Public policy processes in the Pacific islands: 
A study of policy initiation, formulation and implementation in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and regional inter-governmental organisations

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines the manner in which public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented in Pacific island countries and regional organisations, and determines the factors which are most critical for their effective implementation. It employs narrative inquiry and grounded theory approaches, supported by the computer software Nvivo, to data collection and analysis of case studies from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa, and key regional inter-governmental organisations. 128 semi-structured interviews were drawn from ten policy cases (three for each of the Pacific island countries and one from the Region’s Pacific Plan), together with a general narrative of the policy environment spread across all four contexts. A social constructionism worldview allows for the grounding of the research and its findings for both subject and context of the study. Participant voices are utilised as rich descriptions of policy processes, triangulation provided by documentary analyses and participant observation.

Motivating this inquiry was my observation of the lack of visibly significant improvements in service delivery in Samoa and other Pacific island countries. These perceptions echoed criticisms in the literature about the slow improvement of development performance across the region despite high levels of foreign aid. Yet, such assessments often lack a solid understanding about the actual processes of public policy in the Pacific islands. Prevailing theories of public policy have remained largely westernised, and lenses to development primarily ethnocentric.

Accordingly, this study’s findings shed light on the strengths and limitations of current public policy and development scholarships evident from Pacific public policy experiences. There are five key findings: First, policy processes have remained heavily top-down, shaped significantly by political and external interests, and where society has been the neglected element. In essence, the genesis of public policy has been insufficiently rooted in the context, problems and needs to which policies have been directed. This constitutes a significant democratic and development deficit that must be addressed in ongoing public policy development. Second, the use of evidence-based policy has been limited. While existing formal policies were often those transferred from elsewhere, and which do not fit well in the receiving context and culture, the practices were ad hoc, driven by various ideological or social constructions. Third, the success of policy and its implementation depends on mutually reinforcing factors of policy culture and stakeholder support, capability,
implementation modality and leadership. These factors are critical for ensuring that participation, partnership, ownership, understanding and learning are built into policy processes. Fourth, the integration of these elements into ongoing public policy development of Pacific island countries and the region requires a fundamental shift of focus about the role of society, particularly the adaptive capability of indigenous systems to legitimise notions of public policy in state-society relationships. Fifth, following a meta-analysis and synthesis of the four (country) case studies, the overall findings are conceptualised into a (explanatory) model of public policy. This model is a heuristic one that could be used when thinking about adopting and designing public policies in the Pacific islands capable of effective implementation. The model could be applied to non-Pacific small island developing states.

Finally, the model provides a framework for discussing the normative implications of this study’s findings for public policy and development theory, practice and needed future research, and yielded five broad recommendations for future improvement: (1) the centrality of context; (2) societal needs incorporated into the public policy space; (3) focus on the political dimensions of further reforms; (4) international support that is more appreciative of context; and (5) needed changes to the way in which we think about development public policy.
Acknowledgements

This work would have been impossible without the contribution of several individuals and organisations. I am extremely grateful to the 128 participants whose stories became the basis of this research. I give special thanks to Derek Brien, Dr Tess Newton and staff of the Pacific Institute of Public Policy, Konrad Wilfred and Nadine and Hannington Alalatoa (Vanuatu), Penny Alama (Forum Fisheries Agency), Ruth Liloqula, Derek Mauai, Billy Fitto, management and staff of the Institute of Public Administration and Management (the Solomon Islands) as well as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Samoa Ministry of the Prime Minister and various other organisations and individuals in the region for their kind assistance towards the fieldwork.

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To you all, my love and gratitude. Faafetai. Faafetai tele lava.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian Dollar</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Constituency Development Fund</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CROP</td>
<td>Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Reform Program</td>
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<td>DWCP</td>
<td>Decent Work Country Programme</td>
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<td>ELR</td>
<td>Employment Law Reform</td>
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<td>FFA</td>
<td>Forum Fisheries Agency</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GJS</td>
<td>Global Justice Solutions</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Samoa</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
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<td>HRPP</td>
<td>Human Right Protection Party</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>Interim Assistance Phase</td>
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<td>IADF</td>
<td>Institutional Analysis and Development Framework</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Institutional Strengthening Program</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>NCRA</td>
<td>National Coalition for Reform and Advancement</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand Aid</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Priority Action Agenda</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Program Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Pacific Island Country</td>
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<td>PIDP</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Development Program</td>
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<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<td>PIFS</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat</td>
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<td>PiPP</td>
<td>Pacific Institute of Public Policy</td>
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<td>PIRAMS</td>
<td>Public Works Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services</td>
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<td>PLAS</td>
<td>Planning Long Acting Short</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>PRIGO</td>
<td>Pacific Regional Inter-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>PSC-ISP</td>
<td>Public Service Commission Institutional Strengthening Program</td>
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<td>PSIP</td>
<td>Public Service Improvement Program</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>SAPP</td>
<td>Samoa-Australia Police Partnership</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Strategy for the Development of Samoa</td>
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<td>SIAMP</td>
<td>Samoa Infrastructure Asset Management Project</td>
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<td>SICOPSAG</td>
<td>Small Island Community Project Special Assistance Grant</td>
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<td>SIG</td>
<td>Solomon Islands Government</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Community</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
<td>Samoa Police Project</td>
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<td>SPREP</td>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Samoa Police Service</td>
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<td>SPS-ISP</td>
<td>Samoa Police Service Institutional Strengthening Project</td>
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<td>TLAC</td>
<td>Tri-partite Labour Advisory Council</td>
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<td>TLR</td>
<td>Telecommunication Liberalisation Reform</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>TSI</td>
<td>Transparency Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>TVL</td>
<td>Telecom Vanuatu Limited</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USP</td>
<td>University of the South Pacific</td>
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH

1.1. The research purpose and question

Societies worldwide are confronted with enormously complex problems such as climate change, security, poverty, ill-health, unemployment and sustainable development. Addressing these challenges is essentially ‘public policy’. The making and implementation of public policy is core government business at various frontiers—national, regional and global. My interest in public policy—its notions and practices being the subject of this inquiry—stemmed from my personal and professional experience in Samoa, a small Pacific island state not immune from the above challenges. Climate change for instance is a complex public policy phenomenon immediately confronting small Pacific island countries (PICs)—so critical that it is not only of concern to national but also regional and global government institutions.

This study examines public policy processes in a PIC. Research into public policy issues of PICs are rare but essential to our understanding of how they impact on the lives of Pacific islanders. Public policy ultimately refers to the ability (or inability) of governments to penetrate society and bring prosperity improvements to their people by adopting and implementing policies (Polidano, 2000). The significance of public policy is echoed in the developmental experience of the past decades that little can be accomplished to encourage such development unless the right policies are adopted and implemented by effective institutions (Duncan, 1995, p.15; Prasad, 2008; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.59).

For various PICs, public policy development has proven inadequate in bringing about the desired results for societies (Duncan, 2010, p.1; Hughes, 2010; Lua’iuфи, 2010). In my experience, I have often questioned the impact of various policy reforms on local community and standards of living. The same experience has been echoed in regional exchanges: it brings to light questions concerning the practice of public policy in PICs over state functioning, capacity and the nature of its public policy processes.

1.1.1. Public policy status

Over the years, reforms guided by the so-called ‘good governance’ agenda have been adopted to strengthen PICs public policy capacity at state and regional levels (Amosa, 2007a, 2007b; Binayak, 1999; Duncan, 2010; Knapman & Saldanha, 1999; Larmour, 1995;
To support these initiatives, aid has poured into the region, policy institutions flooded with technical assistance. There is no lack of ideas given the availability of international best practices at the disposal of technical advisers. Various regional and national plans and strategies are adopted, and technologies brought in to improve ways of operating (Alley, 2006; Hook, 2009; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Prasad, 2008; Tisdell, 2002; Toatu, 2004).

However, despite various waves of reforms, total results are disappointing. PICs struggle to improve their standards of living, and continue to experience increased poverty and hardship (Abbott & Pollard, 2004, p.x; ADB, 2002, 2003; Bowman & Chand, 2008; Tisdell, 2000). Development performance measurements show that the region has underperformed. Hence the region’s average Gross National Income per capita of US$4,116 in 2013 (World Bank, 2013) has grown by only 1-2% a year for the past 25 years (Hughes, 2003). Most PICs are now classified as lower middle income countries or small island developing states (see Appendix A). The UN (2015a) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report showed that despite progress in some areas (improved access to primary education, protection of marine areas and women’s access to paid employment), the region ‘continues to experience high levels of poverty and slow economic growth and is in danger of missing critical MDG targets’.

Accordingly, concerns have been voiced consistently over a lack of development progress despite the enormity of aid resources and technical inputs. Pacific economies fail to grow (Gibson, 2006; Mishra, Sunila, & Smyth, 2010; Pollard, 2013; Prasad, 2008): a phenomenon labelled the ‘Pacific Paradox’ by the World Bank (1993). Hughes (2010) posited that ‘aid has failed the Pacific’—suggesting that much of the US$50 billion (in 1998 dollars) given to the region since 1970 has been wasted (Hughes, 2003). Here giving more aid is unlikely to fix this dilemma, exacerbating PICs situations, undermining domestic revenue, creating economic rents, increasing dependency and debt, and eroding governance (Batten, 2010; Hughes, 2003; Jayaranman & Ward, 2006; Knack, 2001; Mellor & Jakes, 2004, p.ix). Disappointing outcomes suggest that PIC’s public policy systems are somewhat dysfunctional (Abbott & Pollard, 2004, p.x; Tony Hughes, 2013; Lua’iu, 2010). Given this inability to meet development priorities, some PICs have been labelled ‘failed states’ (Guoliang, 2006; Reilly, 2000; Wainwright, 2001, p.1), something associated with historical

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1 Hughes’ argument is strongly debatable and has been criticised for generalising a development record across a diverse region and ignoring many development successes. However, her critique is not wholly without merit and has brought into more discussion some of the real development issues facing the region (Morris, 2013).
upheavals. Informally, the region has been known for many plans but little or failed implementation.

Failure to understand such poor performance exhibits a public policy lacuna. Limited development progress requires an inquiry into the nature and status of public policy processes in PICs and their region. This includes examining current policy reform approaches, their applicability, and the extent to which the state has the capacity to implement and sustain change. Pacific societies are confronted with complex issues (e.g. climate change, youth unemployment, limited sustainable monetised bases, poverty, poor infrastructure, corruption) best addressed and understood through a public policy lens. The need for a better understanding of the Pacific paradox lies at the heart of ‘public policy’. That is, do PIC governments address these issues in their public policy systems—and if so, how and with what impact—or if not, why not? This ‘how’ question is a central concern of this inquiry.

1.1.2. Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to examine how public policies are adopted, formulated and implemented in a Pacific island state. This is to determine key factors at play when public policies are first introduced and developed, those which are critical during the process of implementation and that have led to effective or ineffectual results. To achieve this purpose, the following questions guided the research:

a) What are the roles of different stakeholders as actors in the policy process and what is their understanding of (public) policy?
b) What policies were adopted, why were they considered and where did they originate?
c) How were policies formulated, implemented and evaluated and to what extent did the key stakeholders perceive that policies had been implemented successfully?
d) What were the key issues affecting the policy process across its different stages? and
e) What can be drawn from the experiences of the selected PICs and the region in terms of implications for public policy and development theory, practice and future research?

1.1.3. Scope and approach

Of some 25 PICs (see Appendix A), three (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa) formed the focus of inquiry into national policy processes. The diversity of these PICs helped
provide a comparative grounding of this study’s research process and findings. Regional policy making is also a core component of PICs public policy frameworks: it allows a holistic lens to cross-cutting issues and commonalities across PICs. Hence the inclusion of this inter-governmental level’s policy processes.

This study is guided by the methodological approaches of qualitative research within a worldview of social constructionism. Case study research was the overarching research design complemented by grounded theory and narrative inquiry approaches. Semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and participant observation were the research methods. Ten policies (three for each of the three PICs and the region’s ‘Pacific Plan’) (see section 3.3.2) were selected as sub-case studies in addition to the general narrative of the policy environment across all four case studies.

1.1.4. Myself as a researcher

Every researcher brings to their research worldviews or ways of seeing things that are influenced by their upbringing and experience. As such, knowledge is socially constructed, shaped by a researcher’s interests and background. I undertook this study because I am a Pacific islander, born and raised in Samoa. My schooling in a rural setting and in Apia, and tertiary studies in New Zealand (NZ) and Australia, provided me with an understanding of both worlds, internal and external. I worked in the public sector for 12 years in various roles where I learnt about this ‘thing’ called ‘government’; a ‘thing’ I knew little about in my previous village life under the fa’aSamoa. Although we are diverse in various demographic and social-political aspects, regional networks have indicated that PICs share common public policy challenges. As a participant, stakeholder and observer in the implementation of 15 donor-sponsored institutional strengthening programs in Samoa, I experienced various local and external interactions.

This background shaped my interest in pursuing this study. The motivation was driven by anxiety over the lack of significant improvement in public policy delivery in Samoa and other PICs, despite various reforms. The desire to gain a better understanding of this dilemma required an inquiry into how public policies are made and implemented, the underlying thinking behind policy practices, and what public policy theory has to offer. As well, I am interested in local participants’ perspectives of these policy processes, something

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\] Literally means Samoan way of life but refers to society’s complex systems of relationships, authority and culture.
which lacks sufficient attention but is given emphasis in this study.

1.2. The Pacific context of public policy

A contextual introduction to the region and the three PICs (the four case studies in chapters four to seven) is required, while acknowledging the enormous complexity of the region which cannot be fully accounted for in this study. The Pacific island archipelago spread over 300 million km², more than 98% of which is ocean, is the largest in the world. Only 500 of approximately 7,500 islands are inhabited (Haberkorn, 2008). What is referred to as the Pacific (islands) region comprises some 25 states and territories noted for their smallness, remoteness, vulnerability and diversity in geographic, social-political, economic and historical dimensions (see Appendices A and B).

The region is home to approximately 10 million people, extracted from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s (SPC) statistics (http://www.spc.int/sdd/) which are based on 22 PICs as members. Figures for Hawai’i, East Island and West Papua are excluded.

Land area in relation to ocean territory also varies significantly amongst PICs. PNG accounts for 84% of the land area but its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is only 10% in the region, compared to French Polynesia which has the largest EEZ of 17% (of all PICs) but a land area of only 0.6% (3,521km²). Kiribati has the second largest EEZ of 12% but a land area of only 0.2% (811km²). Samoa has the smallest EEZ of only 0.4%.

1.2.1. History

The history of the Pacific is complex given the diversity of its islands. It is said that between 30,000 and 50,000 BC, settlers from Indonesia arrived in New Guinea and Australia. The Polynesians and Micronesians are believed to have sailed and drifted from Southeast and East Asia between 2,000 and 1,000 BC. Over time the islanders spread across the region forming three relatively distinct geographical and cultural groupings: Melanesia (to the west),...
Polynesia (in the centre and east) and Micronesia (northwest). Contact with Europeans began with the arrivals of explorers, missionaries and colonisers around the 15th century who, gradually but significantly, changed the islands (Campbell, 2003; Crocombe, 2008).

The Solomon Islands were first explored by Spanish navigator, Alvaro de Mendana in 1568. Given the discovery of gold he named it after the rich, Biblical, King Solomon. British, American and German seamen and Christian missionaries followed around the mid-19th century. Colonial influence included ‘black-birding’ where islanders were enticed or brutally forced to work in Britain’s plantations in Fiji and Queensland. Britain took control of the Solomon Islands from 1877 until it became a British Protectorate in 1893 and independent in 1978 (Fitto, 2009, p.2).

Vanuatu was first visited by Ferdinand de Queiros (Portuguese) in 1606, followed by Louis-Antoine de Bougainville (French) in 1768. Later in 1768, James Cook (British) arrived and named the archipelago the ‘New Hebrides’. In the mid-1820s, British and French interests developed when sandalwood was discovered on Tanna Island triggering the arrival of traders, planters, and church missionaries. Increased settlements led to a tug of war between France and Britain for control over Vanuatu. This rivalry ended in 1906 through the signing of a joint administration, the so-called ‘Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides’. Joint rule ended in 1980 with political independence and a renaming of the country as the ‘Republic of Vanuatu’ (Miles, 1998).

Dutch explorer Jacob Roggeveen first visited Samoa in 1722, followed by Louis-Antoine de Bougainville (French) in 1768, and Christian missionaries in the 1830s. Commercial interests of British, US and German entities flourished during the mid-19th century with the establishment of their local base offices and joint boards. In 1899, the three powers partitioned the islands—Germany annexed Samoa (Western); the US took over American Samoa (Eastern); while the British renounced all claims with territorial compensation in other parts of the Pacific. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, what was Western Samoa was seized by New Zealand (NZ), after which it became a mandated territory under the League of Nations but still under NZ control. Later it became the first PIC to gain independence in 1962 (Davidson, 1967).

In addition to these colonial histories, each PIC has its own dynastic history. From 1962 up to 1980, nine PICs became independent states with Tonga the only PIC that was not colonised (see Appendix A). Five are self-governing states (semi-dependent PICs) and 11
are territories (dependent PICs)—retaining political, constitutional and citizenship ties to former or current colonial masters. Pacific states are products of the decolonisation process in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century (see Figure 1.1), some of the youngest nation-states worldwide.

![Figure 1.1: Nation-states and period of independence](http://geography.about.com/od/lists/a/independenceday.htm)

**Source:** Extracted from [http://geography.about.com/od/lists/a/independenceday.htm](http://geography.about.com/od/lists/a/independenceday.htm) in March 2015

### 1.2.2. Socio-political and economic dimensions

Most Pacific societies were governed by indigenous systems under chiefly authority and customs without a centralised government. Chiefs were largely chosen through service to tribes or clans and were responsible for managing community affairs, resolving conflicts and maintaining law and order at a local level. This system of traditional\textsuperscript{iv} governance changed through external contact and has continued to evolve. With the formation of a state government at independence, most PICs adopted systems of government based on the institutions of their colonial masters (see Appendix A). Thus current governance systems, while differing across PICs, consist mostly of a mixed construction of three key influences: traditional, colonial and independence formations. At the local level, around 70\% of the population reside in rural subsistence communities, their daily lives governed by traditional systems of governance, and in clusters of villages and islands holding the majority of land

\textsuperscript{iv} Refers to an indigenous system in terms of local communities and cultures to differentiate it from a modern state system. Given the continuing intertwining of indigenous systems and other systems (e.g. church, colonial, state) what is purely indigenous is difficult to define clearly.
resources under communal customary arrangements. Cultural and linguistic dimensions also vary significantly. For example, Samoa is homogenous in terms of one ethnicity, indigenous language and common culture. Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, on the other hand, are diverse with more than 100 indigenous languages co-existing with English, French, Pidgin and Bislama (see Table 1.1).

PICs have narrow open economies based largely on agriculture and fisheries as the main sources of livelihood. Tourism and the service sectors are other major sources of foreign exchange earnings and Gross Domestic Products (GDPs). For Polynesian countries such as Samoa, remittances are a major source of cash. The Solomon Islands is well-endowed with rich and abundant natural resources, with logging and minerals major economic contributors. Concerns have been raised over poor resource governance, ecological destruction and upheavals in various PICs. Development is challenging given the lack of a sustainable monetised resource base which, allied to vulnerabilities, particularly climate change, negatively impact on small island economies (Alley, 1999; Anderson, Ivatts, Somanathan, & Rolfe, 2014). The region is known for its fiscal dependency on foreign borrowing and overseas development assistance (ODA), being the largest recipient of aid per capita (see Figure 1.2).

![Figure 1.2: ODA per capita (US$) by region in 2013](source: Extracted from http://www.oecd.org/dac in January 2015)
1.2.3. Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa—the national case studies

In addition to the information provided in Appendix A, Table 1.1 gives a comparative summary of these three PICs’ contexts, providing background information for case studies’ analyses of findings in chapters four to seven and a synthesised discussion in chapter eight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography &amp; demography:</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of islands</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural population</strong></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (0-14 years)</strong></td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History &amp; external influence:</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independence (as at 2015)</strong></td>
<td>1980 (35 years)</td>
<td>1978 (37 years)</td>
<td>1962 (53 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External influence</strong></td>
<td>British and France - joint</td>
<td>British, RAMSI – 10 years</td>
<td>German and then NZ/UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religions</strong></td>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>English, French, Bislama, 115 are indigenous</td>
<td>English, Pidgin, 120 are indigenous</td>
<td>Samoan and English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture, value and belief system</strong></td>
<td>Heterogeneous, <em>wantok</em> system, culture and customs diverse, church</td>
<td>Homogenous, <em>aiga</em>**, *fa’aSamoa, church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional authority</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiefs</td>
<td>Chiefs</td>
<td>Chiefs (Matai)****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local politics</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Big man</em></td>
<td><em>Big man</em></td>
<td><em>Fa’amatai</em>****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Development Index (rank out of 187) (2013)</strong></td>
<td>133 (Medium)</td>
<td>157 (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income basis</strong></td>
<td>Agriculture, fisheries, tourism</td>
<td>Logging, minerals, agriculture, fisheries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance structure</td>
<td>National, provinces, local</td>
<td>National, local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National legislature</strong></td>
<td>52 seats, 4 year term</td>
<td>50 seats, 4 year term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head of state</strong></td>
<td>President (elected by an electoral college)</td>
<td>Governor General (represent Queen Elizabeth II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. parties in parliament (2014)</strong></td>
<td>16 parties, 4 independents</td>
<td>32 independents, 18 others are from 6 parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No changes in prime ministerships (to June 2015)</strong></td>
<td>21 (a different PM every 1½ years)</td>
<td>17 (a different PM every 2 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. individuals in prime ministership (to June 2015)</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fa’aSamoa, fa’amatai, big man, aiga, wantok resonate with social systems but they differ in context. For instance, big man status is largely achieved whereas chiefly status is largely ascribed.

** Literally means ‘one talk, one language’ referring to an extended grouping or clan with similar language and customs.

*** Extended family by blood, marriage and matai titles belonging to a clan or groups of families.

**** Matai means chief. Fa’amatai is a system with matai authority and a subsystem within the fa’aSamoa.

Table 1.1: Contextual information on Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa

Source: UN databases; SPC Statistics for development division website; electoral figures extracted from [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlimesearch.asp](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlimesearch.asp) in January 2015
1.2.4. The regional inter-governmental level—the regional case study

The decolonisation process, beginning in the 1960s, created a strong push towards regional public policy making. Regional policy making concerns nine Pacific Regional Inter-governmental Organisations (PRIGOs) listed in Table 1.2. They are the core ‘regional public service’, coordinated through the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific, CROP (PIF, 2004c). Appendix C gives a brief history of Pacific regionalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIGO</th>
<th>Created</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
<th>Status/Type</th>
<th>Mandate/ Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>New Caledonia &amp; Fiji</td>
<td>26 (22 Pacific States and Territories, Australia, NZ,</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France and USA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the South Pacific (USP)</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>12 (12 PICs (campus in all member countries))</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Academic/ Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>16 (14 Pacific states plus Australia and NZ)</td>
<td>Forum</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Regional</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>26 (21 PICs, Australia, NZ, France, USA and United</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Programme (SPREP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Fishery Agency (FFA)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>17 (16 Forum Islands Countries (PIF Members) and</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tokelau)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>20 (20 PICs)</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Academic/ Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>17 (16 PICs plus Timor-Leste)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Power Association (PPA)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>23 (21 PICs, Australia and NZ)</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Power/ Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>13 (9 Pacific Independent States, Cook Islands, Niue,</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia and NZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: PRIGOs or CROP agencies
Source: Extracted from PRIGOs websites and PIF communiqués (see Appendix A)

Of the PRIGOs, the PIFS, SPC, FFA and SPREP are the ‘core’ group of the regional policy architecture having enmeshed inter-governmental interactions in regional and national policy processes. The other five PRIGOs perform relatively low-level forms of political cooperation and are sector specific in focus such as education (USP, PIDP), tourism (SPTO), power utilities (PPA) and aviation (PASO). PRIGOs are semi-autonomous bodies with their own governance structures and mandates based on country membership. From this it is evident that, to work, regional policy making and implementation has to depend closely on cooperation, coordination and integration (the key requirements of regionalism) from PICs national level (PIF, 2005c).
The PIF has 16 members of the region’s states as the Forum Islands Countries. As the pre-eminent political grouping, PIF is the regional (government) policy making institution meeting annually as the ‘Forum’ of all Forum Islands Countries’ Heads of Government (‘the Leaders’). The PIFS, governed by the Forum Official Council of national officials (Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister or Finance), provides policy advice, coordination and leadership in implementing the Forum decisions (see Figure 1.3). These officials and Heads of PRIGOs formed the ‘Board for Pacific Regionalism’, formerly called the ‘Pacific Plan Action Committee’. This is the body overseeing the ‘Framework for Pacific Regionalism’ (formerly known as the ‘Pacific Plan’), the key regional policy.

![Figure 1.3: PIF’s basic structure and relationship with other PRIGOs](image)

**Figure 1.3:** PIF’s basic structure and relationship with other PRIGOs

Source: Extracted from PRIGOs websites and PIF communiqués

The SPC on the other hand has 26 members; 16 Forum Islands Countries, eight territories including the USA and France (SPC founding members and the territories’ administrators). The SPC is the key regional technical (implementing) institution with a cross-sector mandate in areas of applied geoscience and technology, economic development, education, training and human resource development, fisheries, aquaculture and marine ecosystems, land resources, health, statistics, strategic engagement, policy and planning. The other seven PRIGOs are sector specific (e.g. education, fisheries, aviation) in their implementing roles.
Forming the regional network are about 20 sub-regional blocs (PiPP, 2010), 26 development agencies (e.g. World Bank, ADB, UN, AusAID, NZAID, European Union) and various non-inter-governmental and private organisations forming the regional network. New or redefined bodies appear from time to time.¹

1.3. Thesis outline

The remaining chapters are as follows:

- Chapter two reviews the current theory of public policy and development and the relevant literature on PICs;
- Chapter three outlines this study’s methodology and research design;
- Chapters four to seven analyse the findings from the four case studies in terms of the policy processes in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the region;
- Chapter eight synthesises the findings from the four case studies and discusses the overall patterns against the literature in chapter two; and
- Chapter nine concludes by highlighting the implications of the study’s findings for public policy and development theory, practice, methodology and future research.

¹ For example, the Pacific Islands Development Forum is a regional body and emerged in 2013, a Fiji-led initiative viewed as an attempt to bypass the PIF from which Fiji was suspended in 2009 when under military rule (ABC News, 2013, August 8; Tarte, 2013). Fiji was reinstated in 2014 after returning to an elected government.
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

2.1. Introduction

This study is about ‘public policy’; how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented within a Pacific island state. This chapter reviews the relevant literature against which the empirical findings about the policy processes of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and their region are examined. This review sets out the following arguments:

- Knowledge is socially constructed and so is knowledge in public policy;
- Public policy dominant theoretical currents are constructions largely based on the historical experiences of Western ‘developed’ countries;
- The transference of these theoretical currents to other countries including Pacific island countries (PICs) through development theory is based on the assumption that PICs, as ‘developing’ contexts, will become ‘developed’ by emulating the experiences that led to the development of developed countries; and
- Examination of these theoretical currents against policy processes in PICs or theoretical insights from PICs experiences are sparse.

Within these arguments, three theoretical strands are identified: social construction, public policy, and development which help form the theoretical framework (Figure 2.1) for the review of the (mainstream) literature in the following sections. The strengths and limitations of theoretical currents in explaining this study’s findings are discussed in chapters eight and nine.

![Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework](image-url)

13
2.2. Social construction

Every theory has a perspective: ‘each perspective unfolds in a particular historical setting’ (Pieterse, 2010, p.8). To understand a theoretical perspective or lens is to understand its philosophical basis; to reflect on where that knowledge came from and how it was constructed. Knowledge is socially constructed, relative, and contextual, depending on the worldview or paradigm employed at a particular time. A paradigm according to Kuhn’s (1996, p.10) scientific revolution theory is a body of knowledge ‘which some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice… but which is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to solve’. Knowledge such as facts and natural laws are not neutral; they are subject to human constructions influenced by popular concepts, cognitions, values or beliefs shared by a community of individuals at a given time. Knowledge communicated in a paradigm (dominant theory) carries with it certain assumptions and constructions about the nature of the world (Gergen, 2003; Koch, 2005; Kuhn, 2003, p.9; Lock & Strong, 2010, p.2).

Kuhn is referring to ‘epistemic’ knowledge; the basis of modern development and academic disciplinary discourses. However, such ‘epistemic’ or ‘technical’ knowledge is not the only type of knowledge. Habermas (1987) suggests there are three types of knowledge—technical, practical and emancipatory, which Shotter (1993, p.vii) refers to as knowledge of what a thing is, knowledge derived when making sense of the world (hermeneutics), and knowledge of being in touch with, and grounded within the everyday world. The first is founded on the modernist theories of scientifically grounded rationality; the search for absolute truth and standardised knowledge of the world is construed in the hope for a hegemony of one unified school of thought. The second is based on everyday language, implicit in personal and institutional practices. The third is where communication without the domination of ruling ideas or paradigms leads to new knowledge. (Burrell, 1994; Taylor, 1997, p.4).

Emancipatory knowledge is based on notions of duality rather than dichotomies, contextualisation rather than generalisation, pluralism rather than the universal, and accumulations from what seems disorderly, not that which is assumed to be rational and orderly. The key is reflexivity and shared interpretations based on social interactions where language is central to contextualised understanding. It is about making sense of why things are by moving away from just assessing reality, as against dominant theories or ideologies,
towards a critical discursive reflection about how dominant theories shape the constructions of knowledge and social existence (power, interaction and work) (Burrell, 1994; Shotter, 1993, p.1; Taylor, 1997, p.6). It is ‘phronesis’; ‘practical value rationality’ based knowledge involving ‘a sense of the ethically practical rather than a kind of science’ (Colebatch, 2006, p.315).

Public policy and development involve all three knowledge types; the third provides the lens to examine dominant perspectives and how they shape historical thinking in both fields.

2.3. Public policy theory

2.3.1. Defining public policy

Public policy is broadly conceived as about ‘government’; its behaviours, actions, intentions, interactions and commitments (or otherwise) for the common good. It is an interdisciplinary field that emerged from Europe and North America in post-World War II to study the relationship between government (authority) and society (people). Pioneer Harold Lasswell envisioned the field as one of problem solving, methodological and theoretically sophisticated (causal theory), and value oriented (to maximise democracy) (deLeon & Vogenbeck, 2007, p.4; Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p.17; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.4).

Public policy is variously defined as simply about ‘what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes’ (Dye, 2002, p.1). Or ‘the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents as it has influence on the lives of citizens’ (Peters, 2004, p.4). Or ‘an emergent and self-organisational complex system concerning the whole of the activities and relations among self-conscious, purposeful and interdependent actors’ (Morçöl, 2012, p.9). With over 26 theoretical perspectives (Burton, 2006) ‘participating in a policy theory shootout is a daunting task’ and demonstrating one theory is superior over another is ‘wildly optimistic’ (Meier, 2009, p.5). This diversity signifies that public policy is a complex phenomenon; conceptualisations attempting to make sense of its complexity are at best constructed approximations of realities. Settling on a single definition limits the need to make sense of such complexity and ‘to build a richer understanding of the multi-faceted nature of policy’ (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011, p.5).
2.3.2. Current paradigms of public policy

The applicability of knowledge derived from the natural sciences to social sciences continues to raise philosophical and meta-theoretical issues. Nevertheless, academic knowledge and hence public policy (and development) conceptualisations have developed through dialogue with principles derived from the natural sciences and Western philosophy, progressing largely in three paradigmatic movements.

2.3.2.1. Scientific rationalism—physical sciences

Given its intellectual origin in the 17th century Enlightenment era of European and then North American scientific revolutions, much of the thinking underlying public policy in its foundation, institutionalisation (government systems) and theoretical currents are grounded in the philosophical-scientific (analytical) thinking of Descartes, Newton, Copernicus and others in the study of physical systems (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p.18; Geyer, 2003; Geyer & Rihani, 2010, p.12; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007, p.28). Central to this first-ordered paradigmatic movement are the following beliefs and conceptualisations:

- The universe is conceptualised as a mechanistic system, so the behaviour of a system (phenomenon) is understood as a clockwork or cybernetic machine;
- Reality (truth about the world) is absolute and universal; the beliefs in the discovery of absolute universality through the scientific methods of positivism. Truths are in the form of timeless, deterministic and linear causal laws;
- The belief lies in the power of autonomous individuals to reason about causal explanations of phenomena;
- The hope is to bring order to the world through rationalism and scientific discovery to eliminate medieval myths (e.g. religious) about the nature of the world; and
- Truth is obtainable by dividing a system into parts, observing their behaviours objectively and forming a complete view of the system’s behaviour obtained from the summative views of the parts—‘the whole is the sum of its parts’.

This first-ordered paradigm’s deterministic, linear, causal and orderly notions have profound influence on public policy conceptualisations (Stacey, 2007, p.21). They are embedded in Lasswell’s vision of the policy science to be analytical (causal theory), and as featured in Sabatier’s (2007, p.8) call for better policy theories that meet the criteria of scientific theory. This dominant paradigm consists of the following constructions (ideas, values, ideologies,

The rise of modern states and bureaucracy in post-World War II given the need to bring order to the world;

The separation of powers within government such as in the Westminster system or Weberian bureaucracy;

The study and conceptualisation of public policy in different parts, levels, units or stages are largely influenced by this mechanistic view of the world as existing in separate parts;

Rationality, long-term planning, classical management theories, instrumentalism and incremental change as espoused public policy models;

Understanding about the nature of the world is in terms of mechanisms like input-output linear causality models; and

The individual as an objectivist detached from reality. Government (as a rational actor) is separated from society in order to be objective and neutral.

2.3.2.2. Systems thinking—biological sciences

The first-ordered paradigm’s limitation to account for dynamic interactive behaviours of phenomena brought to the fore systems thinking. Systems thinking is as old as Aristotle’s holistic and teleological views of ‘the whole being more than the sum of its parts’. It existed in the study of quantum physics but was suppressed by the prominence of the first-ordered paradigm (Morçöl, 2012, p.64). Kuhn (1996) posits new/prior knowledge (suppressed/neglected previously) emerged/re-emerged from new research and practices when a dominant paradigm becomes inadequate. Systems thinking was largely advanced by the study of organisms (living systems) in the 19th century by Wiener’s (1948) cybernetics theory, von Bertalanffy’s (1968, 1975) general system theory, Maturana and Varela’s (1987) autopoiesis theory, and Bogdanov’s work on system theories in the 1910s (Midgley, 2003, p.xxii). This second-ordered paradigm advanced the following conceptualisations (Capra, 1983, 1996; Geyer & Rihani, 2010, p.16; Midgley, 2003; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007):

Phenomena (natural, human) are systems (irreducible wholes) within larger wholes (supra-systems) with interdependent parts (subsystems) embedded in context (environment);

A holistic understanding of a system requires examining its parts and dynamic
interactions amongst these parts and other interconnected systems, all nested as hierarchical wholes (levels) in the supra-whole. Thus the whole becomes more than the sum of its parts;

- Open systems (e.g. human, society) exchange matters with their environment through negative and positive feedback mechanisms allowing the system to self-regulate (stabilise) and self-renew (grow) itself;

- Moving the system towards stability requires finding leverage points to strike a balance between negative and positive feedback loops and maintaining orderly relationships within subsystems;

- A living system self-defines and self-creates itself (autopoiesis) through its parts and boundaries (identities) which separate, yet also link the system to its environment. The system and its parts emerge from their own operations and interactions (as self-organising wholes), not imposed from outside (pre-given); and

- Loss of identity means the destruction of the system. Maintenance of identity requires that change be internally determined and facilitated by a process of autopoiesis, not external perturbations.

Systems thinking in contrast to the positivism/rationalism limitation explains historical forces and irrational behaviours that appeared to ascribe more to socio-cultural elements (macro aspects) than primarily to individual actions. The individual is not a rational entity standing outside observing, but is part of a system; ‘they have to be necessary for the production of the whole, otherwise they have no relevance as parts’ (Stacey, 2007, p.31). Systems thinking implications for social phenomena and public policy are as follows (Durlauf, 2012; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007; Teisman, Gerrits, & van Buuren, 2009):

- Public policy is a system made up of interconnected parts (individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, etc.) co-evolving with their environment;

- Understanding a (public) policy system requires a holistic understanding of its parts and their dynamic interactions (processes, structures, organisation) as a whole;

- A policy system’s survival and growth require regulative mechanisms (negative feedback) for stability and positive feedback (learning) for change;

- Change cannot be imposed, but emerges from interactions (the unfolding self-organising processes) of different parts;

- Autopoiesis is the cognitive process of actors to collectively interpret meanings,
maintain identity, and communicate actions contributing to the system’s survival, destruction or growth. Actors’ key roles are to ensure the system’s stability; and Individuals’ actions emerge from their self-organising interactions where they co-construct reality (public policy); not necessarily a result of own rational thinking given their boundedness in context.

2.3.2.3. Complexity thinking—a synthesis

Systems thinking emphasises phenomena’s wholeness, irreducibility and dynamics. However, it overlooks phenomena’s disorderly, iterative (orderly-disorderly) and indeterministic behaviours advanced by the science of complexity in late 19th century. Based on the mathematical modelling of irregularity behaviours of phenomena (chaos theory) (Gleick, 1987; Stewart, 1990); and the study of chemical and physical systems (theory of dissipative structures) (Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, 1996); and complex adaptive systems (e.g. flock of birds, human) (Gell-mann, 1994; Holland, 1998; Kauffman, 1995); complexity theory has advanced the following conceptualisations:

A system contains iterative movements of stability, cyclical (peaks, troughs) and instability (chaos); paradoxical nonlinear dynamics due to negative feedback (producing stability); and positive feedback (producing instability/chaos)—leading to increased complexity where long-term predictions are impossible. The system is sensitive to initial conditions (history) hence small fluctuations in one period can escalate over latter periods (butterfly effects);

Influenced by fluctuations (feedback loops) in the environment, a system that is far-from-equilibrium can maintain stability or undergo sudden changes at bifurcation points. At these points (‘at the edge of chaos’), the system undergoes a self-organising process; it may decay into chaos, or emerge into a new behaviour or order called ‘dissipative structure’—‘an order out of chaos’ without a blueprint;

Through interaction and co-evolution, entities form a complex adaptive system with a population-wide pattern leading to the maintenance or emergence of order or complexity. This evolutionary experience is unknown (hence the basis for creativity) and is a fitness landscape (not given but co-constructed by agents) of hills/mountains (increasing fitness) and valleys (decreasing fitness). All of this represents a stumbling journey in which a system moves forward and backward through self-organisation, not
by chance; and

The self-organising interaction of (diverse but connected) agents in its evolving system (network) create enabling and conflicting dynamics. The system’s evolution (life and its organisation) arises from a dialectic between competition and co-operation, and where agents evolve to new forms; including that formerly unknown (‘transformative causality’). The whole takes on a life of its own, is never finished, but is always evolving. (Kauffman, 1995; Morçöl, 2005; Stacey, 2007; Waldrop, 1992).

Advocated as a new paradigm, providing alternative ways of looking at the natural and human worlds, complexity theory has attracted scholarly attention in the last 50 years in most fields as it challenges dominant notions based on predictability, linearity, causality and orderly worldviews (Cairney & Geyer, 2015). Implications for understanding social phenomena are as follows:

- Stability keeps a (policy) system where it is, but a far-from-equilibrium operation destabilizes that system opening it up to change through feedback loops (e.g. information, rules, learning, adaptation);

- A (public policy) outcome is not pre-given or unknowable but under perpetual construction through the paradox of stability/instability and conflicting/enabling behaviours and where time irreversibility plays a constitutive role. This evolution process involves encountering bifurcation points where the policy system undergoes change;

- Taking paths and creativity at these points depend on agents’ self-organising interactions; can cause a system to unfold in unpredictable behaviours; and


2.3.3. Approaches to studying public policy

The paradigms just discussed have influenced public policy conceptualisations, notwithstanding the limitations inherent when attempting to transfer methodologies from one field of investigation to another quite different in nature. This is evident once public
policy itself comes into focus, as discussed in the following sections. Here scholars have approached the study of public policy at different elements/parts/levels—micro (individual actor); meso (multiple actors, institutions or action arenas); macro (context); ideas and the whole (system) with associated theoretical perspectives as outlined in Box 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/unit/element</th>
<th>Framework, theory, model</th>
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</table>
| Policy cycle/stages of policy | • Agenda setting, formulation, decision making, implementation, evaluation  
  • Theories within each stage:  
  o Agenda setting - multiple streams, advocacy coalition framework (ACF)  
  o Formulation - rationalist, welfare economics, social construction  
  o Decision making - public choice theories  
  o Implementation - top down/bottom up and synthesis theories  
  o Evaluation (including monitoring) – learning theories |
| Individual | • Public choice theories – rationalism, welfare economics, incrementalism, bounded rationality, muddling through |
| Groups & networks | • Group and network theories, advocacy coalitions |
| Institutions | • Institutional theories or institutionalism, welfare economics |
| Society (socio-economic) | • Social theory, pluralism, corporatism, top-down/bottom-up theories |
| Ideas | • Social construction, policy transfer, policy diffusion |
| Systems | • Systems theory – general system theory, punctuated equilibrium, chaos theory, complexity theory, complex adaptive systems |

**Box 2.1**: Units/elements in a policy sub-system and theoretical perspectives  
**Source**: Author’s construct based on reading the literature

2.3.3.1. The policy cycle

As Lasswell’s (1956) first attempt at theory, the policy process is viewed as a cyclic operation of distinct but interlinked stages: agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation. The model is an oversimplification of reality where the policy process is often complex and messy. Yet despite criticisms, the model remains of use as a heuristic understanding. By studying its different parts as stages, it can readily show how they fit into an overall process (Birkland, 2011; Howard, 2005; Sabatier, 2007, p.7).
2.3.3.2. Public choice theories

The individual rational actor is regarded as the foundation of political action/inaction pursuing policies to maximise self-interest. State versus market policy processes are advocated with the state providing an enabling environment for the market to function in public good provisions and curb individualist maximising behaviours. Critics view these perspectives as oversimplifications of human behaviour since actors do make choices advancing the public interest. This lens misses institutional factors, being based on a liberal culture (e.g. US) with little recognition of other perspectives (Andrews, 2007; Cairney, 2012; Hill, 2005, p.51; Howlett et al., 2009, p.35). What constitutes rationality when fostering the public goods of democracy remains unclear (Kuruvilla & Dorstewitz, 2010).

2.3.3.3. Group and network theories

Emerging from Marxist, pluralist and corporatist analyses in the modern era are a range of different group/class theories that view the policy process as involving mainly state-society interactions. Here society comprises nothing more than a complex (of) groups/classes pursuing distinct interests based on those primary identities. Critics have argued such theories underrate the role of government, international actors and collective action arenas in shaping policies and that are based in open societies (e.g. US, Europe). Such groups are free-forming, acting as state-societal groups’ institutionalised through forms of co-operation and bargaining, and contributing to historical development processes. Countries that lack these features evolve differently (Hill, 2005, p.63; Howlett et al., 2009, p.40).

2.3.3.4. Institutional theories

Institutionalists stress the need to see policy making in its own context (Howlett et al., 2009, p.43). Institutions refers to organisations (bureaucratic, networks, families, voluntary groups, international regimes, etc.), legal and cultural codes, norms and rules (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). Actors’ interests are pursued within institutional contexts that shape expectations and outcomes. Institutions affect what the state does in legitimising actions and fashioning constraints and opportunities. Institutions embody historical patterns as path dependencies shaping future possibilities. They are defined broadly, making it difficult to empirically identify on the ground commonalities (Ostrom, 2007, p.23). Institutionalism can also assume relatively static policy processes, and thus fail to explain why change happens or how institutions are created (Howlett et al., 2009, p.45; John, 2003).
2.3.3.5. Socio-economic approaches

Marxist political analyses in capitalist societies view the policy process as dominated by powerful societal classes (the capitalist), the state an instrument of class domination and its policies reflecting capitalist interests. This is a heavily society-centred approach which contrasts sharply with a state-centred focus where the policy process is affected not so much by society, as by the state’s organisational context. Here the state is a rational actor with its own interests to pursue (Grindle & Thomas, 1989; Kuruvilla & Dorstewitz, 2010; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.45). The focus is on how decisions are made through various explanatory models such as the ‘perfect rationalist’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘satisficing’, ‘incrementalism’ and ‘muddling through’ (Bendor, 2015; Forester, 1984; Hill, 2005, p.147; Lindlom, 1959).

2.3.3.6. Ideas and ideational approaches

The manner in which an issue is interpreted, recognised and mapped by policy makers determines how it will be addressed. This ‘raises deep questions about the nature of human knowledge and the social construction of that knowledge’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.121). Policies are created out of actors’ social construction process (not necessarily in any rational or self-interested manner) involving histories, traditions, language, moral values, individual judgement, group beliefs, public attitudes, seeking meaning and offering competing worldviews across different time and issue settings (Adams, 2004; John, 1998, p.144; 2003; Sutton, 1999). Colebatch (2006) argues that good policy should be based on all three types of knowledge (see section 2.2), not just epistemic knowledge. Ideational approaches challenge conventional rational-based perspectives, but ‘there is little systematic investigation into why, how and when decision makers utilised policy knowledge’ (James & Jorgensen, 2009). Hence the call for more explicit research on these approaches (Campbell, 2002).

2.3.3.7. Policy as (self-organising, emerging and co-evolving) systems

Systems theorists consider the historical debate of one element/level being more important than another as limited; instead all such elements/levels are nested parts of a (policy) system. Their interaction as irreducible wholes co-create and co-maintain the system they are part of. Complexity theory brings a synthesis lens to breaching traditional macro versus micro approaches to studying policy processes by demonstrating that a policy system contains nonlinear, emergent and paradoxical (e.g. stability-instability, conflicting-enabling)
behaviours. The following are complexity theory’s implications for public policy:

- participants in a policy system self-organise and co-evoive in ‘fitness’ to context, the environment in which they operate;
- a policy system is complex given the dynamic interaction of elements within its boundaries that cannot be defined clearly, but are nevertheless constructed by an observer;
- policies change as intended or unintended because they depend on the feedback loops and attractors in the system (endogenous). External factors can trigger change but are not the causes of systematic change;
- policies may emerge as planned or unplanned because of actors’ self-organising, emerging and co-evolving behaviours; and
- a policy system should be studied as a ‘whole’ to understand the complexities and dynamics that shape nonlinearity movements in the system (Bittick, 2010; Colander, 2014; Eppel, 2009; Geyer & Cairney, 2015; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Meek, 2010; Morçöl, 2012; Teisman & Klijn, 2008).

Easton (1957) applied system theory to politics but his model follows a mechanistic view of the political system. Freeman (1965) and Heclo (1977; 1978) also developed a policy (sub)system framework (see Figure 2.2) where the policy process involves actors’ complex interactions over time in pursuit of their interests and ideas within the social-political, economic and international environment (Considine, 1994, p.22; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.53). How environmental factors shape actors’ interactions is not spelt out in this framework: this remains a task awaiting empirical investigation.

![Figure 2.2: The policy (sub)system framework](source: Adapted from Howlett & Ramesh (2009, p.84))
Chapman (2002, p.10) argues that dominant approaches based on mechanistic, rational and reductionist thinking contributed to much ‘system failure’ in government. Rather government should learn to think differently using the lens of a complex system. Utilising complexity lenses to conceptualise public policy systems as evolutionary, and involving unpredictable long-term complex changes, are approaches yet to develop fruitfully (Cairney, 2013b). Some attempts include the Punctuated Equilibrium approach which conceptualises how policies change over time (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; John, 2003; Petridou, 2014). Also, the institutionalism emphasises path dependency, irreversibility, locked-in and sequencing phases to show how history and context matter in policy processes (Cairney, 2013b; Howlett, 2009b; Howlett & Rayner, 2006). These theories conceive of policy processes as largely random, accidental or economic crises-based and have had limited application in settings outside the US (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, & Jones, 2006).

2.3.4. Conceptualisations of the policy process

In addition to the different approaches to studying public policy are perspectives on sub-processes of the policy process (see Box 2.1).

2.3.4.1. Where does public policy originate?

In view of the (sub)system framework, policies can originate from domestic or external policy systems or both (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.29; John, 1998, p.28). It can emerge from policy makers directing an agenda, groups or networks making demands for attention on a particular issue, social-economic forces forcing government to adopt an agenda, or policy transfers or pressures for compliance with a particular international regime. Agenda setting theories have sought to explain why some issues and not others come to get considered.

2.3.4.1.1. The Multiple Streams

Building on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ model of organisation choice, the Multiple Stream posits that policy actors take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’ to push an item on to a government agenda. Three streams (problems, solutions and politics) mix in a ‘primeval soup’ that intersect to produce a policy once a window of opportunity opens. Such windows may include a change in the political arena, ideological shift or appearance of a compelling problem (Kingdon, 1995). The theory is criticised for a lack of

2.3.4.1.2. Groups, networks and institutions

Group theories view the policy process as involving an ‘iron triangle’ (dominant interest groups, state and bureaucracy) and their interactions (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, p.129; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.38; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.77). More recently, that has been challenged as the policy process becomes less elite dominated, but more open and fragmented to involve multiple interactions among networks. Policy networks are no longer confined to top-down/bottom-up/centre-to-periphery structures, but involve horizontal relationships within-and-across state and non-state actors as ‘networked governance’, ‘joined-up government’ or patterns of interactions in a (sub)system. Network theories have gained momentum as they are consonant with democratic public policy values, service delivery demands, and inter-organisational/governmental collaboration for addressing complex problems extending beyond a single organisation/state capacity (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008; deLeon & Varda, 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006; Koppenan, 2012; Rausser & Swinnen, 2011; Teitz, 2009; Ulibarri, 2015).

The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IADF) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) offer some prominent theory of this form of the policy process. The IADF focuses on how rational actors can collaborate to solve common pool dilemmas through incentives, rule formation, de facto coalitions and existing authorities (Feiock, 2013; Ostrom, 2007, 2011; Petridou, 2014). The ACF (Sabatier, 1988) on the other hand, views policy as driven by strong coalitions with shared, deeply held beliefs within societal subsystems. Beliefs are difficult to change but engagement in ‘policy oriented learning’ can modify them. (Sabatier, 1991; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Schlager, 1995; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009).

However, the application of these theories outside the US and Europe remains limited (Han, Swedlow, & Unger, 2014; Nedergaard, 2008; Petridou, 2014; Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 2004). The ACF loses traction when applied to processes operating across overlapping (sub)systems, or cross-cutting integrative policies (e.g. drugs, terrorism, poverty) (Jochim & May, 2010). Operative deep beliefs within an ACF construct go unspecified. Recent attempts to address such limitations by integrating cultural theory are limited, given its emphasis on
group as distinct from individualised definitions of culture (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta, & Ripberger, 2014; Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Swedlow, 2014).

2.3.4.1.3. Policy transfer and policy diffusion

Nation-state based theories often fail to recognise how political and economic relationships and interdependencies between states shapes public policy (Obinger, Schmitt, & Starke, 2013). Policy transfer refers to the process whereby policies/ideas from one jurisdiction or domain are used in the development of policies/ideas in another by involving processes of ‘copying’ (same policy is replicated), ‘emulation’ (policy is modified to suit different contexts), and ‘inspirational’ (policy stimulates the creation of novel policy elsewhere) (Dolowitz, 2003; Dolowitz, Greenwold, & Marsh, 1999; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1998, 2000). Policy transfer instances are commonplace (Carroll, 2012; Larmour, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2005) involving global networks of experts and organisations, sharing so-called international ‘best practice’, ‘what works’, ‘off the shelf’, or ‘not to reinvent the wheel’ policies, ideas or practices (Common, 1998; Pal & Ireland, 2009; Peel & Lloyd, 2007; Prince, 2012).

A related idea is policy diffusion, ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated… over time among members of a social system’ (Rogers, 1983, p.5). The adoption of a program by a state arises because of internal determinants (domestic) or policy diffusion (external), and where states borrow innovations perceived as working elsewhere, influence by states that are geographically proximate—the ‘neighbour models’ (Berry & Berry, 2007, p.224). The relationship between policy transfers and outcomes is an area of growing importance but remains under-researched (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012).

2.3.4.2. How is public policy formulated?

Policy formulation concerns how the government addresses the issues on its agenda. It is a normative question of policy analysis and design in relation to the kinds of instruments available to implement policy decisions (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). Normative aspects involve the rationalist versus social construction approaches. Divided by philosophical and epistemological underpinnings, the former takes positivist, while the latter prefers post-positivist, stances.
2.3.4.2.1. Rationalist

As a public choice theory (see section 2.3.3.2), the rationalist approach sees actors behaving rationally to achieve goals by pursuing optimum courses of action. Technocrats or experts conduct objective data-based assessments of problems and advise on the best possible solutions. Involving this rationalist approach is a welfare economics approach seeking reconciliation of state versus market instruments as to how government can best allocate resources to maximise the public interest. Efficiency is the dominant value judgment in this evidence-based policy process (Adams, 2004; Albæk, 1995; John, 1998, p.116; Kuruvilla & Dorstewitz, 2010; Peel & Lloyd, 2007; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.107).

2.3.4.2.2. Social construction

This post-positivist approach views the rationalists as promoting a particular set of values (efficiency) at the expense of democratic values (equity). Rationalism encourages bureaucratic policy-making that reinforces the status quo, giving little room for citizen participation. For a post-positivist, alternative policy is viewed as the prerogative of politics, making it unlikely to respond to any objectively rational analyses (Andrews, 2007, p.224; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.116). Based on the worldview of ‘the (political) world as socially constructed’ (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.121), policy making is largely driven by worldviews and values rather than technocratic process (Geva-May, 2002; Yanow, 1993, 1995, 2000). Discourse and interpretive analyses are more appropriate, involving the art of constructing policy arguments (‘the argumentative turn’) and recognising non-economic factors (e.g. culture, social realities) in shaping policy making (Jones & McBeth, 2010; McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007; Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011). Social construction has gained considerable scholarly attention (Petridou, 2014; Pierce et al., 2014; Trousset, Gupta, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, & Herron, 2015; Wilkins & Wenger, 2014). This is on account of gaps now evident between rationalist prescriptions and lived reality (Head, 2014).

2.3.4.3. How is policy implemented?

Implementation is ‘the process whereby programmes or policies are carried out and the translation of plans and laws into practice’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.185). Advanced by Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) influential study of implementation failures in California, implementation studies were generated by interests in examining the ‘black box’ between
intentions and outcomes (O'Toole Jr, 2004; Schofield & Sausman, 2004; Wolman, 1981). This led Hargrove (1975) to denote implementation as the ‘missing link’ in policy studies (Wheat, 2010). Implementation studies have proceeded in three generations: examining what has or has not worked (1973-1980s), theory construction (1980s), and theoretical synthesis/verification (1990s) (Bowman, 2011; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.156). Implementation studies have pointed to the need to better integrate so-called ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom up’ models.

### 2.3.4.3.1. Implementation models


The ‘top-down/bottom-up’ debate relates to that between the ‘rationalist/post-positivist’ approaches. Both perspectives claim legitimacy; hence studies have long moved beyond top-down/bottom-up to synthesis models (O'Toole Jr, 2000, 2004). Application of Sabatier’s (1986) ACF and Elmore’s (1979) backward mapping models were some early syntheses. Applications of governance theories (Conteh, 2011; Exworthy & Powell, 2004; Hill & Hupe, 2009, p.123; Howlett, 2009a), collaborative approaches (Koontz & Newig, 2014), institutionalism (Rice, 2013), and others (May, 2013), are some recent synthesis examples. They overlap with policy theories already discussed, and in which policy making and implementation are not distinct but iterative parts of an (overall) policy process.
Well-established implementation models have not been fully advanced (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 12). Research has largely been concentrated in the US and Europe but lacking adequate cross-national comparison (O'Toole Jr, 2000). This has led Smith and Larimer (2009, p.178) to conclude that implementation studies comprise a prospective third generation. Others maintain that, since implementation remains the missing link, its integration into overall policy theories remains weak, not reconciled (O'Toole Jr, 2004; Robichau & Lynn Jr, 2009; Wheat, 2010).

2.3.4.3.2. Public management versus public policy

This ‘missing link’ conception led scholars to revisit Wilson’s policy/administration dichotomy, where policy (making) belongs to the political realm (politics), and administration of policy (implementation) to the bureaucracy (Howlett, 2011; Stewart, 1996; Wheat, 2010). This sees the study of (public) administration as separated from that of (public) policy, with implementation as the ‘missing link’. But the issue here is that such a dichotomy ‘bears little reality to political and administrative behaviour’ (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p.31), limiting attempts to synthesise the policy processes as a whole (Bozeman, 2013), and undervaluing management’s roles in policy making (Meier, 2009). Policy making and implementation ‘overlap and cannot be separated even analytically’ (Dror, 2008). Thus the study of ‘public administration’ including its (new) public management variant is relevant to studying implementation. The New Public Management has asserted that adopting market-based instruments will improve public policy and management, a claim that has superseded attention to implementation issues themselves (Barrett, 2004).

2.3.4.3.3. Implementation and success/failure

How evaluation is used to judge policy outcomes may involve positivist and/or post-positivist assessments. However, what actually constitutes policy failure or success is an under-researched, poorly understood area in the literature. While failure is a wider concern, accepted definitions or agreement over its causes are absent. Limited agreement is partly a reflection of the complexity and contested nature of public policy where assessments are socially constructed and political. Failure or success for whom, how, when and why mean different actors frame success or failure differently in terms of relevant impact and attributing factors (Fotaki, 2010; Ika, Diallo, & Thuillier, 2012; Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010, 2011, 2014).
2.3.4.3.4. Implementation and evaluation

Debating implementation success, failure or shortcomings requires ‘giving a normative qualification as a result of a comparison between what is observed and what is expected’ through evaluation. While the conceptual distinction between evaluation and implementation is important, they overlap in practice (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.157). Evaluation (administrative, judicial, political) depends on its purpose, methodology, venue, actors involved and effect (Hill & Hupe, 2006, p.11).

Evaluation can involve finding out what actually happens during implementation, determining value for money in terms of results, establishing accountability for these results, or learning lessons from past experiences. How such lessons are then used to effect further change will depend on two types of policy learning: lesson-drawing and social learning (Hall, 2011; Hall, 1993; Real-Dato, 2009). Lesson-drawing takes place among sub-systems aimed at effecting changes in the policy process (e.g. assessing instrumentalities that have failed or succeeded). Social learning, by contrast, concerns fundamental changes in goals, paradigms or the underlying thinking from which lesson-drawing is based. It originates ‘outside the formal policy process affecting the capacities of policy makers to change society’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.222). Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) call these two ‘single-loop’ versus ‘double-loop’, or incremental (technical, trial and error) versus transformational (complex) learning. The latter concerns changes in governing beliefs, ideologies and construction of policy, power relations and political learning (Hall, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; May, 1992; Stacey, 2007). Hall (1993) refers to the latter as ‘third level change’, and where the state and society are in a constant dialectic of reciprocal and communicative influence. When state capacity is high and remains the dominant actor, then lesson-drawing is expected. When state capacity is high but society dominates a sub-system, social learning may be more evident (Howlett et al., 2009, p.193).

2.3.5. Summary of public policy theory

In sum, public policy is studied at different levels: individual, groups, networks, institutions, ideas, socio-economic dimensions and systems. These levels are complex elements nested within a setting comprising the ‘whole’ of a policy system evolving with other systems. As approaches to studying public policy are divided in terms of focus or unit of analysis, it is difficult to reconcile a promulgation of various theories so as to provide an overview of a policy process that is applicable to particular situations (Eller & Krutz, 2009; Kuruvilla &
Dorstewitz, 2010; Meier, 2009). Each theoretical lens attempts to fill a gap within an area unexplained, or limited in explanation by a different theory. Studies of implementation are disjointed from those of policy making, but a solid understanding of why policies are either more or less effective requires an understanding of that policy process in totality. Thus scholars call the current status of research a ‘synthesis’—a thinking of multiple perspectives that are complementary for advancement of the field (Nowlin, 2011; Schlager & Weible, 2013). This task is onerous as perspectives are constructed from different philosophical and methodological underpinnings (Cairney, 2013a). Diversity in perspectives is a reflection of the multi-faceted nature of social phenomena. That ‘no one model has yet been developed that can fully explain all the nuances and intricacies of the policy process’… perhaps ‘the very complexity of politics and society will make a universal theory of the policy process impossible to achieve’ (Birkland, 2011, p.1263).

2.4. Development theory

Public policy discourse developed primarily in Western societies (Baumgartner et al., 2006; Carroll, Carroll, & Ohemeng, 2003). Its universality and applicability to other countries is central to the purpose of this study and raises the question of what is different about the policy processes of other countries. Seeking answers to these questions requires an examination of the development discourse, a field dedicated to the historical conceptions of developing countries’ public policy development.

2.4.1. The development agenda

Despite their diversity, countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific are categorised as developing, underdeveloped, Third World, the South, or the periphery. Conceptions of their states’ basic institutions emerged from the development (policy) agenda constructed in post-World War II following European decolonisation of Africa, Asia and, previously, Latin America. The agenda was a response to the need to understand the causes and solutions of underdevelopment. Conceptions underpinning this agenda have their origins in political economy, more specifically the modernisation perspectives from the modernist philosophers such as Durkheim, Marx and Weber (Davis, 2002, p.31; Martinussen, 2007, p.50; Pieterse, 2010, p.20; Thomas, 2000, p.5; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.4). Forming this agenda are various conceptualisations set out in Box 2.2.
### Box 2.2: Development theory in history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical context</th>
<th>Hegemony/paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nineteenth century | British empire (Enlightenment/Modernist era)  
                      Marxism  
                      Progress/evolutionism  
                      Colonialism/catching up  
                      Political economy |
| Post-war           | Modernisation  
                      Growth theory  
                      Structural functionalism |
| Decolonisation     | Dependency  
                      Nationalism  
                      Neo-Marxism |
| 1980s              | Neoliberalism/Washington Consensus  
                      Globalisation  
                      Structural adjustment |
| 1990s              | Capacity building  
                      Developmental state  
                      Human Development, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),  
                      Sustainable Development Goals  
                      Globalisation  
                      Good governance  
                      Alternative development—post-modernist |
| 2000s              | Pluralism |

Source: Adapted from Pieterse (2010, p.10)

#### 2.4.1.1. Modernisation theory

This perspective viewed developing countries’ underdevelopment as caused by limitations of material wealth, modernity and rationality, this due to their ‘backwardness’ (‘traditional’) as compared to ‘modern’ societies. For countries to step out of underdevelopment, they needed to emulate Western societies’ development experience. Provided that the preconditions for development already existed in Western societies, and that a ‘form of structural heterogeneity’ was assumed to exist in countries, all that was required was a process of transfer. This transfer process took place through structures, institutions, laws, policies and planning largely involving international development agencies. This perspective was ethnocentric as the Third World’s development problems and solutions were determined in other locations (Martinussen, 2007, pp.4, 168; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.6). ‘Modernisation was… synonymous with Westernisation’ (Pieterse, 2010, p.23).

By the 1960s, the theory had not lived up to its aspirations. Situations in various countries deteriorated, leading to a fundamental rethinking of development from Neo-Marxist and

2.4.1.2. Dependency theory

Neo-Marxist dependency theorists, writing in the 1970s claimed that ‘imperialism’ and the international system have contributed to the underdeveloped world. Colonialism had distorted countries’ ability to develop independently. The international system was an instrument of the nations of the ‘centre’ to control the ‘periphery’, exploiting their weaknesses through various regimes leaving peripheral countries to remain trapped in poverty. Economic domination by rich countries was the main determinant of underdevelopment as distinct from domestic factors. Thus real development required a state-led development model, de-linking the ‘periphery’ from world markets to allow for self-determining development. (Martinussen, 2007, pp.86, 168; Pieterse, 2010, p.26; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.7).

2.4.1.3. Neoliberalism

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, development failures in the South, and differential development experiences in emerging economies (China, Malaysia, etc.), dependency theories lost ground (Schuurman, 2008, p.12). This led to the revival of neoliberalism and prominence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by development agencies since the 1980s. Privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and New Public Management reforms characterised this agenda, designed to roll-back the state in the belief that development requires the market do the work of setting prices right. Neoliberal reforms are still promoted despite widespread criticisms (Leftwich, 1993; McGillivray, 2009; Pieterse, 2010, p.7).

2.4.1.4. Capacity building—the developmental state

In the late 1980s, the development focus again shifted, this favouring the capacity to make and implement decisions—to roll-in the (developmental) state again (Leftwich, 1995). This ‘Keynesian Consensus’, not pursuit of market-led recipes, saw development policy redesigned for strategies strengthening the state’s autonomous capacity and community involvement in decision-making, and adoption of welfare goals (meeting basic human needs, poverty elimination, employment creation) (Martinussen, 2007, p.41; Pieterse, 2010, p.185).
Others (Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.6) regarded this policy shift as ‘liberal reformulations’; a set of goals impossible to achieve in the global context while Martinussen (2007, p.41) viewed it as ‘capacity building’. The UN began advocating this development agenda through its Human Development Report beginning in 1990 (UNDP, 1990) and subsequently through the MDGs in 2000 (UN, 2000) and the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in September 2015 (UN, 2015b).

2.4.1.5. Good governance

A catch-all notion of development policy to emerge was the ‘good governance’ agenda, in the form of aid-funded reforms, a further wave of policy transfer that began occurring during the 1990s (Macdonald, 1998, p.22; Santiso, 2004). With its origin in institutional economics, this agenda emphasised the state and its (institutional) capacity to pursue development (Grindle, 2011; Polidano, 2000; van Arkadie, 2012, p.55; World Bank, 1998). The ‘good governance’ concept was invoked following the World Bank (1989) report on high failure of development projects in Sub-Saharan Africa where a ‘crisis of governance’ was identified as the underlying cause. Since then, good governance became the development paradigm of donors (Abramsen, 2012, p.31; Kulshreshtha, 2008; Larmour, 1998a; van Arkadie, 2012, p.53). ‘Governance’ is defined as the ‘manner in which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s resources for development… the government capacity to design, and implement policies… and discharge functions’ (World Bank, 1991, 1992). ‘Good governance’ is defined in dimensions such as voice and accountability, quality of government’s policy making and public service delivery, rule of law and protection of property rights, independence of the judiciary and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 2000; World Bank, 1994). Yet when it came to the question about how to attain these objectives, then market-oriented policies, implemented through New Public Management reforms, were still advocated (Barzelay, 2001; Larmour, 1998a, p.2; Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012, p.1).

Criticisms of this agenda contest the notion that only liberal democracy and public policy making in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model can bring good governance (Kulshreshtha, 2008). While there are no doubts that poor governance adversely affects development, there is no consensus over a single model for the practice of good governance (Collins, 1996). Evidence has concluded that countries only improve governance with development, not as a precondition to such development (Grindle, 2004; Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012, p.9).
Development outcomes (e.g. East Asia versus Western countries) do not depend on any particular form of government (Andrews, 2012; Larmour, 1995, p.109). Furthermore, good governance reforms are often conflicting and not synonymous with democratic principles (Pieterse, 2010, p.197; Ryan & Lewis, 2007). Hence ‘what ought to be’ in implementing ‘good governance’ becomes more prominent but still ambiguous (Grindle, 2011).

What appears to matter is the abilities of states and their political processes to decide on the types of institutions and policies to progress development (Hughes, 1995; Leftwich, 1993; Rodrik, 2000). That ‘institutions matter’ (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Davies & Pickering, 2015; Goldsmith, 2012, p.117; Prasad, 2014) is evident, but little is known about how to go about establishing effective institutions (Duncan, 1995; Grindle, 2011; Toatu, 2004). These are ‘institutional puzzles’ or ‘missing pieces’ (Orrnert, 2006)—a central issue confronting agents when trying to understand the underdevelopment dilemma (Duncan, 2010).

Applications of this agenda vary across countries. McCourt’s (2008) analysis of 28 studies in developing countries during 1999-2008 found that incidences of policies under this agenda were modest. As well, Goldfinch, Derouen, and Pospieszna’s (2013) literature review of good governance reforms in 49 low income (UN classified) countries found ‘only a small number of documents linking good governance reform with implementation’ and ‘little empirical evidence… that reform enhances service delivery’, hence leaving the good governance a ‘flying blind’ agenda. A thematic analysis of some 18 studies (Andrews, 2008; Andrews, 2011, 2013; Batley, 1999; Grindle, 2004; Jones & Kettl, 2003; Laking & Norman, 2007; Manning, 2001; McCourt, 2008; Minogue, 2002; Mongkol, 2011; Norton, 2007; Ohemeng, 2010; Pillay, 2008; Polidano, 1998, 1999; Polidano & Hulme, 1999; Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrews, 2012; Samaratunge, Alam, & Teicher, 2008; Soeters & Tessema, 2004; Zafarullah & Rahman, 2008) highlighted that this agenda and its policies have been:

- modest in take-up and limited in achievement with more endogenous reflections on what works in specific contexts;
- limited in implementation with issues concerning formulation and lack of capacity and ownership highlighted;
- promoted despite being a contested model even in developed countries. This is an inappropriate application of one-size-fits-all concepts impacting on social capital, accountability and ethical government; and
- criticised for having no empirical foundation in developing countries’ contexts (so difficulties in application are expected); exacerbating capability traps in various
developing countries by adopting best practice reforms that do not work, crowding out alternative ideas and ignorance of context within which reforms occur.

2.4.1.6. Alternative development

Much of the attack over development agendas surfaced in the 1990s from neo-populist or post-modernist scholars. They criticised these development paradigms for universalistic treatment of countries and normative development based purely on state versus market prescriptions. Given development failures, they suggested that the whole notion of ‘development’ should be problematised and deconstructed, from its ‘standard assumptions about progress, which possesses the keys to it and how it may be implemented’ (Sidaway, 2008, p.17). They advocated ‘alternative development’ on the basis of socio-economic diversity, the role of indigenous knowledge, culture, civil society, social capital, eco-sustainability and bottom-up approaches (Potter, 2008, p.67 & p.107; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.9).

Critics view the post-modernists as another ‘intellectual fad’ of little use to the Third World. However, such criticisms ignore the merits of examining the underdevelopment dilemma from multiple lenses. ‘Development’ is only one way (carrying certain assumptions and consequences) of dominating worldviews and approaches to development (Sidaway, 2008, p.17). This is driven by the ‘epistemic’ of Western expertise forming and transmitting universal forms of knowledge and beliefs about what constitutes development, which is a rational scientific process (Sutton, 1999).

2.4.2. Impasse in theory and measuring development

With this paradigmatic crisis between positivist and post-modernist positions on what is development, the field is viewed as at an impasse (Pieterse, 2010, p.5; Schuurman, 2008). In the absence of well-established theories over what constitutes development, the established ways of modelling development are development agencies’ constructions (e.g. income level, GDPs, MDGs, Human Development Index, good governance indicators) to simply label countries as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’. However, ‘when it comes to classifying countries according to their level of development, there is no criterion (either grounded in theory or based on an objective benchmark) that is generally accepted… in the absence of a methodology or a consensus… some international organisations have used memberships of the OECD as the main criterion for developed country status… resulting in the designation
of the 80-85% world’s countries as developing… An explicit system that categorises countries based on their level of development must build on a clearly articulated view of what constitutes development’ (Nielsen, 2011, pp.3-4).

2.4.3. Public policy processes of developing countries

Previous sections have attempted to trace how development theory came about. However, questions concerning why and how issues come to be considered by government, and how policies are formulated and implemented in developing settings remain unanswered. Studies mentioned are largely evaluative in focus, leaving theoretical perspectives on the so-called ‘processes’ of policy making sparse. Standing back, the conceptual research into these processes would seem to involve questions such as:

- Are developing countries’ policy processes largely determined by externally prescribed development agendas or by domestic factors? And for either, to what extent?
- Is policy transfer the predominant explanatory theory of policy making processes in developing countries? If not, are there other perspectives?
- Are there differences between policy processes among countries, developed and developing, and, if so, what are they?

Horowitz (1989) has asked ‘is there a third-world policy process?’ His response was that ‘this depends on whose view of Western policy is preferred’ as there are ‘divergences of policy in terms of disparate access to resources, levels of economic development and social patterns’, but convergence ‘in terms of the deeper exigencies of human problem solving in highly structured contexts’. Peters (1996) argued however that the difference ‘is largely those of degree rather than the fundamentally different types of policy problems and processes’. Exceptions to a general observation that little has been written about these comparisons are summarised here:

Grindle’s (1980, p.15) studies showed that policy activities in the US and Western Europe largely focused on the input (policy making) while in developing countries, the focus is on the output (implementation) stage. As mechanisms of aggregating interests are weak, the implementation stage is where actors seek to participate in policy processes and where political relationships are prevalent in influencing resource allocation.

Grindle and Thomas’ (1989, p.217) study in 12 developing countries showed that policy
options are constrained by ‘societal interests, past policies and historical and cultural legacies’. A policy’s characteristics largely influence whether it will get consideration. Elites shape policy significantly and are not as constrained as suggested by pluralist theories.

As the policy process is political, Thomas and Grindle (1990) resisted the linear model predominantly adopted by donors (as it treats the link between formulation and implementation as automatic). They noted that various reforms were attempted, even when resources did not exist, often leading to unintended results. They advanced an ‘interactive model of implementing policy reforms in developing countries’ to show the iterative reality of policy processes.

Turner and Hulme (1997, p.66) argued that policy models based on societal class and pluralist analyses (see section 2.3.3.3) are inappropriate for developing countries. Compared to developed countries, interest groups are not diverse and formal channels are limited hence informal mechanisms are often utilised to secure voice in the process.

Carroll et al. (2003) assessed the limited contributions from developing contexts as attributable to studies focusing mostly on public administration (implementation) aspects, not policy making. While arguing the policy process is the same in developed and developing contexts (although the weighting of some variables is different), they advanced ‘an approach to the policy making process in developing countries’ model emphasising the interaction of structural and contextual factors in shaping policy.

The United Kingdom Overseas Development Institute’s large case studies research in developing countries showed that ‘policy making is a dynamic, complex and chaotic process especially in developing countries. This is attributed largely to troubled political contexts, lack of credible policy research, donors’ influences in imposing agendas of little relevancy and emergence of civil society as a key player (Young, 2005).

And with the Pacific in mind, (Duncan, 2010) identified the following thematic issues from a review of recent studies on the political economy of reform in developing countries including PICs:

- ‘There was little in the way of political economy studies of the factors underpinning economic reform and why some reform attempts fail’ (p.6);
• There is little understanding about how to bring about needed change;
• Reforms do not follow the linear model of the policy process adopted by donors;
• ‘Policy making process is complex and needs to be country-specific’ (p.8); and
• Binding constraints to reform (requiring in-depth exploration) include weak governance institutions, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, poor quality of education and lack of good institutions (emphasising incentives).

2.4.4. Summary of development theory

Integrated development and public policy theories provide sparse insights about developing countries. Few studies discuss what is either distinctive or similar about policy processes as between developed and developing countries. Divergence and convergence in experiences depends on the lens adopted when studying these processes. Studies are largely empirical in nature, often attempting to examine reforms advanced under prescribed (development) agendas, highlighting the modest take-up and limited achievement of the good governance agenda, but giving limited attention to local context.

Development theory is regarded as a Western construct lacking empirical grounding in fields that purport to explain, thus losing legitimacy (Andrews, 2012, p.97). Reading development theory is like ‘reading a history of hegemony in political and intellectual Eurocentrism’ (Pieterse, 2010, p.9) with relationships between knowledge and power a central issue in development and antidevelopment lenses (Jalali Rabbani & Ebooks, 2011). Scholarship has turned to the limitation of current approaches and what matters most to development is context, specificity, history and institutional variations within countries (Grindle, 2013).

The key to development via hegemony is neoliberalism (Duncan & Codippily, 2014; Sutherland, 2000). Late-comers in the development journey can catch up with development if neoliberal models based on Western pioneers’ experiences are adopted and implemented. The question then is how in the pre-defined models that countries have been advised to adopt, will policies be implemented from the basis of the experiences and ideologies of others? Such problems and assumptions of the development theory remain unexplored.

2.5. Pacific public policy and development

PICs are part of the global system, hence the review of the public policy and development theories in preceding sections. We now examine public policy and development studies in
PICs and their region, the core of this study.

2.5.1. Policy and development studies

To date, ten PhD studies were found to have direct relevance to this study. Sause (2008) examined PNG’s central agencies’ policy advisory capability. Two studied the role of civil society in development (Swain, 1999) and governance (Iati, 2007). Gani (1996) studied the application of International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies in some PICs. Three examined aid and development relationships in Fiji (Ruru, 2010), PNG (Davis, 2002), Samoa (Lua’iufi, 1995) and some PICs (Schultz, 2012). Kerslake (2007) examined the privatisation of Samoa’s former public works department. Amosa (2003) assessed Samoa’s public management reforms and Martin (2014) examined the implementation of international health treaties in some PICs.

These PhDs and including Masters studies (Jackson, 2010; Lealea, 1995; Moe, 1998; Puna, 2008; Ulu, 2013; Vanua, 2014) and other contributions (which are mostly donor-sponsored studies) are country-specific, evaluative and empirical in nature (see section 2.5.3). While informative in understanding PICs issues, such studies are limited in their theoretical insights into the processes of public policy—how they are developed and implemented in a PIC environment. Comparative lenses are also limited as to what is either distinctive or similar about policy processes between PICs and other countries.

Thematic areas highlighted in existing studies are discussed below.

2.5.2. The significance of context

While relevant knowledge is socially constructed or contextual, context is considered ‘a missing link’ in public policy and management theory (Pollitt, 2013, p.xvii). Such context is ‘not sufficiently recognised and appreciated by researchers’ (Johns, 2006). Only recently has its significance been signalled for further research to better inform development policy in PICs (Duncan, 2010, p.1).

2.5.2.1. The concept of small-island state

defined small-states as countries with populations of fewer than 1.5 million, leaving PNG as the only non-small-state PIC. Not all small-states are ‘islands’ and ‘developing’ nations. The UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries (2011) uses a vulnerability index to classify 52 small island developing states. All 25 PICs are classified as small island developing states.

The ‘islandness’ of PICs, in addition to being ‘small’, makes them the most ‘remote’ region; 40% further from major GDP markets compared to the Caribbean and Indian Oceans (Gibson, 2006, p.15). This isolation is validated as a determining factor in their slow economic growth (Gibson, 2006, p.24; Yang, Chen, Singh, & Singh, 2013). And, as well, they have small markets, limited economies of scale, imperfect competition, high transportation and transaction costs, vulnerability and little power to compete.

Most of this (section 1.2) is well-known, but how distinctive are these entities in shaping policy settings, and policy design and implementation? This is less understood and largely overlooked in development research and policy (McGillivray, Naudé, & Santos-Paulino, 2008a, 2008b; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015). Interest in the special nature of small states in terms of appropriate administrative models and capacity to manage development programs grew in the 1980s/1990s following the decolonisation of small-states in the 1960s/1970s era (Murray, 1981; Schahczenski, 1990; Wijeweera, 1992). This interest faded in the mid-1990s, only recently gaining revival (Corbett, 2013; Hezel, 2012; Horscroft, 2014).

Sarapuu (2010) identified five traits of small-states that potentially influence policy making: limited scope of activity, a tendency towards multi-functionalism, reliance on informal structures, constraints on steering and control and high levels of personalism. However, there is little research on ‘the relationship of the size of a state and the operation of its administrative structures’. Small-states generally have limited manpower, a dominant government workforce and closeness or cohesiveness in relationships that can enhance collaboration. However, personalism can compromise professionalism over how policies are decided upon and delivered (Schahczenski, 1990; Wijeweera, 1992).

These features bring unique challenges to the types and nature of policies under consideration (Gibson, 2006; Kotzebue, Bressers, & Yousif, 2010; McGillivray et al., 2008b; Panke, 2010; Peretz, Faruqi, & Kisanga, 2001, p.41; Sarapuu, 2010). Wrighton and Overton’s (2012) research in Tuvalu showed that ‘size matters’; ‘the constant stream of consultants, officials, missions, and researchers that arrives to consult creates a burden that
is extremely disproportionate relative to the size of its own bureaucratic resources’. The Haque, Knight, and Jayasuriya (2012) comparative study confirmed that smallness matters for countries with populations of less than 500,000. Thus most PICs suffer from endemic capacity constraints undermining the implementation of financial management functions, hence the need for careful reform design and prioritisation.

2.5.2.2. Other contextual implications

The relationship between government and indigenous institutions (see section 1.1.2) is another matter of growing scholarly discourse involving contested views over dimensions of modern versus tradition distinctions, their relevant tensions, and scope for a blending and legitimation (Curry, Koczberski, & Connell, 2012; Hassall, 2010; Hassall, Kaitani, Mae, Tipu, & Wainikesa, 2011; Kavaliku, 2005; Schoeffel & Turner, 2003; White, 2007). Arguably, indigenous institutions matter more to the lives of many islanders than what the government does (Laking, 2010) and this raises important questions about the legitimacy of the state. Why and how such distinctions matter, or whether they can be synthesised, matters to policy making and implementation yet remains under-explored in the literature.

Scholars differ on the centrality of indigenous or cultural dimensions of public policy and development. Most taking the positivist or economic perspective see the dominance of cultural dimensions in PICs as institutional constraints impeding a market-driven development (Duncan & Codippily, 2014; Sugden, 2008). Others, taking an insider or post-positivist position, consider cultural dimensions crucial for social capital, protection, security, and social governance (Morrison, 2008; Ratuva, 2014). Some consider cultural influences as either negative or positive, positing that the connection between policies and realities lies within such cultural dimensions (White, 2007). While the role of cultural aspects, indigenous systems, and community-based institutions in grassroots development have gained recent research interest (Hassall, 2012; Hauck, 2010; McNee, 2012; Thornton, Sakai, & Hassall, 2012), their legitimate recognition in development and policy thinking remains minimal (Morgan, 2005). How such dimensions matter to policy making and implementation is less understood (James, 2005).

In turn, this relates to how historical patterns have featured in the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of public policy, but again less known empirically. Legacies may affect international relationships, inter-governmental co-operation, and how Pacific societies (as recent ex-colonies) generally perceive the world of development (Binayak, 1999; Fraenkel, 2013b).
2.5.3. Public policy development

Since the 1990s, PICs have been adopting reforms under the good governance agenda (Abbott & Pollard, 2004; Binayak, 1999; Fraenkel, 2013a; Tony Hughes, 2013; Larmour, 2005, p.1; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Prasad, 2008; So'o & Laking, 2008; Swain, 1999; World Bank, 1998) or as answers to the ‘Pacific paradox’ (Hameiri, 2009; Henderson, 2003; Sutherland, 2000). This agenda appeared to others a second wave of colonialism or donor countries’ ways of governing the region (Hodge, 2014; Larmour, 1998b). PICs’ struggle with development raises questions about the appropriateness of prescribed agendas, and whether Pacific states have the capacity to implement them (ADB, 2009b, p.1; Henderson, 2003; Hughes, 2010; Larmour, 2005). Others point to the need for appropriate policies that account for development complexities in PICs (Alley, 2006) and what works, doesn’t work and why (Heppell, 2008, p.v). A review of existing studies (Bolger, 2008; Duncan, 2010; Huffer, 2006; Tony Hughes, 2013; Kavanamur, Okole, Manning, & Levantis, 2005; Laking, 2010; Larmour, 2002a, 2005, 1998b; Levin, 2013; Lua’iufi, 2010; May, 2009; McCormick, 2014; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Paton & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2010; Peake & Marenin, 2008; Ratuva, 2011; Sarker & Pathak, 2003; Sharma & Lawrence, 2009; Sutherland, 2000; Tisdell, 2000; Utoikamanu, 2013; World Bank, 1998) highlighted the same thematic issues identified in sections 2.4.1.5 and 2.4.3. These include reforms being advanced irrespective of suitability and, whilst implementation varies across PICs, a high degree of unsuccessful results being reported. Reasons include limited ownership and commitment, weak policy coordination and planning, political instability, staff turnover, growing reliance on outside assistance, reforms seen as mostly donor-driven, and little consideration of local conditions. Capacity has been a key challenge affecting implementation.

A major focus with existing studies concerns the ‘take-up’ and ‘outcome’ of reforms with little explicit examination given to the processes of policy making and implementation—what is really going on inside the arena of local interactions in these processes. Thus Hughes (1995) points out that PICs’ (governance) issues ‘are not given the explicit examination that they deserve (p.24)… absent from this discussion is what we might call ‘process’… how policy is made and why some projects succeed and others fail’ (p.23). Insights into the practice and context of policy processes are limited. Previous studies are largely conducted from an ‘outsider’ point of view, detached from a PIC context. The voice of local actors in these processes often lacks sufficient attention by existing studies. Overall, then, there is a need to develop both empirical and conceptual understanding of PICs’ policy processes.
2.6. Summary—gaps addressed in this study

PICs contextual features are well-known, but lacking is a solid examination of how contextual factors such as culture, civil society and indigenous institutions impact on policy processes. This literature review has revealed the modest take-up and limited achievement of the development agenda in most developing countries. Reasons include inappropriate formulation of policies, limited capacity, and neglect of local context. Given limited implementation of ‘good governance’ reforms, this development agenda remains a contested model with its theoretical constructs coming under increasingly critical scrutiny.

The existing literature is predominantly ethnocentric, based largely on Western contexts. Saetren’s (2005) comprehensive literature survey on public policy implementation shows that ‘the Western hemisphere accounts for close to 90 percent of all publications’, with only two percent for the Oceania region, one percent for the Third World and three percent for the international/global level. Thus the public policy theory is very limited in its empirical examination in PICs and small island developing states. A deeper understanding of a country’s public policy practices and processes is fundamental for gaining an understanding of why reform attempts fail or succeed. Addressing this gap is crucial to improving public policy and development theory and practice. Knowledge is socially constructed and insights from the experiences of other contexts such as PICs are essential to addressing the ethnocentric nature of current theories, hence strengthening their wider applicability. New insights would advance existing knowledge on how public policy and development phenomena should be better understood. The number of small island developing states (with a combined population of 63 million) (UN, 2014) is quite significant, so the study of public policy processes from the perspective of a small island developing states matters for an understanding of their development status. This study contributes to the need for policy studies in PICs, helping to form a base-line case that could be further developed for non-Pacific small island developing states.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology and research design of this project. This has examined how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented in three Pacific island countries (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa), and key regional inter-governmental organisations (the ‘Region’). The investigating design needed to be appropriate to the research purpose and subject under study (Flick, 2002, p.129), involving the intersection of guiding philosophy, methodology and methods. Philosophy refers to a worldview (‘a set of beliefs that guide action’) (Guba, 1990, p.17 cited in Creswell, 2007, p.17) about the nature of reality (ontology), the nature of knowledge of what exists may be known (epistemology) and how we inquire about what we want to know (methodology) (Crotty, 1998, p.3; Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p.191). Method refers to ‘a procedure, tool, or technique used to generate and/or analyse data’ (Glesne, 2006, p.6). Figure 3.1 gives this study’s research design and methodology with each element discussed in the following sections:

![Figure 3.1: Research design, methodology and methods](image)

Source: Adapted from Crotty, 1998; Cresswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Flick, 2002
3.2. Philosophy

Some research designs allow for the three interconnecting elements of ontology, epistemology and methodology to stay distinctly articulated; others adopt a more fluid design where they are blurred and intertwined within data collection and analysis (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990). This study is guided by this latter style. It is grounded in a social context; built on the epistemology of reality that is complex and socially constructed—a ‘constructionist’ (as opposed to a ‘positivist’) worldview (Crotty, 1998, p.6; Morçöl, 2012, p.21).

Positivism holds that an objective reality or truth is obtainable through inquiry. Knowledge is a function of measurement, so positivist research concerns empirical observation, measurement and theory verification. The researcher is an observer detached from the world being studied. Constructionism, in contrast, holds that reality can never be fully captured, only approximated through interpretation of human and social interactions. Knowledge is constructed through multiple meanings that people ascribe to realities; thus constructionist research is concerned with understandings, multiple participant meanings, contextualised construction and theory generation. Data is contextual and so is knowledge, hence total objectivity is not possible: the researcher and the researched are interactively linked within a process of co-interpreting and co-constructing social experiences as they unfold within a particular context (Crotty, 1998, p.6; Flick, 2002, p.31; Torres & Arminio, 2006, p.5; Yanow, 1993).

3.3. Methodology

Methodological strategies are taken from the qualitative research tradition as this is congruent with the research purpose. Qualitative research enables the researcher to ‘get under the skin of a group/organisation to find out what really happens in order to view the case from the inside out—to see it from the perspectives of those involved’ and ‘to carry out research into the processes leading to results rather than into the significance of the results themselves’ (Gillham, 2000, p.11). Qualitative (as compared to quantitative) research is concerned with the how and why questions, and hence impart value rich descriptions into the studied world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.12; Punch, 2006, p.34). Qualitative research is therefore guided by principles of naturalistic inquiry; fieldwork is conducted in the natural setting of the subject under study where the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 1994, p.145). Broadly speaking, quantitative research is
mostly deductive (theory-led), whilst qualitative research is mostly inductive (theory-generated) (Flick, 2002, p.2).

3.3.1. **Criteria for selection of methodology and methods**

Within a range of qualitative strategies, common approaches include case study, ethnography, grounded theory, narrative inquiry and phenomenology (Creswell, 1998, p.15). Punch (2006, p.33) distinguishes research types as to whether they are descriptive, explanatory or interpretive. A descriptive study is concerned with ‘making complicated things understandable; it involves summarising specific factual information into empirical generalisations’. An explanatory study ‘sets out to explain and account for the descriptive information… making things understandable but on a different level—it aims to find the reasons for things, showing why and how they are what they are’. ‘We can describe within explaining but we cannot really explain without describing’. Descriptive study asks the ‘what’ questions and explanatory study asks the ‘how and why questions’. But there is a third category—the ‘interpretive questions’ which ask about meanings of things for people directly involved.

Box 3.1 specifies the range of qualitative approaches of concern to this study, which are to: describe and explain the processes of policy initiation, formulation and implementation in a Pacific island state (to find the reasons for these things); interpret policy actors’ experiences in these processes (how the practice of policy processes and activities appeared to them, not only of how things ‘are’); identify patterns common in the cases being studied; trace policy processes, practices and events; and compare such patterns in policy processes against theories outlined in chapter two.

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<th>Interpretive description and explanation</th>
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<td>Identification of patterns</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of processes</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating propositions</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent model development</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Box 3.1:** Five qualitative approaches or requirements of this study

**Source:** Taylor (1997, p.71); Tesch (1990)
The qualitative strategies and methods were chosen for their appropriateness to the five requirements in Box 3.1.

3.3.2. Design framework—case study research

Case study was considered the most appropriate research design. A case study is ‘not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied using any methodologies or methods (Stake, 2000, p.435). It is ‘an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a ‘real-life’ context’ (Simons, 2009, p.21). Figure 3.2 presents this study’s multi-case design:

![Case study research design](image)

**Figure 3.2:** Case study research design

The research purpose, interest and questions (section 1.1.2) and literature review (chapter two) provided the theoretical overview for this design. The design followed a replication and cross-experiment—the researcher moving from case to case—firming up key findings and propositional refinements as the data analysis progressed across Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, the Region and Samoa (see Table 3.1) as a four part case study. This allowed a model to be developed inductively, tested, and then validated from these four data-sets (inclusive of the pilot).
The selection of national case studies (Table 3.1) was influenced by the researcher’s background and choice of countries within the need to achieve the research purpose. Samoa was chosen for the obvious reason of the researcher being a Samoan (see Section 1.1.4). Vanuatu’s (a Melanesian country) population size and economic development outcomes are comparable to Samoa (a Polynesian country) but these countries differ noticeably in geographical and social-political circumstances (see Table 1.1 and Appendix A). The Solomon Islands (another Melanesian country) was viewed as a deviant case study that offered a challenge to findings (or propositions) from the Samoa and Vanuatu case studies. The Solomon Islands is relatively bigger in geographical setting and population size, and richer in natural resources than Samoa and Vanuatu but is one of the few ‘least developing countries’ in the region. It is a PIC that had been subjected to external influences (through the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands) over 10 years following the 1998-2003 tensions. These contrasts in the three national case studies brought interesting insights into why things happen the way they are, or why policy processes are similar or vary across places, and whether the same propositions hold across different public policy contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fieldwork</th>
<th>Site/Case study</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>Methodological testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>September - October 2012</td>
<td>Development of initial findings/propositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>October - November 2012</td>
<td>A ‘replication’ design – confirming/disconfirming initial findings/propositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 3</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>November - December 2012</td>
<td>Strengthening findings/propositions using the holistic perspective from the ‘regional’ level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 4</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>December 2013 - January 2014</td>
<td>Validation of concluding findings/propositions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Fieldwork for the pilot and four case studies

Approaching the research purpose in its subject and context involved two iterative processes of data collection and analysis (see Figure 3.3). The first comprised talking to key people who are either are or were at the core of policy processes in each country about how policies are generally adopted, developed and implemented in each local setting. The aim was to obtain a sound grasp of the policy environment and key contextual influences, strengths and challenges. The second was selecting specific policies and exploring their initiation, formulation and implementation processes, to gain deeper insights into the specifics of the dynamics, practices and factors shaping such processes and their outcomes. The downside
of the first approach is a risk of research that is too abstract having been based on a surface understanding of the subject under study; the second is missing the bigger picture of a holistic understanding of policy processes within and across contexts. The intention, therefore, was to achieve a balance between a big picture overview of the policy context while also delving into the specifics of a small number of examples of policy processes in each jurisdiction.

Figure 3.3: Visual presentation of the research purpose and interest in section 1.1.2

The selection of policies (Table 3.2) examined in depth was based on a combination of the following dimensions; namely, a policy that:

- highlights the processes, practices and capacities of public policy operating within the internal public administration (government and its public service);
- explicitly identifies the interface between the state and society (particularly civil society and its indigenous system);
- explicitly explains the interface between the state and private/business actors (the market system);
- cogently details the interface between the domestic policy system and relevant regional and global policy systems; and
- is perceived/assessed by participants as either effective or ineffective.
Table 3.2: The ten policies (as sub-cases) within the four case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Specific policies (sub-case study)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>• The Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Telecom Liberalisation Reform (TLR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Employment Law Reform (ELR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>• The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Constituency Development Fund (CDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Public Service Improvement Program (PSIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>• The Pacific Plan (PP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>• The Public Works Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services (PIRAMS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Public Service Commission Institutional Strengthening Program (PSC-ISP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Samoa Police Project (SPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While participants were asked to discuss these particular policies, they were encouraged to raise other policy examples to better amplify points and concepts under discussion. This open approach helped ground the research in its place of study. Participants drew from own lived perspectives, rather than telling the researcher what they believed she might have wanted to hear. Here it was vital to keep in mind that the focus of the research was not so much about any particular policy. Rather it lay in ascertaining people’s meanings and the key concepts and principles guiding participants when talking about policy processes from within their own experiences and public policy worlds. That is, the research seeks to understand why things are as they ‘are’ in understanding key issues, dynamics or factors behind any adoption, formulation and implementation of a policy that has led to particular results.

3.4. Research methods

While a case study design guided the overall project, grounded theory, narrative inquiry and participant observation provided complementary techniques for data collection and analysis. Grounded theory is the technique most suitable for this project, given its ability to validate theoretical propositions that are well based in the field using the constant comparative method for within-case and across-case search for patterns (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2005, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Morse et al., 2009; Strauss & Corben, 1990). Grounded theory is the most widely adopted approach to generate theory in qualitative research (Denzin, 1994; Punch, 1998: cited in Simon, 2009, p.168).
Narrative inquiry such as *talanoa* (conversation) and *fono/tok tok* (meeting)\(^\text{VI}\) captured the ‘lived experiences’ of participants in story-form or narratives (Simons, 2009, p.75). Stories of policy makers, formulators, implementers, funders and observers offered depth of richness in descriptions, and interpretation as to how and why policies emerge and then their results. In telling (constructing) and re-telling (re-constructing) these experiences ‘interpretation is inevitable because narratives are representations’ (Reissman, 1993, p.2). Excessively grounded theory coding can distort the meaning of data (Eisenhardt, 2002) hence the need for supplementary techniques of narrative inquiry.

### 3.4.1. Data collection

Interviews (semi-structured) were the main data collection method utilised, documentary analyses and participant observation used for triangulation. Fluid and face-to-face conversations produced meaningful relevant data, particularly relating to PIC cultural contexts. The sampling method was ‘purposive sampling’ (Creswell, 1998, p.18) or ‘theoretical sampling’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), where ‘particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices’ (Maxwell, 2009, p.235). Theoretical sampling applies where cases are chosen to replicate others and to either extend an emergent theory or fill conceptual categories involving frequent overlap of data analysis with data collection and reflectivity (Eisenhardt, 2002, p.12). Policy documents, reports, cabinet and parliamentary papers, budget documents, project documents, newspaper reports, donors’ documents and databases and other relevant materials were analysed to trace and map processes, validate participant narratives and allow my own participant observation and interpretation.

Given a conducting of multiple case studies, prior preparation was essential. Preparation of fieldwork protocols included a pilot in Samoa that tested and refined selected methods. The use of social networks in finding gatekeepers in-country was essential when screening policy cases for final selection, and for having induction to research locations (the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Region) where the researcher was less familiar.

Table 3.3 outlines this study’s participants. While they are grouped according to location, most provided not just within-case but also across-case perspectives. Prior to interviews, 

\(^{VI}\) While other scholars (Suiaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014) refer to *talanoa* as a methodology, this inquiry adopted *talanoa* as a method. In my Samoan experience, *talanoa* means the binding (*noa*) of the stories/words (*tala*) through having informal, open and culturally appropriate conversations between two (or more) individuals. *Fono* is referred to as a group meeting (or *talanoaga* in Samoa). *Tok* is the Melanesian pidgin word for talk.
they were informed about the four case studies, specific policies under investigation, and the overall research focus. A personal letter, information sheet and consent form (Appendix D) explaining the research were sent in advance to every concerned organisation and individual requiring support and permission before arrival in-country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa*</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public servants/government officials</td>
<td>15⁺</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17⁺</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors/figures</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6⁻</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor actors (including consultants)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Forum Fisheries Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society/independent actors</td>
<td>8⁺</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Others (USP, UNDP, Civil society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total across the four case studies – 128 participants

* included 12 participants from the pilot
⁺ counting participants interviewed in groups - three in Vanuatu; one in the Solomon Islands, four in Samoa and two in the Region

Table 3.3: This study’s 128 participants

Interviews were tape recorded. The first interviews were heard and used to shape those following as an iterative learning process. Important points made during interviews needing further clarification were followed-up with later interviews.

3.4.2. Data analysis

Enabling data analysis identified in Box 3.1 required diligent application of analytical case study tools (Eisenhardt, 2002; Simons, 2009; Stake, 2000, 2006; Yin, 2009); grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Morse et al., 2009); and narrative inquiry and qualitative methods in general (Creswell, 2009; Flick, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The Nvivo software (Bazeley, 2007) was utilised for data management, thematic coding, process mapping, pattern matching, and memo writing (e.g. to self-reflect on strengths and gaps in data collection and record thoughts at different times). Overall, data analyses involved the following:

- Each case study being analysed ‘as a case’ where data was analysed and interpreted in accordance with the research purpose;
- Importation of data sets (interviews, documents, observation sheets, field notes) to Nvivo. Data was organised into folders (four case studies) and sub-folders (specific policies, types of data, memos);
- Self-transcription of interviews and translation of Samoan narratives;
- Using pilot data to test out (grounded theory) coding procedures, and where an initial
coding tree (see Appendix F) was inputted into *Nvivo* as codes (*nodes*). Codes were descriptions of participants’ responses to interviewing questions based on the research purpose, interests and questions. Figure 3.4 is a screen-shot of Vanuatu’s coded participant narratives;

As data collection and analyses progressed across the four case studies, the coding tree was amended concurrently to accommodate new or different themes emerging from the data, or to reflect concepts consistently emphasised by participants;

The coding process involved several iterations of listening to interviews, reading transcripts, coding, interpreting, reflecting and making sense using *memoing*;

Based on the frequency of coded narratives and validated by documentary analyses and participant observation, the stand-out patterns (core thematic variables) were interpreted, compared, and then constructed into findings/propositions;

Findings/propositions were further synthesised/re-coded to help form a model. This model was revised when moving from within-case to cross-case analysis to compare findings;

Once each case was analysed and written up as a narrative, cross-case analysis further identified similarities and differences. This confirmed or validated final findings/propositions (overall patterns) and key variables (of the model).

This research dealt with socially constructed realities. Participants’ views were subject to their own interpretation of these realities influenced by their own backgrounds, worldviews and positions held. From my background as a Pacific Islander, I have interpreted these realities (as told by participants) and constructed them as evidence of how public policies have been initiated, formulated and implemented within a Pacific island setting. Given this social constructionism lens to the research, narrative extracts are presented in this thesis in verbatim forms (the manner in which they were said). Given that most participants were from non-English speaking backgrounds, and the use of colloquial languages in interviews, the grammar in verbatim quotes might not be accurate. Narrative extracts are coded according to participants’ roles (see Appendix E).
3.4.3. Participant and researcher in the study

Grounding this research requires an in-depth insight into a PIC context and what actually goes on. All research, whether conducted by an insider or an outsider, faces limitations and challenges in execution. This study was no exception. My background as an insider (see section 1.1.4) could be construed as constituting a bias when undertaking this research. However, subjectivity is a facet of human nature significant to any research and should not be seen solely as disadvantageous. Being a Pacific islander with inside knowledge and experiences in the subject of this study brought insights and certain advantages such as in establishing rapport with participants, obtaining their frank responses and acquiring documentation. Some researchers (Iati, 2007, p.16; Sause, 2008, p.96) have encountered similar difficulties when accessing confidential and sensitive documents and interviewees given a culture of secretive, protective and ‘guarded jealously’. Hence personal links

Figure 3.4: A screenshot of coding participant narratives from Vanuatu
facilitated access to people who had the required information about the policy cases. Participants saw me as an insider. This affected their responses such as making comparison of their situations to Samoa and related to things that I think they might not have mentioned to a non-Pacific person.

Cultural orientations, in particular, are central to Pacific people influencing observer-observed interactions. A researcher unfamiliar with these considerations can face difficulties in comprehension and in turn may lead to misinterpretation of the meanings of things (policy practices) to local people. Duncan (2010, p.19) has alluded to the difficulties faced by development agencies when informing themselves about such orientations. This has had a significant impact on understandings of why certain reforms have been unsuccessful. PICs are known for the informalities of process, hence the need to account for what people say about themselves or policies (espoused theory) and what they actually do or practice (theory-in-use) (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p.13; Gillham, 2000, p.14; Jones, 2009). Attending to these distinctions during interviews, observations and analyses was vital for getting a good grasp of what actually occurs when policies are made and implemented.

3.5. Research validation

Certain criteria are used to assess and judge the validity and reliability of research. Validity concerns the quality of the research to the extent that it contains procedural errors or bias of the researcher and how far her construction (of reality) is empirically grounded in the field being studied. Reliability concerns the quality of methods and procedures used and how methods are made transparent (and to whom) so as to assure the trust of a research audience as to findings (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.21; Lincoln & Guba, 2002, p.205; Maxwell, 2002, p.41; Yin, 2009, p.40). Acknowledged criteria that scholars have used to assess the validity and reliability of qualitative research included:

- ‘trustworthiness’ of reported observations, interpretations and generalisations’ (Mischler, 1990);
- *procedural validity*: clarifying the researched-researcher relationship throughout the course of the research and when presenting the final product (Flick, 2002, p.225);
- *triangulation* of the research using different methods, study groups, settings and theoretical perspectives in dealing with a situation (Denzin, 1989, p.23);
- *credibility*: likelihood of ‘prolonged arrangement and persistent observation in the field’, checks of data and interpretations by participants and discussing research with
others to ‘disclose one’s own blind spots’ (Flick, 2002, p.228);

**dependability**: checking of research dependability through an auditing trail and quality management procedures (Flick, 2002); and

**generalisation**: the ‘transferability of findings from one context to another’ which involves the ‘gradual transfer of findings from case studies and their context to more general and abstract relations’ (Maxwell, 2002, p.52).

The researcher had to stand back a pace as someone undertaking the role of interpreter in this research. Previous experience assists but possible bias (conscious or unconscious) when conducting this research cannot go ignored. Reducing such bias and enhancing the reliability and validity of the research were facilitated through a proper, diligent and careful execution of the research according to design. In accordance with the above criteria, the following procedures and approaches facilitated the reliability and validity of this study and its findings:

- Multi-case study using multiple sources of evidence led to triangulation of findings (Stake, 2006, p.33; Yin, 2009, p.18);
- Case study research was carefully designed with protocols, procedures and guidelines ensuring the rigour, reliability and validity of the research (Yin, 2009, p.40);
- Multiple-case study with 10 policies as sub-cases provided ‘analytic generalisation’ (rather than statistical generalisation), because the aim was to be ‘generalisable to theoretical propositions’ (not to populations or universe) (Yin, 2009, p.15);
- The use of ‘multiple-case study’ (as opposed to a ‘single-case study’) gave confidence to ‘generalisation’ because of multiple experiments’ through the ‘logic of replication’ (Yin, 2009, p.38);
- All procedures used in the course of the research were properly documented using well-established research methods and tools, being adapted to suit Pacific cultural contexts. This ensured procedural validity, credibility and trustworthiness;
- Data collection and analysis employing appropriate techniques (grounded theory, narrative, cultural methods, etc.) to ensure the quality of texts and interpretations;
- Findings were read and commented on by supervisors and various other experts with in-depth experience in the field of public policy, development and in the region; and
- Declaration of my bias (both positive and negative) as a Samoan and a Pacific Islander throughout the conducting of this research.
3.6. Research limitations

Data obtained were voluminous (128 interviews) each rich in participants’ perspectives. Much of the analysis written during within-case processing to gain deeper insights into each country’s policy process was omitted due to limited space. However, nuances and key themes emerging across cases were maintained. Examining the processes of public policy is complex because public policy is a living, intersubjective and paradoxical social phenomena. Data presented here was collected in 2012 with some added in January 2014. Changes that took place after this period were not validated by participants but only through available media sources up to June 2015.
CHAPTER 4: POLICY PROCESSES IN VANUATU

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses Vanuatu’s policy processes based on patterns emerging from participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses and participant observation. The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in chapter three. Vanuatu’s background is provided in section 1.2. A total of 33 participants (see Table 3.3) shared their experiences and observations of the three policy cases (see Table 3.2) and how public policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented in Vanuatu. Section 4.2 examines the policy cases while Section 4.3 describes the general patterns of policy processes. Section 4.4 summarises key findings emerging from Vanuatu.

4.2. The policy cases

Vanuatu’s policy cases are the Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP), Telecommunication Liberalisation Reform (TLR) and Employment Law Reform (ELR). Policies were selected based on requirements outlined in section 3.3. The emphasis of examining these policies is to determine critical factors at play in the initiation, formulation and implementation processes, and that have contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2).

4.2.1. The CRP

4.2.1.1. Background

The CRP, Vanuatu’s first major reform, was instigated by the Vanuatu government in response to a mid-1990s economic crisis. As the mainstay of ongoing public sector development, the CRP remains relevant having occasioned various offshoots, such as the forced resignation and subsequent contracting of the Directors General of 13 Ministries in 2012 ("Directors General likely to go on contract this year," 2012, August 30). The CRP began in 1997 and ended in 2000 in relation to the US$20 million Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan program used to design and implement the first two phases (see Table 4.1). Australia and New Zealand aid support continued phase three which was long-term and not

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vii Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-italicised.
necessarily attributable to the original CRP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Donor project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Immediate-short term: July 1997 to December 1998</td>
<td>US$20 ADB loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium term: up to the end of 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Long term: beyond 2000</td>
<td>AusAID/NZAID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: CRP design
Source: Extracted from Gay (2004); Pal (2002, p.6)

The CRP’s vision was ‘to empower ni-Vanuatu, through the private sector to lead the development process in Vanuatu, with government playing a supporting and enabling role’. The goal was ‘to enhance economic growth and raise the socioeconomic standards of all ni-Vanuatu’. This involved five objectives: renewal of the institutions of governance; a redefined role for the public sector; improved public sector efficiency; encouragement to private sector led growth; and improved equity between sections of the population (Pal, 2002, p.5). Designed to be comprehensive (encompassing all sectors), the first two phases comprised 46 reform measures (see Table 4.2) drawn in an ADB ‘program loan matrix’ and for implementation by government departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform measures</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Government systems strengthening (financial, human resources, policy, operational processes, etc)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legislative changes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Restructuring and institutional set-up/changes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tariffs, tax, licenses changes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corporatisation and privatisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy reviews (health, education, infrastructure, decentralisation)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credit and borrowing schemes for citizens</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial institutions revitalisation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Double budget (health and education only)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working committee to strengthen cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: CRP elements
Source: Extracted from Pal (2002, pp.30-53)
4.2.1.2. Initiation

The CRP was initiated in response to an economic crisis driven primarily by political instability, corruption and social unrest. Vanuatu was at a critical point of nation-state building and had faced turmoil (e.g. 1994 public service strike, 1997 riot) after 15 years of unsettled post-colonial independence. Reform trends around the region added momentum for the CRP adoption:

When we became independent, there was a rout, a fight, nearly a war here ... They (colonisers) went home and we had to start a lot of things from scratch. After 15 years there (independence) we went down. We went broke like everybody else... The problem is that political governance continued to ruin this country... The mid-1990s was where everybody went crazy about reform. That was where we precipitated this CRP. [VPA.1]

The critical point for the CRP movement was the first change in government in 1991 when the Vanua’aku Party (in power since independence) then split (see Table 1.1), leading to the formation of the Union of Moderate Parties. This became the ruling coalition from 1991-1998 and its Prime Minister (PM), Serge Vohor started the CRP process from 1995. However, party fragmentation within subsequent governing coalitions (a ‘crisis in government’ (Huffer & Molisa, 1999)), made it difficult to obtain policy stability and consensus. What then enabled the CRP to act was the two mentioned main parties’ leaders (Serge and Natapei) adopting a political compromise not to bring the government down on grounds of precipitating reforms needed to address the crisis facing the country:

1991 was the first time we changed the government... But then the government was changing every time. We had like four governments in a row.... Some ministers served for one month... So we were so fed up because this new Minister came and said to go this way. We started working on it but another Minister came and said to go that way. [VPS.1]

Serge started the reform and we knew when we went back to government that we needed him... So we came up with this idea of ‘agreeing to disagree’—‘Natapei and Serge’. You are talking about Serge, our rival. We fought and hated each other, French and English speaking ... It was a decision we had to make. There was no choice. That we disagree but we don’t need to break the government...

We needed to hang on for four years to be able to bring about the reform. [VP.2]

The CRP, as a reform package was adopted as part of the structural adjustment agenda promoted in developing countries during the 1980s/1990s. ‘It was seen as a structural adjustment program and therefore must be treated as one. The ADB acts as a kind of IMF or
World Bank for the Asian and Pacific Region. Conventional methods are employed’ (Gay, 2004, p.25). One participant gave a strong view about how this agenda was adopted:

\[ CRP \text{ was spearheaded by the ADB... and other foreign forces for the sake of good governance. There had been fear in those days because that's how these big donors come in to overtake. They came and said 'you are going down, if you aren't careful you will go bankrupt'. They came and went through our political system and said 'go through reform'. } \text{[VPS.12]} \]

4.2.1.3. Formulation

According to various participants, the CRP adoption and formulation were shaped by a combination of ideas from technical advisers, reform-minded agents in government and the region, and politicians who had had exposure to similar reforms across the region:

\[ \text{We were learning what happened in the Cook Islands and Samoa, clearly the signs were there for reform... Samoa managed the reform well but Cook Islands reform was drastic. We didn't like what happened in Cook Islands. } \text{[VPS.2]} \]

\[ \text{We are talking about the 1990s... Samoa was leading the whole thing and we came after you. I was in charge of this reform at the Forum but Vanuatu was never interested. Suddenly John Sammy from ADB in Fiji, one of the regional guys with a regional vision came and whispered to my ears and we started the reform here. } \text{[VPA.1]} \]

As indicated by participant narratives and available documents (ADB, 2009a; Pal, 2002), the CRP’s knowledge basis was a ‘state versus market-led’ public policy model. Ideologies of ‘private sector led economy’, ‘a more open economy’ (market) in the name of ‘good governance’ (state) were adopted. However, reforms for the private sector were limited to 10 compared to the 34 for the public sector (see Table 4.2). Here the political element was not the main emphasis. The nature of the reform measures entailed structural (rather than behavioural) change within the public sector. There was little consideration given to the possible role of civil society despite intentions to enhance rural development. The formulation process involved work of various working committees and technical advisers, reporting to a steering committee headed by the PM and coordinated and facilitated by the PM’s office. Elements of policy transfer were evident in the reform content:

\[ \text{The reform was done in a form directed to the PM. The Deputy PM was Chair of the Reform Committee. We had the governance and economic sector areas and I was chairing that sub-committee. Everybody was requested to make submissions on the reform to the CRP Secretariat in the PM Office... We were doing all this work and we got bits and pieces from Samoa. } \text{[VPS.8]} \]
As part of the package of the ADB loan we had some technical advisers. So many I cannot count them, mainly to do reforms at Finance and PSC. [VPS.3]

The CRP summit, the first held in June 1997 during the CRP inception, entailed a nationwide consultation process. As this was an annual event, the CRP day-to-day formulation was largely a top-down process driven by parliamentary back benchers, officials and technical advisers:

*If the CRP was to be the whole thing inclusive of Vanuatu, it never... They said that they had consultation nationally. But in terms of education it didn’t reach the majority of people.* [VPS.4]

*Technical advisers came and started writing these initiatives and strategies. It helped but that was where it went astray because it was done by them and a small contribution was from the ni-Vanuatu part.* [VPS.6]

### 4.2.1.4. Implementation

All 42 reform measures were ticked off as completed (Pal, 2002, pp.30-53). Value added tax was introduced, the government machinery was restructured with a 10% (over 700 employees) reduction in employment (ADB, 2009a, p.75), financial institutions (e.g. Vanuatu National Bank, Vanuatu National Provident Fund) were restructured, and public sector financial, corporate management and planning systems introduced. Over 200 laws were passed and policy functions and processes established. The Priority Action Agenda (PAA) and the Planning Long Acting Short (PLAS) (Vanuatu Government, 2006, 2009b) that emerged from the CRP became national policy frameworks:

*We have this value added tax which we didn’t have before. We passed more than 247 pieces of legislation. We came up with a new government structure including Director General posts... A lot of initiatives mostly in finance and the public sector like this statutory office, the financial intelligence unit where loans are injected, measures to collect debts and restructuring of financial institutions.* [VPS.2]

*From the summit, we came up with the CRP matrix, a wish list of many refurbishments... Currently when you talk about the PAA, it emanated from that matrix.* [VPS.3]

Implementation of the 42 measures became loan conditionalities (see Table 4.3). These conditionalities were ‘overwhelmingly governmental in nature’. Furthermore, ‘part of the loan was used to employ 42 international consultants who were to carry out the first stages of the program’ (Gay, 2004). ‘There was very little if any procurement of goods and services
apart from the services of the consultants’ (Pal, 2002, p.15). A major challenge according to participant narratives (and as Nari (2000) reiterates) involved trying to balance the government’s commitment to the program against the loan and local needs. Yet the commitment was more towards the former. Moreover, the reform was seen as a ‘big bang’ (Gay, 2004); ‘the government itself viewed the CRP as deliberately ambitious and reflecting the scale and urgency of the task’ (Pal, 2002, p.6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>First tranche</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release 1</td>
<td>Release 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector cuts and restructuring</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial restructuring</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal stabilisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 4.3: ADB US$20 million loan allocation and conditionalities


A lot of changes during a short period. In some sectors we did a lot of drastic reforms that people are still questioning. [VPS.10]

The implementation was consultant-driven. Most technical advisers were from developed countries on short-term assignments focusing largely on meeting loan covenants. The completion report (Pal, 2002, p.14) mentioned one consultant employed as Vanuatu National Bank’s General Manager fudging accounts to show that the Bank was making a profit and the ADB monitoring making no mention of this deception. Together with participant narratives indicating a lack of focus over context, ownership, understanding and sustainability, the CRP can be assessed as based largely on foreign ideologies and concepts:

We made a royal mess at everything. To begin with I recruited the wrong consultants. I got this American friend with some powerful connections. He wrote this fancy M&E system. Oh it was so complicated. He gave it to his counterparts and I don’t think they understood it. Every time he explained it I got more confused. Then Penny came and reviewed the M&E and she said he wrote a non-sense of it all. [VPA.2]

It took us a long time to understand the CRP concept and what was beneficial to us. They were foreign ideologies. The challenging part was how the reform connected with our cultural values. [VPS.13]

Most things they suggested to include were to recruit technical advisers... When they left, most things in these institutions collapsed... When they left PSC they just left the templates with these guys. [VPS.5]
Although the CRP was consultative (the summit), implementation was largely top-down. Local people were neither sufficiently consulted nor cognisant of the reform’s specifics; it treated Vanuatu as an experimental object that could be moulded to externally designed specifications:

*Perceptions about the CRP were different from the design by consultants... I was summoned by my own leaders for providing these foreigners. They built the wharfs and aren’t working... That’s what happen when you come up with a plan and without consulting people for the local knowledge you end up putting them in the wrong place. That wharf was built on the dry side. That’s why I had to do a lot of public relation exercises as we got a backlash for those silly projects. They say, no, not the Natapei government, not the ADB, because they don’t know how to build wharfs. [VPA.1]*

*People didn’t know what was happening... In terms of where the traditional society came in, I worked in customs and I didn’t look at that. It’s either you pay tax or not and that’s it. There are no grey areas. [VPS.3]*

*I was one of the expatriates involved in the CRP at the time. At the end of the process you go and give a report to your donor. It always happened outside the country. Our report happened in Noumea. [VP.1]*

The CRP was not a linear process. Politics and political leadership were critical in overcoming resistance and differences. But loss of momentum was evident through reversion to old practices and some implementation activities were discontinued when funding ran out:

*There were big differences in opinions about the reform... My Minister didn’t support it. But as the PM was in charge I used to go behind his back and said ‘PM, your reform, we are delivering it, but the Minister is not supporting it’... The PM said ‘don’t worry, I will fix this up, if someone doesn’t comply I will sack them’. [VPS.8]*

*When the CRP was put forward, the intention was clear but in the implementation, people forgot what they agreed to; the principles, the bigger picture. I said this because the public service has grown by 2,000 employees... The issue of tax was to be considered after one year but nobody wants to talk about it... The CRP summit has stopped as there’s no funding. From that non-convening of the summit you see people falling off. [VPS.14]*

Several participants considered political leadership as a key issue affecting reform effectiveness and sustainability. ‘It is not evident enough whether or not there is a real political will and support for the CRP as political instability and continuous changes that are contradictory to the agreed principles under the programme’ Nari (2000):
There are about 29 political staff despite the law in place... So was it a good change. Do we really need Directors General because politicians still want to have their own political advisers? [VPS.3]

Under the CRP, we came up with the Lands Act giving powers to the Minister to consent the signing of land leases. But we have huge problems with land dealings because when you become Lands Minister you get superpowers... In 2006 we had the land summit’s resolution to remove these Ministerial powers. But till now, every Minister and government doesn’t want to amend the Act. [VPS.5]

4.2.1.5. Results

Based on participant narratives, a completion report (Pal, 2002) and available assessments (ADB, 2009a; Gay, 2004), the CRP’s results were mixed. Success was assessed mainly against achievement of some macroeconomic, financial, and policy stability and relevant outputs. Key financial institutions were revived from insolvency. Public sector legal, financial and human resource management, policy and planning and accountability systems were put in place. In the eyes of the development community (ADB, 2009a, p.75), Vanuatu’s governance had improved:

We came in when the Ministry had no plan. Without the reform, we wouldn’t have some stability. [VPS.1]

In early 2000 we started to see some results. Our economy is booming... The National Bank is making profit. The Provident Fund has a... cash flow standing at about $16 million. [VPS.8]

After 10 years we can see some successes and weaknesses of the reforms. It’s successful only in terms of like donors giving lots of funds to Vanuatu because of improved governance ratings. [VPS.4]

However the CRP was unsuccessful when assessed against its objective, where ‘the important consideration of the reform is to ensure that it leads to greater openness of the global economy and also to a more equitable distribution of benefits’ (Pal, 2002, p.5). Economist Gay (2002) assessed the CRP as having succeeded only in enhanced public sector governance, while failed in private sector development. He reiterated at a 2014 seminar that the CRP was a failure:

CRP failed on almost every one of its objectives... CRP was sold on the basis of a predicted rise in GDP growth to 5.8% in the period 1999-2005. In fact GDP declined... there were major recessions in 1999 and 2002; the latter the worst since independence. (Makin, 2014, January 22, 2014, January 30)
Contributing to limited success was locals’ unpreparedness to embrace the change process. Sustainability was a concern as several changes were introduced within a short period. The importance of leadership in reform effectiveness has been highlighted but was not part of this reform’s focus:

The speed with which the CRP was implemented did not fully prepare the public servants and the community at large to fully embrace the reform process… CRP brought in a lot of amendments to a number of legislations… too many to implement and enforce in a short period of time… It is the view of most people that CRP was force fed in Vanuatu. (Pal, 2002, pp.16-17)

*We need to do something but people just don’t have the will. You give Directors General powers but PSC still hire and fire. Recruitment takes about seven months and disciplinary takes 18 months to reach a decision.* [VPS.2]

*All the reforms from the late 1980s up to the 2000s were about the public service. We didn’t include the political side… No one looked at how you support the political machinery, how you get the great minds into the political arena because they are the decision-makers.* [VCS-M.2]

The CRP has contributed to rising debts, but not improved service delivery. The public service downsizing negatively impacted upon some services and led to unnecessary redundancy. Savings from downsizing, supposedly to double health and education budgets, were used to fund public sector restructuring:

*The CRP is still quite contentious as it resulted in a misguided downsizing of the public service especially in agricultural outreaches.* [VPS.13]

*So what was the CRP for? It didn’t materialise because we did some serious cut of the public service… But it never works because the very people who were taken away were appointed back.* [VCS-M.2]

Has CRP helped? Probably not… the service since the CRP has not significantly improved. A visit to a village will perhaps give one a shocking account of type of service delivery meted out to the rural population… Such is the service after reform… Respective consultants must definitely be aware of these situations but no mention has been made in reports made available. (Pal, 2002, pp.20-22)

A major flaw in the CRP was its ignoring of civil society. On paper, social equity was the CRP’s objective but its implementation was just one of structural adjustment committed to meeting loan conditions. ‘The CRP was thus a faint echo of the global structural adjustments of the 1980s and with few of the positive results’ (Gay, 2004). Given that focus, and with over 40 technical advisers brought in-country and absorbing most of the loan money, some
labelled the CRP as missionary, which harboured resentment towards this reform:

*I regard my traditions and church as very important, influencing the ways villages are set-up. But in service delivery under the reforms, I don’t think we gave them the recognition they deserve... If we use local institutions fully, it demands very good changes.* [VPS.14]

*The reform we adopted in 1997 focused mostly on the public sector... in terms of policy consistency without addressing the community side.* [VPS.6]

*In 1997 we saw a flood of people coming in from all angles taking up the PM office... They lifted up and decided ok... we came to set up these systems, reforms and structures. They have done their jobs. I call them missionaries. They come, steal, kill and destroy.* [VPS.12]

### 4.2.1.6. Key factors

Table 4.4 summarises the critical factors of the CRP’s policy process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Young nation-state in a post-colonial era | Initiation  
- Political leadership  
- Change agents  
- Policy transfer – structural adjustment agenda | Success in outputs achievement within the public sector |
| Fragmented, unstable political system | Formulation  
- State versus market public policy model (the Washington Consensus)  
- Consultative but largely top-down  
- Limited focus on society | Unsuccessful in societal outcome, sustainability questionable |
| Dependent state – loan/aid | Implementation  
- Overambitious, big bang modality  
- Outputs and consultants driven  
- Meeting loan conditionality  
- Reform is complex change but structural in focus | |

Table 4.4: CRP key factors

### 4.2.2. The TLR

#### 4.2.2.1. Background

The Vanuatu government initiated the TLR in 2007 to end the monopoly status of Telecom Vanuatu Limited (TVL) and encourage competition in the telecommunication sector.
Telecommunication services were provided solely by TVL operating as a joint venture between the government and France Telecom and Cable and Wireless. TVL was accused of having poor services, high calling costs, and poor network coverage. Together with global liberalisation trends and rapid technological development, this led to the TLR. TVL’s exclusive franchise ended in 2012. Digicel entered the market in 2009, other providers (Telsat Broadband, INCITE) followed (PiPP, 2009, p.1). AusAID and World Bank provided financial and technical support to the reform which was still ongoing during the 2012 fieldwork.

Various participants assessed the TLR as a success story. Attributing factors are explored by examining its policy process.

4.2.2.2. Initiation

TLR had been on the agenda since the late 1990s as part of the CRP, but its initiation came to fruition when the government recognised the need for competition and that monopolisation was not good. There was societal demand for improved telecommunications amidst pressure from other actors to enter the market. Leadership at political and public administration levels spearheaded this reform with donors supporting it:

> Amongst the politicians, there was broad consensus it was time for the monopoly to end. This whole process began in the late 1990s and it took a long time to come together. In fact it was almost accidental. The Finance Minister while at an IMF meeting in Washington took a taxi down to the World Bank to follow up a letter he sent to them asking for telecom assistance… And it was something the World Bank couldn’t refused anymore as they forgot to reply. So they were quite available to Vanuatu’s request and provided us with some researchers… who had been through the same process in the Caribbean. [VPS.11]

> There are 150 international liberalisation cases influencing the stand that monopolies are not good; high prices, poor services, it’s an expensive world. Also, Digicel was knocking on the door saying give us a licence… It was obvious to people that the reform was beneficial. So it really landed on the PM at the time to recognise the need for competition. And AusAID said yes. [VTR]

4.2.2.3. Formulation

The development of the telecommunication industry has been guided by the PAA and the PLAS. For the TLR, the key policy document was the ‘2007 Telecommunications Policy Statement’ (Vanuatu Government, 2008) consisting of four principles: open and competitive
market; modern, independent and proportionate regulation; non-discrimination and technology neutrality and optional use of scarce resources. These principles guided the following TLR’s content:

- The 2007 Telecommunications Act amendment and the new 2009 Telecommunication Regulations;
- The 2008 establishment of the Telecommunications and Radio-communications Regulator;
- The formulation of telecommunications operational policies, such as the universal access, licensing and dispute resolution policies; and
- Negotiations for the monopoly’s end allowing new providers to enter the market.

A series of policies were formulated, negotiated, and tested before becoming laws, making this a phased trialling process. For example, to ensure nationwide coverage, a bond between the government and Digicel obligated Digicel to provide 85% telecom service coverage, including uneconomical islands, this was supported by a universal service fund:

We had to make a number of key decisions before putting in laws... Under the universal obligation, the licence given to Digicel obligated them to provide 85% coverage.... We wouldn’t have this coverage today because 20% of the areas are uneconomical. The second obligation was the universal service fund... we collect between 0 and 4% of the operators’ revenue to fund infrastructure in specific areas... Payments to the fund were used to tender for 10 mobile sites including Ratura and Fatuna, some of the uneconomical areas. So a draft law was passed, an agreement was reached with TVL after a great deal of debate. And licences were issued to TVL and Digicel. [VTR]

International experts were deployed working with a taskforce of local change agents. As this was a new development, three expatriates with relevant experience were recruited in succession to the post of Telecommunication Regulator from 2007. International evidence was taken into account, but policy instruments were adapted to local conditions:

The government appointed four directors and an outside lawyer with telecommunication experience as a taskforce to look into all the issues—policy, business model, concessions, etc concurrently... That was how we tackled the reform. It was a lengthy process, looking at the implications of this liberalisation. [VPS.11]

The PM recognised that liberalisation was the right thing, experts were employed to develop the laws, and international experience was taken, but not just vaulted into Vanuatu, it was appropriately adjusted. [VTR]
The process involved a great deal of consultation and negotiation amongst different actors (TVL, Digicel, government, donors, etc.) in developing, coordinating and understanding policy instruments. Recognising culture added value to the whole reform such as securing land for infrastructure and having the required support through positive working relationships:

_They didn’t just fly in and do their technical research... We really needed to make the point of familiarising them with the ways of the think, work and speak and all of that. So part of my job was to help people understand better._ [VCS-M.1]

_All pieces of the jigsaw were enacted. A regulator was set up. We interviewed stakeholders particularly consumers and businesses... People understood what they got to do, how their actions play a greater role and what rewards they get if they succeed._ [VTR]

_We had dialogues with chiefs to reach a common understanding before we can build the infrastructure. The traditional system plays an important role as the culture is very strong ... If there’s a disagreement, we can leave all these papers and go to Nakamal and talk in informal ways. It added value to the whole arrangement and the government should take advantage of the culture to do stuff._ [VPS.10]

### 4.2.2.4. Implementation

The implementation process was not smooth, with resistance, court battles and disagreements encountered. Political instability and politicking led to disharmony and delays. Disagreements over the monopoly’s ending led to a court case in 2006 where the government prevailed over TVL. TVL’s refusal to negotiate the monopoly’s ending led to the use of deportation notices; this was designed to threaten TVL’s expatriate management (from France Telecom and Cable and Wireless) into co-operation. At one point, the key change agent behind the TLR was removed. Another court case occurred in 2012 involving the Regulator’s illegal suspension by the Minister:

_The government had minority share, so its says it didn’t affect TVL decision-making... So we traded that share to incentivise TVL to end its franchise. But TVL disagreed and the case ended up in court. Then we took advantage of the political will and sovereignty of this country. We advised the PM to deport all expatriates in TVL. As once they leave, no one would run TVL... So we were telling them, you either come to the table or you will be given deportation notices. TVL then agreed._ [VPS.11]

_It’s not like this was done without disharmony. At one point the Chair of the transition committee was removed as Director General of public utilities on flimsy charges. His dismissal was politically
motivated; TVL went to their friendly Minister and had things put in motion... And there was a six week period where Natapei was removed as Minister. It was a political shake-up and he briefly joined the opposition while the politician behind this Director General’s dismissal was moved in as Minister. He immediately went on a trip paid for by France Telecom... while announcing to put everything on hold... After six weeks, the party that had moved into the opposition was back in good grace as the government. Natapei was back and everything moved again. But for six weeks it looked like all of that was going to die on the line. [VC.4]

Vanuatu’s unstable political system meant that obtaining policy consensus was difficult, yet essential for implementation. This involved finding key local change agents who were able to maintain policy stability. Understanding the limitations of operating within the political and sociological (cultural) dynamics of a small polity was critical to the instrumentation of the reform—the ‘how’ of implementation. One participant described this as follows:

*It’s always about accepting we work within limitations. That the best people in-country will never be specialists. They have to be generalists. They’ve got too many other responsibilities. People at the core of the negotiations weren’t telecom experts but had experts available to them. They were however experts on Vanuatu. They know more about how things fit together here than any outside experts could ever hope to learn... So I’m always careful when people talk about capacity because you have no choice but identifying what the actual lack is and how to fill them is significant... You can throw anything into a gap but it doesn’t make it safe... You can throw popcorn into a big pothole and fill it up quickly but the next truck over is going to break into an accident. So people went on about political instability. But it’s not like there’s nothing we can do about it... The key is maintaining policy stability. Because a Minister is leaving from one week to the next and you don’t know where you are going to be next week... But there needs to be this small group of people capable for the sake of the country, who maintain this policy stability in spite of being in the midst of this turmoil... It’s not obvious how it’s going to work tomorrow but by-and-large it’s been workable... Telecom stabilisation is one example. And that understanding of the dynamics was key to the whole thing. In the Pacific you cannot ignore the fact that all social dynamics are driven by personalities. They are institutions but they are not the same. I’m from Canada and Canadians understand institutions as the parliament, court; the big things that never change. It doesn’t feel at all like that here. We have institutions constantly in a state of flux subject to re-interpretation every day. Personalities manifest themselves more, so these enduring things keep running through our lives but they find their voice through the individuals who are involved. So the key in development policies is finding these key individuals and that’s how you ensure continuity. [VC.1]*

Critical to the implementation process was the timing or sequencing of the reform in relation to the monopoly’s ending. Given political instability and small local capacity, more flexible or emergent approaches were critical in facilitating the change process. A top-down process or one-size-fits-all approach, often advocated by donors, may not work and risks being
obstructed by opportunism within a fluid political system. Reforms will not work unless they take account of such dynamics:

The other factor we looked at in negotiating this was the timeframe. We knew the TVL concession ended in 2012, so we started preparing everything now in anticipation of that. [VPS.10]

It was rather an ad hoc process in the sense you are reinventing it every day. Like this is what has worked up to now... But the moment the circumstances changed a new personality evolved. I have to change to accommodate this. It means it’s hard to plan for any significant period... Planning in details gets in the way, like what a donor wants... It’s more appropriate than a top-down process... Because it’s stupid to assume you can put too many processes on top of one another, as the guy who has to do it isn’t going to be one person... This means that the administrative processes you see in most donor agencies don’t work. They cannot react... So we are talking about the lack of capacity in the Pacific but it’s also the inability of donors to match their capabilities to the Pacific. They cannot drop a 100 thousand bucks on a quick win. Because it’s utterly unrealistic for developed countries to think ‘oh well, we just get this country working like us so we all be divine together’. No, things just don’t work that way. [VC.4]

Leadership, ownership and capability building were critical to reform sustainability. As the former Regulator, Crook (2010, p.6) stated in a submission to AusAID, ‘in the smaller countries a great deal of capacity building is needed to enable the indigenous peoples to take-up governance roles in a meaningful and effective way’. The inclusion of a monitoring component ensured that the TLR’s obligations were progressing:

There’s a danger that might happen when you have experts coming in without effective local staff. That you get a policy written, experts go away and nobody here understands it. So ownership is one of my things, to develop local capability to lead and manage projects. We have built an exemplary group and good governance mechanisms. When I leave, the show can go on. [VTR]

No matter how good the people are when there’s no leader at the top things start falling apart. So the other success factor is visionary political leadership. And we didn’t just employ expatriates. Ni-Vanuatu were at the core of this process. We spent a lot of time training them... getting our procedures, corporate memory, structure, policy, everything internally. [VPS.14]

We have 90% coverage now. Digicel didn’t meet that at the time. But they had a bond that was big enough to incentivise them to meet their obligation. [VC.4]

4.2.2.5. Results

Based on participant narratives and other evaluation (PiPP, 2009), the TLR was a success.
Contributors included local demand for improved telecommunication services. It was not a public policy that people saw as a threat, being deemed beneficial.

_The Director, Pacific Cable and Wire said in an interview this was the most successful negotiation. He had worked in the Caribbean where Digicel started and he knew just how bad it can get. The breaking of the monopoly was just agonising with huge court battles. You couldn’t call the other services and this went on for years while they were basically dragged, kicking and screaming into co-operation with one another._ [VPS.11]

_The TLR has been a success for a whole lot of reasons. Primarily, there was a gap in the market so people wanted that service, low prices and new products... It’s national. It’s really not a political football. It’s something that benefit us all._ [VTR]

Coordinated working relationships between Ministers, officials and donors was another contributor to success, as Crook (2010) has highlighted. Leadership was a fundamental factor. The TLR was locally driven with ongoing donors’ support to ensure sustainability.

_As long as there’s understanding and good relationships, things come and go. We achieved more on that, around 60% on that relationship._ [VPS.10]

_Leadership is a key factor. You need somebody who can drive this through, who is futurist on where this type of infrastructure will take the government._ [VPS.14]

Research shows that the TLR has led to ‘nearly universal access to mobile telephony’ with rural access increased by 23% in 2008. Costs of doing businesses were reduced and household productivity, resource distribution, access to services, information and social networks improved (PiPP, 2009).

### 4.2.2.6. Key factors

Table 4.5 summarises the critical factors of the TLR’s policy process:
4.2.3. The ELR

4.2.3.1. Background

The ELR was instigated by the Vanuatu government in 2008 to enact domestic employment law changes in compliance with international labour standards. Vanuatu became an ILO member in 2003 and is signatory to eight ILO conventions (ILO, 2009, p.10). Implementing these conventions requires domestic policies and laws. The ILO Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) has been the key policy document utilised to specify domestic labour reforms. About 81 countries have DWCPs, all developing nations (ILO, 2015). Vanuatu’s DWCP (2009-2012), based on ILO standards, regional agendas (MDGs, Pacific Plan), and its national policy, the PAA, guided the ELR. Building on the ILO’s primary goal ‘to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity’, Vanuatu’s DWCP contained four priorities:

- ‘labour legislation reform and application of international labour standards;
- promotion of decent employment opportunities particularly for young women and men, and inclusive of persons with disabilities;

Table 4.5: TLR key factors
capacity building of tripartite partners and improvement of social dialogue; and increasing social protection’. (ILO, 2009, p.14)

As part of the ELR, Vanuatu’s Employment Act 1989 (‘the 1989 Act’) was amended in 2008 to enact increased employees’ benefits. Amongst other changes\textsuperscript{viii} was a substantial 300% increase in severance allowances and a 100% increase in maternity leave. A Bill introduced in Parliament on 19 November 2008 was passed the following day but suspended from gazetting following hostile reactions from the business community. Submissions to the PM made by the Chamber of Commerce on behalf of employers requested a compromise on the Bill given its huge impact on businesses. Communication between the two parties ceased only when the President referred the Bill to the Supreme Court in February 2009 on unconstitutionality grounds (Jowitt, 2012, p.86).

In 2009, the 1989 Act was further amended altering provisions of the original 2008 amendment. Maternity payment provisions, for instance, were reduced by a third, as was the severance allowance. The 2008 Bill was not gazetted until October 2009 along with the amended 2009 Bill. The 2008 Bill was not assented to by the President until June 2009. This followed a May 2009 court ruling that the 2008 Bill was a political issue beyond the court’s mandate (Jowitt, 2012, p.94). The unsettled status of this legislation continued in 2010, when the 1989 Act was further amended to incorporate a Tri-partite Labour Advisory Council (TLAC) comprising government, employers and employees’ representatives. Law reforms continued during the 2012 fieldwork investigations. A new employment relations Bill, consolidating three existing labour laws was in draft form with further policy work to follow.

Various participants assessed the ELR as an unsuccessful case. Attributing factors are explored by examining its policy process in the following sections.

4.2.3.2. Initiation

Participants were asked where the ELR originated from and why it was initiated. All responded that the reform was introduced as an ILO requirement, seen as foisted upon developing countries:

\textit{When I said it was externally driven by ILO, this is because on their website you will find their DWCPs through the majority of ILO members are developing countries. It’s like the ILO pushing...}

\textsuperscript{viii} Jowitt (2012) gives a detailed accounts of the amendment.
these onto developing countries as developed countries are wise enough to tell them to go away. [TLAC-M.1]

Participants were subsequently asked why local actors accept these agendas if they felt that they were impositions. Responses demonstrated that the adoption of these agendas occurred largely to secure aid funding as conditionalities, or to meet performance criteria:

_There’s always this conditionality… If you don’t meet them then we still don’t access funding. If there’s no policy, there will be no funding. If you have a policy, yes. It’s a performance-based thing for them – these UN or semi-UN agencies… They are subject to performance, a deadline to meet their results… They bring aid and super programs but also ask us to abide by their rules. So in being a UN member we are gazetting the new bill next year._ [VCS-M.4]

Consideration of the ELR comprised mainly ILO representatives talking to the Minister and Ministry of Internal Affairs about reforming the law to reflect ILO principles in the DWCP. Generally the ELR was adopted to meet political interests:

_There has been this external influence pushing the country in directions it’s not ready for. During the 2008 election there was a lot of scrambling in trying to form a government. Eventually government got formed and the first thing the Minister did were these radical law changes… He and others made deals with voters they are going to get more pay-outs._ [TLAC-M.2]

### 4.2.3.3. Formulation

This was a classic example of a top-down policy with little prior consultation or warning. An ILO consultant did the drafting, a process that involved elements of policy transfer without consideration of contextual issues and implications:

_The ILO people just talked to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and did the amendment. This is why people are angry because there wasn’t much consultation._ [VPS.12]

_A consultant was engaged by the ILO to draft the bill. There were drafting notes suggesting there had been some discussion. But these notes are generic. I never saw or talked to anybody who had the opportunity to make inputs to these notes… This bill got drafted by being copied and pasted from Fiji. Then in 2010, they decided to go back to reform the law again. And what they did is resurrected an already problematic process which didn’t have a sound base in the first place. So we pay severance allowance the Minister increased with no discussion, no prior warning, nothing. That DCWP was never contextualised… It’s an excellent example of a totally irrational policy process._ [TLAC-M.3]
The basis for these increases remained unclear. For instance, according to participant narratives, some provisions such as the maternity leave could be based on ILO standards, but that used for other provisions, such as the severance increase, remained elusive. The increase was promulgated via a Ministerial directive, suggesting limited neutrality by public servants and TLAC in policy formulation and advice provisions:

Employers are struggling to pay these increases. They are saying where on earth did this come from? For the severance payment I cannot see where that came from. The maternity leave can be based on international standards but that in itself is problematic because these standards are inconsistent. There is a convention on maternity leave from 1919, one from 1952 and the most recent in 2000 and they all contain different standards. [VPSM.1]

The law changes four years ago were done unilaterally by the Minister. He promised certain voters he would increase the minimum wage and severance. But this is not the way to do things because there’s a TLAC set-up by legislation and he didn’t even think of going through that system. [UR.1]

The Directors General have to be very strong, people who can say sorry Mr Minister, this is the way to do it. But if you are slow... and have fear of your boss, it put you in a weak position. [VPS.13]

The public only became aware of the 2008 Bill when it went to Parliament. It was passed with little deliberation and against concerns from the opposition as to its negative implications. There was no time allowed for any public submission:

I went to parliament to get the records of their discussions. Funny enough the tapes were lost. There’s one lot of minutes from the first reading indicating they spent half an hour discussing the bill. Wednesday was the first reading and the second reading took place the following day where the Act got voted in. 50 out of 52 Member of Parliaments voted for it despite the opposition leader saying the day before that this is going to destroy our country. Then, of course, the outcry started. None of these (2008 Bill papers) was publicly discussed and I cannot find documents on it. [TLAC-M.3]

The ELR’s ideological foundation has been the ILO standards and principles upholding the rights of individual workers in formal employment (ILO, 2009). Promoting human rights in employment relations involved adopting contractual and bargaining arrangements, tri-partite structures and union representation. These arrangements were promoted and adopted despite international criticisms such as limited civil society representations. These arrangements, based on a well-developed private sector, were problematic for Vanuatu’s current economy with an underdeveloped private sector, and where unions are small. Tri-partite structures only represent formal employment, not those in the informal system. About 77% of the rural population are engaged in informal subsistence employment. Only 14,272 people are in
formal employment with government being the dominant employer (Vanuatu Government, 2009a). Accordingly, TLAC representatives wear multiple hats lacking neutral representation:

> Internationally, it is recognised this tri-partite structure is exceptionally problematic... Here unions are exceptionally low and they represent people who already have jobs. The majority of our workers don’t have jobs, are looking for jobs, are in the informal sector or are unionised. In this tri-partite structure, there’s no space for civil society representation and this is your international criticism. And as government representatives, you would think they contribute to the policy dialogue. In practice, we get the Commissioner of Labour and his staff as union members. So they aren’t able to play that mediation role effectively, to say, ‘hang on, this is the policy and the priorities’. [TLAC-M.1]

> It’s funny because when I sit on the TLAC I represent the employers. But I have been asked by the employees’ representatives to go and talk to the people. And I say um, can I do that? But I can do that because that’s what I need to be doing. [VP.1]

> We want a body that is independent to choose its own chair. But now the TLAC chair and its Secretariat are both public servants. So I don’t know if we have moved past what we had before. [UR.2]

The PAA’s ideological position is ‘private sector led development’ while that of the DWCP is ‘human rights’ through decent work (ILO, 2009, p.4). The latter was the basis of the law change, but it impacted negatively on the former, in particular its employment functions. Policy actors were unaware of the trade-offs between these ideological positions:

> There are insights that employers aren’t employing too many people. This is reducing the number of new jobs every year. This is a trade-off. [VPS.12]

This unawareness was attributed to a lack of prior discussion about the changes being foreshadowed. Some articulation of the rationales behind the law changes did subsequently take place to justify the changes and as defence against employers in disputes. The Internal Affairs Minister’s justification in a December 2008 meeting with employers’ representatives was that ‘the workers’ perception is that employers have had it good for 25 years’ (Jowitt, 2012, p.84):

> This is a huge part of the problem. They jumped into reviewing the law rather than going, we got this DCWP, the PAA, how do these things fit together, what are our labour policies and priorities. Then you need another level of discussion as per what we want with the labour reforms before the laws.
So there’s this post-justification process. You made your decisions and justify it later, rather than starting with a context analysis of issues, policy aims and specific interventions… That process simply doesn’t happen. [TLAC-M.2]

Participants saw the ELR as not adjusted to Vanuatu’s situation in terms of its development status. The 2009 Bill was a reaction to employers’ complaints against the 2008 Bill rather than an opportunity to consider the core issues and rationales behind the 2008 change and its appropriateness or likely impact:

This redundancy payment is inappropriate. It could be a big issue in years to come as we develop more… Our economy is quite superficial. We depend a lot on aid. We don’t produce money for our budget. So we need to be careful about the way we legislate our employment because it affects the private sector, the government and its finance. It’s very delicate. [VPSM.1]

There was an order to say rather than a rational consideration of what should be done, a consensus was reached, for everyone to save face and feel happy. This is somewhat problematic. The policy, this DWCP, has been driven by the ILO and not contextualised. If you look across the Pacific programs you will find they are all similar. If you look at the problems internationally… it’s a mess. [UR.1]

In a rational process, the policy groundwork involving discussion and analysis of the issues did not happen before law making. Instead, the approach was something of a ‘cart before the horse’. The 2010 amendment was just a name change of the TLAC without considering why such a body did not work before, and why it should work now. Understanding (or an emphasis on) that rational process was lacking in previous and ongoing ELR work:

We haven’t reached that stage where we actually work on the employment policies, because we are still in the process of amending the Act again. Once it’s gazetted then we work on the policies… The tradition is to go with the legislation first and then the policy. [VPS.12]

There was an advisory board… under the 1989 Act but it never met or did anything. They decided rather than getting this body to work, let’s amend the Act which did the same thing as before. The TLAC, the body that develops labour policies got established in 2011 and the first thing on its list was let’s review the Employment Act. The connection between policy and law is problematic and whether people don’t understand the policy process is one possibility. [TLAC-M.2]

4.2.3.4. Implementation

As a law change, the ELR was enforceable. This change was regarded as both an imposition and a threat to businesses and investment development. It was described as ‘chaotic’, or
‘very messy’ with employers reacting in various ways to manage this sudden change:

_We were all surprised because these are imported factors that became new paragraphs of the bill... Most employers here don’t know what ILO is._ [VPS.13]

_Because employees are able to access enforcement mechanisms of any sort, the laws are by-and-large enforced. These changes are exceptionally chaotic. This is where we are... trying to make the best of a very messy situation._ [TLAC-M.1]

Evidence shows that the ELR increased business liabilities affecting solvency and investments. Court cases continued, particularly over the retrospective aspects of the severance increase.

_It’s essentially putting companies into liquidation as suddenly businesses are saving for this employee’s severance for 10 years. With the information released by the Vanuatu Investment Promotional Authority, there was a significant drop in investment renewals and new applications in 2009; anecdotal evidence that this was happening._ [TLAC-M.3]

_It’s a financial burden to businesses. We got some big companies in court like ANZ (Australian and NZ) Bank, RICOH and TVL challenging whether the Act should be made retrospective or not._ [VPS-M.2]

It was assumed that employees were happy with the increase but the evidence suggests otherwise. The change impacted negatively on decent employment as employers reacted in various ways to manage the implications involved. Employers who afforded the pay-outs then terminated all their employees’ employment arrangements, paid out whatever severance was owed under the old provisions, and then re-hired some employees under different conditions. Casualisation rather than full time employment was seen in Vanuatu’s low-skill labour market. Gender discrimination in employment was a concern because of the cost of the maternity provisions to employers:

_Maternity leave concerns me because the obvious response is we are going to stop employing women. There’s data and you can find in the MDGs report that the participation rate of women in the formal sector is decreasing. You have to wonder if this is because of the labour law._ [UR.2]

_Small businesses are problematic because they try all sorts of ways to avoid paying such entitlements. They are struggling to make their investments work._ [VPS.12]

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4.2.3.5. Results

Improvement in decent work and private sector development as ELR’s key objectives have not been formally evaluated, but participant narratives suggest limited improvement. The ELR has not worked because it was a policy seen as imposed on the business community lacking consultation and contextualisation, impacting negatively against its objectives:

*Did they achieve the policy objectives? First and at one level this is hard to answer because there were never any clearly stated policy objectives. On another level, if you step back and say the policy objectives are in the DWCP, well no, not really because these are all about increasing employment through private sector development.* [TLAC-M.2]

*They haven’t worked because we don’t know what it is about. A lot of this labour stuff is just because the ILO wants it... Not because anyone here wants it. This policy stuff is a lot of work. You have to understand it. You have to sit down and talk hard.* [VP.2]

This case demonstrates the risk of adopting a policy when a country is not ready for it. While intentions seemed good, contextual factors question the suitability of advancing such reform types at this stage. What could work locally in terms of specific policy instruments did not take place. However, as a sovereign country Vanuatu could resist any change if that was deemed unsuitable. Rather than blaming the ILO alone, the law change was adopted for political interest, within an unstable political situation, and where politicians had freedom to do whatever they wanted with limited public awareness.

*Here, where you got an extremely unstable government, politicians are so concerned with their manoeuvring games that policy isn’t given the attention that it deserves. Instead we got things like the labour law changes as ways to manipulate and gain an advantage rather than looking at how they further the national objectives. Unfortunately that happens in a number of areas.* [TLAC-M.1]

*The population needs to get its act together through local authorities to have an influence. At the moment if you look hard you cannot see a clear picture coming out from the mass. This is demonstrated in their silence in labour issues and others.* [VCS-M.1]

4.2.3.6. Key factors

Table 4.6 summarises the critical factors of the ELR’s policy process:
Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from Vanuatu’s policy cases, in comparison with those in Samoa, the Solomon Islands and the Region (see Appendix G), and against existing literature.

4.3. The policy processes in general

This section examines participant experiences and observations of Vanuatu’s policy processes in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors for effective implementation.

4.3.1. Policy initiation

Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originate. Narrative coding (content analysis) yielded the patterns in Table 4.7. They show that participants experienced issues that became public policy as originating from actors in government, from society, and from abroad (external). The narratives frequency depicts three key patterns. First, the origins of what became public policy was influenced significantly by politicians (frequency of 34) and external actors (frequency of 34). Second, external influences came as policy transfers but also through the roles performed by donors and consultants. Third, public policies originating from society were limited (frequency of 22 and 11). The genesis of Vanuatu’s public policy was more supply (politicians and outsiders) than demand (society) driven:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young nation state</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Unsuccessful – outputs and outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented unstable political system</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy transfer - ILO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No rationality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Directive/imposed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy transfer – consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact negatively – path dependency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chaotic and messy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: ELR key factors
Narrative extracts illustrate these patterns:

*The ideas are from two people; the foreigners and big people up there, the politicians. If foreigners come with big money things will go fast. But if there’s no money things will still be there.* [VCS-M.2]

*We have many donors and sometimes our policies are donor-driven. They inject millions in Vanuatu but they got their own agenda.* [VPS.6]

*One of the difficulties is they have been left out for so long—the community.* [VPS.3]

*We have produced a good plan for the next 5 years but there’s no real demand from the people who we are trying to impact. The supply side is there but its miss-targeting the demand side.* [VC.3]

### 4.3.2. Policy formulation

What is constructed by various policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how they are constructing policies are the concerns of this inquiry.

#### 4.3.2.1. Construction of policy

Participants were asked about what they refer to as ‘policy’ and how they see the nature and characteristics of existing polices. Sections 4.3.2.1.1 to 4.3.2.1.3 analyses participant responses to these questions.
4.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy

Participants made reference to various documents in Table 4.8 as policies, indicated that the term ‘policy’ can be diluted, and can refer to different things. However, the narratives frequency reveal the following key patterns about the construction of policy in Vanuatu:

a) Most participants equated ‘policy’ with a strategic plan; e.g. the PAA, PLAS and plans at sectoral and organisational levels (frequency of 30);

b) Participants also talked of policy in terms of the espoused, rational top-down approach; the ‘policy for policy’ (frequency of 17) process held in Cabinet manuals, and for Ministers and public servants to follow as to how it should be developed and approved;

c) Some considered legislation, rules, policy statements, and procedures (frequency of 14 and 11) as all policies, but with limited understanding and practice about what comes first or later in a policy sequence;

d) Some referred to policies based on international and regional agendas (frequency of 11) as part of domestic policy. An ‘aid driving policy’ tendency with policy development a prerequisite for aid (as opposed to an ideal situation of ‘policy driven aid’) (frequency of 8) meant that aid conditionality was a policy component; and

e) Political policy platforms or visionary type policy (frequency of 9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulation of policy document (what)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic plan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy for policy</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules, policy statements, operating procedures</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and/or regional policy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor requirements</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal (e.g. a reform program)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political manifestos/platforms, leadership visionary type policy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Construction of policy in Vanuatu
Narrative extracts below illustrate what participants meant about these patterns:

When you talk about national policy, it’s the PAA and the PLAS. Then Ministries got their Annual Plans identifying what they should do based on the PLAS. [VPS.13]

There are all kinds of policies... But the policy I’m talking about is the template Ministries should follow in formulating a policy and get it approved by the Council of Ministers... But most don’t follow that because at most times the problem is being identified by the Minister. [VPS.7]

We got legislations coming out of our ears to which people don’t understand. They don’t know why we have them because they don’t have a policy. We got huddles of legislation but that’s not policy, that's not vision. [VP.1]

Once you are a UN member you are obliged to accede. If you don’t, they will look at you worriedly. Even if you don’t have the will power, it’s just to see there is a paper format to say yes. [VCS-M.2]

When that (US Millennium Challenge) project came in,^ they say it’s US and World Bank’s policy that you pay the quarry materials. Now everybody wants the government to pay for the quarry. But the roads are theirs to use. [VPS.14]

Across the Pacific we don’t have the Obama’s figure coming in and portraying the vision of hope for the next 20 years for our young people. [VDA.1]  

4.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies

A dimension of why participants referred to ‘policy’ as different things occurs because they constructed its manifestations according to different levels. Such levels are interdependent formulations, seen as corresponding to different stages of the policy cycle. Table 4.9 depicts Vanuatu’s policy framework constituting various documents existing (or yet to exist) at various levels. Implementing the PAA as the national policy required its translation to other levels; sector, industry (meso), organisational and individual levels (micro). Documentation of this top-down policy framework was incomplete at various levels:

^ See [https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/vanuatu-compact](https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/vanuatu-compact).
Narrative extracts below illustrate what participants meant about these levels:

_The PAA hasn’t been translated into sector and corporate plans in order to implement. This work is missing. Most Ministries’ corporate plans are not updated, still based on the old CRP. [VPS.5]_

_We don’t have all operating policies and processes written down, why a lot of things are falling apart and sticky hands coming in. [VPS.1]_

### 4.3.2.1.3. Features of policy

Participant narratives indicated that various participants regarded plans in place as ‘wish lists’, and seen as isolated from societal realities. There was an interpretation from the narratives that these were not public policies since they did not emerge as issues from society, but something seen as imposed. While these plans, regarded as national policies, sit nicely on paper in Port Vila, often what gets adopted and implemented has been mostly driven by dominant political agendas:

_I’m not saying we don’t have policies. But we have lots of policy transfer, stuff that gets thrown on us and we end up taking those as policies… It’s not policy because we didn’t create it. So it can’t be ours. [VP.1]_

_It’s a national policy (PAA) that doesn’t sink or land itself in the different islands… I don’t see that PLAS happening. [VPS.12]_

_Because a lot of interest is in the use of power and getting a quick fix, a lot of government resources are allocated to where it’s inappropriate. [VCS-M.2]_

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**Table 4.9: Vanuatu’s policy framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Most relevant to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National (Macro)</td>
<td>Political policy platform; PAA; PLAS; Cabinet minutes</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (Meso)</td>
<td>Sector plans - Vanuatu education sector strategy, trade policy, industry policy, tourism policy, etc; Sector project design documents</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry (Micro)</td>
<td>Legislation – Acts and regulations; Corporate and annual Business Plan; Rules, instructions, procedures, manuals (operational policies); Budget</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across</td>
<td>Six monthly report; annual development report</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
4.3.2.2. How are policies formulated?

Participants were asked about how policies are formulated; the processes employed, who has done the work of formulation, what is used as a knowledge basis for policy, and stakeholders’ understanding of policies. Table 4.10 gives the coded participant narratives for this ‘how’ question. Patterns shown by the narratives frequency are discussed in the following sections. Narrative extracts provided shortly illustrate what these patterns meant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge basis</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfer – imported social construction/evidence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social construction – ideologies, beliefs, values, etc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual research/evidence based – rational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology**

- Directive: 82 (22)
- Consultative: 12 (12)
- Participative: 0 (0)

**Formulators**

- External consultant/adviser: 39 (16)
- Policy unit – public administration: 19 (9)
- Working committees: 1 (3)

**Understandability**

- Yes: 0 (0)
- Some: 29 (12)
- Nil: 36 (16)

*Table 4.10: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in Vanuatu*

4.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy

Table 4.10 shows five key patterns about the knowledge basis of policy – what has been influencing the construction of policies as written and practised:

a) Policy formulation was a process dominated by policy transfers and social construction *(frequency of 55 and 41)*;

b) There was limited evidence-based policy process *(frequency of 1)* and what emerges is largely espoused rather than practised. The formulation process was largely ad hoc,
reactive, of a ‘cart before the horse’ nature and lacking consistency. Legislation was often introduced without proper analysis;

c) The policies and practices have been influenced by these types of social construction, involving interwoven belief systems that have co-evolved over time from:
   i. traditional culture;
   ii. religions;
   iii. politics and business;
   iv. colonial administrators (e.g. Anglophone versus Francophone);
   v. donor countries and the global policy system (policy transfers); and
   vi. formal education;

d) What got ‘written’ in policy documents was dominated by v) and influenced to some extent by vi). However, the ‘practices’ were strongly influenced by i), ii), iii) and iv). Thus what was practised often deviated from what was regarded as policy in any formal sense; and

e) The influences of i), ii) and iii) lack sufficient attention in formal policy processes and reforms. In essence, the context of (public) policy was largely ignored.

Narrative extracts below illustrate these patterns:

Why does it fail, simple, we have almost no formulation... If you watch the silent movies, there’s a group called the Keystone Cops in this old car driving around town with policemen hanging out, falling over and doing dumb things. That’s a lot like our governments... We are always reacting to things happening. And we aren’t setting a policy of development. We aren’t setting a policy of what we believe in. [VP.2]

The first government adopted this model from Tanzania and tried to fit it in a tiny country... And they only did a couple of plants here, not the other islands. We came up with these reforms but this Westminster still hasn’t taken into account other layers of traditional governance... the influence of culture in policy formulation. [VPS.12]

How are these policies formulated? It’s been rammed down the throat of politicians by donors and public servants... Although they don’t understand government they have to be seen to be dictating policy to get them into power. That’s how things are done. [VCS-M.6]
4.3.2.2. Methodology—how is it constructed?

Various participants (see Table 4.10) experienced the formulation processes as top-down (directive) (frequency of 82), where most policies were constructed with little stakeholder involvement. While consultative approaches (frequency of 12) have improved recently, the meaningful participation of civil society in policy processes was limited (frequency of 0). Various participants experienced donor actors’ significant influences in these top-down processes:

*Significantly we suffer because the policy formulation starts only within government. Very few in civil society; whose lives are affected by the policy are consulted.* [VCS-M.3]

*Sometimes instead of the government driving the agenda, the donors drive the agenda. We have lots of examples. The donors say I will give you money but I will send you my consultants. The consultants fly in, sit in Vila for two weeks and write everything nice on paper but have never visited the islands. They just based everything on the Vila perception. So nothing gets filtered down.* [VPS.15]

4.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policy—who is writing the policies?

Table 4.10 shows that most policy documents were developed by consultants (frequency of 39) and some by public servants (frequency of 19). Stakeholder participation (e.g. through working committees) were limited (frequency of 1). Narrative extracts below illustrate these patterns:

*If I take a picture of a child trying to write something and someone comes along and helps the child to hold his pen, that’s the picture of how we do policies. When we want to write policies for Vanuatu’s development we get an expert from France or somewhere to come and hold our hand.* [VSP.4]

*I’m a consultant myself and I’m cynical about this. A lot of these plans were written by consultants and with vested interests. A lot were designed to be lucrative. To be fair to donors, a lot of their projects are contracted to consultants and consultants are human... We must think more of the impact in why are we doing this policy.* [VPA.1]

4.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy

The patterns in Table 4.10 further indicate that most policies including systems of formulation and implementation were not well understood (frequency of 36). This limitation is attributed to lack of education, poor understanding of concepts and terminology (in policy documents), limited access to quality information, language diversity, and top-down
approaches to policy:

>The chiefs still have the people with them... but they are afraid because they don’t understand the system. They don’t understand these western concepts on which our constitution is written. [VCS-M.6]

>Our concern about the policy cycle is the level of understanding of these processes, not only at the community but also the politicians. They just rushed up stuff bypassing the processes. [VPS.6]

>The people who got voted in are not educated so how can they understand the PLAS. That’s why Vanuatu is in this way because most Member of Parliaments went as far as class six. [VPS.10]

### 4.3.3. Policy implementation

Examining the processes to determine factors or issues critical to implementation is central to this research. Table 4.11 identifies factors participants talked about most:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues concerning implementation</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder support and feedback</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People capability</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy culture and ownership</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget capability</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy translation to community</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.11: Issues or factors central to implementation in Vanuatu*

Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and narrated in the following sections under five headings: public policy leadership, stakeholder support and feedback, policy culture and ownership, capability, and translation of policy to community.

#### 4.3.3.1. Public policy leadership

Section 4.3.1 confirms that the policy process is political. Vanuatu’s public policy emerged as significantly influenced by political instability, lack of accountability, misunderstandings as to the role of government, and the influence of the ‘big man’ culture.
4.3.3.1. Political instability

Political instability is a symptom of Vanuatu’s diversity (see Table 1.1). In such a fragmented society, nation building is challenging but essential to public policy setting. Societal fragmentation translates into the instability of the political system. Policy consensus, and confidence in the government to ensure policy and implementation continuity, are difficult but important ingredients of the whole process:

We have to learn and accept this instability is the symptom of our diversity, 102 different dialects. Unless you have stability, you find it difficult to generate commitments and remain there to implement it. The way politicians think is like if you are going to switch from one side to another, what’s in it for me without bothering to think about how it’s going to affect the country. [VPA.2]

There isn’t a political party that hasn’t split. So many parties for a small country. The government needs to work together to do something but the PM is not able to do anything because if he does something these guys aren’t happy with, they jump off and join the other group and throw him out. [VPS.14]

4.3.3.2. Accountability

Participant narratives suggest that the dominant, state-led public policy system in Vanuatu has contributed to politicians becoming self-serving individuals corrupting the state system and with weak accountability. The public policy system became politicised affecting effective implementation and equitable resource distribution:

If it’s corrupt they forget about public policy. These guys are elected to government but still behave and act as though they are down in the village… The government system is being manipulated for personal gain affecting everything especially these plans. [VPS.9]

I believed this is where Vanuatu has gone wrong. It has come up with a system that allows for politicians to do things unchecked. [VCS-M.5]

How do you implement policy when the bosses can’t work together and within the rule of law? [VPA.1]

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\[x\] Vanuatu was ranked 77 (out of 182) on the 2011 Corruption Perception Index. (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results). Data unavailable for subsequent years.
4.3.3.1.3. Big man culture

Vanuatu’s public policy leadership and practices are largely influenced by ‘big man’ beliefs and political practices. Big men are not necessarily traditional chiefs but ‘men’ acquiring powerful status (‘big’) through wealth accumulation and influence in society. Improving accountability of this big man leadership requires making the checks and balances of the government system more relevant to the electorate:

The reality is that we live in the arena of big man politics. It’s not going to change anytime soon. That leadership has worked for thousands of years... as checks and balances so you won’t get tyrannical chiefs becoming dictators... How do we build those checks and balances into the government system so there’s more expectation of the leadership to be accountable? The greatest check and balance is the motion of no confidence but the most misused in bringing government down. Partly because these rules and processes aren’t relevant to the majority of the electorate basis. So they are open to misuse and multiple meanings in the Pacific. [VDA.2]

4.3.3.1.4. Understanding of public policy

Participant narratives pointed to a lack of understanding about the role of government in public policy, not only at the political level but throughout society. This issue has affected leadership capability to aptly deal with dynamic foreign influences and what is suitable locally. Similarly, this limited understanding has people’s ability to effectively hold their leaders accountable:

We got this problem where our Ministers go in government but have no idea of what they are supposed to be doing. So you end up with foreign influences because they come and say you need this. And the Minister says yeah, that’s a good idea. But you end up with something you don’t really need. [VP.2]

You cannot get the leaders to perform and refrain from doing something. People write to the media... and that’s it. They don’t really know how to channel their grievances and get to be listened to. [VPS.5]

4.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback

Lack of consolidated community support and feedback is a key area affecting the policy environment and implementation, particularly in a geographical and culturally diverse country such as Vanuatu. As the policy process is largely top-down and driven by the interplay of political and external interests, there is a need to bridge gaps in state-society
relationships, and a wider understanding of public policy has been limited. Efforts to improve these relationships saw the establishment of the Malvatumaui National Council of Chiefs. However, the Malvatumaui’s influence on public policy matters has been limited. Its role is restricted to advisory matters (over customs) (Vanuatu Government, 1980) and it is not mandatory for an issue to be given to the Malvatumaui for discussion or approval:

The further away you are from Vila, the less and less you see government, its policies, control and governance... The further away, governance is totally traditional... and the less you expect to see any service delivery or policy impact. People just continue with their own lives, with whatever they have. [VCS-M.1]

We have the chiefly system but our masters said ‘no, we needed the Westminster system’. But we don’t understand that. It’s fine if we are talking about Vila but there are 83 islands. 80% of Vanuatu doesn’t happen in the urban areas. It happens out in the villages. [VPS.2]

If Parliament talks about anything concerning land or a bill they should consult us (Malvatumaui). But we don’t get consulted... People in that red house (Parliament) are fighting against the traditional system so they could hide and be involved in corruption. [VCS-M.5]

4.3.3.3. Policy culture and ownership

Issues concerning implementation reflect policies already in existence. Most are not contextualised, being too distant in their formulation from those who implement them. Implementation then becomes difficult as there is a lack of policy ownership and engaged understanding. This issue concerns the limited collective ownership of the whole system of public policy, namely the government. Such limited ownership is reflected in the lack of influences from local people over public policy settings (see Table 4.7):

The whole reason is we don’t have enough expertise in the country. If we want policies that suit Vanuatu, those policies need to be written by Vanuatu experts, not foreign people. People who understand the cultural background, who can influence people to change mind-sets... There’s no willpower. We need a system that can influence. [VCS-M.3]

When you go to church, they have structured meetings. Then you look behind there is a planner there. But when it comes to his work here that doesn’t apply. It’s good to use in the church but why don’t you use it also in your job because the government sent you for training. Why are you promoting it in your little corner? So it’s that issue; the government is not for the people. [VPS.13]
4.3.3.4. Capability (people, budget, education and learning)

Vanuatu’s distinct situation (e.g. isolation, smallness, a young nation-state) posed ongoing challenges for the required capability to implement policies and sustain their impact. Implementation depends on fiscal capacity and how resources are utilised. Vanuatu does not have personal income tax. Value added tax was only introduced in 1998. Development mostly occurs in the capital with about 70% of the population engaged in subsistence living. Some experienced aid as a boomerang. Sustaining implementation has been an issue given the short-term modality of aid programs:

*It all depends on the cash flow in the country. That’s a big contributing factor in policies not implemented... We need to implement this decentralisation policy but there’s no budget.* [VPS.5]

*To get government services to all 80 islands involved huge costs. Most of the services and budget are centralised. We are talking of a national vision yet all the minds are in Vila.* [VPS.8]

*Donors are putting a lot of resources... But many people are questioning the effectiveness of the Paris Declaration. Because at the end of the day we just find little achievements. So most say its boomerang as only 20% is used here. So in the mind of a ni-Vanuatu, it’s not about how much you give but how much you use it for.* [VPS.7]

*Often we do something for a while and that’s it. But continuing it so it will have an impact is the real issue. Because a lot of these changes aren’t overnight. But often when the money runs out, it stops. It’s not giving it enough time to be part of their lives, for them to do it. The issue of longevity of keeping it going is often the difficulty.* [VPS.1]

4.3.3.5. Translation of policy to community

Previous reforms have focused mainly on ‘planning’ in public administration. What was limited is the actual work of determining how high level plans can be operationalised, monitored, and evaluated in the normal system of functioning within a small PIC. Measurement of reforms was mostly about outputs, yet without looking at how policy change could be built into the fabric of society. That task has been challenging given the short-term modality of aid programs/projects, and where policy (implementation) as a process often ended once a project finished, whereas achieving change from a reform is long-term. Policy functions were recently established as part of the CRP and capacity for M&E

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xii Aid money mostly returned to donor countries (see sections 8.5.2 and 8.5.1.2).
remained a significant developmental need:

The approach to policy must not be something just to cover, but part of building what is there and understand it. The difficulty with the aid coming in is we put it in but the context is not understood… Projects are for three-five years—that’s not enough to change attitudes. So after the project, it hasn’t had any impact on people and society… In the next five years, we do the same thing… under a different name… Our people have got used to their way of life for years… To expect change isn’t easy—building it into the social fabric already there… So if the change brought to them isn’t enough to influence it just dies out. For example, the concept of schooling isn’t new. But how we apply it at home is different—because people come together in a Nakamal or groups… But we have taken all of that out and put them in this little thing called ‘school’… Quite often, the school is detached from the community, instead of being part of the community, the school is part of itself. So the kids go to school and learn different things they find it hard to apply when they go home. [VPS.9]

An M&E unit had just set up this year in the PM’s office. We need indicators to tell whether this policy has been implemented, or not. That’s missing in most policies. [VPS.6]

4.4. Summary of findings

Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 4.12 summarises key findings in terms of propositions emerging from Vanuatu. Chapter eight discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Samoa, the Solomon Islands and the Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/category</th>
<th>Key findings or propositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation and adoption of</td>
<td>1. The origin of public policy is dominated by political and foreign actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td>2. Policies emerging from society are limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Adoption of policy is political. Political interests and legitimisation play a major part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in policy consideration, consensus and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of policy</td>
<td>4. Policy development is largely top-down, shaped by ideas and models of donor countries and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>are written by consultants without proper consultation and involvement of civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Evidence-based policy is limited, more often espoused than practised. There is no proper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>process of formulation; it is ad hoc, reactive and inconsistent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Constructions of policy are influenced by multiple intertwined beliefs (culture, religion, politics, colonialism, education, donor countries and the global policy system). Written policies are largely influenced by the last two while the practices are strongly influenced by the first three which receive insufficient attention in formal processes.

7. There is no consistent understanding of policy. References are often made to policies as documents manifested at different levels and scope shaped by multiple influences of both the domestic and global policy systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation of policy</th>
<th>8. Limited implementation is a reflection of policy and how they were put into place. There is little policy understanding and ownership and translation on the ground.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Reforms over the years have produced plans with little implementability with regards to Vanuatu’s context. Implementation issues largely concern the complex political-social dimensions of society and development status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. The key interconnected factors influencing policy implementation (and the whole process) are leadership, stakeholders support and feedback, policy ownership, capacity and the interplay of aid politics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy process as a whole</th>
<th>11. Contextual factors (geographical, social, historical and development status) have a significant influence on the practices of public policy and status of development.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. The concept of public policy and its notion of serving the public interest are not well understood. Isolation, education level, lack of policy discourse and access to quality information largely contribute to such limited understanding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Society needs to have collective ownership of government requiring a better understanding of the state and its role in public policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.12:** Key findings emerging from Vanuatu
CHAPTER 5: POLICY PROCESSES IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses Solomon Islands’ policy processes based on patterns emerging from participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses, and participant observation. The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in chapter three. Background on the Solomon Islands is provided in section 1.2. A total of 34 participants (see Table 3.3) shared their experiences and observations of the three policy cases (see Table 3.2) and how public policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented in the Solomon Islands. Section 5.2 examines the policy cases while Section 5.3 describes the general patterns of policy processes. Section 5.4 summarises key findings emerging from the Solomon Islands.

5.2. The policy cases

Solomon Islands’ policy cases are the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and Public Service Improvement Program (PSIP), highlighting critical factors across their policy processes. The emphasis of examining these policies is to determine critical factors at play in the initiation, formulation and implementation processes, and that have contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2).

5.2.1. The TRC

5.2.1.1. Background

The TRC was set up by the Solomon Islands government (SIG) following persistent requests from civil society groups (namely the Solomon Islands Christian Association and Civil society Network), for a fact finding commission to look into the causes of the 1998-2003 tension (the ‘tension’). The Solomon Islands is still recovering from this tension which led to a breakdown in governance and suffering amongst its people. Fundamental public policy challenges confronting the Solomon Islands lie at the heart of the tension, shaping ongoing and future development efforts. Examining the TRC provides a rich comparative

xiii Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-italicised.
understanding of those challenges.

The TRC was costed at US$3,029,886 in donor funding (European Union, UNDP, AusAID and NZAID) and SBD14,840,336 in local government funding (TRC, 2012, p.1228). It started in April 2009 when Parliament passed the TRC Act 2008 (SIG, 2008c) and completed in February 2012 upon submission of its final report (TRC, 2012) to government. The report detailed the TRC’s work in meeting its objective: ‘to promote national unity and reconciliation by engaging all stakeholders in the reconciliation process, by discovering and helping to understand what happened in the tensions and why’ (TRC, 2012, p.9). To achieve this objective, the TRC was to:

- Examine the patterns of human rights abuses and intervene in synergy and co-operation with other initiatives and strategies being implemented in the process of reconciliation and peace-building in the country;

- Investigate and fully report on the root causes of the tensions, human rights and international humanitarian law violations and abuses which occurred and those responsible for them, whether government, groups or individuals, as well as the role of internal and external factors in the conflict;

- Report on the raid on police armouries and the destruction or damage done to public property; and

- Work to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by allowing victims to tell their stories about the violations and abuses suffered and providing for perpetrators to relate their experiences, creating a climate fostering constructive exchange between victim and perpetrator’. (TRC, 2012, p.9)

Understanding the TRC requires an understanding of the tension. The tension was rooted in issues concerning the historical concentration of development and political power in Guadalcanal (where the capital of Honiara is situated) since colonial times. Within the Solomon Islands’ imbalanced changing social and economic environment, anxieties about land, development and identity fermented resentments amongst Guadalcanal people (Gualés), mostly towards Malaitans who settled and worked around Guadalcanal. Gualés’ grievances were mostly about land ownership, state government, benefits distribution from Guadalcanal resource exploitation, halts to internal migration and compensation for the
killing of some Gualés years ago. These crystallised into ‘the bona fide demands of the indigenous people of Guadalcanal’, first presented to the government in October 1978 (three months into independence) and then re-submitted in 1988 and 1999 but which have not been fully addressed (TRC, 2012, p.54):

Because of the centralised system, you see all development centralised… people moving into inner parts of customary lands by force… claiming these are theirs. People here alerted every government to listen to their demands. They said ‘please listen to us, you are killing our people, spoiling our lands, not respecting our customs, you think we are silent people and you move boundaries. Move back to your provinces, give us state government so we could benefit more, give us compensation for 20 people you killed in our lands’. But the government kept closing its ears. So they opted for trouble. They started forcing people to move on from Guadalcanal. That was how the tension started and somehow it escalated to confrontation. [TRC-M.1]

The tension emerged in late 1998 and led to the eviction of about 30% of Guadalcanal’s population (TRC, 2012, p.337). This epitomised Gualés’ dissatisfaction with the government’s lack of response to their grievances. Underpinning them were issues concerning nation building and development since independence that successive governments had failed to address. Addressing them remained a complex task in a fragmented society; a society that former PM Mamaloni portrayed as a ‘nation conceived but never born’ (Crocombe & Tuza, 1992, p.14) and one in which self-independence was said to be given rather than fought for. Political leaders have manipulated local people’s limited understanding of what political power entails in a nation-state governance system for personal advantage:

We got 34 years since independence and they haven’t changed the constitution or anything. [SIPS.2]

Solomon Islands was made independent without the majority knowing what that entailed. They didn’t fight for independence. It was just given to us. People don’t know what political power is. Most are illiterate about these things. So the greedy people capitalise on that. During elections whoever tells the best lies wins. That’s a big problem and that’s where corruption starts. [SIPS.13]

The tension and subsequent riots (Radio NZ, 2014, May 21; Spiller, 2006, April 21) expressed how people felt about the government and its public policy. Evident from these conflicts was a type of development that had bred corruption, encouraged dependency, damaged the social fabric, and deprived the people of the living standards they believed they deserved from resource exploitation. Many locals also believed that if the government continued in failing to address these issues at the root, then conflicts would continue:
Culture held the people together and the social fabric was strong that if you do this you get punished. It’s no longer the case. The social fabrics have been damaged, corrupted so much by what we make of the economic situation... A simple example is when you drive along Honiara you see people opening car doors spitting out. You see youths standing around eating betel nuts... The peace we now experience is on the surface. Very fragile. Last week there was a shooting on the Weather Coast... by a logger and was to do with land. Land is the core issue at the tension but left unresolved. If we aren’t careful we are going to explode again. [SIPS.8]

The tension saw criminal activities by armed groups of militants (Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, Malaita Eagle Force, etc.) and retaliation by police joint forces that resulted in the killing of about 200 and displacement of around 35,000 people. Abduction, torture, pillage, sexual violence (mostly against young girls), and loss and destruction of personal and public property were other crimes. The impact was not only social-political-economic, but also physiological in its dimensions (TRC, 2012). Truths about the tension were unknown until the TRC:

This is where the TRC went in and got stories... The stories are very bad. There was rape and murder and these people are walking free. A lot of kids couldn’t continue schooling. They were raped. They were forced to marry... These children are traumatised for the rest of their lives... This police joint operation went around just enjoying themselves. A lot of these stories aren’t known. [SIPS.16]

While often called ‘ethnic tension’, the involvement of criminal activities and material interests indicated that it was much more than an ethnic polarisation between the Gualés and Malaitans. Spillover effects onto other islands, and a government unable to provide law and order, indicated that it involved deliberate manipulation, power competition, and corruption amongst political elites behind the scene (Dinnen, 2002):

The government made the coup... A lot of the violations took place under this Police-Malaitan militants’ joint force. They took advantage of the opportunity to be extreme. It was inhumane. [TRC-M.2]

With the arrival of the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003, the tension gradually came to an end. Within the need to bring peace, healing and reconciliation, the idea for a TRC was advocated. The following sections examine the TRC’s policy process, highlighting factors attributing to its success.
5.2.1.2. Initiation

Civil society campaigning and lobbying pressured the government to initiate the TRC. Political leadership also supported the TRC initiation:

_The TRC idea came from civil society. They pressurised the government and the public gave their full support for TRC... saying this is the only option to mend relationships and go back to peace. Finally the government was convinced. Ati Uale (Member of Parliament) who was with civil society came back to government and they got him the model for TRC._ [TRC-M.3]

The nature of the issues concerning the tension signifies the role of civil society in peace building, a process such as the TRC relevant to the Solomon Islands’ turmoil and cultural dimension:

_RAMSI came and formed this Peace Monitoring Council to monitor RAMSI. The Council was made up mainly of women... These women and church leaders campaigned for a TRC establishment. Due to the culture of the people, it sort of demanded that when such things happen they have to do reconciliation._ [SIPS.8]

5.2.1.3. Formulation

The formulation process of the TRC (its mandate, policies, programs and operationalisation) was participatory involving civil society, government and international actors. This process involved two key stages:

**Stage 1: TRC as a policy idea (2000–2006).** The TRC originated from peace building work already undertaken by the Solomon Islands’ Christian Association and Civil Society Network who lobbied for the TRC formation from the early 2000s. A series of interactive processes established support for the TRC and its modalities.

- A Solomon Islands Christians’ Association Peace Committee engaged in peace advocacy researched into a TRC establishment involving study visits to Africa and Timor Leste to examine similar TRCs;
- A consultative committee assessed and then confirmed wider support for the TRC;
- These civil society groups formulated a TRC concept paper approved by Cabinet and Parliament;
- The Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, established in 2006, took over TRC functions previously undertaken by the Peace Monitoring Council since
PM Sikua’s Grand Coalition for Change government took up peace and reconciliation as a priority in a policy statement. (SIG, 2006, p.4; TRC, 2012, p.1187):

We wanted to give chances to everyone; victims, perpetrators, ex-combatants, children and women who were involved in the tension to come up. The policy is to reconcile everyone. There was a policy statement to work on a forgiveness period. [TRC-M.1]

Stage 2: TRC instrumentalisation (2007–2009). This stage was the TRC formalisation involving the following:

A Steering Committee of external experts and respected members from every sector was tasked with the TRC establishment. Consultation on the TRC Bill further validated strong support for TRC;

A National Selection Committee, mandated by the TRC Act and chaired by the Chief Justice, had membership from every sector and was tasked with the selection of (Truth and Reconciliation) Commissioners;

Two Commissioners were non-nationals (Sophia Macher (Peru) and Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (Fiji)) and three were nationals (Sam Ata (Chairman), Caroline Laore (Western Province), and George Kejoa who was later replaced by Kamilo Teke (Guadalcanal)); and

Commissioners’ selection involved the National Selection Committee calling for public nominations, working with the UN office on non-national nominations, and raising awareness over the importance of nominations comprising persons of integrity, credibility and competence. (TRC, 2012):

It was a long process involving lots of consultation. An overseas person assisted in formulating the TRC Act. People were called in to look at the draft before it became a bill... The selection committee went to the provinces and said ‘we are looking for people not involved in politics to help us’. [TRC-M.2]

There was wide support from the international community. International experiences were deployed given limited local experiences in TRC. The localisation of these experiences was evident in the inclusion of community actors and an experienced commissioner from Fiji. The UNDP local office provided a project coordinating and supporting mechanism (called the ‘International Support Facility’ (TRC, 2012, p.1198) amongst donors:
Donors came together and put in a pool of funds to support the TRC. TRC falls under my programs here so UNDP was given the funds to administer the whole program. [SIDA.2]

TRC was the first in the Pacific. We sent somebody to look at how they did it in Africa... We were lucky to have Sofia and Joni who were involved in the Peru TRC and reconciliations in Fiji. Our local commissioners were committed but they weren’t trained in this. [TRC-M.3]

5.2.1.4. Implementation

The TRC’s work involved research, investigation, counselling, awareness raising and reconciliation. This work was significant for preventing future conflicts. Here procedures had to be established to guide staff. Given the sensitive nature of the issues surrounding the tension and involvement of previous governments, civil society played a critical role in implementation:

They had all these documents on the whole plan of TRC and how it was to work. They had counselling sessions, closed hearings for ex-combatants and high level people like Member of Parliaments. [SIDA.2]

The policy was the government does the reconciliation. But that was difficult as government was a party to the tension. When government people went out, the people weren’t responding. So we used civil society organisations and it worked far better than the government trying to do it - to encompass all nine provinces as future conflicts can arise anytime anywhere. [SIPS.13]

Leadership was provided by the TR Commissioners. About 167 total staff (field workers, volunteers, experts, etc.) were employed and provided with relevant trainings in implementing TRC activities to ensure that the work reached the grassroots. (TRC, 2012). The process was sufficiently confrontational and traumatising for some not to continue:

We were confronted by people. They said ‘who are you, you think you can solve problems in Solomon Islands, where’s the government all these years?’... What they said was true. But we slowly got thick skins and continued. The expatriates were traumatised and went home. [TRC-M.1]

We were doing reconciliations, workshops and training for the chiefs and youths in the hope that by establishing these conflict resolution methods they would do it amongst themselves. [SIPS.16]

Some people were reluctant to come forth in the process of truth telling and reconciliation. Yet public awareness and utilising the potential of community actors facilitated people’s understanding, trust and participation in the process:
They were reluctant at first. But because there was awareness people were prepared to have negotiations within their communities. Prior to any public hearings father Sam Ata and his team visited the provinces and did consultations so people were aware before the TRC arrivals. [SIDA.1]

Guadalcanal has to reconcile with the government and Malaita but these haven’t been done as we can’t reconcile people unless they want to. So we had to use the faith organisations and women as they were instrumental in making people come forward. This is the best way because there’s progress with this… Not everybody came forward but they got a good number. [SIPS.8]

There was some conflict of ideologies underpinning TRC activities, such as reconciling and forgiving versus prosecution. In the broad sense, conflicts such as these centred on the ideological differences underpinning modern versus traditional public policy settings:

Parliament passed an amnesty to forgive those involved in the tension… The Ministry has worked on a forgiveness bill. But our thinking is they shouldn’t be forgiven. So we are still talking with the PM in throwing out this bill. Even with that amnesty, people were still prosecuted under the TRC mandate. The information collected is used as evidence in court. [SIPS.13]

The biggest challenge was the political element. Some politicians obstructed the TRC process given their involvement in the tension; this was further demonstrated in the non-release of the TRC report after submission to the PM in February 2012. The report editor, however, leaked it to the news media:

We had lots of hiccups because people don’t want to get exposed. Prominent leaders… are anti-TRC because it did dig up what they did. So the PM is under pressure because of this report. This is the biggest battle we fight. How can you weed out corruption because you never hear a real story when these people are in police custody? We cannot fully account for what happened because it’s high corruption…. the politicians and high ranked police officers were involved in the tension. [SIPS.16]

The PM has refused to pass on the Report to Parliament… claimed that its release will re-ignite ‘ethnic tension’… I don’t believe this. The Report is very accurate… gives proper recognition to the victims of the conflict whose stories should be heard… I am convinced that the TRC Report, as an exercise in truth telling, painful as the recollection may… will help bring… lasting justice, peace, reconciliation and unity that Solomon Islands so badly needs. ("Solomons Truth And Reconciliation Report leaked by editor," 2013, June 29)

For the TRC to work it had to take into consideration different cultures. Following a standardised approach was difficult given the cultural diversity involved. The nature of the TRC work indicated the impracticality of following a strictly prescribed process:
We asked them ‘what is your culture when you preside at, or over a meeting or reconciliation’. So they said ‘you make a custom like this…’ So there was a bit of culture, custom and wisdom. We didn’t have a standard. We respected whatever location… There was no straightforward policy that says you go like this but it was very much about how you program yourself in the process. We didn’t have interferences in the process of respecting culture. [TRC-M.2]

That’s the only way you go about implementing anything in the Pacific. You have to do it in their culture... traditional ways that you need to address before entering into anything. It’s different for Melanesians as there’s no one culture. So it’s got to be different types of approach. Although you have these documented policies, there are always these unwritten ones. [SIDA.1]

Some activities (e.g. exhumation) were beyond the scope of TRC in terms of its capacity, resources and timeframe. This, and further reconciliation comprise ongoing work:

About 200 were killed. We exhumed only four. People are still waiting for the remains of their relatives buried in foreign lands. It’s a lot of work. We have no qualifications for this job. We got overseas expertise and were very expensive. This exercise is left open. [SIPS.13]

5.2.1.5. Results

Peace and reconciliation remain a long-term change process given the impact of the tension. The TRC was only a start to that process. That a lot of people came forth, told their stories, and were counselled and reconciled, meant that the TRC added value to national reconciliation, something essential to nation building and the Solomon Islands state of national affairs. Contributing to this was the TRC process built from within the local context. International experiences were utilised, but adjusted to local conditions through participatory mechanisms:

It was challenging but a successful project. This was the first time for the Pacific to have such a commission for a post-conflict country but had impact on the people. There were families able to forgive each other. Although there were organisations doing similar things the TRC was on a formalised basis. Donors provided support but were totally hands off. [SIDA.1]

The TRC was seen as by the people for the people. It was supported by the donors as getting around Solomon Islands is difficult. They used a wide range of people from different communities who know who to approach in the provinces. That was why it worked. [SIPS.8]
5.2.1.6. Key factors

Table 5.1 summarises the critical factors of the TRC’s policy process:

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<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
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<td>Young post-colonial, post-conflict state</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Success - outputs and outcomes with process ongoing</td>
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<td>Fragmented society and fragile public policy system</td>
<td>Civil society driven</td>
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<td>Political system – corruption</td>
<td>Political leadership</td>
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<td>Path dependency of historical development</td>
<td>Policy transfer – international evidence</td>
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<td>Dependent state – RAMSI</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Underdeveloped society – lack understanding of government</td>
<td>Contextualisation</td>
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<td>Focus on society</td>
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<td>Participatory - locally driven</td>
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<td>Both evidence and ideological based</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Implementation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contextualisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Donors support and coordination</td>
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<td>Reform content is complex change</td>
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<td>Emergent and adaptive</td>
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<td>Locally driven – leadership, ownership, capacity building</td>
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<td>Relationship between local and external actors</td>
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Table 5.1: TRC key factors

5.2.2. The CDF

5.2.2.1. Background

During fieldwork in the Solomon Islands, the CDF was consistently voiced as a key concern. Examining the CDF’s policy process brought out key issues affecting the Solomon Islands overall public policy setting and implementation. The CDF developed originally from the 1989 Mamaloni’s (People’s Alliance Party) Government’s Small Island Community Project Special Assistance Grant (SICOPSAG) (SIG, 2013f, p.6). Intended to support rural economic stimulation and empower provincial governments (SIG, 2008b; To’abaita Authority for Research & Development, 2008), the SICOPSAG and other provincial funds were initially managed by the Ministry of Provincial Government (Suluia, 2012, p.35). It then evolved in nomenclature (also called the Rural Development Fund, discretionary fund or slush funds) and in its management and methods of allocation.
In 1993, the Hilly Billy government abolished the SICOPSAG and replaced it with the Rural Development Fund (SIG, 2013f), entrenching and increasing the Fund’s value from SBD100,000 to SBD200,000 per constituency (Alaisa, 1997; Harry, 2014). This largely contributed to the re-election of 61% of Members of Parliament (Fono, 2007) in the 1993 election. In 1997, Mamaloni’s National Unity, Reconciliation and Progressive Government reintroduced the SICOPSAG and also increased the CDF based on constituencies’ population size (instead of the previous standard amount). In 2007, the CDF was transferred to Member of Parliaments discretion and management under a newly created Ministry of Rural Development. Constituencies also increased from 38 to 50 (SIG, 2013f). CDF allocation has increased every year; from SBD600,000 in 2007 to SBD6 million in 2013 (Anti-corruption Network Solomon Islands, 2013).

Other than it being a patronage mechanism, there was no specific policy on the CDF. Government documents and Parliamentarians’ speeches however advocated ‘rural development’ as the rationale. Member of Parliament Oti in a parliamentary speech on the 29 August 2008 stated that ‘rural development became a specific policy target by the then People’s Alliance Party Government’ and every successive government has taken rural development as the basis for the CDF (SIG, 2008b). Other labels such as ‘bottom-up’, ‘rural growth centres’, ‘people centred development’ and ‘empowerment of the people’ were used in every coalition government policy statement (SIG, 2006, 2008a, 2010a):

That’s the signatory policy of government. That’s what they preach to get into power, to create rural development. They will create rural development centres with infrastructure like buying centres, banks and all services farmers and people can access. [SIPS.10]

In March 2013, the CDF Bill (SIG, 2013d) was passed despite public opposition. A petition organised by Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI) was signed by more than 2,000 people and presented to Parliament including a public protest at Parliament house (SIG, 2013g; TSI, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). Opposition also came through the local and social media, plus public hearings and submissions made to the National Parliament of Solomon Islands Bills and Legislation Committee inquiry into the Bill (SIG, 2013e, 2013f). Concerns regarding the Bill were:

- The CDF is flawed, has no basis and since its introduction development and service delivery have not improved;

SBD means Solomon Islands Dollar.
The Bill does not set out any governance mechanisms for the CDF but will legitimise corruption which has been endemic over the years;
The CDF distracts Member of Parliaments from their public policy making role;
The Bill is unconstitutional, violates the separation of powers in government, and further weakens administrative capacity at national and provincial levels;
Huge financial resources are given to few individuals depriving the role of community leadership in the development processes; and
The Bill’s preparation was rushed and lacked consultation.

This petition was defeated with only 10 Member of Parliaments voting for it (SIG, 2013g). The Bill was passed without any consideration of the concerns raised by participants during this study’s 2012 fieldwork. Parliamentary speeches and debates on the Bill cannot be found on the Solomon Islands’ parliamentary website.

5.2.2.2. Initiation

Participants asserted that the CDF was an idea local politicians copied from PNG’s ‘electoral development funds’ introduced in the 1970s. The take-up of CDF under different names in PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu mirrored what was happening in other countries including the US (Baskin, 2010). At least 23 countries have adopted and are considering CDFs (van Zyl, 2010). Every government had continued the CDF and increased its appropriation despite public complaints:

*It’s a borrowed concept from PNG but the fund is from Taiwan.* [SIPA.9]

*If you read the paper people are complaining about the CDF... Before the recent election there was a public outcry that it must be shifted back to Ministries.* [SIPS.14]

5.2.2.3. Formulation

There has not been any formulation of the CDF. In the absence of a written policy there were no articulated objectives about what the CDF was specifically intended to achieve. Current practices indicated that the CDF’s purpose for rural development was counterproductive. The CDF has transformed from an original intention of providing just a small fund into a patronage system delivering services on behalf of politicians and their supporters:

The Bill does not comply with Standing Order 43(7) which requires an explanatory memorandum
setting out the financial impacts if a bill will involve expenditure of public funds. Without a policy, a study or wide consultation, it is not possible to make such an assessment for this Bill. (TSI, 2013d)

The CDF is expanded from its initial intention… for Member of Parliaments to support constituents when they ask for anything. But it’s being developed into a delivery mechanism of services. [SIPS.6]

Narratives of justifications included ‘empowering Member of Parliaments’, ‘no development in the constituency’, and ‘nothing is going down’ to the rural people. Others loosely mentioned in Member of Parliaments speeches and government documents included: ‘bringing development closer to the people’; ‘for Member of Parliaments to deliver services to their people’ (Fono, 2007); ‘avoid having Member of Parliaments behaving like beggars at the foreign missions in Honiara’; ‘ease the mounting pressure from constituents by their demands upon their Member of Parliaments’ (Alaisa, 1997); and ‘this is the only fund that goes down to rural people’ (SIG, 2008b):

That stemmed from people saying all the money is spent in Honiara and nothing is going down. So the politicians say to address this issue by empowering Member of Parliaments with funds so it will take only two days to reach constituencies. This double with the fact there’s no development in constituencies. [SIPS.2]

The CDF management was at Member of Parliaments’ discretion. The Ministry of Rural Development assisted in the CDF operationalisation after Member of Parliaments’ directives, provincial governments having no role in the process. The guidelines given below for the CDF management were procedures loosely adopted, being largely understood as practices rather than set policies, until the CDF Act 2013 came into place. This initially provided:

- The CDF allocation is in accordance with the 50 constituencies or Member of Parliaments;
- Member of Parliaments to develop their Constituency Development Plans as the basis for funds allocation and disbursement;
- Member of Parliaments to appoint their Constituency Development Officer or committees (political appointees) to assist in CDF planning and implementation;
- Member of Parliaments to approve the funds which are then deposited into Member of Parliaments’ Constituency Development Accounts. Member of Parliaments and Constituency Development Officers are signatories of these accounts;
- Ministries to assist Constituency Development Officers on technical aspects of implementation; and
The CDF divided into six funds. Four were specific (Rural Livelihoods Fund, Millennium Development Fund, Micro Projects Fund, and Water and Sanitation Fund) while two (Rural Support to CDF and Support to Rural Development Fund) were not specifically targeted, their purpose being at the Member of Parliament discretion.

The CDF Act 2013 legislated for all of the above arrangements except the last. While the budget specified different funds, it did not specify allocations in terms of programs/projects, activities, costs and implementers (SIG, 2013c). These requirements were designated Constituency Development Plans, but most Member of Parliaments lacked such plans:

*If you look at the Ministry of Rural Development’s budget there are no activities there. It’s just project figures and titles. Most funds end up in the hands of Member of Parliaments.* [SIPS.12]

*A lot don’t have Constituency Development Plans. They are working with Constituency Development Officers on whatever they want to do.* [SIPA.14]

*It is already in Member of Parliaments accounts so there are no more requisitions, no more vouchers…if you want to hand out cash the Member of Parliament can hand out cash.* [SIPS.5]

5.2.2.4. Implementation

Few Member of Parliaments have utilised the funds for projects, most ending up captured in the hands of Member of Parliaments and supporters for their own purposes—for campaigning, free hand outs and consumables:

*That CDF is where politicians get those funds. So we have 50 millionaires in the Solomon Islands.* [SIPS.10]

*The reality is that the population that touches that money is very small. But how they talk is the entire system, on behalf of their constituencies.* [SIPS.7]

*They did in a way that it’s a fund allocated purposively for constituencies’ development activities. But a small portion is used for capital projects or investments. Most are for consumables and all sorts of things for supporters.* [SIP.2]

There was little transparency, accountability or equity in the CDF management and distribution. Compliance with these principles largely depended on the trustworthiness of Member of Parliaments. Procedures required were meaningless as they have not been followed:
I won my first and second elections. I got knocked out in the third. I couldn’t compete with the amount of money that was needed. But the CDF helped a lot. That looked after issues in my four policy areas I campaigned on… My CDF came to my account. I approved the acquisitions. My Constituency Development Officer had to check and sign off. But even then there were many problems… You have to retire your first allocation before you go for your next CDF. The accounting officer is the Permanent Secretary, not the Member of Parliament. If there is misuse of funds, the Leadership Code Commission investigates, but usually nothing is ever audited. [SIP.1]

Our officers haven’t seen any single form (for projects) but this is what they want. What else can we do? When cabinet makes a decision you can’t refuse. It’s difficult. [SIPS.5]

The CDF was a classic case of the separation of functions in government breaking down. Politicians and their officers were directly involved in implementation, bypassing accountability to parliament and the public service’s implementation role. There was ignorance of why such a separation of functions is critical to good governance:

The PM is saying we aren’t going to put money through the government. We are going to give it to the politicians to hand it out. There’s an assumption there this is a more effective way of delivering public policy than using the bureaucracy… It’s an improper model, a complete breakdown of the separate roles of the bureaucracy and politicians. [RAMSI-M.2]

In one way it’s good because we struggle to do it the normal way… We have technical officers running around doing procurement but in this way we give that load to Constituency Development Officers. [SIPS.12]

What’s happening is that the PM keeps on having votes of no confidence. One came up last night. So he’s hoping that by giving politicians more money they will continue to vote for him. [SICS-M.2]

There are various justifications for political interference in CDF administration: lack of political trust in public servants, inefficiencies in using the bureaucratic system, and using Member of Parliaments and their officers as a more efficient means of delivering services:

Politicians thought public servants would get the money for themselves if funds are paid through Ministries. [SIPS.2]

Member of Parliaments want something to happen during the four years but the public service machinery is difficult to use. [SIPA.18]

Member of Parliaments decided to follow this way because they said ministries are too slow in mobilising funds. [SIPS.17]
The functions and capacity of public administration and the provincial systems were further weakened through CDF practices. Huge funds were given to a few individuals having little capacity in management or technical areas of implementation:

I spoke to PM Philip two months ago and he said Member of Parliaments are going to receive SBD9 million in their accounts. Normally that money goes to the Ministry of Rural Development. So there’s no more jobs for that Ministry. [SIPS.6]

Last year’s budget identified a number of programs allocated to the Permanent Secretary of Women and Youths. Just before that meeting, the PM gave instructions to give the youths’ allocation to the Member of Parliament discretionary funds. The question is do Member of Parliaments have qualified people to run these things. All they have is a Constituency Development Officer but what qualifications do these fellas have. Most are wantoks of Member of Parliaments. They have qualified people in ministries yet these fellas do the distribution. This is why there isn’t much rural development because the preference is determined by this man who sits here. [SICS-M.1]

The CDF had the largest budget allocation and thus impacted significantly on overall public resource allocation. In the 2013 development budget, the Ministry of Rural Development had the largest allocation (22%) compared to the other 29 ministries (SIG, 2013c). About 38% of that 22% allocation comprised donor funds, Taiwan being the main contributor. That allocation however did not fully reflect actual CDF expenditures as Ministries’ budgets were often diverted into CDFs and ‘remained outside the auditors’ range’ (Bennett, 2002). Aid support towards the CDF became a contentious issue in the donor community with civil society calling for a ‘general aid freeze’ to the Solomon Islands as corruption had become out of control (Pacific Islands Report, 2014, March 9):

The government is looking at $500 million for development projects. Its taxpayers’ money and Taiwan. My ministry (of rural development) alone got half of this budget and most will go to the Member of Parliaments. [SIPS.12]

This year the politicians saw the cocoa and coconut budget for rural development and wanted that as well to be deposited into their accounts. [SIPS.5]

It’s about SBD5.5 million per Member of Parliament. My trouble is whether this money is SIG or Taiwan. This is a print out of where the tourism fund is going to. I would say 1/3 of that money goes to Member of Parliaments’ relatives. We put bilateral money into renewable energy, tourism and cocoa rehabilitation and I had to write to the government we can’t keep putting money in if you are taking it out. This is a big problem here. [RAMSI-M.1]

Continuous diversions of funds intended for the implementation of Ministries’ programs and
service delivery suggests that the bulk of the Solomon Islands’ fiscal capability has been taken up by CDFs. Convery’s (2009) analysis of the Solomon Islands’ budget processes indicated that public policy lies in these CDFs, rather than any formal pronouncements, priorities or plans:

From the Cabinet agenda, the only thing I see is this trend of that funds. If there are Ministries’ projects submitted for approval and there are funds, Cabinet will divert them to CDFs. [SIPS.11]

We see the budget as a hindrance, most projects’ funds that should touch the lives of people are diverted to the 50 constituency accounts. [SIPS.7]

Monitoring of CDF projects was limited. Although some politicians have been imprisoned for corruption, Member of Parliaments continued to misuse CDFs. Some public servants devised odd mechanisms to safeguard against being criminalised for CDF practices. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock signed an agreement with the Member of Parliament, West Honiara Constituency, for the transfer of SBD350,000 from the Ministry’s budget into the Member of Parliament’s constituency account. The contract for this agricultural livelihood project was signed by the Member of Parliament as the ‘implementing part’ representing West Honiara Constituency and the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary representing ‘SIG’ (SIG, 2012b):

There’s absolutely no monitoring. The money goes to Member of Parliaments but they say it goes to the operators, then that’s the end of implementation... We have a good number of politicians in jail for misuse of these funds... Based on the things I see, some will be on trial in years from now. [SIPS.6]

Most participants see leadership as the core issue in terms of politicians using CDF practices over the years to politicise the whole public policy system for personal advantage:

It’s the absence of strong leaders... And maybe it goes back to the culture of the people where they are aligned through their wantok. Public servants are aligned with politicians, so the public service is so politicised. This CDF is making it worse. They are legislating it for their purpose. [SIP.2]

This is policy free. This is just about handing out money.... It’s undermining public policy by this business. This is not a culture of the big man. It’s the big men standing between traditions and the state, manipulating both. [RAMSI-M.1]

5.2.2.5. Results

CDF has not been formally evaluated for its impact. Nevertheless, evidence from participant
narratives and documentary analysis revealed that the CDF has done more harm than good, undermining public policy, governance and development:

On the whole, CDFs are not delivering public goods. They are used for outboard motors, funeral needs, etc., which are private, not public goods. [RAMSI-M.2]

Rather than reinforcing an empowering and developmental culture, the CDF has reinforced a hand-out and dependency mentality amongst people in patronage state-society relationships:

Why things are the way they are is because of our political system. It keeps on creating this hand-out mentality. Our Ministry has a lot of projects for farmers. But once the funding stops, they stop working. But it’s their fields... People see these projects as government, not theirs. This hand-out mentality ruins a lot of things... This is where we aren’t doing well because our modality of delivery is all over the place. The first thing is to remove that money from Member of Parliaments. But it’s difficult. [SIPS.4]

The CDF and its practices have been referred to by some as a curse or evil contributing to corruption as a result:xv

It’s almost evil in the sense it’s the pro-use of public money to serve the interests of politicians than the public interest. Every element of this CDF is a curse. It’s politicising our resources. [SIP.2]

Our policies are informed by the rural development needs. But they don’t even have trained teachers. Why? The system itself and the people manning it are so corrupt that it’s a disease. [SICS-M.3]

5.2.2.6. Key factors

Table 5.2 summarises the critical factors of the CDF’s policy process:

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xv The Solomon Islands was ranked 120 (out of 182) on the 2011 Corruption Perception Index. Data unavailable for subsequent years. (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results).
5.2.3. The PSIP

5.2.3.1. Background

The PSIP was a five-year (2009-2013) program instigated by the SIG as part of RAMSI to rebuild the public service institutional capacity following the tension (see section 5.2.1.1). The PSIP’s goal was ‘to contribute to an improved capacity to deliver government services across the Solomon Islands’. Its purpose was ‘to strengthen human resource management (HRM) and so improve the delivery of government services’ (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.21). It comprised 23 outputs to be implemented within a (rolling) period of five to 10 years and under six components, namely:

- Change management framework, principles, policies and processes;
- Strengthened capacity of central agencies;
- Strengthened capacity of line agencies;
- Strengthened human resource management in the provinces;
- Response to emerging issues under the umbrella of an integrated public sector improvement program; and

The PSIP offers a closer look at internal public administration and the relationship between local actors and RAMSI, the main foreign intervention present in the Solomon Islands for
10 years (2003-2013). RAMSI was deployed at the request of the SIG and under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (see section 1.2.4) ‘to restore law and order, stabilise the economy and repair the basic machinery of government’ under the three pillars of law and justice, economic governance and machinery of government. The Machinery of Government pillar aimed ‘to enhance the capacity of the Solomon Islands public service, ensuring it can deliver services more effectively’ through strengthening programs for the public service, Cabinet, Parliament, accountability institutions, provincial government and the electoral system (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.7).

While public service strengthening had been on the agenda since 2003, a program was only formulated in 2005 with its Project Design Document approved by government in November 2006. Implementation was to follow in 2007, but implementation only began in 2009 due to delays in mobilising the project team (SIG-RAMSI, 2008, p.17). Implementation went for a year but went on hold in 2010 to await a review. It restarted in 2011 and was ongoing during the 2012 fieldwork, and was due to complete in June 2013. The PSIP was costed at AUD$5,791,980 of funding provided by RAMSI (SIG-RAMSI, 2012).

The 2010 review led to a significant reduction in the PSIP’s scope, focusing on just the four components stated shortly in the Ministry of Public Service, the central agency responsible for HRM functions. There was no more ‘whole of public service’ (central and provincial) strengthening as outlined in the 2007 Project Design Document. The rationale was that the Ministry of Public Service’s internal capacity first needed strengthening before it could similarly assist ministries and provinces. The PSIP management was thereafter brought under the Ministry of Public Service from an original oversight role of a multi-stakeholders committee. The review sought:

- Improved HRM systems and processes;
- Expanded opportunities for individual capacity development;
- Organisational development for improved HRM; and

5.2.3.2. Initiation

The need to rebuild the public administration was self-evident given the tension’s impact and where the public service was near dysfunctional. Public servants were unpaid for months, the payroll system had a number of ghost workers, the backlog of recruitment processes
reached about 300 vacancies, and phones and counter services were left unattended:

After the tension our governance frameworks collapsed... Service delivery was zero. Officers weren’t secure in making decisions as guns were there... We didn’t receive our pay for months. The morale and those things went down. It was a sad situation and everybody realised the mistake. When RAMSI came, they put in place law and order, then strengthened finance and governance where the PSIP comes under. [SIPS.10]

The PSIP’s starting point was the 2005 Pacific Public Service Commissioners’ Conference held in Fiji. This annual dialogue provided an opportunity to discuss and place reforms under consideration in the Solomon Islands within a regional context. Solomon Islands leaders participating in that conference then took up further discussion of a reform agenda with RAMSI (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.7). The critical point for initiating that agenda was the formation of a new government, in April 2006, that took up public service strengthening as its key policy (SIG, 2006, p.37).

5.2.3.3. Formulation

Stakeholders’ workshops conducted in November 2005 and February 2006 informed the 2007 Project Design Document. External expertise was recruited to facilitate the PSIP scoping and design. A senior official from Samoa shared her experience of similar reforms (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.Annex C). The 2007 original design was complex, but it acknowledged that building a professional public service in the Solomon Islands was a long-term or generational change. The difficulty in enacting transformational change in a post-conflict context was reflected in initial lapses. Accordingly, the PSIP’s redesign from a complex reform into an incremental program only occurred after one year into implementation:

We had workshops at the design stage and it was clear that people want to improve these services and put into place procedures. [SIPS.14]

The PSIP only went for 12 months and at the end of 2009, AusAID and RAMSI became aware that the PSIP was too ambitious... So there was an immediate review and a redesign reducing the project to just four components. It was about slowing down. [RAMSI-M.4]

It’s a generational change. It’s not like before now. Younger graduates come and don’t show much commitment and take instructions. [SIPS.9]
Part of the difficulty was a lack of local ownership. In its original stage, the PSIP operated largely in isolation from local actors and was driven by RAMSI. It took time for RAMSI to realise that this was a significant issue:

*The PSIP was driven by RAMSI people originally. We, Solomon Islanders continued to voice that no, you should come together, we should have tales and even to lead.* [SIPS.10]

*This was a big shift… Part of the redesign was to make sure the PSIP wasn’t running as a separate program… So it’s much more integrated than before. It’s not good having counterparts working away on one project and we work on something else. Because if it’s not a priority to them, they won’t implement it. You might as well forget about it. I look back at my two years here and I said ‘gee, I was a naive adviser. I really didn’t get it’. I reckon it took us a long time to realise that.* [SIC.1]

### 5.2.3.4. Implementation

Initial delays in implementation led to the loss of momentum generated during the design stage (SIG-RAMSI, 2008, p.17). As well, a lack of trust between locals and RAMSI colleagues was reflected through counterparts having little knowledge of or authority over PSIP resources:

*My biggest challenge is not knowing what resources are available as it’s all controlled from Lelei (RAMSI headquarters). The money for our program doesn’t come to the government’s consolidated funds. The issue is they don’t trust local people… But how can you plan and run a program when you don’t know what resources are there.* [SIPS.10]

A constant change of advisers also impacted negatively on sustaining trusted relationships and skills transfer, in a setting where absorptive capacity was already critically low:

*The whole model of aid policy in bringing in and taking out advisers on a 12 month contract isn’t a useful approach.* [SIC.2]

*Too many short-term advisers and few are for 12 months. Mostly from Australia. Skills transfer has been a point of concern since RAMSI came. Most are on certain assignments so there’s limited emphasis on skills transfer and sustainability. It is also the absorptive capacity of Solomon Islanders to take on these changes, to see why we have this change.* [SIPS.14]

Understanding local cultural context, such as the importance of relationships and working environment, was critical to making sense of what could work in the reform process:

*It takes a long time for us, particularly Australians to understand that some things are done
differently in the Pacific and that’s okay. It doesn’t have to be our way. Once you can shift your mind, you can get to where your counterparts are coming from, and work around that on ways to deal with work... It helps you to be better at the job as you have some idea of what life is like for Solomon Islanders. Not many advisers here live like that. It’s about what works here... One of my counterparts said ‘us, the white fellas come in the room with the issues all listed ready to make whatever decision in the best interest of those issues. But the important thing for us will be leaving that room with the relationship intact’... After the tension public servants didn’t get paid for months so people relied on their wantoks. These guys haven’t forgotten that. Always on their minds I’m not going to spoil my relationship if I have to rely on that one day. That’s how this society works. It’s how people survive in this town. [SIC.1]

Conflicts between advisers and counterparts led to non-implementation of some activities, hence a change of some advisers:

*I ran into conflicts with our advisers sometimes... There was a functional review in 2010 but during implementation there were conflicting views between the adviser and my staff... So we didn’t implement the functional review and we filed it away. [SIPS.17]*

*We changed the adviser to the PSC Chairman from an Australian to a Fijian. And it’s working much better because he was a Fijian public service commissioner himself and he understands much more the political context of these people. [RAMSI-M.1]*

However, leadership, ownership and learning did lead to the implementation of some activities:

*The permanent secretaries’ contracts were taken away from the PM’s office and put under PSC to try and depoliticise that process. This is the first time it ever happened. We got a strong Chairman who wants this to work. When we got a champion like him it makes a big difference. It keeps us motivated. [SIPS.9]*

*One thing I was given to do was the development of a Human Resource Strategy... And I could have done it quickly by using the same approach used many times before. I come and give a document to a local and he said okay. But there’s no ownership. So I was fortunate to convince AusAID and RAMSI that we tried something different. We picked a group of local managers and worked with them to develop this strategy and I was their facilitator. It took me 12 months to develop it because it was driven by them. Aside from the fact we came up with this product, it was the growth of the individuals along the way. They learnt by doing. They co-operated and created it. Because they own it they want it to work... This is a great example of something that is carried through to implementation and everybody would argue it’s because it is owned. It’s not perfect in my eyes but that doesn’t matter. It’s theirs. They are using it. This tells me that all those nice documents on the shelves are never going to get implemented. There are general orders, systems and rules that aren’t*
Some activities were difficult to implement, needing time to mature given capacity constraints and a constrained reform environment. Consistent understanding of the reform process was critical, but this was often lacking:

*Our aim is getting these HRM functions delegated to Ministries. But we aren’t ready. We need to build ministries’ capacities. It will take years before we see much delegated. In fact we delegated discipline but Ministries don’t utilise that authority... It was the tension time. We have this bombard of these concepts; performance management, workforce planning, etc. and we didn’t make the rest of the workforce understand why we are doing these things.* [SIPS.10]

*We may have the qualifications but not the experience. So we need technical assistants in some areas. One objective was to look into the Public Service Act but it never happen.* [SIPS.3]

*The implementation of the expected outcome is always hindered by the budget, human resource capacity, technology and most of all the political environment.* [SIPS.6]

**5.2.3.5. Results**

Based on participant narratives and PSIP documentation (SIG-RAMSI, 2012), the PSIP’s results were mixed. Success was seen by putting in place some HRM policies, systems and processes. They included the HRM strategy, a code of conduct, Human Resources Managers’ Forum, the Institute of Public Administration to provide public service training, and some improvement in the public service recruitment and selection culture. The Aurion HRM information system resulted in a removal of about 400 ‘ghost’ workers and an annual $2 million saving by rectifying such anomalies:

*We are more confident in how to recruit people now than before where you just go for your wantok. You cannot totally rule out those elements but it’s fairer than before. People are knowledgeable about setting interviewing panels and things like that which is the intention of the program.* [SIPS.7]

While those directly involved in the PSIP were to some extent satisfied with the results, some stakeholders saw the PSIP as just tinkering with the status quo given its redesign to focus on the Ministry of Public Service only. To them, the opportunity was lost to address fundamental HRM issues facing the public service:
I’m satisfied with the PSIP although it could be better... We have benefited in terms of having that knowledge of exposure and how we approach advisers. [SIPS.10]

There’s no reform there. They are just improving existing programs. People were thinking the PSIP is across the entire government. It’s not. It’s for the Ministry of Public Service only. [SIPS.6]

That’s the worst program around. There’s a lot of sticks coming to the public service but no incentive. It’s all punishment and no empowerment. [SIPS.8]

5.2.3.6. Key factors

Table 5.3 summarises the critical factors of the PSIP’s policy process:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young post-colonial, post-conflict state</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Mixed outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wantok system</td>
<td>• Driven by tension/crisis</td>
<td>– impact is a long term assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented, unstable public policy system</td>
<td>• Political and public administration leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent state (RAMSI)</td>
<td>• Policy transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural context – relationship important</td>
<td>• Part of RAMSI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consultative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Initial design was complex and long term but it was turned into something</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>much simpler and incremental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of ownership initially</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Both evidence and ideological based. Evidential in terms of the need to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>address the impact of tension. HRM concepts are foreign.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resource mobilisation – controlled by RAMSI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Short term modality of external consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity building/learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: PSIP key factors

Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from the Solomon Islands’ policy cases, in comparison with those in Samoa, Vanuatu and the Region (see Appendix G), and against existing literature.
5.3. The policy processes in general

This section examines participants’ experiences and observations of policy processes in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors for effective implementation.

5.3.1. Policy initiation

Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originated. The patterns of the coded participant narratives in Table 5.4 show that the origins of what became public policy was significantly influenced by political elements (frequency of 48). Public policies originating from society were limited (frequency of 11). The ‘external’ limited coding (frequency of 11) did not mean limited external influences, but an indication that they were confined during RAMSI’s prolonged presence in the Solomon Islands, and when it acted as a kind of filter over them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Origin (where)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political executive</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (civil society)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government organisations (organised interest/lobby group)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors - consultants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Origins of public policy in the Solomon Islands

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant:

*Policies are only at the political level. When it comes to the endorsement by the people, no.* [SIPS.18]

*This NCRA policy never had any public discussion. It’s only in the political circle and they refer to it as policy. But the word is 'public' and they don’t have that because they cannot be bothered talking public policy until they get themselves organised. This has been going on for many administrations that policy is the last thing to talk about after the government is formed.* [SIPA.2]
I apologetically joked that in this country the social contract is with RAMSI, not with government because RAMSI is here to keep the peace and it’s keeping the peace. [RAMSI-M.1]

Foreign interference into the country is too strong. It unbalances everything... RAMSI is becoming a donor instead of a program. They don’t want other donors to come and find anything in it. [SICS-M.2]

We have big companies influencing fisheries but we got the economic reform unit basically run by RAMSI advisers... A lot of policies in Cabinet are made by RAMSI anyway. We are at the bottom of the heap because we got RAMSI basically looking after our country... I cannot help to feel that the air you are breathing is getting less and less. [SIP.1]

These extracts represent how various participants experienced how politicians and RAMSI exercised significant influences over public policy settings within a post-conflict polity. Here, existing policies lacked societal inputs, public discussions and political deliberations. These views further reflect local actors’ agonies over these influences, particularly against the fact that a foreign element has been cleaning up their mess after the tension. They reveal local actors’ frustrations and lack of confidence in their government to resolve issues at the tension (see section 5.2.1). These issues continue to shape Solomon Islands development, as one of the (few) ‘least developing countries’ in the region (see Appendix A). The narratives depict major problems with how Solomon Islanders perceived their government and themselves as a nation.

5.3.2. Policy formulation

What is constructed by policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how are they constructing policies are concerns of this inquiry.

5.3.2.1. Construction of policy

Participants were asked about how they conceive (public) ‘policy’, its nature, and characteristics of existing policies. Sections 5.3.2.1.1 to 5.3.2.1.3 examine participants’ responses to these questions.

5.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy

No consistent construction of ‘policy’ emerged, although it was mentioned in various documents cited in Table 5.5. National policies identified were the National Development
Strategy (NDS), National Coalition for Reform and Advancement (NCRA) policy statement,\textsuperscript{xvi} and the NCRA policy translation and implementation document (SIG, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). The first was a strategic plan developed by the Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination. The second was a collection of statements picked from policy platforms of different parties in the (NCRA) coalition government. The third translated the NCRA policy statements into concrete strategies. Ministries were meant to implement both the NDS and the NCRA policies, two systems of formulation running in parallel—that is, from the political level and from the public service. Yet it was unclear which took precedence as national policy. Other documents (procedures, legislation, donor and international requirements) were also variously referred to as policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulation of policy document (what)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules, policy statements, operating procedures</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political manifestos/platform</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor requirements</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal (e.g. a reform program)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and/or regional policy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy for policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5: Construction of policy in the Solomon Islands

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant:

*Not only is our NDS but there are also international and regional commitments like this national adaptation policy on climate change.* [SIPS.15]

*We have national and sectoral policies. There are other links. Donors have their own policies and priority areas.* [SIPS.11]

*In the public service, when they talk policies the word policy itself always refers to guidelines.* [SIPS.3]

*Public policy is a set of rules to guide the public as a whole on whatever they want to do like we have a policy on early childhood.* [SIPS.2]

\textsuperscript{xvi} During the 2012 fieldwork, NCRA was the government under PM Gordon Lilo. Following the December 2014 election, PM Manasseh Sogavare’s Democratic Coalition for Change became the new government (SIG, 2014a).
The NCRA policy is from different parties. Normally they form and call themselves a coalition something, an alliance or rural development. They also have the NDS. There’s a mismatch there. [SIPS.10]

5.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies

Table 5.6 depicts the Solomon Islands’ policy framework consisting of various documents that participants referred to in Table 5.6. Participants constructed policy documents as manifestations at different levels of the framework co-existing with other policies from regional and global levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Most relevant to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>NCRA policy statement (4 years); NDS (10 years); Cabinet and caucus directives</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Macro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Sector plans; provincial strategic plans, Medium Term Framework (4 years)</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Meso)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>NCRA policy translation and implementation document, corporate and annual work plans; Legislation – acts and regulations; standard operating procedures, general orders, rules, instructions, procedures, manuals (operational policies); development budget</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Micro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across</td>
<td>Annual reports, etc.</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.6**: The Solomon Islands’ policy framework

Narrative extracts below further illustrate these different policies:

*Policy is more than a statement. Different people look at policies at different levels. This NCRA policy is for politicians to make... As it comes down to Ministries and divisions, it involves a whole process to make it operational in corporate and work plans and to link it to the budget.* [SIPS.4]

*We are working with Ministries on this Medium Term Framework in terms of programs, projects and indicators to implement this NDS within the four years life of government.* [SIPS.1]

But from sector to the ministry levels huge gaps remained, up-to-date policies such as sector and corporate plans, regulations and operating procedures still not yet in place. Attributing factors included political instability and limited local formulation capacity and culture:

*Most Ministries don’t have corporate plans... The Permanent Secretaries will say something that sounds so good but it’s not the reality. They probably have a good reason for not having a plan*
because of instability. Not like Samoa, it’s being the same government so there’s consistency in policies. [SIPA.1]

The frame is there but the documentation is little... One factor why policies fail is because there’s no legal backing. If you talk about qualification there’s no act to accommodate that. Often there are acts but regulations and standard operating procedures are missing. Like when you charge him, you say ‘charge him with what?’ Maybe they don’t know how or I don’t do it and I still get pay. [SIPA.3]

5.3.2.1.3. Features of policy

Most participants regarded those policies in place as wish lists, largely isolated from the realities of need, and developed for purposes of political positioning or satisfying donor requirements. They were fragmented, ad hoc and not implementation-focused; reflecting political instabilities and problems of administrative functionality within the government system:

The consultant who wrote this NDS pulled together everyone’s ideas, so we called that not public policy but a wish list as it’s got everything in it... Donors... write these documents because we ask for these big documents to be written. This is about meeting donors’ needs. Like this NCRA policy, this is not about implementation; this is about making politicians look good. [RAMSI-M.2]

What is expected of ministries is to implement this NCRA policy but the difficulty is that these policies don’t reflect the realities in sectors. [SIPS.3]

There are policies of ministries and policies of politicians and their marriages are problematic in terms of implementation. And there are these de facto ones. When you have donors’ interests coming in that’s the worst thing. It’s difficult for donors to engage in situations where things are ad hoc and unsteady, not only political security but also administration functionalities. [SIPS.18]

Despite political instabilities, every government policy statement has remained more or less the same in content. While constructed as national policies (on paper), what got adopted has been driven mostly by political agendas:

They make statements and normally they are just a continuation or little variation of what already exists... we just twist the language to make it not look like previous governments’ policies. [SIPS.7]

Politics divert things regardless if you have a policy, project or whatever. Cabinet decides to do otherwise even if it is not in policy or budget. [SIPS.4]
5.3.2.2. How are policies formulated?

Participants were asked about how policies are formulated; the processes employed, who does the work of formulation, what is used as the knowledge basis for policy and stakeholders’ understanding of policies. Table 5.7 gives the coded participant narratives about this ‘how’ question. Sections 5.3.2.2.1 to 5.3.2.2.4 elaborated on the patterns shown by the narratives frequency. Narrative extracts below the table illustrate what these patterns meant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social construction - ideologies, beliefs, values, etc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual research/evidence based – rational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfer – imported social construction/evidence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External consultant/adviser</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy unit – public administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working committees</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understandability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly understood by stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not understood by stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in the Solomon Islands

5.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy

In Table 5.7, most participants regarded evidence-based policy as limited (frequency of 106). Instead, the policy process was typically ad hoc, dominated by ideologies (frequency of 78) and policy transfers (frequency of 35):

It’s ad hoc. You have a coalition government and issues that go into their policy document would be
magic, scenery assessments type of things. You don’t bring in people to say this is what we are going to do, give me the cost for next year and you factor it in. No. It’s just guess work. [SIPA.1]

**In most policies I’ve seen, they are policies from another country and you try to fit it here. Like this national cocoa strategy, they just do it out of what the expert wrote to achieve.** [SIPS.3]

One policy that has failed are rural development centres. It’s in that NCRA policy but has never taken off the ground... It’s ill-conceived. There hasn’t been any feasibility study into that idea. Implementers have different views about it. There hasn’t been a budget to support it. It’s just a statement trying to discover an elephant, without knowing what to do. [SIPS.10]

When you talk national in whatever policy it’s based on the 50 constituencies. The best you can handle in this country is 50. People in these political groups come with their own thoughts or philosophies in writing the policy. So what is important for me is whose context is that policy referring to? It has to be robust to accommodate over 70 cultures and languages. There are common beliefs that we tie together as policies but when it comes to implementation, it’s different for every island. Very complex. It took us 30 years (of independence) to realise when you talk about modern laws and you try to put them into over 70 cultures, they are bound to fail. [SIPA.3]

Limited evidence-based policy revealed the lack of local consultation, discussions and rational assessments of policy issues and implications. Participants assessed the NCRA policy as ill-conceived and lacking shared understanding, ownership and support, hence the limitation in its translation into implementation. The complication concerning the lack of policy consensus at the political level reflected the complexity of society. Accommodating common beliefs of different political actors from diverse ethnicities in the formation of a national policy document can be straightforward. But the challenge lies in implementation: how to accommodate different cultural interests and worldviews.

**5.3.2.2.2. Methodology**

The patterns in Table 5.7 also show that the policy process has been commonly top-down (directive) *(frequency of 26)*, reaffirming similar patterns in previous sections. Given the exclusiveness of policy processes, existing policies were assessed as lacking presentation of the public interests and stakeholder support:

*Policies are made in the room. We don’t know where those policies come from, what research they take them from. It’s top-down. Parties come together and make some consensus like you give that policy, my party give this policy and we use this from my manifesto.* [SIPS.2]
The process of getting these plans endorsed is to invite stakeholders. I haven’t seen it here. The lack of consultation and support from the people is the major problem. [RPS.5]

When we made public policy it loses touch with the people... The election system gives the opportunity to inform public policy but that doesn’t happen. So policy like this NDS becomes diluted. It’s an exclusive process influenced mainly by donors... rather than us. [SIC-M.1]

5.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policy

Further, policies have been formulated mainly by political groupings (frequency of 57) and consultants (frequency of 54) (see Table 5.7). There has been some policy formulation by the public administrative structure (frequency of 18), but it was not the main formulator. Backbenchers who drafted the NCRA and other political policies were mostly Member of Parliaments’ wantoks while donor influences through consultants were evident in the formulation of the NDS and Ministries’ policies. Participatory mechanisms (where working committees could be involved) were limited (frequency of 6). Reflecting as well in participant narratives was the lack of attention to issues of implementation:

Unfortunately we don’t have debates or discussion of issues used to formulate policies. People who put up these policies are campaign managers of candidates forming the government... You are my nephew, come join our group, you draft our policy and hopefully give you a job. [SIPA.1]

They just did a policy for the Ministry of Health... It was done by this guy from the World Bank. He used languages like what are we doing good, what we can do better, more, less or the same. No one has been able to figure out this plan. [RPS.9]

The NDS is a classic piece that outsiders wrote it. It’s going to annoy a lot of people for a long time but in the meantime we keep referring to it. But it’s meaningless. It’s all too easy to get somebody to come and write a policy. It’s much harder to sit down and say what is it that we want and how are we going to do it? So policy is very demand rather than supply driven. If donors want a policy, they say pay a consultant to write it and that has happened a lot. But the real game is what is the next step and making sure it gets to budget. We often look for these ambitious documents that are never going to be played. This (NDS) is good to show it’s not going to get implemented. [RAMSI-M.1]

5.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy

The patterns (Table 5.7) indicate that existing policies (including the government’s role in public policy) were not well understood (frequency of 54) by stakeholders (internal and external). Attributing to this limitation is societal development status: limited education and
access to quality information within the top-down nature of the policy process. These issues fundamentally affect state-society relations and how local people see their government’s role:

*Because it (NCRA policy) came as a finished product, something pre-made, you don’t understand where these come from, but we continue to try and do it.* [SIPS.2]

*These people’s whole cycle is around one place, in villages, so it’s usually a word of mouth when people talk and know about policies.* [SIP.1]

*It’s an educational problem. You can publish your policy platform but not many people understand it even if you write it simply. It will become another piece of paper in the house.* [SIPA.2]

*This country elects people into government and that’s it. Its civil education that doesn’t touch base with people’s realities and linking the people to what the government’s roles are. All they see is what’s there. They don’t see the government, only the schools and health clinics and that’s all.* [SICS-M.2]

### 5.3.3. Policy implementation

Table 5.8 outlines what most participants considered as critical factors or issues impacting on implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues concerning implementation</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People capability</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy culture and ownership</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation of policy to community</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and alignment</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget capability</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder support and feedback</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.8: Issues or factors central to implementation in the Solomon Islands*

These factors resonated in the findings presented in previous sections. Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and further narrated in the following sections under five headings: public policy leadership, capability, policy culture and ownership, and translation of policy to community.
5.3.3.1. Public policy leadership

The immediate section shows a policy process that was highly politicised. Public policy leadership was largely affected by political fragmentation, the ‘big man’ culture, lack of accountability, and insufficient societal understanding of governmental functions.

State building which involved developing a shared national identity, political community and expectations about what is required of government is central to national public policy. Yet this is a challenge for a society of over 900 islands and 120 languages (see Table 1.1). Where people are divided as a community, leadership, politics and public policy are also fragmented. However, leaders have neither focused on nor are prepared to deal with nation-state building in such a complex society. Patronage or social connections shaped leadership interests and politics, more than written policies:

*The ideal situation (NCRA policy) is what I just said. But that’s not what is happening... Party groups aren’t understood so they only pop up near election. They identify themselves to their ethnic groups so we have policies within ourselves... The leader has its own people, so they listen to their people, not the party... These people are from different island spaces and coming into power it’s a shock to their lives. They don’t know what policy is. So it’s uncomfortable to put up the right policy because personality comes in. Whoever has the strongest say can defeat a policy despite how good you may think of it.* [SIPA.3]

*It’s fragmented that the only thing that unites them (politicians) is the need to be in government. What this PM has done is made it worse. As soon as he came in, he reshuffled everybody.* [RPS.5]

In such patronage relationships between people and government, ‘big man’ leadership and politics have played a huge part:

*The Minister is a big man. Big men are warriors because they destroy the challengers and are left only with themselves. So the terminology becomes the ‘big man’ in terms of power, legacy and providing for the people. The people simply depend on them.* [SIP.2]

*We have politicians who once elected they think of themselves as someone probably next to God. I keep telling them ‘if you don’t see them in the law, there’s a custom, a convention on doing these things’. But they say ‘I’m the Minister, I have the power’. They actually don’t listen to public servants.* [SIPA.1]

*The idea of big man is being transformed from the village to the national level... But in here the arena and resources are much bigger. And unfortunately party politics are weak.* [RPS.9]
Instead of focusing on nation building, the task of leaders has been to maintain political power. Accountability lies with people, but that requires a common understanding of government and its public policy role. Unfortunately, this understanding is limited reflecting the underdevelopment of society to participate in government affairs (see section 5.3.2.2.4). Politicians have capitalised on these gaps and differences in state-society relations to gain or maintain personal advantage:

*If there are more people educated then they should contribute more effectively. You notice that our literacy level is very low compared to Fiji and Samoa.* [SIPS.9]

*They are discussing policies but what is coming from the people isn’t necessarily what they need in development. Most are worried about getting cash in hand for kerosene, tobacco, etc. so they vote for wherever that’s coming from.* [SIPS.17]

*People see their politicians as sources of money. But they see government with great frustration and suspicion. The state is failing to deliver public policy and that’s an accountability issue between the state and people. So public policy is floating around because it’s not linked to budget, outcome and people. There are weaknesses and strengths with nations joining traditional and modern structures... in ways to ensure accountability and all that. These institutions can be powerful but it all depends on how people are engaged... Here, we have big men exploiting the differences for personal gains. But the strong leaders are saying ‘how do we get these structures to work to meet the needs of both sides’?* [RAMSI-M.2]

### 5.3.3.2. Capability (people, resources, learning, monitoring and evaluation)

The capacity to formulate and implement policies in a modern state is comparatively low in the Solomon Islands. This lack of capacity is also reflected in the lack of understanding of public policy and how it functions within a modern nation-state setting. The machinery of government does not work properly and the role of the public service expected in a Westminster government system is largely undermined by political agendas. The political sphere operates in isolation from the bureaucracy. Existing policies are not linked to budgets, and budgetary provisions are often underspent or misused by politicians. The lack of mechanisms to implement, monitor and evaluate policies are a reflection of the government administrative system:

*A lot of things in the NCRA policy haven’t trickled down. The whole machinery doesn’t work and that starts from the top. We have Ministers who don’t know what they should be doing in government. Permanent Secretaries can get kicked out any time and get people who don’t know much about government. That lack of legislation and these things are a reflection of that.* [SIPA.2]
Cabinet is setting this year’s budget and there’s nothing behind it on how to implement policy. Nobody knows the ‘how’. So the easy way is to take it (money) all out and give it to Member of Parliaments accounts... The question then is who makes who accountable about your policy. [SIPA.1]

There are big gaps here... We have problems of functionalities, public servants not turning up to work, not getting paid and their morale is very low. The upper ranking is very different from the rest... Permanent Secretaries are detached from the public service. They are about 20 political appointees set up here and their salaries are like three times the salaries of the whole public service. [SIPS.18]

5.3.3.3. Policy culture and ownership

A fundamental issue remains: who owns the government and its public policies? Here a lack of ownership was due to limited understanding of the government’s role in public policy, attributed largely to the policy processes as being too top-down. Collective ownership within government itself was an issue, actors working in isolation, and not within one institution. This fragmentation at vertical and horizontal levels of political and public administration domains signified a lack of a collaborative culture, which has reduced to broader problems within society:

*I can only speak for my people. For them the government is non-existent.* [SIPA.3]

*National identity is very weak. There’s no sense of ownership of the nation. That’s why the Honiara streets are dirty. When you talk about national public policy and laws, people just go ‘it’s your worry, not ours’. Our leaders have every freedom to get whatever they want. So people see that and say oh, these properties belong to the Member of Parliaments.* [SIPS.2]

*Everyone builds a fence around themselves. I don’t have faith in the public service... The only thing they have against their fellowmen is like hey, don’t do that, he comes from Nukufalala, he is targeting me because he does not like my ethnic group.* [SIP.1]

*I don’t align myself to his (political appointee who wrote the NCRA) policy but I try to push him to recognise the importance of aligning himself to us, otherwise we go nowhere.* [SIPS.3]

5.3.3.4. Translation of policy to community, stakeholder support and feedback

Political accountability for public policy and translation of existing plans at a local level require consolidated community support and feedback. Public policy development needs to
address this issue in a highly fragmented society. However, the centralisation of public policy development over the years has meant that the need to bring society towards an understanding of government objectives has lacked focus. This state-led model, which has been the focus of the development agenda of development agencies, has meant that external actors’ involvement and interests add layers of complexity to local society’s existing complications and problems. How to balance external and local interests has been another key challenge:

One thing about public policy is that it’s not understood… There’s no dialogue on what the role of the state is and how it can function best with the community… That notion is non-existence. [RAMSI-M.3]

Solomon Islands is so fragmented. We in Honiara are from thousands of islands and language groupings. That’s what makes it complex. Ownership is different. Some islands like Malaita are matrilineal. Some like Guadalcanal are patrilineal. So to put policies to effect is hard to get accepted by the rest of the country. Often these government policies aren’t real to people. [SIPS.9]

I get a bit complex because we don’t need these guys (RAMSI). But if it weren’t for them, it wouldn’t happen because this public service will try and screw the country again. It’s like where do we find the right balance… The fact reminds us where’s our confidence to rebuild our country? As long as we depend on aid, our future is getting control. [SIP.1]

5.4. Summary of findings

Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 5.9 summarised key findings in terms of propositions emerging from the Solomon Islands. Chapter eight discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, Samoa and the Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (chapter two):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/category</th>
<th>Key findings or propositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation and adoption of policy</td>
<td>1. The findings from the Solomon Islands confirm the same propositions from Vanuatu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The key difference is that foreign influences in the Solomon Islands are more confined to RAMSI with direct external interventions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Formulation of policy** | 3. The findings from the Solomon Islands reinforces most of the propositions found in Vanuatu. The key differences for the Solomon Islands are as follows:  
a. The formulation of national policy is largely carried out by political groupings. The role of the public service in policy formulation is limited.  
b. The policy formulation process in the Solomon Islands is more fragmented compared to Vanuatu.  
4. The separation of powers under the national Westminster system of government is almost non-existent in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu. |
| **Implementation of policy** | 5. Findings from the Solomon Islands are similar to Vanuatu. Some differences such as political interference in the public administration is a matter of degree rather than a major difference.  
6. The capacity to formulate and implement is considerably lower in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu and Samoa.  
7. Policy sovereignty, culture, ownership and coordination are fundamental issues to the Solomon Islands that requires considerable attention for implementation to improve. |
| **Policy process as a whole** | 8. The same propositions from Vanuatu hold for the Solomon Islands. The key difference is a matter of degree.  
9. Both Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have fluid political systems but the political system is more fragmented in the Solomon Islands – and so is the formulation and implementation processes.  
10. The extensive effect of the recent tensions that led to the collapse in the machinery of government reflected the lack of policy culture, sovereignty and integration and the problematic leadership in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu. What thus becomes priority to the Solomon Islands in terms of public policy development differs from Vanuatu or Samoa. |

**Table 5.9:** Key findings emerging from the Solomon Islands
CHAPTER 6: POLICY PROCESSES IN SAMOA

6.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses Samoa’s policy processes based on patterns emerging from participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses, and participant observation. Samoa’s background is provided in section 1.2. The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in chapter three. A total of 36 participants (see Table 3.3) shared their experiences and observations of the three policy cases (see Table 3.2) and how public policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented in Samoa. Section 6.2 examines the policy cases; section 6.3 describes the general patterns of policy processes; and section 6.4 summarises key findings from Samoa.

6.2. The policy cases

Samoa’s policy cases were the Public Works’ Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services (PIRAMS), Public Service Commission Institutional Strengthening Program (PSC-ISP) and Samoa Police Project (SPP). Policies were selected based on the requirements outlined in section 3.3. The emphasis of examining these policies is to determine critical factors at play in the initiation, formulation and implementation processes, and that have contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2).

6.2.1. The PIRAMS

6.2.1.1. Background

The PIRAMS was a five-year (1999-2003) institutional reform, initiated by the government of Samoa (GoS) to transform the then Public Works Department’s role from a traditional service provider to that of policy advice, regulatory, asset management and developing partnerships in infrastructure. It was designed and implemented as a sub-project (the ‘institutional strengthening’ component) of the Samoa Infrastructure and Asset Management Program (SIAMP), a sector-wide, multi-agency, 10-year phased, World Bank Adaptable Loan Program (see Table 6.1). It comprised four components: organisational reform; participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-italicised. Public Works Department, Samoa Airport Authority, Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment, Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development, Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Public Service Commission (PSC).
improved delivery of public works and services; asset management systems and road network; and transport planning (Kolone Vaai & Associates, 2001), PIRAMS aimed to achieve SIAM’s objective: ‘transport and coastal infrastructure assets are economically, environmentally and socially sustainable and managed by an effective partnership of stakeholders’ (World Bank, 2006, p.2). This public-private partnership was highlighted in the Statement of Economic Strategy (GoS, 1996), as the GoS’s vision for development, and included a consolidated reform package of expanding the private sector role, further market liberalisation, and human resource development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SIAMP-1 (1999-2003) | Meeting vital priorities and strengthening | • Air transport infrastructure  
• Road system infrastructure  
• Coastal infrastructure management  
• Institutional strengthening  
• Project management | • 14.4 (Loan)  
• 1.3 (AusAID)  
• 3.0 (GoS)  
\textit{Total} = 18.8 |
| SIAMP-2 (2004-2010) | Investing for sustainable growth and protection | • Extension of SIAMP-1 with a specific focus on sustainability | • 12.80 (Loan)  
• 1.2 (AusAID)  
• 3.4 (GoS)  
\textit{Total} = 17.4 |

\textbf{Table 6.1:} SIAMP design  

\subsection{6.2.1.2. Initiation}

PIRAMS comprised part of ongoing economic reforms that began from the late 1980s and that were adopted to revitalise Samoa’s economy. This followed the 1980s global recession which weakened traditional exports into the early 1990s (GoS, 1992). Hopes for a quick recovery were dashed when the 1990 and 1991 cyclones caused damage estimated at ST$450 million (World Bank, 1999a).\textsuperscript{xx} The 1993 taro blight followed, wiping out Samoa’s staple food and main export earner. The budget deficit reached ST$66.7 million in 1992/1993 (GoS, 1991-1995), this aggravated by state-owned enterprises’ financial losses (Clarke & Melei, 1996); that of the Polynesian Airline, for example, amounted to ST$125 million (GoS, 1994).

\textsuperscript{xx} ST means Samoan Tala.
Given this weak fiscal position, development agencies were active in economic revitalisation providing loans together with financial and technical assistance. Market-oriented models were advanced, noticeably in the contractual employment of Heads of Departments, introduction of a value-added tax, revision of the tariff systems and privatisation of 20 state-owned enterprises by the mid-1990s (Clarke & Melei, 1996). Neoliberal reforms were adopted against a backdrop of political events, and advancement of the ‘good governance’ agenda in the 1990s considered a necessity for development. This necessity was articulated by the Controller and Chief Auditor (1994) report concerning the government’s failure to collect $20 million of revenue, unlawful use of public money, non-preparation of public accounts, and tendering of public works to relatives of Ministers and Heads of Departments. Controversy surrounding this report saw dismissals of the Chief Auditor and corruption allegations made against Ministers and departments, constitutional change to weaken the Chief Auditor’s independence and, most tragically, the 1999 assassination of the Public Works Minister. This latter event put Samoa’s political credibility under the spotlight, but proved a catalyst for change, particularly in the Public Works Department:

There were periods when Samoa was excessively influenced by consultants... during difficult economic situations...the hurricanes, collapse of the copra industry, taro blight and so on. New Public Management ideas shouldn’t have been done as they were disruptive in services such as health. [SC.1]

The assassination of a cabinet minister (Luagalau), the arrest of two leading politicians... is turning into a seismic event for Samoa, as a deep strain of high-level political corruption is revealed in this drama... When Tuilaepa became PM... Luagalau... was made Works Minister and reputedly was told to clean up a department riddled with corruption... Chief Auditor... revealed corrupt practices amongst half of the Cabinet... clear evidence of collusion, fraud, dishonesty and mismanagement at senior levels of public works. (Field, 1999, August 8)

This political turmoil, allied to the Public Works Department’s failure to perform its roles were turning points for reform. Within pressing development needs and ongoing reform efforts, recognising the private sector’s potential in infrastructure and reforming the Public Works Department were vital for strengthening accountability and sustainability of development efforts. Leadership and the private sector’s positive response to the government’s vision expedited the reform process:

If Public Works didn’t fail we wouldn’t have started that reform. But the private sector also responded to it well. [PSS.3]
Before the cyclones, the World Bank was already doing a lot of work. Then the cyclones came and infrastructure works were massive. A lot of aid came in to rebuild the economy. But the public sector was so comfortable in their pay and things like that. So we needed to look at ways to make people more accountable in delivering these services. We consulted the private sector and they allowed us to use their equipment to do the work. But there was a bad element in that arrangement. The private sector used to tip Faamoe (Public Works Department supervisor), even gave him some beers to falsify their claims like payments for eight hours of equipment hire for works done in only two hours. So there was a lot of corruption... Also we saw the private sector’s ability to take up these responsibilities. It was just a matter of saying well, you got the equipment, why don’t we give you the works and do it according to these specifications. If you don’t, we won’t pay you. If you stuff up, you have to do it again. Otherwise you won’t get any more work. Well, it works. [PSS.2]

We had the involvement of three Ministers. It started from the time of Luagalau; that was where this vision got introduced. Then that incident happened and Liuga came in as Minister... Liuga is a person who doesn’t like to drag things. When we came back from that study tour, he wanted the reform to happen. So we went straight into implementing it. Leiataua (former Head of Public Works Department) led the reform from the start and when Liuga came in he backed the whole thing up. [PSS.1]

6.2.1.3. Formulation

The PIRAMS was designed and implemented within the SIAMP’s reform program and was shaped by the following processes:

- Mutual understanding of the reform required aligning the Government of Samoa (GoS) and development partners’ agendas. AusAID’s institutional strengthening focus, and the World Bank’s physical infrastructure concentration, were based on these agencies’ regional policy agendas, prior involvement and experiences;
- SIAMP’s complex and progressive design allowed for multi-agency commitments, long-term partnership building, and sustainable infrastructure management. It was the first Adaptable Loan Program in the Region;
- A Steering Committee comprising Heads of Departments of implementing agencies and a civil society representative, facilitated ownership and integration of various components across the sector;
- The Secretariat was the Project Management Team. An individual project component manager was assigned to each sub-component project.
- PIRAMS’ operationalisation was facilitated by experts through Opus International Consultants Ltd, and led by a former senior official from Kolone Vaai & Associates;
A participatory approach was built into the design and carried through to implementation. This included community consultations on issues such as land acquisition and coastal infrastructure management; and

SIAMP was informed by evaluation of previous works and studies on relevant technical, environmental and social-political aspects. (Hopper, 1998; Martin Associates P/L, 2003; Opus International Consultants Ltd, 1998; World Bank, 1999b, 2003a, 2006).

Models of infrastructure development and delivery were at the disposal of experts and local actors. However, the limitations of a small economy, and the need to adapt ideas and models to the social-political context of the reform were recognised: ‘specific requirements were made for the process to incorporate traditional cultural values’ (World Bank, 2006, p.10):

*The reform was approached with the underlying thinking involving three elements; social, political and economic. What I did which was very important was to drop the economic element and focused on the political and social elements. Because if you harmonise these two, the economic part naturally falls into place and we don’t have a lot of resistance or strikes as in other countries.* [SP.1]

In Samoa, as elsewhere in the Pacific, the indigenous culture and tradition are the fundamental parameters which guide national life… As per policy recommendations, an initial social assessment was made to identify the pertinent social and cultural issues to be taken into account (World Bank, 1999b, p.17).

### 6.2.1.4. Implementation

Implementation resulted in key changes identified below. The PIRAMS program was adjusted to accommodate government-wide reforms occurring concurrently, such as in PSC and MoF.

- The Public Works Department’s role was transformed from a service delivery to a policy and regulatory institution, now the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure. The PIRAMS covered only ‘works’ and ‘infrastructure’ but a later inclusion of ‘transport’ came from the 2002 government realignment under PSC;
- The Land Transport Authority was established as a state-owned enterprise responsible for land transport functions and services;
- Contracting out infrastructure works in terms of construction, maintenance and some monitoring;
- Creation of business units for outsourced services (e.g. mechanical workshops, quarry,
asphalt operations, maintenance services); Reducing in Public Works Department personnel from 403 to 58, involving staff redundancy, transfer to other departments, business establishment and training for new roles; and Policy, planning, legislative, system and corporate cultural changes and capacity building (World Bank, 2003a, 2006).

The change was gradually managed using a participative and consultative process which led to wider support and acceptance of the reform. International experience was incorporated, but the process was driven locally. Political leadership and direction was central to the whole process:

*One thing I reached out to was the Public Service Association so that they don’t stir up any resistance... The World Bank showcased our reforms but they didn’t have the profile to relate to our people. So that was what I did. We had several retreats where these guys started to come out and accept the change... The PM never believed it was going to be that smooth. [SP.1]*

*The government is trying to apply the same outsourcing model in health but it hasn’t worked because health has a weak Minister. The public works reform worked because he was a strong Minister. He wanted to make sure the reform got implemented. [SP.3]*

Implementation encountered challenges, including those that Samoa continues to face in its distinct social-political setting and developing status. A lack of supervision and quality checks persisted as ongoing issues, this deriving from limited technical capacity and uneven accountability enforcement:

*Payments are given to us but there are no monitoring reports. We don’t have enough manpower to perform that onsite supervisory role. My division has only three staff... This always comes back to this issue of how we retain engineers as most leave for better jobs elsewhere. Then we bring in consultants to fill that gap but they are very expensive. So it’s difficult how you balance that. [PSS.2]*

*People in government don’t do proper reporting... They just accept the payments. It’s to do with their policies and culture as local companies can do better supervision like the overseas ones. Nobody is checking their work. They are the bosses and can do whatever they want. [SPS-M.1]*

Lack of infrastructure quality is also affected by the practice of awarding tenders to the lowest (financial) bids. This was occasioned by limited affordability, and the difficulty of balancing development effectiveness against political interests within a vulnerable island economy operating off a narrow fiscal base:
That Malifa-Vailoa road, about 3km was constructed with a US$30 million loan and the quality is good because we built it according to the standards any road should be. But the LTA budget is only ST$30 million to cover 1000km of all roads. So what is built reflects the money going into it... Then from the political side, how do you satisfy everyone’s needs as people come and say why are you only building that road... Last year we constructed only 15km of roads as cyclone Evan came and SA$15 million went into recovery work. So it all depends on our affordability and level of development. [PSS.3]

Political input has usually affected long-term development, a form of interference that remains significant in public works. The implementation process is largely driven by pressures seeking popular political support:

When it’s near election it’s obvious that ministers’ constituencies have lots of work carried out... The prioritisation comes from only two people; the PM and our Minister... With our three-year contract you have to do what the Minister tells you. The right thing is to rebut when something isn’t right. But that’s the end of you. You have to find ways of working with that if you want to continue as a CEO. [PSS.2]

Participants saw political interference and top-down leadership as directly linked to the fa’amatai culture. The fa’aSamoa pervades the public service culture by limiting its neutrality in policy advice and implementation:

ADB forced the removal of Ministers from government boards last year... Then they got these men and it ends up like a whole gang of Tuilaepa’s government. In other countries once you stuff up as a director they clean you up. But here, no way... That’s why policies aren’t working. Even with the works we are doing it’s whatever the Minister wants. It’s like how the matais run things in the village. I reckon everything is to do with culture. [SPS-M.2]

With our fa’aSamoa culture of respect, love and relationship it’s difficult to turn people away. When a high chief comes, it’s natural to automatically think about those cultural aspects. There are cases where I say no but people turn around and go to the Minister. Then I get a directive saying there’s a law but use your common sense. But that’s corruption... But we still managed to achieve what was setup under the reform. We just have to learn how to deal with these challenges. [PSS.1]

The challenge here is again not only about infrastructure development as such, but about the broad public policy issue of operating and fostering development within a small, intimate island economy:

It’s about looking at ways for a small economy to survive. The only new money coming in is from the private sector. But the private sector is struggling. We got aid money but more than half goes back
to consultants. That aid is for new development initiatives… If we cut aid we are doomed. What we have is only for consumption. We don’t know where to get more tax or money. We need more exports...

But if you go to NZ supermarkets, the bananas are from Asia, not from here. [SPS-M.4]

Usually the lowest bid is picked. If Lucky tenders $500,000 and Bluebird tenders $100,000 then Bluebird gets the job. But Bluebird can withdraw as they want Lucky to get that job for the extra $400,000 to come to their family. Ah Liki, Bluebird and Lucky are all from the same family and Care Blue Allow is their joint contractor. Ott and King Construction are separate contractors but King is Ott’s son… They do a lot of collusion as it’s allowed and the market is too small. [PSS.1]

6.2.1.5. Results

The World Bank (2006) evaluated the SIAMP Phase I, where PIRAMS was the main component, as being ‘highly satisfactory’. Positive aspects included leadership, ownership, participatory nature of the process, consideration of local context, and positive working relationships with development partners. The reform was seen as a model for other small states:

The project design and successful performance became a model for improving portfolio performance in small-scale countries… The overall outcome for the first phase is rated as highly satisfactory… The main component reformed the Public Works Department from a traditional service provider to an assessment manager and policy office, while transferring services and assets to the private sector… The institutional development impact has been high. (World Bank, 2006, pp.5-14)

Participant narratives highlighted ongoing challenges facing infrastructure development. Nevertheless from the PIRAMS experience, participants cited instances of its visible impact:

Instead of only two companies that were there, there are now 10 good contractors in Apia and another 10 in Savaii. Instead of the 300 jobs taken away during the reform, about 1,000 new jobs were created. The saving in roads construction is about $2 million a year. The private sector is growing. There’s good quality. That’s why you have to be bold enough to take that risk. [SP.1]

Our people’s capacity to understand and run things on their own is improved. Success is seen like before the road cost $500, now its $50 a metre. The change enabled local companies to perform at a higher standard, instead of just bringing in overseas companies. The challenge is maintaining the standards. But overall the results are good and the reform is working. [SP.3]

6.2.1.6. Key factors

Table 6.2 summarises the critical factors of the PIRAMS’ policy process:
6.2.2. The PSC-ISP

6.2.2.1. Background

The PSC-ISP was a five-year (1999-2004) reform program initiated by the GoS ‘to strengthen the management of human resources in the public service as part of a continuing public sector reform, aimed at furthering the development of Samoa’. Its purpose was ‘to implement across the public service sound human resource management (HRM) practices supported by legislation, policies and manuals which assured that Heads of Departments are accountable’. The PSC, the statutory employer of all public servants, was the beneficiary of this ISP. With ‘more efficient policy and decision-making’ through HRM strengthening, improved service delivery was expected (PSC-ISP, 1998, p.30). The PSC-ISP was a three-stage project funded through an AusAID AUD$5.5million grant and AUD$948,400 in counterpart costs (see Table 6.3). Gunn Rural Management International Pty Ltd was the Australian Managing Contractor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fa’amatai subsystem</td>
<td>Initiation  • Political and economic crisis  • Government reform agenda  • Leadership – political and public administration  • Involvement of international development agents</td>
<td>Success – with ongoing challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent SIDS</td>
<td>Formulation  • Participative and consultative  • Coordination and alignment  • Complex sector reform program  • Policy transfer and contextualisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable political system (powerful PM)</td>
<td>Implementation  • Participative and consultative  • Coordination and alignment  • Gradual  • Leadership  • Political interference  • SIDS – business collusion  • M&amp;E – an issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: PIRAMS key factors
6.2.2.2. Initiation

Institutional strengthening gained strong momentum in the mid-1990s given the emphasis on capacity building for carrying out and sustaining ongoing reforms. About 15 donor-funded ISPs were implemented during the 1990s-2000s period. Treasury and Customs Departments were the first to have ISPs, concurrent with initial economic and financial reforms. Later reforms identified in the Statement of Economic Strategy (1996, 1998) included performance budgeting, the devolution of central agency responsibilities to ministries, corporate planning, and redefining the public service’s role. The last three were the subject of the PSC-ISP.

The PSC-ISP as an idea originated from donors and reform-minded officials who wanted Samoa to keep up with global trends. Leadership enabled the PSC-ISP’s initiation with AusAID being willing to provide support:

*The decision wasn’t something that happened overnight... Treasury and customs ISPs were first and were working well. And when Lofi came in as CEO, she wanted one for PSC... Because as more CEOs became knowledgeable of global trends they thought Samoa needed to follow. And AusAID was willing to assist. The government’s manifestos also spelt out reforms as one of their mandates.*

[PSS.4]
6.2.2.3. Formulation

The PSC-ISP’s formulation resulting in the 1998 Project Design Document were facilitated by the following processes:

- The 1995-1997 Job Analysis formed the basis for further reforms;
- Two leadership retreats in 1996 and 1997 allowed discussions and support for reforms;
- Australia’s support for the PSC-ISP and Education-ISP was requested at a 1997 Australia/Samoa high level consultation in Canberra; and
- A five member team (a local member and four external specialists) conducted a feasibility study and stakeholders’ consultation for the design (PSC-ISP, 1998):

  One thing that sold the change was the Job Analysis. It boosted the remuneration of people at the middle level and so they thought the changes coming in further would benefit us even more. [PSS.6]

The PSC-ISP was designed to reflect principles of Samoan-led reform, skills transfer, flexibility, achievement of change in support of the GoS policy, and Samoa-Australia partnerships based on mutual responsibilities. Thus the following mechanisms formed the design:

- A multi-layered management structure consisted of the Program Coordinating Committee (PCC), Steering Committee, Secretariat, Project Monitoring Group, Project Director and Australian Managing Contractor;
- Program management was the responsibility of the Steering Committee which consisted of an independent chair, two Member of Parliaments, six Heads of Departments including PSC, a civil society representative, PSC-ISP Head of Secretariat and Australian Managing Contractor’s Team Leader;
- Management and implementation rested with the locals while the consultancy team was there to provide support, advice and mentoring;
- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were conducted through the Secretariat quarterly reports, Project Monitoring Group reviews and Samoa/Australia governmental reviews through the PCC; and
- Flexibility meant that the latter stages were revised, based on lessons learned from previous stages, and accommodating changes in the operating environment. (PSC-ISP, 1998, 2004):

  Samoan ownership was there as represented by the Steering Committee. They knew this was going
to have implications for them so they got involved upstream before the change came knocking on their doors. [SC.4]

The nature of the PSC-ISP’s knowledge basis meant policy transfer was inevitable given the involvement of consultants. Also the Steering Committee and project team members undertook a study tour in Australia, Philippines and Fiji to examine similar reforms (PSC-ISP, 2000). The reform was locally driven, invigorated by local actors’ strong sense of national pride in ownership:

It was a reform transfer. I remember the project director influencing a lot of the design because he was a public service commissioner in Australia and he just picked up manuals, holus-bolus out of his office and brought them over. [SC.3]

People in government have a strong sense of nationalism. Not only they knew what was best for them, they also weren’t prepared to just take what someone says, like from AusAID or ADB. We said this is the design but the design was talked through all the way. That got the project off to a good start. There’s a degree of tokenism about that which separates Samoa from other countries I worked in. They pay lip service to the whole notion of collaboration and performing an equal partnership. [SC.5]

6.2.2.4. Implementation

Participative approaches through departmental sub-projects (functional review, policy review, legislative review, corporate planning system and communication) were used to facilitate understandings of different aspects of the reform:

My role as team leader was really about modifying stages of implementation, priorities and timelines to suit the context of the day. But we were using a fully participative model where every bit of the reform was being done by working parties… PSC-ISP absolutely proved that this is the only way to work in any culture. And I carried on with the same methodology in every other project after that. [SC.3]

Implementation was experimental in most cases. For instance, before recruitment and selection was devolved to departments under the new Public Service Act 2004, that function was first piloted by instruments of delegation in groups of (six) departments. Lessons learned from the first group were fed into the next, and used to revise the recruitment and selection policy. This process involved legislative changes, policy reviews, manual write-ups, pilots, and workshops and training for PSC and departments in the performance of their new roles. The PSC’s role was eventually changed from ‘hire and fire’ to a policy role, while departments were empowered to assume that delegated authority. The same process applied
to other functions such as discipline, grievance management, and corporate planning:

We had groups from departments. Their involvement made it easier when we went out to explain what was happening and coming out. We had a lot happening, one policy review after another. [PSS.6]

Implementation was complex and did not follow a predetermined line. The GoS expectation of what it wanted from the reform was somewhat different from what was in the plans. For instance, the public service alignment was not a core project activity but a major reform. As this change was huge and sudden, it affected how people saw the PSC-ISP in its overall shape and content:

The explicit outputs are clearly defined in all of the Stage Work Plans and PDDs. However, the GoS, and the PSC… were very clear about what they wanted out of this reform. This clarity was not shared by the Australian Managing Contractor until late in the process… The reduction in the size of the public service by up to 20% never appeared in any Project Design Document or LogFrame document… Full devolution was only explicitly requested in the 9 last months of the project… The general elections, the enactment of legislation and… the Realignment of Departments being the three most significant… were not unexpected, but their impact was sometimes greater than anticipated. (PSC-ISP, 2004, p.24 & p.43)

After one year of implementation, there seemed few tangible achievements as outputs and AusAID was about to withdraw. Contributing impediments included the effects of the 2001 election, staff losses and loss of momentum. Some experienced uncertain leadership as the key issue:

There has been a lull in the project and a loss of momentum… attributed to the effects of the election period, the suspension of Steering Committee meetings over the election and post-election periods, staff losses in some areas and concentration on budget preparations. However, re-vitalisation of the project is not yet becoming evident. (PSC-ISP, 2001, p.1).

At the end of 2002, AusAID sent in an M&E team… they wrote a report to the PM evaluating the PSC-ISP as a failed project. They brought everyone together and publicly announced that my project was failing. And everybody in the room knew why. The only challenge was leadership and that was how AusAID saw it. AusAID wrote a letter to the Steering Committee and CEO, PSC that unless things changed they were going to discontinue funding the program as there was no tangible result. [SC.3]

Conflicting motivations behind the Australian Managing Contractor and local counterparts shaped the differences in their expectations and assessments of the reform, and how the pace
of change was managed to facilitate local acceptance and absorption capacity:

*There are always conflicting motivations behind project teams and how they operate with local people. I saw this first hand because Mick (team leader) was always stressing that nothing was happening. Whereas things were happening but the change wasn’t obvious. The Australian Managing Contractor had outcomes to deliver to AusAID and that was their main driver... But from our point of view we needed to take the change at the pace that was required. We can’t force things on people without explaining well. We in PSC also needed to understand what was happening so we can sell it to them.* [PSS.4]

*Often the milestones are ticked off but the actual capacity to absorb and to buy into the real change isn’t there. That’s why reforms often don’t work.* [SPS-M.2]

Limited initial progress triggered major progress in stage three. Contributing to that was strong PSC leadership and a change in project team leadership. Furthermore the project was brought under PSC management, strengthening PSC’s commitment and accountability for the reform. The PSC-ISP multi-layered management facilitated awareness of the reform, but its conduct led to a diffusion of roles between the PSC, Steering Committee and PCC as to who had real responsibility for progress. Consequently, the PCC was removed, the Steering Committee’s role changed to that of an advisory body, and the Head of Secretariat position turned into a PSC management role. As intended, the Steering Committee and Head of Secretariat were dissolved at the end of the first year of stage three. This allowed the PSC to take full responsibility for the reform on grounds of sustainability (PSC-ISP, 2004). All of this change was obviously unsettling:

*The biggest attention I had was to the CEO, to get her on board. So for the next one year, she was a strong leader. She was interested in meeting the logframes, reading the reports, to see what the working parties were producing and what went to the Steering Committee. That was the year we made progress... She also delegated a senior officer who worked constantly with me in getting the outputs out to departments. Because unless you got a change agent little else can happen. If you got good advisers and capable executives you can modify the design to suit what you want to do. You’ve got to have a strong leader who backs you, who backs the project when it gets tough.* [SC.3]

Relating to reform fatigue was an inherent flaw in the way such reforms are often designed and anticipated within a notion of government providing for development. Here Stage two reforms set unrealistic goals for achievement within the existing local setting and project timeframe. Thus full devolution of PSC functions to Ministries were not reached, only four (out of seven intended) being delegated:
A third blockage in the design was the objectives for Stage 2 were far too unrealistic for the policy and context and capacity levels of both PSC and Ministries… The list of achievements for Year 1 of stage 2 was completely unachievable in any public sector context, much less that of a developing country… The donor and the contractor did not fully appreciate the enormity, and therefore the difficulties, that a project of this nature represented… a similar scale of reform in an Australia jurisdiction has taken over 20 years to reach a level that was expected in Samoa in five years. (PSC-ISP, 2004, p.46)

*Development is always reform. One reason why there has been a chequered history of not much success with reforms anywhere is that the more complex the reform, the longer it takes and the more tired and disinterested staff get… So there’s an inherent flaw in big projects that go on in developing countries. It’s just a flaw in any long-term change. I was dealing with huge reforms in Australia and the same thing happened. But the additional layers in PICs where you got different cultures and expectations of the role of government in development add to reform complexity. When you are a member of government you’ve got to do this work, you’ve got this role conflict and that add to reform fatigue. Because people doing reforms have own worldviews of what their roles are in there.* [SC.5]

Another challenge lay in understanding the psychological dimensions of how people were affected by such change. Yet, there was limited understanding amongst different actors over what the project entailed by changing the status quo in a conservative society. And here the traditional system (*fa’aSamoa*) retained its significant influence over the reform process:

*I don’t believe AusAID, the project team, even myself understood what releasing that power by PSC meant to them and how that was a subtle resistance. In that reform where you are completely shifting responsibilities, almost a psychological understanding is required from the start. You start working with people in how they can replace their sense of job pride by giving authority to others and replace it with something else. If you got everyone in the mindset ready to go, implementation is easy. It’s about designing reforms. And in my experience in every project I worked in, donors wouldn’t accept designs like that… In the original design, the design team would have a model in their heads of what a donor wants the design paper to look like—with the logframes, milestones and timelines. So it’s easy to blame the context when something goes wrong because you can wipe your hands and walk away.* [SC.3]

The major lessons learned during this project relate to the complexity of major public sector change at a central agency whole-of-service level, where there are enormous political, administrative and behavioural implications of changing the status quo… The power of the philosophy of hierarchical controls underpinning the traditional governance systems in Samoa remained a significant influence through the subsequent reform initiatives. (PSC-ISP, 2004, pp.3-5)

Cultural aspects thus had a significant influence over the reform and how people operated, these aspects not reflected in the design:
I saw what fa’aSamoa did. It makes it hard for outsiders to have a legitimate role. I’ve never seen it anywhere else. They believe in it. That fa’aSamoa gives an enormous amount of pride. If you are sensitive to watch the way people reacted, other than the technical knowledge you might bring they want nothing more from you… They just want you to show them how to do this thing and go away. But that flies in the face of every design rule of any reform in a development context. \[SC.4\]

The logic that underlay the output narratives, their indicators and their completion dates for the whole of stage 2 and some of stage 3 also indicated a poor understanding of the operational and cultural requirements of implementing such reform initiatives. (PSC-ISP, 2004, p.46)

The fa’aSamoa reinforced local leadership, participation, ownership and acceptance of reform. But it also inhibited transparency of dialogue, frankness in discussion and effective utilisation of the expertise that was on tap:

> Our culture helps because we grow up to respect our elders and to work together. You listen to what the matai says. You respect what was coming from the leaders in terms of the change. So you got to absorb it. But you might not get the frankness of what people thought of the change. \[PSS.7\]

> It’s the nature of the folks there to be nationalistic. The Samoans through the Steering Committee were driving it. That talking in Samoan made things localised. But it made us feel useless to some extent because there were areas where Mick and I could contribute if we knew what was discussed in meetings. That ownership and talking in Samoan tended to underutilise what the project could offer. \[SC.3\]

### 6.2.2.5. Results

At the end of the project, the PSC-ISP was assessed as generally successful. Achievements included a 20% downsizing of the public service, with departments reduced from 27 to 14 ministries. There were also legislative changes, HRM policies in place, operational functions devolved to ministries, professional development programs provided across the public service, and PSC performing a new policy role (PSC-ISP, 2004):

> When I wrote the final report in 2004 I made a cogent argument that it was a success. We got a new act, new regulations and general orders on every HRM aspects for the public service in that country. We have reformed it. So it was a successful project in the end. \[SC.3\]

A 2002 community survey showed that 90% of those surveyed viewed the government services as good or very good (PSC-ISP, 2004). However there has not been a full evaluation of the PSC-ISP and other ISPs, hence it was difficult to determine through cost-benefit
analyses any of the long-term impacts not readily visible to the public eye. Some cast doubt on the impact of this ISP on public sector rightsizing and service delivery:

A lot of these reforms were invisible. The real thing was that Ministries were able to recruit and select their people, we slashed the public service, and all that. But if you talk to the men on the street they wouldn’t see it because it’s a long-term institutional reform. And no one has questioned PSC through its annual reporting on the benefits of these reforms. No one has actually looked at that. [SPS-M.4]

Millions are going into these ISPs... They were meant to right-size the public sector and improve service delivery. But it’s not reflecting that. The biggest challenge is the public sector growing, not the private sector. It’s a huge burden to this country. [SP.3]

6.2.2.6. Key factors

Table 6.4 summarises the critical factors of the PSC-ISP’s policy process:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>Initiation&lt;br&gt;Donor and change agents&lt;br&gt;Policy transfer&lt;br&gt;Leadership – political and public administration&lt;br&gt;Government reform agenda</td>
<td>Success - outputs&lt;br&gt;Impact - sustainability&lt;br&gt;questionable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa’a Samoa (fa’amatai subsystem) – nationalism</td>
<td>Formulation&lt;br&gt;Participative and consultative&lt;br&gt;Contextual research&lt;br&gt;Complex sector reform&lt;br&gt;Samoa-led, flexible and skills transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Implementation&lt;br&gt;Participative and consultative&lt;br&gt;Experimental/gradual&lt;br&gt;Leadership – change agent&lt;br&gt;Ownership&lt;br&gt;Non-linear process - lack progress initially&lt;br&gt;Influence of culture</td>
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Table 6.4: PSC-ISP key factors
6.2.3. The SPP

6.2.3.1. Background

The SPP was a reform program initiated by the GoS in 2001 ‘to strengthen the Samoa Police Service (SPS) to enable it to contribute economic growth, social stability and ensure equitable access to efficient police services for all Samoans’ (SPP, 2005, p.6). The program has evolved in name, delivery, and management modality (see Table 6.5). Implementation commenced in 2004 as a five-year (Australia-Samoa) bilateral ISP, preceded by an Interim Assistance Phase (IAP) to prepare the SPS for reform. AusAID direct support through UniQuest Pty and Global Justice Solutions (GJS) (as AMCs) completed in December 2008. The January/September 2009 extension assisted the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) takeover through an Australia-Samoa Police Partnership (SAPP). The SAPP was ongoing during the 2012 fieldwork and was not known when and whether it will come to an end. The five-year ISP was costed at AUD$16 million, AUD$7 million going into the new police headquarters and armoury. The SAPP was costed at about ST$2.64 in 2012. Components under different AMCs (Table 6.6) were geared towards improving the SPS technical and corporate capacity in modern policing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>AMC</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interim assistance</td>
<td>May 2001 - December 2002</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>UniQuest</td>
<td>SPS-ISP</td>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Implementation</td>
<td>January - June 2004</td>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>UniQuest</td>
<td></td>
<td>AUD$16 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2004 - December 2006</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>UniQuest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January - June 2007</td>
<td>Redesign</td>
<td>GJS</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2007 - December 2008</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>GJS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stabilisation / continuity</td>
<td>January - September 2009</td>
<td>AFP handover</td>
<td>GJS</td>
<td>SAPP</td>
<td>ST$2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 2009 - now</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: SPP movement in design and managing contractors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community safety and public order</td>
<td>Improve operational effectiveness</td>
<td>• Strategic growth</td>
<td>• Improve public safety through strengthening investigation and general policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting life and property</td>
<td>Enhance the capacity and capability of the command group</td>
<td>• Training capacity and curriculum development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and justice</td>
<td>Improve organisational efficiency</td>
<td>• HRM</td>
<td>• Improve the Samoa Police Service by responding positively to shape community perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Project management</td>
<td>• Community engagement</td>
<td>• Samoa Police Service corporate support capacity facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future directions, asset management &amp; administration</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: SPP movement in content
6.2.3.2. Initiation

The SPP came considerably late compared to most government ministries that already had their first ISPs by the mid-1990s. Given the role played by the fa’amatai in local law and order, state policing was confined initially in having a restricted role in village law and order. However, as the economy developed, so did social problems placing pressure on traditional institutions to cope with increased criminal activities (particularly amongst unemployed youths in urbanised areas outside the fa’amatai). Noticeable was increased domestic violence, social offences, white collar crimes, transactional crimes and illegal drug use (Lua’iufi & Aiafi, 2010; SPS, 2011). Strengthening the SPS policing capacity consequently emerged as a significant need. Late acknowledgement of the centrality of social stability to economic development also contributed to the late birth of the Law and Justice Sector in 2006, the last to become formalised within the umbrella of 15 sectors (GoS, 2009). This sector’s vision in its first plan was ‘justice for a safe and stable Samoa’ (GoS, 2008). A realisation that this vision required strengthening the SPS’s policing role was emphasised in the SDS 2005-2008 (and later versions).

Within this strategic direction, the SPP became part of ongoing reforms (SAPP, 2010c). The need for reforms occurred during (Police) Commissioner Asi Blakelock’s leadership in the mid-1990s, therefore the instigation of the IAP to facilitate a culture for reform within the SPS. The IAP was initially for one year only (May 2001-April 2002) but this extended out to December 2002. Yet the SPP only began its implementation in 2004 when a new Commissioner was appointed. The IAP’s extension, followed by lapses in the SPP, indicated concerns over leadership of this reform and a consequential need for change at this level:

These reforms were there all along waiting to happen. But Asi didn’t accept them. So the government decided to retire him and find someone else who was receptive to reforms. That was when Lorenese was appointed Commissioner in 2003 and he came in and started the SPP. [PSS.10]

Edd Peek (AusAID) informed the PCC regarding the levels of risks associated with the project… there would be a break of between six weeks to a couple of months… due to uncertainty in the future of the project no further PCC meetings would be planned until notification. (SPS-ISG, 2002)

6.2.3.3. Formulation

The SPP’s four key movements, identified in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, are summarised below. They indicate that the project underwent significant changes from its original formulation:

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The IAP aimed to ‘plant the seeds of change’ and assess the SPS’s culture, competence and capacity for implementation through training, community consultation, and testing models for a new organisational structure. Legislative changes facilitated the establishment of a new contemporary SPS structure with four Assistant Commissioner positions. The IAP informed the 2003 Project Design Document and confirmed wider support for reform. Five Australian consultants (two were long-term) under Uniqueast assisted in the IAP under the stewardship of a multi-stakeholders PCC (Schofield, Solofa, Lewis, & Cain, 2006; SPS-ISP, 2001, 2002).

Uniqueast, consisting of three long-term advisers, continued as the Australian Managing Contractor in the implementation phase in January 2004. The IAP PCC continued to provide oversight through quarterly meetings. AusAID and other external mechanisms provided M&E (Schofield et al., 2006; SPP, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).

GJS took over from Uniqueast in 2007 after the 2006 Medium Term Review. This led to an overall re-design of the SPP, realigning its components with SPS strategic direction and capacity building. The PCC was converted into a Steering Committee, and a senior police officer appointed SPP deputy team leader to strengthen the project and its counterpart linkages. GJS had a ‘culturally sensitive balanced’ team of internationally, regionally and locally engaged experts, as well as a mixture of four long-term and various short-term advisory inputs into different policing and corporate areas. M&E mechanisms (Steering Committee, SPP/SPS management meetings, reviews) were revitalised. (SPP, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009a).

AFP provided ongoing support through the SAPP following the Joint Review and Planning Mission towards the end of the SPS-ISP in 2008. The aim was to consolidate and stabilise the reforms (SAPP, 2010c) through a coordinated approach under the Law and Justice Sector. This was consistent with the GoS sector-wide approach and Australia’s regional Pacific Police Development Program (SPP, 2008).

As was evident from various experts’ inputs, the SPP was based on ideas of modern policing and organisational development under a Westminster government system. However, research, consultation and analyses were undertaken indicating efforts to locally contextualise this reform.
6.2.3.4. Implementation

After two years of implementation, the 2006 Medium Term Review assessed the SPP as not working. This was attributed to the following:

- It was not reflective of contextual changes and priorities despite its rolling design;
- Did not sufficiently take into account the socio-cultural environment. Community policing was not guided by an understanding of the relationship between police and *fa’amatasi*;
- Insufficiently directed towards capacity building and establishing relationships between advisers and counterparts;
- Lack of local ownership, direction and relevancy;
- Raising of expectations for which the SPS was not prepared to meet;
- The historical neglect of the Law and Justice Sector as reflected by poor police conditions;
- Dependence on too few advisers rather than a cadre of local change leaders; and
- Lack governments (Samoa-Australia) monitoring and policy dialogue. The PCC met only once. (Schofield et al., 2006):

> That review assessed the project as failing... We also did a survey which showed no improvement in public confidence in the police. The project came and it wasn’t part of us. These guys came and just sat in their little office, doing their own thing. There was no sense of responsibility from us. [PSS.9]

Tangible implementation largely took place in the 2007-2009 period, following the 2007 overhaul of the project design to facilitate localisation, ownership, leadership and capacity development. Momentum loss during Uniquest’s management and following the 2006 Review and redesign required a definite focus ‘to restore the project credibility with the SPS and other stakeholders’ (SPP, 2007a, p.7):

The SPP has contributed to a range of noticeable achievements in capacity development since the Medium Term Review. Stakeholders widely attribute the success of this assistance to the increased use of local and regional expertise... within the relevant SPS work areas... a significant improvement in the morale within senior SPS ranks and an increased sense of ownership of the development process. Strong leadership from the Commissioner indicates his growing confidence in the SPS. (SPP, 2008, p.6)

> It was that redesign where the police started to realise it was their project.... The executive realised they should be leading the whole thing... It was the GJS time where all these changes happened like
The ups and downs of this project indicated the significance of leadership for reform within a police institutional culture. But that leadership saw three different Commissioners. First was Asi Blakelock who encountered the first phase of major public sector reforms in the mid-1990s, but who was not receptive to change. Then came Lorenese Papalii who was instrumental in reform from 2004, but his leadership was discontinued in 2009 following involvement in gun smuggling (2009, September 21). Next, Lilo Maiava continued the reform from 2009, but his service was also discontinued in September 2014 after an investigation of mismanagement (Radio NZ, 2014, December 12). This left the reform environment unstable during the 2014 fieldwork, making change difficult to progress, given Lilo’s suspension since mid-2013, and the SPS being rendered subject to a commission of inquiry. Police leadership in Samoa has always been controversial, with external recruitment often considered an option to help break a cycle of corruption within the police. In March 2015, a non-SPS Samoan with overseas police experience was appointed Commissioner (Radio NZ, 2015, March 26):

There was never any commitment by Asi’s leadership… It was like let’s go with the flow. Everybody is reforming. And we have this money. Lorenese was pro-reform but he didn’t have the maturity and vision for the Ministry. But he was better than most of them. They must have a leader who is prepared to say no… Bringing in an overseas person would send a strong message to these people, to break their corrupt cycle. Lilo’s suspension is planting the seed for some change there. [PSS.12]

The project since AFP’s takeover changed significantly with only limited institutional strengthening in focus. This was largely due to the project’s management and delivery staying conditioned by AFP home politics and processes, and where the project was treated as an AFP mission rather than a reform process within a developmental context:

It’s the political thing back home that drives what we can do here, restricting how we move things… We have things in mind based on getting money like this police academy… But people at home keep stripping money from us. Because it’s got to be a cash grab and a quick spend rather than long-term projects that build in things. We are trying to improve things at an accelerated rate while we are here but I don’t think we have been successful like that. So we have to expect that our influences here are small steps at a time. [AFP-M.2]

The only thing I see now is these Australian people coming in and buying things that are visible. Capacity building was the focus but there is no more of that… The project is stalled to await the results of this commission of inquiry. [PSS.11]
A major factor influencing policing work and its reform has been political interference. The police force is not independent in performing its law enforcement functions as is expected under a Westminster system:

*I see Ministers and CEOs doing corruption but most are dismissed not charged... The Commissioner has the power to investigate them. But no Commissioner will because he won’t last five minutes. They got enough evidence to summon the Deputy PM but they got a stop from up there. That behaviour is consistent across all executive members... That’s culture. Fatu (Assistant Commissioner) did his job but didn’t get re-appointed because he answered back to the PM.* [AFP-M.3]

*Instead of coming to me, he (Associate Minister) directed Angie (Manager Corporate) to outsource the construction of police outposts to his business. I advised him that we can’t do that. But he went ahead and built some outposts... I had many problems with my management because of so much political interference.* [PSS.12]

Coupled with strong political interference and limited strong police leadership remains the pervasive influence of the fa’aSamoa. Locals take some cultural aspects as a normal part of life, while most external actors see them as part of the problem in maintaining an objective and accountable police service:

*This is a good police force. But there’s a big cultural influence holding the country back. Some elements of the culture are good but unfortunately it’s a bit like the egg and the chicken... There’s so much conflict of interest that it’s not funny. Everybody is related. There are lots of favours done. That influences a lot of what we are trying to do here. It’s like our Western system being imposed on this culture and it’s hard to fit in. And it doesn’t do a bad job. It’s got a long way to go.* [AFP-M.1]

There are considerable gaps in the SPS capacity compared to other ministries. Hence the ongoing challenges that are faced in sustaining introduced changes within an embedded police culture influenced by social-political elements. Given these influences, the approach to reform has largely been gradual and will continue accordingly. Major changes in policing are seen as generational, subject to determination by behavioural changes throughout society:

*If you look at the police force you are looking at the community in smaller aspects... If the police force is brutal, the community is. The whole thing is a circle. If you are the PM and you try to stop cultural influences and corruption, you aren’t going to be PM for long. It takes a brave leader.* [AFP-M.2]

*The biggest gap is grasping the knowledge given by the project. When advisers go its back to square one. It’s not so much an issue of knowledge transfer. It’s more about the education and culture of these people (police). There are big gaps there.* [PSS.10]
We gave a structure for how we see Intel to take advantage of training. I asked for 15 staff but they got only 8. They can’t afford more people. So they continue doing the same work as before… So training is not being used. Sustainability is a worry. That’s why I said small steps. It’s generational. [AFP-M.1]

6.2.3.5. Results

The SPP’s results were mixed. Formal evaluations and various participants considered the SPP as having contributed to positive changes. Improved physical infrastructure and resource base for police work did contribute to increased police mobility and visibility (GoS, 2008, p.27). SPS corporate planning and policy culture were also improved with up-to-date mandates (legislation, policies and systems), and a modern structure (with functions such as domestic violence, professional standards, intelligence, HRM and training) in place. Gender equity xxi and engagement in whole-of-government and regional processes have been enhanced:

There’s a big improvement. A lot of policies are in place like an organisational structure, systems and processes to guide our work. [PSS.10]

One noticeable success is in gender balance and sensitivitisation. Once we can get that balance at the Assistant Commissioner level we can see some breakthrough in the Ministry. [SPS-M.2]

However, some stakeholders saw benefits accrued as not equating to resources consumed by the police reform program. Ongoing investigation of alleged mismanagement and corruption have also affected perspectives about the program’s overall performance. Nevertheless, those with close involvement in the project witnessed these benefits albeit not easily visible to external actors. Independent surveys have also shown improved public confidence in the police:

That reform is an absolute waste of time and money… It’s more than 10 years and the money going into it is probably close to $40 million. But it’s not working. The only success I see is the new building, uniform, vehicles and things like that. [SCS-M.3]

We still have issues with corruption. But compared to 10 years ago, there are major improvements. Surveysxxii show a big jump in public confidence in the police since the project started. [PSS.9]

Significant progress has been made by the SPS since the formal commencement… To the casual

xxi A survey (SPP, 2009b) showed an increased number of women being promoted over the previous five years.
xxii SPS (2013).
observer this progress can be underestimated… The SPP has been the subject of intense scrutiny and consistently has been proven to be effective both in content and its style of delivery. (SPP, 2009a, p.21)

6.2.3.6. Key factors

Table 6.7 summarises the critical factors of the SPP’s policy process:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fa’asamoa (and fa’amatal)</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Success in outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal stability – political stability</td>
<td>Donor and change agents within government</td>
<td>Impact - sustainability questionable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small knit-close society</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delayed initiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership – periods of lapses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td>Consultative and participative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redesign – evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of ownership initially</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Leadership change and issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change process was incremental, some generational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform content is complex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-linear process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7: SPP key factors

Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from Samoa’s policy cases, in comparison with those in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and the Region (see Appendix G), and against existing literature.

6.3. The policy processes in general

This section examines participant experiences and observations of policy processes in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors for effective implementation.
6.3.1. Policy initiation

Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originated. Table 6.8 shows that issues that became public policies originated mostly from within government (frequency of 32) and external actors (frequency of 26). Issues originating from society (frequency of 5) were limited. These patterns indicated that public policy settings in Samoa remained top-down:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Origin (where)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political executive</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (civil society)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(organised interest/lobby group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. External (international)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors - consultants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: Origins of public policy in Samoa

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. They indicate that policy settings were influenced predominantly by politicians, public servants and donor aid-sponsored policy areas:

Most of what we adopt is what the government wants… things that get them re-elected. But we also have these plans to make them look good, to show people we are doing something, to show how clever you are and to get money from donors. [PSS.13]

It’s the officials who are driving it (the SDS). And is driven, I won’t say by donors, but by where the aid is going into, like climate change because there’s so much funding coming into that area. But we need to ask in the overall context of our society where should really be our priority. [PSS.5]

6.3.2. Policy formulation

What is constructed by various policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how are they constructing policies are important areas of this inquiry.
6.3.2.1. Construction of policy

Participants were asked about what they refer to as (public) ‘policy’ and how they view the nature and characteristics of existing policies. Sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2 examine participants’ responses to these questions.

6.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy?

There was no consistent construction of ‘policy’, which might have referred to any of the documents in Table 6.9. Nevertheless, that mostly referred to as key policy documents included the SDS, and the plans at sectoral and ministry levels (frequency of 32). International, regional and donor requirements (frequency of 12 and 11), the rational process for policy formulation (‘policy for policy’) (frequency of 12), legislation (frequency of 8) and other documents were also referred to as policy. Political policy platforms were limited, often loosely portrayed (frequency of 4):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulation of policy document (what)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Plans (e.g. SDS, sector plans)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and/or regional policies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Policy for policy’</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor requirements</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals (include reform program)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules, policy statements, operating procedures</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political manifestos or platforms</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Papers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9: Construction of policy in Samoa

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. The SDS’s development and policy advice to Cabinet have been driven bottom-up by public servants. Formal political agenda settings and policy discourse including feedback on existing policies were regarded as limited:

*If you look at the way the SDS was developed, the MoF just asked Ministries to give whatever strategies they wanted to pursue in the next five years. Then the MoF put them together and signed off. There needs to be top level agenda setting done.* [PSS.5]
At the party level they don’t have institutional bodies to do research and develop policies ... At our Cabinet there isn’t a strong institutional policy role either. Here, the advice is very ad hoc driven by the public service ... There was a time when an emphasis was given to political manifestos. But that has drifted. Now it’s like a dominant squad. It’s only Tuilaepa promises and it’s like let’s go and listen to what he’s telling us to do. There’s no policy discourse—in-depth discussions to get feedback on where we are. [SPS-M.4]

6.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies

Table 6.10 shows Samoa’s policy framework comprising various documents referred to as policies in Table 6.9. Participants constructed these documents as manifestations evident at different levels of the policy process. The SDS co-exist with sectoral and Ministries’ strategic plans. Operational policies (legislation, procedures, etc.) exist within Ministries and M&E mechanisms encompassed Ministries’ annual reporting to Parliament, SDS and budgetary reviews and the Cabinet Development Committee’s process where major development projects are appraised and endorsed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Most relevant to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National (Macro)</td>
<td>SDS (5 years), Cabinet directives</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (Meso)</td>
<td>Sector plans (5-10 years), medium term frameworks</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry (Micro)</td>
<td>Corporate (3 years) and annual plans, legislation, operational policies</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(standards, procedures, instructions, manuals), budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across</td>
<td>Annual report, SDS/planning reviews, Cabinet Development Committee</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>monitoring, Budget reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10: Samoa’s policy framework

A key issue identified was the need for an alignment and understanding of different extant plans. As well, specific policies to operationalise high level plans into actions across sub-sectors and Ministries were required. This will vary with some institutions, yet a complete set of these hierarchical plans was required for inclusion within a coherent working framework:

We have some major gaps as far as policies are concerned. If you go sector by sector, there will be some like health, education and water with policies. But there are sectors that have minimum to none documented policies. And a lot of things are beginning to go down the same path of individual sectors having silo mentality... Ministries do their own agenda and policies and just flip them up. Because Cabinet doesn’t have a policy coordination happening, things just get signed off without proper understanding. [SPS-M.1]
A further gap in operationalisation has occurred at the legislation level. Having relevant and up-to-date acts and regulations, to support implementation and enforcement, involves reconciling modern laws and customs. This remains necessary although a long-term task:

*They stopped prosecuting anyone because they lost the court cases. Written procedures of how they operate it (breathalyser) and do blood testing were missing. The legislation (Traffic Ordinance 1960) was very difficult to read, even for me as a palagi. It was from NZ and wasn’t set to Samoa’s conditions. So I worked with the traffic people to get these procedures in place.* [AFP-M.1]

*The Law Reform Commission is in the forefront of updating laws, to blend what’s acceptable... In many cases they make adaptations in reconciling customs and modern laws... Like the need to give order in the village community in your rights as individuals and communal interests and unity, through the village council and the decision-making system.* [SC.5]

### 6.3.2.1.3. Features of policy

Most participants regard existing policies as glorified plans which, in their formulation, comprised an exercise that appeared mostly technocratic and isolated from known realities (see section 6.3.2). Plans were often produced for purposes of securing funding that may then go underutilised for implementation. They lacked long-term focus and remained more or less the same in content. In reality, what got adopted has been driven mostly by rewarding perceived political support:

*We don’t really come up with new policies. We just review and update these policies to ensure they remain relevant.* [SPS-M.15]

*Policies are the basis of what we are doing... In many ways that’s why we are in trouble. There’s no national integrated policy on issues. There’s lots of plans. But they are glorified plans like this SDS. We keep referring to it but it’s just a Treasury plan for investment. It doesn’t reflect much other than the budget. It doesn’t spell out where Samoa is going to be in the next 10 or 20 years. It’s very much about whatever the government decides then we just follow. But a lot of things don’t add up. Like this schoolnet, it’s a great plan but it’s unrealistic, the infrastructure is terrible, internet is so expensive, because we don’t know where we are going with information technology.* [SPS-M.4]

*A lot of aid agencies just go with the ‘tick in the box’ approach. There’s a plan and that’s it. If you look at the Public Administration Sector Plan, PSC basically abandoned it. It was only when it was reviewed that it was taken up again and passed onto us. If you look at its history, it was never utilised to improve policy. Like it was needed. It was really a plan to get more aid into the Public Sector Improvement Facility, to save this money from losing out for other commitments.* [SC.6]
6.3.2.2. How are policies formulated?

This inquiry examines how policies are developed: the methodological processes employed, who has been doing the work of formulation, and what is used as the knowledge basis for policy. Table 6.11 gives the coded participant narratives about this ‘how’ question. Patterns shown by the narratives frequency are discussed in sections below. Narrative extracts provided shortly illustrate what these patterns meant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge basis</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social construction - ideologies, beliefs, values, etc.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual research/evidence based - rational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfer - imported social construction/evidence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Formulators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulators</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External consultant/ adviser</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy unit – public administration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working committees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Understandability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understandability</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.11: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in Samoa

6.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy

The patterns in Table 6.11 show that evidence-based policy was limited (frequency of 23). Rather, the policy process was commonly ad hoc, dominated by ideological factors (frequency of 12) and policy transfers (e.g. development orthodoxies) (frequency of 8). Participants experienced rational analysis of issues and contextualisation of policies as limited. Often, high level plans (sector and Ministries’ corporate plans) are formulated. But prioritisation and making trade-offs amongst competing strategic policy areas needed proper consideration for the operationalisation of high level plans into implementation:
The operation of that policy cycle is ad hoc, very much depends on the priority of the Minister and CEO. We rarely get a policy paper that fleshes out the issues before we decide on what to do. What’s happening is we jump into law. Then you implement it, you have loopholes because we didn’t do the fleshing out first. So the whole process is problematic... What we are doing is guesswork, a copy and paste thing without attempting to contextualise what is suitable. If we look at child abuse cases it’s a priority. But if you ask whether we have a policy to address this issue, there’s none. [PSS.16]

It’s hard to make sense of what policies are driving the decisions. In these plans, agencies end up with broad —‘we want all things for all people’— statements. They don’t help you to prioritise, to set your agenda. These high level documents are easy to do because you just put everything in and not worry about how much you are able to do in this timeframe, what you can afford, and what to drop off the list. Here, they are a long way away from being able to take this proliferation of strategic documents and boil them down to a list of priorities, something practical. [SC.2]

6.3.2.2.2. Methodology

In addition to findings presented in section 6.3.2.1.3, the policy process remained top-down (directive) (frequency of 20). Consultation (frequency of 18) and participatory (frequency of 11) approaches have improved, but in-depth dialogue and scope for constructive feedback remained limited. Some attributed this limitation to Samoa’s micro-context where constructive debates or criticisms are less welcome given strong social ties:

The form of it seems technocratic—these overarching strategies like the SDS and Public Administration Sector Plan... It’s quite top down. The weakness is that it’s takes on a life of its own, becoming an exercise in its own right with no real connections to what the important things are. So you end up with a plan which is not implemented, gathering dust on the shelf. You get a small bunch of well-educated, analytical thinkers disconnected from the real world of politics writing this beautifully crafted document under the influence of consultants flown in from Canberra or Wellington. But it doesn’t reflect the realities of people and those whom it’s intended for don’t really feel they own it. [SC.1]

In terms of a relatively independent body to review and advice back on policies, that we are drifting this way or that way, there’s none. The types of consultation we are doing is like we go there, have morning tea, say a prayer and that’s it. There’s no in-depth dialogue... This goes back to the micro-context of our community, that the so-called constructive criticism of policy is not conducive. [SPS-M.3]

6.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policy

Further, most policy documents were developed by public servants (frequency of 10). Given
lesser technical capacity in a small state, that role was often supplemented by overseas consultants (frequency of 18). Consequently, consultants’ influences and inputs into local policy formulation remained significant. Political direction of policy setting was however limited:

*My suggestion during the consultation was there should be a whole-of-government approach to the SDS in close consultation with the government... At the moment it’s not. Most Ministers don’t have much say in the agenda setting or the SDS. The only matter filling Cabinet agenda is travel and most policy setting is done at our level.* [PSS.18]

*What’s influencing the whole policy process in any country is capacity in terms of scale. There’s this policy frame based on objectivity in terms of research, data and assessments. That rational approach requires a lot of brains and hands. Most PICs don’t have that luxury. In NZ most ministries have several analysts working full time on a particular policy area, the issues, and checks and balances of the system. We don’t. Our basic constraint is limited capacity to respond to the gaps in the whole process. Then we have an army of overseas consultants coming in to plug up those gaps to the extent they become parts and even drivers of policy.* [SPS-M.5]

### 6.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy

A limited understanding of existing policies (see *frequency of 37* in Table 6.11) commonly signposts the lack of a consistent and clear comprehension of an actual policy and what it should achieve in the medium—versus long-term. At the macro-level, this limitation derives from a lack of understanding about the essence of national government and its public policy role:

*There doesn’t seem to be the attention given to public policies. People don’t talk about public policies. People talk about laws, regulations, plans and strategies but not policy rationales and objectives.* [PSS.7]

*Policies are all in sector plans. We contribute to the long-term vision through the sector-wide approach. The short-term vision is addressed through corporate plans. The issue is whether we are clear in where we want to go in five or 10 years. I don’t think it’s clear.* [SPS-M.3]

### 6.3.3. Policy implementation

Table 6.12 outlined key factors or issues most participants considered as significant to the whole policy process in terms of successful implementation:
Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and narrated in the following sections under five headings: public policy leadership, stakeholder support and feedback, capability and translation of policy to community.

6.3.3.1. Public policy leadership

Leadership is influenced by the fa’aSamoa (see Figure 6.1). The government is another layer over the fa’aSamoa. As a homogenous society (see Table 1.1), every aiga, village and district is governed by matai ranked according to a customary constitution (fa’alupega) and decision-making and administration are in accordance with the fa’aSamoa. Those born and raised under this system know their place in terms of their relative roles, relationships and expectations. Actors (all politicians and most senior officials) are matai connected to their aiga as homes and sources of identity and obligation. Within a blending of fa’amatai and introduced institutions comes a mixture of expectations: some to a national system of government, others more strongly to fa’aSamoa where obligations are to your aiga operating within an immediate village fa’amatai governance setting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues concerning implementation</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People capability</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder support and feedback</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy culture and ownership</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and alignment</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation of policy to community</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget capability</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12: Issues or factors central to implementation in Samoa
6.3.3.1.1. Stability and power

Samoa is regarded as a role model in the region because of its positive progress since self-government contributing largely to political stability, which enables consistent public policy. Political stability reflects societal stability and the resilience of government and fa’aSamoa institutions. With limited exceptions, only matai can stand for election. Village councils under the Village Fono Act 1960 have authority for local law and order. The Land and Titles Court registers lands and matai titles and handles disputes. It is in the nature of the fa’aSamoa socio-political mechanisms to maintain stability across aiga and villages. The fa’amatai is a dispersed system with power not concentrated in any one aiga.

However, Samoan political power is heavily concentrated. Since 1982 only one party (HRPP) has held office. The key to retaining this one party dominance lies in its gaining executive control of parliament, the public service, fa’amatai, and an often docile local news media. For instance, the 1988 establishment of Associate Ministerial posts (22 Member of Parliaments),xxiii in addition to 13 Ministerial posts and the 2009 Electoral Amendment Act

xxiii Previously called Parliamentary Under-Secretaries.
disallowing party-hopping helped maintain the HRPP majority.\textsuperscript{xxiv} The Ministerial advisory committee system of salaried, high profile matai in every portfolio has secured HRPP’s patronage control, and continuing support at village levels. The hiring and firing of all Heads of Departments are subject to Cabinet approval. In 2015, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment subjecting the appointment of the Head of State, Speaker and Deputy Speaker to Cabinet’s recommendation (instead of the previous parliamentary nominations) (Radio NZ, 2015, May 28):

\textit{This is why Samoa is like this with its public policy—they go ahead with anything even when it’s inappropriate and despite protests like this road switch. They can do it because of their majority and how they look after their Member of Parliaments. The whole system is corrupt,\textsuperscript{xxv}—designed to maintain them in power, to demolish the opposition to where it’s almost non-existent. [SP.3]}

\textit{In a democratic system like NZ, the continuity is with the public service to provide the advice and non-political service, not with Ministers as they come and go. That’s missing in us. We don’t have a Westminster system. We have the form, but not the substance of it. [SCS-M.1]}

Such power concentration not only reveals a ‘one party state’ but also a ‘one man party’, the HRPP under the leadership of only three Prime Ministers in the last three decades, the current incumbent serving since 1998:

\textit{The whole situation can become weakened in the sense that Tuilaepa is too powerful... If something happened to him, the vacuum could destabilise public policies because once you are in the tail spin you cannot make timely decisions in terms of policies and things like that. [SPS-M.2]}

\textit{We are no different from China... If you look at our fa’aSamoa, absolute power means the concept of ‘malo’ (win). In those days, once you win the ‘malo’ through the ultimate way, which is war, its absolute power. That’s what we are seeing now with our government. [SCS-M.1]}

\subsection{Leadership and accountability}

This power concentration reflects the status of public policy leadership as directive but lacking in checks and balances. Much public policy making was seen as passive and reactive, thereby overlooking societal development needs. Table 6.13 shows that 50.4\% of matters discussed during Cabinet meetings during 2009-2010 concerned overseas travel. Other items considered also concerned administrative matters. Only 2.9\% concerned policy papers. This

\textsuperscript{xxiv} Preventing members from joining the opposition party which had only 12 Member of Parliaments in 2015.

analysis reaffirms the view of various participants about the lack of leadership focus on fundamental public policy issues:

They don’t focus on fundamental policies. They focus on micro-management issues. Cabinet’s got the wrong mix... He (PM) was good but he’s tired. All he’s doing is looking for things to mark his time as if something is happening, like the time zone change and road switch. But those decisions have absolutely no positive impact for Samoa. [PSS.17]

People are aware of how much power government has. But there’s fear. You even find it in the public service. For this democratic society to work, people have to voice the truth... It’s becoming dangerous. Our GDP per capita is US$3,000 but the reality of that indicator is skewed to only 1% of the population or five families. And government hasn’t given this issue enough attention. [PSS.6]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis of cabinet minutes for 2009 and 2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category of items recorded in minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• overseas travel matters (mostly official travel, some personal travel, reporting on attending an overseas meeting, conference, training, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• internal administration (appointments, personnel, public sector structures/functions, budgetary/financial matters, ceremonial matters, government legal cases, responses to parliamentary committee queries, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• overseas treatment of local citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• matters concerning contractual works (mostly infrastructure) including establishment, management and maintenance of government assets/properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• government organisations’ reporting (financial, performance, audit, work progress, business, licence, dialysis patients) and right hand drive matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• policy papers (proposals, submissions, reforms, sectoral and corporate plans, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• legislation - bills and amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• trade, investment matters for private sector and community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• sporting issues - funding, donations to sport organisations, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• tsunami matters, changes in petrol, oil and kerosene prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• matters concerning government donations and relations with other governments/organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Table 6.13: An analysis of Samoa Cabinet minutes for 2009-2010

Source: Samoa Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet
6.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback

The key issue concerning limited political accountability for public policy is that most people residing in rural communities vote according to familial and traditional lineages, less so on public policy issues. This confirms the influence of the fa’aSamoa, together with a limited understanding of government and government’s patronage influence. Changing the status quo would require generational (long-term) changes:

We vote on traditional kinships and familial affiliations. Only about 2% of people in Apia vote on issues. For that to change you are looking at new generations who are not embedded in the fa’amatai. [PSS.7]

In the last election the opposition won most of the seats in town. It’s a reflection of people here knowing what’s going on. But most people at the back have no idea of what’s going on. That’s why the government just picks the top chiefs and pays them... They just vote for whoever... That’s why these policies don’t work. [SP.3]

Limited understanding of government has resulted in a lack of common appreciation as to how the two systems (national government and fa’aSamoa) could collaborate to mutual advantage. This includes how democratic practices could be enhanced in government and village administrations. Given such limitation in understanding the principles underpinning the two systems, the differences have been used as a leverage to advance political power:

We need to move forward but not give up fa’aSamoa. Nobody cares about China or Japan for that matter... This Westminster system is given to us but we have the fa’aSamoa. Both systems are different and so we are applying the principles of democracy differently. It’s all mixed up. This issue is old... but it’s never talked about. I’m in my village fa’amatai and people there don’t understand and know the differences. So we aren’t used to it. The system is thus being twisted by this group to get more power. We’ve got to plant those principles within people first as they affect public policy. These are the principles that drive and make me look at the world in certain ways. If democracy is what we want, let’s understand it—how the two systems relate in that. [SCS-M.2]

6.3.3.3. Capability (people, resources, learning, monitoring and evaluation)

Samoa’s narrow fiscal and technical base is a key challenge for implementation. The 2014 budget deficit stands at ST73 million (MoF, 2014). The recurrent budget absorbed two thirds, one third going to the development budget financed mainly through external borrowing and donor funding (GoS, 2014). Plans when drawn up often take little account of this limited capacity and the M&E process of reforms already undertaken:
Most plans are taken out of context. This Public Administration Sector Plan has many outputs yet you are looking at only one or two people to do the implementation. It’s unrealistic. It’s the same throughout the Pacific... There’s a need to rescale all these plans. Like 20 outputs in Australia should equate to only 3 outputs here so you can actually deliver. [SC.15]

All ISPs didn’t have an M&E component... But when donors came to follow-up, they saw that a lot weren’t working. Because to them as long as we get that change and the system in compliance with good governance, it was okay and that was achieved. But M&E was never part of the reform. [PSS.4]

6.3.3.4. Translation of policy to community

While high level plans are in place, Samoa has not worked out for itself what is relevant and what could work within its own national setting. The challenge is how best to tap into the civic village space with its authority and resources. This requires a better articulation of both systems (state and fa’aSamoa) and their potential roles in development. There is a further need for these roles to build bridges into the modern world of development and as one requiring strengthened local institutions. This process can be regarded as evolutionary, being one not necessarily addressed through externally derived policy transfers or top-down policy processes. Policy contextualisation and effective implementation required proper deliberation of assumptions, contradictions and fitness of local institutions, rather than simply adopting conventional approaches often available through policy transfers or formal education:

Why we remain underdeveloped is because we haven’t done much implementation. We did a lot of enabling activities ... piloting things with experts to test whether they are good or not. But we haven’t got a step-by-step approach on what could work for us. Donors just give us the money but if you visit Ministries it’s a mess. [PSS.16]

We are naturally not people who sit down and write out a nice plan. We go with the flow... It will be interesting to suss out these conflicts in a traditional versus modern system. When we look at what is required, a lot of the stuff is adopted from outside with certain assumptions and behaviours which we don’t share. There needs to be other ways. Like we are devolving schools management to village committees and health is applying the same model. But that model is based on assumptions that people at lower levels have the capacity to do that work... It’s an issue that you can’t really address through public policy. You can’t really say to people you need to write a policy and do this and the problem will be fixed... Those things require an evolution of individuals and society in terms of certain models and ways for doing things to be effective. Our people with understanding of both systems need to be part of these committees and models to help improve the capacity out there... Contexts are different and these things need consideration before we sign off on policies. Often in
developing these plans we don’t think deeply about these things. We simply take the easy way out like a training, legislation or reform. It’s the ways we are educated. We learn about Western thinking and when we come back, we seem to have forgotten about the local context, so it’s hard to apply that thinking in our community. [PSS.5]

6.4. Summary of findings

Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 6.14 summarises key findings in terms of propositions emerging from Samoa. Chapter eight discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, Samoa and the Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/category</th>
<th>Key findings or propositions</th>
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| Initiation and adoption of policy | 1. Most public policies originate from within government or external influences. Public policies originating from society are limited.  
 |                                  | 2. Policy adoption is highly political.                                                                                                                                 |
| Formulation of policy           | 3. Policy formulation is largely top-down developed by public servants and consultants.  
 |                                  | 4. Policy discourse and evidence-based policy are limited. Rather the process is ad hoc, driven by ideological factors of the local context and policy transfers.  
 |                                  | 5. The term ‘policy’ largely refers to strategic plans made manifest at different levels which are seen as technocratic and isolated from realities. What is often adopted and implemented is driven by perceived political demand.  
<p>|                                  | 6. The above findings are consistent with those from Vanuatu and Solomon the Islands – the difference being a matter of degree.                                                                 |
| Implementation of policy        | 7. Instrumentation of high level strategic plans into implementation in society appeared missing, this related to limited understanding of the introduced system of government and the traditional system, and how both relate when translating public policy to a community level. |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Political power is highly concentrated in that the politics and public policy is regarded as passive and lack checks and balances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The success of implementation is attributed typically to leadership (political and public administration), local ownership, participation and consultation, adaptation of reform to context and mutual partnership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Contextual factors of a small island state, status of development and culture (<em>fa’aSamoa</em>) impact significantly on the practices of public policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Public policy development lies at the intersection of the practices of the principles underlying the modern system of government and those of the <em>fa’aSamoa</em>. This requires an understanding by locals of the two systems and about how they could evolve and function best to serve the collective interests of society.</td>
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**Table 6.14:** Key findings emerging from Samoa
CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES

7.1. Introduction

The previous three chapters examined the (‘national’) policy processes of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa. This chapter examines ‘regional’ policy processes based on patterns elucidated from participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses and participant observation. The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in chapter three. Contextual background to this regional case study in section 1.2.4 must be read in conjunction with this chapter. A total of 25 ‘regional’ (see Table 3.3) and 21 ‘national’ participants shared their experiences and observations of the Pacific Plan (the selected policy case) and how policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented at this regional inter-governmental level (the ‘Region’). Researching all relevant regional institutions was beyond the scope of this study—the focus being largely on the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), as core Pacific regional inter-government organisations (PRIGOs) encompassing 60% of this study’s regional participants.

Section 7.2 examines the Pacific Plan’s policy process. Section 7.3 describes the general patterns of regional policy processes. Section 4.4 summarises key findings emerging from this regional case study.

7.2. The policy case

The Pacific Plan was adopted by Pacific leaders in 2005 to promote and implement a Pacific regionalism agenda. At the completion of its 10-year life plan in 2014, the Pacific Plan was recast as the ‘Framework for Pacific Regionalism’. This case study is based on data collected in 2012 while the Pacific Plan was the key regional policy platform.

7.2.1. The Pacific Plan

7.2.1.1. Background

The case for regionalism, following the development of regional systems elsewhere, has

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Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-italicised.
been promoted to address common development challenges facing Pacific island countries (PICs). Pooling of resources across PICs, it is claimed, can provide economies of scale, efficiencies, and effectiveness in services and international competitiveness. Adoption of the 2005-2014 ‘Pacific Plan for strengthening regional co-operation and integration’ by Pacific Leaders promoted this regional approach to public policy through the following ‘Vision’:

Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values and for its defence and promotion of human rights... (PIF, 2005c)

The Pacific Plan’s goal was to ‘enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism’. Within these four pillars, 13 objectives were identified to achieve this goal. xvii The implementation strategy outlined 37 initiatives for implementation during the first three years (2006-2008), eight initiatives requiring agreement in principle, and six requiring further analysis. Implementation was the responsibility of PRIGO or CROP agencies under the Pacific Plan Action Committee oversight (see section 1.2.4).

7.2.1.2. Initiation

The Pacific Plan began with the 2004 Eminent Persons Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and its Secretariat (PIFS). This was the first comprehensive review since the PIF’s establishment in 1971. The Review, agreed to by Leaders at its 2003 Forum (chaired by the New Zealand Prime Minister (PM)), was driven by concerns that PICs’ development situations had deteriorated since their independence and beliefs that existing levels of regionalism were not adequately addressing the challenges confronting PICs (PIF, 2003):

_The Pacific Plan started in 2003 when Helen Clark was NZ PM where there was a big push to reform the PIFS. Leaders endorsed a review of the PIF and its Secretariat by an Eminent Persons Group from around the Region. [PRS.4]_

Amongst this Review report’s 32 recommendations (on transforming the PIFS) were the

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xvii Improved trade and investment, private sector development, sports, infrastructure, natural resource and environment management, health, education and training, gender equality, youth, political and social stability and safety, good governance, poverty reduction and protection of culture and traditional knowledge.
adoption of a ‘refreshed’ Vision (to that of the traditional ‘Pacific way’) supported by a redefined mandate—a Pacific Plan. This report was discussed by Leaders in April 2004 where the above-stated vision was adopted and deep regionalism re-emphasised (PIF, 2004b). The following prescriptions for the Pacific Plan’s development were further endorsed, namely:

- A need to sequence priority areas for deep co-operation and integration;
- Based on comprehensive research and analyses, identify the possible development of a regionalism model suitable for the Pacific;
- Promote ‘regional integration that runs deeper than that established already’;
- Placing the ‘big idea’ of Pacific regionalism at the front of regional political agenda and stimulating debate on the region’s long-term future;
- Build on the evolutionary process of regionalism of the past, and policy proposals for several pooling of regional resources, services and capacities;
- Emphasise the Forum’s key interests of economic growth, sustainable development, governance and security; and
- See these objectives developed by a taskforce. (Chan et al., 2004):

  What came out of that Review was the Pacific Plan. The Review said the Pacific needs a clear strategy for what it is trying to achieve. The other element out of that Review was the Vision for the Pacific. [RPS.4]

  Leaders agreed that the serious challenges… facing the countries of the region warranted serious and careful examination of the pooling of scarce regional resources. (PIF, 2004b)

Although the 2003 Forum was the turning point for the initiation of the Pacific Plan, participant narratives indicated that the Pacific Plan, as an idea or concept, appeared to originate from the UN ‘Sustainable Development’ agenda promoted at the first 1992 World Summit in Rio:

  At the time the Pacific Plan was mooted, we just came out of the world summit and the key aspect of that was that countries will develop Sustainable Development Strategies. That was a priority we picked up on the Pacific Plan. A lot of support from the PIFS and partners went into countries to do that. [RPS.13]

### 7.2.1.3. Formulation

The Pacific Plan Taskforce, endorsed by Leaders in August 2004, consisted of Forum Islands
Countries’ officials and core PRIGOs representatives. The Taskforce carried out the Pacific Plan formulation under the oversight of a ‘core group’ of past, present and future Forum Chairs (PIF, 2004a). A draft Pacific Plan produced in December 2004 became the basis for consultation in early 2005 (PIFS, 2007). Basing the consultation on a pre-drafted version of the Pacific Plan and the adoption by Leaders of a Vision for the Region, before undergoing consultation and before the Pacific Plan was formulated, seemed to some as the downfall of the formulation process from the outset:

*I knew the Pacific Plan inside out because I translated it into Solomon Islands pidgin... The Pacific Plan is not a dream of the people. The Leaders just dreamed for us. The Leaders met in Auckland in 2004, drank wine, had a five course meal, got excited while they were talking and made an Auckland Declaration on the Pacific Plan. There was consultation but it came later after they formulated the Plan... There was no meaningful consultation... If they want us to share their dream, they should come and talk to us. That should give enough information on what the Pacific Plan should be about. But that didn’t happen.* [RCS-M.1]

The Vision linked to the Leaders was framed by Dr Senipisi Langi Kavaliku (one of the 2004 Eminent Persons Group Review), a Tongan intellectual and close friend... Kavaliku told me that he drew inspiration for the Vision from Professor Amartya Sen’s notion of ‘Development as Freedom’... How many... Leaders who signed off on the Vision in Auckland in 2004 knew of the developmental intension is not known but what is clear to me now is that few of our current Leaders have a clue on the origins of the Vision that underscores the Pacific Plan. (Chand, 2013, March 13)

An ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat (2005) project commissioning 17 regionalism studies, and the Hughes Review of the Regional Institutional Framework (2005), formed the analytic foundations for the Pacific Plan. The ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat (2005) report assessed regional initiatives most likely to yield higher benefits as improving labour market access between countries, telecommunication markets liberalisation, harmonising fisheries access arrangements, creating certain regional offices and facilities (ombudsman, aviation, nursing and police training, bulk purchasing of petroleum products)’ and capacity supplementation in economics, statistics, customs and auditing. As indicated by participant narratives, and as the ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat’s study (2005, p.6) reiterated, the Pacific Plan fell short of its prescriptions recommended in the 2004 Eminent Persons Group Review. The Pacific Plan did not have a new formulation: it merely reiterated the PIF’s work practices since its establishment:

*Identified under the Pacific Plan are things this Forum has talked about over the last 40 years of its existence. Common topics are trade, regional integration, climate change, environment and...*
The Hughes (2005) Review suggested that deep regionalism required a radical reform of the regional architecture. Amalgamating PRIGOs into a single Pacific Community regional organisation would exploit capabilities and enable deeper integration. Although the Pacific Community was not a new idea, it had not materialised, being often resisted by some leaders and regional organisations:

The Regional Institutional Framework was an attempt to radically reform the whole CROP family. The idea was that you would end up with one or two regional organisations; a political arm and a technical arm... It got undermined. Countries didn’t want to give up their regional organisations. SPREP is based in Samoa and your PM wasn’t keen to lose that. [RPS.15]

The Pacific Plan was endorsed by the Leaders in 2005 including the following implementation requirements as identified in the ‘Kalibobo Roadmap on the Pacific Plan’:

- The PIF to ‘move progressively towards a comprehensive framework agreement amongst all Forum Islands Countries that includes trade (including services) and economic co-operation’;
- ‘Implementation is the responsibility of the PIFS’, overseen by a Pacific Plan Action Committee (a descendant of the Pacific Plan Taskforce);
- Successful implementation is ‘dependent on the support and commitment of member countries, regional organisations, development partners and other stakeholders’;
- ‘The development and implementation of national policies and strategies on regionalism are an important strategic objective of the Pacific Plan’;
- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), through quarterly and annual reports and independent reviews every three years; and
- Implementation carried out through a centralised ‘Pacific fund’. (PIF, 2005a, 2005c)

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Moore (1982), NZ PM proposed a South Pacific Economic and Political Community. The NZ government subsequently commissioned a ‘Towards a Pacific Community’ study with a report suggesting further dialogue on the matter (Henderson et al., 1990). The same idea re-emerged in the Australian Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee (2003) Report which was the first time the issue of closer regional integration was acknowledged as part of Australia’s future Pacific policy. The idea was to have a Pacific parliament, certain regional offices, and a common labour market and currency (Sercome & Peebles, 2005). The Hughes (2005) report was criticised as lacking consultation and its proposed Pacific Community was considered unworkable given PRIGOs unequal governing structures. A six person team (Tavola et al., 2006) was tasked with exploring Hughes’ proposed restructuring. The team’s recommendation, which was approved by PIF (2007), was to re-organise the Regional Institutional Framework into three pillars (instead of a single Pacific Community): a political and general policy institution (the PIF and its Secretariat (PIFS)); a sector-focused technical institution (the Pacific Community and its Secretariat (SPC)); and academic and training institutions (USP and PIDP). Four other PRIGOs—FFA, SPREP, SOPAC (Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission) and SPBEA (Secretariat of the Pacific Board for Educational Assessment) were to be absorbed into SPC. Absorption of SPREP and FAA never took place.
The Leaders in 2005 also adopted the ‘Agreement Establishing the PIF’ as an intergovernmental organisation at international law for the first time, and redefining ‘the Forum’s purpose and functions to reflect the vision and directions taken under the Pacific Plan’. This agreement awaits ratification by all Forum Islands Countries (PIF, 2005a, 2005b).

Baaro’s (2009) Review of the Pacific Plan (after its initial three years) led to the establishment of in-country desk officers seeking to strengthen regional-national linkages on the Pacific Plan. As well, the ‘Compact on strengthening development coordination in the Pacific’ adopted at the 2009 Forum, emphasised three commitments to strengthen the Pacific Plan’s M&E:

- peer (country-to-country) reviews of national policy systems and implementation;
- donors’ commitments to improve development coordination and to report to the PIF on development effectiveness; and
- expanding the post-Forum dialogue to include private sector and civil society stakeholders (PIF, 2009a).

The 2013 Review (near completion of the 10-year lifespan) led the Pacific Plan to be recast as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism to address the misconception that the Pacific Plan was a regional development plan. Rather, it comprises a framework needing to be seen as a political process. The policy is no longer a ‘master strategy’ with a grand design but an eight-page framework with sections on the vision (shortened from the 2005 one), values, objectives, forms of regionalism (definitions), process for priority setting (regional initiatives as proposed by interested stakeholders), M&E processes, and criteria (tests) for regional action. The Pacific Plan Action Committee was also reconstructed as the Board for Pacific Regionalism (Morauta, Peseta, Killion, Bazeley, & Poletti, 2013; PIF, 2014).

The assumption shaping the Pacific Plan was the creation of ‘a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity’ (the 2005 Vision). Ideas and models underpinning such a regionalism agenda (even ‘the possible development of a regionalism model suitable for the Pacific’) appeared to be mostly policy transfers, without much dialogue within PICs themselves (Chan et al., 2004). A clear example is Hughes’ (2005) proposed Pacific Community based largely on Caribbean regionalism: ‘such proposals have tended to originate more in the developed Forum members than in the newly independent PICs’ (ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.2).
7.2.1.4. Implementation

The challenges facing the development and implementation of policies for Pacific regionalism 30 years ago remain pertinent today. They remain valid for regional development given the views of various participants, and the conclusion of the 2009 and 2013 Pacific Plan Reviews, that actual implementation had been limited:

The kind of regionalism envisaged under the Leaders’ 2004 Auckland Declaration—of sovereign countries of the region gaining from sharing resources and governance, and aligning policies under the auspices of a Pacific Plan—has been slow to emerge. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.16)

The intention of the Pacific Plan is to have a common regional policy on integration. The implementation of that hasn’t materialised… That’s the frustration of members. [RPS.3]

Limited implementation pointed, to a lack of ownership and understanding of the Pacific Plan across the Region which principally reflected the policy itself. It had not undergone meaningful consultation or promotion. The complexity of regional processes contributed considerably to such limitations:

The Plan is not widely known about beyond its immediate stakeholders. It has so many priorities, and is so broadly framed, that it effectively has no priorities. It is not mandatory, and carries no powers of enforcement. It has no budget, timeline or robust indicators of what success looks like. It lacks ownership. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.17)

My friend, Greg Urwin (former Secretary General) called me when I wrote an article that the ‘Pacific Plan is a ghostbuster’. That the Pacific people don’t own the Pacific Plan… It didn’t include them meaningfully to be part of the Pacific Plan… So the Pacific Plan dream was doomed because we over-harvest, overfish, everything. Because it just was a dream of the Leaders in a cocktail room. [RCS-M.1]

People knew there was a Plan but they didn’t know its implications. It was sitting in our little office near the Secretariat General and no one was going out and saying, hey we got a regional plan… Because there was no good understanding of what its focus was, people were pushing everything should be in the Pacific Plan. But it’s hard to know exactly which aspects contribute to this… There’s this whole process in the Region. Also are development partners with their own processes. There are so many forces that come into shaping, to form this misunderstanding. [RPS.8]

A lack of shared understanding was evident in the inconsistency seen in participants’ views about what the Pacific Plan encompassed. This derived from tensions over ‘regional’ versus ‘national’ public goods defining PRIGOs’ mandates. Some viewed the Pacific Plan as more
about regional co-operation where national capacity supplementation is deemed a priority and linking regional and national plans is required. Others viewed the Pacific Plan as about regional integration: an actual pooling of common policy practices across PICs. Still others viewed the Pacific Plan as more about strengthening the Pacific voice on global issues. In practice, national capacity supplementation and dealing with international issues encumbered PRIGOs with an immense workload of implementing roles:

It’s too complicated to have a shared understanding. A lot say the Pacific Plan should reflect national priorities. But it’s not a national or regional development plan. People may understand it’s about regional co-operation or integration. But in having a clean story it’s not. What happened is that national work becomes align with regional programs. It becomes confused. [RPS.4]

We have been criticised that the Pacific Plan is far removed from realities. But Leaders deliberately kept it at a high level because they don’t want the Pacific Plan to be interfering with national sovereignty... The Pacific Plan is not supposed to replace national plans... The other thing is that the RIO*20 conference identified the pillars of the global sustainable development agenda. Those pillars are the same as the Pacific Plan. [RPS.2]

In the event, the regional integration envisaged under the Pacific Plan got buried under regional bureaucratic politics and processes. Operationalising the Pacific Plan through policy conversational and bureaucratic processes was lacking. Other than external studies undertaken during the formulation stage, ongoing assessment of options has been limited:

One thing we don’t have under the Pacific Plan is an ongoing research program. That is what we need but it hasn’t happened. [RPS.6]

In the bureaucracy you start focusing on activities at this level and you lose sight of the philosophy of that... What we do at meetings is you have this vision and four years later we are all fighting about projects and activities. That is what it’s all about. People here saw the Pacific Plan as a way to fund their programs... They list them as priorities. Instead of saying let’s talk about regional integration, about bulk purchasing that could work... That was the Vision. That got pushed aside. And we focus on the day-to-day things... So there hasn’t been that dynamic process of what the Pacific Plan meant to be. It was just everybody repacking what they want to do anyway. [RPS.3]

Implementation did not happen because the Pacific Plan became the plan for everything with no clear focus about what it was trying to achieve. In practice, the Pacific Plan was used as a funding mechanism for parochial areas of interest, with limited prioritisation given to what should be most beneficial for regionalism:
It didn’t happen because regional organisations didn’t want to give up their pets… The whole process got hijacked as a way to get funding. That’s my version, cynical of it. Once it’s in the Pacific Plan everybody argues it’s a priority. I need funding… We need to go back and get our fundamentals. [RPS.2]

It’s got 37 priorities. It’s too much. You need to cut it back. To do that you need to rebuild consensus. The question is where our real common interests are as Forum Islands Countries. We should focus on a few things that represent the best of regionalism; maybe trade, shipping, climate change and pharmaceutical purchasing... We spend more time and energy on these. The rest becomes normal work. So countries know what we are doing and the dollars to access. If we do these well then people say we care and the Pacific Plan has helped the Pacific… But at the moment people see the value of the Pacific Plan as a concept but the trouble is it’s hard to tell a clean story as everything isn’t necessarily as it seems. [RPS.17]

Deeper regional integration initiatives grew too hard to progress within the existing status quo. Pooling requires a working consensus amongst PICs, but the demands of day-to-day realities, path dependency of existing policies, and bilateral arrangements all complicated implementing such initiatives. National interest mentalities, unwilling to cede on national sovereignty, and patchy experiences with previous integration initiatives, affected confidence in further progress:

Some became too hard. So the ambition went down. We did a cost-benefit analysis for bulk purchasing of fuel and we said it’s not possible… We did that for shipping, but see the Pacific Forum Line (PFL), Air Pacific and USP were the Forum’s first initiatives. PFL was sold as it couldn’t make any money… But unless we solve shipping, our development remains handicapped. That’s the kind of issue the Pacific Plan needs to talk about… Air Pacific couldn’t make any money. So it pulled out and just focused as a commercial airline. Other governments got nationalistic and wanted their own airlines. [RPS.3]

Progressing these major initiatives was considered a long-term process given the above-mentioned difficulties. A translation towards a long-term view of implementation required agreed actions over what needs to happen over time. However, a consolidated, conscious approach towards an enduring implementation of the Pacific Plan was lacking:

There hasn’t been a focus on how things are implemented. They try a piecemeal approach but we never had a conscious approach this is the project and this is going to work. What is missing is how you implement the vision in a calculated way… If you look at bulk procurement of fuel there’s a Memorandum of Understanding countries have signed up to. But there are no agreed standards. So you can’t even start the process. Countries all got different types of fuel, storage capacity and existing contracts… But there hasn’t been an agreement to say these are the steps to take in the next five
years or so, this is where national governments need to come in, and national policies that need to change... It’s the same with pharmaceuticals. That’s what the Pacific Plan should be doing. We’ve got some regional policies but often it’s about policies that got implementation built around them that are missing. All we’ve got is the high level framework that says what we think is a good idea. But to make it happen you need the more detailed strategies and steps. So the Pacific Plan is a plan for a plan. We need to look at how to reform the implementation side. [RPS.8]

The key issue was who was to actually implement the Pacific Plan? The Plan stated that implementation was the responsibility of PIFS (PIF, 2005c, p.10), but that is a ‘political’ sphere that should not interfere with implementation. The ‘technical’ PRIGOs are the implementers. Yet PRIGOs were not legally bound to the implementation of the Pacific Plan as such, nor did they share the same kind of legitimacy of a national government being accountable to an electorate. Thus implementation required a great amount of interaction across national spaces to ensure that the Pacific Plan got translated into local implementing roles, and with commitments from state and non-state actors. However, regional-national interactions were confined to a few central agency officials (as members of the Pacific Plan Action Committee/Board for Pacific Regionalism), but who were not implementers of the Pacific Plan’s sectoral initiatives. Private sector and civil society roles in regionalism have only recently, been recognised in Forum mechanisms:

In a way we (PIFS) are in this comfort zone as we just do the policy and expect countries to implement. We get criticised for not having implementation. Whereas SPC does a lot of implementation... it goes there, does water tanks, that kind of stuff. We don’t. That’s our dilemma. [RPS.2]

The problem is that PRIGOs don’t exist just to implement the Pacific Plan. They exist to implement many different priorities with different actors. What we would like to do more is recognise the contributions of non-government organisations on a priority. That’s an area that hasn’t been looked at very much. [RPS.6]

The difficulty is this uncertainty about the role the Pacific Plan should play... The problem is that there’s no regional government that is tied to an election cycle. The Leaders come together but there’s no body that forces them to do this. You can only do things out of consensus. [RPS.18]

The Pacific Plan lacked a specific budget, which was another contributor to limited implementation. Donors provide about 90% of the budgets of the PIFS and SPC (see Table 7.1). PICs contribute only 2.8%. Australia and NZ are the biggest donors to PIFS, while the USA, France and others are the SPC’s major donors. Such aid dependency signifies the scale of donors’ influences over regional policy processes:
Australia does not support the establishment of a fund specifically for Pacific Plan implementation…

The Plan should not be a list of activities solely designed to attract donor funding. (Australian Government, 2013)

If all countries set up marine protected areas (MPAs), we would have full control of the ocean. However, countries are doing their own MPAs… We don’t want to end up like the Atlantic, it doesn’t have any fish anymore… But it’s hard because development partners come and blindfold us with so much money… We are trying to put a quota on fishing but the problem is that China says it will pay a country $50 million for free access of 10 boats. When a donor comes with big money like that, the licensing, any policy or effort, just breaks down… No matter how hard we try it’s the money that counts. Like who is going to deny $50 million that is being offered to your country. So it is also the politics of donors. Our problem is that we’ve got no money. So whoever has the biggest cheque gets it. [RPS.2]

Furthermore, what was available to the region in terms of resources did not equate to that needed to implement the Pacific Plan’s ambitious agenda. The decision to have a ‘Pacific Fund’ never materialised, individual donors preferring to direct their funds to individual PRIGOs. Such aid bilateralisation meant implementation was complicated by a disconnection between Pacific Plan endorsed priorities and actual resource allocation:

The thing with regionalism is the context. The way the Pacific is going through regionalism is to the experience for Asia. But institutions and resources are different. The resources we need for regional integration would be billions. The Pacific doesn’t have billions… There are issues in engaging with national governments on the Pacific Plan because they are small bureaucracies dealing with huge international and regional agendas and they aren’t resourced for that. They do a good job considering what they have. But they need to make it simple for the engagement. It’s too complicated. [RPS.13]
There’s this mismatch between where the resources are coming from and where the priorities are set. We sit here (PIFS) and say you need to implement this priority. They say ‘okay, but you aren’t giving us any money… we have to be accountable to those who give us money’. That’s a big issue with implementation… Development partners say if you’ve got clear priorities we will fund them. But it’s never as easy as that. They have their government support and bureaucratic processes… Often there’s no one sitting there to say to the Leaders ‘I don’t think you should agree to this as it’s going to cost this much’. No one is making the decision directly in between because the funding is coming from different areas. And it’s hard to control, hard to match up with the policies. [RPS.20]

Fragmentation in the existing regional architecture is at the core of why the Pacific Plan’s implementation has been limited. Each PRIGO has its own governance structure and mandate competing for the same finite amount of available resources:

They fight for the same bucket of resources. They have issues around mandates… The ongoing challenges are things like policy territory… tensions around who is doing what in this policy… Much is driven by personalities and views of the different governing councils of PRIGOs… SPC’s 26 members include Forum Islands Countries but also territories and other donors. So you get different interests at play driving SPC policy positions beyond Forum Islands Countries… The politics and tensions between donors… are also brought into the governing councils’ decisions. China is a member of the South Pacific Tourism Organisation governing council so they forbid South Pacific Tourism Organisation to bid for assistance that Taiwan provides. These issues affect implementation because of the difficulty in policy coherence even in a particular sector and across PRIGOs who are part of that sector. [RPS.6]

The answer to the question of why the Pacific Plan has not progressed lies in an examination of the institutions and processes that surround and support the Pacific Plan… This led the Review to its primary, most central, conclusion: what is needed to progress regionalism is not a revised list of priorities, but an overhaul of the processes, institutions and governance of the Plan. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.18)

Although the Pacific Plan is a political process, political interchanges around the Pacific Plan’s objectives have been limited. Instead, it has been an official-led process, driven by PRIGOs’ individual interests. Integration requires transformational change which requires strong leadership to change the status quo:

Processes around the Plan appeared… to be dominated by bureaucratic and institutional interests, the result being that the Plan contains too many priorities, often of the wrong sorts (p.19)… Hard political choices… about economic integration and the future of the Pacific are much harder to pinpoint (p.54)… Yet the Forum is the Region’s ‘peak political body’, and the Pacific Plan is fundamentally about the expression of social and political values and making hard political choices (p.74). (Morauta et al., 2013)
It will take leaders to adopt that transformation... If we have an agenda to say we are going to force all PRIGOs into one agency in the next two years, it’s never going to happen, unless we’ve got strong leadership as everyone’s got their own interests and views of what the Pacific Plan is about.[RPS.18]

Given an inconsistent understanding of the Pacific Plan, views about how it should be measured in national versus regional impact are also contentious. Either way, M&E have been limited:

*There are no indicators for the Pacific Plan. They have six monthly reviews, the Forum Compact and Pacific Plan Action Committee reporting. But it’s just outputs reporting... A good example is when I reviewed our Joint Country Strategy (JCS) for Kiribati where the President’s office said ‘there’s so much money going into health but they’ve got the worst health indicator’. [RPS.8]*

*People think the Pacific Plan should be measured at the national level with progress in different areas. It was never designed to do that... It’s a regional plan and it needs... indicators that appreciate the processes that are starting because of the Pacific Plan in bringing about policies over the next five to ten years. That’s what the Pacific Plan has done. And it’s not something people would credit. [RPS.13]*

### 7.2.1.5. Results

Regional integration or pooling has been limited. Any success has been mostly seen in regional coordination and co-operation which was the key focus. Maintaining a collective Pacific voice internationally has been another benefit of regionalism. These successes cannot be attributed solely to the Pacific Plan; forms of regionalism that previously existed had progressed before the Pacific Plan came into being:

Pooling of resources... in sea and air transport services improved... for a while, but ultimately failed, as did attempts to institutionalise common bulk purchasing of fuel and pharmaceuticals... Real forms of regional integration have slower to emerge, but the common management of oceanic fish stocks... has been largely successful... Neither can they always truly be said to be products of the Pacific Plan, although the Pacific Plan captures them in its oversight... For many Pacific citizens, the Plan and its implementation just aren’t making enough of a difference. (Morauta et al., 2013, pp.52-55)

*When you look at a plan for regionalism as being the first, a lot of people say the Pacific Plan has failed because you have a trade agreement for around 25 years and is still moving slowly. But integration of that nature is always going to take a long time whether or not you have an overarching framework. If you look at pooling of capacities it has been good. Our ability to better coordinate various stakeholders working on a sectoral issue has been advanced by the Pacific Plan. [RPS.14]*
7.2.1.6. Key factors

Table 7.2 summarises the critical factors of the Pacific Plan’s policy process:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complex, diverse and fragmented Region</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Impact minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small island developing states</td>
<td>Eminent Persons Group Review of the Forum – evidence-based</td>
<td>Success only seen in regional cooperation and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent states</td>
<td>Policy transfers - Sustainable Development Agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path dependency of historical and colonial constructs</td>
<td>Political leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant external influences</td>
<td>Formulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative but not participative/inclusive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence based analyses – ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>study, Regional Institutional Framework Review</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy transfers – regionalism concepts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack shared understanding and ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of focus – too many priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited instrumentation and translation on the ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP hijacked for funding organisational interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No specific resource allocation for implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donor influence and interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform content is complex – transformation change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fragmented regional processes and mechanisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of political leadership (and dialogue)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Pacific Plan key factors

Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from the Pacific Plan’s policy process, in comparison with those in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa (see Appendix G), and against existing literature.

7.3. The policy processes in general

This section examines participant experiences and observations of regional policy processes in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what were critical factors for effective implementation.
7.3.1. Policy initiation

Coded participant narratives in Table 7.3 indicated that most participants saw regional public policies as influenced mainly by the Leaders (*frequency of 21*) and external interests (*frequency of 28*), with international agenda issues (*frequency of 18*) comprising a major component of regional policy. Given that the Region is inter-governmental, influences from societal actors (*frequency of 4*) have been restricted to the Leaders and a few national officials:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Origin (where)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders – Forum</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional public administration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific national governments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society (country level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. External</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors - consultants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Origins of policy at the regional level

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. The increased take-up of international issues or agendas reflects PICs joining more international organisations as members of the global policy community. Here, regional organisations have played a filtering role over global pressures and advocating for a Pacific voice on critical global issues such as nuclear testing and climate change:

*Two main things influenced the development of regional policies. One is the influence of international arenas; global issues that are popular at the time. Second is what the Forum decides are the major issues facing the Region. Those are related. [RPS.14]*

*In my experience in this Secretariat about how we put things on the agenda it’s a mix of several influences. But I say the majority of policies are pushed from external interests, not necessarily by donors but even international organisations. The classic one was the International Atomic Energy Agency pushing for nuclear issues. It’s the pressure of globalisation... when our members join more international organisations, they come under pressure to join international frameworks. Climate change is now driven primarily by small island states. [RPS.3]*
7.3.2. Policy formulation

Participants were asked about what they refer to as (public) ‘policy’ and how they see the nature and characteristics of existing polices.

7.3.2.1. Construction of policy

7.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy?

There was no consistent construction of ‘policy’ embracing the various documents outlined in Table 7.4. Different constructions intersected between domains of national (frequency of 59) versus regional (frequency of 119) versus international interests or issues (frequency of 59) that PRIGOs dealt with. While regional integration and co-operation were often espoused as the focus, PRIGOs have also had to deal with other issues of national and international in nature:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulation of policy document (what)</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global policy (UN conventions, Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action, etc.)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors/development agencies’ policies</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Plan</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector policies</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum decisions (communiqués, treaties, declaration, etc.)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating policies</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy for policy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic plans (e.g. National Sustainable Development Strategy)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation policies</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Construction of policy at the regional level

Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. They further elaborate on the findings in section 7.3.1 about regional policies influenced by actors and issues of these three overlapping policy systems—global, regional and national. Hence policies are interdependent constructions:

The only time the proliferation of policies becomes a problem is when we try to meet the obligations that are drafted by the consensus of countries in the UN system. All aspects they cover aren’t always
things we need to urgently address of policies but the processes are set up to start filtering out some of that noise down to the level that is practical. [RPS.13]

I suppose it’s your definition of what is policy. One of our policies is regional integration. We work with members in negotiating these agreements and sign off. Then we have trade agreements and then we cut it down to the level of implementation. If you talk about non-communicable disease there’s a declaration on what you do with that. Then in implementing that policy, SPC dissects it because it’s not just about what you eat, it’s about your lifestyle, what you trade and the food governments bring in. You cut it up to have specific activities for each part of the policy. [RPS.7]

7.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies

Following from the findings presented in the preceding sections, further outlined in Table 7.5 are various documents (and hence mechanisms) that make up the regional policy framework and manifest at different levels of the policy process. The Pacific Plan/Framework for Pacific Regionalism, the regional master plan, co-existed with other international, regional and national commitments. Implementation of policy largely exists at the sector level in regional frameworks, and with an expectation that these frameworks were to be translated into national policy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Most relevant to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional (Macro)</td>
<td>Pacific Plan/Framework for Pacific Regionalism, Forum decisions (communiqués, conventions, treaties, declaration, statements, roadmap), International conventions/treaties</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (Meso)</td>
<td>Regional (policy) frameworks (economic, security, trade, human right, health, energy, transport, disability, food security, gender, youth, ocean governance, climate change, information and communication technology, tourism, etc.) Corporate and annual plans, Service level agreements (e.g. Joint Country Strategy), Operating policies (standards, procedures, etc.), Budget</td>
<td>Formulation / Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across</td>
<td>Forum compact, Annual reports, Independent reviews, Sector Ministerial meetings reports, Governing council reports – e.g. Forum Officials Council, Board for Pacific Regionalism, CROP executive reports, Sector working groups reports, Budget reviews</td>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5: Regional policy framework

There are a lot of policy documents floating around at different levels. There are Forum policies but we also have our own policies. In every sector we have a policy framework... The Pacific Plan are regional commitments. Then there are international commitments. The funding requirement is one way of enforcing those commitments. Like the Federated States of Micronesia had to do a policy and
legislation for human trafficking otherwise the USA wouldn’t allow them on their flights... So there are different layers and streams. [RPS.10]

7.3.2.1.3. Features of policies

Participant narratives revealed that the ‘espoused’ view of policy in documents little resembles the ‘in-use’ view of policy as practised. That practice has been driven by the personalities and interests of regional public servants, programs put up largely to justify their tenure and attract or justify funding:

We have JCSs for all 22 countries as the basis for resource mobilisation. But a number of our divisions have used JCSs to put up wish lists but don’t deliver against it. It’s not aligned. [RPS.8]

That’s how it’s done here. They use the communiqués to attract development aid... Because development partners only give when they see it’s in the Leaders’ communiqués. European Union’s contribution to the Region is about EUR$1.6billion and that’s how that money got here. [RPS.2]

It’s really difficult to talk about core functions in separating your involvement in it because you want to justify the existence of your program. A lot of time is consumed in clarifying roles. [RPS.4]

Some participants considered regional policies as comprehensive, but limited in implementability because the resources and support needed to enable their instrumentation are inadequate. These limitations were linked to issues concerning the fragmentation of regional processes:

I would call them comprehensive, not sound, as I’m not sure if there are sound policies for the Region. To be sound means they are going to be used. At the moment they aren’t used. Why? It’s a question of time, money, sequencing policy and convincing governments it’s the right policy to take. [RPS.14]

Different CROP agencies own different strategies. I haven’t seen a joint strategy for all CROP agencies for a single country. There isn’t a single place for you to go and say these are all the regional strategies and let’s regularly review them... There’s no common standard on regional policy. [RPS.15]

7.3.2.2. How are policies formulated?

Participants were asked about how policies are formulated, the processes employed, who has done the work of formulation, what is used as a knowledge basis for policy, and stakeholders’ understanding of current policies. Table 7.6 gives the coded participant narratives about this
‘how’ question. Patterns shown by the *narratives frequency* are discussed in sections below. Narrative extracts provided illustrate what these patterns meant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge basis</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social construction - ideologies, beliefs, values, etc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual research/evidence based - rational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfer - imported social construction/evidence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Methodology | |
|-----------------|----------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Directive | 38 | 11 |
| Consultative | 21 | 9 |
| Participative | 6 | 5 |

| Formulators | |
|-----------------|----------|----------------------|---------------------|
| CROP agencies (Regional public administration) | 67 | 12 |
| Regional committees (Ministers/official forums/meetings) | 39 | 11 |
| External consultants | 26 | 9 |
| Participatory working parties/taskforces | 4 | 3 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understandability</th>
<th>Regional participants</th>
<th>Clearly understood by stakeholders</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National participants</td>
<td>Clearly understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.6: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of regional policy*

### 7.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy

The patterns exhibited in Table 7.6 indicate that formulation of regional policies have been influenced by both ideological factors (local and policy transfers) and by rational (evidence-based) analyses. The former (*frequency of 42 and 26*) was however stronger than the latter (*frequency of 20*). The participants viewed evidence-based policy as limited in regional processes and practices, even going so far as to say evidence was often gathered to justify a favoured policy. Policy transfers (imported knowledge and social construction) remained significant given path dependencies of colonialism and ongoing aid-sponsored programs where donors exert their influences:
The central question is whether regional organisations are doing enough of the far sighted policies that we should be doing. We had the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting and I looked at the papers and I said to our directors ‘they aren’t good enough’. We need the real meat where we excite Ministers to go ‘yeah, we will think about it, go and do more work’. That’s what we are lacking. [RPS.3]

If they do evidence-based policy, a lot of governments would avoid a lot of bad decisions... Instead what we have is policy-based evidence. They make the decision and say go find me some evidence to support this. Unfortunately that’s what happens. We start a new airline because it’s good for exports, actually we don’t export anything by air but we have an airline anyway. [RCS-M.2]

The official processes in PICs would be fairly similar because a lot of institutional structures left during post-colonial times are similar. These continue with a lot of development assistance coming in because they send in consultants who draw from their own experiences and that further perpetuate the use of those same systems. [RPS.20]

### 7.3.2.2.2. Methodology

Policy formulation processes were largely top-down (directive) (frequency of 38). Participative processes were limited (frequency of 6). The inclusion of non-state actors in policy processes was not absent but has been often neglected:

It’s also about how much policy is given space and time, to look at Cabinet papers, or is it just someone standing up saying ‘we should do this’. Like the PMs got together and all of a sudden we are told to do this, and we go ‘where did that come from?’ The question is then which part of implementation where there are no bodies on the ground, and which part is a reflection of the policy itself. That Leaders just go ‘we should do this’. And the members go ‘yeah, yeah’ and they won’t implement it. [RPS.2]

Our peer review system has only been in two years of operation. But the reviews so far have shown a lot of criticism from civil society and private sector stakeholders that they don’t get consulted. That a lot of our development planning have been done without their involvement. [RPS.1]

Policy design has always been top-down. It’s the role of government and bureaucrats. You go out, consult some people and come back and say ‘this is what the people want’. But once the policy is put into like a white paper, it’s not consulted widely. It runs across the entire region. [RCS-M.1]

### 7.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policies

The formulation of policies has been mostly conducted by regional public servants in CROP...
agencies \((\text{frequency of 67})\), and using regional committees \((\text{frequency of 39})\) as coordinating mechanisms. External consultants \((\text{frequency of 26})\) have played a significant role in providing independent analyses and assessments. Participatory mechanisms (e.g. working parties where non-state actors could participate) \((\text{frequency of 4})\) have been limited:

There are a lot of issues on the ground because countries don’t own the Pacific Plan. There has been a lack of consultation. Ideally the regional priorities should be from the countries but we’ve got regional mechanisms designing regional priorities. [RPS.11]

He came in as a lead consultant with a particular view of the PIFS... They made several recommendations without evidence... That review\[xix\] however highlighted a big gap in the PIFS policy capacity... we should be doing more thinking work but we are too focused on meetings and administrative work. [RPS.19]

Tuvalu last year had over 900 separate visiting consultants. That’s like 20 a week in between consultants coming to talk to you about your country. The poor country is confused. [RPS.18]

7.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policies

The patterns exhibited in Table 7.6 show a lack of understanding \((\text{frequency of 34 and 16})\) about regional policies within the Region: its presence and processes are particularly absent at national levels. Most national participants stated that they have little to do with the Region as interactions are restricted to Leaders and relatively few officials:

There are too many plans, even legislations. But their implementation hasn’t been done. Implementation suffers because of the lack of communication. I have been to regional meetings and they gave us the Pacific Plan and I said I haven’t even seen this thing before. Those resolutions are basically taken as the resolutions of all Pacific Parliaments but we don’t even know anything about this Pacific Plan. [SP.3]

If people say this (Pacific Plan) isn’t relevant, then we aren’t reflecting. The question then is what are your representatives doing when they come to regional meetings? Because often we get foreign affairs, finance or trade people and we go into countries and people say I didn’t know that. Even within your own ministry, often it’s the individuals who are making out the policies as they go. Often we get people who basically come unprepared for meetings. [RPS.4]

\[xix\] Winder, Lambourne E E, and Vaai (2012).
7.3.3. Policy implementation

Table 7.7 summarises what most participants regarded as key factors or issues affecting regional policy processes and implementation. Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and narrated in the following sections under five headings: the context of regional public policy, stakeholder support and feedback, policy culture and ownership, leadership and translation of policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues concerning implementation</th>
<th>Narratives frequency</th>
<th>Participants number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder support and feedback</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation of policy to community</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget capability</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and alignment</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People capability</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy culture and ownership</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7: Issues or factors central to implementation at the regional level

7.3.3.1. The context of regional public policy

7.3.3.1.1. A diverse and divided region

Regionalism is about integrating countries around their common interests. This requires a region with some shared sense of identity, solidarity, purpose and commitment to working together. However, regionalism has been and will continue to be a challenging agenda when there is no single agreed region. Currently, the Pacific islands are just a collection of diverse, largely insignificant countries (see Appendices A and B) facing unique development constraints, but all with different backgrounds and national situations. Identities are multi-layered and contextual. You cannot imagine a Solomon Islander conceiving regional identity without a sense of nationhood in a nation with over 70 different ethnicities. Further complication involves the 15 PICs retaining constitutional and citizenship ties to external countries. The nine sovereign states are not wholly independent states given the scale of their external aid and loan dependence and therefore their formal domestic policies influenced by external interests. These contextual challenges continue to complicate the implementation of a regionalism agenda.
Describing the Pacific as a single region is an artificial construct, it is cartographic, rather than ethnic or political, construct. Smallness and remoteness, and for some a shared natural resource (oceanic fish stocks) are certainly commonalities but these in themselves don’t define a single ‘region’, nor separate its sub-regions… The region is diverse and complex. For every generalisation that can be made… there are multiple exceptions. The region is connected but fragmented. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.49)

Pacific Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs) were better characterised as a group of individually insignificant developing countries… each trying to do its own deals with bigger countries. There is little overriding sense of common interest among PICTs, a fact… known and exploited all the time by aid donors and foreign investors… National governments… are instinctively nationalistic, and ethnic groups… treat both neighbours and foreigners with suspicion, viewing them as potential rivals and robbers, while nevertheless managing to fall repeatedly under the spell of logging and other rip-off artists… It’s worth repeating that this is not the Caribbean… indigenous populations and customary relationships are remarkably intact… Physical distance, historical isolation and ethnic identity seem set to continue to shape PICTs attitudes to each other for years to come. (T Hughes, 2013)

7.3.3.1.2. Development path and pace of regionalism

Regionalism requires pooling with some agreed constraints over national sovereignty. To some, undertaking this path requires strong nation-states with the maturity to interact confidently with each other and outsiders. However as small, young nation-states with still recent colonial legacies, most are neither ready nor willing to sacrifice their sovereignty. As the majority of PICs (15) have territorial ties with metropolitan nations, forms of neo-colonialism (in different dimensions) remain prevalent. The timing and path for regionalism must be addressed within such a regional historical context and development path:

*We are on a different journey. For Vanuatu we have nation building for 32 years. To get to the European Union it took 400 years and two wars that nearly broke down the planet. So all that tells me is not that Europe is developed and the Pacific is not. It tells we don’t want to repeat a lot of mistakes Europe made for us. But also what works in Europe isn’t necessarily going to work for us. There are a lot of lessons to learn and things to go through. This is where the regionalism model flat failed here because we are still at the height of sovereignty. And sovereignty means everything, right there rolling.* [VDA.2]

*Why do we have these coups, votes of no confidence and corruption? Why is there no democracy? These are the kinds of issues confronting us. If you look at the history of Europe and America it took them 300 years to get democracy. We have only been independent for 40 years… It reflects the development status of a country and its ability to debate and implement public policy. It’s about*
capacity and expectation and for us these are the big issues... And training the next generations quickly is not easy because people will say go away. The question then is do we have the luxury of doing it at our own pace, or do we need to get ourselves organised and address it, so that it won’t take us 300 years. It’s just that it’s not going to take us 40 years. That’s what people have to acknowledge. We are in a different place in history. For now the concern of most people is bread and butter issues. As long as politicians are delivering those, they aren’t going to ask how that was delivered... So a lot is about educating people, governance, and leadership because if you have good leaders change happens. And in addressing these issues, we need to face them in the context of our history and development. [RPS.3]

7.3.3.1.3. Membership versus donorship

An external resource dependency brings with it tensions, frustrations and layers of complexity that are additional to the existing difficulties of getting 25 countries to collaborate more effectively. With about 26 development agencies in the Region, the interplay of aid politics within the bilateralisation of aid and public policy diplomacy further complicates multilateral efforts to move towards integration. As well, the role of metropolitan countries (Australia and NZ) as members of the Region often conflicts with their roles as key donors to the PIF; likewise within the SPC in relation to the USA and France:

Donor financing... invariably brings with it tensions and frustrations. On one hand accusations abound that donors ultimately control, through the power of the purse, the programmes of an otherwise sovereign membership organisation, and on the other hand that anything less than a hands-on approach by donor agencies will not suffice in terms of meeting legitimate accountability requirements to their taxpayers... Managers within an organisation become as frustrated as donors do with governance, while both remain keen to get initiatives funded. The environment is then set for the ‘bilateralisation’ of the multilateral organisations’ agenda. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.76)

Some policies FFA develops are towards the Pacific Plan. But FFA is different because its policies are driven by PIC governments. It’s really because the resources (fish) are with them. If you have the resources you have the power. That’s not the case with other PRIGOs. Their revenues come from donors. Therefore the metropolitan countries’ influences on their policies... providing most of the advice... It’s that kind of politics happening. Because it’s a natural tendency if I cannot control it then why should I give you the money? [RPS.21]

Because our countries don’t have money they just tag along with what donors say. When a project finishes it doesn’t necessarily mean the policy is finished in achieving its desired outcomes. Donors may after three years say our priorities have changed. And this is where the whole thing collapses because governments would have no assistance to pick it up again. If they do they have to start all
7.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback—regional identity, ownership and legitimacy

Support, and hence legitimacy of regionalism, centred on issues of ‘who is the region’, ‘who does the region belong to’ or ‘who is the Region accountable to’? In terms of ‘geographical space’, the region largely refers to the PICs, while in terms of ‘regionalism’ it refers both to the PICs and Australia and NZ as members. It has been in the interest of everyone, including major western interests, that Australia and NZ plays a ‘big brother’ role in the region; that responding to global issues (e.g. war on terror) requires strategic alliance amongst countries in the regional space. However, Australia and NZ’s (France and the USA also) inclusion in the region is regarded as a key element that makes Pacific regionalism an odd model compared to elsewhere. This view coincides with assessments and references made to regional development (e.g. MDGs) as belonging to PICs only, Australia and NZ excluded (from regional performance) even though they are PIF full members exercising a strong voice over regional agendas:

The presence of Australia and NZ as full members of the PIF… has had a formative influence on the character of that body, the evolution of the ‘regional institutional architecture’ and the practice of regional co-operation. It is one of the most striking differences between the Pacific and Caribbean regional arrangements… equivalent to having the USA and Canada as full members of the Caribbean Community—an unthinkable concept for the independent Caribbean states. (Hughes, 2005, p.9)

The (2012) UN’s MDG assessment of our Region as ‘no progress or deteriorated’ is unfair. The reality is that… each country is doing well. But when they pull the MDGs together as a Region, it doesn’t look good because it’s distorted due to PNG…xxx When grouped according to development status, Australia and NZ are excluded. The UN process discriminates against our own national processes. [RPS.1]

Nevertheless the domination of Australia and NZ in the Forum has been a contested element in Pacific regionalism. Emerging to challenge such domination and existing forms of regionalism (particularly in the Forum) has been sub-regionalism. This trend is reflective of further division in the region, but also a reinforcement of geopolitics and sub-regional identities (e.g. Melanesia versus Polynesia). Others have regarded this tendency as Pacific

xxx See section 1.2.
regionalism in search of a truer identity; that of sub-regionalism serving as a positive trend in progressing regional development given the vast diversities between PICs and the slowness of regionalism to exert tangible impacts:

*Australia and NZ are too strong in the Forum. Of course... They have the capacity to be voiceful. So one way is to do small groupings... The Melanesian Spearhead Group is coming out because these Melanesian countries have the population and resources. [RCS-M.1]*

*One problem with trying to impose a regional framework like the Pacific Plan... is because of existing interests and politics... The Melanesians said we are going to do our own thing, bugger you guys... So Tuilaepa got pissed off and set up his Polynesian Leadership Group... Once we get these sub-regional groups working, that could make this concept of regionalism work. Because in the day-to-day politics, each does their own thing. [RPS.4]*

A lack of regional identity was evident in an absence of ownership of the Region and its policies and their implementation. The regional architecture exists in isolation from Pacific societies. This was reflected in most national participants having little understanding of the Region and its impact. This limited accounting translates into meagre national support for regionalism, or willingness to implement its public policy agendas on the ground:

*Regional organisations are problematic. They aren’t a government and a lot of money is going to them. But what exactly do they achieve? They are getting bigger, sucking out every money in our names. [SIPS.13]*

*Governments have to let go of sovereignty in areas where they can do well as a Region. But regionalism only works if it’s supporting national progress... If you just have regionalism to please donors and nice plans at this level, there’s no ownership of these institutions. The Region is huge with lots of money pumping into them but their impact is not seen. [RCS-M.2]*

In the Forum we are so shielded away from the rest of society, we’re a club of our own in retreat. (Anote Tong, Kiribati President, cited in ABC News (2013, August 8))

### 7.3.3.3. Leadership—governance and political will

Given that PRIGO operate under non-binding arrangements, their commitments to regional policies are based on good faith and a political will to drive regionalism at the national level. Leadership for regionalism is dependent on national leadership where leaders are the legitimate agents of the regional agenda. Accordingly leadership for regionalism depends on leadership at the national level. Yet most leaders have vested constituency interests often
conflicting with both regional and national interests. Such leadership depends fundamentally on national governance conducted within societal determinants and their role in public policy processes:

*Many are asking this same question, how can we get our countries from here to there? It boils down to our politicians. Because they say to address this but they are crooked. It’s that conflict of different constituency vested interests. Regional organisations are just like national public services. We’ve got 16 members instead of 1. That’s the complication... Rarely you get a politician coming here pushing this is what is important about my country. I have to make the hard decisions. It’s about government saying to its people there’s no gain without pain... That dialogue doesn’t happen much. That dialogue requires leaders with the vision. And I’m not sure we’ve got that.* [RPS.2]

*Unless you got strong governments who are prepared to say no, you are still going to get ripped off. The potential of ocean resources is billions. But you’ve got to have strong leadership to make any change. The problem is because governments aren’t being criticised... Civil societies are cut out of the process. They don’t own the policies. Policies are to be contestable otherwise it’s not public policy. The stronger your governance system is, the stronger is your belief and value system and the more you can engage as a society with your government and its policy process.* [RPS.18]

### 7.3.3.4. Translation of policy

#### 7.3.3.4.1. Time, space and resources for policy

Implementation requires resources of time, money and staff. With limitation here, resources and the prioritisation of their utilisation then becomes a vital but key challenge. The Region is now a crowded space where numerous issues were at times diffused amongst competing ‘international’, ‘regional’, and ‘national’ interests, and over the focus about what should be implemented as a priority. Determining this is obviously problematic. Duplication in regional and national public service delivery was evident, while defining what are regional, as distinct from national public goods remains a vital issue. Streamlining major regional and national agendas is required to impart focus to implementation:

*In your prioritisation... how much time do you spend on international issues... when you’ve got bread and butter issues at home like sanitation, transport, health and education. We have to get our basics right. It’s a dilemma of national versus regional versus international. Just as a Secretariat the number of meetings we have is phenomenal. And we aren’t the only organisation. The civil service... got no jobs because they are in meeting after meeting. I haven’t even got into implementation if I haven’t got my policy right. That’s the danger... you get caught up in your own bureaucratic processes.* [RPS.3]
A perception of the Region was that much of its focus has been on planning and developing policies. Yet that has not been accompanied by the time and resources needed to implement them, both requiring greater efforts to ensure local support and commitment. The effective translation of most existing regional policies to a level of national implementation has been inadequate:

*Why is implementation in the Region still failing? It’s because all the money is spent on the top-down approach... on expensive consultants, not in meaningful participation. Quality assurance and prosperity would only come when people participate in the economy. So policies are up there, not implemented.* [RCS-M.2]

*Some have this perception that all we do in the Region is plan. Like here’s another framework. That’s the perception we need to be careful of. That all our investment, energy, time and money don’t get poured into too many plans, M&E and frameworks, whereas the important work of ensuring that communities... are supported through development initiatives aren’t missing out.* [RPS.16]

### 7.3.3.4.2. Capacity (to implement, monitor and evaluate) and implementation modality

Most PICs do not have the qualified people or technical skills to implement a now ambitious regional, let alone national, agenda. Existing policies are largely seen as incompatible with the capacities of small bureaucracies in the Region (20 PICs have a population of around 200,000 or less) (see Appendix A). Some national services are affected because some officials can be absent for up to 60-80% of their time trying to accommodate international and regional commitments. xxxi

*The issue with the Pacific is small administration. Here, a nurse cannot cope everyday with 10 patients. The rate of turnover of our people is very high. You can see the rate at which our people go for regional and international meetings. Most are out of the country... 60-80% of the time. They put in the plan but nobody is there to implement it. That’s why a lot of policies fall down.* [SIDA.6]

*There are a lot of policies and strategies but the real asset comes down to implementation. That’s where the political will is tested, the country’s capacity is understood in terms of its internal resources, and the financial ability of development partners to follow through. The term ‘capacity’ is often overused because it’s not just about training people. It’s the number of people. That’s a real issue for small island states... you spend most of your time out of country.* [RPS.17]

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xxxii As an example, see Table 6.13 where 50.4% of items considered by Samoa’s Cabinet during 2009-2010 concerned overseas travel, an indication of the significant amount of time officials can spend overseas.
Implementation is not just about having the resources but also how they are utilised within the systems of programs, projects and activities to instrumentalise change processes. A key implementation modality in donor-funded programs has been the use of consulting services which can mean most net aid resources return to donor countries. As well the capacity needed to progress effective change has often been underestimated. This modality meant that effective donor-local actors’ relationships are vital for a policy to survive and sustain an implementation process in the local context. These were often not sufficiently attuned culturally or logistically:

*A donor might give a country $1 million but $700,000 automatically goes back to the donor because of consultants they use. Even for the best countries in terms of confidence, only 25% of the aid is delivered using Samoa national systems. So it’s not only the capacity of the country to absorb the change, but also the capacity of donors to work together and with the locals.* [RDA.2]

*Countries have wonderful policies... but they aren’t implemented well. It’s also the modality of implementation. Partners operate through overseas consulting services to implement. They go into countries and the locals are turned off. There’s no ownership and commitment. But then there are issues with donors not listening. Some projects failed because of personality clashes between consultants and locals. Often donors undermine the amount of resources that are needed for capacity building—they think that by putting someone in there for six months would resolve the issue, no. A lot of projects are about changing legislation. That’s not easy because it’s political, you need to do consultation and work with countries in changing mind-sets. That’s not an overnight thing. But projects are finite.* [RPS.8]

7.4. **Summary of findings**

Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 7.8 summarises key findings in terms of propositions emerging from the regional level. Chapter eight discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/category</th>
<th>Key findings or propositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation and adoption of policy</td>
<td>1. Most policies originate from the political leaders and external actors.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. The adoption by PRIGOs of the ‘regional integration’ agenda under the Pacific Plan is limited.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. National and international agendas occupy the workload of the PRIGOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formulation of policy</td>
<td>4. There is no single or consistent construction of ‘policy’. Policy is seen as manifestations at different levels at the intersection of international-regional-national interests and issues.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Evidence-based policy is limited. The regional policy processes are ad hoc driven largely by ideological factors (local and policy transfers).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Regionalism received limited dialogue or discourse amongst PICs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Policy formulation is largely top-down driven by regional public servants and consultants. Non-state actors’ participation has been limited, only given recent recognition.</td>
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<td>8. There is limited understanding about regional policies and awareness of the Region and its processes at the national level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation of policy</td>
<td>9. What is practised differs from policy. Policies and processes of the Region are driven by funding and justification for existence of agents.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Agents’ personalities, the politics of aid and PRIGO interests are key determinants of what is practised.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11. Various policies lack implementability given limited resources and capacity.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12. The Pacific Plan implementation has been limited due to lack of shared understanding, ownership, resource allocation, domestic translation and clear focus from the PRIGOs and political leadership for the Pacific Plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy process as a whole</td>
<td>13. Factors or issues affecting the effective implementation of the regional policy agenda and realising its impact relate primarily to the complexity of the Region and its regional architecture, lack of regional solidarity, identity, legitimacy and ownership, dependency and vulnerability to external resources and influences, limited national resources and capacities and political leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Addressing these issues must be considered against the history, development status and the contextual complexities and diversities of the Region.</td>
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**Table 7.8:** Key findings emerging from the regional level
CHAPTER 8: SYNTHESIS

8.1. Introduction

So what do the case studies; Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the Region in the previous four chapters tell us about how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented? Which factors were at play when policies were introduced and formulated, and which were critical during the process of implementation that led to effective (or ineffectual) results? This chapter addresses this study’s research question through a synthesis of findings across the four case studies, examining the commonalities and differences (the patterns) against the literature (chapter two). The following summarises these findings (see Appendices G and H):

- Public policy is contextual. In a Pacific island country (PIC), public policy occurs through the interactions of three complex policy systems at domestic, regional and global levels;
- As public policy has been shaped by these interactions, the nature and status of policy processes in the four case studies were as follows:
  - Public policies were largely shaped by political and external interests;
  - The heavily top-down nature of policy processes has meant society has been a neglected element; and
  - The use of evidence-based policy was limited; the ‘policies’ were largely those transferred from elsewhere and the ‘practices’ were ad hoc, driven mostly by ideological factors;
- Implementation effectiveness reflected policies put into place, and occurs frequently when policies are based on participative and partnership approaches that build ownership, understanding and learning within the policy process for sustainability of change;
- A realisation of these elements depended largely on interrelated factors of capability, implementation modality, policy culture and stakeholder support, and leadership; and
- For development to impact significantly on society, these four factors must be developed within long-term development needs addressing society as the missing link in public policy, and an appreciation of the context’s continuing impact on development status.
Within this meta-analysis, a model was built from the overall patterns to arrive at a heuristic that prescribes key variables critical for effective implementation. The process adopted in this synthesis follows the research purpose and focus (see Figure 3.3)—that inquiring into the policy processes of any context necessitates examining the following dimensions at different but interconnected levels of a policy system:

- What is the policy process? Level 1 of the synthesis in section 8.2;
- What is the result? Level 2 in section 8.3;
- How does the context influence policy? Level 3 in section 8.4; and
- What are key variables contributing to the result? Level 4 in section 8.5

8.2. The policy process

[Level 1]

As per methodology (section 3.3), grounding this inquiry involved two interrelated explorations: examining ten specific policies to gain deeper insights into the policy processes; and gaining a holistic understanding of the context within which these processes take place.

8.2.1. Patterns evident from the ten policies

8.2.1.1. Policy initiation and adoption

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 draw out the origins and factors critical in the initiation of the ten policies within the four case studies.

CRP, TRC, PSIP and PIRAMS were similar in their adoption as responses to crises of different dimensions in the three PICs. Other policies; TLR, PSC-ISP, SPP, Pacific Plan were path dependent manifestations of earlier reforms. The crises in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, relatively younger nation-states than Samoa, had strong roots in colonial legacies, and occurred at critical points of state building. The Solomon Islands’ 1998-2003 tension (societal impact); Vanuatu’s 1997 riot (confined to the capital); and Samoa’s 1999 political turmoil—all resulted from poor political governance or leadership. At the same time, leadership was the core element facilitating the initiation of the ten policies. The crisis (society) and leadership (state) coupled with policy transfer (external) elements influenced adoption of these policies.
Table 8.2 highlights how leadership in all policies not only involved a change in government, prime ministership (or ministerial) role, but also strong direction from high levels of public administration. Exceptions included the CDF and ELR where administrative leadership was weak or suppressed. The CDF and ELR (unsuccessful cases) were primarily advanced for political propaganda purposes.

Common across the CRP, PIRAMS, TRC and PSIP was their initiation in reaction to a compelling problem that warranted intervention. Exceptions included the PSC-ISP and SPP, seen as more proactive than earlier reform attempts. The CDF and ELR emerged from programs espousing rural development and decent employment, but were then transformed into politically self-serving programs. The TLR, TRC and PIRAMS (effective policies) targeted societal needs for improved telecom services, peace building and infrastructure.

All ten policies involved instances of policy transfer as detailed in Table 8.2.
8.2.1.2. Policy formulation

Table 8.3 compares the formulation process across the ten policies.

Consistent across all policies, except the CDF and ELR, was the complex nature of the required change. The difficulties facing reform in a post-conflict state was evident in the lapses in the PSIP, leading to incremental redesign after only one year.
The CRP, PSIP, PSC-ISP, SPP, Pacific Plan, CDF and ELR all involved strong knowledge basis in ideological factors (i.e. beliefs, concepts or social constructions). However, contextual (evidence-based) knowledge including consultative processes were limited in the CDF and ELR and were regarded as imposed policies. The CRP, rooted in the Washington consensus (see section 2.4.1.3), as a state versus market model was consultative but lacked participative approaches. The TLR, TRC and PIRAMS (successful policies) all had a strong contextual (evidential and ideological) knowledge basis, involving strong consultative and participative approaches. International evidence and state versus society elements were considered in the design process. The incorporation of contextual, evidential and participative ingredients into later reforms (e.g. TLR, PSC-ISP) reflected some learning progression over time from earlier reforms. The PSIP, PSC-ISP and SPP had strong contextual evidential, consultative and participative bases as well. Their focus was more one of internal institutional change, their impact on society largely invisible to the public eye. The Pacific Plan had strong ideological bases in regionalism concepts and emanated from a review, but its formulation lacked consultative and participatory processes. The Pacific Plan’s limited translation in implementation was reflected in its lack of shared understanding, ownership and impact at the three PICs’ national level.

Table 8.3: Critical factors in the formulation process of the ten policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Contextual (local)</th>
<th>Policy transfer</th>
<th>Reform content/design</th>
<th>Methodology/approach</th>
<th>Contextualisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Evidence Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Neglect/limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td></td>
<td>Directive</td>
<td></td>
<td>State vs market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLR</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>No design</td>
<td>Limited/limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political (itself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELR</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>No design</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political (itself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>No design</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Limited/limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political (itself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIP</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Part of RAMSI</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>incremental</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Ministry (itself)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRAMS</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC-ISP</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td>State vs society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>International vs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendices G and H
8.2.1.3. Policy implementation

Table 8.4 compares the implementation process across the ten policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Characteristics of the change process</th>
<th>Critical factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participative/coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLR</td>
<td>Emergent. Sector-wide</td>
<td>Non-linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELR</td>
<td>Imposed through laws</td>
<td>Chaotic. Non-linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Emergent. Bottom up. Sector-wide</td>
<td>Non-linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Legitimised through laws</td>
<td>Chaotic. Non-linear. Legitimise corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIP</td>
<td>Gradual and emergent. RAMSI’s control. Short term consultants. Some generational change. Change from a sector-wide to a ministry program</td>
<td>Non-linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRAMS</td>
<td>Incremental and emergent. Sector-wide</td>
<td>Non-linear. Small market influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Gradual and emergent. Some requires generational change. Ministry program</td>
<td>Non-linear. Reform fatigue. Reverting back</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4: Modality and critical factors in the implementation of the ten policies
Source: Appendices G and H

Change processes across all policies were nonlinear. While broad policy parameters provided strategic direction, processes did not follow predetermined lines, often taking directions during implementation differing from original designs (intentions). Such redirections were unpredictable due to the influence of feedback loops (e.g. change in leadership, influence from other policies, lessons learnt and differences in reform expectations). Given the emergent and self-organising behaviour of actors and their interactions, adjusting program designs and approaches to implementation to
accommodating changes in the environment (feedback loops) became important in progressing the change process. For instance, the PSIP was transformed from a public service reform to a Ministry program, since it was hard to implement such a huge reform within a post-conflict system. Similarly, the PIRAMS accommodated reforms under the PSC-ISP that were not part of its original design. In a stable political environment, Samoa’s reforms were relatively more gradual, seen in the ways the PIRAMS and SPP were implemented, except for the 2002 government realignment which was sudden and not an original component of the PSC-ISP. In the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, emergent and flexible approaches were vital in the change process given political instabilities. For instance, the CRP underwent six changes in Prime Ministership (not counting other ministerial roles) during the 1994-2001 period. This compared to only one change at that level in Samoa in 1998 (see Table 1.1).

In the CRP, PSC-ISP, SPP and the PIRAMS (reforms implemented over ten years) change was ongoing, actors (individuals/institutions) were willing to continue following this path. At the same time, actors experienced reform fatigue by reverting to old practices. These ‘ups’, ‘downs’ or ‘passiveness’ patterns were reflections in the nonlinearity of the change process, and an emergence of different paths influenced by different factors (feedback loops). The ‘ups’ (momentum) were perpetuated by such factors as changes in project management and funding, but leadership remained central. Conversely ‘downs’ or ‘passiveness’ were attributed to the lack of leadership needed to drive and continue the change process. The relative longevity of these policies enabled an assessment of patterns at different times. For example, the SPP underwent a cyclical path of ups, downs and passiveness under three different leaderships. In institutional reforms (e.g. SPP, CRP, PSIP, PSC-ISP), some changes were generational (long-term), dependent on social change (society), and could not be accomplished within a short-term, bounded government project timeframe.

Differing across the three PICs was policy sovereignty or ownership; the ability of local actors to implement decisions independently while valuing available assistance, managing external dynamics, and maintaining positive relationships with external actors. For the PSIP, resourcing was controlled by RAMSI making it difficult for local managers to plan, manoeuvre the change process, or make decisions, particularly on resource mobilisation. This implementation modality of externally controlled resourcing, and the short-term nature of consultancy services, contributed to a lack of positive relationships between advisers and counterparts. This led to limited ownership, understanding and contextualisation of the
change process. Similarly, the CRP, targeting institutional change, ended up as a big bang structural program driven mainly by consultants concerned to meet loan conditionality, but limiting local ownership, understanding and contextualisation. Common in the PSC-ISP and the PIRAMS was strong policy sovereignty or ownership—attributed to the strong sense of national identity amongst local actors, a feature yet to materialise in Solomon Islands’ policy culture.

Interrelated with all these factors was the participative nature of the implementation process. The TLR, TRC, PIRAMS and PSC-ISP initiatives used coordinated and partnership approaches where capacity development was built into the change process. As such, understanding, ownership and contextualisation of the implementation process also developed. These approaches recognised and utilised local knowledge, cultural aspects, and the roles of civil society actors. For the CRP, participative approaches and hence ownership were limited, a market versus public sector model being adopted to society’s neglect, and conflicting with social equity goals. The ELR and the CDF were not contextualised which led to negative impact. Common in all policies was involvement of development actors in the change process, foreign loans and aid used to finance design and implementation processes.

In all policies, strong leadership was critical for ensuring change was implemented and sustained throughout the process. For instance, while political leadership was seen in the Pacific Plan’s initiation, it was not moulded into the implementation process, hence its limited operationalisation in regional and domestic political levels. Mixed leadership (strong versus weak to modest) was seen in implementation of the CRP, SPP and the PSIP, while negative leadership was assessed in the ELR and CDF. In all cases (the Pacific Plan to a lesser extent), neutrality in implementation was limited, and political interference in public administration real.

8.2.1.4. Examining these findings against the literature

These findings are not explicable by a single theory, given the complexity of what went on in the change process of the ten policies, and involving the interplay of multiple factors. Accordingly, a spectrum of six key findings are examined against the literature.
8.2.1.4.1. Policy initiation

Finding 1: policy adoption in response to crises is consistent with the Multiple Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium theories (see sections 2.3.3.7 and 2.3.4.1.1). That is, policies are adopted when attention is given to a compelling problem, a window of opportunity opened to push through a policy solution. In accordance with the complexity theory (see section 2.3.2.3), change occurs when the policy system is ‘at the edge of chaos’ (far-from-equilibrium) influenced by feedback loops at bifurcation points. Crises in the three PICs, where the policy system (i.e. people as collective elements of the system) was ‘at the edge of chaos’, meant some change was inevitable given the impact of these crises. The feedback loops (bifurcation points) that led to the change (policy adoption) involved leadership (politics, agenda), policy transfers (appealing ideas, trends and models), development agents’ dynamics, and support (resources, technical assistance and agenda), all relating to the compelling nature of the problem (the crisis).

However, adoption of a policy in response to crises as stochastic events is not consistent with the Multiple Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium theories. The evidence above shows that these policies (CRP, PIRAMS, TRC, etc.) were adopted not as random or sudden events, but as reactions to critical events involving complex historical contingencies. The Punctuated Equilibrium theory predicts that the policy process involves patterns of relatively stable incremental change, followed by shorter explosive change. Such a pattern appeared consistent with some reforms in Samoa because of the stability of the policy system. But not in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu where the CRP, for instance, was a ‘big bang’ change, not incremental. It was more a complex interplay of several factors (crises, policy transfers of popular ideas around the Region, leadership and donors’ relations), within actors’ (donors, politicians and indigenous graduates) interactions that led to change initiation across the ten policies.

Finding 2: leadership is demonstrated in the findings as a core bifurcation point in policy initiation and implementation. While leadership is highlighted by the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IADF) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (see sections 2.3.4.1.2), as important in the emergence of policy coalitions or co-operation, leadership is not treated here as a core factor of change in these prominent policy theories, including the Multiple Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium. Part of this limitation appears attributable to differences of context. These theories were constructed largely from contexts where formal coalitions and networks are institutionalised. Contrary to the three PICs’
context, leadership is critical as the policy process is one of elite dominance given the prevalence of the *big man or fa’amatai* leadership, culture and politics (see section 8.4.1.3). Largely undervalued in these theories, moreover, is the integral role of development agents. It is no longer adequate to theorise policy processes in a developmental context without considering the role and dynamics of such agents and policy transfers (see section 8.2.2). As Sutherland (2000) states, ‘the increased pace and scope of reforms that occurred in the islands from the mid-1990s onwards cannot be explained outside the context of the donor-driven regional reform agenda’.

### 8.2.1.4.2. Policy formulation and implementation

Finding 3: policies with contextualised processes involving consultative and participative approaches and responding to societal needs were more often implemented successfully, contributing to positive outcomes. The effectiveness of these approaches lies in local ownership, understanding, capacity building and learning—all crucial to progressing implementation and sustaining the change process. An absence of these approaches in policies regarded as imposed further contributed to ineffectuality. Their importance is supported by ethnographic research (Mosse, 2004), network and governance theories, the prominent IADF and ACF, and other theories emphasising collaboration (see sections 2.3.4.1.2 and 2.3.4.3.1). Such findings validate other evaluation/reviews on the importance of participative approaches (Harris, 2007; Park, Howden, & Crimp, 2012; Paton & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2010).

Reflecting on years as a consultant to the United Kingdom Department for International Development, Mosse (2004) states that ‘another thing the new ethnography of development shows is that governance brought by development schemes cannot be imposed; it requires collaboration and compromise… projects do not fail; they are failed by wider networks of support and validation’. Harris’s (2007) analysis of PNG’s political economy (seeking to understand the state’s failure to provide effective governance and development outcomes) pointed to ‘a variety of initiatives occurring at the local level that show promise for improving governance and development outcomes’… that have ‘emerged and (have) proven successful in bringing together local constituencies to cooperate in planning, implementing and operating local initiatives’. He points to the need for more work in understanding the extent to which the existence of such local ‘groups is correlated in shifts in ascription of legitimacy’. Further, Ferraris’s (2008) review of Pacific fisheries institutional reforms demonstrates that ‘the process should be inclusive and enabling to ensure long-term
sustainability of the change… stakeholders participation should develop a shared understanding of what needs to be changed and why, how to bring change about, and acceptance of new rules, which need to be widely disseminated and well understood’.

The ACF and IADF underscore ‘co-operation as precursors to change in policies or institutions’ (Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, & Sabatier, 2012, p.8). However, these theories do not adequately capture the subtleties entailed in enacting collaborative public policy in settings where informal institutions (e.g. culture, relationships, and indigenous language) dominate the public sphere. Yet their utilisation can bring understanding, consensus, legitimacy, ownership and commitment to implementation such as in the CRP, TLR, TRC, PIRAMS and PSC-ISP. Yet these theories have largely conceptualised policy co-operation and networks with reference to formal advocacy groups and coalitions, particularly those employing economic-based and legal mechanisms. Collaboration in culturally-based contexts is ignored (Weare, Lichterman, & Esparza, 2014). This study’s findings demonstrate that participation, collaboration and contextualisation of policy require a recognition of local knowledge, cultural aspects, and the role of civil society. For example, some participants who have direct involvement in the CRP pointed to some wharves built on the dry sides in Vanuatu. Issues identified included a lack of consultation for local knowledge and inputs (see section 4.2.1.3). Also, for different cultural community leaders to understand the CRP (foreign language-based) concepts such as privatisation, strategic planning and reforms, the use of parables to translate these concepts into local languages facilitated an understanding of these concepts within local contexts.

The importance of valuing social aspects in policy processes are largely supported by social construction theories (Yanow, 2000, 2004) and other studies. For example, Ratuva’s assessment of Nauru’s constitutional reforms shows the importance of local context where ‘the use of the English language to satisfy the two foreign consultants posed two problems: the clarity in communicating local knowledge and the intention of local ownership of the change process’. This severely compromised intentions for the reform to be inclusive:

Because most (community leaders) did not understand English and even the interpreted legal concepts and arguments, they were marginalised outside the communicative circle, thus severely compromising their influence within the community… In a community with strong communal and kinship bonds and where social communication was part of kinship networks, the validity of information was judged not by the presentation of the contents but by the reliability and legitimacy of the messenger… The contents of the message cannot be isolated and transmitted independently of the messenger but rather the two are inseparably part of a communicative process. (Ratuva, 2011, pp.251-253)
Finding 4: relationships with development actors are significant in the policy process. For instance, the lack of trust between counterparts and advisers led to the non-implementation of some activities under the PSIP. CRP was largely consultant-driven affecting local-external relationships and worldviews. Law changes under the ELR were formulated by an ILO consultant with limited local inputs. Positive relationships were identified in the TLR, TRC and PIRAMS and hence the effectiveness of implementation. However, the dynamics and nature of local and foreign actors’ interactions are elements that remain largely unexamined in formulation and implementation theories.

Finding 5: the findings about the policy processes (across all policies) as nonlinear and emergent in nature are supported by complexity theory (see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.7). Compared to other prominent policy and development theories set out in chapter two, the behavioural aspects of a complex policy system (in the four case studies) featured strongly in the ten policy processes. The complexity theoretical lenses facilitate a better understanding of the nature of the change and its process, and in making sense of why the change happened as it did or not as intended, the complexities involved, and how context came into play.

Finding 6: context is most significant in the whole policy process. Pollitt (2013) refers to context as the ‘missing link’ in theory (see section 2.5.2). The findings reiterate that public policy is contextual and needs understanding accordingly (see section 8.4) in terms of design and implementation.

8.2.2. The general patterns

8.2.2.1. Policy initiation/adoptions

Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.7, 5.4, 6.8 and 7.3 (previous four chapters) are merged into Table 8.5 for cross-comparison. The coloured figures highlight the stand-out pattern across the four case studies: generally the genesis of public policy is less rooted in its context. That is, the society in which public policy is meant to impact upon, and in which the state is a part of, has been the missing link in policy processes examined here. Issues that enter the government agenda and then become public policies come largely from the top (political actors) or external (foreign actors). As well, policy adoption is political, influenced by local politicians and donor countries. Solomon Islands’ limited coding reflects the confinement of external influences to RAMSI; that
external dynamic was more intense in the Solomon Islands than in Vanuatu and Samoa. Differences in policy adoption across the four case studies emerged as a matter of degree:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of coding (content analysis) of participants’ narratives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Origin (where)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (civil society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External (international)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfers*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors - consultants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* include international agencies

Table 8.5: Origins of public policy across the four case studies
Source: Sections 4.3.1, 5.3.1, 6.3.1 and 7.3.1

8.2.2.2. Policy formulation

8.2.2.2.1. Construction of policy

Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.8, 5.5, 6.9 and 7.4 are amalgamated into Table 8.6. Shown by the coloured figures, the overall pattern across the four case studies reveals four commonalities in the nature of policy formulation:

- There is no consistent understanding about this thing called ‘policy’ at national and regional levels. Various documents are referenced as policies, an indication that the term ‘policy’ is socially constructed;
- While policy means different things, most participants refer to ‘policy’ as a (strategic) plan;
- Regional and international agendas including aid policies are a composite of domestic and regional policy; and
- There are few openly articulated political policy platforms.
Differences across the four case studies offer a spectrum. Hence the political/administration separation is messier and immature and hence more problematic in the Solomon Islands than in Samoa and Vanuatu. The Solomon Islands’ fragmented policy process was evident in a co-existence of two sets of national policy; the NCRA policy (political formulation) and the NDS (public administration formulation). Vanuatu’s PAA and Samoa’s SDS as national policy comprised public servants’ formulations, depicting some degree of political/administration separation.

Table 8.7 (combining the coded narratives from Tables 4.9, 5.6, 6.10 and 7.5) further shows that a comprehensive view of policy requires understanding that policies manifest at different levels; broadly those that are macro (national), meso (sector/sub-sector) and micro (organisations/divisions/sections/individuals). These levels interact with each other and with policies originating at regional and global levels. Given this interdependence, implementation of policy requires translation across other levels. However, while macro-level plans exist, their integrated and consistent translation at lower levels is limited (but of greater prevalence in the Solomon Islands). Such crossover can render implementation problematic by limiting policy operationalisation. Here a common need to emerge was that of having consistent, up-to-date laws supporting implementation, and requiring a reconciliation of formal laws (state-based) and customs (indigenous derived).
8.2.2.2.2. How are policies formulated?

Coded narratives from Tables 4.10, 5.7, 6.11 and 7.6 and about how participants experienced or saw policies being formulated across the four case studies are combined in Table 8.8. The patterns (see coloured figures) show the following commonalities:

- The formulation process is predominantly top-down;
- Most policies are constructed without proper consultation or stakeholders’ participation. Although consultative discourses have improved, civil society’s meaningful participation remains minimal;
- Rational and evidence-based policy is limited (although much stronger at regional than national level);
- The ‘policies’ are largely policy transfers (lacking recognition of local institutions) but the ‘practices’ are ad hoc driven mostly by ideological factors;
- Stakeholders understanding of policies (and notions of public policy in terms of state-society relationships) are limited; and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Political policy platforms, Priority Action Agenda (PAA) (10 years), Planning Long Action Short (PLAS) (4 years), Council of Ministers directives</td>
<td>National Coalition for Reform and Advancement (NCRA) policy statement (4 years), National Development Strategy (NDS) (10 years), Cabinet and caucus directives</td>
<td>Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) (5 years), Cabinet directives</td>
<td>Pacific Plan (10 years), International conventions/treaties, Forum decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso</td>
<td>Sector plans, Sector project design documents</td>
<td>Sector plans, Provincial Plans, Medium Term Framework (4 years), NCRA policy translation, Sector project design documents</td>
<td>Sector plans (5-10 years), Medium Term Framework, Sector project design documents</td>
<td>Regional (policy) frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro</td>
<td>Legislation (Acts and Regulations), Corporate and Annual Plans, Service level agreements, Operational policies, Budget</td>
<td>Across (Monitoring and Evaluation – M&amp;E) Six monthly report, Annual report, Reviews of Plans, Cabinet committee monitoring, Budget reviews</td>
<td>Forum compact, Annual report, Independent reviews, Reports (working groups, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7: Levels of policies across the four case studies

Source: Sections 4.3.2.1.2, 5.3.2.1.2, 6.3.2.1.2 and 7.3.2.1.2
The key difference across the four case studies is direct involvement of the political level in policy formulation in the Solomon Islands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge basis of policies</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social construction - ideologies, beliefs, values, etc.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual research/evidence based - rational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy transfer - imported social construction/evidence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>1</td>
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**Formulators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public servants</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External consultant/adviser</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory working committees/party/task force</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Understandability**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not understood by stakeholders</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.8: Formulation of policy across the four case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Sections 4.3.2.2, 5.3.2.2, 6.3.2.2 and 7.3.2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.2.3. **Policy implementation—a reflection of policy**

Limited implementation as per prevailing perception of the status of public policy in the Region (see section 1.1.1) reflects the actual nature of policies and how they were put in place. Consistent across the four case studies were views of various participants indicating that existing (development) policies are strategic plans mostly seen as fantasies isolated from societal realities. That is, the policy process is not embedded in its system (society), where policies (issues/demands) emerge from dynamic interactions within that systems, and for policies (change) to impact on that system and its elements (people). In large, these plans are:

- Not contextualised and remote in their formulation from those who deliver the outcomes;
- Not linked to implementation and resource allocation, being adopted largely to enhance the standing of politicians and officials, to justify actors’ functions, and to
access donor funding;

- Contained ‘pie in the sky stuff’, ‘wish lists’ or ‘shopping lists’ which have everything a PIC could not possibly implement or deliver;
- Based on foreign ideologies, taking-for-granted the influence of local belief systems on politics and practices of government and society; and
- Limited in translation to the community in terms of how policies are operationalised, monitored, and evaluated in local contexts.

8.2.2.4. Examining these findings against the literature

8.2.2.4.1. The genesis or origin of policy

The findings in section 8.2.2.1 are not consistent with pluralist and corporatist theories positing that the policy process consists mainly of interactions amongst interest groups, the state and bureaucracy (see section 2.3.3.5 and 2.3.4.1.2). These findings are consistent with the findings in Turner and Hulme (1997) that interest groups (the capitalists as the main constituents of society) (as per above theories) are limited and policy making is highly political (see section 2.4.3).

The findings further demonstrate that current theories and previous studies (see section 2.3.5) underestimate the dominant role of political elites and donor actors in policy genesis. This is because current theories have largely conceptualised policy origins in state-society (internal) relations within a society dominated by capitalists in an independent polity. But Pacific states are neither fully economically independent, nor do they have vibrant capitalists. Instead, tribal-based island groupings and indigenous institutions dominate society. Yet, society’s voice in policy setting has been limited. This constitutes a significant democratic and development issue that must be addressed in ongoing public policy development.

The complexity of interactions amongst state-external (political-donor) actors, and how they shape the genesis of public policy in PICs, is not fully captured by existing theories. Donor actors are part of the institutions, organisations or agents of PICs’ policy systems, not necessarily external elements due to their significant influences over development policy, resourcing and reform. Policy transfer theories resonate here, but they lack the power to explain why local actors take up transfers, and how policy transfers then influence the nature of implementation.
8.2.2.4.2. The formulation and implementation of policy

In examining the findings in sections 8.2.2.2 to 8.2.2.3 against the literature, five key points stand out.

Finding 1: the findings of limited evidence-based policy, and policy is not rational as orthodoxy insists (see sections 2.3.3.2 and 2.3.4.2.1). Social construction theories are in evidence across the four case studies. Hence there are different meanings and definitions of policy at various nested levels (individual, organisation, sector, national, regional and global). Policy is thus interdependent in formulations, implementation and context. For instance, the regional labour mobility policy will not get implemented unless it is translated to the (PICs, Australia and NZ) national level. However, ‘a failure to recognize the multi-level or embedded nature of public policies has been a hallmark of most literature on the subject of policy instrument’ (Howlett, 2009a, pp.73-74). Such failure is critical when explaining the implementation deficit evident in the Region (see section 1.1.1). What has been mostly referred to as policies (plans) remain at the highest meta-level in terms of aspirations, goals and fantasies with little calibration into tangible or actionable means and tools.

Finding 2: an additional meaning of policy least touched on in the literature is ‘policy as espoused’ versus ‘policy as practised’. What is public policy in PICs then? In the three PICs examined, practices are dominated by strong, culturally-based polities where informalities and personal relationships are central to how things are done. The findings show that beliefs have shaped these practices, how they matter being largely taken for granted in formal policy processes. Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop’s (2010) research showed the absence of using local institutions for climate change discussions, but these institutions shape Tuvaluans’ beliefs and views about climate change, which do not mirror framing of climate change in formal policies and international agendas. These findings are consistent with the ACF, positing policy as driven by coalitions with shared beliefs (see section 2.3.4.1.2), such as the fa’asamoa, a shared, deeply-held, belief system, absent in the Solomon Islands or Vanuatu. However, deep beliefs in PICs are complex involving dimensions of principles, values, customs, oral histories and languages. Such dimensions are left unexamined in the ACF and other policy theories. And while what is written, preached or espoused (in policy frameworks) differs from what is practised, there is a gap to bridge. That could be closed by examining the socially constructed nature of public policy and development issues in PICs, an as yet neglected area of the literature.
Social construction understanding helps determine the nature of power plays amongst actors and the knowledge basis of policy (as documented), which, in the case of PICs, are largely those of policy transfers—what is driving people to do the things they do,—which are their belief systems. Social construction can examine how an orthodoxy ‘fits into an ideological process of governing’ (Meier, 2009, p.6). The orthodox view of public policy, mostly technical through reference to a rational Weberian model of governance, is somewhat problematic when considering strong cultural worldviews in PICs. Here development issues are seen by participants as more cultural and relational than technical. As Levin (2013) points out in research about Pacific education, an over-reliance on technical remedies is part of the problem as Pacific development issues are not technical. This ‘technical apparatus’ to development aid policy in Oceania is questionable: actors operating in this development space are not rational (Hodge, 2014) but bound by the ideological positions and organisational politics within which they operate (Prince, 2012).

Finding 3: the findings demonstrate that initiation of policy transfers is largely through aid policies and international regimes. Formal policies are put in place by local policy actors to justify or access donor funding and for nations to act as citizens of the international system. This finding is consistent with other studies (Peake & Marenin, 2008; Prince, 2012; Tisdell, 2002; Young, 2005) (see sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.3). However, this study’s findings further explored how the policy process when influenced significantly by policy transfers and external interests affect policy ownership, learning and implementation sustainability. These are issues constantly raised by participants as central to implementation in a developmental context, but overlook in public policy and development theories.

Finding 4: the dominant discourse’s notions of phenomena as predictable and controllable (see section 2.3.2.1) have noticeably influenced approaches to formal public policy across the four case studies; in particular, the production of various top-down plans and intentions for implementation. The findings challenge notions of predictability and controllability: PICs are decorated with such grafted-on pre-designs, now referred to as policies, yet of limited implementability because they were being developed mostly in isolation from societal realities and dynamics, and not owned by those who should implement them. Limitations in the translation of these policies on the ground was unsurprising given restricted societal development in the Region (see section 1.1.1).
8.3. Policy effectiveness

[Level 2]

Depicted in Table 8.9 are the coded participant narratives on assessments of the ten policies and policies in general. The TLR, TRC and the PIRAMS were assessed as mostly effective in their immediate and long-term results, the ELR and CDF less so. The CRP, PSIP, PSC-ISP and SPP results were mixed; some effectiveness was seen in immediate results but some long-term impact was either questionable, or yet to emerge. The Pacific Plan was also mixed in its results, most participants viewing regional policies as generally less effective. In general, most participants were sceptical in their assessment of the status, nature and impact of public policies. While acknowledging some positive ongoing developments, participants suggested that efforts could have been pursued differently had factors or issues of local context and implementation (discussed in section 8.5) been taken into account in the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of policy processes.

| Frequency of coded participants’ narratives on success or non-success of public policy |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Vanuatu**                                     | **General**     | **CRP**         | **TRL**         | **ELR**         |
| Effectiveness (success)                         | 5               | 14              | 11              | 0               |
| Less effective (non-success)                    | 25              | 26              | 2               | 11              |
| **Solomon Islands**                             | **General**     | **PSIP**        | **TRC**         | **CDF**         |
| Effectiveness (success)                         | 2               | 9               | 15              | 0               |
| Less effective (non-success)                    | 22              | 8               | 0               | 24              |
| **Samoa**                                       | **General**     | **PSC-ISP**     | **SPP**         | **PIRAMS**      |
| Effectiveness (success)                         | 5               | 6               | 9               | 15              |
| Less effective (non-success)                    | 16              | 4               | 27              | 0               |
| **Region**                                      | **General and the PP** |
| Effectiveness (success)                         | 11              |
| Less effective (non-success)                    | 41              |

**Table 8.9**: Success or non-success of public policy across the four case studies

**Source**: Participant narratives in previous four chapters

Table 8.10 further summarises the qualitative assessments of the ten policies—what various participants meant in determining effectiveness (or otherwise). Their narratives demonstrated that, while public policy attempts have contributed to the development status of these PICs and the Region, they have also come with some undesirable costs. For instance, there was a perceived threat to sovereignty, a culture of resentment towards government policies and outside influences, poor morale including fear and mistrust among people, and a loss of social cohesion, identity and sense of community (particularly the Solomon Islands).
Increased corruption was a widespread concern, politicians seen as powerful elites acting through self-serving behaviour at the expense of national interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CRP    | • Improved financial and policy stability  
        • Improved public sector systems  
        • Opportunity lost to tackle macro issues  
        • Reverting back – loss of momentum  
        • Limited focus on political reform  
        • Redundant people rehired  
        • Morality of consultants – limited trust between locals and consultants  
        • Threaten to sovereignty and resentment | • Improved governance at global level  
        • Limited impact and societal neglect  
        • Increased foreign debts  
        • Change not institutionalised  
        • Distress too much change in little time  
        • Political party system even more fragmented  
        • Misguided public service downsizing  
        • More power concentration at state level with societal ownership delimited |
| TLR    | • Improved relationships/partnerships  
        • Improved local ownership and capacity building (systems, processes) | • Improved telecommunication services  
        • Positive morale and reform continuity  
        • Local capacity building – sustainability |
| ELR    | • Threaten to sovereignty and resentment  
        • Delimiting local ownership and sovereignty  
        • Negative impact on policy learning/culture  
        • The policy was not contextualised  
        • Over-reliance on external expertise and ideas affect ability to come up with what could work locally | • Imposing bad policy that impact negatively  
        • Poor morale and chaotic process to resolve  
        • State-business confrontational relationship  
        • Path dependency - difficulties and resources wasted in correcting wrong policy  
        • Society unaware of policy change  
        • Lack of political accountability |
| TRC    | • Improved relationships/partnerships  
        • Improved local ownership  
        • Improved local capacity and learning – sustainability | • Societal reconciliation and peace building  
        • Positive morale and continuity of change  
        • Use of local institutions and civil society  
        • Political obstruction in the process |
| CDF    | • Damaging public service morale  
        • Resulting in poor working culture  
        • Huge resources going to few elites  
        • Deterioration in public service delivery | • Institutionalising corruption – lack accountability  
        • Patronage and dependency mentality  
        • Power concentration on few elites  
        • Hindrance to public policy and development |
| PSIP   | • Improved policy/organisational capacity  
        • Lack of trust and local ownership | • Missed opportunity to tackle macro issues  
        • Wide society impact yet to be seen |
| PIRAMS | • Improved relationships/partnerships  
        • Improved local ownership/confidence | • Improved private sector development  
        • Improved infrastructure and local capacity |
| PSC-ISP| • Improved public service-wide capability  
        • Unutilised external expertise | • Wider society impact yet to be seen and not yet assessed in cost-benefit terms |
| SPP    | • Improved resource based, organisational capacity, ownership and public confidence | • Improved gender equity  
        • Corruption and political interference  
        • Sustainability of change questionable  
        • Resources not equating improvements |
| The PP | • Improved regional coordination | • Limited regional integration – yet to happen  
        • Collective voice internationally enhanced |

Table 8.10: Qualitative assessment of success or non-success of the ten policies
Source: Participant narratives (sections 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2)
Participant narratives indicated that public policy impact was often assessed through outputs (deliverables within projects timeframe), within insufficient consideration given to effects on the policy environment. For example, at the end of the CRP, all of its 42 target milestones were ticked off as completed, yet service delivery had deteriorated after CRP (S. H. Pal, 2002) (see section 4.2.1). Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as a government function and learning process, including evaluating long-term impacts of reforms, have been limited. Evaluations are often carried out by external experts and prompted by the need to introduce and design the next reform initiative.

In examining these findings against the literature, conceptions are limited as to what constitutes effectiveness in relation to policy impact (see section 2.3.4.3.3). This study’s findings contribute to defining and assessing policy success/non-success in two dimensions—outputs (short-term/immediate) and outcomes (long-term) with overlapping levels of impact—as through individuals or organisations, and political, economic and social systems. Assessments of policy success/non-success were drawn from the participant narratives—from the perceptions or experiences of local policy actors.

### 8.4. The context of public policy

[Level 3]

To further comprehend the status of the policy processes and results presented, a comparative understanding is required—to see why things ‘are’, or might appear similar or different across the four contexts. This is ‘something that enables us to understand the different evolutions of public policy and management in different habitats’ (Pollitt, 2013, p.xviii). Participant narratives largely refer to it as the geographic-demographic, social-political, historical and development level dimensions (see Table 1.1), co-influencing policy processes through the interactions of individuals, organisations, and institutions in the complex systems of the state, society, region and global levels.

#### 8.4.1. How the context featured in the ten policies

Table 8.11 shows how such contextual dimensions featured across the ten policies. The successful policies took these dimensions into account in their design and implementation processes.
8.4.1.1. Geography and demography matter

This study’s findings confirm that physical aspects significantly influence development status. They matter for policy contextualisation in terms of formulation and implementation.
Isolation, vulnerability and smallness also matter when individual PICs and the Region are set comparatively against global issues (trade, climate change, security, etc.). The Region’s implementation challenge lies in small administrations of limited capacities having to confront huge international and regional agendas in addition to local policy needs. Isolation from world markets and vulnerability affect the development of trade, infrastructure and education, people mobility and livelihood sustainability. Limited infrastructure due to geographical dispersion further compounds the lack of civic participation in policy processes and an awareness of government affairs.

However, across-country comparisons show that physical determinants are relative and contextual. The significance of smallness in Samoa, when compared to Vanuatu, reveals the importance of not so much of population size, but of a small tight-knit homogenous society, where relationships are more intact. Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands’ geographical isolation (over 80 islands with no land borders) and ethnic diversity have substantially influenced societal fragmentation, rendering public policy and development highly complex and challenging tasks. Where a boat trip from the main island to another in Samoa takes an hour, it can take weeks in the Solomon Islands. What appears to matter more to the Solomon Islands in policy making and implementation is geographical dispersion, cultural diversity and historical development, less so smallness. This matters considerably for smaller states (Samoa, Vanuatu) as limited economies of scale and labour capacity impact on the nature of the policy process and implementation. Here, for example, policy actors become generalists, wearing multiple hats and given dual roles in government and society.

8.4.1.2. History and the role of development actors matter

Colonial legacies feature strongly, creating path dependencies. For example, Anglophone versus Francophone worldviews remain apparent in the dividedness of Vanuatu’s education, church, politics and ways its policies are formulated and implemented. The indigenisation of religion or the Christianisation of culture is evident across the three PICs in that religious and cultural distinctions of beliefs and principles are open to multiple interpretations and practices within society and political life. Most politicians assume multiple roles as chiefs, big men or church leaders, often seeing their appointments to office as callings from God. In Samoa, the church is not a separate institution but part of the fa’amatai (see Figure 6.1). Further, how sovereignty was achieved affects national pride and worldviews: Samoa and Vanuatu’s independence was viewed by participants as ‘fought for’, while that of the Solomon Islands was ‘bestowed’. Levels of effective sovereignty featured differently across
the three PICs. Samoa and Vanuatu are more independent in their policy systems, while that in the Solomon Islands had been subject to outside intervention (via RAMSI) over 10 years (2003-2013).

The history of external influences remains significant. Overseas development aid (ODA) configurations (see red figures in Table 8.12) are shaped by diplomatic ties rooted in colonialism. Australia gives 46% of its bilateral aid to PNG (former trustee) while the US gives more ODA to its dependents (FSM, RMI, Palau) (see Appendix A). France gives more to Wallis and Futuna, Vanuatu (former colonies) and regional organisations (SPC’s headquarter is in New Caledonia, a French territory). Similarly, NZ in relation to Samoa (former colony), Tokelau and Niue (realms). In contrast to the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, Samoa receives more ODA in multilateral (than bilateral) arrangements, reflecting coordination and multi-partnership in public policy diplomacy. Better development outcomes might therefore be expected from independent PICs receiving the most ODA. However, when viewed as aid per capita (at a localised level), the (nine) independent PICs receive less aid per capita than the (15) dependent/semi-dependent PICs. This aid versus diplomatic ties relationships begs the question of what is the intention of giving aid: is it to enhance state building and independence, advance donor countries’ interests in the region, or something of each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIC</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>All donors</th>
<th>Aid Per capita</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>NZ</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>International organisations</th>
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<td>19.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>156.6</td>
<td>149.5</td>
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<td>514</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>114.4</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>Tokelau</td>
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<td>24.1</td>
<td>24,056</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>Niue</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>CIs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2147.8</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1041.1</td>
<td>222.4</td>
<td>217.3</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>121.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>385.6</td>
<td>291.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8.12:** ODA (US$millions) by PICs and donors in 2013  
**Source:** Extracted from [http://www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac) in January 2015
8.4.1.3. Social-political dimensions matter

An important further question is why the political system (and public policy) in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands is more unstable and fragmented than in Samoa (see Table 1.1 and sections 4.3.3.1, 5.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.1). Samoa has remained a predominantly one-party state, while Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have had coalition governments and a high proportion of independent candidates running in elections. Small parties have proliferated, while party hopping, votes of no confidence and changes in ministerial roles remain common. In the Solomon Islands, parties are short-lived, often only emerging near elections, whereas in Vanuatu parties exist with structures in operation. The nature of a political system reflects it’s social (and to some extent historical and economic) situations. The Solomon Islands’ fragile policy system reflects the impact of its recent tensions:

*We are a goldilocks country. Not too big. Not too small. Not too fractured. Not too unified. We have lots of islands but not too many like Solomon Islands... We have no history of any significant conflict so you wouldn’t have the difficulty of getting consensus, something you have in Solomon Islands.*

[VPA.1]

Comparing Samoa (four islands, one language) to Vanuatu (80 islands, 115 languages) and the Solomon Islands (922 islands, 120 languages), xxxii illustrates the contextual differences shaping public policy challenges. The Samoan phrase ‘*o le tagata ma lona faasinomaga*’ signifies that individuals identify with where they come from; culture is their source of identity. Multiple communal cultures of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands signify multifaceted belief systems and identities, defined at local levels. In the absence of a shared belief system that unifies society, nationhood is a contested notion causing political instabilities, whereas the *fa’aSamoa* unites society contributing to stability. These differences are apparent in the policy culture where fostering participative approaches and coordination are more challenging in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu than in Samoa:

*Fa’aSamoa gave the strongest unified notion of any nation I’ve been to. It’s the glue that holds the whole fabric of society, government, everything... In Solomon Islands, it’s just the opposite. And that’s their problem... To say there’s a country called the Solomon Islands is rather a faulty expression. That concept of nationhood doesn’t exist. It’s just a collection of different racial groups put under one state. And when the state is dominated by one or two groups there cannot be anything but conflict. Then you add the overloads of corruption brought in by money from other countries and big companies that are in robbing the country... the Solomon Islands could be a wealthy state but its*

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xxxii PNG, Cameroon, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are the world’s top linguistically diverse countries
resources are stolen from them. The money has gone to individuals, not the government... If you do a reform in just one province, it can work. But if you have a one-size-fits-all project operating out of Honiara, it won’t work. [RDA.2]

Cultural worldviews (fa’aSamoa, big man, wantokism) co-exist with others (e.g. religious and colonial impacts). Politicians and officials, as members of society, bring socially constructed views to the workings of government. They interact with processes and institutions underpinning the government and donor systems (often implicit to locals) to shape public policy. Social dynamics influenced by these perspectives, in a small culturally-based society, affect internal and external working relationships. State-society relationships assume forms of patronage where allegiance as a politician or official is owed to the wantok or aiga at a village level. Remittances, a key contributor to GDP in Samoa, is an indicator of strong patronage under the fa’aSamoa. Moreover, tensions between state-society systems are manipulated for political propaganda purposes (e.g. CDF) which, in turn, furthers the patronage culture. Compounding this remains society’s lack of understanding of the state government system.

8.4.1.4. Development status

These findings highlight the importance of situating PICs’ or the Region’s development in the historical context to better understand how countries follow different development paths. Hence priorities vary across contexts and so, too, must the sequencing of policy. Figure 8.1 tries to capture where the three PICs are located in their (public policy) development path in general. This path has involved three significant phases: post-independence (1960s/1980s), reform start (late 1980s/1990s), and continuation (2000s). The wavy arrows reveal that this path has not been smooth. It involved ups (growth) and downs (e.g. crises) triggering interventions exemplified by the ten policies examined in this study. The bullet points summarise the critical steps undertaken during each of these phases, still ongoing in most PICs. For instance, the first self-government building era involved establishing the basic machinery of government and human resource development, and where indigenous graduates could assume senior government positions from expatriates. By the late 1980s/1990s, most PICs experienced the impact of global recessions and local crises while in the midst of nation-state building. Responses included structural adjustments followed by state institutional reforms (e.g. Samoa’s 15 institutional strengthening programs (ISPs)). Reforms continue with recent reflection on what has or has not worked. Regionalism has been re-emphasised, including the take-up of international policy regimes as PICs become...
more integrated globally. In comparison, Samoa exhibits greater maturity being the region’s longest established sovereign state. Vanuatu follows (e.g. CRP), while the Solomon Islands, with its more complicated history, is still struggling to implement some basic governance reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-independence</th>
<th>Public sector reform start</th>
<th>Reform continuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Late 1980s</td>
<td>2001 SPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa's independence (1962)</td>
<td>Samoan's late 1980s economic reforms</td>
<td>2007 TRL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands’ independence (1978)</td>
<td>Development plans</td>
<td>Solomon Islands riots – e.g. 2006, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State building</td>
<td>Samoan Public Service Strike</td>
<td>Vanuatu riots – e.g. 2007, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>Vanuatu’s independence (1980)</td>
<td>2005 PSIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Island Forum formation (1971)</td>
<td>1981 Samoa Public Service Strike</td>
<td>More Reforms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Development plans
- Economic & financial Reforms
- Strategic plans
- Institutional Reforms
- MDGs (2000)
- Sustainable Development Goals (2015)
- Regionalism
- 2009 TRC
- 2006 ELR
- Paris Declaration (2005)
- Enova Partnership (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>Mid-2000s</th>
<th>Onwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- MDGs (2000)
- 2003 RAMSI

- 2005 Pacific Plan
- Development paths in the three PICs and the Region

**Figure 8.1:** Development path in the three PICs and the Region

**Source:** Author’s construct based on participant narratives and documentary analysis

This comparison resonates in the literature noting the slow development progress of the Region, which arises from na"ive assumptions about countries following identical development paths. All countries are ‘developing’ but each is on a different path, is a crucial understanding when examining priorities on the ground, and designing policies to address them. Here reform is likely to fail or prove counterproductive if introduced without facilitating conditions in place. For example, the PSIP’s implementation took five years to gain ground as the Solomon Islands’ public service lacked the facilitating culture for this reform. Accordingly the PSIP was redesigned to strengthen the Ministry of Public Service, so it could have the culture and capability facilitating service-wide reform.

Social-political, and economic dimensions are key explanatory factors in a country’s development status. So is the ‘how’ of development considered historically given that initial
and previous interventions have created path dependencies shaping the trajectory of ongoing development efforts. Complexity theory suggests that a public policy system is sensitive to ‘initial conditions’ (history); these conditions determine evolutionary capacity of a system because of the ‘irreversibility’ and ‘path dependency’ of change (Cairney, 2013b; Room, 2011, p.7). However history, place, and time are dimensions largely neglected in public policy and development theories (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012; Howlett, 2009b; Pollitt, 2008, p.xi) in relation to how those dimensions shape policy processes and development status. The significance of these contextual dimensions to PICs (and other countries) lies in situating their development status within the historical development of nation-states worldwide. This points to lessons about the kind of policies to adopt, and how to sequence and design them considering PICs’ status as young nation-states in their development journey (see section 1.2.).

Variation in the development status of the three PICs lies in how the notion of being a nation-state matures throughout society. In Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, notions of nationhood (national identity, sovereignty) and statehood (state legitimisation) as the bases for national public policy are yet to take shape. ‘Melanesia nationhood remains a stubborn rock despite… the enormous problems of the region… decolonisation remains a crucial historical episode of deep meaning for these peoples’ (Gardner & Waters, 2013). Compare this to Samoa where nationhood existed before notions of statehood came into being. Often taken for granted in development theories and thinking are the notions that a nation-state already exists with the legitimacy and capability needed to formulate and implement a given public policy task for development, and in a rational manner. Pacific states were born in the last century’s decolonisation process.xxxiii Conceiving them as ‘developmental states’ mostly occurred in the late 1980s/early 1990s,xxxiv this emerged mainly in response to economic crises and to adjust economic situations to global imperatives. An overriding conscious approach amongst various politicians (particularly post-independence governments) as to what their roles are in a developmental state has been limited (see section 4.3.3.1.4 and 5.3.3):

*In Vanuatu we are trying to be a state but an unlikely state. The problem with the Melanesians is that we have too many nations within one nation.* [VPA.2]

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xxxiii About 191 nation-states were created by 2000, 95% are postcolonial states (Roeder, 2007, p.6) (see section 1.2.1)

xxxiv The ‘developmental state’ concept credits development primarily to state intervention through conscious and consistent policies as with the East Asian countries’ development experiences since the 1920s (Johnson, 1999; Leftwich, 1995).
8.4.2. Public policy in its context

The above discussion begs the question: what constitutes public policy in the settings considered? Emerging from these findings is the notion that, at the heart of public policy development in a Pacific state lies the paradoxical co-evolution of the state with its society (and indigenous system). Pacific people need to sustain the essence of their indigenous system: the values and principles underpinning their cultures, identities, social capital and societal governance. But they also need to participate in modern development which is the essence of the state’s public policy role. Pacific people clearly value their indigenous systems, but the state’s governance systems are often overlaid in ways that ignore them. Based on participant narratives, Box 8.1 outlines key elements of this paradoxical conception of public policy shaping state-society relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacific society system (indigenous)</th>
<th>Pacific state system (modern)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideologies (values/principles)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal, consensual, cooperative,</td>
<td>Individual, confrontation/dissent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reciprocal, spiritual</td>
<td>competitive, independence, secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths and significance in public policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources (land, ocean, people, etc.)</td>
<td>Material resources, diplomacy, modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social capital, protection and</td>
<td>development, rule of law, property rights,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance, ecological sustainability</td>
<td>national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradox</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional system seen as constraining</td>
<td>State system seen as promoting modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individualism, encouraging</td>
<td>development but also individualism at the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communalism but also constraining</td>
<td>expense of communalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid – near balance (ideal)</td>
<td>Maintain and foster societal values/principles necessary for social capital but also encourage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individuals to participate in authentic development through robust public policy dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 8.1: A paradoxical conception of state-society relationships in a Pacific island state

The core of effective public policy is where the two systems find common grounds for development: a hybrid approach termed ‘Samoanisation’ (GoS, 2006), for example, where the strengths of both systems are optimally utilised. This is where the line of judging policy effectiveness is situated. Hence perpetuating suitable policies within Pacific states’ status of development and social dimensions requires a solid understanding of both systems. As 80%
of the population is governed by the indigenous system, this system is central to public policy development. Finding ways in which the two systems can co-function is the key development policy issue in Pacific island locations. However, as the findings show, policy processes have mostly neglected the indigenous society through lack of community improvement, overlaid by a growing state system revealing weak accountability.

8.5. Key variables of policy success/non-success

[Level 4]

In light of the findings presented so far, this last section offers a synthesis regarding critical factors determining policy effectiveness that require further attention in public policy development. Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.11, 5.8, 6.12 and 7.7 are merged into Table 8.13 to show these critical determinants. The patterns (coloured) in Table 8.13 show that most participants regarded leadership as a fundamental issue. However, for the second and third factors, participants differed regarding priorities. Stakeholder support and feedback as well as people capability are priorities for the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, whereas people capability and M&E were those for Samoa. For the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Region, a united policy system and agenda depends on consolidating diverse communities or countries as stakeholders of one nation-state or region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/issues concerning implementation</th>
<th>Vanuatu</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Samoa</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>119 (1st)</td>
<td>233 (1st)</td>
<td>132 (1st)</td>
<td>126 (1st)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder support and feedback</td>
<td>103 (2nd)</td>
<td>154 (2nd)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>105 (2nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People capability</td>
<td>97 (3rd)</td>
<td>211 (2nd)</td>
<td>96 (2nd)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy culture and ownership</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>79 (3rd)</td>
<td>104 (3rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget capability</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy translation to community</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.13: Issues or factors central to implementation across the four case studies
Source: sections 4.3.3, 5.3.3, 6.3.3 and 7.3.3

Given their interrelatedness, these determinants are condensed under four headings—policy culture and stakeholders’ support, implementation modality, capability and leadership.
8.5.1. **Policy culture and stakeholder support**

The findings point to two components of policy culture and stakeholder support significant to policy effectiveness: collaboration between Pacific states and co-operation with their development partners. Figure 8.2 depicts how actors (across the state, society, market and international systems) interact through participation and partnership to facilitate policy understanding, learning, ownership and sustainability. The policy cases (section 8.2.1) demonstrated that dynamic relationships through operable partnerships, combined with inclusive participation of stakeholders to enact, reinforce and institutionalise the processes of learning, understanding and ownership of policy, are fundamental elements for sustaining the change process. No matter how well a policy is written, if it lacks the legitimate support and ownership of those implementing it, then the efforts of such implementation are limited.

![Figure 8.2: Various stakeholders/actors of public policy and their interactions](image)

8.5.1.1. **Within ourselves: state-society relationship**

Implementation is complicated when policy cultures are limited in terms of policy understanding and ownership—when policies are largely formulated from the top with little involvement of implementers. This arises through a lack of consolidated stakeholder support due to limited societal understanding and ownership of government, a lack of effective participation and neglect of social factors in policy processes.
8.5.1.1.1. Consolidating community is about understanding government

When comparing the four cases, an obvious question to emerge was how can we work with others if we cannot even work amongst ourselves as a nation? How can PICs talk about integrating as a region if society cannot integrate itself and work with its government? But then why is it that, at the local level, a village is clean but not an urban area? Why is it that a village can get together in self-organising ways to fundraise for a new church, yet cannot easily do likewise for a school? These questions highlight the potential for society to work together, showing collective support for a public policy in a communal culturally-based society, where people believe in the value of the church in bringing spirituality and the people together. It is also partly because the grassroots was directly targeted by the work of the church upon its arrival (see section 4.3.3.3). A school, by contrast, belongs to the state; not yet directly owned by the people. The state remains largely isolated from communities; its school could have been built without local authorities’ involvement.

This analogy signifies that the legitimacy of the state system and its public policies are dependent on committed societal support and feedback from the people who are part of and should own that system. To own is to understand, but that requires a cultural transformation in how people collectively see their government’s role in promoting national interests, not in fostering patronage expectations. Leong and House’s (2012) research demonstrated that the ‘success or failure (of water projects) cannot be differentiated on the basis of the rules that are played’ (as per institutionalists, see section 2.3.4.1.2) but ‘succeed mainly because they are embedded in a policy context’… where ‘legitimate institutions’ and ‘normative justifications’ of the state are built. The entrenchment of a culture of state ownership is critical for providing the consolidated support for public policy and its implementation.

8.5.1.1.2. Understanding government is about meaningful participation

While there are initiatives (section 8.2.1) in which inclusive participation has contributed to success, the findings (section 8.2.2.2) demonstrate that participation in terms of building sufficient community influences, energies and capabilities (feedback loops) in the public policy space remain sparse. Consultation occurs but inconsistently, often conducted from pro forma checklists used to justify pre-determined policies. Thus Sutherland (2000) assessed the 1990s reform process in various PICs as limited in consultation and implementation, and subject to much society protest. Limited participation signifies limited collaborative efforts for implementation, which reflects a lack of grassroots development
impact. Slatter (2014, p.105) indicates that ‘Pacific society values participatory, consensus-based decision-making, but it cannot be claimed there is meaningful democratic participation’. Park, Howden and Crimp’s (2012) study shows that climate change vulnerability assessments in most PICs ‘inherently fail to provide the context-specific understanding required to precipitate informed development of adaptation policies and actions’. It makes sense, then, for small communities to value participatory mechanisms for communal benefits, but such values and mechanisms deserve fuller recognition in policy processes.

8.5.1.1.3. Meaningful participation and collaboration is utilising social values

Limited community participation is commonly attributed to the ignorance of indigenous societies. Ethnographer Leenhardt refers to New Caledonia as a society ‘written on the ground’ (Curry et al., 2012) to denote the importance of recognising that the mechanisms (principles, tools, legitimacies) for meaningful collaboration are grounded within society, yet often ignored. Bringing these mechanisms into the public policy (state-society) interactive space requires appreciative understanding by policy actors. This is critical in facilitating the ‘how’ of policy operationalisation on the ground and monitoring implementation impacts on people.

Language clarity, for instance, is vital to contextualising understanding, communicating reasons for action, and influencing popular support for policy. This influence lies with indigenous authorities and their influence over their aiga/wantoks or the overlapping patronage networks like the fa’amatai. If traditional leadership grasps the purpose of a policy, then the legitimacy and capacity to inspire the wantok to support its translation into communities can be enacted within local people’s (cultural) worldviews or ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1984; Hassall, 2010). Social interactions embedded in cultural principles such as vā tapuia (sacred spatial relationship) and tofā fetala’i (wisdom is knowledge sharing) exist to account for the importance of respect, trust and communicative understanding in relationships. Building community support cannot be done without the protocols that inform discussion and negotiations as they provide the basis for achieving buy-in from community actors. Mosse (2004) posits that ‘project models and their interpretations, upon which project success and survival depends, have to be secured and stabilized socially… through actively recruiting and enrolling other supporting actors who tie their interests to the representations of the established project order’.
It is commonly recognised in Samoa that the key incentive for purposeful participation and facilitating commitment is ‘recognition’ (amanaiia). A recognition of various community roles legitimises the acceptance of an initiative—that your voice is valued, cultural protocols shaping and facilitating that voice acknowledged and respected. The three PICs differ in the recognition given to the social context in the ‘practices’ of public policy. The Solomon Islands has yet to fully appreciate the diversity of its cultural dimensions. Samoa and Vanuatu are learning to appreciate such dimensions, though that has created some paradoxes in the policy context (see section 8.4.2), while still being an element that appears to contribute to positive progress.

8.5.1.2. With our partners—donor relationships

Donor systems are a salient but complex component of the Region’s public policy framework. Donors’ roles are more significant as ODA demands increase (Davies & Pickering, 2015), and as various reforms are designed and implemented through donor-funded programs using external actors. Commitments to country ownership, capacity and alignment, as well as mutual responsibility and accountability in development processes, are formalised through relevant bilateral and multilateral arrangements (OECD, 2005, 2011; PIF, 2009b).

Yet experienced realities (as per participant narratives) point to an inadequate implementation of these commitments. Banks et al.s’ (2012, p.183) analysis demonstrates that New Zealand’s aid ‘is not strongly based on geopolitical trends or imperatives of the region and the recipients there’… or on meaningful partnerships but on own domestic interests and individual agenda in Wellington ‘with a faith in the neoliberal market mechanism’. Schultz’s (2012) research highlighted a similar theme in Australia’s engagement with PICs. Donors, for their part, are critical of PICs’ lack of development performance to match ODA received. By contrast, local actors are critical of donors’ approaches, using ‘the power of the purse’ in dealing insensitively with local people and cultures, imposing their own agendas and inflexible aid systems. Despite good intentions, these issues are consistently raised in the narratives as contributing to limitations of policy culture, stakeholder support and policy effectiveness. These findings are not new: some scholars (Alley, 2006; Henderson, 2003; Ratuva, 2011; Sutherland, 2000) have voiced concerns about the detrimental effects of policies seen as driven externally. While some donors have acknowledged these concerns in their reporting, they are often ignored in practice as various participant narratives have highlighted.
In comparing the three PICs’ experiences, a country’s ability to manage these external influences is critical to success. Genuine working relationships and negotiated compromises between donor and local actors is important for progressing implementation (see section 8.2.1). As Mosse (2004) postulates, ‘development interventions are driven not by policy but by the exigencies of organisations and the needs to maintain relationships’. Systems of relationships are personalised in a small, ethnically-based polity, experts needing to account for these relationships since they influence implementation. Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin’s research (2014) show that ‘individuals trust for expertise plays a crucial role in the overall opinion formation process’. Relationships matter because, while high level policy documents provide aspirational directions, it is the institutional practice determined through actors’ interactive interpretations of what a policy means in implementation that contributes to the translation of policies on the ground.

8.5.2. Implementation modality

Implementation modality refers to the systems (instruments, tools, procedures), adopted and built up within institutions, and that actors use to operationalise and monitor a policy as it undergoes change processes occurring at organisational and responsible individual working levels. Often macro-level plans are put in place but their operational systems remain underdeveloped. This is an implementation deficit that is generally perceived throughout the Region (see section 1.1.1), this is partly attributable to issues concerning implementation modality.

Implementation requires a long-term process of cultural changes in individuals and institutions. However, this complex nature of a policy process often goes understated in reforms. The use of short-term consultancy-based programs for implementation hinder the normalisation of change because these programs are seen as operationally detached from local actors. Often a program/project appeared as something over there, it’s something new coming from others but it’s here to stay for five years until the funding (managed using donors’ systems) invariably runs out, experts finish their contracts, tick off the milestones in log frames and go away. Some involved in the project can try to stabilise the ‘developmental work’ experts have developed, depending on whether they understand it and have the resources and support to continue. Some consultants assess a program, but often assessment is about deliverables of milestones at the end of five years. Sometimes, a policy or system is superficially in place, but change in institutionalising new practices in actors’ mind-sets and organisational culture stay far from realisation. Five years on, when there is renewed donor
funding and interest, actors may repeat the same reform. Often the socio-political context of the public service institutions is disregarded. Socio-political dimensions shape local politics and underpin key issues concerning society’s development (as highlighted by these findings and Saldanha (2004), but remain marginalised elements in reforms.

These findings are reflected by other assessments (Chasek, 2010; Levin, 2013). For example, Nauru’s constitutional reform shows that ‘the consultation team was driven by the desire to fulfil the requirements of the reform plan as expected by the project within the specified time and budget. Overall, the results reflected the failure of the five phases of the reform to generate and consolidate the support of Nauru citizens. The Nauru Government… referred to the results… as disappointing… while UNDP ironically referred to the reform as a success’ (Ratuva, 2011, p.257). Amosa (2007a, p.176) assessed Samoa’s reforms as ‘the emphasis was on changes in organisational structures, systems, procedures, and legislation… little attention was directed to transforming the beliefs and values of officials… to conform to the desired behaviour recognised by the reform’.

Similar issues resonated in studies from non-Pacific developing settings (see section 2.4.1.5). ‘Many governments remain deeply dysfunctional even after many satisfactorily completed projects introducing best practices advocated by international organizations… reforms are limited when governments adopt them as signals to garner short-term support… make governments look better, but these are seldom implemented and governments are not really better after the reforms’ (Andrews, 2013, p.xi). Peake and Marenin (2008, pp.59-60) further show that ‘the failure to have stronger impact through aid and assistance… to produce any meaningful long-term and enduring alternations in the police systems of countries being assisted… has resulted from the priority of donor over recipient interests, lack of knowledge about policing, non-appreciation of the complexities of local security conditions, and the inability to link conceptual advice to the practicalities of implementation’. Highlighted as well in the findings and supported by others (Cox, 2009; Fraenkel, 2006; Lua’iufi, 2010) is the impact of aid politics on implementation sustainability. Substantial ODA is given but most is a ‘boomerang’ given the use of overseas consultants for program design and implementation.

These findings support theoretical syntheses (section 2.3.4.3.1) that implementation is not a separate, but an iterative part of an overall policy process involving multiple actors at various levels. Implementation cannot be just top-down or bottom-up; it requires collaborative approaches due to the complex (overlapping, paradoxical and unpredictable) nature of
development issues involving human and institutional behaviours. The evidence presented here, however points to predominantly top-down approaches to public policy, hence a lack of instrumentation on the ground. It follows that bottom-up notions are limited in implementation modalities across the four case studies. That is, implementation is commonly a process not built upon strong localised pragmatic and interactive practices of organisations and people, where ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) are involved in the operationalisation process for the change to fit, carry on and endure. Change takes time to be institutionalised, but attention to long-term public policy development (not only within the state but with society included) has been limited in current modalities.

These findings suggest that existing theories need to account for the complex nature of implementation in a ‘developmental context’, and where development policies are largely subject to external resources, politics, ideas and policies. This requires conversations between development and policy theorists to address the ethnocentric nature of existing theories (see section 2.6).

8.5.3. Policy capability

Policy capability is highlighted in the findings as critical to success; a concept synonymous with ‘capacity’. However capacity is often narrowly conceived in policy theories as technical knowledge or as actors’ cognitive resources (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). The concept of ‘policy capability’ not only accounts for technical ‘capacity’ but also the broad resource requirements (people, monetary, physical) and enduring processes of extracting, building and utilising these requirements at the individual and institutional levels of society and its state—the ‘ability’ to have ‘capacity’. This broader concept is rarely examined in the policy literature, or it is used to identify developing countries’ lack of development (Pritchett et al., 2012).

Filling that capacity has been a focus of international development (Development Aid Committee, 2008). While capacity limitations are often referred to as a contributor to underdevelopment, there is no agreement over what constitutes ‘capacity’. Thus Baser and Morgan (2008) state: ‘we were struck by the limited insights available about the why questions’ of capacity. Despite much focus on ‘capacity’, definitions and approaches remain vague and the search for appropriate frameworks and tools continues (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010). What this lack of capacity comprises (other than simply limited capacity due to being small), why is it lacking, and how it affects policy design and implementation are largely
unexamined questions. The findings offer some insights.

8.5.3.1. Fiscal capacity

Fiscal capacity, the government’s ability to generate revenue to finance its public policy programs, depends fundamentally on a modern or monetary economy. In PICs, most people continue to live in subsistence societies reinforcing reliance on indigenous systems for livelihoods and social capital. In the lack of a sustainable monetised basis, reliance on ODA and foreign borrowing remains, particularly for smaller PICs with limited economic viability. For the economically viable PICs (e.g. PNG or the Solomon Islands), corruption has impacted on development progress in terms of resource utilisation. Effective utilisation of available resources is also subject to implementation modality (section 8.5.2). Table 8.14 gives the following indications about the nature of the three PICs’ fiscal capability:

- Donors’ support contributes around 23% of these PICs’ local budget. However, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands figures do not reflect total ODA as not all donor funding is channelled through the government financial system.

- The limited domestic revenue (mainly from tax) is dominated by recurrent expenditure demands in maintaining the state system (e.g. payroll, operations, overheads, use of goods and services, debt servicing, social contributions). Development or investment initiatives are resourced mainly from ODA and loans.

- As various factors come into play during implementation, utilisation levels (where data is unavailable) can differ from estimates in Table 8.14. For instance, the Solomon Islands 2013 development budget was underspent by around 22%, attributable to limited ODA rationalisation, slowdown in ODA flows, and restricted program and project implementation due to capacity constraints (SIG, 2013a, p.3). Also, only 32% of Vanuatu’s budget support was received in 2013, attributable to delays in implementing projects and non-capture of aid in-kind in the government’s budget system (Vanuatu Government, 2014, p.19).

- Samoa has the smallest payroll appropriation but the highest debt. The Solomon Islands’ declining payroll and debt figures reflected limited borrowing activities due to effects of the 1998-2003 tension and substantial aid support already made available via RAMSI.
Table 8.14: Fiscal capability across the three PICs


8.5.3.2. Human resource capacity

Table 8.15 describes human resource capacity across the four case study contexts. Technical capability in the Solomon Islands was relatively low compared to that in Samoa and Vanuatu. High staff mobility affected policy and implementation continuity. Better utilisation of people’s capability will depend on having conducive working systems, an area requiring further development to varying degrees across these PICs. Noticeable in the Solomon Islands was the number of young expatriates occupying line government positions, while some indigenous graduates were unable to get employment. Across the three PICs, leadership culture of the big man and fa’amatai affected political/administration separation in providing independent advice and implementation. Informality remained a key feature across the three policy systems.
8.5.3.3. Implementation capacity: Aligning policy to capacity and capacity to policy

The findings confirmed the view that limited capacity due to a small market of a PIC was a notable feature as highlighted previously (see section 2.5.2.2). They further suggest that existing policies, including legislation, are limited in implementation and enforcement or are part implemented, but slowly and in ad hoc ways, because of insufficient technical and financial capacities on the ground. However, this limited capacity is relative. For example, Samoa’s population is half that of the Solomon Islands but its basic technical and
administrative capacity (e.g. senior officials are mostly graduates) are more developed than in the Solomon Islands. This comparison affects the kinds of policies adopted and their design under limited capacity, which matters given the need for policies to adjust for capacity limitations.

Furthermore, lack of capacity in PICs is often unappreciated in program designs. Often taken for granted in these program designs (see sections 6.2.2 and 7.3.3.4.2) and global performance assessments (e.g. MDGs) are assumptions that there exists enough self-sufficiency of internal capabilities (political, technical and administrative) to develop and implement policies. This is not the case in small administrations, hence the reliance on external assistance. Issues concerning skills transfer and absorptive capacity are then critical for policy sustainability—reflecting the (in)ability of technical advisers to facilitate capacity building or the (in)ability of local actors to absorb a change (new rule, skill, behaviour or technology) and stabilise it as a normal way of functioning. Having more technical assistance could help, but often this is also about the right pace of change (e.g. quick versus slow, incremental versus radical) in reforms (see section 8.2.1.3) considering the real capacities on the ground (warm bodies, skills) to absorb and carry out the change. Sequencing reforms is thus vital; subjecting the same few change agents (in a small bureaucracy) and their institutions to too much change at one time can often lead to reform overload, operational fatigue, or the tendency to revert to old comfortable ways of management. Therefore, the ability to have flexible designs in order to facilitate adaptation (through iterative learning) during implementation is important.

Another implementation capacity participants discussed (but which is rarely touched on in the literature) concerned local actors’ ability to comprehend various concepts (e.g. public administration, new public management, neoliberalism) in development discourse. This is significant because the nature of policy across the four case study environments are mostly of policy transfers (see section 8.2.2.2). As indicated in section 8.2.1.4.2, orienting local actors’ to this form of thinking and to what its concepts actually mean in their roles is in itself an important capability. The often perceived ‘foreignness’ of these concepts matters but it is also the ability to contextualise their meaning in local interpretation and application that is central to grounding implementation. At a Pacific executive leadership program held in Canberra in 2006 at which a Niuean official discussed a privatisation initiative, this researcher struggled to comprehend what it could possibly mean in an island country of 1,200 people. The capacity of actors to contextualise international developmental thinking
into what is best practice locally is clearly challenging. This is a craft learnt by doing, using the ups and downs that experience imparts as reflective learning. The significance of contextualised understanding is the reason that all policy advice in Samoa is written in the indigenous language. While difficult in multiple language contexts, the self-organising ability of locals to develop Bislama or Pidgin as a national language offers some potential for contextualised policy learning in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

8.5.3.4. The broader public policy capability

Addressing limited technical capacity through more externally-sourced assistance does not offer a panacea for PICs’ development. The capacity to effect and sustain public policy concerns societal capabilities and interventions taken to address capability requirements. This broad capability lies with the ability of governments to influence and utilise community resources to establish and sustain development. A central feature in PICs is indigenous ownership of resources (physical and people). The extraction and mobilisation of these resources for development through public policy, and for the development process to impact on society, depend fundamentally on how people perceive their government and its leadership role in those processes. This society’s ability to influence leadership to use resources effectively for national goods remains a long-term public policy capability for most PICs.

Questions about what impact various reforms exert on state and societal development (Laking, 2010; So'o & Laking, 2008) necessitates a positioning of public policy capability within that broader context, being not just limited to public administration technical capacity. These findings show that limitation in a state’s capability reflects society’s lack of economic and social development. If most institutional reforms over the years (see Figure 8.3) have been about the organisational strengthening of the public service, then their impact has been limited to that extent. If most reforms did not target the political dimension and its links to society, then current capability levels speak for (and are contingent on) such a historically shaped developmental focus.
To further illustrate, Samoa’s improved public service capacity has resulted from a historical focus on education as part of its development agenda. This improved capability has then fed back into ongoing development. In most Melanesian societies with rich natural endowments, literacy remains at comparatively low levels. This lack of basic public knowledge infrastructure, able to support public policy across dispersed islands, indicates potential but inadequately enhanced human resources, needed for this nation-state’s entire public policy capability. It is there, but yet to be harnessed and fed back into an ongoing development of people and society. As Bennett (2002) states, the ‘Solomon Islands suffered too from the lack of educated personnel… that the wider population was not critical of the processes of government’. This limited capability due to lack of development is often recognised in the Pacific as not a lack of basic needs (food, shelter, etc.) but a lack of opportunities enabling people to participate and bring out their potential. Sen (2009, p.233 cited in Qizilbash, 2012, p.11) refers to this capability as ‘our ability to achieve various combinations of functionings’—what people are able to do and to be. These functioning abilities are the ‘yet to develop’ endowments of people—as a process and outcome of development. Figure 8.3 depicted that policy actors’ (individuals/organisations) capabilities (cognitive, resources) are shaped (facilitated/constrained) by society’s capability within which they operate in terms of development levels (education, technology, infrastructure, opportunities, etc.).

Laking’s (2010) assessment of PICs’ capacities has similarly highlighted various limitations of institutional, technical, administrative and political capabilities. As well, the DAC’s (2008) review of ‘40 years of development experience’ states that ‘donors and partner countries alike have tended to look at capacity development as mainly a technical process, or as a transfer of knowledge or institutions from North to South’… (but) ‘often failed to recognize

Figure 8.3: A nested view of capacity and how it has been approached in reforms
the critical importance of country ownership and leadership, and how they underestimated
the importance of the broader political context within which capacity development efforts
take place. The evidence suggests that what is necessary is a fundamental change in
development practice, including focusing on capacity as an endogenous process’.

Facilitating this ‘functioning’ or ‘endogenous’ capability, according to participant narratives,
requires generational or transformational change (see section 8.2.1.3). This comes from
social learning where a paradigmatic shift in belief systems occurs (see section 2.3.4.3.4).
These findings (section 8.2.2.2.2) have established that practices of public policy are largely
shaped by belief systems. Pacific dominant beliefs need changing for transformational
change to occur, otherwise most people will continue to self-organise, reconstructing their
interactions around indigenous and subsistence support systems. Development concerns the
‘patron-client’ (state-society power) relationships, hence social learning is about changing
beliefs and mind-sets in these relationships. They ‘shape people’s very ability to engage with
participatory processes’, but how they influence the ‘intrigue of formal political systems’,
and their ‘reception of and participation in development programmes’ are ‘seldom
considered’ (Cox, 2009).

Complexity theory (see section 8.2.1.4.1) predicts that transformational change occurs when
people or society (as a system) operate ‘far from equilibrium’ where robust feedback loops
challenge dominant beliefs (the status quo). Operating at such a critical point of change
requires the public policy system (the state) to fit its context (the society) where the society
and state systems co-evolve in symbolic and functional ways (structure, processes, beliefs,
cultures, etc.) in a ‘fitness landscape’ (see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.7). Feedback loops
(social learning for societal understanding for state ownership and accountability) shape such
a fitness landscape. Encouragement of strong feedback loops requires utilisation of society’s
resources for endogenous capability to materialise and critical reflection on transfer models.

8.5.4. Policy leadership

The findings show that the realisation of the above three factors depends fundamentally on
leadership because what gets implemented comes down to the decision makers. Good
leadership facilitates collaboration, learning, partnership and capacity building. Ineffective
leadership reinforces the status quo by constantly disrupting any forward momentum. The
findings (section 8.2.1) highlighted that both political and public administration are vital to
success. The first matters fundamentally in agenda setting and policy adoption (giving
legitimacy to a policy); the second (agents of change) featured strongly in formulation and implementation. However, this is a naive separation as formulation and implementation are political (e.g. CDF) with policies also originating from public administration leadership. What matters is the relationship between the two: political will (the head) is essential in providing strategic direction; while the commitment and capability of public administrators (the shoulders, arms and legs) are necessary for policy implementation and continuity. Others (Duncan, 2010, p.18; Levin, 2013, p.1) have also highlighted this centrality of ‘political will’ in political economy.

Also, consistent across all participant narratives is the fact that despite public policy being political, the political dimension has been the neglected areas in government reforms. That is, the core institutions or behaviours shaping the ‘leader-constituent interface’ have been ignored and parliamentary oversight and accountability have been weakened (see sections 4.3.3.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.3.1, 6.3.3.1 and 7.3.3.3). As a result, political accountability remains a key problematic issue across the four case study environments, an issue connected to a lack of societal understanding and ownership of government (section 8.5.1). Then constituents and leaders often have confused views and expectations about the purpose of government and leadership. Often this is not subject to constructive criticisms about what is public policy in relation to national interests. These views and expectations of the public policy leadership are affected by various orthodoxies identified in Box 8.2, involving multi-layered roles influencing politics, power relations and state-society relations. These intersecting orthodoxies, bounded in social beliefs and practices are often voiced as the root of PICs public policy issues but they are also the key to addressing leadership issues for public policy in that context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Orthodoxy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indigenous versus modern</td>
<td>big man/ta’amatai versus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous versus external</td>
<td>policy platform versus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous versus religious</td>
<td>wantokism/aiga (service to clan) versus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigenous versus colonialism</td>
<td>church (service to God) versus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private (interest) versus</td>
<td>Anglophone versus Francophone (e.g. in Vanuatu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public (interest)</td>
<td>patronage (local) versus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>collective (national)</td>
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</tbody>
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**Box 8.2:** Leadership orthodoxies across the three PICs

**Source:** Author’s construct based on participant narratives
An examination of different leadership theories (traits, behaviours, power, influence, followership, relational, situational, functional, transactional, transformational, etc.) (Andrews, McConnell, & Wescott, 2010; Argyris & Schön, 1996; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Teelken, 2012), indicates limitation to fully capture the complexity of Pacific leadership practices, and also how to address leadership capabilities from an orthodox perspective. For instance, Faaulufalega (2008) explains how educational leadership practices are influenced by fa’aSamoa, which differs in various aspects from conventional leadership models taught in professional development programs.

The findings further show that addressing leadership is central to transformational change in public policy development. However, there are no straightforward answers to addressing leadership issues, particularly when leadership is an endogenous process embodied through actors’ interactions and practices in context. Participant narratives assert that most politicians lack ‘good understanding’ of notions of a modern developmental state (as most are more accustomed to indigenous worldviews). The narratives, however, point to an emerging class of well-educated politicians having good understanding but often still lacking practical leadership wisdom.xxxv Leadership development needs to build both: the capability to lead in the context of a developmental state while upholding local leadership principles so that local knowledge, social principles and context are not delimited in development thinking and approaches. This is a leadership requirement for the dialectic transformational progress of PICs (see section 8.4.2).

8.6. Summary of synthesis—a model of public policy

The meta-analysis of the synthesised findings across the four case studies presented here has discussed overall patterns against existing theories and empirical literature. An integration of the four levels or facets: (the policy processes, results, context and key variables for effective policy) in sections 8.2 to 8.5 of this synthesis led to a conceptualisation of this study’s overall findings into a model (Figure 8.4). The model is heuristic and could be utilised when thinking about designing and implementing public policies with a chance of being implemented and contributing to positive results. This model forms the scaffold for the normative implications of this study which are discussed in chapter nine.

xxxv As with a Samoan saying ‘e poto le tautai ae leai se faautautaga ma se tofā’ (an educated leader lacking wisdom and principles).
Figure 8.4: A model of public policy
CHAPTER 9: IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

9.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of this study’s findings. My study examined how public policies are adopted, formulated and implemented in a Pacific island state, using Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the Region as contexts within which to inquire into national and regional policy processes. The interest lies in determining key factors at play when public policies are first introduced and developed, those which are critical during the process of implementation, and those that have led to either effective or ineffectual results.

Chapters four to seven analysed the policy processes across the four contexts using a case study research design involving narrative inquiry, documentary analyses, participant observation, and grounded theory approaches to data collection and analysis (see chapter three). Participants’ own voices were utilised, imparting rich descriptions of the policy processes examined. Chapter eight synthesised the findings across the four case studies and discussed the overall patterns in light of the existing literature (in chapter two). Overall findings were synthesised conceptually into a model (Figure 8.4). As a core contribution of this research, this model demonstrates that:

- Public policy (and development) is contextual and so context matters (Part A);
- Successful policy implementation and sustainability requires participation, partnership, ownership, understanding and learning (Part B-2);
- Reflection of these elements in the policy process depends on the intersection of policy culture and stakeholder support, implementation modality, policy capability and leadership (Part B-1); and
- Public policy and its processes must be assessed on their impact on outputs and, more fundamentally, actual outcomes (Part C) of Figure 8.4.

The model portrays, in a holistic and embedded manner, the interrelated factors and features shaping public policy and its desired results (or lack of them), based on my empirically-informed construct of policy processes in the four contexts. Here, I sacrifice countries’ contextual particularities for the purpose of drawing comparison and generalisation based on overall patterns and using key differences to challenge generalisations. ‘Theories help us generalise, to identify common elements in multiple studies across time and space’ (Cairney,
In summary, my empirical findings are that,

*The success of policy depends on the mutually reinforcing factors of policy culture and stakeholder support, capability, implementation modality, and leadership. These factors are critical for ensuring that participation, partnership, ownership, understanding and learning are parts of the policy processes. The reflection of these elements in ongoing public policy development of a Pacific island state and the Region requires a fundamental shift in focus over the role of society, particularly the adaptive capability of its indigenous systems to legitimise notions of public policy in state-society relationships.*

This conclusion is now used to discuss the implications of the findings.

### 9.2. Implications

The theoretical implications are directed to scholars in the field of public policy and development, while practical implications are recommendations for policy and development actors. They include policy makers, implementers, development agents or partners, technical advisers, consultants as well as private sector and civil society actors and other practitioners working in and with developing states.

#### 9.2.1. Context needs to be made central

#### 9.2.1.1. Findings

If public policy is contextual, then the context concerned must provide a fundamental focus. The model gives the contextual features (Part A) that are universal across Pacific island countries (PICs) which are also applicable to other small island developing states. For these small states, the differences across places are arguably matters of degree. Smallness (many small islands within many small island nations), isolation, dispersion and vulnerability are features more prominent in PICs compared to other small states such as in the Caribbean as previous studies and this study demonstrate (see section 8.4).

This study’s findings further point to two other contextual aspects central to public policy and development: the context of place and time in terms of setting, and designing and implementing change. The ‘time’ aspect signifies PICs as late developing nation-states when their development path is positioned worldwide. Effective decolonisation towards full sovereign independence remains incomplete in most parts of the Region. Path dependencies
of colonial legacies, and external fiscal dependency will remain vital for some years in public policy development. The ‘space’ dimension positions the dominant influence of the indigenous system on every aspect of society and human life—shaping the practices of public policy—as opposed to abstract espoused notions of public policy under imported systems of the state and contemporary policy transfers.

9.2.1.2. Theoretical implications

So what do these findings mean? First, theories must account for the evolutionary nature of public policy and development across ‘space’ and ‘time’, dimensions limited in public policy and development theoretical insights. Current theoretical lenses are typically westernised in construction. Experiences from other places are yet to gain light and be incorporated into existing theories to improve international relevancy. Countries vary in historical and developmental experiences and a platform guiding inter-space comparison and identifying the influence of critical points of development at different stages are yet to emerge in the field.

Second, prevailing theories need to conceptualise public policy in a ‘developmental state’ in which institutions of nation-state are yet to develop authentically. Current theories are largely conceptualised on a taken-for-granted assumption that there is a pre-given nation-state. In diverse societies in the Region, notions of nationhood and statehood, implications for legitimate public policy yet to emerge (see section 8.4.2). Bringing society collectively to understand, own, and hold their government accountable is vital for building these notions of public policy.

Third, people’s social context needs serious attention when thinking about public policy and development if a legitimising of public policy (nation-state notions) is to occur. Cultural aspects of Pacific people and their societies are neglected in current theories and practices of development and public policy. However, their recognition in policy interventions is suggested in findings pointing to effectiveness. Such neglect is a precursor of policy failure. The influence of indigenous culture needs to be more appreciated in development theory and policy.

9.2.1.3. Practical implications

Accordingly, policy actors and development experts need to rethink their development
models and approaches in the Pacific. The relevant nuances of doing so are as follows:

- **Re-scale policies (strategic plans)** to suit small bureaucracies and capacities of PICs. It is important to think strategically but act realistically in terms of implementability by taking into account local capacity, geographical isolation, economic viability and vulnerabilities;

- Focus the development agenda (i.e. further reforms) on domesticating appropriate nation-state building strategies and activities in PICs social-political context. For robust home grown public policy to emerge, this is a priority in diverse societies;

- Take account of limited societal education and social learning as important parts of nation-state building and development;

- As priorities differ across contexts, sequencing reforms based on having the facilitating conditions (that is, what is feasible to be accepted and implemented) for certain reforms needs critical consideration in policy design and implementation. There is a need to remain mindful of the likelihood of unintended counterproductive consequences where the facilitating conditions for a reform are not in place first;

- Development actors need to treat state versus indigenous (civil society) models as central for determining what is public policy and sustainable development in a Pacific context, not just on pure state versus market models. A market-based development process should also evolve from strengthening these state-indigenous society interactions. This includes taking into account the cultural context in policy because of their predominant and nested influences on local politics, relationships and dynamics and hence the social construction of public policy;

- Development actors need to be more appreciative of the distinctive nature of smallness, isolation, vulnerabilities and colonial legacies in PICs and how these features also vary across countries due to historical, social, political and economic dimensions. There is a need to take into account these specificities and path dependencies in the design and implementation processes of development policies; and

- Improvement in the use of technology for online dialogue, meeting and exchanges in

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For example, smallness in Samoa is significant because of a tight-knit homogenous society, not just small population.
order to limit the amount of time that policy actors spend out of country; this impacts significantly on local implementation capacity and service delivery.

9.2.2. Society collectively needs to be brought into the public policy space

9.2.2.1. Findings

If public policy is about impact on people, then they need to be brought into the public policy space. The findings suggest that the public currently plays little role in policy settings. What is referred to as policy in these PICs is not ‘public’. This is the core public policy issue across the four case studies. It is linked to the issue of political leadership having limited accountability for public policy (i.e. national interest). The ‘genesis’ or ‘aetiology’ of public policy is not rooted or built from within the context it is meant to impact. While formal public policies are largely policy transfers, practices are shaped by belief systems. This weakness in formal processes of public policy means existing policies are not dialogical, validated and understood in context. The findings further show that policy is effective when it addresses societal needs and when there is stakeholder support, ownership and understanding. Transforming policy processes so that public policy takes root in society requires the involvement of the public. The ‘how’ of doing so is where the complexities lie given the interplay of contextual factors, belief systems, political self-serving agendas and external influences. Thus, the development agenda requires a more explicit focus on facilitating collaborative public policy and ownership of the state through proven participation.

9.2.2.2. Theoretical implications

The finding of ‘whom is policy for’ or ‘what purpose does policy serve’ needs addressing in the fields of public policy and development. Democracy and problem solving of society as the vision of the public policy field, appear to have been underemphasised in prominent theories (see section 2.3.1). If problem solving is addressed through rationality (reasoning, evidence-based policy) as policy orthodoxy insists, then rationality as the basis of public policy needs to appropriate social construction in locations where problems reside. However, the way we have typically situated rationality, which affects how development actors and practitioners see notions of public policy, is through Weberian models and the influence of the Westernisation of policy processes, transfers and development lenses.
The problem for PICs is that they have constructed a state system with principles based on rationality, conceived commonly in terms of imported models not well understood in society. With a life of its own, the state system beyond an immediate local setting faces limitation in its ownership and legitimacy, and a dislocation between current approaches and their relevance to the lived world of Pacific peoples. While one legitimate application of social values and principles, rationality also needs viewing as a concept that is constructed within a distinct place (society) not principally adhering to Weberian liberal governance notions. The implication here for policy makers and development practitioners is that it is through people’s involvement where rationality in public policy and development processes is built and validated. It is through such involvement that policy changes leading to enhanced effectiveness (Part B-1 of the Figure 8.4) can emerge and are facilitated.

The highly socially constructed nature of public policy needs emphasising in public policy and international development theories. Development policy focuses too much on Western hegemonies, whereas development is a journey that is contextual, shaped by social constructions as to what constitutes development. Constructions through policy transfers are respected, but how they work on location requires serious attention to local institutions and cultures because these beliefs and practices shape actors’ worldviews and interactions. In taking them more seriously, the current gap between what is regarded as ‘policy’ and ‘practice’ (of public policy and development) in PICs (and generally) can be addressed.

### 9.2.2.3. Practical implications

The practical implications of these findings suggest as follows:

- Develop and implement culturally appropriate civic education initiatives aimed at building societal understanding of the state system and its role in public policy and development at various levels (schools, youth, women, church and traditional leaders). These initiatives should facilitate understandings of why society’s voice is vital in political accountability, governance, development and service delivery;

- Strengthen the understanding of local policy makers, implementers and international development actors over the philosophies and underpinnings of the state system, and how these interface with indigenous systems;

- Develop action-learning programs in which development actors and practitioners see the
two systems (state and indigenous) adapting to each other, where contradictions over resources, capabilities and governance are addressed through short and long-term reforms;

- Create linkages between state and society systems to allow robust dialogue and debates amongst different actors, political leaders, development actors, implementers and stakeholders;\textsuperscript{xxxvii}

- Formally recognise the potential (resources, capacities, energies, values) of the indigenous system (civil society) in public policy delivery including the need to build adaptive capabilities among community groups;

- Revitalise appropriate local (bottom-up) approaches in participative and consultative involvement so that transparency, information flows and understandings of public policy are improved, community actors empowered to engage and contribute to effect; and

- Development actors to pay more attention to the socially constructed nature of public policy in PICs, rather than advocating mostly rational techniques and one-size-fit-all approaches.

9.2.3. The political system needs to be the focus of further reforms

9.2.3.1. Findings

Public policy is political, so the political system and its linkages to society need focus in further reforms. Political and public administration leadership is fundamental to policy initiation and implementation. Transformational change requires transformational leadership. Effective and shared leadership facilitates collaboration and capability (people and fiscal resources) and development in public policy processes. In the ten policies examined and the narratives across the four case studies, leadership was identified as the most critical factor for policy effectiveness. Leadership is linked to political actors who must carry the society and facilitate necessary interactions to ensure policy effectiveness. However, reforms have largely neglected this political dimension of public policy.

\textsuperscript{xxxvii} The Pacific Institute of Public Policy carries out similar initiatives where political leaders publicly debate policy issues with community members involved. I have not seen these kinds of approaches in the Solomon Islands or Samoa. These initiatives need to be based more in rural communities where the influence of indigenous institutions are prevalent.
9.2.3.2. Theoretical implications

Leadership needs more centrality in prominent theories of public policy and development. It is acknowledged by various theorists (Advocacy Coalitions, Institutionalists, Multiple Streams, Rationalists, etc., see section 2.3.4) but they do not regard leadership as a key driver of change.

9.2.3.3. Practical implications

In practical terms, this means that:

- Reforms should target the political dimension by improving the following:
  - The voting or electoral system;\(^{xxxviii}\)
  - Parliamentary support, so that leaders are supported in the performance of their role as decision makers and in providing parliamentary oversight and accountability; and
  - Political policy (agenda) setting. For example, strengthen policy development and advocacy at the political level as this is the weakest area.

- Leadership initiatives should target current and future leadership capabilities including improving understanding of the underpinnings of government, and orientation to today’s development trends and needs, but while also valuing orthodox or dual roles in institutions and notions of public policy and development in Pacific contexts.

9.2.4. International support to continue but needs to be more appreciative of context

9.2.4.1. Findings

Given that local capability is limited, international support needs to continue but this support needs to be more accommodating of local context. Development actors (and their systems) are to be regarded as not separate, but integrated components of Pacific public policy systems. PICs’ fiscal dependency on donors’ technical and financial capabilities had led to strong

\(^{xxxviii}\)For instance, the practice in Samoa of candidates providing transport for voters needs to stop as this influences people’s voting on the day. Government to provide a public transport system or alternative mechanisms.
donor influences over local public policy dynamics. The findings pointed to successful policy interventions when positive partnerships and working relationships operate between local and external actors. Failure occurs when policy is viewed by local actors as imposed. Policy is more than a piece of paper; it has to be interpreted locally so it is validated and owned by those who implement it. Effective policy processes take into account local knowledge (principles, customs, relationships, legitimacies) about what is workable. The issue is not just about bilateral policy transfers—as the Pacific community is now part of the global policy system, but about ensuring that local conditions and philosophies are accommodated when designing and implementing policies. ‘Islandalism’ mentalities, and cultural dynamics are particularly strong in Pacific worldviews, relationships, and personalities hence the need to remain sensitive to these dynamics and institutions. Local actors can be alienated by more direct and confrontational personal approaches, which, in turn, undermines the need for the local ownership and understanding needed to effect and progress implementation.

9.2.4.2. Theoretical implications

Public policy theories need to integrate the role of donor actors and how their complex politics, dynamics and personalities (within the international development systems) interact with those of the domestic policy systems. For theories to have international applicability, they must be more accommodative of the dynamic, at times recursive, nature of public policy in aid-sponsored reforms interacting with local indigenous cultural systems.

9.2.4.3. Practical implications

In practical terms, this means the following:

- Make participative approaches (stakeholders’ involvement) a fundamental component of development and aid policy, otherwise policy will continue to have little meaning and impact locally;

- Donor countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand and their development actors, need to have mutual accountability (with Pacific policy actors) for the Region’s development processes and results. This is needed for effective development—rather than the current orientation of external agents taking a positivist worldview of the Region;
International development actors need to seriously engage with the notion that imposing, or perceived as imposing, does not work and has had counterproductive effects;

Development actors working on program design and implementation processes must make people relationships, cultural worldviews and languages central in these processes, particularly when translating policy to local levels, and being held accountable for doing so;

Pacific policy actors must develop and then sustain trust relationships with donors’ actors and value the assistance provided. Consistently blaming external actors for results and approaches to policy adds no value; and

Develop twinning initiatives where young, future oriented Pacific graduates are able to work in overseas public policy settings (e.g. Australia, NZ), and to gain exposure to other working cultures (values and ethics). At the same time, experienced actors in donor countries (much older workforce) to work in PICs to provide coaching, mentoring, and other appropriate capacity building to younger professional workforces in the Region.

9.2.5. The ways we think about public policy for development need to change

9.2.5.1. Findings

The findings point to issues of implementation modality. This needs serious attention in development policy—why and how aid is given, managed and delivered, and how reforms (change) are adopted, designed and implemented. The volatility of aid flows, coupled with the short-term projectisation of development policy reforms, often undermines intentions to build and sustain institutional and behavioural change. Reforms are largely designed and implemented for public sector strengthening outside societal inputs, understanding and functionalities in what civil society actors could offer. The complexities and practicalities of implementation, and how to sustain change, are often not appreciated or ignored due to the modality of aid configured and delivered reforms. As well, the findings revealed that complex reforms, when designed and implemented, are indeed a process that is nonlinear and emergent due to the dynamic interactions of actors involved. In addition, most strategic plans (e.g. Framework of Pacific Regionalism) remain as high level documents only, with limited translation to the operational level.
9.2.5.2. Theoretical implications

Theories (policy and implementation) need to accommodate the complexities of operating in developmental settings, this to better synthesise accounts for enhanced international applicability. Development itself needs conceptualising as a public policy process of change, having no ideal endpoint but continuing to evolve along an unfolding path involving setbacks, advances, delays, and periods of stability and instability. These implications are acknowledged when using complexity theoretical lenses of public policy, though that has yet to develop consciously in the field of development and its theory, policy and practice. The roles of civil society and local institutions need fuller recognition in development theory, rather than being viewed mostly in terms of state versus market thinking and development models.

9.2.5.3. Practical implications

For practice, this means:

Policy makers and development actors need to accommodate a more adaptive and nuanced long-term view of development in reform design and implementation processes. This is because of the behavioural and social change that is needed for the sustainability of reforms;

Sustainability of the change process requires attention to local absorptive capacity, including the need to recognise local actors’ will for change as distinct from fatigue (individual, institution) in policy content, design, sequencing and implementation modality;

Policy makers and development agents need to consider the following gaps in formal policy frameworks and address them in current and future efforts:

- Lack of coherent policy at the sector and organisational levels, an issue common across PICs and the Region, but particularly more prevalent in PICs such as the Solomon Islands;

- Lack of instrumentalisation of policy at the community level (private sector,
indigenous sector, civil society); xxxix

- Adaptation of modern laws and customs;

- Mismatch between policy (that is, strategic plans) and politics;

- Lack of robust and contested political policy platforms;

- Balance between the take-up of global policy and designing locally workable policy instruments in order to address implementation deficits;

- Shift of emphasis from excessive reviews of existing policies (wasting resources), to doing implementation tasks (e.g. Framework for Regionalism), and where policy can be corrected or redesigned through developmental reviews through iterative learning; and

- Make monitoring and evaluation (M&E) a necessary component of policy reforms with capacity building programs, this to improve policy roles (formulation, design, implementation, M&E) in different parts of government;

Formalise through informed dialogue appropriate instruments, agreements and legislation providing for the partnership roles of private sector, civil society and indigenous sectors in development initiatives, and taking into account their status in terms of existing or required capacities. Develop initiatives that target capacities needed by these different sectors into the immediate and long-term; and

Target the rural urban divide in PICs by improving public service delivery and development (particularly infrastructure and education) in further reforms as this will also improve civil participation in policy processes and an awareness of government affairs.

9.3. Conclusion

This study contributes to better understanding (both empirical and theoretical) of the processes of public policy in Pacific locations. Numerous assessments and criticisms exist
of the slow or elusive improvement in development performance across the Region and various PICs (see section 1.1), but to date researchers have not properly examined how public policies are initiated, developed, and implemented so as to fully comprehend why these assessments and criticisms have been made. In the academic world, the theoretical currents of public policy are westernised and prevailing lenses for development primarily ethnocentric. This study has shed light on weaknesses and strengths in these theories and relevant implications for current approaches to public policy processes and practices in PIC settings and the Region. This research establishes a well-founded understanding of how policies are initiated, developed and implemented. In doing so, the critical factors (Part B in Figure 8.4) influencing policy effectiveness or its absence are identified, validated and developed into a model. The utility of this study, its strengths, limitations and areas for future research are highlighted below.

9.3.1. Utility

Where this study has made a novel contribution is demonstrating evidentially the actual nature of the public policy and key critical factors of policy success/non-success. The model (Figure 8.4), and the findings’ implications, can apply to other PICs. The specificities of the three PICs included were sacrificed to enable a making of generalisations based on overall patterns. A micro level model will not do justice to the complexity of public policy across PICs given the Region’s diversity. Factors and features (Part B) in the model are principle-based and allow applicability in other settings, a model that can be extrapolated to non-Pacific Small Island Developing State. Its application as heuristic, and adoption of the implications outlined vary across countries given the dynamical, emergent and paradoxical nature of human and social behaviours in these public policy settings, and given the variations in national historical development and local institutions. Further empirical applications across a wider range of jurisdictions can lead to a refinement and validation of this model.

9.3.2. Strengths and limitations

While the researcher had prior knowledge of previous policies and experience in the Pacific, this study was largely explorative in nature. It is the first on this topic in the fields of public policy and development. Taking this open approach informed the model depicted in Figure 8.4 forming a synthesis of findings from across the four case studies. A multi-methodological approach and multi-country case study within an inductive, qualitative and grounded
research modality assisted this task. Established methodologies (case study, grounded theory, narrative inquiry, participant observation, documentary analysis) were adopted, together with Pacific culturally-based research methods that enabled a grounding of the findings and the model advanced. Establishing good relationships with local informants, and self-transcription and coding of conversational interviews with participants, enabled the researcher to become immersed in their meanings of things and as they interpreted their social worlds.

The model was developed inductively, using a replication or cross experiment design encompassing five data sets (pilot, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Region and Samoa). Examining ten policies, in addition to obtaining a general meta-narrative of the policy environment across the four (country) case studies, proved more than adequate for addressing scepticisms about the limitations of generalisation, or inconclusiveness of the research’s findings. Risks of vagueness were seen as offset by the particularities and specificities provided by the ten policies utilised as sub-case studies.

Taking a social constructionist perspective to this research provided a rich account of actors’ perspectives (experiences, observations, feelings) about their roles and understanding in relation to the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of public policy (as espoused and practised), as well as factors that they regarded as critical in policy processes. This approach is contrary to most inquiries into Pacific public policy or development issues, often advanced and approached from strong economic-based and objective perspectives, and what is needed for a neoliberal market economy in the name of good governance, this a predetermined view of how we need to see public policy and development in Pacific settings.

Given the iterative and multi-methodological approach to this study, the analysis and synthesis contributed to a more diligent and rigorous research process. The richness offered by 128 interviews was not all utilised due to space limitations. However, nuances from each four case studies were used for comparisons and synthesis.

9.3.3. Future research

The following are areas recommended for future research:

- An application of this study’s model in other PICs and non-Pacific context;
The strongly socially-constructed nature of public policy and development in PICs’ needs further exploration in detail regarding the different ways in which actors’ belief systems influence their constructions of policy and development as espoused and practised;

To explore what Pacific societies determine as development from their worldviews, and the extent that this can be ascertained;

An identification of critical points or factors at different stages of development, this based on inter-country experience to provide a platform (trajectory) of development across space and time. Pacific scholars and practitioners can learn much from this if it is well-researched;

The current gap between what is regarded as ‘policy’ and what is ‘practice’ in the conduct of public policy and development needs fuller investigation, and with a view to better alignment; and

Theoretical insights gained from an investigation into the nuances of what a Pacific development model should look like, in state versus society (indigenous) relationships, need further exploration.

9.3.4. Final remarks

There is no ‘silver bullet’ to solving development issues in the Pacific (or anywhere else for that matter), but this study has offered a comprehensive diagnosis as to where the key issues lie. It has examined how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented so as to shed light on what is needed as a focus for their future improvement and effectiveness.
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# APPENDICES

## A. Pacific island countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political status</th>
<th>State government structure</th>
<th>Cultural Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Land Area (km²)</th>
<th>EEZ (km²)</th>
<th>GDP (%)*</th>
<th>GNI per capita (US$)*</th>
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<th>WB</th>
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</table>

| Total   |                  |                           |                | 10,048,943  | 551,221,292,225,008 | |


- Associate member; Ac/M - Active Member; Ac/M - Allied Member; GNI – Gross National Income; LDC - Least Developing Country; LMI - Lower Middle Income; M - Member; N/PoT - Member but Not Party to Treaty; O - Observer; PoT - Party to Treaty; SIDS - Small Islands Developing State; UMI - Upper Middle Income.

* UN World Statistics Pocketbook: These figures are for the year 2011

See the list of acronyms for others not spelled out here.

Source: PiPP (2010); Morauta et al. (2013); PRIGO websites; SPC Statistics (http://www.spc.int/sdd/)
B. Maps: Pacific islands region
C. Pacific regionalism’s brief history

The region with its boundaries and identity as it is now understood, were colonial constructs as were the origins of the regional policy architecture. This originated in the aftermath of World War II when the South Pacific Commission (now ‘the Pacific Community’) was created in 1947 by Britain, France, Netherlands, the USA, Australia and NZ to assist in post-war recovery and development through international co-operation. The South Pacific Conference (now the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC) was subsequently created to service the Pacific Commission. However, the Commission’s mandate was limited to ‘advisory’ functions to the participating governments; political and security concerns (e.g. nuclear testing, decolonisation) for the islands were forbidden. Demanding indigenous control, leaders of five independent Pacific states at the time, created, in 1971, the South Pacific Forum (now the ‘Pacific Islands Forum’, PIF) as the first regional political grouping created outside the SPC’s domain in 1971. The PIF’s establishment followed Fiji’s independence in 1970 and led by Fiji Prime Minister (PM) Ratu Mara with support of other PMs (Western Samoa, Tonga, Nauru and Cook Islands). Australia and NZ joined the PIF bringing its membership initially to seven. Membership has been subject to obtaining self-government, allowing the region’s non-independent territories to gain associate or observer status in the PIF (see Appendix A). To service the PIF, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (now the PIF Secretariat) was established in 1972 (Fry, 1981, 1997). Since then the regional architecture has grown into the current nine PRIGOs.
D. Participant information sheet and consent form

INFORMATION SHEET

Project Title: Public policy processes in the Pacific islands: A study of policy initiation, formulation and implementation in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and regional inter-governmental organisations

Researcher: Ms. Potoae Roberts Aiafi, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ

I am a PhD candidate at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. My thesis examines how public policies are initiated/adopted, formulated and implemented in small Pacific islands and what are the critical factors for effective implementation. Four case studies from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the main regional inter-governmental organisations will be the focus of this inquiry. The study aims to analyse the development of a public policy model that is applicable to the case of a small Pacific island context.

I am Samoan and I have worked in the Samoa Public Service for 12 years prior to undertaking this research. The university has agreed on my area of study and granted ethical approval to carry out this research. The research is undertaken under the supervision of two academic supervisors and in accordance with the policies and procedures of the university.

The practical details for the interview are covered in the consent form. The interview will be conducted based on the preferences that you choose in the consent form. It is very important to point out that participation in this research is voluntary and based on the participants’ willingness. Participants have the right to withdraw from the research within a period of one month from the date of the interview.

The information gathered from the interviews will be the prime source of data. Names of individuals will not appear in the analysis, the thesis or any articles. Even in instances where direct quotes are used, it will not be possible by any means for you to be identified personally. The consent forms, hand notes, tape recordings or any other material collected in connection with the interview that may reveal your identity will be kept confidential to me. If information about the interviews is supplied to my supervisors or other supervisors or other researchers, it will be in a form that will not directly or indirectly disclose your identity. However, it is important to note that while every attempt will be made to maintain confidentiality with respect to your identity this may not always be possible in situations where your position is well known.

The thesis will be submitted to the School of Government and it will be deposited in the University Library. The information gathered will also be used for one or more articles that will be submitted for publication in international journals. Such articles may be presented in academic or professional conferences. The information gathered will be destroyed three years after the full completion of my doctoral degree.

If you have any questions or would like additional information regarding my research, please feel free to contact me or my primary supervisor, Associate Professor Graham Hassall using the contact details below.

Your sincere responses during the interview will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Researcher
Potoae Roberts Aiafi
PhD Candidate
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600
Wellington, NZ
Email: Potoae.Aiafi@vuw.ac.nz
Phone: +64-4-463 5233 ext 8379

Under Supervision of:
Associate Professor Graham Hassall
Primary Supervisor
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600
Wellington, NZ
Email: Graham.Hassall@vuw.ac.nz
Phone: +64-4-463 5047
CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Public policy processes in the Pacific islands: A study of policy initiation, formulation and implementation in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and regional inter-governmental organisations.

I have been provided with adequate information relating to the nature and objectives of this research project and I understood that information.

Researcher: Ms. Potoae Roberts Aiafi, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ

1. I have been given the opportunity to seek further clarification or explanations regarding the research and they have been answered to my satisfaction.
2. I understand that I may withdraw from this study within a period of one month from the date of the interview without giving any reason and in such cases all data related to me shall be destroyed immediately upon withdrawal.
3. I understand that my personal identity will be kept confidential to the researcher and that information from this interview will not be made available to any other person in a form which would identify me. I also understand that the published results will not use my name or any personal details, and that no opinion will be attributed to me in any way that will identify me. Nevertheless, I understand that while every attempt will be made to maintain confidentiality with respect to my identity this may not always be possible in situations where my position is well known.
4. I understand that the electronic recordings and all documents related to this interview will be stored securely and destroyed three years after the conclusion of the project.
5. I understand that the information I provide will not be used for any purpose other than the uses mentioned in the Information Sheet provided to me, and any further use will require my written consent.
6. I understand that the maximum length of the interview will be two hours.
7. I understand that I will be contacted if necessary for further clarification on the information that I have provided for the purpose of the research as mentioned in the Information Sheet.

Name: ...........................................................................................................

Preferred date for interview: ...........................................................................

Preferred time for interview: ...........................................................................

Preferred venue for interview (please specify a secure & quiet place) .................

Consent on tape-recording the interview: Agree □ Disagree □

Consent on quotation: Agree □ (you will not be identified personally)

Disagree □

Would like a written advanced draft of the interview to review and correct: Yes □

No □ (If yes, this will be provided in one month from the date of the interview).

Date: ...........................................................................................................

Signature: ......................................................................................................

THANK YOU
### E. Codes for participant narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study/country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Role/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>VTR</td>
<td>Vanuatu Telecom Regulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLAC-M</td>
<td>Tri-partite Labour Advisory Council Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>Union Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Consultant in Vanuatu</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VCS-M</td>
<td>Vanuatu Civil Society Member</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VDA</td>
<td>Donor Actor in Vanuatu (other than a VC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vanuatu Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VPA</td>
<td>Vanuatu Political Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VPS</td>
<td>Vanuatu Public Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VPS-M</td>
<td>Vanuatu Private Sector Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>RAMSI-M</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Member</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>Consultant in Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SICS-M</td>
<td>Solomon Islands Civil Society Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Donor Actor in Solomon Islands (other than a SIC or RAMSI-M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Solomon Islands Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>SIPS</td>
<td>Solomon Islands Public Servant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRC-M</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>AFP-M</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>Samoa Public Servant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
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<td>SCS-M</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
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<td>Samoa Politician</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SPS-M</td>
<td>Samoa Private Sector Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>RCS-M</td>
<td>Regional Civil Society Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RPS</td>
<td>Regional Public Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Donor Actor at Regional level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F. Initial coding tree

1. Initiation
2. Formulation
3. Implementation
4. Results (research focus)
5. Policy as a whole (context)
4. Results (research focus)

4.1. Success — effective
4.1.1. Outputs
4.1.2. Outcomes

4.2. Unsuccessful — not effective
4.2.1. Outputs
4.2.2. Outcomes
5. Policy process as a whole (context)

5.1. Geographical & demographic variables
5.1.1. Vulnerability
5.1.2. Smallness
5.1.3. Isolation

5.2. Social variables
5.2.1. Culture - values, beliefs, etc
5.2.2. Family
5.2.3. Traditional authority

5.3. Historical variables
5.3.1. Colonial legacies
5.3.2. Young nation-states

5.4. External influences
5.4.1. Aid dependency
5.4.2. Policy transfers
### G. Critical factors of the policy processes across the ten policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy Process</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vanuatu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRP</strong></td>
<td>+ Young nation-state in a post-colonial era</td>
<td>• Political leadership&lt;br&gt;• Change agents&lt;br&gt;• Policy transfer – structural adjustment agenda</td>
<td>• Overambitious, big bang modality&lt;br&gt;• Outputs and consultants driven&lt;br&gt;• Meeting loan conditionality&lt;br&gt;• Reform is complex change but structural in focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Fragmented, unstable political system</td>
<td>• State versus market public policy model (the Washington Consensus)&lt;br&gt;• Consultative but largely top-down&lt;br&gt;• No focus on society</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Dependent state – loan/aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TLR</strong></td>
<td>+ Social dynamics – e.g. relationships</td>
<td>• Demand for reform from society&lt;br&gt;• Political leadership&lt;br&gt;• Policy transfer – international evidence</td>
<td>• Appropriately phased out and emergent&lt;br&gt;• Locally driven&lt;br&gt;• Local capacity building&lt;br&gt;• Leadership&lt;br&gt;• Ownership&lt;br&gt;• Relationship between donors, technical advisers and counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(see Table</em></td>
<td>+ Fragmented, unstable political system</td>
<td>• Design to reflect geographical dimension&lt;br&gt;• Contextualisation&lt;br&gt;• Participative&lt;br&gt;• Focus on society&lt;br&gt;• Locally driven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>4.4)</em></td>
<td>+ Small and isolated geographically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ELR</strong></td>
<td>+ Young nation state&lt;br&gt;+ Small Island States vulnerability&lt;br&gt;+ Unstable political system&lt;br&gt;+ Dependency</td>
<td>• Political leadership&lt;br&gt;• Policy transfer – ILO</td>
<td>• Impact negatively – path dependency&lt;br&gt;• Chaotic and messy</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>(Table see</em></td>
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<td><em>4.6)</em></td>
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<td>Context</td>
<td>Policy Process</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Results</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Solomon Islands</strong></td>
<td><strong>Initiation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Formulation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TRC (Table 5.1)</strong></td>
<td>Young post-colonial, post-conflict state</td>
<td>Civil society driven</td>
<td>Contextualisation</td>
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<td>Fragmented society and fragile public policy system</td>
<td>Political leadership</td>
<td>Focus on society</td>
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<td>Political system – corruption</td>
<td>Policy transfer – international evidence</td>
<td>Participatory - locally driven</td>
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<td>Path dependency of historical development</td>
<td>Both evidence and ideological based</td>
<td>Both evidence and ideological based</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dependent state – RAMSI</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Underdeveloped society – lack understanding of government</td>
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<td><strong>CDF (Table 5.2)</strong></td>
<td>Patronage system</td>
<td>Politically driven</td>
<td>Directive</td>
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<td>Culture – e.g. big man, wantok</td>
<td>Political leadership</td>
<td>No formulation process</td>
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<td>Fragmented public policy system</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td>Not evidence-based – political manipulation</td>
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<td>Dependent state</td>
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<td>No evidence based – political manipulation</td>
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<td>Level of basic development</td>
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<td>Lack of understanding of government</td>
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<td><strong>PSIP (Table 5.3)</strong></td>
<td>Young post-colonial, post-conflict state</td>
<td>Driven by tension/crisis</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
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<td>Wantok system</td>
<td>Political and public administration leadership</td>
<td>Initial design was complex and long term but it was turned into a much simpler and incremental reform</td>
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<td>Fragmented, unstable public policy system</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td>Lack of ownership initially</td>
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<td>Dependent state (RAMSI)</td>
<td>Part of RAMSI</td>
<td>Both evidence and ideological based. Evidential in terms of the need to address the impact of tension. HRM concepts are foreign.</td>
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<td>Cultural context – relationship important</td>
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<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Policy Process</td>
<td>Results</td>
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<td><strong>PIRAMS (Table 6.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td><strong>Initiation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Formulation</strong></td>
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<td>Fa’aSamoa (fa’amatatī subsystem)</td>
<td>Political and economic crisis</td>
<td>Participative and consultative</td>
<td>Participative and consultative</td>
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<td>Dependent small island developing state</td>
<td>Government reform agenda</td>
<td>Coordination and alignment</td>
<td>Coordination and alignment</td>
</tr>
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<td>Stable political system (powerful Prime Minister)</td>
<td>Leadership (political, public administration)</td>
<td>Complex sector reform program</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
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<td>Involvement of international agents</td>
<td>Policy transfer and contextualisation</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>Political interference</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>small island developing state</td>
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<td>– business collusion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation – an issue</td>
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<td><strong>PSC-ISP (Table 6.4)</strong></td>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>Donor and change agents</td>
<td>Participative and consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa’aSamoa (fa’amatatī subsystem) – nationalism</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td>Contextual research</td>
<td>Impact - sustainability questionable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small island developing state</td>
<td>Leadership (political, public administration)</td>
<td>Complex sector reform</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government reform agenda</td>
<td>Samoa-led, flexible and skills transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPP (Table 6.7)</strong></td>
<td>Donor agents and change agents within government</td>
<td>Consultative and participative</td>
<td>Leadership change and issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa’aSamoa (and fa’amatatī)</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td>Policy transfer</td>
<td>Participative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal stability – political stability</td>
<td>Delayed initiation</td>
<td>Redesign – evaluation</td>
<td>Change process was incremental, some generational</td>
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<td>Small knit-close society</td>
<td>Leadership – periods of lapses</td>
<td>Lack of ownership initially</td>
<td>Reform content is complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political interference</td>
</tr>
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<td>Non-linear process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Policy Process</td>
<td>Results</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Plan</td>
<td>Complex, diverse and fragmented Region</td>
<td>• Eminent Persons Group Review of the Forum – evidence-based</td>
<td>• Impact minimal</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Table 7.2)</td>
<td>Small island development state</td>
<td>• Policy transfer - Sustainable Development agenda</td>
<td>Success only seen in regional cooperation and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent states</td>
<td>• Political leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Path dependency of historical and colonial constructs</td>
<td>• Consultative but not participative/inclusive</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant external influences</td>
<td>• Evidence based analyses (e.g. Asian Development Bank–Commonwealth Secretariat study, Regional Institutional Framework Review)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy transfers – regionalism concepts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack shared understanding and ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack focus – too many priorities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited instrumentation and translation on the ground</td>
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<td>• Pacific Plan hijacked for funding organisational interests</td>
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<td>• No resource allocation for implementation</td>
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<td>• Donors influences and politics</td>
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<td>• Reform content is complex – transformation change</td>
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<td>• Lack monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>• Fragmented regional processes and mechanisms</td>
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<td>• Lack political leadership (and dialogue)</td>
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</table>
H. Findings across the four case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vanuatu (section 4.4)</th>
<th>Solomon Islands (section 5.4)</th>
<th>Samoa (section 6.4)</th>
<th>Region (section 7.4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiation and adoption of policy</strong></td>
<td>1. The findings from the Solomon Islands confirm the same propositions from Vanuatu.</td>
<td>1. Most public policies originate from within government or external influences. Public policies originating from society are limited.</td>
<td>1. Most policies originate from the political leaders and external actors. 2. The adoption by PRIGOs of the ‘regional integration’ agenda under the Pacific Plan is limited. 3. National and international agendas occupy the workload of the PRIGOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Policies emerging from society are limited.</td>
<td>2. The key difference is that foreign influences in the Solomon Islands are more confined to RAMSI with direct external interventions.</td>
<td>2. Policy adoption is highly political.</td>
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<td>3. Adoption of policy is political. Political interests and legitimisation play a major part on policy consideration, consensus and stability.</td>
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**Formulation of policy**

4. Policy development is largely top-down, shaped by ideas and models of donor countries and are written by consultants without proper consultation and involvement of civil society.
5. Evidence-based policy is limited, more often espoused than practised. There is no proper process of formulation—it is ad hoc, reactive and inconsistent.
6. Constructions of policy are influenced by multiple intertwined beliefs (culture, religion, politics, colonialism, education, donor countries and the global policy system). Written policies are largely influenced by the last two while the practices are strongly influenced by the first three which receive insufficient attention in formal processes.
7. There is no consistent understanding of policy. References are often made to policies as documents manifested at different levels and scope shaped by multiple influences of both the domestic and global policy systems.

3. The findings from the Solomon Islands reinforce most of the propositions found in Vanuatu. The key differences for Solomon Islands are as follows:
   a. The formulation of national policy is largely carried out by political groupings. The role of the public service in policy formulation is limited.
   b. The policy formulation process in the Solomon Islands is more fragmented compared to Vanuatu.
4. The separation of powers under the national Westminster system of government is almost non-existent in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu.

3. Policy formulation is largely top-down developed by public servants and consultants.
4. Policy discourse and evidence-based policy are limited. Rather the process is ad hoc, driven by ideological factors of the local context and policy transfers.
5. The term ‘policy’ largely refers to strategic plans made manifest at different levels which are seen as technocratic and isolated from realities. What is often adopted and implemented is driven by perceived political demand.
6. The above findings are consistent with those from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands – the difference being a matter of degree.

4. There is no single or consistent construction of ‘policy’. Policy is seen as manifestations at different levels at the intersection of international- regional-national interests and issues.
5. Evidence-based policy is limited. The regional policy processes are ad hoc driven largely by ideological factors (local and policy transfers).
6. Regionalism received limited dialogue or discourse amongst PICs.
7. Policy formulation is largely top-down driven by regional public servants and consultants. Non-state actors’ participation has been limited, only given recent recognition.
8. There is limited understanding about regional policies and awareness of the Region and its processes at the national level.
### Implementation of policy

| 8. | Limited implementation is a reflection of policy and how they were put into place. There is little policy understanding and ownership and translation on the ground. |
| 9. | Reforms over the years have produced plans with little implementability with regards to Vanuatu’s context. Implementation issues largely concern the complex political-social dimensions of society and development status. |
| 10. | The key interconnected factors influencing policy implementation (and the whole process) are leadership, stakeholders support and feedback, policy ownership, capacity and the interplay of aid politics. |
| 5. | Findings from the Solomon Islands are similar to Vanuatu. Some differences such as political interference in the public administration is a matter of degree rather than a major difference. |
| 6. | The capacity to formulate and implement is considerably lower in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu and Samoa. |
| 7. | Policy sovereignty, culture, ownership and coordination are fundamental issues to Solomon Islands that requires considerable attention for implementation to improve. |
| 7. | Instrumentation of high level strategic plans into implementation in society appeared missing, this related to limited understanding of the introduced system of government and the traditional system, and how both relate when translating public policy to a community level. |
| 8. | Political power is highly concentrated in that the politics and public policy is regarded as passive and lack checks and balances. |
| 9. | What is practised differs from policy. Policies and processes of the Region are driven by funding and justification for existence of agents. |
| 10. | Agents’ personalities, the politics of aid and PRIGOs’ interests are key determinants of what is practised. |
| 11. | Various policies lack implementability given limited resources and capacity. |
| 12. | The Pacific Plan implementation has been limited due to lack of shared understanding, ownership, resource allocation, domestic translation and clear focus from the PRIGOs and political leadership for the Pacific Plan. |

### Policy process as a whole

| 11. | Contextual factors (geographical, social, historical and development status) have a significant influence on the practices of public policy and status of development. |
| 12. | The concept of public policy and its notion of serving the public interest are not well understood. Isolation, education level, lack of policy discourse and access to quality information largely contribute to such limited understanding. |
| 13. | Society needs to have collective ownership of government requiring a better understanding of the state and its role in public policy. |
| 8. | The same propositions from Vanuatu hold for the Solomon Islands. The key difference is a matter of degree. |
| 9. | Both Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have fluid political systems but the political system is more fragmented in the Solomon Islands – and so is the formulation and implementation processes. |
| 10. | The extensive effect of the recent tensions that led to the collapse in the machinery of government reflected the lack of policy culture, sovereignty and integration and the problematic leadership in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu. What thus becomes priority to the Solomon Islands in terms of public policy development differs from Vanuatu or Samoa. |
| 9. | The success of implementation is attributed typically to leadership (political and public administration), local ownership, participation and consultation, adaptation of reform to context and mutual partnership. |
| 10. | Contextual factors of a small island state, status of development and culture (fa’aSamoa) impact significantly on the practices of public policy. |
| 11. | Public policy development lies at the intersection of the practices of the principles underlying the modern system of government and those of the fa’aSamoa. This requires an understanding by locals of the two systems and about how they could evolve and function best to serve the collective interests of society. |
| 13. | Factors or issues affecting the effective implementation of the regional policy agenda and realising its impact relate primarily to the complexity of the Region and its regional architecture, lack of regional solidarity, identity, legitimacy and ownership, dependency and vulnerability to external resources and influences, limited national resources and capacities and political leadership. |
| 14. | Addressing these issues must be considered against the history, development status and the contextual complexities and diversities of the Region. |