THE CONTESTED SPACE OF POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

REFLECTIONS OF NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL ON WORKING AT THE NEXUS OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

The distinction between the soldier and the humanitarian in insecure environments is increasingly being challenged. The deployment of military units, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to Afghanistan (2001-2013), combine traditional civil and military objectives. These deployed units are tasked with enhancing security and governance, while facilitating reconstruction and development. Critics of the PRT model suggest that by allowing military units to conduct development work, a line is blurred between apolitical humanitarian activities and politicised military intervention, placing civilian practitioners at risk. Further, military organisational culture and identity are suggested to be incompatible with non-warfighting tasks.

Adopting a feminist post-structural approach, I draw on the emergent security-development nexus literature in addition to post-development scholarship, to suggest that the fidelity of such critiques to a concrete distinction between security and development marginalises the experiences of those military personnel already engaged in development practice. The reflections of ten New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel deployed with the New Zealand PRT in Bamiyan Province Afghanistan (2003-2013) are explored in this thesis.

This research concludes that personnel communicate multiple coexisting understandings of both security and development. These understandings inform their perspectives on their role as development facilitators, and shape their practice in the field. Personnel exercise agency to pursue development objectives not accounted for by the activities of the PRT. This exercise of agency is informed by personnel’s understandings of what development means, and is often explained with reference to their identity as both New Zealanders, and soldiers. Personnel draw on this New Zealand-Military identity to reconcile their position as responsible for guaranteeing security and facilitating development.

Key Words: New Zealand, security, development, identity, Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Team, military
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Actor Network Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>The Australia, New Zealand and United States of America Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghan Transitional Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander's Emergency Response Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Centre - Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Rural Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French SAS</td>
<td>French Sections Administratives Spécialisées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZAP</td>
<td>New Zealand Aid Programme (Formerly NZAid)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ SAS</td>
<td>New Zealand Special Air Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-A</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORD</td>
<td>Organisational Research and Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Provincial Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-Deployment Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Private Military Contractor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbr</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT ESC</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIPs</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCE</td>
<td>Regional Command East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US (USA)</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US DoD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUW HEC</td>
<td>Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>First World War (1914-1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>Second World War (1939-1945)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

The convergence of various literatures, both academic and otherwise, around the concepts of security and development has become particularly apparent in the last decade, although arguably the trend has been evident since the end of the Cold War in 1989. With powerful arguments asserting that previously apolitical areas are becoming ‘securitised’, it is unsurprising that “development”, as an encapsulating term under which international and domestic intervention is taken in the social, political, and economic spheres of life, is being interrogated in this light. This thesis explores this convergence drawing on emergent literature which conceptualises it as not new, but rather an expression of the ever-present interaction between security and development as networked processes. The Security-Development Nexus (the nexus) as it is called provides a space in which to discuss how both concepts are understood and reproduced by various actors at different scales, and in a variety of contexts.

One of the more contentious phenomena which falls within the boundaries of the nexus is the increasingly visible non-warfighting tasks performed by national militaries. While Peace Operations have become an accepted function of national militaries following the Second World War (WWII), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are diverse and go far beyond peacekeeping. Much literature exists discussing the ethical and political implications of this evolving role, particularly with respect to militaries intervening in humanitarian crises or undertaking development and reconstruction work in a post-conflict context. Often it is asserted that the humanitarian or development ‘space’ within which civil organisations undertake these activities should not be intruded upon by militaries. None-the-less, many national militaries engage in humanitarian and development activities for a variety of reasons, including the often cited principle that doing so enables intervening forces to ‘win hearts and minds’ in insecure environments.

The individual actor is visible and invisible simultaneously in this debate concerning the role of different groups in the nexus space. Media reports, television programmes, and films are dominated by images of the soldier, the kidnapped aid worker, or the government official targeted directly. However, equally so the individual is made invisible through the making of statements which reduce their role to actors within an organisation whose prerogative supersedes any agency they possess or may choose to exercise. Within the academic literature, high level theory focused at the structural level, in addition to studies of international and national policy also subsume the individual.
It was during a talk given by the Chief of the New Zealand Army, Major General Dave Gawn that I felt these ideas come together and settle to form the central aim of this research. While the subject of his presentation concerned the future of peacekeeping, he spoke at length about the importance of the ‘strategic private’, as the individual upon which a great deal of responsibility is placed in peacekeeping and MOOTW (Gawn, 2014). Given the significance of this individual soldier, I considered it interesting that their experiences had not featured more prominently in my own learning about peacekeeping and MOOTW.

The propensity of existing analyses to both deny the role of the military as a humanitarian or development actor, and to present ‘the military’ as a monolithic and ultimately homogenous organisation, silence the narratives of individual military personnel. Neglect for the perspectives and experiences of military personnel who have undertaken such non-standard tasks in their professional capacity, ignores the impact they have on the characteristics of the nexus as an imagined and performed space. This research re-centres the individual within a security-development nexus framework (in addition to drawing on post-development theory), examining the role of military personnel involved in development facilitation and in doing so, illustrates the value of enabling military actors to reflect on their work and be heard by a community of their peers.

1. The New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team

The New Zealand contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operational in Afghanistan 2001-2014, constitutes an example of the security-development nexus in practice. From 2003-2013 the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployed a jointly¹ resourced Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Bamiyan province in Afghanistan.²

Bamiyan Province is located in the Hazarajat region in the centre of Afghanistan (See Appendix C). Historically the province was frequented by travellers as a stopping point on the Silk Road and as a result Greek, Persian, and Buddhist influences remain in Bamiyan’s art and architecture (Centre for Army Lessons Learned, 2012; Hall, 2010). Unlike the majority of Afghanistan’s population who are of the Pashtun ethnic group, Bamiyan’s population is predominantly Hazara, with the larger minority groups being Tajik, and Tatar. Bamiyan is a high altitude province mountainous and inhospitable in places, agriculture

¹ ‘Joint’ here refers to the fact that the NZ PRT was staffed with personnel from all 3 branches of service which make up the New Zealand Defence force, namely the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the New Zealand Army.
² Bamiyan can also be spelt Bamyan or Bamian. Occasionally spellings differ depending on whether Bamiyan town or province are being referred to, however, there is very little consistency between sources on this point. In this thesis Bamiyan will be used.
remains the primary economic activity, while access to healthcare and education remains difficult for many, particularly women. The population of Bamiyan are generally portrayed as supportive of ISAF and the democratic regime established post-2001 due to the oppressive stance of the Taliban regime toward the Hazara ethnic group (Hoadley, 2011).

The vast majority of the over 3,500 NZDF personnel deployed to Afghanistan served with task group CRIB and were members of the PRT (Taylor-Doig, 2013). The PRT was staffed by contingents of 100-150 personnel which were rotated every 6 months, there were 21 contingents in total over the ten year period. The PRT was directed, for the majority of its deployment, by senior NZDF personnel, however command of its priorities and actions was transferred to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) in 2011.

The New Zealand PRT3 was responsible for facilitating development & reconstruction, security, and governance projects and programmes in Bamiyan Province. Personnel occupying positions at various levels within the PRT were required to liaise with government officials, administrators, and communities concerning security in their area, development priorities, and governance needs. All large development projects and programmes facilitated by the PRT were in alignment with the Bamiyan Provincial Administration’s development priority areas, which were drawn from the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). As a facilitator of development activity, the PRT served as a conduit for development funding and expertise rather than a ‘doer’ of development in and of itself. The PRT hosted New Zealand Police trainers, other officials and experts who undertook capacity building programmes with local security and governance officials, illustrating the development focus of the PRT as extending beyond simply alleviating material deficits.

In addition to the core NZDF deployment, the NZPRT shared its base with Singaporean and Malaysian units, and various American personnel, often affiliated with US Department of Agriculture (USDA), US Department of Defence (USDoD), or USAID. Bamiyan province also had an active civilian development community, with a number of NGOs operating out of Bamiyan Town, the most prominent of which was the Aga Khan Foundation. Additionally, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was located in Bamiyan town, and took a facilitation role for development activity ongoing in the province.

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3 When making specific reference to the New Zealand PRT the acronym NZPRT will be used.
2. Epistemology and method

This thesis adopts a feminist post-structural approach to supplement the framework provided by the nexus and post-development theory. Concerned with examining the linkages and networks between discursive representations of security and development I draw on Childers, Rhee & Daza (2013) in pursuing an un/contained or ‘promiscuous’ approach to research. An interest in the experience of the embodied individual causes this research to pursue the use of qualitative methods. Qualitative research within national militaries has been labelled a difficult field, due to constraints around access to participants, researcher independence, and limitations in the dispersal of findings (Caforio & Nuciari, 2003; Deschaux-Beaume, 2012). These structural constraints interact with questions of academic integrity posed around the decision of social scientists to work with or for national militaries to substantially limit the amount of qualitative research undertaken in the field.

Questioning these ideas about research with national militaries led me to obtain permission to conduct official research with NZDF personnel (See Appendix H). Drawing on my ideas about research and the type of knowledge I wished to (re)present here I undertook semi-structured interviews with NZDF personnel based in Wellington, New Zealand. I interviewed nine personnel who served with the NZPRT between 2003 and 2013, and one involved in the establishment of the PRT prior to 2003. All personnel were New Zealand citizens, male, and over 30. I met most of my participants through connections made with friends and a couple of lucky decisions to attend speaker events at the last minute. I recorded and transcribed the majority of my interviews with the exception of three which for security reasons could not be recorded. I also engaged in a rudimentary form of auto-ethnography keeping of a research journal, in addition to reflecting on interviews, immediately post and during the review and analysis periods.

When information gathered in interviews is referred to in-text, personnel are referenced as NZDF1,2,3 and so on. Verbatim quotes present within the text are either italicised or indented in Chapters 5-8.

3. Thesis Outline

The structure of this thesis follows a conventional narrative whereby chapters two, three, and four, are dedicated to a review of the theoretical literature, the context specific literature, and the overarching methodology, respectively. Following this the subsequent chapters move to address the central research questions:

1. How do NZDF personnel who served on the PRT (2003-2013) understand their work with respect to their position as security and development actors?
2. What reflections do NZDF personnel who served on the PRT have on their experiences with development in practice?

Chapter 5 considers how personnel understand their position as actors engaged in processes of security and development while deployed with the PRT. In adopting the security-development nexus framework to review the reflections of personnel, this chapter aims to illustrate how the nexus can be utilised as an analytical tool to complicate the causal or instrumental logic which often links the two concepts. Chapter 6 moves on to speak in more depth about personnel’s experiences with development practice. This chapter will draw on their reflections on local ownership and capacity, civil-military cooperation, and accountability to illustrate how agency is exercised to bring understandings of development into being and how reflexive practice is engaged in by personnel. Chapter 7 will expand on the themes identified in Chapters 5 and 6, exploring the role that identity plays in negotiating the interwoven demands inherent in undertaking security and development work in environments such as Afghanistan. Drawing on historical discourses of Anzac identity and more contemporary ideas of Professional-military identity, it will suggest that these discourses serve as a resource for personnel to appeal to in narratives of their experience in the nexus space. Chapter 8 will conclude with a consideration of the implications of this research as well as its limitations, and recommendations for further work.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

1. Introduction
The presence of the military in the development or humanitarian space, either undertaking development or humanitarian tasks, or merely occupying the same environment is an issue area considered by a number of different literatures. This chapter will address these bodies of work, in order to demonstrate how their various assumptions may be aggregated to inform the subsequent discussion concerning narratives of experience. The first section will explore debate around what has been labelled ‘the security-development nexus’ (the nexus) as a perspective or framework through which to view the links and barriers between these two areas in theory, policy, and practice. The second section will serve as an interlude of sorts, introducing post-development as a valuable theoretical lens to augment the nexus perspective, before moving to the third section which will discuss the character of literature concerning military involvement in development work, as an area within the remit of the nexus. The final section will draw on the previous three to explore how the individual is positioned in such debates, and the utility of examining their experiences operating as actors in a nexus space.

2. Problematising War and Peace
“The multiple processes that enable the waging of war are constant features of society, and not just moments or historic events that we can compartmentalise in a linear fashion as war, peace and reconstruction. Hence, the continuity of processes across what are commonly termed conflict/post-conflict situations is a matter of the on-going power relations that contest the way spaces and places are made, maintained and altered. Simply, the processes of war make the worlds people live in” (Kirsch & Flint, 2011, p. 19).

In examining the involvement of the NZDF in Afghanistan, the question of where to begin immediately presents itself. Traditional approaches to the study of conflict, as Kirsch & Flint note above, often reify boundaries between states of war and states of peace, constructing each space as separate from the other, and in possession of a set of identifiable characteristics. Established disciplines such as political science, philosophy, history, economics, geography, and anthropology all boast well-populated literatures concerned with the study of war and peace. However, as Megoran (2011) and Richmond (2008) have argued, in many of these disciplines emphasis has historically rested with the study of war, conversely peace is conceptualised in terms which serve the interests of those in power at a given time, or left unaddressed. Undoubtedly, war as “the organised use of force to achieve essential objectives” (Hoffman & Weiss, 2006, p. 10) does warrant concerted attention. However, Tuan (2002, p. 124) suggests that this attention may be rooted in the fact that “war, with its rich cast of
heroes and villains, politicians and generals, is exciting whereas peace – the daily life of nameless folks – is boring”.

Most scholarly work considering war published before the 1960s falls within the paradigm of strategic studies as concerned with the attempts of a state or other polity to acquire or hold power over other similar entities (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). The centrality of the state as the primary unit of analysis is accompanied by the common positioning of war as a spatio-temporal moment and, at its heart, an unavoidable habit of mankind (Flint, 2011; Kirsch & Flint, 2011; Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). The historic isolation of war in the academic literature illustrates the discursive power held by certain disciplines to determine not only who is spoken to when considering war’s theoretical complexity, but also who has the right to reply.

The 1960s and 70s are cited as a period when writings on war noticeably expanded to form secondary literatures concerned more broadly with conflict and peace itself. Rational choice, game theory, and social psychology were applied to conflict, and while their problem solving approach was later interrogated by critical theorists, they served to expand the field by reconceptualising war as conflict; questioning the centrality of the state and the deterministic logic surrounding organised violence (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009).

Similarly, Peace Studies and adjoined subject areas such as Critical Security Studies evolved substantially in the 1980s and more so following the end of the Cold War in 1989. Suggesting that war and peace were unhelpful compartmentalisers for describing complex human experiences, scholars such as Barry Buzan (1991) suggested that security constituted a more useful descriptor when understood as a derivative concept. As Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 22) summarise “the view of security we have derives from the way in which we see the world and the way we think politics works”. Thus security constituted a way to foreground aspects of lived experience which affected people in relative terms and in doing so, expanded the scope of factors which could threaten security, to include “environmental, economic, political, and social” in addition to more traditional military threats (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 23).

Reconceptualising conflict as a crisis of relative security, and security itself as extending beyond merely military concerns, development came to be positioned as an influential interacting socially constituted imperative. As Stern & Ojendal (2010, p. 6) summarise:
“In the emerging literature – including the official ‘report industry’ – there is a seeming consensus that ‘security’ and ‘development’ are interconnected and that their interrelationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-economic landscape. The notion of a ‘nexus’ seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, an ever-growing amount of economic resources and political will is being poured into the ‘security-development nexus’ and the attendant revamping of national and multilateral institutions and actions designed to address it. Hence, ‘the nexus’ matters.”

2.1 The Security-Development Nexus

In suggesting the presence of a security-development nexus (‘the nexus’), associated scholars draw on the trends which have emerged in policy and organisational arrangements to formulate a theoretical space for discussion of convergence, as opposed to separation.

Literature explicitly referring to a nexus appeared in the early-2000s, drawing on the rhetoric of then UN secretary general Kofi Annan, that there could be “no security without development and no development without security” (Stepputat, 2012, p. 440). Debate, however, exists around the historical character or relative ‘newness’ of the nexus. A nexus itself can be understood as “a network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects” and effectively renders the number of possible linkages infinite (Stern & Ojendal, 2010; 11). Drawing on Polanyi (1944) Hettne (2010) favours a meta-historical analysis of the ways in which security and development concerns have been variously represented and influential over time. Arguing that the historical absence of an explicitly defined nexus does not preclude the interrelationship of separate discourses (and their associated practices) “about either development (termed ‘economics’, ‘progress’, ‘wealth’) or security (termed ‘peace’, ‘politics’, ‘predictability’, ‘order’, ‘stability’)” (Hettne, 2010, p. 49).

Opting for a narrative based analysis, Stern & Ojendal (2010) map the nexus by proposing that parallel stories of security and development have always existed, interacting and being reproduced over time as understandings of their interrelationship are affected politically. Others such as Beall et al (2006) and Picciotto (2004) have suggested the genesis of the nexus defies any concrete understanding, arguing that in looking back over history it is possible to draw out and reinterpret many events as indicative of the presence of the nexus.

The importance and power of discourse to determine how the nexus is perceived are evident in all discussions of its character, as Reid-Henry (2011, p. 97) suggests:

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4 For examples of such reports see OECD DAC and International Peace Academy conference reports (IPA, 2004a, 2004b, 2006).
“The nexus is in effect a hollow signifier capable of carrying any number of meanings, and... this capacity is maintained through its (paradoxically) attaining the veneer of a stable and uncontested notion... dissection is an undoubtedly important task, from which follows what Foucault would call both critical and effective possibilities.”

In most scholarly contributions to the growing body of literature considering the nexus, acceptance of its nascent character as a theoretical paradigm is paired with an understanding of the potential to reimagine history through the lens it provides. Sannerholm (2013) argues the traditional ‘silo approach’, whereby security problems are addressed by security institutions, and development problems by development institutions, makes the nexus a daunting landscape within which to re-evaluate theory, policy, and practice. Re-conceptualisations, he argues, “should be uncomfortable” in prompting the realisation that a paradigm one works within may no longer have sufficient explanatory power when applied to real world cases (Porter, Isser, & Berg, 2013; Sannerholm, 2013, p. 329). Hettne concludes in this vein that “to some extent, the ‘nexus’ is an artificial problem, created by a lack of interdisciplinarity” and asks, “will the ‘nexus’ stop being a nexus as the two concepts – development and security – merge in an emerging body of global social theory?” (2010, p. 51).

Work explicitly adopting the nexus as a framework or perspective for analysis is not particularly widespread. While often presented as an important concept, explorations of the nexus in specific instances are commonly concerned with international and national policy. Other adjoined areas of scholarship such as the justice-security-development nexus (Porter et al., 2013; Sannerholm, 2013; van Veen & Derks, 2012) and the terrorism-security-development nexus (Beall et al., 2006) attend similarly to the national or international scale. Heather Hrychuck (2009) and Dziedzic & Seidl (2005) examine civil-military operating relationships in Afghanistan and draw on elements of the nexus to situate their analyses. Their work confirms the importance of not only addressing the theoretical or policy level nexus but additionally the negotiation of the nexus in its operationalised forms. Reid-Henry’s (2011, p. 101) final note, that it is imperative “to attend to the ways in which the nexus not only ‘means’ different things to different people... but also means different things at different scales of action”, raises the question of what the nexus would look like at the organisational or individual level.

Three characteristics of the nexus are central to its adoption as a theoretical framework for this thesis. Firstly, reconceptualising myriad understandings of conflict or war as a crises of

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5 Emphasis in original.
security, opposed to states in and of themselves, allows for a less presumptive examination of contexts where there may be ‘no war,[and] no peace’ but rather relative levels of security which are experienced at a variety of scales (Hettne, 2010). This consideration of scale is central as, while traditional security holds the referent object to be the state, the nexus is imbued with other understandings of security, such as those at the individual level (termed human security).

Secondly, working within the nexus prescribes a way of looking at linkages between security and development which does not presume to identify a specific moment of convergence. Instead, it is noted that strategies of security and development are constantly reshaping each other, and recent acknowledgement of this fact is a result of a spill-over effect of contemporary (in)security and (under)development which have rendered orthodox frameworks ineffective (Stern & Ojendal, 2010). Finally, as Stern & Ojendal assert, “the ‘content’ or form of ‘the nexus’ is not clear” (2010, p. 24). Both a strength and a weakness, the indeterminate nature of the nexus leaves it open to be populated by many discourses likely to be politically motivated (Duffield, 2010; Reid-Henry, 2011; Stepputat, 2012). This final aspect brings considerations of power to the fore as it is necessary to constantly identify where the impetus to define the character of the nexus is situated.

3. Post-Development

As a primarily political and security oriented framework, literature within the nexus rarely considers development theory in any great depth. This absence of theoretical grounding is contrasted with the ample ideological consideration given to conceptions of security, in particular those literatures associated with peace building and human security. This section welcomes development studies back into the discussion, considering the value of adopting post-development theory as an additional perspective through which to view the nexus and subsequent analysis.

The character of development theory, and development studies as a discipline, is shaped by its relative newness as an area of study. Criticised for being “peculiarly faddish” (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 9) in its adoption of numerous theoretical orthodoxies, development studies sits at a nexus of its own between theory and practice. While citing 1945 as ‘year zero’ has been critiqued by recent development thinkers (Kothari, 2005), the narrative of development theory as having moved from enlightened Western modernisation, to dependency critiques from the global South, to neoliberal economic reform, and finally to some creation of the alternative imagination, remains dominant in textbooks and educational institutions (Andrews & Bawa, 2014). These frequent reconceptualisations of development

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7 This point will be returned to in Chapter 5.
theory are credited some to the dual communities of theory and practice who are engaged in constant (re)negotiation of ‘development’ itself. Kothari (2005, p. 3) states:

“[Development studies] is cross disciplinary, engaging with different bodies of theory, conceptual and methodological frameworks, and understandings of policy relevance and its practical implications. It is this borrowing and application of ideas from different disciplines that to some extent provides the distinctive characteristics of development studies.”

The post-development turn of the 1980s and 90s, in drawing on critical social science theory, argued ‘development’ and its associated lexicon constituted “a ruin on the intellectual landscape” (Sachs, 1992, p. xv). While some have since argued that the post-development critique of development was more of a reiteration of previously existing feminist, post-structural, and post-colonial scepticisms, post-development served as an encapsulating framework within which to make these claims (Sidaway, 2007). Unthinking acceptance of the term ‘development’, scholars argued, reified discourses which reproduced power relations allowing for exploitation and oppression of those seen as ‘underdeveloped’ (Parfitt, 2011). The numerous programmes and imperatives of development were framed as part of a Western “interventionist interpretation” of what it meant to be developed (Cavalcanti, 2007, p. 89).

The moral and theoretical bankruptcy of the development project positioned abandonment as the only option for the international community, one which was unsurprisingly difficult for many to accept (Andrews & Bawa, 2014; Esteva, 1992). Critiqued for lacking a coherent theorisation of the structure-agency relationship, in addition to boasting a generally pessimistic tone, the post-development movement disempowered the socio-epistemological space where development, many have argued, is acted out by real people (Friedman, 2006; Parfitt, 2011). Tempered by its detractors, some post-development scholars have suggested a movement beyond critique of development alone and instead to the exploration of alternatives and possibility (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Matthews, 2008; Sidaway, 2007).

The presently evolving character of the post-development literature makes the unearthing of concerted engagement with security issues, and more specifically military personnel operating as development actors, difficult. However, the extension and application of post-development as a lens has much to offer an examination of the nexus and the broader non-development studies literature. First, by drawing on Foucauldian understandings of power, post-development identifies the salience of hegemonic discourses within development theory and practice (Friedman, 2006). Within nexus literature an awareness of the power of such discourses is central to the deconstruction of truth claims about the nature of the relationship between security and development. Acknowledging and centralising the implicit
assumptions of dominant discourses reveals how concepts are contained and counter-hegemonic narratives silenced, or themselves contained. Second, the tendency of conventional development discourse to other or exclude those seen as ‘un(der)developed’ is critiqued and inverted in some post-development scholarship where the researcher’s gaze is either turned upon the ‘doers’ of development (Matthews, 2008) or upon the researchers themselves (Chacko, 2004; Sultana, 2007, 2014). This reflexivity allows for the incorporation of less complexity-averse theorisations of agency such as Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and critical methodological perspectives which foreground the positionality and intersectional identity of individuals (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013; Law, 2004). Reflexivity is relevant within a nexus framework due to its ability to prioritise understandings of security and development held by different actors in a space. As Reid-Henry (2011, p. 101) notes, a central component of alternative mappings of the nexus is based around this notion:

“[We are required] to reflect on the fact that it is not only states and the international community who undertake such mediating work [imbuing the nexus with meaning]: humanitarian operations, for example, are also often far from politically neutral; though their actions may not be so directly mediated through the development–security nexus, they are increasingly contributing their own meanings to the practice of development and security (Slaughter and Crisp, 2008; Macrae, 2002). So, too, are private security actors and researchers themselves, all of whom may in different ways be working in collaboration with one another.”

The position of military actors, as politicised agents, is often contentious within a development context. However, in acknowledging the agency afforded to such individuals by virtue of their position, the tendency to view the military as singularly purposed or homogenous is challenged. This allows for a more nuanced analysis of their activities and perspectives.

Finally, at the core of most critical scholarship lies a deeply held scepticism of the orthodox, what Piterse has called “an anti-authoritarian sensibility” (1998, p. 366). While initially this manifested in post-development scholarship in the form of declarations that development was a hoax, more recently it has encouraged a broadening of both areas of interest, and methods used in research. The call to (re)connect theory with lived experience is aided by the acknowledgement that other disciplines constitute a source of complementary, as opposed to oppositional, scholarship. Again, openness to various perspectives, in addition to building connections across disciplines, is one of the principle tenets of the emerging nexus literature. Although presently most nexus scholarship is dominated by political theorists and adjoined disciplines, the potential to pursue multi (or inter)-disciplinary research is evident when viewed alongside the perspective provided by post-development.
4. The Military and Development

The security-development nexus and post-development constitute the two main bodies of theoretical literature upon which this research rests. Although not the defining characteristic of either, both host a substantial body of work interested in the mutually constitutive relationship of theory and practice where the ‘doing’ of security or development work is concerned. Jensen (2010, p. 94) has argued there is a “need to study the security-development nexus in the local forms that it assumes”, accepting its diverse character and uncertain foundations as cause for such an approach.

While the local form in question (NZDF personnel undertaking development work in Afghanistan) will be addressed in the following chapter, it is important to contextualise military involvement in this sphere. Reference is often made by academics and practitioners alike to a ‘blurring of the line’ between military engagement and development assistance. Argued to be “a bridge too far” (Barry & Jefferys, 2002) in some cases, or a pragmatic necessity in others, this debate forms the core of the literature, obscuring interrogation of what constitutes the ‘development space’ and whether the military’s involvement in it is at all a new phenomenon. This section will introduce the historical context within which Western militaries have adapted to sharing insecure spaces with civilian organisations before covering the major arguments in the literature over the ethics of their presence and activities.

4.1 The Evolution of Military Involvement in the Civil Sphere

Often framed as an intrusion, the involvement of militaries in ‘non-warfighting’ activities has gained salience in the academic literature since the mid-twentieth century. However, as Hoffman & Weiss (2006) argue, militaries, here defined as an institution with an organised structure capable of perpetrating violence on a grand scale, have been integral in the evolution of humanitarian action and by extension, aid and development. Western military historians have noted that the termination of conflict has always existed as a rubric within which strategic decisions about the future of civilian populations are made (Müller, 1998). Although not often the central priority of militaries, “large-scale systematic operations to improve the welfare of war victims” were not uncommon in Europe from at least the 16th century onwards (Hoffman & Weiss, 2006, p. 35; Müll, 1998). Moral and instrumental consideration of civilian populations in war has contributed to how civil matters are included

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8 See comments made by international NGOs (Ku & Brun, 2003; McGoldrick, 2012; Terry, 2011) national peacebuilding institutes (Eronen, 2008; Prague Security Studies Institute, 2010; Strand, 2010) and the academic literature (Cornish, 2007; Shannon, 2009; Stepputat, 2012).

9 Pre-1945 examples of the US Armed Forces engaging in embedded reconstruction projects include intervention during and after the Philippine insurrection (1899–1902). Additionally British military experience with fighting small wars in the context of decolonisation, endowed it with the structures for civil coordination and inclusion in later engagements (McNerney, 2008).
or integrated within the military apparatus (Kirsch & Flint, 2011; Müller, 1998). As military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart (1927, p. 256) remarked, destructive military offensives ignore that “the enemy of today is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future”.

The twentieth century saw a shift from simply considering civil affairs after war to a more concerted inclusion or integration of concern for Civil Affairs (CA) within the military apparatus during war (Müller, 1998; Slim, 2001). Linked to the Marshall Plan process of ‘assistive nation building’ in the post-1945 period, Pruett (2009) and Dahlman (2011) have made note of an acceptance that the cessation of violent conflict was not synonymous with victory or necessarily constitutive of peace. Dedicated units such as the French Sections Administratives Specialisées (SAS) and the American Civil Operations and Rural Development Support units (CORDS) in Vietnam, are two examples of militaries deploying personnel specifically “trained to intervene and support locals in governance, justice, infrastructure and agriculture” (Eronen, 2008, p. 4).

The end of the Cold War heralded further expansion of the role of militaries in conflict zones, particularly with the exponential increase in both UN and non-UN mandated peace operations (MacQueen, 2006; UNDPKO, 2013). While ‘classical peacekeeping’ was supported by Chapter VI of the UN Charter and based on the principles of consent, impartiality, and non-violence, a shift to active peacebuilding was encouraged by then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992). The boom in peace operations in this period substantially diversified the responsibilities of military personnel deployed as peacekeepers. UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia in particular illustrated the dangers of unclear, inflexible, or ‘creeping’ mandates in rapidly deteriorating conflict environments (Hilding Norberg, 2003; MacQueen, 2006). Further, the opacity of operationalised peacebuilding at the time proved problematic as cooperation was worked out on the ground in an ad hoc fashion that Savage notes “failed to achieve a consistent level of integration” (2008, p. 108).

The increased involvement of national military units in peace operations, in addition to the gradual development of national humanitarian or civil affairs military doctrine are argued to represent both a symptom of, and a response to, the evolving geopolitical climate of the post-Cold War period. Academics and practitioners alike sought to reconceptualise this period as one of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2006) and ‘complex emergencies’ (Keen, 2008) where the paradigm of ‘new interventionism’ (Jackson, 1993) positioned the security of the individual above the sovereignty of the nation state. Cornish (2007) suggests the propagation of ‘complexity’ as a dominant paradigm in the 1990s commanded enough discursive power
to render traditional civilian-humanitarianism insufficient in the eyes of many. Interventions in Kosovo, Haiti, and Iraq, even when civil military cooperation was unsuccessful or ad hoc, reinforced this narrative of complexity (Gordon, 2006; Savage, 2008).

Beyond the civilian practitioner community, the dynamic quality of contemporary operating environments was reflected on and absorbed in national military doctrine. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, while having fallen from favour for much of the 20th century as politically unpalatable, regained prominence in Western militaries (Gorka & Kilcullen, 2011; Kilcullen, 2006). Echoing the cautionary rhetoric of military theorist Clausewitz that one ought not begin a war without considering “the kind of war on which they are embarking”, COIN doctrine accepts the evident difficulty of separating conflict from reconstruction activities and peacebuilding (Clausewitz, 1832 as quoted by McNerney, 2008 p.182). Traditional war planning in assuming that a distinction exists between a Decisive Operations Phase and a Post Conflict Stabilisation period, has little relevance when the battlefield is “embedded within lived spaces” (Dahlman, 2011, p. 181).

From William Lind’s ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ to US General John Abizaid’s description of the ‘360 Degree Battlefield’ military personnel and scholars alike have argued that the character of contemporary conflict as ‘asymmetric’, ‘irregular’, and ‘non-linear’ has heralded an altered role of the intervener. US Marine General Charles Krulak’s often cited ‘Three block war’ captures not only the character of the contemporary operating environment as it is perceived, but also the diversity of action required of military personnel:

“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, proving humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day…all within three city blocks” (Krulak, 1997 as quoted by Capstick, 2007, p. 5).

While much debate exists over whether COIN doctrine presents an appropriate response to the challenges of contemporary warfare11, Friis (2010) has argued that the salience of its principles is evident in their translation into the UN’s ‘Capstone doctrine’ for peace operations. The implementation of COIN strategies by the coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the establishment of PRTs has conclusively demonstrated the

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10 Savage (2008) gives the example of the Canadian Battle Group in Kosovo who became heavily involved in infrastructure and development by virtue of their presence and willingness to assist the broader community.

11 COIN theorists suggest that it is likely to fall from favour again. However, there are necessary lessons to be learned from it given that the majority of conflicts over the past 200 years have been between a state and non-state actor. Gorka & Kilcullen argue therefore that insurgency or “irregular warfare is…more regular or conventional than our strategic lenses would propose” (2011, p. 17).
intent of national militaries to pursue humanitarian and development objectives in insecure environments.

4.2 A Contentious Issue

The debate concerning whether the military should be involved in humanitarian and development work is situated at a variety of scales ranging from high level theory, to critiques of organisational structures and operating behaviour. The expanding role of the military into traditionally humanitarian tasks (often conflated with development), for scholars such as Ignatieff (2003), is symptomatic of a more pervasive trend of securitisation whereby neutral or apolitical areas are politicised through a process of discursive reconceptualization. As Duffield argues “aid has become a technology of security” (2002, p. 154). Its operationalised forms (such as PRTs) are framed as an attempt by Western militaries to extend influence and intelligence gathering capabilities into insecure spaces, as opposed to pursuing productive inputs to societies (Egnell, 2008; Williamson, 2011).

While militaries working to improve livelihoods while eliminating spoilers of peace is seen as a ‘best of both worlds’ scenario by some, others argue that this reasoning is deeply unethical. Organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) understand humanitarian action as being underpinned by four principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence (McGoldrick, 2012; OCHA, 2012; Terry, 2002, 2011). These principles guarantee a ‘humanitarian space’ where aid can be delivered to vulnerable populations regardless of their affiliation and are seen as fundamentally incompatible with the military, which as an arm of government, is inherently politicised and committed at its core to the use of force (Egnell, 2008; McGoldrick, 2012; Slim, 2001; Williamson, 2011).

Proponents of military involvement in humanitarian action commonly make reference to the need to be pragmatic about the dangers faced by any intervener in spaces of conflict regardless of their affiliation (Miskel, 2005). However, the targeting of aid workers in particular is often argued to be a result of the presence of military actors (Collins, 2011; McGoldrick, 2012; Omidian, 2012). Involvement of the military in humanitarian work compromises the ‘humanitarian space’ that aid and development agencies rely on to guarantee their safety, as civilian workers may be mistaken for armed forces or deliberately targeted (Collins, 2011). Humanitarians are faced with the decision to either seek support from security contractors in order to continue their operations, or withdraw (Levine, 2013). This gives more fuel to the counterargument that in insecure spaces it is unrealistic for
humanitarian and development actors to expect that their safety may be guaranteed by virtuous purpose alone (Egnell, 2008; Guttieri, 2005).

Furthermore, Shannon (2009) in working with NGOs in Afghanistan, reported the importance to civilian practitioners that the humanitarian space extend and evolve into a similar development space. However, the point at which the humanitarian becomes the development practitioner remains unclear. Complicating this further was an awareness that while humanitarian action is purportedly apolitical, development is inherently political. As Bonata & Protevi (2004) have argued, those who engage in development practice seek to re-fashion spaces within the orthodoxies of global development, raising the question of whether such practitioners can expect to claim a right to part of the humanitarian space.

4.3 What does this mean for development?

In the literature concerning military involvement in humanitarian or development tasks the civilian is positioned as the soldier’s antithesis rather than a potential ally. At the level of the individual scholars such as Donna Winslow (2005) question whether military personnel are capable of undertaking humanitarian tasks, due to salient differences in civilian and military organisational cultures. It is assumed that the military, lack the expertise and commitment to undertake such work and “are therefore likely to achieve less at a higher cost – while at the same time endangering the work of humanitarian organisations” (Egnell, 2008; 415).

While many of the same ethical debates flow easily from civilian humanitarians to civilian development practitioners, the difference between the two groups of actors on the ground, as Shannon’s (2009) work reveals, remains unclear in insecure environments. At the policy level, accepting the convergence of civil and military rather than denying it, allows for exploration of how states and international bodies attempt to integrate and clarify, changing notions of security and political economy in conflict spaces (Gordon, 2006). Fidelity to a ‘silo approach’ only serves to deny the battlefield as a space historically shared by civilian and military personnel (Ankersen, 2008; Sannerholm, 2013), and further nullifies the significance of “war [as] a spatio-temporal moment in which a host of conflicting social actors construct relations and associated geographical spaces”, simultaneously engaging in a process of constructing and reconstructing themselves (Flint, 2011, p. 39). As Ankersen (2008, p. 2) summarises:

“Much of what has been written on the subject has proceeded from a strictly normative viewpoint that can be seen as antagonistic to the very premise of military involvement in humanitarian affairs…while this literature can be informative, its value is limited by its quasi-ideological standpoint. Polemic arguments founded on a belief that all militaries are bad (due to their use of force) an all humanitarians are good (due to the nature of their moral motivations) cannot advance our
understanding of real-world practices. As Pugh rightly points out, given the realities of the current situation, ‘the main challenge is to maintain the military-humanitarian link, not to ban it’ (1997, p.192).

Maintaining this link involves accepting the (re)constructive power of conflict in determining our understandings of spaces, power relations, and identities (Flint, 2011). Indeed, the focus placed on the process by which humanitarian and development assistance is militarised, marginalises the parallel process whereby the military is ‘humanitarianised’ or ‘civilianised’ to serve changing interests in the domestic and international realms (Forster, 2006). The ‘humanitarianisation of the military’ is evident in the acceptance of the importance of civil matters, the development of protocol and doctrine for cooperation, and the formation and recruitment of specific units to undertake civil action. Therefore, a nexus approach has value to this analysis as it does not presume to isolate a point of civil-military convergence but rather sets about explore linkages between actors, ideas, and processes in the space.

5. The Agent, Military, and Development

The necessity of examining the role of the individual agent has obliquely woven its way throughout the preceding discussions of security and development, post-development, and military involvement in development. Critical security, conflict, and peace studies scholars in addition to emancipatory social theorists, have often made note of the bias evident in many literatures for structure over agency (Themnér & Ohlson, 2014). As Richmond (2008, p. 13) suggests, “the role and agency of individuals and societies in the creation of peace tends to be less valued, the focus instead being on grand scale political, military, social and constitutional peace projects undertaken beyond the ken and capacity of the individual”.

Development studies too has historically preferred structural theorisations of social, political, and economic ‘advancement’ (Heeks & Stanforth, 2014). Further, even within schools of thought concerned with critical reconceptualisations of development, such as alternative and post-development, there remains conflict over what should be made of individual agency.

Early post-development scholarship which positioned development as a ruin, or as a violent project of neo-colonial domination, disempowered the individual in their theorisations, as is evidenced by Ferguson’s (1994, p. 17) assertion that:

“Whatever interests may be at work and whatever they [development actors] may think they are doing, they can only operate through a complex set of social and cultural structures so deeply embedded and so ill-perceived that the outcome may be only a baroque and unrecognisable transformation of the original intention.”

Disregard for individual agency has been similarly evident in reporting and scholarship concerning development practice which is habitually guilty of dehumanising processes of
development (Heeks & Stanforth, 2014; Mosse & Lewis, 2006). For later post-development scholars however, such conceptualisations ran counter to field experience, as John Lie has noted “actors were perfectly aware of what they were doing and acknowledged both the internal and external limitations to what they were trying to achieve” (2008, p. 119).

Explanations of agent behaviour which privilege structure over individual agency are writ large in research concerned with the military. The prevalence of theories of strategic interaction in organisational and psychological studies, limit the modelling of human behaviour to within the principles of rational choice, or game theory. While critiqued by social agency theorists who argue that they make simplistic assumptions about human nature, culture, social norms, and the social space, such approaches continue to be favoured within government funded military research institutes (Higate & Cameron, 2006; Kuehn & Lorenz, 2011; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012).

Emerging literature, that adopts a more anthropological approach to the study of the military, faces many structural constraints in working with closed organisational structures and often addresses highly politicised issues. As a result of this, narrative accounts of the experiences of military personnel are mostly located in the autobiographical works of high ranking personnel and are often used as primary source material in sociological studies of the military, relating to identity, culture, and masculinity. Literature contributed to academic journals by military personnel is often authored by a similar cohort of officers and published in affiliation with specific military or defence colleges. Specific research concerning agent-level interaction of military personnel with development practice is largely non-existent. Related bodies of literature are more plentiful, particularly those concerning the role of military actors as peacekeepers (Duncanson, 2009; Stevens, 2013) and private military contractors (Higate, 2011; Joachim & Schneiker, 2012; Olsson, 2007), in addition to studies of police officers in similar roles (Bevan, 2011; Goldsmith & Harris, 2009; Greener-Barcham, 2007; Harris & Goldsmith, 2009).

Situating analysis at the level of the individual enables assumptions which the literature has traditionally made about the military agent and their behaviour, visible. Feminist theorisations of agency in development theory and practice argue that by decentring the individual, the space in which development is carried out is sterilised. Brushing over the complexity of experience means the importance of “ongoing practices, processes and

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12 See, for example, Feaver’s (1998) analysis of military personnel as rational actors who, when presented with the challenge of cooperation with civil bodies, will either choose to ‘work with’ or ‘shirk’ their responsibility to do so.

13 This point will be returned to in Chapter 4.

14 See for example Duncanson (2009), Woodward & Jenkings (2011) and Higate (2011)
struggles” to the character of development is obscured, as are the power relations which exist in the process of reshaping the social realm (Hart, 2002 as quoted by Clouser, 2014 p.234). These perspectives nest well within the framework provided by the security-development nexus allowing for an exploration of how military personnel understand and negotiate their work as development actors at the scale of individual lived experience, a scale which is seldom addressed.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the literature concerned with security and development, arguing that the nexus constitutes a valuable framework within which to conduct an analysis of the military’s evolving role in non-warfighting tasks. Post-development theory has the potential to augment the nexus, bringing attention to the power exercised by networked agents in defining the character of development in both theory and practice. While the role of the military in the humanitarian or development space is not new, the visibility of this role has increased in recent years. The tendency of the literature to represent militaries as homogenous organisations whose involvement in the nexus space is ethically unpalatable, marginalises the individual military actor, their perspective and experiences. Pursuing analysis at the level of the individual allows for an exploration of how military personnel understand their position and their exercise agency in order to negotiate the various demands placed upon them. Further, it foregrounds “moments of cooperation and coexistence, exchange and encounter” which present themselves as actors engage in peaceful relations in undertaking security and development work (Williams & McConnell, 2011, p. 921).
Chapter 3: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – International and Domestic Context

1. Introduction
The emergence of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as a model for the integration of security and development work in post-Taliban Afghanistan constitutes one of the more influential examples of civil-military engagement in insecure environments. This chapter builds on the theoretical literature covered in Chapter 2 to address how the PRT model developed in both the international and New Zealand context.

The first section addresses the international context of military intervention in Afghanistan after 2001, the origins of the PRT model, and its defining characteristics. The second section situates the international literature within a New Zealand context, addressing how New Zealand’s Defence Force has evolved in tandem with the country’s understanding of itself as an international actor before establishing the foundations of New Zealand involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards. An overview of the New Zealand PRT based in Bamiyan Province from 2003 to 2013 is given, addressing its organisational structure, responsibilities and achievements in order to contextualise the reflections and analysis which will follow in Chapters 5-7.

2. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan
The involvement of national militaries in development or humanitarian endeavours, as has been discussed is not a new phenomenon. The War in Afghanistan, as the principle manifestation of the broader ‘War on Terror’ declared by President George W. Bush following the attacks of 11 September 2001, however, provided the foundation for the development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as an integrated model for civil-military operations in insecure environments. This section addresses the origins of the PRT model before discussing its application across Afghanistan. The PRT model has been subject to re-evaluation by each national military to lead one, consequently these will be discussed before considering critiques of the model itself.

2.1 Origins of the PRT
US led coalition forces (under Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan (OEF-A)) entered Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 with a UN mandate and the support of the primarily Pashtun Northern Alliance (Eronen, 2008). Military victory amounting to the expulsion of the Taliban government was followed by the International Conference on Afghanistan and
the Bonn Agreement (5 December 2001), establishing the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) with Hamad Karzai as its Chairman (Ansary, 2014). In keeping with the recommendations of the Bonn agreement, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386 was issued establishing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF):

“To assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment” (United Nations Security Council, 2001).

While the initial mandate for ISAF was only for the six months, its scope and influence was extended by UNSC resolution 1510 throughout the whole of Afghanistan in October 2003 (United Nations Security Council, 2003).

While OEF-A did include a concerted response to the humanitarian crises occurring (both as a result of the conflict, and those which had been ongoing under the Taliban regime), coalition forces have been critiqued for failing to recognise the importance of the post-Taliban reconstruction phase (Ansary, 2014; McNerney, 2008). The US Army initially established eight Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and stationed them in major towns in an attempt to “minimise the negative effects of combat operations; enhance the credibility of Coalition forces with the Afghan people; and enhance the credibility of the interim Afghan Government” (Flavin, 2004, p. 19; McNerney, 2008, p. 185). Charged with delivering Quick Impact assistance Projects (QIPs) they consisted of around eight Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers and additional Special Forces personnel. CHLCs were restricted in the assistance they could provide and thus failed to establish cooperative relationships with NGOs and local government actors. Pruett (2009, p. 56) notes that their presence made it increasingly evident that “something was missing between the immediate tactical application of military activity and the eventual concerted international community development effort”.

The PRT was born of this gap between short term humanitarian response operations, and the integrated response required to adequately address the needs of the civilian population in the absence of a fully functioning central government (ISAF, 2009).

Initially called Joint Regional Teams, their name was reportedly altered under the instruction of Hamad Karzai who remarked: “Warlords rule regions, Governors rule provinces” and hence their focus should be clearly on reconstruction and governance (Karzai as quoted by McNerney, 2005, p. 36). Conceptually underpinned by experiences with peace operations,

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15 Civil-military operations (CMO) before the fall of the Taliban government consisted of direct provision of humanitarian relief, the assistance of aid providers with transportation of relief supplies, and coordination of effort with UN and NGO representatives stationed at US Central Command (CENTCOM) (McNerney, 2008).
asymmetrical conflict (COIN doctrine), and Civil Military Operations (CMO/CIMIC) PRTs were designed to address the accepted notion that “working on socio-economic development alone, without attending to physical insecurity, exclusion and inequity [limits] the opportunities to effectively bring about development” (ISAF, 2009, p. 12). As such:

“A PRT must focus on strengthening all three pillars of security, governance and economic development with the emphasis shifting to enabling greater [Reconstruction] and [Development] as a province stabilizes and becomes more development-permissive” (ISAF, 2009, p. 7).

The US contingent of OEF-A established the first four PRTs in provinces dominated by Afghanistan’s four principle ethnic groups in the East and North; Gardez (Pashtun), Bamiyan (Hazara), Kunduz (Tajik) and Mazar-e Sharif (Uzbek) accompanied by four support bases in Bagram, Herat, Jalalabad, and Kandahar (Eronen 2008, See Appendix A). In 2003 when NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) took over command of ISAF, and ISAF itself was officially extended beyond Kabul, other states supplied troops to staff PRTs, and consequently the number of PRTs grew substantially (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Eronen, 2008; McNerney, 2005).

2.2 PRT Models and Characteristics

In 2003 a PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) was established to manage their operational direction supported by the PRT Working Group (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). Chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior it also included representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), OEF, ISAF, NATO, and lead PRT nations (Centre for Army Lessons Learned, 2012).

A PRT is broadly characterised as a joint operations group made up of both civil and military personnel numbering between 50 and 150 (ISAF, 2009; Savage, 2008).¹⁶ Most PRTs in Afghanistan were operated by a single national unit, their Area of Operations (AO) generally being constrained by Provincial boundaries (ISAF, 2009). At the command level, five Regional Commands (RC North, South, East, West, and Capital) were established as ISAF expanded, each with a lead nation. Comparative studies of PRT models and the characteristics of different national units are generally focused on the efforts of the US, United Kingdom (UK), and Canada. However, the strong tradition of peace studies in Nordic countries has also meant that the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish contributions have been studied since the mid-2000s. Eronen’s (2008) analysis of different national

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¹⁶ ‘Civil’ personnel may technically be military personnel, such as in the American case where Civil Affairs soldiers are most often used in their civilian capacity, despite being reservists and hence, combat trained.
contributions against a number of criteria (See Appendix B), concluded that four distinct PRT models had emerged: American, British, German, and Turkish.

The American model reflects a response to the volatile operating environment in which the PRT concept was initially conceived. Teams are small, with less than 100 personnel, operate under military command, and have generally favoured military or police training programmes and QIPs over more far reaching development programmes (Eronen, 2008). Criticised for this, over time they have reoriented their approach toward peacebuilding and responded publically lessons learned (Eronen, 2008; Savage, 2008). In contrast, the British model encourages involvement from other national units. British PRTs were staffed by between 50-150 personnel, up to 15% of whom are civilian, command is integrated (civil-military) and while their focus has most commonly been on Security Sector Reform (SSR), interaction with local communities is common, with small mobile units routinely assessing the potential for long-term reconstruction projects (Eronen, 2008; Savage, 2008). The German model differs from both the British and American, favouring large teams of 300-450 with a dual leadership structure where civil and military command chains are separated. Generally assessed as rigidly structured and overcautious, CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) teams map and implement QIPs, while long-term development strategies are designed, managed, and implemented by civilian personnel and Afghanistan based German NGOs (Eronen, 2008). Turkey’s one PRT in Wardak province is civilian led and focuses solely on governance and development through mentoring programmes with the local administration and police force training. Around 70 military personnel are stationed with the PRT but do not conduct independent operations (Eronen, 2008).

2.3 Evaluating the PRT as an Approach to Integrated Operations

In evaluating the PRT model Eronen (2008, p. 25) notes the absence of other broad, comparative studies:

“Research on PRTs remains fairly scattered. Researchers are not networked to extend over professional boundaries of government bureaucracies, military, research institutes, UN agencies, academics, and NGO representatives...one single best model of PRTs in Afghanistan cannot be identified.”

The nexus is writ large in this literature as a variety of actors disseminate and reproduce certain understandings of security and development at different scales. In determining what constitutes PRT best-practice, scholarly and practitioner critiques originate from many different starting points.\(^\text{17}\) PRTs are conventionally assessed as national units, as Savage

\(^{17}\) Such as whether PRTs constitute peacebuilding (Savage, 2008), what they mean for the development of CIMIC (McNerney, 2005, 2008) and whether they even represent a viable model for integrated operations (Pilparinen, 2007; Rana, 2008; Rietjens, 2008).
(2008, p. 114) notes the unique character of each province, and each PRT operating within that province allowed national units “significant latitude in ‘interpreting’ directions” and, as a result, directions were “generally considered to lose potency as they [were] passed down the command structures”. Moreover national military and governance structures influence the approach taken to crisis management, reconstruction, development, peacebuilding and combat operations, which all contribute to the structure and activities of the resulting PRT.

In addition to national character, this thesis draws on theories of individual agency and critical geographies to suggest that the role of the individual agent should be paid equal attention in the determination of a PRT’s ultimate character. Throughout the existing literature, examples of how individuals (both civilian and military) shaped the character of the intervention in Afghanistan are clear and surprisingly frequent. McNerney (2008) argues that in both the operations design phase and in the theatre, an absence of definitive directives meant that personnel were left to determine the nature of operations. Savage (2008, p. 111), in characterising the Canadian approach to peace operations, and later Afghanistan, argues that success was seen primarily in instances where individuals made exceptional efforts rather than as a result of “widespread patterns of effective communication and coordination”. Further he cites a reliance, within the Canadian PRT, on “personalities in the theatre and their experience to make both procedural and operational [decisions]” (2008, p. 136). The influence of the individual is also raised by Rana (2008) as a key feature in determining how objectives, civilian personnel, and local bodies were approached. Arguing that as militaries gain new personnel, the ‘Cold Warrior’ generation who were largely unenthusiastic about the prospect of civil military interaction, are replaced with soldiers well versed in the complexity of the modern conflict environment, a positive step for cooperative efforts (Rana, 2008, p. 230).

However, Piiaprinien (2007) argues that the ‘military mind-set’ continues to constitute a barrier between civilian and military personnel in how objectives are conceived and outcomes valued. He writes:

“If PRTs continue to be left to their own devices in determining their division of labour and code of conduct, the possibility of a ‘clash of mind-sets’ remains and creates a potential source of friction. Currently, this harmony is ensured only by goodwill on the part of individuals” (Piiaprinien, 2007, pp. 155–6).

A reliance on individuals to make PRTs (and broader civil-military arrangements) work is seen as threatening by institutions. A US Interagency paper cautioned that “personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities”, an assessment which reveals institutional uncertainty about the role that individual agents play in the field.
(US Interagency Report, 2006 p.10 as quoted by Eronen, 2008, p. 35). Rietjens (2008) suggests a lack of training programmes, budgets, and capabilities rendered ISAF incapable of developing a common approach in Afghanistan. Rather “person-bonded” and often ad hoc arrangements and relationships played a large role in all PRTs (Rietjens, 2008, p. 97). Such uncertainty and variation leads McNerney (2005, p. 45) to assess that:

“Military and civilian personnel should be educated, trained, and equipped for stabilisation and reconstruction missions in tandem, and not six weeks before deployment but over their entire careers.”

Equipping military and civilian personnel who will work together in the field with the skills to operate in a collaborative and effective manner is increasingly addressed in military research. From the literature concerning PRTs in Afghanistan, however, it is clear that substantial responsibility was still placed on the individual soldier when operating in complex conflict environments.

3. Positioning New Zealand

While the national anthem may direct New Zealanders to ‘defend our free land’, as Stephen Hoadley (2007) notes the actual need to counter a military offensive on the country’s shores has been notably absent from history following the colonial period. Having addressed the origins of the PRT model in the previous section, this chapter considers New Zealand’s experience as an actor in Afghanistan and the conditions under which the NZ PRT was established and operated. Beginning with a discussion of how New Zealand’s Defence Force has developed in tandem with the country’s understanding of its own geopolitical position, this section will move on to discuss the NZ PRT’s origins, responsibilities and activities during its ten year mission in Bamiyan Province, Afghanistan.\(^\text{18}\)

3.1 From Defence to Security

New Zealand’s diplomatic and military interactions before 1989 reveal how discourses relating to ‘defence’ were evoked in relation to national ‘security’. While during the colonial period New Zealand aimed to defend its own shores, its security was ultimately guaranteed by Britain (M. King, 2003). This security arrangement was illustrated by the contribution of expeditionary forces to the Anglo-Boer War (1899), as well as the First and Second World Wars (WWI 1914-1918 and WWII 1939-1945 respectively). New Zealand’s support of British interventions in Suez, Malaya, Borneo, and Indonesia during the Cold War, began a process of questioning whether Britain’s security was synonymous with New Zealand’s

\(^{18}\) The capital of Bamiyan Province, is also named Bamiyan. In instances where I specifically discuss the capital I will refer to it as ‘Bamiyan Town’ in all other instances I am speaking about the Province.
British ‘Imperial defence’ was replaced with a preference for ‘collective security’ as New Zealand gradually reoriented its diplomatic and military activities around working with like-minded states in addition to making a concerted pivot to the Pacific arena, and in doing so, to Australia and the US with the formation of ANZUS (Johnston, 1997). Despite this, involvement in unpalatable military interventions and ultimately the 1984 breakdown of ANZUS\(^2\), “exposed the dependent character of New Zealand’s security relationships” (Mayell, 2004, p. 372).

The years preceding and immediately following 1989 constituted a transitional phase in the character of global defence and security arrangements. While Alley (2001, p. 1) characterises this environment as one of increased “complexity and ambiguity”, in many ways it can be seen to have reinforced the decisions that New Zealand had begun to make in the 1970s with respect to its diplomatic and military positioning. As Johnston (1997) notes, the loosening of ties with Britain and the US over various differences in diplomatic, and economic policy prior to the 1980s, meant that New Zealand’s geopolitical interests were mostly established before 1989. Buchanan (2010, p. 261) posits the suspension of military cooperation with the US had effectively reoriented New Zealand’s security logic in the mid-1980s from partaking in collective security arrangements “based on deterrence rooted in credible counter force” to cooperative security “based on multilateral confidence and security building measures”. New Zealand defence therefore came to be synonymous with a defence of national interests, the most obvious of which were vested in economic and political stability, both within the Pacific region and globally.

Three trends characterise New Zealand’s use of its armed forces since 1989: first, UN authorisation must be given for a military intervention to be legitimate; second, MOOTW are the preferred form of interaction in this context; and third, the Southwest Pacific ought to be the principle focus area (Buchanan, 2010; Mayell, 2004). Accepting that New Zealand’s security has always been vested collectively has resulted in a re-examination of the capabilities of its armed forces against their operational responsibilities. The preference for stabilisation and peacekeeping operations has created debate over whether the NZDF should pursue specialisation in order to add value to multinational efforts. Mayell (2004) argues that New Zealand’s contribution to the Gulf War (1991) of specialist non-combat troops who were capable of acting under the command of the US as a leading partner, set a precedent for future deployments. Critics of this view argue New Zealand’s military status globally is

\(^{19}\) Particularly in light of the fact that these interventions contravened the New Zealand commitment to the principle of self-determination articulated by the UN of which it was a charter member (Mayell, 2004).

\(^{20}\) Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, established in 1951.
harmed by boasting a smaller combat-ready force in comparison with other states (Rolfe, 2008).

Ultimately, Rolfe (2007b, p. 8) argues that “New Zealand defines its need to suit its own understanding of the international environment, rather than acquiescing in some other nation’s definition of threat or need”. In balancing a commitment to UN peacekeeping and military-to-military allegiances, New Zealand is able to independently determine whether its armed forces constitute an instrument of hard or soft power (Buchanan, 2010; Rolfe, 2007a, 2011). Butcher (2012) has suggested that the position New Zealand’s armed forces occupy globally and their ability to operate with legitimacy in different arenas, are greatly determined by other factors, such as economic ties, educational linkages, the tourism and film industries, and aid contributions. As such New Zealand’s understanding of the international environment is not the “exclusive property of professional diplomats or defence personnel” (Butcher, 2012, pp. 261–2).

3.2 Committing to Afghanistan

The attacks of 11 September 2001 are understood as a moment of paradigmatic flux where geopolitics are concerned. Cooperation with the US was immediately pledged by New Zealand’s acting Prime Minister with the attacks discussed in Cabinet in light of their implications for New Zealand (New Zealand Cabinet, 2001, p. 2). On 13 November New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) were officially requested to deploy to Afghanistan by the US under OEF-A where they would remain until 2005 (Hoadley, 2011). In addition to the SAS, New Zealand officers were stationed at US CENTCOM in Florida, ISAF headquarters in Kabul, and Bagram Air Base (Hoadley, 2011). Following the Bonn Agreement New Zealand pledged its diplomatic support for the AIA, and subsequently sent military engineers in 2002 and 2003 to assist with reconstruction related activities (Hoadley, 2011). Throughout this period the establishment of PRTs by the US did not go unnoticed by New Zealand with four potential routes for greater contribution in Afghanistan identified by May 2003. The first three involved the augmentation of pre-existing efforts by other states while the fourth, which was most strongly recommended, encouraged New Zealand leadership “of a self-standing state building and development initiative in the field” (Hoadley, 2011, p. 143). The high profile level of such a contribution was noted as a key advantage amongst political leaders and a statement by then Prime Minister Helen Clarke announced New Zealand’s intent to pursue this option which was confirmed on 7 July, 2003 (New Zealand Government, 2003a, 2003b).
3.3 **Kiwi Base: The New Zealand PRT, Bamiyan Province**

“So the decision was made, perhaps we could go into one of these PRTs you know. It gets you a flag at the table, it gets you seen on the coalition map. It’s not exactly arm to arm combat, ‘warfighting’ in its purest sense, at that stage, and so it achieves most of the aims, and so if we could get a contingent into Afghanistan, to do some development, hook them into NZAP, give them moderate funding, we can say that we’ve taken our bit of the responsibility and the Americans were looking for that, because they wanted to move out of these PRTs, set up more and move South” (Research Participant NZDF4).

New Zealand’s commitment to Afghanistan was solidified with the decision to take over command of the Bamiyan PRT and base (referred to as ‘Kiwi Base’) from the US who had established it during the initial extension of OEF-A beyond Kabul (Hoadley, 2011). Bamiyan presented an attractive option to government officials and senior NZDF personnel for a number of reasons. As an internal province, its distance from international borders meant arms and narcotics trafficking, as well as cross border violence from neighbouring states, was minimal. The province itself was relatively secure, and while infrastructure had been damaged in some areas, Bamiyan had not endured the destructive offensives that had occurred in the East and South (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013). The provincial government’s public support of the Karzai government in Kabul, ISAF and the broader UN effort in Afghanistan, amplified security in the province. This support was compounded by the ease of transferring the pre-existing US base to New Zealand hands. Described as a “turn-key operation” (NZDF4), New Zealand arranged to continue receiving logistical support from the US airbase at Bagram and the handover of the base itself occurred on 23 September 2003 (Hoadley, 2011). While concerns did exist during planning about the difficulties of operating in a high altitude environment (often isolated by snowfall) the advantages of being close to Bagram Airbase and Kabul outweighed these, ensuring ease of involvement for personnel in the decisions being made by both ISAF and the Afghan government.

As discussed, different PRT models emerged as various contributing nations experimented with the framework and experiences of the initial US units. **Appendix B** presents the key characteristics of the American, British, Nordic, German, and Turkish models as collected by Eronen (2008) in comparison with the New Zealand model. Planned as a joint military operation, the NZPRT task group CRIB was commanded by a field grade colonel or equivalent from 2003-2010 (Hoadley, 2011). While initially staffed by around 100 personnel, the number increased over time to 140, in addition to support personnel working in both Bagram and Kabul (Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee, 2013; Hoadley.

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21 Bamiyan Town sits at an altitude of 2,550m, some inhabited regions sit at an even higher altitude, often compared by participants to the summit of Mount Cook (3,750m).
Deployments were rotated approximately every six months\textsuperscript{22} with the command team travelling to Bamiyan ahead of time to begin the handover process with the previous CRIB. The majority of the 140 personnel were stationed at Kiwi Base which was situated just outside of Bamiyan Town in the northeast of the province (See Appendix C). The NZPRT engaged in extensive patrolling of the province and maintained two Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) Romero (in Khamard District), and Chunuk Bair (in Yakawalang District) (Hall, 2010). Each FOB was staffed by a patrol of 12, led by a commanding officer other team members included infantry personnel, a medic, driver, and signals officer in addition to a Liaison Officer (LO) who was responsible for engaging with communities, district governors and administrators (with assistance from Patrol Commanders) in order to coordinate security, reconstruction, and development activities. Patrols often travelled beyond their FOBs to isolated parts of the province (Hall, 2010).

Operating under US led RCE the NZPRT worked closely at times with US Regular forces, State Department, Department of Defence (USDoD) and National Guard, in addition to staff from the USAID, USDA, and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) (Hoadley, 2011; Taylor-Doig, 2013). These additional personnel augmented the capabilities of the PRT Development Group which was established in 2004 under CRIB2, to plan and source funding for the fulfilment of development needs in the province (Taylor-Doig, 2013). Kiwi Base was also home to small units from Singapore and Malaysia, in addition to New Zealand Police Officers working with the PRT and the European Union Police Training Centre (EUPOL) to train the ANP (Hoadley, 2011; McCardle, 2007).

While emphasis placed on their role as facilitators of development and reconstruction fluctuated over time in concert with the character of the security environment, access to funding increased over the ten year period for the PRT (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013). The PRT development group acted as the hub for PRT facilitated development projects, managing priorities communicated to patrols by communities in addition to those identified by provincial and district government bodies (Hall, 2010). While facilitated by the PRT, projects and programmes were approved based on their coherence firstly; with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Bamiyan Provincial Development Plan (PDP), secondly; with the priority areas identified by the New Zealand Government\textsuperscript{23}, and finally; against the reasonable availability of funding from either the NZAP or other

\textsuperscript{22} With the exception of some initial CRIBs where the command team remained for in excess of six months and the regular personnel rotated around every 3-4 months.

\textsuperscript{23} NZAP priority development areas were education, governance, justice and the rule of law, health, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction (managed primarily by NZDF), and sustainable economic development (including Agriculture, Renewable energy and tourism) (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013).
channels. From 2003-2005 development assistance was delivered primarily through NZDF channels before the establishment of an Afghanistan Programme within the NZAP in 2005 at which point available funding increased (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013). Over time the priorities of the PRT became more concertedly development oriented, culminating in the transition to MFAT lead in 2010 with the appointment of Dick Newlands as PRT director (Taylor-Doig, 2013). As of the 2012/2013 financial year NZ$80.63 million was spent on development in Afghanistan (See Appendix D) by the New Zealand government with a substantial increase in funding committed in the year prior to the withdrawal of the PRT (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013). In addition to MFAT funding, the PRT was able to access the contestable Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP) fund managed by the US which, while largely infrastructure oriented, was the largest source of development funding for the PRT in 2008 at over US$20 million (Hoadley, 2011).

4. Conclusion
This chapter, has addressed the PRT as a model for integrated civil-military development work in Afghanistan. The NZPRT operating in Bamiyan Province between 2003 and 2013 constitutes a specific ‘localised form’ of the security-development nexus, and will be discussed in relation to the nexus literature in Chapters 5-7. The evolution of PRTs and illustrates the importance of assessing how adaptation is managed and influenced by the character of national military units, and by the individual personnel who make up those units. Further, the balancing of security and development priorities by PRTs was subject to substantial variation both between provinces and over time. This raises a number of questions concerning how development was understood, performed, and ultimately internalised within PRTs as a non-standard responsibility for many military personnel. The reflections of NZDF personnel on their experiences with this evolving model make visible the power to exercise agency held by those actors to influence development as it occurs on the ground. As McNerney (2008, p. 183) reminds his readers, “to future historians, it may appear that the new doctrine…drove [an] enhanced level of cooperation among military and civilian communities. As is often the case, however, much of the innovation derived from “bright ideas” developed in random conversations.”

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24 New Zealand’s expenditure in Afghanistan in the period from 2006-2012 ranged between NZ$5-10 million, approximately 7% of the total New Zealand Aid Programme country spend. In the 2012-13 financial year this increased to nearly NZ$25 million or 20.8% of total New Zealand Aid Programme country spend (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014; New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013, p. 5).
Chapter 4: Methodology

The image of war, the version of it that I have been exposed to at least, is something akin to a distant game, being played out by people that I have had no connection to. The saturation of the mainstream media with genocide, civil conflict, invasion, and terrorism both draws in and distances me from the reality of those distant others’ lives. That I should feel lucky to live in a country like New Zealand reminds me that ‘peace’ is scarce, a reality of life for the few rather than the many. It is this sense of scarcity which appears to fuel so many attempts to extend peace, or security, or development beyond the spaces where it constitutes the basic character of an individual’s temporal reality. It seems a crowded and complex project with actors wanting to bring about change creating conflict amongst themselves to accompany the conflict they seek to address.

I was born in Wellington to parents whose families had both made the journey from England to Aotearoa-New Zealand, although some 100 years apart. I grew up in a calm house and I feel I can say I live a peaceful life.

The distance I feel from the realities of war is one of the places where my research comes from. Another, is from my fascination with the stories people tell about their lives. In seeking out the reflections of NZDF personnel who deployed to Afghanistan I feel I subconsciously combined these two interests, and only after having to explain my research to myself and others constantly did I realise it. The lives of the ‘distant other’ that development studies so frequently concerns itself with, seem far less ‘distant’ when speaking with someone who is not ‘other’ but of one’s home. The reflections of the personnel I spoke to have challenged my perceptions of the NZDF and encouraged me to confront that in attempting to understand how development has the power to shape social relations it is essential to acknowledge the power held by the powerful, and in so doing, also recognise that they too are people “sensitive to, and aware of, the realities of others” (Chambers, 2005, p. 83).

1. Introduction

In Brian Massumi’s ‘Translator’s Foreword’ to A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) there is a suggestion that books and other written works, like records, ought not to be conceived of as linear, closed systems, but rather as open and interactive pieces. In his imagining we as readers and researchers, should pay close attention to those aspects of our own and others work which follow us around, resonate (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013) or glow (M. MacLure, 2013) as it is these which shape us. The idea of reflexivity, “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher”, sits at the heart of this research (England, 1994, p. 82). In electing to explore the

25 Emphasis in original.
reflections of NZDF personnel who were engaged in development work while deployed in Afghanistan, I have intentionally positioned the individual and their narrative at the centre of this project. However, as the vignette at the start of this chapter illustrates, the self, myself specifically, mediates any interaction with this work as a text, and by extension, this research, and the reflections of those personnel with whom I spoke. To deny this, would be to buy into the myth of objectivity in social research (Warren, 1988), and ignore all that is to be gained from acknowledging the fascinating aspects of being of, and inside, the universe one seeks to understand (D. Smith, 1987, p. 142).

This chapter illustrates the reasoning behind this research, and the process I undertook. The first section draws together various works which have ‘followed me around’ particularly those from the feminist and post-structural traditions. In mapping out my own epistemology I write with Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in mind, considering this an exploration of my own epistemological becoming, characterised by influences on, rather than a strict adherence to a particular perspective. The second section describes some methodological considerations, principally those around undertaking qualitative research with the NZDF, before discussing the use of semi-structured interviews. The final section is concerned with the doing of it all, addressing the research process, reflections, ethical considerations, and method of analysis.

2. ‘Holding the street’ – Positioning the Researcher

The difficulty of spilling the contents of one’s mind onto the page in such a way that the reader may pick it up and know that person has been noted to be one of the greatest challenges in research and writing (Rose, 1997). Furthermore, in seeking to understand the decisions a researcher makes when designing a project, selecting methods, undertaking research, and writing up, we operate under the implicit assumption that there exists something concrete to be known about the phenomenon of research. John Law (2004, p. 2) has suggested this “very attempt to be clear simply increases the mess”, as the choices we make in thinking, acting, writing and re-writing may only serve to amplify the confusion experienced in the quest to know our worlds. The work of Law and other theorists critical of assumptions about knowledge production, resonate with me and have also shaped my own curiosities. Exposure to critical social theorists and philosophers in an undergraduate social science degree, has served to complicate my understandings of knowledge, introducing questions about power, discourse, agency, and subjectivity which are present throughout this research.26 However, in much the same way that early post-development theorists critiqued Development and declared it a ruin (Sachs, 1992), the deconstruction and critique of

26 In particular readings of Michel Foucault’s theories (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1982) in addition to works by Jurgen Habermas (1990), Slavoj Žižek (2008) and Judith Butler (2004).
knowledge can feel unfulfilling and leave one with the sense, as Maggie MacLure has suggested, “that the dynamism and challenge of the [original] figure [has drained] away with use and time” (2013a, p. 629).

In feminist post-structural research I found threads of an epistemology engaged in a productive struggle with the messiness of research, of knowing and creating knowledge. The fragmented nature of pre-existing research in the field of security and development made such an epistemology especially appealing as it addressed the confusion I felt about where to begin a project split between different.

Drawing on Bhabha’s (1994, p. 31) concept of ‘strategies of containment’, Childers, Rhee and Daza unpick this frustration, arguing that by containing disciplines, epistemologies, and methodologies within established systems we create false choices between what is considered “inside and outside of bounds” (Childers et al., 2013, p. 517). 27 Robert Chambers (2005, p. 75), in discussing his personal experience with development studies reflects on this idea within the university, stating:

“I do not think many lecturers realise that giving a lecture again and again is, like a catechism, disabling and conservative because each time we say something we embed it, remember it better and believe it more, diminishing our doubts, finding it easier to repeat, and to a degree closing our minds.”

These ideas made sense to me as I feel containment is constantly returned to within the process of research creation and meaning making. Containment of epistemology, methodology, literature surveyed, and methods chosen, all aid in our justification of the relevance of our work (Burawoy, 1991). Yet, in acquiescing to being contained researchers yield to the centre or the periphery of a given discipline, declaring allegiances and reproducing orthodoxies (Moss & Falcomer Al-Hindi, 2008). Childers, Rhee & Daza characterise this experience as contributing to “anxieties, disappointments, and frustrations [with] feeling out of place” in research and academia, suggesting that a troublesome solution is to be found in pursuing a promiscuous or un/contained approach to research (2013, p. 508). Promiscuity or un/containment for them and other feminist scholars, unwilling to be constrained by conventional understandings of their pursued perspective, involves an acceptance of “the incompatibilities between imagined research and real life and places” (Childers et al., 2013, p. 513).

The idea of existing in a liminal or in-between space as a researcher has been drawn upon by many critical philosophers and is characterised by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) as being a

27 Deleuze discusses a similar notion to containment but speaks about it as segmentarity (Moss & Falcomer Al-Hindi, 2008, p. 13).
‘space of nomad thought’ (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013). This space is one in which various understandings are affirmed rather than denied and as it has been analogised, is akin to attempting to ‘hold the street’ or another open space, rather than entrenching oneself behind walls or within a fort (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Accepting the position of the researcher as often ‘between’ disciplines and philosophical perspectives, also applies to explorations of how the researcher may be contained or written out of research in traditional paradigms. In discussing their position as ‘Antipodean’, Wray et al (2013, p. 194) draw this link, concluding that writing-in the histories of a discipline is essential in acknowledging the ways in which research is a ‘mangled’ combination of “knowledges, events, experiences and positionalities”. A sense of being ‘in-between’ or ‘nomadic’ has been argued to be common to all researchers in some way, and is seen as a valuable resource for de-peripheralising bodies of work by acknowledging that aspects of unique positionalities are shared across the globe (Aalbers, 2013; Chambers, 2005; Coleman & Ringrose, 2013).

In asserting that knowledge and understanding are mediated by the individual, the question is often asked of how such research is expected to contribute to collective understanding, or be evaluated for rigor. For Bondi (2003) and others this is an unanswerable question. Engaging in reflexive research and writing oneself (and one’s process) in is seen as central as “the issues at stake can never be fully resolved but reflecting on them helps to ensure the vitality of research practices” (Bondi, 2003, p. 67).

In my mind, these arguments flow easily and have helped me make sense of this project. The spectre of the security-development nexus suggests the need for a movement to more promiscuous imaginings of the way in which the two concepts linked through networked understandings and interaction. ‘Holding the street’, in a Deleuzian sense involves viewing both popular and peripheral literatures as a tool box with which to embrace interesting, personal and un/contained understandings of these phenomena. Making space for the self, for reflexive practice, consideration of positionality, and identities, goes hand in hand with a nomadic approach to knowledge.

### 3. Methodology and Methods - Positioning the Research

Bondi’s (2003) assertion, that the process of reflection constitutes an invaluable resource in the research process, guides the structuring of this section as it moves through aspects of my

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28 Kim England (1994, p. 81) assesses “traditional” neo-positivist approaches as comforting and attractive because “they [provide] a firmly anchored epistemological security from which to venture out and conduct research.”
research experience. Having established some epistemological coordinates in the preceding section, this section provides a brief comment on the choice of the New Zealand PRT as a location for research before turning to a discussion of some methodological points of reference and finally, the choice of semi-structured interviews as the principle method.

3.1 Grounding in context

At its core this research is interested in complicating the stories we tell ourselves and others about conflict, security, and development. Positioning the considerations of development studies at the centre serves as a useful starting point. As Uma Kothari (2005) notes, like anthropology, development studies readily borrows and intervenes in other subject areas giving it a decidedly multi-disciplinary character. Literature addressing security and development, and more specifically, the conflation of associated policy, practice, and theory has many facets which have yet to be explored. The involvement of national militaries in what some have conceived of as the ‘development space’, and the associated debate around this phenomenon, constitutes a particularly intriguing example of this convergence. Military personnel are subsumed simultaneously by a dominant academic and vernacular discourse which advances a singular understanding of the military agent and an organisational structure which positions the collective above the individual. It was a frustration with the absence (or selective presence) of narrative and the voices of individual personnel in the literature concerning conflict and immediate post-conflict which ultimately led me to the site of this research project. Rubinstein (2012, p. 193) reflects on his research with peacekeepers in Egypt and his experience with this frustration as follows:

“One of the things that struck me…was that many in the anthropological community would frequently talk about people and organisations of the national security state in ways that they would never speak about other peoples or institutions. I observed, for instance, that our anthropological community would sharply condemn sweeping statements about “The Arabs” as essentialising and totalising, appropriately noting that among these peoples and communities there was considerable variation; however, our anthropological community rarely challenged those who routinely spoke of “The Military” as though no such variation exists. Yet, militaries are as varied and complex as other human communities.”

The propensity of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 to almost singularly consider who was the right to undertake development or humanitarian work in insecure environments presupposes that this space is one which can be isolated in either temporal or spatial terms. This assumption is unhelpful when considering cases such as Afghanistan (specifically after 2001) where myriad actors are present, whether acceptable or not. The security-development nexus presents a lens through which to consider the linkages between theoretical literatures,
as well as actors and organisations operating in shared spaces such as Afghanistan. As established in Chapters 2 and 3, the role of the individual in shaping the character of this space is rarely interrogated as the majority of literature is concerned with structural, organisational, political and ethical debates. In spite of this, it is not unreasonable to assume there is something to be learnt from the experiences of individuals active in this constantly evolving environment.

The decision to focus on the NZDF’s Afghanistan contribution (the CRIB mission PRT specifically) seemed a logical choice of case study at first, as an example of my own country’s military personnel acting in an insecure environment while engaged in development work. However, as the research evolved the centrality of the New Zealand experience to an examination of the nexus in practice, eclipsed any previous notions case study status. Making visible the “varied and complex” character of the NZDF, as well as investigating the exercise of agency, and the salience of identity in an organisational context overtook any pretence of broad theoretical analysis I may have begun with (Rubinstein, 2012, p. 193). Ultimately, locating my research ‘at home’ shaped the project into one which was oriented almost entirely around the reflections I gathered, in an attempt to allow the data and by extension, the participants, to ‘speak for themselves’.

3.2 Methodology
Qualitative research, in asking questions of the interrelated nature of social structures and individual experience, directs inquiry toward what David Smith has called a “geography of real people” (Smith 1999 as quoted by Winchester & Rofe, 2010, p. 7). The “avowed humanistic commitment to study the social world from the perspective of the interacting individual” which rests at the core of qualitative research resonates with both my research objectives and epistemological perspective (Denzin, 1997, p. xv). Further, given the principle objective of this research involves exploring experiences with, and attitudes towards, development, qualitative approaches appropriately privilege narrative and reflection (Kvale, 1996). While I acknowledge there are both merits in quantitative research and limits to qualitative, in this context an interest in the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of social phenomena surrounding military involvement in development processes made the quantitative question of ‘what’ largely irrelevant (Overton & van Dierman, 2014). In embracing a qualitative approach there also existed a natural acceptance of my own narrative as a part of the research process, a feature of qualitative research I believe to be of particular importance (Stewart-Withers, Banks, McGregor, & Meo-Sewabu, 2014). The qualitative methodological foundation of this thesis has also been informed by a number of other methodologies coordinates, namely feminist post-structural approaches and ethnography.
Critical methodologies based in a feminist post-structural tradition encourage researchers to position the research process as one in which those being studied are able to assert themselves, rather than have their voices suppressed by the researcher’s agenda (Speer, 2002). Attentiveness to power relations in research, Chacko (2004, p. 61) notes, involves a process of constant reflexivity based in acknowledging one’s positionality and how they may impact “the exchange and production of information and knowledge”. As Chambers (2005, p. 82) has argued “one methodology we need is to know how to better analyse the links between our choices, and acts of commission and omission, and those who are meant to benefit, and so to learn to make better decisions about what to do”. Practicing reflexivity positions methodology itself as an evolving process rather than a static performance. Promiscuous or un/contained methodology as articulated by Childers, Rhee & Daza (2013, p. 508) accepts this process as a struggle against containment acted out on the page, noting:

“Methodologies, the integration of dirty theory and messy practice, are in the making and "on the move" (Childers, 2012). Because (fortunately) human beings continuously imagine and create fictions of all kinds, including stories that repeat, are mistaken, and extend ontological and epistemological engagements (Spivak, 2012, p.121), methodology-in-practice is always already ahead of what we think it is.”

An ethnographic approach also has utility in this research as a methodology which often bridges the development studies literature with anthropology and oral histories. In this sense I felt as if ethnography crept up on me, gradually shaping my methodology as I read more about ethnographic research and its attempt “to understand another life world using the self – as much as possible – as the instrument of knowing” (Ortner, 1995, p. 173). While the hubris of holism has been accepted by many anthropologists as a flawed aspect of the ethnographic approach, the commitment of critical ethnography to the exploration of lived experience has lent much to disciplines beyond anthropology (Denzin, 1997; Speer, 2002). Denzin’s assessment (borrowing from C. Wright Mills) that “humans live in a second hand world of meanings” applies to this research as it seeks to explore understandings of a contested space in ways which do not privilege one understanding over another, but rather accept their mutually constitutive character (Denzin, 1997, p. xvi).

The reasoning behind the use of qualitative methods in this research extends beyond an epistemological proclivity for narrative and reflection. In the primary stages of research I found narrative analyses of the experiences of military personnel rare, and engagement with individual reflection on development practice by militaries rarer still. A number of interrelated reasons have been suggested for this absence of critical qualitative inquiry. The first concerns the perception of military research as a “difficult field” (Deschaux-Beaume,
2012, p. 102). Goolsby (2012) has discussed the stigma attached to civilian academics who elect to teach in military colleges or conduct research with permission or guidance from national militaries. Laced with underlying assumptions about constrained participation, politicisation of research topics, and restrictions on the dissemination of findings, military research remains an underexplored field in the social sciences (Caforio & Nuciari, 2003; Deschaux-Beaume, 2012; Rubinstein, 2012).

Beyond perceptions of researchers who work with or within militaries, Higate & Cameron (2006) cite the desire for military affiliated research to serve a functional purpose as an additional discouragement, as studies are often directed toward a focus on improving efficiency through empiricism. Further, Dowling (2010) notes the pressure to justify research with militaries in terms of clearly demonstrable benefits introduces a scope for deterministic logics or implicit control of research methodologies by militaries themselves. Higate & Cameron (2006, p. 229) summarise the social research climate within militaries internationally as follows:

“...The dominant research paradigms in which their inquiries have proceeded have remained largely antithetical to an explicitly reflexive approach. Reasons for this have turned on a range of interconnected factors including the historical genesis of military sociology in which positivist approaches remain in the ascendancy. In addition, the privileging of psychology as a credible discipline most suitable to solving the needs of military-organizational problems is considerably less amenable to reflexivity than a more explicitly emancipatory sociological approach. Thus, it is unsurprising that research understood as closer to the engineering rather than the enlightenment model should be configured to policy end users.”

In addition to expectations about accessibility Smith (2006) foregrounds the assumptions that researchers often make when interviewing closed organisations or elites, noting that these perceived responses to external researchers based in institutionalised structures of power result in researchers shying away from participatory, collaborative or empowering approaches and methods. Interview based research with military personnel is often valued solely in terms of its ability to access ‘grey literature’ (Deschaux-Beaume, 2012) and has been noted by Smith (2006) as a site where researchers may challenge ethical codes of conduct in the face of apparent power disparities.

Anthropologists Goolsby (2012), Simons (2012) and Fujimura (2012) all discuss the challenges and rewards of conducting social research with and within militaries, concluding that a commitment to engagement and dialogue between civil and military is their preferred

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29 Information that one would not otherwise be able to review as it is not present in the public domain.
approach. Further to this, research at the level of individual experience presents an under-explored field, particularly, as Vernon (2004, p. 3) notes, the “personal narratives [of] male non-combatant military persons – white males especially” who are “ignored both by scholars who concentrate on the combat memoir and by those who focus on historically marginalised voices”. While the personnel I interviewed were not strictly deployed in a non-combat role, the restrictions placed on engagement while in Afghanistan excludes them from the combat memoir tradition that Vernon refers to. Higate (2011) also makes reference to the potential that qualitative analysis at the level of the individual holds to explore how personnel construct themselves in their professional capacity and conduct themselves in the field. In this research, I hope to communicate as frankly as they have, the challenges and rewards of conducting research with the NZDF.

3.3 Method: Semi-Structured Interviews

The principle method used in this research was semi-structured interviews, a choice which was determined by three considerations. The first was simple, I wished to have “conversations with purpose” (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014, p. 60) retaining the ability to determine their limits, while simultaneously providing space for reflection and narrative to emerge. Semi-structured interviews mitigate (to a certain extent) potential conflict over lines of questioning ahead of the interview, allowing for organic conversation and coverage of pre-arranged content (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). Additionally, the open nature of semi-structured interview schedules allow for flexibility in the interview space, the danger of an interview merely being ‘one-way traffic’ is addressed and hopefully avoided (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003; Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006).

The second was founded in assumptions I made about the accessibility of participants and the palatability of certain types of interviews to them. Laura Nader (1972) notably discussed the rewards and difficulties of ‘studying up’ in anthropology, considering the importance of research which explored institutional structures of power and the people operating within them. Having read widely on interviewing ‘elites’ as an ‘outsider’, my interviewing method, structure, and questions were unavoidably coloured by an assumption of asymmetry in the relationship between myself and the mid-to-high ranking military personnel I sought to speak with (Dowling, 2010; Nader, 1972; Rubinstein, 2012; Stewart-Withers et al., 2014). The accounts of reticence and suspicion from military personnel (and the military as an institution) when interacting with outside academics made me wary of being overly ambitious with my research methods. The semi-structured interview, in affording the researcher a balance of control and leeway, offers participants a similar balance of knowns and unknowns about the interview process (Winchester & Rofe, 2010). In part this can be understood as a
tactic of trust establishment in newly formed and potentially beneficial relationships with
oraganisations and participants themselves (Dowling, 2010). Establishing these relationships
requires reassurance that the interview and interviewer are neither opportunistic or explicitly
critical of participants experiences, part of which I anticipated would come from a clear and
openly communicated interview schedule (Caforio & Nuciari, 2003).

My final consideration drew on this last point, and was less a consequence of my own
apprehension and more a result of considering the position of my participants in signing up
for research which may have not been condoned by their employer (NZDF) at the time.
Semi-structured interviews allowed me to be plain with participants about the goals of my
research and the discussions I envisaged having. They would be free at any point to stop a
line of questioning, move on, or end the interview. In this sense pragmatism and ethical
considerations were one in the same, a marriage I am pleased with.

Adapting my research questions into a semi-structured interview outline was more a mutually
constitutive process than a translation of ‘what I wanted to know’ into ‘how I was going to
ask it’. I wrote pages and pages of draft questions, variously entitled ‘what I want to know’,
‘what I really want to know’ and ‘how do you ask someone to talk about how they feel about
what they did, not just what they did?’. Being encouraged to interrogate how exactly I planned
to interact with participants proved the most formative aspect of my research design
and drew together my curiosities with questions which remained unanswered obvious from my
preliminary survey of the literature. My central aim of gathering personal narratives about
negotiated experiences with development work lent itself to the design of an interview with
a hybrid pyramid-funnel structure which was ultimately based around storytelling prompts
(Dunn, 2010). Appendix F shows an annotated version of interview schedule and can be
broken into four sections. The first section follows convention, posing scene setting
questions aiming to build rapport and encourage active participation from the interviewee
without attempting to elicit particularly demanding responses (Dunn, 2010). Scene setting
questions are followed by prompts to delve further into initial impressions of Bamiyan before
discussing more technically specific elements of participants’ work. While all questions are
oriented around integrating personal storytelling with structural commentary, interspersed
are questions which bring the focus firmly back to the participant. Finally, the last section
aims to encourage an organic summation by the participant, resolving the interview.

4. The doing of it all: Interviews, Ethics & Positionality

In discussing the grounding of this research, its methodology, and methods I have made little
effort to separate reflection from description. Allowing for this is partly a result of
idiosyncrasies in my writing and partly a mirror for, unlike those who took themselves off to ‘the field’ for a period of months, my field was also my home. It seems difficult, in light of this, to discuss the analysis of interview data, without acknowledging that the process of analysis was fluid and that gathering data, its analysis, and ‘writing up’ were jumbled together for most of the twelve month period in which this thesis was written. The writing of this final section was guided by reflections I made about the research process in the ‘field journal’ I kept over the course of the year, and gathers together some reflections on the doing of research, particularly with relation to the ethical considerations of working with the express permission of the NZDF.

4.1 Ethics

The process of gaining ethical approval to conduct this research proved exceptionally informative. While Sultana (2007) notes that institutional ethical guidelines often fail to capture the most commonly experienced difficulties in field research, they undoubtedly prompt important reflection prior to ‘entering the field’ about the personal and functional aspects of the research process. Included in my application was a commitment to gaining permission from the NZDF to conduct research with their support. Having been cautioned by both teaching staff and peers about the difficulties associated with researching the NZDF, I began to feel as if I had been naively optimistic about my prospects. Kiri Stevens’s (2013, p. 36) reflection in particular struck me, she commented in her thesis:

“My application to conduct research with the New Zealand Army was never granted and when this became apparent to me I was plagued with the idea that my application had failed to be taken seriously because I was an inexperienced unaffiliated, young female researcher.”

The spectre of ‘the gatekeeper’, who holds the power to grant access to the elites of our society, is a convincing barrier to research in closed organisational contexts. As has been noted previously, Smith (2006) mentions how frustration with closed institutions has, in some contexts, caused researchers to abandon ethical covenants in order to access information. Conversely, in instances where research is undertaken with express permission from a given organisation, trepidation that results will elicit dissatisfaction may result in research integrity being compromised (Dowling, 2010).

While I do not wish to downplay the experiences of others, my own runs somewhat counter to these conventional narratives. I was lucky to have had pre-existing contacts with whom I

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30 Rubinstein (2012, pp. 193–4) discusses this anxiety, noting his experiences with proposing research which aimed to ‘study up’ to institutional review boards and being met with “disbelief that access could be gained to the institution to be studied, especially when the researcher was a younger scholar or the institutions were part of Western society.”
could cautiously network prior to the start of my research and from whom I gained an understanding of how best to approach potential interviewees and the NZDF as a whole. It was a friend who directed me to the Organisational Research unit with whom I officially applied to conduct research, and another friend who organised conversations with staff at the Command and Staff College (Trentham, Wellington) about previous external research with NZDF personnel and how best to get started. The ability of the personal to subvert organisational constraints where power relations in research are concerned carried through to my conversations with research officers within the Organisational Research unit who were engaged with, and supportive of, my research.

The approval process, while lengthy, was completed in early September of 2014 and required no substantial changes to my research objectives or interview schedule. I reflected in my research journal on this point, considering the question of academic integrity, and what it meant to work with NZDF:

“Speaking with the people in [the Organisational Research unit] it felt like a very big organisation with a normal human face, offering help, support, validation and legitimacy. It has been comforting being able to openly communicate what I am interested in, and be spoken to (equally openly) about Defence’s position. It’s also interesting/reassuring that the points of clarification they sought from me were the same ones that the Victoria Human Ethics Committee asked for. It makes me think of NZDF as not just some monolithic self-interested organisation but rather one full of ordinary people” (Monday 28 July, 2014).

4.2 Interviews and Finding my Participants

Negotiating ethics in practice involves a reflexive interaction with research as “politically engaged, materially grounded, and institutionally sensitive” (Hopkins, 2007; Sultan a, 2007, p. 375). In finding my participants personal connections and good timing secured my initial interviews, from which I engaged in snowball sampling (N. King & Horrocks, 2010). My interaction with what I saw as ‘gatekeepers’ was limited as the gatekeepers were friends and peers. Corra and Willer’s (2002) argument that gatekeepers amplify pre-existing inequalities where access to information and individuals are concerned proved true, as my ability to make the connections I did was a direct function of my positionality and already established connections.

I conducted interviews with ten male personnel over a period of six months, having initially begun with a target sample of between four and twelve participants. Table 1 lists participants and gives an indication of the position they held within the PRT. The benefits of being ‘at

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31 A group within the NZDF Defence Personnel Executive (DPE) which provides Human Resources support see http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/personnel-records/ for additional information.
home in the field’ were evident. By conducting my research in Wellington I was proximate to the majority of senior NZDF personnel and commencing research in the year following the conclusion of the PRT’s deployment, likely also worked in my favour as participants were close and the deployment, some would argue, less politically charged.32

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<th>Table 1: NZDF Research Participants and Positions they held within the PRT</th>
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Anxiety and uncertainty naturally accompanied me into the interview space, compounded by insecurities based what I considered my own lack of contextual knowledge about Afghanistan, my position as a young female researcher, and an outsider to NZDF. Many feminist researchers have discussed the shifting relationships of power which manifest in the interview site, particularly those between female academics and male participants (Arendell, 1997). Smith (2006, p. 646) notes, the assumption is often made when interviewing elites, particularly those working within closed organisations, that “the power and authority available to [them] in their professional life will translate directly onto the interviewer-interviewee context”, however, as I found this was not always the case.

As objectivity was never one of my goals, I chose to view the embedded nature of the field in my everyday life and my positionality as an advantage. Interviews were not solely a site for the gathering of reflections to inform subsequent analysis, but also a place of personal learning. My first participant, with whom I spent more than five hours over the course of three interviews, reinforced this belief as his captivating style of narration and amiability assuaged a lot of the anxiety I carried into the interview space. Valerie Yow writes about the benefits and the weight of reflexive practice in the interview site noting that “we interviewers watch ourselves as much as we watch our narrators” (1997, p. 66). Subsequent interviews

32 Ward & Jones (1999, p. 304) discuss the importance of timing in conducting research with elites in relation to the perceived appropriateness of the research. This is salient at both an individual and organisational level. Sabot (1999) also interacts with the idea of locality and being at home in research with elites, commenting on how differently researchers can be received when conducting research ‘at home’ versus away from home.
with other participants lasted between one and two hours, mostly over a cup of coffee, and were varied in the degree to which I felt at ease or prepared.

Ultimately, speaking with my participants was an experience I enjoyed immensely as it provided a chance to discuss a topic I was passionate about with individuals who had lived what I had only read about. In allowing myself to be immersed in their stories I interrogated whether I had been guilty of making heroes of my narrators, as Yow suggests may be a consequence of conducting narrative or life history research (Yow, 1997, p. 78). This was a question I never resolved, but rather chose to interpret as a valuable experience in developing my skills as an interviewer and researcher. In considering this point I returned to Bondi’s (2003, p. 74) work in particular with fresh eyes, and now feel I grasp her comments concerning empathy in the interview space, she concludes:

“Empathy entails oscillating between participating in processes of (unconscious) identification, and remaining aware of – observing – some distinction (however fragile) between one’s own and the other person’s inner realities. This communicates (usually non-verbally and often unconsciously) respect for differences as well recognition of similarities, and it is this process that matters, enabling us to communicate (however faltering) across differences we can easily name (such as gender) and many others of which we are not consciously aware.”

4.3 Analysis

Analysis of interview data was something of a non-linear process and indeed the four ideal stages of collection, organisation, coding, and finally theorising seemed jumbled from start to finish (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014). The nature of my research questions and interview schedule, focusing on reflections and narrative, encouraged an analysis predicated on the hopeful emergence of common themes

33 (N. King & Horrocks, 2010). Transcription of interviews initially formed a central part of my plan for analysis, as having future access to the verbatim reflections collected in the interview setting seemed essential to comprehensive analysis. However, given the unwillingness of some participants to have their interviews recorded, I quickly discarded this assumption, sliding (as I have at different points throughout the research process) away from my initial rigidity toward a flexibility of process (Murray & Overton, 2014). I opted to transcribe in full those interviews that I had recorded, and take detailed notes in those interviews which I had not. This resulted in a sometimes comical dash back to my computer post-interview to type up my notes and everything else I could remember. More often than not I could be found on buses muttering reflections into

33 Themes defined here as “recurrent and distinctive feature of participants’ accounts, characterising particular perceptions and/or experiences, which the researcher sees as relevant to the research question” (N. King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 150)
my recorder while avoiding eye contact with other passengers. Most of these reflections were based around the acknowledgement of the interview site and conversation itself as a ‘social thing’ meaning that various contextual factors were included in the notes made, both prior to the meeting, and after (Weinberg, 2006, p. 105). These notes featured in the journal I kept during the research and alongside notes in files made for transcription.

The processes of transcription, note taking, and field journaling are argued to form aspects of analysis in and of themselves, and while I initially planned for a specific ‘analysis’ period, themes which emerged were constantly ticking over in my mind as I interviewed (Cuppes & Kindon, 2014). Consequently I chose to utilise a very basic system of data management using the program QDA Miner with which I identified common descriptive elements in interviews, followed by common emotive reflections, and finally common overarching themes (Fielding, 1993; N. King & Horrocks, 2010). My experience of the interview-analysis process as inseparable and iterative made for a constant sense of battling with my own expectations of what kind of reflections I would find, those that I had found, and trying to avoid injecting them into my interviews. I was reminded of Béatrice Pouligny’s (2006, pp. xv–xvi) thoughts on her own research with peacekeepers:

“Personally I always find the analysis and writing phase much more painful than the actual ‘field-work’ phase. One cannot constantly encounter the ambivalences present across our world and not feel somewhat unsteady when putting forward an interpretation of them that a tiny detail can sometimes overturn…It is necessary to accept this. Not to claim that my interpretation is ‘better’ than the others or totally invalidates them, but rather to suggest a possible complement. To give my readers as many clues as possible so that they will know ‘where I am coming from’ and how I worked with the subject…I never stop doubting.”

In reflecting on this aspect of the interview process I struggled to remind myself that it is all too easy to view interviews as “discrete speech events isolated from the stream of social interaction in which – and for which – they were produced” (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006, p. 39). A fear of ‘contaminating the data’ was something I recognised in myself after the first few interviews. Initially I attempted to develop a basic coding system for my own reflections and initial interview notes to account for, or understand, how the interview space may have been ‘affected’. However, I eventually became comfortable with the process, content to read and re-read interview notes and transcripts drawing on Maggie Maclure’s (2013a, 2013b) recommendation that a researcher ought to sit with data, particularly that which doesn’t ‘fit’. Further, remaining open to the data was something that I felt was important, commitment

34 Such as the location of the interview, an assessment of rapport, the time of the interview, dialogue beforehand, as well as my own reflections on the tone of the conversation and aspects which I found particularly interesting.
to the brainstorming of all plausible lines of reasoning for analysis, as Barry Turner (1981) has demonstrated, often forms an vital part of the process in itself.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the epistemological underpinnings of this research in addition to the decision to pursue an approach which draws on the work of critical social theorists, ethnographers, and scholars of the feminist post-structural tradition. Carrying these points of reference through to a discussion of methodology I have evaluated the decision to undertake qualitative research, with semi-structured interviews as my principle method. The following chapters will draw almost entirely on the reflections of the ten NZDF personnel I spoke with to answer my two research questions concerning their experiences with security and development. These reflections are, as will all other parts of this research, (re)presented through the lenses with which I view the world.
Chapter 5: The Nexus in Context

1. Introduction
In literature addressing the emergent security-development nexus the influence of discourse in (re)producing understandings of these concepts in context is centralised (Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2010; Reid-Henry, 2011; Stern & Ojendal, 2010). Often existing as way to “describe and analyse macro processes”, how security and development are understood and (re)produced are similarly ensconced in the process of meaning making and outcome determination at the individual level, as Stern & Ojendal (2010, p. 7) assert:

“The power of definition over ‘development’ and ‘security’ also implies power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses.”

As Chapter 3 noted the diversity evident in PRT models in Afghanistan justifies investigation of the ways in which said diversity arose, while Chapter 4 (in part) illustrated the potential value to be gained from research at the scale of the individual military actor. This chapter adopts the theoretical framework of the nexus, to illustrate the ways in which security and development were understood and communicated by the ten NZDF personnel interviewed.

Broken into three sections, this chapter addresses my first overarching research question, concerning how NZDF personnel who served on the PRT (2003-2013) understand their work with respect to their position as security and development actors. The first and second sections consider security and development in turn, drawing on my analysis of interview transcripts and notes to (re)present common understandings of both concepts, in addition to those reflections which were less easily categorised. The final section draws together strands from the previous two, in order to demonstrate how the isolation of security and development constrains understandings of their interwoven nature as experienced by individuals.

2. Security
In a conceptual sense, security refers to survival in the presence of an existential threat to a referent object and is often linked to the territorial integrity of states and the protection of their sovereignty (Acharya, 2008; McDougall, 2010; Templeton, 1986). Interrogation of ‘security’ has resulted in a partial reconceptualization of what constitutes a threat beyond military action, in addition to whether the state is the only unit which can be threatened (Acharya, 2008; McDougall, 2010). The concept of ‘human security’ has become prominent in this context positioning the individual as the referent object of security and the threats
they experience as extending beyond physical violence (Gasper, 2005). Initially suggested by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘human security’ is underpinned by principles similar to those evoked in discussions of ‘human development’, conflating the conditions which arise to produce crises of both security and development as well as the means by which to combat them (McDougall, 2010).

For military personnel security, or an awareness of the security environment, has traditionally been conceived of in relation to the ability to exact violence in an offensive or defensive context if the necessity to do so arises (Henry, Higate, & Sanghera, 2009; Stevens, 2013). The referent object of security can be determined by the context within which military personnel are operating. In combat operations security may be expressed in relation to opposition forces, while in operational contexts where the military is acting outside a strict warfighting paradigm (such as the experience of the NZPRT in Bamiyan) security may be conceived of more broadly. Potential sources of threat are considered beyond those from hostile actors, while addressing these threats moves beyond offensive action to intelligence gathering, communication and relationship building or ‘winning hearts and minds’ (Friis, 2010). Further, the question of what or who constitutes the referent object of security in this context is complicated, as security is repositioned as an achievable state within which activities can occur (Zürcher, 2012).

These debates are echoed in the nexus literature in considerations of how contemporary conceptions of security interact with development. Considering how security is understood by different actors, some argue, can aid in elucidating the interests of those who “consciously perform security discourse” as well as the conditions within which actors make decisions about security, or with security in mind (Ingram & Dodds, 2009, p. 6). Further, the nexus literature acknowledges the presence of multiple coexisting understandings of security which may not adhere to the neat boundaries existent in theoretical conceptions of security.

This section explores how NZDF personnel communicated their understandings of security. While discussing security explicitly was not a specific goal of the interviews, in the process of reflecting on experience understandings of what constituted relevant aspects of security in relation to development were elucidated. This section makes note of security discourse emerging to convey security concerns as ever present (2.1 Security as first and foremost).

As Gasper (2005, p. 223) summarises the 1993 and 1994 Human Development Reports “added six types of security to a conventional concern with security from physical violence: income security, food security, health security, environmental security, community/identity security, and security of political freedoms.”
discussing how these were positioned as either internal or external, before considering more nebulous understandings and reflections (2.2 Security as *just the fact that we were there*).

2.1 **Security as first and foremost**

Security, was most commonly spoken about in what I have understood as an ever-present sense or, in the words of NZDF3, as “first and foremost”. Expressed in relation to various aspects of the deployment as well as the experiences of personnel in other contexts, security was positioned as both a goal of the PRT’s presence in Bamiyan, as well as a means by which to achieve that goal. While discussions of security often spilled over from one to another, I have chosen to divide these into instances where security was *externalised* by personnel in discussions of threats in the operating environment, and *internalised* as an aspect of the mission or their own professional responsibility. I borrow, in part, from Patricia Omidian’s (2012) characterisation of the ‘security scape’ she experienced while working in Afghanistan, where personal security considerations are combined with the demands of the environment.

2.1.1 **Externalised threats**

The externalisation of security was mostly focused on threats presented by the operating environment; physical, historical, and human. Despite the initial assessment of threat levels in Bamiyan Province and Afghanistan as a whole as ‘high’ (New Zealand Government, 2003b) the threat level described by most personnel was low, with ‘benign’ often used to describe the province. NZDF9 spoke about the operating environment:

Bamiyan [is] unique, [the] security environment there is pretty benign because it’s Hazara primarily, um, so for me the security side of things was only a minor you know? It was me, like I was an insurance policy rather than an active participant of it… we had security incidents, but they were isolated and down to one individual who was causing the same thing, rather than a group or a combined effort.

While the threat of a disaffected Tajik population in the North-East of the province was often raised as a relative measure of insecurity in the province, the majority of security concerns for personnel related to the physical environment itself. The nature of the terrain was described by NZDF1 as *absolutely fantastic ambush country* due to the poor quality of the roads, or their precarious positioning, either at high altitude or in valleys walled on either side by steep slopes. Fluctuations in climate between summer and winter (both seasons of extreme) as well as severe weather at altitude were raised by a number of personnel as more salient security threats than those related to hostile groups.

In addition to the nature of the physical environment an awareness of Bamiyan’s violent past was drawn on by personnel as a component of the security environment. Handmade or poorly maintained roads were a source of concern due to the potential presence of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) placed below the loose gravel surface. Remnants of war also feature in most personnel’s characterisations of the security environment. Abandoned tanks from the Soviet invasion (1979-1989) as well as unexploded ordinance were often seen from the road-side and required investigation by personnel. In both their initial impressions and ongoing reflections, the visible legacy of conflict, particularly in the urban areas, appears to have shaped perceptions of the security environment. NZDF1 described Kabul at first sight as something akin to a Mad Max set and NZDF8 noted that to see the lasting effects from a decade of conflict, at that time, well over a decade of conflict was quite sobering another commenting you could tell that this place had been pretty badly beaten up.

Finally, most personnel briefly discussed the security threat posed by disaffected members of the Bamiyan population, and groups moving through Bamiyan from other provinces. Reticence in this context was linked with an understanding of Afghanistan’s recent past, particularly in relation to the Taliban, and an openness concerning whether individuals they encountered or worked with had been Taliban or may have remained sympathetic to their cause. Such reflections were particularly interesting as they echoed the arguments of critical geographers Kirsch and Flint (2011, p. 14) who note that “many, if not most or all, of the social actors involved in conflict are likely to remain in post-conflict”. Acceptance of this fact draws attention to the renegotiation of power relations which occurs in periods of conflict, and continues during the process of peace in which external interveners become thoroughly ensconced. Personnel demonstrated an acute awareness of this fact, and while the importance of situational awareness and caution were reiterated, there was also an implicit understanding that the security of the PRT was substantially influenced by the sympathies of the people of Bamiyan.

2.1.2 Internalised responses

Less explicitly discussed than externalised understandings, internalised notions of security emerged in discussions of the PRT’s role in Afghanistan, as well as in relation to personnel’s professional competency.

New Zealand’s involvement in Afghanistan was defined by a focus on the “humanitarian and reconstruction thrust of the deployment” (Hoadley, 2011, p. 143). In Government releases security was positioned as something to be enhanced, emphasising “a PRT is not a combat unit. It provides strengthened military observer capacity, which also acts as a centre for the facilitation of NGO and other civilian contributions to reconstruction” (New Zealand Parliament, 2003, p. 6040). These key priority areas were raised by participants often early in the interview as a way to contextualise their responses to the scene setting questions.
NZDF3’s comment (when asked about his expectations of the deployment) on this subject is indicative of this type of framing discussion:

We had three main pillars that we needed to execute you know, security was first and foremost and then there’s reconstruction and development tasks [but] without the security bit we couldn’t do nothing really and so it I had a pretty clear understanding of what was required of us on the ground when we got there.

Grounding narrative in public discourses about the PRT’s purpose, in this case those which demote security and elevate reconstruction and development objectives, was common in personnel’s reflections. As Dawson (1994) notes, narrators will often offer stories which to some degree confirm popularly held understandings of their experiences, regardless of the extent to which those public discourses confirm their own experiences. The remark made by NZDF3 positions security as almost separate to the other pillars, understood as both an organisationally defined goal built into the purpose of the mission, and as something which, if guaranteed, will result in the success of other operations on the ground. The details of what constituted ‘security’ or a secure environment were infrequently elaborated on beyond a relationship to the ability of development and reconstruction to occur. Security was therefore defined as a necessary enabler, and a result of processes enabled by its presence.

Notable for their absence, were understandings of security as conflict oriented. Scholars often note that the recourse to violence or glorification of hegemonic militarised masculinities (often relating to the controlled use of violence) commonly feature in discourses of valorisation for military personnel (Bondy, 2005; Duncanson, 2009; Harding, 2008; Higate, 2011; Stevens, 2013). In my interaction however little to no value was placed on the ‘warrior’ military stereotype. Most commonly personnel commented that such personalities and associated behaviours had no place in the PRT. Remarks about ‘going to war’, ‘fighting’ or eliminating the bad guys were attributed to younger less experienced personnel, and from a leadership perspective, were considered at best unhelpful and at worst a liability.36 NZDF8 commented:

There were a number of young army people who thought we were going over there to fight the Taliban so it was a case of recalibrating those sort of thoughts, you know we’re not actually here to fight the Taliban we’re here to provide security in an area so that we can crack on do our main job which is the development, making the place better for the people of Bamiyan.

Reference to the excitement of having an opportunity to deploy and the sense of purpose gained by personnel as a result, was, however, often reflected on with pride and satisfaction. NZDF3 remarking that it was great to see young Kiwi soldiers doing the job they signed the dotted line

36 The personnel I interviewed fell within the mid to high level command bracket of the PRT and often made reference to themselves as part of the older cohort of deployed personnel.
to do. NZDF1 also remarked in this vein, *you didn't have to tell people to go, they wanted to go - especially the reserves or infantrymen who were all trained up with nowhere to go.*

These reflections stayed with me as I felt they drew on historical narratives of a military’s positioning in society and elements of valour and purpose that are attributed to overseas deployments. Kiri Stevens (2013), in her conversations with two New Zealand Army reservists who deployed to the Solomon Islands, discusses the ‘hierarchy of deployments’ alluded to by her participants. Afghanistan in their mind was positioned on the highest rung, the most prestigious deployment available to personnel due to its perception as a ‘real warzone’. Indeed the majority of my participants reflected that it had been the highlight of their career (NZDF 1, 3, 6, 8) suggesting that purpose or satisfaction in work for military personnel is still closely linked to the security environment they are charged with operating within.

The linkages between military professionalism and internalised understandings of security were also elaborated on in explanations of the Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) phase by all participants, regardless of their military background. Cited as being *primarily defensive rather than offensive* (NZDF1) and *threat oriented* (NZDF7) personnel noted the emphasis placed on force protection or self-protection in the AO during PDT. Some participants suggested that this was a result of the CRIB deployment being planned as a joint operation, NZDF6 commenting:

> The huge chunk [of PDT] was around self-protection, which takes the longest to do because you've got a lot of people at different levels. The army guys, it's their bread and butter but you have navy and air force as well.

Most also noted the emphasis on small team tactics, tactical movement (mounted and dismounted), tactical procedures and small arms training likely resulted from the fact that for many deployed personnel infantry work was *very much a second string* (NZDF8). The emphasis on defensive training and reactive force-protection in the field as an aspect of functional security was returned to by a number of participants later in their discussions of other aspects of their experience.

Two participants commented that being infantry or *being a soldier* was what all personnel were first and foremost. Linking defensive security with military identity in statements such as *of course if we came under attack you resort to being an infantryman* (NZDF2). In this sense the physical security imperative and recourse to violence is ever present yet articulated defensively as opposed to offensively or in an overt display of violence against a specified other. Stevens (2013) made a similar note in her research suggesting that recourse to violence, even in non-warfighting contexts, still constitutes an essential element of military identity, akin to a
'security floor', the presence of which serves to inform all other decisions such individuals make.

The ever present aspects of the security scape articulated by personnel establish that security concerns in Bamiyan were numerous. Externalised threats to security are mitigated by defensive practices and an awareness of the operating environment, professional behaviours which are learned and internalised as part of the conventional military ‘soldier’ or infantry skillset. The way in which security was downplayed by the majority of personnel was undoubtedly a partial consequence of my own framing of my research as a project concerned with development activities.\(^3\) However, it may also be indicative, as has been suggested, of personnel’s unconscious decision to reproduce a public discourse which positions development and humanitarian activities as the most acceptable narrative for explaining New Zealand’s presence in Afghanistan

### 2.2 Security as just the fact that we were there

Security was also understood by personnel in ways which I found difficult to categorise. These more nebulous descriptions connected security with presence understanding it as something was developed and guaranteed. This re-positioned the referent object of security from NZDF personnel themselves to the Afghan people and understood the PRT as a facilitator of security and guarantor of a secure environment by virtue of their presence. The intangibility of presence alone was a source of frustration for some personnel who communicated that at times they felt their role was simply to stay there and keep the peace (NZDF\(^5\)) sometimes without adequate resourcing. NZDF\(^9\), when discussing the advantages of the PRT, reflected on this differently noting that the locals certainly said that they felt, they were appreciative of us just having a presence of not being too overly aggressive with the patrolling. NZDF\(^8\) commented similarly when discussing what he reflected most on from his time in Afghanistan:

> I would I think, um, the key impact we were having was, I would say we were facilitating security. Even though we weren't a big force at the time and even though the situation was relatively benign. I mean these people [in Bamiyan] were always hyper sensitive to any changes in the security situation. So the PRT's permanent presence there, and probably our win, was to engage and talk about it rather than riding past in big armoured vehicles and avoiding them. [That] was probably where we achieved our more successful outcomes. We may not have had the resourcing of some of the bigger PRTs had, um, we had to get in line like everyone else, I think the people probably understood that.

\(^3\) Nina Harding (2008) makes particular note of this in her research.
Sitting with this reflection and others of a similar character, revealed a lot about how different contextual understandings of security were woven together. While security related tasks (such as patrolling), and security threats (hostile local groups, poorly maintained infrastructure, overzealous personnel) were discussed, NZDF8 suggests that the biggest win for security was in the way in which these threats were responded to and the way those responses were carried out. Megoran (2011) and Williams & McConnell (2011) have argued the micro-work of ‘everyday peace’ is to be found in reflections such as these. Engagement (as opposed to avoidance) and productive dialogue concerning security threats is an example of such micro-work which reproducing peaceful relations and, in doing so, enhancing security.

Personnel accepted that the PRTs presence was only ever temporary and their ability to guarantee or facilitate security was limited by both time and the ability of the local population to maintain security in their absence (NZDF1,7,8). As a result, discussions of security as presence often carried over to reflections about relationships formed between communities, government administrators, and ANP. These reflections, however, were often tempered by a reticence about the strength of community policing in the absence of PRT oversight (NZDF2,8,9). Linked not only to the observed behaviour of local police but also to an acceptance that outside of government structures there remains an exceptionally strong parallel structure of power derived from traditional leadership, both religious and otherwise (Ansary, 2014).

3. Development

As development theorists Cowen & Shenton (1996, p. 4) argue, development can “be defined in a multiplicity of ways because there are a multiplicity of "developers" who are entrusted with the task of development". Both theoretical conceptualisations of development, and development as it is practiced, have been argued to display a tendency toward ahistoricism by post-development theorists and anthropologists of development (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Kothari, 2005; Lewis, 2009). The ‘perpetual present’ in which development is acted out, Lewis (2009) posits, embodies the essence of high modernism where the past is viewed as an impediment to progress and necessary social transformation. Unpicking how development is understood and utilised to advance certain agendas involves a necessary engagement with historical perspectives, linkages, and the interwoven logics of its discursive evocation. Lewis (2009, p. 33) argues that doing so at the scale of the individual has the potential to subvert these ahistorical tendencies which dominate at the conceptual level, by privileging “individual life histories that can tell us a great deal about the people and practices involved in development processes and the factors that shape people’s room for manoeuvre within these broader institutions and structures”.

This section explores how development was understood by NZDF personnel and, while following a similar form to the previous section, the focus of interview questions on development meant that reflections were more directed and less incidental. In addressing understandings of development, I refer to incidences where ‘development’ was explicitly referred to and reflected on as well as examples of development practice personnel participated in or observed. Drawing on McDougall’s (2010, pp. 171–2) analysis of the nexus in Timor Leste, I am concerned with what personnel believe was constitutive of “development”, as both idea and process. The first section discusses how development was framed by personnel at the start of interviews in relation to public discourse around the PRT’s deployment. The second considers development as a process oriented around the isolation of need and the subsequent formulation of action based responses before a final discussion of development as communication, partnership and ‘good change’.

4.1 Framing Development

Understandings of development for all participants were established early in the course of interviews. Conveyed initially in relation to the organisational context under which the PRT was operating in Bamiyan, some framed their narrative with reference to the three pillars of the deployment (NZDF1,10) while others elaborated on the interconnected nature of all three.

NZDF2 Now normally military forces go in there purely in the security role just to provide the preconditions to enable development and governance to occur but in this particular instance we were seen as important providing an important function in the governance and development area.

Development, like security, was acknowledged to be both a goal of the PRT and a means by which to achieve the adjoined goals of governance and security in Bamiyan.

Harding (2008), when conducting narrative interviews with Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) personnel, noted a similar tendency among interviewees to initially define the subject matter of their narratives around the information that was provided to them ahead of the interview (such as sample questions and information sheets). Mintz & Redd (2003) discuss such instances at the theoretical or policy level as examples of evaluative framing. In this instance, by prefacing their reflections with initial comments on the subject at hand (the PRT’s development work), personnel constructed their experiences for me, partially in reaction to how I had constructed them before the interview as military-development actors.

In addition to framing development with reference to the pillars of the CRIB deployment, personnel discussed how their role as development actors was initially communicated to
them during the PDT phase. Briefings on Afghan culture, history, and etiquette were cited as providing a toolkit from which to draw on when negotiating development priorities, as well as giving personnel an idea of some of the situations they would encounter (NZDF6,10). While constantly reinforced, as NZDF6 notes that the purpose of the deployment was security, development and governance we weren’t running around the hills looking for bad guys, many remarked that in retrospect they believed development could have been focused on more in PDT. Some commented that while briefings on the operating environment were excellent, they appeared to come at the expense of discussions of development practice:

[NZDF8] We did a little bit of training on um the cultural aspects of Afghanistan, a bit of a read into the intelligence picture, health and safety related stuff, and we did a bit of practical application of meeting etiquette, and stuff like that. But in terms of how to undertake a project, how to manage it, how to provide advice to a district governor on issues such as law and order, public engagement, [were] almost non-existent.

Several personnel accepted that structured training could only go so far in preparing personnel for their role as development actors, noting that the most useful source of information pre-deployment came from peers or friends who had held similar positions on previous PRTs.39

4.2 Development as a Process: Needs-focused and Action-based

While organisational understandings of development served as a frame through which personnel communicated their role as development actors, as interviews progressed the majority of personnel oriented their narratives of development around ‘need’ (material deficits) and ‘action’ (responses). Personnel acknowledged international, national, provincial, and community level development priority areas and how they interacted to determine the overall character of development in Bamiyan. While less obvious immaterial deficits, such as capacity within government or technical expertise were also acknowledged, they formed a secondary, more complex concern for most personnel.

Experiences with development were determined by whether personnel operated at the provincial or local (district and village) level.40 Those operating at the district and village level referred to need in relation to consultation processes with decision making bodies.

38 Personnel cited cultural training, etiquette, language training – including how to interact with interpreters, information about the environment & climate (including altitude)
39 Those occupying a higher level role displayed a more secure understanding of the operating environment and what was expected of them than those in mid-level roles.
40 High level personnel most often interacted with development at the provincial level, consulting with the Provincial governor and administration to coordinate and plan development projects. Mid-level personnel interacted with district governors and sub-governors, as well as communities to coordinate and plan development projects on a smaller scale, as well as feeding large-scale projects into the provincial government’s plans.
Identifying *what are your needs* (NZDF1) at a community level dominated most narratives of development which were heavily focused on determining where priority area deficits were being experienced by the local population (NZDF8). Most personnel linked this focus on need with access to, and availability of, funding noting that the primary focus for funders appeared to be on sustaining and improving lives and livelihoods (NZDF5). Action, in this context, was often directly connected to mobilising funding to address these material deficits.

The organisational or structural imperative behind development as need was reified for most personnel by the existence of an equally strong personal or humanitarian imperative to ‘help’. Participants, particularly those who were directly engaged with local communities, noted the *culture shock* (NZDF10) of being surrounded by an impoverished population dependent on subsistence agriculture (NZDF3,8,10). Needs identified within this discourse were often described in terms of their insubstantial character in the wider project of development in Bamiyan, as well as in comparison with living standards in New Zealand. Such needs logically follow on to an action designed to eliminate a locally volunteered or externally perceived deficit. NZDF3 describes a common QIP providing access to clean water:

> In most of those remote villages their only source of water will be from a spring in the ground which they got their drinking water out of, they got the water to wash their clothing, their dishes and everything else, the dogs drank out of the same source, the donkeys and you know it's just, um it's quite, from a western view it's quite sad to see kids drinking out of the same pool as a dog and a donkey, but that's their life you know?

An awareness of the context within which development had to occur, was spoken about at length by most personnel. Understanding the *culture and need* to be able to sort the source of the problem as NZDF5 succinctly stated, demonstrates personnel’s positioning of cultural understanding as a principle influence on successful development processes.41 This understanding of development as a logical progression from the perception or identification of the need (in addition to a willingness to help), to a tangible action based response, and a beneficial outcome, positions development as a process of problem solving.

Personnel interacting with development at the provincial level attributed relative project value differently to those operating at the community and district level. As NZDF6 summarised small projects at the community or district level were quick wins for the PRT where we could quickly establish a need… [and] you could take it from start to finish, it was pretty small

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41 The way that ‘culture’ was used to describe differences in lifestyle made clear that it was a catch-all term to describe difference for most personnel.
but you could actually take it from start to finish. NZDF2 spoke about the importance of ensuring these smaller projects benefitted all communities and involved key leaders including those whose influence came from more traditional sources:

I spent a lot of time working with them [key leaders] and I sense that we made a lot of progress in terms of breaking down perceptions, um you're not going to have progress straight ahead, they want development and um development takes time so what we tried to focus on was easy, small projects, they're called QIPs focused on projects which actually involved employment.

The position of QIPs within the broader picture of development in Bamiyan formed a central component of decision making for command level personnel. Identifying need at a local or community level was understood as instrumental in maintaining a feeling of momentum where the overall development of the province was concerned and implied a commitment to communities which enabled larger scale development projects to occur. An additional aspect of this instrumental logic undeniably involved security considerations for the PRT. As NZDF2 indicates, small projects and a sense of momentum in part broke down negative feelings around the PRT's presence in Bamiyan.

While a problem-solving heuristic was common in the narratives of personnel it was met by an understanding of, and in some cases a frustration with, the inability to develop action based responses to all perceived needs. An often referenced example was the availability of educational facilities for girls where communities would either have under-resourced girls’ schools or no girls school at all, preferring instead to reserve existing educational facilities for boys alone.42 Another common experience was interacting with Afghan officials who were believed to take part in corrupt practices including appropriation of development funding or resources for their own personal gain. Being placed in a position where ‘cultural’ differences made personnel uncomfortable with the development process and question ‘development’ the idea, raised awareness in their narratives of the complications that accompany a needs-focused and action-based approach.

Attempts to overcome disagreements about the character of development between Afghans and the PRT were a source of frustration, NZDF1 characterised one such experience as having met, a cultural impediment that could not be crossed. Personnel were wary of imposing their beliefs about development on communities and struggled with situations where development projects failed because of the disjuncture between community priorities and those of the PRT. The characterisation of militaries as “problem solving institutions” (Bondy, 2005, p. 4)

42 Example is deliberately vague so as to protect the confidentiality of the participant interviewed.
is reflected in the comments of personnel who noted the satisfaction gained from carrying development projects from start to finish (NZDF6). However, the difficulties experienced by personnel in developing responses to complex ‘problems’ is indicative of broader issues with deficit oriented frameworks for development which are in no way unique to the military institution. Such frameworks obscure the assets already existing within communities and in doing so, often privilege objectively verifiable results based development contributing to the disjuncture between “development ideas and aims, and practices” (Lewis, 2009, p. 37). Most personnel, after discussing these issues, returned to the centrality of needs being identified by the local population rather than by external actors, and even local government officials. NZDF1 commenting:

There were areas that you wanted to help but you couldn't and probably shouldn't, and that sounds heartless I guess but that had to come from within communities.

4.3 Development as Communication, Partnership and ‘Good Change’

The importance of relationship building and communication was raised as a component of identifying development priorities and gathering information about the security environment. However, it also constituted an important part of the fabric of day-to-day life and subsequently was attributed with meaning in and of itself. Problematising the linkages between identification of need, and action taken to rectify that need elucidated understandings of development as a nebulous and networked interaction. While in many instances communication and partnership with the local population were described in process oriented terms, they were also communicated by speaking about local people as friends, comrades or colleagues (NZDF1,3,7,8). Personnel described working relationships of mutual respect, instances where individuals or groups had gone out of their way to help one another, as well as shared jokes or humorous interactions.

Cultural awareness was positioned at the heart of building trusting relationships between the PRT and the local population, administration, and security sector. Most participants who operated at the district and village level felt they had gained a level of understanding as a result of their experiences that those operating out of Kiwi Base did not (NZDF1,3). NZDF3 describes a situation, positioning trusting relationships as a filter through which all else is considered in the context of project based development:

Building relationships with them is the most important thing and we can only do so much, I just had to be straight up with them you know this is all that we can supply and you know based around what was required for the project, they would always ask for more, I would never promise them anything and I'd make sure that they knew that and that no was no, you know there was stuff that we couldn't do that they

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would ask but in the end you know we would visit those villages and you'd know exactly who the head of Shura was, we already had that sort of relationship, they'd always invite you in, especially me in for tea you know and I'd always do my best to accept that because that's part of their culture and it's a gesture that's seen to be welcoming.

NZDF5 also discussed a similar interaction, noting the difficulty inherent in relationship building when PRT members were received by communities with the expectation that some productive input or project would result commenting that unless you knew you could actually deliver something, all you could do was talk.

Building on more personal understandings of development, participants often self-posed questions towards the conclusion of the interview concerning the tangible and intangible impacts of their presence in Bamiyan. NZDF5, in reflecting on measuring achievement in Bamiyan, asked what did we actually build? Did we build capacity? Or did we just build things?, NZDF9 answered similarly in response to Q.12:

It's probably whether we did do good, you know how much we did help the province to sort of get better, to get over the issues it had gone through and that sort of thing. You do sort of go, well could I have done more with that time, what else could I have done, could I have done something better, could we have organised better to do more and achieve more while we were there?

Actively questioning the impact or ‘good change’ that their presence created, revealed an uncertainty in relation to how development as both a process and an ideological programme is populated with meaning by those involved in its practice. Such narratives drew on the more problematic aspects of needs focused and action based development, supplementing process with the personal as a means by which to evaluate the overall impact that personnel saw their presence as having. Many personnel concluded, in the words of NZDF7 that, anything...has got to be better than nothing where development is concerned.

5. Making Links

In separating out security and development in the narratives of personnel and (re)presenting them here as categorised reflections, the preceding sections have established that each was spoken about in a number of different ways. Both were understood as not singular processes or concepts, but rather as a variety of associated means and ends related to the presence of the PRT in Bamiyan. These understandings coexist, allowing personnel to make sense of their professional responsibilities, but are also drawn upon as a way to question the impact of their work. It is evident from these reflections that the two concepts, and their multiple coexisting understandings, remain difficult to address in isolation with each seeping into

44 Q.12 What do you reflect most on from your time in Bamiyan?
explanations of the other. The understandings provide the raw materials for a discussion on how networks form between associated ideas and processes to populate the nexus, as experienced by these personnel, with meaning.

The first network between security and development was clearly articulated by most participants and displayed an understanding of the relationship between the two as causal. In this network the creation of a space for development was a direct result of separate security activities undertaken by the PRT. This involved personnel positioning the PRT as responsible for providing security now that the bad guys had been removed (and ensuring that they did not return), in order for aid and development to fill the gap (NZDF1,5). The acceptance that Bamiyan had been selected as the preferable province for deployment due to its relatively benign security status, made the creation of this secure space for development well within the reach of a small defence force.

In these explanations personnel considered themselves to be security actors, separate from other development actors, despite their involvement in facilitation of development projects. In some narratives a distinction was established between personnel’s role as a guarantor of security and the role of civilian NGOs as development practitioners. NZDF8 compares deploying in Timor Leste and Afghanistan:

In Timor Leste] There were lots of NGOs there and they were effective and we were there providing security so that they could get on and do their job, they were very aware this is our territory, military you just provide the security and we’re going to do our thing, we don’t want you around us, we don’t want you getting involved in development work, you just do your thing, and that was very clear cut and well defined.

A number of personnel communicated the desirability of this clear distinction between security actors and development actors in the field. NZDF8 going on to remark that in Afghanistan these roles were less well defined, we [the PRT] were there trying to do aid work trying to do development, weren’t very good at it, not well practiced at it.

The second network between security and development was often discussed in similar terms to the first. In acknowledging the difficulties of engaging in development work while positioning themselves as security actors, personnel drew on an instrumental logic for military involvement in development. In this understanding, development work was useful insofar as it was able to guarantee the security of the PRT and the population of Bamiyan at large. NZDF2 displayed this, stating:
The quid pro quo is you know, we'll do that [development] but don't shoot at us. And I remember talking to another ex-Taliban guy who'd headed up their secret police and I said you know we'll provide some assistance to you but make sure you don't kill my soldiers, he said do you think I'm stupid I'm not going to shoot you if you're going to provide me with development, but if you're not then I will you know, that's the rules.

In both of these networks ‘security work’ is positioned as distinct from ‘development work’, each allowing the other to be carried out more effectively by virtue of its presence. However, while the causal network positions security as necessary for development, the instrumental network reverses this, suggesting that development work is pursued to justify the presence of external forces, ultimately allowing wider security to be guaranteed. Both of these understandings leave unacknowledged the specific character of each type of ‘work’. Only later, in response to other questions, or as a part of a particular anecdote, did personnel discuss how difficult it was to separate the work of security and development in their experience.

An activity pursued by the PRT, such as mounted patrolling through outlying districts, which would ordinarily be spoken about as a task related to security, was often spoken about in a way which drew on understandings of development. Reflected on as an often enjoyable experience, patrolling presented an opportunity to get to know local people in communities, form relationships, and discuss livelihoods. While conventional development tasks, such as mentoring local government administrators, doubled as opportunities to evaluate capacity in governance and gain an understanding of the local security environment, in addition to the degree of corruption present in the public sector. These sorts of reflections illustrated far more clearly than any discussion of causal or instrumental linkages, the networked nature of the security-development nexus in practice. While personnel commonly reflected that a clearer distinction between the roles of different groups was desirable, their anecdotal experience indicated that a distinction between actors carrying out security and development tasks does not guarantee a distinction in the outcome of a given activity. Further, the conduct of different actors, whether they operate with the intent to enhance security or development, is likely to have greater impact on the outcomes of the activities they pursue.45

The inseparability of security and development is indicated by the coexistence and interaction of differing understandings of each area. In the nexus literature, these differing understandings have been explored at the level of theory and policy (Reid-Henry, 2011; Stern

45 This reminded me of the often cited point made by Michel Foucault that “people know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what they do does” (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1982, p. 187).
& Ojendal, 2010). However, participants, in speaking about security and development activities, showed that a similar diversity of understandings exists in the minds of individuals. Personnel often wandered into the hypothetical when talking about things they had learned, or hoped had been learned from their experiences as actors in this space. NZDF9’s comment is indicative of the difficulties experienced by personnel when confronted with the confines of their role in the nexus space, as defined by others and the dissonance or ‘awkwardness’ that such containment creates:

It’s a difficult one because of the, um, you know because people are reluctant. They see the military as, you know there's that perception that military's only there to kill and destroy things. They don't understand that actually military people have the same aim as aid and development workers they just have different, they just facilitate it in a different way. So there is a reluctance, you know, when I tried to have meetings with [Organisation A] um, they just couldn't understand you know, they wanted me to completely disarm in an operational zone and I said, well you know I'm happy to leave my rifle but I would still like to carry my pistol and they said no, they were unwilling to meet me, and I'm standing there saying well this is my protection um, but you know so there were awkward things around that.

This reflection, and others of a similar character stayed with me long after the interview as they illustrated the necessity of discussing the way development work in particular was experienced by personnel. Opening up a space for these reflections revealed diverse experiences and complicated the dominance of instrumental and causal logics which continue to reinforce separation between (security and development as) mutually constitutive processes.

6. Conclusion
Understanding the nexus as hollow suggests that seeking to create spaces of security which may be filled with development obscures the reality that the two are inseparable, and as personnel have communicated in some instances, mutually constitutive. In this respect the often touted statement that there is to be ‘no security without development and no development without security’ is in part true, security and development are interconnected. However, what is meant by security and development presupposes that it is possible to know the impact of a given action and whether it will contribute to security or development.

These understandings disrupt the clean causality between the provision of security and the subsequent creation of a space for development to occur. The multiple ways in which security has been understood and communicated by personnel illustrates how the supposedly required act of ‘guaranteeing security’ is opaque in and of itself. As personnel have observed, security is not solely understood as confined to the physical but rather is multifaceted and
consequently the attempt to create a ‘secure space’ for development to occur raises questions concerning what this space must look like, as well as who can contribute and how their contributions will be coordinated (or uncoordinated). Development, like security, is hollow in this space. Problem solving needs-action based approaches to development are complicated by less tangible notions of development as relationship building, trust and friendship. Personnel acknowledge and accept the ways in which they are perceived in the development space by civilian groups and the isolation which results from this. Questions posed by many personnel about whether the development work undertaken by the PRT bought about ‘good change’ are understandable given the difficulty of isolating and quantifying the impact that the PRT was able to achieve.
Chapter 6: Development in Action

1. Introduction

 Undertaking reconstruction and development work in an insecure or post-conflict environment presents a substantial challenge to ensuring efforts are effective and ultimately sustainable (OECD, 2012). Shannon has noted (2009, p. 18) “in the post 9/11 era, Afghanistan has become a testing ground for changes in development theory, humanitarian policy, aid modalities, global governance and responses to the ‘war on terror’”. As Chapter 5 established, NZDF personnel involved in security and development activities are aware of the interlinked, and at times contradictory, elements of their work. Their reflections demonstrate how differing understandings of security and development can coexist, as well as how these understandings deconstruct the causal or instrumental logic which is often espoused to connect the provision of security with the subsequent success of development.

This chapter elaborates on the understandings of development introduced in Chapter 5 to explore my second research question which asks what reflections personnel have on their experiences with development in practice. As noted in Chapter 2, the literature considering military involvement in humanitarian and development activities often constructs military actors as homogenous, implicitly or explicitly serving strategic goals, and ill-suited to non-warfighting tasks. This discourse, in consolidating the distinction between security actors and development actors, is problematic when seeking to address instances where military personnel are involved in development work.

When deciding how to (re)present participant’s reflections on development work, I thought about how most had said that the interview experience had been rewarding. By volunteering to share their reflections with me, an outsider to the military as an organisation, they were prompted to be reflexive and revisit their time in Bamiyan deliberately positioning development as the principle area of concern. The interview served as a space for participants to engage in reflexive practice, to listen and to be heard. The absence of academic literature on this subject is likely a reflection of the fact that engagement with the military remains novel or taboo in many disciplines. As Clementine Fujimura (2012, p. 122) remarked “until I was able to dispel some of the stereotypes I held of the military…it was difficult to acknowledge that the military represented a part of my own society and that the “other” was no other than a part of who I was and am”.
As such, this chapter recreates the reflexive space of the interview site and (re)present the reflections of personnel on the process of development and their agency within it. These reflections partly confirm the assumptions of dominant discourses. However, they also serve to complicate the simplistic notion that an organisational or national prerogative can totally dominate an individual agent’s thoughts and actions surrounding their conduct in the context of development. Ultimately these lessons of experience present a source for learning, both personal and organisational, and elaborate on common critiques of military involvement in development work.

The first section addresses the variety of experiences personnel spoke about in relation to development as a process, discussing the project cycle, the scales and areas at which they interacted, as well as the challenges and rewards of their work. Divided into three subsections, the first examines how local capacity and ownership were negotiated by the PRT, the second ask questions of civil-military cooperation, and the third addresses impact and accountability for development projects in Bamiyan. The second section draws together threads which reveal themselves in these narratives concerning the relationships between process, organisational structure, and the agency of individuals in determining the nature of development as it is acted out. NZDF personnel demonstrate in their reflections, the power of the individual to influence development practice. In addition to this they acknowledge the necessity of agency being exercised to account for the reproduction of the separation of security and development concerns.

2. Reflecting on Development Practice

Oriented around themes which emerged from the reflections of participants, this section moves on from a discussion of development as a concept to development as a process. As was noted in Chapter 3, the positioning of the PRT as a development facilitator, as opposed to a direct provider, established a firm foundation for activities in Bamiyan. Development priorities were drawn from the ANDS by the Bamiyan Provincial Government to inform the PDP ensuring that projects and programmes supported by the PRT were aligned with and directed by the Afghan government. Each of the three sub-sections considers an aspect of the development process reflected on by personnel.

2.1 Whose development? Reconciling Ownership and Capacity

In discussing the process of development, personnel often began by establishing the importance of Afghan ownership of development priorities. As described in the previous chapter, development as need oriented meant that locally identified priorities formed a central element of all narratives. Ownership of the development that the PRT sought to
facilitate was consequently based around their ability to engage effectively with Afghan leadership, forming linkages and relationships of trust.

NZDF6 isolates the process of need or priority isolation for personnel as being affected first, by what communities or local authorities requested; second by what the PRT and its associated bodies could provide; thirdly by the limitations attached to certain funding streams available; and finally by the development plan or programme of the Bamiyan Provincial administration. The establishment of trusting working relationships was instrumental to ensuring that development processes were continuously occurring at all levels. This echoes the reminder of former USAID Administrator Henrietta H. Fore (2008, p. 15) that “local ownership and buy-in of development project objectives are essential, just as important perhaps as actually constructing a school or paving a road”.

All participants, when describing development consultation, went on to make a note about the nature of development activity as they saw it in Bamiyan at the time. Several noted the lack of connections between people in remote villages and their district administrators, and the resultant difficulties involved in accessing funding and resources for development projects. Several personnel noted that they made specific efforts to bring the names of local administrators into conversations with remote communities to illustrate the potential for greater connection and accountability. NZDF10 commented that he found it difficult to effectively communicate the work of the provincial administration to community leaders, noting that in these instances effective Public Relations (PR) proved almost as important as the work itself.

Occupying the intermediary role as a facilitator of development was reflected on as difficult at times. At the provincial level development projects were managed by senior PRT officers and the Development Group in consultation with the provincial administration. While at the district level projects were overseen by FOB Patrol Commanders and Liaison Officers. The process of project formation relied heavily on consultation due to the requirement that personnel oversee the progress of projects while acting as brokers between the provincial administration, contractors and local communities. Many personnel spoke at length about exercising their own personal judgement in the development process in order to discern
whether they were being misled, or investigating the requests of a community to ensure they had not sought similar support from another organisation. This equated to development due-diligence for most and was undertaken in the absence of strict guidelines. The pragmatic necessity of being able to isolate what constituted a legitimate need played heavily on the minds of personnel and often elicited feelings of reticence about the development process itself.

Personnel reflected that facilitation often involved them acting as a representative of multiple funding channels which made them responsible in the eyes of the local population for the success or failure of all projects occurring in an area. As NZDF8 commented:

> So you know it was kind of one of those issues where, because the PRT funded the project we were seen as the creators of the problem. But I went to great lengths to make it appear that I was the arbitrator um and we'd get the problem resolved by the contractor who was the actual problem um and I was working in the interests of the people.

This aspect of the process caused some personnel to feel frustrated and at times helpless, given that their security (particularly for the patrols) was guaranteed by the good will of the population. Personnel commented how these interactions made capacity deficits which were capable of inhibiting the efficacy of relatively simple projects visible, causing personnel to question the sustainability of development in Bamiyan, and the appropriateness of ownership in some situations.

Listening to personnel reflect on this point I engaged more with the tone of their narratives. In noting their position as a facilitator of development as opposed to a provider, personnel simultaneously deconstructed and reinforced the power they held to determine the character of development in Bamiyan. When reflecting on project planning personnel elevated the position of stakeholders in the process, situating themselves as mediators and giving their narratives a sense of distance from the actual ‘doing’ of a project. With this in mind I returned to comments such as the following, made by NZDF3 who spoke about the difficulties of making judgements about development priorities:

> There was probably times when they wanted the world you know but there's only a limit to what we had, resource wise and funding wise. So those small projects, the project fund that we had was useful in that respect, plus that gave us a little more credibility that we actually helping them and it's also long term, especially around water you know their health is going to be...you know they're going to be better for it health wise, at the completion of those jobs.

While often when speaking about local ownership, capacity is discussed with respect to that of local bodies and their ability to manage development assistance, the reflections of personnel indicate that the capacity of the PRT itself had equal influence on reflections about
the process of development. Instances where personnel felt ill-equipped to provide advice, or felt limited by their role, or the capacity of the PRT made personnel uncomfortable. NZDF3’s comment above about being faced with communities who wanted the world makes the issue of donor or facilitator-side capacity in the development process starkly apparent, as individual personnel negotiated what they could provide. Critical of their own work, they communicated uncertainty about how they could have improved in these instances, noting the contradiction inherent in facilitation in the absence of available inputs to facilitate.

Personnel spoke far more positively about experiences with development where a sense of reciprocity had been present and communicated how the relationships they had formed with specific individuals aided in the effectiveness of these projects. NZDF3 commented later in the interview on his relationship with a district sub-governor:

He’d always do the courtesy of seeing me, and we used to be pretty straight up and frank about stuff and established a pretty good rapport and relationship by the end of the 6 months, to the point where we were doing our handover and we were back in Kiwi Base and he came to see me before we were about to fly out, not that he knew when we were flying out but he did the courtesy of coming to Kiwi Base while he was in Bamiyan to see me, so it’s about establishing relationships which is probably the most important thing.

I see these reflections, where personnel relate that they were able to openly negotiate development processes with the capacity of both groups in mind, as evidence of a partnership discourse. This allowed my research participants to situate themselves within their narratives as actors with legitimate influence over aspects of the development process, as opposed to attempting to obfuscate their power. While the language of ‘partnership’ is popular in discussions of cooperation amongst donors the preference for ‘ownership’ in describing the interaction of development organisations and recipient groups could be argued to obscure the extent to which, in a post conflict context, neither actor has full access to or control over the inputs and ideas necessary to reconstruct or transform a given environment. Thinking of development as a process of partnership involves acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of both groups as well as accepting that in the process of ‘doing development’ there will unavoidably be imbalances of power which are best negotiated openly than left unattended.

2.2 Working Together: Civil-Military Relationships

The presence of military actors undertaking development work and providing humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan has been argued to have increased the risk to the civilian assistance

46 A number of personnel reflected similarly on relationships with provincial administrators and district or provincial police chiefs.

47 See for example Bennett (2009).
community with belligerents associating such groups with ISAF (Collins, 2011; Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Omidian, 2012; Shannon, 2009). Dziedzic & Seidl (2005, p. 2) in a report characterising civilian-PRT relations in Afghanistan assess that:

“The optimal level of coordination and information sharing sought by IOs (International Organisations) and NGOs involves establishing clear boundaries that preserve the distinction between civil and military communities. Military personnel aspire to a cooperative relationship.”

For personnel I interviewed, the presence or absence of effective working relationships with the civilian development community was often reflected on, either unprompted or in response to Question 7. The position personnel held within the PRT, and the scale at which they worked (at the provincial or district level) had the greatest impact on their assessment of civil-military coordination.

Those operating at the provincial level commented on attempts to coordinate funding or share information about ongoing development projects beyond the PRT. NZDF6 described meetings held between the PRT and the civilian development community:

We used to get together on a weekly basis with a group of people to make sure that um we were coordinated that we weren't all going to be arriving in the same village to repair the one well. But they were yeah not overly successful because a lot of these other, especially NGOs, [had a] bit of an aversion to working with the military and see that if they are seen to be working with the military they won't be… [well it's] better not to. Whereas others were prepared to come in and get briefings on various things.

Others noted that these meetings also served as an opportunity for the PRT to illustrate their alignment with the Provincial Government’s development priority areas (NZDF10). This was acknowledged as particularly important due to the desire of personnel to address preconceived ideas held by civilian agencies about military conduct in a development capacity. Through engagement at the planning level, personnel saw the benefits of both challenging stereotypes and avoiding duplication of effort. NZDF2 commented on the degree of interaction with respect to the UN:

[There was] reasonably good interaction between the broader NGO community the UN, the international community and the Americans. So…what you're trying to avoid is you all doing the same thing, you're all duplicating I thought, you know, genuinely that it was one of the, it was quite unique in the sense that we were both trying to push towards the same end, pushing the same barrow.

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48 How do you feel the PRT fit within the broader context of development work happening in Bamiyan?
As is evident from NZDF6’s reflection above some organisations remained wary about associating with the PRT, a reaction which all personnel acknowledged as reasonable, given the risks that could result from such engagement. Shannon notes that in this context, the space that humanitarian organisations and other NGOs seek to occupy is subject to both “expansion and constraint” and is “negotiated, agreed and achieved in ‘competition’ with other actors and factors which determine respect for applicable norms” (2009, p. 18). In Bamiyan, cooperation between the civilian assistance community and the PRT carried a comparatively lower risk than it did in other parts of Afghanistan, a fact which personnel acknowledged (Omidian, 2012). However, the acceptability of cooperation remained a point of contention, with competing discourses appearing in participant’s responses. Some positioned the risks for NGOs of association with the PRT as a platform for more concerted engagement between groups, with a vision to dividing responsibilities based on each’s strengths. While others argued this constituted further evidence for both groups to pursue separate objectives, limiting cooperation in order to preserve the humanitarian space for NGOs.49

Personnel operating at the district level interacted differently several admitting they felt uncertain about the degree of engagement which was occurring between PRT (higher level personnel at Kiwi Base) and the development community. NZDF1 and 9 both cited examples of projects occurring where the PRT and a given civilian agency were not on the same telephone line (NZDF1) causing them to feel isolated from official channels of engagement and coordination. NZDF9 noted how this often resulted in patrols being faced with examples of ineffective or poorly planned development projects:

One of the issues we had was our relationship with [Organisation A] wasn’t particularly strong so trying to get coordination with [Organisation A] was difficult. There were individuals who would come into the province and do projects, there were other nations and [uh], other organisations that would come in and things would just pop up, and we would learn about this when the locals would say, “why’d you build a school there”, or “we don’t need that, why have you built this here we don’t need that”. So, you know it was hard, to ah, you know it was like herding cats because there’s no line of authority. The only amount of coordination or control we could have would be those attached to the PRT.

49 NZDF2 spoke at length on this point, concerning UN-Military coordination “I know the UN gets a lot of criticism you know, but they get killed let’s be smart about it, so if we can do their job for them or open doors for them then let’s do it for them. The NGOs are slightly different…the UN have become a target unfortunately, [historically] you know a blue hat, they were left alone but not now, the insurgent sees them as a target in the last 10 years, so they’ve got to be sensible otherwise it’s just unnecessary and they get unnecessarily killed and we don’t want that so you can be critical but don’t be critical of someone who’s going to die if they get it wrong. So I think the synergies between the UN and the military and the PRT are really important.”
The lack of consistency articulated by NZDF9 would appear to be a flow on effect of personnel operating at the provincial level being unable to engage with the assistance community to build a consolidated picture of development occurring in the province.

While personnel understood the civilian development community’s reticence when it came to sharing information, they also noted that the tendency of agencies to spend only short periods of time overseeing or monitoring projects meant that communities often held patrol members responsible for dispute resolution or project failure. Personnel consistently displayed respect for agencies who were visibly engaged with communities acknowledging the centrality of the civilian development community to the long term stability of Bamiyan province. NZDF7 commented they [development agencies] were there before the invasion, they were there during the war, and they will be there long after. NZDF2 spoke positively about an Aga Khan initiative supporting a local hospital:

For example in the hospital um, they had got a 30 year project, okay, and the contract was that they would provide money and resources locally employed staff generally with one or two experts with a view to giving the capacity to run their own hospital in a 30 year period now that's what I call good development, it's that endurance yeah?

At both the district and provincial level the power of perception to determine the efficacy of working relationships between the civilian development community and the PRT was continuously presented as central to the development process. NZDF1 commented that in his experience NGOs were extremely reluctant to talk to us because we contaminated the aid space. NZDF5 explained a similar experience hypothesising that the difficulty or inability to work without suspicion that they experienced was partly a result of organisational incompatibility. 50 Most personnel communicated a sense of frustration in being faced with organisations or individuals who appeared to have made up their mind about the PRT without having considered the individual they were interacting with. In many instances this was strongly connected to their own sense of identity and personal ethic, NZDF9 addressed this issue in the following way:

I did hear um rumours from the locals that [Organisation B] were saying, well the PRT’s not here to help anyone they're here to occupy. What I've really found is that it's not organisational dependent it's personality dependent, so you can have really great relationships with different organisations if you've met them and you've developed that trust there. Example's the [Funder A] guy who was attached to the PRT, my predecessor told me he was awkward and difficult to work with, I found

50 Particularly the perception of deference and fraternity which guides military action and effectiveness (NZDF5). See (Piiparinen, 2007) for a discussion of differing civil-military organisational cultures within a PRT.
him excellent to work with. He told me the [Funder B] guy was lazy and I found him, no not at all, he just had a different way of doing things.

Most personnel attributed the formation of productive relationships with the development community to open and honest dialogue, persistence, and eventually the establishment of trust between parties. Largely unrelated to organisational prerogative, cooperation and partnership were founded on the ability of individuals to challenge preconceived notions about their organisational differences. Others noted that displaying awareness of the concerns of the development community provided opened a door for those in that community who had an interest in cooperation and exchange to step forward. The civilian development community therefore was encouraged (in the minds of personnel) to take charge of the conversation and, in doing so, deconstruct further the perception of the military as seeking to fully control the operational environment.

2.3 Impact and Accountability: Addressing ‘Good Development’

The role of the PRT as a development facilitator meant personnel were often engaged in monitoring progress on projects funded through their channels, as well as assessing and evaluating projects at completion and after. Personnel were reflexive about their practice often making comparisons between development projects they were involved in and others they had observed during the course of their deployment, eliciting judgements about the relative impact of projects or programmes on communities.

Facilitation of development by PRT members meant that most projects described were those which had been contracted to local firms. Personnel commented the variable quality of contractors, and the trustworthiness of local administrators or community leaders to manage projects and funding. Corruption was acknowledged by participants as a very real concern, and was linked with patronage networks or nepotism which were described in relation to culture, or to the nature of the material poverty experienced by some communities. Several made note of this when discussing their personal approach to their work NZDF3 noting because it’s such a corrupt country you need to display that [honesty] aye because otherwise you’re getting behind the eight ball before you even start.

Concerns regarding endemic corruption often carried through to projects which were contracted to firms which were not local, as issues with accountability were routinely experienced. NZDF8 and others commented on the tendency of such contractors to renge on the full extent of their contracted responsibility:
A contractor was selected, that contractor was paid, um, they brought in plant equipment and labour, but from what I could see the labour was fairly unskilled, I doubt that they were paid very well, it wouldn't surprise me if the contractor kept most of the money to himself the work was very amateur.

Personnel noted that being responsible for monitoring development projects required a level of knowledge that they did not always possess. Proficiency at a trade or as an engineer was advantageous and amplified the ability of some to assess small scale infrastructure projects, although others acknowledged the absence of such expertise as limiting their ability to evaluate project efficacy in the planning stages. The presence of embedded experts\(^\text{51}\) was noted as being exceptionally helpful in ensuring that projects progressed as expected and were ultimately completed to an acceptable standard.

Effective monitoring practices were strongly linked to accountability for development outcomes, as it was essential for impact to be felt as it was intended. Examples of ineffective or poorly planned development projects were offered up to express the presence or absence of organisational learning, both by the PRT and other members of the development community. Most often such cases focused on ineffective or ‘dead’ aid and were contrasted with ‘good development’ principles and the goal of sustainability. NZDF6, when discussing development projects undertaken by the PRT noted the importance of accounting for the operations of the wider development community:

\[\text{NZDF6: [We were] also very, very mindful of the fact that there were a lot of projects around, not ours but other nations, where you'd drive past and see these things finished and then you'd come back a couple of months later and they're not being used.}\]

\[\text{Samantha: Was this common?}\]

\[\text{NZDF6: Semi-common yeah and you'd just wonder why, you know they'd be perfectly good buildings but obviously no one’s using them, you know? Maybe a school that'd been set up, in the wrong place.}\]

Many personnel perceived dead aid as a result of the ‘see a need, fill a need’ attitude held by some development practitioners present in Bamiyan. NZDF7 asserted that the flooding of Bamiyan province with aid and assistance immediately following 2001 was a \textit{bad way of doing things} as it created a false economy within the province which could not be sustained. Personnel related ongoing issues to the presence of a large community of funders, discussing the willingness of local communities in seeking assistance from multiple groups to undertake a project upon receiving a lukewarm response from an initial consultation.\(^\text{52}\) Others noted that

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\(^{51}\) Examples cited included USDA, US Aid and USACE.

\(^{52}\) Dziedzic & Seidl (2005, p. 10) suggest that such duplication is more a result of the fact that “Village leaders usually do not understand that NGO projects entail long lead time and ask other assistance providers, including PRTs, for the same assistance”. 
under these circumstances they observed unsustainable projects being undertaken on the
directive of local communities, in full knowledge that such projects would ultimately fail.

Personnel often concluded that overly technical solutions to simple problems were a result
of an exceedingly willing community of funders, in addition to a complete absence (in some
instances) of any attempt to understand the lives and livelihoods of the people of Bamiyan,
and by extension the source of their development priorities. Many expressed frustration at
the donation of farming equipment (such as tractors, graders, harvesters) to the Provincial
government due to the complete absence of infrastructure and technical expertise required
to capitalise on the possession of such material assets (NZDF2,7,8,10). Personnel
consistently emphasised not only the importance of investing time and effort into
understanding the context of a volunteered problem, but additionally the accountability that
the development community ought to feel within this kind of environment. In working
through these narratives personnel would often arrive back at the centrality of *Afghans working
for Afghans* (NZDF10), so that development priorities were locally owned, in addition to
effective partnering to formulate a response which would be effective and sustainable.

3. Agency and Power in the Development Process

As is evident from the reflections discussed in the previous section, development in practice
is a process of constant negotiation with recipient groups, the assistance community, and
with one’s self. In questioning where the power to define the character of development in
Bamiyan lay, personnel critically engaged with issues of ownership and capacity. The
difficulty of facilitating genuine local ownership of development processes led personnel to
reinforce the importance of trust and relationship building as a means by which to enliven
development as partnership. Recognition that similar principles of reciprocity and trust were
beneficial in relationships with the civilian development community enabled some personnel
to successfully facilitate cooperation. However, as several personnel acknowledged the fact
that rapport and individual personalities served as the ultimate deciding factor in cooperative
partnerships, while helpful in some instances, was ultimately problematic in developing
effective systems for cooperation over time. Finally, reflections concerning impact and
accountability reinforced for participants the importance of genuine engagement and
commitment to ensure that development was appropriately targeted and sustainable.

Exercise of individual agency is evident in these reflections, and illustrates how
understandings of development are drawn upon and acted out to address challenges
personnel faced in the field. Relationship building with various groups outside the PRT for
example, was often raised as an area where personnel took initiative and acted beyond the
demands of their role in order to improve the effectiveness of development processes. Beyond the examples cited in the preceding sections, anecdotal evidence of other ways that personnel exercised their agency within organisational structures appeared in most narratives.

NZDF3 spoke about organising for junior patrol team members to formulate small assistance projects:

We went into some villages and got her [the patrol team medic] to do some basic medical lessons with the younger, teenage…girls in the communities, and got the boys of the patrol, the younger members of the patrol to help her and they really enjoyed that interaction. It was just another initiative me and the patrol commander said the next patrol would do, we’ll get them to organise it and…so they got a bit of input into it as well.

While NZDF7 discussed a number of examples of small scale projects\(^3\) that he formulated in response to issues identified through conversations with local people. Acknowledging that there were likely structures which should have guided his actions he ultimately stated, the reason I did all that was because I wanted to. I did it. NZDF10 similarly commented that the highlights of his deployment were two informal side-projects, one a school privately funded by the families of PRT members, and the other a small effort where personnel took supplies to women and their children imprisoned often for having the child out of wedlock. Lastly, NZDF8 reflected that interacting with communities who requested a lot of development assistance made him consider those who did not, and exercised his agency on one occasion to correct what he saw as an imbalance in access to such assistance:

Sometimes I mean like I just said about the meetings, you’d get a list of demands, sometimes I’d go out of my way to help people who hadn’t asked for anything you know, you kinda get more good will from that.

The actions of personnel in these instances fall outside of the organisational structures of the PRT for facilitating development in Bamiyan. Eyben (2010) has suggested that such behaviour is indicative of individual agents being able to simultaneously operate within two coexisting modes of thinking, substantialism and relationism. While, in development partnerships, donor organisations mostly operate within a cause and effect (or needs-action to borrow from Chapter 5) linear model of development practice (substantialism), individual actors are able to perceive the necessity of “fluid and multi-layered responses” to complex processes (relationism) (Eyben, 2010, p. 2). While Chambers (2005) has suggested that re-evaluation of structures and protocols around development by agents allows them to be

\(^{33}\) Such as designing and constructing rudimentary rakes in order to address issues with seed germination for local farmers.
endowed with new meaning, Eyben (2010) argues that individuals partaking in relational practice may in fact reinforce substantialist approaches to development. Arguing that often any benefits from relational approaches are represented “as the successful implementation of…orthodox structuralist norms”, and suggests that a solution may lie in more transparent conversations about the everyday practices of aid and development (Eyben, 2010, p. 3).

Whether personnel exercised agency in development initiatives designed to give others a sense of purpose (such as the example provided by NZDF3), to address an issue of access to basic technology (such as NZDF7’s initiatives), or as an act of humanitarianism in the face of injustice (NZDF10), these actions communicate a commitment to an understanding of development in principle which extends beyond substantialist organisational directives. This indicates that NZDF personnel, like civilian development practitioners, draw on their own understandings of development to employ a relational approach to their practice.

Their struggles with the PRT’s presence and what it could achieve were some of the most thought-provoking for me, as they confirmed, not only the importance of exploring how military personnel understand their responsibilities in the development space, but also the value of critically interrogating assumptions about where power lies in that space. Their honesty in relating to me instances where they acted beyond organisational directives, exercising their own agency to bring into being what they understood development to be, also confirms that the kind of transparency of process Eyben (2010) advocates for, is possible, even within stereotypically closed organisational contexts such as militaries. The portrayal of military agents as singular or constrained within their identity as a ‘soldier’ obfuscates how individuals are variously empowered and disempowered through their interaction, in this instance, with development work. Addressing practice and the exercise of agency by NZDF personnel recognises the nexus space as constantly in flux, as Ingram & Dodds (2009, p. 11) have argued, the “geometries of power” present in these spaces:

“…have to be continually remade, and people invariably find ways to reimagine and contest them, albeit in different ways and to different extents. Creativity, ingenuity, hope, care and disrespect often coexist with a blanket refusal to stick to the scripts handed down by power holders. While recognising the force that the powerful can exert at particular geopolitical moments, care is required that analytical frameworks do not reinforce the power geometries and hierarchies they seek to disrupt, thereby writing certain kinds of people and places out of the story and overstating the influence of the powerful.”

4. Conclusion

The reflections of participants on development practice, explored in this chapter, illustrate how development is understood and interacted with as a process. The personnel I spoke with communicated many of the same concerns about the character of development as
civilian development practitioners operating in a similar environment. This problematises assertions made by scholars that the military is a monolithic institution whose structures remain fundamentally incompatible with certain non-military humanitarian-development tasks. The degree to which these ten personnel reflected critically on their experiences and related instances where they had evaluated and adjusted their practice while in the field, affirms that reflexivity and culturally sensitive practice are by no means the exclusive property of the civilian development community. Finally, their reflections provide examples of instances where individuals have exercised their agency to account for the complexities of development in practice bridging the mind-gap between substantialist and relationist approaches to development facilitation.
Chapter 7: New Zealand-Military Identity and Managing the Security-Development Nexus

1. Introduction

Making the voices of those marginalised by development discourses heard is a project which has been pursued with success by feminist, indigenous, and post-development scholars. The interrogation of these silences has served to gradually destabilise the systems of containment which isolate narratives within communities. As this thesis has noted, the voices of military personnel who have operated as development practitioners are seldom heard in the academic and practitioner literatures. Their narratives and experiences are contained by the military itself as a traditionally closed organisation, and by a community of civilian actors who question the validity of their experiences because of their contested position as actors in the nexus space.

The previous chapter has argued that the reflections of NZDF personnel with development in action, reveal that they draw on their understandings of development to guide their practice. Further, they exercise agency to account for instances where there is a disparity between organisationally or politically mandated action, and their individual perception of their responsibilities as development actors. The limited ability of military personnel engaged as development actors to reflect on their practice and be heard by a community of their peers, parallels the wider silence in the development practitioner literature, concerning the power of agents to influence development outcomes within constraining structures. Eyben’s (2010) suggestion that organisational receptivity to reflection on development practice as experienced by the individual would be beneficial can be extended to military personnel given the uncertainty and frustration which emerges in their narratives when discussing experiences with development.

This chapter discusses how identity was reflected on by personnel and how this identity was utilised to make sense of experiences which presented challenges within the nexus space. It first addresses New Zealand-Military identity generally, before turning to discuss the presence of discourses of Anzac identity and professional identity in the narratives of my participants. The final section demonstrates, as Harding (2008) argues, that identity can serve as a resource for personnel to achieve subjective composure in their narratives.

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54 ANZAC being an acronym for the Australia New Zealand Army Corps which were deployed to Gallipoli in the First World War. Harding (2008) in discussing identity does not capitalise all letters, nor will this thesis.

Higate (2011) has suggested analyses of national military identity hold value due to their ability to shed light on the processes of identity formation which ultimately condition the conduct of armed forces personnel in their work. Engagement with how military identity contributes to, or evolves as a result of, the changing responsibilities of the armed forces in contemporary warfare (and in particular peacekeeping operations) constitutes an emerging body of scholarship, however, instances where security and development coexist as mission objectives, military identity remains largely unexplored. This section considers the presence of a New Zealand-Military identity before moving on to discuss how two identity discourses (The Anzac spirit and Professionalism) emerge in participant’s narratives in relation to their role as development facilitators.

2.1 Constructions of New Zealand-Military Identity

The mutually constitutive relationship between military identity and national identity is commonly attributed to the formative influence of war on the development of the nation-state. As Danforth (2001, p. 363) has noted, the nation is often personified, not only in relation to the defining characteristics of its citizens, but also in narrative as an entity which is born and matures over time. Specific national military identities have been observed to draw upon these characteristics and, like nations themselves, display an identity which is constantly in flux (Abu-Lughod, 2005; Gellner, 1983).

Examining identity in this context I borrow the concept of ‘identity work’ from the sociological literature. Identity work is concerned with examining the “distinction between people’s ‘internal’ self-identities and the ‘external’ social identities to which they relate” (Watson, 2008, p. 123). Addressing individual identity in a reflexive manner invites discussion of “how our concepts of ourselves affect our daily lives”, and the means by which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic identities are understood, performed, and reproduced (Liu, McCreanor, McIntosh, & Teaiwa, 2005, p. 13). Conceptualisations of an individual’s identity as unchanging or essential have been challenged by those who argue self-identity is in fact dynamic and constantly re-shaped by competing discourses (Watson, 2008). As such, understanding that “identities, or subjectivities, are caught up in contradictions, struggles, tension, fragmentation and discord” is important in acknowledging how individuals reflexively interpret and create a sense of self (Watson, 2008, pp. 124–5).

Feminist researchers frequently discuss the intersectional character of identity and argue that self-perception as well as perception of ‘otherness’ is greatly influenced by our embodied
identities (Stevens, 2013). Higate (2006; 2011) has argued consideration of self-identity is exceptionally important with respect to how collectively constituted professional and national identities influence the actions of individuals. Holloway (1984 in Harding, 2008, p. 23) has suggested that individuals, in narrating their experiences, will draw on any number of identity discourses available to them in the social sphere in order to convey a certain subject position which is of value to them. The nation as “one of the most important groups to which humankind is constructed as belonging” presents a strong public discourse on which to draw (Harding, 2008, p. 23).

Nagel (1998) notes the natural allegiance between nationalism, militarism, and masculinity, and In New Zealand’s discursive national identity there is little challenge to the assertion of Jock Philips (1996, p. vii) that “there can be few nations which have so single-mindedly defined themselves through male heroes”. As such the NZDF constitutes an important site of national identity production and transformation (Harding, 2008). Nina Harding, in her research on the composition of ‘War Stories’ told by RNZAF 40 Squadron personnel deployed in the 1991 Gulf Conflict, argues that narratives of experience at the individual level commonly draw on an ‘Anzac identity’ or ‘spirit’ which has survived New Zealand’s military transition from a Martial to Peacekeeping nation.

Anzac discourse is a compelling example of a representation of New Zealand-Military identity, having emerged as a collective myth following the WWI and been retrospectively applied to earlier military deployments. Harding (2008, p. 41) makes note of the most common characteristics of the Anzac identity as “military prowess or superiority, self-control, egalitarianism, mateship, ingenuity and larrikinism”. All traits, which King (2003) has suggested were constitutive of New Zealand civilian-male identity before being canonised by the experiences of WWI. A belief in military prowess, situates the New Zealander as a ‘natural soldier’ (McLeod, 1986) who, in the face of danger and absence of proper training, would display stoicism and inner discipline (or self-control). Egalitarian in their approach to relationships with commanding officers, as well as across races, classes, and genders, Anzacs displayed fairness and disliked authority (mateship). “Presented as gifted amateurs who can fix technical problems, find substitutes for something unavailable, or find a better or easier way to carry out a task”, ingenuity too is central (Harding, 2008, p. 48). Larrikinism, the final component, draws on the stereotype of the ‘lad’ who goes to war in search of adventure.

The hegemony of the Anzac civilian-soldier discourse, Harding argues, is gradually being challenged in discussions of contemporary New Zealand-Military identity. The development

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35 See also Higate & Cameron (2006)
of the NZDF from a principally civilian expeditionary force during WWI and II, to a professional force staffed by career servicemen and women is suggested to have been a principle influence on this shift in identity. Additionally, the redefinition of the NZDF soldier from martial to peacekeeper brings into question the utility of the Anzac discourse which emerged as a specific response to the conventional war-fighting tasks undertaken by soldiers in the World Wars. The ‘humanitarianisation of the military’, suggested by Forster (2006) constitutes a challenge to conventional constructions of military identity. Higate (2011) suggests that in this environment professionalism is elevated as an important tool of identity assemblage for private military contractors and military personnel generally. In her work, Harding (2008) noted the presence of a ‘career discourse’ amongst 40 Squadron personnel where for some, their role in support of the Gulf War was spoken about as an aspect of their career development, a job rather than a duty or service to their country.

Identity discourse constituted an explanatory resource for personnel in their narratives, as one participant remarked *in order to understand my decision to volunteer [for the PRT] you have to understand me* (NZDF7). As such, the subsequent sections (2.2 and 2.3) address these two identities (Anzac or civilian-soldier identity and professional identity) in turn, exploring how each was drawn upon to explain various aspects of development practice.

### 2.2 Anzac Identity: The Civilian-Soldier, and Development

Looking back over my initial approach to categorising identity discourses in interview transcripts I evidently expected to find some version of the Anzac spirit. Smith (1987) and Fujimura (2012) contend that being positioned, partially inside of the communities one seeks to examine, constitutes a fascinating resource. As a New Zealander I have grown up with the Anzac myth, and thus am able to recognise facets of it reproduced not only by NZDF personnel but also in the media and by myself. I have elected to draw out three aspects of the Anzac discourse that personnel spoke on in discussing their positioning and their identity in the context of development work: the New Zealand ‘everyman’, the egalitarian, and the ingenious ‘gifted amateur’.

#### 2.2.1 The ‘Everyman’

While peacekeeping, contemporary warfare, development, and reconstruction are all far removed from the experiences of WWI Anzacs, continued evocation of this identity is evident in memorialisation of those who lost their lives in Afghanistan:

> “They continue a proud tradition. A tradition of ordinary men and women who stepped forward to serve a higher calling” (New Zealand Governor General Sir Jerry Mateparae as quoted by Taylor-Doig, 2013, p. 5)
The reference to “ordinary men and women” draws on the foundational characteristic of the Anzac identity which establishes the position of a New Zealand soldier as an ‘everyman’, a civilian with little or no training, who draws on his civilian skills to emerge militarily superior to soldiers of other nationalities (Harding, 2008; M. King, 2003). Positioning the ‘everyman’ as exceptional is common in the Anzac discourse with stories of low ranking soldiers ‘stepping up’ to positions of authority plentiful, as are examples of senior officers ceding authority or readily taking advice from those of a lower rank (Donald, 2005; Harding, 2008).

When discussing with participants the approach they took to development in practice, personnel drew on the Anzac discourse to situate themselves and their team members as ordinary and their approach as natural or unexceptional. NZDF10’s remark that he had approached problems in the old kiwi way intrigued me during the interview, as I found myself simply nodding in agreement, assuming I knew what he meant, before realising I should prompt for him to elaborate. NZDF9 plainly stated that the New Zealand approach is; don’t look for a fight until you’ve got one. His response was similar to many others in its simplicity, as personnel acknowledged the importance of constant vigilance before dismissing the security environment to focus on inter-personal skills describing themselves and their peers as respectful (particularly of other cultures), polite, honest, genuine, trusting, and humble. NZDF2 and 6, the most senior officers I interviewed who deployed with the PRT, spoke about the conduct of their team members:

[NZDF2] I think it's all communication, you know generally, genuinely… you know we have outstanding mid-ranking officers, civilians, other ranks right through to our senior leadership. You know we can always be better, but…I think our education system and our society means that we're very competent talking with civilians, interacting and networking even as a nation, and that's really important. You don't always expect your junior soldiers to be able to do that okay? Because they're not trained necessarily to do that. But at the end of the day they are, they come from a society which is very tolerant and loves children, so it will be genuine, put in a situation with children or whatever and our soldiers will act in the way they do with their normal relatives.

[NZDF6] Whether you’re military or not, we tend to come across as more friendly, more engaged, more interested…The example I would use is where if we came to a village we would slow down, and if we did stop you know we’d find a couple of people and talk to the senior folk. There’d obviously be a couple of guys standing around sort of doing the security thing but there’d be another couple of guys who’d be a block down the road kicking a football around with some kids. Whereas you’d get an American team coming through you know if they’re going through a village they wouldn’t slow down they’d be going straight through, if they did stop they’d be standing around looking pretty armed up, you know, sunglasses and helmets yeah looking quite threatening. I think we were less threatening, and, um, more open to engaging, and that's not just Afghanistan, that's everywhere we go yeah and there's a difference between us and the Australians in that respect, Australians aren't as hard out, well they’re somewhere in between...
and the US]…and many people are aware of this and ask about it and try and do studies on it but it's very, very difficult to say why it is the case and I think it's just how we're brought up.

The comments of NZDF2 and 6 draw on the everyman aspect of the Anzac identity, illustrating how central the translation of civilian skills and the associated non-confrontational approach were to the success in Afghanistan. The suggestion that NZDF personnel particularly those of a lower rank, possess an innate ability to be exceptional in a development context is attributed not to training, but to their natural way of acting, their ordinariness. This discourse was similarly evident in the comments made by Chief of Army Major General Gawn\textsuperscript{56} that the future successes of the New Zealand Army in non-warfighting roles will depend on the conduct of the ‘strategic private’ or ordinary infantryman or woman who will be responsible for exercising their own good judgement in complex operating environments.

2.2.2 \textit{The Egalitarian}

A belief in New Zealand as an egalitarian society, took prime position in most explanations of identity and observations of behaviour. This was most often discussed with respect to NZDF personnel as respectful, open, and understanding. Multiculturalism and particularly the emphasis placed on Māori culture were foregrounded, with NZDF seen as \textit{lucky} (NZDF\textsuperscript{9}) to be diverse in its ethnic makeup.\textsuperscript{57} Personnel connected an internal culture of respect and openness with an enhanced ability to operate in a development context (particularly post-conflict), noting the power of external military forces to display acceptance of difference and fairness in their interactions with civilians, challenging stereotypes and leading by example. NZDF3 spoke on this subject:

I think it's ingrained in us from the day we enlist to respect culture, it's part of our DNA I think. And we're lucky in New Zealand where we've got the combination of two cultures that are combined whether you're of European ancestry or Māori, and we actually respect other's cultures through that, so we've got a better understanding and affinity with other cultures especially indigenous people, you know compared with other countries. And that sort of thing… is a sort of force multiplier, being able to get on with the locals and everything else, and when you look back over history, or recent history through the Asia-Pacific, the sort of conflicts that we've been involved with, New Zealand soldiers stood out in those. In the jungles of Malaya, Borneo, Thailand, Vietnam, you know working and living with locals you know it's probably almost second nature for us. Yeah we're quite resilient you know, and we're quite used to living in hardy conditions don't sort of um, affect us so much as some others that like all their comforts of home [laughs].

\textsuperscript{56} Summarised in Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{57} As of 2012 Māori made up over 17.4\% of the total regular force of the NZDF (Rolfe, 2015)— but have been historically underrepresented in the officer classes (Scoppio, 2010).
Other personnel also displayed a similar perception of the influence of an egalitarian society on conduct in a development context. As NZDF3 explains, an internal culture of respect for difference (particularly ethnicity) is learned and performed by personnel in interactions with other groups. Resilience or hardiness is also linked with this aspect of identity and carries the implication that egalitarianism breeds solidarity with an ‘other’. Ultimately these traits combine to produce an approach which is superior in style to more deliberate efforts, instead for the New Zealander this mode of operation is second nature.

Participants also drew on the egalitarian discourse to speak about ‘otherness’ in relation to religion and gender. I found discussions of gender particularly interesting, given personnel rarely reflected on themselves as gendered actors, instead expressing an awareness of gender in relation to social injustices faced by Afghan women, or when gender presented an obstacle to performing their duties (such as an inability to communicate with Afghan women for cultural reasons). Duncanson (2009, p. 72) has suggested that this absence is a result of the normalisation of masculinity in the armed forces, arguing “because it is assumed that men ‘naturally’ feel what they feel and do what they do, these processes are rarely remarked upon”.

Female personnel were instrumental to bringing women’s concerns within the scope of PRT effort, as male personnel didn’t want to break any social taboos (NZDF1) around interaction with Afghan women. NZDF8 describes the advantages of having a female patrol member:

> Probably one of the best assets I had in my patrol was a female soldier um, you know a big challenge for her to operate in a male-centric environment especially in some pretty rough conditions. But her ability to take off her Shamar, her headdress and interact with a female, was something that none of us could do and the men will say anything to your face, but the women would confirm or deny their stories pretty quickly.

The positioning of the female soldier in question as exceptional due to her ability to operate in rough conditions illustrates how masculine identity is constructed as normal or natural and the female as ‘other’. The female soldier’s resilience is drawn on by NZDF8 to convey respect and solidarity with that soldier. In a similar way to discussions of cultural difference, respect, and understanding, egalitarianism is not evoked to deconstruct or refute difference or ‘otherness’, but rather to acknowledge its presence in a way which is constructive and particularly beneficial in a development context. NZDF2, in speaking about the relationship between egalitarian values within the NZDF and women’s leadership in Bamiyan, illustrates this relationship:

> The other factor is obviously women. You know it’s important that we have women in senior leadership positions because ultimately we’re encouraging their society to have women in their senior leadership positions so what kind of message would that
send if we didn't have women in senior leadership positions our self? So that's something we have got that element of within the New Zealand Defence Force, but again it's something which you know we're constantly trying to make sure that we have women in senior positions and you know [that] they fulfil a function.

2.2.3 Ingenuity and Impact

Finally, ingenuity, as a component of the Anzac discourse, was often present alongside characterisations of the ‘everyman’ and the egalitarian. The necessity of exercising ingenuity, in this context, presumes the absence of sufficient means by which to achieve a set goal, or the application of ones skills to achieve outcomes beyond those set goals. The involvement of personnel in development facilitation, as has been acknowledged in Chapter 6, occasionally involved personnel moving beyond organisational directives or displaying a proactive attitude toward maximisation of impact for local communities. Some personnel attributed ingenuity in development processes to the outcome-oriented mind-set that militaries instil in their soldiers as NZDF6 stated what we military guys like to do is take something on and see it finished. Others described this drive as based around military objective setting, and positioned the soldier’s central purpose as to achieve his or her objective as established by a commander (NZDF5). NZDF7 noted the necessity of the military constantly looking toward an end state where a local administration is able to take over, and as the development adage states, they are able to ‘do themselves out of the job’.

However, ingenuity was most frequently positioned as central to ‘the Kiwi way’ of operating. Personnel saw themselves as lucky to have a seat at the table (NZDF4) in shaping Afghanistan’s future reinforcing their position as a small player in international affairs. These reflections positioned personnel as in solidarity with, and accountable to, the Hazara population of Bamiyan. Development outcomes therefore were a responsibility of PRT members, the application of ingenuity to which was natural, whether within or outside of the PRT’s official structures. Harding (2008, p. 67) has noted that this sense of responsibility “to make a meaningful contribution in the world despite the country’s size and isolation”, is common in many explanations of New Zealand military or diplomatic action. As NZDF7 commented the New Zealand way of doing things [meant] all hands to the pump, making the most of available resources and employing ingenuity to get on to it in solving problems as they presented themselves. NZDF8 concluded on this point:

Yep, I think that a lot of people probably felt the same way [somewhat underprepared for the development tasks required], but I think what we've always employed in the NZDF is a get on with it mentality. The 'yep we acknowledge there's a gap here but we'll get on with it and do the best job we can', um, it relies a lot on the personality and the capabilities of the individual.
2.3 Professionalism & Identity – The Career Serviceman

While characterisations of New Zealand-Military identity which drew on the Anzac discourse were prevalent in personnel’s narratives, the presence of an additional discourse around professionalism reinforced certain traits while devaluing others. What constitutes professional behaviour in the context of a given armed force, depends greatly on the context of that organisational culture’s formation (Higate, 2011). Deference, conformity and obedience, while stereotypical elements of military culture, were notably absent from personnel’s conceptualisations of professionalism. Instead personnel (particularly those of higher rank) conveyed confidence in command chains and structural protocols, citing their importance in maintaining an effective and unified operation. NZDF7’s suggestion that being able to get over individual differences by reverting to strong organisational directives, is an example of how professional behaviour was conflated not with deference to senior officers, but rather with all personnel having an awareness of NZDF structures and mission directives. I have isolated three core characteristics of professionalism from interviews, maturity, restraint, and accountability, which are discussed here.

2.3.1 Maturity and Experience

For all personnel, reflections on the PRT and development work were linked in some way to their personal or career history. All were mature males (over the age of 30) and compared a lot of their experiences in Afghanistan to anecdotes which drew on skills and knowledge gained from experiences both within and outside the armed forces. Consistently demonstrating the value of character traits which were attributed to the maturity of outlook that comes with age. NZDF1, 2, and 3 expressed a belief that with age, people become more engaging, a trait of particular use in the context of development where relationship building is of key importance. Younger or less experienced personnel were seen as less valuable in this context, with NZDF2 noting that in his experience this was often an important factor in working with different cultures:

The real strength [for the NZDF and PRT] is in the, possibly the more mature elements, because remember it’s a society which respects elders, that was very important in Afghanistan and perhaps equally important in other parts of the world, where you’ve got that, I don’t know, acceptance by experience really you know that’s what their society's been built on.

NZDF3 also made note of how he experienced this in practice relating the value of maturity, not only to the respect it enabled him to command with Afghan community leaders, but also to the usefulness of having operational experience to fall back on:
My boss, the commander of my patrol was a lieutenant and he was quite...probably 22 or 23, young looking. He was trying to organise a meeting with the head of Shura, the Head of Shura would always come to me [laughs] honest!...I guess that gets back to the selection of Warrant Officers (WO) and Captains\(^3\) to that level as Liaison Officers as they've got that experience that they can fall back on to use, rather than having a young Sergeant or Lieutenant trying to achieve the same thing, they'd probably go about it in a maybe quite a different way.

NZDF3’s comment illustrates how life experience, both personal and professional, was particularly beneficial in development work. Professionalism is connected with being able to draw on experience to understand the operating environment, and is accompanied by an expectation that those in positions of authority, such as NZDF3’s commanding officer, are able to recognise this experience as beneficial. While critiques of military identity and professional culture assert that deference limits the ability of military personnel to operate in a development context, the anecdote above suggests that maturity and experience are recognised by the NZDF as an asset and as a result are capable of challenging traditional military hierarchies based in rank.

2.3.2 Restraint

The ‘adventurer’ or ‘warrior’ personality type, often identified as being central to professionalism in Anglo-Western armed forces, was significantly moderated or absent in the narratives of NZDF personnel (Bondy, 2005). Participants noted the need for such identities to be recalibrated (NZDF6) to allow for more constructive identities to be performed. Duncanson (2009) has argued that for peacekeepers the value of effective communication, building trust, displaying patience as well as being understanding and empathetic, challenge the warrior identity. While many spoke about the excitement of going to Afghanistan, professionalism in action was linked with an attitude which was respectful and restrained, as NZDF8 commented:

Apart from you know, wanting to go over there and do good for the people of Bamiyan, there was an element [a group of personnel who wanted to] “go somewhere interesting and get a medal for it do something cool rather than stay here in NZ”, and you know that’s understandable but I would hope they would be in the minority.

Restraint, as an emerging indicator of professionalism amongst military personnel, has been suggested by Higate (2011, p. 330) to be linked not only to career experience and maturity but also to relational contrasting between armed forces. Memoirs of British Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in Iraq were saturated with comparisons between professional and unprofessional practice that British personnel observed when operating with American

\(^3\) Liaison officers are traditionally a lower ranking position in an operational unit. WO1s and Captains are comparatively high ranks.
soldiers. Relational contrasting was present in the narratives of NZDF personnel who often spoke at length about the differences between their own approach and those of other militaries, and civilian practitioners. As NZDF8 commented:

In my opinion probably our lasting legacy to Bamiyan would be showing that not everyone's American, not everyone deals with problems in the way an American would, or even the Afghan government would deal with [problems]. We probably showed that we were more tolerant of other people's culture to the point of being very curious and interested in other people's cultures willing to participate um, possibly some of that changed later in the deployments when the security threat went up and we were confined to you know active security patrolling.

Almost all personnel engaged in relational contrasting, most often comparing New Zealand to the US or Australia, and describing New Zealand conduct as less threatening (NZDF6) or confrontational. The example often given was of the New Zealand approach to patrolling or visiting communities where restraint was shown in relation to displays of force, weapons were kept to a minimum and personnel were encouraged to interact with community members. Aggressive behaviour was viewed as unprofessional and deeply unhelpful. Higate (2011) noted a similar response amongst PMCs citing this behaviour as indicative of insecurity in an operating environment, often attributed to inexperience or youth. For the PRT, their role as a facilitator of development meant that professionalism was constructed around engagement and trust.

2.3.3 Accountability

Professionalism was also evoked in discussions of accountability, both to the people of Bamiyan and New Zealand. The desire to achieve ‘real’ development results was linked with the fact that the NZPRT was a small unit, from a small country, with little guaranteed access to funding, meaning that those projects that they did undertake ought to be certain to provide value for the Afghan people and be sustainable. Personnel also understood the importance of the PRT as a good news story to people ‘back home’ and positioned themselves as accountable to the New Zealand public for the money that was spent on development in Bamiyan.59 This sense of responsibility and connection was linked back to the importance of a foreseeable withdrawal and evoked in discussions of the reasons why building capacity was more important than inanimate objects appearing out of the ground (NZDF10). As NZDF10 went on to remark this logic was obvious to him, if you've got a small defence force, or civil defence organisation, or aid agency, wouldn't you be best to teach them [the local population] to do the job themselves.

59 The closeness of the PRT to the New Zealand government was demonstrated by personnel who reflected that during Helen Clarke’s time as Prime Minister, she would often be in direct contact with the commander to remain informed about ongoing work and any incidents which had occurred.
The linkage between professionalism and accountability caused personnel to feel frustrated when they were unable to ensure development projects successfully translated into impact being felt by communities. Ingenuity, while sufficient to bridge gaps in organisational structures within discursive representations of Anzac identity, was an unacceptable response within discussions of professionalism. NZDF5 remarked that reliance on the ingenuity of individuals to ensure that development projects were successful cast New Zealanders as scavengers rather than a well-trained, professional defence force. NZDF8 too reflected that he felt this was indicative of a problematic approach, suggesting that these deficiencies could have been ameliorated or mitigated with some good training, but I just don’t think that training was available or considered at the time.

3. The Nexus, Subjective Composure and Identity

How the nexus is experienced by individual actors is greatly affected by the way they construct and reproduce their identity in that space. As has been established in previous chapters, the character of the nexus in theory remains uncertain with its cohabitants, security and development, routinely reimagined to suit the needs of those who wish to control the space itself. For NZDF personnel operating with the express goal of guaranteeing security and facilitating development, the nexus is experienced as not only a temporal space (Bamiyan Province), but also in narrative reflections as a space constructed in their memories. In reflections personnel are able to choose, consciously or subconsciously, from a variety of available discourses to narrate their experiences “in certain ways for their own concerns and to achieve subjective composure” (Harding, 2008, p. 213). Subjective composure is attained when subjects are able to relate experiences which are recognised by others as belonging to a collective reality (Dawson, 1994). However, the nexus, as a space which remains hollow, contested and uncertain, I argue, presents a problematic collective reality within which to convey experiences. The debate concerning the presence of military personnel in this space, undertaking both security and development tasks, further distances the experiences of NZDF personnel from identity discourses which are available to individuals in more traditional roles as soldiers or peacekeepers. Sultana (2014, p. 337) suggests that “the simultaneous existence of multiple systems that define our realities can cause cognitive dissonance sometimes, especially for those occupying liminal spaces, and plural diasporic identities”.

Having spoken with these ten individuals in their capacity as NZDF personnel about an experience which took place in their ‘workspace’ (for want of a better term) I have explored the identity discourse relating to their collectively understood New Zealand-Military identity. In similar narrative analyses, researchers have had success in characterising identity
discourses specifically related to the role military personnel are involved in performing.\(^6\) The character of the nexus space, and the diverse responsibilities afforded to the NZDF personnel I spoke with, however, prevents me from making a similar characterisation here. Instead personnel draw on two distinct identity discourses available to them in order to make sense of their experiences, neither of which fully account for the roles they perform.

The Anzac identity which has historically defined the characteristics of not only NZDF, but also the New Zealand male, remains salient in the reflections of personnel I spoke with. While the stereotype of the ingenious gifted amateur or ‘everyman’, and the egalitarian are particularly evident in their narratives, larrikinism, mateship, military prowess, and self-control all feature in more subtle ways. The propagation of this discursive identity has utility for personnel as it remains one of the dominant narratives of New Zealand nationhood (Harding, 2008).

Personnel recognised in their narratives contradictory elements of military involvement in development action, and drew on the Anzac discourse to achieve subjective composure in this context. Involvement in Afghanistan was explained within this discourse with personnel making reference to New Zealand’s position, and perception of itself, as a responsible international citizen (NZDF4). Their role, as military actors in the development or humanitarian space was an extension of this national and historical commitment to fairness, collective security, and peaceful relations between states and peoples. While scholars have critiqued the application of military force in attempts to bring about development, personnel displayed an awareness of the difficulty inherent in defending this position. In their narratives they would often return to examples of NZDF involvement in peacekeeping and reconstruction work in order to illustrate proficiency in such operations, in addition to reinforcing the differences between their own conduct and the conduct of other national militaries. As has been discussed, aspects of the Anzac discourse were drawn upon to illustrate how the PRT was able to subvert the traditional war-fighting role of the military, instead focusing on productive and peaceful interaction in undertaking development work.

In addition to drawing on the Anzac discourse to address the dissonant aspects of the NZDF’s role in the development space in Bamiyan, personnel provided specific examples of themselves and their team members performing this identity in practice. Anecdotes reinforcing the existence of ingenuity in developing solutions to material deficits in Afghan livelihoods, as well as egalitarian attitudes to practice, allowed personnel to confirm the

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acceptability of their work as development actors. In instances where the acceptability of this work was challenged by civilian development practitioners, personnel indicated an ability to understand these contrasting perceptions, while also drawing on aspects of Anzac identity to reaffirm that the behavioural norms which underpinned their action were fundamentally positive and constructive. Finally, in situations where personnel felt uncertain in their role as development practitioners, or the structures of the PRT were insufficient in guiding their practice, exercise of agency was explained with respect to this identity, suggesting that responses in these instances were natural or normal to NZDF personnel.

Personnel additionally drew on the more contemporary identity discourse of professionalism to articulate aspects of their interaction with development work in Bamiyan. Discursive representations of the New Zealand-Military identity as a professional identity were available to personnel in narratives of experience due to their positioning as mature career servicemen. The professionalism discourse presented, in most instances, a complementary identity for personnel to draw upon to achieve subjective composure. Personnel were able to affirm their value as development practitioners in the nexus space as a result of their experiences in similar operating environments. Further, relational framing was employed to situate the New Zealand soldier as restrained and non-confrontational, an asset in the context of development where respectful conduct forms the foundation of productive partnerships. Finally, professional identity discourse involved an understanding of accountability in work, to both the New Zealand population as funders of the NZ PRT, and to the people of Bamiyan to ensure development was ultimately sustainable.

The Anzac discourse is undoubtedly influential in shaping how NZDF personnel understand the collective characteristics which define their behaviour and differentiate them from others. In understanding themselves as professionals, however, personnel partially discard the ‘everyman’ civilian-soldier identity which is characteristic of the Anzac discourse. While the civilian-soldier, in the absence of formal training, has mythically proven his/herself capable of mastering a presented task, the professional soldier recognises the necessity of a degree of organisational support when required to undertake non-standard activities, such as development facilitation. In this respect the Anzac identity constitutes a useful resource for personnel to understand their approach to development work as both an individual and as part of the collective, however, the Anzac identity remains primarily personal and is predicated on its ability to exist and guide practice in the absence of organisational directives and structural support.
The professionalism discourse, in the nexus space where military actors are held accountable for guaranteeing security and facilitating development, recognises that the application of the *kiwi way* or a *can-do attitude* (Anzac identity) as insufficient on its own. Personnel often remarked in their concluding comments, as well as in discussions of their PDT that they expected more structural guidance concerning their role as development practitioners. Further, the suggestion of several participants that the NZDF, in one way or another, relies on the reproduction of the *kiwi way* in instances where organisational capacity is deficient or directives may still be in their formative stages, places the judgement and conduct of the individual at the fore of defining good development practice. In this respect professional identity also presents a discourse upon which personnel are able to draw to explain their approach to development work both as an individual and as part of the collective. However, unlike Anzac identity, professional identity *expects* organisational structures to be well formed and learning to be evident. Further, in understanding the New Zealand-Military identity as a professional identity, personnel conveyed that they expected to be supported in the learning of new professional competencies such as development facilitation. Development facilitation, project planning and structures for coordination between civilian agencies and military units were all areas that non-command level personnel cited an interest in learning more about as a result of their experiences in Afghanistan.

From consideration of these two discursive identities available to NZDF personnel, it is evident that while the Anzac spirit is still pivotal in communicating the essence of a New Zealand approach, an understanding of military identity as a professional identity encourages personnel to question the degree of organisational support provided to aid in their capacity as facilitators of development. The uncertain character of the nexus space, and the contention that remains around models of civil-military integration such as the PRT, inhibits personnel from drawing on these discourses to fully achieve subjective composure. Instead personnel used both identity discourses as resources to fill in the gaps of what it means to them to be a New Zealander, a soldier, and a development practitioner.

NZDF3’s comments captured best I feel this patchwork evocation of identity in practice. Referring to notes written in preparation for his interview, he suggested that the understanding of identity that New Zealanders took to Bamiyan, constituted a *force multiplier...for an army or our size and capability*. Force multiplication refers to attributes which make a military more effective at a given task (Cobane, 2005). The presence of a New Zealand-Military identity is significant insofar as it is understood to exist by personnel, retold in narratives of experience, and reproduced by them in their practice. In the case of development work identity does not solely constitute a resource for personnel to draw upon
to achieve subjective composure, but also a resource in the AO, not to be taken for granted.

I would argue that the way that the identity of the New Zealand soldier is understood, at the individual and organisational level, does not automatically make them good at development work. But rather as NZDF9 suggested at one point, this identity has the potential to make them better, the question then becoming one of how to capitalise on this to develop resilient and sustainable capacity at an organisational level. As NZDF8 concluded:

"I would hope that, you know, the next time, maybe somewhere in the future, we get involved in something like Bamiyan that we use those people, their knowledge and their experience and training to help shape our plan, and help shape how we engage with other actors in that space because as you know, it’s a complex space."

4. Conclusion – Identity as a ‘force multiplier’

This chapter has presented two discursive identities which were drawn upon by personnel in their narratives, Anzac identity and professional identity, to inform an understanding of a New Zealand-Military identity. This identity is significant due to the fact that it is conveyed by personnel to explain how they negotiated specific aspects of the PRT’s presence and work in Afghanistan. Personnel drew on these identity discourses as a resource to achieve subjective composure in their narratives.

While the Anzac discourse remains powerful in explaining the collective characteristics of the NZDF, the understanding of New Zealand-Military identity as a professional identity revealed that personnel could not fully achieve subjective composure in the nexus space. The professional discourse caused personnel to question the degree of training, support and organisation around achieving development priorities, both within the PRT and the NZDF more broadly. These critiques, suggest that understanding themselves as professionals, as opposed to the historically salient civilian-soldier, causes personnel to expect more organisational guidance and proactive development of their own competencies by their employer where non-standard tasks (such as development facilitation) are concerned. In this sense, New Zealand-Military identity (the Anzac and Professional discourses coexisting within) is constructed as a resource upon which personnel are able to draw in relating their experiences with development, as well as a resource in the operating environment to guide practice and inform organisational learning.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

As I sit to review this chapter and add my final remarks New Zealand politicians, media commentators, and other experts debate the decision of the National lead Government to commit NZDF personnel to train Iraqi forces in the conflict against Islamic State (Davison, Young, Trevett, & Jones, 2015). Many consider it the responsibility of New Zealand to step in on the side of ‘good against evil’, as an international citizen this is our duty. Others borrow from the same discourse, of duty and responsibility to critique the commitment and the government’s decision to make it without broader consultation. The experiences of NZDF personnel who will eventually deploy to Iraq will undoubtedly be different in many ways to those who deployed with the PRT to Afghanistan. However, the familiar rhetoric of the nexus space, of good against evil, of responsibility for security both international and domestic, of threat, terror, corruption, and state collapse all echo and sound eerily familiar. Duffield’s assertion that the nexus space where such policy is made constitutes one of struggle and “unending war” is an unhappy landscape in both theory and reality (2010, p. 69).

At the beginning of this thesis, I made note of the uncomfortable character of the nexus as a perspective for reconsidering the interwoven nature of security and development in theory, policy, and practice. Acknowledging linkages and networks as well as diverse and multiple understandings constitutes a tricky venture, constantly in pursuit of a convergence the full extent of which is unknowable. However, from within this perspective trying to construct states of war and peace, of civilian and military actors, and of security and development as distinct and definable has become a more uncomfortable prospect for me. Categorising and compartmentalising spaces, processes, and individuals is an ultimately distancing exercise which at the beginning of this research I rallied against. Although, in drawing closer to the perspectives and experiences of NZDF personnel it would be remiss of me not to recognise that I have distanced myself from other perspectives.

The aim of this research was to explore the experiences of NZDF personnel as actors charged with both guaranteeing security and facilitating development. In doing so I hoped to fulfil a secondary aim in presenting the perspectives of NZDF personnel as military agents whose narratives are commonly absent in the academic and practitioner literatures concerned with humanitarianism and development. Working with the nexus and post-development
theory in mind, I pursued interviews with ten NZDF personnel who deployed with the PRT to Bamiyan Province 2003-2013. A feminist post-structural epistemology and qualitative methodology placed narrative, understanding, reflection, and reflexivity as core concerns in the interview space, my analysis, and conclusions.

1. **Summary of Analysis**

Following Chapters 1-4 which addressed the related literature as well as pertinent contextual and methodological considerations, **Chapter 5** began by exploring my first research question concerning how NZDF personnel who served on the PRT (2003-2013) understood their work with respect to their position as security and development actors. Scholars writing on the nexus maintain that one of its defining characteristics is the absence of any single explanation of its cohabitants. Rather security and development discourses are evoked to justify a variety of practices, and are understood differently by various actors operating at numerous scales. I explored how personnel spoke about security and development in a conceptual sense, as well as how they related their experiences in Bamiyan with the objectives of guaranteeing security and facilitating development.

Security was an ever present consideration for personnel. Threats were commonly externalised, originating from physical environment or hostile groups while responses to these threats were internalised, based in discipline and training. Security was also understood in less tangible terms relating to a ‘sense’ of security felt by the people of Bamiyan which was facilitated by the presence of the PRT. Development was understood as central to the purpose of the deployment and public discourses were drawn on to frame subsequent discussions of development facilitation. Development was primarily understood as a process of isolating material deficits in Afghan livelihoods (need) and developing a response (action). This linear cause-effect relationship was complicated when personnel spoke about complex ‘problems’, reflecting that communication and partnership were central to ensuring impact from development interventions was felt by communities.

This analysis revealed that personnel understood security and development in multiple coexisting ways, complicating the assumption that security and development in practice are causally or instrumentally linked. I suggested that instead the two are interwoven with activities and the conduct of personnel undertaking those activities, combining to create impact which was at times intangible.
Chapter 6 elaborated on participant’s understandings of development moving to explore my second research question concerning reflections on development practice. The PRT was involved in development facilitation in Bamiyan province, serving as a hub for consultation, planning and funding. Personnel reflected on experiences with locally guided development, displaying that in instances where capacity to manage development interventions (both within the PRT and the Bamiyan Provincial Administration) was deficient, partnership served as a more effective rubric than ownership. Participants also discussed civil-military cooperation and the importance of perception in determining the viability of functioning partnerships in this sphere. Finally, the importance of ensuring impact in development practice was discussed. Personnel reinforcing a sense of responsibility to the people of Bamiyan for development projects, displaying frustration with themselves and others when reflecting on situations where activities were ineffective or unsustainable.

Ultimately the character of personnel’s reflections on development in action revealed that reflexive practice was engaged in by NZDF personnel. The final section which discussed specific incidences in which personnel exercised agency to advance their understanding of development expanded upon this. I argued that representations of the military as monolithic and of military agents as disempowered by organisational structures are reductive. Personnel displayed a willingness to act beyond substantialist organisational directives and engage in relational practice, confirming the importance of considering individual agency within the military, especially where personnel are engaged in non-standard practice (such as development facilitation).

In Chapter 7 I moved away from my two central research questions, exploring the importance of discursive representations of personnel’s identities to their understanding of development practice. Post-development scholars as well as military sociologists who focus analysis at the level of the individual actor commonly cite the importance of identity in shaping how agents make sense of their realities. Further, discursive representations of collective identities exist as resources which individuals are able to draw on in narrative to achieve subjective composure. In articulating their collective New Zealand-Military identity, personnel drew on Anzac and Professional identity discourses to make sense of their experiences with development facilitation. While aspects of Anzac identity are salient in personnel’s narratives, discursive representations of professional identity recognise the absence of fully supportive structures for development work within the NZDF at this point. Identity is therefore not only a resource for personnel to draw on in their narratives, but also a ‘force multiplier’ for the NZDF.
2. Theoretical Implications, Limitations, and Further Research

Research within a security-development nexus framework, I believe, has utility to scholars and practitioners alike who wish to compliment emancipatory theorisations of social processes. Orienting research around the linkages which exist between seemingly disparate ideas and processes, as opposed to strengthening the walls between disciplines and their audiences has proved a rewarding exercise. Scaling the nexus perspective down to the level of the individual actor has much in common with more agent centred renderings of post-development scholarship, an allegiance which could be drawn on by other theorists. I believe this to be particularly important in the advancement of nuanced theorisations of the nexus as its current readings tend to reinforce the primacy of security over development.

Beyond the advancement of the nexus framework, this thesis has pursued a deliberately reflexive, uncontained and messy approach to research with a national military. Conducting research with the express permission of the NZDF (as I have done) commonly raises questions of academic independence, integrity, and rigor. However, I would contend, in a similar vein to Fujimura (2012) that such critiques ignore that more harm may lie in the consequences of refusing opportunities to engage with national militaries. In simply pursuing the path less travelled and researching ‘up’ social scientists de-peripheralise the study of national militaries by civilian academics. I believe that particular value lies in making spaces for the experiences of individual military personnel to be heard, particularly those engaged in development practice. Through engagement, conversation, and reflection we draw closer the lived realities of individuals whose perspectives are routinely subsumed by their professional identities.

Finally, New Zealand’s position as a small player in international affairs means that research on the work of the NZDF remains within the remit of a relatively small number of scholars. Antipodean perspectives have the ability to challenge hegemonic theorisations of military culture and identity which often originate from American or British experiences with war. New Zealand’s distinctive geopolitical experience and conceptualisation of its own nationhood has shaped its Defence Force in a way which may genuinely predicate a novel approach to peace operations and development facilitation.

I am not unaware of the limitations of this research and the opportunities they hold for further study. Firstly, my selection of research participants, or rather their self-selection in
agreeing to speak with me, limits the generalisability of my findings, as does the small sample size and relative homogeneity of the group. Assumptions I made about the difficulty of finding participants meant that I was not particularly selective about the role that my participants had held within the PRT and consequently their narratives come from a variety of subject positions. Ensuring greater diversity in the participants (and a larger group of participants) would likely have amplified diversity in responses. In further research ensuring a balance or fair representation of genders, ethnicities, and ranked personnel should be a principle objective.

Secondly, my decision to focus exclusively on the narratives of NZDF personnel, while internally justifiable, should be paired in future research with an acknowledgement of other perspectives, and greater attention to secondary sources. Contributing the reflections of military actors to the development studies literature is a good place to begin in de-peripheralising their narratives. However, the ultimate goal in my mind would be for the dialogue between civil and military actors to become more visible in the academic literature. I recognise in this research, that the absence of Afghan voices does nothing to advance the work of emancipatory development theorists who challenge the inherently disempowering notion that distant others need to be ‘developed’ by the benevolent intervener. I feel an allegiance with these theorists and hope that this research may at some point serve as a resource for them. Such research would add to work already being undertaken by development scholars and anthropologists which reaches beyond the intervention community to the reflections of local populations on the processes of peacebuilding and development they are engaged in in nexus spaces (Pouligny, 2006; Stevens, 2013).

Finally, greater attention to secondary sources would not serve to devalue their narratives or reflections, but rather have the potential to evaluate claims concerning the relative ‘good’ they were able to achieve in Bamiyan. While this recommendation also moves beyond the epistemological and methodological approach that I have pursued, I acknowledge the value in developing ways to measure impact, which, as Hoadley (2011) notes, remained underdeveloped during the PRT’s deployment in Afghanistan.

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As has been noted all were mature male Officers with the exception of one Non-Commissioned Officer. The majority were Pākehā, and career servicemen.
3. Recommendations

The implications of this research for the involvement of NZDF personnel in future development facilitation come partly from my own conclusions and partly from the explicit wishes of the ten personnel I spoke with.

The positioning of the PRT as accountable to the population of Bamiyan for development work facilitated by them, underpinned an almost universal desire for more organisational support, professional development, and knowledge where development work was concerned. While I am uncertain of the degree of training currently available to personnel in developing competencies in areas such as project planning, consultation, negotiation and cross-cultural communication, it is clear from their comments that at the time PDT did not adequately prepare personnel for the work they subsequently undertook. As McNerney (2008, p. 194) argues, the contemporary reality of insecure operating environments requires both militaries and their civilian partners to commit to training their personnel to effectively cooperate “not six weeks before deployment but over entire careers”. If the NZDF is to pursue further deployments where personnel are responsible for development facilitation then avenues must exist for developing the skills and attitudes conducive to ‘good’ development practice.

Beyond skills based training, the attitudes that personnel display towards development as an idea and in practice, display an already existent tendency towards reflexivity and respectful engagement. While New Zealand-Military identity appears to play a large role in personnel’s understanding of themselves as effective development practitioners, an opportunity exists for the NZDF to leverage off these pre-existing behavioural norms to enhance effectiveness in the field. All personnel communicated a wish to make a difference in their work, which confirms Anna Simons assessment that in her experience “most [military personnel] are fully vested in the conviction that things can be improved. Otherwise, not even the most cynical among them would be sticking it out when, in today’s all-volunteer force, none of them has to” (2012, p. 236).62 She suggests that this conviction invites more concerted engagement within militaries with critical approaches to their practice and exposure to disciplines such as anthropology which foreground the consideration of culture, understanding and respect. Establishment or augmentation of similar programmes concerning development theory, policy, and practice within the NZDF, or encouragement for personnel to pursue study in

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62 Simons does acknowledge that structural incentives to initially join or remain within militaries may limit the ‘all volunteer’ nature of militaries in some instances.
similar areas, including development studies, outside of the NZDF would be a positive step in this respect.

4. Final Thoughts

Asking my second-to-last interview question concerning what personnel reflected most on from their time in Afghanistan, while small, remains the most meaningful aspect of this research for me. Their responses conveyed a sentiment which echoed Matthews (2008, p.1040) perspective on the role of the privileged in responding to poverty:

“The level of interconnectedness between ourselves and distant others means that we cannot understand their situation as being completely unrelated to our own and that, because of this relatedness, we have some sort of obligation to respond to the plight of those who occupy a disadvantaged position in the complex webs of relations in which we are more favourably positioned.”

While, as she notes, this interconnectedness can become quickly entrenched in discourses of pity and paternalism, I saw solidarity, friendship, and responsibility in the narratives of my participants. This may be reflective of a similar tendency in myself, a feeling of obligation to respond to, or at least engage with, the injustices of conflict through the channels provided by development. In being given responsibility for facilitating development in Bamiyan, personnel imagined and created meaning for themselves and others, shaping their own identity and how they were perceived through interaction, connection, and dialogue. The accountability they felt to the people of Bamiyan was communicated hand-in-hand with a desire to know more about development, to be better at their work, and to ensure that they ‘made a difference’.

I hope that this thesis may serve as part of the foundation for future reflexive explorations of the NZDF’s evolving role in insecure environments. The reflections of personnel on their experiences with development hold many lessons to be learned from, not only by the NZDF, but also by the broader development community. As every individual within the nexus space has a role to play in the micro-work of peace.

“Our societies have always been preoccupied with winning wars. It is time that we reflect on ways of winning peace. These questions cannot be left to national and international officials alone. This…should lead us to question ourselves about the value everyone assigns, as a decision-maker, as an analyst, as a citizen, to our own humanity and hence to that of others” (Pouligny, 2006, p.276).
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## Appendices

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Appendix A: Map of Afghanistan ISAF Regional Command and Provincial Reconstruction Team Locations

Figure 1 Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations. From NATO (3 April, 2009). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afghanistan_prt_rc.pdf
Appendix B: Comparison of National Provincial Reconstruction Team Models (Eronen, 2008) with addition of the New Zealand Model (Hoadley, 2011; Hall, 2010; New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013; Taylor-Doig; 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTNERING NATIONS</th>
<th>AMERICAN</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>BRITISH</th>
<th>NORDIC</th>
<th>TURKISH</th>
<th>NEW ZEALAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>4-5 Continental European</td>
<td>2, North European</td>
<td>1, North European</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0, based shared with 2, American officials often present (RCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL/MILITARY SIZE</td>
<td>40-120 MIL 3-5 CIV</td>
<td>400-500 MIL 10-20 CIV</td>
<td>150 MIL 20-30 CIV</td>
<td>150-200 MIL 8-15 CIV</td>
<td>70 MIL 15 CIV</td>
<td>100-150 MIL 3-5 POLICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>Military Commander supported by embedded civilian representatives</td>
<td>Dual: Military Commander and Civilian Head, leading respective components</td>
<td>Joint between military, political and development representative</td>
<td>Military Commander in consultation with joint (CIV-MIL) Command Group</td>
<td>Civilian coordinator</td>
<td>Military command 2003-2010, Civilian director by MFAT 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>Force protection; police training and infrastructure support</td>
<td>Force protection, modest patrols, police infrastructure and training; police mentoring, training and infrastructure support</td>
<td>Extensive patrols; police training and infrastructure support</td>
<td>Extensive patrols, operations, force protection; police training and infrastructure support</td>
<td>Protection to the civilian component; police training and infrastructure support</td>
<td>Extensive patrols, operations, force protection; police training and infrastructure support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>Regular liaison with key leaders, infrastructure support to local administration</td>
<td>Regular liaison with key leaders, support to justice system</td>
<td>Regular liaison with key leaders, direct support left to the UN and others</td>
<td>Regular liaison with key officials, training &amp; infrastructure support to local administration</td>
<td>Regular liaison with key officials, training &amp; infrastructure support to local administration</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>PRT projects through various DoD and USAID flexible funds (infrastructure in education, health and water), other USAID projects external to the PRTs (roads, water infrastructure, local administration training)</td>
<td>PRT support to local planning, PRT CIMIC projects (education, water), PRT external funding to a vivid NGO community (economic development, education, water, energy)</td>
<td>PRT &amp; external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation though newly modest CIMIC projects (water, roads), PRT external DfID aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)</td>
<td>PRT &amp; external support to local planning, PRT refrained to facilitation, occasional QIPs by both MIL and CIV, PRT external aid through NGOs and national programmes (village development, governance, water, education)</td>
<td>Development aid and technical support through the PRT (education, health, agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRT facilitated projects undertaken by local administration/ communities through funds provided by MFAT, also access to US funds through CERP. Technical support through PRT to local administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVINCIAL AID FLOWS</td>
<td>(Even tens of) Millions of USD annually both through and external to the PRTs. Sums vary drastically between provinces</td>
<td>Some millions of EUR annually, mostly external to the PRTs</td>
<td>Less than one million pounds through the PRT annually, nearly 20 million pounds externally</td>
<td>USD 5−15 million annually, nearly all external to the PRTs</td>
<td>USD 6.5 million through the PRT annually</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NZ 80.36 million over 10 years MFAT approx. NZD 5-10 million per year for majority of deployment. Variable access to additional CERP funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, mostly robust ISAF and OEF-A combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence</td>
<td>Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, few ISAF or OEF-A combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence</td>
<td>High risk areas with frequent serious incidents, robust ISAF and OEF-A combat troops presence, close to non-operational administration and services, few NGOs and limited UN presence, gigantic opium production</td>
<td>Low to mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, robust ISAF or OEF-A combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence</td>
<td>Mid level risk, sporadic serious incidents, some ISAF or OEF-A combat troops, slowly reconstituting administration and services, fairly strong NGO and UN presence</td>
<td>Low level risk, upgraded to mid-level risk deployment progressed. Strong provincial administration, weaker district administrations in some areas, fairly strong NGO/UN presence in Bamiyan town, less so in outer districts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPECIAL</td>
<td>The first PRT model</td>
<td>Part of the strong German community in the northeast</td>
<td>The only PRT to run active counter-narcotics</td>
<td>Developed from the British model</td>
<td>Civilian PRT with only supportive military component</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RATIONALE</td>
<td>Reconstruction focus with counter-insurgency mindset to win ‘hearts and minds’</td>
<td>Stabilisation and reconstruction</td>
<td>Stabilisation through SSR</td>
<td>Stabilisation through SSR</td>
<td>Reconstruction and development</td>
<td>Reconstruction, development and governance principal focus, security (SSR, DDR) focus on 'winning hearts and minds'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPICAL CRITIQUE</td>
<td>Poor quality of QIPs, inefficient support to local capacity building compared to sums flowing in, PRTs politicising/ militarising humanitarian aid and development</td>
<td>Heavy restrictions on the use of military capabilities, fairly large reconstruction assistance insufficiently aligned with the Afghan government</td>
<td>Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development</td>
<td>Local people demand more visible support to reconstruction and development</td>
<td>Variability in funding due to shifting interest in focusing R&amp;D activities on already 'stable' provinces. Deterioration of security situation resulted in PRT stepping back from R&amp;D tasks.</td>
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</table>
Appendix C: Map of Bamiyan Province, Afghanistan

Figure 2. Afghanistan Bamiyan Province. From World Food Programme Bureau for Asia, June 2010 Retrieved from www.foodsecurityatlas.org/afg/country/provincial-Profile/Bamyan
Appendix D: New Zealand Aid Programme Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan 2003-2013

Figure 3. New Zealand Aid Programme Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan 2003-2013. From New Zealand’s Achievements from 10 years of Development Assistance in Bamyan, Afghanistan, By New Zealand Aid Programme, 2013, Wellington: MFAT p.5
Appendix E: Annotated Interview Schedule

NB: Questions highlighted in green (2,6,10,12) are those which are intended to bring reflections back to the perspective of the interviewee, querying about specific personal responses to experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Categories</th>
<th>Sample questions</th>
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</table>
| **Section 1: Background Questions** | 1. Can you tell me about how you came to hold your position with the Provincial Reconstruction Team?  
2. Do you feel like you bought anything in particular to the role, either personal or professional?  
3. Did you have any particular expectations about the role itself? |
| **Section 2: Role Specific Questions** | 4. Can you tell me about your initial impression of Bamiyan and Kiwi Base?  
5. Could you run me through the lifecycle of a typical development project (or projects) which was (were) undertaken by the PRT during your time in Bamiyan? |
| **Section 3: The Development Context and Personal Experiences** | 6. Can you recall any project which stood out for you for any reason? Could you explain why?  
7. How do you feel the PRT fit within the broader context of development work happening in Bamiyan (such as that being undertaken by other organisations – UNAMA, Aga Khan Foundation)?  
8. Did you observe any advantages (or disadvantages) to the existence of the PRT as a development actor in Bamiyan?  
9. How did you feel the local people, particularly members of local decision making bodies perceived you and understood your role, did you ever feel this differed from what you saw your role as?  
10. How would you describe your personal ethic when it came to approaching local decision making bodies and the people involved in them?  
11. We often speak of the ‘Kiwi soldier’ as distinct in their approach from members of other militaries – how would you characterise this approach with respect to your team? Did it appear to be particularly different from the approach of other PRTs you may have observed? |
| **Section 4: Final Reflections** | 12. What do you reflect most on from your time in Bamiyan?  
13. Do you feel any aspect of your practice, or opinions on development was altered from your time in Bamiyan? Do you feel as if this personal learning is reflected in the changing character of the NZDF as an organisation? |
Appendix F: Interview Materials

a. Participant Information Sheet

Title of Project: Post-conflict development: a contested space

Researcher: Samantha Morris - School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

I am a Masters of Development Studies student at Victoria University of Wellington. As a part of this degree I am undertaking research which will inform a thesis. The research I am conducting is a study of how New Zealand Defence Force personnel reflect on their role as responsible for both military and development work.

This research will focus on the experiences of personnel who spent time in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan as members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team between 2003 and 2013. I will explore the reflections of personnel on the development work which took place in Bamyan with specific reference to the processes around project planning and execution. This project seeks to identify and elaborate on the importance of individual defence force personnel in shaping the character of reconstruction oriented operations.

Responses from interviews will be at the centre of my research and thesis. All responses and material collected will remain confidential unless explicitly stated by the interviewee. Names will be replaced with pseudonyms (e.g. NZDF1) where specific opinions are being cited. Only my supervisor and myself will be party to recorded interviews and transcripts.

The process of thesis submission will involve a copy being submitted for marking by the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences and one copy will be deposited on completion in the University Library. In addition to this, in accordance with the requirements of my scholarship, a copy will be submitted to the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET) for publication. It is intended that subsequent articles will be submitted for publication following the return of my final thesis.

This research has been approved by the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee.

What is involved?

- Interviews will likely take between 45 minutes and an hour and will be conducted by Samantha Morris. The time and place of the interview will be mutually agreed upon.
- Participation is entirely voluntary. However before the interview you will be asked to sign the attached consent form. Upon agreeing to take part in the interview you are free to withdraw any information before the conclusion of the analysis period 1/11/2014.
- You will be asked a series of interview questions concerning your personal experiences as a member of the NZ PRT. You may decline to answer any questions you choose.
- Interviews will be tape-recorded and transcribed.
- All recordings and transcripts will be accessed by the principle investigator and her research supervisor. These will be stored in a locked filing cabinet or as password protected electronic documents and destroyed after 5 years.

Please do not hesitate to contact the researcher or research supervisor with any questions regarding this study.
Principal investigator: Samantha Morris

Research Supervisor: John Overton
b. Participant Consent Form

Title of project: **Post-conflict development - a contested space**

- I have read and understood the attached Information sheet. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have about the study and my participation. These questions, if asked, have been answered satisfactorily.
- I agree to participate in these interviews and understand that I may withdraw myself or any information I have provided before 01/11/2014 without explanation.
- I understand that the interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed by the researcher and that only she and her research supervisor will have access to this material.
- I understand that all information I provide will be kept confidential between the researcher and her supervisor.
- I understand that all transcripts and recordings of the interviews will be stored in a locked filing cabinet or as password protected electronic documents and destroyed after 5 years.
- I understand that the information I provide will be used for the purposes of a thesis and subsequent articles published from this thesis. No information will be released to others without my express written consent.

I ________________________________ (full name) hereby consent to take part in this study by being interviewed.

Signature ____________________________ Date: _________________

Interview conducted by: _________________________________

Signature ____________________________ Date: _________________

**I would like to receive**

- a transcript of my interview: Yes / No (please circle)
- a summary of the research findings: Yes / No (please circle)
c. Interview Schedule

Sample question sheet for semi-structured interviews

Title of Project: Post conflict development – a contested space

The questions below are intended to direct rather than limit the course of the conversation, please view them as talking points or guides.

- Can you tell me about how you came to hold your position with the Provincial Reconstruction Team?
- Do you feel like you brought anything in particular to the role, either personal or professional?
- Did you have any particular expectations about the role itself?
- Can you tell me about your initial impression of Bamiyan and Kiwi Base?
- Could you run me through the lifecycle of a typical development project (or projects) which was (were) undertaken by the PRT during your time in Bamiyan?
- Can you recall any project which stood out for you for any reason? Could you explain why?
- How do you feel the PRT fit within the broader context of development work happening in Bamiyan (such as that being undertaken by other organisations – UNAMA, Aga Khan Foundation)?
- Did you observe any advantages (or disadvantages) to the existence of the PRT as a development actor in Bamiyan?
- How did you feel the local people, particularly members of local decision making bodies perceived you and understood your role, did you ever feel this differed from what you saw your role as?
- How would you describe your personal ethic when it came to approaching local decision making bodies and the people involved in them?
- We often speak of the ‘Kiwi soldier’ as distinct in their approach from members of other militaries – how would you characterise this approach with respect to your team? Did it appear to be particularly different from the approach of other PRTs you may have observed?
- What do you reflect most on from your time in Bamiyan?
- Do you feel any aspect of your practice, or opinions on development was altered from your time in Bamiyan? Do you feel as if this personal learning is reflected in the changing character of the NZDF as an organisation?
Appendix G: Victoria University Human Ethics Committee Approval to Conduct Research

MEMORANDUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>Samantha Morris</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COPY TO</td>
<td>John Overton</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>Dr Allison Kirkman, Convener, Human Ethics Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>15 April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Ethics Approval: 20780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post conflict development - a contested space</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thank you for your application for ethical approval, which has now been considered by the Standing Committee of the Human Ethics Committee.

Your application has been approved from the above date and this approval continues until 28 February 2015. If your data collection is not completed by this date you should apply to the Human Ethics Committee for an extension to this approval.

Best wishes with the research.

Allison Kirkman
Human Ethics Committee
Appendix H: Approval to Conduct Personnel Research (NZDF)

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE
Organisational Research and Development

MINUTE

5000/PB/5/3
5 Sep 14

ACPERS

APPROVAL TO CONDUCT PERSONNEL RESEARCH – PRT MEMBERS
PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT WORK

Reference:
A. DFO 3.14[5]

1. In accordance with Ref A, Samantha Morris is seeking approval to conduct research exploring the perceptions of members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based in Afghanistan between 2003-2013 about their post-conflict development work. The research will be conducted in connection with the researcher’s Master of Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, supervised by John Overton (john.overton@vuw.ac.nz).

Background

2. The development studies literature talks about the importance of individual agency in shaping the character of development work. However, the majority of the literature is focussed on the role of NGOs, and minimises the contribution of the military towards development, resulting in an absence of ‘voice’ from military personnel regarding their role in development projects. This research seeks to fill this gap by investigating military personnel's perspectives on their role as responsible for both military and post-conflict development work, in the context of their work in Afghanistan as members of the PRT.

3. The research takes a narrative approach, focusing on the perspectives and experiences of individual personnel, which will be analysed for themes and commonalities. The subjective narratives of NZDF personnel may be used to inform future reconstruction operations.

Research Questions and Methodology

4. The following research questions will guide the research:
   a. How do NZDF personnel who served on the PRT (2003-2013) perceive their work with respect to their position as development actors?
   b. What reflections do NZDF personnel who served on the PRT have on the nature of development in the conflict or immediate post conflict context?

5. The research will involve semi-structured interviews (of approximately 45 minutes to an hour in length) with 4-12 NZDF personnel who served on the PRT in Afghanistan for four months or more, and who either served as a Commander of the PRT or in other positions within the Development Group of the PRT. An outline of
intended interview questions is provided at Enclosure 1. The interviews will be audio-
recorded and transcribed (stored securely in sole possession of the researcher until
destroyed after 5 years). Participation will be confidential, with interviewees referred
to with pseudonyms (e.g., 'NZDF1') and individually identifying information excluded
from reports. The researcher is seeking to conduct the interviews before the end of
November 2014.

Ethical Considerations

6. Although the questions do not encompass conflict-related activity, there is
potential for emotionally uncomfortable issues to be raised by participants during the
research. The researcher has outlined appropriate strategies for managing the risk of
participant harm, including stopping questioning or the interview if a participant is
uncomfortable, and providing information on relevant support resources available.

7. The research is supported by a scholarship from the Peace and Disarmament
Education Trust (PADET), a charitable trust established by the NZ Government in
1988 to promote peace and disarmament which funds not-for-profit projects and
scholarship topics that support these objectives. The abstract provided to PADET is
at Enclosure 2. One of the conditions of the scholarship is that the research findings
will be published through PADET in addition to thesis publication. The researcher
may also seek to publish in academic journals. The COMJFNZ and Joint Forces
Psychologist have expressed support for the research, but request the report is
reviewed and approved by them prior to publication to ensure any potentially
sensitive details are appropriately managed.

8. I endorse this research as meeting the scientific and ethical requirements of
DFO 3.14[5]. Therefore I recommend that you:

a. Request that the completed report is provided to COMJFNZ and the Joint
Forces Psychologist for approval prior to university submission or other
publication.

b. Approve the proposed research by signing the Deed Pro Forma
(Enclosure 3), on condition of para. 8.a..

S.M. OVERDALE
ORM

Enclosures:
1. Question Sheet for Semi-Structured Interviews
2. Post Conflict Development – A Contested Space?
3. Deed Pro Forma

H. V. DUFFY
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