in detail in this thesis. These countries have historically had a strong commitment to the UN, and been champions of its ultimate authority to sanction international responses to conflict. Both countries have a history of significant troops contributions to UN peacekeeping, but have decreased these contributions in the last 10-15 years. Understanding why these two internationalists all but abandoned UN peacekeeping can provide clues as to why other Western militaries have done the same, and concentrated their resources in other peace support operations. These cases also exemplify how the security community concept can be applied to understanding troop contributions to peace operations.

This thesis is divided into four main sections. In the introduction I present the research question and discuss its relevance and importance, as well as the salience of the two case studies, followed by the explanation of my theoretical framework, a review of secondary literature on the topic, and the details of my research methodology. In chapter one I explore a variety of arguments that have been made by academics and practitioners regarding the decline in troop contributions.
contributions from the West. Chapter two covers my first case study – Canada – and chapter three covers New Zealand.

I argue that although the factors that determine countries’ troop contributions are unique and shaped by domestic as much as international circumstances, the wider trend in the West of decreasing troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, while increasing troop contributions to non-UN peacekeeping operations can be explained by building on the security community concept. As such, any return to UN peacekeeping is likely to occur throughout the West or not at all. I also argue that in order for the West to re-engage with UN peacekeeping, both Western governments and the UN must take steps towards redefining the parameters of troop participation in UN peace operations.
Introduction

This thesis explores the changing composition of United Nations peacekeeping troop contributions by examining the decline in troop contributions from the West.¹ It will provide an explanation for why Western states no longer believe that contributing troops to UN peacekeeping serves their national interests, and a theoretical context through which the current Western preference for contributing troops to alternative international peace and security mechanisms can be understood.

Each troop-contributing country has a unique relationship with UN peacekeeping and a variety of reasons for choosing to contribute. However since the end of the 1990s there has been an across-the-board decrease in troop contributions from Western countries. At the end of the 1990s contributions from Europe and the rest of the West began to decline rapidly while contributions from South Asia and Africa ballooned.² Although the UN has more peacekeepers around the world today than ever before, Western countries contribute only six percent of blue helmets.³

There are many obvious explanations for the decline in Western troop contributions: the demand of the ‘global war on terror’ (including wars in Afghanistan and Iraq); the low UN troop reimbursement rate; and the larger number of organizations involved in peacekeeping beyond the UN. However, although these factors are important to consider and do influence every contributor’s decision-making process, the fact that contributions have decreased all across the Western world points to more systemic issues. Almost every Western contributor sent more contingent troops and military experts to

¹ See Annex 1 for a complete list of countries comprising ‘The West’ for the purposes of this thesis.
UN peacekeeping missions from 1990-2001 than they have since then.⁴ Even states that were once firm believers in internationalism have all but abandoned UN peacekeeping, providing the most striking illustration of this decline.

Twenty-five years ago Western countries contributed seventy-three percent of UN peacekeeping troops. The majority of these troops came from states with a strong commitment to Internationalism: a “political ideology that advocates greater cooperation among nation-states in the pursuit of peace through the creation of international law and institutions.”⁵ During the Cold War and the 1990s these countries, including Canada, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand were known as ‘Internationalists’, and maintained a strong belief in the legitimacy and ability of the UN to ensure international peace and security and to uphold international law and order. Contributions from these countries tended to be relatively consistent over time and made to UN operations across the globe.

Some internationalists were also known at the UN as ‘middle powers’ – a status pursued by Canada after World War II to recognize the military and financial contributions it had made to the allied victory and to solidify its rank and the rank of other similar countries below the P5, but above other states.⁶ In addition to Canada, self-identified Western middle powers included Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium and Sweden.⁷ Canada argued that middle powers “could be entrusted to use their power responsibly in the interest of the world community.”⁸ When examining the decline in contributions to UN operations from the West, the decline from internationalist middle powers is particularly notable. A decrease in troop contributions from countries that had for decades

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⁴ The most notable exception to this is Italy, currently the highest ranked Western troop contributor. However Italy, which contributes around one percent of total UN troops, and the few other exceptions who contribute in small numbers, made insignificant contributions or no contributions at all during the 1990-2001 period, and currently contribute almost all of their troops to only one or two missions.


been ideologically aligned with, and dedicated to the organization's purpose begs further examination.

The past, current and future peacekeeping engagements of two such countries will be explored in further detail in this thesis. New Zealand and Canada have historically had a strong commitment to the UN, and been champions of its ultimate authority to sanction international responses to conflict. Both countries have a history of significant troops contributions to UN peacekeeping, but have decreased these contributions in the last ten to fifteen years. But New Zealand and Canada also have their differences: Canada has a medium size military of 66,000, whereas New Zealand’s defence forces number only 8,500. In addition, Canada is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, whereas New Zealand is not, despite participating in various NATO operations over the last two decades. These dissimilar relationships with NATO affect the level of commitment and responsibility each country has to the alliance. An examination of these two cases will reveal that their reasons for and attitudes towards contributing troops to UN peace operations differ in some ways, however their contributions have followed the same trajectory as other Western countries. Understanding why these two internationalists all but abandoned UN peacekeeping can provide clues as to why other Western militaries have done the same, and diverted their resources to non-UN operations.

Realist commentators have argued that the internationalism exhibited by middle powers is rooted in self-interest. But Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams point out “the balance of evidence suggests that these states were primarily guided by the internationalist idea that UN peace operations could play an important role in the prevention, management, and resolution of violent conflict.” In the mid-1990s Laura Neack argued that although middle powers were the most likely states to engage in UN peacekeeping to protect the international system, they did

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so because their national interests were "served by a continuation of the international status quo because in the status quo they have achieved relative affluence and influence." Neack therefore contended that sometimes it is in a state’s interest to pursue an internationalist foreign policy. If this still holds true, the current composition of UN troops indicates that the states once committed to providing peacekeepers no longer believe this to be essential to their national interests.

Realist arguments do not dispute the possibility that during the Cold War and the 1990s internationalists’ conviction and commitment to peacekeeping was real, however it also served them well, earning them a respected place in the international system: Ireland, for example, used its involvement in UN peacekeeping to assert its separation from the UK on the international stage; and Canada enjoyed a high degree of influence over UN peacekeeping issues, and a chance to differentiate itself from the US. Today, these countries still trade on their reputation as internationalists, however their small troop presence in UN peacekeeping suggests that their interpretations of internationalism has changed. The following chapter will explore some possible arguments for why and how the UN peacekeeping is longer perceived to be in the national interest of Western countries, and the subsequent case studies will look at if and how these arguments apply to Canada and New Zealand.

The timing of this research is fitting, as most Western nations have now completely or partially withdrawn large contributions to the US and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, theoretically freeing up capacity to contribute to peace operations elsewhere. At the same time UN peacekeeping has been expanding, with several sizeable missions mandated since 2011 (e.g. in South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic) and large established missions continuing to require significant military components (e.g. in the Democratic

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12 Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System(Oxon: Routledge, 2006).
Republic of Congo, Darfur, and Lebanon). Canada and New Zealand are both contributing historically low numbers of military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, and along with many of their Western counterparts now face the decision of how and where to contribute to international peace and security efforts in the post Afghanistan era.

**Theoretical Framework**

In order to provide a useful analysis of the decline in peacekeeping troop contributions from the West, it is essential to provide a definition of what ‘the West’ is. In the most commonly used political sense, ‘the West’ describes an interstate political space comprised of states in Europe and North America, and Australia, New Zealand and possibly Japan in the Pacific. But constructivists argue that rather than a geographical area or group of states united by a common cultural heritage, the West is a socially constructed political space.

Hellman, Herborth, Schlag and Weber argue that ‘the West’ has been “shaped by security semantics in which [it] features as the threatened, yet notoriously vague referent object that has to be defended against challenges.” The use of security semantics by state actors to transform subjects into matters of ‘security’, and in doing so enable extraordinary means to be used in the name of security, is termed ‘securitization’. Hellman et al. contend that the West has been becoming increasingly securitized in recent decades, moving away from a culture of restraint when it comes to the use of force, towards self-authorization. After World War II ‘the West’ was a collection of liberal democratic states with a commitment to peacefully resolving conflict between them. Today, with peace among the members of this community preserved through alliances and institutions, the West’s focus is on the external threats facing its norms, values and very existence, which results in the self-authorized measures it takes to

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14 Gunther Hellmann et al., “The West: A Securitising Community?,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 17, no. 3 (2014). For a complete list of Western countries see Annex I
protect itself. It is not surprising that in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, which were seen as targeting the very foundations of Western democracy and freedom, political rhetoric further securitized the West and produced a discursive shift towards “self-reinforcing processes of dramatization and escalation.”

For some scholars of international relations the process of securitization in the West involves conceptualizing Western states as a security community. This concept, pioneered by Karl Deutsch in 1957, is defined as “A group of people who have become integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” Deutsch argued that security communities are formed when the members of a community-region “posses a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness - a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-ness’, or a ‘we-feeling’ among states.” This concept is unique in its focus on processes and interactions between states to understand trends in international relations, rather than attributing historical change and trends to structure. The security community approach allows international relations scholars to conceive of the West as “a political space characterized by transnational processes of political association and integration... seen as the result of transformative processes such as the formation of collective identities through social learning.” This suggests that Canada and New Zealand are part of a Western security community not simply by virtue of being Anglo-Saxon former British colonies, but rather because of how their interactions with other Western states have influenced their values, norms and institutions.

Michael Barnett and Adler refined the concept of security communities in the 1990s as, “transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people

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maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” Barnett and Adler’s definition of security communities builds on Deutsch’s by providing further criteria with which to identify a security community, however it also moves away from Deutsch’s focus on transformative processes by assuming “community exists at the international level.” Despite Barnett and Adler’s refocusing of the concept, all three scholars agree that the existence of a security community does not contradict self-interested behavior by states. The benefits of belonging to a security community, such as avoiding conflict with other community members, are in the national interest of all states.

In addition to having shared expectations for peaceful change, Adler explains that people in security communities “institutionalize commonalities running through the whole region, including shared perceptions of external threats.” The shared perception of external threats is central to this thesis’s theory that Western states’ tend to respond in a similar way to threats to peace and security outside their borders. Although the focus of security community literature has been on the interactions and processes between the states within the community, this thesis builds on this concept to understand how security communities respond to external threats. Constructivist theory posits that national interests are formed through processes of social interaction: “transactions and interactions...generate reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests, and even collective identities.” Thus through their interactions and transactions states within the Western security community have developed similar conceptions of their broad national interests, and therefore take similar approaches to protecting or promoting these interests outside of the community as much as within.

The common national security interests of communities of states are often defended by collective or cooperative security arrangements. Multilateral
institutions are a way to formalize collective or cooperative security arrangements, and “can help diffuse and internalize norms and knowledge about how to peacefully resolve conflict – the norms and knowledge which form the basis of security communities – that can play a critical role in the social construction of these communities.”26 The Western security community has been reified through widespread membership of and affiliation with collective security organizations like NATO. In addition, collective historical experiences can bind states into a security community. British hegemony in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the twentieth century have contributed to the number of states who feel they share historical experiences and culture. Through continuous interaction and exchange, including on a military level, members of the community “may gain the ability to more or less predict one another’s behavior and come to know each other as trustworthy,”27 resulting, among other things, in increased interoperability at the military level.

NATO continues to be the major institutional framework binding and identifying states within the Western security community, who are all either members or partners of the organization.28 While realists might see the alliance as “an institutional solution to deal with a multifaceted set of threats and risks,”29 within the security community context it can be understood as an expression of shared values built on “mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration,”30 and reflective of a political culture of liberal democracy. The importance of this foundation is reflected in NATO’s approach to adding members and partners: emphasizing that states are inducted first and foremost into a community of shared values, rather than a simple collective security arrangement. In the case of New Zealand, which became an official NATO partner in 2012, participating in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan was an opportunity to demonstrate these

26 Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," 250.
27 Ibid., 254.
28 The only exception is EU member the Republic of Cyprus. The Island’s disputed status and Turkey’s refusal to recognize the (southern) Republic of Cyprus has made it impossible for Cyprus to join NATO. Judy Dempsey, "Between the European Union and NATO, Many Walls," The New York Times (2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/europe/25iht-letter.html?_r=0.
common values to the organization. Having shared values and norms is not only an important element of NATO membership, but also of security community membership.

Until the 1990s, the UN was seen by most states as the primary legitimate vehicle for responding to the breakdown of peace and security, as there were few other institutions or organizations taking on neutral peacekeeping roles. NATO’s raison d’être during the Cold War was the containment of the Soviet Union, which precluded it from taking on any kind of peace enforcement role. However during the mid-1990s NATO mounted its first peace support operation in the Balkans, the UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) made up on 60,000 troops. Since then NATO has continued to conduct crisis management operations, providing the Western security community with a mechanism for more robust responses to conflict.

In addition to taking on a peace enforcement role, since 9/11 NATO has replaced its geographical understanding of security with a functional one, allowing it to conduct operations outside of its traditional space (Europe and North America). The NATO-led operation in Afghanistan is an example of this functional expansion. Western states rallied to the cause, feeling that Al-Qaeda’s attacks and Taliban activities were a threat not only to their security, but also to Western values. Constructivist arguments contend that it is the collective identity of NATO members and key partners like Australia, New Zealand and Japan (i.e. the West) that has lead to the perception of collective threats, rather than the other way around.\(^{31}\) Essentially by being part of the security community and assuming the community’s collective identity, a state not only has the protection of the community, but is also subject to the threats it faces. This argument that can be used to understand why the West as a whole has reacted in relative concert to terrorist threats in the twenty-first century – because these threats are perceived to be directed against the entire Western security community. Terrorist attacks in the US, UK and against Westerners around the world have

\(^{31}\) Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy(Princeton University Press, 1997), 32.
reshaped the security priorities of Western states. As a result, contributing troops to UN peacekeeping has become a much lower priority than it had been in the 1990s.

The shifting security environment since the end of the Cold War has seen major changes in the way the West chooses to contribute troops to peace support operations. That and other factors that have brought about the decline in contributions to UN peacekeeping from the West will be discussed in the following chapter, however it is ultimately their membership in the Western security community (involving shared values, norms, and trust in each other), that is responsible for their similar approaches to maintaining and restoring international peace and security.

**Review of the Literature**

The decline specifically in Western troop contributions has received little attention in academic literature. Where the decline in Western peacekeeping troops has been recognized, it is usually in the context of an examination of top or emerging contributors, or the political, economic and normative implications of the division of labor that has occurred between financial contributors to UN peacekeeping and troop-contributing countries. Some scholars have used the available data on peacekeeping contributions to outline the demographic trends that have emerged in peacekeeping contributions, but

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have not offered any theoretical explanations for why these trends have occurred.34 Most of this literature tends to have a greater focus on the political, economic, security, institutional and normative factors that motivate or inhibit countries from contributing troops to peacekeeping operations.35 Case studies of Western contributors have been lacking in the last decade, with a notable exception being the International Peace Institute’s ‘Providing for Peacekeeping Project’. This project has made some progress in examining Western contributors by compiling profiles of troop-contributors outlining recent trends, decision-making processes, rationales for and barriers to contributing, current challenges and issues, key champions and opponents, and capabilities and caveats of troop contributions.36

Bellamy and Williams have produced significant work on the subject of UN peacekeeping troop contributions, with a primary focus on the rationales and inhibitors behind countries’ decisions to contribute or not contribute, and the UN’s push to broaden the troop-contributing base.37 Their book Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions provides excellent insights, however case studies are of countries who already contribute significant numbers of troops and the five permanent


members of the Security Council. Although the authors acknowledge the downward trend in peacekeeping contributions from the West and the increase in contributions from other parts of the world, the overarching argument put forth in this work is that all countries approach this issue from a different perspective, largely influenced by their individual strategic cultures. 38 Whereas Bellamy and Williams’ work is useful for understanding the differences between contributors, this thesis acknowledges these differences but seeks to explain the similarities between a particular group of contributors.

Bellamy and Williams have also authored one of the only articles focusing on the West and contemporary peace operations, particularly in terms of troop contributions.39 However this article is more descriptive than analytical in its exploration of troop contribution trends, and does not suggest a theoretical framework with which to contextualize trends in Western contribution patterns. They do, however, note the important role played by other multilateral peacekeeping institutions, such as NATO, in competing for Western troop contributions. In the following chapters the role that regional organizations and alliances, especially NATO, have had in changing peacekeeping troop demographics will be discussed.

This thesis is also unique in its examination of two reputed internationalists whose former commitment to UN peacekeeping has waned. In the case of Canada, although some academics have tackled the issue of the country’s UN troop contribution decrease, most have looked primarily at domestic concerns and factors leading to the decline, and not considered how this issue fits into a greater Western trend.40 In New Zealand there has been considerably less

38 “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions.”
discussion surrounding the decline in UN peacekeeping contributions, although it has been touched upon in the last year in policy and academic circles, and in the media, particularly in the context of the country’s successful 2015-2016 Security Council bid. There has been little analysis of the domestic factors and attitudes contributing to this decline and no discussion of how New Zealand’s choices on this issue are influenced by international relations. This thesis aims to fill these gaps in the literature.

By examining Canadian and New Zealand peacekeeping in the context of a general decline in Western troop contributions this thesis provides an original perspective on the issue. These two cases cannot be used to completely understand the behavior of all Western states in terms of UN troop contributions, as every country’s reasons for contributing are molded by a myriad of domestic and international factors. They can however, be used to understand why despite the different motivations and inhibitions every troop contributor or potential troop contributor has, troop contributions from Western countries have followed a similar trajectory. This thesis is unique in using specific cases as a means to explore a theoretical framework contextualizing the systemic decline in Western troop contributions to UN peacekeeping.


42 The exception being Dr. Bethan Greener, "Contributor Profile: New Zealand," Providing For Peacekeeping(2013), www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/profiles/. This profile outlines recent trends in New Zealand troop contributions, rationales and decision-making processes for contributing, and challenges and issues associated with contributing troops to UN peacekeeping.
Research Methodology

This research relied heavily on UN and national military data to review and illustrate trends in peacekeeping troop contributions and to understand countries’ levels of commitment. One of the greatest problems with data on peacekeeping contributions presented by the UN and other organizations, and with the analysis offered by academics based on this data, is that it tends to rank contributing countries based on the aggregate number of troops they have provided, rather than focusing on the size of the contribution relative to each country’s standing capabilities. For example, a contributor with a 200,000 strong military that contributes 10,000 peacekeepers is actually contributing less of its available capacity than a contributor with a 15,000 strong military that deploys 1,000 peacekeepers. UN rankings would rank the latter country as a lower contributor than the former, simply because it is far easier to present data based on aggregate numbers than to calculate the percentage of national forces dedicated to peacekeeping operations for every troop contributor. It would be a major and complex exercise for the UN to provide statistics based on the percentage of national forces dedicated to peacekeeping, and would require each contributor to submit data on the size of their armed forces. However, in their analysis of troop contributions, academics should at the very least make this observation, and consider if and how looking at contributions as a percentage of national military capabilities could benefit their research. When looking at percentages or total numbers of national armed forces provided to peacekeeping it is also important to note that the total commitment of a country is in reality usually three times larger; for each unit deployed, another is in pre-deployment mode, and another has just returned from deployment.

This thesis focused on troop deployments to UN peacekeeping, and therefore does not explore at length the other types of contributions to peace and security efforts countries make. Training and capacity building, fighting organized crime, arms, drug and people smuggling are all useful efforts that contribute to preventing or managing conflict, however the efficacy of these measures is not easily quantifiable. In addition, while some states have the technology, capacity and resources to provide these alternative efforts, many do not. What makes
troop contributions politically significant is that any country with armed forces can make one, but it requires a government’s willingness to sacrifice the lives of men and women in its armed forces to protect civilians and keep the peace in a foreign conflict. This sacrifice cannot be compared to non-combat contributions. Although the concentration of this thesis does not diminish the importance of non-troop contributions that countries make, the focus on troop contributions is a more effective and realistic benchmark for comparing commitment to the UN as a vehicle for conflict management.

In addition, while police contributions are an essential element of UN peacekeeping, this thesis and the data provided focus solely on military personnel – contingent troops, and military experts, including observers. The UN’s process of generating formed police units and individual police is separate from its military force generation process, and in many countries the procedures and decision-making processes for contributing police are different as well. Police also make up a significantly smaller portion of personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping, and several missions don’t have any police at all. It should be noted that police contributions from the West have followed similar patterns as troop contributions; however excluding police contributions from this research has allowed this thesis to remain cohesive and concise.

It must be noted that the research processes for the two case studies presented in this thesis differed in their approach. Given its illustrious and well-documented history as a peacekeeper, there is substantial scholarly work about Canada’s peacekeeping involvement and troop contributions, particularly from the 1990s and early 2000s. In New Zealand, conversely, troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have not received as much scholarly or media attention. However given that this research was conducted in New Zealand, a number of military and government officials familiar with the issue were interviewed and consulted. Members of the academic community also provided useful insights into New Zealand’s peacekeeping past and present. The research for this case

was, therefore, based on more primary sources than the research for the Canada case study, and although both cases have received thorough coverage and analysis in this thesis, given the difference in research methods, the presentation and analysis of these cases differs slightly.

A final note is that although the UN is not the only organization conducting peacekeeping operations, operations conducted by NATO and Western coalitions often do not fall within the definition of peacekeeping per se. They may, however, be referred to as peace enforcement, or peace support operations, and will be referred to as such in this thesis. Although the ultimate goals of wider peace support operations may not differ greatly from those of peacekeeping missions, their means do; the three basic principles of peacekeeping – consent of parties to the conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of mandate – are often all or partially lacking in non-UN peace support operations.
Chapter 1
Why the West Won't Contribute

This chapter will outline the major changes in the composition of peacekeeping troop contributions, and explore a set of possible arguments for why the decline in troop contributions from the West has occurred. Although these factors have undoubtedly driven the decline in troop contributions to some extent, when considered within the theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter, the systemic decline in Western troop contributions can begin to be understood. Some of these arguments can be applied to the case studies explored in the following chapters and facilitate an understanding of how individual Western states are affected by wider troop peacekeeping trends.

Overview
During the Cold War there was a divide in the West between the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council (also known as the P3: US, UK and France) who largely abstained from contributing troops to peacekeeping in order to preserve the organization’s commitment to neutrality,\(^{44}\) and Western countries actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations. However, after the Cold War the permanent members of the Security Council, in particular the P3, contributed significant troops and equipment to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia and Latin America. The divide between the countries that had been devoted contributors for decades and the P3, who had been kept out of peacekeeping for fear they would use it as a tool pursue national interest, began to erode. However even when the P3 were making considerable contributions to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, their contributions tended to be made to regions in which they had political or strategic interests.\(^{45}\)

\(^{44}\) Bellamy and Williams, "The West and Contemporary Peace Operations."
whereas other Western countries, particularly those with a strong ideological commitment to UN peacekeeping, contributed to a much wider range of UN peacekeeping operations, both geographically and politically. But as peacekeeping troop contributions from the West began to decline in the late 1990s, the distinction between the major powers’ troop contribution patterns and those of other Western countries faded even further.

The decline in contributions from Western internationalists, such as Canada, New Zealand, Ireland and the Scandinavian states, may seem surprising as for decades they had made consistent contributions to UN peacekeeping and shown a strong commitment to the Organization’s principles. However Adler and Barnett contend that the norms, identities and interests of a security community are often driven by its more powerful members: “power can be a magnet; in a community formed around a group of strong powers, weaker members will expect to share the security and (potentially) other benefits associated with the stronger ones.”46 Although the P3 did not contribute troops in great numbers to UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, they were supportive of countries that did, and contributed to these operations in other ways, without diverting contributions to non-UN peace operations. The difference in the last two decades is that Western great powers are not only no longer contributing troops to UN peacekeeping, they have also established other mechanisms for conflict management and protection of national interests, such as coalition and NATO peace support operations. These stronger members of the community inevitably drew the ‘weaker’ states (including those that had been heavily committed to UN conflict management mechanisms) away from UN peacekeeping as their strategic priorities changed.

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46 “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities,” 83.
Peacekeeping data leaves little room for argument over whether or not Western troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have decreased, both numerically and as a percentage of total troop contributions. In November of 1993 Western countries contributed over 36,000 troops to UN peacekeeping missions, primarily in the former Yugoslavia, but in November 2014 their contributions stood at less than 6,000 military personnel. In addition, the percentage of total UN peacekeeping troops contributed from Western countries has plummeted from a high of seventy-three percent in 1990 to six percent in 2014. The following possible arguments have been made to explain this remarkable shift.

**Peacekeeping in the 1990s**

At the end of the Cold War the “reconceptualization of security encompassed a more individual-centered notion of security – ‘human security’ – and the understanding that conflict and insecurity are inextricably linked to underdevelopment and inequality.” As such Western powers saw peace and security issues in Africa, Latin America and Asia as global security concerns. This

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**Figure 1.1**


**Wiharta, Melvin, and Avezov, "The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations," 3.**
conceptualization of conflict resulted in significant troop contributions from Western countries to what were originally humanitarian focused UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, and to a lesser extent Rwanda. The harrowing experiences of Western peacekeepers in these operations has been cited as a factor that has deterred Western countries from contributing large numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping since:49 “States are often concerned about damaging their reputation by deploying troops to operations that are likely to fail. Negative experiences such as those of Belgium in Rwanda, the Netherlands in Srebrenica, and the UK in Bosnia and Herzegovina have made some states more risk averse with regards to UN peacekeeping.”50

It may seem counterintuitive that deploying peacekeepers through a multilateral organization could be detrimental to a country’s standing in the international community, however many Western contributors are haunted by these past UN operations and the negative impact they have had on their reputation as peacekeepers, or on the government’s domestic popularity. It is no coincidence that Western contributions to UN peacekeeping declined after many of these countries had made large troop contributions to notoriously ineffective peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda during the 1990s (see Figure 1.1). The political and military impotence imposed on troops by ineffectual mandates also curbed domestic appetites for peacekeeping involvement and in many cases, increased antipathy towards the UN in military establishments and among policymakers.51 Allegations of human trafficking, torture, rape and other human rights violations have plagued troop-contributing countries, particularly during the 1990s, causing many to be wary of the reputational risk of participating in UN peacekeeping.

Some Western contributors also suffered from body bag syndrome, finding that domestic support for peace operations dropped dramatically when fatalities

50 Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions,” 420.
51 Ibid.
occurred. This was the case in the United States after the ill-fated “Black Hawk Down” incident when 18 US soldiers operating with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were killed. Bellamy and Williams argue that for some countries the risk of incurring casualties is a major consideration when deciding whether or not to contribute to peace operations, as casualties may not be tolerated for operations that are not associated with national defence or core security interests.52 “In theory, this makes it politically risky for leaders to provide more UN peacekeepers. In practice, it often means that the question of contributing more is not seriously raised and debated.”53 The influential role the media can play in disseminating this kind of information and shaping public reactions to it has prompted many governments to consider what the media response to casualties might be before committing to contribute troops.54

The ghosts of peacekeeping operations past have had a huge impact on attitudes towards UN peacekeeping within the military establishments of many Western countries, with antipathy towards UN peacekeeping burgeoning at the end of the 1990s.55 In many Western militaries, including the US, Canada, France and the UK, overt resistance to peacekeeping persists, stemming from a lack of confidence in UN command and control structures and unsuitable mandates. In addition, after that period of intense peacekeeping activity some countries feared that continuous training and deployment of armed forces to peacekeeping would detract from their ability to conduct high-tempo combat operations. As former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously put it with reference to peacekeeping in the Balkans, “We don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”56 Some militaries that had been heavily involved in peacekeeping during the 1990s felt ill prepared for the operational environment they encountered as part of the NATO-led International Security

53 Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions,” 20.
54 In New Zealand this is informally referred to by officials as ‘The Dominion Post test’, referring to a major newspaper circulated in the capital city, Wellington.
55 Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions.”
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Critics of peacekeeping also point to other detrimental consequences of peacekeeping: “less funds spent on weapons systems needed for fighting wars; less time for combat training; dependency on the UN’s ad hoc system of deployment; fewer links to their NATO colleagues.”

As a result, most Western militaries have no internal incentives for participating in peacekeeping. Even militaries that do not have an overt aversion to UN peacekeeping may not have factored UN peacekeeping into their internal rewards system, removing any career incentive for becoming a peacekeeper.

**Exceptionalism**

Bellamy and Williams also contend that the ‘Politics of Exceptionalism’ is another factor that has inhibited troop contributions to UN peacekeeping and motivated countries to establish alternatives mechanisms. This “influential strand of exceptionalism promotes a self-image of possessing unique interests, responsibilities, capabilities, and/or perspectives.” As such “These states tend to see UN peacekeeping as somebody else’s job, or in instrumental terms as a foreign policy tool, a vehicle for advancing regional and global interests, or as a means of supporting diplomatic/peacemaking activities.” States that cultivate this kind of self-image are more likely to see other institutions and mechanisms as viable conflict management options, and to be highly selective about where and how they do contribute to UN missions. Exceptionalist countries expect to have greater influence over the design and planning of missions they have contributed to, and in some cases expect a high degree of independence when it come to command and control.

The US, UK and France are the three most obvious Western countries with exceptionalist tendencies. Adam Smith identifies exceptionalism as one of the factors contributing to the United States’ low troop contributions, as the US has historically objected to foreigners commanding its troops. The UK Ministry of

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57 Kevan Scott (retd. Lt. Col. New Zealand Army), in discussion with the author, December 2014
59 “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions.”
60 Ibid., 419.
61 Ibid.
62 “United States of America,” ibid., ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams.
Defence stated in 2003 that “since it is one of the few states that can provide troops capable of conducting robust, ‘first in’ expeditionary missions in ‘challenging circumstances’, it ‘would expect to play a lesser part in enduring operations where many other countries can contribute’.”63 The expectations of exceptionalist states contrast with the reality of official UN policies and as such, often inhibit countries of this nature from contributing troops to UN peacekeeping. A former UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Force Generation Service official confirmed the impact of exceptionalism in the force generation process, attesting, “many Western countries try to impose their own standards on the UN and can be very demanding of the [organization]. Deployment means and times never seem appropriate [to them].”64 Since the 1990s the detrimental effect exceptionalism has had on UN peacekeeping has grown as an increasing number of Western states are exhibiting exceptionalist tendencies. This may be because the number of organizations and coalitions to which countries can contribute troops has grown, the result being that Western countries that don’t like the conditions of contributing troops to the UN have alternatives.

**Choices – How to Contribute and What to Contribute To**

Although Western troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have steadily decreased since the 1990s, most Western countries have not significantly decreased the number of troops they send to peace support operations more broadly. Instead it has simply become more common for them to contribute to non-UN missions. As Walter Dorn argues:

> The precarious situation in Bosnia from 1992-95 led many nations...to believe that peacekeeping must be made more robust. When the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in late 1995, NATO replaced the UN as the provider of peacekeeping forces. Although it was a new role for NATO, the military organization managed to do well, having far more troops, resources, and enforcement capability than the UN.65

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64 Watters, email message to author
At the beginning of the 2000s some 40,000 peacekeepers were deployed in NATO, OSCE and coalition operations. In addition to operations conducted wholly independently of the UN, Bellamy and Williams point to the increase in what they refer to as ‘hybrid missions’ – non-UN financed missions that work in tandem with UN forces. Hybrid missions can be conducted for a variety of reasons: to prepare the security environment prior to the arrival of a UN mission; to work alongside UN troops providing military security; to provide on the ground support to a beleaguered UN mission; or to perform a deterrent or even enforcement role in support of a beleaguered mission.

Examples of hybrid missions include the Australian-led multinational mission in East Timor (INTERFET), which prepared the security environment for the establishment of a UN mission in 1999, and the UK’s Operation Palliser in support of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000, which provided the UN mission greater enforcement capabilities against spoilers. A recent example is the European Union (EU) mission in the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) in 2014, which aimed to prepare the security environment for the arrival of the UN’s peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA. In most hybrid missions Western forces are commanded independently of UN command structures, either by national commands or Western commands within an organization such as the EU or NATO. Although the majority are explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council, some hybrid missions take place without this authorization, in which case there is usually host government approval and general consensus from the UN Secretary General and members of the Security Council.

Hybrid missions have become more frequent and popular with Western governments and militaries because forces are commanded outside of UN command structures - structures that many countries found problematic in the 1990s. Hybrid operations also allow Western states to “limit the scale, scope

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66 “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations.”
67 Ibid.
and timing of their contribution to peace operations.”69 Again, this was popular after drawn out UN engagements in the 1990s which, lacking clear exit strategies, cost troop contributors casualties and money and soured public opinion towards UN peacekeeping.

The increasing Western preference for contributing troops to hybrid missions, or operations wholly conducted by organizations other than the UN, such as NATO or the EU, suggests that many Western states feel that their forces can be more efficient in these other formats. The UK Ministry of Defence’s statement about expecting to play a smaller role in enduring operations because of their ability to conduct robust expeditionary missions is indicative of this belief. In addition, deploying troops to hybrid or wholly non-UN missions means that Western militaries are more likely to operate alongside other Western partners and militaries that have similar standards of training and equipment. Deploying, with other members of the Western security community, with which they have built a sense of trust and partnership, may increase Western countries’ confidence in these operations.

Although the rise in hybrid and non-UN missions may give the impression that most Western countries’ preference for working with each other has increased, this may not actually be the case. Before Western states began diverting troops from UN peacekeeping operations, they were largely contributing troops to missions that had high levels of Western participation in any case. One example is UNPROFOR where at its highest force levels in September 1994 sixty-two percent of troops and observers were from Western countries.70 Although Western troops generally worked well with non-Western peacekeepers, there were some well-publicized issues that negatively influenced the way some Western militaries felt about working with non-Western peacekeepers with inferior training, equipment and commitment. For example, The Canadian Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Roméo Dallaire, wrote in his account of the Rwandan genocide that he was shocked and appalled

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70 Data from United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors Data Dashboard".
by the preparation and behavior of the mission’s Bangladeshi contingent. He claims the Bangladeshis were an added logistical burden for the mission and frequently sabotaged their own vehicles so as to avoid duties. He was convinced “Bangladesh had only deployed its contingent for selfish aims: the training, the financial compensation and the equipment they intended to take home with them” and that the contingent could not be relied upon.\textsuperscript{71}

Katharina Coleman explains that Western countries that still participate in UN peacekeeping generally do so in two ways: on the condition that they can either command their own troops or have their troops under the command of a like-minded country;\textsuperscript{72} or by making only token contributions to missions where they can put their personnel in key positions, such as staff officers and military observers.\textsuperscript{73} Token contributions are especially popular with Western countries because they do not require committing high numbers of personnel, and they establish a state as a troop contributor, providing it access to operational and political information circulated within the mission, and membership on the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C34). As Canada’s lone officer with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) noted, “As long as there is a Canadian contribution, the Canadian ambassador to the UN goes to all the meetings, is privy to all the information, and has a say in what happens with the mission. Whether your contingent is a thousand or it’s one, you still have a voice.”\textsuperscript{74}

This popular Western contribution patterns allows countries to maintain a degree of influence and oversight in UN peacekeeping while contributing forces to operations outside of the UN command and control structures, allowing for

\textsuperscript{71} Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda\textsuperscript{\textregistered}\textsuperscript{(New York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 2003)}, 205.

\textsuperscript{72} An example of the former is the Strategic Military Cell, established in 2006 when troops from Italy, France and Spain were deployed to UNIFIL. The UN made a special arrangement with the EU allowing for this cell to be staffed by troops from these countries to handle command and communications issues between UNHQ and the mission.

\textsuperscript{73} Coleman, "Innovations in 'African Solutions to African Problems': The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa."

most robust operations than the UN Security Council would ever mandate for a UN peacekeeping operation, faster deployment and often shorter engagement.

**Peacekeeping in the Post-9/11 Security Environment**

The experiences of peacekeepers in the 1990s undoubtedly played a role in the decrease in Western troop contributions to UN peacekeeping. However the beginning of the twenty-first century brought with it new security challenges and understandings of conflict that have also shaped the way the West chooses to respond to peace and security threats. Sharon Wiharta, Neil Melvin and Xenia Avezov argue that contemporary understandings of conflict have shifted away from the human security focus and there has been a “downgrading of the significance of political claims and grievances for conflict relative to the economic and criminal dimensions of organized violence.”

Conflict is often linked to organized crime and terrorism and viewed as “taking place in the context of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states...As such, conceptions of armed conflict have increasingly merged with the law and order agenda...provid[ing] the basis for intrusive peace operations...” Key factors in this reconceptualization of conflict and intervention were the 2001 attacks on the United States, the 2002 Bali attack which killed over 100 Westerners, the 2005 attacks in London, and the ensuing fight against Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The consequence has been that the security priorities of Western countries have undergone major revision since 2001, with a greater focus on national security than on human security.

The terrorist attacks on the US and UK instilled a sense of vulnerability in the citizens of Western countries and led to strong support for participation in coalition combat operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen argues that the 9/11 attacks showed the “globality of security in the late-modern world. Where Americans traditionally could safely assume that

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76 Ibid.
wars took place beyond the horizon, 78 9/11 brought the war to them. He also contends, “The events of 11 September were of such significance because they were constructed as a scenario for security threats in the twenty-first century,” 79 exposing the reflexive nature of security policy. The attacks were touted as a 'wake-up call', a vision of a future the West had to protect itself against. This rhetoric resulted in further securitization of the Western security community and a major shift in the security priorities of Western states. In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center the fallen buildings were imbued with symbolism, 80 increasing the feeling that the attack had been against Western values rather than just two buildings. This increased the feeling of solidarity in the Western security community and even Western states that were not directly targeted with terror attacks, including Canada and New Zealand, were swept into the fight, primarily in Afghanistan.

Although the UN was quick to condemn the 9/11 attacks and the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 outlining immediate steps and strategies to combat international terrorism, it did not have the capabilities to lead a robust military response, nor is that its role. While Western militaries fought in Afghanistan and Iraq the UN continued to tend to other intrastate crises that unfolded around the world in the 2000s, particularly in Africa. With Western countries preoccupied by a war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, African peacekeeping missions become a low priority for Western governments. Peacekeeping expert Mark Malan wrote in 2002 about the probability of the response to 9/11 overshadowing African peacekeeping, predicting, “peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa must inevitably take a back seat to the war on terror.” 81

Although the number of Western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has significantly decreased in recent years, new security crises have emerged to take their place.

79 Ibid., 327.
80 Anthony King, Spaces of Global Cultures: Architecture, Urbanism, Identity(Routledge, 2004).
Western countries are currently preoccupied with The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a well organized, well funded and well trained group taking advantage of the disorder of the Syrian civil war and the weak Iraqi state to carve out their own state built on fundamentalist Islamic thought and antipathy towards the West. Although ISIL presents a far greater direct threat to the people living in the areas it operates in than it does to the West, terrorist attacks by ISIL sympathizers in Western countries and the group’s strong anti-West rhetoric have made it easy for states in the Western security community to portray the group as a threat to their liberal democratic values and security. As Wiharta et al. suggest, the response to the threat of ISIL is seen largely in the context of failed and failing states (in this case Syria and Iraq) and has resulted in Western coalition airstrikes as well as strong logistics, intelligence and training support for security forces in Iraq.

Although the UN may eventually be called upon to play a nation-building role in Iraq and/or Syria, the general consensus in the West and beyond is that ISIL must be combatted with swift and direct force. However there is also an aversion in most Western countries to another military engagement on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, and therefore governments have so far been reluctant to contribute ground troops to operations against ISIL. But as long as Western countries feel that their interests and security are threatened by unrest in the Middle East this could continue to draw the military resources of Western states away from UN peacekeeping, even if troops are not being deployed on the ground. If this is the case, and crises in Africa continue to be seen as less urgent peace and security threats, they will be left for non-Western troops to respond to.
Another key factor in the decline in troop contributions to UN missions from the West is the fact that the bulk of the UN’s current operations and 80% of blue helmets are deployed in Africa. The demographics of peacekeeping forces in these missions are overwhelmingly African and South Asian,\(^\text{83}\) and troop contributions from Western countries are generally in small numbers and located in the safest areas of a mission. Seventy-nine percent of Western troops that are currently serving in UN missions are in the Middle East and Europe, including sixty-three percent with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Top Western contributors France, Italy and Spain have almost all of their UN troops in Lebanon, an area of strategic significance for former colonial power France. Other Western countries are more comfortable contributing to UNIFIL given the significant Western make up and command of its force. As Malan hypothesized, the war on terror has removed the focus from African conflicts and peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Africa. Western participation in African


\(^{83}\) Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have been the three largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping for over a decade and their contributions have always been geographically varied, including significant participation in African peacekeeping missions.
peacekeeping missions was higher in the 1990s in missions including UNOSOM in Somalia, UNAMIR in Rwanda and ONUMOZ in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{84} It is clear from the composition of forces in the UN’s African peacekeeping missions that these conflicts are no longer strategic priorities for most Western countries. In addition, when Western countries do engage in African conflicts in any significant way, it is often through unilateral interventions with worryingly neocolonial agendas. France, in particular, has deployed unilaterally to manage conflicts in several of its former colonies, including Mali, the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire.

Since the 1990s the UN has exhibited increasing willingness to authorize regional organizations to conduct peace operations on its behalf, a conflict management approach known as Chapter VIII peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{85} This has increased the number of organizations involved in peacekeeping efforts in Africa, however despite the efforts of the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the UN is still essential to African peace and security, and UN peacekeeping operations often provide support to regional operations.\textsuperscript{86} In Darfur the UN and AU have a hybrid operation, and in several countries including Liberia, Mali, and the Central African Republic, UN peacekeeping missions replaced initial AU or ECOWAS missions, re-hatting troops. Increased Western involvement in African peacekeeping would be welcomed by the UN, for although African troop contributors can provide manpower, many cannot provide the equipment or specialized units that these peacekeeping missions require, resulting in a ‘commitment-capability gap’.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{84} "Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data".
\textsuperscript{85} For more on Chapter VII peacekeeping see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Wider Peacekeeping," in Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?,” International Relations 11, no. 2 (1992).
The rise of Chapter VIII peacekeeping has provided potential contributors with more choice of where and what to contribute to. Deploying with a regional organization like NATO, or with a regionally based multilateral force is often a more attractive option for Western contributors because they are more likely to be deploying with defence partners, and in most cases can deploy faster and conduct operations more efficiently than a UN peacekeeping mission could. In addition, as regional organizations are increasingly involved in peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, there have been innumerable calls for ‘African solutions to African problems’, and the disengagement of the West from these conflicts.88 The increasing focus on regional responses to conflict in some parts of the world can be problematic in terms of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, as some potential troop contributors reserve troops to respond to regional conflicts rather than contributing more broadly.89

88 Coleman, "Innovations in 'African Solutions to African Problems': The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa."
89 This appears to be the case in New Zealand where in recent years the government’s policies on peace operations have focused on maintaining the capacity to respond to crises in their immediate region, while contributions to missions elsewhere have declined. See New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, "Peace Support Operations Review," 1.
The rise of new international powers has been reflected in UN troop contributions, with countries like India and China now sending significant numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping. According to Wiharta et al. “The emergence of a new set of states as powerful international actors will probably constitute a challenge to existing international security arrangements.” They also contend that challenges to existing international security structures, frameworks and norms may result in increasing separation between UN operations (that non-Western countries contribute to) and Western coalition or regional organization peace support operations. Western powers have shown a much greater willingness to lift limitations on the use of force in peace operations, whereas major UN troop contributors have been critical of the fact that while Western powers are willing to authorize robust UN peacekeeping missions, “they are unwilling to deploy personnel to these missions and are

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90 Data from "Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data".
reluctant to share or transfer necessary technology to Global South contributors."  

The increase in the number of UN troop-contributing countries in the last two and a half decades, especially non-Western countries that rank as top contributors, has diluted the influence that many Western countries once had over peacekeeping issues. As with financial contributions, the larger a country’s troop contributions are, the more sway they might be expected to have over peacekeeping matters. Even if they only have one vote in the UN General Assembly, major troop-contributors can claim high-ranking positions in peacekeeping missions and in the UN Secretariat. Twenty-five years ago Western countries were not only the largest financial contributors but also the largest UN troop contributors, whereas today troop contributors with the most influence over peacekeeping matters are primarily from South Asia and Africa. Many of these new contributors pay a significantly smaller portion of the annual peacekeeping budget, and therefore a burden-sharing arrangement has emerged whereby there is a division between major financial contributors and major troop contributors, with very few countries belonging to both groups. The result is that today more countries are involved in deciding peacekeeping matters – political, operational and administrative – than ever before.

It is unclear whether the rise in new peacekeepers has driven Western states to choose alternative conflict management frameworks, or whether the Western states’ preference for alternative conflict management frameworks has made room for new peacekeepers to step in. Regardless, with a greater number of countries contributing troops to the UN, there is less pressure for Western countries to contribute. However, the Secretariat does still seek support from Western contributors whose training, technology and experience can be critical in carrying out the UN’s increasingly complex mandates.

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93 Ibid., 9.
95 Heldt, "Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities."
The division at the UN between countries that contribute money and countries that contribute soldiers is also to an extent a division between countries that are more able and willing to undertake robust missions and those that prefer traditional peacekeeping. Not all contributors have the political will to engage in operations that are likely to require the use of armed force, however UN peacekeeping has undoubtedly become more robust since the 1990s. As Wiharta et al. argue: “It is widely accepted that one of the central tasks of contemporary peace operations is POC [protection of civilians]. Increasingly, this has meant providing UN missions with robust mandates, including the use of force, in order to protect civilians.” The most robust mandate to date granted the use of offensive force to some troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo, however despite these developments the UN has not come close to conducting the kind of peace enforcement missions that NATO and Western coalitions have embraced. It is unlikely the UN will ever conduct those kinds of missions, particularly given the resistance from major non-Western troop contributors, and as a result Western countries that prefer more robust peace support operations will continue to contribute troops outside of the UN.

As well as feeling a lack of pressure from the UN to contribute, and preferring more robust peace support operation frameworks, Walter Dorn argues that Western contributors generally prefer to deploy their troops to NATO operations rather than UN missions because “the military structure is usually better defined, the number of troops deployed is larger, the level of support is usually greater, and partner nations are generally better equipped and trained than in UN

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missions."

Although throughout the history of peacekeeping there have been many cases of Western and non-Western blue helmets working exceptionally well together, the distribution of Western troops in peacekeeping missions (i.e. the clumping of most troops in certain missions) could be an indication of a Western preference for working alongside traditional partners. By participating in NATO operations Western countries are automatically working alongside like-minded partners, given the organization’s strong focus on shared values. And while Western countries have to compete with non-Western contributors for command positions in UN missions, in missions led by NATO, the EU, and Western coalitions they are guaranteed these valued conditions.

**Economic Disincentives**

In addition to the political and security factors driving the West away from UN peacekeeping, the decline also has an economic component. The UN’s troop reimbursement rates are insufficient to cover the costs most militaries incur when training and equipping troops for peacekeeping deployments, and the purchase and operating costs of the high-tech equipment Western countries favor. Additionally, in the post-financial crisis environment more Western countries are sticking to a ‘doing more with less’ model, particularly when it comes to defence. Although there should be an altruistic element to contributing troops to a peacekeeping mission, for most Western contributors the cost is too high for an activity that is considered low priority against the national interest. Conversely, countries are not reimbursed at all for participation in NATO operations, however considering their perceived relevance to Western national interests countries are prepared to shoulder the financial consequences. Although there was a review of the troop reimbursement system in 2013, and a new rate of reimbursement was suggested by the General Assembly in 2014.

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100 Bellamy and Williams, "Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions."; Coleman, "Innovations in 'African Solutions to African Problems': The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa."


it is unlikely that a flat rate of reimbursement will ever come close to covering the costs incurred by Western militaries. A reimbursement rate based on capability rather than numbers of personnel would better serve these advanced militaries, however it would be unpopular with developing contributors.

Conclusion
The factors discussed in this chapter have impacted each Western nation in a different way, however the cumulative effect has been the draining of Western troops from UN peacekeeping. Many of these troops and resources have subsequently been injected into non-UN led peace support operations, which have proven a convenient excuse for Western countries not to contribute troops to UN missions. Today many of these non-UN operations are coming to an end, or have already accomplished their objectives, and Western governments suddenly find themselves with troops at their disposal. The following cases of two former established troop contributors will test the validity of some of the arguments presented in this chapter. In addition, the exploration of Canada and New Zealand’s negligible troop contributions in the following chapters demonstrates the importance of the security community concept in understanding the systemic decline in Western troop contributions, despite each Western nation’s disparate attitudes and approaches to UN peacekeeping.
Chapter 2
Canada

Canada has one of the greatest legacies in United Nations peacekeeping of any Western troop contributor. At the end of the twentieth century Canada had supplied approximately ten percent of total UN peacekeeping troops and had contributed to almost every peacekeeping mission since 1945. But along with most other Western contributors Canada’s contribution took a nosedive in the early years of the twenty-first century. As of November 2014 only thirty-two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel were deployed across five of the eighteen UN peace operations with blue helmets, and Canada was ranked as the sixty-eighth largest troop contributor out of a total 124 contributing countries. Exactly twenty years earlier Canada was contributing a total of 2,750 military personnel; and it was the eighth largest troop contributor. Canada’s highest

103 “Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data”.
104 Edgar, "Canada’s Changing Participation in International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement: What, If Anything, Does It Mean? “
105 This ranking includes the eighty-one police officers Canada has deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. In contingent troop contributions Canada is ranked seventy-sixth out of 103 contributors
contributions to UN peacekeeping came in 1993 when Canadian troops were deployed in high numbers to UN missions in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Croatia (UNCRO) in addition to smaller contributions to seven other missions, with a total of 3,291 troops deployed – almost 4.5 percent of the CAF.  

Peacekeeping, and UN peacekeeping in particular, are part of Canada’s national identity. Peacekeepers are honored by memorials across the country, as well as on the national currency: a female blue beret appears on the ten-dollar bill, the dollar coin bears an image of the National Peacekeeping monument, and Peacekeeping Day is celebrated annually on August 9th. Canada has also produced some of the most famous UN peacekeepers, including Major General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR and Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Force Commander of UNPROFOR, who have both published accounts of their experiences in UN peacekeeping. The Canadian public has shown strong support for multilateral peacekeeping for decades: A 1943 Gallup poll found almost 80 per cent of Canadians supported their country playing an active part in ensuring world peace, even if it meant again sending troops abroad; In 1988, 75 per cent of Canadians supported playing “an active role in trying to promote peace;” and a 2003 poll found that 81 per cent of Canadians supported “participating in international peacekeeping operations.”

As Canada’s UN troop contributions have decreased, so have scholarly analyses of Canada’s identity as a peacekeeping nation, and dialogue about UN contributions. Although some commentators discussed the decline in contributions in the early 2000s, very little has been written about it in recent years. In this period Canadian institutions dedicated to peacekeeping have also been closed, such as the Lester B Pearson Peacekeeping Center. Although

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109 Ibid.
Canadians still identify their country as a peacekeeping nation,\textsuperscript{111} and despite being one of the largest financial contributors to the peacekeeping budget, Canada’s military participation in UN peacekeeping is negligible.\textsuperscript{112}

The History of Canada and Peacekeeping

Internationalism is a concept frequently identified by Canadian scholars as central to Canada’s foreign policy and key in defining Canada’s relationship with the United Nations. Internationalism emerged in the late 1940s during the era of Prime Minister Louis Saint Laurent and his Secretary of State for External Affairs and successor, Lester Pearson. In 1948 St Laurent declared, “The UN’s vocation is Canada’s vocation.”\textsuperscript{113} As Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson served as the President of the UN Security Council from 1952-53, and made his greatest contribution to peacekeeping in 1956 during the Suez Crisis when he suggested that “the United Nations send an international force to the area, position itself between the warring parties and bring an end to the hostilities.” The operation was to be “a truly international peace and police force...large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.”\textsuperscript{114} As a result the UN’s first inter-positional peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created, and stood as the prototype for peacekeeping missions of the future.

UNEF was unlike any previous peacekeeping missions in that its purpose was to separate fighting forces, not merely to monitor or observe them. It was also the first mission to which countries contributed formed units such as battalions, rather than individual soldiers, and the first mission in which peacekeepers were armed (albeit lightly). A Canadian force commander was appointed to lead UNEF and Canadian troops were deployed to provide essential enabling capacities for

\textsuperscript{111} Murray Brewster, "We See Soldiers as Peacekeepers, Poll Finds," \textit{Toronto Star}, 6 September 2008.


\textsuperscript{113} Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" 9.

the start-up mission. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his UNEF initiative and become known as one of the 'Fathers of Peacekeeping'\(^\text{115}\). With this history of commitment to international peace and innovation in peacekeeping, it is easy to understand why peacekeeping is upheld as part of the national identity in spite of Canada’s decreased contributions to UN peacekeeping in more recent years.

Despite Canada’s undeniable internationalist character, before Canada’s troop contributions sunk to their current level there was lively debate in academic circles about Canada’s true motivations for participating in peacekeeping and to what extent they are altruistic. Internationalist commentators take the view that Canada contributes to UN peacekeeping out of an altruistic commitment to international peace and security, and that Canada must do its part to strengthen international institutions for the sake of global peace. As Paul Martin Sr., External Affairs Minister from 1963-68 and famed Internationalist exclaimed on the subject of peacekeeping, “We do it not for glory but as our duty.”\(^\text{116}\)

Realist arguments stem from a basic belief that governments cannot and will not sacrifice their own interests for those of other countries, and as such claim that Canada’s contributions are a reflection of basic national interest rather than Canadian altruism. During and after the Cold War Canadian national interest involved supporting Western allies, such as the US, UK and France. Canadian historian Jack Granatstein observed that, “[Canadian] peacekeeping efforts almost always supported western interests. Certainly this was true in the Middle East, the Congo, Cyprus...and Bosnia too.”\(^\text{117}\) Regional interests have also played a role, as illustrated by Canada’s contributions to various UN missions in Haiti, and willingness to support US peacekeeping efforts there in 1996. Realist arguments do not necessarily deny that Canada and Canadians have a commitment to multilateralism and human security, but rather assert that national interest has played just as much of a role in the country’s decisions to participate in

\(^{115}\) Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?,” 10.
\(^{116}\) Ibid., 19.
\(^{117}\) Quoted in Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 181.
peacekeeping, and that in fact, multilateralism can be in a country's national interest.

Canada’s waning contributions to UN peacekeeping and increased contributions to NATO and other non-UN peacekeeping have mirrored the behavior of many other countries in the Western security community, which indicates that this shift has not happened in a vacuum. NATO and US-led peace operations have typically had more robust, enforcement mandates than the UN’s peacekeeping mandates, and Canada has for years indicated its preference for robust mandates.118 In the late 1980s and 1990s

Canada...moved away from being the moderate mediatory middle power, seeking to maintain ‘peace, order and good (international) government’ through bringing conflicting parties together to negotiate a settlement. Instead it not only joined, but also actively led the ranks of UN member states pressing for more forceful intervention even against formally sovereign states.119

NATO’s enforcement mandates, and even some of the enforcement mandates that have been passed by the UN Security Council are part of the next generation of peacekeeping, even further removed from first generation ‘observer’, or second-generation ‘inter-positional’ operations. However Canada is not only eschewing UN peacekeeping for non-UN missions because of a belief in the efficacy of robust mandates. By participating in NATO peace operations Canada is honoring its traditional alliance with the US, Great Britain and France and enjoying a better defined military structure, partner nations that are generally better equipped and trained than in UN missions,120 and a sense of trust in these partners built through interactions within the security community.

With troop contributions to UN peacekeeping at such low ebb, there is debate and disagreement about whether or not Canada’s UN contributions will ever rise

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again, and whether or not they should. There is more appetite and enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping among academics and the public, whereas high-ranking members of the CAF have expressed doubt that contributions will ever rise and a belief that this is best for the Canadian military.

Peacekeeping in the 1990s
Canada’s early leadership in peacekeeping resulted in its strong commitment to providing troops to UN peacekeeping until the late 1990s. But just as Lester Pearson’s legacy influenced early peacekeeping policies, the horrors and failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia also left a lasting impression upon Canadian strategic culture. Canadian authors Jocelyn Coulon and Michael Liégeois refer to UN missions in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia as “the deadly trilogy,” and some in the defence establishment refer to the period as the “decade of darkness.”

The experiences of Canadian peacekeepers in UN-led operations in the 1990s had a profound and multifaceted effect on Canada’s decision to decrease its contributions. The way the CAF has reorganized itself, the organizations and conflicts it now chooses to contribute troops to, and its attitude towards the UN, are all symptomatic of the experiences in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. These missions were a very public illustration of the UN’s impotence, and a humiliating defeat for Canadian peacekeepers. The experiences Canadians had in these missions resulted in widespread antipathy towards the UN from many in the political and military establishment.

The impact of these peacekeeping missions on military attitudes towards UN peacekeeping is evident beyond Canada. The failure of Dutch peacekeepers to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica and the resulting national trauma has played a role in the Netherlands’ continued reticence to participate significantly in UN peacekeeping. Rwanda and Bosnia in particular had a strong negative impact on the Canadian military, as both missions had Canadian force commanders, and

121 Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?: The Future of a Tradition, 9, 12, 34.
122 Peter Langille, email message to author, 20 October, 2014.
123 Coulon, Liégeois, and Canadian Defence, Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?: The Future of a Tradition; Fischer and Derks Normandin, “Contributor Profile: Canada”.
their well-publicized experiences cast a shadow over Canada's position as a significant contributor.

Bosnia

UNPROFOR’s efforts to facilitate demilitarization, the provision of humanitarian relief, return of refugees, and myriad other monitoring roles in Bosnia and Croatia failed to staunch conflict in the region. Most of the criticism of UNPROFOR was leveled at the shortcomings of its mandate, rather than the comportment of its troops, who were widely praised for their courage and innovation, despite isolated disciplinary issues.\(^{125}\) Canada had been instrumental in advocating a lead role for the UN in the management of the conflict, but struggled under UNPROFOR’s traditional mandate to prevent the escalation of the violence and the targeting of civilians. Canadian contingents suffered casualties and kidnappings, adding to their sense of impotence. Psychiatric studies in the 1990s revealed an unusually high incidence of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder among Canadian peacekeepers who had deployed to the former Yugoslavia.\(^{126}\)

Canada learned several key lessons from its involvement in UNPROFOR, the first being that political objectives and military means need to be closely coordinated. The mandates produced by the UN Security Council did not provide troops with the authority to manage the conflict as was necessary. The second lesson was that traditional peacekeeping and coercive diplomacy are incompatible; belligerents’ complete disregard for the authority of UNPROFOR forces illustrated that diplomacy without the credible threat of force is futile. Canada also realized that an impartial and lightly armed force is not necessarily the most effective means of facilitating humanitarian relief, and in some cases can prolong and exacerbate conflict.\(^{127}\) Finally, as the US and NATO took a more assertive role in managing the conflict in 1995, Canada was left without a voice, and found its


\(^{127}\) Cohen and Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia."
troops on the ground in dangerous conditions without any influence over a potential political settlement. It was a clear indication to Canada that sustaining political and military relevance would be better achieved by partnering with the US and working within the NATO’s emerging conflict management framework, which varied significantly from the UN peacekeeping framework.

Somalia
In Somalia Canadian peacekeepers experienced similar danger and frustrations as they had in Bosnia and Rwanda. However it was the unconscionable actions of a Canadian airborne unit deployed to UNOSOM in 1993 that marred Canada’s engagement in Somalia and tarnished its pristine reputation as a peacekeeping nation. A group of soldiers from the regiment caught a sixteen-year-old Somali boy infiltrating their compound, and taking him for a looter, detained him. The soldiers then beat and tortured the boy to death of a period of several hours, posing for pictures with his bloodied body. The outrage of the Canadian public and the impact of the incident on the CAF drove Canada to be far more cautious about exposing itself to that kind of risk again. Following what came to be dubbed 'the Somalia Affair', the CAF went through a period of introspection and change, focusing on the education and training of soldiers, as well as improving military justice procedures. The lessons of the Somalia Affair have not been forgotten, and are still taught in Canadian military colleges, but despite this commitment to learn from the past, Canada’s UN peacekeeping contributions have never recovered.

Rwanda
At the same time as the Somalia Affair was unfolding, Major General Dallaire found himself commanding UNAMIR, a small peacekeeping mission in Rwanda that was ill equipped and lacked the mandate to confront ethnic tensions that eventually erupted into genocide. Sensing that if a political settlement couldn’t

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be reached something catastrophic would happen, Dallaire made numerous appeals to the UN Secretariat, Security Council, and Canada for more troops, better intelligence support and a more robust mandate in order to protect civilians, and prevent the escalation ethnic violence. Unfortunately, DPKO and the Security Council were preoccupied by crises in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, and although the Canadian Ministry of Defence supported sending a contingent, the Ministry of Foreign affairs did not, as they were reorienting diplomatic attentions towards Europe and the Balkans and away from Africa. As a result UNAMIR had to stand by helplessly as around 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered during a 100-day period in mid-1994. As in Bosnia, the tragedy highlighted the inadequacy of peacekeeping mandates to address modern conflicts. In addition, the Security Council’s preoccupation with operations in Bosnia and Somalia as the Rwandan genocide raged highlighted the UN’s inability to effectively address multiple crises at once.

As NATO took over operations from the UN in the former Yugoslavia and the world reflected on the UN’s failures in Rwanda and Somalia, Robert Fowler, the Canadian ambassador to the UN in 1995 summed up the collective Canadian (and Western) sentiment: “The era of half-hearted, half-baked, under-resourced, and ill-defined [UN] operations should now be over.” Subsequently Canada was involved, along with several traditional European troop contributors, in the establishment of a UN-associated Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and commissioned a study on ways to enhance UN peacekeeping rapid response mechanisms. However despite the period of peacekeeping reform that followed the blunders of the 1990s, the era of UN peacekeeping seemed to truly be over for Canada, as its primary focus was reforming the CAF to address the deficiencies and inefficiencies that 1990s peacekeeping had made glaringly clear.

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131 The Canadian Ministry of Defence believed contributing a contingent would convince other member states to do the same, as other countries don’t like contributing troops to a mission where the commanding officer’s nation hasn’t committed troops of its own.
Due to Canada's limited troop contributions to UN peacekeeping today, few people in the Canadian military establishment are aware of how much peacekeeping mandates and practices have changed, and the attitudes of the late 1990s persist.¹³⁴

**Contributor Fatigue**

Canada, like many Western countries that provided significant contributions to peace operations during the 1990s, started to experience contributor fatigue by the end of the decade, a phenomenon compounded by the failures and inefficiencies of these missions. As early as 1993, a special Canadian House of Commons committee report on peacekeeping stated, “in light of the increasing numbers of UN peacekeeping and other operations, Canadians are concerned about commitments that are exacting an increasing cost in soldiers and equipment.”¹³⁵ In addition to financial and casualty costs, many Canadian soldiers returning from a tour of duty in a UN peacekeeping mission were suffering from a condition identified by military psychologists as “The UN Soldier's Stress Syndrome”. This syndrome resulted from factors unique to UN peacekeeping, such as imposed passivity in the face of threats or humiliation, fear of losing control over one's aggression if provoked and violating neutrality, and fear that errors can have serious political consequences.¹³⁶ Physical and psychological consequences were exacerbated during the 1990s when, as a result of personnel cuts and corresponding overstretch many soldiers were forced to undertake multiple tours of duty. It has been estimated that the stress casualty rate among Canadian soldiers deployed to peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia was upwards of twenty-five percent.¹³⁷ As the 1990s came to a close the CAF desperately needed a reprieve from the operational intensity of the last decade. But although troops didn’t return to UN peacekeeping in

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¹³⁴ Fischer and Derks Normandin, "Contributor Profile: Canada".
significant numbers, the reprieve was short lived as Canada contributed to the NATO and US-led operations that ramped up at the end of the decade.

Budget Cuts

Peacekeeping was originally an attractive option for the Canadian military because it did not require nuclear weapons, expensive equipment or large deployments.\(^{138}\) However as UN peacekeeping continues to grow in number and size and require increasingly advanced technology and equipment to fulfill their multidimensional mandates, this is no longer the case. In order for Canada to have kept up with the demand and requirements of UN peacekeeping, it would have required commensurate increases in funding; however the Defense budget was cut during the very years peacekeeping began to evolve. Peacekeeping was the primary victim of these budget cuts as the Department of National Defense “sought to preserve its leading edge in military capability.”\(^{139}\) Between 1993-94 and 1998-99 the defense budget had been slashed by $2.7 billion, a reduction of over twenty percent.\(^{140}\) One of the major consequences of these budget cuts was a reduction in the size of the CAF by over seventeen percent between 1993 and 1997.\(^{141}\) The reduction in the peacekeeping budget and the size of the CAF had an undeniable effect on Canada’s decrease in contributions to UN peacekeeping in the mid to late 1990s. Not only did Canada have fewer troops to contribute, but also with NATO taking on a peace enforcement role the troops Canada did deploy were largely committed to NATO missions.

After the late 1990s the defense program’s budget increased steadily and is projected to increase by over 10 billion Canadian dollars in the next 12 years.\(^{142}\) But despite this increase in the budget, peacekeeping contributions have remained low since the end of the 1990s, which indicates that resources are being directed towards activities and deployments that the CAF see as more of a


\(^{140}\) Bratt, "Niche - Making and Canadian Peacekeeping," 78.

\(^{141}\) Ibid.

\(^{142}\) Canadian Department of National Defence, "Canada First Defence Strategy,"(2008), 11.
priority than UN peacekeeping.

Non-UN Peace Support Operations

Figure 2.2

Since the late 1990s Canada has contributed more of its troops to NATO-led operations than to UN-led operations, largely because “the Canadian military feels more comfortable working with other NATO countries as it can benefit from a harmonized operational environment created through decades of collaboration, joint exercises ad operations, integrated communications systems, and aligned technical capabilities.” NATO can also deploy troops faster and in greater numbers to implement robust mandates than the UN can, and a NATO intervention assures members of one valuable thing: US engagement.

However whether NATO’s operations in the last 20 years can all be called ‘peacekeeping’ is doubtful, and it would be difficult for Canada to claim that by participating in NATO operations that it is upholding its traditional commitment to peacekeeping.

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144 Fischer and Derks Normandin, “ Contributor Profile: Canada”.
Canada’s involvement in ISAF in Afghanistan has contributed to the CAF’s preference for taking part in deployments that have some US involvement, as the two militaries have developed a high degree of interoperability and the Canadians have confidence in the command and control structures of this partnership. Command and control structures at the UN had been a problem for Canadian peacekeepers for years; a 1995 Canadian article about structural problems inherent to UN peacekeeping missions complained,

The [peacekeeping] command situation will be chaotic and cumbersome with an inordinate number of UN civilians working as an integral part of the headquarters. Command authority may be ambiguous and subject to massive amounts of interface from [UNHQ] and diplomats working in theater.\footnote{Sean M. Maloney, "Insights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine," \textit{Military Review} 76, no. 2 (1996): 13.}

The number of troops Canada now commits to UN peacekeeping missions is not the only sign that the military establishment is abandoning traditional peacekeeping for peace enforcement alongside NATO and its allies. In 2008 Canada rejected a request from DPKO for a Canadian lieutenant general to lead its peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a position that would previously have been seen as a great honor and an asset for Canada. The military attaché to the permanent mission to the UN admitted, “Finding a lieutenant-general at this time can be a challenge, especially with Afghanistan going on.”\footnote{Allan Thompson, “Rejecting Request to Lead Peacekeepers Indicates Ottowa Abandoning Traditional Role, Ex-Envoy Says,” \textit{Toronto Star}, 2 June 2008.}

But beyond being a reflection of an operational preference, Canada’s move away from UN peacekeeping is also indicative of a change in the country’s security priorities. In the post 9/11 world of global terrorism there has been a sharp shift in security priorities of many Western countries. As a Western democracy allied with, and geographically close to the United States, Canada faces the threat of global and domestic terrorism, issues that cannot be dealt with in the format of a UN peacekeeping mission. Dorn notes, “both idealist and realist schools
recognize that Canadian security...remains linked with the security of the whole world. What ails the world will eventually cause trouble for Canada.”

Therefore Canada’s current troop contributions bely a belief (which appear to be shared by the rest of the Western security community) that US and NATO-led peace enforcement operations are more effective and important in the face of twenty-first century security threats than UN peacekeeping missions.

The Rise of New Peacekeepers
As contributions from Canada and other Western countries have decreased, there has been a significant increase in contributions from non-Western countries, particularly from South Asian and African countries. Each of these ‘newer’ contributors has its complex reasons for choosing to contribute, but with countries like India, Pakistan and Ethiopia prepared to contribute thousands of troops across multiple peacekeeping missions, there is less pressure on countries like Canada to swell the ranks of the blue helmets.

The rise of new UN troop contributors combined with increased troop contributions from the P5 after the end of the Cold War has not only reduced the international pressure on Canada to contribute, but has also limited Canada’s traditional influence over peacekeeping issues. During the Cold War and the 1990s, the size and scope of Canada’s troop contributions meant it could exercise a certain amount of control over the mission planning process, and Canadians were often appointed to high-ranking positions in the missions’ senior leadership. Being unable to use the size of its contributions to retain influence, in order to remain relevant in UN peacekeeping Canada has to leverage its sought after capabilities, such as communications specialists and bilingual units.

Although Canada faces some pressure from the UN Secretariat to make more troop contributions, pressure applied on the Canadian permanent mission to the UN isn’t felt strongly within Canada. Canada has found that it can exercise more influence over peace support operations led by NATO or the US, where it can continue to be a major contributor without fear of being eclipsed by non-

149 Fischer and Derks Normandin, “Contributor Profile: Canada”.
Western contributors.

Canada, the United States, and Peacekeeping

It has been argued that one reason Canada’s commitment to the United Nations developed in the mid twentieth century was because Canada saw the organization as a vehicle through which it could pursue foreign policy goals outside the highly asymmetric North American context.\(^{150}\) In 1994 Joseph Jockel contended, “peacekeeping has become so very popular in Canada because it fulfills a longing for national distinctiveness, especially vis-à-vis the United States.”\(^{151}\) During the Cold War, participation in UN peacekeeping was a way for Canada to differentiate itself from the US, which along with the other permanent members of the Security Council was excluded from direct, on-the-ground participation due to its Cold War strategic involvement in most disputes in the world.

Between 1992 and 1996 the US made significant contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Haiti and Yugoslavia, however apart from these engagements their contributions have remained low. Because of the nature of these engagements and the perception that the US places greater emphasis on the exertion of military power and use of force than it does on peacekeeping, a popular myth in Canada in the 1990s was that Canada was a peacekeeper whereas the US fought wars. Despite the fact that this myth didn’t take into account the extensive support Washington provided to UN peacekeeping through training, logistical support and funding, some realists argue that it was one of Canada’s primary rationales for contributing at the time.\(^{152}\)

Prior to the 2000s Canada’s national interests were largely served through multilateralism and a commitment to the human security agenda. It distinguished Canada from the United States, and earned the country a respected

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\(^{150}\) Edgar, “Canada’s Changing Participation in International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement: What, If Anything, Does It Mean?.”

\(^{151}\) Canada and International Peacekeeping(Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994), 16.

\(^{152}\) Ibid.
place in the international community. However, since the end of the 1990s
Canada’s commitment to its defense partner appears to have trumped concerns
about differentiating itself from the US through engaging in peace operations.
After 9/11 Canada shared many security concerns with other members of the
Western security community, particularly the US, and this perception of shared
external threats has led to closer cooperation among security community
members to address peace and security concerns. Since then Canada has
contributed significantly higher numbers of troops to missions that the US has
led or had a strong presence in – e.g. ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Bosnia and Croatia and
Kosovo Force (KFOR) – than it has to UN peacekeeping, and has clearly
developed a preference for contributing to operations that include US
involvement. The perception that Canada and the rest of the Western security
community are facing common enemies has revived the ‘we-feeling’ that the
country feels towards their southern neighbor. This feeling has been bolstered
by the current Conservative government in Canada, led by Stephen Harper, who
has demonstrated an enthusiasm for US rapprochement.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Canada’s Future in UN Peacekeeping}

With Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan drawing down there has been
discussion of re-engagement with UN peacekeeping, however restructuring of
the CAF post-Afghanistan is likely to leave little room for new or larger
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{154} Persistent institutional antipathy,
and psychological resistance caused by lack of knowledge about current UN
peace operations means that the Canadian military is unlikely to strongly
support re-engagement. In addition, although the war in Afghanistan is drawing
to a close, new security threats that may call for military engagement are
emerging, such as terrorist group ISIL, against which Canada has already made a
military commitment.\textsuperscript{155} The October 2014 attacks on military personnel in


\textsuperscript{154} Fischer and Derks Normandin, “Contributor Profile: Canada”.

Canada by deranged Canadian citizens pledging allegiance to the Islamic State have further thrust this threat into the national spotlight, and will ensure that it remains Canada’s security priority in the coming years. The paranoia and fear engendered by these attacks could ensure that arguments for re-engagement with UN peacekeeping go unheard.

However, the role the Canadian public could play in precipitating a return to UN peacekeeping should not be underestimated. There is far more support for UN peacekeeping from the Canadian public than from the Canadian military. Canadians still cling to their identity as a nation of peacekeepers, and much of the public's resistance to Canadian involvement in Afghanistan was due to the government’s failure to pass off the operation as peacekeeping. The public’s commitment to this identity means that it is not impossible that politicians could use a return to UN peacekeeping to score political points and garner public support. However in the last fifteen years attacks against Western partners and allies have diverted the public's focus from peacekeeping, to warfighting. This has been welcomed by the majority of the military establishment, who fear that a focus on peacekeeping would convert the CAF into a lightly armed force, rendering it incapable of complex military engagement and high tempo operations, and inferior to their NATO counterparts.

Although it seems unlikely that Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping will ever return to their previous scale, some Canadians have argued that Canada can still do more, even if that doesn’t involve a significant increase in troop contributions. When Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping began to decline in the late 1990s, Duane Bratt argued that Canada should be concerned

156 Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?"
158 Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?"

with creating a role for itself as a niche peacekeeper. Today Canada is still capable of developing a niche role through the provision of bilingual troops, expertise in electoral reform, logistical support and media training. There are now many countries in the developing world that can and do contribute the large numbers of soldiers that the UN needs, but these countries often do not have the specialized units and enabling capacities that are as essential as infantry battalions to the success of a peacekeeping mission. A Canadian contribution of this kind would not only be well received by the UN, but would also give some truth to the peacekeeping nation myth that Canadians still believe in.

Conclusion
Canada’s initial rejection of UN peacekeeping as a mechanism for maintaining peace and security was undoubtedly triggered by the trauma of the 1990s peacekeeping missions. However Canada could have taken a couple of years to recover from contributor fatigue, push for peacekeeping reforms at the UN, focus on lessons learned and eventually return to UN peacekeeping with renewed dedication and rigor. So why didn't that happen? Largely because just as Canada was extracting itself from unpleasant UN deployments in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, Western powers were pushing new conflict management mechanisms, namely NATO-led operations. These mechanisms presented an alternative to a peacekeeping system that seemed irrevocably broken. In addition, the twenty-first century presented new security threats, in the form of asymmetric warfare waged by Islamic extremists against the West, and the Western security community has decided to use coalition operations and the strength of the NATO military alliance to address these threats.

Unlike most UN peacekeeping operations, NATO operations use offensive force to manage conflicts. Given Canada’s long-held preference for robust operations and its aversion to UN peacekeeping following engagements in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, it is not difficult to understand why this option was more attractive to Canada. In addition, as a member of NATO, Canada is expected and has a responsibility to be involved in these operations. Unless the CAF is restructured...

\[160^{*} \text{"Niche - Making and Canadian Peacekeeping."} \]
post-Afghanistan in a way that takes possible peacekeeping deployments into account, and unless Canada begins to feel that its national interests are served by re-engaging in UN peacekeeping, Canada’s reputation as an internationalist and a nation of peacekeepers will continue to fade. Any significant re-engagement with UN peacekeeping is unlikely to occur as long as Canada, and other Western countries perceive jihadist violence and Islamic extremist terrorism as the greatest threat to their security. However if the political will exists, Canada could contribute key enabling capacities and niche capabilities on a smaller scale that could enhance the efficacy of UN peacekeeping without degrading the ability of the CAF to respond to national security threats.
Chapter 3
New Zealand

New Zealand prides itself on its reputation as a good global citizen committed to international organizations, principally the United Nations, and a contributor to UN peacekeeping. However a cursory look at New Zealand’s current troop contributions to UN peacekeeping shows that part of this reputation may no longer be deserved. As of November 2014 New Zealand had ten military personnel deployed in two of the eighteen UN peace operations with blue helmets and was ranked as the 101st largest troop contributor out of a total 124 contributing countries. Twenty years earlier, in November 1994 New Zealand was contributing a total of 281 military personnel and was the thirty-ninth largest troop contributor. New Zealand’s highest troop contributions to UN peacekeeping came in 2000 when a large contribution to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and smaller contributions to four other

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161 Data taken from "Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data".
missions, comprised a total deployment of 723 troops, almost eight percent of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).\textsuperscript{162}

New Zealand has contributed enabling units and military observers to peacekeeping efforts since the 1950s, and has made major combat contributions to two UN peacekeeping missions, UNPROFOR in Bosnia and UNTAET in East Timor. Apart from these two deployments New Zealand’s contributions never represented a significant percentage of the NZDF, or of UN uniformed personnel, however contributions and commitment were consistent in total numbers. Until 1999 the United Nations was the primary organization under which New Zealand troops were deployed to peacekeeping operations,\textsuperscript{163} but since the end of the 1990s New Zealand has become increasingly involved in regional peace and security operations in the South Pacific and South East Asia, and from 2002 commenced operations with NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan.

Today New Zealand has wound down its major operations in Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and its overall contributions to international peacekeeping efforts are at a low point. Other than a firm commitment to retain the military capacity to respond to conflict and unrest in the South Pacific, the current government’s criteria for engagement in UN peace operations are vague.\textsuperscript{164} As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2015-16, New Zealand may find that pointing to things it has done with the UN in the past is not enough to uphold its reputation as a good global citizen.

The History of New Zealand and Peacekeeping

In 1935 New Zealand’s first Labour government was elected, bringing with it a liberal internationalist foreign policy, characterized by strong dedication to international organizations, collective security, and the principles of human rights, democracy and self-determination. From this point New Zealand began to

\textsuperscript{162} United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors Data Dashboard", "Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data".

\textsuperscript{163} The only exception is a decades-long commitment to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula.

\textsuperscript{164} Criteria for engagement in peace support operations are detailed in New Zealand Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, "Peace Support Operations Review."
distinguish itself in the international system by advocating commitment to international peace, security and rule of law, over commitment to national interest. Security threats have at times steered foreign policy in a more realist direction, for example during World War II, the Cold War, and since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however despite the current security climate New Zealand continues to propagate its internationalist reputation.

Several of New Zealand’s Prime Ministers have been credited with solidifying this reputation, for example Peter Fraser who, as Prime Minister from 1940 until 1949 was actively involved in the creation of the United Nations after World War II. New Zealand was opposed to allowing the five permanent members of the Security Council veto status, concerned that this would affect the organization’s ability to respond to aggression, and allow the national interests of major powers to dictate the UN’s actions.\textsuperscript{165} The New Zealand delegation felt that rather than being a tool for major powers to pursue foreign policy objectives, the United Nations should play a similar role in collective security to that of the League of Nations prior to the World War II, and forcefully backed the collective security provisions enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Following Fraser a number of New Zealand’s Prime Ministers made significant steps towards enhancing the nation’s reputation as an internationalist. In the 1970s Norman Kirk branded New Zealand “as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to [its] national identity,”\textsuperscript{166} and built on the role best suited to the small country – good international citizen. Subsequent Prime Ministers have continued to support this role for New Zealand, including David Lange and Jim Bolger.

\textsuperscript{165} New Zealand still maintains this position on the Security Council P5 veto power. During New Zealand’s campaign for a position on the UN Security Council in 2015-2016 Security Council reform was a key point on the government’s agenda. This included ensuring that no new rights of veto are given in the event more countries are awarded permanent seats on the council, and curbing and moderating the veto power of the current permanent members.

Helen Clark, Labour Party leader and Prime Minister from 1999 until 2008, is also widely credited for advancing New Zealand’s liberal internationalist agenda. Her government’s foreign policy had a strong focus on advancing the principles of democracy, human rights and self-determination around the world. However with the 9/11 terror attacks coming early in Clark’s years in government, New Zealand’s foreign policy was inevitably influenced by the attacks and the ensuing global war on terror. It was Clark’s government that oversaw the majority of military commitments that absorbed the NZDF and various government ministries from the late 1990s through the 2000s, including Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor. Although Clark’s Labour government demonstrated strong support for the UN, and kicked off New Zealand’s 2015-16 UN Security Council bid, Clark’s commitment of troops to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan showed that her government was willing to go beyond the traditional UN peacekeeping model to confront international peace and security issues. However, the government was adamant that these operations should have UN-authorization before committing any troops to them. New Zealand still sees the UN as the ultimate authority-granting body for peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, which Helen Clark made clear when she refused to send New Zealand troops to assist the US-led operation in Iraq in 2003. It is very unlikely that the government will deploy troops to any future operation that has not been authorized by the UN Security Council, except perhaps in the case of a joint operation with Australia in the South Pacific.

New Zealand’s first contribution to a traditional UN peacekeeping mission was in 1952 when three military observers were deployed to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). This contribution satisfied New Zealand’s commitment to the UN and New Zealand’s duties as a member of the Commonwealth, which both India and Pakistan are also part of.

168 Helen Clark’s predecessor Jenny Shipley and her National party government made the initial commitment of New Zealand troops to the Australian-led international force in East Timor (INTERFET) in September 1999.
Contributions to UN peacekeeping remained consistent but small until the 1990s, however during the Cold War years New Zealand contributed to a wide geographical range of UN peacekeeping missions, in spite of the fact that not all of the missions had direct bearing on national interest beyond advancing an internationalist reputation. New Zealand was elected to a temporary seat on the Security Council in 1993, and it was during this period that New Zealand decided to contribute a combat unit to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia. At the time it was the largest troop contribution New Zealand had ever made to a UN peacekeeping operation.

Peacekeeping in the 1990s and Early 2000s
The failures of UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, particularly in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, had a profound effect on many troop contributors, which realized that the mandates and operational procedures that had been put in place were not appropriate for the conflicts they were trying to resolve. Although New Zealand left Bosnia with lessons learned, the NZDF did not experience the same collective repudiation of UN peacekeeping as some other Western contributors did. This is likely because New Zealand’s deployments were smaller than others, and it played less of a role in the command and control of missions, therefore bearing less responsibility for operational failures. In addition, because New Zealand troops were located in areas of relative calm and in some cases undertook non-combat functions, they witnessed fewer atrocities and suffered less from the inability to prevent them than the Dutch at Srebrenica or the Canadians in Rwanda. New Zealand left Bosnia with similar lessons learned as Canada, namely that peacekeeping mandates would need to become more robust to deal with complex modern conflicts. New Zealand also felt that its peacekeeping troops needed robust mandates behind them in order to protect themselves in unstable and unpredictable security environments.\(^{170}\) In addition, New Zealand’s experience in UNPROFOR made it clear that at the time the NZDF was not entirely appropriately equipped for UN operations.

\(^{170}\) NZDF Official 3, in discussion with the author, October 2014
Bosnia

New Zealand managed to largely avoid the scandals that swirled around UNPROFOR peacekeepers from other countries, however Kiwi troops did not completely avoid controversy and trouble. They found that their kit and equipment, including their armed personnel carriers (APCs), were outdated (having not been replaced since Vietnam), which was highly embarrassing. One New Zealand peacekeeper who served in UNPROFOR claims that the Kiwis’ kit was so woefully old and inadequate that soldiers had to “borrow and steal all over Bosnia” to get what they needed.\(^\text{171}\) In addition, the New Zealand peacekeepers suffered a blow to reputation and morale when one of their outdated APCs malfunctioned and ran over two children, killing them.\(^\text{172}\)

Although peacekeepers endured difficult conditions and poor equipment, one senior NZDF official attested, “Our forces returned...confident in their professional ability and with a degree of satisfaction with their performance.”\(^\text{173}\) Despite the damage the NZDF’s experience in Bosnia might have done to its perception of the UN as an efficient operational mechanism for delivering peace and stability, the New Zealand contingents deployed to Bosnia were considered highly successful in their peacekeeping efforts. According to NZDF historian John Crawford,

The New Zealanders’ success was due in no small degree to their professional, but friendly and outgoing manner, which impressed the local population. They also took a range of innovative measures to develop better relations with, and between, the local Croat and Muslim communities...By late 1995 the New Zealand area of responsibility was widely considered to be the most settled part of central Bosnia.\(^\text{174}\)

Although New Zealand was involved in Rwanda and Somalia on a much smaller scale than in Bosnia, these peacekeeping missions also had an impact on how the

\(^{171}\) Scott, in discussion with the author.
\(^{173}\) NZDF Official 1, email message to author, 8 October, 2014
New Zealand government and the NZDF have approached UN peacekeeping since.

**Somalia**

New Zealand contributed army and air force personnel and equipment to various UN Operations and a UN-authorized, US-led multinational force in Somalia between 1992 and 1994. Although New Zealand troops made important contributions to these missions, and earned a reputation as “hard workers who were prepared to go out of their way to assist other elements of the United Nations force,” they could not claim to have been part of building a lasting peace in Somalia. UNOSOM II wound up in 1995, having achieved its goal of ending famine in Somalia, but not its goal of ending the violent conflict ravaging the failed state. Like Bosnia, Somalia taught New Zealand that the UN isn’t capable of containing and resolving every conflict, particularly with a traditional approach.

**Rwanda**

During the same period the genocide in Rwanda, unimpeded by the small UN mission, shocked the world. Although New Zealand didn’t contribute troops to UNAMIR, it did have a temporary seat on the Security Council at the time, and led a small group of countries in a push to reinforce UNAMIR and to recognize the events unfolding in Rwanda as genocide. Sadly, New Zealand’s calls for steps to be taken to end the genocide fell upon the deaf ears of the major powers on the Security Council, some who were distracted by events unfolding in Somalia and Yugoslavia, and others who had their own neo-colonial agendas where Rwanda was concerned. Although New Zealand could be proud of its conduct during the Rwandan genocide, it could not be proud of the international body of which it was a part, and could not be confident in the ability of UN peacekeeping operations to prevent such atrocities in the future.

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175 Ibid., 71.
East Timor

Although New Zealand’s perception of UN peacekeeping was damaged during the 1990s, the NZDF’s next major peacekeeping deployment – in East Timor from 2000 until 2013 – was a more positive experience of UN peacekeeping. This was in part due to more effective mission mandates issued by the UN Security Council, however the NZDF had also taken the years since Bosnia to upgrade kit and equipment, and to improve tactics and procedures. In addition, New Zealand’s engagement in East Timor was initiated under very different circumstances than previous peace operations. Due to the rapid escalation of hostilities in 1999 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an Australian-led multinational force in September of that year to restore peace and security to East Timor and to protect and support the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which had been put in place to oversee a referendum on East Timor’s independence from Indonesia. INTERFET was deployed quickly, and was able to stabilize East Timor in a matter of months. It was an example the hybrid stabilization missions that have become increasingly common for Western militaries to contribute troops to. In February 2000 New Zealand troops in INTERFET were re-hatted as troops in the follow on UN mission, UNTAET.

Because of the NZDF’s role in INTERFET, it played a much greater role in UNTAET and subsequent UN missions in East Timor than it had in Bosnia, both politically and operationally, which increased New Zealand’s ownership of the peacekeeping process. Despite facing unfriendly environmental conditions and a political powder keg, New Zealand forces were widely commended for their participation in multinational forces and UN-led operations. New Zealand’s role as a defender of peace and security in the Pacific was affirmed, and despite the strain large deployments placed on the NZDF and other government ministries, it was an opportunity for a large portion of the NZDF to gain operational experience. New Zealand forces left East Timor in 2013 with what is hoped to be sustainable peace, and unlike in Bosnia and Somalia, the feeling that the operations had accomplished their missions.
Contributor Fatigue

Despite the positive aspects of New Zealand’s participation in peace support operations in East Timor, it has been argued that the intense operational tempo of these operations, combined with non-UN engagements in Solomon Islands and Afghanistan during the 2000s, resulted in fatigue in the NZDF, which in turn has contributed to the current low number of personnel in UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{176} When major operations ended in East Timor this was of particular concern to the New Zealand Army, which had rotated both of its two battalions through INTERFET and subsequent UN missions a number of times. In addition, the Defence Forces are not the only party affected by the large deployments in recent years; the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as the New Zealand Police had to devote substantial resources in New Zealand to supporting operations in Afghanistan, East Timor and Solomon Islands.\textsuperscript{177} New Zealand’s UN troop contributions have been at similar levels in the past when there have been other major military operations ongoing, for example in 1998 and 1999 when forces were deployed to non-UN missions in Bougainville, the former Yugoslavia and the Sinai Peninsula. However they have also been at similar levels when there have been no major ongoing or recently concluded military operations, such as in 1991, when contributions sank to a total of four uniformed personnel.\textsuperscript{178} So although the fatigue the NZDF and other government ministries might be feeling is real, there are undoubtedly other factors driving down contributions.

New Zealand’s Traditional Defence Partners

The 2013 The External Relations and Defence Committee’s 2013 “Peace Support Operations Review” indicates the strong preference New Zealand has for deploying alongside its close partners to these kinds of operations: “New Zealand

\textsuperscript{176} NZDF Official 2, in discussion with the author, October 2014
\textsuperscript{177} For example, an MFAT civilian employee headed the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan from 2010 until 2013, and this position was in turn supported by a number of staff at the ministry in Wellington.
\textsuperscript{178} New Zealand was involved in the Gulf War until April 1991, however it only made small contributions of aircraft and medical teams, no combat troops. Data drawn from ”Providing for Peacekeeping - Peacekeeping Data”.

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will continue to look for opportunities to work with close partners, such as Australia, the US, the UK and Canada in peace support initiatives.” Given this preference and the negligible troop contributions from these partner countries to UN peacekeeping, it is not surprising that New Zealand has been deploying more troops to non-UN operations and fewer to UN peacekeeping operations in the last decade.

**Australia**

New Zealand’s defence relationships have consistently had a high degree of influence over New Zealand’s decisions about peace support operations, and none more so than New Zealand’s relationship with Australia. The countries are not only geographically and culturally close, but their militaries also have a high degree of inter-operability, frequently conducting joint training exercises and operations. They deployed together to East Timor and in the Solomon Islands, restoring temporary stability in both countries, and in 2012 their Defence Ministers introduced an Australia/New Zealand defence relationship framework detailing practical ways for the neighbors to strengthen defence cooperation. It is likely that any future peace operations in the region will involve further cooperation between these two countries. Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper states:

> New Zealand is the country we are most likely to conduct operations with in our region... The Government is committed to working with New Zealand to enhance peace, security and stability in our region. As a result, we must align our defence postures and continue to coordinate our approaches to defence cooperation.  

New Zealand’s 2010 Defence White Paper mentions partnership with Australia in terms of regional security efforts, but also in terms of operations beyond the Pacific: “New Zealand will also work closely with Australia to identify areas of common interest in ensuring peace and security beyond our region. At times this might mean that New Zealand

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will combine with Australia in an extra-regional action.”\textsuperscript{181} However recent cooperation with the Australian military has not involved UN peacekeeping at all. Australia has made little more than token troop contributions to the UN peacekeeping since it’s involvement in East Timor ended in the mid-2000s. It has, on the other hand, contributed far higher numbers to NATO and US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite New Zealand’s preference for working alongside Australia, and although any military engagement in the Pacific is likely to be undertaken together, New Zealand has in the past taken different approaches to military operations outside of its immediate region, and may do so in the future.\textsuperscript{182} Australia’s disregard for UN peacekeeping operations may influence New Zealand’s troop contributions, but it is unlikely to determine them.

\textit{The United States}

Especially in the last decade and a half, the US has had some degree of influence over New Zealand’s military deployments. In 1985 New Zealand declared itself a nuclear free zone, denying foreign ships with the capacity to carry nuclear weapons to dock in its harbors, and causing the breakdown of the US-New Zealand security relationship. A period of considerably cool relations with the US followed. The relationship began to improve after the 9/11 attacks, which shocked New Zealanders and prompted an outpouring of public and political support for the US. New Zealand decried the attack on Western values and stood strongly beside its former ally, although the government later refused to commit New Zealand forces to the US-led coalition in Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate. In spite of this, since 9/11 the relationship has continued to

\textsuperscript{182} Unlike New Zealand, Australia did not make any significant troop contribution in Bosnia. New Zealand did not contribute troops to the US-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, whereas Australia contributed over 2000 troops in the first year of the war. Australia has made larger troop contributions than New Zealand to the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, and has made significant contributions to the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, whereas New Zealand has only considered pledging training support.
blossom, due in large part to the efforts of Helen Clark\footnote{See "Wikileaks Cable: Scene- Setter for Helen Clark's US Visit," (2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10693849.} and current Prime Minister John Key. The Wellington and Washington Declarations, signed in 2010 and 2012 respectively, have been key in strengthening the defence relationship between the two countries, and demonstrating a shared commitment to humanitarian assistance and development in the Pacific.

New Zealand’s contributions to NATO and US-led operation in Afghanistan have also gone a long way in improving the relationship between the two countries. These contributions are a sign that New Zealand is not only willing to deploy alongside the United States military, but also that the NZDF has a degree of comfort doing so. Combat-focused joint military exercises have been ramping up since 2012,\footnote{Audrey Young, "Military Combat Exercise with US First for 27 Years," (2012), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10798003.} which is further evidence that the NZDF has a degree of operational harmony with the United States military, as well as a sense of trust. New Zealand’s 2010 Defense White Paper refers to the US as a ‘close security partner’ and outlines the benefits of New Zealand being "an engaged, active and stalwart partner of the US."\footnote{New Zealand Ministry of Defence, "Defence White Paper 2010," 19.} The development of this relationship could lead to further military cooperation in the coming years, although it is unlikely to be in UN peacekeeping give the US’s attitude towards contributing troops to UN operations.

\textit{NATO}

In addition to fortifying its relationship with the US, New Zealand has also sought to strengthen its ties with NATO, which considers New Zealand as one of its core partners. New Zealand’s relationship with NATO is not surprising given the country’s historical commitment to collective security and its ties to key members like the US, the UK and Canada. It has been involved in a number of NATO-led peace operations since troops were re-hatted from UNPROFOR to IFOR in 1995. But the more recent improvement in New Zealand’s relationship with the organization is likely due to the post-9/11 security environment, which
has strengthened solidarity among members of the Western security community. New Zealand’s participation in NATO operations in Afghanistan was a clear sign of its support for Western partners that had been targeted by terrorist groups harbored within the country.

In 2012 John Key pledged even closer security cooperation with NATO after signing a new partnership cooperation accord that formalized ties between New Zealand and the Alliance. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s comments and the text of the accord make frequent reference to the shared norms and understandings that bind New Zealand and members of the alliance into the Western security community: “We may be far away geographically, but we are linked by common values and commitment.” He also noted that New Zealand’s troops in Afghanistan were “making a real difference in the interest of our shared security.” The accord itself refers to a partnership between New Zealand and NATO “built upon a foundation of shared principles: common democratic values,” makes reference to “common challenges,” and mentions efforts to “increase interoperability and cooperation between NATO and New Zealand forces.” This partnership, built on a foundation of shared values and reinforced by New Zealand’s experiences deploying alongside NATO partners, could result in a continued preference, or sense of duty to deploy to NATO peace support operations over UN peacekeeping operations.

187 Joint Press Point by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and John Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand," (YouTube, 2012).
188 NATO and New Zealand, "Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between New Zealand and NATO" (Brussels, 4 June 2012).
Non-UN Peace Support Operations

In recent years the numbers of troops New Zealand has been committing to UN operations versus non-UN peace operations show a clear shift towards working more with NATO and like-minded coalitions and less with the UN. However the nature of New Zealand’s previous large-scale engagements in UN peacekeeping reveals that a preference for working with traditional defence partners has always existed. New Zealand’s first large scale combat contribution to UN peacekeeping was in Bosnia, where the New Zealand contingent was imbedded in a British battalion, and enjoyed a degree of operational harmony thanks to their history of military cooperation. In addition the operation had significant troop contributions from European and North American countries with which New Zealand had good political and defence relationships.

In East Timor, New Zealand first deployed with Australian-led INTERFET and troops were simply re-hatted as UN peacekeepers when the UNTAET became operational. Although New Zealand troops worked alongside a myriad of other contributing countries as part of UNTAET, Australia remained by far the largest

\[^{189}\text{Data taken from The Military Balance (1990-2014)}\]
contributor to the mission, and the two militaries cooperated closely throughout. Australia’s presence and the trust between the two militaries gave New Zealand the confidence to deploy such a high percentage of its forces. Had Australia not been involved in operations in East Timor it is unlikely that New Zealand would have made such a substantial troop contribution, if any at all.

To say that New Zealand has an operational preference for deploying peacekeeping troops alongside its allies or traditional defence partners by no means implies that New Zealanders do not work well with other countries and troops. New Zealanders frequently point out that their peacekeeping troops have a reputation for working well in peace operations that require cultural sensitivity and understanding both vis-à-vis locals and peacekeepers from other countries.\(^{190}\) One NZDF official attested,

We are a capable, professional force and we possess the ability to slot relatively seamlessly into a multi-national force environment. ...Most of all we are trusted – as a nation, as a defence force and as individuals...Kiwis’ ‘cultural empathy’ with most people regardless of background, religion or ethnicity, opens doors which others can’t, and greatly assists our effectiveness as peace-keepers.\(^{191}\)

However, for a country with a small military and limited defence capabilities, a preference for deploying alongside partners with which it has a high degree of operational harmony is not surprising. The Peace Support Operations Review” proposes that officials consider the question: “Are any of New Zealand’s traditional security partners contributing to the mission...?”\(^{192}\) when formulating advice for ministers on the nature of potential peace support operation contributions. With relationships built on shared values and culture, as well as similar military training standards and operational methods, New Zealand can trust partners within the Western security community to provide additional


\(^{191}\) NZDF Official 1, email message to author.

security for its troops. Most of New Zealand’s deployments to peace operations are small and do not include force protection elements, and therefore must rely on operational partners to provide protection. For the New Zealand government the safety of troops deployed to peace operations is paramount: the “Peace Support Operations Review” declares, “A high premium is placed on the safety and security of New Zealand personnel deployed on PSOs and officials will continue to take all possible steps to manage the risks.”

For a small country like New Zealand the political benefits or consequences of contributing to one peace operation or another are an undeniable factor in the decision-making process. Whereas UN peacekeeping was widely popular in the West during and immediately after the Cold War, and therefore contributions had high political capital, today Western major powers see contributions to NATO or other coalition efforts as more valuable than UN contributions, and therefore countries like New Zealand are more likely to feel pressure from their peers to contribute to these types of operations. Ultimately the political and economic consequences of turning down a request for troops from UNDPKO are far less grave than the consequences of turning down a request from a defence partner like the US could be. Although New Zealand’s refusal to send troops in the US-led coalition in Iraq in 2003 shows it is not afraid to defy the US, the current National government has been quick to highlight the economic and security benefits of maintaining a close relationship with the US.

New Zealand in the South Pacific and the UN in Africa
In addition to which organizations and operations New Zealand now chooses to contribute troops to, another factor that has impacted the country’s dwindling number of UN peacekeepers in the last decade, and that may influence future troop contributions, is where UN peacekeeping is taking place; the majority of UN peacekeepers are now in Africa. Although New Zealand has sent military observers and staff officers to African peacekeeping missions in the past, it has not made more than a small number of token contributions in Africa since it sent

193 Ibid., 6.
194 Eighty percent of UN troops and military experts are deployed in nine African peacekeeping missions.
a forty-three person supply platoon to Somalia in 1993. Today the only contribution in Africa is three staff officers in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

Despite New Zealand’s insistence that it is a good international citizen, the bulk of its UN peacekeeping contributions have been to missions in Europe, the Middle East and East Timor – regions where either New Zealand or its traditional defence partners have had strategic national interests. Placing national interest over good global citizenship is increasingly reflected in New Zealand’s policies on UN peacekeeping. In addition, Africa is not only geographically distant from New Zealand, but there are also few cultural or diplomatic ties between New Zealand and African countries. As a result, peace and security in this region is not New Zealand’s greatest concern, despite the fact that so many of the UN’s resources are devoted to African conflicts. Even if New Zealand did want to contribute a formed unit to one of these missions, it is unlikely it would do so without the company of one of its traditional defence partners.

The New Zealand government and the NZDF emphasize the importance of playing a conflict management or peacebuilding role in the immediate region. The “Peace Support Operations Review” makes it clear that the South Pacific is New Zealand’s priority, and “that discretionary peace support operations further afield should not affect New Zealand’s capacity to respond to an emerging crisis” in this region. However, with a degree of stability restored to East Timor and the Solomon Islands, any engagement in the Pacific is, for now, hypothetical. There are many conflicts raging around the world that are not, and to which New Zealand could, but doesn’t contribute troops. With less than a dozen NZDF personnel deployed to UN missions, and roughly another 100 deployed to non-UN peace support operations it seems that New Zealand could be doing a lot more without compromising its regional commitment.

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For New Zealand to maintain its reputation as a good international citizen it should be contributing where assistance is needed most, not just waiting for something to go wrong in the South Pacific. Based on its current low number of contributions to peace operations (less than one percent of NZDF personnel), the NZDF should be able to deploy more military experts and staff officers, or even a specialized unit, and still maintain the capacity to respond to crises in their region.

New Zealand’s UN Security Council Campaign
New Zealand has been elected to serve a two-year term on the Security Council from 2015-2016, which has raised questions about its peacekeeping contributions. During the campaign New Zealand traded on its past reputation as a contributor to UN peacekeeping, and the role it played in trying to recognize and contain the Rwandan genocide when it had a seat on the council in the early 1990s. However Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully made it clear that New Zealand would not attempt to buy votes: “Both the Prime Minister and I laid down two very clear conditions: we would not attempt to buy a seat on the Security Council, either by spending New Zealand taxpayers’ dollars or by changing New Zealand policy positions.”

The commitment to sticking to policy positions included policies on UN peacekeeping engagement: New Zealand’s troop contributions did not see any significant increase throughout the ten-year campaign, nor were troops deployed in any significant numbers to new UN peacekeeping operations.

New Zealand’s Future in UN Peacekeeping
Given New Zealand’s upcoming role on the Security Council it remains to be seen how and if New Zealand will decide to re-engage in UN peacekeeping. Despite its commitment to the South Pacific, New Zealand still has the numbers and the capabilities to make meaningful contributions to peace and security through the

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UN. Despite the insistence of New Zealand’s ambassador to the UN that a seat on the council won’t necessarily mean increasing troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions,\(^{198}\) it is possible that New Zealand may feel the pressure to increase troops contributions.\(^{199}\) However, in recent years there have been temporary Security Council members, including Australia, which have not increased troop contributions to UN peacekeeping at all while on the Council. In fact, Australia’s troop contributions decreased during its term on the Security Council.\(^{200}\)

Another factor that may affect future contributions is the nature of New Zealand’s contribution to coalition efforts to combat ISIL. Although John Key’s government is currently considering troops in a training role rather than a combat one,\(^{201}\) the situation in Iraq and Syria is unpredictable, and it remains to be seen how New Zealand will ultimately be involved. It is possible that the government will use its expected participation in the coalition against ISIL as an excuse to hold back from engaging in UN peacekeeping. Many New Zealanders also fear that even a training role in Iraq will be perceived by Islamic extremist terrorists as joining the war, and could make New Zealand a target for terrorism. Concern for domestic security may make the New Zealand government and public less receptive to deploying troops to UN peacekeeping missions.

Whether or not New Zealand gets heavily involved in the fight against the Islamic State, it will never be able or expected to contribute large numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping. However, with one of the best-trained militaries in the world, there are numerous areas in which a small but specialized contribution could


\(^{200}\) United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Troop and Police Contributors Data Dashboard".

make a significant impact.\textsuperscript{202} In the 1980s and 1990s one of New Zealand’s peacekeeping niches was de-mining, with NZDF personnel deployed to assist in demining campaigns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{203} The NZDF no longer has a de-mining program, however it was an example of a specialized contribution that required small deployments and had a major impact. Current niche capabilities that the NZDF could contribute include expertise in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), post-conflict nation-building, military observers, community policing, and gender issues.

New Zealand is also involved in capacity building and training for UN peacekeeping, and although these efforts are valuable, they are relatively risk-free for New Zealand, and therefore easier to make than troop contributions. The challenge for the UN these days is to find countries willing to make contributions to efforts on the ground. So although New Zealand can make the claim that it is contributing in other ways to UN peacekeeping, these contributions simply serve to further divide the countries willing to put their soldiers in harms way to secure peace, and those who are not. Contributing troops to a peace operation remains the most visible, and therefore most recognized contribution a country can make to peace operations.

Conclusion

As a smaller, less powerful member of Western security community, New Zealand’s peacekeeping agenda has been heavily influenced by the changing attitudes of major powers and close partners like the US and the UK. New Zealand has followed the rest of the Western security community in contributing primarily to non-UN peace operations since the late 1990s. The only exception is its significant troop contributions to UNTAET, however the mission was consistent with New Zealand’s regional focus, and followed on from


multinational operation INTERFET. Despite its self-propagated identity as a good global citizen with an independent foreign policy, when it comes to deploying its military New Zealand has always preferred to do so with traditional defence partners, and in the last decade New Zealand’s foreign policy has been increasingly influenced by its close friends in the Western security-community.

This commitment to and reliance on its traditional defence partners combined with New Zealand’s strong focus on the South Pacific, has inadvertently pulled New Zealand away from UN peacekeeping and the regions where it is most common. Given their excellent training and ability to provide niche capabilities, it is a shame that New Zealand troops are not contributing to UN missions that are in need of this kind of support. But for New Zealand to re-engage in UN peacekeeping in any meaningful way, either its partners will have to return to UN operations, or New Zealand will have to decide to put its confidence in new partners. In addition New Zealand will have to reevaluate what sort of capacity is actually necessary to maintain in order to respond to conflict in the South Pacific, and become less wary of deploying troops to conflicts elsewhere in the world.
Chapter 4

Conclusions

The argument that has been put forth in this thesis is that the systemic decline in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping from the West can best be understood by using the security community concept. There are a myriad of factors that have driven contribution patterns and have been discussed in previous chapters, but the reason that every country in the Western security community has followed the same general trend in contributions is due to the very nature of this community. The community is characterized by the way it responds to threats to peace and security from within, but also, as troop contributions patterns show, from the outside. Today, the community’s way of responding militarily to these threats generally takes the form of NATO or like-minded coalition operations. Their contributions to UN peacekeeping are financial or involve capacity building and other non-military support. Troop contributions are insignificant compared to the numbers committed by South Asian and African countries. But if there ever is a change in the position of Western countries on contributing troops to UN peacekeeping, that change is likely to be seen across the security community.

Canada and New Zealand: Differences and Similarities

As members of the Western security community, Canada and New Zealand’s troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have decreased along with the contributions of other Western nations. But although these two countries have that and more in common, as the previous chapters show, their relationships with UN peacekeeping are complex and unique; colored by their historical experiences, national political climate and defence policies.

Canada has always contributed to a wider geographic range of UN peacekeeping missions than New Zealand has. Of New Zealand’s two largest UN deployments one was its immediate region, i.e. East Timor, and in the case of Bosnia, a region of strategic interest to key defence partners. Canada, on the other hand, has contributed troops to a myriad of missions outside its own region and NATO’s
areas of influence. Canada has also had a more consistently high percentage of its troops deployed to UN peacekeeping than New Zealand has. As a result Canada has a stronger identity as a nation of peacekeepers than New Zealand does. Although New Zealand often boasts about its peacekeeping record, in reality apart from significant deployments to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and East Timor, in the periods before, between, and after these engagements its contributions have been consistent, yet consistently low.

Canada was never as particular about deploying to UN peacekeeping alongside traditional defence partners as New Zealand is. The reason is twofold: Firstly, Canada’s formed contingent contributions were usually sizeable enough that they could be self-reliant for force protection and support. Secondly, Canada’s long history of peacekeeping troop contributions also meant that until the 1990s Canada exercised significant influence and control over the planning and execution of peacekeeping missions, including by securing Force Commander appointments, allowing it a level of comfort when deploying troops. New Zealand on the other hand, has usually required support and protection from other peacekeepers because of the size of its contingent contributions. In addition, New Zealand lacks Canada’s illustrious peacekeeping record, and therefore never had as much influence over peacekeeping matters, and although well liked and respected, New Zealanders have not occupied as many key positions in peacekeeping missions as Canadians have. In order to feel a degree of comfort and control in its deployments New Zealand has preferred to work alongside militaries it can trust, and therefore it was the migration of Western powers from UN to non-UN peace support operations that instigated New Zealand’s shift.

But it is thanks, in part, to New Zealand’s smaller contributions and lower level of influence in peacekeeping missions that allowed it to pass through peacekeeping in the 1990s without too much damage. Although Bosnia brought home some important lessons for the NZDF, and exposed troops to tough

conditions and ineffective mandates, New Zealand was by and large proud of its contributions. Canada and Canadian peacekeeping, on the other hand, were badly damaged by the experiences in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. The more illustrious the reputation, the more senior positions occupied, the more shameful these missions were for contributors. Apart from the Somalia Affair, Canadians comported themselves well in all three of these missions, but what they witnessed, and what they were forced to live through, has had lasting effects not only on individuals but also on the entire military establishment. Seeing their soldiers kidnapped and killed, dealing with the extensive mental health issues of returning peacekeepers, and feeling that all these sacrifices had been in vain was largely responsible for the Canadian rejection of UN peacekeeping. Unlike New Zealand, Canada was frightened away from UN peacekeeping by the catastrophes of the 1990s and the rise of new peacekeepers. Canada ran away from UN operations, whereas New Zealand was led away.

Although they might still claim to be internationalists, the peacekeeping policies of New Zealand and Canada today barely give credence to this label. They may not have made conscious choices to abandon this identity – the evolving security environment and policies of major Western powers have precipitated the change – however the way that both countries contribute troops and resources to peace support operations today hardly signifies a commitment to UN peacekeeping. The way that Canada and New Zealand currently contribute is more indicative of their national security concerns than ever before. Whereas it used to be in the national interest of middle states to be internationalists, today it is in their national interest to protect themselves, even if that means eschewing UN peacekeeping for NATO peace enforcement.

Despite having decreased their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping in the last ten to fifteen years, Canada and New Zealand are as unique in their relationship with the UN as any other troop-contributing country. However, the evolving approach of the Western security community to perceived external threats in the twenty-first century has had an impact on both countries. Whereas Canada had already all but abandoned UN peacekeeping and was happy to jump
on the NATO and US coalition bandwagon, as a smaller state New Zealand’s choices about UN peacekeeping participation were shaped by changing attitudes within the security community.

So beyond the unique experiences and domestic factors that influence countries’ contributions, the shared norms and values of the Western security community play a role in determining the way the West responds to conflict and contributes military personnel to peace support operations. Through the constant interactions and transactions that occur between community members, a collective identity and collective interests are formed, and by extension shared external threats. Common national interests and shared threats will continue to result in a relatively unified approach to addressing peace and security issues, through the use of force, or other means.

**Possibilities for Future Western Engagement in UN Peacekeeping**

After the Cold War, conflict changed, and the UN struggled to adapt. But as the organization learned to respond effectively to intrastate, ethnic conflicts, the global security environment changed again in the aftermath of 9/11. The UN is still in the process of adapting to this latest change, but the reality is it will never be the world’s one-stop-shop for the fight against global terrorism and it was not created for this purpose. It could, however, be a much more effective instrument in this campaign if Western powers decided to use it as such, providing much needed multilateral support for political peace processes, and post-conflict state-building, including effective security sector reform and rule of law. The further the West strays from the UNs institutional framework, the more the UN’s ultimate authority will be questioned, and perhaps the less effective it will become. As such it is essential, especially post-Afghanistan, that Western militaries look for a way to make an impact on UN peacekeeping through troop contributions.

While the Western world has tended to the threats against it, the UN peacekeeping system that Western contributors once dominated has ceased to exist. Other countries have taken the title and responsibility of top contributors,
and their valued contributions cannot and would not be swept aside in the event of a Western return to peacekeeping. The UN now needs the West to provide troops with specialized training and enabling capacities that many non-Western contributors cannot provide. The UN no longer needs Western countries to provide the bulk of blue helmets, but there are niches these contributors can, and need to fill.

The UN will need to play a role in paving the way for the West to contribute troops again, however it will struggle with the competing interests of Western and non-Western-contributors. Although the idea is unpopular with most non-Western troop contributors, one of the most effective and fair ways to welcome back Western contributions would be to adopt a capability-driven approach to resourcing peacekeeping missions. At the moment contributors are focused on providing the number of troops DPKO asks for (and is willing to reimburse for) rather than the capabilities a mission needs. A former DPKO Force Generation official explained with reference to the size of a standard UN battalion, “A TCC may be able to achieve the UN’s requirements with less than 850 personnel...but why would they do that knowing that they would be short-changing themselves in reimbursements?”

In order for a capabilities-driven approach to be successful the troop reimbursement system would need to be based on capabilities as well, i.e. what kind of personnel contribution is provided, rather than the number of personnel provided. Complicated as it might be to calculate, if countries were reimbursed based on the usefulness of their troop contributions in achieving the mission’s mandate, rather than on the size of their troop contributions, there would be a major incentive for Western militaries to contribute. Whether they actually would is another question altogether.

The current number of UN peacekeeping operations and the historically high number of blue helmets doesn’t provide any indication that UN peacekeeping is a thing of the past. In the last fifteen years most peacekeeping operations have established rule of law, brokered political settlements, protected civilians, facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid, encouraged national institutions and

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205 Watters, email message to author.
enabled security sector reform in countries afflicted with conflict, and they have done so without significant troop contributions from the West. However one has to wonder how much more effective these operations could have been with broader troop participation.

The UN will have to continue to adapt to the changing nature of conflict, and peacekeeping is likely to become progressively robust and increasingly challenging. For the UN to succeed in current and future operations it will need the advanced technology and specialized capabilities of Western militaries. If not, UN peacekeeping operations risk being unable to deliver upon the very mandates that Western powers play a central role in crafting, and the divide between non-UN and UN operations risks becoming a divide between the West and the rest.
Annex I

**List of Western Countries**
Albania
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Republic of Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States


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Security Council seat would bring pressures.


Watters, Commander Royal Australian Navy (retired) Darryl. By Sophie Maarleveld (6 December 2014).


