NEW ZEALAND'S 'OVERSTAYING ISLANDER':
A CONSTRUCT OF THE IDEOLOGY OF 'RACE' AND IMMIGRATION.

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the development of a 'race'/immigration ideology within New Zealand and attempts to explore the processes through which this ideology has expressed and reproduced itself in New Zealand's past. In order to determine this process, this thesis analyses, as a case study, the causes, patterns and consequences of the politicisation of Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand during the 1970s.

Pacific Island immigrants were negatively categorised according to traditional New Zealand beliefs about 'race' and the immigration of 'alien' peoples, and the stereotypes that arose out of this process justified racist immigration campaigns in the 1970s. The targeting of Pacific Island migrants through these immigration campaigns, and the deliberate scapegoating of Pacific Islanders in the 1975 general election, compounded and entrenched existing negative stereotypes thereby justifying the further politicisation of Islanders in the 1980s. It is argued that this historical process needs to be understood as the outcome, among other things, of the 'race'/immigration ideology.

Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the politicisation of Pacific Islanders during this period was but part of a cycle in a larger process of the generation and reproduction of racism. While the 'race'/immigration ideology is analysed here with Pacific Islanders, the historical campaigns against Pacific Islanders are examined in detail so as to illuminate the broader process of racialisation in New Zealand's past, and to explore the possible form that the 'race'/immigration ideology may assume both in the present and in the future.
A piece of work of this kind is rarely the product of one person's labour. Many people have supported and encouraged me in the undertaking of this thesis. I would like to thank those teachers and lecturers who have, over the years, given me an enthusiasm and love for history, without which this study might not have eventuated and certainly would not have been nearly as enjoyable as it has been.

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INTRODUCTION

In March 1974, in a campaign to crackdown on illegal immigrants, New Zealand police and immigration department officials began a series of night raids on the Auckland homes of Tongans. Tongan migrants were taken from their beds and required to produce passports, and any who could not do so were taken to the Auckland Central Police Station.¹

Those who were picked up...and who didn't have their passports had good reasons. But they weren't even given a chance to dress properly before they were put in police vans. Many appeared in court without shoes. Others had to be loaned clothing to cover singlets.²

In the following year, the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) investigated further raids on Tongans in the Auckland area.

At one house it was pointed out to the policemen and the immigration officer present that most of the passports were in the possession of a travel agency. Nevertheless, those who could not immediately produce a passport were ordered into a police van in the clothes they stood up in and were taken into custody at the police station. Two people were held for a couple of hours, and one person all night, but were then released without being charged upon documentation being made available.³

Similar raids were repeated in 1976 when the minister of immigration, Mr Frank Gill, renewed his promise to "eradicate" migrants who had overstayed their permits, people he described as "troublemakers that the

¹ Joris de Bres, Rob Campbell and Peter Harris, Migrant Labour in the South Pacific, (Auckland, 1974), Part 3, p1.

² ibid., Part 3, p2.

³ Joris de Bres and Rob Campbell, The Overstayers, Illegal Migration from the Pacific to New Zealand, (Auckland, 1976b), p22.
country could well do without". This time, the net was widened to include other Pacific Island migrants as well as Tongans, and as well as continuing the night raids, police and immigration officials also embarked on a campaign of 'random street checks' in which Pacific Islanders were stopped in the streets and questioned about their immigration status.

These immigration campaigns of the early 1970s were unprecedented in their almost exclusive concentration on migrants from the Pacific Islands and they revealed a growing political hostility towards Pacific Island migrants at this time. The New Zealand economy had begun a decline from 1973 and Pacific Islanders had become a scapegoat as Pakeha sought to identify a cause. Pacific Islanders became stereotyped as lawbreakers and undesirables. They were identified as straining public services and threatening the employment opportunities of 'real New Zealanders', and they were held responsible for such varied contemporary problems as the deterioration in law and order and the social problems of the major cities.

The negative label of 'overstayer' also became synonymous with Pacific Islanders at this time. Although migrants from other countries than the Pacific region made up a substantial proportion of illegal residents in New Zealand, in line with the notion that Pacific Islanders were a social and economic 'problem', the term 'overstayer' was politicised in the 1970s to the point where it became almost exclusively associated with Pacific Islanders.

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4 ibid., p24.


As unemployment grew, albeit slowly, pressures increased for both economic and racial reasons for migration from the Pacific to be curtailed, and deliberate attempts were made to link in people’s minds Pacific immigration and crime, Pacific immigration and unemployment.\textsuperscript{7} The activities of politicians, the police, and the Department of Immigration, unfairly created an image of Pacific Islanders as ‘overstayers’, at a time when overstayers were cast as a substantial problem for New Zealand. The media, in repeating rather than challenging the highly inaccurate public image, seriously contributed to producing a blanket anti-Pacific Islander feeling amongst many Pakeha.\textsuperscript{8} The belief that New Zealand (or at least the North Island!) was being over-run by Pacific Islanders was deliberately encouraged, even though it...[bore] no relation to the actual facts of the situation.\textsuperscript{9}

Hence, emerging out of the 1970s economic downturn was a "much more public and significant racist discourse" within which Pacific Island migrants became the scapegoats of both hostile public and political attention.\textsuperscript{10}

The stereotypes given political significance during this period, such as ‘overstayers’ and ‘violent Islanders’, however, did not appear out of thin air. They were social constructs; products of both a long and continuous ideological process, as much as a particular set of historical and material circumstances. While grounded firmly in and shaped by events

\textsuperscript{7} Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, New Zealand in the World Since 1935, (Auckland, 1993), p262.

\textsuperscript{8} Spoonley, (1990b), p32.


particular to the 1970s, the campaigns against Pacific Island migrants were not new - the rhetoric and stereotypes had been laid down long before the events described here. The 'overstayer' campaigns echoed and, indeed, borrowed from the racist discourse of earlier New Zealand historical events, particularly from immigration campaigns against other migrant groups in New Zealand's past. Moreover, the images and stereotypes created in the early 1970s became in turn a major influence on subsequent public perceptions and have provided the conditions for the further generation and reproduction of racism in New Zealand. Thus, the 'overstayer's crisis' of the 1970s can be seen to be but part of a cycle of 'race'/immigration concerns in New Zealand history. Hence, this thesis examines the 'overstayer' campaigns of the 1970s both as a case study of a particular set of historical circumstances, and as a micro-study of a deeper ideological process - the historical generation and reproduction of racism within the migration context.

RACIALISATION - AN IDEOLOGICAL PROCESS

Racism is an ideology - a set of beliefs, often incomplete and inconsistent, held by groups or individuals which provides the basis for their attitudes and actions. It is not only handed down, from one class or generation to another, but is also being constantly created and recreated by people in response to the world as they experience it. It provides a manageable definition of reality, legitimates certain social structures and it justifies the taking of a particular moral

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11 Ongley, (1990), p189.


While each individual is free to devise his or her own set of attitudes and beliefs, the most powerful and effective ideologies are those circulated by a dominant group, especially one that has the power to impose its ideology on others, whether it is to their advantage or not. Particularly when societies are in a state of uncertainty or change, as New Zealand was economically in the 1970s, and members of that society desire explanations, especially ones which apportion 'blame' to others, and remedies for their altered circumstances, a strong ideological lead is welcome. Whether an ideology is correct or moral is not relevant to the holder, if it explains a person's place in their world in accordance with the beliefs of the dominant group, it will stand until another powerful group provides or allows a redefinition.

Ideology is not fixed in a given form, but has to be produced and reproduced, with the implication that its content and its object is subject to change. In the nineteenth century the object of 'race'/immigration debates was the Asian immigrant, whereas during the 1970s, the ideology of racism was reproduced by politicians and the media in a form which had, instead, as its particular object - Pacific Island migrants.

Ideology is reproduced in many ways, most notably through the dissemination of information which reinforces and/or alters subtly the prevailing ideology. The creation of stereotypes of ideologically acceptable or unacceptable people and attitudes is an effective part of this process. Stereotypes are ready-made attitudes which can be

16 ibid.
applied as needed for easy categorisation in a whole variety of circumstances. Like the ideology from which they spring they can change but while they are current they have a certain potency. 18

Stereotypes provide simple and convenient pigeonholes into which the individual can sort his or her society without necessarily having knowledge of its component parts. 19

Through the use of appropriate stereotypes particular interpretations of social events can be given. Events and facts can be linked to existing attitudes and stereotypes to evoke a specific meaning, and in so doing reinforce that attitude or stereotype. 20 In New Zealand in the 1970s, the fact of 'overstaying' was related to negative stereotypes already associated with Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand, and hence these were not only reinforced but given new form in the stereotype of the 'violent overstaying Islander taking our men's jobs'. Once stereotypes such as this one were accepted and believed, many people reacted to the stereotype, believing it to explain the main cause of society's ills.

To have any authority an ideology must be shared to some degree, and this occurs when it serves the interests of certain groups. The more powerful the group, the more likely it is to be in a position to impose its ideology on other groups, but any segment of society may acquiesce to a dominant ideology if they find it to be useful. 21

The role of the state is significant in reproducing and disseminating ideology. In establishing its legitimacy to represent a particular society, it must take account of all those ideas and values, including

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18 ibid.

19 ibid.

20 Ongley, (1990), p184.

ideologies, which are considered important in that society. Hence, the state reflects and appeals to commonly held values to varying degrees, such that if racism is part of New Zealand society, then it would be unusual not to find it represented within the state. It is important to recognise, though, that the state does not merely reflect prevailing perceptions but, by means of selection and distortion, also shapes the content of ideologies and thereby influences the intensity of their expression.

The media, too, play an important role in the reproduction of ideology. In modern society the media have become the key means by which the world is represented to us, and in the production of ideas, images, routines and practices, the media shape our view of the world in particular ways. The media not only publish material about the world, but also construct it, often so as to reinforce dominant worldviews and ideologies. It is the appearance of being factual that makes the 'reality' the media represent so ideologically powerful.

This is not to say that ideology is imposed from above upon an unsuspecting public. Rather, ideology is reproduced within a dialectical relationship between powerful groups such as the state and those institutions which reflect dominant or official ideologies such as the media, and the general populous. Racism appeals to the working-class because it explains their material and political circumstances. Hence, racism became an important part of working-class consciousness when it

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23 Ongley, (1990), p184.


25 ibid., pp18-19.
became the obvious 'common-sense' explanation for, in New Zealand, an existing shortage of adequate housing and a deteriorating economy. The potential existed for the working-class to conclude that those migrants who joined that particular environment would make it more difficult for them to escape those conditions, if not to conclude that the migrants, especially where they were seen to be of a different 'race', that is as inferior human beings, had actually helped to create them. Where these same conclusions were made by politicians or the media this constituted a confirmation of those racist beliefs for some, and for others it provided an interpretation which suddenly 'makes sense', especially in the absence of information and/or a political perspective which pointed to different conclusions. Significantly, it also clearly removed the responsibility for the situation from the state and the majority of the population.

By repeating certain events or facts over a period of time a social 'reality' is created. This 'reality', which is integral to the reproduction of ideology, can then in turn be used to interpret subsequent events. In New Zealand, during the 1970s, the two major political parties arrived at a political consensus of sorts in their handling of the same issue. By each tightening controls on Pacific immigrants, both political parties were by implication accepting that Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand was a problem, more particularly, a 'racial problem'. A 'race'/immigration 'reality' was thus produced, and it was to be instrumental in shaping the public and political perceptions of subsequent events involving Pacific Island immigrants in the 1980s.

'Race' Ideology

27 ibid.
28 ibid., p6.
The ideology of racism stems from the now disputed imperial concept of 'race', an idea which assumes that phenotype or group physical characteristics are an appropriate means of classifying people into social groupings, and that differences in phenotype are synonymous with variations in intellect and abilities.\textsuperscript{29}

Racism exists where certain groups' characteristics are ascribed negative values, and where one group views its cultural values, lifestyle and socio-economic self-interest as superior to or having priority over those other groups.\textsuperscript{30}

The concept of 'race' itself, however, is an arbitrary social classification. It describes an idea and not a biological reality. Races exist only in so far as people think and believe they exist.\textsuperscript{31} Only certain physical characteristics are thought to indicate a different 'race'. Within any group there are differences of hair colour, height, weight, colour of eyes, length of arms and so on. When a person is identified as being of a different 'race' it involves a process of selective perception - 'races' do not naturally exist, they are socially created by human beings.\textsuperscript{32}

Stereotyping or categorisation on the grounds of race is based on physical characteristics, but can also be on the grounds of ethnic identity and therefore based on cultural characteristics.

Discrimination by either categorisation varies only in form; to say that another ethnic group has a different way of life (by implication, they can't cope with a European lifestyle) sounds more rational than saying blacks have smaller brains but either approach


\textsuperscript{31} Miles and Phizacklea, (1984), p13.

\textsuperscript{32} ibid.
can equally be used to justify discrimination.\textsuperscript{33}

Moreover, according to the 'race' ideology all cultural characteristics are determined and can therefore be explained by 'race type', hence arguments about fixed cultural or ethnic difference can be fundamentally racist.\textsuperscript{34}

While the idea of 'race' cannot be defined with any accuracy, and has indeed no scientific justification, it continues to be commonly used.\textsuperscript{35} It continues to be employed to structure social and political relationships.\textsuperscript{36} Hence, what are defined as 'race relations' are not naturally occurring relations but certain sets of relations which are socially defined and reproduced in a particular ideological form.\textsuperscript{37}

When the ideologies of 'race' and 'race relations' are generated and reproduced, this process can be called racialisation.\textsuperscript{38} The analytical task here is to identify and explain why certain sorts of situations and relations at particular times in the past were socially structured as 'race relations'.\textsuperscript{39} While the primary focus of this study is the

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\textsuperscript{33} ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Banton, (1977), p47.
\textsuperscript{35} Paul Spoonley, 'Legitimising Racism: The Use of 'Race'', Sites, Vol.9, (1984b), pp63-64.
\textsuperscript{36} Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, 'Some introductory observations on race and politics in Britain', in Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea (eds), Racism and Political Action in Britain, (London, 1979), p2.
\textsuperscript{38} See generally Robert Miles, Racism and Migrant Labour, (London 1982).
\textsuperscript{39} Miles, (1982), p43.
racialisation of Pacific Islanders in the 1970s, it is hoped that by examining the process of racialisation some of the patterns of that historical process will also be illuminated.

Any explanation of the position of Pacific Islanders in social relations in recent New Zealand history must, however, be historically and materially grounded. That is, it requires an examination of the economic structure of New Zealand society as well as an examination of the way in which political and ideological relations have been constructed and reproduced. This is not to say that racism is economically determined - it has conditions of existence which are political and ideological as well as economic - but only to acknowledge that it does not occur in a vacuum nor exist independently of its material context. Hence, this study will examine the ideological reproduction of racism in New Zealand within the context of the large-scale migrations of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand in the latter part of the twentieth century.

THESIS OUTLINE

The remainder of this thesis attempts to analyse the causes, patterns and consequences of the racialisation of Pacific Island migrants in the 1970s. Chapter Two examines the ideological context within which Pacific Island labour migration has occurred, focusing primarily on the reproduction of racism in New Zealand leading up to the ' overstayer' campaigns of the 1970s. This chapter also discusses the development of the 'race'/immigration ideology, examining the parallels between the racial categorisation of Pacific Island labour migrants in the twentieth century and the categorisation of other immigrants, particularly Asians, nearly a century before. Chapter Three discusses the political framework of labour migration to New Zealand and the role of the state in determining a particular pattern of immigration, looking specifically at

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40 Ongley, (1990), p172.

41 See generally Miles, and Ongley.
New Zealand’s immigration policies and legislation, and at the circumstances that shaped Pacific Island and other labour migrations to New Zealand. Chapter Four examines how the state responded, both politically and ideologically, to the general economic downturn of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Chapter Five analyses in detail the role of political organisations in reproducing an ideology of racism by scapegoating Pacific Island migrants, focusing especially on the propaganda of the 1975 general election. Chapter Six explores the political and ideological processes that shaped the ‘overstayer’ campaigns of 1976, while Chapter Seven develops these themes by analysing the patterns and consequences of the symbols created during these campaigns. It discusses the continued racialisation of Pacific Island migrants in the 1980s, specifically examining how the reproduction of racism in this period reflected the political and ideological context of the 1970s. Chapter Eight further develops these themes and examines the general historical pattern of the ‘race’/immigration ideology, and the form it has assumed in the 1990s.

As with any work of this nature the scope of the study is in some ways limited. It is a matter of regret that this work has little to say about Pacific Islanders’ political consciousness or action. It is not that this is considered unimportant or irrelevant, but simply that it is a discussion which deserves more detailed treatment than can be given here. It is not the intention of this work, however, in emphasising only one side of events to suggest that Pacific Islanders were the passive victims of forces beyond their control. Rather, within the structural and ideological boundaries of the period under examination, Pacific Islanders actively sought to shape and control their own lives. A more thorough consideration than is possible here would reveal the diversity of Pacific Island protest and compromise.

Another problem that needs to be acknowledged at the outset is the basic problem of how groups in this work ought to be identified. Firstly, groups do not become Pacific Islanders until they arrive in New Zealand.
It is a term that has been imposed by Pakeha and, in strictly logical terms, it does not make a lot of sense. New Zealanders, whether Pakeha, Maori, Samoan or Tongan, are all Pacific Islanders. Secondly, it is a term that blurs the different experiences of the people to whom it refers, encompassing as it does people from different islands and different regions with different histories and often vastly different cultures and different languages. It is generally a label that is unacceptable to people of Pacific origin, therefore, wherever possible, individuals and groups are referred to by their particular island group's identity. However, while acknowledging the problems associated with the label 'Pacific Islander', there are simply those instances where there is no authoritative and adequate term to replace it. Moreover, it also reflects the mindset within New Zealand during the period studied.

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42 Karl Pulotu-Endemann and Paul Spoonley, 'Being Samoan: Samoan Ethnicity in New Zealand', in A.D. Trlin and P. Spoonley (eds), New Zealand and International Migration: A Digest and Bibliography, Number Two, (Palmerston North, 1992), p82.
AN OVERVIEW OF RACISM IN NEW ZEALAND

Racism in New Zealand has been reproduced in various forms. The focus here is upon those forms which were to be of significance in the reproduction of racism towards Pacific Island migrants in the 1970s. The symbols and stereotypes of 'other' which were reaffirmed and reconstructed to justify discrimination against Pacific Islanders at that time were the ideological legacies of two earlier significant forms of racism: that which was expressed towards other immigrant groups in New Zealand, and that which was directed toward Maori. Both forms remained in the form of negative imagery and rhetoric and were reinterpreted to target Pacific Islanders during the ' overstayer' campaigns in the 1970s.

IMMIGRANTS AND RACISM

Stereotypes and the ideologies from which they come are not simply abstract concepts, unrelated to real social conditions, but are in fact useful strategies in given situations, both for explaining particular individuals' or groups' experiences of the world, and for protecting those groups' interests. At various times in the past people adopted racism as a defence mechanism against real or apparent threats to their conditions. In New Zealand there has been protest against almost every group of immigrants to the country.

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Both the New Zealand Chinese and Dalmatian communities in particular were made the targets of political and popular hostility in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Often the cause of prejudice was the fear of economic competition - they were vilified for extracting wealth from the colony and supposedly threatening the livelihood of New Zealand workers. A high correlation existed between adverse economic conditions in the colony and the prevalence of anti-Chinese sentiments, for instance. In the recession of the 1880s the Chinese became a convenient scapegoat, anti-Chinese demonstrations became a common occurrence, and the working class in particular welcomed a scapegoat on whom they could vent their displeasure at the hardships they had endured through economic recession. The intensity of this prejudice was mediated primarily by contemporary ideas about 'race'.

The apparent physical and cultural differences of these small communities were highly visible in the confined locations in which they tended to congregate, and as a result they were immediately identified as being separate from other 'New Zealanders', as 'alien', as being of a different 'race'. Of course, this racialisation of the Chinese and Dalmatians made them easier targets for scapegoating on economic grounds, but it

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7 Rachagan, (1972), pp10,141.


9 Pearson, (1990), p96.
also provided the justification for such victimisation. In order to lay claims of right or privilege to certain resources, other New Zealanders had to establish themselves as distinct from those groups they wished to exclude. The ideology of 'race' not only provided for a readily accessible categorisation of difference, it also provided the justification for exclusion in that, according to this particular ideology, it was the 'British race' which was held to be superior in all respects, and therefore the British who had more and greater rights than other 'inferior races'.

Indeed the premier, and earlier governor, Sir George Gray argued before parliament in 1879:

To preserve, therefore, the Anglo-Saxon race in its full purity...is not a mere selfish instinct....It would, therefore, hardly be an exaggeration to say that the future of the Islands of the Pacific Ocean depends upon the inhabitants of New Zealand being true to themselves, and preserving uninjured and unmixed that Anglo-Saxon population which now inhabits it, and the pure-bred descendants of which ought to inherit these islands for all time.

The racist and xenophobic hostility that the Chinese and Dalmatian groups encountered was based not only on New Zealanders' fears about economic competition, but also on these groups' apparent strangeness, and the threat they were seen to represent to cultural homogeneity. Cultural homogeneity was one of the hallmarks of colonial society, and with it came a striking degree of intolerance towards cultural minorities and a strong sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority over 'alien' and coloured peoples. Both the Chinese and the Dalmatians were considered unsuitable migrants because they did not fit the British mould. They

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12 Ongley, (1990), p183.

were seen as unassimilable.\textsuperscript{14} Much of the anti-Chinese feeling of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was based on their separatism, which was as much a result of discrimination as it was a cause of it. Little thought was given to the fact that New Zealand’s immigration policies forced the Chinese into such a position.\textsuperscript{15} They showed all the signs of refusing to assimilate, of failing to settle with their families, of demonstrating their lack of allegiance to the new nation by their habit of sending accumulated savings back to China.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise, the Dalmatians tended not to settle permanently, they maintained too strong ties with their homelands, they lived in separate communities and had little to do with outsiders, and they gambled, lived frugally and spoke little English.\textsuperscript{17}

When confronted with such an apparent cultural ‘threat’ the dominant group in New Zealand found recourse to racist ideologies as a means for responding to such ‘threats’. These groups’ differences were thus categorised in racial terms, with all the associated judgements of inferiority and undesirability. New Zealanders convinced themselves, for example, that the Chinese people were debauched and drug-ridden, inclined to the worst vices and perversions.\textsuperscript{18}

Above all, though, the issue was one of ‘racial purity’; the preservation of not only the cultural but also the biological British character of society.\textsuperscript{19} The Chinese were perceived throughout the period as a threat

\textsuperscript{14} Pearson, (1990), p96.
\textsuperscript{15} ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Pearson, (1992), p80.
\textsuperscript{17} ibid.
to white womanhood and the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race. The apparent racial threat to New Zealand society was seen not only to come from those already in New Zealand, but also from those yet to come - the 'Yellow Peril': the countless millions believed to be waiting to swarm down from Asia to the thinly populated lands of the South Pacific. "The yellow race doubled itself once in every forty years," one newspaper cried, "whereas it took the white race one hundred years to do likewise. The Asiatic nations must expand and where would they go?" The Dalmatians presented a similar 'race' threat. Numerous letters, articles and editorials advanced racial arguments for the exclusion of the Dalmatians from New Zealand.

Figure 2.1 The Yellow Peril, Goodall, Truth, 1907.

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22 ibid., p75.
Throughout all of this, the concept of 'race' had not only descriptive but also explanatory significance, and was presented as the central element of a complex ideological package. The identification of 'race' became strongly associated with conflict and various problems. Concern centred on 'race relations' and the solution was proposed in the limiting of migration. The immigration control solution was articulated in conjunction with the idea of 'race' in such a way as to appear as a logical and common sense solution to problems. Notions of racial purity were mixed with heavy doses of nationalism and Chinese and Dalmatian immigrants became the subjects of both legislative restrictions on their access to New Zealand, and restrictions on their work and living conditions once in New Zealand. Thus, an additional set of meanings - immigration control - was added to the already dominant stereotypes and images of 'race', and in this way, the 'race'/immigration 'problem' became a new ideological construct.

MAORI AND RACISM

In the nineteenth century, settler domination over Maori, both materially and culturally was justified and explained by New Zealanders in racial terms and the Maori population was generally defined as a backward and inferior race. Significantly, New Zealand’s subsequent colonial relations in the Pacific mirrored these same paternalistic, ethnocentric and racist attitudes.

This expression of racism towards Maori increased in the twentieth

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25 See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of New Zealand's past immigration policies and legislation.

26 Miles, (1984a), p238. See also Angela Ballara, (1986).

century with the labour migration of Maori to urban, largely Pakeha-dominated areas, and it became clear that Pakeha attitudes continued to be marked by perceptions of 'racial' difference and negative stereotypes of Maori character. A few key characteristics constantly recurred in studies of attitudes and prejudices toward Maori. They were considered, in various combinations and degrees, to be 'lazy', 'unambitious', 'lacking in application and perseverance', 'irresponsible', 'unreliable', 'improvident', 'violent', 'dirty', and content with sub-standard and overcrowded living conditions. Even the apparently positive attributes, such as being 'easy-going' and 'happy-go-lucky' were not regarded as conducive to success in an individualistic capitalist society, and was in many respects a 'polite' way of depicting laziness, unreliability and improvidence.

These stereotypes clearly reflected a particular interpretation of the material position of Maori, originating in their economic marginalisation prior to the Second World War, and reinforced by the inferior economic position occupied after subsequent large scale urban migrations. They were employed in a narrow range of positions in production relations which bore the burden of short-term economic fluctuation and uncertainty. They were (and continue to be) prevented by social, institutional and economic barriers from moving into the primary workforce and were thus stuck in unskilled jobs with low wages, poor working conditions and unstable tenure. The negative connotations of such material disadvantage, however, came to be strongly associated with Maori, and was, over time, incorporated into the existing negative

28 Ongley, (1990), p188.
29 ibid., p185.
30 ibid.
31 ibid., p186.
stereotypes. Thus, the characteristics of the Maori came to be seen as the cause of this phenomenon, rather than the prevailing socio-economic conditions which in fact produced it. For instance, descriptions of Maori 'uncleanliness' and deliberate 'overcrowding', descriptions which were given authority by the 'race' ideology, came to provide 'common sense' explanations for living conditions which were primarily the result of housing shortage and urban decay.

The Hunn report of 1961 illustrates another aspect of racism toward Maori, which also echoes those forms reproduced to explain New Zealanders' experiences of earlier immigrant groups. In his report on the Department of Maori Affairs, J.K. Hunn highlighted 'problems' increasingly associated at this time with Maori; unemployment, limited educational achievement, the growth of urban 'ghettos', and high crime rates. Assimilation into the Pakeha society ('integration') was proposed as the solution for meeting these 'Maori problems'. Hunn and his departmental co-authors looked at communities of Maori and saw only a mass of social and economic problems. They sought to solve these through the imposition of conformity.

Significantly, the future of 'race relations' in New Zealand was seen to hinge on the 'Maori problem'. Public and political attention was focused on the Maori, their character traits, educational deficiencies, low occupational status and standard of living, and their high crime rate. The future of 'race relations' depended on whether the Maoris became Pakehas rapidly enough, and the solution lay in the elimination of

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34 ibid., p186.


36 ibid., p135.

difference. New Zealand was marked at this time, as before, by an excessive concern for uniformity; there seemed to be a deep distrust of non-conformity, and an inability to visualise a plural society.\(^{38}\)

**THE RACIALISATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS**

Pacific Islanders entering New Zealand in increasing numbers in the late 1950s and in the 1960s and 1970s encountered similar prejudice.\(^{39}\) Almost immediately they were attributed the negative characteristics of the Maori. Pakeha projected an image based on their experience with Maori onto each new Polynesian group to arrive in New Zealand.\(^{40}\) Migrants came to be seen at times as an homogenous group, despite their distinct cultural and island origins, and the problems that had been identified previously as ‘Maori’ became to be seen more generally as Polynesian, that is, as a ‘brown problem’.

The influx of Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand coincided with the gradual decline in living standards which resulted from economic recession, and their presence quickly came to be seen as a ‘common sense’ explanation for this downturn.\(^{41}\) Pacific Island immigrants were thus racialised, in that they were categorised as different and inferior according to ideas about ‘race’, and they were politicised, in that they were deterministically associated with social problems ranging from drunkenness and violence to overcrowding. Significantly, these problems were increasingly explained with reference to a ‘race’ ideology.

\(^{38}\) ibid., p54.


\(^{41}\) Ongley, (1990), p194.
Pacific Island groups were early associated with drink and drunkenness when in the 1960s it was suggested that they were especially susceptible to the influence of liquor.42 A research survey of cases involving Islanders before the court in one year highlighted the 'problem' when it found that, of seventy-two cases, fifty-nine were caused by drunkenness.43

The correlation between Pacific Islanders and alcohol in the public mind also came to include the suggestion of violent crime. In 1967 there was considerable publicity of the need for bar wardens among Islanders in Auckland. Civic, community and social workers stated that special Island wardens were needed to control drunk and brawling Islanders in inner-city hotels. One barman in a hotel in Karangahape Road said that Islanders were the most troublesome people in his bar.44 In the early 1970s, the media highlighted the comments of a Supreme Court judge who, in sentencing a Tongan man for manslaughter, drew attention to the connections made between Islanders, drink and violence. He read statistics in court revealing that out of nine cases of death for that year, in six cases the convicted person had been a Pacific Islander, "as opposed to a native-born New Zealander", and in four of those cases liquor had been the major contributing factor. Further, of sixteen grave assaults, the offender had been seriously affected by liquor in fourteen, according to the judge, and seven of them had been Pacific Islanders. "It is the duty of the Court," the judge said, "to inform the public of the present social scene in so far as it is reflected in the incidence of major crime and to raise a voice of protest." Not surprisingly, during the early 1970s, it was Pacific Islanders who held the public attention


44 Evening Post, 'Bar wardens for Islanders', 22 July (1967).
on charges of drunken brawling and assault.\textsuperscript{45}

Newspaper headlines sustained the belief that Polynesian immigrants were a problem by asserting that they committed a disproportionate level of crime. An article in the \textit{Sunday News} 1966, headlined 'Colour Crisis' and subtitled 'Polynesian Crime Plunge Must Be Halted Now', stated that the incidence of crime among Maoris and Islanders was 'skyrocketing', painting a grim picture of the irresponsibility and lawlessness of the Polynesian population.\textsuperscript{46} The article made no attempt to consider whether this 'skyrocketing' was relative to population increases, to the total increase in crime in New Zealand, to an increase in the number of petty offenses relative to serious crime, or even to an improvement in police efficiency.\textsuperscript{47} Implicit in this account and others was the perception that this could be explained simply in terms of 'race'. Even more conservative papers reinforced the negative racial stereotypes of criminality with headlines such as 'Today's Backgrounder - CRIME - They're Polynesians', or 'Gang Crime by 200 Children - A gang of about 200 Island children had built a formidable list of crime in the central Auckland area...'.\textsuperscript{48} Pacific Islanders were negatively categorised as criminal both by being associated with stereotypes of Maori crime and by the persistent belief (generally unfounded) that immigrants, as opposed to 'New Zealanders', commit more crime.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{49} Trlin, (1973), p397.
The media reinforced negative views about Pacific Islanders generally by the way in which they presented information. A media survey in New Zealand found that words which described the ethnicity of Pakeha were infrequently used when compared with the use of labels such as Maori, Pacific Islander or Polynesian. The latter were used three to four times than the former in newspapers. This was particularly true for reporting of violent and sexual offending, the survey found. Even when allowance was made for the disproportionate number of Maori and Pacific Islanders involved in such offences, the newspapers still exaggerated their involvement by the frequent use of ethnic labels when the perpetrator was Polynesian. Similarly, Harry Dansey, a newspaper journalist before becoming Race Relations Conciliator, raised the point of the negative presentation of minority groups in the 1970s when he observed that "'news showing [minority groups] in a poor light is accentuated, but stories showing them in a positive or good light are played down or not published at all.'" It is clear that the media's influence in shaping 'race' stereotypes was significant. In 1974 the Auckland Task Force, a special law enforcement squad, was established in response to public fears about Polynesian violence in Auckland's inner-city streets, despite the fact that statistics discounted claims that Auckland was a violent city. These fears were based instead upon the repeated statements of politicians and newspaper editors who had for some time lent weight to

50 Spoonley, (1990b), p33.


the belief that the streets were not only violent, but that this violence was primarily due to the actions of one segment of the community. "Islanders [were] at constant risk over crimes of violence" according to one prominent Auckland newspaper.

Racially-biased news about crime even influenced stereotypes held by the police. Police Inspector James Morgan, in his own study of stereotypes held by police in Auckland, found Islanders to account for four and a half percent of a cross-section of offenders in 1971. When he checked the impressions of a number of fellow policemen to see what they believed the percentage of Islanders involved in crime would be, their replies ranged from three to more than seven times the actual total, illustrating the potency of the negative characteristics that were being ascribed to Pacific Islanders.

This stereotype of the violent and criminal Pacific Island immigrant increasingly skewed towards a focus on violent sexual crime, as a particular association was made between Islander males and sexual offending. In an article examining Pacific Island crime in 1976, the Auckland Star quoted figures stating that four Islanders were jailed for one week in the month of October, 1975, for offences involving rape, and went further to say that "in a number of other rape and assault reports in recent months the consistent description has been that the suspect is Polynesian, probably an Islander." Aided by further comments made by public figures and the police, rape became a racial act, and Pacific

54 ibid.
56 ibid.
Islanders were yet again categorised as the cause of social problems. 59

Another 'problem' which was associated with Pacific Island immigrants, and which therefore came to be defined as a 'racial problem', was in the area of housing. High rents and their exclusion from more desirable properties forced migrants to settle in areas of decline, where they were welcomed by landlords for creating demand where demand for housing had been falling. 60 Although the preconditions for and the actuality of urban decline in these areas were in evidence before Pacific Island migrants settled them, and their forced concentration in these areas only highlighted existing social deprivation, racism defined them as its cause. 61 As it had been with Maori, the cause of depressed housing was explained by the presence of Pacific Islanders, and not by the function of age and state of decay in inner-city housing areas. In Auckland and Wellington, these areas became identified as 'problem' areas - sites of poor housing, overcrowding, depressed physical environments, and the implied correlates of poverty, unemployment, and more specifically, street crime, vandalism and violence. 62 As the state built new suburbs, Otara in Auckland and Porirua in Wellington, these too became seen as symptomatic of the urban malaise associated with Pacific migrants. 63 One correspondent, writing on the subject of Samoan immigration in 1973, complained that "Auckland...is beginning to look like a huge ghetto." 64

As a result there arose a tendency to associate colour with low social


status and undesirable social traits, and there was a general concern among sectors of the Pakeha community that the arrival of Islanders in a street or neighbourhood would cause property values to depreciate, as well as bring about more general moral and social decay.65 One 1976 study of the attitudes of landlords in Auckland highlighted the prevalence of negative stereotypes about Pacific Islanders, with seventy-seven percent of respondents claiming that Islanders, as either renters or buyers of houses, lowered the value of neighbouring properties.66 Many of the original residents in the central parts of Auckland subsequently thought in terms of selling their property and moving away, their attitudes summed up in the words of one Auckland pensioner: "of course we don’t believe in any discrimination, we just don’t want too many Islanders in our street".67

This sort of racism was partly a response to perceived economic and even physical threats. Pacific Islanders' physical presence in large numbers "introduced a brown wedge into the cosy, homogenous, white society in which many European New Zealanders wished to believe".68 It was also a response to a perceived cultural threat, as can be seen in the debate about overcrowding. Pacific Island migrants presented (like the urbanised Maori before them) a visibly different family structure, the extended family, which challenged the New Zealand ideal of the nuclear family. Houses with large families were not the accepted norm, and Islanders were criticised and stereotyped for overcrowding their homes. Racist stereotypes provided a convenient means of reinforcing the prevailing ideologies about family size and living arrangements, while at the same time absolving individuals from having to accept the


66 Auckland Star, 'Putting a roof over their heads is the first priority', 22 August (1979).

67 Curson, (1970), p188.

realities of cultural difference.69

In the late 1950s media attention was focused upon the 'problem' of Islander health and housing in Auckland, with one newspaper describing "gross overcrowding" amongst Islanders in the city.70 Responding to this in 1957, the Auckland City Council called for a large scale investigation of the premises occupied by Pacific Islanders.71 The prejudice of those involved was revealed by the Council chairman's own words; "it can be appreciated that overcrowded houses of this type bring a certain amount of stigma to a whole area....Council views that rather seriously."72

The outcome of the sanitary inspectors' investigation in 1957 was reported widely in local newspapers, and it was revealed that, contrary to expectations:

overcrowding was no more common among [Islanders] than it is in other homes in the same districts...Overcrowding within the meaning of the present city by-laws occurred in only 4 of the 161 dwellings.73

However, after several meetings, the council recommended that the criteria for overcrowding be re-examined by all local authorities, implying that if Pacific Islanders would not comply or conform to Pakeha attitudes of what constituted a desirable number to have living in the same house, then the local bodies' standards must be raised.74 Pacific Islanders offended more against Pakeha cultural standards than they did


70 New Zealand Herald, 'Lured to City by Hope of Accommodation', 11 April (1956).


72 ibid.


74 Hooper, (1958), p41.
against the legal minimum health standards set by authorities.\(^{75}\)

Despite the results of the sanitary inspectors survey, the stereotype that Pacific islanders overcrowded their houses persisted. Subsequent to the survey, one Auckland sanitary department official ventured the opinion that, "All these people are the same - once one of them gets into a place the whole pa follows them."\(^{76}\)

In another study into Pacific Island housing in the 1960s, in response to continued criticisms about sub-standard housing and overcrowding, it was found that there was overcrowding in only 4.59 percent of the 305 houses surveyed.\(^{77}\) Yet, in a series of articles purporting to inform its readers about Pacific Islanders in 1976, the Auckland Star, not only reinforced the stereotypes about Islander overcrowding but went on to associate that stereotype, yet again, with criminality:

> It's overcrowded, the evidence is that it's unhealthy, and it produces social problems. One is child bashing: If you're a Pacific Islander's child you stand nine times more chance of becoming a child abuse statistic than a European child, according to "Child Abuse in New Zealand", a definitive study.\(^{78}\)

Although the article did admit that child bashing was not just an 'Island' problem, it did so on the grounds that Maori bash their children, too; "That familiar Maoritanga word aroha doesn't save Maori children either. They run six times the risk of abuse of European children."\(^{79}\) The implication made was that only Polynesians abused their children.

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\(^{75}\) ibid.

\(^{76}\) Quoted in Hooper, (1958), p43.

\(^{77}\) McCreary, (1965), p29.

\(^{78}\) Auckland Star, 'The gold isn't paving the streets - but they know it's here in Auckland', and 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January (1976).

\(^{79}\) Auckland Star, 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January (1976).
More importantly, along with being held responsible for various social problems in New Zealand, Pacific Island migrants, like the Chinese and Dalmatians before them, were also labelled as 'not-New Zealanders'. Significantly, although in some instances Pacific Islanders had been categorised along with Maori in the group, 'brown Polynesian', in this instance they were distinctly set apart from them. Whereas, Maori had been incorporated into the Pakeha idea of the nation, that same sense of nationalism categorised Pacific Islanders as 'outsiders'.

Regardless of the fact that many were New Zealanders, that is, citizens (many New Zealand-born) or permanent residents, they were seen as aliens, and were often typified as a threat to the New Zealand way of life. They had been portrayed as being responsible for violence and lowering the residential standards of housing. They were also seen as lowering the standard of employment in some areas. The recruitment of Fijian migrants for the purpose of scrub-cutting in the Gisborne area, for instance, after attempts to recruit local unemployed failed, was opposed at the time by the local Trades Council on the grounds that:

The use of this type of labour could put a heavy damper on efforts to improve the image of farm employment and would be a menace to the health, ethnic and employment standards of the whole district.

Moreover, they were seen to be disadvantaging New Zealanders' access to social services. The Auckland Star reported that:

Bobby has school problems and his mother puts it down to those "Island children in the class....Every week there's another one, some can hardly speak English at all, and the whole class is held back because they can't cope."

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80 Sinclair, (1986), p204.


82 Auckland Star, 'Like it or not, it's an issue for us all', 20 January (1976).
The same paper also wrote that poor health and disease amongst Islanders put undue pressure on New Zealand's health and social services:

The most recent survey of Auckland's A and E service showed that 11.2% of patients seeking attention were non-Maori Polynesians. Comments the associate professor of general practice at the School of Medicine, Prof. J.G. Ackards: "This represents considerably more than their population in the Auckland urban area." And, he adds, this figure plays a significant part in the difficulties that this overworked department experiences.

This general feeling of displacement by Islanders was summed up by the letter of one correspondent to an Auckland newspaper:

Auckland alone is overrun by Islanders. Try walking along Karangahape Road any busy day or night; it is we New Zealanders who have to step off the footpath into the gutter out of their way.

Such prejudice against immigrants was, and continues to be, a powerful instrument in maintaining dominant groups' interests. Immigrants took on the function of scapegoats for the deficiencies of a capitalist society, which was unable to provide adequate living conditions and to guarantee security to the whole of its working population. Part of New Zealand's ideology has been that the responsible citizen should hold a job and provide a house for his family. If he was unable to do this, racist ideologies and stereotypes allowed him to blame the scapegoat group for his predicament rather than the government or any other powerful interest group. The visibility of Pacific Islanders enabled people to identify and categorise them as a separate 'racial' group. Attention was subsequently focused upon them in the public mind through

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84 Auckland Star, 'Packed in to pay the rent', 21 January (1976).
stereotyping, and once those stereotypes were accepted and believed, Pacific Islanders came to be seen as the main cause of society's ills.

The identification of the presence of Pacific Island immigrants as the origin of 'race relations problems' meant that 'they' were made the object of political attention. Debates were concentrated on what needed doing for or to 'them'. Thus, the scapegoating of Pacific Island immigrants for New Zealand's social and economic problems, was invariably accompanied by threats to send them home or prevent more coming. The Auckland Star, in 1976, argued that New Zealand had admitted too many Islanders in the past ten years, and that it was time to restrict their entry. Likening Islanders to the 'problem' migrants of America, they warned of the threat of Polynesian immigration to New Zealand society:

New York's Puerto Rican problem began much the same way - with small-scale migration of people who, like the Cook, Niue and Tokelau group, had unchallenged right of entry. They went to the US with the same problems of language and employment. They settled in Harlem which rapidly spread its boundaries to become Spanish Harlem with more social problems than ever before. Now, nearly one in seven of the city's 8 million population is Puerto Rican. Violence, prejudice and squalor are part of their way of life.

Implicit in the paper's stance was the perception that Pacific Islanders were the cause of New Zealand's problems. Racial tension, violent crime, housing shortages and all manner of social problems were all seen to be caused by the immigration of Pacific Islanders. The solution was convenient and simple - send them home. Thus the reproduction of racist ideologies in the case of Pacific Island migrants, as for earlier migrants, became inextricably entwined with debates about immigration.

The ideological consequence of this 'race'/immigration dualism was that the two notions became interchangeable. When immigrants became the centre of debate, reference in fact was to 'coloured people', and not to

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89 Auckland Star, 'It's time - New Zealand will have to be firm', 27 January (1976).
all persons entering New Zealand, and in the 1970s, that reference became directed more particularly to Pacific Islanders.
CHAPTER THREE

IMMIGRATION
NEW ZEALAND POLICY AND PACIFIC ISLAND
LABOUR MIGRATION

The underlying objective of New Zealand immigration policy until very recently has been to maintain a homogenous society in terms of ethnic composition. Government rationale has been to encourage immigration of only those people who could be absorbed into New Zealand society without strain, by implementing selective policies which fostered immigration from Great Britain, and which placed severe controls on non-British migrants. Along with this desire to preserve British 'racial' and cultural superiority in New Zealand, a desire to increase or at least maintain New Zealand living standards has also contributed to the formation of selective immigration policies. Legislation to control immigration has been introduced by the government in response to public pressure when either the volume or ethnic composition of migrant flows to New Zealand have been perceived to threaten these living standards. Similarly, selective policy has also been introduced when either lack of manpower or particular occupational skills has retarded the desired growth of living standards.

1 See Chapter Eight for an illustration of the extent to which this has changed. New Zealand has, since the late 1980s, placed more of an emphasis upon economic considerations such that Asian immigrants have much less restricted entry to New Zealand than that of former years.


Selectivity in New Zealand' immigration policy has been generally exercised in two ways; firstly, by discouraging large-scale non-British migration by legislation, as well as through administration (especially since 1920) of a flexible immigration policy, and secondly, by encouraging British migrants through specific legislation and state-assisted immigration schemes.5

THE DESIRE FOR A 'WHITE NEW ZEALAND'

Although restrictive legislation was not enacted until the 1880s, New Zealand had not been, before then, advertised as a destination for all-comers. Early assisted immigration schemes, operated as effective forms of selection and exclusion, and in the main, reinforced existing ethnic and cultural patterns in New Zealand. The overwhelming majority of migrants to the country were from England, Scotland and Ireland.6 Subsequent immigration policy and legislation was designed to maintain this initial pattern of ethnic homogeneity.7

Initially, immigration from China was the focus of restrictive legislation in New Zealand and between 1881 and 1920, at the will of both the New Zealand government and public, successive racist statutes established what was, "if not literally a 'white New Zealand policy', at least one which was carefully designed effectively to prevent the settlement of Asians."8

In 1881 the New Zealand government passed the restrictive Chinese

5 ibid.


Immigrants Act which required every (and only) immigrant Chinese to pay a ten pound poll tax upon entry to New Zealand and placed a quota of one Chinese per ten tons of cargo on ships carrying any Chinese immigrants. These restrictions were increased in subsequent legislation so that by 1896 the poll tax had been raised to one hundred pounds, and the quota had been further restricted to one Chinese person for every two hundred tons of cargo. An act of 1907 imposed on Chinese the additional test of reading to the satisfaction of customs officials a hundred words of English. Similarly, a 1908 amendment made it mandatory for all Chinese leaving New Zealand to provide a thumbprint, to theoretically prevent one Chinese immigrant leaving and another assuming his name to enter New Zealand and avoid the poll tax.

Figure 3.1 Still They Come, J. Blomfield, Free Lance, 1905.

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9 Rachagan, (1972), pp139-133.

10 P.S. O'Connors, (1968), p42. Note that although these acts were replaced by the subsequent 1920 legislation, the poll tax remained in force, and while it was not levied after September 1934, it was not abolished until 1944.


Although the Chinese were the primary target of selective immigration policy during this period, legislation was passed to exclude other non-British groups also. Restrictive measures were passed in successive Kauri Gum Industry Acts from 1898 to 1910, for instance, to stem the flow of temporary Dalmatian immigrants.\(^{13}\) Controls of increasing severity, directed at the exclusion of all 'Asiatics', were introduced but these failed to receive Royal Assent, mainly because the term included Indians, and as they were British subjects their exclusion on the grounds of 'race' ran counter to the doctrine of free movement of all British subjects within the Empire.\(^{14}\) A compromise, along the lines of legislation passed by Natal was suggested by Joseph Chamberlain at the Imperial Conference in 1897 and was incorporated in the Act of 1899.\(^{15}\) This became the principle means of excluding 'alien' groups before 1920 and declared as prohibited immigrants those who, not being of British or Irish parentage, could not write out in any European language an application form as set out in an attached schedule.\(^{16}\)

Renewed protest at increasing 'alien' immigration after World War One, however, led to the introduction of further legislation in the form of the 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act which replaced the Act of 1899.\(^{17}\) This legislation gave the government a more flexible instrument for immigration control than any that had been previously fashioned in New Zealand, and, perhaps more importantly, it established an important principle which was to remain in effect until the early 1970s.\(^{18}\) This

\(^{13}\) See A.D. Trlin, (1979).


\(^{15}\) ibid.

\(^{16}\) P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p44.

\(^{17}\) Rachagan, (1972), pp260-272.

\(^{18}\) A.D. Trlin, 'New Zealand's Admission of Asians and Pacific Islanders', in James T. Fawcett and Benjamin V. Carino (eds), Pacific Bridges. The New Immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands, (New
principle was to allow free entry to all persons of exclusively British (including Irish) birth and descent, to require all persons of non-British origin to obtain entry permits by application, and to invest the minister of customs (later the minister of labour and immigration) with sole discretionary power to approve or disallow such applications and hence entry to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{19}

Several factors underlay the demand for restrictive legislation on ethnic criteria over this period. Working-class fears of cheap labour depressing an already uncertain income level was a dominant factor, and was compounded by middle-class fears of similar competition in the sphere of retail business.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, politicians, some of whom, such as W.P. Reeves and R.J. Seddon, were outspoken racists, were not above making political capital of these fears, even to the point of reinforcing public fears if they showed inconvenient signs of waning.\textsuperscript{21} Above all else, though, these attitudes were a reflection of British convictions of racial superiority and the hostile stereotype of all persons not of British origin.\textsuperscript{22}

The 1920 Act marked the development in New Zealand of a virtual unanimity about the virtues of staying 'white'.\textsuperscript{23} Racial prejudice was the determinant factor shaping early immigration legislation, and indeed, the 1920 Act fixed the 'white New Zealand' ideology in policy such that it strictly regulated not just Asian but all 'alien' immigration to New York, (1987), pp201-202.

\textsuperscript{19} ibid.


\textsuperscript{23} P.S. O'Connor, (1968), p64.
The aim of maintaining a basically homogenous population, both culturally and racially, remained basic to immigration policy after the Second World War. In place of ethnic background as criteria, migrants' ability to assimilate and integrate with the host population became the major criterion on which entry was based. While the racial biases of this approach were not as explicit as in previous policies, the underlying racial prejudices and assumptions were essentially the same. For, although the entry of non-British migrants increased in the post-war era, the assimilation and integration principle effectively limited their


entry so as not to alter New Zealand’s predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Maori population. 27

It is clear that underlying the rhetoric about the "great question of assimilation and integration" were assumptions based on the idea of 'race'. 28 Those immigrants who were categorised as 'racingly' different were assumed to have less ability to assimilate. It was believed that they simply would not make good New Zealanders:

People who share a common heritage of language and tradition integrate very quickly. The greater and more obvious the differences between the immigrant and the average New Zealander, the longer and more difficult the period of assimilation, and the greater the tendency of immigrants to hive off into little colonies which become self-sufficient and resistant to the process of assimilation. 29

Asians, along with Southern and Eastern Europeans, and some Pacific Island immigrant groups, were among those cited as presenting "more difficult problems of assimilation". 30 Accordingly, policy provisions were intended to limit the immigration of such groups to numbers that experience suggested could be absorbed without detriment to the "racial balance" of the country and its harmonious intergroup relationships. 31 The general policy of successive governments was to selectively admit to New Zealand only those people who could make a worthwhile economic or cultural contribution to the community, who would be readily assimilated.

27 ibid.


29 T. Shand in Dominion, 1 July (1968).


and, most significantly, who would be accepted and welcomed by the community in general.\textsuperscript{32}

Consequently, while immigration legislation was exercised to exclude undesirable immigrants, state-controlled immigration schemes were initiated to encourage those immigrants who were acceptable, that is, British and Irish migrants. If Australians, Canadians and white South Africans were counted as British, then in 1961 only two percent of all immigrants born outside New Zealand were 'aliens', and of that two percent more than a third were Dutch immigrants who had entered New Zealand under a special arrangement between the New Zealand and Netherlands governments.\textsuperscript{33} By setting preferences for immigrants with specific occupational skills and by funding assisted passage from selected countries, the state was able to determine the type of immigrant who could enter New Zealand.

Before 1950 the assisted passage scheme was confined solely to migrants from Great Britain. After 1950, as the demand for migrants in New Zealand exceeded the number wanting to emigrate from the United Kingdom, the selection field was widened to include selected European countries.\textsuperscript{34} However, although small numbers of Danish, Austrian, Swiss and German nationals, and a more significant proportion of Dutch migrants entered during the 1950s as assisted immigrants, New Zealand's schemes continued to favour British (that included white Commonwealth immigrants) entry to the point of virtual exclusion of all others.

A second immigration scheme, the subsidy scheme, introduced in the early 1960s, was also initially restricted to British migrants, and even when it was widened to include other 'white' countries in the late 1960s the vast majority of subsidised migrants continued to come from the United

\textsuperscript{32} Department of Labour, (1970), p1.

\textsuperscript{33} Ballara, (1986), p156.

\textsuperscript{34} Dalziel, (1976), p55.
Kingdom. Significantly, at least 89% of the immigrants entering New Zealand under the subsidy scheme during the 1969-1976 period were British.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, the majority of incoming migrants to New Zealand in the whole of the post-war period were British, and the bulk of the remainder came from a small group of other traditional source 'white' countries.\textsuperscript{36}

**THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR**

In the face of labour shortages after 1945 it was asserted that "if the country was to reach its full development potential more people and skills were required".\textsuperscript{37} Assisted immigration schemes had provided not only the means to regulate the ethnic composition of the population but also came to provide the means to acquire the labour necessitated by economic expansion.

The scope of the schemes was widened or narrowed according to fluctuating economic conditions. In the early 1960s, for instance, the annual target of assisted migrants was set at 4,000 and eligibility criteria were eased to facilitate that target. However, the economic downturn of 1967-1968 prompted the government to reduce this number to an annual target of only 1,500 and tougher eligibility qualifications were imposed.\textsuperscript{38} In 1970, as a result of the combined effects of economic upturn and contemporary net migration losses, New Zealand faced a dramatic change in its employment situation; 5,595 vacancies and 1,818 unemployed at the end of January 1970, compared with 3,533 vacancies and 4,641 unemployed a year

\textsuperscript{35} From annual reports, Department of Labour, AJHR, (1969) - (1976).

\textsuperscript{36} Pearson, (1990), p114.


earlier. \(^{39}\) Important changes were subsequently made in the conditions for recruiting migrants under the immigration schemes. \(^{40}\) Limitations on the subsidy scheme, including the maximum number of immigrants allowed to New Zealand annually, were removed and the scheme was extended to the United States, Belgium, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands with proposals to extend it even further so as to meet the increased labour demand. \(^{41}\) After 1969 the subsidy scheme became the major mechanism of assisted immigration to New Zealand, and between 1969 and 1976 more than 30,000 people entered New Zealand under this scheme. \(^{42}\)

More importantly, whereas previous immigration policy had continually emphasised preference for British migrants, the demand for labour in the expanding economy in the late 1960s required the state to look to other less traditional sources for workers. Increasingly, as a result, the gaps in the semi-skilled and unskilled part of the labour market were met not only by British migrants, but also by migrant workers from the Pacific Islands.

**PACIFIC ISLAND LABOUR MIGRATION TO NEW ZEALAND**

Prior to the Second World War there were few Pacific Islanders in New Zealand - only 1,000 at the time of the 1936 census. \(^{43}\) Poor communications and regional transportation, and limited external labour demand, among other things, had inhibited migration. However, World War Two proved to be a watershed in the history of migration for Pacific Islanders, as much as it had been for rural Maori, stimulating


\(^{40}\) ibid.


\(^{43}\) Pearson, (1990), p116.
significant urban migration within island groups and international migrations between them, including New Zealand.\textsuperscript{44}

Like New Zealand Maori, Pacific Islanders formed a convenient and cheap labour reserve for industrial expansion in post-war New Zealand, and the demand for unskilled labour to work in the manufacturing industries in Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand's two main cities) was increasingly met at this time by Island Polynesian sources.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1945 there were less than 2,000 Pacific Island Polynesians in New Zealand. By 1956 there were over 8,000; ten years later there were 26,000, with the great majority in urban residence, and most of those in jobs employed in the manufacturing industries.\textsuperscript{46} Overall these Pacific Island Polynesians accounted for almost 2.0 percent of the total population compared with 0.12 percent in 1945.\textsuperscript{47}

While the incorporation of Pacific Island labour into the New Zealand economy, like that of Maori and European migrant labour, arose out of economic expansion, creating excess labour demand in New Zealand's urban secondary industries, labour demand alone cannot fully explain this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{48} The rapid post-war growth of the resident Pacific Island population must be explained with regard also to the historically uneven economic development between the migrants' countries of origin and New Zealand, and the political and ideological context within which migration occurred.

\textsuperscript{44} ibid.


\textsuperscript{46} ibid., p118.

\textsuperscript{47} ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} See Ongley, (1990).
The Historical Background: New Zealand and the Pacific Islands

The pool of island migrant labour available to New Zealand industry after 1945 was the consequence of the "development of underdevelopment" in the Pacific Islands as a result of the historical patterns of capital accumulation. Underdevelopment in the Pacific resulted in a growing dependency on economic opportunities elsewhere, so that today, labour migration is an integral and perhaps irreversible feature of most Pacific Island economies. Indeed, in some cases the export of labour constitutes the mainstay of the economy.

Following World War Two this labour supply found a ready market in the swelling New Zealand economy where entry was facilitated by legal and political obligations arising out of a history of colonial domination and economic exploitation in the Pacific region.

New Zealand - Pacific Islands Historical Relations

In 1901 the Cook Islands and Niue were annexed by the New Zealand government and the resident islanders granted New Zealand citizenship. In 1914, largely by military accident, New Zealand 'conquered' the German colony of Western Samoa and later gained jurisdiction over it through a League of Nations mandate in 1918. In 1925 the Tokelau Islands were transferred to New Zealand administration by the British, and New Zealand subsequently established less direct influence over other island groups.

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50 Ongley, (1990), p69.
51 ibid.
such as Tonga and Fiji.  

This colonial history led to specific legal and/or economic arrangements with New Zealand that were to become important in shaping their access to that country later in the century. The Cook Islands and Niue established a relationship of free association with New Zealand, wherein Islanders from both countries retain New Zealand citizenship and so enjoy freedom of entry to New Zealand. Likewise, Tokelau Islanders also have New Zealand citizenship, and therefore unrestricted rights of entry and permanent settlement. Moreover, the New Zealand government embarked upon a resettlement scheme whereby migrants from the Tokelau Islands were assisted to move to prearranged employment and accommodation in New Zealand. Prompted by the recognition of problems arising from rapid population growth in islands with scarce resources, this resettlement scheme involved about 500 migrants during the period 1966-1975.

Immigration from Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, however, in accordance with New Zealand’s racially-determined policy, has been, to varying degrees, restricted. Western Samoa, although granted independence from New Zealand in 1962, did have a colonial history with New Zealand and this resulted in Western Samoans being accorded a more favourable immigration status than the Pacific states of Tonga and Fiji. Under the 1962 Treaty of Friendship Western Samoans received a permanent quota for migration to New Zealand, which in 1970 was set at 1,500 persons a year. Migrants under this quota were still required to meet the normal immigration requirements regarding age and family size, and the

58 ibid.
possibility of extending their permits for a further four and a half years. During this period of five years 'continued residence' Samoan migrants were required to demonstrate that they were satisfactory citizens, prepared to accept New Zealand laws and social mores.59 Furthermore, for a short time, 1969 to 1970, single Samoan women entering New Zealand were also subject to pregnancy tests, but this practice was regarded as discriminatory and dropped.60

Although there were no formal ties between Tonga and New Zealand of the kind described above, there was a tradition of co-operation in the fields of education and missionary endeavour especially. Tonga was never a 'colony' of any European power and New Zealand, as its nearest metropolitan neighbour and a country with close associations with other parts of the Pacific, naturally became a favoured destination for Tongans seeking work.61 Likewise, although New Zealand had no formal administrative links with Fiji there had been considerable co-operation between the two countries, and small numbers of Fijians had been entering New Zealand from at least the 1920s.62 However, because of the perceived 'large intake' of immigrants from other Pacific Islands, it was deemed necessary to place restraints upon the entry of unskilled migrants from Tonga and Fiji.63 Accordingly, with few exceptions on humanitarian

59 T. Shand, 'New Zealand and Immigration', reproduced in Dominion, 1 July (1968).


62 ibid., p120.

or occupational grounds, permanent entry of Tongans and Fijians, as well as those Western Samoans not included in the annual quota, was restricted to the fiances, fiancées, husbands, wives, and children of New Zealand residents. 64

Provision was also made for temporary migration from those island groups with restricted entry, as a form of aid by New Zealand to assist Pacific Island development, but this was influenced usually by New Zealand’s own economic self-interest. 65 Various official temporary migration schemes allowed for the migration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand as contract labourers for limited lengths of time, usually during expansionist periods in the New Zealand economy.

For Fijians, a scheme was set up during the 1960s, when local labour was scarce under conditions of full employment, whereby farmers could obtain through the Department of Labour temporary workers for such rural activities as scrub cutting, tussock eradication, market gardening, and tobacco picking. 66 This scheme was automatically adjusted to New Zealand employment conditions. Entry was on condition that employment was available, and unemployed New Zealanders available and willing to do the work had to be employed before Fijian labour. 67

In 1966 a sponsorship system was established for Tongans, whereby they could enter the country as visitors if they provided evidence of means of support for a three-month period in New Zealand - either $200 a month or a letter of guarantee signed by a New Zealand citizen or permanent

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65 ibid., p204.
resident covering accommodation and maintenance for their stay in New Zealand.68 This scheme was not widely used until the early 1970s, largely because, before that time, Tongans were generally not motivated to try to came to New Zealand, and the Tongan population in New Zealand was too small to sponsor relatives to the country.69 Similarly, in 1969, the Hutt Valley Chamber of Commerce introduced a scheme to bring in Tongan workers, because of the then acute shortage of labour in the area, which continued on a small scale until it was subsumed by an official government work scheme in 1975.70

New Zealand's immigration policy regarding Pacific Islanders was designed to ensure that most Pacific Island movement to New Zealand was in response to short-term employment opportunities in the New Zealand labour market, without this response leading to permanent settlement.71 In the late 1960s, the general climate of public and political opinion favoured extensive immigration, and this, combined with the demand for unskilled labour in New Zealand's expanding manufacturing sector, contributed to a rapid increase in the volume of movement between the island countries and New Zealand during the early 1970s.72 But it was only temporary migrants who found favour - New Zealanders wanted Pacific Island migrants' labour, they did not want them to stay permanently. From 1970 to 1975 the increased movement from Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa accounted for forty percent of temporary migration to New Zealand but only three percent of total permanent migration to New Zealand.73

68 Hegarty, (1977), p44.
69 ibid., p45.
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
The goal of maintaining a predominantly 'white' community continued to be instrumental in shaping New Zealand immigration policy with regard to Pacific Islanders. Skills or labour were not as desirable as a majority with 'white' skin. In 1970 a new immigration card was introduced to replace the old format which had required all new arrivals to nominate their 'race', ironically because that was seen at that time to hint at racial prejudice. However, the new immigration card, a labour department spokesman announced, was to drop all mention of a visitor's racial origin "except in the case of Polynesians".

New Zealand governments, motivated largely by racist attitudes and biases, attempted at different times and with different levels of

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75 Ballara, (1986), p158.

76 ibid.

enthusiasm, to limit Pacific Island migration. Their experiences in this respect mirror that of many European countries and the same types of restrictions were employed, for instance, it was made difficult for temporary migrants to bring their families, and restrictions on Pacific Islanders became more severe than those applied to other nationalities.\textsuperscript{78} Such restrictions on the immigration of Western Samoans, Tongans and Fijians inevitably encouraged attempts to beat the system and flout the conditions of entry.\textsuperscript{79}

**Overstaying**

Prior to the mid-1970s the main means of entry for Tongans and Fijians, and that used mostly by Samoans despite their more favourable rights of permanent entry, was through temporary non-renewable work permits or non-working visitor’s permits, generally of three to six months duration.\textsuperscript{80} Until the early 1970s, control over the number of temporary migrants was lax and no systematic efforts were made to trace or prosecute persons who overstayed their permits.\textsuperscript{81} Such conditions enabled visitors to easily overstay their entry permits.

Migrants were lured to New Zealand on short-term visitors permits by the prospect of comparatively fabulous earnings which would yield a substantial sum of savings by the time their permit expired. However, in the short three-month period usually permitted, migrants had to earn enough to repay their air fares of between NZ$200 and $300, over and above housing and food costs in New Zealand, before showing any net


\textsuperscript{79} Trlin, (1987), p204.

\textsuperscript{80} Ongley, (1990), pp107-8.

\textsuperscript{81} Trlin, (1987), p204.
return on their work. While some were able to accomplish this within the legal period of their permits, most could not. Rising living costs made the task more and more difficult, and as a result migrants overstayed their permits to make more profitable gains than was possible within the legal permit duration. In 1974 it was reported that the average length of stay for Western Samoans in New Zealand on three month permits was in actual fact more than seven months.

Encouraging Pacific migrants to overstay their permits were very real factors of unemployment and poverty in the Islands. The remittances of migrant workers were not only important to their countries' balance of payments, but family and community projects, even their families' immediate consumption were often dependant upon the New Zealand workers. For instance one New Zealand migrant stated that:

In Tonga employment for many like me is almost non-existent. Without this steady source of income life for me and my family would be very grim indeed....There is no steady source of income with which to provide one's family with a decent standard of living. I have found myself a steady job [in New Zealand] which provides me with a steady source of income that enables me to help not only my own family but also my wife's brothers and sisters.

Significantly, Pacific migrants were not the only ones with cause to flout temporary permits. Their New Zealand employers were usually aware that they were overstayers, but given the shortages of labour and the prospect of losing a valuable employee, employers often encouraged

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83 ibid.


Pacific Island workers to overstay.\textsuperscript{87} Pacific Island workers were in demand because of their willingness to take on those jobs vacated by the local work force in the expanding economy - labour was so short that employers paid agencies fifty dollars a head for each Pacific Island worker they could recruit.\textsuperscript{88} Because they were more focused on short-term money and large remittances, Pacific Island migrants were consequently more pliable, eager and exploitable as a workforce, and more prepared to undertake, dirty, tedious jobs in the area of low-paid (in New Zealand terms) unskilled labouring.\textsuperscript{89} Many industries became dependent on Pacific migrant labour with Islanders making up sixty to eighty percent of the workforce in some workplaces and thus employers encouraged migrants to overstay their permits.\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, in 1974 the minister of immigration, Mr Fraser Colman, was reported as saying:

\begin{quote}
The government had to face the fact that New Zealand industry was dependent on illegal island labour. Unless they used such labour, production and export targets would not be met.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

More importantly, the New Zealand government supported this status quo.\textsuperscript{92} When the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour in New Zealand was high an almost open-door policy reigned. When work was readily available, a willingness to work and a job to go to were counted as evidence of support by immigration authorities.\textsuperscript{93} The rapid rise in the numbers entering New Zealand for supposedly 'non-working' purposes should have had obvious implications to the Immigration Department, as should

\begin{enumerate}
\item Gibson, (1983), p39.
\item \textit{Auckland Star}, 'Working their way up - from factory floor to white collar', 23 August (1979).
\item \textit{Tonga Chronicle}, 28 April 1974, cited in Hegarty (1977) p47.
\item Hegarty, (1977), p46.
\item Douglas, (1985), p422.
\end{enumerate}
the upsurge in remittances of money to the Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{94} However, overstaying, was not only allowed, but encouraged by all concerned - visitors, the New Zealand government, employers, New Zealand trade unions and the Pacific Island governments.\textsuperscript{95} Hence, "overstaying became the norm, apparently accepted by both employers and government authorities."\textsuperscript{96}

This situation also owed its existence to the fact that the recruitment of migrant labour was advantageous to the New Zealand economy in general. It permitted the recruitment of ready-made workers, a gift to capital and the state in that the initial costs of social reproduction had been paid for in another social formation.\textsuperscript{97} Moreover, without denying that Islanders and island economies benefitted in some ways from labour migration, the benefits were more heavily weighted in favour of New Zealand industry.\textsuperscript{98} Labour migration, in reality, did little to alleviate the economic backwardness of the regions from which migrants came, indeed it was more often a hindrance to development.\textsuperscript{99} Labour migration in that respect can be seen as a form of development aid given by poor under-developed nations to wealthier countries.\textsuperscript{100}

Significantly, Pacific Island migrant labour was recruited on a contract basis. The migrant worker was politically and ideologically defined as a 'foreign national', a 'guest' who could be expelled from the 'host'

\textsuperscript{94} de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p449.
\textsuperscript{95} Douglas, (1985), p422.
\textsuperscript{97} Gibson, (1983), p30.
\textsuperscript{98} See de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974).
\textsuperscript{99} See Joris de Bres, How Tonga Aids New Zealand. A report on migration and education, (Auckland, 1974), and Joris de Bres and Rob Campbell, Worth their Weight in Gold, (Auckland, 1976a).
\textsuperscript{100} Castles and Kosack, (1985), p8.
nation state when that contract was deemed to expire.\textsuperscript{101} This provided a ready solution to New Zealand's at times contradictory immigration goals - to provide the labour required for capital needs, and to maintain cultural and racial purity. 'Coloured' migrant workers were made to occupy a vulnerable position as a reserve army of labour. Their tenure in New Zealand was regulated by the demands of capital, and made politically precarious by the fact that they had few or no political rights in the host country, and in the case of overstaying, by the fact that many were a part of a pool of illegal workers who could be exploited because of their illegal status.\textsuperscript{102}

That Pacific Island workers occupied a markedly inferior position within the labour force and within class relations was, to a considerable extent, a legacy of the role which Pacific Island migrant labour was required to fulfil in order that accumulation in the expanding secondary industries could be sustained in the three decades following the Second World War. \textsuperscript{103} Their inferior position cannot be explained, however, by reference to the labour migration process alone. It was as much a product of a distinctive set of ideological and political relations which determined not only the terms under which Pacific Island migrants could enter New Zealand, but also the status prescribed them once there.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, Pacific Island migrant groups were racialised. Identified as culturally and physically different from the dominant population, they were categorised in negative racial terms, in much the same way as the Chinese had been in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{101} Miles, (1984a), p230.


\textsuperscript{103} Ongley, (1990), p169.

\textsuperscript{104} ibid., p170.

A racist ideology was the predominant influence in limiting the numbers of Pacific Islanders settling in New Zealand. The same ideology was influential in explaining and maintaining the inferior social and economic position of those Pacific Island migrants who had settled in New Zealand. In the early 1970s, in the face of general economic downturn, this same ideology again shaped the public and political response to Pacific Island migrants. Their vulnerability as temporary, and for some illegal, migrants made them not only the most likely, but also easy targets. Pacific Island migrants had long been blamed for a series of social and economic problems. Hence, when the economic recession of the early 1970s worsened, racist imagery was relatively easily reproduced to deflect attention away from the state’s management of economic crises by constructing immigration and ‘race’ relations problems out of issues such as unemployment and law and order.\(^{106}\)

CHAPTER FOUR

1974
RECESSION AND DAWN RAIDS

When the effects of the international oil crisis hit New Zealand in 1973 the country experienced its worst drop in terms of trade since the 1930s. From June 1973 to March 1974 there was a forty-six percent decline, and the large surplus in the balance of payments that existed in 1973 was rendered, by 1975, into a deficit of $1,300 million.\(^1\) In response, the Labour government (1972-1975) stated that it was looking at all contingencies that might arise from the oil crisis - the effect the crisis might have on the economies of other countries and how that might cause problems for the government's policy of maintaining full employment. Immigration, it said, was one of those contingencies.\(^2\)

During the early 1970s there had been an unprecedented flow of migrants to New Zealand.\(^3\) In the year ended March 1973, the total migration gain to New Zealand (excess of arrivals over departures) numbered 25,475 migrants. In the following year, ended March 1974, the total migration gain increased to a record high of 33,167.\(^4\) Economic pressures in Britain in the 1970s led to particularly high migration levels from the United Kingdom. The largest net gain to New Zealand in the 1973-1974

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\(^3\) de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), p2.

period was from Britain, with British migrants numbering 20,948.\(^5\) Similarly, the number of inquiries from prospective British migrants received by the New Zealand High Commission in London increased sharply in this period to 138,517, compared with 90,328 in the previous year.\(^6\) In response to these trends, and fears that large immigration gains could not be absorbed without straining public services and jeopardizing employment opportunities for New Zealanders, in June of 1973 the Labour government announced an immigration review.\(^7\) The prime minister, Norman Kirk, later explained that:

> The immigration intake had increased greatly in the past year, putting considerable pressure on housing and other services....International conditions including those arising from the fuel crisis, had reinforced the need for effective control of immigration....New Zealand cannot continue to receive a net migration gain of the size that seems likely without serious problems in housing, inflation, balance of payments, and possibly employment.\(^8\)

The review recommended that future immigration should be controlled as to numbers within New Zealand’s capacity to provide employment, housing, and social services, with a view to promoting stable growth rates in the economy and maintaining reasonable living standards for the growing population.\(^9\) Particular attention was given to the issue of employment:

> An aim should be to ensure that employment opportunities for the New Zealand labour force, whether skilled or unskilled, are not jeopardised and that as far as practicable the demand for skilled workers should be met by training New Zealand workers.\(^10\)

In these concerns, New Zealand reflected an international trend. In

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\(^5\) ibid.


\(^8\) ibid. pp14,15.


response to the international economic downturn, the industrialised world in general was closing its doors to migrant workers at this time.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, these sorts of concerns had always shaped New Zealand immigration policy, and in that respect did not herald any change in policy objectives. What was new, however, was the way in which those objectives were to be met. The review made drastic changes to the regulations governing permanent entry. In particular, the era of free entry for persons of exclusively British and Irish birth descent, which had existed since the Immigration Restriction Act of 1920, came to an end. On the 2 April 1974, Kirk announced that all migrants wishing to settle in New Zealand from that date would have to obtain entry permits in advance of their arrival in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{12} Detailed guidelines on future permanent immigration policy stated that British migrants to New Zealand would be admitted, along with other permanent migrants, in accordance with defined criteria, including the requirement that the breadwinner should possess skills and qualifications in continuing demand in New Zealand.

Significantly, while the review officially ended British open entry to New Zealand, the occupation and family size criteria, and the objectives of harmonious settlement and the avoidance of racial tension, meant that immigration policy continued to favour British immigrants and to restrict Pacific Island immigrants.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, British migrants continued to enjoy more generous entry than most other migrant groups. Under the policy changes, migrants from the United Kingdom would be able to visit New Zealand without making the prior application required of other migrants, and permits to stay up to six months would be granted on arrival on the usual conditions that visitors had fully paid tickets to a country to which they had right of entry and sufficient money to

\textsuperscript{11} Pearson, (1990), p122.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid., p14.

\textsuperscript{13} ibid., p28.
support themselves." The existing assisted passage and subsidy immigration schemes were set to continue, and Australian citizens would continue to be able to enter New Zealand freely.15

DAWN RAIDS

At the same time that immigration policy was being reviewed by the Labour government, immigration officials, assisted by police, began to seek out individuals who had overstayed their visas. There had been some attempts at finding and deporting overstayers before this, in the years leading up to 1974.16 In 1972 and 1973 attempts to round up and deport illegal immigrants had included dawn raids on the houses of suspected overstayers from the Pacific Islands. In 1973, following representations by the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), the acting minister of immigration, Phil Amos, had called for "an immediate review of methods used to detect illegal immigrants so that as far as possible no inconvenience or embarrassment is caused to innocent people".17 CARE had protested that methods used to detect illegal Polynesian immigrants would not be used if they were not Polynesian and said of the dawn raid procedures, "that if the person they were looking for was, for instance, an American, they would not order everyone in the hotel out of bed".18 The Immigration Department denied such charges of racial discrimination, but one senior official had stated that "if you have more visitors who are Polynesian, then of course the frequency with which these inspections are carried out with regard to their ethnic group would be different from other ethnic groups".19 In fact the majority of the quarter of a million

14 ibid., pp17,18.
15 ibid., p16.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
visitors who came to New Zealand in 1973 were not Polynesian. More than eighty percent of the visitors in that year were from either Australia (50.5%), the United States (22.9%) or the United Kingdom (7.0%), and yet there was little record of migrants from these countries being constantly raided in the manner that Pacific Islanders had been. Indeed, a month after the minister called for a review of detection methods, a small news item in an Auckland newspaper advised that "no change in the procedure for finding illegal immigrants is to be made." Hence, in 1974, in response to the weakening economy and in concert with the immigration review already under way, officials launched a more systematic campaign to find, arrest and eventually deport overstayers, and police targets, as before, were clearly Pacific Island migrants. In fact, it was Tongans who bore the brunt of the raids.

Late at night on 13 March 1974, police and immigration department officials began a series of raids on houses in the Onehunga suburb of Auckland, and by 2.00 or 3.00 a.m. had arrested thirteen Tongans on charges of being illegal immigrants or failing to produce a passport. Despite protests from anti-racism groups, the night raids continued and on 18 March a further 21 Islanders were arrested in the early hours of the morning after raids on another six Onehunga houses. The next evening a prayer meeting of the Free Church of Tonga was interrupted by the police and five more people, including the minister of the church, were arrested.

The Dominion subsequently reported that night raids on different Auckland addresses were continuing and the number of arrests made was understood

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22 Evening Post, 'Mr Kirk challenged on 'party' explanation for dawn raids', 26 March (1976), and de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p2.
to be more than forty. Pacific Islanders were working to help friends and relatives affected by the blitz on migrant workers, securing houses and belongings of those arrested and helping with legal aid and providing accommodation for those on bail. One Tongan helper, Tavake Kaho, said that the humiliation suffered in the dawn raids was enormous. "It is as if these people had committed some ghastly crime - a murder, or rape," he said, "Does any person deserve to be hauled away in the middle of the night because he has overstayed a permit? Another Tongan spokesman was quoted as saying:

Many people are in a state of panic. The atmosphere is tense to say the least. No-one knows who'll get a tap on the shoulder next. I cannot understand why the Immigration authorities should do this when they allow planeloads of Tongans to come here on visitors' permits. They know the Tongans aren't visitors. They come here to work. There aren't 20 Tongans a year who could afford to come to New Zealand just as visitors....Every Tongan at present in New Zealand has had, up to now, a clean police record. It is alarming that they should come here and run foul of the law through sheer economic desperation. What people don't realise is the terrible consequences of being convicted as an illegal immigrant. The victims immediately become prohibited immigrants, not only in New Zealand but every other Commonwealth country. They can't even land in Fiji without special permission. They are, in effect, sentenced to live forever in their own country. And their only offence, in their eyes, is a desire to work and be paid so they can better their standard of living and that of their families.

Responding to protests and calls for an amnesty from groups such as CARE, the New Zealand Race Relations Council, the Polynesian Panther Party, the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, and the National Executive of the Federation of Labour, on 21 March the minister of immigration, Fraser Colman, announced that dawn raids were to cease immediately. Explaining that they were alien to the New Zealand way of life, he said, "firm action is necessary but until we have a concerted plan sporadic raids can


24 ibid.

only damage New Zealand’s image at home and abroad". Significantly, in terms of the exclusively Polynesian image of overstaying that was evolving, he then proceeded to censure Island workers for breaking the law:

Temporary permits are being openly flouted by Islanders. The permit was intended to be used by genuine visitors such as tourists only. But there was evidence that Islanders were looking for jobs immediately they stepped off the plane in Auckland.

Despite Colman’s termination of the raids, those migrants already arrested were not granted a reprieve, indeed, fifteen Tongans were deported by plane on 1 April after earlier efforts to deport them on the Ocean Monarch were thwarted by pickets and a threat to walk-off the ship by its crew. Moreover, raids continued to be reported.

In the face of mounting protest, on the evening of 1 April, the prime minister personally intervened in the controversy and announced that the government was suspending immediately the issue of all entry permits for Tongans until the government could set up a tighter system of vetting applications. Kirk said that this would affect about 6,000 Tongans with applications already in the pipeline. At the same time a stay of proceedings was announced, with the aim of getting as many overstayers as possible to register themselves voluntarily with the Department of Labour by 31 May in exchange for immunity from prosecution, for the estimated 1,000 to 2,000 Tongans illegally in New Zealand. The prime minister said that they would be given a chance to declare their presence and gain time to earn enough money to go home without arrest and

26 Quoted in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p5.

27 ibid.


29 Evening Post, "‘Tight-lipped silence’ on future of Tongans in Mt Eden’, 1 April (1974).
deportation.\textsuperscript{30} What had become a de-facto immigration policy, he said, would be re-established as an official policy on a basis that would be fair, just and non-discriminatory.\textsuperscript{31}

Significantly, the government's step of suspending the issue of visitors' permits for Tongans further underlined the fact that it regarded Tongans as the only overstayers, a fact that would not have escaped public attention. Through its discriminatory actions, the government had established and was persistently reproducing a stereotype of the 'Island overstayer'.

More than 3,000 Tongans registered under the stay of proceedings and in the three months following Kirk's announcement, some 1,500 Tongans left for home.\textsuperscript{32} However, because of transport problems and protests by Auckland manufacturers, concerned at the prospect of Tongan labour drying up, the permits of a further 2,000 registered overstayers were extended from the initial deadline to varying dates through to December 1974.\textsuperscript{33} Mr R.W. Southcombe, secretary of the Auckland Manufacturers Association, exhorted the government to delay the removal of key workers, stating that Tongan labour was very highly regarded, and any sudden withdrawal would seriously affect Auckland industry.\textsuperscript{34} The managing director of one Onehunga firm said that nineteen of his twenty-six workers would have to go back to Tonga and there seemed to be no prospect of more coming. The

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Evening Post}, 'No more Tongans till labour man is based there', 2 April (1974), and \textit{Dominion}, 2 April 1974, cited in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p9.

\textsuperscript{31} Quoted in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p10.


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Auckland Star}, 22 April 1974, cited in de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p11.
Tongan workers were the "best workers I have ever had," he said.\textsuperscript{35} Permanent residence was eventually granted to about 300 of the remaining 2,000 registered overstayers. The majority of the other 1700 left for home when the extensions to their permits expired, though a number failed to leave and were subsequently deported or re-registered in 1976.\textsuperscript{36}

In conjunction with the overstayers register, the government also introduced an interim work permit scheme, which allowed manufacturers to sponsor workers from Tonga for three months, to regulate Tongan immigration to New Zealand until a new workers' permit scheme was finalised.\textsuperscript{37} The new scheme was announced in a 'Memorandum of understanding on temporary entry from Tonga', issued after meetings in October 1974 between the deputy prime minister of Tonga and the New Zealand minister of immigration. Under the new scheme the interim arrangements operating since June were phased out to end in December 1974, and operation of the new scheme began 1 January 1975.\textsuperscript{38} The scheme was based in many of its aspects on the one operated by the Hutt Valley Chamber of Commerce in the early 1970s. It provided for work where local labour was not available, and was, in the words of the New Zealand minister of immigration, self-regulating to the New Zealand economy.\textsuperscript{39} The period of employment was for four months, which could be extended to six months, and certain obligations were placed upon the various parties; the employer was required, among other things, to advance the costs of the worker's return air fare and to arrange accommodation; the home governments were required to select the workers according to defined criteria; and the workers themselves were required to remain in the employment provided and to depart from New Zealand at the expiry of their

\textsuperscript{35} ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Macdonald, (1977), p11.

\textsuperscript{37} de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part 3, p14.

\textsuperscript{38} de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p451.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{NZPD}, Vol.400, (1975), p3619.
permits. Significantly, Air New Zealand played an administrative role in the scheme, notifying employers and the Department of Labour of the arrival of individual workers as well as of their departure, and the Department of Labour held the passports and return tickets for workers during the period of their stay.

Similar schemes were negotiated with the governments of Fiji and Western Samoa in 1975 with a view to covering Fijian and Samoan workers as well. In conjunction with the gradual introduction of these work permit schemes, in November 1975, Fijian, Western Samoan and Tongan visitors' permits were reduced to one month as part of a package designed to protect the official work schemes.

The measures implemented to cut down and strictly control the numbers of migrants from the Pacific, however, merely exacerbated existing problems and thus encouraged further overstaying. Although the number of Tongans entering New Zealand to work illegally on visitors permits decreased substantially after 1974, it was still significantly higher than for those who entered to work on the official scheme. Figures in May 1977 demonstrated that since the scheme had begun, only 501 Tongans had entered New Zealand on the official scheme, yet between April 1975 and March 31 1977 the total short-term arrivals in New Zealand totalled 5,418 Tongans, 3,304 of whom, or sixty-one percent, gave 'holiday/vacation' or 'stay with relations' as the reason for their

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41 de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p452.
43 ibid.
44 NZTDC, (1982), p44.
It is made clear by these figures that the work scheme was not designed to guarantee the Tongan government a certain reasonable flow of workers and hence to remove the risk of grave fluctuations in overseas earnings from migrant labour, indeed, in contrast, the scheme achieved a dramatic cut-back in the number of migrant workers.\textsuperscript{46}

Tongans, rather than use the official scheme, tended to use an extensive informal network of kinship contacts in New Zealand to get work in the country while visiting on short-term permits.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, as far as Western Samoans were concerned the scheme did not really get off the ground. Samoans preferred to come in under the quota for permanent residents, or continued to use the visitor's permit as an avenue for finding short-term work. In the latter case, kin resident in New Zealand provided assistance with accommodation and found jobs for visitors through 'informal' guest-worker schemes.\textsuperscript{48} Employers in New Zealand continued to allow their resident Samoan employees to bring new workers into the factory even though temporary work without approval on entry was illegal.\textsuperscript{49}

In actual fact, a series of mechanisms within the new work scheme functioned as disincentives, for both Island migrant workers and employers, to use the scheme. One of these was the time-lag between applying for a worker under the new scheme and the worker's actual arrival in New Zealand to take up the job. Employers had to find accommodation and have it inspected by the Department of Labour, the job

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} Hegarty, (1977), p55.
\item \textsuperscript{46} de Bres and Campbell, (1976a), p35.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Bedford, (1984), p125.
\item \textsuperscript{48} See Cluny Macpherson, 'Guest-worker movements and their consequences for donor and recipient countries: a case study', in G.W. Jones and H.V. Richter (eds), Population Mobility and Development: South East Asia and the Pacific, (Canberra, 1981).
\item \textsuperscript{49} ibid., p261.
\end{itemize}
offer had to be forwarded to the Tongan Overseas Employment Division and a worker recruited, and Air New Zealand had to arrange ticketing, which it would only do for bookings made seven weeks in advance. The total time-lag therefore, between a position becoming available and the actual arrival easily exceeded two months. Unless employers could anticipate vacancies that far in advance, they were unlikely to participate in the scheme.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, Island workers were usually unwilling to wait the lengthy period it took for their applications to be processed, particularly as in that time a job offer might have lapsed.\textsuperscript{51}

The administrative burden placed on employers was a further inhibiting factor for employers wanting to employ Tongan labour. The cost of paying airfares in advance, finding accommodation, having it inspected and making all the necessary arrangements for meeting the workers, settling them in and ensuring their departure, made it more attractive to look elsewhere for labour, especially when Tongan workers were still able to by-pass the scheme and come on visitor’s permits.\textsuperscript{52} Clearly, as long the scheme remained unattractive to both employers and workers, it would be avoided.

Perhaps as a response to this, attempts to seek out overstayers continued. By May 1975 the immigration department reported that Islanders were appearing in court every day on charges of overstaying permits.\textsuperscript{53} Then, in August, raids were again reported in the press, and although they did not take place in the early hour of the morning, police dogs were used instead. According to an investigation by CARE into raids on Tongans in the Ellerslie (Auckland) area:

At one house 2 police dogs were used - one was stationed at the

\textsuperscript{50} de Bres and Campbell, (1976a), p36.
\textsuperscript{51} Macpherson, (1981), p258.
\textsuperscript{52} de Bres and Campbell, (1976a), p36.
\textsuperscript{53} Auckland Star, 1 May 1975, cited in de Bres and Campbell, (1976b), p22.
back door and one was brought into the sitting room. When one resident asked a policeman to show a search warrant one dog was moved forward and began snarling. The policeman threatened to set the dog on anyone who tried to move away.  

Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, despite these incidents, the Labour government’s handling of immigration from the Pacific Islands over this period provoked relatively little comment. What protest there was in 1974 was limited to the Pacific Island community and those few groups concerned with civil liberties and human rights. The main reason for this was that the government had produced a formula which, through its stay of proceedings and registration programme, was seen to offer the overstayers, the island governments, and the New Zealand government an exit from an embarrassing and complex situation. The success of the Labour government in limiting censure over their handling of the dawn raids had much to do with the goodwill amongst Islanders enjoyed by the Labour government and more particularly by the personality of Kirk, not simply because he was liked and trusted by Pacific leaders but also because he brought a caring image into New Zealand’s relations with its neighbours. Where his National Party predecessors had projected an image of performing their paternalistic duty, Kirk was seen as emphasising Pacific relationships because he really believed in them.

To a large extent this was a case of delicately handled public relations, but the New Zealand government was also assisted by other factors. Pacific Island etiquette rendered any strong protest impolite and Pacific Islanders were generally very reluctant to criticise the New Zealand government, displaying instead a strong preference for compromise and cooperation. Given the Island governments’ general sense of dependence

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54 ibid.
56 ibid., pp11-12.
on New Zealand, both in terms of aid and labour opportunities, and the feeling amongst migrants that they were somehow privileged to work in such an 'advanced' society, that there was only limited challenge to the government's immigration campaign is not surprising. Moreover, the Tongan economy in early 1974 was, in relative terms, enjoying an all-time 'high' and was thus better able to absorb its returning citizens. Aid from New Zealand had increased rapidly in the early 1970s and had generated employment as well as goodwill, copra prices had reached record levels, remittance income was high and the tourist boom was on. All of these factors served to soften the impact of the Labour government's measures, and thereby, also, any criticism of its campaign.

An important ingredient, also, in the reaction to the dawn raids was the general mood of the New Zealand public at this time. In a poll conducted by the Heylen Research Centre in 1971 on the Western Samoan prime minister’s campaign to increase the quota of permanent Samoan immigrants allowed into New Zealand each year from 1,500 to 2,500, two out of every three people in a random sample of all age groups opposed the move. Moreover, in another Heylen survey in April 1974, 83.9% of those surveyed agreed with the government's decision to restrict the number of British immigrants to New Zealand. The degree of support for the government's measures was evidenced by the fact that there was only a limited ideological challenge to the government's assumption that immigration restrictions were the 'common-sense' solution to economic difficulties. Indeed, in this respect the attitudes of both the government and the general public demonstrated the continued strength of

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earlier beliefs about the social and economic threats of immigration.\(^\text{61}\)

However, while there seemed to be a degree of unanimity about protecting New Zealand’s resources and controlling migrant levels in the early 1970s, the question of why the government’s focus was so determinedly fixed upon Pacific Island, and more specifically Tongan immigrants is left unexplained. Pacific Island migrants accounted for only a small proportion of the total immigrant flow to New Zealand at this time. In the peak years of immigration, 1973-1974, Fijians, Tongans and Western Samoans accounted for a mere 2.7% of all permanent immigrants to New Zealand, and only 40.6% of all temporary migrants.\(^\text{62}\) The targeting of Tongan migrants in 1974 in the dawn raids and other Pacific migrants in 1975 with immigration policy changes was, in light of the small numbers of immigrants actually involved, illogical, but became all the more perplexing when compared with figures of other immigrant groups in the same period. For the year ending March 1974, Australian immigrants accounted for 29.1% of all permanent immigrants, and 32.3% of temporary immigrants, and yet controls on Australian immigration remained negligible; Australians continued to enjoy free entry to New Zealand.\(^\text{63}\) Hence, in the year ended 31 March 1974, a total of 20,319 permanent and long term migrants entered New Zealand from Australia, and 100,939 tourists.\(^\text{64}\) As long as there were no controls on such a large flow of immigrants as this, concerns about the effect of immigrants, including Pacific Island migrants, on New Zealand’s employment and standard of living were spurious.

Moreover, in terms of the threat that immigrants were supposed to represent to New Zealand’s employment, unemployment at this time was not

\(^{61}\) See Chapter Two and Three.

\(^{62}\) de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p446.

\(^{63}\) ibid.

\(^{64}\) Department of Statistics, (1976), p4.
only low, it was actually lower than it had been in the late 1960s. Similarly, it is difficult to perceive of Tongan migrants as a drain on the economy when they not only paid taxes like any other worker in New Zealand, they withdrew no welfare benefits. For the majority of Tongan migrants to New Zealand, the fact that they were not citizens meant they had no entitlement to state welfare or health benefits, and relied instead upon relatives and members of their island communities for these things. British migrants, however, were entitled to welfare benefits, and this is significant when it is considered that in 1973, sixty-seven percent of the immigrants from the United Kingdom in that year were non-working dependants, and therefore constituted a much greater strain on resources than the predominantly single migrants who came from Tonga.

The reason Tongan migrants were targeted in the dawn raids campaign may have been due partly to their political or immigrant status. Because of the requirement that Pacific Island visitors obtain visas before they arrived in New Zealand (unlike Australian immigrants, or immigrants from countries with which New Zealand had visa abolition agreements, such as the United States), the department had a considerable amount of personal information about them which made it relatively easier to track them down once in New Zealand. Furthermore, the usual requirement for people entering New Zealand on short visits was that they be in possession of sufficient funds to maintain themselves during their stay. This was generally set at a minimum cash level for each month of stay. Special arrangements existed, however, under the sponsorship scheme for Tongans to enter under a sponsorship guarantee, whereby the cash requirement, which most Tongan and other island migrants could not afford, was waived in lieu of a guarantee from relatives or friends in New Zealand. Thus the department had contact names and addresses for all visitors under

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this scheme. Hence, biases in immigration legislation and policy may have been reproduced in the immigration campaign.

However, the grounds for the campaign's bias lay also in the ideological framework which had already implicated Pacific Island immigration as problematic. Comments by the minister of immigration, Fraser Colman, placing the blame for overstaying wholly on Tongan migrants, and the government's suspension of the issue of further visitor's permits to Tongans immediately following the raids, underlined the fact that it regarded Tongans, rather than New Zealand's immigration policy, as being responsible for the situation that had arisen. There was an assumption that Pacific Island immigration was inherently troublesome. The Labour government's actions in the early 1970s were determined by the 'race'/immigration ideology in which immigration was defined as being responsible for all sorts of problems, immigration cuts as being the obvious solution, and wherein Pacific Island immigration was defined as the biggest problem of all, and cuts to immigration from that source the best solution. The outcome of the government's actions was to give credence to that ideology, and to entrench it further in social belief.

It is significant that the first event to bring widespread public attention to Pacific Islanders in New Zealand was a campaign which negatively ascribed Island migrants as criminals, as 'overstayers', and as a social problem. By targeting Pacific Island immigrants in 1974, the Labour government set these same immigrants up for similar attacks in the succeeding years.

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In its moves to regain power in the mid-1970s the opposition National Party sought to show the damage caused to the economy by the Labour government's immigration policy. By late 1974 the leader of the party, Robert Muldoon, had begun to build his election platform with, as a central plank, the promise that a National government would cut immigration 'to the bone'. As the 1975 general election campaign developed, the problems that National attributed generally to immigration were increasingly associated more specifically with Pacific Island migrants and in a classic scapegoating manoeuvre the National Party managed to portray Pacific Islanders as both a social and economic liability.

There was nothing new, in times of economic difficulty, in blaming immigrants for shortages in housing, social services, hospital facilities, employment and other breakdowns in the system, indeed similar political debates had recently occurred in several other western countries. Rather than blame all immigrants to New Zealand for the country's problems, however, the National Party deliberately attempted to place the blame solely on Pacific Island migrants. The political scrutiny to which Pacific Islanders had been subjected under the Labour government was intensified in 1975 by the National Party, which went to


great pain to portray Pacific Islanders as a social threat. In an election campaign marked by grave distortions and dishonest appeals to latent racism in the New Zealand population, the National Party engaged in constructing a moral panic about Pacific Island immigration. The immigration of Pacific Islanders was selected out as a threat to the social structure and was presented, out of all proportion to its actuality, as one of New Zealand's most pressing social problems. This depiction was set against a history of concern about Islanders in New Zealand, and was based on the numerous, and frequently inaccurate, sensationalised and stereotyped stories about Pacific Islanders, which had abounded before and during the election.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE POLITICISATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND MIGRANTS

As early as January 1974 the National Party stated its intentions to re-examine its policies on immigration, and Muldoon (who became the leader of the party later in 1974), made clear that it was time for New Zealand to start shutting the door: "we have to get tough". Immigration became one of the leader's main props for criticising the state of the New Zealand economy, and was largely seen as a useful scapegoat for health, housing, industrial relations and law and order problems. The budget deficit of $497 million was seized upon by National members of parliament (MPs) as an example of how 'New Zealanders' were losing out to immigrants. That money, the National Party asserted, had not been spent to help the key export industries and thereby to support New Zealanders'

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5 Paul Spoonley, 'Polynesian Immigrant Workers in New Zealand', in Clive Moore, Jacqueline Leckie and Doug Munro (eds), Labour in the South Pacific, (Townsville, 1990a), p158.

6 See Chapter Two.


8 Evening Post, Campaign Analysis, 22 November (1975).
jobs, nor was it spent to improve the quality of life in New Zealand, rather it had been spent providing for the more than 60,000 immigrants who had arrived in New Zealand over the previous two years. Moreover, according to the party, each immigrant was costing New Zealand $32,000, "and for 32,000 immigrants a year that runs into a figure exceeding $1,000 million. That is one of the additional burdens placed upon our taxpayers, and it must have a terrific impact upon the country's economy". Immigration was portrayed as one of the most inflationary pressures on the economy, and the key to New Zealand's housing shortage problems.

The first step, therefore, to controlling the economy, according to the National Party, was to cut immigration. Significantly, the party's election policy, to cut immigration to a target of less than 10,000 immigrants a year, was not without appeal to many voters. Many electors saw this proposal as both a method of alleviating immediate problems, such as unemployment and housing shortages, and as a step in the right direction to shaping New Zealand the way they wanted it.

As well as proposing drastic cuts in the numbers of immigrants arriving in New Zealand, the leader of the National Party also proposed a probationary period for all new immigrants, during which time any indications of an inability to fit into the New Zealand way of life would

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result in deportation.\textsuperscript{15} This policy targeted, among others, British migrants, whom Muldoon held responsible for industrial violence and disorder, but it was interpreted more widely as a policy to curtail immigration from the Pacific Islands, and to control law and order problems among Pacific communities established in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{16} When announcing the probation suggestion, the party leader frequently examined it, and the problem of law and order, in relation to Pacific Island immigrants.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, from the earliest stages of the National Party campaign, the party's focus on immigration had been discussed in connection with Pacific Islanders and the problems 'they caused' in New Zealand. Early criticisms of the Labour government's immigration policy had centred on the problems of law and order, and had been clearly framed in the stereotype of Pacific Island violence, by connecting immigration to the "thuggery and bashings that [had] been occurring in Auckland".\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, within the immigration debate, Pacific Island immigrants were blamed for placing greater than normal pressure on social services. The Auckland Hospital Board, asserted National politicians, had a problem in coping with the needs of sick people from the Pacific Islands:

Disproportionately many patients in Auckland public hospitals had come comparatively recently from the Pacific Islands, and many of them had complaints which should have prevented their coming to New Zealand in the first place.\textsuperscript{19}

Increasingly, it became clear that where the National Party talked about immigration it was, more specifically, talking about Pacific Island immigration. Indeed, in a television interview in 1975, Muldoon contested the interviewer's assertion that migration from Britain was the

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Evening Post}, 'Bad immigrants not wanted by Mr Muldoon', 19 May (1975).

\textsuperscript{16} Levine, (1976), p25.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Evening Post}, 'Bad immigrants not wanted by Mr Muldoon', 19 May (1975).


only immigration problem, emphasising instead that migration from the Pacific Islands must be reduced. Correspondingly, National party candidates continually answered questions on the general subject of immigration with the idea that 'We must provide more aid so that they won’t want to come here', thus betraying their particular focus on immigration from the Pacific Islands. The party even went so far as to propose that the immigration of Cook Islanders, who were (and still are) New Zealand citizens, should be reduced and, not surprisingly, elicited an angry response from the premier of the Cook Islands, Sir Albert Henry.

The National Party persuaded formerly neutral New Zealanders that matters were more serious than they had realised and provoked considerable and often poorly informed debate about the cost to the country of Pacific Islanders’ presence. In a National Research Bureau survey of political opinion conducted in July 1975 the issue of immigration displaced concerns about housing and unemployment, to rank as one of the top ten problems concerning electors at that time. Even a newspaper editorial which was highly critical of the National Party’s proposed immigration policies agreed that immigration was a problem, especially Pacific Island immigration. The media implicitly accepted, and thereby failed to challenge, the assumptions that were central to the National Party’s campaign; that immigration was the cause of all New Zealand’s problems, and that cuts to Pacific Island immigration in particular would solve

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20 de Bres, (1976), p1.

21 ibid., p2.


23 Macpherson, (1979), p110.


these problems. Indeed, some newspapers took the 'race'/immigration ideology even further than the National Party. Not long after the general election, the Auckland Star, a major Auckland daily newspaper, in calling for tougher restrictions on Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand, added a new dimension to National's 'send-them home' proposals:

Where Samoans are involved in crime, we can apply the conditions of entry here - and good behaviour is one - and revoke their permits or not renew them. New Zealand citizenship held by Cook (sic), Tokelauans and Niueans prevents deportation in the same way. But as New Zealand citizens, they should be subject to local probation law. New Zealand citizens sentenced by the Courts can be directed under the terms of probation to "live and work as directed." It should be made plain to this group of Islanders that these provisions apply to them, and that when they break laws, they can, and will, be directed to "live and work as directed," back in their home islands.26

Figure 5.1 Every fear answered..., Tom Scott, Listener, 1975.27

26 Auckland Star, 'It's time - NZ will have to be firm', 27 January (1976).

Frequent assertions and incessant innuendos from candidates, news reports, and talk-back radio shows all implied that the crux of New Zealand's problems (regardless of what those problems were) was migration from the Pacific Islands, and in this way the issue attracted an extreme amount of attention. People who had been alerted to it by the immigration campaigns of 1974, became more aware of it and focused upon it. Once the stereotype was established, people believed it to explain all of society's ills. The overall mood of the public was such that general fear and anxiety could easily be converted into a paranoia centred upon Islanders. Particularly in the period of general social and economic insecurity and uncertainty that existed at the time, individuals seeking explanations and remedies for their altered circumstances, were ripe for the strong ideological lead that the National Party provided.

"NEW ZEALAND THE WAY YOU WANT IT" 

The 'natural' evolution of political issues is not a common occurrence. In the modern political process political reality is carefully constructed by an elite of political media specialists and politicians. In 1975 the National Party ran much of their election campaign using the 'race'/immigration issues that they had calculatingly defined. These issues were at first subtly delineated through the media. As has been discussed, while in opposition the party consciously debated immigration issues and targeted Pacific Island immigration as a significant problem which required their attention. The mass media reported these issues in

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30 National Party 1975 general election campaign slogan.

31 Chris Wilkes, 'Politics and Television. In which Hanna-Barbera win an election by giving us what we want, the way we want it', MA Thesis, (Canterbury University, 1976), p35.

32 ibid., p96.
the form of news, but were in actual fact conveying the National Party's ideological and political agenda to the public. Similarly, Muldoon, the leader of the party, deliberately set out to develop a groundswell of public opinion by presenting a carefully designed message in his pre-election speech tour in 1974. The media took up the message as news from these speeches, placing his message before the public, and over time the issues that had been developed by the party came to be absorbed into the community. Moreover, the issues that were, in fact, consciously generated and reinforced by the party's propaganda machine eventually came to be seen by the public to arise spontaneously from society in general.\(^{33}\) Thus, when Muldoon spoke to the 'problems' that he had had a role in defining, he was generally perceived to be accurately reflecting the public mood. Unlike his Labour counterparts, he was seen to have his finger on the pulse of the nation.\(^{34}\) Indeed, in this there was some truth.

The National Party's election campaign agenda was based to an extent on the voter survey polls which it had started as early as May 1973, and which it continued until the end of the election campaign.\(^{35}\) Particularly zealous in its market researching, the party was said to have "market researched the entire nation and every fear, real or imagined, [was] answered somewhere in the National party policy".\(^{36}\)

The National Party's campaign was based entirely on the anxieties of the electorate which had been identified in the polls. After the initial surveys the party machine took over and, through propaganda, deliberately created problems which appealed to those fears. The solutions provided by the party were of the sort to appease anxieties, and provided the


\(^{34}\) Blackburn, (1977), pp102,150.

\(^{35}\) Blackburn, (1977), p150.

layperson with the 'just enough' sort of knowledge s/he needed to feel informed about the political matters of the day. Consequently, the overall image of the campaign was subjective and difficult to pin down. The details were only vehicles for the overall image; it was an impression and not factual content that was important. The objective of the campaign was to keep an overall image in people’s minds to support particular myths, and the issues were submerged and distorted by symbolic images and the secondary reality constructed by the politicians and their team of propagandists.

The party developed in this way, for instance, the myth and patriotic image of the ideal 'Kiwi bloke' as a campaign tool. They could point out that the traditional order of New Zealand society was being eroded away (without being explicit about the reasons why or how this was the case) and develop their policies about bringing back and preserving those past attributes that made New Zealand great. They used to effect, as Muldoon did in his 'Meet the People' campaign late in 1974, the traditional idiom of the everyday New Zealander. National represented Muldoon as the ordinary 'bloke' in the street, while it's policies were represented as being grounded 'fair and square in the issues of the day'. Its campaign was aimed at the blue-collar and white-collar worker. According to a senior member of the National Party publicity organisation:

He [Muldoon] was aiming at the worker on the factory floor, concerned about threats to his employment and union officials seemingly unconcerned about his needs; at the working class urban dwellers concerned over law and order, and the influx of Polynesian migrants; at the elderly and the solo mothers.

The basic image of the problematic world which the 'ordinary bloke' would not understand was evoked in the election slogan of "New Zealand the way


you want it". The party’s early definition of problems and successful use of market research meant that the part of their messages which spelled out political problems were already firmly embedded in the minds of most voters. National merely repeated back to voters the sort of anxieties that research told them were already of common concern. Thus, half of their policy was already acceptable to voters and all they had to do was to provide some useful looking solutions.

Hence the general public concerns about immigration were translated into National’s manifesto and electioneering advertisements. Coupled with its image of the ‘Kiwi bloke’ was anti-immigrant sentiment. It had always existed in New Zealand, but under National’s right-wing propaganda machine it flourished and the party exploited it extensively throughout their campaign.

THE CAMPAIGN MESSAGE

In its manifesto guide, the party repeated its commitment to cutting immigration to protect New Zealanders’ “quality of life and living standards” and to deporting immigrants who broke the law. It also spelled out the importance of carefully assessing immigrants, and promised to review immigration policy so that “procedures will include examination of the capacity of the individual immigrant and family to adapt to New Zealand society”. It was a thinly veiled attack on Pacific Island immigrants and was repeated under other guises elsewhere in the manifesto. Under the heading of ‘The Economy’, the party blamed


42 Wilkes, (1976), p63.


45 ibid.
immigration for unemployment and the strain on development resources, claiming that immigrants cost the country around $11,000 each, and calling for immigration to be cut 'to the bone'. This bid was repeated under 'Urban Development', and was juxtaposed with the "problem of crime and violence in our larger cities", covertly framing the discussion once again in the context of Pacific Island immigration.

We will stop the sprawl...tackle the social problems - particularly those which have emerged in Auckland....we cannot create a better environment when people are pouring into the country faster than anybody can provide houses - any kind of houses. Thus immigration will be cut from the current rate of 30,000 per year to around 5,000. This will give us the breathing space we so desperately need.

The role of television was a central one in defining the political realities in the 1975 general election. The campaign was very widely viewed on television and the average viewer watched a great majority of the campaign programmes offered. Television dominated all other sources of information about the election.

Much of the material in the National Party campaign was a propagandised misrepresentation of everyday life, and this was even more true of their television campaign. The television advertisements and campaign statements employed by the party were a deliberate distortion of everyday life and experience. Instead of a two-way flow of information between participants, this part of the campaign was characterised by a one-way flow from the television transmitter to the viewer. Instead of a position of full accountability between participants, a situation existed where there was no accountability. The sort of political knowledge which

46 ibid., p1.
47 ibid., p11.
48 Wilkes, (1976), p84.
49 ibid., pp69-72.
50 Wilkes, (1976), p84.
was represented via this medium was thus able be in the form of half-truths, lies and exaggerations.\textsuperscript{51} The National Party made little attempt to reflect political realities, and its manipulation of knowledge made the best possible use of the television's lack of accountability, to say what they liked, without fear of recrimination.\textsuperscript{52} One commentator at the time explained that:

\begin{quote}
National intends to support the grass-roots kiwi...with all his private and individual motivations which aren't necessarily planted in reality, but are securely planted in nationalism and fear of the unknown.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

National's television campaign took two major forms, the first being short political advertisements. These were three minutes in duration and received exposure on both television channels on repeated occasions, always at peak viewing hours.\textsuperscript{54} The messages were succinct, clear and unequivocal and provided clear statements of policy in a form the average viewer could digest. Once again the party's principal election scapegoats, the immigrants, figured prominently. In its advertisement on housing, the party blamed the housing shortage on immigration, stating that this was why "the average deposit on a house in Auckland jumped from $5,000 to $10,000. And why State rental housing lists are now the longest in New Zealand's history".\textsuperscript{55} National neglected to develop a direct relationship between immigrants, housing shortages and the development of private capital. This was tied up with tackling the 'number one cause' of the housing problem which was never really

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} ibid., pp84-86.
\item \textsuperscript{52} ibid., p87.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Wilkes, (1976), p56.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Transcript of full text of advertisement, cited in Wilkes, (1976), p121.
\end{itemize}
specified, but immigration was connected vaguely with it. Its policy was not designed to solve specific problems, but to offer ambiguous statements about general social problems. Similarly, in its advertisement about the cities, National blamed immigrants for housing shortages, crime and the shortage of social services. Immigration supplied a simplistic and 'obvious' answer without the party having to enter the more complex issues involved such as the problems of town planning in a laissez faire free market economy or, more importantly, the responsibility of former National governments for the declining economy. Instead, what National based its advertisements on were unsubstantiated truisms.

The other major part of the National Party television campaign was in the form of cartoons created by the animation team Hanna-Barbera. The cartoons mercilessly lampooned Labour's shortcomings and grossly exaggerated and distorted the problems besetting New Zealand. The whole emphasis in this part of their message was on the emotional sell and the resulting cartoons were very controversial. Some of the footing on one advertisement on 'Industrial Relations' was sufficiently emotional to stop either channel running it without cuts and it was modified before showing. A spokesman for Colenso, National's marketing agency, explained that if there was nothing essentially logical about the product, "we will do it emotionally".

56 Blackburn, (1977), p175.


59 Wilkes, (1976), p63.

60 ibid., p64.

One television cartoon in particular graphically illustrated National's scapegoating of Pacific Island immigrants. It depicted a Polynesian character snarling and clawing the air like a tiger, then fighting with a Pakeha while a narrator warned that Labour policies had caused unemployment, which in turn aroused anger and violence, "especially among those who came from other places expecting great things." An investigating officer from the Race Relations Office, which fielded protest over the advertisement, accused the party of "climbing on the bandwagon of Polynesian violence", and felt that:

the cartoon obviously referred to Polynesians, and that the implication was that Polynesians are violent people, or more correctly, are involved in the violence on our streets. More importantly, however, the featuring of a Polynesian-type figure only in violent situation, in the light of the adverse, negative publicity relating to Polynesians and violence, has the net effect of stereotyping Polynesians as violent people.

The cartoon was clearly intended to arouse ill-feeling against immigrants from the Pacific, and placed the party's other campaign statements about immigration firmly within that context.

So much of the National Party's campaign material was questionable that a case could have been made to have had large sections of it removed from the campaign. As it was, however, everything but one small section of film was shown, and the anxieties which National portrayed, even though grossly distorted, were acceptable to a surprisingly large number of people. In a survey on the television campaigns, fully fifty-two percent of all voters, regardless of their own voting persuasion, made it clear that National's was the most effective campaign. While a sizeable minority objected to the National Party material, it was National's campaign that was likely to remain in the public mind, rather than the

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63 ibid., pp112-113.

64 Wilkes, (1976), p72.
reasoned views of the other parties, in the years to come. The emotive quality of its racist arguments tended to obscure their irrationality and to prolong, if not perpetuate, their influence. This was especially so as the National Party’s campaign, and therefore it’s messages about Pacific Island immigration, was never effectively challenged.

The media failed to challenge the party’s assumptions about immigration, and particularly its message that immigration from the Pacific Islands constituted a problem. Instead, the media in general sanctioned the fundamental assumptions of the ‘race’/immigration ideology. In fact, earlier depictions of Pacific Islanders in the mass media, as some kind of aberration or problem, gave the National Party the licence and the material with which to further promote negative stereotypes and images. Hence media-derived ideas were actually more conducive to the development of hostility towards Pacific Islanders than acceptance.

Similarly, the Labour Party failed to challenge the opposition’s campaign. The emotionalism of National’s campaign might have been countered if the Labour government had bothered to reply to its blatant manipulation of people’s fears, but the Labour party made little or no effective reply to National’s allegations. The Labour Party’s campaign was lacklustre and its television advertising fell down badly. It did not define any problems, instead suggesting that there was little wrong with things as they were and that there was, therefore, no need to provide any solutions. This did little to reassure voters’ fears and

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even less to counter National’s claims. Whereas modern techniques of market research and careful attention to the importance of organisation played a significant part in the success of National’s campaign, Labour’s organisation staggered along by comparison and showed signs of being below strength.

Moreover, the fact the Labour government had already, in 1974, constructed Pacific Island immigration as a political problem also meant that, far from challenging National’s negative portrayal of Pacific Islanders and immigration in 1975, the Labour and National parties could actually be seen to desire the same thing: controlled immigration from the Pacific. Indeed, in 1975 the minister of immigration, Fraser Colman, continued to reproduce the same prejudices to which National appealed by asserting that "illegal immigrants" (a term which following the overstayer campaigns of 1974 was generally perceived to mean Pacific Islanders) were taking up employment which would otherwise be available to unemployed New Zealand workers. In actual fact, on the issue of Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand the Labour Party agreed with National’s particular formulation of the political problem, and its solution.

Hence, the ‘race’/immigration ideology was reproduced and brought to greater prominence by the National Party in 1975. A complex interaction between grassroots political consciousness and formal political activity and propaganda, mediated by newspaper and television coverage that acceded to the sort of negative stereotypes that were promoted, saw that

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71 Evening Post, ‘Organisation: that is what National has as Labour’s faltered’, 4 December (1975).


the representation of Pacific Island immigrants as 'problem' was further entrenched. One social commentator remarked that

I would have said that New Zealanders were reasonable, tolerant, liberal and fair-minded. I would have expected them to reject the election of a party that promoted itself on the platforms of fear, such as fear of the immigrant. Instead, the campaign went down perfectly. 74

In fact, the National Party won the election with a remarkable 8.6% swing to National and 10.4% swing away from Labour. 75 In a reversal of the previous election, the Labour government lost twenty-one seats to National, including the seats held by five ministers. 76 The National Party had won a political struggle, and more significantly, the ideological struggle to ensure that Pacific Island immigration became the focus of attention as the cause of all New Zealand's troubles. 77

The immigration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand had been successfully defined by the party as a pressing political problem and, ominously, on the night of election victory, the National Party leader, Robert Muldoon, made the statement that immigration would be one of the more immediate aspects to which the incoming government would turn its attention in the new year. 78 Having firmly established in people's minds strong, albeit irrational, connections between Pacific Island immigration and law and order problems, housing shortages and unemployment, the National Party succeeded, during this period, in readying the public for deliberate and

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74 Brian Edwards, quoted in Vernon Wright, 'If you don't like it here why don't you go home?', Listener, Vol.84, No.1928, (1976), p15.

75 Evening Post, 'Labour government thrown into the wilderness by electors in massive upset', 1 December (1975).


78 Evening Post, 'Giving back, cutting down, and keeping out are the big National issues', 1 December (1975).
drastic action in the form of new immigration campaigns against Pacific Islanders in 1976.
One of the first actions of the new National government was to move to implement its desire to cut immigration to New Zealand 'to the bone'. Having been appointed minister of immigration, Frank Gill announced that one of his first jobs in the new year would be to travel around the Pacific (not, significantly, to other immigration sources) to inform the Pacific Island governments of the need to reduce migration.¹

Gill toured the Pacific in January 1976, significantly, without a press entourage, and stepped along a very fine line between the opposing responsibilities of appearing to the New Zealand public to make change while assuring Pacific Island leaders that things would, more or less, stay the same. According to one commentator, Gill's trip had to serve two purposes:

on the one hand, to appear to put into effect a policy of "acting tough" on Pacific migration following the National Party's appeal to unfounded fears and racist attitudes during the election campaign, and, on the other, to tell Pacific Island governments that there would be no basic change in policy and possibly even some improvements on Labour's record (in preparation for the next period of economic expansion when we may need more workers in a hurry).²

At the end of the tour, in Fiji, Gill stated that there would be very little change. "The immigration policy of the new Government," he said, "will remain about the same as that of the previous Labour Government."³

In New Zealand, on his return, however, he gave a very different version,

¹ Evening Post, 'Come back in February,' British would-be migrants to NZ Told', 13 December (1975).
² de Bres, (1976a), p2.
triumphantly announcing new, tighter immigration regulations. The Cook Islands government, he said, was to, hence forth, require evidence of jobs and accommodation in New Zealand before nationals could enter New Zealand. These regulations had, however, already been agreed to by the Cook Islanders before the National Party took office. Moreover, enforcement of these regulations at the New Zealand end was completely impossible without depriving the Cook Islanders of their New Zealand citizenship and there were, in fact, no plans to do this.

Gill also announced that visitor's permits for Tongans, Fijians and Western Samoans would be cut from three months to one (compared with the six months for visitors from other countries), but this also had been put in place by the previous government. All Gill did was refuse to change the restrictions when asked to do so by Island governments. Likewise, the National cabinet adopted the previous government's work permit scheme with only minor modification, and although it was extended to Fiji (January) and Western Samoa (June), negotiations for these inclusions had begun long before in 1975 under the Labour government.

In actual fact, Labour had done National's job for them. Despite National's heavy emphasis on a new immigration policy as a solution for everything from inflation to housing and law and order, there was little left for them to change. The only substantial change made to policy by the new government was the abandonment of the permanent quota for Tongans (150 annually) established by the outgoing Labour government, and the commitment to halve the Western Samoan permanent quota of 1500 per year


7 de Bres, (1976a), p2.
over two years.\textsuperscript{8} Yet, during the election campaign, the National Party had done its utmost to prove the inadequacies of the Labour administration's immigration policies, and it needed to be seen to do more than simply adopt and continue those same policies. Having created, during their election bid, the bogey of 'brown hordes' descending upon New Zealand, they were required to go through the elaborate ritual of appearing to put the bogey back in the cupboard.\textsuperscript{9}

Consequently, in February 1976, dawn raids resumed. At 6.00 a.m. on Tuesday, 17 February, police and immigration officials descended on the Onehunga home of Mrs Telesia Topping, a Tongan married to a New Zealander and who had lived in New Zealand ten years.

At 6 o'clock we were all asleep except for one, who had to be at work at seven. He was making breakfast when he saw a policeman trying to push up the window. He was pointing towards the door. As the door opened, they burst inside. Four were inside, four more outside the house.

A young policeman, about 22 years old, came into my room. I'd just opened my eyes because of the noise. I asked him what he was doing in my bedroom. He did not answer. I was really frightened. He went into the bathroom, inspected it came back and pulled the covers off my bed, looked under the bed. I called out to him again what he was doing in my bedroom. He ignored me. He pulled open the wardrobe, fiddled with the clothing, checked everything. The same policeman went into the adjoining room where my two nephews, aged 19 and 20 years were asleep. the policeman shone the light into their eyes, saying 'get up and get out'. Another policeman was also there. My nephews were very frightened. The police then started dragging them out to their van. One of them said they were taking us in because we were illegal immigrants and I told them we were not.\textsuperscript{10}

Papers were produced to prove that the six were legal immigrants and they were allowed to go back inside the house. After further questioning Mrs Topping, the police and officials left without apology. All the people

\textsuperscript{8} NZPD, Vol.404, (1976), p1512.
\textsuperscript{9} de Bres, (1976a), p2.
\textsuperscript{10} Auckland Star, 'Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan migrants', 19 February (1976).
had legal permits and had in no way breached the Immigration Act.\textsuperscript{11}

Further raids were made in Wellington, where the deputy director of immigration, D. Bond, claimed that there had been no change in procedure and that the raids were simply part of a continuing programme of apprehending overstayers.\textsuperscript{12} Subsequent statements from the head of the Auckland immigration division, A.W. Smith, compounded people's concerns when he made clear that checks had not only been intensified since Christmas, when the division had apparently been given more staff, but also that officials acted on every tip-off, even if it was an anonymous phone call.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, he admitted that about half of the raids conducted actually yielded nothing.\textsuperscript{14}

The immigration minister, Frank Gill, defended the raids, calling them, instead, 'visits', and stated that it was simply unfortunate but unavoidable that inquiries had to be made at times and places considered by some to be inconvenient.\textsuperscript{15} Significantly, he made clear that Pacific Islanders were again the primary targets of the immigration campaign:

\begin{quote}
Anyone who enters this country on a work permit or visitor permit is made fully aware that he or she must abide by the conditions of entry. Most such people, tourists and working visitors alike, from most parts of the world, do observe the law. A few, however - and most of these unfortunately are from the Pacific Islands - choose to ignore it and trust instead to the 11th commandment, 'Thou shalt not get caught'.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Dominion}, 'Migrant raids lead to 2 arrests', 20 February (1976).

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Auckland Star}, 'Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan migrants', 19 February (1976).

\textsuperscript{14} ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 'Alternative Sought To Dawn Raids', 25 February (1976).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Dominion}, 'Gill stands up for night 'visits''', 25 February (1976).
In March, anti-racism groups and Island community and church leaders began making various representations to the government for an amnesty for illegal immigrants. Up until this point, developments almost exactly paralleled those of 1974, the only difference being that in 1976 all Island immigrants, and not just Tongans, were being targeted. However, while in 1974 the government dealt with the aftermath of the campaigns with little publicity and few problems, further incidents in 1976 caused serious embarrassment to the government and ensured that the overstayer issue remained highly visible and contentious.17

At the end of March Gill stated that refugees from majority rule in Rhodesia were the 'kith and kin' of New Zealanders and should be treated sympathetically. "We have a sort of affinity with white Rhodesians," he said, "they are our sort of people."18 This was interpreted as clearly meaning that white Rhodesians were regarded as more preferable immigrants to Pacific Islanders.19 Furthermore, a remark by the prime minister, Robert Muldoon, that the newly independent Tuvalu was eight islands, 7,000 people and lots of coconuts that nobody wanted was widely reported and created considerable anger, especially given Gill's earlier statements that Rhodesian refugees would be welcomed by New Zealand.20 A Fiji Times editorial commented:

This is precisely the kind of remark that nobody in the Pacific wants, and if Mr Muldoon does not quickly become aware of Pacific sensibilities he will all the more quickly be regarded as someone who stands for attitudes which have now for some time been regarded as unacceptable.21


19 ibid.


21 ibid., p12.
At a meeting in April, Gill firmly secured the disdain of Island community leaders and left the New Zealand Pacific Islands community almost totally alienated from the government. 22 Pacific Island leaders had been particularly keen to obtain from the government a general amnesty for all overstayers, which would have regard to the human problems and the needs of Pacific Island communities and people involved, and with that in mind had arranged a meeting as a dialogue with Gill in Auckland, for which Island representatives spent many hours preparing submissions for the minister. 23 However, Gill demonstrated that he was unwilling to discuss the overstayer problem. He attended the meeting, only to read a prepared statement which he had already released to the press, in which he announced, without discussion or modification, decisions that had been reached in advance regarding a stay of proceedings until 30 June and an overstayer register, similar to the one implemented in 1974. 24 However, Gill not only made a nonsense of the time, money and effort the various Pacific Island groups had put into preparing for what they believed to be a genuine consultation, he also offended leaders by criticising their estimates of the number of overstayers actually in New Zealand. Island representatives had, before the conference, carried out a field survey from which they estimated the number of Island overstayers to be about 3,500. Gill, however, contradicted this with unfounded estimates of at least 10,000 to 12,000 overstayers, two thirds of whom he asserted to be Pacific Islanders. 25

Island leaders' immediate reaction was to pass a motion not to co-operate with the register. They accused Gill of blatantly disregarding their submissions, and made a statement which said that:

24 ibid.
Mr Gill had flagrantly abused the mutual respect and alienated the council's co-operation by his actions. Mr Gill injured our pride and dignity and lowered his stature in our eyes by engineering the meeting to appear that his Wellington-made decision, with a little slot to accommodate us, was a consensus agreement among all parties involved.

Hence, for the first three weeks following the opening of the government register in Auckland only thirty people had signed.

However, it became clear to Pacific Island community representatives that the minister of immigration had no intention of granting a total amnesty. After further meetings with Gill had satisfied community leaders that the majority who signed the government's register would be granted permanent residence, they embarked, in good faith, on a major programme to get overstayers to sign the register. The task undertaken by the Island community was not made easy by the government. Government publicity about the register only began in earnest about two and a half weeks before the register closed, and the onus was upon the Island community to inform overstayers about the stay of proceedings and help them to register. Moreover, in June the Department of Labour began mailing out a four-page, twenty-one question application form for permanent residence or permit extensions to those people who had signed the register. The forms were written entirely in English and had to be returned, along with two references and two photographs, within seven days of posting from the department. Given that by that stage almost four thousand people had


registered, community and church leaders found that they suddenly had to provide literally thousands of references within a week. In the resulting panic, the deadline for the return of applications was extended two further weeks, but the forms revealed other problems for the overstayers.\textsuperscript{31} Applicants had to give details of all employment they had had in New Zealand, and it was clear that work records would be taken into consideration in decisions to grant permanent residence, but in the constant struggle to evade detection over time, many overstayers had changed jobs regularly and their work records, as a result, suggested instability and lack of promotion to skilled work.\textsuperscript{32}

Although the numbers coming forward to sign the register tended to confirm the estimates given previously by Island leaders, Gill continued to assert that there were considerably more overstayers and even revised his earlier estimate of 10,000-12,000 upwards.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, when the register closed at the end of June, with 4,627 people having registered, Gill expressed disappointment with the figure, claiming that there were still many more Island overstayers who had failed to sign.\textsuperscript{34} Despite the assurances of Island leaders that most Island overstayers had registered, Gill announced new measures for seeking out unregistered overstayers, including the use of a computer to cross check immigration records.\textsuperscript{35} As had been the case in almost all of Gill's discussions about illegal immigration and overstaying, his statements were couched solely in terms of immigration from the Pacific. "The overstayer problems must be eradicated," he said, "This is necessary for the good of those

\textsuperscript{31} New Zealand Herald, 'Deadline Is Extended', 9 July (1976).


\textsuperscript{33} Evening Post, 'Overstayers are revised - upwards', 17 April, (1976).

\textsuperscript{34} New Zealand Herald, 'Still Time to Register', 26 June (1976).

\textsuperscript{35} New Zealand Herald, 'Brain' to Catch Overstayers', 10 July (1976).
Island people legitimately in this country."\(^{36}\)

We don't want to do anything clumsy, such as taking arrest warrants, but if there were an outcry against efforts to find overstayers, this would just have to be lived with in the best interests of New Zealand. One way of getting at the problem would be to issue all New Zealanders with identity cards, but this should be avoided. We hope to avoid these sorts of controls and with cooperation, we will do so. If we are going to keep our society open, we must put up with the inconvenience of people enquiring about overstayers. It's a simple thing to live with.\(^{37}\)

![Image: The Gangplank, Minhinnick, New Zealand Herald, 1976.\(^{38}\)]

Figure 6.1 The Gangplank, Minhinnick, New Zealand Herald, 1976.\(^{38}\)

Having placed faith in the government and their credibility on the line to persuade overstayers to sign the register, Pacific Island leaders were

\(^{36}\) New Zealand Herald, "'Brain To Catch Overstayers', 10 July (1976).


\(^{38}\) Reproduced in Mary Boyd, 'New Zealand and the other Pacific Islands', in Keith Sinclair (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, (Auckland, 1990), p315.
dismayed by events that followed its closure. A special department of labour committee established to consider the registered overstayers' applications was composed exclusively of immigration officials. Their terms of reference were not disclosed, and they sat in private, although as gesture of fairness they allowed a member of the Inter Church Commission on Immigration to sit in as an observer. By late August it became clear that, contrary to Island community leaders' earlier understanding of meetings with the minister, not only were applications being rejected but they were being rejected at a rate of about half the total number of applications considered. This caused concern not only for leaders in New Zealand, but also leaders at home in the islands for whom the prospect of a sudden repatriation of workers to already strained island economies was deeply alarming.

Even more distressing for Island representatives, perhaps, was the fact that Islanders who had signed the register were being arrested - contrary to the explicit promise that signing would provide immunity from prosecution. In late July a registered overstayer was arrested, on a warrant issued sixteen days after Gill had opened the stay of proceedings for registered overstayers, and was held overnight in police cells. The man's lawyer said that he had already appeared for four others in the same situation. Despite Gill's assurances that the charges laid against the man would be withdrawn, by mid-August nothing had been done to clear up the matter and the man had his second appearance in court.

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41 New Zealand Herald, 'Rejections Upset Samoan PM', 30 August (1976).
Moreover, it was revealed that warrants for arrest had been issued for 74 people who were registered as overstayers.\textsuperscript{45} By late September 1723 applications had been accepted for permanent residence, compared with 1764 who were to be sent home at various dates from 31 January the following year.\textsuperscript{46} About the same time, the government resumed actions to seek out or hunt down overstayers who had not signed the register, and Pacific Island community leaders, in some cases reluctantly, assented to the resumption of the raids, as long as they were done in a humane and dignified manner, in order to protect those who had acted in good faith and complied with the government's register.\textsuperscript{47} The combined result was serious divisions within the Pacific community, between registered overstayers who were allowed to stay, registered overstayers who were told to go home, unregistered overstayers who began to feel that they had done the best thing by not having anything to do with the register, legal Pacific Island residents, and registered overstayers who, having been told to go home, decided to go underground once more in order to remain in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{48}

Events in New Zealand contrasted starkly with solutions found in Canada and Australia during this period. In 1973 the Canadian government opened an intensive two-month search for foreigners who were in the country illegally - not to get them out but to welcome them in. The purpose of the drive was to give illegal immigrants a chance to regularise their status and, as one government advertisement phrased it, "to make our

\textsuperscript{45} New Zealand Herald, 'Good Faith Move on Overstayers', 18 August (1976).


\textsuperscript{47} Auckland Star, 'Overstayer gets cold shoulder', 7 October (1976), and Amnesty Aroha, (1976), pp23-24.

\textsuperscript{48} Amnesty Aroha, (1976), p23.
country your country". Any illegal immigrant who had settled in Canada with a job, family ties, job prospects, or who, for any other reason, could show that they could become established in Canada, were invited to become Canadians. The director of the campaign explained:

What we’re really saying is, look, if you’re here in Canada, and you’re generally getting along O.K., we’re going to let you stay, and we’re not going to ask how you got here. The only criterion was the desire and reasonable ability to become a citizen, and tens of thousands of people came forward to claim permanent status and citizenship. Similarly, in Australia in 1976, a full amnesty was granted to 30,000 overstayers there, solving the problem that they were facing in both a humane and expeditious way.

In New Zealand some placatory gestures were made. Muldoon personally attended meetings of South Pacific leaders in 1976 and, when discussing the issue of repatriation with heads of governments in Suva in early October, he held out the possibility of allowing greater numbers of overstayers to remain in New Zealand and of phasing the repatriation of others. Similarly, Gill announced plans to visit the Pacific later in November but, despite these conciliations, the situation in New Zealand went from bad to worse.

50 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 ibid., p14.
On 21 October the police began a series of random checks on Polynesians in the streets of Auckland. In an unprecedented move, police teams sought out dark-skinned drinkers in pubs, passengers at taxi ranks, and pedestrians in Auckland's streets, demanding evidence of their citizenship and right to be in New Zealand. After a night in which patrols stopped hundreds of Polynesians in the streets, Auckland chief superintendent, A.G. Berriman, warned, "Anyone who speaks in a non-Kiwi accent or looks as though he was not born in this country should carry a passport." Berriman asserted that the checks were made completely at random, yet by his comments it was made clear that Pacific Islanders were the targets:

Naturally we'd look twice at someone we did not think was New Zealand born....Anyone who speaks with a non-New Zealand accent must arouse some query or suspicion as a first step.....We went for the obvious ones first....You look at the likely places if you are after something. Why would you look in Kohimarama or Remuera? [both wealthy, and white, middle-class Auckland suburbs]....It would help us and them if Pacific Islanders carried passports during this period.

One newspaper described a young Samoan man, Iakopo-Tevaga Sio, wrongly arrested while walking down an Auckland street, who spent almost fourteen hours sobbing in an Auckland police cell before it was found out that he was a legal immigrant. Another wrote that only two of twelve arrested during the Thursday blitz appeared later in court on immigration charges. Four of the others had been continuing residents in New Zealand for a

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57 ibid.

lengthy period, one had permanent residence, two were registered overstayers, and one was Tokelauan and therefore a New Zealand citizen. 59

Police minister, Alan McCready, gave his full backing to random searches, saying that it was just like having to produce a drivers licence. "People who look like overstayers will have to put up with a little inconvenience," he said. 60 McCready's statements also made explicit the racial selectiveness of the random checks. "If you have a herd of Jerseys and two Friesians," he said, "the Friesians stand out." 61

Figure 6.2 ...'Proper' locals, Tom Scott, Listener, 1976. 62


61 ibid.

The media played a prominent role in increasing protest against the immigration campaigns by highlighting the racism inherent in the police operation. Following the weekend blitz, the Auckland Star sent to the prime minister in Wellington six sworn and signed statements spelling out the details of random checking of Island overstayers after the prime minister challenged reporters to provide evidence of any police impropriety. In one statement Auckland-born Samoan, Mila Solomona, described having been stopped along with other Polynesians in the street and told that "because I did not look like a New Zealander I should carry a passport." Malu Odaufavea, a Tongan recently granted permanent residence, told how he was stopped three times by three different policemen on his way home. Viliami Tui was stopped along with others at a taxi stand and was taken to the police station for questioning. Wayne Toleafoa, a New Zealand-born Samoan, was stopped along with other Polynesians passing by and questioned in the street. Iakapo Tevaga, a Samoan resident on a five-year permit, was stopped and asked for his passport, and accompanied to his home by police to see it. As it did not show his five-year renewal, and his permit was with his lawyer, he was arrested and jailed overnight. His wife was denied access to see him and bail was refused. When immigration officials the next day confirmed that he was a legal immigrant he was finally released. Yet another statement detailed how Hinerangi Burney, a Tuhoe Maori, was stopped and questioned in an Auckland street.

Condemnation of the checks was swift and widespread. Whereas concern earlier in 1976 had been largely confined to Pacific Islanders,

63 Auckland Star, 'Star flies evidence to PM', and 'Minister: 1st I want the police numbers', 27 October (1976).

64 Auckland Star, 'Stopped, told to carry passport', 27 October (1976).

65 ibid.

organisations concerned with racial issues, and some sections of the Labour opposition, the issue in late 1976 became one of civil rights, and there were large demonstrations in protest at the police action. Demands were made for the resignations of the ministers concerned and a total amnesty was seen by many as the only means of restoring trust between New Zealand and its neighbours. 67 Pacific Island leaders declared their intent to take civil action against the police minister, while the Auckland Pacific Islands Council sent a telegram to the United Nations special committee for the elimination of racial discrimination to register their complaint. 68 Debates raged in chamber over the raids, with the Labour opposition calling for the resignation of both the minister of police and the minister of immigration, while government ministers, in a counter-offensive, labelled critics of the immigration blitz as "police-haters" and accused them of inciting racial disharmony. 69 Even National government backbenchers were incensed by the police actions and ministerial explanations. 70

The campaign was badly handled by the government, with both the prime minister and the minister of police, throughout the blitz, denying that it had even taken place. Muldoon categorically denied that police were conducting random checks and, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, continued to assert that police were acting only where there existed prima facie evidence that a person was an overstayer. 71

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71 Evening Post, 'No random checks carried out, says Muldoon', 25 October (1976), and 'Assurance given by PM of no discrimination', 26 October (1976).
Similarly, McCready, having earlier shown support for the checks, also denied them, stating that police acted only on information received and warrants executed for arrest. And, despite increasing public protest, he not only refused to reconsider the methods used in the overstayer crackdown, declaring that "the people who are kicking up all the fuss are upholding lawbreakers, and we don't uphold lawbreakers", he also lifted a ban, imposed by the former Labour government after protest at raids under their administration, to allow for further night raids on overstayers. Instead of admitting the occurrence of raids, both blamed the media for creating protest over nothing, accusing it of "excessively emotive news coverage".

On 25 October, at a crowded Auckland City Council special meeting to discuss and protest the campaign, Assistant Commissioner of Police J.W. Overton, issued an order to all Auckland police that "random checks on the streets and elsewhere will not be part of our policy". He asserted that random checks were never part of police policy in the overstayer campaign, and denied that the campaign had been directed solely at Pacific Islanders. The checks had occurred, according to the assistant commissioner, because some police had not followed instructions correctly and, indeed, had disobeyed their orders in conducting random checks for overstayers.

However, subsequent evidence showed that the assistant commissioner's...
comments were misleading and suggested, instead, that random checks had been mounted as a direct result of instructions given to the Police Department by the government itself. The Dominion reported that Gill had met with immigration officials on the Monday before the weekend blitz and had asked that action against overstayers be stepped up. Gill had then discussed the subject with the police minister throughout that week, and even wrote McCready a letter to finalise the increased action against overstayers, and as a result, on the Thursday, the day the blitz in Auckland began, police were asked to assist. Accounts of who devised the methods used were less clear. The immigration division was adamant that it only asked for help from police because they were better equipped and because legislation allowed them to deal with such matters. McCready agreed that he had asked the police to co-operate in the campaign, but said that police and the immigration division had then worked out a plan between them.

In response to comments made by Overton, and in a move that illustrated police dissatisfaction with the whole affair, Auckland chairman of the Police Association, Sergeant Peri Ngata, leaked to the press a departmental memo which clearly instructed police to stop and question suspected overstayers "on the streets". The memo stated that:

Police are to round up all illegal immigrants and overstayers of all races....Police will have complete discretion as to the time of day/night when arrests may be made....all members...are to take part in this operation by questioning persons in custody and on the streets and at any places where there are reasonable grounds to

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77 Evening Post, 'Truth of campaign 'should be told'’, 28 October (1976).


believe they may illegal immigrants or overstayers. Others confirmed the orders. One Auckland policeman said that the message had come down loud and clear - "Go out into the streets and get them". Another said, "the whole thing was a botch-up from the word go." Reports circulating amongst police held that the campaign had been ill-conceived and ill-planned from the start, and many Auckland police felt that officials in government and the Police Department should tell the truth and admit that it was "a bad blue".

McCready, some days later, conceded that random checks had indeed occurred, although he said that that was the first he had proof of it. He gave as an example of a situation which could have been mistaken for a random check, where a 'bona fide New Zealander' might have been arrested for drunkenness and he points at a man and says, 'he's an overstayer why don't you arrest him?'. "Is the policeman to go away?" he asked. Significantly, he determined that the checks were the result of police exceeding their instructions and gave his assurance that such action had never been contemplated by the government or the commissioner of police. "The checks," he said, "were not sought by the government nor are they condoned." Shortly after, however, an inquiry was made.

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84 Evening Post, 'Truth of campaign 'should be told''', 28 October (1976).
85 ibid.
87 Auckland Star, '"Checking" is all PM says', 28 October (1976).
89 Dominion, 'Police checks confirmed', 30 October (1976).
to investigate the overstayer checks, and its subsequent findings further confirmed that the checks had, all along, been the result of cabinet instructions.

Figure 6.3 *But we were told...*, Tom Scott, 1976.  

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The full report of the internal police inquiry compiled by Chief Superintendent Fleming and Superintendent Silk, upon its completion in late December, was never made public. Instead, the minister of police released a statement admitting that random checks had been carried out but did not attribute blame to anyone for giving the random check orders.\(^{91}\) According to the minister, lack of time and insufficiently detailed orders were the culprits.\(^{92}\)

A closer reading of the complete report, however, gives a somewhat different picture. The writers of the report personally interviewed 849 members of the Auckland police, and determined that in 856 actions, taken in the streets, at hotels and dance halls, and at private premises, 201 had been carried out randomly.\(^{93}\) They further determined that of the forty arrests that had been made during the campaign, as many as sixteen of the arrests were doubtful or simply not justified.\(^{94}\) In the majority of the sixteen cases the individuals had been detained at least overnight in police cells when, in fact, they were legal residents or registered overstayers.\(^{95}\) The investigating officers said:

> It was obvious that many Officers and N.C.O’s were vague on the law and the Police powers in the Immigration Act. Their misinterpretation of these powers and the subsequent misdirections

\(^{91}\) Evening Post, ‘Probe on overstayers confirms that random checks made’, ‘Overstayer operation reported on’, 23 December (1976), and Auckland Star, ‘There were random checks - 201 of them’, ‘Report doesn’t put blame on anyone’, 23 December (1976).

\(^{92}\) ibid.


\(^{94}\) ibid., pp43-44.

\(^{95}\) ibid., pp45-62.
to subordinates played a major part in the unlawful detention and arrest of some persons. 96

Moreover, they found that in the course of the police operation there had been great confusion and ignorance as to the availability and whereabouts of the overstayer register. The register had been available for checking at all times and outside normal business hours had been held at the Auckland Central Police Station. However, in the early stages of the operation this had not been widely known by police members. 97

Furthermore, the register used by police was incomplete. It did not disclose the names of all persons who had registered, it was not cross-indexed, nor were name variations or anglicanised versions included. There was a lack of details as to nationalities, dates of birth, addresses, next-of-kin and occupations. 98

Many members of the police had little or no idea about continuing residence, or the complexities of the various passport and permit stamps used to indicate the time of stay of persons entering New Zealand, and the non-availability of immigration division records and staff, or for that matter, interpreters, to establish the status of suspected overstayers led to the unjustified arrest of a number of persons. 99

In these respects, according to the report, many of the problems experienced in the campaign arose because the police were inadequately prepared. The Auckland office had not been advised until late on the afternoon of 21 October of the government’s change in enforcement policy, and, as a result, there was a failure to anticipate and appreciate the problems likely to be encountered, and little time for a proper evaluation and effective plan to be made for the event. 100

96 ibid., p74.
97 ibid., pp6,80.
98 ibid., p80.
99 ibid., pp80-81.
100 ibid., pp78,81.
However, contrary to public statements by the minister, the report made very clear that the responsibility for the raids rested with the acting district commander in Auckland, Chief Superintendent A.G. Berriman, if not with the commissioner, and the minister themselves. It had become apparent that the Department of Labour (Immigration Division) was experiencing difficulties in coping with the overstayer problem, and the police were consequently asked in October to intensify their efforts in the enforcement of the Immigration Act, by being given responsibility for tracing offenders. For a specified period of three months, beginning 21 October, police were to take positive action against overstayers, at the end of which time active police participation was to be reviewed.101

On Thursday, 21 October the district commanders of Christchurch and Wellington and the acting district commander of Auckland, A.G. Berriman, attended a commissioner's conference in Wellington at which the commissioner indicated that he had "acceded to a request from Government [my emphasis] for increased Police enforcement of the immigration laws in relation to overstayers and illegal immigrants."102 A subsequent commissioner's circular confirmed orders that:

all District Commanders are to give priority to the seeking out and apprehension of overstayers. Immediate action is to be taken. In districts where large numbers of illegal overstayers are known to be living, staff are to be assigned full-time to the task....there is no restriction on the times that Police may visit private homes in the course of their enquiries but good sense must prevail in this regard.103

The subject of casual checks on people in the street was not mentioned at this stage, and the method of implementation was left to the discretion of the individual district commanders.104

101 ibid., p4

102 ibid., p26.


That same day, upon returning to Auckland, Berriman held a meeting at which he briefed divisional commanders, other officers and N.C.O's of his meeting with the commissioner. He told those present that cabinet was dissatisfied with the Labour Department and was giving police the job of enforcing the immigration legislation, under "Operation Immigration", for three months.\(^{105}\) He asserted that it was essential, given that the police had been given a task which had not been successfully carried out by another department, for the police to show "early positive results".\(^{106}\) The enforcement was to be given priority and special squads were to be set up in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. All other police, including C.I.B., were to question all likely overstayers, and the questioning was to be carried out on all occasions that the police had contact with the public in any way [my emphasis]. Police were to be given a free hand to go anywhere in an effort to locate persons in breach of the Act, including streets, public places and houses, and Karangahape Road, where it was late night shopping that night. In addition, certain hotels and dance halls, significantly, those known to be frequented by Islanders, were nominated as being places where overstayers could be found. Police were to round up as many illegal immigrants and overstayers as they could possibly get.\(^{107}\) Significantly, the comment was made that although the police were entering a new type of law enforcement, "it could eventually prove beneficial in requests to Government for equipment, vehicles and possibly a future argument towards Police pay".\(^{108}\) This comment regarding pay was, in fact, later communicated to front line staff in the divisions.\(^{109}\)

Berriman obviously felt pressured to begin operations as soon as

\(^{105}\) ibid., p5

\(^{106}\) ibid., p28.

\(^{107}\) ibid., pp27-30.

\(^{108}\) ibid., p29.

\(^{109}\) ibid.
possible. He told the conference that he had been instructed to urgently return to Auckland to set up an operation commencing that day.\(^\text{110}\) Moreover, directions had been given for action to be taken quickly, in the police division's own interests, before the news media became involved.\(^\text{111}\) In reply to recommendations from some at the meeting that officers be given time to prepare the operation, he indicated, significantly, that "he had no leeway in the matter" and instructed operations to commence that evening.\(^\text{112}\) Neither Wellington nor Christchurch district commanders commenced field operations on the same day that they had received their briefing from the commissioner, however, the commissioner's circular, and presumably the commissioner's conference, had made clear that the onus of this operation was upon Auckland police. The commissioner had explicitly stated that it was those areas where large numbers of illegal overstayers were known to be living that were to be targeted in the police campaign. Consistent with the belief that overstayers were all Pacific Island immigrants, the police campaign, therefore, was to be focused mostly in Auckland.\(^\text{113}\)

In their report, the officers concluded that the acting district commander, Berriman, had "given specific oral orders which in substance amounted to directions to carry out 'random checks' in the streets and in other public places."\(^\text{114}\) Further, the terminology used by Chief Superintendent Berriman at his briefing was interpreted as meaning that the police had a free hand to go anywhere in an effort to locate persons in breach of the Act, including streets, public places and houses.\(^\text{115}\)
The investigating officers found these random check orders to be contrary to earlier instructions from the commissioner, and as a result seem to place the responsibility of the checks implicitly with Berriman. However, he was only fulfilling the expectations of his superiors. Both the commissioner and the government, who instructed the police commissioner to undertake action against overstayers, had asked for effective action against Island overstayers. They wanted "positive

116 Reproduced in Grant, (1980), p221.
results". The speed with which Berriman acted in establishing 'Operation Immigration' and comments he made indicating the demand that had been placed upon the Auckland district to get results, suggest that the pressure on him from his commissioner, and the government, had been considerable. Moreover, while the commissioner, and the government ministers instructing him, are unlikely to have desired the highly contentious and politically embarrassing campaign that eventually took place, it is difficult to see how else the police were expected to conduct their campaign. The racist premise of the operation was bound to afflict the campaign from its outset. In accordance with the government's politicisation of Islanders, the police were asked to target, almost exclusively, Pacific Island overstayers. It would have been extremely difficult to carry out such a discriminatory agenda without the final operation also appearing to be discriminatory. Regardless of whether random checks or some other means of targeting overstayers were used, the racist premise of the operation was always going to influence its ultimate configuration.

The directives given by Berriman had the effect of a chain reaction, in that they were passed directly on to front line police. One constable of six years service considered that his instructions were that if a person obviously appeared to be a foreigner, for example a Polynesian, he should approach him and establish his identity. If the man admitted he was a foreigner, request his passport or visa. If the person refused to supply the documents, after warning, arrest him, as a good cause to suspect would exist. Other N.C.O's and constables placed similar interpretations on their briefings. One sergeant interpreted and advised his duty staff that good cause to suspect could be a person appearing to be a foreigner refusing to speak, for example feigning

117 ibid., p28.
118 ibid., p68.
119 ibid., p35.
illiteracy or otherwise, and should be arrested.\textsuperscript{120} The constable was also told to act with vigour with regard to locating overstayers, to visit hotels, billiard saloons and to stop people in the streets and ask for documentation if they appeared to be foreigners.\textsuperscript{121} Indeed, it had been generally agreed that as inquiries were to be begun that night, then the streets were the only place to operate in the early evening, as there was insufficient information available to warrant going to houses or places of employment.\textsuperscript{122}

Clearly, the October campaign, while partly the result of mismanagement on the part of the police, was ultimately the result of a direct request from the National government. It was entirely in keeping with its handling of the whole immigration issue. It had been uncompromising about immigration while in opposition, it had promised to get tough on immigrants during its election campaign, and it had already implemented a controversial immigration crackdown earlier in 1976. There had been a continued need to be seen to deal to the immigration bogey that they had created, particularly as the dawn raids campaign had withered in a protracted and complicated bureaucratic mess. A large number of the registered overstayers were being granted, by the immigration committee, permanent residence to stay in New Zealand, and for the 'send-them-homers', to whom the National Party had appealed when constructing its immigration scapegoat, this would hardly have been acceptable. Moreover, throughout the year, Gill had continually asserted that there were 12,000 or more overstayers in New Zealand, with the insinuation that they were all Pacific Islanders. Given that only about 4,600 Pacific Island overstayers had signed the government's April register, the public was left with the impression that there were yet another 8,000 or so errant, law-breaking Islanders still at large, and the onus had been on the government to do something about it. On the other hand, the suggestion

\textsuperscript{120} ibid., p39.

\textsuperscript{121} ibid., pp34-35.

\textsuperscript{122} ibid., pp31,38.
was made that the random street methods had simply been a ruse to "make
dawn raids on Polynesians' homes - with police teams and trained dogs
even - as acceptable socially as a Sunday school picnic."\textsuperscript{123} By
comparison, the dawn raids would be seen simply as normal police
practice, where there was cause to believe that the law had been
broken.\textsuperscript{124}

Similarly, the fact that it was Pacific Islanders who were targeted in
the October blitz, that is the racism of the strategy, also highlighted
the government's role in the operation. Although, in part, it was
indictative of the degree to which racist and negative stereotypes and/or
attitudes were held by individuals in the official bureaucracy, it was
more specifically the result of the National Party, and later
government's, explicit attempts to link immigration problems, illegal
immigration and crime with, as a group, all Pacific Islanders. The
constant message from the National ranks, whether through explicit
statements or more indirect, but nonetheless explicit, actions had been
that Pacific Islanders were 'overstayers', 'criminals', and in short a
social headache, and that they had to be dealt with. Given the constancy
of that message, the Auckland immigration blitz was both quite logical
and inevitable.

**DAMAGE CONTROL**

For the remainder of 1976 and into 1977 the New Zealand government
attempted to recover lost ground in its relations with its Pacific Island
neighbours. In November 1976 Gill visited the governments of Fiji,
Western Samoa, and Tonga, where his reception, especially in Samoa and

\textsuperscript{123} Maurice Dick, ' 'Gestapo in our streets' the Aucklanders cry',

\textsuperscript{124} ibid.
Tonga was mixed. At an official level, all three governments dealt with the overstayer issue in muted tones, a result somewhat of the keen awareness of each island nation's dependence upon New Zealand goodwill in matters of trade and aid. Unofficially, however, Gill received "a very cold reception in the Islands." According to a journalist in Tonga and Samoa at the same time as Gill, at a cocktail party given for Gill in Samoa, out of 600 people invited, only 80 attended, and the prime minister only then after arriving more than an hour and a half late. Apparently, officials avoided the New Zealand minister, and when Gill approached a member of the Samoan government and asked him his name, the man replied "Is this a random check?". Deep hostility existed towards New Zealand following the immigration campaigns against Pacific Islanders, and was still evident in all three island groups when the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visited them several months later in early 1977, to the extent that he was compelled to admit publicly that mistakes had been made.

On his return to New Zealand late in 1976, Gill reiterated his government's opposition to a full amnesty for overstayers but, instead, reopened the overstayer register from 20 December to 31 January the following year, and promised to review the cases of those people who had already registered and had their cases for permanent residence declined.

127 Evening Post, 'Mr Gill snubbed on Islands trip says journalist', 29 November (1976).
128 ibid.
by the special immigration committee. At the same time, however, he also announced his intention to increase the numbers of immigration department staff, so as to ensure that there were no recurrences of the "overstayer problem", and in this respect highlighted the unchanged commitment of the government to crackdown on immigration, especially Pacific Island immigration.

At the close of the second register in 1977 a further 635 applications were forwarded to the special immigration committee. In the final analysis 5,381 people registered as overstayers in the 1976/1977 registers - 2,507 from Tonga, 2,464 from Western Samoa, 336 from Fiji, and 74 from other nations. Of that total, 3,712 or nearly seventy percent, were provisionally approved for permanent residence, comprising 3,657 nationals of Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa (69% of the total applications for these three countries), and 55 nationals of other countries (74% of 'other' applications).

At about the same time, in response to requests made by the island governments on Gill's Pacific tour, the South Pacific Work Permit Scheme was altered. Hence, permits were able to be extended to eleven months, sponsorship of workers by individuals and organisations such as churches was finally made permissable and a special loan fund was established for

\[\text{References:}\]

130 Auckland Star, 'Islanders split over pushing registration', 30 November (1976).

131 ibid.


134 Evening Post, 'Almost 70% of registered overstayers win right to stay on', 8 June (1977), and NZPD, Vol.411, (1977), p1369.
employers to help them advance airfares to migrant workers. 135 Despite these measures, however, the scheme continued to be unattractive to most migrants and employers and numbers entering New Zealand on the scheme remained small. 136 Apart from these few concessions, the New Zealand government's attention remained fixed on strict immigration controls.

In 1977, new measures undertaken to keep track of overstaying revealed that between 3,000 and 4,000 overstayers were in New Zealand at any one time, and that of the 3,641 recorded in New Zealand at the end of 1977, all had arrived in New Zealand in that past year. 137 The minister of immigration expressed his disappointment and concern at the pressures that this must exert on employment "which should be available to New Zealand residents", and made clear his intention to prevent the situation from escalating. 138 Computer recording had been introduced in 1976 and, as another major element in the control programme, specially appointed teams of immigration field officers had been established to locate and hasten the departure of persistent overstayers. The first field officers had begun their activities in March 1977, and had since then made more than 7,000 field visits. Significantly, from those 'visits' (not unlike the raids of 1974 and 1976) only 419 overstayers had been induced to leave and court action had only been taken against a further 202. These figures would suggest that, as before, in a majority of cases (more than ninety percent) the Immigration Department's 'visits' yielded nothing, and yet this information was received with little if any public


138 ibid., p55.
Moreover, the National government introduced a law in 1977, in the guise of the Immigration Amendment Bill, which made it an offence for visitors entering New Zealand to seek work unless they had been authorised to do so or for an employer to employ a person s/he had reason to know did not have permission to work. The Bill also made it an offence to remain beyond the expiry date of a permit even if the migrant was acting on the advice of the immigration division or if the division was at fault in unduly delaying a decision on a renewal application. As well, the legislation gave greater powers to the immigration minister, including the power to deport that formerly belonged to the judiciary, the power to deport a person for petty offences, and the ability to require a deportee to meet his or her own deportation costs.\textsuperscript{140}

At the close of the government’s overstayer debacle, some things had changed, while other stayed the same. One of the contributing causes of overstaying had been the encouragement offered by legal migrants to visitors to remain in New Zealand. At the time the probability of detection had been low, the costs of accommodating the overstayers had been small, and their potential contributions to migrant kin and non-migrant kin projects had been considerable.\textsuperscript{141} However, as a result of the continued economic downturn, that situation had changed significantly. The economic position of Pacific Islanders who were not New Zealand citizens had begun to deteriorate and this group increasingly became a heavy burden for those who must support them when their own incomes were falling. Hence, one of the contributing causes of overstaying disappeared.

\textsuperscript{139} ibid., p56.


\textsuperscript{141} Personal Communication, (1993).
In spite of this, the government’s approach had not changed. It was still intent upon clamping down on immigration, consistently categorising overstaying as a breach of the law that could not be tolerated. Moreover, it was still focused disproportionately in this desire for immigration control upon Pacific Island immigration.

The persistently heavy-handed approach of the government to the overstaying issue distracted attention from the possible causes of not only overstaying but of also the social problems, such as unemployment, that the government had linked to it. By encouraging a negative perception of Pacific Islanders it also drew public support. While Pacific Island immigrants had long been associated in the public mind with various social problems, after the campaigns of 1976 the perception of Pacific Island immigrants as overstayers was much more widely and deeply held. The dawn raids and random checks under the National government saw the entrenchment of new stereotypes, wherein old attitudes and beliefs were reproduced: overstayers were brown Polynesians; brown Polynesians were overstayers; New Zealanders did not look like Polynesians; and people who looked like Polynesians were not New Zealanders. The old ‘race’/immigration ideology was reinforced. Indeed, a survey of the many letters sent to a major Auckland newspaper in response to the "Operation Immigration" blitz in 1976 found that those writing in support of the government’s crackdown outnumbered those expressing concern at the police tactics by two to one.


During the 1975 election campaign the National Party had encouraged New Zealanders to look more closely at Pacific Islanders and something of a moral panic occurred whereby Pacific Islanders were held responsible for a series of problems, from unemployment to a decline in law and order. The reaction to Pacific Islanders, encouraged by the National Party and by already long-held racist community attitudes and stereotypes, reached a peak in 1976 when Pacific Island migrants were blamed for migrating to New Zealand in too large numbers and were held responsible for breaking New Zealand's immigration laws, for overstaying, and for putting New Zealand residents out of work. A series of historical, material and ideological factors merged with the result that the public perception came to be that 'Islander' and 'overstayer' was one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{145} But if we unpack the events and rhetoric of the period, it becomes evident that Islanders were not an immigration threat to New Zealand, those who overstayed were only part of a much larger group of immigrants who were overstaying, and they were not taking the jobs of New Zealanders.

One of the most constant complaints against Pacific Island overstayers was that they had broken the law, indeed, Gill, among others, had continually iterated that "we cannot tolerate the open flouting of our immigration laws".\textsuperscript{146} Yet the situation was not quite so simple. In the first place, the overstayers' offence was technical. Their crime did not harm persons, property or public order and they could be regarded in the same light, for instance, as people who failed to pay their television licence. The perception of Pacific Island overstayers as criminals, moreover, was strongly imbued with negative connotations which owed more to the general stereotypes about Islander-criminality and violence, to which the National Party had appealed so explicitly in its election

\textsuperscript{145} Spoonley, (1990), pp158-159. See also Chapter Five.

\textsuperscript{146} de Bres and Campbell, (1976b), p14.
campaign, than it did to any real understanding of the Immigration Act or the material circumstances which compelled these labour migrants into overstaying.

In addition, New Zealand's structurally racist immigration laws made illegal for Pacific Islanders acts which for immigrants of other nationalities were perfectly legal. For instance, Britons and Canadians who had migrated to New Zealand before April 1974 and who had continued to stay in New Zealand, unlike Tongans or Samoans who did the same, could not be classified as overstayers. Technically, an overstayer was a person who had been granted temporary entry to New Zealand for a limited period who then failed to leave at the expiry date of that period. Prior to 2 April 1974, however, citizens from the United Kingdom and Canada were automatically granted permanent entry on their arrival in New Zealand. Similarly, while it was illegal for Tongans and Western Samoans on visitor's permits to stay in New Zealand more than one month, for immigrants of most other nationalities, stays of three to six months were acceptable.

Moreover, the law for which Islanders were being pursued was not one which was administered justly. While Pacific Islanders made up only a proportion of overstayers in New Zealand at any one time, the immigration campaigns during the 1970s targeted them to the exclusion of almost anyone else. Indeed, while Island overstayers were being tracked down, deported, or made to sign official registers, other 'white' overstayers were given the opportunity by the Immigration Department to regularise their status without fuss, without publicity and without recrimination.

Furthermore, in stark contradiction to the stereotype that all Pacific

147 Evening Post, 'Discrimination warning from Samoan PM - unless Europeans held', 25 October (1976). See also Chapter Three.

Island immigrants in New Zealand were overstayers, and hence 'criminals', the great majority of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand at any one time were legal immigrants and residents. In the 1976 census there were 61,354 Pacific Island Polynesians recorded as living in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{149} Even if Gill's 1976 estimates of 10,000 to 12,000 Pacific Island overstayers resident in New Zealand had actually been accurate (which they were not), that figure would only have accounted for, at the most, less than twenty percent of all Pacific Islanders in New Zealand. In addition, of the seventy percent of registered overstayers from 1976 who were granted provisional permanent residence, many were entitled to permanent residence anyway as they were already married to a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident.\textsuperscript{150} Moreover, the subordination of different Islanders' identities to the general appellation of 'Pacific Islander', meant that subsumed within, and made invisible, by this umbrella stereotype of 'all Pacific Islanders', were Niueans, Tokelauans, and Cook Islanders who were all New Zealand citizens by right, as well as all New Zealand-born Pacific Islanders. For Western Samoans in New Zealand in 1976, this accounted for 8,165 or approximately twenty-nine percent of all Samoans in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{151}

The number of Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand was an important ingredient in the moral panic that developed over Pacific Islanders in the 1970s. The image was one of 'brown hordes invading' New Zealand, and the hype about 'hordes' of overstayers fitted neatly into that context. Yet, Pacific Island migrants were only ever a minority of immigrants entering New Zealand. The great majority of immigrants to New Zealand were, in fact, from the United Kingdom and Australia.\textsuperscript{152} Even by 1986, those born in the Commonwealth Pacific Islands made up only fourteen

\textsuperscript{149} Quoted in Bedford, (1984), p117.


\textsuperscript{151} Pulotu-Endemann and Spoonley, (1992), p84.

percent of the New Zealand resident immigrant population, compared with more than fifty percent who were British.\textsuperscript{153} Even as temporary migrants, of whom Pacific Islanders made up a more substantial proportion, they still comprised a small proportion of the overall migration flow into New Zealand. The largest proportion of the temporary migrant flow ever reached by Island migrants was only 50.4\% in the 1966/1967 year, the only time in the ten years from 1966 to 1976 that they ever formed the majority of migrant workers.\textsuperscript{154} Even in the peak years of New Zealand immigration, 1973 to 1974, Fijians, Tongans and Western Samoans made up a mere 2.7\% of permanent immigrants to New Zealand and only 40.6\% of temporary migrants, in comparison to 29\% and 32.3\% respectively for Australian immigrants.\textsuperscript{155} Still yet, for the 1976 year, net migration from the Pacific accounted for only 1,352 immigrants, a mere twenty-six percent of the total migration gain for that year of 5,192.\textsuperscript{156} Significantly, throughout the period under discussion open entry to New Zealand for Australians continued, and for the year ended 31 March 1977 alone, more than 222,000 Australians visited New Zealand (nearly as many as the total populations of Tonga and Western Samoa put together), making the figures for Islanders in New Zealand small, and that for Island overstayers insignificant.\textsuperscript{157}

More importantly, Pacific Islanders comprised not only a minority of all immigrants to New Zealand, they made up a minority of overstayers, too. In 1976 Gill made plain that of the 10,000 to 12,000 overstayers he estimated to be in the country, they were virtually all Pacific

\textsuperscript{153} Ongley, (1990), p120.

\textsuperscript{154} Evening Post, 'The migrant population', 3 November (1976).

\textsuperscript{155} de Bres and Campbell, (1975), p446.

\textsuperscript{156} Bedford, (1984), p121.

Islanders. Moreover, in 1978 the Immigration Department gave the ratio of Islanders to non-Islanders appearing in the courts as overstayers for the preceding year as twenty-five to one. In actual fact, however, the Labour Department in 1976 had little idea of how many overstayers were in the country at all, let alone how many overstayers were of Pacific Island descent. The estimates given by Gill and his department, of 10,000 to 12,000, were no better than guesstimates; indeed, they were called into serious question when, in fact, only 5,307 Pacific Islanders in total came forward in 1976 to sign either of the two registers. The estimate of about 3,500, given by Island community leaders in April of 1976, was more accurate, especially given that at the end of the first register about 4,600 signed. Island leaders had reckoned that they had contact with about eighty percent of overstayers, and as their estimate of 3,500 subsequently accounted for more than seventy-five percent of the total who actually registered in the first stay of proceedings, the accuracy of their smaller estimate, as opposed to Gill’s, seems even more likely. Most significantly of all, however, when computer figures of actual overstayers became available in early 1978, only forty-eight percent of the total figures for overstayers for the preceding year were actually Pacific Islanders. The majority of overstayers, in fact, were British, American or of nationalities other than Tongan, Western Samoan or Fijian, and there is no reason to suppose that this was not also the case in 1976.


162 *Auckland Star*, ‘4,000 overstayers here at a time’, 1 November (1977), and ‘‘Get all overstayers’ says Islander’s man’, 22 April (1978).
The racially selective campaigns of 1974 and especially 1976, wherein Pacific Islanders were almost exclusively targeted, made invisible those overstayers who were from regions other than the Pacific and, in a self-perpetuating cycle, reinforced the stereotype that it was only Pacific Islanders who were overstayers. It would appear that when overstayers from countries such as America or Britain did come forward, they were diverted from the process with which Pacific Islanders were being dealt, so that they tended not to appear on the overstayers register.\textsuperscript{163} Of course, this meant that for those who were watching closely the register became a self-fulfilling prophecy with regards to Pacific Island overstaying. This was compounded by the fact that the register was signed largely by Pacific Island overstayers under the encouragement and advice of both the government and their community leaders.

On the other hand, for those European or American overstayers who chose not to come forward, it was relatively easy to avoid detection by the authorities. In the first place the police were not looking for them. In the random check campaign in Auckland, for instance, police were instructed instead to look for Pacific Island overstayers. In addition, visitors from regions other than the Pacific generally had more money and were therefore more able, than comparatively poorer migrants from the Islands, to lie low and bide their time to avoid detection. Moreover, under the different entry arrangements for Pacific Islanders and other migrants, those not from the Pacific were advantaged in that they generally provided less detailed information about themselves and their intended whereabouts than did Island migrants. Pacific Islanders had to provide detailed information for their visas which, for instance, Americans, under New Zealand's visa-free arrangement with the United States, were not required to provide. Similarly, under the sponsorship guarantee, Pacific Island migrants, who were the predominant users of the scheme, had to provide detailed names and addresses for themselves and their sponsors while other migrants generally entered with sufficient

\textsuperscript{163} Interview, "Chris", 10 November (1992).
funds so that they were able to avoid furnishing the same information.\textsuperscript{164} Furthermore, the overstayers who signed the 1976 registers, who were predominantly Pacific Islanders, had to provide detailed information about themselves, including addresses of employment and two photos, by filling out a twenty-one question application form. By this means the government obtained further important information. Not only did the questions establish full files for these overstayers, but they provided the Immigration Department with photos which would assist in future identification and detection if the overstayers attempted to disappear again if their applications failed.\textsuperscript{165} As many European and other non-Islander migrants did not sign the register, they were again advantaged in that they were less vulnerable to detection.

The other major criticism levelled at Pacific island overstayers was that they were a burden on the economy and deprived New Zealanders of jobs. But this stereotype was simply not true. Firstly, as a general rule, immigrant workers tended to have higher than average rates of economic activity, and made tax contributions to health, unemployment and pension insurance far in excess of their demands on such schemes.\textsuperscript{166} Most Pacific Island migrants (excepting those who were New Zealand citizens, such as Tokelauans, Cook Islanders and Niueans) had little or no entitlement to government benefits, such as the unemployment benefit, and relied instead upon their family networks for what support they needed.\textsuperscript{167} British migrants, by comparison, resided in New Zealand in substantially greater numbers and with a large proportion of dependants, unlike Island migrants who tended to come to New Zealand without

\textsuperscript{164} See Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{165} de Bres, (1976b), p8.

\textsuperscript{166} Castles and Kosack, (1972), p10.

\textsuperscript{167} Casaloma Ahokovi, quoted in Geoff Chapple, 'Through the eyes of the Islander', \textit{Listener}, Vol.80, No.1873, (1976), p17.
dependants, and they were entitled to welfare services and benefits.¹⁶⁸

Secondly, Islanders did not take the jobs of New Zealanders. Instead, they occupied the low-skilled, low-status, low-paid jobs to which employers had difficulty attracting industrious, stable, loyal local workers.¹⁶⁹ "For years," one Auckland manufacturer said, "industry needed all the Islanders it could get for the unskilled drudge jobs that no-one else wanted."¹⁷⁰ Labour was so scarce that some firms sent employment officers to the Pacific Islands to recruit workers, and others paid employees $10 if they found a new worker.¹⁷¹ Indeed, large numbers of immigrant workers took up key positions in the productive process, so that even in the case of recession their labour could not be dispensed with.¹⁷² The full extent of some companies' dependence on island labour had been made apparent when employers had lobbied the government to delay the repatriation of overstayers after immigration raids in 1974.¹⁷³ In 1976 employers had expressed similar concerns, and a number of companies' performance and productivity were seriously disrupted as parts of their workforces were either removed or disappeared to avoid detection.¹⁷⁴ One company employing a largely Samoan workforce of some forty or more persons found that, during the overstayer investigation, as many as fifteen of its employees had been absent daily and the atmosphere within the factory had been uneasy. The manager had stated that if the investigation continued he would be unable to meet export contracts or

¹⁶⁸ de Bres, Campbell and Harris, (1974), Part One, p3.

¹⁶⁹ Spoonley, (1990a), p159.

¹⁷⁰ Auckland Star, 'Working their way up - from factory floor to white collar', 23 August (1979).

¹⁷¹ ibid.


¹⁷³ See Chapter Four.

local demand and that his firm's economic survival was in doubt.\textsuperscript{175}

Pacific Island migrants did not take the jobs of New Zealanders because they formed a separate secondary segment of the New Zealand labour force. They were forced into the unskilled jobs with low wages, unstable tenure, and poor working conditions that no-one else wanted, and that were characterised by disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities, women, youth, immigrant and illegal workers.\textsuperscript{176} The continued use of Pacific Island labour during periods of high unemployment demonstrated that relative labour shortages still existed in the lower end of the labour market where jobs remained unattractive to local workers. The employment of Pacific Island immigrants did not greatly affect New Zealand workers because the immigrants were employed in a structurally separate segment of the labour market, in a Polynesian fraction of the working class.\textsuperscript{177} Recent findings suggest that because of this segmentation immigration does not, in fact, increase unemployment in general but actually improves, on average, the chances of an unemployed resident worker's obtaining a job.\textsuperscript{178}

In fact, in terms of the problems of unemployment, inflation, and economic recession that were besetting New Zealand at this time, the immigration of Pacific Islanders was not the issue. Island immigrants were used by New Zealand governments as a smokescreen to deflect attention from their mismanagement of economic crises. In fact, despite the immigration cutbacks of the 1970s, the economy continued to

\textsuperscript{175} ibid.

\textsuperscript{176} Gibson, (1983), pp35-37.

\textsuperscript{177} Ongley, (1990), pp111-112, and Terrence Loomis, Pacific Migrant Labour, Class and Racism in New Zealand: Fresh off the Boat, (Avebury, 1990), pp64-83.

\textsuperscript{178} Jacques Poot, Immigration and the Economy, A Review of Recent Australian Findings on the Economic Consequences of Immigration and the Relevance of these Findings for New Zealand, (Wellington, 1986), pp29-32.
deteriorate and economic stagnation persisted.\textsuperscript{179} By December 1976 inflation had risen to 16.9 percent and economic activity had contracted sharply. Moreover, unemployment continued to grow rapidly to reach 22,300 by the end of 1978, and this was despite the large-scale emigration that had accompanied the economic downturn.\textsuperscript{180}

Regardless of the fact that Pacific Island immigrants did not take the jobs of New Zealanders, that they were not all overstayers, and that they did not make up the larger proportion of all overstayers, the negative stereotypes continued unabated.\textsuperscript{181} This was partly because neither political party, Labour or National, challenged the assumptions upon which these beliefs were grounded: that immigration was a problem, that Pacific Island immigration, involving as it did a 'problem race' was the biggest problem of all, and that immigration cuts were therefore the only solution. Indeed, their combined immigration campaigns against Pacific Island immigrants simply reinforced these assumptions.

The media, moreover, did not effectively counter these assumptions or stereotypes. In many instances the media were dependant on information from 'expert' sources, generally government departments, and this was at times misleading. In 1976 the Immigration Department and Gill justified overstayer campaigns on the grounds that there were 10,000 to 12,000 overstayers in New Zealand, but subsequent figures on the register were less than half this, and computer figures for the following year suggested that at any one time there were never more than 5,000 overstayers in the country.\textsuperscript{182} As well as publishing inaccurate figures to begin with, the media also gave unbalanced attention to the different figures. The early inaccurate estimates received considerably more press

\textsuperscript{179} Alan McRobie in Rice, (1992), p393.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{181} See Chapter Seven.

\textsuperscript{182} Auckland Star, '4,000 overstayers here at a time', 1 November (1977), and 'Get all overstayers' says Islander's man', 22 April (1978).
coverage than the subsequently released actual figures. This was possibly because of sensationalism or possibly because the inaccurate figures were made by Gill, a public figure who attracted considerable media attention at the time, and they therefore made better press copy than subsequent corrections. Similarly, the media as a whole did not challenge the constant interchangeable use by politicians and officials of the terms ' overstayer' and 'Islander' as if they were one and the same thing. Indeed, most, even some of those papers which supported the overstayers' cause, supported the stereotype by using the terms in the same way. 183

The media did play an important role in rousing public indignation against dawn raids and random checks, and embarrassing the government into ending these highly controversial practices. However, despite the fact that most newspapers condemned the government's campaigns, in terms of the stereotypes promoted about Islanders, their criticisms were outweighed by the sheer intensity and duration of the coverage they gave to the overstayer issue. 184 The saturated media coverage of the overstayer campaigns, especially of the random check campaign in October 1976, inundated the public with images of Pacific Islanders associated only with overstaying and illegal immigration, and this ultimately served to support the negative myths about Pacific Islanders. It is significant that the media coverage at this time, the first extensive media coverage of Pacific Islanders, was of a negative content, and led to negative stereotypes. 185

Constant front page headlines on major daily newspapers, for example


184 See Auckland Star, Evening Post and Dominion for criticism of the government's handling of the immigration/overstayer issue.

185 Finau 'Ofa Kolo, 'An Incident in Otara: The Media and Pacific Island Communities', in Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines, Racism and the New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), p120.
"Problem Of Overstayers", "Dawn raids start again for illegal Tongan migrants", "Islanders go to ground to escape expulsion", "Overstayer figure climbs past 12,000", "Seven caught last night in Police net", "Permanent life here for many Island 'stayers'", "Islanders get notice", "Immigrant outsiders toe the line", "Police blitz on Islanders curb against overstayers", and blanket coverage of the October random checks afforded a persistent negative image of immigration and Pacific Islanders.\(^\text{186}\) The release of figures which revealed that the great majority of immigrants on the overstayers' registers were Pacific Islanders, without any critical discussion about the reasons for the relative absence of European and other overstayers, simply reinforced the media message; that Pacific Islanders were overstayers, illegal immigrants, and above all, trouble. This message was stated even more explicitly in newspaper editorials which supported a tough stance against Pacific Island immigrants.\(^\text{187}\) Despite the fact that migrants from countries other than in the Pacific made up a majority of all immigrants to New Zealand, and a substantial proportion of overstayers, the term 'overstayer' was politicised during the 1970s to the extent that it became synonymous with Pacific Islanders.

This process of racialisation, in which Pacific Islanders were politicised as a 'problem' and scapegoated, was the result of a milieu of factors. For one, Pacific Islanders had always been regarded in New Zealand, before the 1970s, as different, as outsiders. Indeed, it was this general perception that was seized upon and enhanced by the National Party in its 1975 election campaign. It relied upon sharpening the


categories of distinction between New Zealanders (including Maori) and Pacific Island migrants, by heightening the migrants existing negative typifications, and linking popular perceptions of economic problems and social decline to the outsider group. Hence, a process of differentiation which had begun beforehand, played a large part in making it easier for the state to scapegoat Islanders for its own political purposes, and for the general public to largely accept this later in 1976.

In addition, Pacific Island migrants in general belonged, because of the historical material consequences of their labour migrations to New Zealand and because of the ongoing reproduction of racism, to a social and economic class, a Polynesian fraction, which was materially disadvantaged. On the one hand that meant that they belonged to a low socio-economic group that was already eagerly blamed for social problems such as crime and moral decline, and which was generally identified in the public perception as already being a 'problem'. Add to these attitudes, the ideology of 'race', and it was easy for others to believe that Pacific Islanders were responsible for all sorts of problems, such as housing shortages, unemployment and so on - it made common sense. On the other hand, the material position of Pacific Island migrants generally meant that as individuals they were not in a position to be able to easily protest against the immigration campaigns that they faced. Legal action, and indeed, public campaigning for support cost money that most did not have. The island governments were in a similar position. Their material dependence on New Zealand aid stifled strong criticism of the New Zealand government's internal affairs during this period.

188 Loomis, (1990), p126.
189 See Chapter Two.
191 See generally Ray Watters, 'Mirab Societies and Bureaucratic Elites', in Antony Hooper et al (eds), Class and Culture in the South Pacific (Auckland/Suva, 1987).
Moreover, as well as being in a materially vulnerable position, Pacific Island migrants, and especially overstayers, were also in a politically exposed situation. Pacific Islanders' representation in the New Zealand state was limited. The first governmental body specifically concerned with Pacific Island interests was the Pacific Island Affairs Committee established to advise the minister of Pacific Island affairs in 1984. In addition, up until 1993 there had been no Pacific Island member of parliament and, as an immigrant minority, the concerns of Pacific Islanders were of low priority.\textsuperscript{192} Moreover, as a minority, they also represented little political threat to a government that might intentionally scapegoat them. Pacific island overstayers were even more disadvantaged in that they had no political rights whatsoever.

Set against these historical, political and material factors, which all served to circumscribe Pacific Islanders into a highly visible and vulnerable position, was the factor also of ideological relations. 'Race' and 'race'/immigration ideologies were available to the public to explain the causes of and solutions to the economic recession and perceived social decline in the mid-1970s, and were reproduced by the media, and more deliberately by the state to promote this intellectual process. Racist ideas and stereotypes had already been used to explain and attribute to Pacific Islanders such social problems in New Zealand as crime and overcrowding.\textsuperscript{193} They provided a manageable definition of changing realities, absolved individuals or groups from taking certain action, by apportioning blame on Islanders instead, and justified the taking of others. The Labour government, in 1974, acted upon these very ideologies in its campaign against Pacific Island migrants. It accepted the assumption that Pacific Island immigration was a problem, more of a problem than immigration from Britain or Australia which was larger in volume, and it was the 'race'/immigration ideology that informed that assumption.

\textsuperscript{192} Ongley, (1990), p208.

\textsuperscript{193} See Chapter Two.
The Labour government's concern fitted into a long history of concern about the immigration of 'other races', and that 'great question of assimilation and integration'. Pacific Islanders were not regarded as making 'good New Zealanders', because they tended to retain cultural and racial characteristics that were increasingly associated negatively with, among other things, crime, poor educational attainment, and material disadvantage. The Labour government's subsequent immigration campaign, of course, only served to reinforce the existing ideology about Pacific Islanders. It simply added to the list of problems for which Islanders were held responsible, overstaying, and in this way made it relatively easy for the National Party to further deliberately reinforce the 'race'/immigration ideology in its bid to win voters' approval in the election. On the one hand it needed a scapegoat with which to deflect attention from the more difficult issues such as the deteriorating economy and, on the other, it needed to appeal to some aspect of the public's view of the world. It was the ideology of racism, as it was expressed towards Pacific Island migrants, that provided them the vehicle for this political campaign.

Thus, at the beginning of 1976, New Zealanders, in general, had already been persuaded that Pacific Islanders were a problem. Ideologically they had been primed for the immigration campaigns that were to occur later in 1976. Dawn raids and random street check campaigns were merely an extension of that ideology. If the problem was Pacific Island immigrants, especially overstayers, then the solution was only going to be how to get rid of them. Hence, the images and the rhetoric of 1976 which politicised Pacific Island migrants as criminals, as economic burdens, as problems, merely reiterated old and well-entrenched stereotypes. The 1976 campaigns merely reproduced already existing racist attitudes towards Pacific Islanders and by giving them greater expression, legitimated and further entrenched them. It was not at all out of place, then, for the minister of immigration, Frank Gill, in 1977

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194 See Chapter Three.
to talk about Pacific Island overstaying as being an "epidemic", conjuring up images and associations of life-threatening plagues with the implication that overstaying was as much a threat as any "communicable disease".\(^{195}\) He revealed not only the attitudes that allowed the immigration campaigns to occur in the 1970s, but also heralded the attitudes which were to continue to shape events well into the 1980s.

\(^{195}\) New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 'Overcoming the "Overstayer" Problem', Vol.27, No.4, (1977), p56.
Although the very public and controversial immigration campaigns of the mid-1970s had ended, the issue of Pacific Island immigration continued to be the subject of public and official concern into the 1980s. The stereotypes that had been created in the previous decade, those of the 'overstaying Islander', the 'lawbreaker', and the 'immigrant who took New Zealanders' jobs', continued to influence people's perceptions of Pacific Islanders. A newspaper series on Islanders in 1979 maintained that it was common for Pacific Islanders in New Zealand to be stereotyped as poor, dirty, unhealthy and heavy boozers.\(^1\)

Prejudice does exist. A woman turns down an emergency house because Islanders live next door; high school kids in Otara tell how they are automatically branded as gang members; a Niuean boy is picked up by police as he walks a city street at night and wonders if it would have happened to a palagi.\(^2\)

The image of overstaying remained particularly strong. In 1980, in the first visit by a New Zealand prime minister to Western Samoa since its independence, Prime Minister Muldoon addressed the Samoan Legislative Assembly with a speech that talked at length about the 'worries' of the immigration flow from Western Samoa to New Zealand and the "problem of lawbreaking overstayers".\(^3\) That politicians continued to give it such attention was an indication of how entrenched that image of Island


\(^2\) ibid.

immigrants had become.

The speech by Muldoon was interesting also for his vision of the strong bonds underpinning New Zealand-Western Samoan relations:

We are secure in the knowledge that our friendship is within the family, we are part of each other’s aiga. We can call on each other for help, confident that support will be forthcoming. He even went further to assert that New Zealanders would continue to welcome Samoans to their shores. These sentiments are intriguing, for less than two years later the bonds between the two countries that Muldoon described were sorely tested by the New Zealand government’s continued prejudices against Pacific Island immigrants. Then, old stereotypes and racist attitudes played a significant role in closing immigration doors on New Zealand’s Samoan ‘family’.

LESA AND THE CITIZENSHIP (WESTERN SAMOA) ACT, 1982

In July 1982 the highest court in the New Zealand law system, the Privy Council, ruled that Falema’i Lesa, a Western Samoan facing prosecution in the New Zealand courts as an overstayer, was in fact under earlier legislation a natural-born British subject and hence a New Zealand citizen. Lesa’s defence case was based upon section 7(1) of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New Zealand) Act of 1928. In their consideration of the meaning of this and other Imperial Acts of the United Kingdom deemed to be part of the law in New Zealand, the Lordships declared that:

In Their Lordships’ view, there is no escaping that s7(1) of the Act of 1928 means what it so emphatically and unequivocally says; a person born or resident in Western Samoa is to be treated in the same manner in all respects for all the purposes of the Act of 1928

4 ibid., p32.
5 ibid., p28.
as if he had been born or resident in New Zealand proper.\footnote{ibid., p278.}

The court's decision effectively meant that all Samoans born in Western Samoa between 1928 and 1 January 1949, together with all the children of Samoan fathers born within that period, estimated to involve 100,000 Western Samoans, or two-thirds of Western Samoa's population, were New Zealand citizens.\footnote{Ballara, (1986), p161, and Barrie Macdonald, 'The Lesa Case, and the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act, 1982', in A.D. Trlin and Paul Spoonley (eds), \textit{New Zealand and International Migration. A Digest and Bibliography, Number One}, (Palmerston North, 1986), p73.}

The decision came as a shock to political and legal establishments and sparked off a virtual panic in New Zealand at the imagined prospect of a sudden flood of Islanders into New Zealand, bringing in their wake the kind of "social pressures and disturbances that marked the arrival in Britain of the great waves of West Indians and Pakistanis during the 1950s".\footnote{Dominion, Editorial, 'Calmer view on Samoans', 2 August (1982).}

New Zealanders, responding to images and stereotypes that had been created in the previous decade, were haunted by the fear of a new 'invasion' of brown immigrants.\footnote{Ballara, (1986), p161.}

The old images and stereotypes, of the 'socially inferior brown immigrant', and the 'violent overstaying Islander taking our men's jobs' which in particular had been reproduced so vociferously in the 1970s, still powerfully shaped most New Zealanders' understanding of Pacific Islanders. New Zealanders in general perceived immigration from the Pacific in terms of the 'race'/immigration ideology, with all its cliches of 'invasions', 'alien floods', and related social 'problems'. Thus, the New Zealand government over-reacted and panicked at what it perceived to be a major threat to New Zealand society; a perception that was based more upon myth and prejudice than it was upon fact.
Despite the figures of 100,000 that were bandied about as the likely number of Samoans who would come to New Zealand, and the political scaremongering about the great stress the sudden arrival of many thousands of outsiders to New Zealand would cause, the fact was that the spectre of an exodus and a Samoan elbow at every porthole had no substance.\(^{11}\) Samoan leaders assured the New Zealand government that surveys made in Samoa showed that most Samoans had no desire to emigrate to New Zealand.\(^{12}\) Samoans could generally only afford to migrate to New Zealand when the economy was buoyant and there were jobs. There was no reason to suspect that there would be a sudden influx of migrants when, in the worsening recession, jobs were scarce.\(^{13}\) Indeed, in the two years previous to the Privy Council decision there had been a net outflow of Samoans from New Zealand.\(^{14}\) Western Samoans were pleased to learn that they were New Zealand citizens, not necessarily because of the advantages of New Zealand entry which such rights bestowed, but because it both confirmed an historical association and their membership of a wider community.\(^{15}\) One Samoan explained:

We have always been close to New Zealand, for good or for bad, and this was just another step closer. It doesn't mean we were indifferent - citizenship is a birthright and a source of status and such things are of great importance to Samoans. But it did not change the fact that there are no scholarships or airfares or jobs to go to in New Zealand. We did not see why we should suddenly all want to go to New Zealand.\(^{16}\)


\(^{12}\) Dominion, 'PM tells Samoa to deter migrants', 14 August (1982).


\(^{15}\) MacAlevey, (1982), p383.

The real issue in 1982 was not so much about the capacity of the New Zealand economy to absorb new immigrants as it was about New Zealanders’ perceptions of themselves and others. It was about most New Zealanders’ continued desire to maintain cultural and physical homogeneity. It was about most New Zealanders’ belief in an ideology that had for many years characterised Pacific Islanders as a threat to that homogeneity and all else that New Zealanders might hold dear. The events of the 1970s had entrenched racist attitudes and had politicised the issue of Pacific Island immigration to the extent that it became a flashpoint for prejudice and panic. The potency of the stereotypes that had been fixed in the immigration campaigns of a decade before was revealed in the government’s haste to overturn the Privy Council decision. There was no immediate reason for the government to act as it did, or so fast. No convincing evidence was produced to suggest that those Samoans still in Western Samoa would have used their newly-discovered New Zealand citizenship in a manner imminently detrimental to the social or economic well-being of either country. It is difficult to see any other reason which could justify the extreme haste with which the government moved to nullify the court’s decision, other than in its conviction in the ideology of ‘race’/immigration and all the frightening, misrepresentative images that it involved.

The New Zealand government reacted immediately to what they described as a "constitutional bombshell". As soon as the Privy Council decision was announced in mid-1982 the New Zealand Government placed an immediate ban on the issue of all visas and permits for Samoan immigrants, and the New Zealand prime minister, Robert Muldoon, cabled his counterpart in Samoa, Va‘ai Kolone, to arrange detailed talks immediately following the South Pacific Forum meeting scheduled to be held in New Zealand in early

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August. At their meeting Muldoon said he gave the Samoan delegation a list of options aimed at resolving the "headache" arising from the Privy Council decision.

Although the Samoan representatives made clear that they were opposed to any New Zealand moves to legislate against the court decision, at no time did the New Zealand Government, or the parliamentary opposition for that matter, advocate accepting the Privy Council ruling. It was later revealed that, in talks in Wellington, Muldoon had secretly told the Samoan Government to produce a plan to prevent mass Samoan migration to New Zealand or else it would act to prevent it itself. The New Zealand Government sought a guarantee that Samoans would not flock to New Zealand following the court decision, and gave the Samoan Government about a week to come up with a plan that would avoid the need for New Zealand legislation. Muldoon made it clear that "if Samoa did not agree to the New Zealand proposal then the New Zealand Government would act anyway." A week later, the New Zealand attorney general and minister of justice, Jim McLay, flew to Samoa to sign a Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship which in effect stripped the majority of Samoans of their newly realised New Zealand citizenship rights.

The Protocol was signed on 21 August in Apia and, only a few days later, on 24 August, legislation implementing the Protocol and revising the effect of the Privy council decision was introduced to the New Zealand

21 Dominion, 'PM tells Samoa to deter migrants', 14 August (1982).
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
Parliament. While the Bill confirmed the New Zealand citizenship of Falema'i Lesa, on whose behalf the original action had been brought, it asserted that all other Western Samoans who had similar claim to be British subjects and therefore New Zealand citizens were deemed never to have been New Zealand citizens. Having denied citizenship to persons whom the Privy Council had declared New Zealand citizens, it then granted rights to citizenship to all Western Samoans who happened to be in New Zealand on the day before the date on which the Act was to take effect. This provision confirmed the right to claim citizenship, but not citizenship itself, on the basis only of the location of the individual concerned on a specific date. The Bill also granted the immediate right to citizenship to Western Samoans subsequently granted the right to enter and reside in New Zealand, instead of their having to wait several years for citizenship as had formerly been the case. Moreover, the Bill quashed the convictions for overstaying of more than 750 Samoans who had been deported since 1968, thereby removing their status as prohibited immigrants. Overstayers who had left the country voluntarily had subsequently had their names and those of their relatives put on an administrative list of persons who were effectively denied re-entry to New Zealand for a period of five years. Likewise, under the provisions of the Bill, that list was to be abolished.

Following its introduction, the Bill was referred almost immediately to the Select Committee for hasty consideration. Submissions were called


27 ibid.


30 ibid., pp2514,1516.

31 ibid., p2514.
for on Wednesday 25 August, the deadline for which was noon the following Monday, 30 August. The public had effectively only two days to prepare and post submissions. The dispatch of the committee’s sittings was explained as being out of a concern not to further delay the inconvenience of the ban on Samoan migrants wishing to enter New Zealand. Subsequent reports, however, indicated that such haste was merely a result of the government’s own self-interest. Initially, it had wanted the Bill passed through all its stages a week earlier, before it was decided to send the Bill to committee.

The submissions heard by the committee were apparently unanimous in their opposition to the Bill. The legislation was seen as an "affront and a gross insult" by many Samoans, and the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, though it retreated somewhat later, submitted that the Bill (by depriving citizens of their citizenship on the basis of ethnic origin) had "an unfortunate racist implication". Despite this, the Bill was passed into law with only minor amendments on 14 September.

The passage of the Bill was stormy, with the Labour Party criticising the government’s handling of the negotiations with the Western Samoan Government and the speed with which it had passed the resulting legislation through parliament. However, when the final vote was taken only five Labour MPs voted against the Bill, despite the fact that the Labour Party’s ruling executive had asked all of its MPs not to support it. Indeed, from the start, the Labour opposition had agreed with the

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32 *Dominion*, ‘Submissions deadline set’, 26 August (1982).
33 *Dominion*, ‘Samoa bill set for quick hearings’, 31 August (1982).
34 *Dominion*, ‘Samoan bill brings outcry’, 1 September (1982).
36 *Dominion*, ‘Labour split over Samoa’, 11 September (1982), and ‘Samoan marchers too late’, 15 September (1982).
government that the Privy Council decision should be reversed. The fact that the court’s decision had been immediately interpreted by politicians on both sides of the house as being a problem, revealed the extent to which the old images and stereotypes of the ‘race’/immigration ideology pervaded political thought, and the degree of consensus that continued to exist between the two major political parties on the issue of Pacific Island immigration.

The New Zealand government’s handling of the Western Samoan citizenship issue was questionable, and its solution unnecessarily arbitrary and discriminatory. Pressure applied by the New Zealand Government clearly played a major role in securing the citizenship agreement with Western Samoa. The deadline imposed by the Muldoon government on negotiations with Samoa did not allow for wide enough consultation in Samoa, or for a consensus to be reached. Samoan Cabinet MP, Le Mamea Ropati, admitted that the deadline had been difficult and had not given his cabinet enough time to reflect on the full implications of the court judgement, or to consider the protocol agreement. As it was the Samoan cabinet sat through a marathon debate on the protocol to meet the deadline, from 9.30 a.m. until midnight, and even then split four votes to three on approving the agreement. According to the secretary to the Samoan Government, Maiave Iuali Toma, however:

even apart from the fact that we were given a deadline, there seemed little point in asking Samoans what they thought, because we knew all along that the decision was not for us to make. It was very clear that New Zealand would not leave the thing alone,

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40 *Dominion*, ‘Samoan says fear led to protocol’, 2 November (1982).
regardless of what the Samoan people might request.\footnote{Quoted in Stirling, (1982), p19.} A senior Samoan government source later said that the delegation he went with to Wellington was told by the New Zealand Government that it had already prepared a bill completely overturning the Privy Council decision, and that that legislation was ready to go in to parliament.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Samoan says fear led to protocol’, 2 November (1982).} A Western Samoan cabinet minister involved in considering the Protocol stated that:

There was definite pressure. When Va’ai returned (from talks in Wellington) he said he was told by Mr Muldoon that unless there was a definite answer they would go ahead with whatever the (National Party) caucus decided. That I viewed as an ultimatum.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Racist label marks protocol’, 23 August (1982).}

Throughout the negotiations with New Zealand an undercurrent of resigned acceptance and bitter criticism pervaded the Samoan response.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Racist label marks protocol’, 23 August (1982).} Resentment over the Protocol was widespread. A petition circulated in Samoa opposing the Protocol collected, in only a week, more than 22,000 signatures, representing more than twelve percent of the Samoan population and making it the largest petition in Western Samoan history.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Petition arrives’, 9 September (1982).} A subsequent meeting of all Western Samoan mayors was also far from overwhelming in its support for the Protocol.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Samoan mayors hear racist claim’, 1 November (1982), and ‘Muldoon errrs on protocol count, says Tupuola Efi’, 3 November (1982).} One group even tried through the Western Samoan Supreme Court to have the Protocol declared null and void because it contravened the constitutional rights of Western Samoans.\footnote{Dominion, ‘Samoans file against protocol’, 4 November (1982).} Such protests gave strength to claims made in Apia that, despite Prime Minister Muldoon’s assertions that the issue had been
handled in "the Pacific way" and "discussed...carefully and in a relaxed manner, with no ultimatum being given and no time limits being set", the decisions of the New Zealand Government were racist, ill-considered and had been foisted not only on to a small, weak and economically dependant nation but also on to a government made doubly vulnerable by a domestic political crisis. "Whereas before," said Fogi Retzlaff, a spokesperson for the protest group Taga-i-Lima:

if you had asked Samoans to raise their hands if they wanted to take up the rights of citizenship you would have very few responders, now if you asked how many of them felt their rights had been violated they would all stand up. We felt it was not just an injustice to some but a gross insult to the Samoan people in the way it was handled.

The inter-governmental negotiations had come at a time of political crisis in Western Samoa where the survival of Va'ai Kolone's government was under threat because of disputed electoral returns. In the event, the government fell to opposition leader, Taisi Tupuola Efi, who tried to have the Protocol set aside. The New Zealand Government's response was to threaten the Western Samoan Government with a full renegotiation of the Treaty of Friendship if they set the protocol aside, and to secretly freeze all Samoan applications for permanent residence.

In keeping with the spirit of the citizenship legislation immigration minister, Aussie Malcolm, had begun issuing permanent residence permits to about two hundred Samoans wishing to fly home for Christmas as an

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50 Dominion, 'Kolone bribe hearing starts', and 'Judge chides Samoan political way', 25 August (1982).


interim measure while they waited for New Zealand citizenship, which could take up to six months to obtain. However, reacting to Efi’s challenges to the protocol, the New Zealand Government attempted to halt the proposed legal review by arbitrarily and without justification freezing Samoan permanent residence applications. One political commentator was prompted to quip that Muldoon’s much vaunted "Pacific way" was obviously to "talk softly and carry a big carrot and threaten to hit people with it, or remove it altogether if you don’t get your own way."

Figure 7.1 *All in the same boat*, Tom Scott, *Listener*, 1982.

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54 Dominion, 'Sour in Samoa’, 1 November (1982).


It was an entirely sorry affair which only served to further damage New Zealand's strained relations in the Pacific. Tupuola Efi was to later describe the protocol as:

a friendly agreement between two friends to express in the friendliest manner the unfriendliest of intentions of one towards the other.

What was made patently clear throughout the whole affair was the depth of fear New Zealanders felt towards Pacific Island immigrants. Past events and stereotypes had created a spectre of the immigrant 'threat' from the Pacific and it was to this image that New Zealand politicians reacted. Their response to the Privy Council decision could only have further entrenched it. The consensus between the two parties, the haste with which the government reacted to the court decision, and the lengths to which it went to prevent Western Samoans obtaining New Zealand citizenship must have only served to convince the public that there was indeed a problem, and that that problem was, once again, 'the Island immigrant'.

While on the one hand the government's legislative measures did not challenge the prevailing ideological orthodoxy about Pacific Island immigrants nor, on the other hand, did it change the longstanding discriminatory basis of the immigration of Western Samoans to New Zealand. In particular the restrictive thirty day visitor's permit was retained and the annual Samoan quota for those seeking permanent residence was held at 1,100. It did nothing to clean the slate of residual problems in other areas of Pacific Island immigration either - especially those affecting Fijians and Tongans. Nor did it establish either policy or procedures that would eliminate the immigration problems

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59 See consecutive editorials in the *Dominion*, (1982), for an example of media acceptance of the appropriateness of overturning the Privy Council decision.
which had regularly strained New Zealand's relations with its island neighbours.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

Other events served to highlight the deficiencies of the existing New Zealand immigration legislation as well as practice. Following a departmental review, the minister of immigration, Aussie Malcolm, introduced a new Immigration Bill in December 1983. While the proposed revision was held to apply to all persons, it was immediately criticised by Pacific Islanders, and by Western Samoans in particular, as racist. The Bill was to rationalise procedures; decriminalise most immigration offences; add to the grounds for deportation; and limit appeal against deportation orders. The Bill also required employers and educational institutions to keep records on the immigration status of employees or students, and, in a move which echoed the worst abuses of the immigration campaigns of the 1970s, it required non-citizens to carry permits, with any refusal to produce documentation proving citizenship or lawful presence being sufficient grounds for the assumption that an offence had been committed. It also gave immigration officers the right of arrest and provision to random search private homes.

When introducing the Bill, Malcolm made clear that it was to target people in New Zealand unlawfully - overstayers:

These people prey on our society. They are like the uninvited guest, or the guest who outstays his welcome in our home. By his

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64 ibid.
presence he makes a mockery of our careful policies that are
designed to enhance opportunities for New Zealanders." 66

Given the past associations of overstaying with Pacific Islanders, it was
not surprising that Islanders perceived this legislation to be strongly
targeted, despite assurances that it was to cover all immigrants, towards
them. In fact, subsequent events gave them good grounds for believing
that those past stereotypes and attitudes would indeed have coloured the
implementation of the proposed legislation.

The Bill died with the Muldoon government in July 1984, but not before
it had soured relations between New Zealand and its island neighbours,
and not before it was revealed that judgements about ‘race’ continued to
play a part in the practice of New Zealand’s immigration policy. 67 In
May 1984 a complaint from a prominent American Samoan businessman sparked
off an embarrassing diplomatic row for New Zealand. Fritz Kruse had
flown to New Zealand with his two sons, both of whom were born in
American Samoa and were holders of American passports, whereupon his sons
were told to leave New Zealand because they lacked visas, despite the
fact that American visitors did not need visas to enter New Zealand. One
son was given a thirty-day entry permit on his American passport while
the other was given a day to quit the country, only after he had shown
the immigration officers an outward-bound air ticket. The boys were
treated in this way apparently because of their ethnic identity. 68

Newspapers in America and Western Samoa seized on the incident and
proceeded to blast New Zealand immigration policy as racist. The
Governor of American Samoa published a criticism of New Zealand policy
in a United States government publication, while American Samoa’s
congressman, Foto Sunia, took a formal complaint to the American
Secretary of State, George Schultz, and to the New Zealand Embassy in

68 Warren Berryman, ‘’Racist’ claims rile Malcolm in Samoan visa
New Zealand’s immigration minister, Aussie Malcolm, continued to deny the charges of racism, claiming that the boys were treated differently from other American visitors because they were American nationals and not citizens. However, his own immigration officers bore out claims that New Zealand did indeed make distinctions between Samoans and other American citizens based on ‘race’. Officers at Auckland airport admitted that one American passport looked like another and the only way to distinguish between American nationals and citizens was by the colour of the holder’s skin and his or her place of birth.\(^{70}\) The debacle highlighted, once again, the racist assumptions within New Zealand’s immigration practice.

Racism and the Immigration Department

Two years later, in a report on New Zealand’s immigration practices which illustrated the positive role the media could have in challenging racist practices, Auckland Star journalist, David Mcloughlan, revealed disturbing trends in overstayer prosecutions and deportations.\(^{71}\) He found that while Pacific Islanders accounted for less than a third of 9500 alleged overstayers, they were virtually the only ethnic group arrested, prosecuted and deported for the offence. The biggest proportion of those overstaying temporary entry permits consisted of North Americans, Britons and continental Europeans, but they were rarely sought by immigration officials.\(^{72}\) In response to these allegations, the Labour government’s minister of immigration, Kerry Burke, requested the

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Race Relations Conciliator to investigate, and the subsequent report by the Race Relations Office confirmed the practice of racial discrimination within the Immigration Department.73 Significantly, the office found that the racism involved in stereotyping and targeting Pacific Island groups during the overstayer campaigns of 1974 and 1976 had remained a dominant influence in the department.74 It submitted that the situation wherein Pacific Islanders constituted a minority of overstayers but a majority of those prosecuted was "a residue of the 'White New Zealand' policy" and practises as exemplified by nineteenth century anti-Asian immigration legislation and more recently in late twentieth century racially discriminatory criteria in immigration policy.75 It found that while the immigration law no longer contained explicit racial bias that "particular philosophy of the past continues to influence current policy and practises."76

The report found that Pacific Island immigrants were discriminated against in several ways. Firstly, approximately ninety percent of the estimated 600,000 people who visited New Zealand annually entered without a visa. Under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement and other inter-governmental visa-abolition agreements, visitors from a large number of countries were exempt from visa requirements.77 This, however, was not the case for visitors from the Pacific Islands, who were seen to be among the most likely to overstay their permits.78 An anomaly clearly operated to the disadvantage of Pacific Island immigrants in the requirement to


74 ibid., p8.

75 ibid., pp8-9.

76 ibid., p9.

77 ibid., p11.

78 ibid., pp11,13.
obtain a visa. The more stringent conditions applied to, and more detailed information obtained from these visitors made it easier to apprehend and prosecute them at the later point of expiry of their permits.\(^{79}\)

Moreover, the limit imposed on their entry permits also operated to disadvantage Fijian, Western Samoan and Tongan visitors in comparison to other visitors. The stated purpose of this limit was to discourage breaches of the law involving working and/or overstaying, yet no such deterrent was stated with regard to any other groups entering New Zealand.\(^{80}\) Other procedures operated within the department, such as providing separate computer print-outs for Fijian, Samoan and Tongan suspected overstayers, which also appeared to target this group in preference to others.\(^{81}\) The image of overstaying established in the 1970s, in the 1980s became the justification for discriminatory activities within the Immigration Department.\(^{82}\)

Similarly, the sponsorship system, despite its stated purpose to assist Pacific Islanders to enter New Zealand was seen as discriminatory, and to be operated in such a way as to impose post-entry controls on Pacific Island immigrants.\(^{83}\) The sponsorship system was stated by both immigration officers and Pacific Islanders to be the reason why more Islanders than any other groups was prosecuted for overstaying. The information collected under the sponsorship guarantee provided reliable contacts through which people might later be located, whereas non-sponsored visitors may only record the address of the hotel or motel at

\(^{79}\) ibid., pp13,15.

\(^{80}\) ibid., p61.

\(^{81}\) ibid., p61.

\(^{82}\) Spoonley, (1990b), p31.

which they were to stay on their first night in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{84}

The Race Relations Office also found that pervasive and prejudiced attitudes, incompatible with the department’s own objective for an immigration enforcement which made no distinction between national groups, existed at all levels within the department. It was widely believed by immigration staff that Pacific Islanders actually comprised the majority of overstayers, that they overstayed longer than any other groups, that they were less likely to leave the country voluntarily, and that they were more likely to take their case through the appeal system and "clutter up" the courts. These beliefs, the report stated, were an important reason for the more vigorous pursuit of Pacific Island immigrants than any other group.\textsuperscript{85}

The effect of these practices, the office found, meant that more time and resources were applied to the apprehension and prosecution of Pacific Island immigrants than of any other overstayers. As a result, citizens of Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga comprised a minority, approximately one-third, of the total number of overstayers in New Zealand, and at the same time a large majority, over eighty-six percent, of the prosecutions for overstaying under the Immigration Act.\textsuperscript{86} The report stated that this discrimination was on the one hand the logical outcome of New Zealand’s discriminatory immigration policy and law, and on the other hand the result of discriminatory attitudes and erroneous beliefs.\textsuperscript{87} These attitudes, stemming from old misconceptions and fears about Pacific Island immigrants, were responsible for the creation of a circular problem. The higher number of convictions that resulted from

\textsuperscript{84} ibid.

\textsuperscript{85} ibid., p35.

\textsuperscript{86} ibid., p60.

\textsuperscript{87} ibid., pp60-62.
discriminatory attitudes, actually reinforced the original beliefs.\textsuperscript{88}

Hence, it can be seen that the overstaying images of Pacific Island immigrants that had been promoted in the 1970s had serious repercussions for Pacific Islanders. Not only did they cause Pacific Island immigrants to be unfairly targeted in subsequent immigration enforcement practices, they also created a self-perpetuating situation, wherein the stereotypes sustained themselves. The continued belief in the 'overstaying Islander', and the actioning of policy based upon that belief, simply served to reproduce and continually reinforce the old 'race'/immigration ideology.

Recommendations that arose from the Race Relations inquiry were subsequently embodied in the Immigration Bill 1986, which represented an important departure from previous migration policies.\textsuperscript{89} In particular it was proposed that visitors from Tonga, Fiji and Samoa should no longer need visas, as other nationalities were not obliged to produce them; that the offence of overstaying be decriminalised; and that an offender should have the right of re-entry after five years, where previously they had been barred for life.\textsuperscript{90} These recommendations were accompanied by changes to the definition of 'immediate family' under family reunification clauses, the liberalisation of the family size rule, and the removal of national origin as a factor in immigration selection.\textsuperscript{91} The liberalisation of measures particularly seen to be associated with Pacific Islanders, however, did not escape opposition. National party politicians criticised what they saw as an imbalance in the future

\textsuperscript{88} ibid., p62.


\textsuperscript{90} Toft, (1990), p114.

immigrant composition if immigration from the Pacific Islands was favoured in these ways.\textsuperscript{92} Said one MP:

Traditionally, as immigrants from lower socio-economic countries do, they are starting to work their way up through the socio-economic scale. At this stage they are moving up to the taxi driver rank, when we need people to open businesses and to employ people who traditionally come from lower socio-economic areas.\textsuperscript{93} Others opposed the liberalisation of rules relating to overstayers, who were still believed to be predominantly Polynesian despite the recent inquiry findings.\textsuperscript{94} One National MP even went so far as to say that such a proposal discriminated against ‘New Zealanders’:

I find it careless and dubious of the Government...that it should soften up the country’s traditional approach to overstayers. They are persons unlawfully in New Zealand at a time when our own people are undergoing increasing pressure and competition for places at work and for social services.\textsuperscript{95}

Obviously, attitudes towards Pacific Island immigrants in some quarters at least, were still coloured by past events and stereotypes. Islanders were still regarded as undesirable immigrants and as potential overstayers. Subsequent events proved also that despite the Labour Government’s preparedness to liberalise some of the rules which discriminated against Pacific Island immigrants it, too, was ultimately moulded by the same prejudiced attitudes.

\textbf{ABOLITION OF VISAS 1986-1987}

In December 1986 the Labour Government extended the visa-abolition scheme that had existed for Western Europeans, Japanese and North Americans since 1985 to Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga, and standardised the initial period of stay for visitors from the Pacific and Europe alike at three

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{92} See \textit{NZPD}, Vol.471, (1986), pp2347,3934-3935.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{93} \textit{NZPD}, Vol.471, (1986), p3937.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{94} \textit{NZPD}, Vol.471, (1986), p3928.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{95} \textit{NZPD}, Vol.471, (1986), p3931.}
months with the right of applying for an extension of up to twelve
months.96 From 1 December 1986 Tongan, Western Samoan and Fijian
visitors could enter New Zealand for an initial three months without
visas. However, before the first three months had even passed the visa
exemption for Pacific Islanders was abolished.97

As early as the beginning of February concern had begun to be expressed
about the numbers of Pacific Islanders entering New Zealand under the new
scheme. The parliamentary opposition claimed that the freer immigration
rules had merely opened the way for a "new generation of overstayers"
taking jobs from New Zealanders.98 Immigration officers were reported
to be inundated with Pacific Islanders applying for permit extensions,
and phonecalls from local employers checking whether they could employ
Pacific Islanders applying for jobs.99 It was in response to claims that
insupportable numbers of Islanders were entering New Zealand that the
visa-free scheme was ended on 17 February 1987, just ten weeks after it
had begun. "The sheer force of pressure from people rushing here," the
minister of immigration explained, "has caused the Government to say,
'this is not good enough'."100 He said that a welter of evidence had
emerged to show that the new arrangements were being abused. More than
a hundred students, he said, had sought to enrol at Auckland schools
without the necessary permits. Planes had returned to the islands with
dozens of empty seats. Visitors had arrived on chartered planes with
return tickets valid only for the plane they came on, but the planes had

96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Immigration Policy', New Zealand

97 Annual Report, Department of Labour, AJHR, Vol.10, G.1, (1987),
pp36-37.

98 New Zealand Herald, 'Tongans In Exodus Seeking Jobs In NZ', 4
February (1987).

99 New Zealand Herald, 'Visa Office Rush by Islanders', 5 February

100 New Zealand Herald, '"Rush' Shuts NZ Door Smartly', 18 February
left Auckland and had not been scheduled to return. Employers reported that large numbers of visitors had been seeking work without the necessary permits, and Fijian, Samoan and Tongan communities in New Zealand, he asserted, were finding it difficult to cope with the "waves" of visitors from the islands.\textsuperscript{101} What had been a potentially superb entry policy had been "corrupted" by people arriving in large numbers on temporary entry and seeking to stay permanently, the minister said.\textsuperscript{102}

![Figure 7.2 Shut the door...](image)

\textit{Figure 7.2 Shut the door...}, Minhinnick, \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 1987.\textsuperscript{103}

Such accusations, however, had less to do with any actual abuses of the system than negative stereotypes about Pacific Island immigrants and the expectations that New Zealanders had of immigrants based on those stereotypes. The government acted merely on the basis of old fears and prejudices towards Pacific Island migrants. The three-month period for the first visitors had not even expired. Any accusations about Islanders

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 'Rush' Shuts NZ Door Smartly', 18 February (1987).

\textsuperscript{102} ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Minhinnick, 'Shut the door...', \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 19 February (1987).
overstaying were quite spurious. Moreover, given the large number of Islanders who were, quite legally and within their rights, applying for extensions to their three months stay, the fact that return airfare bookings to the islands were not being taken up was not at all out of the ordinary and certainly represented no cause for alarm. Pacific Islanders who entered New Zealand under the scheme were still free to apply for an extension of their visitors’ permits for up to another nine months.104

Pacific Island community representatives denied claims that their communities had complained of the strain of hosting extra visitors. Tanuvasa Yandall, a Samoan advisor to the minister of Pacific Island affairs, explained that Island communities coped every Christmas with an influx of holidaying relatives, and this Christmas period was no different.105 In fact, the Government was not able to produce anything to back up its allegations.106

Similarly, the minister’s accusations about chartered flights proved also to be misdirected. When police investigated the issue of charter flights, it was revealed that far from orchestrating an elaborate scheme to stay in New Zealand as had been insinuated, Pacific Islanders were in fact the victims of disorganisation in the airlines concerned.107 They had paid for what they genuinely believed to be a two-way fare, and had actually attempted to leave New Zealand on their return tickets. The fault was with the airline which had failed to organise return flights for them.108 Yet despite the police findings, the government placed a


106 ibid.


108 ibid.
ban on all further charter flights from Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga.\textsuperscript{109}

The greatest fear, from the outset, was about the numbers of Pacific Islanders arriving in New Zealand under the scheme. "Insupportable numbers" of Islanders were contended to be "flocking" to New Zealand in "waves", and exorbitant figures were proclaimed about the number of Samoans and Tongans entering the country.\textsuperscript{110} One television news team estimated that 25,000 Islanders had entered under the scheme before it was finally axed.\textsuperscript{111} But, as the airlines explained, demand for flights to New Zealand over the Christmas holiday period was always high. Both Air New Zealand and Polynesian Airline’s extra flights over the December-February period had been planned long before the New Zealand Government introduced its visa abolition scheme.\textsuperscript{112} The scheduling of increased normal and charter flights was merely part of the regular seasonal trend. "We have always done this at this time of year for the last 10 years," a Polynesian Airline spokesman said.\textsuperscript{113} Of the thirteen charter flights out of Samoa over the Christmas period, Air New Zealand confirmed, only two had been a result of demand after the visa restrictions had been lifted.\textsuperscript{114} The fact was that Islanders simply could not afford to come to New Zealand in the great numbers for which they were accused.

Significantly, when the decision was made to end the visa-abolition scheme the government in fact had no idea how many Pacific Islanders had


\textsuperscript{110} See New Zealand Herald February (1987)


\textsuperscript{112} New Zealand Herald, 'Airlines Say Blame Unfair', 19 February (1987).

\textsuperscript{113} ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} ibid.
actually entered New Zealand up to that point. Their decision was made from estimates, of about 11,500 - 12,000, which were based on an assessment of aircraft capacity for 1987 and a count of arrival cards for the month of December only, which took, therefore, no account of the those who might have since left the country or any subsequent decrease in numbers. Hence, the government, having only ten weeks before placed Pacific Islanders on a par with other immigrants to New Zealand, reimposed former discriminatory sanctions in response to what were incomplete and inaccurate immigration figures. In the months that followed it was revealed that immigration division officials had actually used figures that were more than double the actual number of visitors for that period. In fact, thousands of non-Polynesian visitors entered the country under the same conditions during the same period and yet there were no concerns ever expressed about them. While the combined total of arrivals of visitors from Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga for the three months was less than 15,000, in the same period more than 90,000 Australians, 54,000 Americans and 17,000 Britons entered New Zealand.

Anxiety over the numbers of Pacific Islanders migrating to New Zealand was unjustified given the vastly larger numbers of other migrants entering the country at the same time. But then the issue was never really about numbers, the real or even imagined figures - just as it had never been about the supposed stresses being placed on Pacific Island families resident in New Zealand. Rather the government and public's overreaction to Pacific Island immigration in 1987 was the product, once again, of past racist stereotypes and beliefs. The government acted to end the visa scheme, not because Islanders were overstaying, but because


116 ibid.

117 Toft, (1990), p115.

it believed that it was inevitable that they would overstay. As one newspaper explained, the government had been "stampeded" into the visa-abolition scheme because of "fuss" in 1986 over the discrimination against Pacific Island visitors highlighted by the Race Relations inquiry:

The spectre of racism raised at that time swamped attempts by immigration officers to explain that, unlike most travellers, Islanders are generally desperate to stay. It should not have taken this experience to vindicate the previous procedures.119 People believed the old stereotypes about 'overstaying Islanders', regardless of the fact that it was unwarranted to assume that Islanders were overstaying when the three month visiting period had not even expired when the scheme was abolished. The myth, the ever-present ideology of 'race'/immigration, was more compelling than the reality. Indeed, the government's actions merely legitimated that myth. The fact that it acted to end the scheme was seen by many as proof that Pacific Island migrants generally were indeed a threat to the New Zealand economy and society.120

THE REPRODUCTION OF RACISM

These prejudices and beliefs continued to reinforce one another throughout the 1980s. For instance, at its June conference in 1988, the Local Government Association added its voice to growing calls for relaxed immigration criteria so as to attract more skilled and semi-skilled workers to New Zealand.121 In deference to the generally negative feelings about Pacific Islanders at the time, however, the mover of the remit, a provincial deputy mayor, felt moved to assure those present that he was not, in calling for greater immigration, advocating

120 Loomis, (1990), p126.
throwing open the doors to half the Pacific Islands. Fears about the threat of Pacific Island immigration and the belief that it was genuinely destructive continued to prevail.

In 1989, the Labour Government’s prime minister, David Lange, raised the prospect of terminating the Western Samoan quota which had long been a symbol of New Zealand’s ‘special relationship’ with Western Samoa. Since the immigration campaigns of the 1970s, Pacific Island immigration had come under regular scrutiny. The belief in the negative effect Island immigrants had in New Zealand ensured that Pacific immigration was a perpetual focus for debate. In June 1989 the minister of foreign affairs was sent to Apia to review immigration issues with Samoan government officials. The outcome was a decision to retain the quota but both governments agreed to use existing immigration policies to encourage a return to more traditional levels of immigration of around 2,000 Western Samoan citizens a year. The effect of this decision was reflected in the immigration figures of subsequent months. The number of Western Samoans granted visas and permits to reside in New Zealand between 1 April 1989 and 31 March 1990 totalled 1,215, compared with a total of 4,082 for the previous March year. Yet the tap was screwed down to reduce the flow of Pacific Islanders into New Zealand at a time when official encouragement was being given to much higher levels of net immigration overall. In October 1989, the Minister of Immigration was talking of net gains of 10,000 people annually and significant changes to both immigration policy and law were being mooted early in 1990 to this end. The government wanted immigrants, but obviously Pacific

\[122\] ibid.


\[124\] ibid.

\[125\] ibid.
Island immigrants were not among those invited.

Also in 1989, the Auckland Star, reported a respected High Court judge as saying, of Pacific Island immigrants:

the people of New Zealand are fed up with you coming and taking what you can get and then claiming the benefit of what you prefer to have from your own way of life.\textsuperscript{126}

In this particular case, the Samoan family he was directing his comments to were being sentenced for some serious offences. What is significant, however, is how the judge was able to express his own perception of Pacific Islanders, and then through the media reinforce popular negative beliefs. It is an illustration of how the 'system' and the media unknowingly continued to conspire to foster negative myths and prejudices.\textsuperscript{127}

In 1991, fifteen years after the overstayer campaigns of the 1970s, old stereotypes and attitudes continued to be reproduced through the media. In a Pacific Islands Monthly article, significantly entitled 'When visitors are not welcome', the old ideology was reasserted when Islanders and 'overstayers' were written about as if they were one and the same thing. The terms were continually confused as if all Pacific Islanders were 'overstayers' and all 'overstayers', Pacific Islanders.\textsuperscript{128} The author's remarks about the "effrontery of lawbreakers" were similarly exclusively directed towards Pacific Islanders:

It really comes down to legal observance and the presence of 7000 Western Samoan overstayers does not say much for their regard of the law. It also shows abuse of New Zealand's special quota that allows 1100 Western Samoa migrants entry each year....And Tongan overstayers could reflect on their abuse of the family


\textsuperscript{127} Samasoni, (1990), p134.

\textsuperscript{128} David Barber, 'When visitors are not welcome', Pacific Islands Monthly, Vol.61, No.8, (1991), p27.
The 'race'/immigration ideology that shaped responses to Pacific Island immigration in the 1970s continued, in the ensuing decade of the 1980s, to reproduce itself. The public and politicians continued to explain events according to that racist ideology and old stereotypes continued to provide powerful common-sense explanations about Pacific Islanders and immigration. There were some important exceptions in the media, for instance, when racism was highlighted and criticised in the Immigration Department in 1986, and when the government’s high-handed management of the Western Samoan citizenship issue was roundly criticised in 1982. However, while some practices were challenged, the general underlying philosophy in most cases was not. While the media criticised the way the government handled itself in 1982, it accepted that there was a 'need' to overturn Western Samoan citizenship. Moreover, in 1987, it was the media that helped to promote panic about the number of visitors arriving in the country from the Pacific. The spectre of competition for jobs, and the inflated immigration figures and images of 'hordes' of Islanders that were generated by the media only served to support and further entrench negative stereotypes.

The continued belief in old ideologies was self-perpetuating. Islanders were believed to be overstayers and subsequent action based on that belief merely proved that, indeed, they were. They were believed to represent all manner of dangers to the country, and action taken in response to that conviction merely legitimated the belief, and in a round-about way proved it to be true. When an event occurred involving Pacific Island immigrants, it was continually explained by the stereotypes of the 'race'/immigration ideology, and action was taken in accordance with that ideological position. In a circuitous way this was then seen to prove that the event had actually been a 'race'/immigration problem in the first place. The pattern was cyclic. It was the response

\[129\] ibid.
to an event that ultimately defined the occurrence. When the next event occurred it was again explained and actioned according to those same negative ideological expectations. Hence, the more the stereotypes and misconceptions of the 1970s were used to explain and define realities in the 1980s, the more entrenched they became. Any issue or event concerning Pacific Island immigration merely provided the opportunity for the reproduction and reinforcement of the old categorisations - 'Islanders are overstayers', 'Islanders are lawbreakers', 'Islanders take our jobs'. The fears and prejudices that peaked in the 1970s remained powerfully effective in circumscribing the lives of Pacific Islanders in the 1980s. As long as that ideology of 'race'/immigration remains unchallenged, it is to be assumed that it will continue to be just as potent in the 1990s.
The labour migrations of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand in the post-war era was not unique. In many respects they mirrored the international labour migrations of other groups, such as the movement of migrants from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent to Britain in the 1950s, or the movement of millions of other immigrants to Germany, France and Switzerland in the same period.¹ Their motivations for migration were primarily economic. They moved from areas where they were unemployed or underemployed to developed industrial countries where there was a shortage of labour and where wages were relatively high. The migrations corresponded both to the desire of the migrants themselves for higher incomes and to the need of New Zealand employers for additional labour to allow expansion.² Historical ties between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands laid the political framework for this process.

Pacific Island labour migrants, as with labour migrants to Europe, characteristically held a subordinate position on the labour market, forming as it were a distinctive fraction of the working-class. They generally undertook the low paid, low status, semi-skilled or unskilled work that New Zealanders did not want. They tended to concentrate in particular urban areas, such as Otara in Auckland or Porirua in Wellington, and settled in poor, cheap housing accommodation in the rundown areas of inner-city decline or state housing estates.

The status of Pacific Island migrants in New Zealand, however, was not

² ibid., p3. See also Ongley, (1990), Chapter Three and Chapter Four.
determined solely by production relations or the migration process. Nor can the events of the 1970s be explained solely by the tenuous material and political position of the labour migrants. Rather, racism should be conceived of as an important ideological dimension of the migrants’ position in social relations. The historical record of prejudice toward Pacific Island immigrants and the politicisation of Pacific Islanders, therefore, is significant when examining the Island immigrant situation in New Zealand.

THE RACIALISATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS

Concerns about Pacific Island migrants emerged as early as the 1950s, and throughout the 1960s they were defined increasingly with relation to various social problems. Hostile attitudes towards Islanders grew in intensity and peaked in the 1970s, a decade which was marked by persistent ideological and political campaigns against Pacific Island immigrants. Having established in earlier chapters the existence of opposition to Pacific Island immigration and the Pacific Island presence in New Zealand at this time, it was necessary to consider its nature and foundation, that is, was it accompanied by the ideology of ‘race’?

Evidence suggests that those concerned about the Island presence did indeed conceptualise Pacific Islanders as a ‘race’. They were conceived of as a separate type, and were attributed with a range of negative social and cultural characteristics. Islanders were associated with violence, drunkenness, theft and held responsible for overcrowding, and the spread of disease. Those particular claims came to be generalised in the 1970s and a predominant element in this political and ideological reaction to Pacific Island immigrants became the claim that Pacific Islanders were directly responsible for both the material and the moral deterioration of New Zealand at that time.

A number of ideological constructs were potentially available, each with its own history, to label and to exclude Island migrants: ‘race’ was one.
Where the idea of 'race' was linked deterministically with other negatively evaluated characteristics as was the case here, we can talk of racism. The context, however, which allowed the idea of 'race' to be employed in this way requires explanation.³

THE FOUNDATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL REACTION

The racist stereotypes and ideological rhetoric of the 1970s were first of all the products of a colonial heritage. By virtue of coming from societies which had, until recently, been parts of the British or Commonwealth Empire, Pacific Island migrants were understood ideologically in terms derived from colonial history. Paternalism and hostility were two of the common reactions, and both were mediated through the idea of 'race'.⁴ Furthermore, colonial settlement within New Zealand itself in the nineteenth century was accompanied by political and ideological conceptions of 'race'. The idea of 'race' was central to European settlers' self-identity and to defining those who were supposedly biologically and culturally inferior.⁵ The racism that was expressed towards Maori had implications for the migrants of the twentieth century in so far as aspects of those ideological relations were applied to them also.

Closely allied to the colonial sense of racial superiority was the British settler desire to maintain racial and cultural homogeneity. They held a concept of New Zealand culture as a white, British, morally conservative essence, and they sought to eliminate everything else that contaminated it.⁶ Difference was associated with threat, and the idea

⁴ ibid., p232.
⁵ ibid., p238.
of 'race' became associated with conflict and problem. The solution, in so far as it related to groups other than Maori, was sought in the limiting of migration. The early debates about Asian immigration and subsequent anti-Asian legislation heralded the first ideological construction of the 'race'/immigration problem in New Zealand. This desire for a 'white New Zealand' was institutionalised into policy and New Zealand immigration became governed by a deep awareness of and hostility towards 'alien cultures' and 'other races'.

The dialectic between ideological and material relations played a further part in the categorisation of Pacific Island migrants as 'undesirable'. The material disadvantage of, at first the Maori, and the new Polynesian immigrants was interpreted through the idea of 'race'. The characteristics of poor housing and low paid unskilled work became negatively associated with Maori and Islanders, and the migrants' 'race' came to be seen as the cause of their material disadvantage. More than that they were seen to contaminate others with these attributes so that in the area of housing, for instance, it was considered a disadvantage to have Islanders as neighbours.

Moreover, these ideological constructs often had a regenerative effect, such that in the 1970s they combined to create new ideological constructs, that is, the stereotypes of the 'overstaying Islander' and 'illegal immigrant'. The 'race'/immigration ideology reproduced itself in new form when, in the 1970s immigration campaigns, Pacific Islanders were associated with overstaying and overstaying was cast as a substantial social problem for New Zealand. The ideology gained its own momentum when the image became public folklore, justifying discriminatory practice into the 1980s.

8 See Chapter Two.
9 Spoonley, (1990b), p32.
In a study of this limited scope the complexity of the reasons for the racialisation of Pacific Islanders in the 1970s is necessarily oversimplified. However, significant processes can be explored, and general groups singled out as important in the reproduction of 'race' ideology at this time.

The Working Class

The majority of Pacific Island labourers migrated to a site of class relations which was definitely manual working-class. However, this addition to the working-class required infra-structural provision, notably housing, for which neither the state nor employers were prepared to take responsibility. Consequently, a section of the existing working-class, which was already having to cope with sub-standard housing and other services, was joined in these circumstances by migrant workers (and, later their families). Those migrants who joined that particular environment were seen by the existing working-class to make it more difficult for them to escape those conditions, and indeed, as migrants of a different 'race', with all the inferior qualities that that implied, were seen in many instances to have actually helped create such conditions. Hence, despite the fact that the urban areas of central Auckland had been in decline before Pacific Island migrants began to settle there in large numbers, they quickly became identified as the cause of that decline. The problem areas of the major cities, especially the state housing suburbs of Otara and Porirua, were also associated with the presence of Pacific Islanders. Because Islanders were so readily, physically identifiable, they became obvious scapegoats for problems wherever they settled.

Moreover, the arrival in large numbers of Pacific Island migrants in the

late 1960s and early 1970s corresponded with a gradual economic decline in New Zealand. Housing shortages were rife, the threat of unemployment became more real, and New Zealanders began to sense the threat of a decline in their general living standards. Pacific Islanders, because they were such visible recent additions within the community and so easily identified and categorised as outsiders, both by virtue of their migrant status and by the application of 'race' ideas, were readily seen as causing such problems. It made 'common-sense' that the group whose presence coincided with these problems, and which had already been associated with similar problems, should be the cause of such decline. Likewise, that association was stretched to explain the causes of moral decline. Crime, violence, drunkenness, and a fall in moral standards were all linked to the racial character of the 'outsiders', Pacific Islanders.

The 'race'/immigration ideology appealed to the working-class because it was a simple, convenient ideology which could readily explain their material and political circumstances. The working-class interpreted their experience in combination with dominant ideas, through the idea of 'race', to simply rationalise their place in an increasingly complex world. The answers such an ideology provided made 'common-sense'. They easily categorised a whole variety of circumstances, and more importantly absolved the holder of any responsibility for either the problems identified or their solutions.

**The State**

Within the state apparatus were individuals, government politicians, public servants, government department officials and so forth, each of whom brought to their job their personal fears and prejudices, and who unwittingly or otherwise helped to shape and influence relations towards Pacific Islanders. Politicians and immigration officials who believed that because Pacific Islanders were a separate 'race' and an 'alien culture' they were problematic immigrants, unconsciously perpetuated
negative ideas about Island migrants by formulating policy that was interpreted as protecting New Zealanders from the 'threat' of the Islanders' presence.

Similarly, their racist attitudes and belief in racist stereotypes in the 1980s, for instance, confirmed the 'threat' implied in earlier policy and legislation. Acting out of a belief in the stereotype of the 'overstaying Islander', Pacific islanders were targeted by the Immigration Department almost to the exclusion of all other migrant groups, and it was largely Islanders, as a result, who were brought before the courts and prosecuted. Hence, the understanding created was that Pacific Islanders did indeed comprise the majority of overstayers because they comprised the majority of those arrested and prosecuted for the offence.

Likewise, politicians' erroneous beliefs continued to reinforce this image when in 1987 the Labour government axed its visa-free scheme with the Pacific Islands. Acting upon their belief in a racist stereotype, the politicians confirmed and reproduced it. Their panicked actions merely gave substance to the myth about the 'overstaying Islander' and, by a circular process, legitimated the stereotype. Via their actions, these individuals unconsciously perpetuated the notion that Pacific Island people were a blight on New Zealand society. The continued belief in these stereotypes, by politicians and others, highlights the potency of the ideology, that is, the 'race'/immigration tradition.

Racist ideas were also reproduced in a more deliberate manner by the state. In the 1970s National Party politicians deliberately and unashamedly attempted to identify Pacific Islanders as the cause of the New Zealand economic decline. They were made the scapegoats for unemployment, a deterioration in law and order and other problems in the major cities. Economic and social problems for which the state was responsible, were laid directly at the feet of Island migrants. It was blatant political manoeuvring on the part of National politicians: a neat
sidestep to escape accountability for their own economic mismanagement. It was also an astute electioneering bid. Rather than be seen to avoid dealing with the complex and pressing social problems that concerned the New Zealand public, the party hit upon a means of appeasing voters by deftly attributing the cause of such problems to Pacific Island migrants. Instead of hitting at the real causes of such problems, which would have been too politically contentious or difficult, but at migrants, the National Party found a way to offer up a simple solution to all of New Zealand’s problems, that is, to limit Pacific Island immigration. In that way they could be seen to be doing something to deal with the problems (whatever those problems were), and could do so without alienating too many voters. For the party had selected a perfect scapegoat: one which had already been blamed in the public’s mind for many of society’s problems.

Aside from the question of whether or not the Labour and National parties marginalised Pacific Islanders deliberately, the simple fact that they reached an implicit consensus about Pacific Island migrants ensured that ideological constructs associated with them were not only reproduced, but entrenched. Both parties, especially when in government, pursued policies founded in a belief in the ‘race’/immigration ideology. Both legitimated the hostile stereotypes about Pacific Islanders, through their immigration campaigns and the political rhetoric associated with them, and thus gave them a respectability they did not deserve. The actions of both parties, in the 1970s and beyond, perpetuated racist ideologies and continued to marginalise Pacific Island migrants.

The Media

The role of the media in racialising Pacific Islanders throughout this period has been a complex one and deserves closer study. That the media can and does influence what people think and do directly has been
confirmed on many occasions. The effect of the media, however, arises more indirectly out of the overall role of the mass media in selecting and providing social knowledge. In a modern society, wherein people live fragmented and divided lives, we are forced to rely on the media for our knowledge about the rest of society. The media provide and select images about other people, and it is through the media that a picture of overall society can be gained.

More than face to face experience, or any other social institution (including schools), it is the media which entertain and inform. They 'define reality' and 'set agendas': they decide what the important issues of the day are, who should be listened to and who should be marginalised, ignored, ridiculed, and stereotyped. Further, the agenda the media construct is overwhelmingly oriented towards the status quo of the world.

There is no doubt that the New Zealand media, for the most part, remain very close to the middle ground of everything. In the production of ideas and images the media have generally reinforced the majority view and marginalised others. Hence, the media have selected and reproduced images of Pacific Islanders generally in accordance with the 'race' ideology.

Quite routine and often unconscious factors shape this process. News editors, chief reporters, reporters and sub-editors all bring to their job their own beliefs and prejudices and, while paying lip-service to objectivity, unwittingly help to mould, shape and influence our attitudes in a variety of ways. Because those in media get to choose what does


12 ibid., p16.

13 ibid.

14 ibid., pp19,20.

15 Samson Samasoni, 'Pacific Island Responses to Our Monocultural Media', in Paul Spoonley and Walter Hirsh (eds), Between the Lines. Racism and the New Zealand Media, (Auckland, 1990), p135.
and does not get into print, on radio or television, they become gatekeepers, often reflecting the values that they have through their own perception of events.\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, ‘newsworthiness’ is judged according to general criteria such as the news’ simplicity or drama, or according to themes and continuity. For instance, a particular event is more newsworthy if it is contiguous with previous events. Events are recognised as stories because they fit with common themes so that a possible story about Mongrel Mob members visiting a marae may be bypassed in favour of a retailer’s complaint that gang members congregated outside his or her shop.\(^\text{17}\) Similarly, events linked with Pacific Island overstaying in the 1980s were ‘news’ because the theme of Island overstaying had already been politicised and made topical by the earlier events of the 1970s.

Hence, in these ways the media will reflect and appeal to commonly held values to varying degrees.

Media coverage of Pacific Island news and events is usually inadequate and tends to reinforce a negative image of Pacific Islanders, who are regularly portrayed in the pages of New Zealand dailies and weeklies as criminals, overstayers, rapists, unemployed dole bludgers, streetbrawlers, and so on. Rarely are there positive stories about Pacific Islanders to balance these images.\(^\text{18}\)

The media’s power to ‘create’ facts and confirm values makes them a significant, if not the significant, factor in influencing public opinion. But there are also certain limitations to the media’s influence. People are not passive, and while the media reinforces prejudice, they seldom create it.\(^\text{19}\) Similarly, there is no guarantee that everyone will take the same intended meaning of a programme or item. Audiences need not and do not necessarily accept what they are given,

\(^{16}\) Maharey, (1990), p21.

\(^{17}\) ibid., pp21-22.

\(^{18}\) Kolo, (1990), p120.

\(^{19}\) Spoonley, (1990b), p31.
although in a modern society they are increasingly reliant on the media for information.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, the media, particularly with regard to the reproduction of racism, are not necessarily always generators of negative images. The media played an immensely important role in creating government embarrassment and bringing an end to the immigration campaigns in the 1970s. Similarly, Auckland \textit{Star} journalist, David McLoughlan, uncovered racist trends in overstayer prosecution and deportation in 1986, and rigorously challenged the Immigration Department's practices and policies, thereby helping to alert the public to the racism of particular departments.

Paradoxically, however, despite the fact that the media have in some instances challenged the state's racist practices, their extensive coverage of the 'overstayer issue' has still led to the creation of a widely held stereotype of Pacific Islanders as 'overstayers' and illegal immigrants. Media interest in Pacific Islanders, particularly in the 1970s, has focused almost solely on immigration 'problems', including overstaying. There have been few positive images to balance this out. It is significant that the first extensive coverage of Pacific Islanders was not only of a negative event, that is the 'problem' of overstaying, but that it also led to the creation of negative stereotypes.\textsuperscript{21}

The media have played two different roles in the debate over overstaying. Media reporting has roused public indignation against dawn raids and random checking, and has challenged government departments on the treatment of Pacific Island overstayers. In these instances the media have demonstrated their ability to exercise power to raise public consciousness in the interests of greater social justice for migrants. However, media reporting has also continued to associate Pacific

\textsuperscript{20} Maharey, (1990), p25.

\textsuperscript{21} Kolo, (1990), p120.
Islanders with 'overstaying', which in turn has been defined as a social problem, and in this respect has represented more conservative Pakeha interests. More than a third of Pacific islanders in New Zealand are New Zealanders because they are Cook Islanders, Tokelauans or Niueans, and more than half of the Pacific Island population are New Zealand-born. Yet as a result of media coverage all Pacific Island people continue to be lumped together and associated in the public mind with 'overstaying'.

It has been the media role in reproducing racism, rather than their role in challenging it, that has been the most influential. Thus it is no surprise that it is the image of the uneducated, non-English-speaking 'overstaying Islander' which remains strong in the minds of many New Zealanders - too strong to be contradicted by reality.

THE IDEOLOGICAL PROCESS

The reproduction of racism as it was expressed towards Pacific Islanders in and subsequent to the 1970s needs to be understood as the product of a dialectical interaction between various social processes and groups. The need for an economic and political scapegoat in the 1970s arose in a society which had also developed commanding 'race' stereotypes and an ideology which had long had the ability to make a complex world more straightforward. The cohesion of these circumstances gave the ideology of 'race' a new and particular authority.

Likewise, the interests of different groups fused at this time to ensure that Pacific Islanders were an inevitable target for political and ideological hostility. Politicians deliberately reproduced 'race' stereotypes to deflect attention from their own mismanagement of the economy. The media reproduced racist images, or highlighted instances of racism, in order to sell a story. Other individuals held to a 'race'

23 ibid., p134.
ideology simply in order to understand their place in the new world
and/or to explain and defend the loss of resources or their standards of
living. The National Party, for instance, appealed to racist ideas it
already knew to exist, the media translated and reported these back to
the public, and public attitudes were reinforced, extended and
entrenched. Hence, it was in this way, as various groups turned for
various reasons to the 'race' ideology, that a consensus of racism was
attained.

The effect was cumulative. Each event that was racialised or politicised
built upon itself and created the context in which the next event could
be defined and explained. Each event that was defined racially provided
justification or proof of the veracity of the 'race' stereotype, making
it evermore potent and entrenching it even further, and shaped the social
climate for it to be used again and again. The more the 'race' ideology
was used to explain the world, the more it was able to fashion it in the
future.

The reproduction of racism in the 1970s was part of a pattern in New
Zealand wherein, during periods of economic recession or decline, society
has focused upon nationalistic, chauvinistic attitudes in order to
provide simple answers to problems.24 Preceding the 1970s 'overstayer
crisis', for instance, was the period of the so-called 'Yellow Peril'.
This period of political and ideological campaigns against Asians in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly during the
economic recession of the 1880s and the economic uncertainty following
World War One, were part of this ideological pattern. The hostility
towards Asians was closely associated with the economic fears of New
Zealanders and their desire to maintain the New Zealand dream, and was
expressed strongly in terms of the ideas of 'race' and national
character. Similarly, the 1970s immigration campaigns against Pacific
Islanders spiralled out of a deteriorating economy and a period of great

24 Paul Spoonley quoted in Television New Zealand, One Network News,
social and economic uncertainty. The subsequent targeting of Pacific Island immigrants was also, in part, a reflection of the continued uncertainty felt in the face of radical economic restructuring and record unemployment in the 1980s.\footnote{Gibson, (1983), pp37-38.} Those perceived as different and as outsiders become obvious targets for hostility during recessionary periods when people fought to protect their few resources. When that difference is defined according to 'race' ideas, that hostility will inevitably be expressed racially.

The continued economic and social hardships of the early 1990s have also provided the terrain upon which new patterns of racism are being reproduced. The immigration of Asians, for instance, has once again become the focus of negative attention.

The New ‘Race’/Immigration Cycle

Immigration became a national issue in April, 1993, when a two-page spread in Auckland’s suburban Eastern Courier newspaper, headlined 'The Inv-Asian', tapped into fears and folklore that ran deep in New Zealand history by reporting that galloping immigration was transforming Auckland into the "Taipei/Hong Kong/Seoul of the South Pacific".\footnote{Eastern Courier, ‘The Inv-Asian’, 16 April (1993), cited in Dominion, ‘Migration row hounds PM on eve of Asia tour’, 8 May (1993), and ‘A new home turns hostile’, 15 May (1993).} In the story, an unidentified Chinese landlord was accused of seeking "lent levies", while an unnamed tenant attacked an unnamed Asian landlord for raising his rent. It was grimly reported that "a number of Newmarket properties are now owned by Asians", and that Asian landlords could be "bad news" for all tenants.\footnote{Eastern Courier, ‘The Inv-Asian’, 16 April (1993), cited in Dominion, ‘A new home turns hostile’, 15 May (1993).} An unnamed real estate agent was quoted suggesting that Chinese were greedy landlords taking over parts of New Zealand.\footnote{Eastern Courier, ‘The Inv-Asian’, 16 April (1993), cited in Dominion, ‘Articles on Asians provoke outrage’, 1 May (1993).}
The familiar litany about Asian kids at the best schools and their parents in the best houses was also rehearsed, while references were made to elderly Chinese in "coolie hats". 29

While the Asian community prepared to meet the Race Relations Conciliator to discuss the articles, delegates at the National Party’s Auckland conference gave the debate a new twist by asking the government to require immigrant children to take part in intensive language courses before they could enrol at school. Former immigration minister, Bill Birch, even mused about ways of charging immigrants to achieve this. Although the remit itself did not specify Asian children, speakers in support made clear that they were the target. 30

The issue gained momentum after claims were made that Asian immigrants were prone to carry tuberculosis and Maori academic, Ranginui Walker, called for New Zealand to stop taking migrants altogether. "We have a good lifestyle here and it’s a moot point as to how long we can continue to shift people into this country and maintain that lifestyle," he said. 31 Elsewhere he repeated his concerns:

Our government needs to believe in its own people...if we provide people with training in the skills that our own economy needs than we can sustain a reasonable lifestyle in this country. 32

The remit was seen as evidence of the concern some felt about the growing numbers of Asian migrants. Recent Asian immigration had for some time been a subject of conversation and resentment. Complaints about Polynesians stripping all the shellfish on New Zealand coastlines had

given way to accusations that Asians were the new culprits. Early in 1993 when two Auckland beaches were closed due to overfishing, the first time a blanket ban had been placed on a New Zealand beach, it was Asians who were blamed. Auckland regional councillor, Paul Walbran, who chaired dozens of meetings to discuss the overfishing of inner-city beaches said, "For lots of people, the solution is to send them (the Asians) home."  

When it comes to poor driving also, Asians have picked up the mantle of abuse that once fell to women. Asians in expensive cars have been an easy target, especially when Auckland BMW dealers say that more than half of their sales in recent years have been to Asians. Middle-class New Zealanders have also had to adjust to the academic success of Asian children. Throughout the Auckland region they have moved effortlessly into the top places of the country's schools - much to the consternation of many otherwise liberal parents who feel that the pressure on education means that their children miss out. This resentment was inflamed in 1992 with the discovery by McLeans College principal, Allen McDonald, that several of his students were being left at home alone while their parents looked after business interests in Asia. Kim Loo, spokesman for the Howick-Pakuranga Chinese parents Association, has said that this is extremely rare, yet the antagonism persists. People will tell you that the comfortable eastern suburb of Howick, where recent Chinese settlement has been highest, is now called 'Chowick'.

35 Reid, (1993), p41.
36 ibid., p41.
37 ibid., p41.
Calls to public talkback radio have demonstrated the depth of prejudice felt by New Zealanders in this new wave of anti-Chinese racism. One caller said, "It's as though we're aliens in our own country. And we feel that we're just not...we're not New Zealanders. They're taking over." Another exclaimed:

We're sick of the Asians. They don't integrate. We don't want them. We've got our own people to look after. I'm so against it. They're creeping in. It's silent invasion. They're creeping in. Next minute...you know, twenty years down the track, they're going to say 'well, we own your country'.

Still yet another talkback caller, typical of the many, said firmly, "They will own us. And I don't want an Asian boss, thank you very much. No way would I work for an Asian. You know, I'm sorry. I'm not a racist

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42 ibid.
person, but against the Asians, yes, I'm beginning to be like that."\(^{43}\)

Anti-Asian feeling has reached such a peak in some areas that it has even led to violence against immigrants. In two incidents in Nelson a group of anti-Asian skinheads threatened an Asian restaurant owner in the inner city with a rifle, while a cross with an effigy was burned on the front lawn of a house in which three Asian students, two Taiwanese and one Japanese, lived.\(^{44}\) Another group of pseudo-skinheads, who targeted anyone without white skin, were responsible for other incidents in the city where Asian students were being harassed in the streets, or had been subjected to racist remarks.\(^{45}\)

There is more than simply anecdotal evidence of increasing anti-Asian racism. In 1992 a Time Morgan poll detected 44% opposition to immigration among New Zealanders, but found also that 53% objected specifically to Asian immigrants.\(^{46}\) Politicians have begun to reflect this mood. The National Party remit had already been seen by some as an election year appeal to anti-Asian rednecks.\(^{47}\) Subsequent comments by New Zealand First party leader, Winston Peters, revealed more clearly xenophobic attitudes. When announcing policies to tighten immigration, he labelled immigrants as 'aliens who don't speak our language'.\(^{48}\) Clearly he was not talking about British or Australian immigrants who comprise the majority of immigrants to New Zealand, but Asian immigrants.

\(^{43}\) ibid.

\(^{44}\) *Dominion*, 'Racism blamed for violent incidents', 26 October (1993), and 'Crackdown follows racist incidents', 27 October (1993).

\(^{45}\) *Dominion*, 'Crackdown follows racist incidents', 27 October (1993).

\(^{46}\) Reid, (1993), p41.


The recent 'race'/immigration debate is not dissimilar to the racist campaigns against Pacific Islanders in the 1970s. Then, Pacific Islanders were welcomed in to the country when their labour was needed, but a particular combination of ideological and economic circumstances led subsequently to their racialisation. Today, in contrast to the formerly severe restrictions on Asian immigration, Asians are being welcomed into New Zealand because they, too, are needed in the current economic climate. Several years ago New Zealand set its mind to attract entrepreneurs with skill and capital to spur the economic recovery. The National government forced the pace by setting an annual target of 25,000 new migrants. The closest source of wealth and skills, as it has turned out, has been Asia.49 Since the system began in November 1991, Asian migrants have poured nearly $200 million into the New Zealand economy and the money continues to stream in at an average of $2 million a month. Taiwan community leaders estimate that the 2,000 Taiwanese families that have settled in New Zealand since 1987 have added $1 billion to the economy. Most Asian families have brought with them at least half a million dollars.50 Some parts of Auckland have experienced a mini-boom in real estate, and Asian businessmen have invested in a range of joint ventures, from exporting the Kiwi meat pie to building retirement villages.51 As well as welcoming the capital that new Asian migrants have brought into the country the government has valued, as further resources for New Zealand business to tap into, the access back to Asian markets and the links with home countries and knowledge of Asian ways which the immigrants have also brought with them.52

Similar to the events of the 1970s, although the number of Asian immigrants has increased rapidly, the 'invasion' by these migrants so


51 ibid.

52 Dominion, Editorial, 'NZ destiny as part of Asia', 12 July (1993).
widely spoken about has been overstated. In 1992 New Zealand received 49,010 permanent and longterm arrivals, of whom 7887 were from Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan. This was lower than either Australia’s 13,189 or Britain’s 11,227. While, in the past six years, the Asian population in New Zealand has almost trebled to more than 50,000, Asians still make up less than two percent of the total population.

Although the New Zealand’s doors have been opened to Asian immigrants, New Zealanders’ attitudes towards this new migrant group have been, at best, ambivalent. As with Pacific Islanders in the 1970s, Asian immigrants have been viewed generally with distrust and disaffection. They have been welcomed in by the government and business for their money (with Pacific Islanders it was their labour). The growing perception is that it is only for their money that they are welcome. There has been an easy assumption that the Asian presence is to be measured purely in terms of financial gain, and certainly government statements only confirm that view. Seeing new arrivals simply as people has not yet entirely caught on. Most New Zealanders would seem to view the arrival of these new migrants warily. The degree of antagonism felt towards Asian migrants is illustrated simply by the fact that the arrival of a small group of migrants, both in comparison to other migrant groups and to the size of the New Zealand population as a whole, can have been described at all as an "invasion". It strongly echoes New Zealand’s earlier virulent anti-Chinese traditions, and highlights the degree to which those old prejudices still exist.

This latest ideological cycle reveals, among other things, the potency and persistence of stereotypes. Anti-Asian sentiment has obviously remained strong within New Zealand, and many of the old stereotypes have not lost their influence. Concerns about the Asian immigrants' supposed inability to integrate, fears that they are taking over (whether economically, culturally or 'racially') and rhetoric about their potential as carriers of disease draw strong parallels to the debates of the late nineteenth century. Significantly, the new stereotypes, about driving BMWs for instance, reveal the ability of the 'race' ideology to subtly transform to fit new circumstances and situations while retaining it's essential features, and more importantly, it's authority. There can be seen in the current debate an inversion of some of the old stereotypes. Last century the Chinese were attacked as immoral and lazy,

\[56\text{ Reproduced in Scott, (1991), p62.}\]
whereas now they are attacked for being over-achievers. "In the past we were criticized for being ignorant and poor," Dr Man-ying Ip, lecturer at Auckland University's school of Asian studies, commented, "Now we're satirized for being smart and rich. Maybe the simple fault is being Chinese." 57

The current racist revival also reveals many of the patterns of the 'race' ideology. Much of the concern expressed over Asian immigration is expressed, as it was for Asians and Pacific Islanders at other times in New Zealand's past, in terms of competition for resources. Whether the new immigrants are seen as threatening shellfish resources or New Zealanders' access to a good education, they are typically perceived as an outside threat with less right to New Zealand's resources than other New Zealanders. The rhetoric, too, is similar to that used in other debates. The language and images of "invasion" echo images of the 'brown hordes' and last century's 'yellow peril'. The common factor in all of this is the definition of groups as outsiders, both in terms of their 'race', and by virtue of their migrant status. Ideology has played a convenient role in categorising these groups differently. By separating them out from the 'real New Zealanders', and generally by defining them as inferior as well as outsiders, a situation has been created so that during periods of economic recession when competition for resources is heightened, there are some groups that can immediately be pushed to the back of the queue.

Significantly, the move in focus of the 'race'/immigration ideology, from Pacific Islanders in the 1970s and 1980s to Asians in the 1990s, may reveal important clues about the future of that particular ideology. A majority of New Zealand's Pacific Islanders in the 1990s are New Zealand-born, and the Pacific Island population in New Zealand is a population that is becoming increasingly established as Islanders reach their second

57 Man-Ying Ip quoted in Reid, (1993), p41.
Conclusion

and third generations of family born in New Zealand. Moreover, it is a population that is not only increasing at a faster rate than other groups in New Zealand, but it is doing so by natural increase as opposed to migration. The Pacific Island population in New Zealand, by virtue of these changing population characteristics and the increasing profile Islanders have in sports such as rugby which have traditionally defined the New Zealand cultural and national identity, have become more established as a part of New Zealand, if not as New Zealanders. They cannot any longer be easily conceived of simply as immigrants, and the argument that they somehow do not 'belong' has lost much of its authority.

By comparison, however, Asians comprise a smaller proportion of the New Zealand population, less than two percent; they have a lower profile in the national identity; and more than two thirds of the Asian population in New Zealand are indeed migrants to the country. They, more readily than Pacific Islanders, can be labelled as outsiders. The 'race'/immigration ideology has lost some of its usefulness or explanatory significance as Pacific Islanders have become a more entrenched feature of New Zealand society. That particular ideology, to be useful, has had to be redirected to another 'outsider' group, hence, the focus has moved to Asian immigrants.

The question of course is what will the pattern of the 'race'/immigration ideology be in the future? If the Asian population in New Zealand becomes as established as the Pacific Island population, will that signal the advent of a new ideological focus? That particular ideological strand, the 'race'/immigration ideology, could be redirected, as it was

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59 See Ongley, (1990), p123.

from Islanders to Asians, towards a new immigrant group. Or it could be transformed into a new strand of ideology, wherein immigration plays a less crucial role. Indications are that the latter may already be happening to a small degree. Pacific Islanders, who were formerly defined as distinct from Maori while they could be defined as outsiders, are becoming more closely associated with the other 'race' stereotypes ascribed to Maori. The general racial classification of 'Polynesian' is beginning to take on more significance ideologically than it once did, supplanting in some respects the old migrant stereotypes that had been reserved for a period for Pacific Islanders alone.  

That is not to say that the 'race'/immigration ideology as it was expressed towards Pacific Islanders has disappeared, nor will disappear. There is no reason to suppose that the old ideological images and stereotypes will lose all value. The rhetoric and prejudices that had marginalised Asians in the nineteenth century, for instance, have proved a century later to continue to hold some usefulness and authority. Likewise, the image of the 'overstaying Islander' may once again prove useful in explaining different circumstances at some other time in the future. The demand in the Pacific for access to employment and settlement opportunities in New Zealand is unlikely to diminish. New Zealand is still perceived as a land of opportunity by Pacific Islanders in spite of the contemporary economic recession. Migration from the Pacific is an ever present possibility. Moreover, demands for entry into New Zealand may in the future become more urgent given the current population pressures in Tonga or the predictions of environmental devastation to low-lying island states such as Tuvalu should global warming establish as a climatic trend, for instance. New Zealand could again be faced with pressing issues about the restricted entry and  

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61 This ideological transformation is not without its limitations. In the current climate where biculturalism (as opposed to multiculturalism) and the rights of the tangata whenua are emphasised, Pacific Islanders are still 'outsiders' to a large extent.

immigration of Islanders to the country. It is likely that within such a debate the old ideological constructs would again surface.

As New Zealanders attempt to define themselves and their place in the world in the future, the challenge for them will be to move away from the ideological traditions of their past. For New Zealand as a whole to move towards becoming a truly multicultural society, the old ideologies about 'race' and cultural difference must be challenged. Examining more closely the patterns of racism and prejudice in New Zealand's past, and identifying the processes through which those prejudices have developed is a crucial part of that maturation process. This present work is an invitation to the reader to correct and deepen, by critical reading, his or her understanding of those processes. It is vital that a more thorough and critical understanding of New Zealand history is reached, for the view which New Zealanders have of their past will help in turn to shape their future.
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AJHR - Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives.
NZPD - New Zealand Parliamentary Debates.

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