EMANCIPATING SPACE FROM THE CONDITIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE BROKEN MIDDLE AND INAUGURATED MOURNING IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

By

Jenny Ombler

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Dedicated to my Grandparents
Abstract:

Spatiality in Israel and Palestine is mired in ongoing trauma and hardened differentiation. This thesis argues that spatiality must be reconfigured in order to break from a stagnated pattern of ongoing conflict. First, border lines become increasingly rigid, and come to enact a bordering practice that radically differentiates. Second, the site of the border itself offers opportunity for political possibility. Third, the spaces of violence must be subject to a process of mourning that enables emancipation from the conditions that would support ongoing violence. I draw upon the thought of Gillian Rose to re-articulate a notion of the border as a broken middle, and to set forth an approach to the spaces of violence that incorporates them into a process of inaugurated mourning. Re-articulating the border as a broken middle enriches the field of critical border studies which seeks to expand on the notion of the border as a site of potential connectivity and political or social possibility. A Rosean approach challenges the dualisms that a hardened border represents, persistently subjecting these dualisms to interrogation that undermines their rigidity. Re-configuring the spaces of violence through a process of inaugurated mourning gives expression to grief, and disentangles the organisation of space from ongoing violence, without forgetting past suffering. An inaugurated approach seeks a fuller and self-reflective understanding of the conditions of suffering; it works against retreating into a melancholic condition that would reproduce the conditions of violence. These arguments are developed through an exposition of projects by artist Francis Alÿs, and architect/artist collective Decolonising Architecture Art Residency. Through their propositional nature, these projects illuminate the possibilities of a critical approach to the production and re-configuring of political and social space.
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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatiality: political and social space</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders: rigidity and critique</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The broken middle: in the border</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaugurated mourning: Emancipation of space</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part One: Hardening</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardening and invulnerability</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Israel: Earthly redemption</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionism: A response</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia: Imagined wholeness</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reproduced Other</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines in our hearts: Alïs and the fragility of hardening</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Two: Beginning</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alïs: encountering</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The border: the broken middle</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAAR: The Lawless Line</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawlessness</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning: beginning rehabilitation</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Three: Emancipation</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trauma</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberrated mourning: Inaugurated mourning</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space: violence and emancipation</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oush Grab Military Base/Shdema Outpost</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillian Rose: architecture, the third city, and inaugurated mourning</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference List</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This thesis advocates an approach to reconfiguring spatiality in Israel and Palestine that breaks from the conditions of ongoing violence. Spatiality in Israel and Palestine is bound with conceptions of security and vulnerability that seek rigid definition. Territory and space become rigorously differentiated, and people represented by conceptions of space become subject to uncompromising dichotomies. It is a context in which past trauma has come to weigh heavily on the present, in which imagined utopias impose themselves upon a reality which cannot support them, and in which the hardening of borders is a relentless pursuit. I argue that spatiality in Israel and Palestine is multiply affected by trauma, and that moving forward requires two things: first, a process of rearticulating the idea of the border; and second, emancipating space from the conditions of violence.

First, the work of the broken middle upends the notion of borders as end points, instead reconceptualising borders – physical, imagined, and constructed – as starting points. Second, inaugurated mourning suggests an approach which breaks from the conditions of violence by reinventing the existing organisation of space to remember, mourn, and to allow for new possibilities.

The broken middle and inaugurated mourning are concepts developed by theorist Gillian Rose. The broken middle denotes the state of flux between binaries. It infers a condition of perpetual negotiation that resists absolute universalism or absolute ethics. Instead of absolutes, the broken middle compels an approach to acting ethically and politically, that endlessly draws on the brokenness between the particular and the law in pursuit of a ‘good enough justice’. A ‘good enough justice’ seeks to ‘rehabilitate’ the law, knowing that this is ongoing work that may never be complete. (G. Rose, 2011; Schick, 2012) Inaugurated mourning denotes an approach to ‘working through’ trauma and grief. (Schick, 2011) This approach does the political work of mourning, in which expression is given to grief, and in which the political implications of suffering are examined. I take Rose’s concepts and develop an argument which augments the limited body of literature that seeks to examine Rose’s rich and provocative thought. I do so by placing Rose’s thought in relation to spatial dimensions of injustice and suffering, pointing to a possibility that John Milbank indicates in Rose’s work, of an “architectural third way.” Milbank finds Rose’s examination of architecture “crucial, as it concerns
the usage of all ‘intervening’ human space.” (Milbank, 2015, pp. 74, 75) In
developing Rose’s thought in relation to, first, the border, and second, the spaces
of violence, I expand on this spatially-oriented thread of Rosean thought, and
indicate how it enriches contemporary debates.

I embed this discussion within the present-day conflict that torments Israel and
Palestine, as spatiality is so clearly implicated within this conflict in multiple
ways. My argument rests on the premise that spatiality and conflict are mutually
constitutive, and that therefore the pursuit of peace must incorporate a
thoroughgoing examination of the implications of the organisation of space, and
the conditions of violence that this supports. Solutions to the conflict in Israel and
Palestine are increasingly evasive, as Palestinian sovereignty and territory is ever-
undermined, and as attitudes towards security and relations become more
entrenched in hatred. This conflict is deeply historical, yet is attributed historicity
in asymmetric and stagnated ways. On one hand the conflict is mired in a
particular memorialisation of the Holocaust, which acts both as a leveraged
means of entrenching ongoing violence, and as opportunity for moral dissent.¹ On
the other hand, treatment of the present is subject to a-historicism, in which a
silencing of certain histories of the land diminishes the ability to resolve injury.
Rosemary Sayigh is careful to point out that attempts to negotiate this conflict
regularly detach from the Palestinian experience of trauma, reproducing an
impression of ‘violence-prone’ without understanding the hurt that leads to
ongoing violence. (Sayigh, 2013) Such silencing necessitates an interrogation of
historicised meta-narratives, and the ways in which these undermine the ability
for multiple traumas to be acknowledged.

To illustrate the political possibilities of a critical approach to spatiality and
conflict in Israel and Palestine, I examine works by artist Francis Alÿs, and
artist/architect collective Decolonising Architecture Art Residency (DAAR). As
propositional gestures, that seek to propose nothing but provocation of thought, or
to propose something different to the status quo, these works offer glimpses of

¹ For example, on Holocaust Remembrance Day, May 2016, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Israeli Defence Force, Major-General Yair Golan, gave a speech drawing upon the lessons of
the Holocaust and the hatred that drove its inception. He did so to make a moral argument
about the state of present-day Israeli society, and what he perceived to be increasingly un-
ethical trends. See: (Golan, 2016)
possibility. Alÿs is an internationally-established artist, who is known for his ‘walks’. These ‘poetic gestures’ take him on circuits or journeys that invoke the condition of space and the performance of moving through space. Alÿs asks, “does the artistic or poetic act…in this pragmatic situation…does it have any role?” (Alÿs, 2004e) Without positing an answer, Alÿs’s question provokes responses which come to form part of his works. They become political works in that they prompt discussion which is then disseminated through the exhibition of the work. DAAR, unlike Alÿs, have stated political aims, in that their work is in support of the decolonisation of Palestine, and is situated explicitly in this context. Nevertheless, their propositions for the re-interpretation and re-use of space reflect an approach which supports an open-ended politics rather than a pre-fixed notion of what ought to be. In exploiting the contradictions that they see to be inherent in hegemonic space, DAAR invoke moments of political and strategic possibility.

This thesis has three parts. First, ‘Hardening’ explores the processes of differentiation and repressed anxiety, elicited through conversations that arose in response to Francis Alÿs’s The Green Line (sometimes doing something poetic can be political and sometimes doing something political can be poetic) (2004). Second, ‘Beginning’ develops a notion of the border as a broken middle, and therefore as a starting point for doing the work of recognition and negotiation, through a discussion of Alÿs’s work, and two works by DAAR: The Lawless Line (2010) and Common Assembly (2011). Finally, ‘Emancipation’ explores an approach to breaking from the conditions of violence, through a place-based approach to inaugurated mourning.

I begin by examining ‘hardness’, and particularly how a sense of insecurity informs approaches to space and its definition. To do so I explore the meta-narratives of Israel, in particular how these act to embed rigidity in response to ongoing anxiety. I then turn to Alÿs’s work, to elucidate a number of aspects of the imposition of ‘hardness’ and its attendant anxiety upon lived experience in Israel and Palestine. First, bordering practices impose upon the embodiment of space by particular people. The meanings that borders confer come to entrench

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2 Throughout I have abridged the quotes derived from transcribed conversations surrounding Alÿs’s work, to remove repetition and filled pauses (such as ‘um’).
differentiation. Further, the notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’ denotes a sense of threat in which a traumatic past is represented within the organisation and differentiation of space. This trauma is embedded within the psyche of particular meanings of particular spaces, “After the 1967 war, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban told the United Nations: “The June [1967] map is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger. I do not exaggerate when I say that it has for us something of a memory of Auschwitz.” (Browning, Heschel, Marrus, & Shain, 2015, p. 177; Dimant, 2014) This section argues that as the production of differentiated space in Israel and Palestine is mired in trauma and anxiety, it reproduces the conditions of violence, by closing to the possibility of recognition.

I then turn to the notion ‘beginning’, in which I develop an interpretation of Rosean thought that lends to the possibilities within the physical border. I examine the manifestation of such an approach through two projects by Beit Sahour-based collective DAAR: *The Lawless Line* (2010); and *Common Assembly* (2011). Rather than as a hardened border signifying insecurity (an end point), the idea of the border as a width of autonomous space that challenges binaries (the beginning) lends to the notion of the border as a starting point. Further, the practical implications of living close to and on ‘the line’ complicate the process of hardening, and force micro-moments of negotiation and recognition. I frame these moments within the greater concept of the border as a starting point, to put forward a notion of the physical border as a ‘broken middle’ in which fixedness is troubled, in which thinking anew becomes possible, and in which the particular and the law are continually antagonistic.

Finally, I turn to a place-based concept of mourning, and emancipation. I explore how the work of DAAR may lend itself to the work of mourning, and to the emancipation of place and architecture that does not simply bury the past or replicate structures of violence. Rather than repeating conditions of conflict that are grounded in the existing organisation of space, DAAR’s work seeks to transform the functions and concepts of once-violent spaces, in order to break from the conditions of violence, and to work through the effects of trauma, without seeking to forget the past. I argue that spatiality must be incorporated into the process of mourning, and that DAAR’s approach suggests a way to integrate
past suffering into the process of renewal, thereby unburdening spaces of violence from the conditions that give rise to ongoing conflict.

**Spatiality: political and social space**

The conflict in Israel and Palestine draws from a confluence of ideology, religion, utopian visions, and rigid differentiation. Whilst driven by these, the conflict is fundamentally layered onto territory and place, onto which idealisation and division are imposed. Given that the conflict’s primary premise is the control of particular land and its resources, the conflict becomes spatially oriented, layering particular meanings and burdens onto the organisation of space. In turn, these burdens become reflected back onto the social relations that created them, reinforcing the divisions that they support. This is most apparent in the imposition of borders and the restrictions they impose upon the movement of particular people. Further, the imposition of borders impacts on the interactions of people with spaces beyond the border to which they are beholden. Bordering practice therefore refers to the impositions of particular spaces on particular people, especially how the imposed meanings of these spaces support behaviours that render some ‘insiders’ and others ‘outsiders’. Bordering practice can occur in multiple places therefore, and in spaces of conflict, is amplified to render a palpable violence. The spatiality of conflict carries the threat and memory of violence, in turn reinforcing the centrality of violence to particular spaces. To disrupt the legacy of conflict requires attention to the spatial dimensions that it produces.

The social theory of spatiality seeks to understand the production, performance, and ideological impacts of space. Henri Lefebvre embarked on an exposition of spatial theory in the 1970s, drawing on a Hegelian-Marxist framework, to argue that a socialist revolution must incorporate spatial revolution. This argument centres on his theoretical development of a spatial code, which “is a means of living in that space, of understanding it, and of producing it.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 48) The spatial code is a form of social understanding, which informs how subjects live in and constitute particular spaces. Rather than approaching space as though it is ‘empty’ before social relations impose meaning, or on the other hand, that space produces social relations, Lefebvre approaches the ‘production of space’ as a dialectic relationship, “an interaction between ‘subjects’ and their
space and surroundings.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 18) Spatiality infers a mutually constitutive production of space and the social relations that it supports.

Lefebvre understands spatiality to be mediated through the body. The ideologies and perceptions that inform social space are transferred and enacted through the body: “The whole of (social) space proceeds from the body.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 405) Otto Friedrich Bollnow discusses this mediation of body and space in terms of the embodiment of the ego. He writes, “The body is in a direct sense the ‘seat’ of my ego, and the whole spatial world is transmitted to me only through my body, or rather, perhaps, I am admitted to the spatial world by my body.” (Bollnow, Shuttleworth, & Kohlmaier, 2011, p. 269) Thus, spatial codes render embodied experience, the enactment of which in turn come to further constitute spatial codes. Whilst spatiality incorporates the intangible matter of social relations, it does so tangibly through the physical mediation of the body. Frantz Fanon’s analysis of the experience of being ‘black’ in colonised places reflects the bodily mediation of social space, and what this imposes upon the experience of having a particular body in a particular space. Steve Pile writes:

Fanon is made visible by the skin of his body, but cloaked in legends and anecdotes that envelope the black body. He is simultaneously visible and invisible, marked and erased, certain and uncertain – he certainly has a black body, but there is deep uncertainty about what this might be. (Pile, 2013, p. 252)

In this framework, the colonised body is mediated in social space by the expectations and inscriptions of social relations, and comes to be reproduced in its embodiment: “The black/white grid of meaning, identity and power is not imposed from the outside, but is inscribed in the movements of people, in their actions, thoughts and feelings.” (Pile, 2013, p. 251) Therefore, embodied space also reflects a dialectic of the struggle of power: “The definitive ‘performance’ of self is placed in the middle of a ‘real dialectic’ between the (tacit) self, the (seen) body and the interventions of the external (colonial) world.” (Pile, 2013, p. 251) Spatiality, then, incorporates the dynamics of power’s effects, which in turn come to constitute the embodied self.

Lefebvre further locates his understanding of spatiality within temporality. He argues that the production of space is in part the product of the inscription of
history, “what happened at a particular spot or place and thereby changed it – all of this becomes inscribed in space. The past leaves its traces…” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 37) Therefore, past events become part of the ‘script’ of space, in particular how these inform ongoing social relations. However, Lefebvre cautions against an understanding of spatiality that is overly entrenched in historicism: “space is always, now and formerly, a present space, given as an immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections in their actuality.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 37) Immediate spatiality implies a wholeness in which history and future possibility are always incorporated within the complex of actuality. Lefebvre’s overall argument for a socialist revolution that incorporates spatial revolution ultimately relies on the ever-present ability to transform space The actuality of the present therefore, carries a latent yet inherent transformative potentiality.

Following, there is political possibility intrinsic to social space. Whilst the impositions of power inscribe space and the bodies that enact it, there remains the inevitability of “permanent transgression”. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 23) Within this inbuilt inevitability is the possibility of political transformation. Lefebvre writes:

…it [space] is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make use of it. The social and political (state) forces which engendered this space now seek, but fail, to master it completely. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26)

This implies that within social space there is an omnipresent Other that is constitutive of the space’s domination, and thus, simultaneously is its transgression. As the example of Fanon shows, being ‘black’ in a colonised space comes to constitute ‘whiteness’, yet ‘in the uncertainty of what that might be’ resists the absolute and therefore troubles spatial and social categorisation. Ever-present in Lefebvre’s dialectic of social space therefore, is the possibility to transform power relations through the mutually constitutive practices of spatiality.

As I will discuss throughout this thesis, there are multiple points of contradiction and transgression within spatial practice in Israel and Palestine. Following from Lefebvre, these moments which escape the absolute are therefore treated as moments in which political possibility exists. At the same time, these are the
same transgressions which invoke the operation of power, however in doing so a momentary dialectic opportunity is apparent which undermines dominance. Whilst political and social change is pursued on a number of levels, this thesis takes as its premise, that momentary ruptures in spatial domination provide opportunities to further disrupt the conditions of violence. Spatiality is a central feature of social change, and must be incorporated into the processes and aims of change in order to ensure that the conditions of violence are not re-enacted.

**Borders: rigidity and critique**

Critical to understanding spatiality in this context is the idea of the nation-state, and particularly the divisions between nation-states that are assumed in traditional international relations. Despite globalisation, regionalisation, and global governance theories, which have influenced the rights and obligations that attend sovereignty, the organisation of global territory into defined sovereign nation-states has persisted. (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012; Pemberton, 2009) The ideas of Israel and Palestine emerge from this assumption of political and social organisation, and so too, does the ‘peace process’ with its fixation on achieving full statehood in two separate and delineated states. Critics of the two-state solution tend to focus on a one-state solution, though there are nuances within this as to the design of such a state. Both approaches rely on an organisation of space that is absolute and defined, whether in relation to each other (two-statism) or to surrounding states (one-statism). The implicit purpose of such delineation is to give effect to political and civic self-determination within a defined space, and to make that space secure.

Critical border studies has recently come to question the ethics of rigidly defined borders. A critical focus on the idea and nature of borders has been prompted in part by, for example, the movement of people between countries, and the inequalities that arise from disparities in freedom to do so, and in part from renewed attention to cross-border environmental issues. It questions the ability of a segmented political organisation of space to respond to contemporary

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3 A particular example of the impact of global governance on sovereignty is the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, which outlined an obligation to ensure the safety of citizens. This extends to the ability, under international law, for the UN Security Council to approve intervention in a state’s sovereign affairs if the safety of its citizens is unduly compromised. For more see: (Evans, 2009; Thakur, 2006)
challenges, and to meet ethical expectations. Further, it interrogates the replication of the territorial border in the actions of those who are affected by it.

Joseph Carens makes a case for ‘open borders’ in which state sovereignty becomes a matter of organisation and provision, rather than based primarily on an inherent right of exclusion. He asks us to deconstruct associations between cultural values and sovereignty, and ultimately, to open our self-understandings to constant readjustment based on changing communities. (Carens, 2013, 2015) This leads to the notion that the actions and self-conceptions of people constitute borders by performing them, and that this performativity is able to be renegotiated. The performance of space has been theorised by Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose as ‘performance’ being what subjects do, and ‘performativity’ being “the citational practices which reproduce and/or subvert discourse”. Thus, space “needs to be thought of as brought into being through performances and as a performatively articulated power.” (Gregson & Rose, 2000, p. 434) It follows that border performativity denotes the ways in which the power that constitutes the border’s imposition is reproduced (or subverted).

However, bordering practices are also constitutive of identity, and act on multiple planes rather than an imposition of hegemonic power. Noel Parker and Rebecca Adler-Nissen argue that bordering practice plays a constitutive role for social meaning. They articulate a notion of disaggregated ‘bordering’ which is multi-planed. They write:

Rather than asking to what degree the state is withering away and whether absolute sovereignty is a thing of the past (as globalisation theory might do), a theory of state-bordering practices needs to look at the interplay of different functions of borders

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4 For Carens, borders are inherently unjust. The construction of sovereign states (often attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648), is seen to be in the interests of hegemonic and totalising power, and creates unnecessary and unjust distinctions between people, based predominantly on birthright and inherited status. Carens makes an argument for more permeable and just borders based on an appeal to democratic principles, in a desire to affect change more readily. He argues that democratic states ought to adjust their self-understandings in order to adjust to immigration (rather than require assimilation to a fixed cultural standard). However, his argument ultimately rests on a notion of borders and sovereign states as an entirely artificial construction of distinction with no justifiable moral basis. For Carens, no person or group of people has any more right to land and opportunity than another, and the construction of sovereign states serves to protect the interest of particular groups at the expense of others. For more see: (Carens, 2013, 2015)

5 This Gillian Rose is not the theorist of the same name used predominantly in this thesis.
which states will seek to fulfil by articulating the border as different planes of inscription. (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012, p. 793)

For Parker and Adler-Nissen, the framework of the ‘border’ as a territorial demarcation of sovereignty is insufficient for explaining the multi-faceted ways in which states and entities enact bordering practice. Further, they argue that these practices are interrelated but increasingly disaggregated – thus, their interaction is complicated:

On different planes, different border inscriptions help constitute a particular topography of each state, a separate social identity for each state, an economic room for manoeuvre, etc. These different inscriptions do not necessarily correspond; indeed, they are semi-autonomous. Thus, what happens to one border inscription on one place (e.g., economic) does not straightforwardly affect another place (e.g., cultural). (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012, p. 793)

This argument rests on a compulsion to accept that bordering practices are essential for constituting identity, and that therefore the notion of sovereignty will persist, despite claims of globalisation theory. However, in doing so, they also argue for a more dynamic, and therefore perhaps more negotiable understanding of bordering, in which bordering practices take place at multiple levels, and between state and non-state actors rather than unilaterally. Therefore, though they trouble Carens’ insistence on deconstructing the relationship between identity and borders, their dynamic understanding of bordering renders it more open to the constant readjustment that Carens advocates.

Parker and Adler-Nissen’s work stems from an earlier programme led by Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Lines in the Sand’, in which three dimensions of study were set out: Border epistemology; ontology; and spatiality-temporality. According to their initial discussions, border epistemology denotes (following Derrida) “a craving for the distinctions of borders, for the sense of certainty, comfort and security that they offer.” (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 584) They ask whether an epistemology of border experience might be developed, in which difference might be understood in more relational terms, and further, what possibilities arise from “a shift from a geopolitical to a biopolitical horizon”. By shifting, Parker and Vaughan-Williams suggest that an
epistemology of borders which takes into account the lived experience of those who encounter, express, and “exist as” the border, may assist in troubling an attachment to territoriality and binaries. (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, pp. 582-584) Border ontology refers to the idea of the border as a foundation or foundational act, in which they suggest that “new descriptive ontologies” such as “threshold, (en)folding…the soglia\(^6\) (space in-between)…[and] ‘event’\(^7\)” might reconceptualise the notion of the border. (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 585)

Parker and Vaughan-Williams further ask questions about the (in)consistency of the border in space and in time. In doing so they advance a re-conception of the possibility of the border, in which borders may “open/foreclose different political and ethical possibilities”. They also propose that marginality may be a site of “strategic potentiality/possibility.” (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 585) This moves away from a conception of the border that relates to statism and to state-centric power. As Chris Rumford writes: “When ‘seeing like a state’ one is committed to seeing borders as lines of securitised defence.” (Rumford, 2012, p. 897) Rumford discusses the notion of ‘multiperspectival’ border studies, in which borders exist and are enacted in varied spaces, and for varied reasons. His discussion of the idea of the border as a ‘non-space’ of potential connectivity, and the ways in which some borders are increasingly seen as connectors rather than dividers (e.g. airports, intra-EU borders, and the US/Canada border), supports Parker and Vaughan-Williams’ invitation to reconsider the border in terms of a threshold. However, whilst insisting that “freeing the border from an intrinsic relation to the nation-state is an important first step” (Rumford, 2012, p. 900), Rumford (in this instance) stops short of suggesting how to consider the ‘political and ethical possibilities’.

It is here that I consider Gillian Rose’s notion of The Broken Middle to be a useful guide for rendering political and ethical possibility within bordering practice, without foreclosing to a utopian ideal, in which it is assumed that merely encountering leads to ethical engagement. She writes: “Premature acts of

\(^6\) From Italian, a broader notion of ‘threshold’. see: (Giaccaria & Minca, 2011)

\(^7\) Parker and Vaughan-Williams gesture here to Alain Badiou’s ‘event’ in which a subject is constituted by accessing or producing a ‘truth’ spurred by an uncertain or unpredictable ‘event’ or encounter. See: (Hallward, 2003)
association with others, which avoid the agony of reflection and *ressentiment* and have not learnt to transform them into anxiety of beginning, are [equally] calamitous.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 162) By insisting that encountering requires not only association, but deep interrogation of one’s self, Rose’s *broken middle* lends to an ethical bordering practice, one that relinquishes the epistemology of certainty described earlier. Further, she requires that in doing so, one must maintain cognition of both the abstract and the particular, remaining within the antagonistic pull of both. She writes:

Addressing people under the qualification of ‘a public’ is flattering and undermining: it elevates reflection and debases both passion and action, so that the response to distinctions, especially to one’s distinction from oneself as abstraction, is to retreat into *ressentiment* – resentfulness towards the actuality of the pain of differences, instead of passion to recognize them, and action to aid others to recognize them. (Kierkegaard & Dru, 1962, pp. 49, 51) (G. Rose, 1992, p. 162)

To begin the study of bordering practice from a Rosean perspective is to interrogate the processes by which this practice might lead to recognition, rather than, as Rose laments, to resentfulness. It further requires an understanding of performativity of the border. In reflecting on our own border performativity, we come to understand how we are both active and complicit in the constitutive practice of bordering. We are thereby challenged to examine our role in the injustices bordering (and therefore exclusivity and exclusion) may cause. This is what Rose calls the ‘anxiety of beginning’, in which this agony is transformed, by our own effort, into the possibility of comprehension.

*The broken middle: in the border*

As described above, Rose suggests that there are two responses to distinctions: resentfulness or recognition. The first, *ressentiment* (resentfulness), denotes a retreat into ‘a dangerous security and comfort’. (G. Rose, 1992, p. 162) This retreat follows from Adorno’s notion of ‘hardness’, which he decries as an “absolute indifference toward pain.” (Adorno, 1998) Hardening denotes a move

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8 Rose’s notion of *ressentiment* (noted here as ‘resentfulness’) draws from Nietzschean theory. Magdalena Zolkos discusses *ressentiment* in terms of Jean Améry’s interpretation, which reflects the way *ressentiment* and ‘resentfulness’ is used in this thesis: “the subject retains a strong investment in the binary victim-perpetrator relationship, and where the mnemonic site of suffering continues to dominate the subjective terrain of the self.” (Zolkos, 2014, p. 363)
towards a sense of invulnerability, or a sense of security, in which the self is radically defined against, and protected from, the Other and from ‘vulnerability’ itself. Such hardening involves closed-ness and incomprehension, a definition of self which denies self-implication and recognition of the self within the other. The sense of security created by hardening borders of the self, the community, and the state, relies on a measure of threat from which to be secure. This ‘strength’ of security is unable to be detached from persistent threat. It does not seek peace, as the absence of threat softens borders, exposing a psyche which is not prepared to see itself made vulnerable.

The second response to distinction is a form of recognition, which for Rose is speculative\(^9\) and therefore active and ongoing. This speculative approach to recognition requires a staking of one’s self as active witness to suffering, and in doing so to work towards comprehension of the ways in which the self is implicated in the structures that uphold ongoing suffering. To understand this implication, the ‘witness’ must hold together dualisms, in particular the “disunity of singular and universal” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 164), therefore to hold ‘as one’ the distinctions between (for example) particular suffering and institutions of the state, “seeking to understand how they are mediated by one another.” (Schick, 2013, p. 45) This approach actively works against ‘hardening’, as it requires not only that the self is contested, but further that recognition is evasive and dynamic. She writes: “This unsettled and unsettling approach, which is not a ‘position’ because it will not posit anything, and refuses any beginning or end, would yet induce repetition forwards – a beginning in the middle.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 155)

Beginning in the broken middle, therefore, works against the ‘certainty, comfort and security’ of borders that Parker and Vaughan-Williams discuss. For Adorno, such a craving would be tantamount to the repression of anxiety (the anxiety that attends uncertainty, discomfort, and insecurity), which in turn compels an attachment to hardness, and to invulnerability. In this sense, ‘vulnerability’ is understood to be “susceptible, exposed, at risk, in danger.” (Gilson, 2011, p. 309)

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\(^9\) A speculative approach to recognition draws from Hegel’s definitions between dialectic and speculative philosophy, in which dialectic thought denotes negative reasoning, and in which speculative thought denotes a constant flux of interplay between opposites that are constitutive of one another. For more see: (Schick, 2013, p. 47)
means and makes possible. Given that hardening denotes closed-ness, vulnerability re-figured comes to mean “openness to being affected and affecting.” (Gilson, 2011, p. 310) Rather than passive openness, Rose would maintain that this openness is active and laden with the struggle of self-reflection. The ‘border’, therefore, becomes the ‘third place’ in which diremption is acknowledged, yet in which the work of vulnerable recognition occurs. (Schick, 2015) Following on from Parker and Vaughan-Williams, it is a site of ethical possibility.

_Inaugurated mourning: Emancipation of space_

Hastening to harden (to become ‘invulnerable’) in response to trauma leads to an inability to mourn, and therefore to an inability to seek understanding of what has occurred. This closes the possibility of addressing the conditions which give rise to violence and to trauma, compounding and stagnating in a condition of ongoing violence, in which ways to a more peaceful existence become obscured. (J. Butler, 2006; Schick, 2011) Approaching ongoing violence by hastening to harden and protect a rigid conception of ‘us’ denies opportunities to reflect, to understand, to mourn, and to work through trauma in pursuit of ‘a good enough justice’. (G. Rose, 2011; Schick, 2011, 2012) Hardening creates a dichotomous notion of ‘us’ in which the self is defined positively (utopian) in differentiation from the meaning we ascribe to that which is external to ‘us’. This exclusivity compels not only a rigidity against that which we understand to be external, but also against that which is the buried internal.

An existence in which there is persistent and un-mourned trauma is stagnated within the trauma itself. The past comes to bear upon the possibilities of the present, concealing ways to work through trauma, and to think anew. In such a burdened life, the myths and structures which support the stagnation of trauma compound, making it increasingly difficult to dismantle the conditions of violence. To dismantle does not then denote a return to a previous condition.

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10 Diremption refers to a fundamental brokenness, but not of something that was ever wholly one. Engaging with diremption therefore does not indicate ‘mending’, but of seeking to understand and negotiate antagonistic dualisms. See: (Schick, 2012, pp. 5-6)
Working through\textsuperscript{11} requires that we come to find ways of living with and beyond trauma. What has happened comes to inform the present, but does not come to rule it. This is a transformative approach, which acknowledges that a desired return to an idealised pre-condition is only another mode of closing in which trauma persists, and in which willing agency to rethink is fundamental.

Addressing trauma - historical, present, and ongoing - from within the midst of violence does not await a moment of clarity from which to begin to work through. Rather, it sees the trauma itself as intrinsic to ongoing violence, and maintains that only by beginning to address pain and suffering, will a more peaceful and just future begin to become possible. This is onerous work, as it requires moving towards a sense of vulnerability and culpability, yet by doing so, is able to begin to agitate and provoke for renewal which does not forget or break from the past. Rather, it works through past and present trauma, transforms its hurt into a way of living with comprehension, and finds an ability and willingness to continue to work at comprehension rather than to settle or to harden.

I turn here to Rose’s differentiation between aberrated and inaugurated mourning. Aberrated mourning denotes a silencing of the past which refuses to ‘work through’ the effects of trauma. (Schick, 2011) For Rose, the trauma then is relived as endless tragedy: “the remains of the dead one will be incorporated into the soul of the one who cannot mourn and will manifest themselves in some all too physical symptom, the allegory of incomplete mourning in its desolate hyper-reality.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 70) Inaugurated mourning, rather than stagnating within the trauma, struggles in pursuit of comprehension of the structures that led to suffering, and the implications of this for the self and relationality. It therefore seeks a fuller understanding of failure to prevent suffering: “I offer the comedy of absolute spirit as inaugurated mourning: the recognition of our failures of full mutual recognition, of the law which has induced our proud and deadly dualisms…” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 76) Rose places an onus upon those implicated in trauma to be open and to learn, in order that the conditions that gave rise to suffering might be better understood, and critiqued.

\textsuperscript{11} I refer here to Kate Schick’s notion of ‘working through’ trauma, an approach that addresses “the underlying structures that perpetuate violence and suffering…to take the difficult path of mourning and political risk.” See: (Schick, 2011, p. 1854)
Like Rose, Judith Butler finds political possibility in the work of mourning. She considers the desolation of grief to be an opportunity, in the reassembling of one’s self, to come to know suffering and the vulnerability of others. She writes: “To grieve, and to make grief itself into a resource for politics, is not to be resigned to inaction, but it may be understood as the slow process by which we develop a point of identification with suffering itself.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 30) Butler calls for a critical understanding of how global politics maintains a ‘hierarchy of grief’ which must ‘negate’ the Other “again (and again).” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 32) She maintains that this inability to mourn the Other reproduces the conditions of violence: “Violence renews itself in the face of the apparent inexhaustibility of its object.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 32) To break from renewed violence, therefore, the object of violence must become a subject who is able to be mourned.

The work of inaugurated mourning calls for an understanding of how suffering is distributed and reproduced in relation to the structures that uphold differential distribution and reproduction of violence. The differentiation of space, and therefore the attachment of meaning to those who are attributed to particular spaces, works to support differentiation of the ability to mourn. Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty write: “Human geography is that part of social theory concerned to explain the spatial patterns and processes that enable and constrain the structures and actions of everyday life.” (Dear & Flusty, 2001, p. 2) The spaces of bordering practice and violence reproduce differentiation, hardening and anxiety. It follows that these spaces must be incorporated into the process of inaugurated mourning, in order to be emancipated from the conditions of ongoing violence.
Part One: Hardening

This chapter explores the process of hardening, with reference to Francis Alÿs’s *The Green Line (sometimes doing something poetic can be political and sometimes doing something political can be poetic)* (2004). First, I attend to the ideal of hardening (becoming invulnerable), and discuss this dynamic in the creation of identity and conceptualisations of Israel and Palestine. I then introduce Alÿs’s work, and the ideas of partition, differentiation, and insecurity that arise during the discussions surrounding his work. I argue that bordering practice in Israel and Palestine follows a pattern of seeking absolute differentiation, and avoiding recognition, thereby reproducing conditions of insecurity and trauma.

Hardening and invulnerability

Hardening is a process by which the security of self is relentlessly pursued. Adorno describes this as an ‘ideal’ which represses the anxiety of the possibility of pain, and imposes this condition externally. He writes: “Whoever is hard with himself earns the right to be hard with others as well and avenges himself for the pain whose manifestations he was not allowed to show and had to repress.” (Adorno, 1998) Hardening is therefore a relational expectation, in which a ‘self’ represses the anxiety of pain, and also represses the expression of that pain to appear acceptable to others. Adorno further notes that repression has ‘destructive’ effects, in which the ‘self’ becomes cold (indifferent\(^{12}\) to the suffering of others.

In repressing the anxiety of the possibility of being hurt, hardening becomes ‘wilfully ignorant’ to the effects of pain on others. (Gilson, 2011; Schick, 2016; Tuana, 2006)

In global politics, the effect of hardening is to buttress security of the idealised state from that which threatens to harm it, and to avenge hurt, in order to appear ‘hard’ or strong. Challenges to the sense of security offered by the state become catalyst for further entrenching and reinforcing hardness. An ‘arms race’, for example, responds to the idea of threat by relentlessly seeking to out-strengthen the opponent. This produces an absurd security, which depends on insecurity to define itself. Likewise, 9/11 injured a sense of security that had been harboured by the idea of U.S. borders, protected by the formidable U.S. security apparatus.

\(^{12}\) On ‘indifference’ see: (Schick, 2016, pp. 35-38)
The response to this injury was vengeance (as Adorno would observe - vengeance for pain that was not allowed to be shown). The anxiety of the possibility of being hurt was laid bare for a fleeting moment, and was silenced in haste by enacting revenge.

The impulse to secure against threat is directed both externally and internally, by increasing rigidity of definition and exclusion. As Adorno wrote, anti-Semitism is not necessarily about Jewish people. Rather, it is about the fragility of the identity of the anti-Semite, compelling construction of internal identity by differentiation. (Adorno, 1986, pp. 127-128) Similarly, in the wake of 9/11, security came in the form of vigilant distinction between ‘us’ (who are good and strong), and ‘them’ (who hate us). These categories appear to be rigid, yet they are movable, being more attached to those defining than to the Other. Donald Trump’s demonization of ‘Muslims’, for example, differs from George Bush Jr’s demonization of ‘terrorists’, yet both draw on the same dynamic of distinction to support securitisation.

Hardening, therefore, is a response to the possibility of insecurity and pain, and seeks to repress the attendant anxiety. Judith Butler considers this in terms of a primary human vulnerability, which is distributed differently, but nonetheless felt. She writes: “That we can be injured, that others can be injured, that we are subject to death at the whim of another, are all reasons for both fear and grief.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. xii) In order to repress this vulnerability of the ‘self’ by securing against an Other (and thereby enacting violence or the threat of violence on them), the vulnerability of the Other must be ‘derealised’. ‘Derealisation’, according to Butler, is a process of de-humanising the Other, in which the death or hurt of that Other ‘doesn’t count’ in the same way that would be attributed to ‘one of us’. (J. P. Butler, 2009, p. xxii)

De-humanising requires the re-allocation and severing of sociability. If there is a connection between the self and the Other, violence becomes more difficult to enact as it is relatable to violence towards the self (understandable as suffering): “To kill the other is to deny my life, not just mine alone, but that sense of my life which is, from the start, and invariable, social life.” (J. P. Butler, 2009, p. xvii) Butler derives an account of social life from the idea of primary human
vulnerability – in which all humans require sociability in order to live. To enable derealisation, social connection and likeness to the Other must come to be denied. Butler writes: “It shores itself up, seeks to reconstitute its imagined wholeness, but only at the price of denying its own vulnerability, its dependency, its exposure, where it exploits those very features in others, thereby making those features ‘other to’ itself.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 41)

In terms of bordering practice, this process of derealisation becomes attached to hardened edges: of the self; the community within which one identifies; the state, and ‘like’ states (i.e. the ‘West versus the rest’). The ‘imagined wholeness’ is an internalised norm, whereby the Other becomes rigidly defined externally to the whole – and therefore expendable, unreal, and, as Butler would maintain, less human. However, derealisation is an ever-incomplete task. As Butler insists, negation must occur ‘again (and again)’. It is subject to persistent contestation by virtue of realisation of its incompleteness, and must harden ‘again (and again)’.

(J. Butler, 2006, p. 32) The ‘hardened edges’ of the border must be constantly performed to negate their transgression. Mark B. Salter writes: “Indeed their very failure reinforces the grand narrative of sovereignty: borders are created by the assertion of sovereign states, the naturalness of which is immediately undermined by the fabrication and necessary transgression of the border. The border naturalises the violence that was necessary to create it.” (Salter, 2012, p. 735)

The construction of the nation-state both affords the ‘right’ of self-determination (autonomy) and disentangles the ‘problem’ of the resident Other. By demarcating borders between groups, the global Westphalian system entrenches difference, and naively attempts to mitigate the associated difficulties through place-based (identity) politics. In order to humanely deal with the Other, the system of states either gives ‘them’ the right of self-determination elsewhere (which it does not matter to ‘give up’), or attributes universal human rights (of which self-determination is one). Either the other within has the same rights, and is equal, or the problem of self-determination is removed from within, because there is a

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13 Butler’s notion of primary human vulnerability derives from an understanding that humans must ‘by virtue of bodily requirements’ be given over from birth to another to be able to live, and that therefore none can claim absolute autonomy. See: (J. Butler, 2006, p. 31)
space ‘elsewhere’. Rather than complicating the ‘imagined wholeness’ of the
nation-state, the interests of the Other are either subsumed or extricated.

Border performativity imposes a sense of rigidity and differentiation upon those
who enact and experience ‘bordering’. The spatial differentiation implied in the
notion of the border acts as a representative and enabler of the impact of
differentiated law, identity and inclusion/exclusion, on those who are subject,
either as within, or as outsider (be it externally situated spatially or resident
alien). To perform the border suggests a process of delineating boundaries of
meaning and enacting grand narratives to support the reproduction of this
delineation. The Other(s) become essential signifiers of boundaries. Though
rendered expendable they are entirely embedded within the narrative and are,
consequently, indispensable.

Performing Israel: Earthly redemption

Hardening is a performed process, in the pursuit of security and formed identity. I
argue that the meta-narratives of Israel are a hardened response to insecurity, and
that they reproduce insecurity and the conditions of violence. Further, I propose
that these narratives are indicative of a bordering performativity that seeks to
harden and rigidly differentiate. Israel is at once a messianic utopia, an ancestral
home, a religious and historic place, a political utopia, and a reaction to the
seemingly incompatible notions of the ‘nation-state’ and the alien within. First,
Zionism drew on and was a reaction to pervasive anti-Semitism in Europe, and is
therefore in itself a response to the experience of being the Other. Second,
Zionism attached itself to then-Palestine and constructed an ‘imagined
wholeness’ which embedded itself in a utopian attachment to land. Third, Israel
has sought to externalise its anxiety, and hardens in relation to its Other. This
section sketches these three points. I then introduce Alýs’s work, and explore how
the fragility of hardening is made visible through his action.

Zionism: A response

Zionism and Israel is in part a reaction to pervasive anti-Semitism in Europe,
unwillingness on the part of many European nations to carve an accepted Jewish
identity into their own, and ultimately, to the Shoah. When the nation-state is
constructed as singular in meaning, the Other (for Europe, the Jewish people),
must be either subsumed or extricated. Israel extricated that demand, whilst appearing to meet the expectations of common humanity and universal rights. David Ben-Gurion (first Prime Minister of Israel) insisted that this was a natural right for Jewish people ‘like any other people’ (J. Rose, 2005, p. 114). However, “as Hannah Arendt pointed out, emancipation, while pretending to give the Jew equality, in fact makes the Jew stand out more visibly, as pure difference, from the rest.” (J. Rose, 2005, p. 112) In this respect, Zionism can be considered to have been usurped as a means of realising the self-determination right of the Jewish people, whilst simultaneously removing the ‘issue’ of Jewish Europeans from being accorded full placehood in Europe.

Zionism14, whilst drawing on the European experience of nation-forming, also sought to corral a sense of delineated identity, separate to that of nations that were forming in Europe. Jewish people had long been persecuted in Europe. The presence of Jewish communities became perceived as a ‘problem’. The term ‘The Jewish Question’ came to signify debates around how these communities should be treated. This ‘Question’ became stark when related to increasingly exclusive concepts of nation. (Brustein, 2003; Bunzl, 2007) The Zionist movement responded to this hostility by garnering a sense of collective identity, and some argue, leveraged from anti-Semitism in pursuit of its political aims. J. Rose writes: “A Jewish state would solve the Jewish problem. ‘I have the solution to the Jewish question,’ (Herzl, 1960) he [Herzl] insisted to Moritz Güdemann. And not just for the Jews. The nations of the world would remove a ‘foreign body,’ or political irritant from their midst.”15 (J. Rose, 2005, p. 111) Such a sentiment removes the impetus for European nations to build Jewish identity into their own. As Arendt laments, drawing on difference to pursue equality renders difference more apparent.

Difference, and the calamity it brought, is embedded in the genesis of Israel.16

The memory of the Shoah, invoked in Ben-Gurion’s 1948 Declaration of

14 ‘Zionism’ refers to the political movement, unless otherwise indicated.
15 Hannah Arendt’s depiction of the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem discusses his admiration for Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, (an early Zionist ‘classic’). According to Arendt, Eichmann considered Zionism to be an idealist pursuit, complementary to his own idealism surrounding the idea of the German state. See: (Arendt, 1963)
16 ‘Israel’ refers to the state apparatus and supporting narratives, and is not intended to be a catch-all for the entirety of Israeli society.
Independence, continues to impart a sense of trauma. (Ben-Gurion, 1948) The effects of unmourned trauma on the ongoing identity of a group who are brought together in part by virtue of that experience is “not a positive or therapeutic community; it is ‘corrosive’. (Erikson, 1995, p. 189)” (Schick, 2011, p. 1840) Where such a community is defined in terms of suffering, suffering itself becomes intrinsic to its ongoing identity. There is no community without trauma. Ilan Pappé, discussing the work of Moshe Zukerman, finds that “the powers that be seek to re-traumatize the newly formed Jewish society and keep alive its constant angst about a second Holocaust.” (Pappé, 2014, p. 177) By agitating the ‘raw nerves’ of Holocaust memory, Pappé finds that the Israeli state compels the “nation to be constantly at arms.” (Pappé, 2014, p. 176)

Zahava Solomon argues that, as the rebuilding of lives shattered by the Shoah coincided with the building of a new nation-state, mourning was truncated, and ‘strength’ came to be privileged. She suggests that the experience of nation-building, in particular the ‘War for Independence’ of 1948-9, may have established a sense of pride, by inflicting violence rather than receiving. She writes:

…many of the survivors perceived the establishment of the State of Israel as evidence of the failure of Nazis to destroy the Jewish people. This perception could have given special meaning to their survival and helped restore some of their massively injured self-esteem. In addition, the participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict presented many of the survivors with the opportunity to channel their pent-up aggressions towards the Arabs, and helped to replace their image as victims with a new self-concept of warriors fighting in a war of independence. (Z. Solomon, 1998, p. 70)

This self-image as warrior is tied to repressed anxiety, an anxiety which then grips the psyche and must be constantly re-repressed. Further, this anxiety becomes laden as externalised violence onto the Other. As Adorno wrote, hardness towards the self comes to warrant hardness against others, and pain inflicted becomes vengeance for pain suppressed. (Adorno, 1998) As Solomon further observes, “manifestations of weakness and dependency were regarded as detrimental to the national effort of building a new state. As a result, expressions of grief, sadness, and bereavement were discouraged.” (Z. Solomon, 1998, p. 71)
Rose finds certain representations of Holocaust memory to be in service of what she terms ‘Holocaust piety’, which “degenerates into myth and sentimentality…of the ultimate predator.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 47) By silencing those narratives\(^\text{17}\) which do not fit the re-traumatization of a population on the basis of primary distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, Israeli meta-narratives silence the ability to mourn: “they unify and make compact a complex series of events in a way which removes those events even beyond mythic meaning and leaves only dumb witness.”(G. Rose, 1993, p. 241) Further, they embed the idea of Israel as infallible, and as primarily ‘good’, in a world which is dichotomised between victim and perpetrator. To be ‘constantly at arms’ becomes the only option, against the ever-threatening ‘ultimate predator’. I return to the characterisation of the ‘ultimate predator’ later. I now turn to discuss how Zionism, as a response to the experience of being the Other, came to characterise itself as an ‘imagined wholeness’.

**Utopia: Imagined wholeness**

The imagined whole is a utopian impulse. This wholeness is pursued by a subject to establish “a norm by which that subject might be known.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 41) Butler describes nations as a different order to the ‘individual psyche’, but both as *subjects* which are compelled to become known. In this sense, a nation must define itself in positive terms – what it may be known *as*. To be known as something infers its negative: what the nation is not. In the case of Israel, Zionism draws on a dichotomy of catastrophe and redemption, and on a dichotomy of Israel and its Other. The building of the nation-state becomes bound with the notion of redemption, and is cast dramatically against the catastrophe which precedes it: “only the Jewish state could save them from a similar fate.”\(^\text{18}\) (Pappé, 2014, p. 177) Redemption and the state is simultaneously figured as redemption in the now and in the future, and as redemption to an idealised past. J. Rose

\(^{17}\) An example of an alternative narrative would be Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the Adolf Eichmann trial in Israel in 1961-2. Arendt complicated the idea that Eichmann could be portrayed and understood as evil, instead arguing a thesis of ‘the banality of evil’, in which the perpetrator comes to be understood as a regular person ‘simply doing their job’, rather than as inhuman and monstrous. Arendt therefore advances the idea that the production of evil acts is due to other societal factors: nationalism for example, rather than an inherent characteristic. See: (Arendt, 1963)

\(^{18}\) On the nation as ‘victim’, and the state as ‘rescuer’ as a meta-narrative in support of securitisation see: (Anker, 2014)
writes: “According to messianic legend, Israel – although it will ultimately be led through all tribulations to national redemption – will have to bear its share of suffering in the final cataclysm. (Scholem & Werblowsky, 1973). Redemption will not be realised without ruin and dread.” (J. Rose, 2005, p. 6)

When this reliance on the dynamic between suffering and redemption is considered in terms of an account by Israeli academic Yael Zerubavel, suffering becomes associated with the period of exile, regarded as “inherently regressive and repressive”, and national redemption becomes associated with “Jewish national life as experienced in Antiquity.” (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 14) Casting exile as an impermanent state both removes the impetus for acceptance of the diaspora into ‘host’ cultures, and makes inevitable the ‘return’. Israel becomes an inevitability, in which ‘ruin and dread’ must be endured (and enacted) in order to overcome. Zerubavel writes: “The Zionist collective memory…linked Antiquity and the modern National Revival with the myth plot structure of a successful stand of the “few against many”, and subsumed Exile under the plot structure of persecution leading to victimization and death.” (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 217)

This version of Zionism is inextricably attached to particular territory, in which the land itself becomes an active subject. “Zionist memory portrayed the land as empty and desolate, yearning for the return of its ancient Hebrew inhabitants.” (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 215) By ‘yearning’ the land becomes active in its own redemption narrative. Further, the portrayal of the land as ‘empty’ and ‘desolate’ removes a sense of attachment that others (Palestinians) have to the land. They become temporary inhabitants – part of the story between Antiquity and redemption – and ‘desolation’ becomes the result of this lack of intrinsic connection. Baruch Kimmerling writes:

…the struggle for land was defined, not by accident, as “the redemption of the land” – a phrase with a double meaning. Not only was the land to be redeemed from non-Jewish ownership to Jewish ownership, but it was also to be redeemed from its desolation and from nature. As early as 1907 Epstein advanced the claim that would consistently be used as part of the Zionist argument – both for internal and external consumption: “We will again conquer, by means of science and sweat, what our fathers conquered by sword and spear. And we will redeem the land, not from the
The narrative of neglect that Epstein forwards serves a dual purpose. First, the land has been neglected by its ‘temporary’ inhabitants. Second, neglect is the result of exile – the land is neglected by its ‘rightful’ inhabitants. As a consequence, there is a burden or obligation upon the diaspora in relation to the land itself. Kimmerling writes:

The struggle with nature in which the pioneers were involved, the changing of the landscape, the improvement of the land and the climate – all these would strengthen the right to settle the land. The local residents did not care about making the land bloom, and sometimes even damaged the landscape and ruined the climate, but now, after the “heroic Hebrew pioneers” had come, they were returning and reviving the land. This motif was repeated many times in Zionist mythology. (Kimmerling, 1983, p. 203)

This motif calls on the Jewish diaspora to realise its redemption through working the land, ‘making the desert bloom again’. The land and its redemption becomes both actual and metaphorical redemption, individually and collectively. To neglect this pursuit (or to argue against its claim) comes to mean abandonment of redemption itself. Further, this redemption is connected to an idealised historical period. Rather than grappling with contemporary realities, this pursuit to the past silences Arab claim and connection to the land, and silences disparate and alternative Jewish articulations as to what Zionism is and what Israel should or could be.

Despite the catastrophe and redemption narrative that runs throughout Zionist ideology, the movement was simultaneously committed to the idea of the modern, secular nation-state. By finding an ideology that was able to support such seemingly divergent pursuits, the Zionist movement was able to appeal to both an ethnic-religious imagination, and to more modern (and Western) ideas about the nation-state. The collective memory served to consolidate the idea that the ‘national community’ itself existed, while the design of the intended nation-state reflected ‘universalist’ pursuits of secularism, rights, and democracy. These ‘universalist’ pursuits create a persistent sense of legitimacy as a beacon of
Western values, as Pappé reflects, helping to “restore civilization following the Second World War.” (Pappé, 2014, p. 4)

The prevailing narrative generally serves a conception of the founding of Israel as overcoming hostility, and of ‘making the desert bloom again’. In this conception, a barren land had been returned to and cultivated by those whose natural and divinely-ordained homeland it was considered to be. According to these tenets, conflict between Israel and Palestinians is continuous with insecurity of persecution and genocide, in which hostility towards Israel ‘opens the wounds’ of pervasive anti-Semitism in Europe, and as part of the messianic trope of suffering. This pictures the establishment of Israel in utopian terms, in which the Zionist claim to certain territory is absolute, and is couched in terms of regeneration and redemption. Further, Israel is simultaneously pictured as a civilizing project, and therefore inevitable on two accounts: as a messianic redemption; and as a progression of modernity.

Zionist memory and design leveraged from persecution (in exile), from the idea of collective redemption, and from ‘universalist’ principles simultaneously. It did so by building a collective memory of negativity in exile and an idealised historic period, intertwined with Western notions of the nation-state. Rather than struggle for recognition and rights in ‘host’ countries (which did not, in many cases, support the potential for such recognition), and embracing a culture of diaspora, the Zionist movement sought to mobilise a narrowed mythology in the pursuit of a modern nation-state. The imagined whole of Israel is utopian both in a particular and universalist sense. It is particular, as it embeds a redemption narrative of a trauma-ridden community onto land and territory, and it is universal in that Israel is situated as a beacon of modernity and universal values. It follows that in order to be reproduced these positive terms must be simultaneously embedded with their counter.

The imagined whole, by internalising certain traits and meta-narratives, seeks to make its self-conception rigid by externalising that which is Other to it. However, in doing so, the whole represses those ‘othered’ traits within itself, and silences self-reflection. Self-reflection would make “the violence of each towards its ‘Other’ and towards itself…then discoverable.” (G. Rose, 1993, p. 8) Such
repression and relentless externalisation both enables and requires violence upon the Other: as Butler would suggest, that which is subject to the process of othering is ‘derealised’. In establishing the meta-narratives of redemption and universalism, Zionism and the Israeli state establishes its own Other, according to which its constructed self-image is reproduced.

**The reproduced Other**

As outlined above, in the first instance, Israel is a reaction to the experience of being the Other. It begins by differentiating from its ‘ultimate predator’, yet in doing so, re-attributes the status of ‘ultimate predator’ onto its own Other. In 1963, Hannah Arendt’s coverage for *The New Yorker* of the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem became the subject of vociferous criticism. Arendt was accused of ‘victim-blaming’, as she discussed Eichmann’s career with reference to the collaboration of Jewish leaders in facilitating the deportation of Jewish Europeans. Her depiction challenged the idea that the distinction between good and evil was clear. The hostility of the response to Arendt’s coverage indicated that this distinction – between good and evil, therefore just/unjust, and deserving/undeserving – was held to be a static truth, and was continually reproduced in order to maintain its status. Some further argue that the Eichmann trial served to consolidate a new instrumentalisation of Holocaust memory. Ilan Pappé writes:

> The impact of this trial on the institutionalisation of Holocaust memory, when viewed from the post-Zionist perspective, added an angle of which Hannah Arendt was unaware, and which emerges forcefully in the work of Idith Zertal. She connects the trial to the impact of the manipulation and instrumentalisation of Holocaust memory on attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the Palestinians within Israeli Jewish society. The most important theme in this connection is the Nazification of the Palestinian struggle. (Pappé, 2014, pp. 174-175)

The discourse that supports the idea that Palestinians are an existential threat to Israel draws upon a history of violence. This includes early clashes with pre-state *Yishuv*\(^{20}\), apparent cooperation with Nazi Germany during WWII (therefore a

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19 Adolf Eichmann was a high-ranking Nazi official, responsible for the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Jewish people.
20 Jewish settlements
conflation with the threat of genocide), terrorism (particularly centred on Intifada movements, and increasingly located within the global ‘war on terror’), and by a perception of pan-Arabism which in some instances suggests anti-Semitism. The formation of Israel was in part a response to the suffering of the Holocaust, in the immediate aftermath of WWII. In some cases hostility towards Israel is perceived as being continuous with this history of persecution and genocide in Europe. At times, the actions of Palestinians have been directly tied to Nazism. Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers’ study of cooperation between Arab nationalists and the Third Reich is an example which attempts to tie present antagonism to this particular episode. In their view, this cooperation informs continuing Arab ideas about Israel, and about Jewish people. They turn to Enlightenment thinking, and particularly the claim to a universal understanding of human rights, appealing for recognition that these values are not shared:

…such a civilizing ideal does not yet exist in some communities, and…some nations, such as Germany, even voluntarily renounced it at some stage in their history. In no way can this lead to declarations of understanding for Arab societies that, although well on their way to obtaining national independence, were prepared to realize that goal through an alliance with Nazi Germany and through the commission of mass crimes. (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2013, p. 218)

This not only links Palestinians with the ‘ultimate predator’, but also reinforces a dichotomy between ‘civilized’ and Other. Mallman and Cüppers infer that Arab societies have ‘not yet’ realised ‘such a civilizing ideal’. The realisation of adherence to a particular rendition of Enlightenment values is assumed to be inevitable, and further, a responsibility to be expected (a responsibility which, in their view, Arab societies do not uphold). This articulation leaves little room for the idea of Palestine as a peacefully coexisting entity. Palestinians must meet certain unilateral expectations, in this view, to be deserving of trust.

Continuous with this perception that Palestine must earn trust is the idea that the Intifada movements and sporadic attacks (suicide bombings, stabbings at checkpoints, rocket attacks) ‘prove’ that Palestine is not to be trusted. As Benny Morris reflects, “the bombing of the buses and restaurants really shook me. They made me understand the depth of the hatred for us.” (Shavit, 2004) Israeli security policies respond to this persistent threat of terror by controlling
Palestinian movement and access to resources, and by retaliating with immense force. The policy is one of containment, deterrence, and instilling fear. Some contend that Palestinian acts of terror are, in a sense, a desperate cry for help against an aggressive occupier: “Wake up world. Palestinians are throwing stones at tanks.” (Parry, 2000). Others, like Morris, find these acts to be expressions of a violent, un-trustable society. Both call for outrage – the former on behalf of Palestinians, the latter of behalf of Israelis. In building on a link, be it implicit or direct, between past cooperation with Nazi Germany and Palestinians, Israel re-externalises the threat of genocide. The ‘ultimate predator’ becomes timeless, and is a relation to the imagined whole rather than an intrinsic ‘thing in itself’. Palestinian violence becomes amplified, and questioning of its causes is silenced.

In reproducing the ‘ultimate predator’ in the Palestinian Other, Israel draws on a colonialism, and on a contemporary ‘clash of civilisations’ rhetoric. First, the Zionist movement and establishment of the State of Israel drew on a dynamic of European colonialism. Through this lens, Israel can be understood as a late example of the colonial mind-set, in which land already inhabited by ‘others’ was viewed as legitimate for establishment of new powers that discounted the claim of those already present. Arendt writes:

> After the [Second World] war it turned out that the Jewish Question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved – namely by means of a colonized and then conquered territory – but this solved neither the problems of minorities or the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely reproduced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. (Arendt, 1973, p. 290)

Arendt is unabashed about naming the formation of Israel to be colonisation – even conquest. She further makes clear that in solving the ‘problem’ of the resident Other in Europe, Israel and the world powers that enabled it, merely reproduced the same patterns of statehood and rights at the expense of the same for the Other. In 1896, against the backdrop of European countries having colonised much of the world, Theodor Herzl wrote:
Palestine is our unforgettable historic home. Its very name would be a powerful, stirring rallying cry for our people. If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return pledge ourselves to regulate all the finances of Turkey. As for Europe, we would there form a part of the bulwark that protects it from Asia. We would serve as an outpost of civilisation as opposed to barbarism. As a neutral state we would retain a connection with all of Europe, and Europe would have to guarantee our existence. (Herzl, 1973, p. 31)

This appeal, to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in this case, draws on a colonial mind-set which finds justification for its actions in a dichotomy of civilized vis-à-vis barbaric. Whilst differentiating ‘Jewish’ from European categories, Herzl nevertheless places Jewish as European, or at least as the upholder of European values in relation to a ‘barbaric’ East. This ‘clash of civilizations’ premise persists, and finds new impetus in the present-day ‘war-on-terror’ rhetoric which increasingly demonises Arabs and Muslims in particular. Edward Said writes:

…neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the Other. That these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulation and the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent self-pride and arrogance – much of it having nothing to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, “we” Westerners on the other – are very large-scale enterprises. (Said, 2003, pp. xii-xiii)

This large-scale enterprise is evident in the rhetoric of Israeli historian Benny Morris. He says: “I think the values I mentioned earlier are values of barbarians – the attitude toward democracy, freedom, openness; the attitude toward human life. In that sense they are barbarians. The Arab world as it is today is barbarian.” (Shavit, 2004) Just as Herzl drew upon colonial thought which privileged the idea and interests of the ‘civilized West’ over the ‘barbaric other’, some continue this dichotomy, drawing on rhetoric surrounding the ‘war on terror’ to justify increased differentiation and security measures, and to place Israel (and its actions) as wholly ‘legitimate’. Compounded with apocalyptic messianism, this clash of civilisations discourse contributes to a sense of urgency and foreboding in the Israeli psyche.
The idea of Israel has drawn upon a plethora of ideologies to support its establishment and legitimization of particular policies. Despite extensive persecution in Europe, the idea of Israel maintains a ‘Western’ identity in contrast to how Palestine is framed. The idea of Palestine therefore, may be understood in relation to these ideologies which have come to shape it. In one conception, Palestine is an existential threat. The Palestinian within threatens the existence of Israel: “The Israeli Arabs are a time bomb. Their slide into complete Palestinization has made them an emissary of the enemy that is among us.” (Shavit, 2004) A sovereign Palestinian state renders Israel’s borders to be ever-threatened by hostile neighbours: “what are the prospects for a two-state solution? Put simply, they appear very bleak. Bleak primarily because the Palestinian Arabs, in the deepest fibers of their being, oppose such an outcome, demanding, as they did since the dawn of their national movement, all of Palestine as their patrimony.” (Morris, 2009, pp. 193-194) In another conception, Palestinians are colonised, subjugated, subject to ethnic cleansing, and are deserving of the realisation of their own self-determination.

The dynamics of colonialism and the ‘clash of civilisations’ has served to buttress a radically securitised version of the Israeli state, in which the Other is an ever-present and imminent threat, yet is ‘derealised’ in its differentiation from the ‘imagined whole’. I argue that by re-attributing the ‘ultimate predator’, the idea of Israel has retreated from the ability to understand and acknowledge insecurity and suffering, and becomes mired in a persistent anxiety. By hardening in response, through endless securitisation and differentiation, the anxiety of insecurity is repressed behind a façade of militarisation and the ‘imagined whole’. Thus, suffering is reproduced in the Other, through which the externalisation of injury comes to serve the ideal of ‘hardness’. Butler writes:

> Violence renews itself in the apparent inexhaustibility of its object. The derealisation of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy.

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21 Ilan Pappé in particular has argued that the events of 1948-9 and continuing policies constitute ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Israel against Palestinians, a crime in international law. See: (Pappé, 2007)
regardless of whether or not there are established grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims. (J. Butler, 2006, p. 34)

The ‘inexhaustibility of the object’ engenders an existence in which the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, though drawn upon as a legitimising trope, is extended beyond the traumatic event itself. The construction of Other is in service of the identity of the ‘imagined whole’, and must endlessly reproduce the Other to buttress its conception of itself. Hardened differentiation is enacted through the rigid imposition of meta-narrative onto the performance of space, and the territorialisation of meaning.

*Lines in our hearts: Alýs and the fragility of hardening*

I have argued that, in response to insecurity, Israel reproduces the conditions of violence by hardening and rigidly differentiating, silencing the ability to reflect. I have shown that this process of hardening relies on meta-narratives, and on an embedded Other, against which violence may be done through a process of derealisation. I have further indicated that, in doing so, Israel’s meta-narratives enact a spatiality that reproduces hardness and derealisation. I now turn to Francis Alýs’s 2004 artwork, *The Green Line (sometimes doing something poetic can be political and sometimes doing something political can be poetic)*. I explore how, in Alýs’s action and the conversations surrounding it, the process and ultimately the fragility of hardening is made visible.

In 2004, Francis Alýs, a Belgian-born artist who resides in Mexico City, walked along a portion of ‘the green line’ that runs through Jerusalem. He carried a tin of green paint, which trailed a line along Alýs’s path through a hole punctured in the bottom of the tin. The line is inconsistent, wobbly, splattered, and often seems to disappear into the dust. It trails through quiet and grassy hills, pocked tarseal roads, between cars on busy highways, past houses, schools, and through checkpoints.22 Alýs walks at a quick pace, and stops only to refill the tin. As he walks, some stop or look as he carries on. An old man inspects the line that follows behind, a young man attempts to transfer some of the still-wet paint onto his cart-wheel. A woman pauses from sweeping her steps, and a schoolboy waves

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22 Ein Yaël Checkpoint and Ramot Checkpoint.
hello. The line of paint, and the line that Alýs walks, courses through seemingly everyday life.

At the same time that Alýs walked along the ‘green line’, the Israeli-West Bank barrier was being constructed to the East. The ‘green line’ refers to the ceasefire line after the 1948 war between Israel and surrounding countries. Moshe Dayan (Israel) and Abdullah Al-Tal (Arab Legion), each drew their respective ‘front lines’ on a 1:20,000 scale map – Dayan in green grease pencil, Al-Tal in red. Though intended as a temporary ceasefire agreement, the ‘green line’ became the de-facto border between Israel and Palestine until 1967, and is understood to be a starting point for negotiations towards a two-state solution. In 2004, the Israeli-West Bank barrier was being constructed, loosely along the path of the old green line. The barrier is mostly a concrete and barbed wire structure several metres high, with a width of land covered in barbed-wire on one side. Its stated intention is to be a temporary security border, to dissuade terrorist attacks by Palestinians. Though it takes part of the green line as its path, it often snakes into the Occupied Territories of the West Bank, linking Israeli settlements with Israel itself.

After Israel occupied the West Bank following the six-day war of 1967, the green line quickly became obscured. Denied politically, it became merely something that had been where now there were people living. As Michael Walzer noted, “even adult Israelis, who had lived with the Line from 1948 until 1967, had difficulty visualizing exactly where it had been.” (Walzer, 1988, p. 22) Walzer argued in 1988 that the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) had re-configured the ‘green line’ as a border of security (on the West) and insecurity (on the ‘other side’). Rather than as a physical line, Walzer wrote, “the exact location isn’t terribly important…Its existential proof, so to speak, is the fact that Israelis travel ‘on the other side’ armed, or with army protection.” (Walzer, 1988, p. 22) By the time Alýs made his walk, the line was quite literally becoming made of concrete, though its path was now argued to be dividing a possibility of Palestine into ‘bantustans’, and to be making illegal Israeli settlements legitimate by virtue of ‘facts on the ground’. (United Nations, 2003)

Alýs’s act in this context appears to be politically charged. By tracing this line, according to an idea of where it used to be, Alýs makes visible that which had
been obscured. The imprinting of the line on the ground is a reminder that though its path appears to run through seamless everyday life, that life in that particular place is the result of the occupation of territory. Further, it recalls that the memory of the ‘other side’, now on the other side of a concrete barrier, still exists on that land. Without being explicit, Alys’s act is provocative, and without leading, it prompts questions as to what that line means along that path. What does it mean that firstly, the line is no longer immediately apparent where Alys walks, and secondly, what does it reflect about the line further East, now concrete? To further elicit these questions, Alys’s work incorporates conversations with eleven people: activists, politicians, journalists etc. These twenty-minute conversations respond to the video of Alys’s act, and form an integral part of the work itself.

Alys’s act fits into a broader body of work, in which he travels or walks; in doing so, he raises questions as to how people move around differentiated spaces. In 1997, Alys embarked on a ‘loop’ from Tijuana to San Diego, using the fee received for an exhibition of his work in San Diego. He travelled from Tijuana to Mexico City, Panama City, Santiago, Auckland, Sydney, Singapore, Bangkok, Rangoon, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Seoul, Anchorage, Vancouver, Los Angeles, and finally, to San Diego. The distance between Tijuana and San Diego directly is about half an hour by car, but would include crossing the Mexico-US border. In circumventing this, Alys draws attention to the obstacle of that border, and to the ability of only the financially privileged to be able to circumvent it as he did. In short, it is an economic border: it is demonstrably difficult for economic migrants to pass through it. Alys could do so with ease, but in an almost callous display of privilege, he redirects that economic ability to show that his options are much wider than for others who make the journey from Tijuana to San Diego in different circumstances.

This work involves travel from one place to another, but it is also movement through other spaces. Alys’s walks, though in ‘a line’ from one place to another, or in a loop, go through particular spaces. In doing so, the act of walking itself, and the possibilities of walking, become a spontaneous part of the work. As Rebecca Solnit observes, “Walking is about being outside, in public space” (Solnit, 2001, p. 10) Just as Alys demonstrated his privileged ability to travel in
particular ways on his ‘loop’, his walk through Jerusalem speaks pertinently to
the interaction of his particular body, nationality, and therefore privilege, in the
‘public space’ of Jerusalem, which interacts with other bodies, and other
nationalities, in different ways.

As described earlier, borders are ‘performed’ on various planes. Those who enact
or experience bordering do so in the ways that they conceive of space and the
meanings that are attached to the people determined by a particular organisation
of space. While walking through Jerusalem, though he attracts quizzical looks,
Alýs moves unencumbered. He walks straight through checkpoints, within metres
of armed soldiers, who give him merely a second glance. The effect of the
organisation of this space on his body and his movement is unfettered, but in
watching his act, the presence of bordering practice in this space becomes
apparent. The checkpoints and armed soldiers are there to block the movement of
someone else, a point which Alýs’s ease of movement through this delineated
space makes clear by contrast.

Despite apparent ease of movement, Alýs still appears to be aware that the act
will attract attention. His purposeful walking and lack of direct interaction with
those around him at times make the viewer feel as though he is cognisant of the
boldness of his walk. Rima Hamami, an anthropologist from Jerusalem, finds that
Alýs embodies a ‘sneakiness’ that a Palestinian audience will relate to. She
describes Alýs’s demeanour and posture as mimicking that of a young Palestinian
man, a man who is moving through this space but is not quite legitimate: “As a
Palestinian here now, you are somehow illegal.” (Alýs, 2004e) The effect of the
delineation of space is that certain bodies become sensed and experienced as
illegal by virtue only of being in a particular space, not by any particular act.
Their movement through these spaces becomes a transgression, on which
hardening is reproduced: “they [Palestinian men] have to be so buried deep in
themselves…they have to pull their whole being deep down into themselves.”
(Alýs, 2004e)

This speaks to the embodied internalisation of bordering practice, whereby the
border is performed not only by those who enact it upon the Other, but also by the
embodiment of that border within the subject: “They’ve became implanted in our

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As Foucault observed, “power is a certain type of relation between individuals…there is no power without potential refusal or revolt.” (Foucault, 1979, p. 324) To impress the control of bordering upon the actions and interactions of certain people is to imprint an expectation of ‘potential refusal or revolt’ and therefore the threat of violence. In being subjected (made vulnerable to) the effects of bordering, Palestinian bodies come to perform this expectation: they embody the precariousness of the transgression itself by simply being in the space, and by being affected by the contingencies of their body being in that space.

Judith Butler discusses the embodiment of potential violence in terms of how that person in that body comes to be treated by those who fear violence, yet inflict violence. She writes of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, “There is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint….they may not be individuals at all…they must be constrained in order not to kill….they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill.” (J. Butler, 2006, p. 78) Israeli historian Benny Morris, when discussing the ‘iron wall approach’ said, “Something like a cage has to be built for them [Palestinians]….There is a wild animal there that has to be locked up in one way or another.” (Shavit, 2004) To refer to a group of people in such a way is to reduce their ‘humanness’. For Butler, this is tantamount to a process of derealisation, whereby the human life of that person becomes ‘unreal’. Both their life and the violence inflicted upon them is derealised in itself. In this process, misrecognition is repetitive, deliberate and actively suppresses the possibility of recognition.

In conversation with Alŷs, Israeli publisher Yael Lerer discusses this process of bordering, as Israelis attempting to “empty our Arabness”. (Alŷs, 2004h) The drive to dehumanise Palestinians – to either enforce a concrete wall, or the embodiment of borders within the transgression of being – is for Lerer a reflection of an internal Israeli struggle, in which this bordering practice is about “demolishing the Arabic things…inside them.” (Alŷs, 2004h) Much as Hamami says that, for Palestinians, the lines have become internal, Lerer points to the idea that the lines are an internal struggle externalised. She sees this as a process of disconnection – from a fundamental connection that Israelis have with being
Arab: “Within each of us, there is an Arab memory, as much as we attempt to destroy it. But also, we live in a place – its memory is an Arab memory, is a Palestinian memory.” (Alýs, 2004h) The ‘iron wall approach’ becomes apparent as an internal wall for the repression of self-identification, and further, as repression of the memory of the land.

Misrecognition denotes the compulsion to make identity rigid, and to do so at the expense of coming to know one’s self. In turn, this compels a sense of othering, in which the characteristics of the self that one wishes to deny become externalised. There is a simultaneous repression and externalisation – the latter supports the former. In the case of Israel, Lerer laments the relentless separation of ‘Israeli’ from what she sees as part of its fundamental roots. She decries the walls of separation being built, as walls which make Israelis ‘become not from here’, a denial that she sees as fundamental to the repression of Palestinians. In becoming ‘not from here’ she sees that Israel wishes to be part of Europe, and that the building of physical walls contributes to the sense that Israel is oriented towards the West, and separated from the East. (Alýs, 2004h) Similarly, Eyal Sivan notes that the idea of separation in Israel is to “separate ‘us’ – the ‘whites’ from the idea of belonging to ‘the Orient’.” (Alýs, 2004b) This affirmation of a European self-identity represses identification with the Other within, and closes to the possibility of understanding.

In this context, the green line becomes a symbol of differentiation between an identity which Israel reinforces and its Other, and therefore is a reminder of the fragility of this differentiation. By pushing the borders of itself out further in territory, Israel also pushes away demands to confront its self-conception – the fragility of the symbolic green line is protected by extending the territorial line further away. For Yael Dayan (former Knesset member, and daughter of Moshe Dayan), returning to the green line as it existed prior to 1967 (the line Alýs reintroduces) “is returning to a situation that we, at the time, considered very dangerous.” (Alýs, 2004g) Whilst she points out that, for some, the line may be interpreted as ‘peace by agreement’, for many it is primarily about separation. For others still, it is about insecurity, something that in itself produced war. The latter see the green line as disastrous, as ‘Auschwitz borders’.
The notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’ reflects a deeply-held sense of insecurity and catastrophe. The dread of threatened annihilation is within living memory for many Jewish Israelis. Anxiety about this is what Freud would call ‘realistic anxiety’. Freud describes two possible outcomes of realistic anxiety: a signal in which the subject “can adapt itself to the new situation of danger and can proceed to flight or defence”; or “the old situation can retain the upper hand…in which case the affective state becomes paralysing and will be inexpedient for present purposes.” (Freud & Strachey, 1974, p. 114) The first response is able to draw on anxiety to adapt, whereas the second becomes mired in the anxiety of past trauma. Rose would refer to the latter as aberrated mourning, likened to Walter Benjamin’s Angélus Novus (Angel of History) which “sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.” (Benjamin, 1999, p. 249) Whilst the notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’ contends that such insecurity is within the frame of Freud’s first response, there are others who find that this notion reflects melancholia and perpetuates violence.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban first referred to the memory of Auschwitz within the green line in 1969, in an address to the UN. Though Eban advocated a withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, his characterisation of ‘Auschwitz Borders’ described the insecurity of proximity felt by Israel. Pushing beyond the green line allowed a more significant ‘buffer’ between Israel and what it viewed as hostile outsiders, intent on the destruction of Israel. Eban’s characterisation has persisted, and is deployed to frame rhetoric around negotiations to settle borders between Israel and Palestine. (Browning et al., 2015, p. 177) In response to Brazil and Argentina’s 2010 announcement to officially recognise a Palestinian state, the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles (a Jewish Human Rights NGO) issued a statement: “the endorsement of a return of Israel to its indefensible 1967 ‘Auschwitz borders’ is inexcusable and immoral…No Israeli leader would ever agree to return to a border only seven miles wide…nor would they agree to re-divide Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people.” (Simon Wiesenthal Center, 2010)

The idea of ‘Auschwitz Borders’ is used to justify ongoing occupation of the West Bank by Israel, and the establishment of ongoing illegal (in international
law) Israeli settlements in occupied land. Likud member and then-Deputy Foreign Minister Zeev Elkin, speaking at a 2014 dedication ceremony in a new Jordan Valley settlement, and in the context of an imminent tour by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, invoked the notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’. It was expected that Kerry’s visit would include discussions to work towards a framework agreement for peace, in which possible borders for a two-state solution would be raised. Elkin, in light of this, declared:

To all those who are now making proposals for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, there is only one reply, which was already given in 1969 by then-foreign minister Abba Eban: The 1967 borders are Auschwitz borders! The only reply that Likud government should give to such proposals is: No! It’s right to talk to our neighbours, but it’s illogical for them to ask us to give up the security of Israel’s inhabitants and Israel’s vital interests. Anyone who gives up the Jordan Valley will turn Kfar Sava into Sderot. (Ravid, 2014)

Sderot bears the brunt of rocket attacks from Gaza, and has earned the nickname ‘bomb shelter capital of the world’ due to its numerous reinforcements, including bus stops doubled as bomb shelters. By comparing Kfar Sava (a small city in Sharon) with Sderot, Elkin invokes proximate insecurity and threat, and a warning that land concessions in the West Bank will undermine the ability of Israel to defend itself. In doing so, however, he draws on the comparison of this feeling of insecurity with Auschwitz, relating the threat of the absolute horror of genocide to land concessions. It follows that, to make such a comparison, there is a deep association between controlling particular land and dissuading insecurity.

‘Eretz Israel’ often refers to a much larger tract of land than is currently recognised as Israel, encompasses all of what would be Palestine, and often includes parts or all of Jordan. According to David Starr: “Religious Zionism has become more politicized, more hawkish in its approach to Israel’s security, and more messianic in its apocalyptic reading of the state’s religious significance.” (Starr, 2006) For groups that identify with the type of religious Zionism that Starr

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23 Likud are the major centre-right political party in Israel.
24 Sderot is also a centre for ‘The Other Voice’, an Israeli organisation that works with Palestinians in Gaza, seeking to end the Israeli siege against Gaza and bring about peace.
refers to, territorial concessions by the Israeli state actively work against redemption. In this view, the establishment of the Israeli state “actually represented a stage in an unfolding messianic process.” (Inbari, 2012, p. 2) The land ‘acquisitions’ of the 1948-9 and 1967 wars, and continuing settlements and redefinitions of borders, are therefore part of a continual process. In their view, they must plough forward with the ‘acquisition’ of land that will ultimately realise redemption of Eretz Israel and messianic promise. Whilst this current of thought has long been present, following the territorial concessions that resulted from the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the ‘Gush Emunim’ (Block of the Faithful) movement emerged as a strong political force in pursuit of the ‘Eretz Israel’ ideology. Motti Inbari writes: “Gush Emunim sought to prevent territorial concessions and to push for the application of Israeli sovereignty to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. It attempted to actualize its objectives by settling Jewish communities in the occupied territories.” (Inbari, 2012, p. 3)

With the rise of Gush Emunim came a significant juncture between religious Zionism and the Israeli state. Whilst the state itself was seen as an intrinsic step in a process towards redemption, its movement towards territorial concessions and withdrawals came to be seen as contradictory to the aims the movement sought to espouse. Small territorial concessions become representative of a dwindling messianic hope. Inbari writes:

The pictures of these girls [crying during the eviction of Jewish settlements in the Gaza strip] can be seen as a metaphor for messianic religious Zionism, which weeps at the shattering of its dream. The intermediate path the movement sought to follow, based on an unbreakable link with the Orthodox world and an unshakeable bond with secular Zionism, is now perceived as having reached an impasse. The messianic utopia religious Zionism sought to create now seems far from realization. The girls’ tears are also those of a messianic redemption that is vanishing into the distance. (Inbari, 2012, p. 186)

As described earlier, the dichotomy of catastrophe and redemption is a central theme in Zionist meta-narratives. Where redemption is challenged, such as when the Israeli state makes territorial concessions, catastrophe is invoked. The catastrophe of Auschwitz, in this context, is invoked as an absolutism which silences debate, and brings the trauma of the past into the present, without
seeking understanding of its lessons. The ‘Auschwitz border’ is a ceaseless anxiety of the expectation that the unthinkable will happen yet again: “the holocausts yet to face us.” (Inbari, 2012, p. 50) With the expectation that there will be repetition of the holocaust comes the impulse to endlessly defend, and to lock into a perpetual struggle of threatened annihilation and the promise of redemption.

Israel’s responses to the Intifada movements, and antagonism particularly from those acting in the name of Hamas in Gaza, is widely condemned as ‘disproportionate’. Israel’s retort to this is that its responses are legitimate self-defence. In an exposition of Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, Judith Butler asks “whether and how the notion of “self-defence” invoked by the State of Israel works in the service of retribution…under what conditions does self-defence become unmoored from the problem of self-preservation and operate instead as the legitimating condition of unbridled violence?” (J. Butler, 2012, pp. 92-93) Self-defence, when fastened to the possibility of another holocaust, becomes ‘unmoored’ from expectations the UN had about ‘legitimate self-defence’ in terms of inter-state violence. Defending the state becomes synonymous with defending the Jewish people from genocide, and therefore critique become suddenly weighted with this responsibility. Invoking ‘Auschwitz borders’ imbues negotiations for a Palestinian state with impending catastrophe, and perpetuates the drive to push borders further out, whilst simultaneously attempting to make them impenetrable. For Butler, “within such a closed dialectic, no thought is finally possible – and certainly no politics one can stand by.” (J. Butler, 2012, p. 93)

For Alýs then, making this line visible again, is “an everyday form of resistance”, even if he refrains from taking an explicit position on the matter illuminated. (Alýs, 2004e) Rather, his work functions to illuminate, and to question the appearance of reality: “it has to derive from the moment in which the gesture illuminates – gives you a sort of sudden insight into a situation, which isn’t itself political, but has the potential to open onto a political light.” (Alýs, 2004d) What becomes clear in the conversations pointed to here is that there is a ready acknowledgement of the multi-faceted ways in which the border and bordering practice comes to impress upon people, the ways in which they experience
spaces, and the ways in which these spaces come to be defined. These conversations in themselves also illuminate the responses different people have to the problem of changing what is acknowledged to be an untenable situation. For Yael Dayan, borders should be determined by population and demographics: most Palestinians should be in a Palestine defined by borders, and most Israelis should be in Israel (she emphasises, 99.9%). (Alýs, 2004g)

Dayan’s insistence, however, merely reinforces difference, and further suppresses ‘the Arab within’, as Lerer would point out. Dayan stops short of interrogating the ways in which accepting this difference as untroubled reinforces insecurity and injustice. As Ruben Aberjil deplores, “people are limited by these lines, lines which are never in favour of the Other.” (Alýs, 2004f) Dayan’s conclusion, which relies on defined boundaries, limits possibilities for recognition. It further accepts a status quo which aggravates difference, thereby entrenching and reinforcing the impulse to defend against the Other, against existential threat. As Butler writes:

…there is no self without its relations. If the self seeks to defend itself against this very insight, then it denies the way in which it is, by definition, bound up with others. And, through this denial, that self becomes imperilled, living in a world in which the only options are to be destroyed or to destroy. (J. Butler, 2012, p. 98)

Alýs’s act, and the conversations surrounding it, makes the process of hardening visible, in that it elicits a response that laments “the lines in people’s hearts.” (Alýs, 2004f) It becomes clear that the line which Alýs walks, and the lines the act calls attention to, exist territorially in particular spaces, but impose their meanings and differentiations onto the people who experience and embody them. The fragility of the concept of self in relation to its Other becomes buttressed by relentless hardening, differentiation, and securitising. As the notion of Auschwitz borders, and Butler’s observation infer, this serves a ceaseless anxiety, which becomes locked into the conditions that contribute to ongoing violence.

As indicated earlier, a bordering practice which hardens merely reproduces ressentiment (resentfulfulness), both towards the Other and towards the Other within the self (the ‘Arab within’). This dialectic, which stagnates and hardens against the possibility of recognition, perpetuates anxiety, and in this context ‘re-traumatises’. In seeking to endlessly harden against ceaseless and entrenched
anxiety, the conditions of violence become locked. In the next chapter, I seek to re-articulate a notion of the border as *broken middle*, in which *ressentiment* gives way to vulnerable recognition, (Schick, 2015) and in which the possibility of ethical engagement arises.
Part Two: Beginning

In Part One, I argued that the meta-narratives of Israel produce rigidity and dichotomies, such as West/Orient, and civilised/barbaric, which in turn reproduce insecurity and the conditions of violence. These processes of hardening are illuminated by Francis Alÿs’s action and conversations surrounding *The Green Line*. In particular, the ways in which people who experience and are affected by bordering practices come to embody the dichotomies and expectations that bordering imposes. Further, the notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’ indicates an unceasing and entrenched anxiety of *ressentiment*, in which the Israeli state seeks to endlessly harden and protect against existential threat. This reproduces the conditions of violence, locking the state of Israel into an existence of re-traumatisation and endless securitisation.

The discussion above signifies borders as end points, in which states and people seek to define the boundaries of themselves as distinct from an Other. When the ‘imagined whole’ that exists inside borders conceived of as end points is subject to re-traumatisation and repressed anxiety, borders become increasingly hardened and securitised. Such hardened differentiation is privileged in traditional geopolitics. As Parker and Vaughan-Williams note:

> The privilege accorded in Western thought to binary oppositions has prioritised a particular spatial and temporal topology: that of inside/outside. This framing, within which undecidability, indistinction and indeterminancy are obscured, has come to dominate our understandings of the concept of the border. (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 584)

The agenda for critical border studies that Parker and Vaughan-Williams set out refers to a notion of the border as a site of political and ethical possibility. Following, there have been critical re-articulations of the border as a site of potential connection, interaction, and as a ‘suture’. (Rumford, 2012; Salter, 2012) I seek to enrich these re-articulations by forwarding a notion of the border as a *broken middle* in which there is possibility for the work of vulnerable recognition to begin. This promulgates the epistemology of the border as a ‘beginning’ (therefore, as a threshold), yet suggests that political and ethical possibilities reside in an approach to ‘beginning’, which is “alert to implication”, and is prepared to “misknow and yet to grow”. (G. Rose, 1992, pp. 309-310) Such an
approach willingly accepts anxiety and self-reflection, and deeply examines implicatedness in the conditions that give way to ongoing injustice. It works against hardening, and against a shallower notion of connection which is not prepared to challenge self-conception.

I begin this chapter by briefly revisiting Alýs’s work, and the associated conversations that give rise to a re-understanding of the border as a starting point rather than as an end point. I then draw from these discussions to conceive an interpretation of Rose’s *broken middle* which lends to an ethical and political approach to bordering practice that works towards comprehension and a ‘good enough justice’. (G. Rose, 2011; Schick, 2012) I then turn to two works by Beit Sahour-based collective DAAR: first, *The Lawless Line* (2010), to argue how the work of the *broken middle* is suggested through their approach to borders, and the micro-moments of negotiation that occur within them; second, through *Common Assembly* (2011) where I discuss DAAR’s approach to rehabilitating an idea of Palestinian law.

**Alýs: encountering**

As Alýs walks, the line he makes with the dripping green paint stretches from one point to another. He does not loop, or cross back over himself. However, the quality of the line itself is irregular and spontaneous. Sometimes it is a reasonably solid and consistent line of paint, at other times it is splattered and wobbly. It becomes a messy and playful suggestion of a line rather than an unequivocal and hardened line. So, too, border lines in lived political reality are complicated, inconsistent, and at times comically absurd. This inconsistency and absurdity gives way to transgressions which undermine the political impositions of border lines. Discussions surrounding Alýs’s work at times infer a type of connectivity produced by proximity to the line (and therefore to encounters with the Other). Generally, this is discussed as a node of possibility, in which encountering and interaction might give way to more meaningful change. However, it is not always apparent that interaction or proximity lead to openness.

For some, Alýs’s action is playful and amusing, which in itself makes visible the absurdity of the border and the ways in which it imposes itself on people’s existence and interactions. The arbitrariness of trailing a line of green paint
through areas in which people live (so in which there do not appear to be any consistent natural boundaries) suddenly makes the arbitrariness of the borders themselves apparent. This is a comic gesture, which implies that the seriousness with which the borders are enacted is overwrought. For Ruben Aberjil, “Of course, the lines would be funny, were it not for the walls in people’s hearts.” (Alýs, 2004f) Aberjil considers Alýs’s “poetic gesture” to “be useful because it is amusing”. It can (in an amusing and non-threatening manner) “break down the fixed opinions of people, who are stuck on some line.” (Alýs, 2004f)

The idea of playfulness works against the idea of being locked into fixedness. It disrupts hardening, and comes up against it in its transgressions, but without coming into direct conflict or challenge: “Alýs’s act is not violent or dominant, not regular – [it is] wonderful, because sometimes we get locked into how we see.” (Alýs, 2004e) Playing suggests an exploration of concepts and interactions that would otherwise be politically difficult, without requiring commitment to anything other than ‘playing’ itself. It has the potential to open up to new ways of seeing - even if these are transitory, they invite a change in perspective. For Alýs, the ‘poetic act’ itself carries these qualities:

Through the gratuity or absurd quality of the poetic act…art provokes a moment of suspension of meaning, a brief sensation of senselessness that reveals the absurd of the situation, and, through this act of transgression, that makes you step back or step out and resume/revise your a priori regarding this reality…In the best of all cases, it can open up – even if just for a few seconds – a new, other, perspective on the situation. (Cooke, 2008, p. 79)

For Eyal Sivan, the absurdity of the line is reflected in the absurdity of Alýs’s act. Sivan lived by the green line as a child, in (as he describes it) a “bourgeois white Jewish neighbourhood”. Their place of play, he recalls, was the 500 metre width of the line itself, between his neighbourhood and the Palestinian village on the other side: “the only contact was on the no-man’s land”. However, this contact was antagonistic with the bordering practices of those around Sivan. Upon becoming friends with Palestinian children from the ‘other side’, Sivan describes losing Jewish friends. He reflects: “Your [Alýs’s] line will just disappear…abolishing a mental border is much more difficult.” (Alýs, 2004b)

The transgression of play, and ultimately friendship, that Sivan established across
the line (which he sees to be an absurdity), became imposed upon by the bordered ontologies of those around Sivan. This is a disruption that meets the practices of hardening, yet is a disruption nonetheless.

Like Sivan, Amira Hass, in response to Alŷs’s action, recalls playing on the line as a child. Hass noticed that, with closer proximity to the line, and therefore closer proximity to Palestinian villages, there became a more pronounced disdain for “the Arabs”. The children there, unlike children further away, played a game they called “killing Arabs”.25 (Alŷs, 2004a) Unlike Sivan’s experience, Hass’s reflection that disdain grew with closer proximity to the line speaks not to a disruption, but to increased hardening in response to more immediate challenges to wholeness. In this recollection, play and potential connectivity (by closeness) merely reinforce hardening. It follows that it is not always clear that closeness (and therefore encounters) lead to the ability to begin the work of recognition. As suggested by Sivan’s loss of Jewish friends, and Hass’s observation of the effect of proximity, encounters might serve to buttress imagined wholeness, rather than to challenge it.

Where it might be expected that meaningful engagement could occur, is sometimes the site of the most intensive hardening (and, avoidance of recognition). The notion of ‘kissing points’ is one such complication to a one-dimensional view of ‘imagined wholeness’ within borders. Eyal Weizman explains that Alŷs’s line flattens the actual line, and that in reality there are points where the borders cross: “from a one-dimensional entity becomes a non-dimensional coordinate”. (Alŷs, 2004c) These ‘kissing points’ lack the clarity of a border line, and therefore could suggest a site of potential connectivity. However, as Weizman notes, ‘non-dimensionality’ necessitated three-dimensionality, in which the border becomes layered vertically. For example, Palestine, at this point, will be represented by an underpass, whereas Israel will be represented by an overbridge. Despite potential to be a point of meeting, three-dimensionality becomes a way to manoeuvre away from this possibility, and maintain difference.

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25 Hass explains a letter her mother keeps, in which it is explained that she did not allow another child to play with her, as the other child had wanted to play ‘killing Arabs’. Hass’s observation is of the difference between where her family lived (in Jerusalem), and this village where she was staying (by the line).
As briefly discussed here, despite potential for connectivity, proximity does not guarantee recognition. However, a current continues in the responses to Alýs’s work that sees potential for the border to be re-figured as a starting point. For Weizman this is possible, not by the existence of these potential contradictions in hardness in themselves, but by how they are manipulated: “everything that would make these entities unstable, flexible, would constantly have to negotiate with each other...let’s create interdependencies that are essentially going to finally eat up this very hermetic...division of the nation-state.” (Alýs, 2004c) Weizman’s approach advocates constant antagonism, fissures, movement, and negotiation. It is an unsettled and unsettling approach which does not seek a flat and shallow encounter, but pushes for continued confrontation and exposition of reality. (G. Rose, 1992, p. 155) As he suggests, “We sometimes have to treat conflict as a productive force, rather than trying to mould it into a kind of consensus culture that seeks to blur positions and bury conflict.” (Alýs, 2004c) I depart now from Alýs, but take Weizman’s suggestion forward, as a suggestion by which to begin a consideration of the border as a broken middle.

The border: the broken middle

As described so far, there are multiple ways in which borders and border performativity harden, and therefore reproduce insecurity and the conditions of violence. Hardening denotes a fundamental attachment to dualisms, in which the imagined whole comes to be defined in many layers against its Other. These dualisms are both internal and externalised – those traits which do not fit the imagined whole are both suppressed within, and laden onto the Other. Hardening also denotes an indifference to suffering, in which continued suffering serves to buttress hardness and relentless securitisation. In response, the politics of particularity would draw attention to particular suffering. However, as Rose would suggest, too much of an ‘over-correction’ towards particularity would neglect attention to the structures that reproduce suffering. She maintains that in order to address suffering, the dualisms of particular and the law must be held together. Equally, the implications of each in the structures that produce the conditions of violence must be attended to.

This also speaks to ‘contact theory’, which elucidates the conditions in which ‘contact’ may lead to either the lessening or increasing of prejudice. See: (Allport, 1979; Amir, 1969, 1976; Forbes, 1997)
Rose’s *broken middle* acknowledges brokenness, and does not seek to mend what was never whole. The ‘mended middle’, as she laments, is a bounded imagined whole, that seeks its wholeness by withdrawing from relatedness and implication, and therefore does not grapple with diremption and suffering, merely avoids it. Rose argues that avoidance reproduces injury in the imagined whole. In her words: “If the broken middle is abandoned instead of thought systematically, then the resulting evasive theology, insinuated epistemology, sacralised polity, will import the features of the City of Death remorselessly.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 293)

The sacralised polity that Rose refers to (the ‘mended middle’) evades diremption, and thereby evades the brokenness by which it might come to understand the conditions which lead to suffering. Seeking a ‘mended middle’ is an approach which hastens to ‘fix’, at the expense of self-reflection.

Mending would imply that the ‘line’ between sovereign territories becomes settled, that what is ‘divided’ is known, and that the border itself refers to its negative (what is on each side, rather than what ‘it’ is). The ‘line’ is a mode of thinking that accepts and reinforces dualisms. I argue that Rose’s *broken middle*, as explained so far, insists on the border itself as a place ‘in itself’. If the dualisms of ‘either side’ are persistently reinforced, the uncertain space of the border itself is a location which persistently challenges the hardness of these dualisms, and undermines their rigidity. The concept of the *broken middle*, as an approach to recognition compelled by this particular space, may enrich the field of critical studies which seeks to re-articulate the border as a starting point, rather than as an end point. Further, rather than an anarchic conception which renders the border-space stateless, this approach sees border-spaces as dynamic and thoroughly intertwined with the dualisms that seek to produce it.

Rose finds that impulses to make whole that which has been broken through suffering embark on an illusory social utopianism. She argues that “these attempts to restore the middle have the effect of undermining it.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 297)

Her argument rests on the idea that the ‘middle’ – ever-broken – is the state of flux between dualisms. It is the point at which recognition might be pursued. To ‘mend’ is to cover over that which cannot be mended. Such a mend exacerbates

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27 ‘Fix’ refers to the impulse for rigidity and hardened definition, over an acceptance of ambiguity and flexibility.
its brokenness in the harshness of rigid dualisms. To invoke a ‘public’ at the expense of particularity is to flatten and impose, whereas invoking particularity at the expense of ‘the universal interest’ withdraws from the structural conditions of suffering, rather than seeking to grapple with them. Rose calls for the pursuit of the ‘universal interest’ with attention to particular suffering. This is to hold disunity in unity without favouring one over the other or attempting a shallow reconciliation.

Rose terms the ‘mended’ or ‘holy’ middle the agapic community: “the loveful communitarian withdrawal from the world leading to an authoritarian regime which results from refusal of anxiety of beginning and equivocation of the ethical.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 179) The agapic community, without heeding the ‘universal interest’, withdraws from the world. The structures which lead to suffering are replicated in this withdrawal. The anxiety of beginning calls for openness to the anxiety of pain, to begin in active vulnerability. The ethical, for Rose, rather than a ‘holiness’ is an approach to struggle and self-reflection, in pursuit of a ‘good enough justice’. (G. Rose, 2011; Schick, 2012) ‘A good enough justice’ appears in Rose’s later book, Love’s Work, in which she writes, “ethics is the development of…diaporia, being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.” (G. Rose, 2011, p. 124) A ‘good enough justice’, works against withdrawal, and compels work towards earthly justice, without redemptive (agapic) promise.

However, despite suspicion of the withdrawal to the particular, Rose also implores that attention is paid to particular suffering, as she considers that a universal approach flattens particularity, and become incognizant to its lessons. She writes: “grounded in an overweening claim to absolute and universal authority, without awareness of history, language or locality, enlightened reason sweeps all particularity and peculiarity from its path.” (G. Rose, 2011, p. 137) A universalist approach, which might make appeal to such abstractions as universal rights, fails to heed its origin in particularity (particular interest and ontological grounding), making what Rose considers to be a false claim to absolutism and authority. In failing to heed its own contingency, universal claim to the absolute obscures unintended consequence: “the ineluctable discrepancy between our
worthy intentions and ever-surprising outcome of our actions.” (G. Rose, 2011, pp. 124-125) Despite the ‘good’ that is pursued by absolute abstracted reason, the imperfect world does not perfectly adhere to the ‘no-place’ that reason constructs itself around. (Hutchings, 2013, p. 29)

Rose’s broken middle holds together particular suffering and universal interest, without abstracting from either: “Because the middle cannot be mended, because no politics or knowledge may be available or employable, it does not mean that no comprehension or representation is possible, or that it is in any case avoidable.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 296) Rose insists that despite knowing diremption and having no guarantee, beginning in the broken middle requires that comprehension is pursued. Advocating to ‘misknow and yet to grow’ she argues for an approach which is prepared to make mistakes in risking comprehension, and to reflect critically upon those mistakes, retaining an openness to learn and to examine implication. This is a progression without linearity, which is contingent upon particular circumstance. It seeks the best of what there is and could be, without pursuing a utopia: either an agapic community or universal abstraction, each at the expense of the other.

By engaging in the middle between the law, its particular effects, and its peculiarities, Rose compels an approach which seeks to ‘rehabilitate’ reason. (Schick, 2012) Rather than seeking to transgress law (and therefore, to withdraw into the agapic community) in response to injustice, Rose insists that the boundaries of the law and the particular must be rearranged in response to recognition of the other. To act politically is to challenge the structures that uphold unjust law, to hold themselves to account, to reflect critically, and to respond to suffering. Further, it is to engage with the particular, and to work to understand how an ‘over-correction’ towards agape may inadvertently reproduce conditions of injustice. To work from the broken middle, to engage with the diremption of law and the particular without abandoning their possibility of justice, is to work in agon: “Agon, struggle, is the condition of the middle, and the human condition.” (Lloyd, 2008) For Rose, the work of the broken middle is the work of accepted ‘perennial anxiety’; it is a stubborn, determined, disappointing, pragmatic, yet hopeful pursuit.
Beginning in the *broken middle* requires a reconsideration and understanding of law and the structures that uphold injustice. Rose argues for an approach that begins in the middle but does not give in to particularity, and must maintain an understanding of particularity’s ongoing relationship with the “implication of state, nation, sovereignty, representation – of power and its legitimation.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 297) Thus, Rose argues for maintained cognition of a triune structure which posits the particular and the universal simultaneously, and in relation to the other. To do so compels an interrogation of the operations of power with regard to the particular, and the implications that then arise. This works against the fixedness of the idea of ‘nation’ and, specifically, the ‘national community’ (hence, the ‘imagined whole’). In turn, the structures (such as: the state and the borders) which support the fixing of the ‘national community’ are subject to interrogation, without abandonment. Rose asks that the structures that uphold political life are not abandoned in favour of the particular, but are ‘rehabilitated’ (Schick, 2012) in pursuit of “the just city and just act, the just man and the just woman.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 26) To abandon the structural, is to retreat into *agape*, and into misrecognition.

To address borders and bordering practice in light of Rose’s insistence on attentiveness to constitutive dualisms, is to consider the border (physical and enacted) as a site of potential recognition. However, it does not stop at this potentiality. The *broken middle* compels an approach to recognition that is prepared to stake the self as well as the imagined whole, and which interrogates the ways in which these are implicated in injustice. For example, a Rosean approach asks how seeking a sense of security by retreating to an imagined whole hurts and expels others. Following, it advocates a politically embedded approach that is prepared to re-assemble the bounds of the ‘community’, and how the identity of the self is constituted through this mechanism, to mitigate suffering. Abandoning the structures that support the imagined whole in light of recognition of suffering would merely give way to renewed despair. Therefore, as Rose insists, the work of the *broken middle* seeks justice in both structures and in the particular, making each answerable to the other without mending.

In the following I introduce DAAR’s 2010 work, *The Lawless Line*. I then consider how the actions and propositions of this work reflect an approach to
bordering practice that opens the line itself to ethical possibility. DAAR attend to particular contradictions of the line, thereby situating their interventions within particularity. However, in doing so, they seek to give these micro-moments of contradiction greater scale, by considering how they relate to the state, law, and the idea of the border, and therefore where there is potential for ethical agitation. This also speaks to the notion of ‘micro-politics’ in International Relations theory, a recent strand of thought which pays attention to the interactions of the particular vis-à-vis the structural. (T. Solomon & Steele, 2016) I argue that the approach of DAAR lends to a re-conception of the border as a broken middle, as a site that holds dualisms together, making their constitutive relationality apparent, inviting the risk of comprehension. In a Rosean sense, this reflects an approach that works with what is (the border), in order to render its potential for pragmatic justice.

**DAAR: The Lawless Line**

*The Lawless Line* consists of a series of actions and propositions that attend to contradictions and strategic possibilities of the widths of the lines between Areas A, B, and C. The ‘Oslo Accords’ of 1995 divided the Occupied West Bank into three territories: Area A is fully administered by the Palestinian Authority; Area C is under full Israeli civic and security control; Area B is under Palestinian civic control, and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control. (*Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 1995; *Oslo II Accords (Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip)*, 1995) The Oslo Agreement was intended to gradually step towards a possibility of a future Palestinian state through the ‘peace process.’ Therefore the lines divide varying degrees of sovereignty, and varying degrees of direct or indirect control and influence. Whilst the agreement delineates space into three separate areas, DAAR find that instead of three, there are in fact four spaces. The fourth is represented by the width of the line itself. DAAR write:

> When the process collapsed and the temporary organization of the occupied territories solidified into a permanent splintered geography of multiple prohibitions, a fourth place was suddenly discovered. Existing between all others – it was the width of the lines separating them. (*DAAR, 2010a*)
The Lawless Line explores the complications of the line, within the width, and by the imposition of lived reality across both sides of the line, which in turn undermines its actuality. In one case, DAAR follow the progress of returning Palestinians seeking to build on their property – which they find now exists on either side of a line dividing Areas B and C. In another, they develop a legal case for recognition of autonomy of the width of the lines. Further, DAAR explore the potential for land transformation on the lines through gardening (in itself a subversive act due to restrictions on planting), and through an exploration of the idea of ‘atolls’ – spaces in which a house for example, contradicts the imposition of the line onto actuality. In all of these micro-moments, DAAR grapple with the interactions of particular experience and the imposition of law. They seek to work through each to agitate in a way that interrogates both without seeking to abandon (for example) the lines. They work within actuality to agitate towards ethical engagement, and to provoke a type of recognition – not necessarily between individuals, or publics, but between the particular and the law.

DAAR is an architectural studio and artist residency based in Beit Sahour, Palestine, founded by Sandi Hilal and Alessandro Petti. Their work centres on spatial interventions and propositions as a form of political practice. This practice is specific to the context of Palestine, in which space and its meaning is politically-laden and saturated with the effects of conflict. It must work within a sense of suspended progression, in which conflict and occupation are entrenched, but in which architecture and planning must not wait for a difficult-to-see future to begin work. They therefore work to speculate from what exists in the present, without a utopian vision. The Lawless Line is part of this speculative work. It takes the stalled divisions between Areas A, B, and C, and seeks to articulate ways in which to pragmatically work within this system to affect change on a small level, whilst implicating the legal structures that uphold these divisions. I explore the aspect of lawlessness (the legal case for the width of the line) with a view to eliciting how the approach of DAAR begins to agitate towards an ethical engagement.

Lawlessness
The idea of the ‘lawlessness’ of the line itself stems from an understanding of the line, not as a demarcation of ends that meet perfectly, but as a width of space that
was drawn on a map without due consideration for all that lay in its path. Intended as an interim delineation of security and civic administration, the lines that divide Areas A, B, and C did not consider the longer-term effects for those who were living on and around these new demarcations of space. Further, lines on a map translate to significant areas of land. Political agreements worked out cartographically and therefore abstracted, must be re-negotiated in actuality, as the ‘line’ of administration may come to overlap, or move in one direction or the other, depending on the particularities of place. DAAR’s intervention sought to make a legal case for the width of land which could not be absolutely attributed to a particular administration. In their argument, this width of space represented a strategic possibility, being “perhaps all that remained of Palestine.” (DAAR, 2010b)

The inability of a line drawn on a map to translate neatly onto reality affects those who come to find themselves living or working on either side of new lines, or indeed, within the ambiguous space of the line itself. To return to Alÿs for a moment, Eyal Sivan recounts a story of a Palestinian man recalling the imposition of the borders of Resolution 181 on his land. The white stones that represented its path were laid through his land: his house became part of Israel, his olive grove, Jordan. After the officers left, the man moved the stones to ensure his entire property was in one country – he ‘extended the country.’ (Alÿs, 2004b)

Paying attention to this simple act as a political act, speaks to what Ty Solomon and Brent Steele term a move towards ‘micro-politics’ in International Relations theory. They argue that recent turns towards micro-phenomena such as emotion, practice, and ‘the everyday’ in IR studies reflects the inability of ‘grand theories’ to account for the ways in which socially embedded actors constitute and shape politics at large. They write: “To think through micropolitics is not to discard these categories [larger categories of state, economy, security and so on], but instead to engage with what escapes, overflows and exceeds them.” (T. Solomon & Steele, 2016, p. 4) Addressing the line itself and its social constitution reflects the unintended excesses of the process of bordering.

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28 United Nations Resolution 181, or the ‘United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine’ is the 1947 agreement that formed the initial plan for the partition of the area formerly known as ‘The Palestinian Mandate’ into separate Jewish and Arab states. See: (Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine, 1947)
At the macro-level of inter-state negotiations a line drawn on a map intends an absolute and binary delineation to be represented in actuality. However, there are multiple ways in which actuality contradicts this intended neatness, as indicated by the story of the man and the stones. The ambiguous width of land represented by lines on a map can at times be of significant width on the land (DAAR suggest up to several hundred metres depending on scale), and can cut directly through houses and neighbourhoods. This ambiguity necessitates and prompts pragmatic negotiation, which in turn can reflect and challenge the macro-structures of law which make the assumption of delineated space. A Jerusalem-based lawyer repeats an account of a woman whose house straddles a municipality border line in Jerusalem. The bedrooms are outside the municipality border, but the entrance and kitchen are inside the border. His case on her behalf is that, as the entrance to the house is inside the municipality, she and her children must be considered to be living in Jerusalem, whereas the municipality claims that, as most of the house is outside, she should lose her Jerusalem identity card (and so would also lose access to medical treatment and schooling in Jerusalem). (DAAR, 2010c) Her predicament is part of the ‘excess’ of attempts to delineate. The attempt to argue her case for one side over the other reflects the difficulty that over-arching law and regulations have in accounting for the ambiguity caused by this excess.

DAAR consider that this ambiguity is often harnessed by state power. In the case of this woman, the Jerusalem municipality’s argument fits into a framework that seeks to manipulate demographics. In the case of the man and his olive grove, by moving the stones he adheres to the practicalities of living within a single jurisdiction rather than two. In both cases, actors seek to disambiguate ambiguity. Each knows that the law will not work to their advantage when it is not able to classify them absolutely. Those who enact the law, in turn, know that ambiguity is an opportunity to fix to advantage. However, the contradictions embedded within the attempted absolute of the border agitate the system, making macro-politics visible in their effects on the particular. The impetus for the Jerusalem municipality to argue that the woman and her children do not, in effect, live in Jerusalem stems from an overt attention to ‘demographic balance’. Eyal Weizman writes of a policy to maintain the ‘demographic balance’ of Jerusalem to 78% Jewish, 28% Arab. He argues: “the illegal policy was implemented by
manipulating seemingly mundane planning categories.” (Weizman, 2012, p. 49)

In this light, Weizman’s argument (which he discusses with reference to housing permits in particular) makes comprehensible the Jerusalem municipality’s insistence that despite having to pass through Jerusalem to enter and leave her house, the woman and her children should not be considered eligible to live in Jerusalem ‘by law’. By using the ambiguity of her situation to re-attribute her administrative links, the municipality manoeuvres this ambiguity in accordance with its desired ‘demographic balance’.

Thus, the border line and the ambiguity of its width may be manipulated in the interests of power. DAAR’s attention to the space within the line, however, seeks to reorient the status of the space ‘in-between’ to represent an autonomous zone, one that cannot be manipulated by power so easily, and instead makes negotiation necessary. In 2010, DAAR asked Jerusalem-based lawyer Ghiath Nasser to “file a petition in the Israeli courts – arguing that the line is in an extraterritorial zone – a site for a new ‘borderline state’.” (Hilal, Petti, Weizman, & Perugini, 2013, p. 206) As they point out, the maps that were used for the Oslo process were drawn digitally, but the official documents, signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, are in hard copy. They argue that, during the process of its formation, the “line acquired a width of about five meters.” (Petti, Hilal, & Weizman, 2013, p. 153) In asking to file a petition, DAAR seek to make this ‘acquisition’ acquire, in turn, legal status. The excess of ‘extra-legality’ that is the ambiguous part of bordering becomes part of the legal apparatus of institutions that mediate relationships; in their words it takes on its own status as a ‘borderline state’.

The idea of the width of the border itself as a ‘borderline state’ is interesting on two accounts. First, it troubles the assumption of the ‘end-point’ of one jurisdiction coming up against the ‘end-point’ of another jurisdiction. Instead, it refocuses these end-points as coming up against the space which mediates the relationship between the two binaries. Second, it enhances the status of this intermediary space. Rather than just a point representing the meeting of two ends, it takes on ‘state-like’ attributes itself. Therefore, as a ‘state-like’ place between two jurisdictions, it gathers its own ability to relate to each ‘side’. However, as a ‘not-quite-state’ it does not relate to each ‘side’ as another state would. Rather, its relationship to them is as the ‘third place’, the place between binaries. Both are
beholden to the third place in order to establish their self-conceptions. However, as the space in which each binary establishes its self-conception (against the other), the line also refuses fixedness in itself, and troubles the fixedness of each side, compelling them to re-negotiate, and to re-fix, endlessly.

Rose discusses her broken middle in terms of being the ‘third city’, as that which exists between and because of a struggle of binaries. She writes:

…the ambitions and the tensions, the utopianism and the violence, the reason and the muddle, which is the outcome of the struggle between the politics and anti-politics of the city. This is the third city – the city in which we all live and with which we are too familiar. (G. Rose, 1996, p. 34)

Rose establishes the idea of the ‘third city’ as the struggle between the ‘first city’ (absolute reason) and the ‘second city’ (absolute ethics)29. It becomes the place between universalism and particularity, between the tensions of absolutism. She argues that the retreat to a ‘new ethics’ (for example, in the ‘imagined whole’), not only abandons the ‘universal interest’ but also abandons the ability to comprehend the Other. The process of doing so creates an impulse to silo, in which multiple Others retreat into themselves. However she also argues that a passive approach to recognition neglects the importance of political action. She writes:

This new ethics denies identity to the other as it denies identity to the actor, now passive beyond passivity, more radically passive, that is, than any simple failure to act. But the other, too, is distraught and searching for political community – the other is also bounded and vulnerable, enraged and invested, isolated and interrelated. To command me to sacrifice myself in sublime passivity for the other, with no political expression for any activity, is to command in ressentiment an ethics of waving…(G. Rose, 1996, p. 37)

The ‘ethics of waving’ that Rose refers to is an ethics by which encountering does not wholly engage. Through a lack of engagement this ethics is unable to recognise the suffering of the other “not waving but drowning” (G. Rose, 1996, p.

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29 Rose terms her cities ‘Athens’ (reason), and ‘New Jerusalem’ (ethics). To avoid confusion given the context of this thesis, I shall avoid these terms. I note, however, that they carry significance in terms of Rose’s thought on the creation of Israel, a discussion which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The analogy of ‘waving’ is contrasted to an ethics which engages in empathy, self-critique, and the pursuit of justice. To do this, Rose argues that one must ‘begin in the middle’ – that is, “to urge comprehension of diremption in all its anxiety and equivocation.” (G. Rose, 1992, p. 310)

The width of the border as a ‘borderline state’ is a site of agitation which challenges the diremptions of Otherness bound in the ‘imagined wholes’, engaging with the brokenness that pervades between them. In and of itself this width of land is not an ‘anarchic non-place’, but as Salter writes, it “is pregnant with meaning – not only by what it creates and separates, but also in the way that it connects and distinguishes.” (Salter, 2012, p. 740) Salter argues a case for the border as a ‘suture’, which denotes a process of differentiation and stitching back together at multiple points of interaction. In doing so, he advocates the significance of the ‘suture’ as a site of activity rather than as a ‘non-place’.

However, in the context of the Occupied Territories of the West Bank, the implication that there is an active process by each ‘side’ of ‘re-knitting’ a suture does not quite account for the differentiation in power. The persistence of violence is more akin to an ‘open wound’ analogy than a suture. DAAR’s attention to the width of the line, therefore, is also an attempt to create a space to hold power to account.

In DAAR’s account, the width of the line ‘may be all that is left of Palestine’. Their effort to have the space acknowledged legally, then, is a challenge to the domination of Palestine by Israel. As sites that officially represent a possibility of a Palestinian state are in effect controlled (directly or indirectly) by Israel, DAAR consider the ambiguity embodied in the width of the line to be a site of opportunity within which to agitate, and to make small advances in beginning to negotiate. The micro-moments of opportunity for agitation that they discuss in this light reflect an attention to the ways in which particularity interacts with the legal structures that uphold injustice. They advocate an approach that proceeds through channels of law in a challenge to ‘rehabilitate’ their ability to uphold justice. By going through Israeli courts, they challenge the state institutions that on the one hand uphold injustice, to engage in critical self-reflection as to the implications of the law and its implementation on particular moments of suffering or difficulty.
One example that DAAR discuss is the arrest of an Israeli Jewish man from the village of Neve Shalom/Wahat-Al-Salam. This village, which is inhabited by both Israelis and Palestinians, has been divided by one of the many lines that carve the West Bank. In 2003 Eitan Kramer was “accused of transporting a Palestinian worker from the West Bank to the village.” (Petti et al., 2013, pp. 162-163) Restrictions on movement for those under occupation, and on those who collaborate in their illicit movement are one way in which the Israeli occupation restricts freedoms for Palestinians, and also restricts the freedom of Israelis to engage with Palestinians. The transgression of the border line by the physical movement of the Palestinian worker (from one side to another) is an example of the line taken as an absolute – the transgression of which becomes re-hardened against by the arrest of Kramer. However, in court Kramer argued that the village (to which he was accused of transporting the worker), was not, in fact, on ‘this side’ of the line. Rather, he argued that the village was within the width of the line, in ‘no man’s land’ to which the extent of the law could not reach. As Petti et al. write, “The court accepted his claim, and he was acquitted, demonstrating the ongoing ambiguity that state institutions still have towards the extra-territorial spaces of and between the lines.” (Petti et al., 2013, p. 163)

Whilst this is an example of the line as a space into which the law cannot reach, it also is an example of how to challenge the limits of that law. As Salter writes, “there is something unique about the state border – and that is the possibility of appealing to law.” (Salter, 2012, p. 750) In a context of occupation, where the border represents varying degrees of control, rather than absolute state sovereignty, this challenge to the limits of the law establishes a limit to occupation itself. The ‘no-man’s land’ (despite not having been granted legal autonomy as DAAR petitioned for), is enhanced as an arbiter of justice, in which the seemingly small action of transporting a worker becomes magnified in its significance. Those who are affected by the width of the line in their daily lives become part of that which must be the negotiated edges of sovereignty, and as people are not static territories (they move, live, and work), their lives consistently push up against multiple limits, and force their renegotiation. As

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30 Neve Shalom/Wahat-Al-Salam is a village jointly established by Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, in an effort to foster the idea of cohabitation and peaceful coexistence.
discussed earlier, it is not necessarily the land that makes the border, but the ways the border is performed that come to constitute it. The performance of the ‘borderline state’ becomes constitutive of the between, which in this instance is not between two equally sovereign states, but between occupier and occupied. Thus, it becomes a site of agitation and political possibility within a situation of ongoing injustice.

The idea of the width of the border as a conceptual and actual site in which to agitate towards the work of the broken middle, as an urge towards ethical engagement, lies in its visibility as an irruption into asymmetric power. The petition by DAAR to legally recognise the width of the line as a ‘borderline state’ is part of a larger framework in which they wish to contribute to the ‘decolonisation’ of Palestine. They therefore begin with the contradictions and ambiguity that irrupt into totalisation, complicating its practice. Further, and significantly, they push for decolonisation to begin in the courts of Israel. In doing so, they ask for the law of Israel to ‘rehabilitate’ its ability to work as a ‘just law’. The width of the line represents brokenness, which they do not seek to mend. Rather, they seek to enhance it, and so to amplify its potential as a space of agitation and negotiation. In asking Israeli courts to recognise and support this, they push for Israeli institutions to reflect on, and question, Israel’s own relationship to the width of the line, and therefore to the occupation, and to the agitations and contradictions made visible.

This part of The Lawless Line seeks a way in which to amplify Palestinian interest. In doing so, it does not attempt to retreat into a disengagement that shores up against Israeli occupation. Rather, it asks the Israeli institutions that (for DAAR) uphold suffering, to embrace ambiguity and its attendant anxiety, and to build this into their institutional framework. Rather than pushing for hardened borders that seek to keep Israel out of a Palestinian state, their articulation of the width of the line seeks steps towards ethical engagement. The approach implies a relationality that exists in itself in a third space. It is a space in which there is political possibility, not only to mediate but to contribute to questioning, through a legal framework, the implications of this relationality. They aim to make visible the ways in which structures of ongoing suffering are upheld. In short, they do not abandon the idea of Israel and Palestine coexisting (in whatever form)
peacefully, nor do they abandon the idea that Israel ought to exist or the ability of its institutional framework to act in the interest of justice. Rather, they work with what is, to agitate for reflection and critical response. In doing so, they step closer to active engagement, rather than advocating merely ‘waving’ without interrogation. Though their work falters, remains just as a proposition, and is small in scale, it is an approach which stubbornly pursues ‘a good enough justice’, and accountability, however imperfectly.

Cleaning: beginning rehabilitation

DAAR’s approach to The Lawless Line articulates of the width of the border as a site of political possibility that challenges the ‘rehabilitation’ of Israeli institutions. I have argued that this reflects an approach to the border itself as a broken middle. Rose’s conception of the broken middle urges that in pursuing justice, one must engage with diremption, thus to hold particularity and the law as one, rather than to retreat into a utopian imagined whole, or to overly-abstracted reason. I have also discussed the significance of particular kinds of spaces, and how they come to be enacted by those who perform their meaning. The width of the border as a ‘borderline state’ may therefore be performed in its own right. I now turn to DAAR’s attempt to rehabilitate an idea of Palestinian law. They do so by further engaging with border lines and spatial meaning, specifically where the border between Jerusalem and Abu Dis runs directly through the building intended for the Palestinian Legislative Council. I argue that their action reflects an engaged approach to realising the centrality of political action, even from within the difficulties of ongoing occupation.

Common Assembly is a 2011 programme of work by DAAR. By beginning with the problem of a never-used parliament building that straddles the border between the Jerusalem municipality and Abu Dis, DAAR grapple with questions of sovereignty and representation. Through this work, they indicate some of the challenges that attend Palestinian representation and sovereignty. They engage with how to enact the idea of the ‘commons’ in a context in which the population is dispersed and separated. Their work centres on the building itself as a starting point for thinking about political possibility: “the building stands as a monument to the collapsed peace process but this condition of local impossibility allows for
a political imaginary to arise. Thus, the building becomes a starting point to imagine new types of political assembly.” (DAAR, 2011c)

The building itself was constructed during a period in which hope and promise surrounded the Oslo Peace Process (construction began in 1996). Criticised as a corrupt process that lacked transparency and engagement, the planning of the building was intended to stake a Palestinian claim to Jerusalem, specifically East Jerusalem, as the capital of a future Palestinian state. However, with the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process, the building has been abandoned, unfinished and unused. For Palestinian activist Fajr Harb, the dilapidated building “maybe represents the truth of the Oslo process”. (DAAR, 2011a) For Harb, it represents not only a failed process bilaterally, but also failure on the part of Palestinian leadership to represent the interests of the Palestinian people. As a ‘monument to the collapsed peace process’, in its emptiness and desolation, it symbolises the fragmentation of the interests of Palestinians, and a lack of cohesive and functioning leadership. DAAR’s project seeks to understand the problems of representation and to re-articulate the spatial attributes of the building itself to ‘rehabilitate’ its possibilities.

Political representation, law, and the idea of the ‘commons’ is utterly fragmented for Palestine. The territory that represents a possibility of a future Palestinian state is divided between Gaza and the West Bank (with Israel in between), and the West Bank is subject to ongoing Israeli settlements (some sanctioned by the state, some tacitly sanctioned but undertaken by non-state settler groups). The territorial effect is what some have termed the ‘swiss cheese’ effect, where Palestine exists only in divided and surrounded pockets. Further, Al-Shatat31 comprises generations of Palestinians living overseas and in refugee camps across the Middle East, and there are some 1.4 million Palestinians living inside Israel ‘proper’. (DPA, 2013) Without a contiguous territory, and with a fading sense of commonality as generations pass, the idea of what Palestine is, and who or what it represents, becomes less clear. The question of assembling a commons therefore, in which disparate voices may be heard, becomes complicated and laden with the memory of politics that have disappointed, leading only to ‘empty buildings’.

31 Palestinian diaspora
Whilst the location and process of the building represents an authoritarian and corrupt style of decision-making, and speaks specifically to conflict with Israel, DAAR’s actions seek to refurbish the idea of the Palestinian commons by exploiting the apparent contradictions of the space the building sits on. Their primary action involved cleaning the width of the line that runs through the building. By doing so, they point to cleaning the debris of occupation: “like these [bird] droppings, the thickness of the line is the legal flotsam of the illegal process of Israeli domination.” (Petti et al., 2013, p. 171) After the line is cleaned, three sections become visible running directly through the seats intended for parliamentary representatives. One part is in Israel, another is in Palestine, and the third place represents the extra-territoriality of the width of the line. For DAAR, these three sections represent the three groups of Palestinians that comprise the idea of the Palestinian commons. The Israeli section, to represent those Palestinians living in Israel, and the Palestinian section to represent those living in Palestine. The third place, in the middle, becomes not antagonistic relationality as in The Lawless Line, but comes to signify those who exist extra-territorially: Al-Shatat. Again, the width of the line is ‘pregnant with meaning’ but now as representing an idea of belonging in the middle, embedded, yet without direct territorial presence.32

Hence, DAAR insist that the idea of the Palestinian commons must comprise all of those for whom the idea of Palestine is at stake, rather than just those living in the land that might become a Palestinian state. Second, the idea of the commons insists on an unmediated relationship that comes to inform democratic institutionality. The debris of the multiple buildings that have, at some point, been destined for Palestinian governance (in Jordan, Cairo, Ramallah, and Gaza

32 In her 2012 book Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Judith Butler sought to find Jewish resources for critique of Israeli policies, and in doing so articulated a positive diasporic identity, shared between the Jewish diaspora, and the Palestinian diaspora. She does so to give effect to a shared conception of ‘return’ in which the rights of returning refugees (be it returning Jewish people from a hostile Europe, or returning Palestinians who were forcibly expelled) is a unifying concept, rather than at the expense of the other. She concludes: “What would we do without poetry? Against all the odds, it gives us no direction, but a new political cartography. Darwish invokes Said in his contrapuntal ode: “He says: I am from there, I am from here, / But I am neither there nor here.” Who can say these lines? The ones who are within the State of Israel: surely. The Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza: surely. In refugee camps in Southern Lebanon: yes. Exile is the name of separation, but alliance is found precisely there, not yet in a place, in a place that was and is in the impossible place of the not yet, happening now.” (J. Butler, 2012, p. 224)
as well as in Jerusalem), whether empty or appropriated, for DAAR need to be
rehabilitated to reflect representation of the will of the commons. For Karma
Nabulsi, an Associate Professor in Politics at Oxford University, and a former
representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the ‘public square’ (the
metaphorical and territorial commons) must be recaptured, hence the political
will of the Palestinian people (represented by the three spaces within the
abandoned building) must be reclaimed.

Nabulsi’s insistence stems from the idea that the Palestinian people must take
responsibility for claiming the ‘public square’ even from within the midst of
occupation and exile. She is determined that “the public square is ours, and we
must work to claim it.” (DAAR, 2011b) She advocates an approach in which the
work of “revolution” (of claiming the commons) is long and challenging, yet in
which the populous of the commons (the will of the people) is a momentary act
that confers legitimacy onto certain approaches (the work that has already been
done). The work of creating political possibility must have at its heart “the people
and their sovereignty”, rather than beginning with ‘the state’. She says, “The
mass (the public) are always the last to arrive at the public square, and always the
first to leave it. However, they claim the national institutions.” (DAAR, 2011b)
Justice, for Nabulsi, is enacted through the meeting of institutions with those who
enable it. To act politically is to enter the ‘public square’ and to work to make
“that empty building represent us yet again.” (DAAR, 2011b)

The implication of Nabulsi’s articulation is that though the idea of Palestine is
challenged by occupation and fragmentation, Palestinians must take ownership of
the debris of decolonisation and work to rehabilitate it. DAAR rearticulate the
hardened cracks in colonialism – the discrepancies and contradictions against
which hardness recreates itself – to speak to the idea of political possibility. In
these cracks they argue that the contradictions of state apparatus are made visible,
and further, that those who have been marginalised become re-embedded,
‘realised’ yet again. By cleaning part of the parliament building, DAAR
symbolically begin the work of cultivation of the ‘good enough justice’. Taking
their cue from the cleaning of Tahrir Square during the Egyptian Uprising (in
their view, through the communal act of cleaning reclaiming the public square
from the debris of dictatorship), the act of cleaning invokes the idea of Al-Mashā.
Al-Mashà is a traditional Palestinian concept of common land use, which for DAAR, “can only exist where people have agreed to cultivate together.” (Petti et al., 2013, pp. 182-183) The work of cultivation therefore implies the work of beginning, of political risk that is prepared to “take on the difficulties and injustices of the existing city.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 36) Though, as Rose would insist, reclaiming the public square must not denigrate into a retreat to the commons enclosed, or to a utopian notion of cultivation (thus, redemption).

Rather, a Rosean approach insists that this cultivation takes on the onerous work of mourning. In the following chapter I advance a notion of place-based inaugurated mourning, in which the ordering of space and its meaning is emancipated from the conditions of violence, without forgetting.
Part Three: Emancipation

In Part Two, I argued that the ‘cracks’ of the widths of border spaces represent an opportunity to begin the work of the broken middle. Though small in scale, and often faltering, DAAR’s approach to rearticulating the width of the border line seizes upon the contradictions its imposition causes, and asks the institutions that (in their imposition or inexistence) uphold the conditions of ongoing suffering, to reflect critically upon their relationships to particularity. In doing so, DAAR challenges the institutions of Israel to engage with the contradictions inherent in the imposition of hardened borders. Further, they indicate the political possibilities of ‘rehabilitating’ spaces that may support a framework for the Palestinian commons, drawing on the legal anomaly of the border line within the parliament building to illustrate cultivation of a cohesive fragmentation. In this chapter, I deepen the notion of refurbishing the spaces of political disappointment, by arguing an approach to place-based inaugurated mourning, which seeks to break from the conditions of ongoing violence. I argue that the spaces of violence must be incorporated into the process of mourning in order to emancipate them from the conditions of ongoing suffering.

In the first instance, space and its organisation in Israel and Palestine is embedded with violence and differentiation. These are the embedded counters to utopian notions of redemption and the imagined whole which are imposed on a reality which does not support such absolute delineations. Alÿs’s act shows the fragility of the process of hardening, whilst DAAR’s works The Lawless Line and Common Assembly exploit this fragility to pursue a ‘good enough justice.’ DAAR’s work attends to the spaces that embody political disappointment, violence, and ongoing suffering. Their express aim is to work to support the decolonisation of Palestine. To decolonise infers a shift from a situation of oppression to emancipation. However, there is potential for such a process to denigrate into a replication of the structures of violence, in which the spatial ordering of the city and politics renew oppression. I argue an approach to emancipating the spaces of violence, to mourn their architectural injustice, and thus to find a way to integrate acknowledgement of suffering into the process of renewal. Through this approach, the trauma of the past is ‘worked through’, and the spaces of violence are transformed from their oppressive functions and
memory, without forgetting. I begin this chapter by discussing trauma, melancholia, and mourning, and their relationship to space. I then turn to a particular space, the Oush Grab military base/Shdema Outpost, near Bethlehem, to examine an approach to freeing this space from its repeated violence, without abandoning the past entirely, or stagnating within its trauma.

**Trauma**

The spaces and political organisation of Israel and Palestine are multiply affected by trauma. As discussed in Part One, the creation of Israel is in part a response to the experience of being the Other in Europe, and to the Shoah. Though the Shoah is memorialised in many ways across the world, and in particular ways by individual survivors, some argue that the memory of the Shoah is stagnated in political articulations in Israel, ‘re-traumatizing’ the population to legitimise endless securitisation and violence. By re-traumatising, the opportunity to mourn is denied, and the state locks into an embedded anxiety, in which it must endlessly defend against “the holocausts yet to face us.” (Inbari, 2012, p. 50)

Those who suffer the effects of this stagnated trauma, as well as Israelis who find themselves affected by the repression of anxiety, are Palestinians who have at times been attributed the status of ‘ultimate predator’. This is conflated with and reproduced in the discourse of the ‘war on terror’, and more recently, the struggle against the ‘Islamic State’. As described earlier, the trauma of being imprinted with the expectation of ‘potential refusal or revolt’ comes to be embodied, and enacted.

Nanette C. Auerhahn and Dori Laub write of the difficulty in studying inter-generational Holocaust trauma, in that for some the pathologisation of survivors and their children doubly-victimises, “in part because to expose the magnitude of the Nazis’ destruction is to confirm Hitler’s posthumous victory.” (Auerhahn & Laub, 1998, p. 21) To avoid the pathologisation and hence re-victimisation of survivors and their children, Auerhahn and Laub avoid judgement of psychological health, and shift to understanding the effects of different types of Holocaust knowledge on lived outcomes. Following, the discourse that surrounds memorialisation of the Shoah by the Israeli state, when performed to give effect

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33 On the notion of ‘multiple’ traumas see (Cabrera, 2003)
to certain policies, contributes to a type of Holocaust knowledge that affects the ability to memorialise and mourn the Shoah for some survivors. Pappé reflects:

Even after post-Zionist critics had salvaged the survivors’ point of view, few survivors actively challenged the tale told by the state about them and their fate. Their silence did not arise from fear; it was a much deeper response to the horrors they had witnessed. (Pappé, 2014, p. 173)

There are multiple responses to trauma, including silencing and repression. By ‘re-traumatising’ as Pappé alleges, the Israeli state further represses those memories that might trouble the dominant narrative, and inhibits the ability to understand and to articulate. This discourse encourages a retreat into the ‘imagined whole’, and discourages critique. As Adorno would lament, the hardness produced by such repression of anxiety inflicts its pain within and without, reproducing the conditions which contribute to ongoing suffering.

However, Israeli society is diverse, and only some are Holocaust survivors or offspring of survivors. There is evidence to suggest that the children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors are more politically moderate than their peers. (Z. Solomon, 1998, p. 80) This suggests that the Israeli state’s ‘re-traumatisation’ is not a direct link to the actual experience of surviving the Holocaust. Rather, the official discourse of Holocaust memorialisation in Israel lends to a political climate in which survival is built into the imagined national whole. An observation of students, some of whom were Israeli descendants of Holocaust survivors, and some of whom were German descendants of Nazi perpetrators, found that “While in Germany, students tend to claim that “nothing in the Nazi era was relevant” for their present social perspective, in Israel we found the opposite tendency (“The Holocaust was very relevant for our present social contexts”).” (Bar-On, Ostrovsky, & Fromer, 1998, p. 98) This suggests that the imagined whole of Israel has internalised a particular memory of the Shoah, that it informs the present, and that the intrinsic understanding of the Shoah as a central experience may both inform and be mobilised by contemporary security and territorial pursuits.

34 Repression in this instance does not refer to actual forgetting, rather avoidance of thinking and dwelling on the traumatic event(s). (McNally, 2005, p. 212)
The experience of *Al-Nakba*\(^{35}\), multi-generational displacement, and the experience of being the Other to Israel contributes to ongoing trauma for Palestinians. Further, the effects of ongoing violence and oppression - terrorist attacks, disproportionate retaliation, control of movement and access to conditions in which to pursue a liveable life – affects the repetition of trauma for both Israelis and Palestinians. Attempts to understand the effects of trauma on Palestinians have found evidence of high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A 2011 review of mental health studies of children and teenagers in Middle East conflict zones found that the rate of PTSD was 23-70% in Palestine, compared to 5-8% in Israel, a difference attributed to exposure to insecurity, and disparities in the stability and standard of infrastructure and access to resources. (Dimitry, 2012) Similarly, a 2014 review found high levels of PTSD in children in Palestine, in which the trajectory for improvement generally followed the expected recovery from three months post-trauma. However, this trajectory for improvement was adversely affected by recurrent exposure, and more direct exposure (for example, a family member being killed). (Punamäki, Palosaari, Diab, Peltonen, & Qouta, 2015) This suggests that whilst the findings of the study were hopeful, in that Palestinian children showed resilience to traumatic episodes, ultimately, improving standards of living and reducing exposure to trauma must be pursued to avoid more detrimental effects of longer-term PTSD.

Attempts to articulate the communal dynamic of trauma\(^{36}\) in Palestine have often come to centre on comparisons to colonised populations, and apartheid (the ‘separation wall’ discussed earlier is often referred to as the ‘apartheid wall’). (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015) Strategies to ease suffering have centred on decolonisation, or on mobilising the strategies that helped to bring the demise of apartheid in South Africa (the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement). If these strategies have effect, the result may be a new Palestinian state beside Israel, or a one-state solution. As the effects of trauma are multiple

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\(^{35}\) *Al-Nakba* refers to the ‘catastrophe’ – the Palestinian name for the events of 1948-9, widely understood to be mass displacement, and loss of land, homes, and entire villages and cities to the Zionist movement.

\(^{36}\) Magdalena Zolkos discusses communal vis-à-vis individual trauma as distinct in that communal trauma refers to the ‘damage of social fabric’ rather than simply a cumulative effect of multiple individual traumas. Communal trauma implies a politically manifested phenomenon which is related to and informed by individual trauma and subjectivities, but carries the weight of a wider social trauma. See (Zolkos, 2009, p. 87)
for both Israelis and Palestinians, the manifestation of unmourned trauma, should these strategies be effective, is at stake. In a post-occupation existence, memories of injustice and injury must be processed and articulated to dissuade from reproducing the structures of violence in new forms. In particular, following from Fanon, the territorial organisation of space must be renewed after decolonisation, in order that the unjust hierarchies it supported are not reproduced. (Fanon, 2007) However, whilst Fanon advocates total destruction, a Rosean approach argues that this would be likely to replicate injustice in its abandonment of potential justice alongside injustice. I argue that the spaces of violence must be integrated into the process of mourning, as a political act that seeks a ‘good enough justice’.

Responding to multiply-laden trauma therefore, in a context in which space and territory are weighted with meaning and the legacy of violence, demands attention to the ways in which space might be detached from the conditions of ongoing suffering. Such an approach insists that the trauma pervading the organisation and memory of space is attended to, by navigating its complexity without denigrating to overly-simplistic stories. As Kate Schick writes:

…working through stands in stark contrast to acting out: it is a politically engaged response that refuses to be seduced by simple stories about trauma, with their easily identifiable villains and victims, but that takes time to understand an inevitably more complex reality. (Schick, 2011, p. 1838)

In a context in which once-occupied land becomes freed, the impulse to fix – firstly against the prior occupier, and secondly to establish stability – must not come at the expense of pursuing a more just way of living and acting politically. I now turn to elucidate aberrated mourning as opposed to inaugurated mourning, before turning to how the lessons of inaugurated mourning may be considered in a Palestinian context. This argument is important to understanding how a theoretical realisation of a sovereign Palestine can move forward without replicating the conditions of violence from which it arises.

Aberrated mourning: Inaugurated mourning
Aberrated mourning is Rose’s term for a response to trauma that becomes stagnated within the trauma itself, and refuses to reflect. It is a response that hastens to fix, rather than to accept the anxiety that attends trauma, in order that
the conditions which gave rise to suffering might be understood. On the one hand, aberrated mourning reflects a resolve to strengthen against insecurity in response to a single traumatic event, closing against the ability to question the event’s connections to larger structures. On the other hand, aberrated mourning may be the result of multiple traumas over a long period of time, entrenching an intergenerational response that is unable to begin the work of mourning. As Joe Sacco reflects, “Palestinians never have the luxury of digesting one tragedy before the next one is upon them.” (Sacco, 2009, p. xi) An aberration of mourning is unable to begin sorting through the debris of trauma, just as Benjamin’s Angélus Novus stands in perpetual horror at the singular catastrophe of history, in which trauma imprints its violence upon the everyday, and obscures a possible future.

Thus, the Shoah and the Al-Nakba each become aberrated, imprinting their injustices and violence upon the possibility of breaking from their hurt. The integration of Holocaust memory into hegemonic Israeli politics stagnates its trauma into the identity of the nation, seeking to justify further violence and externalisation of hurt, without heeding the suffering of the Other. The Al-Nakba al-mustamirrah (ongoing Al-Nakba) reflects the ongoing state of disaster for Palestinians, whose traumatic memory of the Al-Nakba of 1948 goes largely unacknowledged, and for whom military occupation, extensive repression, instability, and ongoing war are constant. An aberrated response might pit the suffering of one against the other, further stagnating in the violence of ‘derealisation’ of the suffering of the Other, rather than recognising that trauma and suffering on both accounts is valid, and requires response without competition. Rosemary Sayigh writes:

The absence of the Nakba from the trauma genre both reflects and reinforces the marginalization of Palestinian claims to justice and the recognition of the Nakba in world politics, and thereby, it contributes to the continuing failure to reach an equitable settlement. (Sayigh, 2013, p. 58)

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37 I note here the particular experience of the double-burden of displacement for those Palestinians refugees who came to live in camps in Syria following the 1948 Al-Nakba, who have now been forced from those homes as a result of the Syrian War. These people do not receive the same rights as other refugees in host countries, particularly regarding the likelihood that they would be allowed to stay, and the ability to legally work temporarily.
Aberrated mourning in Israel and Palestine signals the silencing of mourning, of the Shoah, of Al-Nakba, and further, of the repeated traumas that have injured those attempting to live a liveable life – in Israel, Palestine, or indeed the diaspora. The inability to do the work of mourning fixes all in ongoing insecurity, stifling the ability to break from ongoing violence. For Rose, it is “a counsel of hopelessness”, which disqualifies “both critical reflection and political practice.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 70)

An aberrated response to trauma seeks to become invulnerable. In global politics, the impulse to harden or to retreat or, on the other hand, to “eliminate vulnerability” (Schick, 2013, p. 43) through universalist or cosmopolitan means, each deem vulnerability to be a weakness that must be worked against to eliminate suffering. A negative conception of vulnerability sees vulnerability as a weakness, as being vulnerable to injury or to discrimination. As Gilson writes: “normative projects typically involve minimising vulnerability and protecting the vulnerable.” (Goodin, 1985) (Gilson, 2011, p. 309) Such minimisation and protection from vulnerability leads to a hardened response, which seeks to shore up against the threat of hurt. Minimising vulnerability denotes a response which buttresses the vulnerable towards a sense of invulnerability through strengthening, whereas protection denotes a paternalistic response which reproduces the ‘inherent’ vulnerability of those protected. (Robinson, 2016) They become doubly-burdened, as vulnerable to that which threatens to hurt, and vulnerable to the possibility that the protector might cease to protect. Both work to maintain a system of hierarchy in which the ‘invulnerable’ enjoy the privilege of the strong, whereas the ‘vulnerable’ must rely on the whims of others to either protect or refrain from enacting injury. This regime is stagnated in a perpetual and simplistic dialectic of those who can injure and those who can be injured.

In Israel and Palestine, the dynamic of injurer to injured has been confounded by conflict, meta-narratives, and the effects of unmourned trauma. The story of Al-Nakba would support a narrative of a colonised population, subject to ethnic cleansing, and sixty years of exile, oppression, and military occupation and bombardment. Thus, this population has been made vulnerable to European colonisation, to injury, and to the silencing of this narrative. However, in international politics the push to find justice for Palestinians often meets the
critique of anti-Semitism (when the State of Israel is criticised), or violence of Palestinians is weighted evenly against the violence of the Israeli State. This does two things: first, the critique of anti-Semitism, (though at times justified), silences; second, evenly weighting violence makes both ‘sides’ equally responsible as though they are traditional evenly-matched nation states, and further results in a zero-sum logic in which the ‘beginning’ of particular violent exchanges is argued over in order to place blame and to level the claim of self-defence. Such approaches do not acknowledge the extent of Palestinian suffering. However, counter-approaches which level a simplistic claim of colonisation, whilst attempting to demystify, do not adequately attend to the emotions entangled in the state of Israel.

Aberration of mourning in its horror at trauma perceives that in order to avoid more trauma it must harden, and must become invulnerable to the apparent inevitability of attempts to injure. The Other becomes reduced to ‘able to kill’ and becomes an acceptable target of violence (in pre-emptive self-defence). In such a climate, securitisation becomes privileged. The sites, monuments, and cultural displays of securitisation become accepted as necessary and become rigorous in their piety to the buttressed, strong, (often militarised) defined nation-state. In an international sense, the conquest of another comes to mean taking control of the security apparatus of the Other (or, removing it entirely). Again, this reflects a simplistic duality – the strong and the weak (the weakened), those who can injure and those who can be injured. To be relieved from occupation or oppression, then, may invoke an aberrated response that seeks never again to be subject to such injury by displaying strength - through violence, revenge, and hardening. This response fixes into the conditions of violence, and refuses to mourn that which has been hurt. It becomes mired in repetition of violence, and the repetition of trauma.

The political work of mourning is what Rose terms inaugurated mourning: “to soften the rigid stare of the Angélus Novus, the angel of history.” (G. Rose, 1993, p. 182) Inaugurated mourning speaks trauma, and must be heard. Rather than becoming mired in trauma, this response seeks to ‘work through’ trauma, to speak

38 On the charge of anti-Semitism as a mode of silencing critique of certain policies of the State of Israel see: (J. Butler, 2004)
of it, and to understand its attendant implications. (Schick, 2011) To do the work of inaugurated mourning is to act politically, in the hope that this work will lead to a more just existence. However, whilst it acts in hope, it does so with the knowledge that it may be disappointed and that it may fail. Thus, it commits to continue to work, to seek understanding of why it has failed, and to continue to hope. In pragmatic hopefulness, inaugurated mourning works with what is, seeks to understand not only the causes but the reproduction of injustice, and works within to attempt to negotiate a ‘good enough justice’. ‘Justice’ in turn, denotes not a redemptive promise, or enactment of revenge, but the possibility of living a liveable life whilst labouring to mitigate inadvertent suffering.

A Rosean approach welcomes a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability which denotes an active openness, willingness to live in anxiety and uncertainty, and responsiveness to critique from both within and without. Such a re-articulation of vulnerability connects the pursuit of invulnerability with ongoing suffering, and conversely, connects vulnerability reconsidered with the possibility of dismantling the conditions of ongoing suffering. Vulnerability reconsidered turns away from a negative conception, which at first sees it more ambivalently, as “a basic kind of openness to being affected and affecting in both positive and negative ways.” (Gilson, 2011, p. 310) This notion of vulnerability rests on an assumption of ‘primary human vulnerability’ and relationality. ‘Primary human vulnerability’, as indicated earlier from Butler, denotes an understanding that all people are in a sense vulnerable to another, by virtue of inherent sociality (that we all rely on others for survival and to live in some way). This troubles the notion of the autonomous rational actor, in which self-determining and self-sufficient beings share access to ‘reason’. The trope of the rational actor, in turn, minimises relationality and its constitutive capacity. Relationality, at its most fundamental understanding, denotes that each self is constituted by its relations to others, and that this constitutionality is determined by recurrent rearranging of the boundaries of self through a reciprocal process of recognition.

Vulnerability enacted implies active and self-relenting recognition. For Gilson, ‘epistemic’ vulnerability entails an enabling condition, suggesting that it exists in potentially active relation to other conditions or pursuits (for example, empathy or justice). Whilst at first vulnerability may be considered in terms of ‘openness’,
Gilson argues that such openness is a necessary precondition to being open to learn. Epistemic vulnerability begins with the condition of being able to learn, and moves to an active and wilful staking of one’s self in ambiguity. Gilson writes:

…one must be open to altering not just one’s ideas and beliefs, but one’s self and sense of one’s self. If one changes only what one believes but does not allow this alteration to go all the way down, to affect what one does (the practices that shape self-identity), how one thinks about and defines oneself, then the power of vulnerability is limited. (Gilson, 2011, p. 326)

Vulnerability reconsidered then, requires relinquishing the boundaries of the self and actively working to reassemble them over and over again. Staking one’s self within the broken middle, and taking the risk of comprehension, requires an approach which is prepared to engage in critical self-reflection, and openness to being wrong, and to being affected. The self is not considered as a static entity (a rational self, for example), but as an ever-changing assembly of relations and bounds that are persistently relinquished and staked in relation to others and to new understandings of the self. Thus, ‘fixing’ is only ever a denial of the flux of the self and such fixedness will find itself ever-challenged.

This openness to being affected actively informs how one engages. It is a deeply political and social activity, which seeks comprehension of the ways in which the self is enmeshed in an inherently social, relational existence. To comprehend this relatedness requires that the self’s relationship to societal structures is interrogated and acted upon. The ways in which identity is bound with the impulse to divide, to differentiate, and to secure must be questioned, to understand how the impulse to fix comes to exclude. In doing so, the societal and political structures that uphold division, differentiation, and violence become visible as structures which uphold injustice. Yet, a Rosean approach insists that it is the ways in which these structures are enabled and performed by people that leads to injustice, not the structures in themselves inherently. It is possible for people to rearticulate the structures of law to support justice rather than injustice, and to find ways of living that do not rely on violent exclusion to form identity.
Inaugurated mourning consequently works against the “passion of indifference” brought by aberration. (G. Rose, 1996, p. 113) By becoming actively vulnerable, inaugurated mourning works at comprehending trauma, and in doing so, to commit to a thoroughgoing recognition. Further than an empathic response that seeks to ‘know’ and understand, inaugurated mourning is a staking of the self as ‘active witness’, is prepared for that self to be fundamentally altered, and in turn, to alter. Thus, inaugurated mourning infers a transformational aspect, in which the work of mourning, of witnessing, and of staking the self, may come to ‘rehabilitate’ a ‘just law’. Rose writes:

Mourning draws on transcendent but representable justice, which makes the suffering of immediate experience visible and speakable. When completed, mourning returns the soul to the city, renewed and reinvigorated for participation, ready to take on the difficulties and injustices of the existing city. (G. Rose, 1996, p. 36)

To mourn, suffering must be expressed and understood within a framework of justice that attends to the particular rather than to abstraction. It is a more involved work of mourning than attending to personal grief on its own. As Schick notes, “the political work of mourning particular losses also points to the need to take political action that addresses the underlying structures that facilitated those losses.” (Schick, 2011, p. 1853)

Inaugurated mourning, by attending to grief, and to the political, is a responsive approach to both working from within the conditions of violence, and in the moments in which there is opportunity for the conditions of violence to be disrupted. As an endless work that “returns to negotiate and challenge the changing inner and outer boundaries of the soul and of the city” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 36), inaugurated mourning is an approach to trauma which need not wait a moment of clarity to begin its work. It promotes an open self-reflection, even from within trauma, and advocates taking time to understand, even when it is not necessarily easy to do so.

Space: violence and emancipation

As discussed, Israel and Palestine is multiply-laden with trauma. As Karin Fierke has argued, the experience of Palestinians has been largely silenced, and as a continuing trauma which carries the memory of Al-Nakba into the present, is
difficult to give voice to, and to mourn. She writes: “Constructing a historical narrative, which distinguishes past from present, is highly problematic in the context of war or its aftermath.” (Fierke, 2013, p. 795) A ‘clean break’ from a traumatic past that hastens to fix would silence its pain, and fail to integrate the learnings of the past. Becoming mired in an aberration of mourning however, which carries the past into the present without ‘working through’ stagnates in the trauma, and remains embedded in the conditions of violence. (Schick, 2011) An inaugurated response therefore must find a way that mourns trauma, places it in the past, yet integrates its lessons into pursuing a more ‘just law’.

In a context in which territory is bound with trauma, and in which the spatial ordering of occupation and violence is pervasive, it follows that the spaces that support suffering must be integrated into the process of mourning. The organisation of space imposes its enacted meaning upon those who experience that space. As Lefebvre writes, “The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 31) A produced space that carries the dynamics of violence throughout may form part of the reproduction of violence when mourning is halted prematurely. In Israel and Palestine the spaces that represent and enact hardened borders or the apparatus of conflict and occupation, if not addressed through a process of inaugurated mourning, entrench hardening and ongoing violence. An inaugurated response takes the particularities of the context into account and enables the expression of grief, whilst continuing to heed the greater frameworks in which the particular exists and operates.

Hardened spatiality, as described in Part One, imposes upon people and their experiences of particular spaces. In Israel and Palestine, sites of military occupation are intertwined with the direct and lived experiences of occupation. Often for young Israelis, their only direct contact with Palestinians is as military personnel. Forced hierarchies, and dynamics of power and trust, impose a character on these interactions that works against recognition. Military sites, or new settlements (which are legally allowed to have private militia) are often placed on top of hills, looking down on Palestinian villages. The advantage of being able to see from above leads to an imposition of oppression and insecurity.
for those who experience being seen from below. Further, military sites often incorporate watchtowers, from which the Palestinians who must live beneath them do not know when they are being watched, or who by. The sites of occupation, for Palestinians, often represent a loved one lost, detention, harassment, and the burden of being controlled by another.

Therefore, the organisation of space is representative of a Foucauldian surveillance and control, which exacerbates insecurity. The spatial dimensions of the imposition of settlements onto the West Bank results in a layered occupation, in which Israeli raised settler-only walled highways run above Palestinian villages. When driving on the highway, the walls obscure the villages, making the experience of settling the ‘frontier’ of Israel (in the Occupied Territories) one in which interaction with those who already live there is avoided to the point that they are obscured from everyday view, but persistently subject to surveillance as perceived threats. Thus, the spatial interactions and obfuscations render Palestinians on the one hand irrelevant and invisible (not belonging) and at the same time as potential threats (who must be controlled). Weizman writes:

The territorialisation of Israel’s demographic phobia has generated increasing numbers of barriers between Jewish and Arab communities in neighbouring villages or shared cities, and has led to the further fractalization and fragmentation of the terrain into an archipelago of enmity and alienation. (Weizman, 2012, p. 155)

The dimensions of space that are imposed by occupation and division produce and reinforce ‘enmity and alienation’. The disproportionate ability to ‘see’ and to ‘be seen’ contributes to a sense of vulnerability, exacerbated when linked with the experience of being injured. Particular spaces become associated with traumatic events and particular ways of experiencing space contribute to ongoing trauma.

Concomitant with the spatial experience of occupation is the irruption of conflict into the everyday. Refugee camps and villages often become sites of immediate conflict; by understanding a place through a framework of ‘terrorism’, ‘threat’ is deemed to exist throughout rather than in specific and identifiable governmental or military spaces. Closely-built residences often become part of a ‘battleground’, in particular through an Israeli Defence Force strategy to go through walls to ‘advance’, blasting into a family living area, and then through the next wall into
the next residence. (Weizman, 2012) In this way the path that has been made through residences avoids the openness of the streets. However, this strategy also draws private space into conflict and makes the experience of living under occupation one of constant and immediate spatial threat. There is therefore an unbalanced access to securitising. Through the excesses of occupation and spatial domination, the Israeli state makes its presence known throughout Palestinian life, whereas Palestinians are seen and controlled from heights that they are unable to access.

Such an asymmetric dynamic of spatial organisation entrenches the conditions of violence. With the possibility however, that the occupation may at some point end, and that Palestinians may have access to the sites that had previously been the sites of oppression, comes the difficulty of moving on without forgetting. This has sometimes happened on a small scale, where for example a settlement might have been abandoned, or a military site might have been withdrawn from. These moments, during a situation of ongoing occupation, provide a microcosm for thinking about how to respond to a change in access to particular places. Furthermore, these sites are often subject to multiple changes due to fluctuations in securitisation, settlement, and withdrawal. They become locked in a push-pull which exacerbates the dynamic of us/them. In the following I argue that the work of inaugurated mourning suggests an approach to emancipating space from the conditions of violence, in a particular place that has, for many, been a site that represents military occupation, hurt, and trauma, and must be freed from these conditions to be able to renew its functions and meaning in the possibility of a new context.

**Oush Grab Military Base/Shdema Outpost**

The site of the Oush Grab military base, in Beit Sahour, Palestine, is a contested site. Located on a hilltop that has been a military base for a succession of occupiers, the Israeli Defence Force withdrew in 2006, again in 2013, and had

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39 Interestingly, this strategy of going through walls developed in part from a study of American artist Gordon Matta-Clark’s engagement with what he called ‘anarchitecture’ (anarchy architecture). Matta-Clark’s works involved cutting through soon-to-be demolished buildings, disrupting divisions between private and public space, and documenting the destruction of neighbourhoods. A research institute associated with the IDF presented Matta-Clark’s ideas alongside the IDF holes cut through Palestinian walls. (Sussman, 2007; Weizman, 2012)
returned as of January 2016. Between the 2006 withdrawal and now, the buildings have been subject to destruction, regeneration, and contestation by Palestinians, activists, and Israeli settlers. The site represents a microcosm of the greater struggle between a number of groups: First, Israeli settlers who think of the site and its surrounding region as belonging to ‘Eretz Israel’ (a greater ‘natural’ Israel than the present-day state defined by particular religious and historic interpretations). Second, the Israeli government which withdrew from the site as part of the evacuation of the West Bank, and which is under international pressure to stop further Israeli settlements. Third, surrounding Palestinian villages, which have had a terse relationship with the site in its iteration as a military base. Fourth, architects, artists, activists, and NGOs, who each envisage different ways to use the land and buildings. I will discuss more closely here two ideas for the future of this site: first, the claim of a group of Jewish settlers, the ‘Women in Green’, and second, a proposal by DAAR.

A small group of doggedly determined Jewish settlers, led by members of the ‘Women in Green’ movement ‘for Israel’s tomorrow’ persevered in occupying and regenerating the site know to them as the Shdema Outpost following the 2006 withdrawal of the IDF. According to the ‘Women in Green’ the site is of primary strategic importance to protecting Jerusalem ‘the heart of Israel’ to the North, Bethlehem nearby, and further, to protecting the expanded notion of ‘Eretz Israel’. According to Nadia Matar, the leader of the settlement project, the land is the God-given right of the Jewish people, and ‘Arabs have plenty of other countries they can call home’. She has led the settlement project, organising weekly regeneration meetings at the site, re-painting of buildings, and vandalism of Palestinian structures on the hilltop. The effort gradually wore down the resistance of the Israeli military, who then provided armed guard for the settler’s meetings. (Women in Green, 2008)

For Matar and her supporters, the struggle for redemption of the Oush Grab/Shdema site is situated in the wider discourse of radical place-based Zionism and the ‘clash of civilizations’. Firstly, the site is one of the primary strategic points of the West Bank, in military terms. Withdrawal, for the settlers, is giving up on land that is ‘rightfully’ Jewish, and offers Palestinians a strategic advantage in the area, which is mooted as being part of a future Palestinian state.
For Matar, there can be no ‘future Palestinian state’, only occupation of Jewish land by Arabs. Second, the media campaign has centred on a notion of the threat of radical Islam, positioning this particular site-specific struggle in a narrative about a clash of civilizations. Promotional material shows footage of suicide bomber initiations, and the aftermath of rocket attacks by Palestinians. Conversely, the proposed Jewish settlement is presented in terms of children, playgrounds, gardening, and ‘cultural life’. Films show would-be settlers painting and tidying the broken-down military buildings, planting vegetables in the surrounding land, and playing music. Matar articulates a plan for a cultural centre on top of the hill, in which the former military buildings are transformed into an exhibition centre for the celebration of ‘Eretz Israel’, through artwork, music, and social activity.

The settler community sees itself as the frontier and protector of ‘Eretz Israel’. It is at odds with the Israeli state, yet sees itself in relation to protecting the interests of the state. Its aims are expansionist, but its community is closed. The promotional material of the ‘Women in Green’ for the Shdema Outpost settlement shows women welcoming people to their meetings and gatherings. As cars arrive the women kiss new arrivals on each cheek. Later, we see groups of the community who have gathered in a circle, holding hands, dancing and listening to music. Two people are pictured planting a seedling together, as others encircle them, clapping. The image presented is of a happy and welcoming community, open-hearted within itself.

Yet, the settlers also express disbelief at the apparent audacity of Palestinians to construct a park and playground on ‘Jewish land’. They are proud to boast of organising a vandalism party, painting the Star of David “on every wall and every door”. On top of the Palestinian community they imprint their claim, and it is not an inclusive claim. They write on top, not only of Palestinian history, but on top of Palestinian claims to a future Palestinian state. The settlers are also enraged at the Israeli government. They are disappointed in the decision to withdraw from the military base, an act which they define as emblematic of ‘warfare’, and they are angered that they were initially prevented from settling the land. Over time, as the IDF gradually began to accept their activity, the settlers enveloped the
soldiers they interacted with into their community, holding up signs to welcome them into Shdema when they arrive.

The community the settlers advocate is inherently exclusionary and defines itself radically against the Other, and against the apparently more moderate aims of the state that it seeks to protect and redeem. The Israeli state’s withdrawal from the military base and parts of the West Bank is situated as a wrongful act, which takes the pursuit of ‘Eretz Israel’ backwards. Palestinians are situated as wrongful occupiers of land that is ‘rightfully’ Jewish. Jeremy Till notes, “the ‘community’ suggested is one…which effectively turns its back on the city as a container for collective life. It is a community which is defined by groups of a narrow social definition, and at worst driven by self-interest, and is therefore exclusionary and not inclusive as a true public social community could be.” (Till, 1998, p. 65) Till is writing in relation to community architecture in the UK, which Rose is critical of for its version of the ‘ethical community’ attempting to dispel with modernist rationality, yet in doing so repeating utopian exclusionary aims and expounding the fallacy of the pure community.

The pure community espoused by the settlers is in pursuit of emancipatory and utopian ideals, yet binds itself to the conditions of violence. It sees the former military buildings as a lost hope, and sets itself the task of redeeming them from the rubble inflicted upon them by the Israeli government’s withdrawal and the Palestinian people’s destruction. It seeks to redeem their productive status as objects which maintain and protect their version of the Jewish utopia, and in doing so wishes to redeem their capacity as violent objects that inflict war and surveillance on the surrounding Palestinians villages. The pure settler community is a radical rationalism and a radical ethics, but grasps at these only with a pure community in mind. It invokes the institutions and structures of a rational order, but fails to examine these, or the impossibility of their planned utopia, with a view to ending suffering. Instead, they pursue a radically divisive utopia that locks into violence to sustain itself.

For DAAR, the site is symbolic of the repression of Palestinian villages and lives by the IDF and the policies of the Israeli state. Many of the surrounding Palestinian villages have been targets of attacks from the military base, and were
constantly subject to surveillance from the tower at the top of the hill. In the immediate aftermath of the 2006 withdrawal, the site was partially destructed by Palestinians, who took materials from the buildings for reuse elsewhere, including taking the reinforcing steel from the watchtower, causing its partial collapse. DAAR saw the initial response of destruction as integral to decolonisation. For them, destruction of architecture that has been associated with violence is “a spontaneous architectural moment of re-appropriation.” (DAAR, 2008b) The destruction itself is therefore architectural. Destruction is a central element of DAAR’s re-conceptualisation of the site and its buildings. ‘Design by destruction’ refers to the deliberate decision to render the buildings unusable, so as to deter the Jewish settlers from being able to use them. The first stage of DAAR’s design is to drill holes in the walls of the buildings, so as to make them “less amenable to being used, before allowing for new functions to inhabit them.” (DAAR, 2008b) They also propose to partially bury the buildings in their own rubble, to “reorganise the relationship between the buildings and the landscape.” (DAAR, 2008b)

As the site is subject to continued contestation for occupancy, DAAR also seek to intervene in the ‘revolving door’ aspect of occupancy, in which one side establishes something (for example, the playground built by Palestinians) which is then desecrated and re-occupied by the other (vandalism of the playground by the settlers). The buildings are on the migration path of birds travelling between Siberia and Eastern Europe. Where there is a hilltop with plants, the birds tend to stop. DAAR propose to plant the hill and let nature take over, encouraging the birds to stop on the hilltop. Where the holes were drilled into the partially-buried buildings will become nesting sites for the birds. For DAAR, this sort of intervention creates a public space, separate to notions of public space that are proffered by governmental authority. (DAAR, 2008b)

_Gillian Rose: architecture, the third city, and inaugurated mourning_

For DAAR, the role of spontaneous architecture by destruction is important to re-appropriating the site, which, in its unpredictability, has implications for the role of architects and planners in re-imagining the site. The role of the spontaneous destruction may be akin to Nabulsi’s notion of claiming the commons – which as she purports are the moments in which the political will of the people claim the
institutions that belong to them. In partially destroying the site, Palestinians partially destroy the memory of violence that the site represents, and further, make claim to the site as one which now belongs to them (during the Arafat government, an agreement was signed stating that in the case of a withdrawal the site would be turned over to the local Beit Sahour municipality (DAAR, 2008a)). However, Nabulsi also makes reference to the extensive work that must take place in order that the institutions might be claimed. In this sense, DAAR’s plans for the future use of the site reflect their understanding of the centrality of architects and planners in the work of building and shaping a society.

Rose approaches architecture as a form by which the extremities of society are shaped, and which is in turn simultaneously shaped by the aims of that society. For Rose, architecture is both the rational order and the “third city”, and though “the form of this illusion of rational independence…it is also itself the middle, and stands for, represents the middle.” Architecture is the physical means by which people order space into public and private spheres. It influences the ways people experience space and relations with others in and around that space, and, in turn, influences the ways people act. The architectural ordering of space in society imposes structure, hierarchy, and distinctions upon people, bodies, and on the ways people think of and perceive the world. Architecture is therefore powerful and can be designed to support the aims of societies and individuals. It can be used to support oppressive ends, as it can be used to support emancipatory ends. Architecture can also carry the weight of trauma, in that the ‘object’ becomes imbued with the meanings of what has happened within and around the structure, and how that structure has drawn distinctions upon the experiences of people.

For Till, “it is Rose’s acknowledgement of architecture as a ‘semi-autonomous’ discipline with the potential to alleviate the pressures of the state that points to a way forward.” (Till, 1998, p. 72) The architects and artists of DAAR are not autonomous, nor objective – they too are entangled in the conflict, personally and professionally. Yet in addressing particularity (both of their own situations, and of their projects), they appeal to the abstract and thus, for Rose, act as intermediaries – they “alleviate the pressure of the…state upon the individual.”(G. Rose, 1996, p. 21) I argue that DAAR’s proposals for intervention
begin the work of the broken middle, to unsettle the fixedness of each ‘side’ and to leverage brokenness from which to begin to negotiate a more hopeful future. As Rose writes, the middle is the centrality and therefore beginning of relationships:

Here it takes three to make a relationship between two: the devastation between posited thought and posited being, between power and exclusion from power, implies the universal, the third partner, which allows us to recognise that devastation. (G. Rose, 1996)

The architect in this context is not the ‘three’ but working from within the third city. The architect’s pragmatic hope breaks into the hardened divisions between communities, and hardened iterations of the Oush Grab/Shdema site. In this respect, as ‘pragmatic optimists’, Jeremy Till has forwarded a notion of ‘angels with dirty faces’ to describe the work of the figure of the architect. Whereas Benjamin invokes Klee’s *Angélus Novus*, which stares in horror at the rubble of history that ceaselessly piles at its feet, Rose invokes another of Klee’s angels, *Angélus Dubiosus*. The ‘dubious angel’, rather than mired in the fixed and ceaseless horror of *aberration*, stakes itself in hopeful pursuit. Rose writes:

…here is the dubious angel – hybrid of hubris and humility – who makes mistakes, for whom things go wrong, who constantly discovers its own faults and failings, yet who still persists in the pain of staking itself, with the courage to go on and on, learning from those mistakes and risking new ventures. The dubious angel constantly changes its self-identity in relation to others. Yet it appears commonplace, pedestrian, bulky and grounded – even though, *mirable dictum*, there are no grounds and no ground. (G. Rose, 1993, p. 10)

The figure of the architect as an embedded yet ‘semi-autonomous’ figure, reflects the approach of the ‘dubious angel’. The work of DAAR in particular, is in a constant flux. Where architecture or urban planning normally rely on a fixed or reliable site, DAAR must work within a context which is distinct in its unreliability and lack of clear attribution: “The erratic nature of Israeli control and the unpredictable military and political developments on the ground renders Palestine an environment of high uncertainty and indeterminacy. Planning in such conditions could not appeal to any tested professional methods.” (DAAR, 2008b) Nevertheless, they situate their work as a pragmatic focus within an ‘erratic’
context; thus, DAAR resolutely work in pragmatic hopefulness. In knowing the likeliness of ongoing difficulty, yet engaging in work nonetheless, DAAR work from within the anxiety of the middle. As Till writes:

I have…suggested the figure of architects as ‘Angels with Dirty Faces’ (Till, 1995), a figure which oscillates between retreat and engagement in the world; in the endless flux these angels dissolve the futile and static oppositions of dialectical thinking. Instead they are androgynous dreamers of worlds full of flaws and contingencies, at times hovering like light doves, at others returning to grounded messy experiences. With feet on the ground, these angels evade the delusions of utopia, but as sceptical optimists they never succumb to Tafurian despair in the face of other forces. The knowledge of such angels is constantly mediated by common experience, and this, in its impurity and restlessness, is not seen as a threatening imposition but as a productive force of change. (Till, 1998, pp. 73-74)

For Till, these ‘angels with dirty faces’ are intermediaries between despair and utopia. In ‘hovering’ they remain hopeful that there may be ‘justice’ to work towards, yet in ‘returning to grounded messy experiences’ they pragmatically seek a ‘good enough justice’ rather than aspiring to an unattainable utopian vision. Further, architects participate in the social ordering of space, and therefore, “confront[s] the political nature of architecture and the production of space.” (Till, 1998, p. 74) As Rose insists, to begin in the middle is to recover the ability to act politically.

_Inaugurated_ mourning echoes a resolutely hopeful work of grief, that reassembles the soul, and enables a return to the political, rather than stagnation into _aberration_. The work of ‘angels with dirty faces’ may be an intrinsic part of the work of mourning which is attached to place and spatiality. In particular, in taking its lead from the destruction of grief, the work of DAAR reflects an _inaugurated_ approach, which makes room for the expression of grief, yet – in ‘sceptical optimism’ – suggests plans to emancipate this particular site from its entrenchment in violence and in zero-sum political struggle. An _inaugurated_ response to space would, as with a self, reassemble the boundaries and attachments of that space and integrate its suffering into renewal. Further, it would seek to return that space to a condition of a ‘good enough justice’, in which
its previous binds with injustice are known, interrogated, and disassembled, reorienting it towards hopefulness.

DAAR consider that the ‘moment of first encounter’ must take its course. Palestinians express outrage and grief tangibly and spatially, in the destruction of the structures of the site which is associated with violence and oppression. Rather than preventing this destructive expression in favour of an approach which begins with institutions (for example: the municipality’s plans for the site), DAAR find that the creative assertion of destruction is central to re-appropriation. As a stage of grief, this reflects an initial acknowledgement and expression of “the contradictory emotions aroused by bereavement.” (G. Rose, 1996, p. 70) It is in the aftermath of the initial encounter that DAAR begin their work, by beginning to imagine what might come of the rubble that is left. As David Kaufmann notes, “Mourning’s critical value lies in its affect, its reduction of the world to dust. It shatters the seemingly eternal edifices of second nature – the relations that govern the world we live in – by turning them into ruins and finding their meaning there in the rubble.” (Kaufmann, 2014, p. 81) The destruction of the buildings on the site is a stage of grief that seeks to destruct the conditions of violence in the first instance. The work of inaugurated mourning infers that following this initial response, the ‘meaning in the rubble’ must entail a political act which pursues a ‘good enough justice’. As Rose writes, “transcendent but mournable justice is configured, its absence given presence, in the architectural perspective which frames and focuses…”(G. Rose, 1996, p. 104)

Following Rose, the meaning in the rubble must come to be reflected in the architectural perspective of the ‘just city’. From the rubble must come a construction or reconstruction that ‘rehabilitates’ reason, meets the middle, and avoids aberration. In short, from the rubble of violence and its destructive grief, there must come the work of renewing rather than becoming mired in injustice. The initial encounter of destruction ushers the work of mourning in, by detaching the site from the possibility that it will become resurrected as a site of perpetration. DAAR’s approach to the work following the initial encounter incorporates the possibilities of destruction: “it is important to first render the buildings less amenable to be used before allowing for new functions to inhabit them.” (DAAR, 2008b) DAAR’s initial suggestion for intervention is to perforate
the walls of the buildings and to partially bury them in their own rubble. By perforating the walls, the buildings are rendered less usable for the functions they had supported in the past. Partially burying the buildings in their own rubble points to a way forward which does not forget the past nor allow it to determine the future, but integrates its suffering and the work of mourning into transforming.

As a final work of mourning, DAAR seek to transform the site, by liberating it from stagnated political struggle and from its ‘revolving door occupancy’. DAAR’s proposal is to reinvigorate a notion of “Palestinian public, social and communal spaces” that is distinct from the ‘public’ denoted by affiliation to what they consider to be an un-representative Palestinian Authority. (DAAR, 2008b) They therefore attempt to find social meaning ‘in the rubble’ that might enliven a disparate yet localised sense of civic self-determination, that in its ability to mourn is then able to act politically in its critique of the established authority. To enliven this, they turn the hilltop over to nature, making it a site that can be enjoyed by people, yet need not be attached to any particular political iteration. It is not in pursuit of a particular idea of a Palestinian state, as the municipality’s plans might reflect, nor is it held as a monument to suffering or violence, as the settler’s ‘cultural centre’ might reflect. Instead, the hilltop becomes a stopping point for birds on a migration route between Siberia and Eastern Europe. The birds become the third inhabitants, coming to mediate hardened edges that otherwise form.

By turning the hilltop over to a public space for primarily Palestinians who have otherwise known it as a site of violence, rather than to an established political entity, DAAR begin to address a political work of grief. The military base exists within a situation of asymmetric grievability. Butler finds that Palestinian lives are rendered less grievable in a politicised sense, due to the ‘derealisation’ of Palestinian lives in the first instance. For Butler, those who are not rendered wholly human are consequently not grievable as human, yet persist in their derealisation. Only by becoming a subject may the political work of grief ‘re-realise’ the humanness of the victims of violence, in turn exposing the operations of power and its violence upon the grievability of certain lives as opposed to others. (J. Butler, 2006) By expressing personal and communal grief abstracted in
the destruction of the buildings, Palestinians give voice to grief, in a world in which their grief is otherwise ‘derealised’. And by mediating the site external to, yet connected to, established politics, DAAR’s proposed intervention turns the site over to openness. It then becomes a site of political possibility, in which asymmetric grievability is able to be addressed, in turn exposing the status quo of derealisation. As a site mediated without direct politics, yet irrevocably connected to the extremities of power, the site becomes open to renewed expression.

Though this site is again serving as a military base following renewed violence of late 2015 and early 2016 (and therefore the re-entrenchment of military control over much of the West Bank), the proposal that DAAR envisage remains relevant in approach if not necessarily in detail. Should the site again be abandoned, the approach that DAAR advocates signals the transformative and political work of mourning. Rather than becoming mired in absolute destruction, or re-appropriating without expression of grief, they suggest an approach that begins resolutely in the middle, and works towards a ‘good enough justice’. By validating the initial expression of grief, and seeking to create meaning from the rubble that is left, their work reflects the mediation that Till suggests and prompts the work of inaugurated mourning. This work of mourning concedes the centrality of the dialectic relationship between space and social relations, in that they are constitutive of each other, and so must be addressed together in order to produce meaningful change.
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that spatiality is central to, and constitutive of, the political and social processes of hardening, ethical engagement, and emancipation. As a dialectic relationship, following Lefebvre, spatiality, social relations, and politics are mutually constitutive, and must be addressed together if meaningful change is to be achieved. First, it is evident that certain features of spatiality serve to differentiate and harden against an Other. However, as Lefebvre insists, hegemonic politics can never absolutely command domination of spatiality. Contradiction, the everyday, and the messiness of particularity, regularly irrupt into the attempted absolute, momentarily challenging hegemonic power. Such irruptions invoke the operation of power, ‘re-hardening’ against its cracks. Yet these irruptions are also opportunities to challenge the status quo, to make its injustices visible, and to provoke answerability. Further, as spatiality may carry the burden of history, violence, and trauma, it is essential that such answerability, if meaningfully invoked, must incorporate spatiality into its processes of change. A meaningful justice must re-configure spatiality alongside the social relations it engenders.

In Part One I established the politics of ‘hardening’ as a process by which an ‘imagined whole’ is rigidly differentiated from an Other, and by which repressed anxiety becomes externally laden. This silences the ability to reflect, and perpetuates injustice and the conditions of violence. The meta-narratives of Israel have embedded past trauma into the present. Rather than allowing the past to be remembered and delineated from the present, the Israeli state ‘re-traumatizes’ the population, in anticipation of the omnipresent threat of ‘the Holocausts yet to face us’. (Inbari, 2012, p. 50; Pappé, 2014, p. 177) Karin Fierke has argued that “the current relationship is driven by a memory or ongoing experience of trauma on both sides, which has been transferred from the experience of one generation in Europe to another generation in the Middle East.” (Fierke, 2013, p. 800) In this respect, the trauma of the Shoah lives on in the ongoing hyper-anxiety of the State of Israel, and in the ongoing Al-Nakba for Palestinians. The impulse to ‘harden’ against an Other is an attempt to quash this ongoing trauma without seeking understanding and reflection. As Butler would insist, the spectre of un-
mourned trauma may never be fully ‘derealised’, and will interminably re-
traumatise.

Francis Alÿs’s *The Green Line (sometimes doing something poetic can be
political and sometimes doing something political can be poetic)* (2004), and the
conversations that form part of that work illumine the processes and effects of
hardening. First, the physicality of Alÿs’s action – that of a certain body moving
through a certain space – indicates the embodied effects of bordering practice.
Whilst Alÿs is able to move through Jerusalem unimpeded, he also embodies a
‘sneakiness’ that is reminiscent of the effect of spatiality upon Palestinian bodies.
The burden of differentiation is carried by certain bodies which are Othered. The
presence of certain bodies beyond the borders to which they are beholden is
transgression in itself. Expectation of the performativity of certain bodies
reproduces the imposition of the border upon lived experience. This dynamic of
the inscription of social meaning upon certain bodies is constitutive of self-
identity; as Fanon found, being black gives effect to whiteness. Similarly, the
Palestinian Other gives effect to the Israeli ‘imagined whole’, which requires the
Other by which to define itself.

However, such rigid differentiation suppresses recognition. Whilst distinguishing
a self from an Other, identification with the Other without and within is
repressed. On the one hand, Israel rigidly defines itself as an ‘imagined whole’,
oriented as a manifestation of ‘Western’ values. It draws upon categorisations that
seek to separate Western from Oriental, civilised from barbaric, and legitimate
state violence from illegitimate terrorism. Yet in doing so Israel suppresses the
‘Arab within’, and further, suppresses recognition of suffering of the Other.
(Alÿs, 2004h) By suppressing the ‘Arab within’ Israel suppresses self-recognition
and flattens diversity within the experience of being Israeli. By suppressing
recognition of suffering of the Other, Palestinians become ‘derealised’ and are
therefore susceptible to a violence which is not fully understandable as human
suffering. These two processes are in fact singular: to recognise the ‘Arab within’
would make the suffering of Palestinians ‘realisable’ as suffering of the self.

Rigid borders support this process of misrecognition. The notion of ‘Auschwitz
borders’ embeds anxiety within proximity. The border is pushed further away,
seeking to close from the possibility of confronting recognition, whilst the possibility of negotiating borders that would enable a Palestinian state is imbued with catastrophe. The meta-narrative of catastrophe and redemption becomes an endless state of existence, in which territoriality and the organisation of space is inscribed with inevitability. Imminent catastrophe reinforces the promise of redemption. Conceding territory, or softening in relation to the Other, becomes burdened with the weight of catastrophe. As Fierke further observes, “the political function of traumatic memory is often to deny, block out and forget the trauma of ‘others’.” (Fierke, 2013, p. 800) The notion of ‘Auschwitz borders’ imposes the ‘unthinkability’ of the Shoah onto the relationship between Israel and Palestinians, now rendered the ‘ultimate predator’. This ‘hardening’ silences the voice of grief and understanding, and locks into an unceasing violence.

In Part Two, I developed a re-articulation of the border as a broken middle. By doing so I contribute to the field of critical border studies which seeks to re-orient the border as a conceptual site of possibility, and to the spatially-oriented political thread of Rosean thought. Rather than merely a site of potential connectivity, the border as a broken middle advocates an approach to ethical engagement which holds the particular and law ‘as one’. It goes beyond the notion of mere contact, which is troubled by observations of increased hardening with closer proximity and closer interaction. A Rosean approach requires cognition of how the particular and the law come to constitute one another, and engages from within their diremption to pursue a ‘good enough justice’. The border as a broken middle engages with the diremption of binaries. Rather than withdrawing from the border, or seeking to mend in favour of the ‘imagined whole’ (the agapic community), or addressing insecurity through an overarching universalist assumption (the assumption of delineation), the broken middle holds these contradictions ‘as one’. A Rosean approach works to ‘rehabilitate’ the law, making the law and particular answerable to each other. This is an enriched and active approach to doing the political work of the border, re-conceived, as a site or state of existence, which has its own relationship to each ‘side’. As much as it is constituted by the binaries that attempt to enforce it, the border itself is constitutive of the ever-fluctuating assembly of meaning that each side attempts
to delineate. Diremption becomes the beginning, as Rose insists: a beginning in
the middle. (G. Rose, 1992)

DAAR seize upon political possibility within the contradiction of the line itself.
By re-conceptualising the width of the border as an autonomous site in itself,
DAAR reposition the ‘borderline state’, making visible its constitutive
potentiality. By seeking to enhance the ‘borderline state’s’ strategic possibility,
DAAR engage the legal apparatus to which the border is beholden, challenging
the courts of Israel (in this instance) to realise their potential for justice. In doing
so, particular moments of ambiguity or injustice acquire wider implication. For
DAAR, the implication is for the legal apparatus of Israel to reflect upon its own
relationship to occupation, and to injustice. By challenging such reflection,
DAAR agitate to make Israel answerable to itself. This reflects an approach
which works within actuality, in Lefebvre’s present space, rather than fixating on
a difficult-to-see and abstracted future. DAAR’s attention to the width of the line
is a pragmatic and grounded, yet hopeful, attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ a sense of
justice.

DAAR are also adamant that the work of planning must begin, however
imperfectly, from within the difficulty of occupation, injustice, and ongoing
violence. Agitating the legal implications of the ambiguous width of border lines
is part of a series of propositions that seek to enhance the ability of Palestine to
act politically. Within the constraints of occupation and ongoing violence, the
primacy of politics becomes secondary to existing. The situation of Palestinians
has its own peculiar attributes that make a cohesive (if still diverse) identity from
which to act, challenging. Working with multi-generational displacement and
separation, compounded with the added insecurity of conflict in Syria and its
effect on the Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian Shatat, renders the idea of Palestine
evermore intangible. DAAR’s act of cleaning the width of the line through the
never-used intended parliament building symbolically reha[lities a spectrum of
representation. Rather than the status quo which, for DAAR, inadequately
expresses diverse and disparate Palestinian interest, claiming the Palestinian
‘commons’ must begin with acknowledgement and understanding of who claims.
Looking forward from within the midst of ongoing violence requires attention to the modes and processes of moving forward. In Part Three, I argued that spatiality must be incorporated into the process of mourning. Rather than a melancholic approach which becomes mired in trauma and ongoing violence, the work of inaugurated mourning gives voice to suffering and seeks to understand its implications. This requires two things: first, grief must find expression; second, the lessons of suffering must be incorporated into the processes of renewal. An inaugurated response to trauma ‘works through’ suffering. To ‘work through’ requires that grief is able to be expressed and is ultimately placed into the past whilst its lessons become integrated. This differs from an approach which carries the trauma of the past into the present, by narrowing expression into a hegemonic and instrumentalised narrative, and by silencing self-reflection and interrogation of the conditions which led to suffering. Inaugurated mourning is not prescriptive yet it is politically productive.

As spatiality and social relations are mutually-constitutive, both must be addressed together through a process of inaugurated mourning, in order that the spatial conditions which would support ongoing violence are not replicated. Spatiality produces hierarchies and distinctions that, in a post-occupation existence, must be disassembled. However, a Rosean approach finds that absolute destruction of the spatiality and architecture of violence would abandon potential for justice alongside injustice. Emancipating spatiality from its violence incorporates the past into the renewal of space, yet transforms the ‘script’ of a place to reflect Lefebvre’s present space. The present is ultimately comprised of an actuality that is affected by but not beholden to the past, and carries an inherent sense of future possibility. Yet, as present actuality, resolutely exists in what is, and works within actuality’s imperfections, inconsistencies, and difficulties, whilst cognisant of its latent transformative promise. In this sense, DAAR’s approach to spatiality reflects Till’s ‘angels with dirty faces’ (and Rose’s Angélus Dubiosus). Actuality necessitates a grounded approach to the imperfect present, yet in planning for a post-conflict future, must also work hopefully.

This thesis reflects a lamentation that present suffering is deeply entrenched in aberrated trauma. Attempts to negotiate a way forward in Israel and Palestine
have largely failed, and show little hope of success in the immediate future. Built into overarching negotiations is an assumption as to the delineation of political space, and hence the separation of people. Separation expressed through the idea of ‘self-determination’ does little to repair the hurt that has occurred between such ‘imagined wholes’. Aberrated trauma stagnates within ongoing violence, and entrenches past trauma within the present. Yet to retreat into agapic communities of trauma neglects the work of the political. A Rosean approach insists that the structural conditions of suffering are interrogated, and reassembled to support an ongoing, pragmatic, ‘good enough justice’. This emancipation of space from the effects of aberrated trauma requires the politically productive work of inaugurated mourning, in which the bounds of the self are disassembled and reassembled anew in light of the learnings of grief. I have made the argument that Israel is overarchingly mired in an aberrated mourning, and that this gives rise to ongoing suffering. A perpetual aberration would, in turn, replicate the pattern of stagnated trauma and therefore hardening, should a way forward for a Palestinian sovereignty be realised. Ultimately, I argue that realising self-determination alone is not sufficient. For a meaningful resolution to this conflict, the trauma that is laden onto people, and political and social space, must be wholly attended to, its grief expressed, and its lessons incorporated into the renewal of beginning.
Reference List


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