Pākehā Practice: Music and National Identity in Postcolonial Aotearoa/New Zealand

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Abstract

National discourses specific to Aotearoa/New Zealand — for example, biculturalism, which reimagines Māori-Pākehā relations as a partnership based on the Treaty of Waitangi — help to construct, express, and articulate connections between music and New Zealand identity. Yet unquestioned nationalism — however benign or ‘official’ they seem — can marginalize some ways of being, knowing, organizing, and music-making, through their capacity to advance and reinforce undisclosed social values and political agendas. In this way, nationalism often disguises the consequences of those values and agendas. This thesis demonstrates how, by unproblematically invoking nationalisms for various purposes, significant New Zealand music-related institutions inadvertently reproduce Eurocentric national identity narratives which overlook the social, cultural, economic and political inequities of Aotearoa/NZ’s postcolonial present. Such narratives normalize conceptions of ‘New Zealand music’ dominated by historic and evolving cultural and economic connections between New Zealand society and the broader postcolonial Anglosphere. Consequently, identifications of ‘New Zealand’ culture and music often reflect dominant Pākehā norms, against which other musical traditions are contrasted.

Several prominent ‘national’ institutions involved with music are examined through three cases studies. The first considers how state-supported music policies and agencies construct and legitimize economic, artistic and democratic ideologies as national values, and explores the consequences of a frequent failure to distinguish between a cultural identity, based on dominant Pākehā norms and values, and a culturally plural civic-based national identity. The second case study examines events during and surrounding two major music awards ceremonies, the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards and the Silver Scroll Awards, showing how these ceremonies construct and reinforce a prestige hierarchy of ‘New Zealand music’ in which Anglo-American popular music styles are privileged over other musical expressions. The consequences for cultural representation in relation to New Zealand identity are considered. The final case study analyses the New Zealand popular music heritage presented at Auckland Museum’s exhibition, Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa. Volume’s displays and stories, contextualized and informed by Auckland Museum and prominent entities in New Zealand’s music industry, are shown to reinforce a dominant New Zealand music ‘Kiwiana’, neglecting divergent cultural perspectives and political positions.
The thesis draws on comparative analyses of qualitative interviews conducted by the author, documents and reports, press media and journalism, audiovisual broadcasts and recordings, promotional material and museum visits. These primary materials are contextualized in wider literatures — particularly on nationalism, postcolonialism and music — to provide critical perspectives on historic social, political and cultural issues regarding New Zealand national identity and its relationship to music.
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Preface

This thesis investigates meanings of national identity, or nation-ness, in music-related contexts in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Rather than analysing music for traces of New Zealand-ness, or interrogating which scholarly analyses and common national narratives best define New Zealand music, I question the fundamental processes of associating music with ‘New Zealand’ nationhood. I investigate select cases wherein rhetoric, policy, celebrations, presentations and performances of ‘New Zealand identity and culture in music’ are structured or articulated by national discourses and their political implications.

The musics and contexts that I engaged with in my research were shaped by my background. I was born in Aotearoa/New Zealand to a Pākehā family (my known genealogy traces several generations of mostly New Zealand-born ancestors to England), grew up in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s increasingly bi- and multicultural society of the 1990s-2000s, and spent 2014 travelling through Europe and Asia. Upon returning, I became increasingly curious about national, cultural and ethnic identity, causing me to reassess my preceding musical experience with drums, jazz, and other expressions in light of those identities.

What of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘bicultural’ context? My experiences with te ao Māori (the Māori world or worldview) and other non-Pākehā perspectives have been mostly superficial. Indeed, my family and community upbringing largely reflected Aotearoa/New Zealand’s British/Western-based norms and institutions. One of my participants, Makerita Urale, a Samoan playwright and documentary director, who has explored such issues in her work (e.g. the published play Frangipani Perfume) explained:

We live in a white dominant world, a Pākehā world, where we speak English, and you speak your language, but you can’t speak Samoan and you can’t speak Māori. So every day, for Pacific and Māori people, we’re interacting with people who only have one cultural perspective. I understand both because I am fluent in English as well as my own Pasifika voice. My dream is for all of us to have a better understanding of our own unique perspectives (personal interview).

Although I occasionally use Māori loan words, most are well-known and commonly used in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including by people — like myself — who do not speak te reo Māori. Thus, my arguments and perspectives primarily focus on New Zealand identity,

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1 Pākehā, though contested, commonly refers to New Zealanders of European descent.
culture and music as Anglophone (Pākehā) discourses. This is not a case of ‘Pākehā paralysis’, a trend in which Pākehā scholars have struggled to navigate specific ethical considerations pertaining to cultural awareness with research involving Māori participants, and have thus avoided including Māori participants and perspectives in their research altogether (Tolich 2002). Indeed, my ideas were influenced by engaging conversations with, and thought-provoking literature by, Māori and other non-Pākehā individuals. Rather, this study was unavoidably Pākehā-centric. While Māori words and concepts may be part of New Zealand identity discourse (and contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand society), the cultural contexts in which te reo and te aotearoa Māori reside are distinct from the predominantly Pākehā world of ‘New Zealand’ that I, and many others, live in. This positioning is crucial — particularly for Pākehā — for questions of national identity.

Because of my emphasis on ethnicity and nationhood, issues regarding gender, sexuality, religion, socio-economic class, etc. — and their impact on my findings, conclusions, methods and perspectives — are not adequately addressed in this thesis. I hope these issues are explored in other projects.

**Terminology**

This thesis employs different names to differentiate between specific meanings usually denoted by ‘New Zealand’. These uncommon definitions serve distinct purposes for my thesis. ‘New Zealand’ refers to the imagined (c.f. Anderson 2006), post-colonial, liberal democratic, sovereign nation-state that contextualizes public and policy discourse about a bounded national society. Conversely, ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand’ represents a broader concept of the physical and natural spaces claimed as New Zealand territory, and the people, discourses, ideas, realities, activities, communities, etc. that exist within these spaces (including ‘New Zealand’). I have avoided using ‘Aotearoa’ in order not to appropriate its existing significance in te ao Māori.

The term ‘New Zealand music’ also requires rethinking. It appears frequently in mass media, across music industry entities, and in state-level arts policy. It has widespread currency in everyday conversations about music: We celebrate New Zealand Music Month and New Zealand music awards, support New Zealand music through trusts (e.g. SOUNZ: Centre for New Zealand Music) and state agencies (e.g. New Zealand Music Commission), and

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2 ‘About SOUNZ’, [http://sounz.org.nz/content/about](http://sounz.org.nz/content/about) [23 Feb 2017].

promote New Zealand music through our public broadcaster.\textsuperscript{4} The broad applicability of ‘New Zealand music’ suggests it is largely perceived as an unproblematic term, covering music made domestically, or by a New Zealander abroad, or even music that has an identifiably New Zealand sound. But why has ‘New Zealand music’ (and ‘Kiwi music’ to a lesser extent) become a common moniker, whereas ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand music’ or ‘puoro o Aotearoa’ have not? As I discuss throughout this thesis, the term ‘New Zealand music’ predominantly refers to popular music (and, to a lesser extent, classical music) made by New Zealanders, but not much else. This has ramifications for ethnic/cultural representation, which my case studies explore.

**Methodology**

This thesis follows several methodological approaches. After laying the theoretical framework in chapter one — based on literatures on nationalism, postcolonialism, New Zealand history, and music — I investigate three cases (one per chapter) in which national identity and music are commonly associated. I obtained much of the primary source material for these chapters through approximately twenty\textsuperscript{5} semi-structured interviews with musicians, policymakers, public servants, managers, journalists, educators, curators, licensing organization staff, and others involved in music in Aotearoa/New Zealand in some capacity. Generally, I chose interview participants for their individual expertise and/or experience in a particular field or organization.

My initial contact with interview participants usually began with a statement briefly introducing myself and my project. I explained that I was researching connections between music and national identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and how these connections are viewed from the perspectives of musicians, people in the music industry, and also from a cultural policy angle. I provided them with a project information sheet approved by the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee.\textsuperscript{6} Although tailored slightly depending on the expertise/experience of the participant, my interview questions were mostly broad and open-ended. I obtained consent from each participant to record the interview and use the material for my thesis and subsequent related presentations or publications. Participants could choose to remain anonymous, and thus not all are identified in the thesis. Following the interviews, I

\textsuperscript{4} ‘Concert’, Radio New Zealand, \url{http://www.radionz.co.nz/concert} [23 Feb 2017].
\textsuperscript{5} Only thirteen are referenced in this thesis.
\textsuperscript{6} See appendix.
shared transcripts and, later, quotes in the context of draft sections/paragraphs with participants, which they could verify and make suggestions/amendments if desired.

The interviews were central to the development of my ideas in this thesis, and there are obvious particularities and limitations to their influence. Some participants hold significant, high-level positions in organisations and government, giving their words and ideas much weight in relation to particular arguments. Yet regardless of the standing and status of participants or whether or not they are even quoted in this thesis, every interview illumined valuable and sometimes crucial perspectives on music and identity, informing different aspects of my research. I cannot stress the importance of these interviews to my thesis enough.

I obtained the remaining primary source material for my case study chapters (two, three and four) in ways relevant to those specific cases. Chapter two investigates aspects of New Zealand’s arts and cultural policy, particularly for music, considering how notions of national identity influence policy development and implementation, and thereby, music-making and ethnic/cultural representation. I consulted and analysed both current and historic New Zealand legislation, agencies’ strategic documents and annual reports, and media releases, all of which were available publicly, either online or in hardcopy at the relevant agencies’ offices.

Chapter three examines two major music awards ceremonies, the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards and the Silver Scroll Awards. I explore how transnational influences on popular music-making and consumption in Aotearoa/New Zealand have shaped what music these awards represent and prioritize, and how awards ceremonies affect the signification of ‘New Zealand music’ in and beyond these contexts. I analysed video broadcasts, online journalism, and entry and eligibility criteria policies of these music awards.

Chapter four examines Auckland Museum’s exhibition on New Zealand popular music history, entitled Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa. I map the connections between Volume and other entities publicizing Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music heritage/history, and investigate how such heritage narratives influence, and are shaped by, conceptions of musical, cultural and national identities. I visited Auckland Museum twice for a direct impression of the exhibition, analysed media releases and additional promotional/educational material available on Auckland Museum’s website, and was provided (thanks to Auckland Museum) with a digital file of the exhibition’s display panel text. For each chapter, these
sources were cross-referenced with my interviews and wider literatures to identify relevant and recurring themes, ensure the accuracy of statistical/factual information where possible, and add perspective and nuance to particular issues.

The theoretical framework outlined in chapter one contextualizes my case studies in sociopolitical contexts wherein music-making in Aotearoa/NZ occurs. Accordingly, music is not the primary focus of the first chapter. Some of the basic theoretical areas — particularly nationalism and postcolonialism — emerged in my research. Nationalism provides critical perspectives on national identity, and postcolonialism addresses the political, historical and cultural issues raised in my earlier positionality discussion. I take full responsibility for any potential incompleteness or misrepresentations of my participants’ perspectives, which should be considered my own subjective interpretations. Overall, this thesis aims to reveal a discursive blindspot, or rather ‘tone-deafness’: that notions of New Zealand identity and culture in musical contexts often privilege and represent Pākehā worldviews, perspectives and values at the expense of others.
Chapter One: Whose New Zealand?

In the patriotic 2005 song ‘Welcome Home’ by one of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s most iconic musicians, Dave Dobbyn sings: “Out here on the edge, the empire is fading by the day”. Indeed, the colonisation of Aotearoa/New Zealand seems ever more distant in common national narratives and histories (Gibbons 2002, 5-6). Yet how complete and recent is this change? The nationalist consciousness that emerged among some settlers in the late nineteenth century was inseparable from Britishness (McKinnon 1985, 365-366). A popular colonial ideal constructed New Zealand as a ‘better Britain’ (Belich 2001; King 2003, 172); at the turn of the twentieth century, settlers still largely identified with the British Empire (Watters 2016). Accordingly, New Zealand’s socioeconomic ties with Britain remained unusually strong (compared to other British settler colonies) and even strengthened long into the twentieth century through what James Belich calls ‘recolonisation’ (2001, 11).

Yet ruptures with the empire appeared throughout this period. New Zealand’s involvement in World War I — commemorated annually through high-profile ANZAC ceremonies — is cited as a watershed moment in the development of a national consciousness distinct from British identity (Watters 2016). In 1973, the UK’s entry into the European Economic Community destabilized New Zealand’s British ties, leading to drastic political and economic reforms, and an increasing openness to economic globalization and multiculturalism. In the same decade, powerful reassertions of Māori political rights and cultural legitimacy — particularly appealing to the Treaty of Waitangi — culminated in what is called the ‘Māori renaissance’. Belich has characterized these late-twentieth century changes as the beginning of the present ‘decolonisation’ era (Belich 2001, 12). New national narratives — e.g. biculturalism — seeking to reconcile the competing issues and interests of these sociopolitical developments via a sense of shared nationhood subsequently emerged.

This chapter outlines key theoretical concepts on nationalism, their application to music and to notions of New Zealand identity. Central to this analysis are historical perspectives on nationalism’s development in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including colonialism’s ramifications, and historically produced notions of ethnicity and culture. The chapter also outlines how historical perspectives — including Aotearoa/New Zealand music and music industry

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7 The New Zealand flag referendums of 2015-16 exemplify this issue: supporters of the change (43.2% of the vote) frequently argued the need to remove the Union Jack symbol to reflect, albeit superficially, the nation’s ‘post-colonial’ status.

8 This breakthrough for Māori was preceded by many decades’ worth of struggle for rights and recognition (e.g. Smith 2007, 338-340).
histories — are shaped by unproblematized nationalisms. Ultimately, in light of normalized Eurocentrism in Aotearoa/New Zealand society — e.g. the dominance of the English language, the Westminster system of government, conceptions of property, law and so on (Post 2016) — I argue that articulations of national identity common in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s contemporary society tend to neglect or underestimate how Pākehā cultural norms frame national identity discourse. By unproblematically invoking such nationalisms for various purposes, core ‘national’ institutions reproduce dominant Eurocentric frameworks of nationhood. In music-related contexts, these frameworks also normalize particular conceptions of ‘New Zealand music’ against which other musical traditions practised by New Zealand citizens contrast. Firstly, I discuss how fundamental assumptions about nationalism itself contextualize and reproduce national discourses.

**Nationalism, the Nation and National Identity**

Commentators have struggled to find a universal definition of ‘nation’, likely because of nations’ fluidity, changeability and ambiguity (Hobsbawm 1992, 5-6). The numerous terms related to nation (nationalism, nationality, national identity, nation-state, etc.) often intersect, or are confused, with other categories. For example, the terms nation (usually understood to represent a sociocultural community) and state (a political entity governing a particular territory), though different, are often used interchangeably to describe many modern nation-states (particularly in a geopolitical sense). Yet some nations are stateless (e.g. the First Nations of North America) or only partially recognised as states (e.g. Kosovo, Palestine), and some states even represent multiple nations (e.g. UK). Furthermore, the origin of nations is contested, with commentators divided over whether nations are perennial (or have strong ‘proto-national’ precedents) or are constructs of modernism, imagined into existence to manage significant sociopolitical changes in recent centuries (Spencer & Wollman 2005). Yet many anti-modernist studies have been accused of failing to problematize how present-day thinking about nations and their sociopolitical underpinnings may skew historical perspectives on national origins (Gellner 1997), while several seminal analyses have been criticized for viewing the construction of nations through Eurocentric lenses — e.g. assuming the primacy of literate culture and Western institutions (Askew 2002, 10).

Such confusions also apply to the relationship between nations and individuals. Identity markers like ‘nationality’, ‘race’, and ‘ethnicity’ are often confused or overlapping (Callister 2011, 115), and distinctions between the legal and cultural statuses of ‘nationality’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘national identity’ are often unclear (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015, 13). An
excerpt of the government-sanctioned Encyclopedia of New Zealand, *Te Ara*, demonstrates these ambiguities, stating: “Different people and groups view the nation in different ways. A Southland farmer may describe New Zealand identity differently from a Pacific person in South Auckland” (Barker 2012). Moreover, as McCrone and Bechhofer (2015, 10) note, key studies do not sufficiently define national identity distinct from ‘nation’. McCrone and Bechhofer describe national identity as “the presumed but unexamined hinge between [nation and nationalism], turning the political demands into national substance, or vice versa” (12). Acknowledging each individual’s agency to exercise ‘national identification’, an “active process of doing, which varies according to context” — helps to determine “how and why people mobilise national identifications, and for what purposes” (17). Yet rather than being merely a process of self-identity, ‘national identification’ suggests that objects such as music, animals, or even other people, can also be claimed for the nation.

While nations may have multiple definitions, imaginaries and identities, the idea and manifestation of nationalism is more pervasive and subtle than commonly acknowledged. In his 1995 book *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig depicts nationalism as being so fundamental to everyday discourse and thinking globally that the perceived ‘naturalness’ of nations — and the ‘common sense’ that stems from nationalistic thinking — is often uncritically taken for granted. Although nationalism usually denotes only the most extreme cases (what Billig terms ‘hot’ nationalism, e.g. in extremist political ideologies and independence/separatist movements), such a view ignores the profound influence that an everyday, banal nationalism has on how ‘we’ (especially those in ‘Western’ nation-states) understand the world. He writes:

> Nationhood provides a continual background for... political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (8).

Consequently, nationalism’s influence on everyday life goes largely unnoticed, presumed to be a completely natural principle, and yet requires “a continual ‘flagging’, or reminding, of nationhood” (13). Accordingly, while national identity is negotiated and contested,
nationalism arguably remains the accepted and unchallenged principle underlying this negotiation.

Nationhood’s perceived ‘naturalness’ makes nationalism a convincing and unifying vehicle for political mobilization. Thus, a flag, a sports team, a song, or even an entire cultural/ethnic group can be claimed to represent the nation without needing to justify what specifically makes it ‘national’. Consequently, nationalism can act as a misleading ruse masking other agendas: Peter Skilling (2010, 180), for example, observes how the ‘nation branding’ policies pioneered by New Zealand’s fifth Labour-led government “implied a unity and commonality of purpose that elided questions of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits”. In chapter two, I discuss how nation branding — for which music can be co-opted — reflects nationalism’s capacity to advance political (in this case economic) ideologies via an inclusive narrative, despite potential exclusionary consequences.

Music and National Identity

Music can express and represent, challenge and resist, and be subsumed and appropriated by nationalism in countless, overlapping yet contradictory ways. Music explicitly expresses supposedly ‘national’ sentiment in patriotic songs or national anthems, or when national symbols are consciously displayed or invoked. But how is music deemed ‘national’ when national identity is not overtly expressed or articulated? As Bohlman (2004, 12) posits, one can “experience nationalism in any music at any time” thanks to music’s malleability; its narrative, symbolic, representative and performative powers; its fluid transmission and adoption across borders, continents and oceans; and its various social functions. Arguably, the ease with which music can be deemed ‘national’ renders labelling it as such a simplistic, appropriative, and politically-driven, yet effective tool for subtly reinforcing the nation’s legitimacy and its authority to progress disguised political agendas.

However, articulating music’s national significance is not uni-dimensional or necessarily political. Hans Weisethaunet (2007) agrees that music can advance various nationalist ideologies, but distinguishes claims about music’s ‘national character’ from music’s ‘national significance’, or how they develop national narratives and histories:

The ubiquitous concept of music’s ‘national character’ … involuntarily leads to the use of music for national ideological purposes and a reification of signification processes. In order to speak of ‘national’ representations in music, at least we have to break the analysis down to the level of ‘who said what’: people’s
receptions; composer’s ideas; critic’s constructs; marketing strategies; the ideologies of cultural policy makers, and so on, which in all concern the historiographical perspectives of writing (emphasis in original, 194-195).

Thus the distinction between overtly political and non-political invocations of nationalism centres on whether national narratives are scrutinized or taken-for-granted — the difference between critiquing and constructing ‘national’ discourses. Weisethaunet demonstrates how emphasising music’s ‘national character’ downplays the influence of globalization, cosmopolitanism and other transnational phenomena — one might add colonialism — on musical styles and identities. Conversely, music may be more usefully described in terms of various intranational regional locations and cultural traditions, as Keam and Mitchell (2011b, x) highlight regarding Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Indeed, recent collections of Aotearoa/New Zealand-based musical studies (Keam and Mitchell 2011a; Johnson 2010b) reflect the difficulty of navigating between critiquing and constructing national discourses. Even critical engagement with national identity may leave an overarching ‘national’ theoretical frame unproblematized; e.g. by attempting “to ‘de-colonize’ Aotearoa/New Zealand musical discourse and offer a wider vision of the musical nation and its diverse cultures”, Johnson (2010a, 7) demonstrates how national discourses may be simultaneously constructed and critiqued. Essentially, laudable attempts to rearticulate a more inclusive national identity may still overlook the unintended consequences of espousing a national frame in the first place.

Beyond abstract theories, the specific sociocultural contexts in which national narratives are negotiated and applied to music should be examined. John O’Flynn (2007) argues that “the interlacing and often contesting ideologies underlying the articulation of civic, ethnic or economic national identities along with the institutional structures and dominant social groups… may support some constructions of musical ‘nationalness’ over others” (28). Similarly, Martin Stokes (1994) argues that these associations “can never be understood outside the wider power relations in which they are embedded” (7). Thus, we should:

[T]urn from questions directed towards defining the essential and ‘authentic’ traces of identity ‘in’ music (a question with which much nationalist and essentially racist folklore and ethnography is explicitly concerned) to the questions of how music is used by social actors in specific local situations to erect boundaries, to maintain distinctions between us and them (6).
Importantly, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, ethnicity signifies how nationalism operates to “erect boundaries” and “maintain distinctions between us and them”, but also, paradoxically, homogenizes or encapsulates difference within the broader cloak of nationality. The following section explores how Aotearoa/New Zealand-specific cultural and ethnic discourses constitute crucial sites for negotiating national musical identities.

**Biculturalism and Ethnicity**

The stories and myths underpinning contemporary conceptions of New Zealand identity belie forgotten and suppressed events of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s history. One widely accepted narrative depicts New Zealand as a ‘bicultural’ nation, forged by the encounter between British imperialists and settlers, and the indigenous Māori. The bicultural narrative centres on the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty), New Zealand’s founding document (Watters 2016; Orange 2012). The story of the Treaty’s conception, signing, interpretation, implementation, neglect, breaching and subsequent redress has become a powerful, symbolic national myth of a rocky but persistent partnership between Pākehā and Māori. The bicultural narrative’s ‘official’ status is evident in government departments’ bilingual names (e.g. Manatū Taonga — Ministry for Culture and Heritage). However, the fact that several Māori rangatira (chiefs) did not sign the Treaty confirms the mythology of this partnership (Callister 2011, 119), while the existence of many other agreements between the Crown and Māori challenges the mythology of the Treaty as New Zealand’s sole constitutional foundation (Boast 2006).

While the Treaty gives biculturalism a central role in New Zealand’s modern political constitution, a broader multiculturalism occupies a tenuous position. As Christopher Finlayson — Attorney-General, Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (among other Ministerial portfolios), and formerly also Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage from 2008-2014 — stated:

> We are not a monocultural society, we are a bicultural society with lots of multicultural inputs. And people who come here have to recognise the bicultural component. So there’s no point them saying, “We’re new Chinese and all this Māori stuff doesn’t really do much for us”. My answer is “stiff cheese” (personal interview).

Finlayson’s view demonstrates how the bicultural narrative has superseded a largely monocultural New Zealand identity, yet has not comfortably incorporated multiculturalism.
Dan Bendrups (2010) suggests that biculturalism’s centrality to New Zealand identity — “as the primary vehicle for the reaffirmation of the indigenous culture of New Zealand, which had previously endured decades of official denigration and denial” — has inhibited multiculturalism’s recognition and accommodation in both national discourse and cultural policy: “the reduction of all non-Māori New Zealanders to a single category marginalizes the representation of the many cultural and ethnic groups that are neither Māori nor Pākehā” (30-31). While Bendrups discusses how music represents Aotearoa/New Zealand’s cultural diversity with refreshing nuance, even among ‘Pākehā’ traditions, his language — e.g. “many facets of New Zealand cultural identity” (37) — reinforces an inclusive national discourse overarching these different multiculturalisms. If multiculturalisms, as David Pearson argues, “are as much to do with the imaginings and practices of ‘majorities’ as those of the minorities in their midst” (2001, 153), how might Pākehā, as Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘majority’, shape national narratives like biculturalism?

Biculturalism relies on (and thereby legitimizes) simplistic and unproblematized notions of cultural and ethnic identity. However, the evolution of the Aotearoa/New Zealand-specific ethnic categories of Pākehā and Māori have a distinct, interdependent history that challenges notions of their ‘naturalness’. Pearson (2001, 41-48) argues that indigenous peoples were “‘ethnified’ by dispossession and displacement” through colonization. Indeed Aotearoa’s indigenous inhabitants employed ‘Māori’ as an ethnic category to distinguish themselves collectively from the alien European settlers (‘māori’ literally translates as ‘ordinary’, ‘normal’, or ‘common’), particularly when the growing threat of colonization post-1850s necessitated tribal unity (Salesa 2011, 22-23; Walker 2004, 94); Waitere and Allen (2011, 58) argue that this group naming should thus be considered part of colonial discourse. However, affiliation with ancestral iwi (‘tribe’, ‘people’, or ‘nation’) and hapū (‘sub-tribe’) remains integral to the identity of tangata whenua (King 2003, 239-241; Ranford 2016).

The term Pākehā also developed from the colonial encounter as a Māori descriptor of white (mainly British) Europeans. ‘Pākehā’ is contentious, perceived by some as derogatory, although no substantial evidence of any pejorative meaning exists (Ranford 2016). While some consider anyone non-Māori to be Pākehā (also represented by ‘tauiwi’), it has become accepted, since the ‘Māori renaissance’, as a self-defining ethnic category for European New Zealanders vis-à-vis the indigenous (Māori) other (e.g. King 1985; 1999). Avril Bell (2009)

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9 The translation of these terms is significant, and points to the contentious ‘naming and claiming’ politics of indigeneity (see Waitere and Allen 2011, specifically p.55).
observes how the term Pākehā reflects dilemmas of settler identity; occupying the space between the “metropolitan homelands of their ancestors and indigenous peoples of their national homeland” created a “lack of a sense of cultural specificity, the problem of having ‘no identity’” (147). To simultaneously redeem their ancestral past and “acknowledge the trauma of the colonial experience” (156), some have claimed Pākehā identity as its own kind of indigeneity (see King 1999).

Such use of the concept of indigeneity highlights the relationship between cultural identities and political rights both in Aotearoa/New Zealand and around the globe. Indeed, the concept of indigeneity has gathered increasing political significance — and thus also controversy — in recent decades. It has particular resonance in settler nations — like New Zealand — where the original inhabitants of particular territories have become marginalized minorities in new configurations of political power and jurisdiction in those territories. More recently, international indigenous rights movements have given those minorities a degree of soft political influence (most visibly culminating in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Yet while indigeneity may commonly refer to the concept of ‘firstness’ or the state of being the original inhabitants of a territory, its meaning is influenced by both national and international dynamics of identity formation, solidarity and power. Many scholars today acknowledge that indigeneity is a fluid concept: “a process; a series of encounters; a structure of power; a set of relationships; a matter of becoming, in short, and not a fixed state of being” (Cadena and Starn 2007, 11).

These shifts and contingencies reflect the fraught politics of defining Pākehā identity distinct from its British roots, and the centrality of national identification to this process. Claims to indigeneity by some Pākehā, for example, could be seen as an attempt to erase the status of Māori as Aotearoa/New Zealand’s only indigenous people. This has the effect of imbuing New Zealand national identities and institutions with a sense of indigeneity, positioning notions of ethnic and cultural identity, however diverse, as merely aspects of a broader, ‘indigenous’ nationality. This view is incompatible with the assertion of tino rangatiratanga or self-determination by Māori; instead, such assertions are deemed ‘separatist’. The appropriation of the concept of indigeneity by Pākehā supresses its currency as an identifier of resistance to colonization by colonized peoples (Didham and Callister 2016). Pākehā identity’s indigenization subtly legitimizes the dominance of Anglo-Western culture, eliding uncomfortable postcolonial questions about Aotearoa/New Zealand’s histories and identities.
Identity construction is complicated by the fluidity and confusion between concepts of ethnicity, race, culture, and nationality. Statistics New Zealand’s widely utilized data collection and categorization strategies for ethnic identity — such as category aggregation — often simplify and distort differences, mask greater diversity, limit identity choices, and misplace identities not covered by conventional categories (Callister 2011, 115-124). Statistics New Zealand’s (2005) standard for ethnicity describes it as “a measure of cultural affiliation, as opposed to race, ancestry, nationality or citizenship” (1). Yet a significant rise in an exclusively nation-based ethnic identity, ‘New Zealander’, in recent censuses reflects the fluidity of these categories (see Callister 2011). However, prototypical notions of national character often “over emphasize those features that are perceived as most prototypical of the dominant ethnic majority”, namely Pākehā (Sibley et al. 2011, 21).

‘Ethnicity’ — like national identity, race, culture, and other identity markers such as class, religion, gender, sexuality etc. — constructs or imagines boundaries of ‘difference’. Yet constructions of ethnic identity and difference can also be incorporated into an overarching national identity framework masking inequalities. Consequently, even the concept of biculturalism may reflect historically unequal ethnic relations — particularly when one side’s characteristics are commonly articulated, whereas the characteristics of the other are not because they are presumed to be ‘natural’ or normal (see Said 1979); one can label a piece of music as specifically ‘Māori’, but attempts to pigeon-hole another piece as characteristically ‘Pākekā’ has minimal social currency and quickly becomes contentious.

Indeed, biculturalism’s recent appearance and ascendency is as much about nationalism as sociopolitical history. National narratives like biculturalism appear as inevitable and natural consequences of history. This supposed inevitability has been criticized from a legal and constitutional standpoint, where constructions of national identity underpin proclamations of the New Zealand state’s sovereignty (Seuffert 2006; Yong 2014). The idea of inevitable national development exploits the past to construct national histories in the present (Gellner 1997). As Bohlman (2004, 76-77) articulates, “the nation possesses presents that are both historically and ethnographically imagined”. Indeed, while discussing contemporary accounts of pre-twentieth century histories, Belich observed:

[W]hat I’ve found in my writing on New Zealand general history was that really neither Australia nor New Zealand existed as nations before 1901, when there was no such thing as Australia. There was a Tasman world in which the seven
British colonies of Australasia interacted on a basis of rough parity. New Zealand was one of the big three — it wasn’t little brother then, you know. So, in a sense, Australian and New Zealand historians have retrospectively invented separate pasts for the nineteenth century to suit the purposes of the twentieth century (quoted in Edwards 2008).

This invention of a national past reflects the taken-for-granted aspect of banal nationalism’s modern significance. It allows the bicultural story to be projected onto the past as a feature of “New Zealand society”, even before the Treaty’s signing in 1840 (Hayward 2012). Crucially, this naturalization of the nation also constructs its citizens in particular ways. Regarding accounts of New Zealand history by Pākehā, Peter Gibbons (2002) observes that:

> [M]any tell the same plain story… recounting in moral or providential or racial terms — but with a proper respect for chronology — the circumstances under which settlers came to be dominant and the indigenous peoples subordinate, and making this outcome seem natural, conclusive and definitive. All these histories share an essential characteristic, beyond the similarities in the story contours: they propose the settler presence to be unproblematic, and they problematize the ‘Other’ (14).

Thus, common New Zealand histories reflect contemporary nationalist narratives like biculturalism, which themselves often marshal positional/cultural biases that ‘indigenize’ Pākehā identity. Consequently, national narratives flatten historically unequal colonial power relations between Māori and Pākehā, committing what Hage (quoted in Wevers 2005) has called a “form of symbolic violence in which a mode of domination is presented as a form of egalitarianism”. Referring to Pākehā historian Michael King’s claims to indigeneity, Lydia Wevers states:

> [W]hat his expressed authorial intentions reveal is what Hage has called the ‘power of the dominant to set their own… boundaries’. Hage is referring to spatial control of the tolerated (or not tolerated) other; King is articulating a set of discursive and moral imperatives which position him as the authoritative interpreter, the historian who controls the explanation, the discourse and its reception and who speaks for two cultures (6).
This suggests that an ‘indigenized’ Pākehā cultural identity frequently underpins New Zealand histories. Indeed, many of the critical and historical analyses of Aotearoa/New Zealand music that I reference are written from Pākehā perspectives which employ a ‘national’ historical narrative. These histories not only lack Māori perspectives, but also frequently represent Māori on their behalf. Pākehā settler society — and music’s place within it — is thus framed as New Zealand society, within which Māori are situated. The Pākehā frame’s specificity is rarely, if ever, acknowledged, virtually co-opting the notion of indigeneity in New Zealand by creating an equal playing field on which all ‘New Zealanders’ — regardless of ethnicity, culture, ancestry etc. — are situated as citizens. This ignores the postcolonial histories of disenfranchisement, alienation and marginalization of Māori societies (and other minorities), and does not acknowledge that the concept of equality as ‘New Zealanders’ is based on Eurocentric notions of identity, society, democracy and so on.

The dominance of an unmarked Pākehā culture shaping what ‘New Zealand music’ might represent has particularly pertinent implications. In chapter three, drawing parallels with chapter two’s discussion of the state’s globally-oriented nation branding programme, I explore the paradox of how New Zealand music awards celebrate music that is supposedly distinctively ‘ours’ (New Zealand’s), despite so much of the music showcased following Anglo-American popular trends. I argue that this national-cosmopolitan sensibility stems from Pākehā dominance in developing Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry. Chapter four builds on this argument, investigating how ‘New Zealand music heritage’ narratives, constructed through institutions like museums, reproduce celebratory and inclusive national identity discourses which only cursorily consider how Pākehā perspectives shape them. To understand what produced and reproduces Pākehā cultural dominance necessitates a more critical reading of New Zealand history through a postcolonial lens.

Postcolonialism, the State and Official Nationalisms

In the present ‘decolonisation’ era (Belich 2001, 12), historical narratives about New Zealand’s foundation have increasingly sidelined British heritage and the associated history of oppression. Colonialism appears distant in many recent sociopolitical developments in Aotearoa/New Zealand society: the ‘Māori renaissance’, a re-centring of the Treaty of Waitangi’s constitutional importance, a growing republican movement, an increasing openness to cultural diversity, and so on. However, the idea that colonialism has ended — while legally true (New Zealand is an independent sovereign nation-state) — overlooks
colonial continuities in present-day Aotearoa/New Zealand, and even extends the colonial mentality itself (Byrnes and Coleborne 2011, 4-5):

The basic premise of postcolonialism… is that colonization is unfinished business. …In early twenty-first-century New Zealand, the repercussions of colonialism continue to resonate through entrenched social, cultural, political and economic differences… and are deeply ingrained in ‘real world’ inequalities which reach far beyond the academy (1).

The New Zealand state has been historically crucial to developing and maintaining postcolonial national consciousness.10 While the hyphenation of ‘nation-state’ reflects a conceptual polity representing the epitome of nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992, 18; Pearson 2001, 174-176), the state drives the creation and maintenance of this conceptual unification. According to Pearson, colonial administrations which would later become nation-states used “institutions of governance and control [to] help promote the setting within which national consciousness may emerge” (9-10). Pearson argues that the polity representing such settler societies should be characterized as a ‘state-nation’ rather than a nation-state (10), given statehood preceded common myths of nationhood.

The state is certainly not the sole authority on national identity. State ‘official nationalisms’ have always negotiated popular national identities that often diverged from historic claims to power (Anderson 2006, 83-110).11 Askew (2002) argues that national identity is negotiated “by people at all levels of the social matrix – even if their engagement takes the form of outright rejection or dismissive disregard. …No amount of rhetoric can construct a nation if it fails to find resonance with the state citizenry” (9-10). However, while nationalism is inherently interactive, both struggled against and employed for one’s own purposes, this negotiation of national identity nevertheless occurs within nation-building narratives that are reproduced by dominant sociopolitical structures. In other words, the enigmatic yet ‘banal’ national framework which enables negotiation between New Zealand’s ‘official’ nationalisms and alternative national narratives, depends on the postcolonial state-nation’s origins and continuities.

10 I use the term ‘New Zealand’ in this sense (as opposed to Aotearoa/New Zealand) to describe the socially constructed/imagined nation-state — the site of political dominance and compounded colonial power.

11 E.g. the mid-twentieth century nationalist arts movement of Aotearoa/New Zealand offered a narrative of New Zealand identity distinct from the state’s imperial loyalty (Barker 2012).
Commonly described as New Zealand’s ‘founding document’, the Treaty and its mythology is the historic and contemporary cornerstone contextualising many perspectives of New Zealand’s national imaginary; it explains how institutions of state sovereignty, Pākehā dominance, and the centrality of liberal democracy coalesce. Nan Seuffert (2006) argues that the “the production and legitimation of the dominant story of the founding of New Zealand as a unified nation-state is dependent upon the repression of the appropriative mistranslation of the Treaty of Waitangi into Maori” (12). In the English version of the Treaty, Māori cede sovereignty to the British Crown, whereas:

For most Māori, the Treaty signing did not symbolise the founding of one nation. ...In the Māori versions, Māori retained their traditional control over their land and people, explicitly recognised in the guarantee of te tino rangatiratanga… and in oral guarantees of Māori laws and customs (31). 12

Soon after its signing, based on the English text, the Crown proclaimed sovereignty “by cession” over the North and (later) South islands (SSC 2005, 20), and thus all its peoples, including Māori. As Ranginui Walker (2004, 96) has argued, this mobilized an assimilationist, nationalist ideology of ‘one people’ “that was to dominate colonial policy well into the twentieth century”.

After the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, colonial nation-building policies — working from the belief in cultural and racial superiority — excluded and suppressed non-British identities and traditions (Hayward 2012; Seuffert 2006, 49-70; Walker 2004; Smith 2012). This affected Māori culture and customs particularly harshly. While many Māori adopted European traditions and technologies for their own benefit (see King 2003), the British colonial civilizing mission increasingly encroached on Māori life: colonial land laws and confiscations — designed to serve the fast growing European settler population — alienated many Māori from their lands and forced many to adapt to the British norms of settler-colonial society (Walker 2004, 135-146). For example, Native schools, designed for assimilation, discouraged te reo (“in some instances enforced by corporal punishments” [147]), causing Māori language speakers to decline sharply in the twentieth century. As Ranginui Walker claims:

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12 See also Walker 2004, 90-97.
Schooling demanded cultural surrender, or at the very least suppression of one’s language and identity. Instead of education being embraced as a process of growth and development, it became an arena of cultural conflict (148).

Where land loss and prescriptive schooling are colonization’s material processes, the cultural conflict Walker describes involved subjugating tikanga and mātauranga Māori to Western epistemologies. While these Eurocentric attitudes have diminished, and in some instances reversed, since the Māori renaissance, the consequences of ethnocentrism still resonate across Aotearoa/New Zealand society today.13

New Zealand’s historic ethnocentrism undoubtedly shapes contemporary constructions of nation-ness in music. Given nationalism’s capacity to disguise inequalities, many ‘national’ identifications in New Zealand music represent and reproduce normalized senses of New Zealand identity reflecting ethnic/cultural biases; music historically dominated by Pākehā in Aotearoa/New Zealand — e.g. classical and much Anglo-American derived popular music — is ordained ‘New Zealand music’, whereas non-Pākehā traditions appropriated to represent the nation’s ‘unique’ identity — e.g. kapa haka performed for the Ministry for Culture and Heritage’s Cultural Diplomacy International Programme14 — are ethnically essentialized. The latter suggests that political agendas reinforce ethnic and national characterizations of music; a category like ‘Māori music’ says as much about its position as the ‘other’ in specific musical classification systems — and their underlying aesthetic values and cultural — as it does about the music’s ethnic/cultural qualities.

The New Zealand state has always acted on the authority of its own definitions of citizens’ identities. In recent years, the basis of this authority has shifted to incorporate the priorities of neoliberalism. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2007) has explored how neoliberal politics provided both challenges and opportunities for Māori by redefining Māori and indigenous identities and their relationship to the state. While national, ethnic and indigenous identities have been strongly contested through resistance to these shifts in political ideology, neoliberalism has attempted to consolidate an individualistic Western economic political theory as the standard for all New Zealand citizens, at the expense of alternative cultural and political values, such as those articulated by indigenous resistance movements. Indeed, the connections between

neoliberal policy, tourism, globalization, and national branding — which recur throughout this thesis — powerfully frame Aotearoa/New Zealand’s postcolonial musical identities. I claim that such political constructions and contestations of ‘national’ music connect to a broader, state-facilitated and Pākehā-dominated nation-building project, which exceeds simply privileging Pākehā institutions and conceptions of artistic value (e.g. Western classical music receives the majority of state-funding for music); New Zealand’s state-led nation-building presents liberal democracy itself as fundamental to New Zealand identity.

In today’s political climate, following the Māori renaissance, the ‘one people’ ideology is a contentious and divisive issue. Explicitly endorsed by groups like Hobson’s Pledge\(^\text{15}\) (whose spokesperson, Don Brash, campaigned on a staunch one people ideological platform as National Party leader in the mid-2000s),\(^\text{16}\) the One New Zealand Foundation,\(^\text{17}\) and the political party New Zealand First, the one people ideology rejects so-called ‘race-based’ policy that affords certain ‘privileges’ to particular ethnic groups (particularly Māori) over others. The ideology is justified on ostensibly egalitarian grounds, espousing one law and equal rights for all under a liberal democratic nation-state.

What the ‘one people’ ideology’s proponents fail to recognise is how the New Zealand state-nation, through (post)colonial nation-building, has eroded distinct Māori social, cultural and political systems since the Treaty’s signing, and forced Māori and other ethnic groups to assimilate to a normalized British-based society. As Waitere and Allen (2011, 52-53) explain:

> [W]hen Don Brash, as leader of the National Party, made the claim that proactive policies to engage indigenous aspirations were forms of reverse racism, and that all race-based policies should be eradicated from government policies and practices... he rekindled debates that constructed Māori political claims as problematic and debilitating, obstructive of any form of shared national identity or cohesive society. Brash conveniently ignored or falsely assumed that unnamed, unqualified policies are somehow ‘raceless’, that they are located outside of social histories derived from and predicated on racial hierarchies that underpin the current inequities.

\(^{15}\) [http://www.hobsonspledge.nz/ (23 Feb 2017)].
\(^{17}\) [http://onenzfoundation.co.nz/ (23 Feb 2017)].
In this sense, the ‘one people’ ideology overlooks the destructive effects of colonizing processes. Ignoring the “social histories derived from and predicated on racial hierarchies” and treating an ostensibly ‘race-blind’ New Zealand citizenship as the fundamental basis of rights overrides and excludes any unique position or rights that indigeneity holds for Māori as a marginalized people; this perspective can be seen as either vesting Pākehā with an equal claim to indigeneity, or of eliminating the political significance of the notion of indigeneity altogether. Furthermore, Pearson (2005) outlines how historically uneven standards of New Zealand citizenship that arose from the political, economic and cultural priorities of Pākehā political elites make disregarding claims for indigenous rights an untenable attitude. Yet the difficulty here is that “most New Zealanders, particularly but not exclusively Pakeha, see their rights as individual civic entitlements, shared in common with others” (33). Thus, an unquestioning allegiance to notions of liberal democracy simultaneously reinforces the institutional dominance of Pākehā culture (cf. Post 2016).

The nationalist ‘one people’ ideology even appropriates the bicultural narrative. The landmark 1987 legal case of New Zealand Māori Council vs. Attorney-General established Treaty ‘principles’, distilling the Treaty’s essence into a narrative of partnership, which also happened to fit comfortably within the emerging narrative of New Zealand as an ‘enterprise society’ facilitated by the state’s radical neoliberal reforms (Seuffert 2006, 24-26, 80-83). Government policy now commonly invokes Treaty principles, such as partnership, which underpin the bicultural narrative. While biculturalism has created new political, social and legal openings for Māori initiatives, it simultaneously suppresses alternative Treaty readings (e.g. that Māori never ceded sovereignty in the Māori text), and condone subsequent ‘deceptions’ of colonial policy founded on the ideology of one people. Thus, the appropriation of biculturalism’s political partnership principle as a nationalist ideology reinforces the hegemony of the state-nation — as a Pākehā institution — by co-opting Māori issues within its remit, rather than engaging the idea of shared sovereignty that the Treaty arguably guarantees.18 Biculturalism’s framing as an official nationalism provides a powerful template upon which to project Aotearoa/New Zealand’s musical identities, which simultaneously recognise diversity and overlook the dominance of Pākehā-centric national narratives.

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18 A recent 2014 Waitangi Tribunal inquiry (Wai 1040) found that the rangatira who signed the Treaty did not cede sovereignty.
The remainder of this thesis explores how these national ideologies subtly underlie articulations of national identity in musical contexts. Through representative democracy’s liberal/civic ethos, cultural policy (chapter two) explicitly supports multiculturalisms — primarily biculturalism — which, perhaps inadvertently, perpetuate and justify the one people ideology. I argue that this ideology often manifests when cultural identity, based on Pākehā norms and values, and civic national identity are conflated. The interchangeability of these identities — articulated by common terms such as ‘New Zealand identity’, ‘New Zealand culture’ and even ‘New Zealand music’ — frames distinct cultural values and viewpoints within Eurocentric perspectives. That is, to call something ‘New Zealand music’ too often supresses and distances Aotearoa/New Zealand’s colonial past and its ongoing influence on vital aspects of non-Pākehā New Zealanders’ (particularly Māori) musics and cultures.
Chapter Two: The Art of State-Nationhood: Music and Arts Policy

This chapter considers how broader policy and sociopolitical developments have shaped music policy, in the context of the Eurocentric nation-building strategies discussed in chapter one. After discussing the historical development of arts and music policy, I draw on policy-related documents, legislation, reports, and material from interviews I conducted with government employees, policymakers, and music industry people, to analyse the objectives and outcomes of various music and arts funding policy instruments. I demonstrate how objectives described in ‘national’ terms can mask funding discrepancies and drive what musicians/traditions are supported, funded and celebrated. Furthermore, I discuss tensions between simplistic dichotomies such as ‘high’ vs. ‘low’ culture, ‘art’ vs. ‘popular’ music, and more recently, ‘intrinsic’ or ‘aesthetic’ vs. ‘instrumental’ value, highlighting how these dichotomies incorporate ethnic categories — particularly Māori music and arts — to serve the state’s wider ‘national’ priorities.

More specifically, four core government agencies, under the banner of Manatū Taonga — Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH), implement the bulk of New Zealand’s music policy: Creative New Zealand (CNZ), governed by The Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa (Arts Council), funds various largely non-commercially viable projects and organizations spanning several artforms; NZ on Air (NZOA), the Broadcasting Commission, supports domestic content production and promotion across all broadcasting platforms; Te Māngai Pāho (TMP), or Te Reo Whakapuaki Irirangi, a broad-spectrum broadcasting agency, supports the production of Māori language and culture content; and the New Zealand Music Commission (NZMC), an independent government-funded arts organization, supports the New Zealand music industry’s development.19 Each individual organization undertakes distinct work in relatively diverse areas, much of which grew out of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s particular sociopolitical histories and contexts. Despite their distinct areas, nationalisms influence and are reinforced by all of these agencies’ policy agendas in some way. These agendas and their national framing have developed according to historical developments, which I turn to now.

19 In reality, these entities’ organizational structures are different and more complex than I have described here (in terms of delegated and hierarchical roles and relationships between governance boards and operational/executive arms). Nevertheless, I have largely treated them as single entities (with a few exceptions) for the purposes of this study.
The History of Nation-Building Arts Policies

The 1940s were pivotal for New Zealand arts policy. Previously, government support for arts was irregular, but New Zealand’s Centennial celebrations in 1940 (100 years since the Treaty of Waitangi’s signing) inspired more targeted state support for the arts (Durrant 2014). The 1946 establishment of the NZSO’s predecessor, the National Orchestra, followed the success of the Centennial Festival Orchestra, and drew on Aotearoa/New Zealand’s relatively active orchestral music scene (Brewerton 2012; Walls 2014). This first major post-Centennial arts policy development reflected the contemporary sociopolitical climate; the Centennial celebrations were overtly nationalistic, but the Treaty and Māori interests “took a back seat to the celebration of a century of European effort and progress in New Zealand” (MCH 2014).

The New Zealand Broadcasting Service’s Mobile Recording Unit was another significant state-led music initiative emphasising European endeavour in New Zealand. Between 1946 and 1948, the Unit travelled to various towns and regions recording all manner of oral and local histories, and community and cultural activities. However, owing to its overseers’ priorities, the recording of music was largely “restricted to ‘serious’ or ‘classical’ music”, and became secondary to oral histories because most performances were deemed of insufficient quality for broadcast (Thomas 2002, 88-89). While not explicitly nationalist, these early policies exemplify both Eurocentrism and how state actors’ ideological positions — here, elitist ‘high’ art tastes — can come to represent the nation. Both elitism and Eurocentrism have since pervaded New Zealand arts and music policy.

Through the 1950s-1960s, government support for arts organizations increased. Following trends in Britain and Canada, CNZ’s predecessor — the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council (QEIIAC) — was established in 1963. The QEIIAC instituted an ‘arm’s-length’ funding model, wherein the Council makes funding decisions independent of political influence. As former Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage, Chris Finlayson, noted, “Ministers should not be making decisions about what book should be published, or… that’s what Stalin used to get up to with Shostakovich” (personal interview). While these major mid-twentieth century arts policy developments did not emphasise ‘national identity’, they signified the adoption of Eurocentric ‘high-culture’ frameworks (Durrant 2014): according to then Minister of Internal Affairs, Leon Gotz, in a 1963 Parliamentary speech, European artistic traditions practised by

20 Then Director of Broadcasting, James Shelley, who also oversaw the National Orchestra’s establishment, and the Unit’s producer and ‘officer-in-charge’, Leo Fowler.
Pākehā purportedly reflected “the maturity and status of New Zealand” (quoted in Skilling 2005, 23).

From the 1970s, arts policy diversified, recognizing the importance of wider public participation, popular arts, regionalism, cultural pluralism and, significantly, national identity. Initially, Māori constituted one of several ethnic minorities for arts policy purposes (Skilling 2005). Following the Māori renaissance, arts policy — framed by the Crown’s commitment to the Treaty — recognised “the role of Māori as tangata whenua” as distinct from general support for cultural diversity.21 CNZ’s formation in 1994, replacing QEIIAC, embodied these principles, establishing distinct general and Māori arts boards, and a subsidiary Pacific Arts Committee. The 2014 Act created a single 13-member board requiring a minimum of four members with knowledge of “te ao Māori (Māori world view); … tikanga Māori (Māori protocol and culture); and… Māori arts”, and a minimum of two with knowledge of Pasifika arts and cultural traditions (s 10). These bi- and multicultural provisions exist in much arts and music policy today; CNZ, NZOA’s and TMP’s governing legislation contains explicit provisions to recognise and support Māori arts and culture, and diverse cultural expressions.22 These policies reflect the state’s capacity to incorporate changing sociopolitical demands into pre-existing Pākehā-dominated institutional forms.

The most significant, recent developments in New Zealand’s music and arts policy were shaped by the fifth Labour-led Government (1999-2008) under Prime Minister Helen Clark.23 Scott (2013) characterizes this Government as an ‘enabling state’ operating on an ‘after neoliberalism’ platform that facilitated productive engagement with the globalizing market economy, and developed policy mechanisms — particularly in the so-called ‘creative industries’ — to foster social inclusion for alleged ‘problematic persons’ marginalized by the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (4-5). These neoliberal reforms — based on the belief that deregulated markets most efficiently produce economic growth and prosperity and maximize individual democratic freedoms — dismantled or restructured many traditional state services and institutions to align with market-based service provision. As I explore later, these new neoliberal priorities changed the nature of state support particularly (but not

21 Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 2014, s 3(2).
22 s 7(1)(c); Broadcasting Act 1989, ss 36(1) and 53B(1).
23 Clark’s self-appointment to the Arts, Culture and Heritage portfolio symbolized this Government’s commitment to the arts.
exclusively) for Māori cultural expressions and ‘arts’ by justifying much of that support with market economics and branding.

Importantly, the Labour-led Government’s policy interventions were designed to mitigate neoliberalism’s harsher social effects without disturbing or reversing neoliberalism’s ideological supremacy. Labour’s policies were “circumscribed by the neo-liberal acquiescence to the globalizing market economy, which is seen to endow work discipline, competition and, ultimately, social inclusion through the pursuit of self-interest” (35). This approach, elsewhere described as Third Way politics (Skilling 2005), sees globalizing liberal market economies as integral to the “goal of widening economic opportunity and deepening social cohesion” (Scott 2013, 28). As “global interconnectedness generates incentives for states to construct a unique national brand in the interests of global economic competitiveness,” the benefits and value of music and arts have become increasingly co-opted for this national agenda (Skilling 2010, 177; 2005).

The Labour-led Government’s capitalization on the expedience of nation branding has had mixed effects on artistic endeavours. While the Government’s substantial arts investments boosted opportunities within Aotearoa/New Zealand’s creative industries, and their profile, many feel that the underpinning national branding exercise has drawn narrow, nationalistic boundaries around the valuation of creative work (Williams 2004, 16-18). While national identity has been creeping into arts policy since the 1970s, the neoliberal nation branding exercise demonstrates nationalism’s malleable ideological capacity, wherein celebratory and inclusive national narratives may obscure the costs and benefits of neoliberal policies.

The remainder of this chapter unpicks how various historical and political trends and discourses have informed New Zealand’s contemporary music/arts policy. Despite neoliberalism’s recent influence, the market-based political programme has not superseded existing notions of music’s non-economic value. For example, a high degree of support and funding remains for traditions such as classical music “where older definitions of ‘culture’ and ‘heritage’ provide mutual reinforcement to protect these forms from the harsh sunlight of the market” (Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole 2016, 6). As Michael Brown has noted (cited in Skilling 2005, 23), the development of new discourses does not involve the abandonment of old ones, but rather new discourses build on, and are articulated by, old discourses.
First, I examine how ongoing support for well-established music and arts institutions with historic Eurocentric ‘high’ cultural associations (e.g. NZSO and CNZ) is reconciled with increasing demands for support of diverse cultural traditions. Then, I explore the expansion of state intervention in music following New Zealand’s extensive 1980s-1990s neoliberal reforms. In both cases, I argue that state-sanctioned ‘official’ discourses of national identity and ‘New Zealand music’ inadvertently espouse Eurocentric agendas and perspectives.

**From High-Culture to Multiculturalism**

Notions of artistic value, ‘quality’, cultural significance and heritage are contested in New Zealand’s contemporary arts/music policy. Eurocentric ‘high-culture’ perspectives — while still influential in certain arts policy areas — have been tempered by late twentieth century sociopolitical changes catalysed by the Māori renaissance. Furthermore, changing migration patterns — owing to liberalized 1970s-1980s immigration policies, and refugee intakes (Phillips 2013, 16-17) — have increased Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Consequently, bi- and multicultural policy recognising and supporting the arts of Māori, Pasifika, and other ethnic groups has evolved. These developments reflect a common policy tension in ‘Western’ states experiencing increasingly culturally diverse populations: whether state arts-funding should foreground principles of ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’, or the popular and diverse values of the public (Street 2011).

The notion that artistic ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’ — favouring complexity, and often provoking and challenging popular norms — provide the greatest benefit for an uninformed public is known as the ‘democratization of culture’: essentially an elitist, top-down approach seeking to disseminate (‘high’) culture to the general public by enhancing economic and geographic accessibility (Paquette and Redaelli 2015, 86-87). This approach underpins the NZSO’s Community Programmes, which offer discounts and free concerts for families, young people and school children, and in regions outside Aotearoa/New Zealand’s big cities,24 or the Sistema Aotearoa programme, which provides classical instrumental tuition to low-decile schools in South Auckland to aid social, community, educational and musical development.25 This top-down approach also appears in CNZ’s Tōtara programme, which emphasises engagement with Māori through “services to Māori arts, audiences and

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participants” rather than direct support for Māori music (CNZ, cited in Cattermole 2013a). As Western art music organizations dominate Tōtara’s funding for music, at worst, Cattermole argues, this programme “can be viewed as a resuscitation of assimilationist policy; a paternalistic and patronizing attempt to ‘civilise the natives’” (5).

However, this approach’s benefits are often unclear. For example, CNZ’s strategic outcome that ‘New Zealanders experience high-quality arts’ (the outcome that received the most investment in the 2015/16 financial year) is ambiguous. Clarifications around how ‘high-quality arts’ are assessed — e.g. “attention [is paid] to the strength of the relevant idea, the viability of the process, the experience and ability of the people involved, and the soundness of the budget” — are, aside from budget assessment, as abstract, subjective and inconclusive as the notion of ‘high-quality’ itself (CNZ 2016, 18-20). Furthermore, positive, celebratory and emotional rhetoric can obscure genuine analyses of actual social outcomes (see Baker 2014). Indeed, a report on the outcomes of Sistema Aotearoa identified various positive benefits, yet these were centred on ‘success cases’ and did not consider potential negative outcomes (McKegg et al. 2015).

By contrast to the ‘democratization of culture’, ‘cultural democracy’ is a bottom-up, inclusive, and sometimes populist approach, emphasising accessibility for all, particularly in the provision and definition of cultural opportunities and value (Paquette and Redaelli 2015, 86-87). Highlighting popular values does not necessarily exclude artistic excellence, but tempers traditional aesthetic concerns with democratic values such as diverse representation. Many of New Zealand’s arts policies reflect the cultural democracy approach: CNZ has separate and dedicated funds for Māori arts and Pacific arts stemming from legislative obligations around cultural pluralism and the Treaty. While inevitably reductive, this ‘democratic’ binary distinguishes between specific assumptions of universal cultural value (i.e. European ‘high culture’) and diverse cultural values. However, this distinction is not always made in New Zealand’s arts policy, particularly when national narratives underpin policies espousing such values.

Arts policy legislation, and its interpretation, demonstrates how ‘national’ discourse frames approaches to cultural representation. The Arts Council’s first two statutory functions are to “encourage, promote, and support the arts in New Zealand for the benefit of all New
Zealanders” and “promote the development of a New Zealand identity in the arts”.26 For Nonnita Rees — Manager, Policy Development at CNZ — these clauses necessitate the development of a national identity that embraces diversity:

There’s a principle [in CNZ’s legislation] of promoting the development of a New Zealand identity in the arts, and we do that by actually giving priority to funding New Zealand work for New Zealand audiences. We need to interrogate [that principle] these days by seeing that the work and the people for whom the work is produced reflects our demography. If we were to not be reflecting our diversity of that, we wouldn’t be meeting our requirement to benefit all New Zealanders. So we can’t define the New Zealand identity, I don’t think it’s possible. But if you go back and you see that the art is reflective of the demography, and indeed the ‘for whom’, that the delivery is reflective of the demography – that’s what we’re aiming for (personal interview).

As Rees suggests, developing ‘a New Zealand identity in the arts’ propels CNZ to engage with cultural diversity. Indeed, CNZ funds several programmes for Ngā Toi Māori (Māori arts), Pacific Arts, and projects with other non-Pākehā communities (e.g. the Auckland Diversity Project Fund). Furthermore, CNZ’s ‘general’ funding programmes support projects reflecting diverse cultural traditions.27 Such policy instruments have been described as exemplifying “an overall shift from assimilation to self-determination” in New Zealand’s arts policy (Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole 2016, 166), demonstrating CNZ’s commitment to ensuring “funding and services are fair and non-discriminatory and keep pace with rapid demographic changes in New Zealand society” (CNZ 2015).

Statistics on ethnic involvement and representation in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s arts sector highlight the necessity of such policies. In MCH’s most recent ‘Cultural Indicators for New Zealand’ report (2009), the proportion (in monetary value) of grants awarded to ethnic minority arts groups, and the number of events/activities with a minority cultural ‘theme’ was under half the proportion of the New Zealand population that ethnic minorities constitute (MCH 2009, 59-65). Furthermore, Pākehā represented 90% of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s creative workforce (14-18) — i.e. “those who are employed as cultural creators” (14), rather

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26 Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 2014, ss 7(1)(a) and (b).
than more broadly defined cultural occupations such as “ministers of religion, librarians and early childhood teachers” (7) — despite constituting 74% of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 2013 population (Statistics New Zealand 2015).28 Rather than indicating the efficacy (or not) of cultural diversity policies, such analyses reveal structural biases in arts funding distribution, and Aotearoa/New Zealand’s creative industries.

Occasionally, New Zealand’s arts policy acknowledges that structural and institutional forces affect how diverse cultural values are supported. For instance, while CNZ’s ring-fenced funding streams have enhanced opportunity, access, and development for Māori and Pasifika cultural traditions, the broader organizational and policy engagement with Pasifika and Māori perspectives is still developing. Despite such challenges, important steps are being taken, including delegating funding decisions to Māori and Pacific staff, and the minimum Māori and Pasifika Arts Council representation guaranteed in the 2014 Act. Samoan playwright and documentary director, Makerita Urale, who now works as CNZ’s Pacific Arts Adviser, acknowledged these opportunities for development:

We’re still working very hard on how we implement our systems and processes to align with mana Pasifika and mana Māori. But at the moment it’s just so exciting that the governors are all at one table talking all at once (personal interview).

CNZ’s policy developments address the issue of representational control discussed in the previous chapter. Namely, that historically Pākehā-dominated arts institutions — even when they prioritize cultural diversity — can influence the development and definition of Māori, Pasifika, and other non-Pākehā traditions through funding decisions. While representing non-Pākehā perspectives is a crucial step forward, overarching policy and governance frameworks, particularly in terms of majority/minority representation by numbers29 and culturally-specific concepts of what constitutes ‘arts’, require further consideration.

While cultural diversity policies attempt to address the over-representation of Pākehā and under-representation of ethnic minorities in the arts, the normalization and influence of New Zealand’s dominant Pākehā culture often remains unaddressed. Underlying definitions of

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28 Proportions of ethnic minority creative workers were 7.6% Māori, 5.5% Asian, 2.2% Pasifika, and even fewer (unspecified) ‘other’, while population proportions for these respective groups are 15%, 12%, 7%, and 1%. The percentage totals add up to over 100 because New Zealand’s ethnicity statistical standard allows citizens to identify with multiple ethnic groups.

29 Having 4 persons with knowledge/experience of tikanga Māori and 2 of Pasifika culture and values still only constitutes a minority of the 13 member Arts Council.
categories (by artform) and concepts (e.g. ‘high-quality’) stemming from historically Eurocentric arts policy may shape funding distribution. For example, as Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole (2016) conclude in an analysis of indigenous arts policy:

The overall impression generated by Creative New Zealand’s funding priorities for Māori music is that heritage maintenance is valued over innovation and that the adoption and hybridisation of western art music is valued and promoted over that of other music styles and genres (151).

As such, cultural diversity policies risk ‘pigeon-holing’ and ‘box-ticking’ ethnic representation (Mirza 2009, 62). Furthermore, having particular cultural knowledge requirements for minority representation could result in diversity policies “being narrowly defined along traditionalist lines” (Cattermole 2013b, 26). Broader policy priorities and frameworks can also result in ring-fenced funds creating an unintended funding cap for minority traditions: while Māori and Pasifika arts are eligible for CNZ’s non-specific/general grants, they must compete within a policy framework structured by what Bennett (2001, 27-28) calls “the homogenising tendencies” of the dominant culture and its values; that is, non-Pākehā arts must align with Western artform distinctions of music, theatre, craft/object, and so on, or even CNZ’s definition of ‘arts’ itself.

Much recent critical musicology and ethnomusicology has established that notions of musical meaning are culturally situated. Even the notion of ‘music’, as a distinct artistic or cultural expression, may be meaningless when detached from other sociocultural phenomena (Cross 2012). Anne Salmond (cited in McLean 1996) discusses these issues in relation to representations of Māori:

Māori society has been falsely represented both as functioning in equilibrium until European contact and shattered beyond redemption after contact took place. Other criticisms… are that too little attention has been paid to regional diversity, chronological control has been lacking, and segmentation of Maori society into discrete topics such as economics, religion, art, music, warfare and marriage ’cuts across tribal ways of understanding the past’ (1).

CNZ’s ‘inter-arts’ and ‘multi-disciplinary’ categories — which support non-conventional projects — partially allay these issues, yet combined funding for these two categories was approximately half the total music funding for the past two years (CNZ 2016, 53; 2015, 17).
Arguably, this supports the thesis developed in chapter one, wherein Eurocentrism, reinforced through national institutions, has facilitated Pākehā culture’s normalization as the default representation of ‘New Zealand’ identity. So, in the funding context, the general categories, ostensibly open to all New Zealanders, may unwittingly privilege projects that align with Western conventions, even when non-Pākehā content is apparent.

Supporting cultural diversity in the arts is thus complex. Even statistical measurements on ethnic representation in the arts overlook subtle cultural biases. Here, a closer inspection of how ‘national’ policy objectives shape cultural and ethnic representation is necessary.

*Conflating Nationalisms*

If national identity is fluid, yet Pākehā perspectives dominate national narratives, how do these two phenomena coalesce in arts policy? I argue that open and inclusive senses of New Zealand identity and culture in policy derive from the conflation of civic-based national and Pākehā identities. Many public servants who I interviewed stated that policy does not define New Zealand identity — artists themselves explore and express such identity. Sarah Tebbs, Principal Adviser at MCH, explained:

> It’s not something that government *imposes* on New Zealanders, it’s something that New Zealanders express for themselves. So government policies and agencies are around really enabling and empowering New Zealanders to express their cultural identity, to tell their own stories, and to tell them in multiple ways. And one of the benefits of that is that national identity, or shared identity. Telling New Zealand stories in any number of ways — whether it’s through broadcasting or music or visual art — is important to building that shared narrative of who we are, and what makes us distinct (personal interview).

30 Here, the ‘nation’ frames both individual and collective identity, connecting ‘us’ and shaping who ‘we’ are, demonstrating how diverse cultural expressions may be valued, yet still be mediated by culturally situated state structures. For some, like NZMC Chief Executive, Cath Andersen, geographical location connects New Zealand identity and music:

> For us, it’s really about identifying as a New Zealander, as opposed to making an identifiably New Zealand music. You could be a contemporary classical

30 The views expressed by Sarah Tebbs are not official views of the Ministry or of government.
composer from Wellington or you could be a Punk band from Dunedin, and you are still creating music that is of a place. It is very much to do with location, and sometimes the only common thread through music is where people are from (personal interview).

Both of these statements adopt an inclusive, liberal democratic/civic sentiment casting nationality as citizenship; New Zealanders have innumerable stories to tell, diverse senses of identity which influence each other, and define ‘New Zealand-ness’. Yet, civic-based nationality is not necessarily synonymous with culturally-based national identity. In the broader context of postcolonial Treaty politics, the slippage between the two overlooks embedded Eurocentrism in civic-oriented nationhood narratives.

Publicity about New Zealand’s largest state-supported performing arts institutions exemplifies this identity conflation. In a 2016 Budget media release, Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage, Maggie Barry, announced an additional $11.6m of government spending on the arts over four years. Three organizations will receive this funding: the NZSO, Royal New Zealand Ballet, and Te Matatini Kapa Haka Aotearoa. ‘National’ rhetoric is prominent, but selective, in the short media release: “[a]ll three of these Crown-funded organisations are producing truly world-class work and are part of our national culture”. The press release did not refer to the Ballet’s ‘national’ significance. Similarly, apart from being described as “the national kapa haka organisation”, the additional funding for Te Matatini was “to increase community involvement in Māori dance and promote its health and social benefits, as well as taking the best of kapa haka to the world”. This language appears ‘community’ and culturally specific, and alludes to the current Government’s ‘social investment’ approach with vulnerable communities such as Māori,31 echoing the previous Labour-led Government’s ‘after neoliberal’ socioeconomic policies.

The NZSO — whose annual state-funding totals $14.6m, which is greater than any other, single practising arts organization — received the most triumphant fanfare: “Our national orchestra took New Zealand culture to the world this year, winning a prestigious Grammy nomination for Best Orchestral Recording.” Hyperbole aside, what underpins this overt nationalism? Do New Zealanders need reassuring that government arts funding is not arbitrary, but supports traditions which represent New Zealand culture and identity? How

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many New Zealanders would agree that the NZSO represents their culture, deserving millions of their tax dollars?

Invoking ‘New Zealand culture’ to validate public spending for the NZSO is an opaque statement that masks underlying dynamics of cultural representation and hegemony. Orchestral music has European heritage, but is thoroughly globalized. In fact, the NZSO’s Grammy nominated piece (which “took New Zealand culture to the world”), Symphony ‘Humen 1839’ by Chinese composers Zhou Long and Chen Yi, commemorates the large-scale destruction of opium at Humen, triggering the First Opium War (Paul 2016). Sarah Tebbs’ explanation of how a globalized context frames the NZSO’s national identity status is illuminating:

Half the musicians aren’t from New Zealand, the musical director’s not from New Zealand, the guest conductor is from Norway — what is it about that that makes it New Zealand art? The sheer fact that it’s the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra, that it’s performing in its hometown in a venue built by the local community and supported by the local community, that the musicians are living in the New Zealand community (personal interview).

While this is certainly true from a civic-oriented national perspective, the same could be said about numerous bands or ensembles living, touring, and performing in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In contrast, Makerita Urale noted that, for the NZSO, “it’s the historical connection to Europe and European music. I work with Pasifika heritage artists and I refer to symphonic music as Pākehā heritage music” (personal interview). Here, orchestral music’s European heritage is important in the New Zealand context. Indeed, one might interpret the new funding for organizations that are “part of our national culture” to signify the Government’s commitment to New Zealand’s bicultural national foundations — New Zealand’s European/Pākehā (NZSO and the Ballet) and Māori (Te Matatini) heritage.

Closer inspection reveals inconsistencies in the language the media release uses to describe the NZSO and Te Matatini, respectively. For example, although both organizations ‘take culture to the world’, the NZSO takes ‘New Zealand culture’, while Te Matatini takes kapa haka. If these two entities represent biculturalism’s two sides, why does the media release not acknowledge the NZSO’s European whakapapa (heritage), while highlighting the specificity of Te Matatini’s “traditional Māori dance”? I argue that this results from the discursive conflation of cultural and civic identity: Māori music and arts — while said to represent New
Zealand’s (civic) national identity — are marked by ethnic difference (like the arts of other ethnic minorities), whereas Pākehā music and arts are rarely labelled ‘Pākehā’ or ‘European’, instead being articulated as ‘New Zealand’ arts, representing a normalized New Zealand culture and identity.

What does this say about how orchestral music and kapa haka are valued in Aotearoa/New Zealand? That the NZSO’s annual Crown funding ($14.6m) is over seven times higher than Te Matatini’s ($1.9m) raises issues of equity, as two of my participants expressed:

A: It’s that whole argument against the symphony and the ballet being paid, whereas kapa haka they’re not. But in terms of the time, and the transmission of knowledge, the professional development, in terms of kapa haka, they just have to do it themselves. They don’t get paid to do it.

B: But the extraordinary social, cultural impact of that event on the entire country is incredible (personal interview).

Paradoxically, kapa haka, as an artform largely based on indigenous cultural expressions of Aotearoa/New Zealand, receives far less monetary support than the predominantly ‘cosmopolitan’ NZSO. If Western classical music — practised the world over — could be considered Pākehā heritage music in an Aotearoa/New Zealand context, yet the NZSO is described via arts policy’s recurring citizenship/nationality narrative of New Zealand identity, then civic-based national identity is arguably tied to transnational Western artistic standards of quality. This suggests that Pākehā-oriented notions of New Zealand identity are also globally oriented, and even shaped by international standards of prestige and success. These international influences also call into question how indigeneity is commonly understood via New Zealand national identity — i.e. whether a Pākehā sense of indigeneity is invoked in order differentiate from a global musical community as well as from Māori indigenous traditions.

Interestingly, this interrelationship between national identity, Pākehā culture, and transnational Western musical traditions also applies to New Zealand popular music (see chapter three). The following section examines how and why — in the context of neoliberalism and globalization — recent music/arts policy developments emphasise popular music, and what this elucidates about state-based national identity narratives.
Neoliberalism and National Branding

The extensive influence of the late twentieth century’s so-called neoliberal turn has been widely documented and debated (Bockman 2013; Steger and B. Roy 2010). Between the mid-1980s and early-1990s, New Zealand’s public sector underwent exceptionally rapid and broad restructuring through deregulation and privatization, profoundly affecting the political and social landscape, and opening Aotearoa/New Zealand’s industries to global markets (Boston and Eichbaum 2014). Scherer and Jackson (2010, 15-16) note that “the deregulation of the economy, commercialization of the media, and increased presence of TNCs [transnational corporations] and their promotional campaigns”, facilitated by neoliberal reforms, have enhanced international cultural influences, and stimulated cultural hybridization in mainstream Aotearoa/New Zealand society. Neoliberal globalization has altered state intervention in the arts in contradictory ways, as the state attempted to capitalize on the economic gains that could be made from cultural export to new global markets, while also managing threats that the influx of external cultural content presented to local cultural production (see Homan, Cloonan and Cattermole 2016, 44-56).

Many states have seen globalization as both harmful to national identity, and as an economic opportunity. Adherents of the ‘strong globalization’ thesis argue that proliferating external cultural commodities — particularly from the USA — threaten local music production, justifying support for ‘national’ music (57). Yet John O’Flynn (2007) has observed how state support for ‘national’ music emerges from complex interactions between “the articulation of nationalness in international musical forms” — wherein “a local musical subculture with international continuities… [is] subsumed into national culture and identity” (28-29) — and multinational interests apparent in global marketing strategies which are “reflective of a process of ‘glocalization’: that is, the promotion and production of localized difference for global consumption” (29-30). Yet, ambiguous ‘national’ discourses often obscure such complex local-global connections. As Homan, Cloonan and Cattermole suggest:

There is a form of nostalgia in the constant search (shared by governments and some industry sectors) for the ‘unique’ national characteristic as a problem that can never be solved. Apart from ‘the need to tell our own stories’, there is thus little assessment of what the national is defending (emphasis in original, 81).
Thus, while the state emphatically promotes ‘national’ music, ostensibly to foster cultural protection and national pride, the broader purpose is unclear. This section claims that the New Zealand state’s acquiescence to neoliberal globalization, which incentivizes nation branding, has produced policy instruments (alongside extensive support for ‘art’ musics) which — despite purportedly supporting ‘New Zealand music’ — privilege globally and commercially oriented popular music, which in turn shapes conceptions of ‘national’ cultural norms.

*Popular Music*

Popular music aligns well with New Zealand’s ‘after neoliberal’ government interventions, and is well-supported by NZMC, NZOA and TMP. As a global commodity, popular music complements the state’s emphasis on ‘creative industry’ exports, entrepreneurial policies, and promoting the New Zealand brand (Skilling 2005; Scott 2013, 43-58). In the context of lucrative global markets, popular music policy consolidates economic and cultural interests; increasing the visibility and dissemination of ‘New Zealand music’ both locally and globally enhances sales, increases accessibility and enjoyment, and is said to engender pride in the achievements and success of ‘our’ music. As overseas content has long dominated Aotearoa/New Zealand’s domestic market, such policy strategies seek to strengthen music industry infrastructure and enhance opportunities for Aotearoa/New Zealand musicians. Yet they simultaneously narrow the parameters of much state support for music along popular/commercial lines.

Enhancing musicians’ and music businesses’ access to global markets facilitates the state’s socioeconomic objectives. For NZMC’s Chief Executive, Cath Andersen, global market access offers national and individual economic benefits:

> If New Zealand artists are supported to take their music to the world but can remain here, all their income flows back: songwriting royalties flow back here, the sales royalties flow back here. They develop income streams that mean they can stay in New Zealand rather than having to move to London or move to New York or move to Los Angeles, which means that every sound engineer they pay, every crew member they pay, everyone they work with stays here as well and

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32 As discussed earlier, ‘after’ neoliberalism should be understood as a simultaneous recalibration and reinforcing of neoliberalism, rather than running counter to a neoliberal programme — neo-neoliberalism, so to speak.
make livings in New Zealand. My ultimate goal would be that we have significantly more New Zealanders with the wherewithal to be able to make a living off music, raise families, and buy homes. I mean it’d be awesome if we had five more Lordes, but it’d be even more awesome if we had fifty-five people who are raising families (personal interview).

Furthermore, justifying investment in music export for economic development frequently marshals the idea of national pride. As Andersen states, “supporting success on the world stage is never going to lead to anything except enhanced pride in New Zealand”. This familiar phenomenon of New Zealanders’ obsession with international success — as journalist Jane Bowron puts it, “our dreary mantra of being a tiny little country that punches above its weights [sic]” has recently manifested in music through the so-called ‘Lorde effect’ — a term many of my interviewees used. NZOA’s Head of Music, David Ridler, also connected Lorde’s success to past government support for music export:

The thinking was that success overseas actually engenders a huge amount of New Zealand pride, reflection of New Zealand cultural identity. I think we got evidence of that when Lorde got an extraordinary run of success, and suddenly she’s one of the biggest pop stars in the world. I said earlier how we like to be acknowledged from overseas because that makes us feel validated, or whatever the psychology around that is — the little pat on the head we get from overseas recognition. But I do think that there’s a valid argument that New Zealand musicians breaking overseas in a really strong way does have an effect on New Zealanders at home. I think it gives New Zealand musicians hope and/or belief that there’s a pathway: “they’ve done it, why can’t I?” (Personal interview).

Ridler’s comments show how cultural and economic objectives converge through popular music policy, adherence to market and commercial imperatives, and promotion of national identity. They also indicate that policy prioritizes international popular success as a key pathway for Aotearoa/New Zealand musicians.

How do these policy priorities dictate what ‘New Zealand music’ receives state support? NZOA was established to maintain Aotearoa/New Zealand content production and

dissemination in a newly deregulated/neoliberalized broadcasting environment. However, its interventions aligned with commercial practices (Scott 2013, 62-73), which disadvantaged non-commercially oriented music. According to Ridler, NZOA primarily funds and promotes recordings “that will reach audiences of reasonable size” (personal interview). Yet Dubber (cited in Cattermole 2014, 69) has noted that “[t]hrough exposure comes familiarity and popularity” in music broadcasting, suggesting that audiences could develop around what is supported. However, the dominance of US and UK content in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s commercial radio environment arguably influences audience tastes and sways NZOA to support music reflecting popular Anglo-American musical styles. Ridler elaborated this issue:

Many New Zealand musicians are making music which they are conscious needs to travel for them to create a viable career, because the New Zealand market is really too small to sustain a full-time music career. So that is a bit of a challenge, because is the musician making the music for themselves in a very pure way? Are they making music for their audience who happen to be New Zealanders, or are they making it for an audience of anybody and everybody around the world? And if it is for everybody, would they consciously or subconsciously change things to make it more appetizing to overseas audiences? I expect that is a consideration that’s different for every New Zealand artist (personal interview).

As Ridler acknowledges, market pressures may influence how musicians approach music-making. Consequently, music policy’s commercially oriented national branding paradoxically incentivizes musicians to adopt popular international trends in order to secure funding, validating Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole’s (2016) provocation that in New Zealand’s popular music policy, “Identity was to be aligned with industry” (49).

This commercially oriented identity also elucidates Skilling’s (2010) observation that the state has co-opted New Zealanders as ‘role-performers’ in a rhetorically inclusive (national) ‘shared purpose’ of global economic competitiveness. He argues that policy constructions of national identity serve the state’s socioeconomic policy objectives, particularly those tied to neoliberalism, at the expense of alternative/dissenting articulations of national identity that might highlight neoliberalism’s “unequal distribution of costs and benefits.” Skilling posits that:
[C]lass-based claims that questioned the economic focus of Labour’s shared purpose, or indigenous claims that might threaten a united national image, would not be welcome. A construction of national identity structured by considerations of economic competitiveness translates identity from an intrinsic to an instrumental good, significantly limiting the ways in which New Zealand identity can be understood (180-181).

Thus, while national identity’s alignment with neoliberal economics nudges state-funded ‘New Zealand music’ toward commerciality, broader cultural/ethnic implications are left unaddressed. Given that “indigenous claims that might threaten a united national image” would be unwelcome, how does Māori music fit within this commercially oriented, nation-building policy programme?

**Māori Popular Music**

Commercial constraints have produced mixed results for popular music made by Māori.34 The state has supported the international appeal of Māori popular artists through export opportunities, particularly for world music expos35 and ‘cultural diplomacy’36 — opportunities which tend to exoticize Māori music. This support matches the logic of national branding underpinning other popular music interventions, as the New Zealand Music Industry Development Group’s 2004 report, *Creating Heat*, explicates:

> [P]eople are desperately searching for unique experiences, vibrant new brands...
> New Zealand offers a fresh and exciting new source of creativity for the world.
> Our unique Māori culture and distinctive cultural mix give us an authenticity and individuality that cannot be matched (cited in Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole 2016, 152).

However, the domestic situation is less favourable. Popular music policy’s commercial imperative disadvantages Māori language music — music which is cast as “a threat to profitability” (141). As David Ridler explained:

34 Distinguishing between kaupapa Māori music — whose own diversity eludes a single category — and music with no discernible Māori elements except the musicians’ ethnicity is important here (see Mitchell and Waipara 2011).
It still needs to be the right song, like in terms of getting into the mainstream consciousness, and the audience will respond. That’s the theory at least. And if the audience responds — great, then it should go very well, like ‘Poi E’ did way back in the day, and still does. If the audience doesn’t respond — and commercial radio does a lot of regular music research to determine this — the song just won’t last on the playlist (personal interview).

Thus, even when Māori language music gains mainstream commercial success, Anglophone bias remains an obstacle. Furthermore, this commercial disadvantage limits international development opportunities for kaupapa Māori popular musicians, as export funding often requires previous domestic success (Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole 2016, 153). So, although Māori culture is an important, distinctive aspect of New Zealand’s national brand, Māori popular artists must largely acquiesce to the state’s market oriented economic policies to secure support.

Attempts to support Māori language music are not lacking, yet they often feed into market-based commercial strategies. NZOA’s now discontinued Iwi Hit Disc and Te Reo Radio Hits schemes sought mainstream airplay for Māori language music, while newly implemented distribution strategies for digital and streaming platforms seek wide dissemination (Homan, Cloonan, and Cattermole 2016, 144). These new strategies require consideration of differing levels of economic access and know-how for emerging technologies, which may affect some groups of people more than others (Cattermole 2014, 78). Furthermore, a Māori language quota has not been entertained, despite supporters, likely owing to past tensions over a New Zealand content quota, which contradicted the state’s adversity to market-interference (Shuker 2008, 273-274).

As NZOA does not fund Māori language music specifically (as Ridler noted, “we don’t do any music funding based on ethnicity” [personal interview]), this is covered by TMP. TMP’s explicit mandate “is to promote Māori language and Māori culture”, which has led to Māori music being supported “as a means of achieving linguistic and cultural ends, rather than a taonga (treasure) worthy of protection in its own right” (Cattermole 2014, 71). As te reo Māori, rather than musical convention, is central to government support for Māori music (72), TMP’s focus has been on promoting Māori language music in a commercially

37 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 53B(1).
38 Te reo was claimed as a taonga that the Crown is obliged to protect and support under the Treaty.
dominated broadcasting environment. TMP offers contestable funding for Māori music, whose recipients are primarily broadcast throughout the Iwi Radio Network (IRN). Although IRN stations are highly regulated to maximize airplay and engagement with te reo Māori, they exist for local iwi audiences, and several operate on a commercial basis. As a TMP employee noted in an informal conversation, the ever-present imperative to compete in a media landscape saturated by Anglo-American popular music — even for non-commercial stations — channels most of TMP’s music funding towards contemporary popular reo Māori music rather than other forms of kaupapa Māori music (which are in CNZ’s remit).

Discrepancies exist between NZOA’s legislative emphasis on national identity and policy instruments for supporting Māori music. The Broadcasting Act 1989 — which also established TMP — states that the first of NZOA’s primary functions is “to reflect and develop New Zealand identity and culture by… promoting programmes about New Zealand and New Zealand interests; and…promoting Māori language and Māori culture”. It specifies that broadcasts should reflect diverse peoples’ interests (“including ethnic minorities”), identities, and beliefs. These provisions suggest that Māori music — and various other non-mainstream musics — require non-commercially oriented support streams.

However, in addition to TMP’s prioritization of popular music, NZOA’s current music funding framework emphasises market penetration in a commercial media industry dominated by Anglo-American popular music. The types and genres of music funded and promoted exemplify this: funding is split 60/40% for “songs suitable for mainstream and alternative audiences”, and promotions “[f]ocus on seven music genres… Dance/Electro; Hip Hop/RnB; Reggae/Roots; Rock/Metal; Folk/Country; Pop; Alt/Indie” (New Zealand On Air 2014). Thus platforms seeking to achieve diversity appear restricted to already commercially viable Anglo-American contemporary popular styles. Furthermore, the reference to ‘suitable’ songs in NZOA’s funding structure is vague, and what constitutes an ‘alternative’ audience is unclear. Given most Māori language music does not yet resonate with Aotearoa/New Zealand’s mainstream Anglophone-oriented audiences, NZOA’s criteria appears confused at best, and prohibitive at worst.

The emphases on nationhood in music policy powerfully obscure the shortcomings in such policy. The Broadcasting Act 1989, for example (as in other arts legislation), requires New

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39 s 36(1)(a).
40 ss 36(1)(c) and 36(1)(ca).
Zealand identity and culture to be reflected and developed by promoting New Zealand and its interests, while elsewhere the Act states that broadcasters and curators of ‘on demand’ content are to “promote… a sustained commitment” to content “reflecting New Zealand identity and culture”. While promoting programmes about New Zealand interests can fulfil socially inclusive civic ideals, including the Crown’s Treaty obligations, those ideals are easily conflated with an allegedly distinctive ‘New Zealand’ culture which insufficiently recognises its Eurocentrism, both in terms of specific musical traditions (e.g. NZSO) and conceptions of musical/artistic/cultural value, and broader sociopolitical systems of commerce and government. I argue that this stems from Pākehā New Zealand’s deep connection to the broader Anglosphere, both culturally (i.e. the influence of international cultural products on ‘New Zealand culture’) and commercially (owing to the neoliberal economic framework underpinning Western societies). Consequently, New Zealand musical identity is often essentialized strategically to optimize available gains in a neoliberal global market dominated by Anglo-American popular trends, which reinforces the pre-eminence — even indigenization — of Western musical practices and Pākehā cultural hegemony in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Conclusion

An explicit regard for the importance of national identity permeates much of New Zealand’s music policy. The nationalism underpinning New Zealand’s state-run/funded entities’ work has a legitimating function; ideologically specific values — particularly those that privilege popular music markets, ‘high-art’ notions of quality and artistic excellence, and even liberal democratic notions of cultural inclusivity and diversity — are constructed and validated as national values. The state’s emphatic promotion of a national musical brand — founded on ideologies of New Zealand as an ‘enterprise society’ (Seuffert 2006) and New Zealanders as ‘role-performers’ in the ‘shared purpose’ of optimizing global economic competitiveness (Skilling 2011) — renders support for music (or lack thereof) largely dependent on the state’s broader political agendas. The resultant inequities are masked by recourse to an inclusive national identity.

Although several other musical practices are marginalized by the state’s priorities, the implications for Māori music and arts, and ‘New Zealand identity’, are crucial. For if Māori music and culture is also New Zealand music and culture, yet it relies on separate provisions

41 s 37(b).
and ring-fenced funding for survival, then a globally oriented Pākehā worldview clearly dominates and normalizes constructions of ‘New Zealand’ culture/identity. This normalization, stemming from New Zealand’s official ‘one people’ ideology, ignores or disregards genuinely different worldviews, particularly kaupapa Māori perspectives.
Chapter Three: Competing for National Recognition: The Business of Representation at Music Awards Ceremonies

Popular music of US and UK origin has constituted a substantial part of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s media diet since the mid-twentieth century. Several complex economic, political and cultural factors have maintained this music’s dominance, often generating tension and debate about the value of overseas versus local music. The influence of both local and multinational music businesses over Aotearoa/New Zealand’s airwaves and recording industry undoubtedly stoked these tensions; commercial interests marginalized local music, favouring overseas-made music with proven market success. Predictably, nationalism has been a highly visible, forceful and occasionally successful tool for getting ‘New Zealand music’ noticed, as New Zealand’s fifth Labour Government’s policies demonstrate (see chapter two). Yet in the context of an Anglo-American-dominated music market, achieving this often engenders conformity with popular trends, creating the paradox that the most successful ‘New Zealand music’ often resembles Anglo-American trends and tastes. Aotearoa/New Zealand’s major music awards ceremonies, which support and celebrate the development of New Zealand-made music, reflect this phenomenon. This chapter explores how local and global tensions and resonances in popular music production, dissemination and consumption manifest in music awards, and how nationalism inflects these processes.

The National Awards

The two biggest, most well-known music awards ceremonies in Aotearoa/New Zealand are the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards (VNZMAs, or the ‘Tui’ awards) and the Silver Scroll Awards (SSAs). Run by Recorded Music NZ (RMNZ, formerly RIANZ), the VNZMAs recognise overall achievement in commercial music (particularly sales, artistic merit and technical excellence in music recording), whereas the SSAs, run by the Aotearoa/New Zealand division of APRA AMCOS (Australasian Performing Right Association and Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society, henceforth APRA), emphasise song-writing and compositional excellence. As the Silver Scroll award is peer-voted, the SSAs are often characterized as a celebration of, by and for musicians and songwriters. According to RMNZ’s Marketing & Special Projects coordinator, Mark Roach, the SSAs show “feels a bit more peer-orientated than say our [VNZMAs] show which is more public-orientated” (personal interview). Compared with the VNZMAs, the SSAs are not focused on commercial success, have a smaller media profile, are largely musician-driven,
and thus celebrate music more for music’s sake. The 2016 SSAs’ musical director, Sean James Donnelly (SJD), described the SSAs as having “always been more about integrity and ability versus the numbers/popularity game that is the VNZMAs. There’s always somebody weird and interesting in the Scrolls”.

While histories of the VNZMAs and SSAs are mostly journalistic and incomplete, they highlight some general trends in these events’ development. Both began at the Loxene Golden Disc awards (1965-1972), at which the Silver Scroll was also presented. Only a few award categories existed, and a Pākehā pop/rock style — reflecting contemporary popular trends from the US and UK — dominated. After the Golden Discs era, the Silver Scroll was presented at a low-key, standalone ceremony that many major mainstream artists neglected, remaining so until the early 1990s (Bourke 2015; Brown 2015). Since 1993, the SSAs’ profile has increased, and now includes several new awards, including the SOUNZ Contemporary ‘classical’ composition award, APRA Maioha award for popular Māori composition, and APRA Screen Music awards, introduced in 1998, 2003 and 2014, respectively. Mike Chunn (former member of Split Enz and Citizen Band, APRA’s New Zealand operations director from 1992 to 2003) is credited with revitalizing the SSAs, particularly through the well-received introduction of original performances interpreting the five finalists’ songs. The resurgence in ‘New Zealand music’s’ popularity, known as the ‘pop renaissance’ (Scott 2013), may also have boosted the SSAs’ profile.

The VNZMAs’ development shows similar trends. After the Golden Discs, the Recording Arts Talent Award (RATA) emerged in 1973, broadening the scope from singles “to include albums, performers, producers and engineers — 11 categories in total” (Roach 2015). Although mainstream popular music has dominated these awards, in 1976, the NZSO was awarded Album of the Year for Douglas Lilburn’s Symphony #2. After financial and political issues shelved the RATA, the newly established RIANZ took control in 1978, renaming the RIANZ Awards the New Zealand Music Awards in 1983. Alongside names reflecting various sponsors (being the ‘Vodafone’ NZMAs since 2004), the awards evolved in line with...
developments in the local and global music industries. Since 2013, the VNZMAs has offered 31 awards annually, more than ever before. These 31 categories represent diverse musical sectors, including several genre-based awards, ‘artisan’ awards (Best Engineer, Best Album Cover etc.), and awards for Best Māori Album and Best Pacific Music Album. The diversification of categories prompted increasingly bigger budgets and greater public visibility and engagement.

The annual VNZMAs and SSAs ceremonies are often touted as the most prestigious honours in ‘New Zealand music’. Ostensibly celebrating the most acclaimed and successful music made and produced by New Zealanders, the VNZMAs and SSAs could be considered ‘national’ awards. Such a status is reinforced by their high public visibility (VNZMAs are broadcast live on TV3 and SSAs streamed live online through Radio New Zealand), extensive coverage by news and entertainment media outlets, heavy promotion by their parent organizations, RMNZ and APRA, and attendances by politicians, including former Prime Minister Helen Clark (who was also Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage).

Rhetoric during the ceremonies and in media coverage reflects the awards’ prestigious ‘national’ standing. The VNZMAs are frequently described in mainstream media as “New Zealand music’s night of nights”,45 and as “the biggest night in kiwi music” by RMNZ themselves (RMNZL 2015, 7). Similarly, for APRA, the SSAs celebrate “New Zealand’s finest songwriters and composers”46 and, according to journalist Chris Schulz, present the “best New Zealand songs written in the past year”.47 National belonging is also evoked: at the 2016 SSAs, the MC (and well-known news presenter) John Campbell, gave a warm welcome “to the songwriters, to the performers, to the people who make New Zealand music such a unique and special reflection of who we are, of our place in the world, and our take on the world”.48 This rhetoric’s salience legitimizes use of the term ‘New Zealand (or Kiwi)’49 music’ in these ceremonies. For many observers and participants (whether musicians, industry workers or otherwise), the SSAs and VNZMAs may indeed be New Zealand music’s

49 ‘Kiwi’ is a common colloquial term to describe a person or thing from New Zealand.
most important nights. Yet what actually counts as ‘New Zealand music’ is not transparent, as the VNZMAs’ generic name attests.

I focus on two key, interrelated phenomena evident in both music awards that complicate what determines the ‘national’ in New Zealand music: the diversification of award categories, and the processes which foreground some categories while neglecting others. These dynamics indicate what might constitute ‘mainstream’ popular New Zealand music, given the VNZMAs’ and SSAs’ prestige, and reveal cultural and commercial tensions and continuities between local and global influences, which are mediated by notions of the national (Biddle and Knights 2007). The preamble to the VNZMAs’ judging protocol acknowledges these local-national-global relationships:

> The New Zealand music industry is growing in diversity. The range of genres has increased in recent years keeping up with the changes in New Zealand society and new musical influences. The judging criteria of all the major global music awards are likewise moving in the same direction. The judging of the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards reflect all these factors.

While connecting changes in the music industry, New Zealand society, and major global music awards might emphasise diversity, I argue that positioning ‘mainstream’ popular music as the norm against which diversity is contrasted is equally important. The range of genres/styles encompassed by contemporary popular music may be ever-widening, yet not beyond the currency of a globalized industry that ensnares a matrix of cultural, commercial and aesthetic values. The following section discusses the historical context in which Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music industry has developed and changed, and considers how global influences on these developments have shaped what the ‘national’ represents at Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music awards shows.

**A ‘Glocal’ Music Industry**

Many accounts of popular music’s development in Aotearoa/New Zealand detail the substantial influence of British and US popular culture (e.g. Flint 1994; Mitchell 1994; Dix 2005; Bourke 2010), including accounts espousing the controversial ‘cultural imperialism’ thesis (Lealand 1988). A conservative Western musical culture stemming from New Zealand’s long-lasting British ties variously helped and hindered uptake of popular Anglo-

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American musical movements throughout the twentieth century. Progressive and counter-cultural social movements, technological developments (particularly recording and broadcasting), and the opportunism of multinational businesses all contributed to, and reflected appetites for, Anglo-American popular culture in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Styles that became mainstream in Aotearoa/New Zealand ranged from jazz, country and western, Hawaiian, rock ‘n’ roll, and various rock styles, to soul, funk, electronic/dance, reggae, and hip hop, among others, in later years.

Musical infrastructure heavily influenced local music production. Multinational record label His Master’s Voice/EMI held a virtual recording industry monopoly until the 1950s, and was disinterested in recording local artists. Furthermore, the heavily regulated New Zealand Broadcasting Service espoused conservative agendas, severely limiting popular music broadcasting to short, weekly digests of mainly US and UK artists until the late 1960s (Bourke 2010, chap. 4; Flint 1994, 5-6). While a few independent record labels recorded local artists in this unsupportive environment, commercial pressures limited most of their early work to recording covers of overseas ‘hits’. Although Radio Hauraki’s trend-setting late 1960s broadcasts from international waters greatly enhanced popular music’s dissemination, popular overseas recordings still dominated the trend (Flint 1994, 5-6).

International influences on mainstream media channels since the mid-twentieth century guided economic opportunity and conceptions of cultural identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music. Risk-averse commercial radio stations and multinational record labels, who perceived the quality of locally made music inferior, greatly hindered local musicians’ access to domestic markets (forcing most to seek commercial success in overseas markets, or live/work overseas) (Bourke 2010, 179). A musician I interviewed noticed this belief lingering today: “This idea that just because it’s from overseas, it’s better than New Zealand. I think that we are incredibly good at underselling ourselves here” (personal interview). This self-imposed ‘cultural cringe’ was remarkably pervasive throughout Aotearoa/New Zealand’s cultural practices. Mitchell (1994) argues:

The New Zealand music industry has traditionally been given continual reminders from both inside and outside the country, and especially from across the Tasman, that it represents a tiny and fragile marginality in terms of the global musical economy. The worldwide success of figures like Maori opera singer Kiri Te Kanawa seems only to reinforce this marginality, or to increase a perceived
imperative to make a mark ‘overseas’, preferably in the ‘Old Country’, as a measure of cultural legitimisation and authentication (29).

While ‘cultural cringe’ affects diverse practices, it manifests in popular music through the desire to ‘make it’ overseas, and the concern to achieve commercial success/sustainability.

However, the status of local popular music has recently risen. Several of my interviewees felt that Aotearoa/New Zealand-made popular music no longer induces ‘cultural cringe’ in the face of overseas-made music. For instance, Esther Tobin — Content and Interpretation Developer for Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa, a popular music exhibition at Auckland museum (see chapter four) — remarked:

We did some formative evaluation with our target audience, and they didn’t see a distinction between our national music and international music — for them it was all just music, and all of a similar quality. Whereas when you think about some of the earlier decades represented in the exhibition, it’s more about whether we’ve reached a certain standard or success overseas, and there was this “we’re good enough now” moment. But now that’s completely irrelevant to young people today — it’s all just part of a big soup of good music (personal interview).

This changing sentiment followed a period of significant growth in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music industry since the 1990s — what Scott (2013) calls the ‘pop renaissance’. Accordingly, locally made music’s exposure/airplay, career development opportunities for New Zealand-based musicians, and music industry infrastructure, business, and economic turnover all grew.51 This ‘pop renaissance’ has been largely attributed to the fifth Labour-led Government’s policies (Shuker 2007; 2008), whose emphasis on national branding accompanied rhetoric invoking national pride in ‘New Zealand music’ (see chapter two). However, who or what determines the standard of ‘good’ music?

The growing appreciation of locally made ‘New Zealand music’ often understates international influences. Weisethaunet (2007) argues that musical styles such as rock provide “a way of relating to (or belonging to) an imagined international 'youth' or 'pop culture' in opposition, for example, to affiliation with [national] folk music or traditional culture” (189). Owing to their support for original local music, successful independent labels like Flying Nun have been touted as fostering a “distinctive national musical identity” (Mitchell 1994, 38).

51 2015 saw renewed sales, value added (contribution to GDP) and employment growth in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016).
Yet from a global perspective, as opposed to a nation-centric one, Flying Nun stems from punk and post-punk movements originating in the UK. The ‘nationalization’ of overseas musical styles and identities in Aotearoa/New Zealand also overshadows how styles such as hip hop and reggae reflect and reinforce transnational or ‘translocal’ connections (Zuberi 2007, 10-14). While national identity is partially constructed by globalism and therefore “should not necessarily be considered as oppositional to globalizing influences” (O’Flynn 2007, 21), cosmopolitan Anglo-American popular culture, and the accompanying globalized industry, embedded in Aotearoa/New Zealand society are easily overlooked by discourses of national distinctiveness.

I am not criticizing local musicians’ originality, but rather contextualizing them transnationally. All Aotearoa/New Zealand popular music, including ‘Māori music’, undeniably reflects global influences, for all musicians operate within a music industry dominated by powerful global commercial priorities. Even music industry support for the independence of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s musicians must compete within this environment.

In his history of early-mid-twentieth century Aotearoa/New Zealand popular music, Chris Bourke (2010, 350) articulates the issue thus:

> Popular music of the past century is derivative: that is the nature of market-oriented art. The enthusiasm with which changes in popular music in the US were adopted globally can be seen as cultural imperialism or cultural appropriation. Or, as give and take: they give, we take. We may have adopted the game of rugby from Britain, for example, but see nothing unusual in the fact that for many decades our players were the world’s best. So it is to be expected that our musicians can excel at a borrowed art form and turn it into something unique.

Here, the connection between popular music economics and culture — its ‘market-orientation’ and cosmopolitanism — is important. Adam Krims (2009, 400) argues that the urban, cosmopolitan context inhabited by ‘cultural intermediaries’ (cultural/creative industry, business, and media workers) connects them to globalized industries wherein “the dividing line between economic production and cultural production becomes ever harder to draw with any clarity” (409). Aotearoa/New Zealand popular music reflects this situation: the most celebrated examples of international commercial success (e.g. Lorde, who won numerous awards at both the VNZMAs and SSAs from 2013 to 2015 after substantial popular success in the US) also inspire patriotism in ‘national’ cultural achievement (see chapter two and
four). Whether or not something distinctly ‘New Zealand’ is expressed in such artists’ music, global commercial success seems decisive to their recognition.

Indeed, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry has long espoused a globally-focused measure of success. At the 1978 New Zealand Record Awards, RIANZ’s president, Tim Murdoch, stated:

In the past 12 months, I seem to have heard a lot of comment about the inactivity of recording local talent in New Zealand. Well, I think that everyone in New Zealand tonight can see that the industry is very much alive and well. In fact, 90 artists have been recorded already this year. The standard is higher, the performance is world-class, and I’m sure that we’ll see, in the not-too-distant future, New Zealand recording artists putting New Zealand on the map worldwide (New Zealand on Screen 2017).

Clearly, the quality standard of New Zealand recording artists depended on global comparisons. Paradoxically, nationalistic support for globally oriented ‘New Zealand music’ — owing to the ‘cultural cringe’ phenomenon — privileges musical styles and traditions of overseas origin, reinforcing and legitimizing Anglo-American music’s dominance in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Anglo-American cultural and commercial influences on popular ‘New Zealand music’ reflect the historical, sociopolitical contexts in which Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music industry grew. As chapter one discusses, New Zealand society — through colonization — was largely structured by Pākehā sociocultural norms, to which Māori (and other cultural groups) were expected to assimilate (Seuffert 2006; Walker 2004; Smith 2012). Consequently, as Māori were largely rurally-based until the mid-twentieth century, the urban ‘cultural intermediaries’ who facilitated New Zealand’s connections with Anglo-American cultural and media industries would have been Pākehā-dominated. These ‘colonial’ realities perhaps suggest why, as Flint (1993) observes, popular music trends adopted in Aotearoa/New Zealand in the 1960s “were very largely confined to white music in its various styles”, and also why “when they were not performing tourist-directed versions of their own musical tradition, [Polynesian musicians] would adopt the prevailing white models”. Although Flint argues — rightly, in one sense — that this is “not a question of racism, but one of exposure” (3), that such exposure was of predominantly ‘whitewashed’ music is certainly no accident, and opportunities for Māori were thus constrained.
The Māori renaissance’s ramifications inspired a change in musical development. In a two-part analysis of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s independent music, Tony Mitchell (1994) distinguishes Pākehā and Māori popular music lineages. As Mitchell states:

The appropriation and pastiche of black American, Jamaican and British musical forms by Maori musicians in the past three decades represents a parallel musical culture to that of Pakeha musicians, who have tended to build on white Anglo-American musical roots, and, unlike the Maori, lack an indigenous musical tradition to draw on and combine with imported idioms. This parallel culture, in which the movement towards Maori self-determination and self-celebration is continually strengthening, reflects a binarism of Maori and Pakeha culture which is becoming more predominant within Aotearoa (69).

While treating these as two distinct analytical subjects overlooks important linkages between them, this approach highlights perspectives and histories marginalized in a monolithic ‘New Zealand music’ narrative. Interestingly, Mitchell incorporates much of this material into a chapter on ‘Bicultural Music in Aotearoa/New Zealand’ in his 1996 book Popular Music and Local Identity, framing Māori and Polynesian music within a nationally-bounded biculturalism. Thus, while Mitchell comprehensively articulates the complexities of hybridity and transculturation in contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand musics, his focus on cultural expressions underexplores the political implications of framing music-making in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Pākehā-dominated popular industry in ‘national’ terms. Rather than rehashing the problematic ‘cultural imperialism’ thesis, which Mitchell (1996) himself convincingly critiques, I argue that claims of national distinctiveness overlook cultural and commercial historical continuities between a Pākehā-dominated society and the broader Anglosphere. Here again we can see the effects of an indigenized Pākehā identity in operation.

Recognising these sociopolitical factors is crucial to understanding how Aotearoa/New Zealand’s major music awards operate. New award categories reflect both global Anglo-American popular trends and increasing pressures to recognise traditionally marginalized music, especially by Māori. The following section considers how contemporary VNZMAs and SSAs reflect the historic Anglo-American dominance over Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry and popular trends, and the implications of these musical trends being framed and normalized as representing ‘New Zealand music’.
Categories, Diversity, and Hierarchies

The totality of all music awards offered in Aotearoa/New Zealand — many organized by RMNZ and APRA — suggests that diverse musics are broadly represented. Over time, this diversity grew as new award categories were created — and sometimes promptly discarded — or old awards renamed (Roach 2015). Awards for numerous genres/categories both within and outside ‘contemporary popular’ music — e.g. Māori, Pacific, screen, and children’s music, among numerous others — demonstrate this diversity. The VNZMAs and SSAs present awards for various genres, traditions, and sectors, although many awards are presented elsewhere. Separate awards ceremonies, celebrating specific genres or cultural traditions, occur in various forums: some independently run ceremonies present a combination of self-organized and RMNZ- or APRA-organized awards (e.g. Waiata Māori Music Awards, New Zealand Gold Guitar Awards for country music, Vodafone Pacific Music Awards); other RMNZ- and APRA-organized awards are presented at independent festivals — e.g. Best Folk Album VNZMA is presented at the Auckland Folk Festival, and Best Jazz Album VNZMA and APRA Best Jazz Composition Award are presented at the Wellington Jazz Festival (formerly the Tauranga National Jazz Festival).

While such diversification certainly helps historically marginalized music, the separation of awards into different forums also reveals Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry priorities. If the VNZMAs and SSAs are perceived as the most prestigious nights in ‘New Zealand music’, is ‘New Zealand music’ itself signified by what is included and excluded? As RMNZ and APRA are among the most influential organizations in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s commercial popular music industry, how their priorities, imperatives and mandates influence the VNZMAs and SSAs must be considered. The issue — as in other ‘national’ public forums — is that dominant values (whether cultural, political, economic etc.) may be normalized as ‘national’ values, thus marginalizing divergent values. What can be safely left off award ceremony programmes, the extent and nature of media and public attention different awards receive, how awards are categorized, and even ‘live’ protest against dominant values, all demonstrate the negotiation of these values.

High-profile award ceremonies do not simply present awards, but also influence canon-formation and commercial success in popular music (Watson and Anand 2006). As public, ritual celebrations and performances, ceremonies are pivotal to a particular music ‘field’s’ development (Anand and Watson 2004). By bringing together various organizations and
actors in a ritually structured event, award ceremonies express and reinforce common interests, enable the contestation of political/ideological interests (particularly through the inclusion/exclusion of award categories), confer prestige (unequally), and emphasise particular outcomes to highlight “important goings-on” (76). Furthermore, by ostensibly celebrating ‘the best’ (or 'excellence' etc.) in a musical area, major award ceremonies construct ‘prestige hierarchies’ where some wins matter more than others (76-77). By extension, the ceremonial ritual constructs and consolidates hierarchies of musical styles.

The VNZMAs’ and SSAs’ inclusion and exclusion of particular awards suggests that diverse representation is not equal representation. For example, while categories not formally presented at the VNZMAs ceremony — e.g. Best Country, Folk, Jazz, and Pacific Music Album — may be acknowledged (albeit briefly) at the main ceremony, they are not televised and thus not publically visible. As Reuben Bradley — jazz drummer, composer and previous Best Jazz Album VNZMA winner — observed:

Watch it on TV, but also go to it — [they’re] two different experiences. When you go to it, all of the not — how should I put it — industry important awards are still there, but often they’ll just put on the screen “and this is who won the folk award.” Bang, and there’s a little photo. “And this is who won the jazz award.” Why I say go to it and then watch it on TV is because on TV they put all that shit in the ad breaks. So the public doesn’t even know that there’s a jazz award, they don’t know there’s a folk award, they don’t know about the classical award (personal interview).

Bradley’s observation of the VNZMAs’ unequal regard for different award categories suggests that categories are valued according to more or less mainstream and lucrative styles. Similarly, in relation to the SSAs, particular song awards representing non-mainstream musical styles — e.g. for Country, Pacific, Jazz and Māori songwriters — are excluded from the presentation ceremony. While awards presented elsewhere are undoubtedly significant to their respective communities, their absence from the prestigious ‘national’ ceremonies limits their broader public exposure, thus dropping them down the ‘New Zealand music’ hierarchy.

The VNZMAs’ and SSAs’ application, selection and decision-making policies and processes define the basic shape of awards hierarchies. Commercial music terminology and indicators pervade the 2016 VNZMAs’ terms and conditions of entry. For example, after establishing that recordings are the only acceptable format, clause 6.G states:
To be eligible for the New Zealand Music Awards all recordings must be commercially available for sale through recognised physical or digital retail channels. Sales through artist websites or artist performances may be included at the sole discretion of Recorded Music New Zealand. Proof of sales will be required (RMNZ 2016, 10).

While relatively broad, such criteria exclude music not recorded or made for commercial purposes. Judging processes reflect similar delimitations; while most categories are judged by ‘Voting Schools’, or small groups (approximately 5-10 members), “comprising of expert representatives from the relevant genre or sector of music”, Album of the Year, Single of the Year, Best Group, Best Male Solo Artist, Best Female Solo Artist, and Breakthrough Artist of the Year “are judged by the Voting Academy, which consists of more than 200 representatives from various sectors of the music industry (radio, press, TV, online media, previous winners, retailers, promoters and the like)”. Furthermore, these latter six categories (except Breakthrough Artist) require a “sales performance weighting of 30%”. While these top awards do not explicitly restrict eligibility based on genre/style, mainstream popular artists and styles have dominated, particularly in recent years — e.g. pop artists Broods and Lorde, rock bands Six60 and The Naked and Famous, and R&B artist Aaradhna. While assessment criteria is scarce in VNZMAs’ terms and conditions, clause 11.G for ‘Best Maori Album’ is a standout exception:

The main judging criterion is that the music reflects a unique Maori identity and/or is an expression of an artist’s culture and which may not necessarily have any Maori language content. Artistic merit and commercial success will also be taken into account (RMNZ 2016, 16).

What do these factors imply about this prestigious ‘New Zealand music’ awards event? If identity is paramount for Best Māori Album, then why are there no parallel criteria for ‘Pākehā music’? Is the identity of ‘New Zealand music’ self-evident or unimportant in mainstream commercial music, or does this reflect power dynamics of Pākehā cultural normativity versus Māori essentialism? What does the dominance of commercially oriented Anglo-American-influenced popular styles in the ‘top’ six awards imply about ‘New Zealand music’?

In contrast, the SSA’s rules of entry and assessment emphasise songwriting, rather than commercial recordings. Entries are allegedly assessed on “compositional craft, creativity, originality and excellence” without recourse to commercial indicators.\(^5^4\) However, while the SOUNZ Contemporary Award’s and APRA Screen Music Awards’ rules align with their respective musical areas, entries for the prestigious Silver Scroll must be recordings “made available… for purchase”, and — along with the Maioha Award — “an original popular song”. What ‘popular’ means here is unclear; when I raised this wording in an interview with APRA’s Abbie Rutledge, Manager — Corporate Services, and Lydia Jenkin, Communications & Events, they were initially surprised that the terms of entry actually featured the word ‘popular’. Jenkin suggested that perhaps it differentiates music that is “non-traditional, or contemporary but in a non-classical setting, [as] the word contemporary is often associated with classical work” (personal interview). Rutledge later clarified in an email that “it’s definitely a hangover from the original work being described as ‘popular contemporary’ as opposed to a ‘traditional’ work”, and felt ‘popular’ was odd on its own (personal communication). Both Rutledge and Jenkin acknowledged that navigating terms and categories is contentious and problematic, and it is still not entirely clear how ‘popular’ is to be interpreted here (e.g. to what extent a work containing traditional elements can or cannot be considered ‘popular’).

SSA winners are decided by various means. Other than the Silver Scroll itself, most awards are decided by APRA-appointed judging panels — only the SOUNZ Contemporary Award judging panel is SOUNZ-appointed. By contrast, after the top 20 Silver Scroll entries are selected by a panel of APRA members, the five finalists (and winner) are voted on by APRA’s more than 10,000 members.\(^5^5\) Although the top 20 selection may suggest industry influence, the Silver Scroll’s peer-voted process — unbound by commercial considerations (in principle) — is far more democratic than the VNZMAs’ process. However, substantial crossover exists between winners and nominees of the Silver Scroll and, for instance, the Single of the Year VNZMA: e.g. Lorde’s ‘Royals’ in 2013, The Naked and Famous’ ‘Young Blood’ 2010/09, OpShop’s ‘One Day’ 2008, Dave Dobbyn’s ‘You Oughta Be in Love’ 1987, Netherworld Dancing Toys’ ‘For Today’ 1985.\(^5^6\) This suggests that the tastes


\(^5^5\) ‘Rules of Entry and Awards’, APRA AMCOS.

of the APRA membership largely align with mainstream Anglo-American popular styles privileged at the VNZMAs. The invisibility of other musical styles arguably influences general public perception about the quality standards of ‘New Zealand music’.

While the limits of these rules and processes are fairly broad, and do not suggest anything particularly problematic in principle, they do demonstrate what is valued more or less, or indicate a prestige hierarchy, within the ‘New Zealand music’ industry that privileges commercial, mainstream music reflecting Anglo-American popular styles. For Reuben Bradley, being asked to judge the Best Jazz Album on a year he was also a nominee was bewildering:

I was like, hold on a second – you’re asking me to be a judge and you didn’t check that I was on there? And I just thought to myself, “Well maybe it’s because it’s already decided.” I don’t know. I don’t know what kind of industry stuff happens behind the scenes, even behind behind the scenes. I mean I hate to be cynical about it but I definitely think there are reasons for it. I think it’s probably they just didn’t give a shit to check, because it’s a jazz award, so whatever (personal interview).

As Bradley identifies, whether or not the award was actually rigged, the mistake reinforces a perception that non-mainstream styles such as jazz are undervalued, and solidifies their place further down a ‘New Zealand music’ award hierarchy.

Mainstream media coverage reinforces these hierarchies. Reflecting a ‘best in New Zealand music’ sentiment, the nominees and winners of the mainstream-dominated top categories’ (top six VNZMAs, and the Silver Scroll)\(^57\) monopolize news headlines and coverage of both ceremonies, while ‘other’ winners appear towards the end of articles.\(^58\) Media summary tables of VNZMA winners are typically ordered with Album of the Year at the top through to Breakthrough Artist of the Year sixth. Aside from coverage where only the six “big winners” are mentioned,\(^59\) style/genre categories appear next (consistently ordered with Best Rock, Pop

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\(^57\) New Zealand Music Hall of Fame inductees, who also receive much attention, are an interesting exception, which I explore in chapter four.


and Alternative Album awards first and Best Classical Album last), followed by various other awards. The media’s reinforcement of awards hierarchies — where the Silver Scroll and the top six VNZMA categories sit atop — legitimizes the notion that ‘the best in New Zealand music’ reflects Anglo-American-inspired mainstream styles.

*Cultural/Ethnic Representation*

The VNZMA’s and SSA’s prioritization of mainstream popular music raises issues about cultural/ethnic representation. These awards do not exclude non-Pākehā musicians: both Māori, Pasifika and other ethnic minority artists have won various top VNZMA and SSA categories: Single of the Year NZMA was won by Tumanako (Prince Tui) Teka in 1982, and Che Ness (Che Fu) in 1997, 1999 and 2002; the Silver Scroll was won by Bill Urale (King Kapisi) in 1999, Che Ness in 2002, and Malo Luafutu (Scribe) in 2004. Although much of these artists’ music contains unmistakable Māori and Pasifika elements, globally popular styles — particularly hip hop — are prominent. These artists have pushed the boundaries of what is valued and accepted as ‘New Zealand music’. For instance, on one level, the creation of categories for Māori and Pacific music recognises their importance to Aotearoa/New Zealand's music scene, aiming to mitigate Pākehā musicians’ dominance of the top awards. Despite good intentions, these categories reinforce the implication that this music cannot compete with mainstream ‘New Zealand music’ unless sufficiently large audiences/markets exist. Thus, Māori and Pasifika artists are eligible for general awards and have the opportunity to be counted among ‘the best in New Zealand music’, but only if their music fits the parameters of commercially and Anglo-American oriented mainstream ‘New Zealand music’.

Ironically, the necessity for separate categories also demonstrates their capacity to reify a structural inequality of styles along ethnic lines. Robin James (2005) argues that music itself is constructed and embedded in social structures and ideological discourses: “music works with race, gender, class, and sexuality to produce and reinforce both the boundaries of the self (i.e. identity), as well as the sociopolitical hierarchies through which these selves relate” (185). Like ethnicity or national identity, music can be constructed ideologically; thus a category like ‘Māori music’, which says little about the music’s cultural qualities, is positioned as the ‘other’ within the classification system — and the underlying aesthetic values and cultural norms — of ‘New Zealand music’. As Tony Mitchell and Tama Waipara (2011, 16) argue, “The need to pigeonhole by genre is a limited and largely commercially
driven device which prevents a true or enduring cross section of all that is captured by kaupapa Māori music”. The simple addition of ‘kaupapa’ — “a plan or set of principles used as a basis for action, also translated as theme, strategy or subject matter” — destabilizes ‘Māori music’ s’ position as an ethnified stylistic category of commercial necessity, providing “an important way of accessing and expressing Māori philosophies and ideologies” (10) that are lost in homogenizing and essentializing ethnic and national narratives.

Without acknowledging the values underpinning mainstream ‘New Zealand music’, Pākehā-controlled institutions espousing ‘ethnified’ award categories reinforce structural inequalities. For example, the 2015 VNZMAs ceremony TV broadcast provoked controversy when Best Māori Album award was presented during an advertisement break. While other award categories are similarly excluded, considerable backlash followed on social media over the Māori award’s exclusion. After the event, several prominent Māori musicians met with the broadcast’s producer and RMNZ’s Chief Executive. All sides felt that the meeting was productive, and developed working partnerships to increase Māori music’s promotion. However, no guarantees were made regarding future screening of the Māori album award, as various stakeholders’ interests required consideration. Fortunately, the Best Māori Album award was broadcast at the 2016 ceremony, staving off further controversy. Yet its 2015 exclusion reveals the low priority accorded Māori music within VNZMAs’ category hierarchy, and how easily commercial bias in a Pākehā-dominated society can trample on mana Māori. It also reflects a well-documented bias in Aotearoa/New Zealand media that disadvantages and misrepresents Māori (Moewaka Barnes et al. 2012).

Inadequate Māori representation undermines ceremonies’ capacity to provide a space of resistance, exemplified by Māori musician Moana Maniapoto’s induction into the New Zealand Music Hall of Fame (NZMHF) at the 2016 SSAs. Much of Maniapoto’s music has challenged the Pākehā-dominated mainstream’s biases, particularly through promoting Māoritanga. Her award acceptance speech reflected this kaupapa:

Outside the music industry, our mates were shaking the tree in justice, education, health and media. Why the hell wouldn’t we do that inside the music industry? …In 1994 I called New Zealand radio racist; Māori language music has always been treated as a genre itself — it crosses all genres… yet it’s still not heard on

commercial airways (and the classic excuse is that it doesn’t fit the format). So it’s been 30 years now — stuff all has changed. It hasn’t changed. So I think it’s time… for the Crown to institute a quota for Māori language music on radio stations that play music. Because it’s good bloody music! And it’s a beautiful language… it’s ours — it’s from here, and it’s a Treaty obligation.  

The notion that Māori music “has always been treated as a genre itself” — despite being inherently diverse — demonstrates that diverse representation does not guarantee equal representation. Commercial radio’s agenda of safeguarding ratings and profits, which prioritizes Anglophone music with proven commercial success overseas and marginalizes Māori language music, reflects the bias of commercially oriented categorization.

Furthermore, Maniapoto simultaneously challenges the status quo bias and celebrates the ‘national’ importance of reo Māori music. By emphasising how commercial interests have marginalized Māori language music, Maniapoto reveals how Māori are excluded from constructions of ‘New Zealand music’ that overrepresent Anglo-American musical styles, which music awards reinforce. Proving Maniapoto’s point, the 2016 SSAs media coverage barely mentioned Maniapoto’s NZMHF induction; those articles that did, e.g. Māori magazine Mana, emphasised her musical accomplishments without acknowledging the pertinent aspects of her message. Furthermore, as Maniapoto’s induction occurred early in the programme, the awkward irony for anyone heeding her was that, among presentations of other awards, the Silver Scroll’s (Pākehā-dominated) nominees — whose music unsurprisingly resembled Anglo-American popular styles — dominated the ceremony’s proceedings.

In recent years, the SSAs have addressed issues of inclusion and representation. The flexibility afforded by the SSAs’ lower profile, independence from commercial broadcasts, and peer/musician orientation, allows all awards substantial attention at the ceremony (though not necessarily in subsequent news coverage), and showcases greater musical variety. APRA’s Abbie Rutledge and Lydia Jenkin explained:

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AR: In terms of the event itself, we are very conscious of who’s on that stage, of who is presenting the awards, of who’s performing. If anything, what we present on the night is actually an unfair representation of what it is in reality, just going on our gender splits, for example. So we have more active male writers than we do female writers; on the Scroll night, [we] push to make sure we have 50/50 representation on at least gender, which actually on the books actually isn’t right, because it’s the other way.

LJ: Also both genre-wise and ethnicity-wise and so on, the Scroll performance is generally a very broad spectrum (personal interview).

Thus, the SSAs’ producers aim to support and represent marginalized voices. For example, Māori musicians Maisey Rika, Rob Ruha, Seth Haapu and Tama Waipara performed a medley of the 1981 ‘lost Scroll’ nominees’ songs at 2015’s ceremony. Their politically charged performance, containing both te reo Māori and English, involved Rika wearing (and tearing off) the New Zealand and tino rangatiratanga flags (a symbol of the Māori sovereignty movement), at the time of the New Zealand flag referendums. While such sites of resistance/dissent are highly significant, they are usually under-reported by mainstream media, so their audiences tend to be limited to those present or watching the filmed coverage. Again, the potential political impact of such dissent is minimized by neglect.

Conclusion

The VNZMAs and SSAs ceremonies — which resemble Anglo-American popular music award ceremonies like the Grammy awards — are stages where the politics and inequalities of New Zealand music play out. These ritual spaces exemplify a kind of ‘symbolic violence’ (Hage, cited in Wevers 2005), wherein the New Zealand music industry’s dominant values and priorities are normalized through an inclusive discourse ostensibly celebrating ‘the best in New Zealand music’. Aotearoa/New Zealand’s award ceremonies reveal styles of ‘New Zealand music’ deemed central or marginal, emphasizing mainstream Anglo-American-influenced popular music trends, and marginalizing less popular and non-commercial music. While both ceremonies present various awards, including for several non-popular musical styles (e.g. jazz, country, and Māori music), they attract less prestige and exposure than the more acclaimed mainstream-dominated awards. Even while the ‘live’ and competitive nature

65 For reasons still unknown even to APRA, the Silver Scroll was not held in 1981, and was not awarded until the 50th anniversary show in 2015.
of awards ceremonies creates space for voicing alternative, dissenting perspectives and values, their representations are limited by exposure and eligibility. Music absent from the ceremonial spotlight, whose categories are undervalued, will always remain low-profile. Instead, the top awards — where Anglo-American popular styles dominate — attract the most hype and attention. This constructs a hierarchy of prestige, importance and visibility — shaped by structural and procedural biases of the awards’ judging systems, ceremony programming and media coverage — which undermines the ideal of representing diversity, and normalizes and appropriates the term ‘New Zealand music’ to refer primarily to Anglo-American popular music styles made by New Zealanders.
Chapter Four: New Zealand Mus[ic]eum

Celebrate the music of our nation with Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa, the first-ever major exhibition of New Zealand music. A homegrown, hands-on, ears-on exhibition, Volume explores the soundtracks of our lives through vibrant and interactive displays.  

Auckland War Memorial Museum’s (AM) 2016-2017 exhibition, Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa (‘Volume’), represents Aotearoa/New Zealand popular music history. Volume employs explicitly national language — e.g. “the music of our nation” (my emphasis) — which frames much of the exhibition’s content and structure. The displays are colourful and diverse, consisting of mostly donated/borrowed objects — musical and otherwise — belonging to well-known musicians and influential industry workers, alongside other items (e.g. posters, flyers etc.), audiovisual stations, and interactive components (e.g. mixing desk, DJ station, pub gig simulation). The exhibition features different sized ‘units’, ranging from individual objects, to displays focusing on one musician/group, genre/style, scene, or city theme. Volume uses a reverse chronology loosely delineated by decades: visitors begin in the twenty-first century unit, and end in a 1950s-1960s double-decade section.

This chapter explores issues on national and musical narrative construction raised in museum studies literature. I contextualize Volume via discussions of tourism’s recent influence on museums’ operations, and how museums’ collections construct narratives. Then, I examine how Volume’s specific displays, its focus on the notion of ‘social inclusion’, and celebration of musical ‘rebellion’, help (re)construct a narrative of ‘New Zealand (popular) music’ heritage. This narrative espouses the ‘official’ nationalisms discussed in chapter one, and situates Volume within a broader ‘heritagization’ movement in New Zealand’s popular music industry. First, I explore how museological narratives, the museum’s policy framework, and even the broader communities and society (and their discourses of belonging) that contextualize the exhibition, all help shape the possibilities of what Volume imagines, teaches, and presents.

The Museum Context

Destination New Zealand

AM — where Volume is housed — may not be New Zealand’s official national museum (a status belonging to Te Papa Tongarewa), but it is governed by central government legislation, and presents itself as a national institution — “New Zealand’s first Museum”, which “tells the story of New Zealand, its place in the Pacific and its people”.67 Surrounded by consecrated, commemorative war symbols like the Auckland Cenotaph (an example of the most “arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism” [Anderson 2006, 9]), AM is housed in an imposing “neo-classical building reminiscent of Greco-Roman temples”.68 Changing and diversifying local, national and international audiences have required large national museums like AM to reconsider their conventions in recent decades. Accordingly, exhibitions, displays, and the museum itself, are increasingly marketed as tourist ‘must-sees’, or as exciting and fascinating ‘destinations’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, chap. 3). A national museum like AM is a ‘destination’ which relies on the state-nation’s official nationalisms.

AM’s bicultural management/governance reflect New Zealand’s official nationalisms. Informed by the Treaty of Waitangi and its “spirit of partnership and goodwill”, AM’s bicultural governance structure recognizes and grants to Māori the Treaty’s guarantee of autonomy/self-determination.69 However, an inherent power imbalance/hierarchy remains. AM’s governance structure consists of the Auckland Museum Trust Board, which manages AM’s overall direction, and a Māori advisory committee, Taumata-ā-Iwi. Of the Board’s ten members, five are appointed by Auckland Council, four by AM, and one by Taumata-ā-Iwi. The structure thus caters for Māori interests by including Māori members and delegating Māori concerns, without granting Taumata-ā-Iwi executive power beyond advice-giving. This is not to demean or question the Board’s goodwill in respecting and implementing Taumata-ā-Iwi’s advice, but highlights how bicultural governance often vests ultimate power and control in Pākehā hands.

Such ostensibly inclusive national narratives are common to Aotearoa/New Zealand museum exhibitions. Senka Božić-Vrbančić (2003) discusses how, at Te Papa, the bicultural “narrative presents the past in a specific way to construct a picture of society understood as the

harmonious coexistence of different groups of people… [or] a utopian ideal of contemporary New Zealand” (302). While biculturalism is a recent manifestation, museums have long espoused this national ‘utopian ideal’; Božić-Vrbančić describes how a 1960s exhibition of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s gumdigging trade presented “a singular vision of a highly romanticised past” — ignoring discrimination Croats faced from Anglo-Celtic Pākehā — by “using different elements to tell its story and clearly displacing the memory of the past in order to paint a new picture of New Zealand as ‘one happy nation’” (Claudia Bell cited in Božić-Vrbančić 2003, 308).

Undoubtedly, the bi- and multicultural narratives espoused by Aotearoa/New Zealand’s national museums include and value cultural plurality over New Zealand’s past monocultural ideals. Alongside more inclusive organizational structures, both Te Papa and AM are pioneering discursive and representational frames — e.g. using ‘Aotearoa’ rather than ‘New Zealand’, including te reo Māori website and exhibition panel descriptions, and exhibiting a Treaty history that acknowledges discrepancies between English and Māori versions. Volume also incorporates extensive and considered Māori representation. Yet biculturalism’s co-option as an ‘official’ New Zealand identity frequently masks its Eurocentrism, e.g. that the museum is a Pākehā institution.

Crucially, the ‘national’ frame overarching these institutions is connected to the state. This connection foregrounds the importance of tourism and national branding (see chapter two) to the New Zealand state-nation, alongside the increasing commodification of museum experiences (evident in museums’ centrality in many New Zealand tourist guides). While biculturalism has recognized and revitalized Māori heritage, tourism constructs heritage as a unique marketable product to experience. Importantly, these heritage ‘destination experiences’ are not neutral presentations of culture ‘as it is’; “Rather, the heritage industry is a new mode of cultural production and it produces something new” — “a mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, 150). This newness is tied to uniqueness:

Australia and New Zealand have tended to identify their uniqueness as tourist destinations with the indigenous and to identify culture with the places from

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which settlers came. Yet, despite a high rate of endemism, their difference from
other places is not natural but cultural; that is, difference is produced, not found
(140).

This formulation mirrors how New Zealand’s nationalist ideologies normalize how people
and the past are represented. In her 2011 book, The Tourist State, Margaret Werry describes
how tourism — being intimately connected to nationalism and liberalism — constitutes a
spectacular and benevolent screen for legacies of colonial domination, where state rhetoric
and discourse of benevolence and racial harmony, despite entrenched racism, “allowed
Pākehā New Zealand to avoid reckoning the brutal structural and social legacies of colonial
dispossession” (xxi). It is not that state-backed tourism “outright exploits Māori property
and/in performance in the name of a white state”, rather:

The tourist state’s art of government works by producing the conditions that make
exercising economic self-interest and pursuing indigenous cultural expression
synonymous, both directed to the cause of national welfare via their global
circulation (242).

Thus, as discoverable tourist commodities, both Māori and settler cultures are framed as
bicultural New Zealand identity through Pākehā-centric perspectives. Such perspectives are
arguably closer to Western epistemologies wherein ‘ethnic’ cultural expressions are treated as
spectacles, rather than being grounded in Indigenous perspectives that they supposedly
represent. This is the case in many tour packages of sites of significance, including guided
tours of Auckland museum, which can include a Māori ‘cultural performance’ within the
Pākehā setting of the museum.

AM re-creates the history and heritage of Auckland and Aotearoa/New Zealand in a single
building. Its various exhibitions and collections supposedly represent aspects of Auckland’s
and Aotearoa/New Zealand’s sociocultural and historical continuities. A totalizing narrative
is primary, in the museum’s own words:

[T]he collective strength [of the collection] comes from what can be learned by
comparing objects, specimens and documents across time, cultures, usage, format
and origin. *The value of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts*. The value
of a collection to communities is often intangible and irreplaceable and stems
from deeply-held trust to represent community ideals and values in perpetuity
(my emphasis, Auckland Museum 2016a, 69).
Thus, the museum’s collection and work represents the ‘ideals and values’ of the people, heritage and history of the imagined communities (cf. Anderson 2006) of Auckland and Aotearoa/New Zealand — both to themselves and to outsiders — as discrete destinations to discover. In these institutional and social contexts, how do exhibition objects and display techniques shape cultural heritage narratives? The following section explores how museums represent music, and how these representations facilitate and produce an experience of New Zealand music as heritage.

**Object, Memory, and Culture**

Displaying popular music in a museum represents particular aspects of music. Popular music exhibitions emphasise material, visual and historical cultural elements surrounding musical recordings or performances. They tell stories about musicians, events, and music industry actors, highlighting extra-musical sociocultural elements of the music business. In contrast to conventional approaches, popular music-based “exhibition content is not conceptualized as chiefly about the communication of ‘facts’ but rather… the focus is placed on developing and engaging audiences with social histories and experiences” (Leonard 2010, 172).

Curating objects in conjunction with visual effects, lighting, audio, and interactive elements (as *Volume* has) provides many angles from which museum-goers can engage with the exhibited music’s cultural significance. Mark Roach, *New Zealand Music Hall of Fame* (NZMHF) Trust’s Executive Officer, Recorded Music New Zealand’s (RMNZ) Marketing & Special Projects coordinator, and instigator of *Volume*, recognised this:

> It’s great reading an article about an artist and seeing some photos and listening to a bit of audio, but sometimes I think when you see things like Anika Moa’s ten different drafts of ‘My Old Man’ that she wrote and how much work she put into it, I think that’s sort of more affecting than just reading or seeing a photo of it. That physical connection is really important (personal interview).

By “presenting a range of textual sites through which music is experienced” (Leonard 2010, 174), the presentation of music’s material culture recreates the contexts and circumstances in which original musical experiences occurred.

However, these objects are not innately meaningful. Rather, patrons draw on and negotiate personal and cultural experiences and memories evoked by musical objects (Baker,
Istvandity, and Nowak 2016, 76-77). Veteran music journalist, educator, and Volume’s principal Content Advisor, Graham Reid, explained that Volume aimed to maximize the public’s connection to the exhibition:

My intention right from the start was that it’s just always more, you know — make it more inclusive, have more images, more ways that people can connect with it. To the museum’s great credit, they got that, and they did that. They did actually put in more than I think were originally going to, but not enough for other people. So that’s why you have to get more and more people in and try to make — every now and again you just have to say “right, that person, that object, that’s emblematic of something, it’s not the whole story, it’s just that’s your connection to it (personal interview).

Museum theory and practice has increasingly recognised this more dynamic, inter-personal, and self-reflexive curatorship — where instead of “passively gleaning information from displays… museum audiences are [seen as] active, productive and often expert in the knowledge that they bring to such exhibitions” (Leonard 2010, 172) — even to the point “where the vernacular knowledge and memories of patrons are privileged above that of the expert historian or curator” (Baker, Istvandity, and Nowak 2016, 79). Leonard (2010, 180) states that, while audience oriented curation “does not disavow the authority and power of the museum to select and interpret culture, it does emphasize that such presentations are not definitive and uncontested”. Thus, a dynamic relationship between the museum, its objects of display, and its visitors exists.

How does Volume reflect this dynamic? Volume contextualizes material musical objects as artefacts of ‘New Zealand music’, drawing both on senses of national belonging, and memories of musical experiences. However, by displaying the past through the lens of dominant present-day imperatives, values and ideologies, AM’s exhibitions, objects and experiences are presented as discoverable commodities of an imagined, unproblematized national sociocultural ‘whole’. Thus, Volume serves AM’s promotion of heritage, nationalism and tourism, while offering New Zealanders a new experience of potentially familiar New Zealand (popular) music heritage. Accordingly, Volume draws on existing notions, narratives,

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71 Among several other music studies courses, Reid teaches a first-year course at the University of Auckland entitled ‘From Rock to Reggae: Tracking Popular Music in New Zealand’ which explores history and cultural identity.
experiences and histories that consist in a sense of the ‘New Zealand music industry’ also as a ‘whole’. I explore how these ‘wholes’ are positioned and negotiated within a museological context, informed by ‘official nationalisms’, to construct senses of national, musical, cultural and ethnic identities.

**Volume: The (re)Production of New Zealand Music Heritage**

**The Music Industry’s ‘Virtual’ Heritage**

*Volume* is the first exhibition on Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music, yet only one of many recent projects to capitalize on the heightened appreciation of locally made music since Aotearoa/New Zealand’s ‘pop renaissance’ (see chapter three). While celebrations like the Silver Scroll Awards and the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards are over 50 years old, they celebrate contemporary artists’ achievements as opposed to heritage. As Mark Roach stated, “everyone knows about [artists who feature at awards ceremonies], but on whose shoulders do they stand?” (Personal interview). Here, the NZMHF (whose Trust was the key music industry partner behind *Volume*), and AudioCulture: *The Noisy Library of New Zealand Music*, are important precedents for *Volume*; both produce and celebrate previously underdeveloped, undervalued, and little-known New Zealand popular music heritage.

The NZMHF — a joint venture of APRA and RMNZ — annually inducts two musicians/groups “who have had a significant impact on the evolution, development and perpetuation of New Zealand music”. AudioCulture — an ever-growing online repository of articles, photos, recordings and videos about music in Aotearoa/New Zealand (whose founder, Simon Grigg, was a *Volume* content advisor) — is perhaps the most comprehensive and accessible archive on Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music history. *Volume* sits within this network of people, organizations and entities which form a broad movement to capture a New Zealand popular music heritage.

The NZMHF is intimately linked with *Volume*. As Mark Roach explained, *Volume* emerged from an idea to develop a physical NZMHF and, later, a plan to create a broader permanent music museum (personal interview). *Volume* thus draws on both elements of museum exhibitions — e.g. broad historical coverage, presentation of ephemera and material objects, and focus on general trends, genres and movements — and canonical and biographical features typical of halls of fame (Danilov 1997, 1-2). Nevertheless, Roach claimed that the

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NZMHF did not directly inform Volume’s content development, although all NZMHF inductees feature in Volume. This suggests that, rather than an extension of the NZMHF, Volume is a specifically museological representation of the Aotearoa/New Zealand music industry’s popular music heritage movement.

With Roach’s position (many of my interviewees described Volume as his ‘brainchild’), Volume’s place in this broader movement is clear. As Roach is integral to the NZMHF, a senior staff member at RMNZ, and has worked throughout the popular music industry in various managerial, business and organizational roles, he connects Volume with other significant people and organizations advocating New Zealand music. An excerpt from my interview with Roach highlights one of these connections:

I’ve always seen the museum as a sister version of AudioCulture; it’s like they’re the noisy library of New Zealand and I want to set up the noisy museum of New Zealand, you know, so that we can collect guitars and stuff. So I mean further down the line hopefully the AudioCulture resource and my idea will come together. There’ll be some people who’ll see the Mockers and go “I want to know more about the Mockers,” and then we can go “well here’s the AudioCulture article on it, which is 2000 words, etc.” (personal interview).

The connection between organizations espousing New Zealand music heritage relies on bounded notions of national and musical culture and identity. For Simon Grigg — Aotearoa/New Zealand label owner, writer, producer, DJ, broadcaster, and consulting editor and founder of AudioCulture — addressing the absence of New Zealand music histories was important from a national identity viewpoint:

One of the reasons I started AudioCulture was because there was nothing out there basically. The information levels on New Zealand popular music history were really, really low. It seemed to me that a lot of these people just needed to be documented so that we knew who they were, because who we are comes from that. NZOA funded AudioCulture, and it was a real battle to try and get them to put money into it. They were like “why would anyone want to read this stuff?” And then of course our traffic levels are huge, because people do want to read about it. It’s what they did, it’s where they — you know, the venues where they met their partners, and this is the music that they all love — it’s us (personal interview).
As with museum visitors’ negotiating meaning, *AudioCulture* similarly offers stories evoking memory and experience. Yet while *AudioCulture* is a practically limitless online library, it unifies dominant national and musical identity narratives through a notion of shared heritage. This not so much limits what can be represented, but frames how music is represented: e.g. iconic ‘Kiwi’ musician Dave Dobbyn is said “to speak — or at least sing — for the whole country”, despite being “an atypical New Zealander” (Bollinger 2013); even little-known guitarist Greg Malcolm’s low-profile is cause to invoke national stereotypes, whose article begins, “We don’t do idiosyncratic well in New Zealand” (Steel 2014).

Such casual nationalism disguises how the term ‘New Zealand music’ frequently refers to popular music. This is evident on website descriptions: *Volume* celebrates “the music of our nation” at “the first-ever major exhibition of New Zealand music”, and which “bring[s] the story of New Zealand music to life” — all stated before *Volume* is acknowledged as “more than just a history of popular music”,73 and “AudioCulture is ‘the noisy library of New Zealand music’”, which presents “stories of nearly one hundred years of New Zealand popular music culture”. *AudioCulture* also suggests that “[m]any of the stories of New Zealand music are stories of Māori music”,74 again omitting a ‘popular’ qualifier. The interchangeability of ‘New Zealand music’ and ‘New Zealand popular music’, common in my interviews with popular music industry personnel, demonstrates how popular music is not seen simply as a subset of New Zealand music, but normalized to represent national culture (see chapter three), despite popular music’s definition lacking clarity.

Indeed, while *Volume* and *AudioCulture* eventually identify their popular focus, and the NZMHF is dominated by mainstream popular musicians, many of the artists represented would not necessarily be considered ‘popular’: classical and electroacoustic composer Douglas Lilburn and taonga pūoro pioneers Hirini Melbourne and Richard Nunns appear in *Volume*, and are NZMHF inductees, while several *AudioCulture* articles feature jazz and other obscure artists. Such inclusions in a popular-based heritage are perhaps justified by their ‘national significance’, i.e. their broad influence on music-making in Aotearoa/New Zealand, including popular styles. Nevertheless, these entities — central to Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music industry — frequently employ national frames claiming swathes of music for the nation, and, more specifically, for the New Zealand music industry.

74 ‘About Us’, AudioCulture, [http://www.audioculture.co.nz/about](http://www.audioculture.co.nz/about) [22 Jan 2017].
Volume presents a similar musical and national heritage; New Zealand popular music, past and present, is inextricable from its national context. Positioned in the nationally significant AM, Volume discursively rehearses and reinforces notions of nationalism, producing a sense of inheritance and ownership of the exhibited musical heritage as ‘our’ music — e.g. an early display features “some of our most exciting young musicians who are taking New Zealand music into the future” (my emphasis, Auckland Museum 2017e). Volume’s national narrative is unique among music exhibitions. APRA staff member and music journalist, Lydia Jenkin, explained Volume thus:

It reflects national identity for everybody: everybody has a memory about a song that they loved or meant something to them, or a gig that they went to, or an artist, or whatever. So it’s not just for the people who made the music, it’s for everyone who has ever listened to a song on the radio or gone to a pub, [to] go in there and go “this feels like part of me and part of my life”, which is quite an interesting thing to get from a museum exhibition. In comparison to the David Bowie exhibition, that was a fantastic exhibition, but I didn’t feel about that the same way I feel about the Volume exhibition — that thing where you walk into something and you get that kind of indescribable warmth or feeling of belonging (personal interview).

Jenkin’s perspective indicates how an “indescribable warmth or feeling of belonging”, evoked through personal connections to Volume’s displays, stems from a sense that Volume “reflect[s] national identity”, although identity may resonate in ways other than nationality. I now examine how ideas of national identity — via display techniques, a celebration of ‘New Zealand musical rebellion’, and the ideal of ‘social inclusion’ — facilitate the public’s connection to Volume’s content.

**Objects and Displays**

Objects can powerfully connect music, nation and heritage. As objects may evoke visitors’ own experiences and memories, selecting what to display, and how, is thoughtfully done. For example, the re-creation of a record store — containing 180 vinyl album sleeves, complete with album artworks and three facts about each album — not only reproduces a 1980s record shopping experience but, as Esther Tobin, Content and Interpretation Developer for Volume, explained:
There’s a man behind the counter, and that’s Trevor Reekie. So if you didn’t know Trevor and his relationship to the industry, you’d go “oh look there’s an 80s guy in a record shop.” But the fact [is] that there really was a record store in the 80s: it was called the Record Warehouse and Trevor worked there. Trevor is someone who’s made a tremendous contribution to New Zealand music with his labels Pagan and Antenna, he was known for supporting emerging New Zealand talent, particularly in the 1990s (personal interview).

Such a display can evoke experiences and memories for visitors depending on their age, familiarity with Reekie and the Record Warehouse, and so on. However, Volume’s displays produce additional meaning in the narrative context of New Zealand music heritage. Indeed, Tobin recognised that Volume was not portraying a new narrative, but using the museum’s meaning-producing capacity to portray a common New Zealand music narrative:

This New Zealand music story has been told and retold again and again through our awards ceremonies, through our documentaries, and on screen. Our point of difference, and our only real point of difference is we are a place of objects and of taonga, and so for us we’ve got this amazing mechanism to tell stories through particular objects. The interpretation you wrap around these objects and the interactive activities work together to generate a varied visitor experience (personal interview).

By imbuing objects with significance, the past is drawn into and reconfigured in the present. Accordingly, while particular objects may have existing significance, the objects newly represent a rich, varied, yet familiar New Zealand music heritage.

Positioning objects and displays in narrative contexts transforms those object’s meanings. Most of Volume’s objects — including pages/books of handwritten lyrics, instruments/equipment and cases, artworks, costumes and clothing, photographs etc. — were donated by musicians and other music industry people. Outside the museum, many objects would likely have been simply personal, functional items. Inside the exhibition, the objects’ significance is transformed, as Lydia Jenkin noted:

I’m being anecdotal about musicians here, but they’d say “oh, my t-shirt or my hat or my photo of this,” or whatever, and not really feel like they were

75 Tobin’s use of the term ‘taonga’ suggests that some of the objects selected for display in Volume may have particular significance for Māori.
particularly special objects, but then you take them and put them in a glass case in a museum and suddenly they are something special, and what they represent is special (personal interview).

The process through which objects are given meaning within a New Zealand music heritage narrative is a new form of cultural production which has recourse to the past (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, 149-150), wherein even mundane objects become highly significant parts of New Zealand music history. For example, Ella Yelich-O’Connor’s (aka Lorde) plain black school shoes worn to the 2013 Grammy awards are objects not usually associated with music culture. Being displayed in a case alongside photographs of Yelich-O’Connor and Grammy paraphernalia (including a trophy) reinforces the musical connection. Furthermore, the shared sense of national belonging/identity with Lorde is emphasised: possessive pronouns are used (‘Your girl, Ella’), Lorde is described as “New Zealand’s most successful musician — ever” and, most interestingly, the display panel states that “Lorde wore these [black lace-up shoes] as a nod to the New Zealand schoolkids back home watching one of their own” (Auckland Museum 2017i). Objectified within a music exhibition that extends their significance from ‘national’ school-life to musical stardom, the shoes become powerful new symbols of New Zealand music, connecting music and the nation.

Display curation techniques help communicate specific narratives. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998, 18-25) distinguishes ‘in situ’ museum displays (objects or fragments constructed to represent a broader sociocultural ‘whole’) from ‘in context’ (objects from various and often unconnected sources arranged to express an idea). Volume exemplifies both approaches. ‘In context’ displays incorporate objects from various, often disparate, musical idioms for particular exhibition areas: e.g. representing diverse music of the 1980s, Country musicians and TV entertainers the Topp Twins share a corner of the room with ‘Punk Godfather’ Chris Knox; the ‘Electric experiments’ display represents the ‘electronica’ genre by placing side-by-side photos and descriptions of composer Douglas Lilburn (colloquially stating: “Yep, electronica was first made by academics”), drum and bass/dance band Shapeshifter (“[who] use synthesisers in their rabble-rousing live drum-and-bass shows”), and several other musicians who use electronic instruments like MPCs and synthesizers (Auckland Museum 2017c). However, overall, Volume’s objects and displays represent ‘in situ’ the people, places and sounds constituting Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music culture as a ‘whole’. Despite differences, however vast, a unified and inclusive ‘New Zealand music industry’ is presented through a national popular music heritage narrative.
Social Inclusion

Despite largely focusing on popular music and thus excluding many other musical styles, expressions and scenes, *Volume* explicates inclusionary narratives through representing lesser-known stories within this frame. The ideal of ‘social inclusion’ — typically a policy strategy employed to support socially marginalized individuals and groups — has become increasingly prevalent in museums (Sandell 2003; Leonard 2010). Accordingly, *Volume* publicly celebrates the hard work, dedication, and artistry of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music, past and present. For Esther Tobin, “if you had to boil it down into one thing, it’s feeling connected and proud of our rich musical lineage and where we’re at right now as an industry” (personal interview). APRA’s Abbie Rutledge explained that the exhibition was timely and well-received, perhaps a triumph over the ‘cultural cringe’ that previously made such celebrations difficult (personal interview). While *Volume* reverses the neglect or under-appreciation that many musicians have felt, it does so — perhaps unavoidably — through a national lens; many musicians’ and music industry people’s achievements become ‘our’ achievements. Through inclusive narratives, *Volume* provokes and contests some historical narratives and stereotypes, while celebrating and reinforcing others.

*Volume* fosters social inclusion in multiple ways. First, the Content and Interpretation Developers explicitly aimed to attract an age group (15-29 years old) that does not normally visit AM (personal interview). This perhaps reflects broader strategic objectives about ensuring AM remains relevant and important — a challenge many museums face — by diversifying audiences. Second, *Volume* celebrates underappreciated aspects of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music industry, displaying the skills, intricacies and hard work required — often for little return — for a sustainable and viable musical career. Mark Roach described his own vision for *Volume* thus:

One [aim] is to highlight how much blood, sweat and tears goes into making music, which is designed to then put a little bit of respect back into the local music industry, to make people think twice about downloading music, or pirating music — just going “for you it’s just downloading a track, for someone who makes their living out of trying to make music, it’s months and years of toil and sweat and heartache, you know”. One of the others — and there’s a few — was to put contemporary music on a similar pedestal to what we might loosely call the ‘high arts’; for whatever reason, the music of the masses is less regarded than the
music of the elite. Poor old rock ‘n’ roll and dub and reggae and stuff kind of gets frowned upon, and yet it’s the most widely experienced form of music. So it’s sort of elevating them and saying “look, this is high time we paid some respect and dues to this art form,” because it does have a lot of rich cultural capital that people do relate to and respond to. And this comes back to what your thesis is about; it has a cultural resonance with New Zealanders (personal interview).

Representing music in this way challenges common media representations and stereotypes of musicians’ lifestyles (e.g. focusing on celebrities, fame, fortune and glamour, as well as darker aspects such as drug/alcohol abuse etc.), creating a relatable and positive impression of musicians and music industry workers for the general (museum-going) public. These two elements of fostering social inclusion are also connected. Esther Tobin described that one of Volume’s key aspirations was having:

a place that would inspire young people to understand the industry not just in a kind of X-Factor way, or a superstar way, but having a sense of all the other roles in the industry that play a role in music production (personal interview).

However, while Volume’s ‘national’ frame represents music-making as part of everyday New Zealand life, which affects, connects and touches all New Zealanders in some way, it rallies social inclusion around the popular music industry and its values. Thus, even if previously marginal or excluded voices are represented, they are contextualized by a ‘national’ musical culture wherein Anglo-American popular music and connected industries dominate (see chapter three).

Volume also promotes ‘national’ social inclusion by displaying several influential Māori and Pasifika musicians and groups in discreet sections: several artist- and genre-focused displays acknowledge the musical contributions of Māori and Pasifika artists to Aotearoa/New Zealand — e.g. Moana Maniapoto, whose “music could not come from anywhere else but Aotearoa” (Auckland Museum 2017b), and reggae and dub bands Herbs and Fat Freddy’s Drop demonstrate that “New Zealanders get reggae” (Auckland Museum 2017g). Additionally, drawing parallels with the ‘Māori renaissance’, the 1980s section includes a small display dedicated to Māori influences on Aotearoa/New Zealand popular music, acknowledging “Māori musicians… at the forefront of rock ‘n’ roll in Aotearoa”, the absence of te reo Māori “on our airwaves” from the 1950s-1980s, several past and present musicians, and the influence of taonga pūoro (Auckland Museum 2017a). Such representation and
recognition were important to everyone involved with the exhibition, though getting it ‘right’ was difficult, as Esther Tobin explained:

I just had a discussion today with someone who’s connected to the show, with Pacific Island whakapapa, and I got a sense of how he still feels like he’s battling. And that they’re battling for untold stories from the 1980s. And I saw how every time someone retells a history, that for this person it becomes an opportunity for redress, and the weight of responsibility that comes with that. And it’s that question about “do we have a siloed Pacific [music] hall of fame, or is it part of the New Zealand hall of fame?” and all those issues remain. It was something that we were quite conscious of in the exhibition: we felt that weight also, especially with a limited amount of physical space and so many stories to tell (personal interview).

Presenting music outside the Pākehā-dominated mainstream constructs an inclusive New Zealand musical identity, recognising the value, contribution and centrality of Māori and Pasifika musicians to New Zealand music’s development. Simultaneously, however, Pākehā artists who dominate mainstream popular ‘New Zealand (or Kiwi) music’ are not ethnically marked as Pākehā in the exhibition — e.g. “Split Enz are giants of New Zealand music — arguably the most important and certainly the most successful local band. …No one sounded or looked like them” (Auckland Museum 2017d) — suggesting that mainstream New Zealand music largely represents a normalized Pākehā perspective. Senka Božić-Vrbančić (2003) describes how museums like Te Papa construct a normalized (Pākehā) ‘Kiwiana’ — based on British and Irish migrant/settler culture — against which other ethnic groups are contrasted (300). Similarly, a band like Split Enz are “giants of New Zealand music”, a “local band”, considered unique, but never called Pākehā, whereas a Māori musician like Dalvanius Prime, for example, is described as having a “personal style [that] mashed up Motown-inspired soul with Māori culture” (Auckland Museum 2017f).

Such ethnic identification (or lack thereof for Pākehā) — apparent across all New Zealand music heritage entities — frequently connects to ‘official’ bi- and multicultural national narratives, although often contradictorily.76 In the NZMHF, for example, New Zealand music’s biculturalism is represented by inductees Moana Maniapoto, Richard Nunns and

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76 For all references in this paragraph, see ‘Inductees’, New Zealand Music Hall of Fame, http://www.musichall.co.nz/home/inductees/ [10 Jan 2017].
Hirini Melbourne — based on their contributions to Māori musical development. Similarly, Herbs’ induction is framed from a multicultural perspective. While these artists undoubtedly articulate their own cultural identities and allegiances, viewing them from bi- and multicultural perspectives emphasises their difference from a Pākehā-centric ‘national’ norm. For example, many Pākehā artists and their music — who all, again, represent white(washed) Anglo-American pop, rock and country genres — are labelled ‘Kiwi’ (e.g. see entries for Dragon, Hello Sailor, Shihad, Straightjacket Fits, The Topp Twins, and Jordan Luck); arguably, this music represents a normalized musical ‘Kiwiana’. Conversely, artists inducted for musical contributions outside the ‘Kiwiana’ norm are often described by ethnic/cultural particularity. Even Richard Nunns — recognised for his work with taonga pūoro — is identified as Pākehā, demonstrating how Māori music is typically ethnically marked.

By failing to recognize how Pākehā perspectives are normalized, such inclusive cultural/ethnic representations may be co-opted to serve dominant ‘national’ priorities. This is evident in the thinking behind Volume, as Mark Roach explained:

> It was certainly very conscious to show the influence of Māori music because it is our culture; that part of our culture is what makes us different from American music and British music and Australian music. The Pacific influence — Māori artists and Pacific artists — have had more changing influence on New Zealand music than anyone else. It’s not really recognised as a movement, it’s just there (personal interview).

While Roach acknowledges the centrality of ‘the Pacific influence’, it is recognised for its ‘unique’ contributions to an otherwise derivative New Zealand music, rather than its intrinsic qualities. This uniqueness suits a commodified, discoverable New Zealand music ‘whole’, and highlights the salience of national branding both for an artform (popular music) inextricable from commercial interests and the museum’s position in tourism industry. Volume thus reproduces dominant national musical narratives, reinforcing and representing constructions of normality and difference (‘New Zealand’ or ‘Kiwi’ music vs. ‘the Pacific influence’) that serve broader economic and political priorities.

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77 A redeeming exception is the entry for Moana Maniapoto, where ethnicity does not feature, though the term ‘Kiwi’ is also not used.
Inclusive narratives’ celebratory tone can also flatten or subvert dissenting, opposing or critical voices. *Volume*’s celebration of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s music of ‘rebellion’ exemplifies this. While somewhat present in the exhibition, this national musical rebellion narrative is articulated in depth on AM’s website in *Volume*’s first ‘extended read’ (Auckland Museum 2016b). Representing protest, antagonistic and political music in inclusive language — e.g. “dive into the music that fuelled our rebellious streak and inspired our righteousness” (my emphasis) — re-appropriates music’s political messages for a nationalistic purpose. Here, all forms of musical rebellion become ‘our’ rebellion, regardless of the issue, whether or not one agrees with the message, or who is rebelling.

Māori musicians — whether maintaining or challenging a colonizing nation-building ideology — are positioned within the ‘New Zealand music rebellion’ narrative. For example, ‘Māori Cowboy’ Johnny Cooper brought the raucousness of rock ‘n’ roll to Aotearoa/New Zealand, fuelling a youth backlash against a conservative society (‘The Teenager’ section). Yet without acknowledging the ‘monocultural’ mid-twentieth century urban social context in which this rock ‘n’ roll ‘rebellion’ occurred (partway through Māori urban migrations), and by using terms like ‘New Zealand teens’ and ‘New Zealanders’ unproblematically, the narrative in which Cooper is included is characterized as ‘New Zealand’ social rebellion, rather than more accurately as a Pākehā social rebellion.

Conversely, overtly political post-Māori renaissance groups — e.g. Upper Hutt Posse, Moana and the Moa Hunters (later Moana and the Tribe), Aotearoa, and Herbs — most pertinently address racism, colonization, and the subjugation/marginalization of Māori and Pacific musics and cultures. *Volume*’s extended read partially addresses some of these issues: e.g. “In his latest single 'Don't Rate That', David Dallas triumphantly and furiously expresses his anger with the attitudes found in New Zealand society, and its oppression of certain races and ethnicities” (‘Standing Up’ section). Yet specifics and broader implications of such challenges are unarticulated; e.g. Upper Hutt Posse are described as having “incendiary and uncompromising tracks” such as the “1988 debut single ‘E Tu’… [which] was blunt and staunch”, without discussing specific content. These generic descriptions espouse pride in ‘our’ willingness to act on ‘our’ political values, yet simultaneously displace the substance of Māori and Pacific peoples’ anti-oppression struggles, conveniently avoiding disrupting a harmonious national narrative. To take an excerpt from ‘E Tu’:
‘Cause white rule and injustice go hand in hand / So against that is where we stand
Don’t forget those who’ve fought before / Our struggle continues more and more
Yeah it’s a struggle, it’s a struggle, the system’s got us in a muddle /
So strive to get outta this puddle (Upper Hutt Posse 2004).

Popular music that adopts Pākehā norms (e.g. Johnny Cooper) is unified with music containing explicitly anti-oppression messages (e.g. Upper Hutt Posse) in a national narrative of ‘our’ musical rebellion. While this could be interpreted as Pākehā New Zealanders distancing themselves from the monocultural and colonial past, accepting and supporting ‘our’ struggles against oppression and authority, this is nowhere articulated in Volume or the extended read. In fairness, connections between the notion of ‘white rule’ and the colonial origins of nation-building are equally unarticulated in Upper Hutt Posse’s lyrics as in Volume’s ‘rebellion’ narrative. However, the conflation of a monocultural Pākehā past with the multi/bicultural present reinforces Pākehā cultural hegemony in national narratives; by excluding significant Māori and other non-Pākehā perspectives, New Zealand’s musical history normalizes the monocultural past as ‘our’ (New Zealand’s) past. Through this ‘one people’ narrative, anti-oppression struggles are sanitized, even depoliticized; musical rebelliousness becomes purposeless angst toward a formless foe, though an angst ‘we’ can cheerfully celebrate from comfortable distance as uniquely ‘ours’.

Conclusion

Volume is part of a celebratory heritage movement that has capitalized on the heightened status of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s locally made popular music. The museological representation of ‘New Zealand music’ is a particularly powerful medium for this heritage celebration. The significance of previously mundane objects is transformed, eliciting emotional responses based on memories and experiences; yet a national ideological framework captures these responses. Constructions of national musical identity that refer primarily to popular music abound in Volume, without being problematized. Many reasons for this may exist: the aim to attract younger audiences, key actors behind the exhibition being popular music industry insiders or experts, the broad appeal popular music has with swathes of New Zealanders, belief in a ‘social inclusion’ ideal, and so on. Yet national monikers like ‘New Zealand music’, ‘Kiwi music’ and ‘the New Zealand music industry’ represent a sense of unity that encompasses — and defines — difference and even dissent against a Pākehā-centric music scene dominated by commercial music interests.
Conclusion

Through case studies of New Zealand music and arts policy, major national music awards ceremonies, and a New Zealand popular music history exhibition, this thesis has analysed how senses of New Zealand identity develop in relation to music, demonstrating how Pākehā cultural norms, perspectives, and dominant interests are frequently overlooked. Chapter one explored key theoretical issues underpinning negotiations of New Zealand identity. Michael Billig’s concept of banal nationalism provided a framework to consider how unproblematized nationalisms often justify diverse and even contradictory sociopolitical discourses and agendas. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, nationalism is inseparable from colonialism; nation-building ideologies justified the presumed superiority and dominance of Pākehā norms for much of New Zealand’s history. Although increasing recognition of cultural pluralism has diminished this dominance post-Māori renaissance (particularly through Treaty of Waitangi-based bicultural frameworks), nationalist perspectives continually overlook social, cultural, economic and political inequities of the postcolonial present.

Chapter two discussed how New Zealand’s music/arts policy invokes nationalism in ways that justify sometimes contradictory agendas. One of banal nationalism’s consequences for arts/cultural policy is a common conflation of civic nationalism with Pākehā culture. The ‘national’ terminology used to describe diverse cultural values and practices of New Zealand citizens is often not differentiated from articulating Pākehā/Western traditions and practices as ‘New Zealand’ culture, as my examination of the NZSO demonstrated. In contrast, non-Pākehā traditions are frequently defined by ethnicity before nation. Furthermore, Māori are used to signify the nation’s uniqueness in a global marketplace, which often excludes other non-Māori and non-Pākehā in national representations. When policies based on values of commercialism, ‘high’ art standards and democratic notions of cultural diversity are framed as ‘national’ values, the potential cultural biases underpinning those values are rarely considered. Consequently, nationalism often disguises the costs and benefits of pursuing those agendas.

Both chapters three and four explored cultural and musical representation in different public forums associated with Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music industry: the Vodafone New Zealand Music Awards and the Silver Scroll Awards, and Auckland Museum’s exhibition, *Volume: Making Music in Aotearoa*, respectively. I demonstrated how transnational Anglo-American popular music’s substantial influence on Aotearoa/New Zealand music-making is
reflected in the music most celebrated at these music awards. While such influences are varied, resulting in increasingly diverse representations of styles, a hierarchy of prestige, importance and visibility is constructed, undermining the ideal of representing diversity, and normalizing ‘New Zealand music’ to refer primarily to Anglo-American popular music styles made by New Zealanders. As with policy, the interests of Pākehā-dominated institutions — here, the commercial music industry — heavily influence representations of ‘New Zealand music’.

Chapter four explored more fully the implications of framing Aotearoa/New Zealand’s popular music in national narratives. In a ‘national’ museum context, and through curating objects and displays representing various themes and stories, Volume persuasively constructs ‘New Zealand music’ as national heritage. While this constructed heritage espouses inclusion and cultural representation, normalized Pākehā perspectives on New Zealand music and national identity are not problematized. Consequently, divergent cultural perspectives and political positions — particularly those of Māori and Pasifika — are neglected or deflated, while representations of ethnicities other than Māori, Pākehā and Pasifika are entirely absent.

These three case studies provide distinct but overlapping perspectives on how ideas of New Zealand identity emerge and are rehearsed in public musical spaces. Each case study reflects sociopolitical movements in Aotearoa/New Zealand society, particularly in relation to cultural identity and biculturalism, and how Pākehā hegemony shapes common sense notions of what it means to be a New Zealander and play or enjoy music. In each of my case study areas, inclusivity and diversity appear to be valued and celebrated — through public funding, music awards and in museum exhibitions — as important aspects of New Zealand identity and music, particularly regarding Māori and Pasifika cultural expressions (though multiculturalism is not prioritised in the same way as biculturalism). Yet these supports and celebrations occur in the Eurocentric contexts of liberal democratic state institutions, glitzy and staged awards ceremonies, and the museum. The Pākehā underpinnings of these New Zealand institutions are rendered invisible in the emphasis of diversity.

Recognising Pākehā hegemony in this way does not minimize the significant contribution and influence Māori and other non-Pākehā have made to New Zealand society and in helping define their part in New Zealand’s national character. My case studies were selected for their mainstream position in New Zealand’s musical life, rather than being representative of marginal groups or expressions. Had I chosen to investigate, for example, the Waiata Māori
Music Awards and the Vodafone Pacific Music Awards rather than two mainstream New Zealand music awards ceremonies, or had I included a study of Te Matatini Kapa Haka Aotearoa in my research, the picture of how ethnic and national identity differ and coalesce in New Zealand society would have been richer and more nuanced. Conversely, investigating cases such as the New Zealand Golden Guitar Awards for country music may have provided a deepened sense of Pākehā identity in music beyond what this thesis presents. Instead, my studies have focused on exploring the dynamics of New Zealand identity in contexts which strive to be as broadly representative of New Zealand music as possible.

This thesis primarily develops theoretical perspectives on social issues regarding Aotearoa/New Zealand music and identity. I feel that much music research in Aotearoa/New Zealand insufficiently addresses broader historical and contemporary sociopolitical issues and contexts framing musical analyses. Many normalized assumptions about (particularly national) culture and identity are unproblematized, perpetuating and reinforcing conceptual frameworks that marginalize crucial musical and social issues in Aotearoa/New Zealand. From here, more detailed empirical research is required to examine the nuances of how individuals negotiate musical identities and cultures in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Furthermore, several important issues prominent in musicological literature — e.g. authenticity, world music, hybridity, diaspora, aesthetics, performativity, textuality, subjectivity, technology, etc. — alongside trends in the literature on identity, would provide rich avenues for further research in this area.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, ethnicity and biculturalism are powerful and intertwined concepts underpinning contemporary notions of national identity. Biculturalism’s powerful reformulation of Māori-Pākehā relations as a partnership based on the Treaty of Waitangi has revitalized the legitimacy, value, and vitality of Māoritanga in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s contemporary national life. Simultaneously, multiculturalism plays out unevenly, is encouraged but not emphasised, and appears to take a secondary position to biculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand. However, the clearest and most problematic theme my study identified was how, frequently, notions of ‘New Zealand’ identity, culture and music inadequately recognize or articulate their Pākehā underpinnings. Indeed, like any identity, defining what makes ‘Pākehā’ identity/culture distinctive is complex, never straightforward, nor absolute. Yet in a ‘national’ bicultural context, where Māoritanga is consistently defined and represented, however simplistically or comprehensively, specific cultural and musical
traditions introduced and largely developed by European/Pākehā New Zealanders should be identified as such, rather than as simply ‘New Zealand culture/identity’.

Exploring, identifying and articulating Pākehā musical cultures — while undoubtedly vast and diverse — is crucial to decolonize ‘New Zealand music’. As long as ‘New Zealand identity/culture’ represents undisclosed elements of Pākehā identity, and vice versa, New Zealand nationalism will remain a colonizing force. Through a postcolonial reading, this discursive lapse perpetuates the colonizing/civilizing nation-building imperative instigated by British imperialists. By invoking nationalism, colonizers have asserted — sometimes violently — the superiority of Eurocentric social, cultural, political and economic systems over those of Māori and other peoples. Biculturalism’s ‘official’ national status, rather than representing two genuinely different sociocultural systems, enables Pākehā to claim Māori culture as ‘ours’ (New Zealand’s), regardless of their experience of Māoritanga and te Ao Māori. This notion of Māori culture is decontextualized, superficial and sometimes dehumanized. As New Zealand becomes a more culturally plural nation, its citizens should recognise that nearly two centuries’ worth of sociopolitical domination cannot be easily undone. The capacity for unquestioned nationalisms to marginalize other ways of being, knowing and organizing — however banal or ‘official’ their expression — must be acknowledged.

Notions of culture and ethnicity (e.g. Māori and Pākehā culture), and their position within national frameworks such as biculturalism, require elaboration beyond what this thesis discusses. Notions of hybridity and transculturation are crucial to avoid conceptualizing Māoritanga anachronistically. Conversely, conceptualizing Pākehā-ness in opposition to Māoritanga, while emphasising continuities with Anglophone, post-settler Western cultures, neglects Māori cultural influences, and cultural elements distinct from British, American, Australian, and other Anglo-Western cultures. However, the commonalities between Pākehā culture and a transnational, Anglo-Western, post-settler community, or ‘Anglosphere’, are obscured when national difference/uniqueness — based on dominant, normalized and unmarked cultural norms — is emphasised. Such nationalisms perpetuate, and are connected to, the globalisation of Western cultural hegemony, necessitating a transnational politics of indigeneity which destabilizes Eurocentric and colonial notions of ethnicity and bi- and multiculturalisms, as several studies call for (see Didham and Callister 2016; McCarthy 2011).
However, of course, the picture is complex. In her study on tourism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Margaret Werry (2011, 243-244) concludes:

In academe, we want to tell stories… that have clean endings and unequivocal morals. We want to tell of the tragedy of exclusion or exploitation, or of the triumph of “antitouristic” crusades to redeem the authentic integrity of indigenous culture or expose the white imperialist underpinnings of tourism’s cultural logics. The picture here only shows us the complexity of liberal life, the myriad agencies, compromises, calculations, investments, desires, and ambivalences that constitute the liberal exercise of freedom, mobility, and opportunity in a world still structured by race.

Similarly, over-emphasising the sociocultural and globalizing power dynamics between Māori, Pākehā, and other New Zealanders — and their influence on music-making — denies the connections, agencies, appropriations and influences that do not fit such prescriptive formulations. These complexities demand exploration, yet equally demand critical self-reflexivity.
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Appendix — Project information sheet for interviews

National Identity in Cultural Policy and the Music of Aotearoa New Zealand

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Thank you for your interest in this project. Please read this information before deciding whether or not to take part. If you decide to participate, thank you. If you decide not to take part, thank you for considering my request.

Who am I?
My name is Liam Williams-Prince and I am studying for a Master of Music degree in Musicology at Te Kōkī New Zealand School of Music, part of Victoria University of Wellington. This research project works towards my thesis on national identity and music in Aotearoa New Zealand.

What is the aim of the project?
This project will explore how New Zealand national identity affects music making in this country. I’m interested in knowing what ‘New Zealand music’ means to different people, and how different people conceptualise New Zealand national identity in music. I also want to look at whether New Zealand government arts policy supports specific ideas around national and cultural identities, and whether that support privileges and/or marginalises some musical styles and practices more than others.

This research has been approved by the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Approval Number: 22991).

How can you help?
If you agree to take part I will interview you in a public place, such as a café. I will ask you questions about your views on the music of Aotearoa New Zealand (including your own music if you are a musician), on New Zealand identity, and on the effectiveness of government policy for music. The interview will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour, and no longer than 1 hour and 30 minutes. You can stop the interview at any time, without giving a reason. I will record the interview, write your responses to my questions down later, and I will send you a transcript of your answers within four weeks after the interview for you to review.

You can withdraw from the study up to six weeks after the interview. If you withdraw, the information you provided will be destroyed or returned to you.

What will happen to the information you give?
This research is not automatically confidential, but you may choose not to be named. With your consent, I may describe who you are and quote your views in my thesis. You may also choose to
withhold any part(s) of the interview, or select which statements/quotes you would like to be quoted anonymously. You may also wish to remain entirely anonymous or not to be quoted at all. If so, I will not name you in any reports, and I will not include any information that would identify you. Only my supervisors and I will read the notes or transcript of the interview. The interview transcripts, summaries and any recordings will be kept securely and destroyed 5 years after the research ends.

Please indicate on the consent form whether or not you agree to being identified and quoted by name in my research.

What will the project produce?
The information from my research will be used in my Master’s thesis. I may also use the results of my research for conference presentations, and for academic publications. It is possible I may undertake a PhD project on a similar topic within the next 5 years, and I may find the views you provide in this interview useful for that project also.

If you accept this invitation, what are your rights as a research participant?
You do not have to accept this invitation if you don’t want to. If you do decide to participate, you have the right to:
• choose not to answer any question;
• ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview;
• withdraw from the study up until six weeks after your interview;
• ask any questions about the study at any time;
• receive a copy of your interview recording;
• read over and comment on a written summary of your interview;
• agree on another name for me to use rather than your real name;
• withhold any statements you make from being used in my research;
• be able to read any reports of this research by emailing the researcher to request a copy.

If you have any questions or problems, who can you contact?
If you have any questions, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either:

Student:
Name: Liam Williams-Prince
University email address: princeliam@myvuw.ac.nz

Supervisor:
Name: Kimberly Cannady
Role: Primary Supervisor
School: Te Kōkī New Zealand School of Music
Phone: 04 463-7426
Kimberly.Cannady@vuw.ac.nz

Human Ethics Committee information
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Victoria University HEC Convener: Associate Professor Susan Corbett. Email susan.corbett@vuw.ac.nz or telephone +64-4-463 5480.