Deliver Us From Evil: Morality’s Ability to Divide and Conquer

By

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Abstract

At one point there was consensus that morality was solely based on matters of harm and justice. However, with advances in cultural and anthropological research, Haidt and Joseph (2004) proposed a more expansive approach to morality, known as the Moral Foundations Theory. This theory highlights five foundations: Harm/Care and Fairness/Equality (Individualizing foundations) and Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity (Binding foundations). Established links between the five foundations and political ideologies have been made, as well as broad links with religious affiliation in a US context.

Considerably less research has been conducted on these foundations outside of an American context. Due to New Zealand’s particular ethnic composition, multi-party electoral politics and electoral system, and relatively secular climate, it makes for an ideal setting to investigate moral foundations in the context of political and religious ideology. I sampled 354 New Zealand participants (a mixture of general population and students: 39.5% male, 57.1% females, 3.4% other) on moral foundations, political self-identification, religious ideology, and individual-level individualism and collectivism. Political identification and religious ideologies were correlated with morality as predicted, with more conservative political and religious ideology being associated more strongly with the Binding foundations and more liberal political ideology being associated more strongly with the Individualizing.

Furthermore, results raise speculation that the vertical dimension of individual-level cultural affiliation may be a strong predictor of morality endorsement alongside collectivism. This study replicates the connection between political and religious ideology, and morality but also adds additional insight into these relationships.

Keywords: Moral Foundation Theory, Vertical/Horizontal Individualism/Collectivism, religious ideology, political orientation
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Dedicated to my Grandpa—Richard W. Lynch

Dedicated to my biggest fan, the giver of the best hugs, my favourite breakfast date, my political and religious light, my late night conversation starter, and often times my nurse, my chef, and my greatest listener. To my most enthusiastic music coach, proudest audience member, favourite comedian, and my coffee deliverer after a hard day. To my personal ray of unrelenting sunshine and the collector of some of my most painful tears. To my puzzle partner and my movie and popcorn companion. This is dedicated to you, Grandpa, my most memorable teacher.

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What subjects do people consider to be moral issues? And are these issues the same for everyone? Within and between societies, fierce, perennial political and religious debates surround significant topics such as immigration, economics, environmental concerns, and women’s rights that appear to have a moral element either to their content or the discourse concerning them (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). You may have to look no further than your own family or next door neighbour to find that these diverse topics often shift individuals into starkly opposing groups. Groups may become so divergent you question whether your opposition is simply devoid of moral guidance.

It has been argued that across all cultures, all moral issues involve questions of harm, rights, or justice (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987), but an alternative view has more recently developed, challenging this narrow viewpoint. Researchers in the area of morality and culture have found evidence that the morality domain is wider than previously speculated (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993)—that morality extends beyond matters of harm and justice.

History is replete with acts observers might characterise as good and evil, from groups as divergent as those of Nazis (e.g., The Holocaust) and Quakers (e.g., pacifists), of fascism and communism, whilst ingroup members adhere strongly to the belief that each group is operating according to moral ideals (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). If our moral ideals embrace some similarities, but also apparently profound differences, there are important questions to consider: How do people develop different moralities? What are these diverging and converging patterns of morality across and within cultures?

A Brief History of Morality Research

The study of morality has been approached from different psychological viewpoints throughout the last hundred years, and is motivated to explain the similarities and variations
found in morality. A cognitive-development approach to morality was emerging in the early to mid-twentieth century, in which Piaget (1932) focused on the cognitive processes that underlie moral responses; he suggested the organisation of these processes were different across the stages of development. Kohlberg (1963, 1969) elaborated on this notion, arguing that children pass through a universal and invariant sequence of stages, with advancement onto the next stage only when attainment was reached from the previous stage. These steps were organised by a particular mode of social and moral order, constructed out of individual–environmental interactions. Importantly, not everyone passes through each stage.

Specifically, Kohlberg (1963) postulated the following three stages of moral development:

*Pre-conventional stage:* Centred on children’s judgments about the world based on superficial features of reward and punishment, and on trouble-avoidant behaviour.

*Conventional stage:* Centred on children’s understanding and manipulation of rules, respecting roles (e.g., family, group), and conforming to appropriate behaviours.

*Post-conventional stage:* Centred on children reaching full moral development, cultivating an awareness of principles of choice and reasoning for themselves about the meaning of justice.

Within Kohlberg’s theory (1963) there is the idea that authority/loyalty ideas of morality (found in the *conventional* stage) were immature, but that children can reach a justice-based understanding with guidance. Kohlberg’s (1963) stages were constructed from a rationalist point of view, which places reasoning as the most important and reliable way to obtain moral knowledge.

Turiel (1966), a student of Kohlberg’s, followed a similar pathway to understanding morality but added his own innovation to the field. Turiel’s (1966) stance of morality took on a social-interactionist view in which his early studies focused on telling children stories about other children who broke the rules and then gave the children a series of probing questions.
He found children recognised that rules that dealt with things such as clothing and food were social conventions; for example, if a child was given permission from a teacher to not wear the school uniform for a day then it was permissible to do so and not morally wrong. Alternatively, if a student pushed another student down with permission from a teacher, children said that these actions were still wrong, regardless of whether someone said they could commit the act or not.

Turiel (1966) thus argued that children recognise a difference between social conventions, which were arbitrary and changeable and moral rules which were related to harm and universally fixed. Children learned these differences through direct experiences with both types, and learned they are not the same. Although Turiel (1966) and Kohlberg (1963) differed in key ways, the implications were similar: morality was about matters of harm and fairness.

The cognitive-developmental and social-interactional traditions have provided important contributions to our understanding about morality. However, they have limitations and empirical issues, noted specifically by Shweder (1982, 1990), an anthropologist/cultural psychologist. Shweder (1982, 1990) supplemented the existing morality research by looking across cultures. According to Shweder, the risk of seeking to understand morality from a Westernised perspective is that, simply, it is not representative of the entire population. Our ability to understand the actions, thoughts, and values of others becomes significantly more difficult. Thus, an important question arises: Are these constructions of morality the same for people living in less secularised, western, industrialised nations?

The Cultural Development of Morality

Shweder and colleagues (1987) argued that previous theories of morality worked for people from North America and highly westernised countries, but questioned whether the theories would hold true in other areas of the world. They conducted interviews with children
and adults from Orissa, India, and Hyde Park, Chicago in the United States (US), asking questions about behaviours and their moral significance. People in both India and the US agreed that harming others and treating people unfairly was morally wrong, but in other stories that portrayed no harm or unfairness, some Indians said these actions were still wrong—universally and unalterably wrong. Many of these stories detailed practices related to food, sex, type of clothing worn, and relationships with members of the opposite sex. In contrast with Turiel (1966), Shweder and colleagues (1987) found that most Indians did not find these to be mere social conventions, and thus, they found morality encompassed a broader domain in Orissa, India than in an American sample.

Shweder et al. (1987) suspected that morality centres on questions that deal with how to order a society, the most important being how to balance the needs of individuals and groups. Some societies place the needs of groups and institutions first and the needs of individuals second, which is known as a sociocentric-centred approach. Other societies prioritise the needs of individuals, and place the group’s needs as subordinate, often characterised by cultural psychologists as the individualistic-centred approach.

Deriving from a cluster analysis of the data collected in India and the US, Shweder et al.’s (1987) theory of morality rested on three ethics that could help explain these cultural differences. The first was autonomy, which was devoted to the individual and identified issues of justice, fairness, and freedom as fundamental rights to protect. The second was community, which emphasised seeing the world as a collection of institutions, families, tribes, or other groups and placed primary importance on duty, respect, loyalty, and interdependence. And lastly, divinity which is based on the position that God or Gods exist, and therefore, human agents and their bodies are temples for the divinity that should not be used in inappropriate ways (Shweder et al., 1987; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).
This was the first study to identify cross-cultural differences in interpretations of morality, and other cross-cultural studies soon followed continuing to highlight the differences across and between countries and moral configurations (e.g., Jensen, 1998). Shweder et al.’s (1987) work has convinced some researchers that morality’s domain was broader than previously imagined, highlighting the importance of a cross-cultural perspective to morality research.

Haidt’s Theory of Moral Development

Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) generally agreed with Shweder’s theory of morality but sought to address criticism it received on methodological issues (e.g., certain interview questions might have actually been saturated with harm and fairness moral concerns). Haidt and colleagues conducted their own research in the US and Brazil, interviewing children and adults in each location, taking into account low and high socio-economic status (SES), supplementing Shweder et al.’s (1987) research questions with their own in order to ensure there were ample questions that did not include issues of harm or fairness (Haidt & Hersh, 2001).

Consistent with their expectations, Haidt and colleagues (1993) found general support for Shweder’s theory. Morality consisted of more than just issues of harm and fairness for some people, and that even when some individuals were given harmless taboo acts (e.g., tearing up one’s country’s flag to use as a rag to clean the kitchen), some participants still found certain acts to be morally and universally wrong (Haidt & Hersh, 2001).

Subsequently, Haidt and Joseph (2004) looked into the possible psychological systems that could give rise to these moral intuitions around the world. They considered several theories of morality, values, human universals, and even the social lives of chimpanzees to aid their understanding of automatic emotional reactions that appear widely across cultures. They proposed the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which encompasses
five psychological systems; these systems or foundations act as receptors that can produce a reaction of like, dislike, or indifference. Additionally, Haidt and Joseph (2004) noted that cultures and individuals can vary in the degree to which they construct, value, and teach these psychological, moral systems.

**The Five Foundations**

Haidt and Graham’s (2007) five moral foundations:

**Harm/Care:** Evolution has shaped maternal brains to be sensitive to signs of suffering in one’s own offspring and has extended this process beyond the mother-child relationship; all individuals have the ability to feel and dislike the pain of others.

**Fairness/Cheating:** Related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism; we have become concerned about matters of fair treatment and inequality.

**Ingroup/Loyalty:** Evolution from living in groups of a few dozen people. It has led to special abilities to recognize, trust, and cooperate with members of one’s group, while being wary and distrustful of members of other groups. Due to valuing the ingroup, members may sacrifice for their groups and despise people who betray their group. This foundation emphasizes virtues such as loyalty, patriotism, and heroism.

**Authority/Respect:** Evolution from a long history of hierarchically structured ingroups where certain individuals were dominant members of the group. This foundation emphasizes virtues of respect and even admiration toward superiors. Cultures may construct virtues of good leadership and followship. This foundation can be related to duty and obedience.

**Purity/Sanctity:** Connected to evolutionary aspects of human development which included humans experiencing the emotion of disgust. Disgust can be seen in all cultures and appears to function as a protector of the body, responding to stimuli that are biologically or culturally linked to such things as disease (e.g., vomiting, ingestion of contaminated food). However, it also appears to be linked to social emotions, attached to those who appear different (e.g.,
obese, diseased, immigrants) or have low status (e.g., poor, beggar) and can make people feel uncomfortable and sickened. Religious activities can be thick with purity issues, relating to sexual cleanliness, keeping one’s soul pure from sins, etc.¹

Haidt and Joseph (2004) confirmed Shweder’s three ethics. The first two foundations (harm, fairness) underlie moral concern for ethics of autonomy and have been referred to as the Individualizing foundations. The second two (authority, ingroup) are the psychological foundations found in ethics of community, and the fifth foundation (purity) can be seen as ethics of divinity. These final three are classified as the Binding foundations, due to their ability to bind people into groups. The MFT thus, expounds on Shweder et al.’s (1987) theory by being more specific about the psychological mechanisms that underlie moral judgments.

The Sociocultural Evolutionary Stance

The development of these five foundations is consistent with a modified nativist view which argues that morality adapts from both the evolved mind and by way of the social environment (Haidt, 2012). Graham et al. (2011) argued that if morality can vary based on culture and society, the definition needs to encompass this function. Haidt and Kesebir (2010) defined moral systems as, “…interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 800). Haidt and Joseph (2004) noted that humans come equipped with intuitive ethics, or innateness, which can be

¹ Haidt and colleagues have proposed a sixth dimension, liberty, and its inclusion has been known to help characterise libertarian moral configuration (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Due to libertarianism not being a strong aspect of this research, I have decided to focus on the five moral foundations as they are most relevant to the liberal-conservative dimension (Graham et al., 2009).
seen as being structured in advance of your experiences. Additionally, humans have the
ability to construct virtues, which lead us to develop our individual moral landscapes.

Haidt and Joseph (2004) noted the importance of two main processing systems of
cognition on moral reasoning. Intuitions are part of the automatic system of cognition, and it
appears that many psychological researchers now believe that most social cognition occurs
rapidly and automatically, or intuitively. Examples of this would be the way in which people
appraise others based on attractiveness, threat, gender, status, or ethnicity. These are
constructed with learned facts about the social world and have an evolutionary imperative to
them (e.g., allowing us to perceive potential threats in our environment or select a healthy
mating partner).

Moreover, Haidt (2012) has postulated that responses to questions of morality stem
customarily from our intuitive system. We have quick, intuitive feelings as soon as a situation
is presented then we search for a supporting argument and justification using our more
deliberate, controlled cognitive system. The MFT allows for both intuitive bases of moral
rulings and more deliberate, reasoned judgements (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2001; Haidt &

Haidt and Joseph (2004) argued that although there is a strong sociocultural aspect to
moral development, there is some constraint on learning, with certain morals fitting the
human mind easier than others, and some not at all. We may all be able to agree that it is
quite easy (and helpful!) to detect distress in a child. This intuitive or evolutionary concept of
harm/care can be thought of as a building block that has made it easier for humans to develop
and strengthen certain moral concepts (e.g., harm foundation) over others (Haidt & Joseph,
2004).

The MFT approaches morality using a sociocultural evolutionary understanding, and
the MFT is recognised for its ability to attune to cross-cultural differences and designed for
Cultural Significance: The New Zealand Context

Although Graham and colleagues (2009) utilised samples outside of the US, they did not include New Zealand (NZ) in their trials. Because of this, Davies, Sibley, and Liu (2014) sought to test the MFT in NZ. They noted that although NZ is considered a Westernised country, there are key differences in its history and politics compared to the US. While the US is a two-party democracy, NZ has a multiparty electoral system which allows for a more diverse range of parties and is less divided along liberal-conservative ideological lines. In addition, there is also a large proportion of political moderates in NZ (Lees-Marshment et al., 2015). Due to this, many of the issues that are prominent in the US context (legalising gay marriage, abortion, etc.) are not as divided along party lines.

Davies et al. (2014) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) comparing the five factor structure against a single factor, two factor, three factor, and a hierarchical model of morality (five foundations as nested in two second order factors) and found support for the five factor model as well as reporting a clear two factor solution based on the scree plot and factor loadings. The two factors corresponded to the Binding and Individualising moral foundations, with all items loading on the expected factors. This research has provided evidence for the usefulness of the five foundations in a previously overlooked context, increasing the resolution of the psychological views of morality.

Beyond Davies et al.’s (2014) support for the transferability of the MFQ, other researchers have also demonstrated its compatibility with a non-US sample. Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, and Hatemi (2016) conducted an exploratory factor analysis of the moral foundations using an Australian sample alongside four U.S. samples. They replicated the same overall two factor structure reflecting the Binding and Individualising foundations as
reported by Graham et al. (2011). However, they found more support for the two factor structure amongst their samples than for the five factor structure. Smith et al. (2016) assessed different versions of the MFQ (long/short scales), and reported they were highly correlated. The most readily identified structure was of the Binding and Individualizing factors.

In connection with Smith et al. (2016) and Davies and colleagues’ (2014) findings, the five factor/two factor model analysis increases confidence for using the MFQ in NZ and bolsters support that the MFQ holds reliable even within a differing cultural landscape. According to census data documented in 2006 and 2013, NZ’s population has continued to become more ethnically diverse and multicultural, with an increasing number of individuals identifying as Asian, Pasifika, Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African (Backhouse, 2013). If past research has shown that morality landscapes can differ across cultures (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1987), how might the increasing diversity of NZ influence the morality configurations of this country? And how might we best measure an individual’s endorsement of culture in order to make a more nuanced connection between culture and morality?

**Horizontal/Vertical Individualism/Collectivism**

The constructs of individualism and collectivism have been discussed in diverse contexts across the social sciences (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995), including their relation to values, morality, politics, religion, economic development, and the self (Haidt, 2013; Ho & Chiu, 1994; Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, the constructs of individualism and collectivism are potentially motivating and important variables to consider when trying to understand differences in morality.

People said to exhibit collectivistic ideals are often defined as seeing themselves as part of a group and have personal goals that overlap with the goals of that ingroup (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Where there is a discrepancy between the group and personal goals, group
goals are typically prioritised over personal ones. Social behaviour is predicted from norms, duties, and obligations established in their environment (immediate and in the larger cultural context), and relationships are of the utmost importance. Even when the cost of remaining in a particular group exceeds the benefits, individuals tend to stay in these relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

People who are said to exhibit individualistic ideals tend to focus on self-concepts that are separate and unique from others; individualists are seen as autonomous from their groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They have personal goals that may or may not overlap with a particular group, and usually prioritise individual goals over group goals. In social behaviour, individualists’ behaviour centres more on attitudes and internal processes.

As discussed previously, Haidt et al. (1993) and Shweder and colleagues (1987) collected data from cultures that have been previously categorised by Hofstede (1980) as individualistic countries (e.g., US) and collectivistic countries (e.g., Brazil and India). They found that individuals from the more collectivistic countries tended to uphold a stronger endorsement of the Binding foundations, whereas samples that were typically more educated, higher in SES, and Western (e.g., US) tended to hold a more narrow view of morality, emphasizing the Individualizing foundations to a greater extent. However, these past studies have linked individualism and collectivism with countries arbitrarily and used this link as an explanation of differences and similarities across moralities (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1987).

To the best of my knowledge, only one investigation of the relationship between the moral foundations and culture—beyond the straightforward nation—level individualism/collectivism distinction—has been conducted (e.g., Iyer et al., 2012). Furthermore, even when national-level research has been conducted, the distinction between individualistic and collectivistic countries has often been used without proper measurement.
Triandis (1995) argued that although the individualism and collectivism (IC) dimension is helpful to understand the relationships, goals, and behaviours of individuals, there is another element to be considered that may help facilitate stronger inferences: the Horizontal and Vertical (HV) dimension. Triandis’s (1996) HV IC integrates the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991) such that the Vertical dimension refers to power and achievement and the Horizontal dimension refers to benevolence and universalism (Triandis, 1996). Triandis (1995) has argued for assessing HV alongside IC, to account for psychological variance that cannot be accounted for by IC alone.

Therefore, Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) propose the following dimensions:

*Horizontal Collectivism (HC)*: defined as a cultural pattern in which an individual sees the self as an aspect of an ingroup, and the self is interdependent and the same as the self of others. Equality is the essence of this dimension. People endorsing HC are not likely to submit to authority or feel pressure to do so.

*Vertical Collectivism (VC)*: defined as a cultural pattern in which the individual sees the self as an aspect of an ingroup, but the members of the ingroup are different from each other, with some having higher status than others. Inequality is an accepted aspect of this dimension; people endorsing VC are likely to take direction from authorities and submit to their will even when this may be extremely distasteful to them.

*Horizontal Individualism (HI)*: defined as a cultural pattern that embodies the autonomous self, but the individual is seen as equal in status to others. The self is therefore an independent agent, but the same as the self of others. People endorsing HI are likely to want to be unique but are not especially interested in becoming higher in status. Equality is important in this dimension.

*Vertical Individualism (VI)*: defined as a cultural pattern in which people tend to maintain the autonomous self, but individuals are seen as different from others, with some people having
higher status than others. Inequality is accepted and often expected. A strong essence of this dimension is competition.

For further clarification, Triandis (1995) referenced the US and France as examples of VI, Sweden as an example of HI, India and traditional Greece as examples of VC, and Israeli kibbutz as HC. Although these may be helpful examples, cultures may also be thought of as fluctuating tendencies, and individuals may exhibit each of these patterns at different times and situations. However, this measurement can be useful when predicting differences in attributes/behaviours among individuals within a culture. Cultures do appear to differ in their emphasis and prevalence of these four various orientations (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995).

While different cultures may be characterised in terms of relative endorsement of HV IC, we also know that individuals within similar contexts vary in the extent to which they endorse cultural orientations (Singelis et al., 1995). Due to a lack of research on HV IC and the MFT, this is a novel aspect of the current study. I explore individuals’ levels of endorsement of these cultural dimensions in relation to individuals’ moral foundations.

With the knowledge that individuals who endorse the Binding foundations exhibit greater acceptance and admiration for authority/leadership, adhere to sanctity of the body and mind, and are loyal to their ingroups and distrusting of outgroup members, I would speculate greater endorsement of the Binding foundations would correlate with greater endorsement of collectivism, and in particular, VC. I would also speculate that those who endorse the Individualizing foundations would report greater endorsement of the horizontal dimensions, either individualistic or collectivistic, prioritising the needs/rights of individuals. I hypothesize this due to the equality aspect of the horizontal dimension (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). If everyone is recognised as equal and same as others, an extension of this might be that individual rights would be a strong moral conviction.
Graham et al. (2009) noted that although the MFT was originally developed to describe differences across cultures, the MFT can also help explain within-country differences. One such variable being political ideology (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).

How might culture and morality help explain political identification?

Political Orientation

Haidt (2013) has suggested that moral foundation configurations can help explain the moral upset over such political/religious issues often referred to in the US and other democracies, as the “culture wars” (e.g., women’s right, equality, patriotism) (Haidt, 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Past research has attempted to explain the culture wars and political divide in a variety of ways (Hunter, 1991; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Lakoff, 1996) yet they all converge on the notion that culture war attitudes can be linked to differences in attitudes toward change versus stability, and hierarchy versus equality (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).

While these attitude differences in adhering to traditional authority and an individual’s comfort with change can help explain some of the liberal-conservative war dynamic, there is still more of the phenomenon that needs additional explanation. Haidt and Graham’s (2007) moral foundations theory can help further reveal the moral motives behind the “culture wars” and political ideologies, often times above and beyond other predictors (e.g., age, gender, interest in politics) (Koleva et al., 2012; Weber & Federico, 2013).

Graham et al. (2009) identified stark differences in views held by liberals (left) and conservatives (right) in the American political arena. If we all have the ability to acquire these five foundations yet often have conflicting views on social and economic issues, it is suggested that political parties rely on different moral foundations. Graham and colleagues (2009) conducted four different studies using multiple methods to show a clearer picture of opposing political views and their endorsement of the five moral foundations.
They first asked participants to rate how relevant various concerns were to them when making moral judgments. Although decontextualized, it can be useful for gauging moral values due to values being abstract and generalized across most contexts (Schwartz, 1992). Graham and colleagues (2009) found strong support for their hypothesis; conservatives rated issues of harm and fairness as less relevant to their moral judgments and rated issues of ingroup, authority, and purity as more relevant to their moral judgments than did liberals.

Graham et al. (2009) also created a multigroup version of their model to include participants from the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and a third group of other nations (e.g., Argentina and Canada) to test whether this pattern was unique to the US. Their results suggested similar relations between political identity and moral foundations across groups. In all three clusters, the Individualizing foundations (harm, fairness) were endorsed more strongly by liberals than conservatives and the Binding foundations (ingroup, authority, purity) were endorsed more strongly by conservatives.

However, it was not that liberals or conservatives disagree entirely with one or all five of the foundations. Rather it seems moral thinking may be better understood by looking at the importance placed on the relevance of these moral judgments compared to other moral judgements. To supplement these concerns, Graham and colleagues (2009) looked at self-assessment of more contextualised items. Again they found similar results; relative to liberals, conservatives agreed less with the Individualizing foundations and more with the Binding foundations.

In their third study, Graham et al. (2009) assessed participants’ responses to questions involving moral trade-offs. Participants were confronted with a choice that involved a taboo violation of one of the five foundations (e.g., “Kick a dog in the head” a violation of the harm foundation) for a certain amount of money ($0 to $1,000,000). These moral trade-offs were tested across a variety of cultures including individuals from the US (N = 6,728), Europe (N
Canada (N = 281), Latin America (N = 183), and 488 from other areas. Researchers also asked participants about their political ideology.

Results supported the moral foundations hypothesis: liberals refused to make trade-offs on most of the Individualizing scenarios but were more willing to perform actions that violated the Binding foundations. Conservatives showed a more even distribution of concerns and reported more unwillingness to accept monetary gain to violate the Binding foundations than liberals.

The fourth and final study investigated morality in a public setting; Graham et al. (2009) chose to code and analyse sermons delivered in liberal and conservative churches. A detailed process of identifying words that were associated with the five foundations was developed, and raters assessed sermons noting whether each of the five foundations were used and whether this was done in a negative or positive way (e.g., negative way was noted if the sermons devalued one of the five foundations and belittled its importance). As hypothesised, liberal churches spoke more about issues of harm and fairness than did conservative churches. Additionally, liberal churches also spoke more about the ingroup foundation but negatively, devaluing its importance and praising individuality.

In summary, Graham and colleagues (2009) found support for the application of their moral foundations hypothesis to political ideology using four different methods: moral relevance, moral judgments, violation of foundations for monetary gain, and real world context. For those endorsing a liberal political ideology, morality was primarily concerned with the Individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives’ concerns were more equally distributed across the five foundations while emphasising the importance of the Binding foundations to a greater extent than the liberally oriented individuals. Conservatives are more likely to moralize behaviours that do not involve harm (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 1997, 1998).
To further supplement these findings, Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, and Ditto (2011) attempted to predict participants’ moral positions based on their responses on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). They reported that political identification was a strong predictor of judgements of the culture war issues, but one’s moral foundations also predicted substantial amounts of additional variance above and beyond political identification.

These results may help explain why liberals and conservatives so often disagree on ‘moral’ issues, and why they find it hard to see how the opposing party is acting on moral guidance. Widening our perspective of morality can be very helpful. Liberals tend to adhere to virtues rooted in the Individualizing foundations (harm and fairness) and see conservatives’ endorsement of the Binding foundations (authority, ingroup, purity) as hindering the Individualizing foundations. Contrastingly, conservatives tend to see liberals view of equal marriage and free birth control as promoting impure sexual acts that violate the purity foundation (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).

Not surprisingly perhaps, a variable that can often be linked with culture, morality, and politics, is religion. As indicated by Graham and colleagues’ (2009) analysis of moral concern in church sermons, religiosity can be an important indicator of morality. Religious beliefs are often upheld unshakably and without question, much like moral convictions (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Because of this, religiosity is another organising factor that can lend a deeper understanding into morality and culture: How does culture and morality contribute to religious ideology? How does religiosity relate to political ideology?

**Morality and Religion**

Religiosity has been consistently identified as a sociocultural factor that can predict differences in personality and behaviour, however, researchers frequently differ in their definitions of religiosity (e.g., Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009; Lau, 1989). Graham and Haidt
have noted that religion is multifaceted, but many religiosity studies focus on religion as a set of propositional beliefs—about God, the afterlife, sin, etc.—held by some individuals (Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2002; Guthrie, 1993) and are individualist and cognition heavy approaches (Batson, 1976). Although these approaches do not deny other aspects of religiosity (e.g., communal worship/rituals), they often suggest that religious belief originates first, followed by engagement in worship and ritual.

The origins of religion have also been debated, with some researchers seeing religion as a natural selected genetic adaptation that allows humans to cooperate in groups (Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Wade, 2009) while another perspective argues religion is a natural product of everyday psychological processes (Barrett, 2004; Guthrie, 1993). Graham and Haidt (2010) argue that the sociocultural perspective of religion is vital, and caution that attempting to understand group social processes by laws of individual behaviour may convolute the most important element of religiosity’s motivation, which is to bind people into moral communities.

Graham and Haidt (2010) take a social-functionalist approach to the study of religion. The social-functionalist approach posits that religion should be studied as a complex system with many social functions. One imperative function of religion is that it binds people into cooperative moral communities. They argue that collective behaviours and rituals are crucial to religion. Some studies have suggested that participants who perform ritualised behaviours with others show more trust, cooperation, and prosocial behaviour than non-ritualised groups (Fischer, Callander, Reddish, & Bulbulia, 2013; Rossano, 2012; Sois & Ruffle, 2003). Ritualised actions can be laden with emotional content that signal individuals to extract certain rules that bind people together and assist individuals to value their group (Rossano, 2012).
Socialisation through such ritualised experiences (e.g., stories, songs, dances) can validate and teach individuals to prefer their ingroup, advance feelings of spiritual truth, and foster strong connection to moral narratives (Dunham, Srinivasan, Dotsch, & Barner, 2013). Types of synchronous movement may trigger a kind of off-switch for self-representation in the brain that can prepare people to become less selfish and more group focused. Synchronous movement is often seen in religious activities (Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir, 2008).

Moreover, Atran and Henrich (2010) have suggested that group rituals function to instil commitment to, and belief in, supernatural agents. Most religions give believers ample opportunities to exhibit displays of loyalty to their chosen God, for example: public prayer, chants or songs of praise with others of the same faith, a proclamation of faith, and painful rites of passage (Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011). In other words, shared beliefs help facilitate commitment and can solve cooperation problems by helping people keep oaths to each other and suppresses selfishness (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Once one is committed to a group and adheres to group rituals, religious beliefs can be followed unquestioningly, similar to the structure and intensity of moral convictions (Skitka et al., 2005). If religion can regularly be seen as exhibiting ritualised behaviours and establishing commitment to a group, it is quite plausible that the development of morality for religious people might rest more heavily on the Binding foundations.

**The Binding Foundations and Religion**

Graham and Haidt (2010) connected religion to the Binding foundations and illustrate how essential it can be to understand moral concerns from a group-level scope. *Ingroup/Loyalty:* Religion helps to foster this foundation as it stresses moral obligations of loyalty and self-sacrifice for the particular religious group. Although many religious commandments state to treat others compassionately, it seems that compassion can be limited to the treatment of other individuals within one’s particular religious community. From the
viewpoint of the Individualizing foundations, this exclusiveness seems unjust, but if you place Binding foundations as more relevant to your moral judgment, it demonstrates how religion can foster one’s obligation to help and trust other members of one’s group more than those who are not in your religious group or are not religious at all.

Authority/Respect: Numerous world religions include moral codes about showing respect to authority figures, obeying rules and commandments, fulfilling the duties of one’s social role, and respecting the traditions and institutions of the religious ingroup.

Purity/Sanctity: Religions appear to be particularly concerned about the state of a worshiper’s mind and body. Religious doctrine often discusses what is pure and impure, placing limitations on food, dress, sexuality and sexual behaviour, as well as noting the importance of cleanliness. Religion attempts to shape seemingly mundane and ordinary human elements into practices with widely shared meaning.

Haidt et al. (2009) completed a cluster analysis on US respondents (N = 20,962) to investigate major patterns corresponding with religious and political ideological positions and the moral foundations; four clusters emerged. The first cluster was the prototypical secular liberals; they had the highest scores on Individualizing foundations and very low scores on the Binding foundations. The second cluster emerged as the prototypical social conservatives; this group had the lowest scores on harm and fairness and very high scores on the Binding foundations. The social conservative cluster also had the highest frequency of religious attendance (40% attending church a few times a month or more).

The third cluster had lower scores on the Individualizing foundations as well as lower scores on the Binding foundations. Interestingly, in this group almost 60% identified themselves as libertarians and was thus, labelled as the prototypical libertarians. Iyer et al. (2012) explain that libertarians can sometimes be seen as emphasizing the liberty of the individual and rejecting the notion that the needs or moral code of someone else should be
forced on another. In this way, libertarians often times reject liberals concern for social justice and also discard more conservative ideals centred on respecting current government structures (Iyer et al., 2012). The broad characterisation of libertarianism is consistent with Haidt et al.’s (2009) findings, which showed the libertarian cluster having the lowest endorsement of all of the five foundations.

The fourth and final cluster was a unique combination of secular liberal and social conservative clusters. This group resembled liberals in that they scored high on the Individualizing foundations but resembled the conservative cluster with high scores on the Binding foundations. For religious observation, they resembled the conservative cluster more than the liberal, as 36% said they attended religious services at least a few times a month. Haidt et al. (2009) tentatively labelled this cluster the religious left; this cluster had high endorsement of all five foundations. Haidt and colleagues’ (2009) four clusters show how much ideological variation there can be, even within a single culture.

Although Haidt et al. (2009) make a valid point in attempting to connect political orientation and religiosity on a similar ideological spectrum (left-right/liberal-conservative continuum), very few papers have been published on this connection (Wildman, 2012). Wildman (2012) argued that there is a need to apply what we know about the ideological spectrum of politics and morality to the field of religiosity to help deepen our understanding of their connections. This is a crucial step forward toward understanding the diversity of religious belief and practices and bringing it into a domain that allows stronger connections to be made between political and moral ideology.

In a NZ context, little research has been conducted on connecting the possible relationships between religious and political ideologies and moral configuration. I conducted research that will help fill these gaps by assessing religious affiliation, looking more deeply at its configuration on a left-right/liberal-conservative ideological continuum. Most research has
investigated morality by looking at it in connection with only a single variable (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Weber & Federico, 2013). In reality, though, morality appears to be intricately connected to many variables: culture, political identification, and religious ideology. I sought to tease apart and strengthen connections between these variables.

It is suggested as summarised in this literature review, that there is a strong connection between political and religious ideologies, and that morality may be a strong predictor of an individual’s endorsement of these ideologies. But what do we know about religion’s links with cultural affiliation? Further questions arise: What previous links have been made between religiosity and culture? How might these links aid us in better understanding the other relationships between variables?

Religiosity and Individualism and Collectivism

Empirical investigations of individualism/collectivism and religiosity are rare (Cukur, de Guzman, & Carlo, 2004). Due to the fact that values are often seen as being an intricate part of religiosity, Triandis (1995, 1996) has made connections between IC and values that can help aid possible associations between IC and religiosity. Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, and Suh (1998) found that values such as Power (but not Achievement) were correlated with Vertical Individualism (VI) but not Vertical Collectivism (VC) in a US context.

Furthermore, when Gelfand, Triandis, and Chan (1996) examined authoritarianism and collectivism, they reported that the relationship depended on the conceptualization of authoritarianism. When authoritarianism was conceptualised as “importance of social conventions and customs,” there was a relationship with collectivism but when it was conceptualised as “power,” there was no relation. If religiosity is measured by sustaining important beliefs and behaviours/rituals, there may be an argument for religiosity’s connection with collectivism.
Analysis of religiosity and values can add further insight. Schwartz’s (1992) values have shown that religiosity is associated positively with value types that preserve social order and protect individuals against uncertainty (e.g., tradition, conformity, security). Religiosity has also been associated negatively with values types that emphasize self-indulgence and intellectual or emotional openness to change (e.g., stimulation, self-direction, and hedonism: Huismans, 1994; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).

Moreover, Cukur and colleagues (2004) have examined IC, values, and religiosity in three different countries: the US, Turkey, and Philippines. This design allowed Cukur et al. (2004) to extend understanding of how IC and values are similar and different across cultural groups and also how these variables relate to religiosity. They conducted their study using countries with different predominant religions (e.g., Islam in Turkey, Christianity in US, and Catholicism in the Philippines).

Cukur et al.’s (2004) study partially supported proposed links between Schwartz’s (1992) values and Triandis’s (1995) HV IC dimensions. They found positive correlations between conservation values (traditionalism and conformity) and collectivism for all three countries; these values were positively associated with VC and HC except for a nonsignificant relation between Traditionalism and HC in the Turkish sample.

Cukur et al. (2004) also identified a link between religiosity and both HC and VC. They had hypothesized that religiosity would negatively correlate with HI and VI, but this was not fully supported. In fact, VI and religiosity for the Turkish sample was positively correlated. Cukur et al. (2004) make the argument that their findings suggest religiosity is more consistently linked to collectivist tendencies. However, it should be noted that some scholars have advocated that Christianity is based on personal salvation and therefore prompts individualistic tendencies and that Catholicism promotes more collectivistic
tendencies. Additionally, although Islam emphasizes collective-oriented values it has also been linked to values associated with individualism (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 1997; Sampson, 2000).

I speculate that in a NZ sample, religion would be more highly correlated with the collectivism (perhaps horizontal and vertical) due to the ingroup emphasis that stems from collectivism and can often be seen in religion. I would not necessarily hypothesize that religiosity would have a negative correlation with individualism, although arguments have been constructed that there could be a negative correlation between individualism and religiosity. With research on these variables being scare and inconsistent, more research is needed.

As mentioned previously, religion can be referred to as a cognitive and individual-belief heavy process (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Batson, 1976; Bering, 2002; Guthrie, 1993). However, like Wildman (2012), I argue that it is helpful to encompass more than just someone’s beliefs when assessing religiosity. If one important function of religion is to bind people into cooperative moral communities, and collective behaviours and rituals are crucial to upholding this function, religious behaviour also needs consideration and measurement. Incorporating a scale that allows for cultural variation of religion and moves beyond a unidimensional assessment of religion is advantageous due to being able to capture more of religiosity’s function as well as being able to detect differences found across religions (Allport & Ross, 1967; Hood et al., 2009; Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). *Is there a scale that successfully addresses both of these needs with cultural sensitivity?*

**Multidimensional Religious Ideology Scale**

Wildman et al. (2015) designed a measure of religious ideological orientation that has the ability to assess a variety of religiosities. Wildman and colleagues (2015) have attempted to address the issue of unidimensional assessment by developing a novel multidimensional measure of religiosity that can be used across cultures and for a diverse range of religions.
Three dimensions make up the Multidimensional Religious Ideology Scale (MRI):

**Belief:** What a person believes religiously or spiritually.

**Praxis:** How a person behaves religiously or spiritually.

**Morality:** Person’s cultural or personal code of conduct.

Wildman et al. (2015) constructed these three dimensions to reflect the complexity of virtually all religions. Furthermore, they have also structured this scale on a left-right/liberal-conservative continuum, which is suitable to assess the links between religiosity and political self-identification.

**Overview of New Zealand’s Religious Environment**

New Zealand’s religious environment is important to consider. The most recent census data (2013) has shown there is a diversity of religions practiced in NZ, and while some have grown, the country’s religious climate has continued to gradually decrease throughout the years. For example, there has been an increase of individuals who affiliate with the Islamic faith from 2006 to 2013 (36,072 to 46,149 people), and people identifying with Hinduism and Judaism have also increased slightly. However, despite growth patterns found in some religions, people who identify as “religious in any capacity,” has decreased from 2,271,921 in 2006 to 2,146,167 in 2013.

Similarly, people who report no religious affiliation continues to increase. In 2006, there were 1,028,049 individuals who indicated no religious affiliation and in 2013, 1,635,345 individuals indicated no religious affiliation (census data, 2016). This information lends supports that New Zealand has a diverse and generally diminishing religious climate (Hoverd, 2008). Greater awareness of New Zealand’s religious climate is beneficial in understanding the possible connection of religiosity with political identification, morality, and individual-level cultural orientation.
The current research seeks to investigate the relations between cultural endorsement, morality, and political and religious ideologies.

Hypotheses

Drawing from the social science, cultural and anthropological, and psychological literatures, hypotheses were derived about the relationships between culture, morality, and political and religious ideology. I measured cultural endorsement based on the individual-level construct of HV IC and moral endorsement based on the MFT. I operationalised political conservatism as the average of individuals’ social and economic political self-identification, while religious conservatism was assessed using the Belief and Praxis scores on the MRI. The first three hypotheses reflect previously well-developed links between variables.

(H1) There will be correlations between endorsements of the Binding foundations and political and religious conservatism. Specifically, as endorsement of the Binding foundations increases, so will one’s political and religious conservatism.

(H2) There will be correlations between endorsements of the Individualising foundations and political and religious liberalism. Specifically, as endorsement of the Individualizing foundations increase, so will one’s political and religious liberalism.

(H3) Conservatism will predict a more even endorsement of the five moral foundations compared to Liberalism, which is consistent with findings in a non-New Zealand context (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012).

Next, I hypothesize there will be an interaction between political orientation and religiosity and the moral foundations (e.g., Haidt et al., 2009).

(H4) Endorsement on the Binding foundations will predict greater political Conservatism, and religiosity will exacerbate the relationship between the Binding foundations and political Conservatism.
(H5) Endorsement of the Individualizing foundations will predict greater political Liberalism, and being non-religious will exacerbate the relationship between the Individualizing foundations and political Liberalism.

Lastly, due to the limited research previously conducted in the domain of VH IC and its relationship with religiosity and morality, a novel aspect of this research is detailed in the next hypotheses. These hypotheses are based on previous research conducted by Cukur et al. (2004), Haidt et al. (1993), and Shweder and colleagues (1987).

(H6) Endorsement of collectivism—either Horizontal or Vertical dimensions—will be associated with endorsement of the Binding foundations.

(H7) Religious Belief will be positively correlated with collectivism.

**Method**

**Participants**

The current study sampled three hundred and fifty-four participants which included 39.5% males (n = 140), 57.1% females (n = 202), and 3.4% of participants who selected “other/rather not say” (n = 12). The age of participants ranged from 18 to 84 years (M = 76.11, SD = 12.57). The majority (64.4%) identified as being Kiwi/New Zealander (n = 228) and 31.9% White/European (n = 113). The remaining participants identified as Maori (6.2%, n = 22), East Asian (5.4%, n = 19), South Asian (3.7%, n = 13), Pacific Islander (3.1%, n = 11), and “Other” (7.3%, n = 26).

The majority were New Zealand citizens (74.9%) while 21.8% were not. All participants had to be residing in New Zealand and needed to be 18 years or older. Participants did not have to be a New Zealand citizen to partake in this study. In terms of education, the majority of participants reported they had completed secondary schooling or higher (93.2%, n = 330).

**Materials**
In addition to demographics (age, gender, highest degree/level of schooling received, ethnicity, and place of citizenship), the survey included the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), a measure of Political Orientation, the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale (HVIC), and the Multidimensional Religious Ideology’s Scale (MRI). The survey was always presented in the same order for each participant. A full copy of the survey is provided in Appendix A. The description of scales includes example items below.

**Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ).** The full 32-item scale (Graham et al., 2009) was used to measure participants’ moral concerns and their level of agreement/disagreement on a number of moral judgments.

This scale contained two sections: Relevancy and Moral Judgments. The first section, Relevancy, asked participants to rate how relevant each statement was using a 6-point Likert scale, from (1) *Not at all relevant* to (6) *Extremely relevant* when deciding if something is right or wrong. The second section, Moral Judgments, presented participants with statements regarding moral judgments and had participants measure their agreement from (1) *Strongly disagree* to (6) *Strongly agree*.

Under both Relevancy and Moral Judgements sections, five subscales were addressed: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Ingroup/Loyalty, Respect/Authority, and Purity/Sanctity. The five subscales each contained six items, three items under the section Relevancy and three items under Moral Judgments. The first example for each subscale is measuring Relevancy and the second example for each subscale is measuring Moral Judgments (a) Care/Harm; e.g., “whether or not someone suffered emotionally,” and “compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue;” (b) Fairness/Cheating; e.g., “Whether or not some people were treated differently than others,” and “When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly;” (c) Ingroup/Loyalty; e.g., “Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group,”
and “People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong;” (d) Respect/Authority; e.g., “Whether or not someone showed lack of respect for authority,” and “Men and women each have different roles in society;” (e) Purity/Sanctity; e.g., “Whether or not someone did something disgusting,” and “Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.”

Subscales scores were calculated as the mean of the contributing items for the MFQ scale. Graham et al. (2011) reported acceptable levels of reliabilities for each of the subscales: Harm ($\alpha = .69$), Fairness ($\alpha = .65$), Ingroup ($\alpha = .71$), Authority ($\alpha = .74$), and Purity ($\alpha = .84$). The threshold for alpha is typically set at .70 (Nunnally, 1978), but Graham et al. (2011) argue that although internal consistency is important, so is a comprehensive coverage of the facets of the five foundations. Their aim was not to maximise internal consistency by item redundancy; they desired a balance between enough internal consistency but also maximal item heterogeneity in order to represent the foundations (Graham et al., 2011). For this study, I report the reliabilities in terms of the Binding foundations as a subscale and the Individualizing foundations as a subscale due to their usage throughout my hypotheses and analyses. Alphas have been found reliable. See Table 1 in the results section.

**Political Orientation (PO).** Political orientation was assessed using three general questions (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999). Participants were asked to select the option that best represents their political stance. The questions were, “In political matters, people talk of the “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your SOCIAL views on this scale, generally speaking?” and “In political matters, people talk of the “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your ECONOMIC views on this scale, generally speaking?” These two questions were answered using a 5-point Likert scale, (1) Very left to (3) Neither left nor right, to (5) Very right. The final question asked was, “If an election were to be held this week, which party would you vote for?” Response options for this final item
were as follows: Green Party, National Party, Labour Party, United Party, United First, NZ First, Maori, ACT New Zealand, Don’t know, and Don’t have an opinion.

The spearman’s correlation coefficient between participants’ social and economic views was found reliable, \( r = .61, p < .001 \). Because of the strong, positive correlation, these domains were collapsed into a single measure for further analyses with higher scores indicating more conservative responses.

**Vertical and Horizontal Individualism and Collectivism Scale (VHIC Scale).** The 29-item scale has four subscales (Singelis et al., 1995), measuring an individual’s level of endorsement of autonomy versus interdependence (Individualism/Collectivism dimension; IC) as well as an individual’s level of endorsement of self being unequal to others versus self being equal to others (Vertical/Horizontal dimension; VH). Adding the dimension of Vertical/Horizontal to Individualism/Collectivism has been argued to aid in further defining the constructs of Individualism and Collectivism, and that the addition is a viable and important distinction that can add to greater clarity (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

This scale has been used previously in psychological literature to investigate similarities and differences found between VH IC in different cultural samples and investigate links between religiosity, values, and IC (Chiou, 2001; Cukur et al., 2004). For the current study, this scale was selected for its ability to capture a more refined image of one’s personal IC construct and to see if there are correlations between an individual’s level of endorsement of autonomy (IC) and equality (HV) with the MFQ’s Individualizing and Binding foundations.

Participants were asked to, “*Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements*” on a 7-point Likert scale from (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree. An example of a Horizontal Individualism (HI) item is, “I’d rather depend on myself than on others.” A Vertical Individualism (VI) item is, “Winning is everything.” A Horizontal
Collectivism (HC) item is, “If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.” A Vertical Collectivism (VC) item is, “I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.”

The four subscales (VI, HI, VC, HC) were computed as the average of the subscale item responses. Previous research (Singelis et al., 1995) has reported acceptable reliabilities, HI (α = .67), VI (α = .74), HC (α = .74), and VC (α = .68). The four subscales evidence adequate reliability in this sample, VI (α = .83), VC (α = .70), HI (α = .83), HC (α = .75).

**Multidimensional Religious Ideology’s Scale (MRI).** This 53-item scale assesses a participant’s position on a liberal-conservative spectrum from religiously liberal to religiously conservative (Wildman et al., 2015). Two preliminary questions are asked to make sure the appropriate people are taking this section of the survey. The first question asks, “Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrase “God of Spiritual Reality?” The second, “Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrases “religious or spiritual community” and “religious or spiritual tradition” and “sacred texts?” In response to these questions, participants were asked to answer “yes” or “no.” If a participant answers “yes” to the first question, the participant is asked to continue the survey. The survey is used to assess religiosity, so if a participant answers “no” to being religious, the participant is thanked for their time, but they do not complete this section of the survey.

The MRI consists of three subscales. The subscales were titled “Belief,” “Praxis,” and “Morality.” Participants were instructed to take their time and answer each question carefully, using a 7-point Likert scale from (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree. An example of a liberal Belief item is, “No religious tradition offers perfect truth,” and an example of a conservative Belief item is, “My religious tradition or spiritual outlook offers genuine truth for all people.” An example of a liberal Praxis item is, “An important part of a spiritual life is fighting for the rights of the poor and underprivileged.” An example of a conservative Praxis
item is, “According to my religious or spiritual tradition, some people really do deserve more success than others.” Note that the MRI scale assesses Morality using a subset of Haidt’s MFQ items which were described previously. Therefore, details on the assessment of Morality are presented previously. The MRI morality is not used when answering hypotheses; the full MFQ scale was utilized when assessing morality throughout my results section.

Due to this scale being finalised relatively recently, email correspondence with Wildman was utilised in order to obtain reliability scores (personal communication, September 28, 2015). Wildman stated that both the Praxis and Belief scores had alphas that were above the .70 threshold. As the scale is computed by subtracting the mean of responses to the liberally-worded items from the mean responses of the conservatively-worded items for each subscale, we calculated the reliability of the liberally-worded items and the conservatively-worded items for both Praxis and Belief. The alphas were found reliable: Conservative Belief (α = .76), Liberal Belief (α = .88), Conservative Praxis (α = .76), and Liberal Praxis (α = .71). Alphas are reported in Table 1.

**Procedure**

Ethical approval was received from the Victoria University of Wellington School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee. Participants were recruited through different networks such as social media (e.g., Facebook), recruitment posters that were displayed throughout the Kelburn campus of Victoria University of Wellington, in local public spaces (e.g., coffee shops, grocery stores), through the introductory psychology class subject pool (IPRP), and through speaking about my research with religious organisations (e.g., churches). If people were interested, they were given my email, after which they were sent a link to my survey. In all emails, participants were also offered the option of passing on the online survey link to
other individuals if they wished to do so, meaning that snowballing techniques were used to gain more participants.

The snowball surveying technique was used specifically in order to gain a larger sample than was possible through existing contacts. Convenience sampling is a limitation of the snowballing technique. However, this technique allowed for a larger collection of participants to be sampled than I had the means of collecting on my own, and found this benefit outweighed the limitation. Additionally, it was helpful to publicly present my research to church audiences in order to strengthen the number of religious participants. Due to New Zealand being a fairly irreligious society (census data, 2013), additional effort to gain religious individuals was taken in order to ensure there was enough statistical power to run certain analyses.

Participation involved completion of an online survey delivered via the Qualtrics online survey tool. The survey took participants approximately half an hour to complete. When entering the survey, participants were given an information sheet that explained their answers were voluntary, anonymous, and that they could stop the survey at any time. The IPRP students who completed the survey received course credit for their effort. As an incentive to help gain more interest, non-IPRP participants were informed they could leave their emails at the end of the survey if they wished to be entered into a prize draw for one of ten $50 grocery vouchers.

After completion of the survey, participants were provided with a debriefing sheet which gave individuals a short explanation of the study. Participants also had a chance to enter their emails once they finished the survey if they wanted to receive a direct message with the results and findings of the study. These results were promised to be sent to them between April-May of 2017. Refer to Appendix A for the information sheet, materials used, recruitment poster, and the debriefing sheet.
Results

Data Analytic Procedure

Data analyses were conducted in a series of steps: (1) descriptive statistics and reliabilities of the final scales were analysed; (2) bivariate correlations were calculated to test the relationships between the variables and test hypotheses; (3) hierarchical regressions were calculated to assess the predictive validity of morality and religiosity on political orientation and to assess the predictive validity of cultural orientation on morality. Lastly; (4) moderations of religiosity were conducted and analysed.

Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Figure 1, in terms of political economic self-identification, 9.6% of participants identified as very left \( (n = 34) \), 29.1% identified as middle left \( (n = 103) \), 33.6% neither left nor right \( (n = 119) \), 16.4% middle right \( (n = 58) \), 4.2% considered themselves very right \( (n = 15) \), and 7.1% of participants did not respond \( (n = 25) \). In terms of political social self-identification, 20.3% identified as very left \( (n = 72) \), 31.1% identified as middle left \( (n = 110) \), 26.6% stated neither left nor right \( (n = 94) \), 12.4% selected middle right \( (n = 44) \), 2.5% identified as very right \( (n = 9) \), and 7.1% of participants left this question blank \( (n = 25) \).

![Figure 1. Political Self-Identification](image-url)
For both economic and social political self-identification, skewness and kurtosis tests were calculated to check for normal distribution. Brown (1996) noted a positive value for skewness suggests the possibility of a positively skewed distribution (e.g., scores are bunched up at the low end of the scale). As seen in Figure 1, slightly more individuals score on the liberal or left side of the scale. However, for social political identification, skewness (.354) and kurtosis (-.579) tests were within normal distribution range. For economic political identification, skewness (.185) and kurtosis (-.429) tests were also within normal distribution range and are not skewed to a significant degree. For this sample, these results indicate political self-identification is reasonably normally distributed.

In Figure 2, when asked “If elections were held this week, which party would you vote for?” 27.1% of participants stated they would vote for the Green Party (n = 96), 18.4% stated Labour Party (n = 65), 16.9% stated National Party (n = 60), 2.3% stated Maori (n = 8), 1.1% stated NZ First (n = 4), 1.1% stated ACT New Zealand (n = 4), .8% stated United First (n = 3), 16.1% stated they did not know (n = 57), a further 8.8% stated they did not have an opinion (n = 31), and 7.3% did not answer (n = 26).

![Figure 2. Political Party Identification](image-url)
For the religiosity questions, “Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrase, God of Spiritual Reality?” 50% of participants answered yes ($n = 177$), 42.9% answered no ($n = 152$), and 7.1% did not answer ($n = 25$). If participants answered “no” to the religiosity question, they were prompted to skip over the second religious question and the religiosity questionnaire. If they answered “yes,” they were presented with this follow-up question, “Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrases religious or spiritual community?” Of the 177 participants who answered “yes” to the first question, 77.4% answered yes ($n = 137$) to the second question, and 22.6% answered no ($n = 40$).

Table 1 summarises the reliabilities, means and standard deviations, and intercorrelations between the measured variables. As Table 1 shows, all measures demonstrate adequate internal consistency with the Cronbach’s alpha levels, indicating that the scales were suitable for subsequent analyses.
Table 1: Alphas, Descriptives, and Correlations between VH IC, MFQ, MRI, and Political Self-Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reliability (α)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vertical Individualism</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vertical Collectivism</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Horizontal Individualism</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Horizontal Collectivism</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Binding</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Individualizing</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Religious Belief</td>
<td>&gt;.70</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Religious Praxis</td>
<td>&gt;.70</td>
<td>-2.70</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Religious Morality</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.73***</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.64***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Social/Economic Conservatism</td>
<td>.61***2</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. For correlations of 1-7 and 10, N = 354, for 7-9, N = 171.  
*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001

2 Result of Spearman's correlation coefficient
Inferential Statistics

**Correlations.** I found a significant, strong, positive relationship (Cohen, 1992) between social and economic political self-identification, $r(328) = .61, p < .001$. This finding suggests that the more conservative individuals are on their sociopolitical self-identification, the more conservative they tend to be in terms of their economic political identification.

(H1) *There will be correlations between endorsements of the Binding foundations and political and religious conservativism. Specifically, as endorsement of the Binding foundations increases, so will one’s political and religious conservativism.*

H1 was supported. There was a significant, strong, positive relationship between political Conservatism and the Binding foundations, $r(329) = .49, p < .001$. In this study, the more strongly participants endorsed the Binding foundations, the more conservative they tended to be in their political identification. There was a significant, strong, positive relationship between the Binding foundations and both Religious Belief and Praxis, $r(171) = .52, p < .001$ and $r(171) = .65, p < .001$, respectively.

(H2) *There will be correlations between endorsements of the Individualizing foundations and political and religious Liberalism. Specifically, as endorsement of the Individualizing foundations increase, so will one’s political and religious Liberalism.*

H2 was partially supported. I found a significant, weak, negative relationship between scores for the Individualizing foundations and political Liberalism, $r(329) = -.18, p < .01$. Higher scores on the Individualizing foundations were related to lower levels of Conservatism (higher levels of Liberalism). There were no relationships found between Individualizing foundations and Religious Belief and Praxis (see Table 1).

(H3) *Conservatism will predict a more even endorsement of the five moral foundations compared to Liberalism, which is consistent with findings in a non-New Zealand context (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012).*
H3 was supported (refer to Figure 3). Political Conservatism predicted a more equal distribution of concern for all five moral foundations compared to liberals, who endorsed the Binding foundations to a lesser extent than conservatives. This pattern is consistent with previous literature (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012).

![Figure 3](image.png)

*Figure 3. Endorsement of the Five Foundations based on Political Self-Identification*

**Predictive Validity of Morality on Religiosity and Political Identification**

(H4) *Endorsement on the Binding foundations will predict greater political Conservatism, and religiosity will exacerbate the relationship between the Binding foundations and political Conservatism.*

H4 was partially supported. Hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess the predictive validity of the Binding foundations and religiosity on political self-identification. The moderating effect of religiosity on political self-identification was also investigated. Religiosity was coded as 0 = not religious and 1 = religious. In order to test for a moderation,
a Binding by Religiosity interaction variable was computed (by multiplying the scores for these variables together, for each participant; See Baron & Kenny, 1986). In step one, political self-identification scores were regressed on the Binding and Religiosity score. In the second step, the interaction variable was added. This analysis indicated a moderation if the interaction variable achieved significance after the entry of the first two ‘main effect’ variables (Binding and Religiosity), which specifies that the interaction explains statistically significant unique variance beyond these ‘main effect’-like variables.

Step one of the regression equation was significant, \(F(2,326) = 54.70, p < .001\), and accounted for 25% of the variance in political self-identification, \(\Delta R^2 = .25, p < .001\). As shown in Table 2, the Binding foundations and Religiosity both emerged as significant predictors of political identification. Step two was not significant, therefore, the interaction was not a significant moderator. Although support for H4 was found in the case that the Binding foundations would predict greater political Conservatism, this association does not appear to be moderated by religiosity as predicted.

### Table 2

**Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Political Conservatism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binding Foundations</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding X Religiosity</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta F)</td>
<td>54.70***</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta R^2)</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.** Values for Binding, Religiosity, and Binding X Religiosity are in standardized Beta weights **\(p < .05\) ***\(p < .001\)
In order to better interpret the results of the regression, regression output was entered into ModGraph (Jose, 2013), which is a statistical programme that enables identification of moderating factors. Although the moderation of religiosity was not significant, the graph was still beneficial to assess the ‘main effect’ variables on the Binding foundations. Shown below in Figure 4, when Binding endorsement was low, participants tended to be more liberal in their political views. When Binding endorsement was high, participants tended to be more conservative in their political views. When religiosity was low, participants tended to be more liberal in their political self-identification. When religiosity was higher, participants tended to be more conservative in their political identification. This mirrors the relationship found in H1.

![Figure 4. Relationship of Binding foundations and Religiosity on Political Self-Identification.](image-url)
(H5) Endorsement of the Individualizing foundations will predict greater political Liberalism, and being non-religious will exacerbate the relationship between the Individualizing foundations and political Liberalism.

H5 was partially supported. A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict political Liberalism based on participants’ endorsement of the Individualizing foundations and Religious Belief. In order to test for a moderation for H5, Individualizing by Religiosity interaction variable was computed (by multiplying the scores for these variables together, for each participant). Political Self-Identification scores were first regressed on the Individualizing and Religiosity score. In the second step, the interaction variable was added. This analysis indicated a moderation if the interaction variable achieves significance after the entry of the first two ‘main effect’ variables (Individualizing and Religiosity), which indicates that the interaction explains significant unique variance of these ‘main effect’-like variables.

Overall, the regression was significant, \( F(2,326) = 5.66, p = .004 \), and accounted for 3% of the variance in Political Self-Identification \( (\Delta R^2 = .03, p = .004) \). As shown in Table 3, only the Individualizing foundations emerged as a significant predictor of political Liberalism \( (\beta = -.19, p = .001) \). Religiosity was not a significant predictor nor was the interaction significant. Although support for H5 was found in the case that the Individualizing foundations would predict greater political Liberalism, this association does not appear to be moderated by religiosity as predicted. In order to better interpret the results of the moderated regression, regression output was entered into ModGraph (Jose, 2013).
Table 3
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Political Liberalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualizing Foundations</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualizing X Religiosity</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔF</td>
<td>5.66**</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔR²</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Values for Individualizing, Religiosity, and Individualizing X Religiosity are in standardized Beta weights **p < .01, ***p < .001

Although the moderation was not significant, Figure 5 is useful for interpretation.

When Individualizing endorsement is high, participants tend to be more politically liberal.

When individuals’ endorsement of the Individualizing foundations are low, participants tend to be more politically conservative. No significant relationship of religiosity and political self-identification was found, and the interaction of Religiosity X Individualizing foundations is not interpretable due to the variable not being significant.

Figure 5. Relationship of the Individualizing foundations on Political Self-Identification.
Correlations of Culture and Morality

(H6) Endorsement of Collectivism—either Horizontal or Vertical dimensions—will be associated with endorsement of the Binding foundations.

Partial support was found for H6. Correlations coefficients were calculated for all cultural dimensions and the Binding foundations. As expected, both VC and HC were associated significantly and positively with the Binding foundations, $r(171) = .51, p < .001$ and $r(171) = .26, p < .001$, respectively. If participants endorse either VC or HC, participants tend to have stronger endorsement of the Binding foundations. However, both VI and HI also correlated significantly with the Binding foundations, which was unrelated to my prediction (refer to Table 1).

Due to finding that all of the cultural orientations correlated significantly with the Binding foundations, a multiple regression was performed to see if they all continued to uniquely predict the Binding foundations. A significant regression was found, ($F(4, 328) = 41.91, p < .001$), and accounted for 34% of the variance in the Binding foundations, $\Delta R^2 = .34, p < .001$. However, only VI ($\beta = .25, p < .001$) and VC ($\beta = .47, p < .001$) emerged as significant predictors. Addressing Collectivism’s relation to the Binding foundations, VC significantly explained unique endorsement of the Binding foundations, but HC was not a significant predictor.

Religiosity’s Correlation with Political Identification and the Cultural Dimensions

Due to the MRI scale being a novel measure with limited previous applications, planned comparisons between Religious Belief and Praxis and Political Self-Identification were assessed. Although these relationships were not the main focus of the current research, their assessment allowed for establishing stronger connections between variables and providing additional validation of the MRI scale.
The MRI Belief and Praxis correlated in a way one would predict. As shown in Table 1, there was a significant, strong, positive relationship between Praxis and Belief. As individuals reported more conservative Religious Belief, they also tended to report more conservative Religious Praxis. Additionally, a significant, positive relationship was found between Political Self-Identification and Belief and Praxis. In this sample, individuals who reported being more politically conservative also tended to be more conservative in their religious Belief and Praxis. These relationships fit with the conceptualisation of each variable.

(H7) Religious Belief will be positively correlated with Collectivism.

H7 was supported. Referring to Table 1, a significant, positive relationship was found between Belief and VC and HC. Participants who displayed conservative Religious Beliefs tended to have stronger endorsement of VC and HC. Conversely, there was no relationship found between Belief and HI and VI, indicating that Religious Belief is unrelated to endorsement of HI and VI in this sample.

No specific hypothesis was drawn on Religious Praxis and Collectivism, however, planned comparisons were utilised as it was beneficial to assess if Collectivism continued to be positively correlated with another dimension of religiosity. I would suggest that Collectivism would correlate in similar ways to Religious Praxis as it did for Religious Belief. Referring to Table 1, there were significant, positive relationships between Praxis and VI and VC. The more conservative participants were in their religious Praxis, the more strongly participants tended to endorse both VI and VC, however, no relationship was found between HC and HI and Praxis, which is partially against what was predicted.

Predictive Validity of Cultural Dimensions on Religious Belief and Praxis

As demonstrated above, both VC and HC are correlated with Belief. A multiple regression analysis was used to test if both cultural dimensions continued to significantly
predict participants’ endorsement of Religious Belief. I found a significant regression, 
\( F(4,168) = 13.38, p < .001 \), explaining 23% unique variance of Religious Belief, 
\( \Delta R^2 = .23, p < .001 \). However, only VC emerged as a significant predictor of Religious Belief, 
\( \beta = .52, p < .001 \).

Additionally, a multiple regression analysis was used to test if VI and VC continued
to both significantly predict participants’ endorsement of religious Praxis. I found a
significant regression, 
\( F(4,168) = 11.77, p < .001 \). Both VI and VC contributed uniquely to explain Praxis endorsement, 
\( VI: \beta = .22, p = .003; VC: \beta = .40, p < .001 \).

Discussion

As political and religious disputes continue to divide people on significant topics such
as immigration, economics, environmental concerns, and women’s rights (Graham et al.,
2009), the investigation into the underlying relationships between morality, political
orientation, religiosity, and cultural orientation becomes a vital one. While many researchers
across the disciplinary boundaries have investigated some of these relationships in one form
or another (e.g., Davies et al., 2014; Haidt, 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Shweder et al.,
1987), the current study takes on a more comprehensive and integrated approach than
previous studies, linking several of the variables that have been individually linked to
morality.

Additionally, with a growing number of individuals migrating to New Zealand
(Backhouse, 2013), New Zealand is a distinctive and relevant place to conduct this research.
Many studies on morality have been conducted the United States (Haidt, 2013; Graham et al.,
2009), and the few others attempting to link morality and culture have typically included
samples characterised as collectivistic or individualistic at the national, rather than individual,
level. This study takes a more novel approach by assessing cultural dimensions on an
individual basis, and is conducted outside of the American context—in the relatively secular
country of New Zealand (census data, 2013; Hoverd, 2008). Furthermore, utilising a religiosity scale that allows for assessment of religiosity on a left-right continuum (liberal-conservative) was a very practical and helpful strategy to assess religiosity with the other variables (e.g., political orientation).

I examined the relationship between culture and morality and their links with political identification and religiosity. Table 4 summarises my hypotheses and major results. Using a diversity of variables, I sought more nuanced answers to the pertinent questions: Is morality really about good versus evil? Or is it possible to understand the diverging and converging patterns of morality? How can these patterns of morality help us understand political orientation and religiosity?
Table 4
Summary of Hypotheses and Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(H1) There will be correlations between endorsements of the Binding foundations and political and religious Conservatism.</td>
<td>Supported. There were positive relationships between Binding foundations and political and religious Conservatism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H2) There will be correlations between endorsements of the Individualizing foundations and political and religious Liberalism.</td>
<td>Partially supported. There was a negative relationship between the Individualizing foundations and political Conservatism. No relationship was found between Individualizing foundations and religiosity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H3) Conservatism will predict a more even endorsement of the five moral Foundations compared to Liberalism.</td>
<td>Supported. Political Conservatives have a more equal endorsement of the five foundations compared to liberals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H4) Endorsement on the Binding foundations will predict greater political Conservatism, and religiosity will exacerbate the relationship between the Binding foundations and political Conservatism.</td>
<td>Partially supported. Both Binding foundations and religiosity were significant predictors of Political identification but the interaction of Binding x Religiosity was not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H5) Endorsement of the Individualizing foundations will predict greater political Liberalism, and being non-religious will exacerbate the relationship between the Individualizing foundations and political Liberalism.</td>
<td>Partially supported. Only Individualizing foundations was a significant predictor of political Liberalism. Religiosity was not significant predictor and the interaction was not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H6) Endorsement of Collectivism—either Horizontal or Vertical dimensions—will be associated with endorsement of the Binding foundations.</td>
<td>Partially supported. Only VI and VC were significant predictors; HC did not significantly predict the Binding foundations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H7) Religious Belief will be positively correlated with Collectivism.</td>
<td>Supported. Religious Belief was significantly related to VC and HC and was not significantly related to HI or VI in this sample.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings of Morality on Political and Religious Conservatism

Referring to Table 4, the Binding foundations (authority/respect, loyalty/ingroup, and purity/sanctity) demonstrated a strong relationship with both political Conservatism and conservative Religious Belief and Praxis. This result showed that participants who endorsed morals that are centred on cooperating and valuing their ingroup, emphasising respect and
sometimes admiration for superiors, and highly regulating the emotion of disgust, tend to affiliate with a conservative political identification. These results are consistent with literature that shows individuals who endorse the Binding foundations tend to be more politically conservative (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 1997; Koleva et al., 2012).

Additionally, evidence was provided that those who adhere to the Binding foundations also tended to hold more conservative beliefs and practices if they were religious. It is motivating to see these results outside of the American political context. This research supports the utility of the five foundations for providing insight into political ideology, even in a different religious and political landscape.

The Individualizing foundations (harm/care, fairness/cheating) demonstrated a relationship with political Liberalism. Individuals who strongly endorse the Individualizing foundations also tended to be more politically liberal. This finding was consistent with past literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 1997). There were no significant relationships between Individualizing foundations and Religious Belief or Praxis, in partial support of the hypothesis, which posited that if people were religious, those who endorsed the Individualizing foundations would be more likely to be liberal in their religious affiliation.

One reason for the insignificant result may lie in the argument made by Graham and Haidt (2010) that posited the Binding foundations may have a stronger connection to religiosity in general than do the Individualizing foundations. Religion and its practices can be viewed as fostering ingroup/loyalty, because religion stresses moral obligation, self-sacrifice to particular religious groups, and make us more willing to suppress selfishness (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Skitka et al., 2005). Similarly, religions have codes of conduct for how to worship, who is the authority role, and can be
overly concerned with matters of pure/impure acts which can be seen in the purity dimension of the Binding foundations, as opposed to the Individualizing foundations (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Conceptually and empirically, the moral foundations within the Binding foundations may be more closely related to divinity and religion (Shweder et al., 1997).

Despite this general argument, I posited there would be a relationship between the Individualizing foundations and religious Liberalism due to the possibility that religious individuals in New Zealand may be more likely to be left leaning due to the country’s political and religious climate (STATS NZ, 2013). There is a possibility that there were not enough left leaning religious individuals within my sample to find a detectable impact. Haidt et al.’s (2009) investigations have revealed prominent patterns of religious and political ideological positions and the moral foundations. One cluster of individuals were characterized as the religious left, because some individuals appeared to report strong endorsement of the Individualizing foundations while also endorsing the Binding foundations to an extent. It is probable there was not enough religious leftists collected in the current sample. Perhaps if this cluster of individuals was large enough, there would have been significant relationship between the Individualizing foundations and liberal religiosity.

Moreover, Haidt et al.’s (2009) investigations also revealed a cluster of individuals that were characterized as the prototypical secular liberals; these individuals displayed the highest scores on the Individualizing foundations and very low scores on the Binding foundations. Due to New Zealand’s growing secular climate (STATS NZ, 2013), the secular liberal cluster may have been the dominant prototype in this sample, weakening the relationship between the Individualizing foundations and religiosity.

**The Distribution of Morals across the Political Spectrum**

The results support past literature that has shown individuals who are politically conservative will demonstrate a more equal distribution of concern for all of the five moral
foundations compared to politically liberal individuals (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012). Liberals have higher levels of Individualizing endorsement with low levels of Binding endorsement, while the gap is smaller for conservative individuals. This is to say, participants across the left-right political identification were in general agreement that the Individualizing concerns were important and relevant to morality. Conservatives endorsed the Binding foundations to a greater extent, but it was not that liberals always excused the Binding foundations in their judgments, they simply considered them less often than conservatives. Moreover, as Graham and colleagues (2009) have noted, the most drastic differences in morality are found at the political extremes. The present research adds cross-cultural validation to the differences found in moral landscapes of individuals with different political ideologies on a left-right continuum.

Interestingly, the results of this study suggested that for those who considered themselves “very conservative,” appear to have an atypical decrease in their endorsement of the Binding foundations. This might be because New Zealand has a more moderate political climate (Lees-Marshment et al., 2015). In the current study, very few individuals considered themselves very right in terms of their economic (4.2%) and social political identification (2.5%). Therefore, there does not appear to be a sufficient number of individuals who endorse a very conservative or very right political identification. Because of this, this sample may not be reliable for understanding the morality of the very conservative political ideology.

**Findings of Interaction between Political Identification, Morality, and Religiosity**

The Binding foundations were a significant predictor of political identification. The findings showed that the Binding foundations had a ‘main-like effect’ on political identification. Past research has shown that the Binding foundations can predict political identification above and beyond other variables (Weber & Federico, 2013), and the present study found that Binding foundations accounted for unique variance in political self-
identification. It was also hypothesized that if one is religious, religiosity would further pronounce the relationship between the Binding foundations and political identification and make individuals more politically conservative. Contrary to these predictions, although religiosity was a significant predictor of political identification on its own, religiosity did not interact with the Binding foundations to moderate the relationship between political identification.

Although a moderation was not found, the output of ModGraph (Jose, 2013) facilitated interpretation of the regression results. The results showed that when individuals’ Binding foundation affiliation was low, individuals tended to report more liberal political identification. Alternatively, when individuals reported stronger Binding endorsement, individuals’ political identification was more conservative. Perhaps if the sample included more conservatively religious individuals, there may have been a detectable interaction.

Graham et al. (2009) have demonstrated that the moral foundations and religion play important roles in understanding political orientation, but this study’s findings indicate that perhaps morality is the overarching and more distal predictor of political orientation, above and beyond religious affiliation, at least in a New Zealand context.

It was found that when regressing political identification on the Binding foundations and religiosity scores, only the Individualizing foundations were a significant predictor of political Liberalism. Religiosity did not moderate the relationship between the Individualizing foundations and political Liberalism for this sample. This information adds unpredicted insight into these relationships and indicates that perhaps being religious (or non-religious) is not a strong predictor of political identification for this sample. Although other psychological literature shows religion can play an integral part in understanding the connection between morality and political orientation (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2013), it does not appear to be as vital of factor when looking at the current study’s sample.
Findings of Cultural Endorsement and Morality

All four cultural orientations—HI, VI, VC, HC—correlated with the Binding foundations. However, when the cultural orientations were regressed against the foundations, only VI and VC emerged to explain significant variance in the Binding foundations. Contrary to the hypothesis that collectivism is the overarching connection between cultural orientation and morality, the vertical aspect of culture appears to be an important element to consider. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) state that the vertical dimension is characterized by accepting inequality among individuals, regardless of whether they are seen as the same or different to others. This quality may be more strongly suggested in the Binding foundations, which expresses acceptance and often admiration for authority, those in power, and are more likely to accept inequality (Haidt & Graham, 2007).

Findings of Religiosity and Culture

In support of the hypothesis, conservative Religious Belief was related to endorsement of VC and HC; these results demonstrate the possible importance of collectivism on religiosity. However, it is interesting to note that past research conducted by Cukur et al. (2004) reported that VI was related to religiosity for their Turkish sample, while this study found a non-significant relationship for VI and religiosity. It is conceivable that there are a limited number of people in the current study who indicated they endorse VI. This is probable due to New Zealand being recognised as a more egalitarian nation that places emphasis on people being equal to one another (Hofstede, 1980). This emphasis is not found in the vertical aspect of individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995). If another sample was conducted in the US—which is considered VI country at a national-level (Hofstede, 1980)—a relationship might have been found between VI and religiosity. Due to scarce research in this area connecting cultural orientation to religion, more research is needed.
Although not a specific hypothesis was created for Religious Praxis and the cultural orientations, it was interesting to test the relationship between HV and IC and Praxis to aid in understanding the findings brought forth by H7. It was found that the more individuals were conservative in their Religious Praxis, the more likely they were to endorse VI and VC, which gives a mixed review of collectivism’s contribution to religiosity’s domains. Additional research is required in this area in order to understand the links between HV IC and religiosity to a greater and more reliable extent.

**Summary**

This research also lends support to the five foundations in a different cultural and religious context from those in which it was developed and validated. The results have added more evidence to support the relationship between the five moral foundations and political ideology, indicating that liberals and conservatives tend to speak different combinations of moral ‘languages.’ Moreover, individuals who identify as conservative appear to have more moral foundation ‘receptors’ than do liberals. Liberals regard the Individualizing foundations as a more prominent part of their moral landscape than conservatives, and conservatives adhere to the Binding foundations to a greater extent than liberals. These results allow us to better understand differing political views, and see that others are not devoid of morals, but rather that opponents and proponents are speaking past one another, morally.

Furthermore, Religiosity and Binding foundations were identified as positive predictors of political Conservativism although only Individualizing foundations, and not Religiosity, were predictors of political Liberalism. Inclusion of individual-level cultural orientation, and their relationship with moral foundations adds a novel twist to this research. VI and VC explained significant variance in the Binding foundations. For Religious Belief, VC and HC explained significant variance, while, for Religious Praxis, VI and VC were the only significant predictors.
The present study has attempted to continue to bridge the gap between morality, politics, and religion. It has been found that in a New Zealand context, morality and political identification appear to be similarly linked as they are in previous research and that, feasibly, religion is not as important of a factor to morality and political identification in New Zealand as it is in the US.

**Contributions to the literature**

Studying morality has taken a more cross-cultural approach in recent years, and this study has contributed significantly to the existing body of literature in several ways. Many of the variables utilised in the present study have little track record of use in the New Zealand context. Despite the knowledge that New Zealand continues to become more secularised and preserves a multi-electoral political system, the MFT and its relation to political and religious ideology has manifested in similar ways as found in research conducted in the US and other countries (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1987). Thus, it should not be overlooked that this study has allowed for greater comparison of these relationships with previous findings at a national-level, but has also allowed a brighter light to be shown on the NZ context separately.

Moreover, looking at different cultural orientations within New Zealand has also lent a more cross-cultural perspective, albeit at the individual-level. Many previous studies have only used the straightforward individualism and collectivism characterized at the national level to measure culture, and link it with other variables (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993; Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Oishi et al., 1998; Shweder et al., 1987). With New Zealand’s multicultural composition and particular colonial history, it was beneficial to use an individual-level multidimensional variable to measure cultural orientation. Furthermore, the use of the HV IC scale is more preferable theoretically and empirically (evidencing better internal consistency) to the more general IC element alone (Triandis,
Implementation of the HV IC scale has allowed for a more nuanced effort to tease apart cultural identity’s influence on morality and religiosity.

Beyond culture, many studies that measure religiosity use a unidimensional focus on religion (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Bering, 2002; Guthrie, 1993). The way I measured religiosity also makes this study unique in the New Zealand context, and MFT research. Wildman et al.’s (2015) MRI scale was helpful at capturing the diversity of religion and the left-right, liberal-conservatism dimension of religion, in a very different context to the one in which it was developed. This scale represents an attempt to extend our understanding of the way in which people hold their religion beyond the traditional, all too easy, broad brush characterizations. This scale was recently developed, and therefore has limited past implementation. The current research has provided some validation for the use of this scale. Reliable alphas were found using a different cultural sample, and it connected sensibly with the other variables that were measured.

In a similar vein, Wildman and colleagues’ (2015) MRI scale allowed for people from different religious backgrounds to be able to participate and share their thoughts on religious beliefs and practices. It also made religion’s connection with political self-identification on the left-right continuum easier to assess. This scale helped show the predicted relationship with religiosity and political self-identification. Those that are more politically conservative also tend to be religiously conservative in their beliefs and practices, even in a multiparty political system.

Additionally, the scale was an excellent measurement due to its ability to capture individuals who identify as religious, but have a more open or ambiguous view of ‘God’ than captured by typical measures of religiosity. This allowed for a more encompassing religious sample which is what I desired for this study. Future research could replicate this type of
study in NZ and other more socially progressive nations, to take advantage of the fact that this scale allows for capturing aspects of liberal leaning ideas of faith and/or spirituality.

**Applications**

How might we use this knowledge to advance the issues to which it pertains? Within and between societies, fierce, perennial political and religious debates surround significant topics such as immigration, economics, environmental concerns, and women’s rights that appear to have a moral element either to their content or the discourse concerning them (Graham et al., 2009). There does not seem to be any sphere of modern life that is not influenced by our ideological commitments. There is hope that if we can better understand the opposing side and realise they function in a moral domain—although perhaps a slightly different one—we may stand a much better fate.

Through this study, we have learned that conservatives and liberals endorse Individualizing and Binding moral foundations to different extents. This may be one of the overarching reasons why political discourse shows so little consensus. When we are unaware of these differences in morality, we may be arguing points that are not touching on the opponents’ moral convictions. If we cannot understand the morality domains that others occupy, the group division may continue to widen.

This study helps address the nature of this problem and potentially allows for opening of new dialogue and discussion among different religious, ethnic, and political stances. We can set out to change the focus of cultural wars from arguing blindly to having a greater understanding of the different political and religious moral code. For example, perhaps there is potential to incorporate both a care/harm element to a policy while also maintaining a level of security/authority which is often desired from the politically conservative. Additionally, speaking in a moral ‘language’ that other listeners might understand, may open new doors for legislation and invite more compromise.
Scepticism and negativity toward one’s opposition—religious, cultural, or political—does not often lead to positive change. In order to have positive and intellectual discourse, we need to acknowledge and begin to foster understanding of different moralities, which this study has begun to do (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). If we have political, religious, and cultural leaders that encourage this type of change, it becomes more possible for this adjustment to be instilled in the public sphere; this change could help facilitate more meaningful conversations about important topics that influence laws, policy, societal views, and diversity/inclusion issues.

An interpretation of the overall findings may be that when we see our opposition as human beings living and breathing in a moral landscape, even if different than our own, we can focus on obtaining a greater understanding of others’ morality. An understanding that may also lead to increasing our awareness of other important areas of people’s lives—religion, culture, and political identification.

Limitations and Future Studies

In this study, extensive effort was afforded to try and collect a sample that was sufficiently diverse to allow a robust test of hypotheses. This lead to a combination of student (convenience) and general population samples. When trying to collect data from a diverse sample of individuals from the university setting, it is possible that participants’ length of stay in New Zealand had an effect on the participants’ cultural orientation. Even if participants come from a seemingly collectivistic country or background, they may have internalised more individualistic tendencies due to how long they have been residing in NZ.

Additionally, an argument might be made that individuals who leave their home countries for NZ may be more predisposed to the cultural orientation and societal ideals of NZ. For example, these individuals may hold a more individualistic cultural orientation than others their age from their home countries. Future research could focus on individuals that
have come from overseas within the last few months to a year to help further enhance cultural orientation diversity. We know that different societies build and maintain dissimilar moralities, and also that subcultures within the same society emphasize moral foundations to different extents. I made attempts to target diversity groups at Victoria University (e.g., Christian, Pasifika), but I did not receive many responses. Another way to combat this limitation would be to sample at community diversity events (e.g., additional church organisations, diversity forums, cultural poetry shows). Greater emphasis on diversity groups may lend a more cultural understanding of the potential similarities and differences in morality.

Conducting this research outside of the United States has allowed us to test the cross-cultural applicability of the MFT and method. However, a challenge of the relative secularity of New Zealand was recruiting religious individuals. Although outreach to churches and religious organisations was organised, it is important to note that this sample may not be representative of the breadth of religious ideologies and if more time was afforded, seeking more diverse religious group would have been beneficial.

Political psychologists have learned much about differences and similarities between liberals and conservatives, but very little is known about characteristics of other political identities (Iyer et al., 2012). As this study focused on the political orientation of self-identified liberal/conservative individuals, there are other political ideologies that were not adequately addressed, such as those who may identify as libertarian. Iyer and colleagues (2012) noted that a possible explanation of libertarian’s unique moral configuration (strong endorsement of individual liberty and weak endorsement of all other morals) may lie in lower emotional responsiveness. If they are more rational and less emotional, how does this political ideology fit with Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) moral foundations?
Furthermore, Weber and Federico (2013) and others have suggested that, although political orientation is oftentimes researched as a unidimensional construct, it is not always helpful to do so. They note that research has shown political ideology to be multifaceted, focusing on a fiscal dimension and a social dimension (Bartels, 2006; Weber & Federico, 2007). In a similar vein, Rokeach’s (1987) two-value model speaks to a similar idea; his model demonstrates a difference in political ideology (e.g., fascist, republican, communist) reflecting individuals’ differential endorsement of Freedom and Equality values. In the current study, I combined social and economic political identification for individuals, but it is worth noting that there is a potential gain in teasing these two distinct dimensions apart. Future research would benefit from broadening its research scope to investigate how additional political identifications fit within the Moral Foundations Theory.

It is important to acknowledge that although the moral foundations theory suggests that political orientations are driven by moral evaluations rooted in a sociocultural evolutionary approach, this casual chain between variables is not often tested or easily testable (Smith et al., 2016). As the present study is correlational in nature, it cannot be assumed that the theoretical order of the variables I have proposed is correct. I did not directly test the order of influence among cultural orientation, morality, and political and religious affiliation. Therefore, future studies would benefit from using experimental and longitudinal designs, allowing for needed insight into this limited area of research.

**Summary of Contribution**

In conclusion, I would like to argue that cross-cultural research can benefit from theoretical integrations of such widely used sociocultural constructs as religion, politics, morality, and individualism and collectivism (Cukur et al., 2004)—something I have tried to do. With changes in political, religious, and social landscapes, it is beneficial for all to deepen our understanding of the differing moralities that surround these ideologies in hopes to
facilitate more peaceful and constructive dialogue between different viewpoints. I have elaborated on the existing literature and provided novel insight into the realm of culture, morality, politics, and religion. Perhaps as a result of this research, these difficult topics become a bit more speakable and a lot less intimidating.
References


MORALITY’S ABILITY TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER


University Press.


Appendix

Appendix A: Study Materials

A1: Recruitment Poster

Would you like to participate in a study about morality, culture, and religious and political ideologies? At the moment I am carrying out a study that incorporates all these components, and I am looking for research participants to share information on their experiences with these variables. I invite you to take part!

If you are willing to complete the questionnaire, you can go into a lucky draw to win one of ten $NZ50 grocery vouchers.

You are eligible to participate in this survey if you are 18 years or older and currently live in New Zealand.

This project has been approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under the delegated authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s Ethics Committee (Ethics application: 22691)

If you are interested in participating in the study please contact me.
A2: Recruitment via social media outlets

As part of my research project I am currently working on, I would like to invite anyone who’s interested to tell me about their views on morality, culture, and religious and political ideologies. At the moment I am carrying out a study that incorporates all these components, and I am looking for participants to share information on their experiences with these variables. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been completed. And if you do complete the questionnaire (take approximately 30min), you can go into a lucky draw to win one of ten $NZ50 grocery vouchers. If you are interested in the results, there is a section where you can leave your email, and the results will be dispersed to you upon completion (no later than April 2017).

I am interested in better understanding the relationships between culture and morality development and their intricate connections to politics and religion/faith. Issues of morality play out in the political spectrum and in our individual lives on countless occasions, including decision making on matters of education, homosexually, women’s rights, economic decisions, voting, etc. There does not seem to be any sphere of modern life that is not influenced by our ideological commitments. Understanding morality and its relation to these variables in more depth is of immense benefit for furthering communication between different political, cultural, and religious communities. Much of the previous research in these areas of interest have been conducted in an American context. Due to New Zealand’s different ethnic makeup, multi-party electoral politics, and relatively secular religious climate, it makes for an ideal setting and will lead to a more cross cultural perspective.
Appendix A3: Information Sheet

What is the purpose of this research?
- The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between people's understandings of morality, culture, politics and religion/faith in a New Zealand context.

Who is conducting the research?
- The research will be conducted by Elizabeth Weinberg, a Masters student at the School of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington, under the supervision of Associate Professor Marc Wilson. (This research has been approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee.)

To participate in this research, you must:
- Be 18 years of age or older
- Currently reside in New Zealand
- Be comfortable with communicating/reading in English

What is involved if you agree to participate?
- If you agree to participate in this study, you will complete demographic questions and two surveys where you will be asked about your agreement or disagreement with statements dealing with morality, politics, and religion/faith. We anticipate that the survey will take most people no more 30-40 minutes to complete.
- During the research you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been completed.

Privacy and Confidentiality
- This survey is confidential. Please do not put your name on it anywhere.
- [for IPRP participants only] We do ask for your student ID so we can allocate credit for participation. Once this has been done this information is removed from the data file prior to analysis.
- The survey and the coded survey data will be kept indefinitely in a secure file.
- In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your data may be shared with other competent researchers.
- The data without identifying names may be used in other, related studies.
- A copy of data without identifying information will remain in the custody of researcher Elizabeth Weinberg and supervisor Marc Wilson.

What happens to the information that you provide?
The survey responses that you submit go into an electronic spreadsheet. There is no information in the data file that connects your identity to your responses; thus, we treat your responses as anonymous.

The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, presented at scientific conferences, or included in a book or book chapter.

The information you provide will be combined with the information provided by the other participants in the study and will be written up as a Master’s thesis that will be submitted for assessment.

If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be posted as a downloadable PDF by April 1st 2017 on the CACR website: www.victoria.ac.nz/cacr.

Consent of participation:
Please note that by completing and returning the questionnaire to the researchers you agree that your survey responses will be used and analyzed in the ways described above.

If you have any further question regarding the study, please feel free to contact the investigators listed above, or the Convenor of the VUW Ethics Committee Associate Professor Susan Corbett (email susan.corbett@vuw.ac.nz, telephone +64-4-463 5480).

Thank you for considering participating in this research.

Elizabeth Weinberg and Marc Wilson.

A3: Survey

Demographic Information

For the following questions, please tick the option that applies to you.

1. Please indicate your gender:
   
   Female    Male    Other/Rather Not Say

2. What is your birthday year?³

3. Where do you currently live?⁴
   
   NZ
   
   Other

³ If they are not eighteen years or older, the survey will automatically finish
⁴ If participants answer “other” then the survey will automatically finish
4. What is your citizenship status?

I am a New Zealand citizen

I am NOT a New Zealand citizen

5. If participant answers “I am NOT a New Zealand citizen,” they will be prompted to the next question.

From which country do you hold citizenship?

______________

6. How would you describe your ethnicity or race? (check all that apply)

Kiwi/New Zealander

Maori

Black/African

South Asian

Pacific Islander

Middle Eastern

Hispanic

East Asian

White/European

Other______________

7. What is the highest degree or level of school you have COMPLETED? Tick ONE box. If currently enrolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree received.

- Did not, or have not, completed high school/secondary school
- Completed Secondary School (e.g., NCEA Level 3, Year 13)
- Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA, BS)
- Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, Med, MSW, MBA)
- Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD)
Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Part 1 Instructions: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

0 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)
1 = not very relevant
2 = slightly relevant
3 = somewhat relevant
4 = very relevant
5 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

_____ Whether or not someone suffered emotionally
_____ Whether or not some people were treated differently than others
_____ Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country
_____ Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority
_____ Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency
_____ Whether or not someone was good at math
_____ Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable
_____ Whether or not someone acted unfairly
_____ Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group
_____ Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society
_____ Whether or not someone did something disgusting
_____ Whether or not someone was cruel
_____ Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights
_____ Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty
_____ Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder
MORALITY’S ABILITY TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER

Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of

Part 2 Instructions: Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

0 = strongly disagree
1 = moderately disagree
2 = slightly disagree
3 = slightly agree
4 = moderately agree
5 = strongly agree

Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.

When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.

I am proud of my country’s history.

Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.

People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.

It is better to do good than to do bad.

One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.

Justice is the most important requirement for a society.

People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.

Men and women each have different roles to play in society.

I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.

It can never be right to kill a human being.

I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing.
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.

If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty.

Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.

**Political Orientation Measure**

Please select the option that best represents your political stance.

In political matters, people talk of the “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your **SOCIAL** views on this scale, generally speaking?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Left</th>
<th>Middle Left</th>
<th>Neither left nor right</th>
<th>Middle Right</th>
<th>Very Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In political matters, people talk of the “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your **ECONOMIC** views on this scale, generally speaking?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Middle Left</th>
<th>Neither left nor right</th>
<th>Middle Right</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If an election were to be held this week, which party would you vote for?

- [ ] Green Party
- [ ] NZ First
- [ ] National Party
- [ ] Maori
- [ ] Labour Party
- [ ] ACT New Zealand
- [ ] United First
Measurement of Vertical and Horizontal Individualism and Collectivism

Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = moderately agree, 7 = strongly agree).

I often do “my own thing.”
I’d rather depend on myself than on others.
Being a unique individual is important to me.
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.
My personal identity, independent from others, is very important to me.
I am a unique person, separate from others.
I enjoy being unique and different from other in many ways.
It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
Competition is the law of nature.
When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.
Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.
Winning is everything.
It is important that I do my job better than others.
I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.
Some people emphasize winning; I’m not one of them.
The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.
If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.
If a relative were in a financial difficulty, I would help within my means.
It is important to maintain harmony within my group.
I like sharing little things with my neighbours.
It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.

I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.

I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.

I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.

Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.

It is important to me that I respect the decision made by my groups.

We should keep our aging parents with us at home.

It annoys me if I have to sacrifice activities that I enjoy to help others (reverse scoring).

Self-sacrifice is a virtue.

**Multidimensional Religiosity Ideology Scale**

*Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrase “God of Spiritual Reality?”*

- Yes
- No

*Do you currently have a personal way of making sense of the phrases “religious or spiritual community” and “religious or spiritual tradition” and “sacred texts?”*

- Yes
- No

Please take your time and answer each question carefully.

1. According to my religious or spiritual values, investing in family and community is more important than trying to change the world.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

2. My religious or spiritual tradition commands working courageously to change society.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

3. My religious or spiritual tradition’s most profound teachings are clear and easy to understand.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

4. According to my religious or spiritual tradition, we must always fight to make the world a better place, no matter what the personal cost.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

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5 If participants answer “no,” then they skip the religiosity scale and the survey automatically finishes.
5. Without shared beliefs, my religious community or spiritual group would suffer.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

6. It’s important that people in my religious or spiritual community agree on basic beliefs and behaviours.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

7. A wise person recognizes that there is only one sure path to religious or spiritual understanding.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

8. My religious or spiritual outlook leads me to accept the fact that some people in this world are simply more talented and more worthy of success than others.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

9. People will receive spiritual rewards or punishments after death for the choices that they make during life.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

10. World history is moving toward a point where humanity will be more spiritually advanced.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

11. I usually interpret my religious or spiritual tradition’s truth claims metaphorically.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

12. It’s too much work to fix the world’s big problems, so we should focus instead on being there for one another in our communities.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
13. I question the teachings of my religious or spiritual tradition if they are contradicted by scientific or historical discoveries.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

14. When I read the sacred texts of my religious or spiritual tradition, I know I’m reading the truth.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

15. A mature religious or spiritual person is comfortable with doubting his or her faith.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

16. Inherited religious and cultural traditions should be preserved, even if they result in some social inequality.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

17. My religious or spiritual community needs to work hard to challenge injustice in the world.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

18. An important part of the spiritual life is fighting for the rights of the poor and underprivileged.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

19. I feel connected to God or a spiritual reality when I participate in the ceremonies of my religious or spiritual group.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

20. My religious or spiritual tradition teaches that it’s the small things in life that count, not the big political or social changes.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

21. Society should be continually overhauled until there is equality for all.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree
22. The best possible world would be one in which everyone followed the morals of my religious or spiritual tradition.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

23. The choices that a person makes in life will not result in consequences for him or her after death.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

24. It’s better to have some economic inequality than to overhaul our current economic system.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

25. My religious or spiritual practices are often improvised for the situation at hand.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

26. I feel the power of my religious or spiritual community’s traditional practices working in my life.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

27. The world is advancing towards something better, even if it doesn’t always look like it.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

28. I am open to introducing rituals and practices from the other traditions into my own religious or spiritual community.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

29. My religious or spiritual community should actively seek to liberate the economically and socially oppressed.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |
30. Religious and spiritual meaning is created by people.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

31. No matter how socially advances humanity becomes, we’ll always face the same sorts of problems.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

32. Requests made in prayer are heard and responded to by God or a spiritual reality.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

33. My religious or spiritual tradition is a better guide for living than my individual wants and desires could ever be.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

34. Even if it looks like society is progressing, human nature will always be more or less the same.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

35. My religious tradition or spiritual outlook offers genuine truth for all people.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

36. My religious or spiritual tradition fuels my desire to overhaul society for the better.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

37. The teachings of my religious tradition are more like metaphors than literal truths.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

38. No religious tradition offers perfect truth.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree
39. Inherited religious traditions should be preserved, even if they results in some social inequality.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

40. Each person should individually design his or her own religious or spiritual beliefs.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

41. The teachings of my religious or spiritual tradition are literal truths, not mere metaphors.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

42. It’s healthy for everyone when my religious or spiritual community includes people who disagreed.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

43. Although my religious tradition has developed through history, its underlying truths have never changed.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

44. People ought to devote themselves to the one true religious or spiritual way.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

45. My ideal religious community or spiritual group has people with a wider variety of differing religious and spiritual beliefs.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

46. The scriptures of my tradition offer a clear window into truth.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

47. In general, all other things being equal, it is better to be kind than cruel.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
48. It’s more important for society to be fair than to be stable.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

49. A person who isn’t working to make the world a fairer place isn’t leading a truly religious or spiritual life.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

50. Spiritual rewards and punishments are only relevant in this present life.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

51. The more different voices a religious or spiritual community includes, the better off it will be.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

52. True faith embraces true doubt.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

53. According to my religious or spiritual tradition, some people really do deserve more success than others.

Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Strongly Agree

Thanks for completing the survey. If you would like to go into the prize draw, or receive a summary of the results of this research by email, please provide this information below:

Do you wish to enter the prize draw?  No ☐  Yes ☐

Would you like an email summary of results?  No ☐  Yes ☐

If you said yes to either of the above, please tell us your name and email.
Name:
Email Address:
Thank you for participating in this survey.
The purpose of this research is to better understand the relationships between culture and morality development as well as their connections to politics and religion/faith. Issues of morality play out in the political spectrum and in our individual lives on countless occasions, including decision making on matters of education, homosexually, women’s rights, economic decisions, voting, etc. There does not seem to be any sphere of modern life that is not influenced by our ideological commitments. Understanding morality and its relation to these variables in more depth is of immense benefit for furthering communication between different political, cultural, and religious communities.

Much of the research on these topics has been conducted in countries other than New Zealand. Links between morality and American politics as well as broad links to religious affiliation have been established in past studies, but the religious landscape in America is very different from here in New Zealand. Due to New Zealand’s different ethnic makeup, multi-party electoral politics, and relatively secular religious climate, it makes for an ideal setting. Collecting data in NZ will lend a more cross cultural perspective to the literature on sociocultural evolutionary perspective of morality.

In this study, we have asked you some questions about your political and religious practices/beliefs on a left-right continuum. Furthermore, we asked you about your endorsement of the five moral domains and your individual endorsement on a cultural scale. By measuring these variables, we can determine how the endorsement of particular morality foundations vary between people of different cultural, religious, and political ideologies.

The results of the study will be posted at www.victoria.ac.nz/cacr no later than April 1st, 2017. If you’d like to receive results by email please provide your email on the following page. If you have any further question regarding the study, please feel free to contact Elizabeth Weinberg, or the Convener of the VUW Ethics Committee Associate Professor Susan Corbett (email susan.corbett@vuw.ac.nz, telephone +64-4-463 5480).

Thank you again for participating in this research.

Elizabeth Weinberg and Marc Wilson