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THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION: ALL-IRELAND SELF-DETERMINATION POST-BELFAST AGREEMENT

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The Northern Ireland Question: All-Ireland Self-Determination post-Belfast Agreement

By the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the major parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict agreed that the territorial status of Northern Ireland would be determined by the Northern Irish people, and the people of the island of Ireland collectively. Although this Agreement is significant in shaping the right to self-determination in the all-Irish context, it contains within it many ambiguities. Many questions as to the nature, extent and effects of the right to self-determination in the all-Irish context still remain. These questions and issues which arise within the Agreement are resolvable with recourse to the customary international law of self-determination, particularly the law and practice relating to referenda. The Belfast Agreement is not simply of relevance in the Irish context. Rather, it has the potential to serve as a model to see the resolution of territorial and self-determination conflicts.

Key words: Northern Ireland; Belfast Agreement; Self-Determination; Referenda; International Law

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I Introduction

Writing of the conflict known as the ‘Troubles’, which concerned the status of the six counties of Northern Ireland, Desmond Egan posed the “Northern Ireland Question”: “two wee girls/were playing tig [sic] near a car.../how many counties would you say/are worth their scattered fingers?”

Years later, but too late for the 3,600 people who were killed in the conflict between pro-Irish ‘nationalists’ and pro-British ‘unionists’, these two traditions answered this question with a resounding “none”. By the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the use of violence for the furtherance of political goals was completely rejected. The Agreement is comprised of two agreements: the first being between the Northern Irish political parties (Multi-Party Agreement); the second being between Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) (British-Irish Agreement). It outlines several developments aimed at securing peace and cross-community cooperation in Northern Ireland. Significantly, it poses an answer to another Northern Ireland Question: how can two opposing, yet equally legitimate, self-determination aspirations be recognised? The answer found in the Agreement is that “it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone” to exercise their right to self-determination to create a united Ireland should they wish, provided that the choice “freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland” as to the territory’s status would be respected.

Yeats’ remarks on the failed 1916 Irish Uprising, that a “terrible beauty is born” are an apt description of these provisions. Although the Agreement provided some answer to the

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4 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
5 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
Northern Ireland Question, much remains ambiguous.\(^7\) Little academic commentary on these provisions exists.\(^8\) This essay, therefore, shall seek an answer to the question as to the nature, extent and effects of self-determination in post-Agreement Ireland. Seeking this answer requires an examination of the general law of self-determination; how this can resolve ambiguities within the Agreement; and the effects of the Agreement’s self-determination provisions, both in Ireland and more broadly.

II The Belfast Agreement

A Background

The Agreement was a peace agreement to bring an end to the conflict known as the ‘Troubles’.\(^9\) Although the conflict had complex routes, it was, at its core, a conflict of status,\(^10\) sparked by an Irish civil rights movement.\(^11\) Northern Ireland was, and is, part of the UK, and contains within it two communities divided by ethnicity, culture, religion and politics. The majority of the population are ‘unionist’.\(^12\) Traditionally of Protestant denomination, unionists identify as British and support Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK.\(^13\) Nationalists, on the other hand, form an increasingly growing minority.\(^14\) Traditionally Catholic and of Irish identity, nationalists support the creation of a united Ireland.\(^15\)

The Troubles occurred between 1969 and 1998, and resulted in over 3,600 deaths.\(^16\) The British armed forces were deployed. Unionist and nationalist paramilitaries committed acts

\(^7\) Christine Bell and Kathleen Cavanaugh “‘Constructive Ambiguity’ or Internal Self-Determination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement” (1998) 22 Fordham Int'l LJ 1345.

\(^8\) Amy Maguire “Self-Determination, Justice, and a ‘Peace Process’: Irish Nationalism, the Contemporary Colonial Experience and the Good Friday Agreement” (2014) 13 Seattle J for Soc Just 537 at 563.

\(^9\) McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 255–256.

\(^10\) At 1–2.


\(^12\) McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1.

\(^13\) At 1.

\(^14\) David Young “Protestant-Catholic gap narrows as census results revealed” (11 December 2012) Belfast Telegraph <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>.

\(^15\) McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1–2.

\(^16\) At 377.
of violence to push their agendas. Human rights violations were also committed by both the UK and Ireland.\textsuperscript{17}

Peace processes began in the 1990s, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.\textsuperscript{18} The Agreement contains provisions on justice, human rights, governance and cross-border institutions. In contrast to the self-determination provisions, these have been analysed extensively.\textsuperscript{19}

The Agreement was reached not simply through State negotiations, but largely by the major Northern Irish nationalist and unionist political parties.\textsuperscript{20} As previous conflict resolution attempts had largely excluded these groups,\textsuperscript{21} this itself was a major development. The Agreement was accepted by the populations of both Ireland and Northern Ireland by referendum.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{B The Agreement’s Self-Determination Provisions}

The self-determination provisions are contained in both the British-Irish Agreement and the \emph{Multi-Party Agreement}. The provisions therefore represent not only an inter-State consensus, but also a social and political consensus, between the peoples of Northern Ireland.

The Agreement acknowledges the legitimacy “of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of people of Northern Ireland” regarding the retention of ties with Britain or the formation of united Ireland,\textsuperscript{23} and states that to change Northern Ireland’s status other than


\textsuperscript{18}McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 255–256.

\textsuperscript{19}See for example Austen Morgan \textit{The Belfast Agreement: A practical legal analysis} (The Belfast Press, London, 2000).

\textsuperscript{20}At [1.18].


\textsuperscript{22}At 79.

\textsuperscript{23}British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); \emph{Multi-Party Agreement} at 479.
by majority consent would be “wrong”. The Agreement further states that “it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment” to bring about a united Ireland should they wish. Therefore, the consent of the population in both jurisdictions on the island is a prerequisite to the formation of a united Ireland. Should the “people of the island of Ireland” wish to create a united Ireland, both Ireland and the UK are bound by this wish.

Regardless of Northern Ireland’s status, government there must be “exercised with rigorous impartiality”, and the “birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland” to Irish and British identity and citizenship is affirmed.

The means by which the wishes of the people are to be obtained cannot be properly assessed without reference to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK), which states that this is to be assessed by a poll, or referendum. Limited additional guidance as to the poll’s nature is given.

Whilst there are no present plans to hold a referendum, four factors indicate that the holding of one is not unlikely in the future. First, following the recent self-determination referendum in Scotland, nationalists have called for a referendum on the North’s status. Second, the centenary of the 1916 Irish Uprising, which set into motion the events leading to Irish independence, is approaching, creating a climate of increased nationalistic pride amongst parts of the population. Third, although the traditionally nationalist Catholics within Northern Ireland remain a minority, the population gap between Protestants and

24 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
25 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
26 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iv); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
27 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(v); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
28 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(vi); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
29 Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK), s 1(2).
30 Schedule 1.
32 Ruth Dudley Edwards “Still obediently following Fenian instruction booklet: Gerry Adams wants to put the 1981 hunger strikers on a par with the men of 1916” (30 August 2015) Belfast Telegraph <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>.
Catholics is rapidly decreasing. Fourth, the UK government has shown its willingness to permit self-determination referenda, as shown in Scotland. Taken together, these factors suggest that discourse surrounding self-determination and the Agreement will become increasingly important. In such discourse, the resolution of the Agreement’s ambiguities will be crucial.

C The Agreement and Politics

The lack of precision within the self-determination provisions is unsurprising. Law is inherently political, especially where minority rights and self-determination are concerned. Such is true of the entire Belfast Agreement, in particular its self-determination provisions. However, despite the Agreement’s political nature it is a legally binding treaty between the UK and Ireland. Ambiguities must therefore be resolved by the law, not politics. Although much has been written on the political desirability of the Agreement, these issues are legally irrelevant. What is relevant is how the Agreement’s provisions can be interpreted and implemented in light of legal principles, particularly the general law of self-determination.

III General Self-Determination

A Scope

Self-determination concerns the right of people “freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural

33 Young, above n 14.
34 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721 (Can) at 728.
35 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can) at [1].
36 Doherty v Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2002] 2 IR 252 (SC) at 254 per Keane CJ; Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] NI 236 (HL) at [66] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting.
37 Bell and Cavanaugh, above n 7, at 1335.
38 Doherty, above n 36, at 254 per Keane CJ; Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, above n 36, at [66] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting.
39 Morgan, above n 19, at [1.27].
development”. This “requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned”. Self-determination is a fundamental, *erga omnes*, legal principle.

Self-determination has internal and external aspects. Internally, it concerns the pursuit of political goals within an existing State. The State’s population has the right to determine its own destiny and to choose representative government. Distinct groups have the right to participation in the State’s political life, representation in its government and to non-discrimination.

External self-determination concerns a territory leaving a State. This right arises in limited circumstances. It is applicable to trust territories and non-self-governing territories “whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”. Outside these contexts, its application remains unclear, although the scope of its application is widening. It has been applied in the context of State dissolution and

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45 John Dugard “The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo” (2011) 357 Recueil des Cours 9 at 85–86.

46 *Reference re Quebec*, above n 35, at [126].


48 At 621, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion).

49 *Reference re Quebec*, above n 35, at [126].


51 Charter of the United Nations, art 73; Crawford, above n 50, at 116.


53 Thürer and Burri, above n 52, at [34]; *Opinion No 2*, above n 52, at 168–169.
occupation. Furthermore, it has also been argued that a right of ‘remedial secession’ may exist in some circumstances. The Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 states that self-determination cannot authorise any action which impairs the unity of “States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”. This apparent proviso has been controversially interpreted as permitting a people to secede from a State which grossly violates their self-determination rights. For present purposes, the relevance of this controversy is that it highlights the contestable nature of self-determination.

Of course, self-determination is applicable where a State willingly adopts it to resolve a particular dispute, which is what the Belfast Agreement does in terms.

**B Peoples**

The right to self-determination attaches to ‘people’. However, the definition of people remains unclear. Such uncertainties have led to self-determination being described as “ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.”

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54 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at [118].
55 Friendly Relations Declaration, above n 42, principle 5.
57 Crawford, above n 50, at 117.
58 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
59 See for example Charter of the United Nations, art 1(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 1(1); Friendly Relations Declaration, above n 42, principle 5.
61 Ivor Jennings The Approach to Self-Government (Beacon Press, Boston, 1956) at 56.
Despite this, there are several accepted indicia of a people. A group classified as a people will generally share common elements, such as language, culture, ethnic identity and ideology. Minority groups are not precluded from the definition, although people generally form a majority within a distinct territory. More than one people may exist within a territory. As they “are the masters of the country”, and have the right to determine the status of destiny of the territory, the determination of whether a group amounts to a people is crucial.

C Territorial Integrity

States who act in accordance with, and respect the right to, internal self-determination are entitled to the protection of their territorial integrity. Territorial integrity limits external self-determination, as a general right of secession “would reduce to naught the territorial sovereignty and integrity of States and would lead to interminable conflicts and chaos in international relations.”

D Referenda

The will of the people is best established through referenda. As was observed by the French Conseil Constitutional, the result of a referendum constitutes a direct expression of

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62 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [125].
63 At [125].
64 Gunme v Cameroon [2009] AHRLR 9 (ACHPR) at [170].
65 At [170].
66 Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 621, at [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion); Crawford, above n 50, at 121.
67 Dugard, above n 45, at 91–92; Gunme, above n 64, at para 170.
68 Dugard, above n 45, at 97; Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [124]; Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at [109].
69 Kim Dae-jung (President, Republic of Korea) and Kim Jong-il (Chairman, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) South-North Joint Declaration (2000) at [1].
70 Western Sahara, above n 43, at 114 per Judge Dillard (separate opinion).
71 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [130].
72 Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 622, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion).
national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{74} In the Irish context, a referendum is required before any change in Northern Ireland’s status will be lawful.\textsuperscript{75}

In this regard, the Belfast Agreement is not unique. Numerous referenda have been employed internationally, and customary international law now requires a referendum before any territorial change is lawful.\textsuperscript{76}

However, even if referendum results favour secession, this does not give rise to independence as a right.\textsuperscript{77} Rather, such results trigger an obligation to enter into negotiations to discuss the future status of the territory, whether that be independence or otherwise.\textsuperscript{78} The exception to this rule, which applies explicitly under the Belfast Agreement,\textsuperscript{79} is where a State commits to allowing independence prior to the holding of the referendum, and is therefore bound to honour this.\textsuperscript{80}

From the numerous referenda which have taken place, numerous principles as to their conduct have emerged. Rather than being merely good practice, these are principles of customary international law.\textsuperscript{81} The existence of a customary rule is demonstrated by general State practice, which is accepted as law,\textsuperscript{82} and can be established by academic


\textsuperscript{75} Northern Ireland Act, s 1.

\textsuperscript{76} Peters, above n 60, at 288; İlker Gökhan Şen Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2015) at 85.

\textsuperscript{77} Vidmar, above n 73, at 259; Víctor Ferreres Comella “The Spanish Constitutional Court Confronts Catalonia’s ‘Right to Decide’ (Comment on the Judgment 42/2014)” (2014) 10 EuConst 571 at 580–581; Sentencia 42/2014 (2014) 87 Boletín Oficial del Estado 77 (Esp Tribunal Constitucional) at 95 (translation: Judgment 42/2014).

\textsuperscript{78} Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [91]; Sentencia 42/2014, above n 77, at 98; Vidmar, above n 73, at 263.

\textsuperscript{79} British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iv); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.

\textsuperscript{80} Vidmar, above n 73, at 263.

\textsuperscript{81} Sarah Wambaugh “La Pratique des Plébiscites Internationaux” (1927) 18 Recueil des Cours 149 at 232 (translation: “The Practice of International Plebiscites”).

\textsuperscript{82} International Law Commission Identification of customary international law: Text of the draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee A/CN.4/L.869 (2015), draft conclusion 2; North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at [77].
opinion as a subsidiary means. In the specific context of referenda, three points also serve to support the argument that the principles discussed below are custom,

First, as self-determination is customary international law, the rules of referenda must also be custom. To suggest otherwise would undermine the logical application of self-determination. Self-determination requires a genuine expression of the people’s will, and this is best determined through referenda. As the principles relating to referenda, like self-determination as a whole, are aimed at ensuring the will of the people is freely and genuinely expressed, they form a subset of the law of self-determination. As a matter of logic, the principles must be customary law, too.

Second, analogies may be drawn to international human rights law. Established human rights law requires free and genuine elections. Such elections are at the foundation of the democratic system, and are crucial for establishing and maintaining legal, democratic regimes. These underlying rationales apply equally in the context of referenda, such that human rights bodies have not hesitated to apply electoral human rights in referendum contexts. This cross-applicability also has scholarly support. Due to this cross-applicability with the established legal principles of election rights, the principles of referenda are also principles of law.

83 Identification of customary international law, above n 82, draft conclusion 14.
84 East Timor, above n 44, at [29].
85 Western Sahara, above n 43, at [55].
86 Cassese, above n 73, at 213; Vidmar, above n 73, at 261–262; Peters, above n 60, at 286.
87 Peters, above n 60, at 288; Şen, above n 76, at 85.
89 Oran v Turkey (28881/07) Section II, ECHR 15 April 2014 at [51].
90 Dicle et Sadak c Turquie (48621/07) Section II, ECHR 16 June 2015 at [76] (translation: Dicle and Sadak v Turkey).
Third, the Venice Commission, a Council of Europe body, released a *Code of Good Practice on Referendums*,\(^\text{93}\) and the principles outlined below are mostly contained within it. Whilst this cannot establish custom of itself, the *Code* was readily adopted by the Member States of the Council of Europe,\(^\text{94}\) this being a significant piece of practice.

With these general propositions in mind, State practice establishes that the following norms are principles of customary international law which will be relevant in a referendum under the Agreement.

1. **Good Faith**

That ambiguities in the Agreement must be interpreted in good faith is uncontroversial, as all treaties must be so interpreted.\(^\text{95}\) The good faith rule has also been explicitly applied in a referendum context.\(^\text{96}\)

Good faith obligations require the resolution of differences by negotiations.\(^\text{97}\) When the General Assembly condemned Crimea’s 2014 referendum as unlawful,\(^\text{98}\) it called on parties to enter into “direct political dialogue” to resolve the dispute as to Crimea’s status.\(^\text{99}\) This obligation was also reflected in the debate leading to the resolution’s adoption,\(^\text{100}\) and in a draft Security Council resolution.\(^\text{101}\)

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\(^{95}\) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31(1).

\(^{96}\) *Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v Peru) (Award)* (1925) 2 RIAA 921 at 929.

\(^{97}\) At 933; *Reference re Quebec*, above n 35, at [91]; Vidmar, above n 73, at 263; Clarity Act SC 2000, c 26, s 2(1); Cassese, above n 73, at 212.

\(^{98}\) *Territorial Integrity of Ukraine* GA Res 68/262, A/RES/68/262 (2014) at [5].

\(^{99}\) At [3].

\(^{100}\) See for example United Nations General Assembly: 80th Plenary Meeting UN GAOR, 68th Session, 80th plenary meeting, A/68/PV.80 (2014) at 9 per Mr Ulibarri (Costa Rica).

2 The Will of the People

It is a fundamental rule of customary international law that self-determination referenda permit the free expression of the will of the people.\(^{102}\) The Irish Chief Justice, in the context of a municipal referendum, aptly stated that the people’s will expressed in a referendum “is sacrosanct and if freely give, cannot be interfered with. The decision is [theirs] and [theirs] alone.”\(^{103}\) Even in what is perhaps the earliest treaty envisaging a referendum in the context of territorial reunification, it was stated that the reunification was to take place without constraining the population’s will.\(^{104}\)

The customary nature of this norm is clear. Following the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia, recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina was declined in the absence of a free referendum on independence.\(^{105}\) Further evidence of the norm’s legal status is found in the Crimean context. Although much criticism was directed at the Crimean referendum’s municipal unlawfulness,\(^{106}\) States were more concerned with the fact that the referendum was conducted in a manner so as not to establish the free will of the people. The European Union’s (EU) refusal to recognise the referendum as lawful stemmed from its failure to

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\(^{103}\) Hanafin v Minister for the Environment [1996] 2 IR 321 (SC) at 425 per Hamilton CJ.

\(^{104}\) Traité relatif à la réunion de la Savoie et de l’arrondissement de Nice à la France, France–Sardaigne 122 CTS 23 (signed 24 March 1860, entered into force 30 March 1860) [Treaty of Turin], art 1 (translation: Treaty concerning the reunion of Savoy and of the borough of Nice to France, France–Sardinia).


adhere to “democratic standards of free expression and free will”, a position also echoed by other States before the Security Council and General Assembly.

Significantly, Russia’s conduct in relation to Crimea also provides evidence of the binding nature of the norm. Rather than argue that the territory could be transferred without freely given consent, the Russian delegation argued that the referendum permitted the people of Crimea to express their free will, and that the referendum was undertaken in “strict compliance with international law and democratic procedure, without outside interference and through a free referendum”. The fact that Russia refuted allegations of a breach of law by attempting to use the law to justify the referendum’s legality only serves to emphasise the customary nature of the rule.

3 Peacefulness

The Crimean referendum also highlights the requirement that the territory be at peace at the time of a self-determination referendum. Again, part of the rationale for the international community’s refusal to recognise the referendum’s results was the presence of military forces in the region. The reason for this norm is that where armed forces,

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107 Question for written answer P-003209/14 to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative) Lorenzo Fontana (EFD): VP/HR - Consequences of the referendum in Crimea [2014] OJ C 335/149.
108 United Nations Security Council: 7134th Meeting S/PV.7134 (2014) at 8 per Sir Mark Lyall Grant; United Nations Security Council: 7144th Meeting S/PV.7144 (2014) at 7 per Mr Araud (France), at 16 per Ms Murmokaitė (Lithuania); United Nations General Assembly: 80th Plenary Meeting, above n 100, at 9 per Mr Ulibarri (Costa Rica), at 22 per Mr Lupan (Republic of Moldova).
109 Security Council 7134th Meeting, above n 108, at 6 per Ms Power (United States of America), at 8 per Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), at 14 per Mr Quinlan (Australia); Security Council 7144th Meeting, above n 108, at 7 per Mr Araud (France), at 13 per Mr Quinlan, (Australia), at 16 per Ms Murmokaitė (Lithuania), at 17 per Ms Lucas (Luxembourg); United Nations General Assembly: 80th Plenary Meeting, above n 100, at 9 per Mr Rishchynski (Canada), at 12 per Ms Gunnarsdóttir (Iceland).
110 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at [186].
111 Peters, above n 60, at 297.
112 United Nations Security Council: 7157th Meeting S/PV.7157 (2014) at 13 per Mr Araud (France), at 16 per Ms Lucas (Luxembourg); Security Council 7134th Meeting, above n 108, at 6 per Ms Power (United States of America), at 8 per Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom), at 14 per Mr Quinlan (Australia); Security Council 7144th Meeting, above n 108, at 7 per Mr Araud (France), at 13 per Mr Quinlan, (Australia), at 16 per Ms Murmokaitė (Lithuania), at 17 per Ms Lucas (Luxembourg); United Nations General Assembly: 80th Plenary Meeting, above n 100, at 9 per Mr Rishchynski (Canada), at 12 per Ms Gunnarsdóttir (Iceland).
whether government or otherwise, are present in the territory, some degree of undue influence over voters is inherent, meaning the expression of the people’s will may not be free and genuine. The requirement of a territory being at peace at the time of a referendum is also borne out in practice relating to other referenda and academic opinion.

4 Clarity

The requirement of clarity is twofold. First, the question asked must be as clear as possible, and free from ambiguity. It must allow the retention of the status quo as an option. The international illegality of Crimea’s secession also stems from the referendum question’s failure in this regard. Likewise, State practice in other contexts also indicates that a clear question is crucial for the establishment of the genuine will of the people. Similarly, only one question should be posed in a single ballot paper in order to increase clarity.

Examples of clear questions can be found in relation to Montenegro and Scotland. In the Montenegro independence referendum of 2006, voters were asked “Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with full international and legal personality?” The question asked of Scottish voters was “exemplary in its clarity”, with voters asked “Should Scotland be an independent country?”

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114 Wambaugh, above n 81, at 241.
115 The situation of human rights in the Sudan, above n 102, at [7].
116 Wambaugh, above n 81, at 241.
117 Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s III.2.
118 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [87].
119 Security Council 7134th Meeting, above n 108, at 6 per Ms Power (United States of America), at 8 per Mr Araud (France).
120 Clarity Act, s 1(4)(b).
121 Re Law Relating to the Consultation of the Populations of New Caledonia and its Dependencies (1987) 89 ILR 19 (Fr Const C) at 21–22; Venice Commission Crimea Referendum Opinion, above n 106, at [22].
123 Vidmar, above n 73, at 227.
124 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 (UK), s 1(2).
Second, the turnout and majority thresholds must be clear. Although the Venice Commission has advised against the imposition of a turnout thresholds or thresholds of more than a simple majority of votes,\textsuperscript{125} State practice indicates that such thresholds are permissible.\textsuperscript{126} There is no universally prescribed threshold in law. Rather, there is a general requirement of a clear and unambiguous majority.\textsuperscript{127} In this regard, Canadian State practice helpfully states that the determination of whether a majority is “clear” shall be considered with regard to the size of the majority,\textsuperscript{128} the percentage of eligible voters partaking,\textsuperscript{129} and any other matters which are relevant.\textsuperscript{130} The difficulty with applying this to Northern Ireland will be that the Irish referendum is binding, whereas those envisaged in Canadian practice are not.\textsuperscript{131}

5 \textit{Voter Eligibility}

Although universal suffrage is the most appropriate solution to voter eligibility in the context of referenda,\textsuperscript{132} restrictions placed upon eligibility, particularly on the basis of a residential period, are not unlawful.\textsuperscript{133} Any restrictions on the electoral rights must not be discriminatory or unreasonable,\textsuperscript{134} and must take account of local requirements and circumstances.\textsuperscript{135} In order to lawfully restrict voting rights, States must have a legitimate aim.\textsuperscript{136}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Code of Good Practice on Referendums}, above n 93, s II.7.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Vidmar, above n 73, at 271.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Clarity Act, s 2(2)(a).
\item \textsuperscript{129} Section 2(2)(b).
\item \textsuperscript{130} Section 2(2)(c).
\item \textsuperscript{131} Vidmar, above n 73, at 272.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Question of the future of Western Samoa GA Res 1569, XV (1960) at [3].
\item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Code of Good Practice on Referendums}, above n 93, at s I11.d; Tacna-Arica Question, above n 96, at 945; \textit{Py v France} (2006) 42 EHRR 26 (Section II, ECHR) at [45]–[52].
\item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Gillot}, above n 91 at [12.2].
\item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Py}, above n 133, at [64].
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2)} (2006) 42 EHRR 41 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [74]–[75].
\end{itemize}
6 The Role of States

States should take a minimum role in referenda, in that they should not promote one agenda to the exclusion of another.\(^{137}\) Although States can support one side of a proposition, such intervention cannot result in excessive, one-sided campaigning.\(^{138}\) States remain obliged to inform voters of the effects of the various outcomes available.\(^{139}\) The rationale underpinning this is that although law and politics are often intertwined,\(^{140}\) referenda themselves should not be used as a “political weapon” by the State.\(^{141}\)

Notably, both Irish and UK municipal law support this proposition. Under Irish law, the government is restricted, on the basis of equality, from providing a particular side of the issue with public funding.\(^{142}\) There is also authority from the UK to the same effect.\(^{143}\)

7 International Observation

International observation is crucial to ensure that the international community will accept the result of a referendum.\(^{144}\) It was called for as a condition of a referendum in the context of Bosnia-Hercegovina, so that the free will of the peoples could be properly obtained.\(^{145}\) Particularly in the context of a post-conflict society, international scrutiny adds to the legitimacy of the outcome of any referendum.\(^{146}\) As with many of the other principles discussed thus far, part of the international rationale for the unlawfulness of the Crimean referendum was the lack of international observation of it.\(^{147}\)

\(^{137}\) Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s I22.a.iii.

\(^{138}\) Section I.3.1.b; Peters, above n 60, at 298.

\(^{139}\) Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s I.3.1.c.

\(^{140}\) Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [1].

\(^{141}\) Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case (2004) 2004Hun-Na1, 16–1 KCCR 609 (Sth K Const C) at 173.

\(^{142}\) McKenna v An Taoiseach [1995] 2 IR 10 (SC) at 41 per Hamilton CJ.

\(^{143}\) See for example Wilson v Independent Broadcasting Authority 1979 SC 351 (OH).

\(^{144}\) Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s II.3.2.a; Question of the future of Western Samoa, above n 132, at [5].

\(^{145}\) Opinion No 4 on Recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, above n 105, at 178.

\(^{146}\) Peters, above n 60, at 298–299.

\(^{147}\) Security Council 7144th Meeting, above n 108, at 7 per Mr Araud (France), at 16 per Ms Murmokaité (Lithuania), at 17 per Ms Lucas (Luxembourg).
IV Self-Determination Post-Belfast Agreement

Thus far, the self-determination provisions of the Agreement have been outlined, as have key principles of the law of self-determination which will impact the exercise of the right under the Agreement. In combining these two sets of legal principles, the nature, extent and effects of self-determination in the all-Irish context can be established. In order to establish the nature of this right to self-determination, issues with the Belfast Agreement, and the mechanisms of the referendum under it, call for exploration.

A Issues

1 Post-Conflict Society

Northern Ireland is in a post-conflict period. This will present difficulties in the context of self-determination. The conflict was one of status, and where in the global order Northern Ireland properly belonged. Although the Agreement contained provisions on the decommissioning of paramilitary organisations, and completely rejected the use of violence in all circumstances, sectarian violence has continued. Tensions remain, and unless peace and reconciliation measures are implemented, there remains a risk that the territory will enter into a state of conflict once more.

Although any suggestion that Northern Ireland will enter into conflict again is speculative, it must be appreciated that this is a genuine risk, as evidenced by recent events. Following the emergence of evidence suggesting the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) had not fully decommissioned, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) accused Sinn Féin of being involved in the PIRA’s continued existence. Sinn Féin denied this, and accused the

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148 McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1–2.
149 William A Schabas and Peter G Fitzmaurice Respect, Protect and Fulfil: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (Border Action, Monaghan, 2007) at 12.
150 At 12.
151 At 13.
153 Jonathan Bell “UUP to walk out of Northern Ireland Executive after ruling body endorses Mike Nesbitt proposal” (29 August 2015) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk>.
UUP of undermining the Agreement. Further, the UUP has announced its intention to withdraw from the Northern Ireland Assembly, an institution set up by the Belfast Agreement. This latest series of events highlights the fragility of peace in Northern Ireland. The ramifications of this series of events, particularly the UUP’s withdrawal of support for an institute created by the Agreement, cannot yet be known. However, these recent events are concerning, and highlight the need for increased measures aimed at building and ensuring peace.

Given that the Troubles was a conflict concerning Northern Ireland’s status, a referendum on this issue may trigger underlying tensions. A referendum in Northern Ireland would differ from most post-conflict referenda, wherein there is often an overwhelming majority in support of independence, or some form of constitutional collapse which makes secession the only viable option. Likewise, Northern Ireland is contextually different from referenda in Scotland and Quebec, wherein the same background of sectarian conflict was absent. There are, therefore, few useful precedents in addressing how to deal with the implementation of a self-determination referendum in a post-conflict society wherein the majority are not clearly in favour of secession.

To ensure that any future referendum is undertaken in peaceful conditions, as required by law, it is crucial that measures are implemented in Northern Ireland to deal with the past. Not only is this crucial in a referendum context, but the resolving of these issues will go some way to ensuring a just and lasting peace, regardless of Northern Ireland’s status. The failure of the UK government to prioritise addressing the past has drawn criticism from human rights proponents, who have called for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for addressing the past, protecting human rights, building peace, and encouraging reconciliation.

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154 Conor Murphy “Nesbitt leading UUP on a road to no town” (28 August 2015) Sinn Féin <www.sinnfein.ie>.
155 Bell, above n 153.
156 Vidmar, above n 73, at 273.
157 At 273.
158 Wambaugh, above n 81, at 241.
160 At 59; Maguire, above n 8, at 571.
The implementation of appropriate mechanisms to deal with the controversies of the past is therefore crucial, not only in the context of self-determination, but to ensure a lasting peace. Contrary to recently expressed opinion that peace and reconciliation processes cannot occur “while Britain continues to occupy even one square [millimetre] of Ireland”, peace and reconciliation are not dependent on a united Ireland, they are a prerequisite to it. To suggest that such processes cannot occur if Northern Ireland remains a part of the UK is irrational, particularly given the fact that there is no guarantee of the creation of a united Ireland, and given the fundamental obligation of States to ensure that their citizens live in peace. In implementing measures for adequately dealing with the past, the two governments will not only make significant progress to ensuring lasting peace, but, should the circumstances arise where a self-determination referendum is to occur, they will have gone a significant way to creating conditions wherein it can be undertaken in more just, equitable and peaceful conditions, regardless of the outcome.

2 The Unit of Self-Determination

The identification of the self-determination unit in the present case is a matter of great importance. Although the “people of the island of Ireland alone” have the right to bring about a united Ireland, this cannot happen without the consent of the “people of Northern Ireland”. The “people of the island of Ireland alone” will include a population which is overwhelmingly in support of a united Ireland, as it includes persons from the Republic of Ireland. In recognising that the “people of the island of Ireland” may collectively bring about a united Ireland, the Agreement vests the right of external self-determination in this unit. The right to self-determination of people of the island of Ireland, however, is not absolute. Rather, it is inherently tied to the right of another self-determination unit, the people of Northern Ireland. Indeed, there will be cross-over between these two groups: a

161 Schabas and Fitzmaurice, above n 149, at 39.
162 At 39–40.
163 At 40–49; Maguire, above n 8, at 571.
164 Francis Boyle United Ireland, Human Rights and International Law (Clarity Press, Atlanta, 2012) at 194.
165 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
166 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
person who is a person of Northern Ireland will also be a person of the island of Ireland, although the converse will not always be true.

In this regard, the Belfast Agreement differs from the general law of self-determination. In the context of external self-determination in the all-Irish context, the provisions of the Belfast Agreement with regards to who constitutes a self-determination unit are *lex specialis* provisions – that is to say that by their specificity, they take precedence over the general law of self-determination.¹⁶⁷ This means that in the Irish context, the right to external self-determination does not vest in nationalists or unionists per se. Rather it invests in them as a collective.

That said, the fact that the nationalist and unionist populations both have characteristics of a people in their own right¹⁶⁸ per the customary international legal definition¹⁶⁹ is significant. Although the Agreement’s provisions are *lex specialis* with regards to external self-determination, customary international law will remain relevant for matters that are not covered by it.¹⁷⁰ The Agreement’s provisions relate only to *external* self-determination. Therefore, for the purposes of the *internal* right to self-determination, the nationalist and unionist populations still constitute different peoples, as they would in customary international law.

The point is not of mere academic interest. As the right of internal self-determination grants a right to peoples to take an active part in the political life of the State and to be free from discrimination,¹⁷¹ this means that unionists and nationalists, in their own right rather than as collective, must be granted these rights internally regardless of the status of Northern Ireland.

The right of self-determination in the Irish context, therefore, operates in two ways. The first means by which the right operates is externally. The people of the island of Ireland are entitled to form a united Ireland as a unit of self-determination, subject to the requirement that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, being a subset of the people of the island

¹⁶⁸ McKittrick and McVea, above n 2, at 1–2.
¹⁶⁹ *Reference re Quebec*, above n 35, at [125].
¹⁷⁰ *Fragmentation Study*, above n 167, conclusion 9.
of Ireland, also share this wish. The second mechanism of operation is internal self-
determination. Rather than attaching to the people of the island of Ireland, or Northern
Ireland, it attaches to the nationalist and unionist populations. As such, although
nationalists and unionists are entitled to customary legal protection of their right to internal
self-determination, the right to external self-determination is vested in the people of
Ireland and Northern Ireland, and is not delineated on the basis of traditional customary
international law divisions.

B Referendum Mechanisms

The nature and extent of the right to self-determination under the Belfast Agreement can
only be properly understood by examining the mechanisms of the referendum envisaged in
the Agreement. The Agreement is largely silent on the mechanisms of the envisaged
referendum. However, by reference to customary international law, a fuller understanding
of the referendum processes can be established.

1 Pre-Referendum

(a) Calling the referendum

The British-Irish Agreement itself is silent on when a referendum is to be held. This matter
is provided for in the Northern Ireland Act, which implemented the Agreement into the
UK’s municipal law. The Act states that Northern Ireland is a part of the UK, and shall
remain so unless a “poll” indicates that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland do
not wish for it to remain so. Such a poll, or referendum, is to be called by the Secretary
of State. It may be called at any time, but must be done if it appears “likely” that a
majority of Northern Irish voters would vote in favour of a united Ireland. As the Act
implements the Belfast Agreement, the failure to call a referendum where it appears likely
that a vote in favour of a united Ireland would result would be an internationally wrongful
act for which State responsibility could be invoked, and an action for which remedies in
judicial review would lie. Should a referendum be called, and lead to a vote in favour of

173 Schedule 1, cl 1.
174 Schedule 1, cl 2.
175 Richard Humphreys Countdown to Unity: Debating Irish Reunification (Irish Academic Press, Dublin,
2009) at 122.
retaining Northern Ireland’s current status, another self-determination cannot be called until the passing of seven years.176

Neither the Act nor the Agreement contain an express obligation for the UK to consult with Ireland before calling a referendum. To not do so, however, would be unlawful. The Agreement requires that consent to form a united Ireland be “freely and concurrently given” on both sides of the border.177 The implication of this is that the referendum must be held at the same time in both parts of Ireland. Given this, and the good faith obligations on the parties,178 before the statutory power to call a referendum is exercised, negotiations with the Irish government must take place.

(b) Amending the Constitution of Ireland

Prior to the referendum, amendment to Irish constitutional law may be required. Any law which is inconsistent with the Irish constitution is invalid.179 This may present difficulties in relation to the implementation of the Belfast Agreement in a united Ireland. Although the present study has focused mainly on the implementation of the Agreement’s self-determination provisions, many other issues are addressed in the Agreement. Significantly, the Multi-Party Agreement contains provisions on an agreed, devolved governmental structure for Northern Ireland.180 If, as it will be argued in section V, the Belfast Agreement would continue in force should a united Ireland be created, Ireland must allow regional government in Northern Ireland on these terms. Such a change will require change to the Irish constitution, which itself is only amendable by referendum.181 This means that the changes to the constitution necessary to enable the continuation of the Northern Ireland government will need to be made either at the time of the self-determination referendum, or beforehand.

176 Northern Ireland Act, sch 1, cl 3.
177 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(i); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
178 Tacna-Arica Question, above n 96, at 933; Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [91]; Vidmar, above n 73, at 263; Clarity Act, s 2(1); Cassese, above n 73, at 212.
180 Multi-Party Agreement, at 483-488.
181 Bunreacht na hÉireann, art 46(2).
To do so beforehand is preferable, as it means the terms on which the Northern Irish people would be accepted into a united Ireland would be made fully known to them.\textsuperscript{182} This is in keeping with the State’s obligation to ensure that voters are fully informed of the implication of the referendum results.\textsuperscript{183} Furthermore, to change the constitution at the time of a self-determination referendum would be contrary to best practice, as it would mean that voters would be voting on multiple issues in one referendum,\textsuperscript{184} and the requirement of clarity would be greatly undermined. As the Irish parliament is not competent to legislate in respect of Northern Ireland,\textsuperscript{185} these amendments would have to be done on the basis that they would have no force unless Northern Ireland were to become a part of a united Ireland.

(c) Voter eligibility

With regards to voter eligibility, only restrictions with a valid reason may be placed on the right to vote.\textsuperscript{186} Particularly, residency requirements would be both lawful\textsuperscript{187} and advisable. The right to self-determination is not vested in the inhabitants of the island of Ireland, but in the people.\textsuperscript{188} The implication of this is that those who are entitled to vote are those who can demonstrate a permanent connection with the island of Ireland, not merely presence there, or even British or Irish citizenship. As such, imposing a restriction so that persons who are eligible to vote are only those who have resided on the island of Ireland for a time agreed by both States is a legitimate objective, so as to protect the interests of the identified self-determination units.

Even within the island of Ireland, restrictions on voter eligibility on the basis of residency will mitigate the risk, however marginal it may be, that the Northern Irish vote could be affected by nationalist migration to the North. Given the openness of the Irish border, there is a, albeit rather minimal, risk that persons of more extreme political views will attempt to

\textsuperscript{182} Humphreys, above n 175, at 84–85.
\textsuperscript{183} Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s I.3.1.c.
\textsuperscript{184} Re New Caledonia Consultation Law, above n 121, at 21–22; Venice Commission Crimea Referendum Opinion, above n 106, at [22].
\textsuperscript{185} Bunreacht na hÉireann, art 3(1).
\textsuperscript{186} Hirst (No 2), above n 136, at [74]–[75].
\textsuperscript{187} Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, at s I11.d; Tacna-Arica Question, above n 96, at 945; Py, above n 133, at [45]–[52].
\textsuperscript{188} British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
affect referendum results by casting their vote on the opposing side of the border. This 
history of political tension is a sufficient local circumstance\textsuperscript{189} to justify the imposition of 
an ordinary residence requirement, so that a person who has been residing in either Ireland 
or the North for an agreed period of time will have their vote counted in that territory, 
regardless of which side of the border they are on come polling day.

(d) The required threshold

As to the imposition of a threshold which must be met to ensure territorial change, a 
simple majority threshold is appropriate. Although State practice does not set a defined 
threshold which must be met,\textsuperscript{190} thresholds of more than a mere majority are 
permissible,\textsuperscript{191} although not advisable.\textsuperscript{192} However, the Agreement, and the Northern Ireland Act, are not silent on the threshold which must be met: both state that territorial change will occur if a “majority” of voters favour it.\textsuperscript{193} This shows that it is envisaged in the Agreement that a simple majority of the Northern and Republic votes would be a sufficient indication of the free will of the people so as to change Northern Ireland’s status. The imposition of a higher threshold, as occurred in Montenegro,\textsuperscript{194} would be contrary to the Agreement.

(e) The question

Finally, the question must also be determined. In order to meet the requirements of clarity 
and unambiguity,\textsuperscript{195} the question posed on both sides of the border should be identical. As 
the Scottish referendum question\textsuperscript{196} was so “exemplary in its clarity”,\textsuperscript{197} it is proposed that 
the Scottish question be adapted so as to fit the Irish context, the suggested question being 
“Should Northern Ireland form part of a united Ireland?”

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\textsuperscript{189} Py, above n 133, at [64].
\textsuperscript{190} Vidmar, above n 73, at 271.
\textsuperscript{191} Law on the Referendum on State-Legal Status of the Republic of Montenegro, art 6.
\textsuperscript{192} Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s II.7.
\textsuperscript{193} British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479; Northern Ireland Act, s 1(2).
\textsuperscript{194} Law on the Referendum on State-Legal Status of the Republic of Montenegro, art 6.
\textsuperscript{195} Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [87]; Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, s III.2.
\textsuperscript{196} Scottish Independence Referendum Act, s 1(2).
\textsuperscript{197} Vidmar, above n 73, at 227.
2  The Referendum

Two key issues will need to be addressed in relation to the actual referendum process: the first being the role of the States; the second the role of international observation.

(a) The role of the States

States should generally restrain from excessively campaigning for one outcome in a referendum. The UK has stated that it has “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”, and the Agreement states in terms that it is for the “people of the island of Ireland alone… without external impediment” to determine Northern Ireland’s status. The implication of this is that both States should refrain from excessive campaigning in favour of one result or the other.

However, the role of Ireland is more complex. Although the UK has declared it has no interest in Northern Ireland’s status, Ireland has historically pursued a claim to it, in both the international and municipal spheres. These claims, rather than being political, were legal. There was a “constitutional imperative” to seek unification. Although Ireland’s constitution was amended under the Multi-Party Agreement so as to not make such claims, it has been argued that the constitutional imperative to seek unification remains. Were this the case, the Irish government’s role during the referendum would be mandated by this constitutional imperative, as well as international law.

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198 Code of Good Practice on Referendums, above n 93, at s 122.a.iii; McKenna, above n 142, at 41 per Hamilton CJ; Wilson, above n 143.

199 Albert Reynolds (Taoiseach, Republic of Ireland) and John Major (Prime Minister, United Kingdom) Joint Declaration on Peace (1993) at [4].

200 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.

201 Joint Declaration on Peace, above n 199, at [4].


203 Bunreacht na hÉireann, art 2 (as enacted).

204 Russell v Fanning [1988] IR 505 (SC) at 537 per Hederman J; McGimpsey v Ireland [1990] 1 IR 110 (SC) at 119 per Finlay CJ.

205 Multi-Party Agreement at 481; Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution Act 1998 (Ire), sch, cl 7(3).

However, this proposition cannot be sustained. The Agreement specifically vests the future of the territory in the hands of the people, not in either State. On a constitutional level, the Irish people are the source from whom the State’s power is derived, and it is the people’s right “to decide all questions of national policy”, not the right of the State. Taken together, these provisions imply that Ireland has not only withdrawn her legal claim of right to the North, but also that she is no longer under a constitutional imperative to seek unification. To hold otherwise would be to use any referendum as a political instrument, which would be impermissible and contrary to good faith.

(b) International observation

The second key issue to be resolved is the role of international observation. Northern Ireland has been beseeched by conflict for most of its existence. Tensions and distrust remain high within the territory. Given this, impartial international observation and monitoring, conducted by either the EU or United Nations, will help to ensure the results are open, free and trusted.

V Post-Referendum

There are three possible results to any self-determination in Ireland: first, a majority in Northern Ireland vote for the retention of Northern Ireland’s current status; second, the island of Ireland is divided, in that the Northern Irish majority supports a united Ireland, whereas Republic voters do not; and third, a majority on both sides of the border vote in favour of a united Ireland. Each of these possible outcomes has different legal ramifications. In other words, the effects of Irish self-determination depends on the outcome of any future referendum.

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207 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(ii); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
208 Bunreacht na hÉireann, art 6(1).
209 Impeachment Case, above n 141, at 173.
210 Schabas and Fitzmaurice, above n 149, at 12.
211 Peters, above n 60, at 298–299.
A United Kingdom

Should a majority vote to retain ties with the UK, there shall be no change in the status of Northern Ireland.212 This does not mean, however, that the obligations to respect the right to self-determination will cease. The unionist and nationalist populations remain ‘people’ entitled to the customary protections of internal self-determination. The UK remains under an obligation to respect this right, which encompasses the pursuit of political participation within the State.213

In Northern Ireland, internal self-determination is crucial. Although Northern Ireland is not a colony in a legal sense, the nationalist population within the territory have still experienced many of the negative effects traditionally associated with colonialism, such as marginalisation, discrimination, cultural alienation and social disadvantage.214 Whilst the devolved government now in place in Northern Ireland goes a long way to remedy this,215 it is crucial that the right to internal self-determination continues to play a role in government and discourse.

B Divided Ireland

If the Republic votes in favour of unity, but the North does not, there shall be no change in Northern Ireland’s status.216 The same is true in the unlikely event that Northern Ireland supports a united Ireland, but the Irish electorate does not. The right to external self-determination in the Agreement is limited to a right to retain the status quo or form a united Ireland. Solutions such as independence or joint sovereignty are indirectly ruled out.217 Such a result is not unprecedented. In the Northern Cameroons case, the International Court of Justice observed that where a referendum envisages only two

212 British-Irish Agreement, arts 1(i) and 1(v); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
213 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [126]; Charlesworth, above n 60, at 84; Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), above n 47, at 621, [9] per Judge Yusuf (separate opinion).
214 Maguire, above n 8, at 555–557; Grote, above n 11, at [13].
216 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iii); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
217 Humphreys, above n 175, at 108; Bell and Cavanaugh, above n 7, at 1357.
possible results, with there having been no prior discussion of a third possible outcome, it is “indisputable” that third options cannot be achieved.218

C A United Ireland

The effects of a vote in favour of a united Ireland, on the other hand, are more complex. In this case, both governments are obliged to introduce legislation to enable a united Ireland.219 Should the people of the island of Ireland vote for this option, many issues of law will arise.

1 Statehood

One of the key areas of concern in the exercise of external self-determination is the effects this has on international legal personality. In the context of the 2014 Scottish referendum, major scholarship was done on this matter.220

Fortunately, such issues are simpler to resolve in relation to Ireland. Whereas the Scottish referendum concerned State creation,221 the Belfast Agreement concerns the transfer of territory from one State to another. This means that issues of personality are unlikely to arise. Mere territorial change does not affect the international personality of States,222 a point relevantly demonstrated by the fact that Ireland’s independence did not change the UK’s international status.223

2 International Organisations

The continuing international personality of both States means that membership of international organisations, such as the UN, will be unaffected. Likewise, EU rights and obligations will continue unimpeded. The EU does not define the scope of a State’s

219 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(iv); Multi-Party Agreement at 479.
221 At [1].
222 At [53].
223 At [65]–[66].
Although the EU is a “new legal order of international law”, it remains bound by custom, under which the Statehood of both Ireland and the UK would continue. Therefore, provided the proposed referendum on continued UK membership in the EU does not result in withdrawal, the exercise of self-determination will not cause difficulties as to EU rights and obligations.

3 The Continuation of the Agreement

Of major significance is the effect that the creation of a united Ireland would have on the continuity of the Belfast Agreement. There are contending views on this matter. On one hand, the Agreement has been described as a transitional, rather than final, settlement, the implication being that the Agreement would not continue post-unity. On the other hand, it has also been argued that the Agreement’s provisions will continue indefinitely. The resolution of this issue is of crucial importance. If the Agreement would continue in force, the obligations of the Irish State would include a continuation, in some form or another, of the Agreement’s devolved government structure.

The Agreement would remain in force in a united Ireland. There is no sunset clause in the Agreement, and the plain wording of the text implies that it is intended to continue regardless of the North’s territorial status. The Agreement states that “whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”, government there is obliged to exercise jurisdiction impartially. This creates an obligation that is clearly intended to continue even in the event of a united Ireland. This intent is also shown through the fact that the Agreement confers on the people of Northern Ireland a right to

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224 Case 148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt (Principal Customs Office) Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787 at 1805; Crawford and Boyle, above n 220, at [159].
227 Crawford and Boyle, above n 220, at [53].
228 European Union Referendum Bill 2015 (HC Bill 6) (UK), cl 1.
229 Maguire, above n 8, at 567.
230 Humphreys, above n 175, at 84–85.
231 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(v); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
Irish and British identity and citizenship, regardless of the North’s status. As such, unless the parties agree to terminate the Agreement by consent, the Agreement would remain in force.

4 State Restructuring

The fact that the Agreement will continue in force means that there would be an obligation on Ireland to continue a regional government, for her sovereignty over her territory would be limited by the treaty. Scholars have proposed that a federal Northern Irish State within a united Ireland would be an appropriate solution to alleviate concerns about power imbalances. If the Agreement would continue in force, a devolved regime of this manner is not merely good policy, but legally imperative.

Even if the Agreement does not continue, or is terminated, a federal Northern Irish State is an appropriate means by which to protect internal self-determination. The regional distribution of governmental power in federal systems means that the right to internal self-determination can be readily fulfilled within them. As federal systems encourage greater participation in government decisions within minority populations, such an approach would have significant merit in a united Ireland.

5 Continued UK Involvement

Should a united Ireland eventuate, this does not mean that the role of the UK in the North will cease. It will be continued in at least two ways, both of which will ensure that the interests of unionists are aptly protected.

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232 British-Irish Agreement, art 1(vi); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
234 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101 (Arbitral Tribunal) at 120; The Iron Rhine ("Ijzeren Rijn") Railway (Kingdom of Belgium v Kingdom of the Netherlands) (Award) (2005) 27 RIAA 35 at [54].
235 Humphreys, above n 175, at 86.
236 At 84–86.
238 Thürer and Burri, above n 52, at [38].
239 Opeskin, above n 237, at 4–5.
First, the Agreement creates cross-border bodies and forums, which allow the discussion of matters of mutual concern.\textsuperscript{240} As the Agreement will continue in force, these entities, too, will continue to exist.

Second, the people of Northern Ireland will remain entitled to British citizenship.\textsuperscript{241} States have a right to invoke the responsibility of another State for wrongful acts done to one of their nationals.\textsuperscript{242} Theoretically, the UK could therefore invoke the responsibility of Ireland for any violations of the right to self-determination, or other fundamental rights, of unionists therein.

The difficulty with this is that the people of Northern Ireland are dual nationals. A State may invoke diplomatic protection against another State of nationality only where the former State is the State of predominant nationality.\textsuperscript{243} There is no set criteria for what determines the predominant nationality, the assessment is largely circumstantial.\textsuperscript{244}

Even if it could not be shown that a person is predominantly of British nationality, the role that inter-State applications before the Strasbourg Court have played in allowing diplomatic protection of a form must be noted. When it was alleged that the UK was torturing nationalist prisoners, Ireland brought a case before the Court, and had some limited success in holding the UK accountable.\textsuperscript{245} As withheld evidence emerged, the matter will be reheard in Strasbourg, again on Ireland’s initiative,\textsuperscript{246} thus indicating that mechanisms of some effect for State accountability do exist.

Where a right to diplomatic protection exists, there is also a common law duty on the Crown to exercise it in certain circumstances. Although there is no international obligation to pursue diplomatic protection,\textsuperscript{247} the Crown owes a duty of protection to its citizens,\textsuperscript{248} from which stems an obligation on the Crown to consider undertaking diplomatic

\textsuperscript{240} British-Irish Agreement, art 2.
\textsuperscript{241} British-Irish Agreement, art 1(vi); Multi-Party Agreement, at 479.
\textsuperscript{243} Article 7.
\textsuperscript{244} Article 7, commentary at [5].
\textsuperscript{245} Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 ECHR 25 (ECHR) at [174].
\textsuperscript{248} At [9.19].
The discussion of the Belfast Agreement thus far has focused on the interpretation of the Agreement in light of the general law of self-determination. However, the Agreement, as a piece of State practice, may also impact the general law of self-determination.

It is oft-stated that Northern Ireland is exceptional. Although this argument has been convincingly rejected, there remains an exceptional innovation within the Agreement, in its mixing of international and constitutional law, so as to accommodate two competing self-determination goals.

Particularly innovative is the role that various actors have had, and will have, under the Agreement. To date, State practice has recognised that there is an obligation for States to enter into good faith negotiations with each other with regards to referenda in territories over which they both have a claim. Customary international law also establishes an obligation on States to enter into negotiations with a territory wishing to become independent. The Belfast Agreement, however, was reached by a mixture of both of these. The right to self-determination truly was given to the people, as it was the people themselves who determined the scope of their right, with the consent of both States. By recognising the legitimacy of nationalist and unionist aspirations, and forfeiting any vested interests in Northern Ireland, the UK and Ireland have created a settlement to a long and bitter conflict. Whilst the peace is uneasy and imperfect, few would deny that it is an

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250 McLachlan, above n 247, at [9.81].
251 At [9.85].
253 Grote, above n 11, at [43].
254 Tacna-Arica Question, above n 96, at 933.
255 Reference re Quebec, above n 35, at [91]; Vidmar, above n 73, at 263; Clarity Act, s 2(1); Cassese, above n 73, at 212.
improvement to the conflict years. Should this approach be adopted elsewhere, it could have a significant impact on the way in which self-determination is realised in post-conflict contexts.

Secession movements remain prevalent around the world, the Crimean crisis being the obvious example. Aside from the flaws in the Crimean referendum which have been already been noted, a comparison of the Belfast and Crimean mechanisms highlights the merits of the Belfast approach to self-determination. At a basic level, the two situations have similarities: two neighbouring States with historic and present interests in a territory, in which there are competing nationalist and unionist movements. Had the two governments involved in Crimea, particularly Russia, followed the approach adopted under the Belfast Agreement, the free will of the territory’s people, on which Russia placed so much importance, could have been properly obtained.

Given the reluctance of States to forfeit their territorial integrity, to expect such a result is idealistic. However, if States are prepared to do so, the people truly become the “masters of the country”, and the people “determine the destiny of the territory”, rather than having their destiny determined by it. The Belfast Agreement is a testament to this.

VII Conclusion

The Belfast Agreement is outstanding for having ushered in a new era of peace in Northern Ireland. Although recent events have highlighted the fragility of this peace, the Agreement has survived such difficulties before. Provided the parties recall their firm commitment to non-violence, and are resolved to act in good faith towards each other, such difficulties can undoubtedly be overcome again.

Through its provisions on self-determination, the Agreement recognises the legitimacy of conflicting aspirations as to Northern Ireland’s status. Although ambiguous in parts, the Agreement, being a creature of the law, must be interpreted in light of it, which enables the resolution of any issues which may arise.

256 Security Council 7134th Meeting, above n 108, at 16 per Mr Churkin (Russian Federation); Security Council 7144th Meeting, above n 108, at 8 per Mr Churkin (Russian Federation).

257 South-North Joint Declaration, above n 69, at [1].

258 Western Sahara, above n 43, at 114 per Judge Dillard (separate opinion).

259 Murphy, above n 154; Bell, above n 153; Elliott and Kinahan, above n 152.
Although the Belfast Agreement has made significant advances in the context of Irish self-determination, its innovative approach is also more widely significant. The Agreement stands testimony to what may be achieved when States forfeit their interests, and work alongside, not against, conflicting self-determination aspirations. Far from being applicable merely in Ireland, the principles and mechanisms underpinning the Agreement serve as a model by which secessionist disputes may be resolved in post-conflict territories. The Agreement, therefore, will remain significant in the future, whether or not a future referendum results in a united Ireland.
VIII Word Count

The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises approximately 7,956 words.
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