
By

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A thesis submitted to Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

Victoria University of Wellington
2017
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Acknowledgements

I would not have been able to complete this work without the help, faith and support of a number of very important people.

To my supervisor Dr Katherine McMillan, thank you for your support, guidance and patience.
To Rosie, thank you for your love and for believing in me.
To my family thank you for always being there for me.
To all the friends and colleagues who have helped and taken an interest in my work, thank you.
To all people interviewed, thank you for your time and insight.
Abstract

In the last seventeen years, migrant settlement and integration policy has grown and expanded in New Zealand. While not necessarily a new concept in public policy, settlement and integration of migrants and refugees has dominated the discourse of Immigration policy in New Zealand for much of the 21st century. The topic of Immigration has become more complex and politically challenging as the world has become more interconnected and globalised. Consequently, as the public sector learned more about what settlement means in the context of migration and what programmes and services Government should deliver to newcomers and refugees, discussions have taken place to codify what responsibilities both central and local government in New Zealand have to newcomers. The central research question of this thesis has been how and why has local government’s role in delivering migrant services changed vis-à-vis the role of central government in New Zealand since 2000? By extension, how effective do community stakeholders and local authority staff perceive the current set of arrangements for delivering migrant integration and settlement services?

To answer this question, the thesis analyses the early national immigrant settlement framework and then early regional government settlement framework through its two case studies, in Auckland and Wellington. This thesis draws from a vast well of Government reports, reviews and policy recommendations, scholarly articles and academic opinions as well as interviews of current stakeholders. It charts the changing priorities of central government post-2008, stakeholder perceptions of those arrangements and, in the context of local and central government service delivery, argues that while the first national and regional framework were focused on the social aspects of settlement, the latest frameworks have prioritised the
economic aspects, as central government has learned from the results of the first framework and formulated its position on settlement services as one of leadership. This is in contrast to local government which has not yet successfully reached a consensus position. What this thesis concludes is that while the new set of arrangements has been met with mixed reception, and central government is still working on improving them, local governments in New Zealand are behind in formulating policy but based upon the findings in this thesis, have a responsibility to migrants and refugees when settling them into communities.
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## Abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARMS</td>
<td>Auckland Regional Migrant Services Charitable Trust</td>
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<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Auckland Regional Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>ARSS</td>
<td>Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy</td>
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<td>ASCP</td>
<td>Auckland Sustainable Cities Programme</td>
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<td>CAB</td>
<td>Citizen’s Advice Bureau</td>
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<td>ESOL</td>
<td>English Second Language</td>
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<td>FI</td>
<td>Family Sponsored Immigration</td>
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<td>GWRC</td>
<td>Greater Wellington Regional Council</td>
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<td>INZ</td>
<td>Immigration New Zealand</td>
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<td>LISNZ</td>
<td>Longitudinal Immigration Survey New Zealand</td>
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<td>MBIE</td>
<td>Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment</td>
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<td>NZMSIS</td>
<td>New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy</td>
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<td>NZRSS</td>
<td>New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy</td>
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<td>NZSS</td>
<td>New Zealand Settlement Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Refugee and Migrant Service</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Regional Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>SALT</td>
<td>Settlement Action Leadership Team</td>
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<td>SKB</td>
<td>Settlement Knowledge Base</td>
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<td>SLG</td>
<td>Settlement Leadership Group</td>
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<td>SNAP</td>
<td>Settlement National Action Plan</td>
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<td>SB</td>
<td>Skilled Business Stream</td>
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<td>SSLG</td>
<td>Settlement Strategic Leadership Group</td>
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<td>SSNZ</td>
<td>Settlement Support New Zealand</td>
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<td>WRAP</td>
<td>Wellington Regional Action Plan</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>WREDA</td>
<td>Wellington Regional Economic Development Association</td>
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<td>WRSS</td>
<td>Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy</td>
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Introduction/Thesis Overview

The topic of immigration, and by extension, migrant settlement, has become more prevalent and divisive in the last twenty years, with the onset of globalisation and the growth of migrant populations in developed host countries. The debate over migrants and their place in society has become a key election issue in some western countries as a result. However, what is also of equal importance is the discussion and formation of public policy tailored to integration and settlement of existing migrants in communities in order to demonstrate a skilled understanding of how a host country can efficiently handle an influx of new immigrants who arrive with different cultures, expectations of life and understanding of social concepts. A lack of adequate policy at both a national and regional level can be extremely damaging to a host country, as successful integration is essential for social cohesion in a modern society.

In 2004 the then-Labour Government created and approved the New Zealand National Settlement Strategy to create a policy framework to assist migrants at both a national and regional level with settling and integrating into New Zealand society. Since then the policy has undergone several reforms and additional regional policies in Wellington and Auckland have been created to supplement the national public policy framework.

This thesis seeks to explore the development of the role local governments in New Zealand have played in delivering migrant settlement services and how that role has changed since 2000, via the changes and developments to central government policy. It will examine also why these changes have occurred and what the perception of
regional stakeholders are currently in response to changes in the arrangements between central and local government. The thesis will analyse the development of both central and local government policy and in two case studies: Auckland and Wellington regions. It will analyse the changes in the relationship between the levels of government through the developments in each’s responsibility to migrants and their involvement in settlement and integration programmes and policies. The thesis will use the analysis of this relationship and perceptions of said relationship to formulate a comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of both levels of government when delivering migrant settlement and integration programmes and services.

Immigrant integration policies can range from employment policies and programmes for new migrants to second language classes, health, education, training and social benefits. However, integration also means access to information services that can help migrants understand New Zealand’s culture and customs and how to integrate into New Zealand society and become active and productive citizens. Additionally, adequate policy will help inform New Zealand citizens and show them how to welcome new migrants of varying ethnic cultures and religious backgrounds into culturally diverse communities. Migrant settlement and integration policy is therefore a necessary part of any country’s social and economic growth, as migrants who arrive with a diverse range of skills and experiences can fill gaps in a country’s economy that its national born citizens may not necessarily be able to. It is the injection of diversity into communities in order to help grow their cultures and solve wider social issues while teaching society about the cultures and issues outside of their community. Therefore, at a local level, it is incredibly important that local authorities and councils under New Zealand’s unitary political system understand their role in delivering services to migrants in their communities.
and helping communities resolve social and cultural issues that may be brought up by the addition of a new cultural element into their communities.

At a national level, successful integration can increase a country’s human capital, contribute to the development of enterprise and innovation, and strengthen a country’s international linkage. In New Zealand’s case, migrants are important in “helping grow a stronger economy, create jobs and build diverse communities.”¹ The current refugee arrival statistics show that “the average intake of refugees per year has increased from an average of five hundred per year ten years ago, to over eight hundred in 2015.”² These recent Government statistics point to the argument that multiculturalism while already playing a part in New Zealand’s national identity, is going to continue to grow in the next decade through increasing levels of refugees and by extension migrants. As such it is reasonable to conclude that New Zealand needs adequate and efficient public policy to ensure the transition from migrant and refugee to permanent resident is successful but also that migrants who arrive in the country have access to social services that would not be afforded to them in their country of origin. These services would assist with their settlement into New Zealand daily life and their integration into their communities of residence.

**Importance of research**

The research will provide a detailed examination of the role and responsibilities of the two levels of government in New Zealand towards migrants post-arrival. It will explore what programmes both central and local government have provided and currently provide to migrants and refugees, and how public policy has been tailored

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to meet the changing needs of migrants and refugees. The intent is to add to the New Zealand literature, not just on what services both councils and central government provide, but the level of responsibility each has to deliver those services. It will attempt to ignite questioning over whether local authorities are doing enough to help migrants settle into communities, and whether central government should have more or less responsibility in delivering national services.

The importance of the research carried out is to analyse not just the development of public policy in New Zealand at both a national and regional level, but to assess the relationship between central and local government on delivery of settlement and integration services, and to identify perceptions stakeholders may have of the current set of arrangements between the two. This will be done through available literature, Government reports, stakeholders’ views and interviews of relevant individuals that will help supplement the existing research.

**Case Studies**

The two case studies in this thesis are the two largest regions in New Zealand, Auckland and Wellington, each having, at one point in time, regional settlement and integration strategies and action plans that were tailored to their individual needs and goals, in line with the central government’s national strategy. Both Auckland and Wellington have comparatively high numbers of migrants and refugees compared to the other cities and rural areas in New Zealand. “Auckland is New Zealand’s largest metropolitan area. It has an increasingly diverse population with around one hundred and fifty different ethnic communities and the country’s highest number and proportion of migrants and refugees settling in the region.”3 As of the last census 39 percent of Auckland’s 1.4 million residents were born overseas,

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compared with 25 percent for New Zealand as a whole. This is reinforced by a 2012 study with an “overseas long term migrant population of 249,000 migrants in Auckland, compared to New Zealand’s total of 481,000 for the year ending 2012.” In addition to these figures Auckland hosts the Mangere Refugee Centre and has the largest settling refugee population at 2377 total.

As of 2012, Wellington had the second-highest number of migrants, at 66,000. While this is small in comparison to Auckland, Wellington has become a “global industry leader in screen and digital technologies and is recognised globally for entrepreneurial successes e.g. Xero, Weta, TradeMe and Icebreaker. However a key factor to the Wellington region’s success is inventive, high-value businesses excelling in global markets.” This is coupled with Wellington being the “home of central government and some of New Zealand’s largest employers (such as ANZ National Bank and New Zealand Post), many of which are located in Wellington’s CBD.” Wellington regional policy has indicated a need to focus now on “growing labour markets and employing a more highly skilled and diverse workforce to generate diversity and economic growth.” This is designed to supplement the existing industry in Wellington with new talent and grow business competitiveness on the international stage. While the two case studies do not make up all of the areas where migrants settle and attempt to integrate, they comprise of a significant portion of the population so they can be analysed, and viable conclusions on the importance of delivering services to migrants can be drawn. They were also the first two regions to

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7 Wellington Regional Strategy, Wellington Regional Strategy. 6.
8 Ibid., 13.
have regional settlement strategies so the first regional strategies are important to understanding the current arrangements and changes in public policy from those early days. The time period for the study of these two regions is 2000-2016. This period was chosen, so that the regions could be analysed before and after they had implemented their own regional strategies and frameworks and begun working towards outcomes and goals outlined within them. It was also chosen so that the thesis could provide a history of central government’s policy towards migrant settlement and integration and further supplement and analyse the development of regional policy around it.

The Auckland region centralised its territorial authorities or councils into one main council in 2011 called Auckland Council, however, prior to that it consisted of the following: Auckland City Council, Manukau City Council, Waitakere City Council, North Shore City Council, Papakura District Council, Rodney District Council, Franklin District Council and the Auckland Regional Council. For the purposes of this thesis I will be examining the councils as a whole prior to and after the amalgamation. The Wellington region currently consists of the following councils: Wellington City Council, Hutt City Council, Porirua City Council, Upper Hutt City Council, Kapiti Coast District Council, South Wairarapa District Council, Carterton District Council, Masterton District Council and part of Tararua District Council, with the Greater Wellington Regional Council overseeing them. Each region will be analysed according to their, policies, programmes, outcomes and reviews but will also include input from regional stakeholders and Government officials. This input will give further perspective to the existing literature and information available and will be able to reinforce any conclusions drawn from the literature.
The New Zealand Settlement Strategy, launched in 2004, was the template from which the Regional Settlement Strategies were designed. Outlined in the Government’s strategy were six main goals for successful migrant settlement: employment; English language skills; information and services; social community networks; ethnic identity; and community participation. In comparison, the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy had 12 goals including the original six and the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy had seven. The ideas behind both regional strategies were that they were to build upon the existing framework outlined by central government, pivoting towards issues they faced in their areas and conversely, improving the existing national strategy. Along with a coalition of national and regional public agencies and stakeholders, the overarching goal of both regional strategies and the national strategy was to form a network of settlement and integration services tailored to each region’s geopolitical and cultural needs.

**Research Questions**

In conducting this research I have framed my arguments and analysis around three primary questions:

1) How and why has local government’s role in delivering migrant services changed vis-à-vis the role of central government in New Zealand since 2000?

2) How effective do community stakeholders and local authority staff perceive the current set of arrangements for delivering migrant integration and settlement services?

3) What recommendations if any, can be made on further developing the current relationship between central and local government?
The following section will briefly outline how the chapters in this thesis sought to answer the above research questions.

**Thesis Overview**

Chapter One of the thesis will discuss a set of concepts and ideas relevant to providing context to the thesis’ topic. They are: the development of the terminology of ‘settlement’ and ‘integration’; the advantages and disadvantages of local and central government; and the concept of ‘social cohesion’. Each of these is relevant in framing the context of the thesis and the parameters and focus of the research.

Chapter Two will discuss the development and implementation of the New Zealand National Settlement Strategy and the national public policy framework that established migrant settlement and integration in public policy. I will look at the reasoning behind the development of the first national strategy, the initial stakeholders’ and reports and literature surrounding the public policy. I will also examine how the policy was managed, reviewed and reported on up until 2008. The intention is to frame the central government’s position on migrant integration over this time period, and the effect that position had on regional policy frameworks.

Chapter Three will examine and analyse the two regional case studies, discuss the focus of each policy and their intended goals and outcomes, up until reporting on them ceased. This will help to establish the perspective of Wellington and Auckland local authorities and stakeholders up until 2013.
Chapter Four will examine changes in the relationship between central government and local government as a result of public policy shifts at a central government level from 2008 to 2016, and the causes for those changes. By examining Government, stakeholder and local government reports and views, the thesis will highlight the relationship up until recently, between local and central government. Its aim is to chart how the relationship has changed and why the relationship has changed in relation to migrant settlement service delivery.

Chapter Five will discuss stakeholders views from the perspectives of the people interviewed for this thesis. It will seek to get their views on the changes to settlement policy and delivery mechanisms and their views on the current set of arrangements between central and local government.

Chapter Six will examine the advantages and disadvantages of local versus central government service delivery in the context of the previous chapters. It will seek to highlight the benefits and weaknesses of local and central government service delivery based upon the thesis’ research and conclusions.
Chapter One: Concepts, Ideas and Methodology

Concepts and Ideas

This chapter aims to examine the concepts and ideas relevant to the wider discussion of migrant settlement and, to an extent, the powers and roles which local authorities in New Zealand have to create and implement policy around migrant integration. It will also define the terminology being used in the thesis. Firstly, an examination of the literature around the definitions of ‘settlement’ and ‘integration’ will be provided, with the aim of outlining the changing definitions of what constitutes successful integration. Secondly, I will outline the respective powers of central and local governments in New Zealand, and what capacity local authorities have in New Zealand’s context to write policy and deliver services. Finally, an analysis of the concept of ‘social cohesion’ will be examined, outlining what social cohesion is, why it is important to public policy and why it is a fundamental part of New Zealand’s literature on migrant settlement. This chapter will then conclude by outlining the methodology of the succeeding chapters in this thesis.

Settlement and Integration

The conceptual term of ‘settlement’ or ‘integration’ in New Zealand public policy has not had a straightforward history. Before the term settlement or integration became commonplace in New Zealand policy other terms were used to describe the relationship between the host society and migrant groups. During the post-war period of the twentieth century, the prevailing approach to settling migrants and refugees was the notion of assimilationism. “The objective was that migrants should assimilate into their new society, without significantly altering it or requiring active
change on its part.”\textsuperscript{9} Thus the definition of successful settlement at the time was “the achievement of invisibility by the migrant, that is neither the migrants as a whole nor individual national groups should remain visible in the sense of having special needs beyond the initial period of arrival.”\textsuperscript{10} However, late into the 1960s academics began to challenge assimilationism as an appropriate or even a possible objective of migrant settlement. This approach was linked to “overarching nationalistic desire to protect the theoretical identity and characteristics of citizens, an identity that may be threatened by an influx of immigrants who may be inherently different.”\textsuperscript{11} Conversely, multiculturalism, which was growing out of development of the European Union at the time, argued that it was “preferable for the state to grant immigrants formal social and political rights while contemporaneously allowing continued expressions of the immigrants’ own cultural identity.”\textsuperscript{12}

One of the major arguments in favour of changing the definition came out of Australia and Canada, where studies concluded that “during the initial post-war period many migrant groups appeared not to be assimilating materially in the sense of comparable social and economic outcomes.”\textsuperscript{13} This was driven by the notion of cultural assimilation being seen as dehumanising, and contrary to the growing international literature and practice of basic human rights. The concept of multiculturalism was adopted in both Australian and Canadian public policy in the 1970s; although New Zealand never formally adopted multiculturalism into its official policy it never supported the concept of assimilationism in public policy again. Multiculturalism implied that migrant settlement was not a one-way process,

\textsuperscript{9} Michael Fletcher, Migrant Settlement: A Review of the Literature and its Relevance to New Zealand. (Wellington: New Zealand Immigration Service, 1999), 7.
\textsuperscript{10} Fletcher, Migrant Settlement, 7.
\textsuperscript{11} Miran Milosevic, “The Ideology of Integration: An Examination of the New Zealand and Ireland Case Studies,” (MA diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 2014), 25.
\textsuperscript{12} Milosevic, “The Ideology of Integration.” 25.
\textsuperscript{13} Fletcher, Migrant Settlement, 7.
as assimilationism defined it, but a “two way process involving change by both the migrant and host country and this allowed for settlement to become the preferred term up until the late 1990s.”\textsuperscript{14} But again the issue was that there was only the implication within the policy framework that migrant integration was a two way process but for all intents and purposes “the concept of settlement retained a strong expectation of commitment on the part of the migrant and their new home.”\textsuperscript{15} The 1988 Fitzgerald Report in Australia reinforced this idea, with its position on migrant integration more specifically, advocating for the creation of policies that encouraged migrants to take up Australian citizenship as an indicator of their commitment to living there.

Official statements on the objectives of Immigration in New Zealand tended towards the concept of multiculturalism. In 1986 the Government reviewed immigration policy in preparation for the introduction of the Immigration Act 1987. This review led to a shift in New Zealand’s immigration policy effectively ending the traditional ‘source countries’ (UK and Ireland) approach to Immigration that had dominated New Zealand public policy for most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century essentially “beginning New Zealand’s globalisation process.”\textsuperscript{16} This new liberalised approach to immigration adopted a pragmatic approach to citizenship recognising that “the decision to become a New Zealand citizen involved many factors and did not necessarily reflect a stronger commitment to reside in New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{17} Hence the term commitment became a crucial part of what settlement meant in a New Zealand context.

\textsuperscript{14} Jill Murphy, \textit{The Settlement and Integration Needs of Migrants: A Literature Review}, (Ontario: The Ottawa Immigration Partnership, 2010), 11.
\textsuperscript{15} Fletcher, \textit{Migrant Settlement}, 7.
\textsuperscript{17} Fletcher, \textit{Migrant Settlement}, 7.
In the 1990s, settlement was defined in public policy as a “two way process of adaption for new migrants and refugees as well as for host countries, with a commitment to reside in New Zealand society.”\textsuperscript{18} This was described as the early stages of adaptation to New Zealand life where newcomers make basic adjustments such as “finding somewhere to live, beginning to learn the local language, getting a job and learning to find their way around an unfamiliar society.”\textsuperscript{19} The difficulty with correctly defining settlement was that the process was open-ended and was variable. “Definitions ranged from a permanent footing in a new country, to full participation on the economic and social opportunity structure of society.”\textsuperscript{20} This issue was compounded by the variability of migrant’s successful settlement; some migrants would take longer to process and settle into society than others while refugees “often faced more complex issues and settlement challenges than migrants who chose to relocate.”\textsuperscript{21}

Nearing the end of the twentieth century, the term integration began to gain prominence in political literature, being described as “the long-term approach to settlement and the fundamental next step for migrants post settlement who wanted to live in the host country permanently.”\textsuperscript{22} Leading authors began to view ‘integration’ as a fluid term, similar to settlement in that there was no one single definition for it. Many pointed to “the new stage of globalisation in the twenty-first century sweeping through the old, bounded, container nation-state society, further individualising society, loosening social bonds and rendering borders more porous

\textsuperscript{19} Fletcher, Migrant Settlement, 24.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{21} Morse, New Kiwis and New Americans, 25.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 3.
as the origin of the term integration.” Integration became an amalgamation of the concepts included within settlement, but also developing the two-way process into a “reciprocal process involving the adaption not only of immigrants but also of structures within the host country.”

The Integration Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada defined the term integration in 2001 as “a two-way process that requires accommodations on both sides, this implies a two-way adjustment process whereby immigrants and the host society together create a new culture.” The significance of framing integration this way was that it “becomes a relationship not a firm outcome. The process is made to seem organic, as though something is to be negotiated between individuals in the time and place of their meeting.” However, critics argue that the term integration takes settlement a step too far in that it implies “that by pressing cultures to coalesce into a new integrated culture, integration goes against the principles of multiculturalism that values a society where many cultures co-exist with none dominant.” In New Zealand’s public policy, settlement and integration are treated as cooperative elements, attempting to achieve the same goals but to differing degrees. “Settlement and migrant integration are a complex multi-faceted and long term processes’ the differentiation that can be made is that settlement focuses on initial settlement goals while integration focuses on the long-term applications of those goals.” Settlement and by extension integration success has come to be defined as “no longer about how long migrants stay put, but rather any migrant who

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27 Ibid.
has made a positive contribution to society.”

New Zealand’s public policy and how central government interprets integration has come to be defined as the “longer term process through which newcomers become full and equal participants in all the various dimensions of society.”

Local Government v Central Government

The second set of concepts to be discussed is the advantages and disadvantages of local government and central government political systems in New Zealand, in relation to settlement service delivery. A core part of this thesis is the discussion about the role of local governments in New Zealand, and what their responsibilities are and can be to migrants in their communities. With this in mind, an analysis must be made of what rights and obligations they, under New Zealand’s unitary political system, are afforded in creating and implementing policy. Further, the potential advantages and disadvantages of central government service delivery will be compared to local government service delivery.

Local Government in New Zealand

‘Local government’ and ‘local authorities’ are terms used to describe regional, district, city or unitary councils in New Zealand. Current legislation, which codifies and empowers local governments, is derived from the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA). This updated version of the legislation “gave local government’s greater power and flexibility in deciding which activities to undertake.” One of its key features was that it “required local government to facilitate a process in their

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29 Fletcher, Migrant Settlement, 27.
30 Morse, New Kiwis and New Americans, 38.
communities, once every six years, to identify community outcomes.” While this is not the only piece of legislation regarding local government, it is the main source of local government’s regulatory powers. Local governments are governed by an elected body of representatives and a chief executive who is responsible for financial management and performance reporting of said local authority. Local organisations such as Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs), Building Consent Authorities, reserves, trusts and District Health Boards all have regulatory responsibility under the LGA. Traditionally, the relationship between local and central government in New Zealand has been hierarchical and not one which has led to a great deal of interaction and understanding of the respective strengths and capabilities of the two. The Productivity Commission in 2013 defined engagement between the two as “generally poor due to a lack of working relationships and poor common understanding between central and local government.”

Currently, an organisation known as Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) represents all the local authorities to central government. One of the resulting key advantages for local governments in New Zealand, based on its legislative powers, has been that they are able to adapt to local needs and react more quickly to local problems than central government. Because local governments in New Zealand have responsibility for a limited geographical area, they have been able to offer a more local and targeted approach to issues in their prospective areas, which avoids a “one-size fits all approach to issues which are over-engineered to meet all circumstances.” Central Government agencies, by contrast, are directed to solve national problems and respond with national programmes.

33 Local Government New Zealand, Local Government Funding Review. 37.
Local governments can create bylaws for their own areas around water management, building consent, dog control, alcohol reform and zoning, so long as they do not conflict with current NZ legislation in those areas. This allows local governments to have a greater level of control of service delivery in their area, rather than central government designing and implementing local policies with local government input or control. Another advantage of local government is that they are comprised of people who live and work in the area. Policy officers and councillors have an advantage, in that they have the ability to live, work and understand the local area to which they are responsible. In comparison, central government agencies are often large bureaucratic machines that must cater for all of New Zealand, so it is difficult for them to have individuals within their management who are focused on a particular area, and have a good understanding of the geographical issues of that area.

A major disadvantage of local councils in New Zealand, however, is that their funding is wholly derived from their own income, which is found through rates and local taxes, investments and loans, additional service fees, charges and income on facilities and programmes that they own and operate. Central government does not provide significant funding to local government, although it does subsidise projects that it considers to be part of its mandate, such as road repairs and infrastructural upgrades. This means that any service where there is not a collaborative arrangement on funding with central government, the local government must fully fund out of what income it receives and has available. “One of the challenges facing local government is finding a funding system that meets the needs of very diverse communities. Revenue sources that are suitable for a small rural community may not be adequate to meet the needs of large growing urban areas.”35

35 Local Government New Zealand, Local Government Funding Review. 11.
This leads to another issue in policy delivery at the local government: a lack of co-ordination between local governments means that there may be no consistency between the policies and the services they offer their residents. Control over their own funding and the finite resources available means they often do not loan to, or fund neighbouring councils who may be struggling financially to meet their needs. There is a lack of equity in that “some cities and districts are more able to afford quality infrastructure and services while some lack the economic base to grow.”

Many issues that are handled by central government agencies fall outside the capability of some councils to resolve themselves, due to funding and skill shortages, particularly in rural areas. In terms of service delivery, it would be difficult for a council controlled settlement delivery service to be replicated onto other councils, because of this fragmentation. Councils would need to design and implement local settlement policies and programmes that reflect their particular area, rather than a universal approach. Priorities, representation, and quality of working staff are all factors that impact services operated by a local council.

Another disadvantage of local councils operating local settlement services is an inconsistent quality. Since yearly budgets for council’s are determined by how much councils can borrow, versus how much they are projected to have available, the funding of social services fluctuates accordingly, based upon how much councils have to go around and how much they are willing to invest in the programme.

A secondary query posed here with regards to migrant settlement services at a local level, is that, should local government fund local settlement services from their own income? This can be answered based upon the priorities of the particular authority, the geographical makeup of the area, the support from local representation and

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36 Ibid., 35.
policy officers for any project or programme, and support of the local areas ratepayers which consist of residents and businesses. So, while local governments are constrained by both their finite resources and their population, central government agencies only need approval of Cabinet to fund their programmes, which are derived from the Government’s annual budget. However, there is no legislative barrier to local governments funding settlement services, only a financial and interest based one.

Central Government in New Zealand

Central government, or the state sector in New Zealand, is made up of Government departments responsible for serving the Government of the day. They provide the Government with advice and deliver services to the public. At the time of writing, there were 28 Government departments or ministries operating in New Zealand delivering a range of services from healthcare to social services, to justice and commerce. Government departments are not responsible for a particular geographical area within New Zealand but must deliver their services to all of New Zealand. Central government, like local government, derives its income mainly from forms of tax such as revenue and company taxes, but also from investment and sales of goods or services. However, while local government rates are confined to their particular area and population, central government taxes all New Zealand citizens, thereby receiving a far higher income than any local government. Also unlike local government “central government agencies have no legislative requirement to engage in the identification or promotion of community outcomes.”37 Their responsibility is to provide their services, as outlined by their respective Minister in Cabinet, who directs the policy and priorities of the department as per Cabinets direction, and the Chief Executive who is responsible for the department’s financial management and

37 Waitakere City Council, Effective Relationships and Collaborative Arrangements. 14.
performance. So, while local governments offer a targeted approach, central government agencies must deliver a wide reaching approach encompassing the entire country thereby fulfilling their purpose and policy mandate.

With central government the national interest is prioritised over dedicated locally targeted services as a result. Central government agencies often have the ability to “invest in better policy and focus on policy capabilities and long-term effects.” Disadvantages include, as already briefly discussed above, a ‘one size fits all’ approach to solving issues, which may not work depending on the area of their administration. Central government policy makers often “lack an understanding of how local government works, making collaboration on specific issues or programmes difficult at times.” However, in 1999 the election of the Labour-led Government in New Zealand led to an “ideological shift from public sector reforms of the 1980s to a third way approach to Government, with an emphasis on building relationships and working in partnership with Government agencies and local governments to empower communities and improve outcomes.” Evidence of this change in approach will be found throughout this thesis, where the first national settlement strategy regarding migrant settlement was a collaborative policy encompassing the involvement of multiple Government agencies and local governments. But it still remains an important problem in New Zealand’s decentralised public sector. The separation of policy agencies that create, lead and manage a specific policy or programme, from the operational agency, the department that carries out the policy at a local level sometimes “cut policy makers off from the on-the-ground realities of service delivery.” Translating this into a hypothetical model for migrant settlement, the department that creates the public

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38 Local Government New Zealand, Local Government Funding Review. 38.
39 Ibid., 36.
40 Waitakere City Council, Effective Relationships and Collaborative Arrangements. 3.
policy on migrant settlement and a separate department that implements the policy in day-to-day programmes in communities, may have widely differing interpretations of whether that policy is delivering outcomes and whether outcomes it delivers are successful or not.

While local governments can suffer a similar issue, in that the local authority that makes the policy, and the organisation they contract to implement it, may differ in success and views on the quality of the implementation, central government departments operate in their own spheres of service because of their size and priorities. In the public sector though, “there is little evidence of any consequences from a failure to act beyond a narrow interest, and a great reluctance to mandate whole-of-Government or best practice solutions – and to negotiate them is generally a slow, difficult and inefficient process.”42 So while Government departments are more capable in delivering national solutions, they have difficulty collaborating with other Government agencies to improve outcomes and providing a more narrow local approach to issues. One of the key points of this thesis will be that local and regional governments in New Zealand have a responsibility to create and implement migrant settlement and integration policy in conjunction with central government. But one of the fundamental issues with New Zealand’s public sector is that local and central government operate within their own spheres and have difficulty co-ordinating and communicating with each other. These issues are not recent but longstanding and ingrained due to the development of New Zealand’s public service. Any collaborative arrangement on an issue that has multiple Government agencies involved would compound the issue of collaboration between local and central government further, as Government departments also operate separately from each other. But the first national migrant settlement policy in New Zealand was an

42 Kerry McDonald, “The Critical Role of Leadership in the New Zealand Public Sector: Why the Sector is Falling to Perform to its Potential” (Wellington: Presented to the Corporate Governance in the Public Sector Conference 2007), 10.
attempt to rectify these long standing issues through collaborative measures. The following chapters will highlight two models of policy implementation; decentralisation and collaboration across whole-of-Government and centrally-controlled public policy. Both methods had strengths and weaknesses but the public policy will be measured in terms of how it affected the relationship between central and local government and what stakeholders thought of the changes and the current set of arrangements.

**Social Cohesion**

The final element relevant to this thesis is the idea of social cohesion. Internationally similar to the conceptual debate about ‘settlement’ and ‘integration’, there has been disagreement over a single definition for social cohesion and in the last twenty years the definition has been changing to meet policy needs. In Canada, Government resources were devoted to the “project of defining what it meant and how it might be measured and quantified statistically.”43 Between 1990 and 2004 the language used to define social cohesion had changed from “an ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada to shared citizenship and an interest in social capital.”44 The European Union the Council of Europe had a different view, putting social cohesion in a “broad term separated into three interrelated categories, democratic cohesion, social cohesion and cultural cohesion.”45 Canadian theorist Jane Jenson proposed a set of widely used indicators to measure social cohesion with eight indicators which were “access to financial resources, access to economic activity, access to education, access to health, access to technology, social cohesion as cultural homogeneity, trust and participation

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45 Ibid.
and solidarity.”[^46] Her definition of social cohesion was belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy, a commonly adopted definition and the primary one used by the New Zealand Immigration Service in the first national settlement strategy. This view is reinforced by a set of three categories created by Regina Berger-Schmitt that comprise social cohesion; ties that bind, differences and divisions and social glue which, refers to “associations and networks, infrastructure, values and identity.”[^47] The New Zealand definition is therefore an amalgamation of several internationally held views compressed into a single framework. The Ministry of Social Development in 2008 adopted the broad Council of Europe’s definition but also included Jenson’s specific framework. The report acknowledged that “New Zealand Government officials have used this definition in their policy work on settlement issues and it formed the draft basis for measuring settlement indicators.”[^48]

In a 2013 report by Auckland Council they conceptualised social cohesion as being defined by the first three of Jenson’s dimensions, belonging, inclusion and participation. This was decided on the basis that “the three dimensions are more closely associated with the overall purpose and activities of local government, which are to enable local decision-making and action.”[^49] A distinction between central government public policy and local government public policy has clearly developed as a result, with central government focusing on a broader definition of social cohesion while local government, specifically Auckland, has taken a more specific


focus on what it terms social cohesion but this definition is based off of the central government accepted definition.

The current New Zealand Government definition for social cohesion is that it must demonstrate a sense of being part of the wider community, trust in other people, and common respect for the rule of law and for civil and human rights. Because of New Zealand’s pre-existing bicultural foundation through the Treaty of Waitangi, its ethnic diversity should be recognised, celebrated and valued. This is accomplished through inclusion via “equity of opportunities and of outcomes, with regard to labour market participation, income, education, health and housing.” Migrants must also participate and involve themselves in social activities, community groups and organisations, and in political and civic life. This idea posits that all migrants who come to settle and integrate into New Zealand society should participate in every aspect of that society which reinforces the idea of inclusion.

The final two elements that are necessary to fulfil the definition of social cohesion in New Zealand social policy are recognition and legitimacy. Recognition is the valuing of diversity and respect of differences among all groups, including the host country through “protection from discrimination and harassment and a sense of safety and diversity of opinions and values.” Finally, legitimacy is the confidence in public institutions that act to protect rights and interests and to mediate conflicts, and institutional responsiveness. “Public institutions must foster social cohesion, engender trust and be responsive to the needs of all communities.”

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51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
The New Zealand definition provides a broad national platform for social cohesion in the context of migrant settlement and integration. It clearly identifies a set of requirements that must be adequately fulfilled in order to create meaningful social policy. But also in terms of influencing positive outcomes for migrants, the Ministry of Social Development recognised that “Government influences social cohesion in a number of ways, including assistance with settlement, immigration policy, employment policy, human rights legislation, justice policy and initiatives to improve intercultural relationships.”

Not only that, social cohesion also focuses on application of this platform at a local level based upon “the concentration of immigrants in New Zealand towards urban locations, most notably Auckland, requires national driven policy interests to be accompanied by local initiatives.”

However, as local government policy has developed, there is an indication that they are taking a position on social cohesion that departs from the established New Zealand Government definition prioritising “the need to foster an environment within which communities feel a sense of belonging, inclusion and participation.”

In Chapter Three the regional strategies of Auckland and Wellington will be discussed, which show a greater application of social cohesion at a local level.

Social cohesion is a foundational concept that helps the development and implementation of indicator frameworks based upon its elements. “Indicator frameworks are established to facilitate an understanding of change over time, in this context migrant settlement and integration satisfaction and outcomes.” A New Zealand model for assessing outcomes would “ideally look to fit the five ideas associated with social cohesion into two categories for an indicator framework,

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53 Strategic Social Policy Group, Diverse Communities. 6.
54 Spoonley et al, Social Cohesion, 99.
55 Meares and Gilbertson. "We all get along", 5.
56 Spoonley et al, Social Cohesion. 100.
elements of socially cohesive behaviour and elements that comprise conditions for a socially cohesive society.\textsuperscript{57}

In Chapters Two and Three, the thesis will analyse the national settlement and integration policy, as well as the case studies of regional policy. This analysis will determine whether they have or had a successful or adequate indicator framework from which to measure not only their outcomes, but also developments and improvements on the issues that affect migrants in their areas. The aim is to determine whether social cohesion has been put into practice and whether the corresponding policies are relevant to a successful public policy framework.

**Methodology**

For the purposes of this thesis, qualitative research analysis, along with inductive research, will be used to generate theories and answer the wider issues outlined in the research questions. Qualitative research is the approach usually associated with the “social constructivist paradigm, which emphasises the socially constructed nature of reality. It is about recording, analysing and attempting to uncover the deeper meaning and significance of human behaviour and experience, including contradictory beliefs, behaviours and emotions.”\textsuperscript{58} Qualitative methods are usually inductive rather than deductive. With an inductive approach researchers “develop a theory or look for a pattern of meaning on the basis of the data that they have collected. This involves a move from the specific to the general and is sometimes called a bottom-up approach.”\textsuperscript{59} This thesis, like inductive research, does not base itself on a pre-determined hypothesis but a guiding, overarching theory that frames

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 102.


\textsuperscript{59} “Types of Research.”
the discussion. This approach is a critical analysis of a wide variety of research material, in order to answer a central set of research questions as outlined in the introduction. All data collected will be textual rather than numerical, as it will be the literature, both domestic and international, that assists in analysing the issues involved in the research questions. Because of the lack of numerical data on successful settlement outcomes and the difficulty at quantifying statistically such results, this thesis will rely on a degree of primary source material in the form of interviews, with relevant parties to the topic of migrant settlement and integration.

The reports and strategies in New Zealand’s public policy will be analysed to determine how and why the roles of central and local government vis-à-vis integration and settlement have changed over the set time period. The aim is to examine policy to determine how and why policies changed over time and then examine the opinions of stakeholders to compare what their current perceptions are of the division of labour between central and local government. However, all policies will be examined within the framework of the central research questions identified in this thesis in order to keep on topic and to identify critiques of the public policy and recommendations for changes to the existing framework.

Limitations

The limitations of the research carried out should be noted as well. Considering the underlying focus was on charting the development of public policy in local and central government and perceptions by stakeholders, there is scope for bias depending on those interviewed. Opinion was a factor in arguing the relationship between central and local government currently is not satisfactory and need changes, particularly from interviewees at Hutt City Council and the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE). However, there were no interviews
conducted of Auckland Council representatives or its former bodies or contact with MBIE’s settlement service providers. This in turn potentially led to a level of bias against MBIE and bias against its contractors, which will have led to a degree of imprecision in articulating the perceptions of stakeholders. In order to form a more concrete argument, correlation between the effects of the relationship between central and local government and perceptions, more interviews would have had to be done on Auckland Council policy officers, MBIE contractors and local organisations within Auckland and Wellington regions. Due also to the wide ranging nature of policy development, some material could not be gathered, and this may have led to gaps in explaining the policy development. These gaps may have changed the nature of the argument and its conclusions.
Chapter Two: New Zealand’s Public Policy Framework

This chapter seeks to examine New Zealand’s public policy framework on migrant settlement and integration from its early development in 2004 to 2008 when Immigration New Zealand ceased reviewing the national framework. It will cover an examination of the early source material that led to the development of the first major public policy, an analysis of the first New Zealand Settlement Strategy and National Action Plan, a review of early stakeholder’s reports into the new strategy and finally, a review of the second iteration of the National Strategy in 2008 before annual reviews on the national strategy stopped. The intent of this chapter is to provide context to the wider development of central government’s settlement policy and how it influenced regional policy as a result. It also outlines the central government position on migrant settlement and integration before 2008 and how that position helped frame and develop local government policy at the time. While the policies and material may have been changed since 2008, they offer valuable insight into how the relationship between local and central government on migrant integration was formed, what the issues were at the time, what socio-economic factors affected those issues and how responsibility for those issues was distributed between the two parties with regional stakeholder involvement.

Migrant Policy Development pre-2004

In order to analyse the New Zealand Settlement Strategy and its subsequent iterations, one must first examine the information, reporting and policy changes that led to the creation of the strategy. The strategy itself was not developed spontaneously; rather it was the result of a project that had begun two decades before, with policy changes to the Immigration Act, which shifted the direction of Immigration Policy in New Zealand. In 1986 the Government announced a
“comprehensive policy statement on immigration, as well as the introduction of a new immigration bill to Parliament.” This policy statement and subsequent new Parliamentary bill called for three overarching changes to immigration policy in New Zealand, which were the following:

i) Abolition of national origin as a criteria for entry into New Zealand

ii) Introduction of a compulsory interview for all applicants and their families in order to assess the candidate’s personal qualities, employment skills, work history, language proficiency and motivation for migration.

iii) Removal of family size guidelines from a limit of four dependent children

These recommendations were followed by clear changes in policy tailoring a focus on a more multicultural and inclusive immigration system in New Zealand. These focused on the following:

i) “To enrich the multi-cultural social fabric of New Zealand society through the selection of new settlers based upon the strength of their personal contribution to New Zealand.”

ii) To facilitate reunion in this country

iii) To fulfil New Zealand’s international obligations

iv) To facilitate the entry of visitors to New Zealand for the purpose of fostering tourism, trade and commerce

v) The selection of new immigrants will be based upon their personal merit without discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, sex religion, ethical belief or marital status

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62 Ibid., 50.
Migrants were encouraged to “participate in New Zealand’s multi-cultural society while being able to maintain valued elements in their own heritage.” This marked a break with the earlier emphasis on admitting migrants based on ethnic origin and nationality.

The Immigration Policy Review in 1986 led to the Immigration Act in 1987, which introduced the points system and category system for prospective migrants to New Zealand also facilitated the now, voiced desire of New Zealand’s Parliament to investigate the development of migrant settlement policy. This led to a renewed interest in the area from the public. Immigration became a key electoral issue and the New Zealand Immigration Service the predecessor of the current service Immigration New Zealand, in 1998 “expressed a desire publicly for more integrated settlement programmes.” Literature at the time was also in support of this idea with Michael Fletcher’s Review of Migrant Settlement Literature in New Zealand among others advocating for a more structured approach to settlement and integration outcomes. In 1999 the new Labour Government approved the Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand (LisNZ), a significant project which aimed to “provide Government, policy makers, local government, service providers and academics with robust information about migrants’ initial settlement experiences and outcomes of immigration policies.” The report, completed in 2004, categorised migrants surveyed into several different sub-fields of initial settlement experiences, which included: motives for migration, skills and resources, economic contribution, and social integration and settlement. Migrants were also categorised according to which immigration stream they arrived under and were then measured against the sub-fields for the survey to identify the principal factors that affected

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63 Ibid., 51.
64 Fletcher, Migrant Settlement., 11.
each category of migrant. These arrival streams were the Skilled/Business Stream (SB) and secondary Skilled/Business Stream migrants who were spouse’s partners or dependent children aged 16 years and over of principal applicants. Finally migrants approved through the Family Sponsored and Humanitarian Stream (FI) assessed. Region of origin and occupation were also taken into account. The results of the LisNZ were a contributory factor in formulating New Zealand’s first comprehensive national migrant settlement and integration policy.

The LisNZ results were used to determine what the initial issues and outcomes were for migrants arriving and settling in New Zealand. This helped to formulate the structure of the first national settlement policy and determine its goals and outcomes. In the LisNZ, under motives and processes of migration, it was found that lifestyle was the main reason given by SB principal migrants for deciding to apply for New Zealand residence. Reasons were mixed for SB secondaries and family relationships were the key motivating factor for FI migrants. For skills and resources migrants were found to be “generally well educated with over half completing post-school study before applying for residence, but there was a corresponding focus on pay or profit as the most common activity for migrants before coming to New Zealand.”

Economic contribution showed that migrants in both SB categories rate of employment increased from 53 to 62 percent over an 18-month period with “the proportion of migrants seeking work correspondingly dropping from 14 to four percent over the same period. However, the report stressed that while “participation in the labour market was an important measure of settlement success; it is not the only measure and should not be treated as such.”

Prior to 1999 the National Government of the time was perceived to view “immigration (and relatedly integration) through an economic lens; as a measure for obtaining economic

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66 Ibid., 4.
67 Ibid., 126.
prosperity." Finally the last category of assessment focused on social integration with a major point identifying that “the majority of migrants interviewed were satisfied with living in New Zealand citing the climate and friendly nature of local New Zealanders but noting that they disliked the lack of, or poor employment opportunities.” However, a corresponding research study at the time also cited that “lack of acceptance is not conducive to encouraging newcomers to share their cultural backgrounds.” The Longitudinal Survey also found that “migrants place a higher importance on preserving and carrying on their values and traditions the longer they stay in New Zealand.”

The survey concluded that there was “clear evidence that while settlement is progressing for some, it is not progressing for others, and that there needs to be a continued strong and responsive settlement focus in immigration policy.” A secondary study concluded the same arguing that the “lack of well-defined settlement policies is not conducive to maintenance of cultural links and that any major changes to settlement policy involve wide consultation with interested parties before implementation.” The second study concluded that there needed to be prioritised and specific public policy introduced around settlement of migrants long-term and that needed to be a main focus of New Zealand’s Immigration Service. Complementing that view, outlined in the literature used, the study concluded that both central government and local authorities have a responsibility to immigrants in New Zealand. “Central government needs to explain immigration policy objectives clearly while promoting interconnectivity between migrant groups and

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69 New Zealand Immigration Service. Migrants’ Experiences of New Zealand. 121.
71 New Zealand Immigration Service, Migrants’ Experiences of New Zealand, 127.
72 Ibid., 128.
73 Watts, White and Trlin, The Cultural Capital Contribution of Immigrants in New Zealand. 45.
stakeholders, while local authorities need to demonstrate respect for the cultures that immigrants bring with them and actively showcase them.”74

However, the Longitudinal Survey was not the only major report that helped create the measures for the first settlement strategy. The second major report was called *Refugee Voices: A Journey Towards Resettlement* and it was focused around resettlement experiences of refugees in New Zealand. In a Literature Review of the project in 2001 it was stated “to date there has been no major Government sponsored research focusing on the resettlement experiences of refugees.”75 The project was again run by the New Zealand Immigration Service, which studied two distinct groups of refugees and surveyed their experiences. These groups were recently arrived refugees who were interviewed six months after arriving in New Zealand and then again at two years. The second group were established refugees who were surveyed after five years of living in New Zealand. The total proportion of refugees interviewed and whose results were recorded and incorporated into the project was 398. The overarching aim of the project was to “describe refugees’ resettlement experiences over a broad range of areas including their backgrounds, the information they had about New Zealand prior to arrival, their arrival experiences, housing, getting help, family reunification, health, learning English, adult education, labour force and other activities, financial support, children and teenagers, social networks, discrimination, cultural integration and settling in New Zealand.”76 In the report it concluded several major elements that eventually were incorporated into the forthcoming New Zealand Settlement Strategy.

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74 Ibid., 49.
The report broke the findings down into five categories; background, settlement, training, work and income and social integration examining the survey participants in relation to each category. In terms of background over half of recently arrived Quota refugees had no formal qualifications and eight in ten established refugees had no formal qualifications prior to arrival in New Zealand. The main point the report made out of this finding was that educational training and information services needed to be a major priority of any strategy or policy in Government. A chief issue was that refugees were receiving all information and English language training exclusively out of a six-week rotation in Mangere Refugee Reception Centre and after the rotation there were neither “options for housebound refugees nor a system in place to ensure equitable delivery of post rotation English services.”

In terms of settlement issues the report found that “more than a third of recently arrived refugees had problems finding suitable housing with overcrowding a main factor, but also lack of English language ability also causing issues.” However, the report also found that over 39 percent of established refugees had similar problems, including lack of available information, training, financial support and finding work. Lack of education stemming from few clear English training programmes at the time also clearly affected employment prospects with the report finding that lack of English language proficiency was causing discrimination or difficulty in both groups with seven out of ten refugees experiencing difficulty integrating into the workplace. A separate report by Alison Gray and Susan Elliot in 2001 concurred with this finding citing that “lack of recognition of qualifications, English language experience, and lack of advocacy to alleviate employer’s concerns over refugee

77 Ibid., 368.
78 Ibid., 20.
reliability and cultural practices needed to be addressed in order to help integration.”

Finally, *Refugee Voices* concluded that “social integration should be a key priority with separate focus for children and teenagers who intend to live in New Zealand permanently.” It addressed the barriers of the time including discrimination, lack of social networks, lack of information and lack of understanding of New Zealand culture as contributory factors that were preventing successful integration in communities. However, while not explicitly including the recommendation in their report, there was a view that “service providers felt that people within refugee communities were best positioned to help members of their own communities while highlighting needs and gaps in Government policy.”

While the reports above identified issues, that both migrants and refugees shared, there were also distinct issues that one group placed as a higher priority over the other. For example, out of the Longitudinal Survey, migrants placed labour market opportunities as a high priority while in *Refugee Voices* refugees placed education, English language learning and information services as a high priority. In the Longitudinal Survey one in five migrants identified English language difficulties while in *Refugee Voices* only “17 percent of recently arrived refugees said they could speak English well upon arrival with 46 percent of Quota refugees saying they could not speak English well after two years of residency.” It was a prevalent issue in *Refugee Voices*, contributing to issues including lack of social and cultural

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80 New Zealand Immigration Service *Refugee Voices*: 369.  
81 Ibid., 370.  
82 Ibid., 190.
understanding of New Zealand along with discrimination and lack of information services reinforced it.

The reports ended up creating the first national settlement strategy which was an amalgamation of both migrant needs through the Longitudinal Survey and refugee needs through *Refugee Voices*. While there was common ground in shared issues between migrants and refugees, there was a clear distinction in their needs and priorities upon arriving in New Zealand using different methods to gain entry and using different resources to establish themselves in New Zealand. There was no distinctly separate policy or strategy created for refugees until 2013, and as will be expanded on in Chapter Four, this caused serious issues in continuous review and implementation of the national settlement strategy. But from this early point an issue with settlement policy in New Zealand is clearly evident in that both refugees and migrants are two distinct groups of people following different processes and prioritising different issues in their journey to integration in New Zealand but early public policy placed them together.

**New Zealand Settlement Strategy 2004**

In May 2004 the New Zealand Government launched the first national strategy on migrant settlement, the New Zealand Settlement Strategy (NZSS). The strategy was the result of several years of research and policy review. It was funded through a $62.39 million budget package as part of the Government’s annual budget. The funding was allocated to the launch of the programme and its continuation over a five year period. The Department of Labour and the New Zealand Immigration Service were charged with its development and implementation. The opening statement of the strategy explained its purpose:
We want all migrants regardless of their reasons for coming to live here, to establish their families quickly and successfully in local communities, and to contribute fully to our nation’s social and economic life. For many people settlement is relatively straightforward, despite the challenges of life in a new country. Other people need more assistance as part of our welcome to them. A range of Government agencies already provides and fund settlement services. However, services have been fragmented and of uneven quality. We know there are gaps and barriers to accessing services. The New Zealand Settlement Strategy addresses these issues by taking a cross-Government approach to settlement.\textsuperscript{83}

This purpose was then expanded upon in the six strategy goals the strategy produced. They were employment, confident English use, access to appropriate information and responsive services, including but not limited to; housing education and services for families, supportive social networks in communities, feeling safe in expressing ethnicity and culture and finally civic participation. The strategy was formulated to target “permanent residents of New Zealand and their families and aims to help them feel at home permanently so that they do not return to their home country. Encouraging migrants to return to their home country is not part of the strategy.”\textsuperscript{84}


Table One below outlines the funding package committed to the NZSS for the creation period from 2004-2008 and the services the funding was allocated to:

Table One: New Zealand Settlement Strategy Funding Package

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<tr>
<td>Career Advice</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
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<td>0.450</td>
<td>1.576</td>
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<td>ESOL in Schools</td>
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<td>8.499</td>
<td>12.475</td>
<td>12.630</td>
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<td>NZQA</td>
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<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant resource services</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>3.137</td>
<td>3.476</td>
<td>3.386</td>
<td>11.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Migrant Services</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>6.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Settlement Secretariat</td>
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<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The strategy was divided into two areas: goals and implementation, and initiatives to meet each, providing an outline of what central government targets were and how they were going to implement the strategy with stakeholders to reach those targets. The first goal, obtaining appropriate employment, was a major focus identified in both contributory reports, and the strategy identified that “the speed at which they [migrants] integrate into the labour market, finding work that fits with their skills and qualifications, is a significant indicator of progress for settlement.”

that reports to the Ministry of Education, allowing them to tailor their services towards “career advice for migrants and refugees and assessment of refugee qualifications.” The second goal was access to appropriate information and responsive services, the strategy would fund English Second Language (ESOL), training of both migrants and school children who are recent migrants. “Outcomes for children will be improved through raising their level of achievement in English speaking by providing additional support materials to teachers and students.”

The third goal was information and services, and the strategy proposed the creation of several entities focused on providing information services to migrants and refugees, and communicating between the Government and local stakeholders. These entities were the Refugee and Migrant Service (RMS), Settlement Support New Zealand, an initiative operated jointly by the New Zealand Immigration Service and local governments, and finally the “establishment of a national structure, supported by a secretariat to address the current lack of co-ordination and information sharing across and between Government, local government, and other stakeholders.”

What is noticeable both in the strategy and in literature around it is that it only had implementation initiatives for the first three goals. The last three goals of supportive social networks, feel safe expressing ethnicity, and participation in civic and community social activities did not have defined initiatives, but rather “the strategy’s continued development will be achieved through a series of dialogue based forums and meetings over the next eighteen months with local...”

88 Ibid., 17.
stakeholders.” What is clear in the initial strategy is there was an “expectation that positive settlement outcomes could be achieved by Government agencies, non-Government service providers, and migrant and refugee communities working together in local settlement areas.” In mapping key areas across the country to identify those which had high migrant and refugee populations, the Department of Labour’s policy was to work collaboratively with regional stakeholders to advance the national strategy believing that without their input the strategy would not be able to grow as migrant and refugee needs changed in New Zealand. From this position, we can clarify the relationship between local authorities and central government surrounding national settlement as one of direct cooperation. This cooperative relationship was intended to build the infrastructure necessary to reach the outcomes stated in the public policy framework, which was developed by the Longitudinal Survey and Refugee Voices. This cooperative approach was designed to “ensure local settlement planning reflects local settlement needs, identifies gaps and eliminates any duplication of services.”

From its initial creation, the original New Zealand Settlement Strategy developed a relationship between local authorities and stakeholders, which aimed to identify local issues and the strategic application of resources in correspondence with those issues. The initial strategy recognised that the creation of local settlement support coordinators and increased collaboration with local networks not only provided a clear point of contact for migrants and refugees to access information, but a local support network for them to increase opportunities for migrant and refugee communities to participate in designing appropriate solutions. The stakeholder responses were drawn from a range of workshops, public forums, and Government agency meetings. These responses were used to further tailor the strategy and create the

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89 Wallis, “Keeping Pace with a New Zealand Settlement Project” 4.
90 Morse, New Kiwis and New Americans. 30.
91 Ibid., 3.

Only a small portion of the initial dialogue between central Government agencies that were attached to the project and stakeholders was located for this thesis. These agencies included the New Zealand Immigration Service, Ministry of Social Development, Department of Justice and the new Office of Ethnic Affairs, formerly the Ethnic Affairs Service, a subsidiary within the Department of Internal Affairs. This dialogue consisted of recorded minutes of local and regional workshops, as well as written summaries of those meetings and progress reports, with NGOs and non-Governmental organisations supporting migrants and refugees in New Zealand. However, the portion which was located offers insight into perceptions and thoughts of both local and regional NGOs and migrant groups in 2004 as to what the state of settlement and integration was at the time. This was helpful in pinpointing what recommendations could be made to the initial NZSS. The Department of Labour, in conjunction with several other Government agencies, was tasked with overseeing several key workshops with ethnic communities, local government, non-Government organisations and economic development agencies over a series of months in areas of high migrant populations. These areas were; Christchurch, Hamilton, Waitakere City, Auckland City, Manukau City and Wellington. According to the dialogue reports, the Government was aware that there were a number of barriers to achieving good settlement outcomes. One of the main barriers “was a lack of national co-ordination and information sharing among those working in the settlement area.” The Government sought to address this barrier through asking two questions regarding the NZSS: firstly, how does central government improve the way communication with regional stakeholders is made and

maintained, and what are “the priorities to improving settlement outcomes for a long-term work plan?”93

In subsequent consultations, specifically with Pacific Island communities in 2004, these questions were answered through stakeholders saying that they “viewed face to face communication in the form of community meetings with Government agencies as particularly important to Pacific communities. Many Pacific people are unaccustomed to speaking in meetings and tend to rely on community leaders to speak for them.”94 Considering local government involvement, the Department of Labour indicated “local government should be acknowledged for taking a successful, co-ordinated approach to community consultation, and plays an important role in linking communities to central government.”95 This indication recognises that at the time of the first NZSS, central government valued the relationship it had with local governments to deliver settlement services. More specifically, Government work on developing the first national strategy reflected local community issues and actively encouraged local consultation and input through local governments and stakeholders.

Stakeholder reports also showed that there was strong support for a National Settlement Secretariat in the Department of Labour to meet the “need for a centralised focal point for communication and co-ordination.”96 While the NZSS did highlight the desire to have local co-ordinators to reinforce the creation of a national structure to improve co-ordination, communication and information sharing across Government agencies, stakeholder views indicated, a network of approachable

93 Department of Labour, New Zealand Settlement Strategy Feedback, 1.
94 Woolford, Social Protection for Migrants from the Pacific Islands in Australia and New Zealand. 16.
95 Department of Labour, New Zealand Settlement Strategy Feedback, 2.
96 Wallis, “Keeping Peace with a New Zealand Settlement Project” 3.
contacts for refugees and migrants in Government agencies could break down the reluctance of many people to approach Government agencies directly. Refugees interviewed were also prioritising different issues as opposed to migrants as indicated by Refugee Voices. Family reunification was seen by refugees as a high priority with the Government having a responsibility to reunite families where only part of a family has been brought to New Zealand. In comparison, migrants prioritised employment assistance over family reunification in their responses.

Concerning the issue of housing, migrants and refugees had similar yet differing opinions in terms of housing priorities. “Migrants are often unaware of the standard of housing that is acceptable, and local councils could have a role in providing guidelines. Refugees in comparison would like their own communities to decide where they should be located.” While both groups gave responses to central Government agencies during the stakeholder consultation process, both had markedly different priorities. There was no indication in the stakeholder responses that the lack of differentiation in policy between migrants and refugee priorities, was a potential issue nor did the New Zealand Immigration Service make clear at the time that they believed an issue in delivery of services may arise from this lack of separation.

Overall, stakeholder perceptions at the time were positive in the sense that the NZSS was addressing the gaps that refugees and migrants wanted addressed. However, it is clear in the stakeholder responses that both migrants and refugees, while sharing similar issues, prioritised them differently in terms of urgency and Government involvement. This reinforces the view of the preliminary documents that created the NZSS, when those migrants and refugees even then had similar but also differing issues. As this thesis will show further in this chapter, but particularly in Chapter Four, the issue of amalgamation of refugee and migrant issues in public policy

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 11.
created problems for the NZSS in the long-term which led to a change in priorities of central government changing the relationship with local government.

**Settlement National Action Plan 2006**

The results of the stakeholder’s work with the Department of Labour were codified in the Settlement National Action Plan (SNAP) in 2006. This document was designed to set out what will be done at a national level under each of the Strategy’s high-level goals, what organisations would be responsible for completing the goals and providing outcome reports, and the role of local stakeholders in the process. SNAP was formed during the phase of introducing the NZSS, as a result of all the information collected by stakeholder meetings and forums from 2004-2005. SNAP was the implementation plan for the strategy, and sets out the responsibilities and timeframe for action. The six NZSS goals were compiled under four initiatives within SNAP. These four initiatives were economic transformation, families young and old, national identity and crosscutting initiatives: a total of 26 actions were created to reflect these initiatives and the NZSS goals.

Each initiative had elements of multiple NZSS goals, with clear overlap between initiatives and the goals of the NZSS. This overlap resulted in Government agencies becoming responsible for multiple goals and actions within the SNAP, rather than tailoring a single agency to a single goal. For example under the economic transformation initiative in the SNAP the NZSS goals “access to appropriate employment” and ”good English use” were placed with the intended outcome being to “identify practical measures, in partnership with other organisations, to reduce migrants’ barriers to employment and enhance their employment outcomes.”

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98 Ibid.
Another intended outcome in the initiative was English language use; the aim was to “identify proposals to overcome barriers to access and to address gaps in service provision for ESOL and work readiness programmes to improve employment outcomes.”

The action plan had three objectives. The first aimed to set a standard in public policy and clearly state central government’s targets and goals to regional stakeholders. The second objective was to identify the responsibility of each Government agency for meeting the goals and outcomes of the NZSS thereby facilitating cross-Government involvement. This responsibility aimed to establish a timeframe for delivering outcome and progress reports to Cabinet and Government agencies. The Department of Labour was designated as the leading reporting Government agency. The final objective was to create a new integrated information network for both migrant and refugee settlement services with input and involvement from both Government officials and non-Governmental representatives. This was done through the launch of Settlement Support New Zealand (SSNZ), an arm of the Department of Labour established to “co-ordinate the delivery of settlement advice and information for migrants and refugees at mainstream agencies or specialist organisations, in collaboration with local councils and local settlement support agencies.” Settlement Support intended to be a bridge of communication and cooperation between Government officials and local representatives to ensure that the goals of the NZSS remained relevant and were continually developed, and to ensure central government remained responsive to changing needs of migrants and refugees. This meant that local authorities also took on a level of contractual responsibility to report on and inform central government

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100 Morse, *New Kiwis and New Americans*, 29.
on what was working in their area and how central government could improve its delivery of settlement services.

SSNZ was given $11.7 million over a four-year period to establish its infrastructure and networks with 19 local Settlement Support initiatives being introduced nationwide. SSNZ involved local stakeholders, local government and central government in order to achieve outcomes. Central government was to renew funding after four years, with a $3.5 million influx per year. By 2008 there were 18 Settlement Support Networks operating around New Zealand independently and reporting to their local councils, stakeholders and the New Zealand Immigration Service.

However, there was a roadblock in the NZSS evaluation framework for Settlement Support which would have long term effects, not just on the ability to report outcomes of the NZSS, but also the ability to evaluate and record outcomes from the succeeding regional settlement strategies. Such settlement strategies will be discussed in further depth within Chapter Three but all of them had the same issue. In the original NZSS framework, the “programme theory assumed a clear point of contact would be established as one of the mediating mechanisms through which the objectives of SSNZ would be realised.” These points of contact were visualised as physical sites in local communities whereby migrants and refugees would visit if they needed information or assistance in any aspect of their settling process. Ruth Wallis’ 2006 report on the early NZSS setup phase found that “as local initiatives developed, it emerged that some had excluded the contact centre aspect and focused exclusively on setting up their Local Settlement Networks to promote greater

101 Wallis, “Keeping Peace with a New Zealand Settlement Project” 5.
collaboration and co-ordination across service providers and their localities.”

This meant that Settlement Support networks were acting independently of the New Zealand Immigration Services’ direction, in some cases prioritising issues they felt were a high priority in their community.

Due to the nature of the intended relationship between central Government agencies and local stakeholders, there were clear gaps in the evaluation framework of the NZSS. The NZSS had given local government the power to formulate their own settlement policy, which would be designed to supplement the existing NZSS policy. However, the consequence of such supplementation was that in evaluating and determining outcomes, local stakeholders were prioritising the development of their settlement infrastructure over co-ordinating and assisting central government in developing their infrastructure. So, while the NZSS was still developing, local governments’ and NGO organisations were focusing on their own frameworks and not assisting the NZSS in the capacity that the Department of Labour envisioned. Also, the Department of Labour found that “initiatives were taking longer to establish locally than had been expected and consequently that the evaluation was taking place during the development phase of the programme rather than after its implementation.”

The evaluation framework of the NZSS was not complete and there were no clear instructions on how to monitor and report on outcomes in the SNAP. As a consequence, local government policy replicated this issue in their own workings.

If any regional impacts resulted, it should be noted that regional stakeholders had a different interpretation of the evaluation framework than the Department of Labour,
believe that it was central government’s role to direct local government to report on their strategies and specifically direct them to report on key information central government wanted at the time. This approach will be further explored in Chapter Four, as the differing views between central government, local government and stakeholders affected not only their relationships with one another but also the direction and priorities of the national public policy on migrant settlement and integration.

**New Zealand Settlement Strategy 2008**

Near the end of 2007, the Government decided to re-release the NZSS in a compilation of all the material and information the Department of Labour had gained since they began the settlement policy development. Hence the NZSS was updated and re-released in 2007 but lacking any major changes to its goals or intended outcomes. However, it did clarify “the Department of Labour is responsible for leading and co-ordinating the implementation of this cross-sectoral strategy, which provides an umbrella for other broad-based settlement initiatives through the Settlement National Action Plan.”

The strategy placed responsibility on the Immigration Service now known as Immigration New Zealand (INZ) to lead, co-ordinate and deliver settlement services nationally. While it was both assumed and indicated that the Department of Labour was responsible for carrying out the NZSS in 2004, it was never explicitly stated within the policy that this was their responsibility. With the 2008 strategy their role was clarified in the public policy.

The 2008 strategy employed a similar method to the SNAP, outlining three overarching priority areas: economic transformation; families young and old; and

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national identity. The 2008 strategy further incorporated the individual strategies goals into these policy areas. Only one of the original NZSS 2004 goals was changed and split into two separate goals in the 2008 strategy. “Feeling safe with expressing their ethnic identity and being accepted by and becoming part of the wider host community” was split into; “are accepted and respected by their host communities” and “feel safe within the wider community which they live.”105 The only other new addition to the 2008 NZSS was the policy statement on working with local government to achieve outcomes. “No single part of Government is solely responsible for settlement, all Government agencies have a part to play. A partnership approach is important at all levels, Government agencies, local bodies, communities, migrants, refugees and service providers.”106 This is seen as a confirmation that central government believed that the delivery of migrant settlement services should be through a cross-Government multi-tiered approach incorporating Government agencies and working with local governments, NGOs and charities to achieve outcomes.

The Government recognised that every community was different and that a single specific Government agency approach would not be successful in integrating migrants and refugees long-term and that a cross-Government approach was needed. However, the reverse is also true in that ethnic communities have different approaches to settlement. For example, in a stakeholder’s report it was found that “the holistic approach that is favoured by Pacific communities can lead to burnout by community volunteers and assistance is needed to build capacity within communities.”107 What is also important is that the 2008 strategy confirmed and implemented a new organisational structure that included the involvement of the regional settlement strategies that had been created since the 2004 NZSS and the

106 Ibid., 16.
forthcoming regional strategies soon to be introduced. Below outlines the national settlement organisation structure in 2008:

Figure One: National Structure for New Migrant Settlement

Concluding Remarks

In concluding this chapter, three salient points are apparent in the New Zealand Government’s early approach to migrant settlement and integration. Firstly, the issues of migrant settlement and integration are broad as there are dozens of other smaller issues, which are based upon what migrants see as important issues to them. The original NZSS and its subsequent iteration had a focus on both migrants and refugees, further broadening the public policy and making it more difficult to measure. As the NZSS was an amalgamation of both refugee and migrant issues with clear overlap, the public policy framework was attempting to cover two groups, among whom there were both similarities and clear differences. While the long-term consequences of not recognising or studying this kind of overlap are not apparent in this chapter, they will be made apparent in Chapter Four where I define such overlapping in policy application as a contributory factor to the relationship between central government agencies and local government. The lack of a differentiation in policy would lead to consequences in managing the NZSS framework.

Secondly, the Government clearly indicated in their reports, reviews, policy recommendations and national settlement strategy, that local government would have a leading role in migrant and refugee integration and settlement policy. They concluded that the only way their targets in the NZSS could be reached is if there was a broad national framework that was implemented not just across Government agencies but also across major stakeholders, NGOs and local Government agencies. This would give the NZSS a flexible and evaluative quality, allowing it to pivot towards issues as they became relevant to migrants while also remaining up-to-date with migrants and refugees locally so that it did not lose touch with communities.
Finally, there was a clear differentiation between local Government providers, local stakeholders and central government agencies’ perspectives over responsibility and priority of implementing the NZSS infrastructure, more specifically the infrastructure of Settlement Support New Zealand. This differentiation will also be further examined in Chapter Four as another contributory factor in the ongoing relationship between the two entities. Ultimately, the Department of Labour recognised, in 2006, that the disagreement over who had sole responsibility in implementing NZSS formats was a potential issue for migrant settlement in New Zealand, so they decided to settle it by outlining in the updated strategy that Immigration New Zealand’s role was to lead and co-ordinate the framework at a national and regional level. As this thesis will show in Chapter Three, the creation and implementation of the NZSS opened the door for local governments to formulate their own regional migrant settlement and integration policies not only supplementing the NZSS framework but, focusing on local issues for migrants, resolving them, and relaying the information of the issues and their approaches back to Government agencies.
Chapter Three: Case Studies - Auckland and Wellington Regions 2004-2013

As outlined in Chapter Two, the creation of a national settlement strategy and the endorsement by central government for the creation of local infrastructure propelled the development of regional settlement strategies in New Zealand. The regional strategies at the time had two goals: to complement and support the developing national framework and to identify regional and local gaps that could be filled by a local approach as opposed to a whole-of-Government approach. The Department of Labour at the time highlighted that the importance of regional responsiveness was to “develop regional settlement initiatives to improve service provision to migrants and refugees through improved co-ordination, cross-sectorial planning, information sharing and knowledge transfer.”

Of the regional strategies developed, two have had the most impact on the direction of settlement policy in New Zealand: the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy (ARSS) and the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy (WRSS). They were the first regional strategies launched and were the intended foundations of what was to come for other regions in New Zealand. For this chapter the thesis will be examining both of these regional strategies separately, discussing how they were developed, what their issues were, experiences in their implementation and their strengths and weaknesses. The aim of this chapter is to outline the early local government position of the relationship between central and local government, in terms of migrant settlement and integration policy and service delivery. Unlike Chapter Two which focused on the central government position and policy development up until 2008, this chapter focuses on the local government position until 2013 when regional

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settlement policy stopped being reviewed by local government and was changed under a new national model.

Case Study One: Auckland Region

Regional Policy Development 2004-2008

The earliest regional strategy that was incorporated into the developing national settlement infrastructure was the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy launched in 2006. The Strategy was a three phase project which consisted of: supporting a partnership approach with local and regional stakeholders and agencies, literature overviews to consider previous information on settlement issues, and finally evaluating migrant and refugee communities to identify what assisted and prevented them from achieving settlement outcomes. Manukau City Council commissioned the project in 2003 from within the Auckland Mayor’s Forum, with the support of Lianne Dalziel, the Minister of Immigration. The project was then incorporated into the Auckland Sustainable Cities Programme (ASCP), described as the programme’s “flagship project for sustainable development spearheading the ASCP, a partnership of the Auckland region’s seven territorial authorities, the Auckland Regional Council and twelve central government agencies.”

The ASCP recognised in its drafting of the regional strategy that “the migrant population in Auckland is continuing to grow and a concentrated effort towards developing a regional strategy to integrate them into Auckland Region’s social and economic infrastructure should be a priority.” Statistics New Zealand also reported that for 2003 the inflow of settling migrants in Auckland had reached a peak 41,000 with an


110 Watkin, “Success and Sustainability.” 2.
outgoing flow of 19,000. Figure Two below shows the Auckland arrival population by year compared to all other regions in New Zealand:

Figure Two: Permanent Long-Term Migrant Arrivals for Auckland and other Regions 1996-2013.

The trend identified above reinforces the point that the justification for the reduction in arriving migrants between 2003 and 2005 stemmed from “a change to New Zealand immigration policy granting extra points to people applying for residence under the ‘skilled migrant’ category, if they had a relevant job offer outside the Auckland region. Auckland was immediately affected by the new policy, with arrivals decreasing from the 2003 peak to 31,000 in 2005.”\textsuperscript{111} However, after 2005 there was a gradual increase in population again for most of the post-2005 period.

In the initial draft strategy the ASCP recognised that “across a wide range of Government sectors there are a number of existing mainstream and targeted strategies and initiatives available to all New Zealanders to address socio-economic and other disparities. As migrants and refugees are encompassed in that approach, it

sought to avoid the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy duplicating work already undertaken.” The ASCP also outlined the importance of the strategy being essential to central and local government’s intention to be responsive to the needs of people who have come to live permanently in New Zealand, and to produce a sustainable and co-ordinated approach to settlement policies and programmes. The 2006 strategy was described as a “precursor of what Auckland can be going forward into the twenty-first century and how involved and responsive migrants and refugees can be in growing that future.” The ASCP recognised that duplication of central government services already being provided by the NZSS would be a key weakness of the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy, if it was not kept in check through rigorous evaluation and review. This led to three iterations of the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy: 2006, 2009 and 2012. The task for the first regional strategy in Auckland was one of relevance, collaboration and delivering successful outcomes through “taking a long-term view by building upon existing settlement work and explicitly acknowledging that settlement is a two-way process between existing communities and new arrivals.” The purpose of its iterations was to build upon that foundation.

The Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy acknowledged and described the concept of settlement and how it would be applied to the goals the strategy identified. While it acknowledged social cohesion, it clarified that its position on the concept of settlement was a three stage approach, pre-settlement, initial settlement and post-settlement. It employed the Government’s position on the concept as one “of an open-ended process, as there is essentially no clear point at which settlement can be said to be complete.” As covered in Chapter One, the concepts of settlement

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115 Ibid., 8.
and integration were still developing and evolving at this time. The regional policy in Auckland’s case employed the Government policy concepts of settlement rather than the developing concept of integration. This suggests that the regional policy from the start was closely tied to central government policy reports, reviews and positions on the concepts of settlement and social cohesion.

Another point to mention about the development of the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy is the ASCP position on the responsibilities of local government to migrants and refugees. They described their role as one of “key leadership in assisting migrants and refugees to establish themselves in local communities; maintain strong networks; be accepted by local host communities; and participate in civic community activities.” The NZSS had taken a similar position but, unlike central government, the ASCP looked at the local government position as one of a legal requirement under the Local Government Act 2002. “The role of local government is congruent to the Local Government Act 2002 for local councils to consider the social, environmental, economic and cultural well-being of communities as part of taking a sustainable approach to development.” The ASCP had set within the first ARSS a clear position of what it believed the responsibilities of local governments were to migrants and refugees and, while broad and vague in its implementation and desired outcomes, it outlined that local government was to have a role of leadership and direct assistance to migrant and refugee communities in the region.

During the Strategy’s engagement process before its launch, it identified several barriers and challenges for settling migrants that it wanted to address. They were

116 Ibid., 10.
117 Ibid.
unemployment, lack of English proficiency, inaccessibility of information, difficulties in accessing mainstream services, discrimination, difficulties connecting and lack of recognition. However, in its outline of what it focuses on to overcome those barriers it identifies that “the focus of the strategy is on host communities as well as migrant and refugee communities across Auckland Region.” Once again, similar to the national strategy, the first regional strategy also interlinked refugees and migrants into a single strategic policy rather than separate strategies. The regional strategy, like the national strategy, draws on the same two key pieces of literature; Refugee Voices and the Longitudinal Survey in order to create its goals and formulate its direction and purpose. The ARSS applied the same development method as the national strategy, potentially weakening it in the long run and inflicting it with the same issues that the NZSS had. In order to test the theory that the first regional strategy had the same or similar weaknesses to the national strategy, a detailed examination of the goals of the first regional strategy and its subsequent iterations must occur. The final strategy document was divided into four parts, rationale, development, goals and opportunities for improving outcomes. As the first two parts have already been discussed, the focus in the following subsections will be on the final two parts.

**Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy 2006 Goals**

The vision of the 2006 ARSS was to give “migrants, refugees and their families a sense of belonging through opportunities to fully participate and contribute economically and socially in the Auckland region: and by being recognised and respected as equal and valued New Zealanders.” This vision not only aligns with the central government definition of settlement but also a portion of the conceptual framework of social cohesion as the strategy acknowledges and was starting to be

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118 Ibid., 13.
119 Ibid., 4.
incorporated into Government policy at time. This demonstrates a strong link between central government agencies, specifically the Department of Labour and the ASCP, during the development of the 2006 strategy. The ARSS produced ten goals and out of those ten only four of them were focused on NZSS goals while the other six branched off into regionally specific goals. Employment, English language use, access to information and acceptance of diversity were all codified in the regional policy but several overarching NZSS goals were broken down into more specific ARSS goals. For example, meeting housing needs and enhancing physical and mental outcomes were given their own separate goal objectives while in the NZSS they came under access to services.

One of the ARSS goals of particular interest to note is local government supporting migrants and refugees to connect at a local level. “The principal settlement goal for local government in Auckland is to support migrants and refugees to settle and connect at their local level as quickly as possible.”120 This was further expanded upon with specific objectives such as working to help communities support mutual understanding, ensuring migrants and refugees are aware of and have access to services and encourage supporting migrants and refugees to participate in civic affairs. This final objective was, in itself, a NZSS goal so while the ARSS incorporated NZSS goals and it also prioritised them in terms of importance and developed its own regional specific goals that superseded them regionally in terms of importance and focus.

An additional point that shows that stakeholder views were being listened to, was found in another ARSS goal, that being to address the settlement needs of Pacific migrants. While NZSS literature highlighted the importance of Pacific migrant

120 Ibid., 5.
issues, the NZSS did not demonstrate a goal that was specifically tooled towards Pacific people. However, in the ARSS, Pacific people were recognised as requiring a specific focus rather than a broad goal. In a census report, published in 2015, it recognised that the “Pacific population comprised 11.9 per cent of the Auckland population in 1991, rising to 14.4 per cent in 2006 and 14.6 per cent in 2013.”

The ASCP recognised, as early as 1991 but explicitly included in the first ARSS, that the Pacific population in Auckland was significant and would continue to grow, and therefore was warranted an individual goal focused on issues within their communities. So while more specific and focused than the NZSS, it does not account for the many different ethnic populations, only what it perceives as the largest in its region. This produces an interesting question for later study, would ethnically specific regional strategies have been more successful than regional strategies that encompassed migrants and refugees in their entirety? While this thesis is not examining whether the strategies were successful, only the relationship between central and local government in the overarching idea of migrant settlement and integration, there is an indication here that there was a focus on ethnic population goals at a regional level rather than grouping them into a broad national framework.

Another regional specific goal in the 2006 ARSS was enhancing physical and mental health outcomes. The objective here was to “ensure healthcare services are accessible and responsive to the physical and mental health needs of migrants and refugees, and do not create health inequalities.” In a preceding report, given by Anne Henderson in 2004, she argued that “there remains a need for culturally appropriate social services, social support and health services in the Auckland

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region.” This is further evidence that the ARSS was developed with significant independent and central government research.

There are three key points that the ARSS included in the outcomes section of the strategy and they were; primary healthcare affordability, healthcare planning and service delivery through improved DHB access to information on refugee populations, and finally “use the existing NZSS officials group to develop and improve forward planning, information sharing and collaboration among agencies and organisations in the healthcare sector.” Henderson identified a couple of major elements that were affecting the level of information available to DHBs and Government agencies in regards to maintaining a working health sector tailored towards migrants and refugees. Firstly, she identified a lack of research on overall physical health of migrants coming into New Zealand, clarifying that “social support systems relied heavily on family and friends from an immigrant’s culture and there was a need for more accessible information on health options, and greater availability of interpreters in hospitals to overcome language barriers.” Secondly, discrimination was established as a predominant factor in obtaining healthcare for migrants. While the NZSS literature recognised that discrimination was indeed a barrier to settlement, Henderson reported that Asian and Pacific Islanders were mainly affected by it in obtaining healthcare.

The overarching idea here is that the regional strategy was broader in scope than the NZSS, yet it was using similar information in its approach. This points to the suggestion that the ARSS was ambitious, encompassing far more organisations than

the NZSS intended and focusing more on the specific outcomes it wanted. It should also be noted that the original ARSS did not contain a funding plan or proposal, merely that it would be working collaboratively within the NZSS framework and funding infrastructure to achieve its outcomes.

**Opportunities for Improving Settlement Outcomes and Auckland Regional Plan**

Further evidence of the approach by the ASCP towards regional settlement in the Auckland Region can be found in the opportunities for improving outcomes section of the ARSS. In it, the ASCP lists 39 separate outcomes that it wished to achieve with the ARSS and wanted incorporated into the following Auckland Regional Settlement Plan, similar in concept to the NZSS’s Settlement National Action Plan. However, the ASCP recommended the outcomes be split into two categories. “Proposals that are agreed that need to be addressed by local government agencies need to be considered for inclusion in the Long-term Council Community Plans, while proposals that need central government agency involvement should be considered in the NZSS work programmes.”

While some of the outcomes are reflected in the overarching goals of the NZSS and its successor in 2007, many are not, and are left to the ARSS to allocate within their infrastructure. However, the ARSS does not make clear the division of responsibilities each of its partners will have in achieving the outcomes it sets, rather than the responsibility of the partners involved in the ARSS to decide who is responsible for achieving which outcome. Secondly, the opportunities and outcomes also amalgamate many of its proposals as migrant and refugee outcomes, not distinguishing migrant and refugee issues and separating those issues into distinct goals. As already discussed, this setup has had negative impacts on the NZSS and, as will be further elaborated upon in Chapter Four, the

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lack of distinction led to a duplication of resources and services and a poor allocation of available resources in achieving outcomes at the national level.

In summarising the major issues with the first ARSS, we can draw three distinct points about potential weaknesses in the first regional strategy on migrant settlement and integration. Firstly, while the ARSS relies heavily on a wide range of Government reports, reviews and scholarly articles, a good deal of which was sourced directly from the NZSS and, as such, the ARSS suffers from a recurring issue already mentioned; it does not distinguish between migrant and refugee needs adequately. Within its goals and intended outcomes, it treated migrants and refugees as one in the same, not separating outcomes or goals into distinct migrant and refugee categories. This is a result of the NZSS also not making this distinction, but what is interesting here, is that the ARSS recognises in its purpose, that migrant and refugee issues are distinct and should be treated as such. However, both within the ARSS, its outcomes and action plan, there is no distinction made. This leads to the potential for gaps in the delivery of services, duplication of resources and programmes, and failure to adequately recognise refugee issues.

Secondly, there was no core funding infrastructure or programme setup plan for the ARSS. The ARSS implied that central government would be the primary source of funding for the management of the ARSS and local governments and organisations would have to fund and invest in new programmes from their own budget and a funding outline or document was not found to the contrary. There was a lack of clarity over the level of financial responsibility, if any at all; the territorial authorities within Auckland at the time had to commit to the project. The ARSS, while committed to assisting the NZSS build their intended infrastructure in the region, i.e. settlement support and local settlement, co-ordinators did not lay out the financial
input of the local councils, DHBs and Auckland Regional Council. Given the broad list of outcomes the ARSS wanted to achieve, coupled with the already allocated amount of Government funding to the NZSS, it was unclear how long-term funding was to be maintained to achieve the outcomes the ARSS desired.

Finally, the ARSS’s goals tended to tailor towards particular ethnic groups in specific local areas rather than regionally. As already discussed above, there were specific settlement goals and outcomes relating to Pacific peoples, based upon the justification of their high population within the Auckland region, specifically South Auckland. What this creates, is a regional strategy that is targeting a set area within its region rather than a regional strategy. Given the size of the territorial authorities involved at the time, what could have been more beneficial in delivering services, is if the ARSS outlined specifically what each territorial authority or local council would focus on, rather than a broad stroke approach with no allocation of responsibilities among the authorities.

Overall, the first regional settlement strategy painted a broad picture of how the Auckland region wanted to address migrant settlement and integration. It relied heavily on the newly implemented NZSS, borrowing its research, goals and intended outcomes, while synchronising these with its own which were compiled through independent and local research and consultation. However, in doing so, the ARSS becomes a large and unwieldy project with no clear responsibility delegated to the individual territorial authorities within its region. It also remained unclear on how the ARSS would be funded in the long-term, not addressing questions such as what each local authority would contribute to the development of the infrastructure required to deliver services. The ARSS does make clear that under New Zealand legislation at the time, specifically the Local Government Act 2002, local councils and
territorial authorities had a responsibility to create settlement policies, create a list of programmes it wanted to achieve, and work collaboratively with central government to achieve both central government’s goals and its own goals. It highlighted that the responsibility of migrant settlement did not solely rest with central government agencies, and that local government also had a responsibility to deliver services, but in a collaborative work environment with central government. It relied on direction and placed central government’s role as a leader and a co-ordinator, rather than a direct controller of the focus and intended outcomes, granting local councils a level of autonomy to create regionally specific policies.

Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy and Action Plan 2009-2014

In 2009, the Department of Labour and the Auckland Regional Council updated the regional strategy, becoming a six-year plan for the Auckland region’s future response to migrant settlement, and updated the regional strategy in a subsequent report. The approach was one of medium term, the justification being to “ensure that the strategy was ready for changes facing Auckland, including the transition into a super city with a single council.” The new strategy framed itself not so much a review of the 2006 ARSS, rather it was an update on what had been achieved since 2006, what the issues with the strategy were, and how the strategy is to further develop given the change in regional management, with the amalgamation of all the territorial authorities within the Auckland region into a single council. An important point in the updated strategy was that it clearly identified the management structure of the ARSS, which had been vague at best in the previous 2006 strategy. This is best clarified in a later report as the strategy having an overarching Strategic Leadership Group (SLG), which then oversaw three separate Settlement Action Leadership Teams (SALT). They were the economic (ESALT), community (CSALT) and

mainstream (MSALT). Each of the intended outcomes within the ARSS was then assigned to a specific SALT in charge of delivering those outcomes and reporting back to the SLG. The new strategy purported that “its new Action Plan brings together partners from central government, local government and non-Government organisations to work on activities that benefit from collaboration.”

Specifying that it had over 50 working partners at the time but not clarifying who those partners were, the new plan also identified in a later report was the acknowledgement that “the Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy was to be funded and officially co-ordinated by Immigration New Zealand.”

In explaining the projects and programmes that were now underway the strategy it highlighted several unique projects that had been developed. Firstly there was the Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Training a programme designed to overcome miscommunications between primary, secondary and disability health staff and migrants and refugees. Secondly there was a Cultural Diversity Pilot Project in six schools in the Auckland region jointly run by the Ministry of Education to “strengthen awareness and develop effective teaching and learning practices in response to diverse classrooms.”

Finally there was a Pacific Return to Nursing Programme designed to upskill Pacific nurses to become registered New Zealand nurses. This is just a small group of the programmes that the ARSS had implemented through joint organisation with central government agencies to achieve its outcomes but it is indicative of a regional strategy that was working collaboratively with central government to achieve its goals through new programmes and joint delivery of services.

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However, like the NZSS, the ARSS was implemented through contracts with businesses, NGOs and public sector entities to fulfil its programmes. However, this type of work was labelled as “semi-competitive as there are few providers with the resources to implement the services.”

By its very nature, this would make it extremely difficult to exclude small local charities and organisations that are not heavily subsidised by the public sector or local government, directly leaving private organisations like the Chamber of Commerce to implement the ARSS. While only larger groups that have resources would be able to implement a regional strategy of the size of the ARSS, the system of partnership, as indicated above, would be unfavourable to local groups operating within a small portion of the region.

After 2010, the ARSS was not updated, only incorporated into the Auckland plan of 2012 as part of the new unified Auckland City Council. In early 2013, the ARSS underwent a review from the Auckland Council. However, this review acknowledged that the ARSS was being independently reviewed in 2013, by the now amalgamated central government ministry MBIE. This point will be discussed in depth in Chapter Four, as it has relevance to the changes in the relationship between local and central government during the period.

**Concluding Remarks to Case Study One**

From 2006 the ARSS demonstrated a clear position on what the role of local governments were in the national framework on migrant settlement. Firstly, it showed an indication towards central government having and maintaining a leadership role over the implementation of the ARSS. In the 2006 strategy, this was through central government’s previous work on the NZSS, the knowledge it developed and level of assistance it gave to the development of the ARSS.

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2009 version, the ARSS was working across-Government to implement collaborative programmes and had some success. Both shared the similarity in that central government had more of a hands-on approach, and thus both policies continued to uphold this view. Both policies still displayed a degree of autonomy in that they framed migrant settlement as a collaborative issue that both sides would need to work together on. The policies did identify that central government, specifically the Department of Labour, had a responsibility to lead and advise the ARSS working teams. Regionally specific goals were allocated to local stakeholders, territorial authorities and NGOs rather than just central government agencies. The 2009 strategy was also aware that the upcoming amalgamation of the territorial authorities in the Auckland region may have an impact on the delivery of settlement services under the ARSS, so they outlined a counter measure in that the ARSS was incorporated into the Auckland Plan the first major regional policy of the new Auckland Council.

Secondly, while the original 2006 ARSS was a broad strategy with no clear individual responsibility among the territorial authorities that comprised it, the 2009 strategy indicated that the super city approach was more beneficial. The super city approach was preferred under the assumption that it would be better at delivering settlement services but, shows no clear evidence to justify this. The lack of an early management structure clearly impacted the long-term development of the ARSS and the implementation of the SALTs’ and a Strategic Leadership Group served to connect the ARSS with the SNAP but this was done later into the strategies implementation. As will be expanded upon in Chapter Four, these issues had wide ranging consequences upon the relationship between central and local government. These consequences specifically affected the delegation of roles and responsibilities of each entity to deliver services.
Case Study Two: Wellington Region

The second case study in this thesis is the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy (WRSS). Like the ARSS, the WRSS was created out of the NZSS, and was officially launched in 2008, two years after the ARSS. However, while the ARSS demonstrated a level of influence from NZSS, the WRSS duplicated the NZSS’s vision, goals and Action Plan framework, inserting its own regional goals into that framework. The WRSS also went through two separate drafting stages before it was finalised, with attention paid to governance structure and division of responsibility between central and local government. Unlike the ARSS, the WRSS had a clear governance plan and a clear division of roles between local government, stakeholders, NGOs, businesses and central government agencies. Also unlike the ARSS, the WRSS did not have any timetable for goal achievement, measurement of progress and intended review procedures. This gave the initial impression that the WRSS was more closely influenced by the NZSS and relied heavily on central government direction with little regional and local governance. Due to this impression, the WRSS will not only be analysed and discussed, but its review stages, governance structure and reporting structure will be examined in detail. This examination will identify the logic behind relying heavily on central government direction on regional policy as opposed to being influenced by it but not relying on it for future direction and progress.

Background Draft 2007

Work on the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy began in June 2007 as part of the Department of Labour’s Settlement initiatives outlined in the NZSS and SNAP. At the time of the 2006 census, over “23.4% of the total population of the Wellington region was born overseas. This, at the time, was more than the national average of 21.8% and second only to Auckland, where 37% of the regional population was born.
overseas.”

This was one of the main justifications for the project by Wellington City Council’s Strategy and Policy Committee. In the draft report by the committee, it was noted that, while the WRSS presented a range of opportunities to grow strategic linkages across the region between the local territorial authorities, there “was no new general funding allocation specifically attached to the implementation of the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy. All participating agencies are expected to meet the cost of their staff time contribution to the governance arrangements and individual projects.”

The report clearly indicated that the WRSS was intending to be funded through already existing funding allocations outlined in the NZSS, rather than an added funding injection by the regional council or the local councils in the region. The committee’s view of the rationale for the WRSS was to “provide a strategic context for agencies working together to maximise the economic, social and cultural contribution of newcomers (those here for five years or less) and to enhance the social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing of all communities in the region through improved settlement outcomes.” So not only does the committee state explicitly that there was no intention to invest into the strategy outside of the central government funding model, but it also had its own definition for when the strategy can apply to migrants and refugees. This applied specifically to refugees who had been in New Zealand for at least five years. The draft report does not address its own definition of what settlement and integration is, but rather states clearly who it intends to effect.

The strategy’s vision and goals, however, are a duplication of the NZSS goals and National Action Plan. While it clearly states that settlement is a two-way relationship, it adopts the overarching concepts that the NZSS were categorised into:

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133 Ibid., 2.
134 Ibid., 5.
economic transformation; families young and old; and national identity. The language in the drafting stage is also different than the NZSS or ARSS with the application of the term “newcomer”, a concept not expressed in either the NZSS or the ARSS documents. This term is described as “including individuals and family groups who come to live in New Zealand and their diverse range of needs and interests.” The term is open-ended as it is based on an individual’s perception of their future in New Zealand, which changes from person to person. The intended regional settlement goals are then grouped around the three overarching concepts in the SNAP, with the only change being the term “newcomer” used to explain each goal.

From the initial draft phase of the WRSS, it is clear there was a different level of attention and priority in its development than in the ARSS or NZSS. The WRSS draft committee identified a clear target for migrants and refugees, a clear position on funding the initial strategy, and a clear intent that the WRSS would closely replicate the NZSS’s goals and focuses. The use of a new concept to describe the intended group that the strategy pertained to notwithstanding, but aside from that, the WRSS also clearly outlined an intended governance structure, something the ARSS did not have in its draft phase.

**Governance Draft**

The governance draft for the WRSS was released in February 2008, compiled by the Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC), not the Wellington City Council’s Strategy and Policy Committee. It proposed the governance arrangements for the implementation of the WRSS should be in line with the principles of public sector

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governance, which were created by the Australian National Audit Office in 2003. “This was a guide to good practice in public governance to raise the public standard of local governance in Australia and assist the Australian Public Service in communicating and interacting at a local level.”\textsuperscript{136} “These are generally regarded as the key attributes of good governance in the New Zealand context, both in the public sector and more broadly in non-Government organisations.”\textsuperscript{137} These principles set the tone for the ideal governance structure the GWRC wanted for the WRSS.

\textsuperscript{137} Greater Wellington Regional Council, \textit{Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy}. 1.
Below are the governance arrangements intended for the WRSS as outlined by the GWRC.

Figure Three: Governance Arrangements for Proposed Implementation Phase of Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy

Within this governance structure, there were three important parts or groups who were charged with its governance and implementation. They were the Settlement Strategic Leadership Group (SSLG), Regional Settlement Strategy Co-ordinator (RSSC) and Regional Settlement Working Group (RSWG). The Settlement Strategic
Leadership Group was tasked with leading the implementation of the WRSS, with its role taking on multiple objectives. Two of the objectives are particularly notable being to “ensure that the Strategy remains up-to-date and relevant through an ongoing cycle of review, informed by consultation with newcomer communities and agree and implement and evaluation framework.”138 This imparts the responsibility for regional management, evaluation and review to this group, clarifying that “development of the Settlement Strategy and Plan of Action involved joint leadership between local and central government. It is proposed that this partnership continue during implementation through the joint chairing of the SSLG.”139 However, the governance draft indicated that the Department of Labour would continue as the central government leader to co-ordinate the whole-of-Government approach to settlement.

In terms of membership of the SSLG, the report recommended that representatives be made up of the five territorial authorities in the Wellington Region, nine central government agencies two representatives of the health sector representing the district health boards and Ministry of Health and finally five representatives from the non-Government sector and three representatives from the business sector. The report made the point that “newcomer membership of the Settlement Strategic Leadership Group is not considered appropriate or practicable due to the diversity of newcomer communities which would over encumber the already large leadership group and there is no process for selecting said members to speak on behalf of issues of other newcomers.”140 This meant that the SSLG had no migrant or refugee representation on its committee, which would result in its direction being set by local policy officers and central government representatives rather than local stakeholders.

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138 Greater Wellington Regional Council, Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy. 2.
139 Ibid., 2.
140 Ibid., 3.
The Regional Settlement Working Group would also assist the SSLG in undertaking their tasks, rather than work in a separate work strand. Their key responsibility was to “contribute to the development of the process for reviewing and updating the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy.”\textsuperscript{141} Their meetings and agendas would be determined by the SSLG and any oversight would also be done by the SSLG. Finally, the Regional Settlement Strategy Co-ordinator would be the link between the implementation leadership and strategic decision-making groups of the WRSS. The co-ordinator would be one of the Settlement Support co-ordinators intended by the NZSS, who would implement the WRSS, chair the RSWG and maintain the relationships between the WRSS governance groups and the central government agencies. Specifically they would “be responsible to the SSLG for the delivery of outputs related to the WRSS and be accountable and report to the Department of Labour.”\textsuperscript{142}

However, one distinction the WRSS made in its early arrangement is that it allocated a separate strategy to refugees’ needs, with the Wellington Regional Action Plan for Refugee Health and Well-Being (WRAP). This strategy would be linked to the governance structure of the WRSS, complementing both strategies through shared resources and work strands. While the shared issues are evidenced in the WRSS’s final report, the WRAP focused exclusively on the needs and issues of refugees in the Wellington Region. It described that the prior work on refugee needs “has failed to bring meaningful long-term solutions to many of these concerns and that the aim of the Wellington Regional Action Plan is through dialogue and collaboration to identify key areas for joint action to improve refugee health and well-being in the

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
Wellington region.”143 This was the first time a separate regional strategy on refugee
needs had been developed, and while a national strategy was still on-going at the
time, a group of NGOs, in collaboration with the WRSS working groups, formed a
separate strategy in 2006, which was recognised later in the WRSS. Also unlike the
WRSS and the NZSS, this strategy would be and has been, updated and reviewed
every year since 2006. Its primary architect was the organisation Changemakers who
were one of the contractors that the NZSS had allocated responsibilities to.

The governance arrangements for the WRSS not only dispersed the responsibilities
of delivering services and maintaining the policy among key groups, but it
confirmed that the GRWC believed the overall leadership of the project had to be
with central government, specifically with the Department of Labour. The GRWC
also believed that it was their responsibility to co-ordinate with the Regional
Settlement Support Co-ordinator and the Settlement Strategic Leadership Group to
communicate their goals and assist in the delivery of WRSS goals. Despite the
structure of the WRSS governance arrangements being clearly outlined, however,
and while the governance report allocated reporting reviewing and evaluating the
policy to its groups, it did not indicate how those review procedures were to go
ahead, nor how the governance teams would report on outcomes or deliver reports
on goal achievement. While it placed the responsibility of such tasks upon them so
they had a clear idea of what they were meant to do, it did not outline how they
would do them or provide any indication of such. However, a clear upside in
developing the governance arrangements was the acknowledgement of the WRAP
and the highlighting of its importance in long-term settlement objectives. This was
also the first time a separate refugee strategy had been developed outside of both the
National Strategy and Regional Strategies.

143 Adam Award, *Wellington Regional Action Plan for Refugee Health and Well-Being 2006*, (Wellington:
Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy 2008-2013 Goals

The WRSS in its entirety included seven regional goals that were incorporated into the SNAP strategies goals of economic transformation, families’ young and old and national identity. It employed the term ‘newcomers’ heavily in its literature, carried over from both its settlement draft and governance draft. The WRSS had three major contributions of settlement to the central government’s goals, which were also incorporated into the national action plans framework. Rather than changing the national framework, they were designed around it, so that they would be complementing the national approach while at the same time focusing on regional and local outcomes. The WRSS held the idea that; newcomers would support prosperous communities and an entrepreneurial and innovative Wellington region, newcomers would achieve their full social and economic potential, and newcomers would be secure in their sense of cultural identity and would contribute to the creation of the region’s identity. The strategy’s goals revolved around the idea that “the Wellington Region welcomes and supports newcomers to settle successfully and newcomers to participate, prosper, connect and contribute to the well-being of our communities.”144 The seven regional settlement goals were divided into three categories; people of the Wellington region, newcomers to the region and service providers. The people of the Wellington Region were to:

i) Welcome and include newcomers in our local communities and workplaces and support them to feel safe by respecting their cultural differences

Newcomers to the region were to:

i) Respect our values and ways of doing things and care for the environment

ii) Develop supportive social networks connected with local communities and contribute to civic and community activities

iii) Support the region’s prosperity through developing their skills as well as finding work that recognises their potential economic contribution

iv) Are confident using Kiwi English

v) Know where they can get relevant information to help them settle well.

To achieve those goals, service providers were tasked with delivering services ranging from; education and training, employment, family services, health, housing, settlement, legal and justice services and local planning and civic affairs. The providers were contracted by central and local government to deliver services in their area that fit not only the national framework goals but also the WRSS goals and intended outcomes. Below is the service provider’s allocation table, outlining which services each stakeholder was responsible for in the regional goals.
This was another element of the WRSS that stood apart from the ARSS in that the WRSS outlined clearly what goals stakeholders had to achieve or were responsible for. This was justified as “a complexity of connections, collaborations and
contributions that need to be articulated as clearly as possible to provide mechanisms for working together in our complex world in ways which contribute towards the achievement of results.”

This framework was broken down and explained further in the Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy Plan of Action.

The Plan of Action would designate a lead agency or organisation responsible for achieving an action and stakeholders ranging from other local governments, to central government agencies, NGOs and charities would contribute to the lead organisation delivering the service or achieving the action. Actions would be achieved through joint cooperation through community funding schemes and central government funding grants. It was not clear whether councils would specifically contract NGOs or charities or businesses to deliver of settlement services under the regional strategy actions. It did not outline how those actions were to be reported to the SSLG, central government agencies or local government authorities. The information obtained indicated the SSLG had responsibility, through their role to develop an evaluation framework, but there was evident overlap with other working groups which distorts the responsibility on delivering and compiling outcomes. Essentially the governance setup of the WRSS was bureaucratised to the point where there was a lack of clarity on which working group or committee was responsible for each governance task. The lack of significant migrant or refugee representation on these governance committees would have contributed to this confusion.

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145 Ibid. 6.
Concluding Remarks to Case Study Two

The WRSS shared several similarities to the ARSS, but also had some distinct differences. Unlike the ARSS, it was more definitive in the role it sought for itself and placed primary responsibility upon the Department of Labour to manage the strategy and lead stakeholders involved in achieving outcomes. While it set out its own regional settlement goals, they were more closely aligned to the National Settlement Action Plan than the ARSS goals. The WRSS and its infrastructure closely aligned with the NZSS on directions from central government agencies. This not only stripped a degree of autonomy from the stakeholders leading the WRSS from the local government perspective but it also caused a reliance on Department of Labour for direction. Since the WRSS was never updated, it further compounds the view that WRSS governance, and by extension its goals and objectives, were reliant on Department of Labour input and clearance. The strategy and policy committee within Wellington City Council made clear in the drafting phase, that additional funding from stakeholders, more specifically local government, was not planned. Responsibility for working out funding arrangements therefore also rested on the Department of Labour. Because of the finite funding allocated to the regional strategies within the NZSS framework this would have stretched resources in the Department of Labour and created a further strain between central and local government.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the settlement strategies of the two regional case studies and examined how closely they were aligned with and relied on, central government agencies in respect of migrant settlement and integration policy and service delivery. While the regional policies in both Auckland and Wellington took the same path to creating their policy they reached separate outcomes and prioritised separate issues.
The Auckland Regional Settlement Strategy focused more on regional issues, utilising reports and research of its region and existing information from the New Zealand Settlement Strategy to formulate regionally specific goals. However, this came at the cost of having no clear funding infrastructure for the programmes they wanted to put in place locally and prioritising ethnicity issues in specific areas of their region. It was never made apparent which local authorities would fund specific programmes or whether central government were to fund the programmes and local government were to implement them however, based upon the research compiled the latter appears more likely. They also did not separate refugee issues from migrant issues. However, they had a clear sense of what they wanted to achieve out of the regional policy and a view that central government agencies mainly the Department of Labour would serve a leadership role to accomplish those goals.

The Wellington Regional Settlement Strategy sought to align itself more closely with the goals of the NZSS and its Action Plan, relying heavily on the direction and information of both in order to formulate its policy. Its goals were created around that initial framework and as such there was little regional autonomy in the strategy with a clear reliance on central government to direct, inform and suggest review when necessary. The stakeholders, (local government and NGOs), were given clear responsibilities within the framework and the WRSS did provide and set tasks they had to accomplish within set timeframes. Also, the WRSS drafting team made clear that the contributors would not initially allocate additional funding to their projects, relying on the Department of Labour funding infrastructure which was already stretched between developing its own programmes, infrastructure, and communication networks and directing the regional strategies in accomplishing their goals. The WRSS did separate refugee and migrant issues with a separate strategy that had been developed two years prior, however, whether the contributors recognised that a separation was needed is unclear in the policy documents, only
that refugee issues were equally important and that the WRSS must complement not only it but also several other local and regional strategies that focused on a variety of needs. Both strategies made clear that their role was to contribute regionally to the on-going national framework and deliver services through their territorial authorities and stakeholders, with overarching leadership and direction from the Department of Labour. Chapter Four will be examining how this set of arrangements was changed by the ongoing developments within the Department of Labour and Immigration New Zealand and how policy recommendations and reports affected local government.
Chapter Four: Summary of Policy Recommendations and Changes 2008-2016

One of the primary research questions in this thesis has been how and why has local government’s role in delivering migrant services changed vis-à-vis the role of central government since 2000? Chapter Two and Three have covered central government and local government’s roles up until 2008 and 2012 respectively. The focus of this chapter is to summarise the reports and policy recommendations made by central government, independent reviewers and local government up until 2016, and examine the specific changes these reports, reviews and recommendations made to the way services were delivered and created the current set of arrangements between central and local government. Chapter Five will provide a commentary of the stakeholder’s perceptions of these changes and their opinions of the current set of arrangements between central government and local government as a result of these changes in public policy and service delivery. The underlining argument of the preceding chapters has been that while migrant settlement and integration policy has been a progressive step in New Zealand public policy since 2000, both central government policy and regional government policies have had similar weaknesses in focus, approach, management and implementing the public policy to deliver tangible and recordable achievements. Likewise, issues such as decisions not to differentiate in policy and practice, the needs of migrants and refugees, organisational structure of the policies, and management of them, have also been referenced. Secondly, this chapter will explain how policy recommendations and reviews were put into practice at a delivery of service level.

The original NZSS cast a wide net on a range of social and economic issues that had been formulated from decades of independent and Government contracted research into the needs of migrants and refugees in New Zealand. This approach in policy is
reflected in earlier discussion regarding the makeup of New Zealand’s public sector. Being so wide, gaps became apparent in how central government handled the regional policies of both Auckland and Wellington, which were directly descended from this original strategy. This chapter will seek to argue that, while the original set of arrangements was not perfect, changes in central government priorities shifted the wide reach outsourcing approach of previous settlement policy arrangements, into a centrally-controlled approach, shifting responsibility onto only a few Government agencies and contractors, and reducing responsibility and involvement of local governments. Reviews, reports and policy changes and effects of their recommendations in this chapter will highlight this changed approach.

2008: Immigration New Zealand shifts focus

From 2008 major changes began to be facilitated internally and externally within the Department of Labour and Immigration New Zealand, and those changes were affecting the focus and delivery of settlement services in New Zealand, and changing the responsibilities of central government agencies. Reporting on and reviewing of the NZSS ceased at the end of 2008. From 2008 the Governance Team in charge of the NZSS did not meet and no annual review was conducted, a requirement for approval of the annual settlement structure. The Settlement Secretariat did not “carry out any further reviews of the settlement structure therefore reporting on the National Structure, Settlement Strategy and action plans had stopped by 2009.”146 From 2008 focus had shifted towards developing a Refugee Settlement Strategy. The Auditor-General argued in 2013 that during the development of this new strategy “governance no longer occurred on the NZSS as the governance group had shifted

146 Controller and Auditor-General, Immigration New Zealand: Supporting New Migrants to Settle and Work. 29.
away to the new focus on refugees, the cross-Government working group responsible for the NZSS fell off the radar.”

The Department of Labour, released a report in 2009 titled Developing a Settlement Knowledge Base, which focused on developing a settlement knowledge base to complement the ongoing NZSS, a sign that work was still continuing on the NZSS but with a shift in focus and reporting structure. This report did two things; defined migrants and refugees as newcomers, a terminology already in use within the WRSS, and outlined that the focus of a new “Settlement Knowledge Base” (SKB) was to build an “improved understanding of settlement outcomes for newcomers to New Zealand across central Government agencies.” The report reviewed and discussed the outcomes from the six intermediate goals of the NZSS, labelling the outcomes as “indicator areas” and how to measure them across Government agency work. This can be viewed as an attempt to design an outcome measurement framework that the NZSS, and by extension the ARSS and WRSS, did not have. Also, the term “newcomer” was defined as “migrants, refugees and their families in their first five years in New Zealand.” So while the original Government position on the term settlement was three years, this new developing Government terminology extended this to five. It was unclear whether the SKB was ever implemented, only that work on improving the NZSS was continuing.

The report also found that there were unemployment rates among Pacific Island people that the NZSS had not addressed effectively. It found that “six percent of Pacific Islanders remained unemployed after living more than 15 years in New Zealand.”

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147 Controller and Auditor-General, Immigration New Zealand. 30.
148 Department of Labour, Developing a Settlement Knowledge Base-Baseline Information for the New Zealand Settlement Strategy Indicators. (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2009), 5.
Zealand.”¹⁵⁰ Pacific Islanders made up 14.6% of the population of Auckland in 2013, “rising at a steady rate of over one percent per annum.”¹⁵¹ The Department of Labour report dedicated a large portion of its review to unemployment and under-employment rates in New Zealand 2006-2009, the period the NZSS was updated and the SNAP was launched. The Longitudinal Survey, which was covered in Chapter One, was also updated in 2009, which produced similar results, but its key point was that “49.3 percent of migrants lived in the Auckland region, 31.5 percent lived in the rest of the North Island, and 19.3 percent lived in the South Island.”¹⁵² Auckland, while always being a major focal point for migrant settlement, had now nearly overtaken the rest of the country in terms of migrant population.

In 2010 the Immigration Act 2009 came into force. While the Act did not change settlement policy it modernised New Zealand’s immigration laws to reinforce “active policy to attract skilled migrants.”¹⁵³ It centralised its terminology regarding the term visa, phasing out the terms permit and exemption and created a new sponsorship system for migrants entering New Zealand. It further tightened policies around returning resident visas, recommitted New Zealand to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and increased penalties on employers for breaching employment law regarding foreign workers. This is important because it demonstrates that Immigration law and policy was undergoing a period of redevelopment to bring it into line with Government priorities. Immigration New Zealand viewed settlement as “a two-way process requiring adaption by new migrants and host communities; multidimensional involving all aspects of life and

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 10.
¹⁵¹ Auckland Council, Pacific Peoples in Auckland: Results from the 2013 Census. 1.
¹⁵² Statistics New Zealand “International Migration to and from the Auckland Region: 1996-2013.”
¹⁵³ Sturge, Auckland, New Zealand: A Case Study from: Migrant and Refugee Integration in Global Cities. 11.
open-ended meaning that while settlement takes place at the point of arrival there is no standard point where it can be deemed complete.”\textsuperscript{154}

By 2011 Immigration New Zealand’s focus had clearly shifted to the more economic aspects of migrant settlement policy. An example of these changes can be found in a shift away from low-level qualifications in the immigration criteria and tighter restrictions on international students in a bid to “attract more high quality international students to enable the best and brightest to remain in New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{155} ESOL qualifications gained in New Zealand no longer contributed to the qualification point’s standard of the Skilled Migrant Category – demonstrating a tightening up of immigration policy to attract a specific class of migrants: those who were intending to study to work in highly skilled jobs or migrants who had high level work experience. Both sets of migrants were deemed to be assets to New Zealand’s future investment and economic growth. Finally, Immigration New Zealand proposed a change to the New Zealand Residents Programme and, as outlined in Table Two below, there was a significant projected intake of migrants under the four streams of Immigration between 2011-2014 as a result.


Table Two: Immigration New Zealand New Zealand Residents Programme projected Intake 2011-2014

| Table 1: The NZRP from 2010/11 and the proposed NZRP for 2011/12 – 2013/14 |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                 | 2010/11 Low | 2010/11 High | 2011/12 Low | 2011/12 High |
| Skilled/ Business stream        | 26,900     | 29,975     | 80,700     | 89,925     |
| Uncapped Family stream          | 9,300      | 10,700     | 29,700     | 32,100     |
| Capped Family Sponsored stream  | 4,950      | 5,500      | 14,650     | 16,500     |
| International/ Humanitarian stream | 3,250   | 3,825      | 9,750      | 11,475     |
| Total Residence                 | 45,000     | 50,000     | 135,000    | 150,000    |


This is indicative of an intended shift towards increasing the intake of migrants into New Zealand, while at the same time adjusting procedures around international students and educational language qualifications to incentivise them to stay longer in New Zealand.

In 2011, INZ agreed on a new Purchasing Strategy for Settlement Services, which shifted focus on “purchasing services that reflected immigration priorities and contributed to successful migrant settlement and retention outcomes.”156 This was a departmental strategy rather than a cross-Government purchasing strategy and its priority areas were; newcomers, workplaces and Auckland. It also identified the need to “reconfigure the arrangements for the delivery of settlement information.”157 This laid the groundwork for a review of Settlement Support, one of the key service deliverers under the NZSS, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Changing views within central government towards immigration during this time were also reflected in the merger of the Department of Labour, the Department of Housing, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Science and Innovation to form the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE). This newly dubbed ‘super-ministry’ primary purpose was to “Grow New Zealand for All. It was created to lead Government efforts to promote this goal, at the microeconomic level, the level of the firm, sector, region and market.”

This was to be achieved through the development of policy, services, advice and regulation to support business growth, and the prosperity of all New Zealanders. The Ministry laid out an employment and economic based growth platform cited in Figure Five below:

Figure Five: Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment Growth Platform

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MBIE’s Statement of Intent in 2012 included a relevant outcome that the best people are brought to New Zealand, with a secondary outcome that migrants settle and work. But what does “best” mean in the context of immigration? It was not clear at the time what “best” meant in this context, but in practice, MBIE was prioritising economic development over the social aspects of migrant settlement. Up until this point, settlement was an all-of-Government responsibility, with the Department of Labour co-ordinating the Government agencies to deliver services from the top down, but this fusion into a super-ministry and its subsequent focus, indicated that they were shifting towards the economic factors of migrant arrival rather than long-term settlement service delivery. Thus a pattern had begun to emerge in Immigration New Zealand in which focus had shifted away from the social aspects of migrant settlement and instead narrowing in on the economic impacts of migrants on the New Zealand economy and adjusting their policies accordingly.

2013: Local strategy review process begins

By the end of 2012, Immigration New Zealand, now a part of MBIE, had signalled to local government that a review process on the progress of the regional settlement strategies would begin in 2013. The review, conducted independently by consulting firm Martin Jenkins, was commissioned in 2012 in collaboration with Immigration New Zealand, the Auckland Council, and Hutt City Council, a council for the Lower Hutt region of Wellington, both of which were the product of an amalgamation process. The primary focus of the review was on what the ARSS had accomplished and how it could be improved and respond to, both the changed governing dynamic of the Auckland region, and the changing priorities of Immigration New Zealand. As outlined in an MBIE terms of reference report prior to the commencement of the review, the stated purpose was “to provide an independent assessment of the
implementation and achievements of the settlement strategies for the Auckland and Wellington regions.” The review identified the lack of clear allocation of responsibility to the various stakeholders involved as a major weakness for a cross-Government approach to migrant settlement. It argued that; settlement services could be ‘streamlined’ to generate more quantifiable outcomes throughout regions. This process could be achieved by “governance arrangements being future proofed but also redesigned in a way whereby they are focussed on supporting economic success, in particular the attraction and successful employment of migrants. Governance of settlement services needed to be employer focussed not all inclusive of every key stakeholder.” One of the major criticisms the Martin Jenkins review levelled against the governance of settlement services was that the governance arrangements had become “cumbersome as they were intended to be inclusive of every stakeholder therefore few decisions were made and more senior representatives sending delegates on their behalf further weakening the decision making process.”

However, the review lacked a clear focus or insight on the social aspects of national and regional settlement, instead tailoring its review around the changes to MBIE and Immigration New Zealand priorities. This implied an approach where central government wanted to take settlement and integration policy, and a very limited picture of the successes of the current arrangement of the time, and a deft focus on its weaknesses alone, in order to justify a major change, not only to the arrangement between central and local government, but also the focus and priorities contained in that arrangement.

The review found that over 40 actions had been achieved since the implementation of the ARSS in 2007 and this was attributed to central and local government coordination, which had “led to improved regional service provision for migrants including reduced duplication and filling of gaps.”\textsuperscript{162} It noted that during the review process there was difficulty in identifying adequate evaluation and monitoring of frameworks and impacts the regional strategies had on delivering outcomes, indicating that regional strategies had no adequate way to evaluate their policies to determine if they were being achieved. As a result, outcomes could not be statistically recorded or monitored. Citing also that the momentum of the regional strategies had slowed, the review noted “Wellington had developed a tighter focus on regional economic development while Auckland had diverted resources inwards to focus on the formation of Auckland Council.”\textsuperscript{163} The review recommended several changes to the current structure of governance, but an overarching recommendation was that “governance and institutional arrangements, if they are to remain, needed to be streamlined and focussed on supporting economic success.”\textsuperscript{164} It made the case that regional strategies needed to be clearer in accountability and resourcing as they “help align national and regional efforts.” \textsuperscript{165} The justification for this recommendation came down to a shift in central government priority towards migrants with the report arguing “Government’s approach to settlement needs to be understood within the broader picture of attraction and retention, areas of particular interest to the Ministry.”\textsuperscript{166} Thus the regional strategies’ goals no longer fitted with MBIE’s priorities and, in order to be successful local governments would need to realign themselves with MBIE priorities.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 7.
The Martin Jenkins review concluded that the ARSS had been largely successful in achieving its objectives. Despite the praise afforded to the ARSS, however, the review recommended that the ARSS be phased out in favour of an Auckland Regional Partnership Agreement (ARPA) and a similar partnership agreement be created for the Wellington region through the Wellington Regional Economic Development Association (WREDA). This would form the template for the current regional agreements called Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs), contractual memorandums of understanding between MBIE and the regional council and its economic development agency, on how they would co-operatively deliver settlement services in the region. The RPAs in their most basic form would help local government and MBIE stay on the same page in terms of focus and policy.

Below in Figure Six are the new governance arrangements as recommended by Martin Jenkins with the inclusion of RPAs.
Figure Six: Martin Jenkins Recommended Regional Partnership Agreements Overview.


The template RPA outlines the hierarchy of MBIE, which unit is responsible for communication, delivering outcomes and liaising with stakeholders in the agreement and what the roles of the regional development agency and local authority are. At the national level, the parties were Immigration NZ and the Settlement, Protection and Attraction Branch, while at a regional level the parties are the overarching local authority and its economic development agency. When delivering services, Immigration NZ would use their designated regional service providers or contractors who, in turn, would feed information back to the regional economic development agency and regional government on what the region needed or whether the goals were being met. Local authorities and the economic development agency “would lead the relationship with local and regional stakeholders such as businesses, charities and NGOs while INZ would manage the
wider MBIE relationship and whole-of-Government relationships.” The RPA would be flexible enough to be adjusted to reflect the needs and desires of the parties involved, but its wording is clear that its major focus is more on the economic side of migrant settlement, and interlinking those central government goals into a regional economic development framework.

While the template included regional goals, there was little to no explanation on how those goals and outcomes would be measured in the context of settlement delivery, a key failing of the original regional strategies. The RPA had a measure success area that would tell the parties involved whether the RPA was achieving success. These measures included such areas like “taking advantage of opportunities to collaborate with each other’s existing activities, have a positive working relationship with good communication on common goals and finally businesses were to feel confident in their ability and would be supported to attract and retain migrants.” The question here is how are these measures of success statistically quantifiable and how can they be measured? The lack of an answer to these questions was a key weakness of the regional strategies and NZSS and the RPAs offer no further progress in resolving this longstanding issue.

The Martin Jenkins review also stated that the NZSS was to be updated from July 2014 and it was to have a “stronger ‘economic lens’, and a broader focus, covering attraction, settlement and retention, as well as monitoring and evaluation.” This would bring the national strategy and its framework into line with MBIE’s goals and purpose. The review recommended that central and local government should have

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169 Kim, Review of the Regional Settlement Strategies and Planned New Arrangements. 35.
clearer roles and responsibilities including ownership of and accountability for actions, and that Immigration New Zealand formulate RPAs with other local government bodies in Wellington and throughout New Zealand to reflect this change in approach to the relationship it wanted to have with local government. This would mean that, while the issues in each RPA would be different depending on the region, Immigration New Zealand would treat all relationships the same and not use different methods of co-ordination and policy making depending on the area. Central government would ultimately, “bear the larger responsibility in co-ordinating with the regional stakeholders, formulating the public policy and reporting on outcomes, while local governments would take the role of advocating for, and assisting with, the attraction and retention efforts through deploying their resources, services, networks, knowledge and relationships.” This implies that central government wanted a relationship where local government was restricted in the level of responsibility they had to deliver settlement services, and their level of autonomy in informing central government on the national framework. This is important, because it is strikingly different from the pre-2008 arrangement, where local government would actively inform and co-ordinate with central government and have autonomy to set their own goals within their areas which central government would contribute to through their service providers. This demonstrates a clear set of roles for central and local government going forward; central government would be the leader of policy and priorities and local government would be the deliverer of local services that fit within central governments priorities.

Aside from the recommended shift away from regional policies and the centralising of governance arrangements through RPAs the Martin Jenkins review offered an alternative option in that instead of complete upheaval of the governance of

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settlement the arrangements at the time could be evolved to streamline governance. Below in Figure Seven is the outline of their proposed status quo alternative.

Figure Seven: Evolution of Status Quo Overview.

![Diagram](image.png)


However, this approach was deemed to “likely involve higher upfront costs, with a process of involving larger numbers of regional and central stakeholders and require individuals to drive oversight and implementation strategies.” While communication and co-ordination between central and local government was not perfect, as discussed previously, there was no clear evidence that it was entirely ineffective, rather than it had strengths but also weaknesses. The Martin Jenkins review acknowledges this, but instead of recommending adjustments to the current set of arrangements, it proposed a form of hard reset of the arrangements and reduces them back down to a form of contract between agencies filling desired roles. Benefits would have included reduced costs and clearer accountability and ownership however, central government’s priorities had shifted, and because they have changed, the focus of settlement services had also changed.

\[17\] Ibid., 38.
2013: Refugee Resettlement Policy Launched; Settlement Support Ends

Immigration New Zealand launched the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy (NZRRS), during the migrant settlement policy review period in 2013. This is important to note, because it was the first national strategy to distinguish migrants from refugees, a clear and consistent weakness in the early national framework and by extension, the regional strategies up until this point. Its purpose was to:

Have refugees participating fully and integrated socially and economically as soon as possible so that they are living independently, undertaking the same responsibilities and exercising the same rights as other New Zealanders and have a strong sense of belonging to their own community and to New Zealand.\(^{172}\)

Lacking the comprehensiveness of the annual Wellington Regional Action Plan for Refugee Health and Well-Being, the new strategy had five goals; self-sufficiency, participation, health and wellbeing, education and housing. Central government agreed that there would continue to be a “six week programme at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre for new refugees, the biggest centre in the country. This was to ensure that all refugees had a good start to their life in New Zealand.”\(^{173}\)

In the outcomes section, the five goals were: self-sufficiency, focusing on increasing proportions of employment; housing, with a reduced housing subsidy for a period of two years; education, with a target of sixty-seven percent of refugees having five years in the New Zealand education system; health, increasing the immunisation population among refugees; increasing the utilisation of general practitioners, and finally participation; achieving improvements to the number of adults with English Language training. The goals were derived from meetings between INZ and refugee and community groups in 2010 but all the goals were highlighted as issues for

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refugees in 2004 through *Refugee Voices*. This would indicate that since 2004 either very little work had been done on helping refugees adjust to New Zealand, or that the issues highlighted in 2004 were still prevalent and long-standing issues.

The strategy lacked not only a model for measuring and achieving its outcomes, which was a long-standing issue within the public policy sphere that was identified in the Martin Jenkins report, but also an action plan of what Government agency was responsible for what goal, a clear list of stakeholders involved in the process, and finally, a long-term approach to refugee issues. However, one of the ongoing priorities of Immigration New Zealand in the strategy was to “place a strong focus on employment as part of the central reception programme, and review services people need for their resettlement in the community.”\(^{174}\) This is further indicative of a change in focus within MBIE and INZ to bring further attention to the economic priority of the current Government. What was also interesting with the NZRRS was that there was no focus on rural New Zealand. Refugees were to be housed in New Zealand’s urban areas, primarily Auckland, but also Wellington and Christchurch. No element of the policy encouraged refugees to migrate to rural New Zealand areas and all the resources and programmes were, by perception based upon the strategy, being concentrated within urban areas.

Aside from the development of the NZRRS, during 2013, Settlement Support New Zealand (SSNZ) was discontinued, and in 2014 reformulated into a new Immigration New Zealand organisation, New Zealand Now. This new service was not contractually involved with local government, but rather came under the responsibilities of the Citizens Advice Bureaus (CABs) in the area, and Immigration New Zealand. It became a public and local information database. The local

\(^{174}\) Ibid., 9.
Settlement Support Co-ordinator, who had worked within the communities they were tasked with, were replaced with a digital service which was then supplemented by CABs information service. The justifications for the closure of the local Settlement Support Co-ordinators’ roles that were funded directly through Immigration New Zealand with a contract with the local government in the area varied from area to area. For example a Hutt City Council City Development Committee Report showed that while Settlement Support in their area was doing well, MBIE deemed the unit to have fulfilled its requirements and was in need of change. “Clients and stakeholders of SSNZ have also expressed a high level of satisfaction with the work of SSNZ. However, the economic, social and global contexts in which SSNZ operates have changed since its initial introduction, and the current model is no longer considered the most effective or efficient model for achievement of the desired current and future outcomes.”\textsuperscript{175} The report stated, that between the annual years 2012-2013 over 799 clients had used Settlement Support Hutt Valley, with the top three reasons for use being; daily life, employment and learning English. A proportion of the total clients surveyed in the report stated, “92% of clients were satisfied with the services provided, and 88% said that service exceeded their expectations.”\textsuperscript{176} Settlement Support Hutt Valley was clearly dealing with a large local client base with a successful rate of return in terms of service delivery. While this is but a sample of one Settlement Support Unit, and it is unclear if all units were as successful as this one, the entire national service was effectively discontinued and reformulated within few months of this final report. Volunteers of the Local Citizens Advice Bureaus replaced Local Settlement Support co-ordinators: the latter were tailored in their focus and priority to migrant and refugee needs, while CAB has a far broader focus. New Zealand Now is now a public and online database providing up-to-date pre-arrival and post-arrival information on Immigration New Zealand, its services, and where to find help.

\textsuperscript{176} West, \textit{Hutt Valley Settlement Support Report 2012-2013}. 7.
The effects of this decision also affected the Auckland Regional Migrant Services Charitable Trust (ARMS), which held the Settlement Support contract for Auckland Central and Manukau regions. “Through the changes in MBIE’s new migrant information model, ARMS suffered a significant loss in staff experience and numbers with the loss of five full and part-time staff members.”

Under the new model, the face-to-face part of settlement support was taken over by CABs as they were an existing information provider providing a national service. But unlike them the Settlement Support Co-ordinators were specifically trained and prioritised to migrants and refugee needs rather than everyday community needs. The stakeholder commentaries provided in Chapter Five will discuss the views of this decision in more detail from a stakeholder perspective. However, regardless of the reasoning, the review of Settlement Support was a catalyst, which led to the creation of a new role of settlement within INZ, named Regional Relationship Managers.

These eight new relationship managers were responsible for the areas formerly covered by the 18 Settlement Support New Zealand initiatives. Only introduced late in 2013, the roles were designed to “provide strategic support to regional economic development planning, build relationships with local councils, and Economic Development Agencies and Chambers of Commerce and key sector players in regions.” The role was not to reduce services, but realign their availability to the channels that can best deliver the information. This role formed the network that the NZSS originally wanted, connecting the various areas in New Zealand back to INZ and MBIE. The relationships these managers have vary from area to area based upon a variety of factors at a regional and local level. Further review of the progress and

success of the Regional Relationship Managers is necessary to understand what is working well in the new system and what is not working well. Since the role is relatively new INZ intends to review the overall effectiveness of the role in 2017.

2013 The Auditor General’s Report

In November 2013, the Controller and Auditor-General submitted a performance audit to Parliament, of Immigration New Zealand’s delivery of settlement services. This report was highly critical of the ongoing changes to Immigration New Zealand’s management, co-ordination and delivery of settlement services from 2008 onwards and highlighted to Cabinet the continuing challenges Immigration New Zealand was facing in delivering the national framework model under the NZSS. The report had significant implications on how Immigration New Zealand led and communicated with its stakeholders and partners nationwide and the level of responsibility it placed upon itself to deliver services. While reviews, like the Martin Jenkins review, were focussed specifically on the regional strategies and their relationship with Immigration New Zealand, the Auditor-General’s report was focussed on the internal workings of Immigration New Zealand and the effects the management of the Government agency had on the NZSS and regional strategies. This report offered insight into what was occurring within INZ at a managerial level before INZ updated their national settlement model in October 2013, and what needed to change within the organisation to improve the governance of the NZSS strategy, more importantly, the delivery of settlement services. The overarching questions the audit aimed to answer were, “how effectively does Immigration New Zealand lead the whole-of-Government approach to support new migrants to settle and work by collaborating with other agencies, and how effective has Immigration New Zealand been in assessing settlement outcomes through evaluation monitoring
and reporting?”\textsuperscript{179} The report identified three major criticisms in Immigration New Zealand’s handling of settlement services. First, they identified some duplication of services between INZ and other Government agencies and local service providers, which was due mainly to the second criticism, a lack of co-ordination between INZ and other Government agencies, and local government services. Finally, they argued that it was difficult to assess the success of the NZSS and the regional strategies due to a lack of adequate measureable outcomes or evaluation frameworks.

In the first area, the Auditor-General reported that Immigration New Zealand had “narrowly interpreted its role in co-ordinating the governance of settlement support throughout Government.”\textsuperscript{180} While the Martin Jenkins review had indicated that there were leadership issues within Immigration New Zealand at the time, the Auditor-General’s report painted a more detailed and negative light on those issues. Ranging from a failure to understand what their responsibilities were towards migrants and refugees, to a lack of co-ordination with the regional strategies, to a “duplication of some settlement services and resourcing while at the same time a failure to report to Cabinet of its annual progress on the New Zealand Settlement Strategy.”\textsuperscript{181} While it has already been covered that the Settlement Secretariat and NZSS governance team stopped meeting regularly as resources were diverted away to the refugee strategy, at a regional level there was an indication that there wasn’t just a lack of co-ordination but a lack of resources to fulfil the regional strategy goals for both Auckland and Wellington. The Auditor-General’s report stated that at the time of writing, Immigration New Zealand was carrying out another review of the regional strategies to determine how it could govern them more efficiently. Whether this was the Martin Jenkins report is unclear, but since the ARSS had been subsumed

\textsuperscript{179} Controller and Auditor General, \textit{Immigration New Zealand.}” 8.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
into a regional partnership agreement in early 2014, and the WRSS was still tied up with WREDA, it is likely this was the review the Auditor-General referred to.

In the second area, the Auditor-General’s report offered a glimpse into Immigration New Zealand’s settlement funding infrastructure post-2008. As stated previously in chapter two, when the NZSS was created the Government allocated 62 million dollars of its Budget to building the settlement infrastructure at a national and regional level through collaboration with Government agencies, local government, community stakeholders and charitable entities. However, the NZSS clearly outlined “a review of the NZSS funding infrastructure is to take place after 2008 to determine whether the Government will need to allocate additional funding to the NZSS.”

That review did not occur and if it did, there is no public record of it happening however, the NZSS was to be updated in 2014 a full six years since its last update.

The Auditor-General’s report shows that for the period of 2012-2013 funding was derived from three areas; migrant levy, visa fees and crown funding. However, unlike the direct injection of funding through the 2004 Budget, the NZSS total funding for the period was only 15.1 million. The NZSS infrastructure, as of 2007-2008, averaged over 19 million in comparison, excluding the migrant levy fund and visa fees; however, it is not clear from this research whether these sources of funding were included in the NZSS funding allocation prior to 2008. Of this total 15.1 million, only 4.7 million was allocated to central government agency settlement programmes. These included; Language Line, ESOL, migrant employment assistance, Settling In, Careers New Zealand and pre-purchased ESOL tuition for secondary skilled migrants. Of the remaining funding, 3.5 million was allocated to Settlement delivery, which included, Settlement Support and the Migrant Settlement Programme.

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contacts with Citizens Advice Bureau, Chambers of Commerce, Chinese New Settlers Trust and the Auckland Regional Settlement co-ordination team. Further information related to the Migrant Levy fund showed that the Levy had funded settlement initiatives in 2008-2009 at around 12.6 million, however, for 2012-2013 that number was 9.2 million, showing a trend of reduction between the periods of 2008-2013.

The Auditor-General’s report showed that there were reductions in Government funding allocations during the period of 2008-2013 and no explanation is given for this, rather a list of contributing factors ranging from the shift in priorities towards refugee resettlement policy to a shift in policy within Immigration New Zealand to a more economic focus in line with MBIE priorities. One of the issues that compounded the ongoing problems with the NZSS and the regional strategies was a lack of funding during the post-2008 period and the Auditor-General’s report clearly showed that ongoing changes to the way settlement services were being delivered coupled with a significant reduction in annual funding had a detrimental impact on the national framework and regional framework’s during this period.

What this area does show is that there was no funding apparatus for charitable entities or NGOs in the NZSS post-2008. However, the NZSS applied a whole-of-Government approach to funding with multiple Government agencies funding specific programmes at a regional and local level and Immigration New Zealand under the Department of Labour co-ordinating them. It is clear from the Auditor-General’s report that this approach was abandoned or broke down during the post-2008 period and the report makes it unclear whether other Government agencies were funding regional and local settlement and integration programmes through the regional strategies during the period. The regional strategies indicated that that was
the agreed approach but from this perspective it appears that approach was either scrapped or changed during 2009-2013. This is important because it shows that after 2008 the ongoing issues with governance and funding of the national strategy on settlement became more pronounced in how they were affecting the management of settlement and integration services.

The review of the evaluation framework of the national strategy found that Immigration New Zealand had not “put in place the integrated settlement evaluation and monitoring framework for the whole-of-Government Settlement Strategy, including links to the national and regional action plans as set out in the approved 2006 Cabinet proposal for the Settlement Strategy.”183 This meant that Immigration New Zealand could not measure tangible outcomes from the NZSS and could not statistically quantify whether the goals outlined in the NZSS and SNAP had been achieved or were being achieved. The Settlement Unit of Immigration New Zealand bears the primary responsibility of “leading and co-ordinating the Settlement Strategy, the national and regional action plans, and the National Settlement Structure.”184 As stated previously, the governance team stopped meeting and reporting in 2009 and the Settlement Secretariat stopped being reviewed in 2009 too. This would make it extremely difficult for the Settlement Unit to produce credible information around progress in the NZSS goals. As outlined in chapter three, the WRSS had no evaluation framework, which local governments viewed as the responsibility of the Settlement Unit to create and manage in collaboration with the GWRC. The fact that these frameworks were not in place by 2013 indicates that the regional strategies were, to some extent, abandoned in favour of reviews in 2013 or Immigration New Zealand’s priorities shifted during the phase of amalgamation in MBIE. The Auditor-General recommended “Immigration New Zealand

184 Ibid.
implement evaluation and monitoring frameworks and outcome reporting for whole-of-Government settlement activities.”

This was a recommendation based upon the reporting done by the Auditor-General as an evaluation framework was meant to be instated in 2006 but still hadn’t by 2013 and had only been discussed by the Department of Labour through the SKB in 2009.

As a result of these criticisms the Auditor-General made seven recommendations to Immigration New Zealand. The first four recommendations were around governance and communication with the recommendation that “Immigration New Zealand work with Government agency partners to improve the settlement governance structure and approach and to use this improved structure to co-ordinate and make better use of resources.”

The report also recommended that the new structure be regularly monitored and reviewed to ensure its ongoing effectiveness and implement an evaluation and monitoring framework for whole-of-Government settlement activities. Finally the Auditor-General recommended that the quality of information reported to Government be improved and that Immigration New Zealand continue to provide quality information to new migrants and work with Government agencies to better target resources to overcome barriers to migrants.

2014-2016: New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy

With INZ committed to further changes outlined in the Martin Jenkins review and the Auditor-General’s report, the updated national strategy was launched in July 2014, six years since it had last been updated in 2007. The new strategy was a clear reiteration of the ongoing theme in this chapter, that being the prioritisation of the

185 Ibid., 40.
186 Ibid., 24.
The economic side of migration rather than the social aspects of integration and settlement. The renamed New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy (NZMSIS) took the 2007 NZSS and condensed its six goals into five outcomes and one overarching outcome. They were; employment, education and training, English language, inclusion and health and wellbeing with the overarching outcome that “migrants make New Zealand their home, participate fully and contribute to all aspects of New Zealand life.”187 Below in Figure Eight is an outline of how INZ structured the new goals and outcomes.

Figure Eight: New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy Outcomes

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At a glance, the new strategy separated education and training and English language into two separate goals, stripped information services as a goal and condensed acceptance, safety and establishment of social networks key elements of the previous NZSS into their inclusion outcome. This was indicative of the new centrally controlled approach in line with INZ changing through its inclusion into MBIE. Goals became clearer more concise but also more condensed into themes rather than objectives. Evidence for the justification of this can be found in the strategies executive summary which states “employment and education and training are the primary integration outcomes reflecting their importance to the Government’s Business Growth Agenda.” Also unlike the strategy’s predecessor, which was vague regarding the categories of migrants and refugees it would apply to, the new strategy made clear that “funding for settlement services is prioritised to newcomer skilled migrants who make the largest potential economic contribution.” While the new national refugee strategy handled refugees in a separate way, the updated migrant strategy had been clearly tailored towards migrants who would make the biggest economic contribution to New Zealand. Funding of settlement services tangentially includes the families of the migrants that fit the skilled migrant category; the strategy affords no focus to them in its outcomes, services or in its description. Again, while its predecessor has been acknowledged to be very broad in focus, it at least made clear in its goals and in the SNAP that families were a major priority not just skilled migrant workers.

INZ’s priorities had shifted towards migrants who had the following when arriving to New Zealand; resources such as wealth and capital, recognised existing academic qualifications and long-term skills and work experience to fill MBIE determined gaps in labour force. Unlike the original national framework, which did not

distinguish migrants but rather had a broad brush approach attempting to cater to all types of migrants and refugees regardless of their own personal circumstances, this new strategy was more targeted to Government priorities for New Zealand’s future economic growth. This is a significant departure from the intention of early national settlement policy in New Zealand. In the new strategy there was no action plan, funding plan, timetable of goals and outcomes with corresponding agencies responsibilities or evaluation plan, only the notice that “Skilled and Safe Workplaces Chief Executive Group will monitor performance across the success indicators and a new Migrant Settlement and Integration Seniors Officials’ Group of key agencies will collaborate on settlement-related policy.” However, no public reporting or annual analysis of the performance indicators of this group has been made available for public record.

In 2015 the new Settlement Funding Allocation Model was released by Immigration New Zealand, which reaffirmed the objectives of the new strategy as well as supporting the “prioritisation of Government funding for settlement within the broad landscape of settlement services.” As outlined in the Auditor-General’s report, the two principal sources of funding were to continue to be Crown funding and the Immigration Levy fund, formerly the Migrant Levy fund. A major point of the model was comparing the old funding model to the new proposed one in that previously “agencies made independent bids for settlement funding, with very different approaches to the purchase and delivery of settlement services, including measuring success.” The old model had the weakness in that it created potential duplication of settlement services through this competitive bidding process that being if several agencies are bidding for the same funding for similar programmes

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190 Controller and Auditor-General, Immigration New Zealand: Supporting New Migrants to Settle and Work.” 42.
191 Immigration New Zealand, Settlement Funding Allocation Model. (Wellington: Immigration New Zealand, 2016), 5.
192 Immigration New Zealand, Settlement Funding Allocation Model. 6.
with differing degrees of reporting on the success or failure of those programmes. The new model encouraged cross-Government co-ordination and collaboration to deliver services across the Government agencies.

The new arrangements had agencies working together to achieve “consensus decisions on the proposed funding allocations across all outcome areas.” The changes to the overall settlement policy were twofold; no more competitive bidding or competition between Government agencies over contracts for settlement service delivery, and a perception that INZ wanted to encourage collaboration between agencies and improve communication and co-ordination of service delivery across all of Government. This meant that INZ would lead and co-ordinate the inter-agency approach to settlement funding and programmes, a key weakness in the previous NZSS arrangements as highlighted by the Auditor-General. This is further indicative of an INZ that is keenly aware of the Auditor-General’s criticisms in 2013 and an organisation that was responding with progressive steps within its own operating framework to address them.

However, the funding model does not highlight whether additional funding similar to the funding delivered in the 2004 Budget would happen again, rather that it focuses on allocation and management of resources with the select resources that are annually available to it, i.e. Crown funding and Migrant levy fund. This meant the new national framework would not receive additional resources to develop its governance, evaluation and monitoring frameworks, essentially they had to make do with what they had available. INZ co-ordinates most of the yearly funding with its national contractors rather than have a competitive funding process. The new model does not show whether there were alternative funding schemes for local stakeholder

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193 Ibid., 6
NGOs and charitable organisations. Its focus on contracting large national organisations like Citizens Advice Bureaus to deliver information services, Chambers of Commerce to deliver employment services, Red Cross to manage and handle refugees and English Language Partners New Zealand to teach migrants and refugees English skills, to deliver services, is evidence of a national approach to settlement services rather than a local and regional approach that was the focus of the former regional strategies. This was also a departure from the original SNAP, which had a wide range of organisations delivering services with overlap between them, this new model contracted services to a select group of providers thereby reducing the range of partners INZ had to work with and co-ordinate with in its funding infrastructure.

A year after the new strategy was introduced a report was released reviewing the settlement programmes that were run by the INZ contracted service providers under the new funding model. The programmes reviewed were the New Kiwis programme run by the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, An Ju Le Ye run by the Chinese New Settlers Trust, Regional Settlement Facilitation and Information Service organised by the Auckland Regional Migrant Services Trust (ARMS), CAB Language Link run by the Citizens Advice Bureaus, Regional Newcomers Skills Matching Programme run by the Wellington Chamber of Commerce and finally the Connecting Canterbury Employers and Newcomer’s Skills Matching Programme run by the Canterbury Chamber of Commerce. One of the common themes that came out of this review was that the providers indicated that the current funding levels were insufficient. What is curious is that out of the contractors reviewed, only ARMS services were determined as “no longer required because MBIE’s new information model provides awareness of settlement information.” Correspondingly, ARMS had the most negative view of the relationship between itself and MBIE stating that “ARMS feels considerable

frustration that MBIE does not appreciate: the breadth of stakeholder knowledge and engagement required in the contracted work; the time commitment involved in collaboration and trying to generate good practice.” 195 This point is made to demonstrate that there was a lack of priority to the more local organisations and NGOs in favour of a strategy that was tailored to national organisations. While the effects of decisions like these cannot be quantified because of the infancy of the new approach to settlement delivery, it demonstrates that at a local level there was limited focus and priority given to organisations that were limited to a specific geographical area in favour of larger organisations like Chambers of Commerce and CABs who had a far wider reaching structure.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter outlined and examined the changes in New Zealand public policy towards migrant settlement services between 2008 and 2016. During this period Immigration New Zealand underwent a substantial reconfiguration in how it operated, what its priorities were and what its approaches were to migrants and refugees. This was reflected in public policy which underwent changes in governance, management, leadership, co-ordination and allocation of responsibilities between central and local government. After 2008 central government did not agree with the organisation and management of settlement services and strived to update and centralise its management of services into a more streamlined and modern system in order to “make more efficient use of resources and deliver better outcomes.” 196 This occurred for a variety of reasons ranging from INZ’s shift in priorities towards a more economically tailored framework, a shift from a previously whole-of-Government collaborative approach to a centrally-controlled approach to governance and responsibilities, caused mainly by external

195 Ibid., 64.
196 Altinkaya, “Interview Conducted on 13th February, 2017.”
pressures through reviews and internal priorities through the redevelopment of INZ as an entity of the MBIE. The review of INZ’s management style through the Martin Jenkins review and the Auditor-General’s report acted as catalysts that sped up this process of public sector management. In approaching the relationships with its external stakeholders (local government), INZ changed its operating structure to clarify its responsibility to the overall process of migrant settlement and integration services. It firmly established itself in a leadership role whereby it would lead and direct the delivery of services through its partners and stakeholders. The new arrangements created roles such as the Relationship Managers to act as the representatives of central government policy in their regions, new funding agreements through the use of an approved set of contractors and providers and the condensing of the former regional strategies into Regional Partnership Agreements. Chapter Five will be examining whether these changes have been effective from the views of community stakeholders, central government officials and local government staff in order to evaluate how effective these changes have been.
Chapter Five: Stakeholder Perceptions

A key aspect of this thesis is stakeholder perceptions and how effectively community stakeholders and local authority staff perceive the current set of arrangements in delivering settlement services. In order to draw indicators of the current perception of the relationship, this chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part provides comments from interviewees regarding, not only Settlement Support’s redevelopment, but the introduction of the Refugee Resettlement Strategy. The second part discusses the Relationship Managers and Regional Partnership Agreements as replacements for the regional settlement strategies and how interviewees feel these new models have performed in communicating settlement policy between central and local government stakeholders. The third part outlines the stakeholder’s views of the current arrangements between central and local government on service delivery, in order to frame an overarching narrative between the previous chapters and the research questions. This will articulate whether local government and community stakeholders agree with the changes that have impacted their responsibilities and level of engagement in public policy, and whether a positive or negative view of central government has, accordingly, been formed. Below, in Table Three, are a list of the stakeholders interviewed and their area of expertise, however, while this list is small, it should be noted that over 25 people were contacted for this thesis.
Table Three: Stakeholders Interviewed and Area of Expertise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Stakeholder Interviewed</th>
<th>Area of expertise relevant to the field of study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judi Altinkaya</td>
<td>National Manager, Settlement. Immigration New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Moore</td>
<td>Divisional Manager for Strategy and Planning Hutt City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Pritchard</td>
<td>Senior Research and Policy Advisor Hutt City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelle Kenny</td>
<td>Talents and Skills Manager, Wellington Regional Economic Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Spoonley</td>
<td>Distinguished Professor and Pro Vice-Chancellor Massey University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Thomas</td>
<td>Refugee Trauma Transition Manager, New Zealand Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the small number of interviewees that responded their opinions should not be taken as representative of all stakeholders and Government officials involved in migrant settlement services. However, their opinions provide an image of the current state of settlement services and the relationship between central and local government from where conclusions can be drawn. Their views overlap in areas and there is consistency in their opinions. The stakeholders interviewed all had a level of involvement in migrant settlement services in New Zealand and this was found through the research materials used when compiling this thesis. Interviewees were recruited through email correspondence and all, excluding Paul Spoonley and Jeff Thomas, were interviewed in person, and their interviews were audio recorded. The interviewees were asked a series of questions relating to their particular area of expertise. These questions can be found in Appendix One. All interviews were
carried out in accordance with Ethics Approval from the “Victoria University Ethics Committee.”

Redevelopment of Settlement Support

The changes brought on by the redevelopment of Settlement Support into New Zealand Now were one of the most contentious issues for stakeholders surveyed. As already discussed, Settlement Support was contractually run by local government and NGOs who had agreements with Immigration New Zealand. Councils could employ the Settlement Support Co-ordinator for their specific area, who would be the link between council, communities and Immigration New Zealand, delivering Immigration New Zealand’s settlement services, but also informing and reporting to councils on the issues for migrants and refugees in the area. They acted as the local advocate for migrants and refugees arriving and settling in communities, specialising in providing information, advice and assistance to newly arriving residents.

When Settlement Support underwent review in 2013, two distinct views emerged. On one side, INZ believed that Settlement Support had outlived its usefulness in the sense that migrant priorities had changed since 2004 and Settlement Support needed to be reorganised to fit those priorities. Judi Altinkaya, the National Manager for Settlement, Protection and Attraction within MBIE, who designed Settlement Support in 2004, stated that “when we (INZ) started Settlement Support in 2004, with very skeletal information, no one had an iPhone, now no one has to go in and talk with their local council person, they can find out everything they need on an iPhone.” With the advances in digital technology, computers and phones have become an important source of communication and information, as a result, the need


198 Judi Altinkaya, “Interview Conducted on 13th February 2017.”
to ask for help in person has reduced. Altinkaya stated that “by 2008, even I, kicking and screaming, could see that its day and time had come.”\textsuperscript{199} Altinkaya also stated that there were consistency problems in SSNZ, due to the co-ordinators being council or NGO employees, and not INZ employees. Altinkaya also explained that Settlement Support co-ordinators were being pulled between the individual territorial authority’s ethnic liaison officer and Settlement Support. “At some point we realised that we needed those people to be our own people, so we knew that they were delivering credible information, and we needed a mainstream service for delivering our services and a mainstream website to deliver that information to migrants.”\textsuperscript{200} It was the view that SSNZ co-ordinators needed to be INZ people not council people. “They needed to understand the policies within INZ, how to communicate those policies, and how to use New Zealand Now and similar settlement tools and be trained in their use. It became a value add approach.”\textsuperscript{201}

The other view apparent during the review process of SSNZ was that it was still an effective service for migrants and refugees. Wendy Moore, a Policy and Divisional Planning official with Hutt City Council, stated that “from 2009 onwards Government funding was reduced with less being put into regional settlement programmes and more being put into economic tooled agencies and groups focused on employment and skills management.”\textsuperscript{202} Moore had been Hutt City Council’s Policy and Liaison Officer prior to 2008, and had been heavily involved in managing the relationship between Hutt City Council and INZ. She viewed SSNZ favourably “Clients and stakeholders of SSNZ, at the time, had expressed a high level of satisfaction with the work of SSNZ.”\textsuperscript{203} John Pritchard, another Senior Policy Officer with Hutt City Council stated that, “Settlement Support was good for migrants

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{200} Altinkaya, “Interview Conducted on 13\textsuperscript{th} February 2017.”
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{202} Moore, “Interview Conducted 18\textsuperscript{th} January 2017.”
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
because it provided the links to groups and organisations so migrants could get the help they needed. If you didn’t have these links and relationships, it is difficult to know how to contact the right people.”²⁰⁴ Adelle Kenny, the Project Manager with the Wellington Regional Economic Development Association (WREDA), reinforced this view by saying that “when Settlement Support existed, migrants knew exactly where to go.”²⁰⁵

Under SSNZ, Moore stated that, “the service allowed Council to take a very active role in migrant settlement and integration policy. The yearly outcomes generated from SSNZ allowed Council to remain informed on the issues for settling migrants in their community, and helped them design council funded programmes that would supplement the ongoing service providers in the area.”²⁰⁶ With SSNZ reviewed and replaced by a joint programme with New Zealand Now and CABs, the source of information was taken away, and councils had to then rely on MBIE to communicate and provide information on what they were to focus on. After the review period, Moore explained that “Hutt City Council began having strange meetings with MBIE, where they told councils that the focus on how they select migrants had changed, and they would be prioritising economic value. What compounded this issue was that MBIE had poor communication with us. One minute they would be corresponding on a daily basis when they wanted to arrange a regional meeting, but afterwards we wouldn’t hear from them for months.”²⁰⁷

The last report for SSNZ in Hutt City, by Vesna West, the local SSNZ co-ordinator, stated that while client satisfaction was high and SSNZ in her area was meeting the outcomes set by central government and Hutt City Council, “the economic, social and global contexts in which SSNZ operates had changed since its initial

²⁰⁴ John Pritchard, “Interview Conducted 27th January 2017.”
²⁰⁵ Adelle Kenny, “Interview Conducted on 24th February 2017.”
²⁰⁶ Moore, “Interview Conducted 18th January 2017.”
²⁰⁷ Ibid.
introduction, and the current model was no longer considered the most effective or efficient model for achievement of the desired current and future outcomes.”

This was a statement of acceptance of the findings of the SSNZ review, and matched the views of Altinkaya, who explained that migrants had become more interested in where they could find the information they wanted in a quick and efficient manner, hence in the SSNZ review, it was concluded that Settlement Support be repurposed into an information hub to fill that gap. “Previously under Settlement Support, we had 18 different websites all in various stages of correctness, now under New Zealand Now there is only one single sole source of truth, a trusted source of truth.”

It is clear that while repurposing Settlement Support had its benefits, it had previously been a source of information for local councils and with its change into a digital provider under the direction of INZ, instead of a physical provider who was contracted by councils and community stakeholders, local government and local stakeholders lost a source of information, not only on what was happening in their communities and what the issues were, but also a connection to central government and what central government was up to.

**Stakeholder Views on the Refugee Resettlement Strategy**

The Refugee Resettlement Strategy, as stated by the Auditor-General’s report in 2013, drew from resources dedicated to the NZSS during its developmental phase. This was noticed by stakeholders as early as 2009, with Moore stating that the development of the new strategy “created a visible rift in Immigration New Zealand between the economic focus group and the social focus group with each sharing the same resources at the time while not communicating effectively with each other or local government on what they were responsible for.”

The development of the national strategy on refugees, while necessary, was a contributor to the ongoing

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209 Altinkaya, "Interview Conducted on 13th February 2017."
210 Wendy Moore, “Interview Conducted 18th January 2017.”
issues with the NZSS at the time, and discussing the views of this strategy is important as it affected the whole-of-Government approach to settlement.

Jeff Thomas, the former chair of Refugee Trauma Recovery, an NGO responsible for delivering refugee services, stated that the new strategy had significant flaws in its delivery of services ranging from a lack of healthcare, counselling services and information services. Refugee Trauma Recovery was merged into the NZ Red Cross in late 2016 in order to better co-ordinate and utilise resources to help refugees in the Wellington region. Thomas stated that “the settlement programme funded by Immigration NZ and delivered by NZ Red Cross, only funds new arrivals for six months of support, which can be extended to 12 months. This is way too short for the kind of clients we had referred to us.” Thomas went on to state that the new national strategy for refugees had significant issues with communicating between the Health sector in Government and DHBs, stating that “the settlement of refugees is a whole-of-Government response and as DHBs operate with considerable autonomy from the Ministry of Health and each other, there is no obligation required of them. Funding contracts to both Wellington and Auckland have been static for four years and therefore require public donations just to stand still financially.” His opinion was, resources that had been drawn away from the NZSS had not translated into an adequate framework in the new refugee strategy, further purporting that central government had failed to enact adequate national policy regarding refugees and their approach had been inconsistent with their goals.

In regards to local government involvement with refugees, Thomas stated that local government had taken a more supportive and active role than central government. “City councils in the Wellington region have had a supportive role, in that there is some funding to assist NGOs deliver services to refugees. Wellington City Council

211 Jeff Thomas. “Interview Conducted on 28th February 2017.”
212 Thomas. “Interview Conducted on 28th February 2017.”
offers housing to refugees, something that few, if any, other councils in New Zealand offer. NGOs have maintained an ongoing active role in delivering refugee services that fit within their own goals and objectives.”

What is clear from the stakeholder interview obtained is that the refugee settlement strategy had been ineffectual in dealing with the ongoing issues that refugees face when settling in New Zealand, and consequently, the lack of leadership and handling of these issues at a central government level has, in the interviewees’ opinion, reduced the quality of the services delivered.

**Introduction of Regional Partnership Agreements and Relationship Managers**

The second major change, from the perspective of stakeholders, was the redevelopment of the regional settlement strategies into Regional Partnership Agreements. Altinkaya’s view towards what the regional strategies had achieved was that they were “knowledge building exercises and engaged local governments to communicate and collaborate with their stakeholders.”

Altinkaya had the same view of the NZSS, believing that the early strategies were “meant to build the knowledge of migrant settlement and integration issues with central and local government so that later policies and programmes could be more targeted to delivering outcomes.”

Pritchard stated that, in regards to the WRSS, it was not a successful strategy and that it lacked an economic focus. Moore agreed with that assessment stating that, “the Regional Settlement Strategy could have had a sharper focus on the economic issues of migrants, as it was designed at a time when migrant intake was increasing. One of the issues was that it wasn’t holistic enough, but now it has gone in the opposite direction, focusing solely on economic issues.”

Moore stated that “communication between regional strategy stakeholders and MBIE, regarding the WRSS, became virtually non-existent by 2013, as it became tied

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213 Ibid.
214 Altinkaya, “Interview Conducted on 13th February 2017.”
215 Ibid.
216 Moore, “Interview Conducted 18th January 2017.”
to WREDA and the regional partnership agreement, whereas previously it had always been difficult to communicate and understand what MBIE was doing and wanted from the regional strategy.”

During the process of review of the regional settlement strategies, in the opinion of Hutt City Council’s policy officers, the relationship deteriorated. Pritchard stated that “the relationship has developed in such a way that now central government tells local government what they are going to do, but does not wish for local government input, this was not the case in years past.” When the RPAs were developed, there was stronger emphasis on clarifying the responsibilities of central and local government, but conversely, a stronger economic focus was attributed to them. Altinkaya stated that “local government often had difficulty in understanding what central government was responsible for, funding being a key issue. The RPAs allowed us (INZ) to introduce a new collaborative funding arrangement within central government to help clear up this confusion, while, at the same time, communicating to local government the extent to which central government would fund local services.” Kenny viewed the RPAs as “action plans and memorandums of understanding rather than regional strategies or policy documents. They tell us what projects MBIE will work on with us, allowing for joint actions to be more aligned.”

Pritchard stated that an Individual Partnership Agreement for the Wellington region had been in the hands of WREDA since 2013, while the corresponding agreement for Auckland was launched in March 2014 as a joint agreement between INZ, Auckland Council and the council controlled organisation Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development (ATEED). So since 2013 “we have heard little to nothing regarding the current stage of the regional partnership agreement for Wellington. We have yet to even see a first draft of the intended

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217 Ibid.
218 Pritchard, “Interview Conducted on 27th January 2017.”
219 Altinkaya, "Interview Conducted on the 13th February 2017."
220 Kenny, "Interview Conducted on 24th February 2017."
agreement and it is now 2017.” Kenny responded to this by saying that ongoing issues with WREDA’s human resourcing were behind the delays, but that WREDA hoped an agreement would be finalised by 2017.

The introduction of the Relationship Managers also drew response from interviewees, with Moore stating that “the Wellington Relationship Manager was difficult to communicate with. They very rarely communicated with Council and when they did, it was about what central government was doing or what information they wanted from us for their projects. They were not very interested in our input.” At the time of writing, the Wellington Regional Relationship Manager had left her post, so further information about this specific issue of friction was unavailable. However, it is important to note, that the relationship managers were meant to be the conduit between local government and stakeholders and central government, and that failing to communicate would have compounded the already existing communication issues between the parties.

In an updated report on the development of the Relationship Managers role so far, in late 2016 the role was viewed by interviewed stakeholders as “having a positive impact on the stakeholder’s organisation; most saw Relationship Managers’ impact on the region as positive.” The report found that stakeholders were disappointed at the service being responsive rather than proactive, and that “Relationship Managers were perceived to be making decisions and judgements based on their own experiences, not in response to stakeholder comments.” The critiques made by Moore and Pritchard were directed at the Wellington Relationship Manager’s ability to communicate and organise effectively, yet in the report on progress to date,

221Pritchard, “Interview Conducted 27th January 2017.”
222 Moore, "Interview Conducted 18th January 2017.”
224 Altinkaya, "Success Through Immigration." 5.
there was no mention of communication being an issue. This particular case could be an outlier, in that the overall service is positive, however, with the Wellington Region still not having a formal policy for settlement services with INZ, further investigation into the quality of the current service should be completed to ascertain whether these responses are outliers, or indicators of a much larger problem in the Wellington Region.

Current Set of Arrangements and Concluding Remarks
The stakeholders interviewed also shared their thoughts on the current set of arrangements in delivering settlement services, and what needed to change. Local authority staff interviewed had a consensus opinion that “councils have an interest and a responsibility to ensure that people settle and integrate smoothly. However, the ongoing changes in central government, due not only to the priorities of the Government of the day, but the focus in allocating resources available, has degraded the previously existing collaborative relationship, and as a result, the focus on developing policy has fallen away.” Moore had the opinion that, aside from the ongoing issues with policy changes within INZ since 2008, “a struggle had developed within INZ between the economic and social streams of the Settlement Unit. This issue had been exasperated by the merger into MBIE and adoption of an economic growth agenda.” Moore concluded her views by stating that, “since 2011 there has not been a serious discussion between INZ and Hutt City Council on immigration, and as a result, there is no longer a real relationship with central government. The current Government has made its view of local government clear, through how they approach local government issues, as incompetent or unable to do the jobs and solve the issues; consequentially a ‘pass the buck’ attitude has developed between the two.”

225 Moore, “Interview Conducted on 18th January 2017.”
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
All the local authority and NGO stakeholders interviewed had the same opinion; that the changes in policy and delivery of service in INZ had negatively impacted the relationship between local and central government. The role of local government had become unclear, with the delivery of services being centred on INZ’s contracted service providers. Thomas stated that “NGOs who were not contracted by INZ to deliver services were still delivering services, but their funding had been significantly reduced or frozen for several years due to central government applying a new funding model across all of Government.” As a result, NGOs had become frontline services at a local level, with varying degrees of support from local and central government. Professor Paul Spoonley, an expert in the fields of migration and sociology, stated that “the voluntary sector does, in the main, a good job with immigrant settlement, especially organisations like English Language Partners. He also stated that “local authorities need to understand the drivers of immigration and the benefits. They need policies to recruit immigrants to settle and welcome them. This does not occur very well at the moment.” This implies that local government had become unable or unwilling to keep up with the changing needs of migrants and refugees and as a consequence had not developed current adequate integration policy to meet the demands of migrants and refugees.

The perception from NGO stakeholders was that because critical services like healthcare and childcare were not being provided by INZ under the national settlement strategy and are not being funded through other Government agencies, that NGOs, with some support from local governments, were covering the issues. Thomas stated that “councils were providing some grants and funds for very small projects, which fit the criteria of their community funding schemes, but that this was not a long term solution.” Charitable organisations, like ARMS, had to reduce staff

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228 Thomas. “Interview Conducted on 28th February 2017.”
229 Paul Spoonley. “Interview Conducted on 13th February 2017.”
230 Thomas. “Interview Conducted on 28th February 2017.”
capacity due to their loss of contract with MBIE, resulting in reduction of services and programmes.

Altinkaya stated, that INZ needed to improve its services in regards to “children, health and Tangata Whenua, more specifically, the relationship between migrants and refugees and indigenous Maori.” This admission that INZ needs to improve, and is working on improving the services it delivers, is an acknowledgement that the current set of arrangements are not perfect. However, the perception of local authority staff and community stakeholders was that, not only could the provision of services be improved but the quality of the communication from INZ to local government as well. Stakeholders believed that, because these services are not being provided by INZ and are not being funded through other Government agencies, that NGOs were covering the issues, with some support from local governments. While this set of arrangements was fine in the short-term, in the long-term, stakeholders thought it was detrimental to achieving successful outcomes for migrants and refugees. Altinkaya held the view that INZ “does not base its policies on individual needs and does not function to keep organisations going but rather what organisations deliver best.” While this attitude is indicative of a central government agency applying a national approach rather than a regional or local one, the current set of arrangements place a high level of responsibility on local government to develop local migrant settlement policy and co-ordinate with community stakeholders. The problem currently is that the relationship has developed in such a way so that local government now waits for central government approval before they formulate policy or work on programmes but, they can still formulate their own policy and tie it into INZ’s Regional Partnership Agreements. So far no local government in the Wellington or Auckland region has taken this approach.

231 Altinkaya. “Interview Conducted on the 13th February 2017.”
232 Ibid.
In this final chapter, the thesis will seek to discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of local and central government service delivery, based upon the findings of the preceding chapters. The delivery of migrant settlement services has been an ongoing issue in New Zealand’s public sector, with focus on developing the public sector understanding of migrant settlement in New Zealand a key priority since before the 21st century. At the same time, central government has wrestled with the question of who should deliver migrant settlement services. Frameworks have been devised to deliver services across all of Government, and attempts have been made to determine which public service is responsible for leading that approach. A further underlying difficulty of settlement service delivery has been the role of local government in New Zealand, and what responsibilities they should have when delivering services. Is their role meant to be active and proactive, charting their own policies, programmes and projects, or is it complementary, meant to assist central government in delivering its services but not be responsible for them? This thesis has discussed the varying opinions, perspectives and critical discussions around those questions and this chapter will seek to provide an answer to these ongoing questions.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Local v Central Government Service Delivery

Since the early days of settlement and integration public policy, central government has struggled to conceptualise the level of responsibility they would have in settling migrants and refugees. This has been demonstrated by the changing public policy definition of what settlement meant for migrants and refugees, and determinations over how long central government should provide services during the process of
integration. Does Government have obligations in the long-term (10 years or more) or in the short-term (five years or less) or does central government have any obligations at all to migrants and refugees? The current Government has settled on the view that it does have an obligation to migrants and refugees for a period of five years in terms of providing settlement services. Current and forthcoming programmes and settlement policies have been tailored to fit within that parameter. However, the period of settlement is subjective and dependent on what the individual organisation or Government believes is fair and adequate. “There is no identifiable point at which a migrant might be seen to have reached the end of the settlement process in all aspects of their life.”

Central government has far greater access to resources to compile information and take positions on the issues, more so than local government. The way New Zealand’s public service has been formed is that there is often complete separation between central and local government and, likewise, local governments are often fragmented and divided on issues themselves and build their networks and programmes within their geographical area. Central government tackles national issues, as it has a responsibility to the whole of New Zealand. Its programmes and settlement policies have been developed from this viewpoint and have changed from broad sweeping social issues to more centrally controlled economic issues. These approaches, not only reflect the governing political ideology of the day, but the problems of national concern that Government prioritises.

Local governments, while following a similar process of building their priorities based upon public feedback and electoral participation, often do not have the

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resources to take such a broad approach to issues. Today’s modern problems, like housing, immigration, health, and crime, often cannot be solved solely through the work of local government, but rather through the acts of central government agencies. However, the public sector reforms that created the Local Government Act 2002 gave local governments more responsibility to focus on their communities to improve long-term community outcomes. This required them to “adopt the roles of facilitator, negotiator and catalyst in strategy development. However, achieving outcomes for communities often requires alignment of the strategies and activities of other councils, central government agencies, and organisations in the private and community sectors.”

This is especially true for rurally-based local governments who often have significantly different quantities of resources, due to population differences, than their urban counterparts. But unlike central government, local government has the power to focus on achieving its own community outcomes, and while these are often related to central governments wider priorities, they are more specific as they are designed to incorporate the makeup of the individual community and solve community problems, rather than tackle fundamentally national ones. However, the status of the relationship between local and central government has always been uneven and while they are independent of each other often “the principle in action is that local government are free to make decisions so long as central government does not disagree.”

This demonstrates a key advantage and disadvantage in service delivery for both central and local government. With the knowledge of the development of settlement policy so far, it is clear that the early national settlement strategy and subsequent regional settlement strategies were attempts to codify in public policy this new focus

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on collaboration between central and local government. Where the difficulties lay was in central government approaching the issues of migrant settlement as ‘one-size-fits-all,’ indicative of the public sector, unable to localise the issues by area without local government involvement. Not all of their goals and intended objectives were relevant to local government, especially in rural New Zealand where migration was not significant enough to warrant local government attention through strategic planning. With the new reforms in local government powers and responsibilities, and local governments’ adjusting to this new way of working with the public sector, they approached the issues within their own geographical area and long-term outcomes for their communities. However, local governments’ reliance on central government for leadership and direction, led to the regional strategies duplicating and then attempting to localise these national issues that central government were targeting. A lack of evaluation measures and outcome measurements, coupled with local governments’ inability or unwillingness to invest their own resources in an organised way into solving these issues and developing the new programmes set by central government, caused significant weaknesses in this new collaborative approach.

In comparison, today’s settlement policy is designed around a whole-of-Government approach, with little input from local government. Because of the continued confusion within local governments, and the lack of understanding of their roles and responsibilities, central government has created a new centrally-controlled approach to settlement and integration of migrants. The leadership of this approach is given to Immigration New Zealand. They are responsible for communicating and coordinating with other central government agencies to utilise resources and develop services. But while this has alleviated the confusion that early settlement policy faced, local governments have, to an extent, been left behind in the learning process. Regional Partnership Agreements have been adopted over the previous regional
settlement strategies to align local government with central government priorities, but their primary focus has been on the economic issues facing migrants when entering and settling in New Zealand. Issues such as healthcare, childcare and relations with indigenous Maori have all either been left behind or not prioritised over economic issues such as employment, English language and information services a reality that central government is aware of.

These underdeveloped social issues are more tailored to local government, because they tie into local government priorities, such as infrastructure and community outcomes and funding schemes in line with long-term planning a requirement for all local governments under the LGA. Charities and NGOs often supplement their income through grants and funding schemes from central and local government, due to their nature as not-for-profit entities. Local governments often work better with them than central government agencies because of their localised nature and familiarity with the people working in both areas. Geographical restrictions, priority restrictions and resource restrictions, all keep such organisations confined within a set area and they often work with local government to achieve their outcomes. NGOs that work at the national level often must work across both central and local government to achieve their outcomes. An inherent advantage for local government here is that they can divert resources, time and patience to working with charities and NGOs to deliver services for the community and provide governance services. “Council will still be the principal funder but has passed the primary governance role over to people from within the community who have the skills and interest in making a contribution to a specific service.”236 This type of working relationship allows NGOs to deliver a social or outcomes based return on the financial investment from local government while at the same time providing a service. This

is where local governments should be working to research and determine the local issues affecting migrant settlement and be creating their own localised policies while, at the same time, work with central government to assist them in delivering the larger regional and national outcomes.

Ultimately central and local government both have traits that make them suitable to deliver migrant and refugee settlement services. However, because of their differing nature, local governments cannot focus on national issues and therefore national programmes and services relating to migrant settlement. On the other hand, they can localise their service to target their own communities, but because of their fragmentation, the services would be on a council-to-council basis. Every local government would be different, have different needs and different priorities, but if local governments want to invest in the future of migrant settlement they need to begin to formulate their own policies and programmes in line with their community outcomes. This approach would be determined, not only by their elected officials, but by their constituents and whether ratepayers’ money should be funnelled and allocated towards delivering migrant settlement services. Local governments do have a responsibility to migrants and refugees who settle to live and work in their area. The future challenge for local government will be to what extent migrants and refugees are worth investing in for the future of communities.

In summary, the current set of arrangements is the result of changes in the dynamic between local and central government over the last 16 years. What is clear, is that when the first national framework on migrant settlement and integration was created, it promoted collaboration between central and local government. The framework relied on outsourcing its goals and intended outcomes to multiple Government agencies, and regional and local stakeholders, with the intention to
create a national framework that unites and monitors them all. It was the first attempt by central and local government to create and implement settlement policy in New Zealand. However, weaknesses within INZ in how they led, co-ordinated and built this network, combined with a variety of external factors, led to a shift away from collaboration at a local level, in favour of a centralisation of national services and a concentrated effort in improving the delivery of services and utilisation of resources. Ultimately, this first attempt was about knowledge building and what was right and wrong with the public sector’s first attempt at devising settlement policy. The current set of arrangements is a response to the weaknesses of the earlier policy, where central government has now clearly defined its role and in the process, defined local government’s role. Local government still needs further work, deciding whether they have a responsibility to deliver localised settlement services and whether that role is outside central governments design.
Conclusion/Future Research

This thesis sought to examine the dynamics of the relationship between local and central government in New Zealand, as they relate to migrant settlement and integration public policy, with reference to local government in Auckland and Wellington. The relationship between the two in this area of public policy has been one of learning and development over the last 16 years. In its early days central government prioritised the social long-term issues of migrant settlement, and consequently, the two regional settlement strategies in Auckland and Wellington reflected that approach. This was indicative of local governments aligning their priorities closely with central government, highlighting that they share a leader to follower relationship. However, over the last decade this approach has changed, with central government focusing on delivering its own services, at the expense of the relationship with local government.

Central government has carved out their priorities by tailoring the public sector to focus on issues of national interest, and the day-to-day functions of New Zealand’s public service. Conversely, local governments have looked inward to focus on delivering community outcomes to their constituents based upon the priorities in their long-term plans and strategies. What this thesis shows is that in the last 16 years, central government has found its role, as a leader of migrant settlement services. Local government, however, has not yet found its role in delivering services, and while some councils have taken a proactive approach to delivering localised services, the vast majority of local governments do not have a clear position on their obligations to migrants settling in their communities. Because of the fragmentation of local government and its limited resources, it would be difficult for all local authorities to develop a consensus view of migrant settlement and integration services. While central government continues to develop relationships
with local government through regional partnership agreements, these agreements primarily align local government with central government’s economic priorities and the difficulty is in whether social issues are of equal importance to both entities. This matters in relation to the future of New Zealand and its current challenges. Issues such as crime, housing, foreign investment, the environment and education are all ongoing issues that central government faces. But while they can build national frameworks and models, their resources and skills are limited in terms of implementation at a local level. Migrant settlement is a national issue and requires a national response. But if the solutions devised to combat these issues are to be successful, they will require a collaborative approach from not just central government agencies, but also local governments and community stakeholders, NGOs and not-for-profit organisations. A one-size-fits-all approach will not be feasible if central government wants to achieve lasting success. A collaborative approach encompassing whole-of-Government at both a central and local level will be required. This will necessitate local governments work collaboratively to achieve regional outcomes and goals, but also interlink their goals with local stakeholders to ensure delivery of services. The current set of arrangements focuses on economic growth, as opposed to social-wellbeing, and migrant settlement requires a dual approach at both an economic and social level. While central government specialises in the economic approach, local government can, and should, focus on social issues and work collaboratively with central government through resources, working groups and public policy planning. This matters in our understanding of settling migrants. If New Zealand is to host migrants and refugees for long periods, and have these migrants become permanent residents, it has to develop a comprehensive central and local government response to their issues.
Future Research

In order to deepen our understanding of the effectiveness of the current immigrant settlement policy, and the role of central and local government in delivering settlement services, further research needs to be focused on the current case studies and regional policies. Policies in Canterbury, Hawkes Bay and Tauranga have only been developed in the last few years and were not studied in depth in the context of the early regional policies of both Auckland and Wellington. Investigation of the relationships of those local and regional bodies, and their connection with central government, may highlight a different type of relationship between the two, perhaps even a better one than has been demonstrated in this thesis. Studies might also look at the effect that a lack of regional and local policies have had on rural New Zealand, as that area has had little focus in this thesis. Identifying the long-term impacts of migrants and refugees on local economies and juxtaposing those findings with rural economic growth and their corresponding migrant and refugee populations may also help understand the long term benefits of having migrants and refugees settle in communities. Settlement is an intrinsic part of assisting migrants and refugees to integrate permanently in New Zealand and devising successful policies and programmes that deliver services to assist in that process is a key social issue for all communities in New Zealand. While there is no statistical evidence gathered to suggest that rural areas are struggling due to a lack of migrants and refugees in their communities there is no evidence to suggest the contrary.

Migrant settlement and integration services in New Zealand need to be collaborative in approach to creating and implementing policy and delivering and improving programmes that fill gaps in society’s needs. In respect of that, further work needs to be conducted on how both areas of New Zealand’s public service communicate, coordinate and implement policies and programmes to achieve outcomes. Central
government is better at responding to national interests, but local governments have a better understanding of the local communities they are accountable to and representative of, and they are in a better position to deliver localised services that can improve how efficiently newcomers settle and integrate into New Zealand daily life.
Appendix One

These were the general interview questions by area of expertise due to an incomplete set of intended individuals, but a complete set of groups and organisations intended for interviews. They were used as the structure of each interview.

Regional Stakeholders (Wellington/Auckland)

1) What do you believe are the current issues with regards to the settling and integrating of migrants in the communities you service?

2) What is your current view about the work of central government agencies responsible for assisting migrants? Are they meeting their obligations? Are they meeting the needs of migrants?

3) Explain your understanding of the role councils or local authorities play in delivering services to migrants and refugees in the communities you service.

4) In your view, should local governments be doing more or less to help migrants and refugees settle in New Zealand? Please explain why.

5) Explain what, in your view, (name of regional strategy) achieved in delivering migrant settlement services? Was it successful overall and what, in your opinion; were its flaws, if any? Supplementary questions will be asked of the stakeholder before this question to ascertain whether they know or understand their regional migrant settlement strategy.
6) Are there any elements of the current central government policy towards migrant integration and settlement that you would recommend be changed based upon your experiences and knowledge?

Regional Strategies Officials (Wellington and Auckland)

1) To the best of your knowledge, what is the current state of your regional policy? Is it still being funded, implemented and reviewed? Why, or why not?

2) In your view, what were the major policy factors that had to be considered when designing your regional strategy?

3) What were the roles and responsibilities of local authorities and regional stakeholders in implementing your regional strategy?

4) Were there any barriers or obstacles to creating your regional strategy framework? Where did they come from and how were they overcome?

5) In your view, what was the designated role of central government agencies in collaborating with your regional strategy? Did they fulfil this role?

To the best of your knowledge how were outcomes measured and goals adjusted during the implementation phase of your regional policy?
6) What, in your view, should the role of local authorities be in providing and delivering settlement and integration services to migrants?

Academics

1) What is your view of the current state of central government public policy tailored towards migrant settlement and integration?

2) Explain your understanding of regional migrant settlement policy in New Zealand. In your opinion is it or has it been effective? Why, or why not?

3) What role do you believe local authorities should play in delivering migrant settlement and integration services?

4) What is your view of the role of regional stakeholders, organisations and charities in delivering migrant settlement and integration services?

5) In your view, who has responsibility or should be responsible for migrant settlement and integration services? Should it be left to a single party or organisation or be a collaborative multi-layered cross-agency approach?

6) Are there any elements in the existing public policy framework that you would recommend be changed based upon your experiences and knowledge?
Local Government Representatives

1) What do you believe are the current issues with regards to settling and integrating migrants in your community?

2) How would you describe your council’s responsibility to settling and integrating migrants?

3) What, if any, programmes does your council provide that addresses the issues of migrant settlement and integration? Has that changed in the last decade?

4) Explain what, in your view; (name of regional strategy relevant) achieved in delivering migrant settlement services? Was it successful overall and what in your opinion were its flaws if any? Supplementary question will be asked of the individuals before this question to ascertain whether they know about, understand and are familiar with their regional strategy.

5) In your own words, please explain your view on the current relationship between local and central government in delivering migrant settlement and integration services.

Central Government Representatives

1) In your view, what do you believe are the current issues for settling and integrating migrants in New Zealand?
2) What current policies and programmes do you have in place to address the issues associated with migrant integration and settlement in New Zealand?

3) What is your view of the role of regional stakeholders, organisations and charities in delivering migrant settlement services?

4) What is the level of involvement and responsibility local governments have in these policies and programmes? What programmes or responsibilities do you delegate to them? Supplementary questions will be asked if the answer is that they have no involvement, such as why they do not have involvement and whether there is a place for them going forward.

5) What if any, tangible effects have changing central government public policy on migrant settlement and integration had on your organisation in the last decade?

6) What policy recommendations would you suggest for further development of the existing public policy framework? Would you delegate more to local authorities or regional stakeholders?
Bibliography


