SECURITIES OVER LIVESTOCK IN NEW ZEALAND

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INTRODUCTION

The provision of adequate facilities for lending to farmers has always been of paramount importance to the economic well-being of New Zealand. On the introduction of the Wool and Oil Securities Bill, 1858, the first New Zealand legislation designed specifically to facilitate farm borrowing, the House was told:

This measure was of a very simple and intelligible character, and one much needed in this country, where great inconvenience was frequently experienced from the want of ready cash. The difficulty of obtaining ready money frequently resulted in injury to stock, and materially retarded the producing powers of the country. (1)

Over a century later in the 1971 Budget the Minister of Finance stated:

"Farming will remain New Zealand's largest and most important export earner for as far ahead as we can see, and the Government is committed to maintain the viability of farming in the national interest."

In 1970 agricultural produce and processed agricultural products provided 86 per cent of the total value of exports from New Zealand. The National Development Conference recommended that 55 per cent of the additional exports required to meet national needs in 1979 should come from the agricultural sector (2).

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the law relating to securities over livestock in New Zealand (3) and to determine

(1) Mr. Stafford. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol. 2 (1858) p.382 here referred to as Hansard plus the appropriate volume, year and page reference.


(3) For a general introduction to the historical and policy background of the New Zealand legislation in this field, see Riesenfeld, Quagmire of Chattels Securities in New Zealand, Legal Research Foundation, Auckland.
whether it is suitable for its purpose. Where weaknesses exist in the present legislation these have been discussed and improvements suggested. Although the traditional English approach does not permit reference to the Parliamentary Debates as an aid to statutory interpretation (4) for the purposes of gaining a deeper understanding of the special problems in this area such references have been included in the present paper. The practical background to this type of lending has also been described to explain why legislation which contains more than its share of problems and uncertainties should have remained so long on the statute books without modification. For this aspect of the paper the writer has relied to a certain extent on views expressed by solicitors dealing with this type of security, stock and station agents, bankers and farmers. Various relevant passages in letters received from country solicitors on the question as to whether the present law is satisfactory have been reproduced in full rather than paraphrased by the writer to enable the reader to appreciate more clearly the opinion of those so closely involved in the practical aspects of this type of security. A further section dealing with some of the parallel United States laws in this field has been included, as a means of comparison and, where appropriate, as a model for improvement in our own law. However in many cases it will be seen that the

(4) The strict application of this principle was well illustrated in the interpretation of s.28(2)(d) of the Finance Act 1960 (U.K.) in Cleary v. I.R.C. [1967] 2 All E.R. 48 (H.L.) Viscount Dilhorne refused in his interpretation of that section to be influenced by what had been said in Parliament about that section by the man who had taken responsibility for drafting it. In fact the judge and the draftsman (then Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller) were the same person; see Fleisch Tax Avoidance (1968) Current Legal Problems 215 at 219.
American attempts to deal with the special problems raised in livestock securities have been no more successful than our own.

The paper is divided into four parts.

**Part I** deals with the law relating to livestock securities in New Zealand as contained in the Chattels Transfer Act 1924 and discusses the following areas:

(a) the definition of livestock  
(b) classes of livestock  
(c) description of livestock  
(d) after-acquired stock  
(e) description of land  
(f) sale of encumbered stock  
(g) purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock  
(h) wool securities  
(i) variation of priority of instruments

**Part II** examines the practical background to the lending on the security of livestock in New Zealand and explains the inter-relation between the law and practice in this field.

**Part III** by way of comparison looks at certain aspects of the American laws relating to livestock securities and deals with the following areas:

(a) Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code  
(b) farm products - Section 9-109  
(c) description of livestock  
(d) after-acquired stock  
(e) sale of encumbered stock
Part IV concludes the paper by summarising the recommendations made during the previous sections as to improvements in the present law.

"The present Act as including any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches, and any other living animals (5). It is interesting to note the objection made by the maker for Gisborne when the extended definition of "stock" was introduced in the 1924 Chattels Transfer Bill. Mr. Lyne said this definition as a matter which should be adjusted. "If the producer is to have any existence at all without being absolutely controlled in every movement by the mercantile institutions of the Dominion" (6). The then Minister for Justice the Hon. Mr. Farr considered there was nothing sinister in the definition of stock:

"It [the definition] is certainly comprehensive; but a definition cannot hurt anybody, so that nothing attaches to the objection that the definition is too wide. Until a person puts his hand to paper and mortgages or deals with a particular animal, the definition cannot affect him." (7)

(5) s.2 Chattels Transfer Act 1924; cf., Mortgage of Stock Registration Act 1898. s.2 "stock" shall include any sheep, cattle or horses; Chattels Securities Act 1899. "stock" includes any sheep, cattle and horses; Chattels Transfer Act 1923 and 1924; "stock" includes any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches and llamas.

(6) Hansard Vol. 205 (1924) p.832

Mr. Lyne (Gisborne)..."I will ask honourable gentlemen to look at the interpretation of the word "stock". It includes any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches, and other living animals. "Any living animals" will include a man's cat, dog, or goat. As Hon. Member - And rabbits. Mr. Lyne - Yes, and rabbits, but unfortunately the mercantile institutions cannot catch them.

PART I: LIVESTOCK SECURITIES UNDER THE CHATTELS TRANSFER ACT 1924

(a) The definition of Stock

"Stock" is defined in the present Act as including any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches, and any other living animals (5). It is interesting to note the objection made by the member for Gisborne when the extended definition of "stock" was introduced in the 1924 Chattels Transfer Bill. Mr. Lynsar cited this definition as a matter which should be adjusted "if the producer is to have any existence at all without being absolutely controlled in every movement by the mercantile institutions of the Dominion" (6). The then Minister for Justice the Hon. Mr. Parr considered there was nothing sinister in the definition of stock:

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(5) S.2 Chattels Transfer Act 1924; cf. Mortgages of Stock Registration Act 1868. S.5 "stock" shall include any sheep, cattle or horses; Chattels Securities Act 1880, "stock" includes any sheep, cattle and horses; Chattels Transfer Act 1889 and 1908; "stock" includes any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches and llamas.

(6) Hansard Vol. 205 (1924) p.632
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Mr. Lynsar - Yes, and rabbits; but unfortunately the mercantile institutions cannot catch them.

It is considered that the present definition of "stock" is practical and realistic, since by reason of its all-embracing nature it removes any scope for dispute as to whether any given animal falls within its scope (8).

The earlier cases in which it was attempted to restrict the meaning of the expression "stock" to embrace only "stock" depasturing on a farm or station were dispelled In re Alloway (9) by Edwards J. who held that horses, whatever the occupation of their owner were "stock" within the meaning of the Chattels Transfer Act 1908.

"...a horse is in my opinion a horse, a cow is a cow, and a sheep is a sheep, no matter what the occupation of its owner may be, and whether he has an occupation or not." (10)

(b) Classes of Stock

A more difficult question of interpretation in s.29 is the meaning to be ascribed to the word "class" in the phrase "all stock of the class or classes described in the instrument". Does the word refer to the particular genus of living animals such as "sheep" or "pigs" or may it refer to a class or category within a genus e.g. "Jersey" or "Friesian" cows, "dairy" or "beef"?

(8) Quaere: a chattel mortgage of fish!
(9) [1916] N.Z.L.R. 433. In so holding Edwards J. dissented from two earlier decisions; Andrews v. Fan Tu (1909) 28 N.Z.L.R. 1042 a bill of sale by an expressman over his vehicle and horse was held, as regards the horse, a mortgage of stock under the Act: Hickmott v. Kesteven (1913) 15 G.L.R. 402 a carrier's horse held not to be "stock" within the Act.
(10) ibid. p.445.
cattle? If the latter interpretation is correct, a grantee could find his security defeated where, for example, a farmer replaced all his sheep of one breed by those of another. This would be an unfavourable result since it would facilitate the impairment of the grantee's security.

Ball (11) says that although there is no direct authority, it appears that sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, and any other genus of living animal each constitute a class. However, he does acknowledge a passage from Chapman J.'s judgment in the Supreme Court in Bailey's case supporting a different interpretation of the word "class":

"here it is unnecessary as a matter of business to draw any distinction between one class of cows and another..." (12)

On the other hand Edwards J. in the Court of Appeal considered that if any instrument under the Act:

"...assigns or purports to assign animals referred to in the operative part of the instrument as the "stock" described in the schedule thereto, and such stock are found by reference to the schedule to consist of only one or more of the classes of animals which are intended by the interpretation clause of the statute in the word "stock", the meaning of that word, wherever used in the same instrument, is confined to stock of the species mentioned in the schedule." (13)

Ball's view of the word "class" in s.29 appears to bear the intention of the legislature as evidenced by the Parliamentary


debates preceding the enactment of this section (14). Originally the Government had endeavoured to enact an amended s.29 which would have had the result that whenever a farmer mortgaged his sheep then all his other stock was also included and became subject to the security. The then Attorney-General the Hon. Sir Francis Bell introduced the Bill stating it was a "highly technical piece of legislation" and he did not think any advantage would be gained by explaining or discussing it. The Attorney-General believed that the Bill which had been prepared by a committee of merchants and bankers and two very experienced lawyers appointed by them to help, "will be found to be a very beneficial measure indeed" (15).

A cynic might be inclined to ask "very beneficial to whom?", because strong opposition was taken to a number of clauses especially clause 29. The member for Hamilton, Mr. Young, "felt sure that country settlers could not realise what was in this clause (i.e. clause 29), or they would be up in arms against it from one end of New Zealand to the other" (16). As a result of the controversy raised by this provision the Minister of Justice (17) "in deference to the views of a great many members of the House" agreed to strike out the new words in that clause so that a bill of sale would not include stock other than that specified in the bill.

(14) Refer to footnote (6) page 5 supra.
alteration initially accepted by its opponents (as shown by the deletion of the words underlined below) failed to alter the clause's effect:

"...and all stock of every kind (whether of the classes described in the instrument or not)...."

The situation was finally remedied when it was agreed to omit all the words struck out by the House (shown underlined above) but to substitute in lieu of the words so struck out, the words: 'of the class or classes described in the instrument' (18).

From the foregoing discussion of the Parliamentary Debates it appears that the legislature intended the word "class" in s.29 to refer to the species of stock and not the particular type or breed within a species. However this very important question is not free from doubt (19) and should be clarified at the first suitable occasion. It does seem an anomalous result when a security embracing ordinary breeding ewes worth say $6.00 a head could give the grantee the right to after-acquired stud sheep worth $40.00 a head. Likewise the section would appear to create a blatant legal fiction if for example an after-acquired dairy herd is to be deemed to form part of the security on a herd of beef cattle. On the other hand once one enters into the area of drawing distinctions between types of sheep or cattle on the basis of breed or function the possibility of complex borderline cases based on

(18) Hansard, Vol. 205 (1924), 1073 (Legislative Council); 1078 (House of Representatives).

(19) See Bailey (S.C.) p.18 Chapman J. "one class of cows and the other".
fine distinctions may be endless. A significant merit of the present rugged approach which lumps all animals of a species into the one "class" is that lenders are more inclined to advance money to farmers knowing that even if there are changes of quality or type within the secured class of animals the loan is still protected (20). Nevertheless this is no excuse for not making it clear just what is meant by the word "class".

c) Description of Stock: s.28

The Chattels Transfer Act requires that except in the case of the chattels mentioned in s.26, every instrument shall contain a schedule of the chattels included therein: s.23. Whether or not a description is sufficient depends upon the circumstances of each case (21). However, the object of legislation which insists upon a description of chattels is to facilitate identification of articles enumerated in the schedule with those that are to be found in the possession of the grantor. Identification should be rendered as easy as possible so that the dispute as to the intention of the parties or the possibility of fraud and controversy to which general descriptions invariably give

(20) Provided of course that there is an implied or express covenant to brand or earmark. See also the covenant implied by clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule that forbids the grantor without the grantee's consent in writing to change the general quality, character or description of the stock subject to the security.

rise should be rendered as rare as possible (22).

"The Statute (23) exists so that money advanced may be well secured, and so that the person who has the security gets no more than his security. It is a protection against dishonesty; and, while it safeguards creditors, it aims at enabling the rights of a grantee to be determined with certainty and without difficulty." (24).

Livestock raise special problems of description. In a large flock of sheep or cattle of the same breed it is often impossible without human intervention by distinctively marking an animal, to distinguish the property of one owner from another. In addition to the difficulty of similar appearance is the natural increase which takes place each year in a breeding flock or herd. At the other end of the scale is the decrease in value of the security as stock grows older, becomes less productive and unless disposed of dies on the owner's lands.

It is therefore not surprising that the Chattels Transfer Act has made special provision for the description requirements of livestock. Section 26 exempts, inter alia, stock, wool and crops from the operation of sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Act. In the case of livestock a special code is provided for their description in Sections 28, 29 and 30. No doubt the reason for the specially favourable treatment of mortgagees of stock, crops and wool was to enable farmers to borrow more readily from

(23) i.e. Chattels Transfer Act 1924.
(24) Eyre v. McCullough (supra) at 398 per Herdman J.
financial institutions on the security of such chattels (25).

Section 28 (26) requires stock to be described either
(a) by brand, earmark or mark on them, or
(b) by sex, age, name, colour or other mode of description
so as to be reasonably capable of identification, and
(c) the land or premises on which such stock are or are
intended to be kept (27).

If the requirements of (a) or (b) above are not observed then the
instrument is void as against the persons mentioned in s.18. Section
28 does not state the consequences of a failure to describe the land
or premises. However it has been held that the effect of non-
compliance with this requirement is that if the instrument is
registered, the grantee is deprived of the benefit of such registration
although the instrument is not invalidated as between the parties (28).

"Branding", in the commonly accepted use of the term, means
the burning of a mark on the hide, skin, face or horn of an animal

(25) This opinion was expressed by Cooper J. in Official Assignee
at p.890 (C.A.).

(26) The following letters (a), (b) and (c) and explanation are
the writer's breakdown of the section's description
requirements, and not the section as it appears in the Act.

(27) The question of the description of land is discussed later
in this paper at pp. 35-40.

(28) Lee v. Official Assignee (1903) 22 N.Z.L.R. 747: cf the
English Bills of Sale Act 1882 in which the consequence of
non-registration was to avoid the instrument even between
grantor and grantee. Lee's case was applied in Silk v.
of a failure to describe land is dealt with later in this
paper at pp.37-38.
with a hot iron. This system of identification is understood to be very little practised these days in New Zealand (29). Although never judicially considered it is arguable that the statutory definition (30) of branding given in the various stock Acts and now embodied in the Animals Act 1967 would be used should the interpretation of this word ever be disputed. Generally in the earlier Acts the term included (in the case of sheep) earmarks, wool-marks, metal-clips attached to the ear, tattoo-marks and fire-marks on the horn or face. Therefore there are certainly grounds for arguing that for the purposes of s.28 of the Chattels Transfer Act "branding" can be read as including "earmarking".

"Marking", in the case of sheep has now lost favour, to a large extent, and even its legality as a method of identifying sheep for the purposes of determining ownership. Due to the fact that any mark applied to the wool will be lost once the sheep is shorn, this method of description has never been ideal. In the Animals Act 1967 the legislature has recognised the harmful effect wool marks can have on the marketing of wool in competition with other fibres and has therefore forbidden the marking of wool except by approved preparations (31). It is understood that the marking

(29) See p. 33 infra.
(30) Stock Act 1893, s.56; Stock Act Amendment Act 1895, s.7; Stock Act Amendment Act 1898, s.14; Stock Act 1908, s.61; Stock Amendment Act 1956 s.3; Animals Act 1967, s.69.
(31) Animals Act 1967, s.94 subs. (3) provides a penalty on summary conviction of a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars. cf. Stock Act 1908, s.61 where "pitch, tar, paint, raddle or lamp-black mixed with oil or tallow... to be plainly made with distinct letters" was one of the methods prescribed by the Act for marking sheep.
of sheep has now fallen into desuetude compared with its use during the era when the present Chattels Transfer Act was enacted.

"Earmarking" is the most widely used method of marking animals for identification purposes and for purposes of recording age, sex and ownership. The stringent requirements as to the registration and use of brands (which under the Animals Act 1967 includes earmarks) should theoretically mean that the best practicable method of identifying sheep or cattle should be by reference to an earmark. Although this is largely true, even here there are difficulties. A farmer who buys replacement or store stock for fattening will be bringing on to his farm animals which already carry the earmark of another farmer. In many cases it may be impossible for the purchaser to super-impose his own mark on the new stock (32).

Are there then any better methods of identification available? Sex may be of assistance in the case of rams or bulls in a small flock or herd but is generally an insufficient method of identification. Age is of assistance in the case of young animals, e.g. calves, heifers, lambs and hoggets, but after the animal matures the only sure method of age determination is by looking at the animal's teeth (33). Name could only be appropriate

(32) The Animals Act 1967, s.83 allows a purchaser to brand new stock with his registered brand provided that he does not place his brand over the whole or any part of the existing brand.

(33) For example in the case of a sheep from 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years, its set of teeth comprise two large teeth and in the following two years four and six teeth respectively, after which it has a "full mouth" and age can no longer be precisely determined.
with a small number of animals and even then, in the absence of some other identifying feature, one must rely on the owner or some other person to say that a particular ram is "Garry" since an animal's name in the absence of some other description is very much a subjective matter. Lastly colour is at least for most cattle and sheep quite unhelpful as a means of identification. One may ask why the legislature failed to specify breed as one of the modes of description of stock since this form of identification enjoys the advantages of being absolutely immutable, (unlike a brand, mark or earmark), easy to see (unlike age, name, or even sex (34)) and there is today a sufficient number of breeds of both sheep and cattle in New Zealand for this factor to be, if not a sole means of identification, at least one which may narrow the field down to a considerable extent. Yet even if an animal's breed was used as a means of description serious problems could arise in the case of after-acquired stock under s.29 if these are of a different breed from the stock originally secured under the instrument.

Despite the numerous methods of description allowed by the Chattels Transfer Act the mortgagee of sheep and cattle has, at least under s.28, a very limited choice as to the method he will employ to achieve a description which renders the secured animals reasonably capable of identification.

The leading decision on the description requirement of s.28 (34) e.g. It can sometimes be impossible to tell whether a particular sheep is a ewe or a wether without catching the animal and making a closer investigation.
is the Official Assignee of Bailey v. Union Bank of Australia (35). Bailey purported to assign to the Union Bank by an instrument duly registered under the Chattels Transfer Act a herd of cattle and certain sheep depasturing on his land together with all after-acquired stock. The schedule to the instrument described the stock as:

All that flock of sheep comprising 500 ewes of mixed ages 250 lambs of mixed sexes. Also that herd of cattle comprising 49 heifers and 1 bull. All which sheep and cattle are earmarked with the registered earmark of the grantor... (36)

The schedule also described the land on which the stock were depasturing. The instrument contained a covenant by Bailey with the Bank "that the grantor 'will brand' and will earmark as shown in the schedule hereto" but no brand was shown on the instrument or the schedule. Bailey sold the sheep and purchased 28 cows with the proceeds. None of the stock either at the date of the instrument nor subsequently bore the grantor's brand as shown in the instrument and it was admitted that they could not by means of the description given be distinguished from 28 additional cows subsequently acquired by Bailey who had not observed his covenants to brand and earmark.

After Bailey's adjudication in bankruptcy the bank seized and sold the stock depasturing on his farm including 77 cows (being the 49 original heifers plus 28 cows acquired with the proceeds of the proceeds of


(36) ibid p.874.
sale of the sheep), 1 bull (not being the original bull but acquired after the date of the instrument), 3 yearling heifers (the progeny of some of the 49 heifers) and 8 calves or weaners, 2 horses (after-acquired) and one pony.

On an originating summons the Court was asked to decide whether the Bank or the Official Assignee was entitled to retain the proceeds of the sale. The Official Assignee argued that the instrument was void as against him because the original 49 heifers and 1 bull were not within s.28 (37) but were in fact actually misdescribed in that they were not earmarked with the grantor's earmark. The plaintiff argued that unless stock belonging to the grantor are properly described at the time of execution of the instrument they would not be covered by a covenant to earmark.

Chapman J. in the Supreme Court held that the description by sex and approximate age was in the circumstances sufficient to render the herd reasonably capable of identification unless an objection dependent on the absence of brands was to prevail. The learned Judge observed that description by reference to brands or marks in s.28 was alternative to that "by sex, age, name, colour, or other mode of description" so that one or the other would suffice. Chapman J. showed a sound insight into the practical difficulties of describing livestock referred to earlier in this paper.

(37) s.25 of the 1908 Act.
"A description by sex may leave some room for doubt, just as a description by colour may:...a description by name may be equally defective, save in the case of a domesticated beast which will answer to its name. A dairy-farmer's herd of heifers or milch-cows is, however, in itself a fairly definite thing." (38)

Had it not been for the further complication of after-acquired stock being mixed in with and indistinguishable from the original 49 heifers there may be good business reasons to adopt Chapman J.'s somewhat rugged approach to the description requirement of s.28.

The policy behind his decision appears to be that the same strictness of description required by the English Bills of Sales Act and the cases decided thereunder for all chattels including stock was not appropriate, in the case of livestock, to New Zealand conditions.

"The lending of money on stock is a regular business in New Zealand; and to it the same kind of suspicion and even discredit, that appears to attach to moneylending transactions involving bills of sale in England, does not attach." (39).

Yet the fact that lending on a particular type of security is common in a country should not in itself justify a lessening of the standard of description required for such chattels. If anything, widespread borrowing on the security of livestock may render a strict description requirement even more necessary and desirable to protect borrowers. However the predominant and underlying philosophy behind the above quote is that the description requirements handed down by

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(39) Bailey (S.C.) 15.
English case law should be relaxed in New Zealand to favour lenders so that agricultural borrowers will find it easier to obtain financial accommodation.

Another justification for a different approach in New Zealand is of course the comparative numbers of stock involved. Whereas in England many farmers and even their neighbours might know their animals by name or individual appearance (40) the same could not be true of New Zealand farming conditions with its large numbers of livestock and comparatively sparse human population.

The decision of Chapman J. on the compliance of the instrument in question as to description under s.28 was reversed by the Court of Appeal (41). Sim J. stated that the case was not one where it was claimed that a general description, correct as far as it went, might be treated as a compliance with the section. On the contrary he regarded it as an instance where it was sought to treat a serious misdescription as a sufficient description for the purposes of the section (42). Edwards J. considered that the New Zealand Act required even greater particularity of description than s.4 of the English Bills of Sale Act 1882 and that the purpose of the requirement

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(40) "... in a country parish in England every farmer and every farm labourer in the parish would know everyone of the cows in question by sight, and that the case is very different with respect to 47 cattle on a farm in New Zealand" Edwards J. [1916] N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 881.


(42) Bailey 882 (C.A.).
of s.28 as declared in that section is to ensure that the stock shall be reasonably capable of identification. Reviewing the English decisions on the meaning of this requirement Edwards J. found that the test whether or not the description of chattels was sufficient to meet the statute was whether or not the chattels mortgaged could be identified with reasonable certainty. This test was in His Honour's opinion expressed in direct terms in the Act. Applying that test to the facts before him the learned judge found it "beyond question" that the provisions of s.28 had not been complied with.

"If, using the words of Lord Justice Kay in Davidson v. Carlton Bank (43), the Official Assignee in this case had gone upon the land mentioned in the schedule, taking the schedule in his hand and applying it to the cattle which he found there, he would not only have failed to find a single beast which corresponded with the description in the schedule, but he would have found that by far the greater number of the beasts which were there bore earmarks totally different from that mentioned in the schedule... How then can it be said that each beast was described in such a way as to enable a person dealing with Bailey to identify these which were intended to pass with the security?" (44)

The "reasonably capable of identification" test was considered in relation to pigs in The King v. Buckland & Sons Ltd. (45) which were described in the schedule to the bill of sale as "1 white sow (dry), 1 black-and-white sow, 6 'young' 1 week, 6 'young 5 weeks,

(43) [1893] 1 Q.B. 82, 87, Lord Justice Kay's statement was cited with approval by Herdman J. in The King v. Buckland & Sons Ltd. [1922] N.Z.L.R. 683, 686.
(44) Bailey 882 (C.A.).
8 'young' 2 weeks, 8 'young' 5 weeks, 7 slips, 10 slips, 45 young slips." There was a covenant in the instrument that the grantor "will brand" but the animals were not branded nor earmarked. In an action for damages for conversion of chattels by the grantee against the defendant company of auctioneers which had sold the pigs without knowledge of the plaintiff's bill of sale, it was held that only the "white sow (dry)" and the "black-and-white sow" were sufficiently described for the purposes of s.28.

Herdman J. stated that the object of the legislation was to enable interested persons to avoid confusing stock which is the subject of a chattel mortgage from stock which is unencumbered and that the method of distinguishing one animal from another adopted in the case of the porkers, the slips and the young pigs did not achieve that purpose. The learned judge stated that the sex and the colour of the young pigs and the porkers might have been given in the instrument but this had not been done.

Yet even if the sex and colour of the pigs which were found to be insufficiently described had been given one might ask whether this would have been sufficient information "to enable any person, taking the schedule in his hand and applying it to the subject matter, to identify the chattels assigned without the aid of any other document" (46). It is felt that the judges in this case as in Bailey's case (Court of Appeal) have approached the difficult subject of identifying livestock too much influenced by the consideration

(46) per Kay L.J. in Davidson v. Carlton Bank loc. cit. 87
applying to inventory description and insufficiently appreciative of the special complexities involved with describing a living "chattel". The writer suggests that even if the young pigs and the porkers had also been referred to by colour and sex they may still have been confused with other animals on the property not within the security. With many everyday chattels such as motor vehicles or electrical appliances an exact means of identification can easily be achieved by reference to a serial number and or a brand name. Likewise many chattels can be given a permanent distinctive mark to denote ownership by a particular person. However distinctive marking in the case of livestock is a far more difficult task. Not only must the animal be initially caught and marked but on later occasions it will be necessary to get close enough to the animal to check its brand or earmark. In the case of a large herd or stock the only way to be sure that all animals bear the correct mark is to catch and examine each one in turn, a most time-consuming exercise. Therefore it is submitted that when dealing with a reasonably large number of stock of the same breed which are similar in appearance e.g. sheep, poultry (47) pigs or cattle one of two methods of description can be adopted.

(47) Palmer & Co. Ltd. v. New Zealand Farmers' Co-operative Distributing Co. Ltd. [1924] N.Z.L.R. 280. The difficulties presented by this case had to be cured by special legislative enactment, namely s.30 which, inter alia, excludes the operation of s.28 in the case of poultry.
Either an exactitude of marking or description must be attained which would be enormously difficult and time-consuming or alternatively one should settle for the best general description available and tie this in with a description of the land or premises on which the stock are to be found (48). Any stock could be excepted from this general description on sufficient proof being given that they belonged to someone else, e.g. a neighbouring farmer whose sheep have slipped through the grantor's boundary fence (49).

Although there has been no recent litigation turning on the description of stock under s.28 of the Chattels Transfer Act this is attributable to factors described elsewhere in this paper (50).

(48) A similar method has been accepted as a sufficient description in the United States, "see County Bank v. Hulen Mo. App 195 S.W. 74 and pp 66-70 of this paper.

(49) This approach is recommended by a Masterton solicitor who states:
"If ever a case arose for proper identification of livestock, the ear-mark system could well break down. I see no reason why all livestock on a given property should not prima facie be deemed to be the property of the land occupier subject to any livestock being excluded from a security on satisfactory proof of a Bailiff or an Official Assignee that in fact that stock belong to some other person."

(50) See pp. 63-64 of this paper.
rather than to the quality or suitability of the section (51).

(51) The doubts as to the suitability of the description of livestock requirements of the Act are well expressed in the following paragraphs of letters from Masterton and Te Awamutu practitioners respectively to the writer:

"We have not had any difficulty in describing livestock, but again the apparent lack of difficulty may be due to the lack of enforcement action. Difficulties only appear when enforcement takes place and there are competing claims. The Chattels Transfer Act refers to "brand, ear-mark and mark." Branding is now a thing of the past and often the only branding which is done is an internal numbering system for the farmer's own records and convenience. Ear-marking is still, of course, current but is often honoured more in the breach than in the observance. A number of farmers "deal" in livestock. This means that they purchase livestock, fatten and sell. Often the holding period is fairly short and they do not bother to re-earmark for the brief period they have the stock on the property. Thus, if ever a case arose for proper identification of livestock, the ear-mark system could well break down. I see no reason why all livestock on a given property should not prima facie be deemed to be the property of the land occupier subject to any livestock being excluded from a security on satisfactory proof of a Bailiff or an Official Assignee that in fact the stock belong to some other person."

"Branding - the present provisions for branding and earmarking would seem to be unsatisfactory. Most Instruments provide for the Granter to brand and earmark but in practice this would rarely be carried out. Most farmers would perhaps use their own marking systems for identifying stock which would not be in accordance with the Instrument."
(d) **After-acquired stock; s.29**

The judicial interpretation given to s.29 (52) has circumvented some of the difficulties of description referred to in the preceding discussion on s.28. The "covenant to brand" implied in all instruments over livestock by virtue of s.29 has been used as a fictional device to save what might otherwise be insufficient descriptions under the Act.

The Court of Appeal decision in **Bailey's case** best illustrates the operation of this "empty formality" (53) upon which a valid security over stock may often depend. It will be recalled that Chapman J.'s decision in the Supreme Court that the description of the cattle had complied with the requirements of s.28 was reversed on appeal. However the majority (54) held that though the instrument was not valid for the purposes of s.28 the provision in s.29 that an instrument comprising stock shall be deemed to include all the stock the property of the grantor which he has covenanted to brand or mark, and which are depasturing on the land mentioned in the instrument, made the security valid.

Stout C.J. said it was clear on the facts that the stock described in the schedule of the instrument were neither

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(52) The most thorough text on this section is Ball, *Law of Chattels Transfer* (1940) 63-67.


(54) Stout C.J., Cooper and Sim J.J. (Edwards, J., dissenting).
branded (55), nor earmarked as stated in the schedule. He was of the opinion that because the instrument could be interpreted as imposing a covenant to earmark on the grantor as shown in the schedule, there was a sufficient compliance to let in the operation of s.29. This view of s.29 raises the question whether a covenant to earmark present cattle which already have a different earmark from that shown in the instrument is to be construed as requiring the cattle to be earmarked with the new earmark. His Honour answered this difficulty as follows:

"If the covenant was so construed it would make s.29 quite inoperative in the majority of securities. Sheep and cattle are bought with earmarks and everyone assumes that they may acquire new earmarking. The question really is, was there a covenant to earmark as described? If there was, in my opinion this security comes within s.29 and is valid and effective." (56)

The writer suggests that this reasoning is faulty. Although there may be good practical reasons for not requiring after-acquired cattle to be immediately earmarked with the earmark shown in the instrument, it seems inexcusable not to require those cattle owned by the grantor at the date of the instrument to be accurately described. Secondly this reasoning almost renders the description requirement of s.28 redundant so long as there is a covenant to brand or earmark in the instrument.

(55) In fact no brand was mentioned or described in the instrument, although a description of the earmark was given. The plaintiff argued that the words "will earmark" could refer only to sheep but this contention was not accepted by the Court: see Stout C.J. Bailey 876-877 (C.A.).

(56) Bailey (C.A.) 877.
For the sake of uniformity it has been thought advisable to substitute references to sections in earlier enactments of the Chattels Transfer Act to the corresponding sections in the 1924 Act.
The Chief Justice went on to justify this interpretation by invoking the golden rule of interpretation, that is to try to give effect to all the words in a statute or document. He said that if there is an instrument to which s.28 is applicable, that instrument can have no effect if the conditions mentioned in that section are not complied with. This the writer submits, was the factual situation in Bailey's case since surely s.28 should have applied at least to the cattle originally mortgaged. His Honour then went on to say that if the condition as to branding or marking has not been complied with the security may be good under s.29 if there is a covenant to brand or mark and the lands on which the cattle are depasturing are described. Yet it is suggested that this approach contradicts the golden rule referred to by the learned Chief Justice in two ways. Firstly it fails to give effect to the words of s.28 and treats them as virtually redundant in an instrument containing a covenant to brand, and secondly it fails to give effect to the words of s.29 itself (57).

Both these failures were clearly revealed by Edwards J. in his dissenting judgment. Commenting on the majority interpretation he said:

(57) It is submitted that the fourth to last sentence of Stout C.J.'s judgment in Bailey's case may indicate that His Honour felt somewhat uneasy about his interpretation of the combined effects of ss.28 and 29: "If the meaning I have given to these two sections is incorrect, then the present system of advances on stock mortgages will have to be changed." p.878.
"It is contended, however, that, although s. 28 in the clearest possible language declares that the instrument shall be void, in the circumstances of the present case..., nevertheless s. 29 gives the bank the same security as would have been given by an instrument in all respects scrupulously regular within the provisions of s. 28. If that is indeed the true construction of this enactment it is, I venture to think, the most astonishing piece of legislation which it has been the duty of any Court to construe." (58)

His Honour warned that this construction would sweep away the protection given by the statute to persons giving credit to stockowners and that it would render s. 28 worse than a "meaningless absurdity but an actual trap" to those who relied upon its provisions:

"...the mortgagee who knowingly acquiesces in the deliberate disregard of the provisions of s. 28 is as fully secured as if the instrument under which he claims had complied strictly with these provisions, and as if all the covenants which by the schedule to the Act are implied in such instruments had been scrupulously observed. Nay, the mortgagee is in an even better position, for he enables the mortgagor to maintain a fictitious credit which it is to the interest of the mortgagee to support." (59)

Edwards J. stated that the purpose of s. 29 was to overcome the difficulties of identification that would arise in the case of a natural increase of existing stock or where additional stock was brought onto a farm or station of the same description as the mortgaged stock and would be branded with the same brands. Since in such cases it would be impossible to distinguish between the stock included in the security and the additional stock depastured on the same lands and branded with the same brands s. 29 was enacted to

(58) Bailey 883 (C.A.).
(59) Bailey (C.A.).
meet this difficulty by bringing such additional stock within the security. His Honour said that it was the meaning and intent of s.29 to:

"...assume the existence of a mortgage of stock complete under s.28, and to add to the security thereby given (i) the natural increase of such stock, (ii) all stock the property of the grantor branded or marked as specified in the instrument, (iii) all stock which the grantor has covenanted or agreed by such instrument to so brand or mark, provided in the second and third cases that the stock are depasturing or are at, in, or upon any land or premises mentioned in the instrument or the schedule thereto." (60)

As further support for his interpretation of s.29 Edwards J. stated that to include stock, not sufficiently described for the purposes of s.28 within the benefit of s.28 by their inclusion in category (iii) (of the preceding quoted passage) not only destroyed the effect of s.28 but rendered meaningless the following words of s.29: "not only the stock comprised therein as provided by the last preceding section, but also..." His Honour considered that these words, being in the opening sentence of s.29 were the controlling words of that section (61).

It is not surprising that the majority decision in Bailey's case, although applied in Honore v. Farmers' Co-operative Auctioneering Co. Ltd. (62), has been the subject of critical comment. Mr. Cain

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(60) ibid. 885.
(61) ibid. 885-886.
(62) [1923] N.Z.L.R. 56. In this case none of the stock mentioned in the schedule bore the brand described therein and all the original mortgaged stock had been sold and replaced. Herdman J. held that although the description was insufficient to comply with s.28, as the instrument contained a covenant to brand it covered the stock on the grantor's farm at the date of his bankruptcy under s.29. It was also held that the fact that the brand was not registered under the Stock Act 1908 was immaterial.
states that:

"...the strong dissenting judgment of Edwards J. [in Bailey's case] is preferred by most lenders. It was there considered by the majority that, if existing stock were so described as not to comply with (now) s.28, they might be saved if complying with s.29; the better view seems to be that the two sections are mutually exclusive, and that beast charged at the date of the instrument should be described as required by s.28, with s.29 assuming greater importance as individual beasts die or are removed." (63)

Professor Gray in the Law of Personal Property (64) shares the same view as that given by Mr. Cain above and considers that this opinion:

"is fortified by the circumstance that s.29 makes no provision avoiding the instrument in case of misdescription of the stock or land: hence, if present stock could be brought within the ambit of s.29, s.28 (with its penalty) would be otiose." (65)

However, Professor Gray acknowledges that the majority of the Court of Appeal in Bailey's case took the view that if an instrument failed to comply with s.28 it could be saved if it complied with s.29.

Ball does not specifically direct himself to the issue as to whether stock on the properties at the time of the instrument and purported to be included therein must be described in accordance with s.28 (66) but does say that it is desirable that an instrument to obtain the protection of ss.28 and 29, should contain, inter alia, an exact description of the stock at the time of the instrument (67).

(64) 5th ed.
(65) ibid. p.148.
(66) See The Law of Chattels Transfer (1940) first complete paragraph on p.64, subheading (2).
(67) ibid. p.65.
This may be an implied acceptance of the fact that lenders should not place total reliance on the majority decision in Bailey's case.

The covenant to brand, mark or earmark assumes great significance under the Act by virtue of the interpretation placed by the Court on s.29 (68). It is therefore relevant to inquire into the meaning of this covenant which has been described by one writer as being in certain circumstances an "empty formality" or "fiction". The most thorough judicial treatment of the covenant to brand was given in Palmer & Co. Ltd. v. New Zealand Farmers' Co-operative Distributing Co. Ltd. (69) by Salmond J. who held that a covenant to brand on its true construction was insufficient to bring s.29 (70) into operation so as to include after-acquired poultry being upon land specified in the instrument.

"A covenant to mark or brand is not a meaningless form of words inserted in an instrument for the purpose of bringing into operation s.26 of the Chattels Transfer Act. To be effective for this purpose it must, on its true construction as a term of the contract, impose upon the grantor a legal obligation to mark or brand in a specified manner the after-acquired stock claimed by the mortgagee in reliance on that covenant. To ascertain whether the clause in question has this effect it must be interpreted on the same principle as any other term in the contract. The question for determination, therefore, is whether the grantor of the defendant's bill of sale has, on the true construction of that document, bound himself by a valid and operative covenant to "brand and earmark "with his registered brands and ear marks" all poultry which he may afterwards possess upon the farm mentioned in the instrument. I consider that he has not. The covenant can only be reasonably construed as limited to sheep, cattle, and horses." (71)

(68) e.g. Bailey's case S.C. & C.A.
(70) s.26 Chattels Transfer Act 1908.
His Honour went on to state that the question is not whether the parties expected or understood that the stock in question would be branded but whether the grantor has bound himself by a valid covenant to do so. If he has, s.29 applies even though the covenant is not performed or expected to be performed.

While this judgment is to be commended for its decisive and unequivocal approach to the problem, the self-contradiction inherent in the decision may be a cause for uneasiness. This fault is clearly expressed by Mr. Cain when he says:

"Hence (i.e. from the decision in Palmer's case) ...there must be a valid covenant to brand, but it must not be "a meaningless form of words". A covenant to brand poultry was meaningless (Palmer's case) but it seems that to covenant to brand stock that can in fact be branded, but which the parties know the grantor has no intention of branding is not meaningless." (72)

He concludes on this point that if poultry and other stock not capable of being branded are entitled by s.30 to exemption from the covenant to brand, it seems reasonable to extend the exemption to stock which are not branded in the usual course of farming practice or to specifically exempt dairy stock from the branding covenant of s.29. (73).

Assuming that Mr. Cain when he speaks of a "covenant to brand" also refers to a covenant to mark or earmark, there is certain merit in his proposal to extend the exemption from a branding requirement to stock not usually "branded" in practice. A number of experienced

(72) (1959) 35 N.Z.L.R. 89.

(73) s.30 was enacted in the 1924 Act after the decision in Palmer's case and no doubt to remedy the difficulties raised by that case for mortgagees of stock not capable of distinctive marking.
practitioners in this field have expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing position to the writer. A senior conveyancing partner in a Hamilton firm is of the opinion that:

"The use of a brand is almost universally in discard, while even an earmark is used only occasionally (74) and is then often of little use, particularly for one who deals in stock, because of the difficulty of earmarking when the stock has already been earmarked with some other earmark."

This opinion is reinforced by those of Masterton, Te Awamutu and Waipukurau solicitors, respectively:

"The Chattels Transfer Act refers to "brand, ear-mark and mark". Branding is now a thing of the past and often the only branding which is done is an internal numbering system for the farmer's own records and convenience. Ear-marking is still, of course, current but is often more honoured in the breach than in the observance."

"The present provisions for branding and earmarking would seem to be unsatisfactory. Most instruments provide for the grantor to brand and earmark but in practice this would rarely be carried out. Most farmers would perhaps use their own marking systems for identifying stock which would not be in accordance with the instrument."

"The main difficulty (of the Act) is of identification. Where the fat lamb farmer buys in ewes from a number of flocks the earmarks are not much use. As far as branding is concerned, this is rarely used now and I do not think there is any longer a requirement to register a brand. This difficulty is why stock firms tend to lend a limit per head of $3 per sheep regardless of age, quality, breed, etc." (75)

Nevertheless the amendment suggested by Mr. Cain is strictly speaking unnecessary in the case of s.28 because the branding or

(74) Writer's note: With respect it is understood the earmarking particularly of sheep is still very prevalent in New Zealand.

(75) Writer's note: For those unfamiliar with sheep prices a good store or fat lamb would fetch between $4 to $6; a 2 tooth breeding ewe $6 to $10; a fat wether $5 to $7. It is understood that generally stock firms will lend only about 50% on the total value of livestock.
marking requirement in that section is not obligatory so long as the stock are otherwise referred to or described so as to be reasonably capable of identification. So far as s.29 is concerned there is some merit in Mr. Cain's proposal to exempt stock which are not branded (assuming this term embraces also earmarked or marked) in the usual course of farming practice. Yet this solution could raise as many problems as it seeks to answer. Since "stock which cannot be properly the subject of distinctive marking" are already exempted by s.30 all that are left are stock which can properly be the subject of distinctive marking. Given that the practice of earmarking sheep or cattle may vary from farm to farm and district to district who is to say whether it is usual or not to mark such stock in the course of farming practice? The writer suggests that a better way to meet the problem is to delete the words "branded, earmarked, or marked as specified in the instrument, or which the grantor has covenanted or agreed by such instrument so to brand, earmark or mark, and" from s.29 and substitute therefor "and which are reasonably capable of identification as being the property of the grantor". Such an amendment would have the effect of including all after-acquired stock of a class in a mortgage of present stock of that class.

It could be argued that such an amendment is unduly favourable to grantees. In the writer's opinion there would be little substance in this type of criticism because the amendment does little more than reflect the effect of existing law and what the existing law is generally understood to mean by the parties.
At the same time it obviates the need for the covenant to brand "fiction". It is submitted that any alternative would make the identification requirement an extremely onerous and time consuming task and would tend to make lending on the security of livestock an unattractive proposition. Essentially, the writer feels that one must acknowledge the peculiar complexity of describing livestock for the purposes of an instrument by way of security and adopt a practical albeit a different approach from the description of other chattels. Any grantor who is unhappy with encumbering his future class of stock in this way has only to insert in his instrument a clause expressly excluding the operation of s.29.

(e) Description of land

The Act is not explicit on the consequences of a failure to describe the land on which livestock are depasturing. In Lee v. Official Assignee of Parke (76) it was held that non-compliance with the requirement of s.28 (77) that "the land or premises on which such stock are shall be described or mentioned in such instrument or schedule" did not invalidate the instrument between the parties but, if registered, deprived the grantee of the benefit of the registration. However, a careful reading of s.28 itself suggests a different answer. The section states

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(77) Then s.34 Chattels Transfer Act 1889.
that unless stock are branded, marked or described so as to be reasonably capable of identification the instrument shall be void to the extent and as against the persons mentioned in s. 18. The second part of the section, which is divided from the first part by a semi-colon, reads:

"...; and the land or premises on which such stock are or are intended to be depastured or kept shall be described or mentioned in such instrument or schedule."

If it had been intended that non-compliance with this latter requirement should render the instrument void then surely the description of land requirement would have been included in with the description of stock provision in the main body of the section and it would be clearly stated that a non-compliance with either would invalidate the instrument. Moreover the second part of s. 28 appears to allow a certain flexibility or independence of the stock from the land in that the words "land on which such stock are or are intended to be depastured" suggest that the legislature has contemplated a situation where the mortgaged stock will not in fact be on the land. Yet if this is the case why should a failure to describe the land invalidate the instrument if the stock are otherwise reasonably capable of identification? It is submitted that the purpose of the land description requirement in s. 28 is to inform grantees that if they fail to describe the land or misdescribe it, although their instrument is not thereby void, they do so at their peril. In the words of Edwards J.:

"The 28th section having provided that for the purpose of identification of the stock mortgaged it shall be sufficient to describe such stock by some brand or
brands or other marks upon them, it at once becomes apparent that in the absence of some further provision endless disputes might arise as to the identity of the stock mortgaged. To meet this difficulty the concluding paragraph of s.28 provides that the land or premises on which such stock are shall be described or mentioned in the instrument or schedule." (78)

What then in view of Lee's case is the situation where stock are on the move from one property to another or have been removed for sale? Are they still covered by the security under s.28?

Edward J. stated that:

"Section 28 does not, however, confine the security thereby given to stock otherwise sufficiently described while they are upon the lands so mentioned. Such stock if they can be identified, can be followed wherever they may be found. (79)

It would appear that on this important question there are a number of possible views as to the effect of non-compliance with the description of land requirement in s.28:

i. Non-compliance renders the instrument incapable of registration under the Act or if registered deprives the grantee of the benefit of such registration: Lee's case.

ii. Non-compliance renders the instrument incapable of registration but provided stock can be identified independently of the land then a valid registered security retains the protection of the Act even if the stock are subsequently removed from that land. Edwards J. in Bailey's case.

iii. Non-compliance does not render the instrument void and incapable of registration but the stock in question must be reasonably capable of identification under s.28 and if a grantee omits to correctly describe the land he does so at his peril, since his security will stand or fall by the description of the stock there being no sufficient description of land to rely on as well.

(78) ibid. 884-885.
(79) Bailey 885 (C.A.).
It is considered that (i) and (ii) above read together represent the present law though not necessarily the best interpretation of s.28 and that (iii) although preferred by the writer, is against the weight of authority.

If the land is not made an essential part of the description then as Edwards J. commented, enormous difficulties would be involved for a lender advancing money on a herd or flock because he would have to rely on the description of the animals which, as shown earlier in the paper, can be a most uncertain and difficult exercise to accomplish. Yet if land is an essential part of the description then third parties could be deceived into lending on stock which is subject to a security but is not on land shown in the instrument. There are also difficulties with stock on the move, temporarily on another paddock or farm, or which have strayed (80), not to mention innocent misdescription of land due to clerical errors or incorrect information being supplied (81).

The words "or any land and premises used and worked as part of the first mentioned land and premises, whether or not such stock

(80) Fortunately for reasons given elsewhere in this paper many of these problems under modern New Zealand farming conditions are academic rather than practical.

(81) In In re Fairbrother Official Assignee v. Baddeley (1905) 25 N.Z.L.R. 546, Stout C.J. at 548 took a sensible approach to a clerical error in the misdescription of land in holding that"the blunder of substituting [lot] "23" for "25" seeing that the rest of the description is correct ought not to invalidate the instrument."
be removed therefrom" have not yet been the subject of judicial
consideration. The Hon. Mr. Lee (Minister of Justice) stated
during the debates on the 1922 Chattels Transfer Amendment Bill
that the reason for the amendment to the principal Act by adding
the words "whether or not such stock may be afterwards removed
therefrom" was to provide:

"...that the security is to remain over stock if the stock
is removed from the land on which it was originally
depastured. It happens sometimes that there is a bill
of sale by way of security over stock, and the farmer
may buy an adjoining field and remove the stock to it.
At the present time the stock affected by the bill of
sale must remain where they were when the bill of sale
was made. This removes that difficulty." (82)

In 1924 the further words "or any land and premises used and
worked as part of the first mentioned land and premises" were added.
It seemed to be the view of the Government members that the addition
only reflected the existing law after the 1922 Amendment Act (83).
The member for Timaru, Mr. F.J. Rolleston stated

"it is quite reasonable that stock should still be
covered although perhaps not on the land. It would
not be reasonable to say that because stock were
taken off the land the security would not stand." (84).

Ball considers that the effect of the words added in the 1924
Act is to include other lands which, although not described in the
instrument, are used and worked as though they were part of the land
described in the instrument (85). The writer considers that this

(82) Hansard (1922) Vol. 198 774.
(83) Hansard (1924) Vol. 205, p.635; the member for Hamilton
Mr. Young.
(84) ibid. p.637.
(85) Law of Chattels Transfer p.67.
view is borne out both by the words themselves and also the intention of the legislature as indicated in Hansard.

It is therefore submitted that s.28 be recast so that a failure to describe the land or premises on which stock are kept or depasturing shall not void the instrument as against the persons mentioned in s.18 unless the stock are not reasonably capable of identification without reference to the land.

(f) Sale of Stock by Grantor

It is obvious that if a farmer is to carry out his normal operations he must have some freedom to dispose of stock. Yet in the case of mortgaged stock any such disposal of stock will of course diminish the grantee's security. The implied covenant in clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule to the Act and the interpretation placed on it by the Courts endeavour to balance this conflict of interest. Encumbered stock may only be sold by the grantor during the ordinary course of business, but no sale shall be made so as to reduce the number of the stock stated in the security.

An interesting Parliamentary battle preceded the enactment of this covenant in its present form. Clause 9 of the Bill originally presented to the House of Representatives in 1924 contained the words "or to reduce the present value of the stock for the time being subject to this security to less than the market value of the stock originally covered by this security" after the words "so as to reduce the number of the stock stated in this security" which appear in the present clause. Opposition members described the requirement on the grantor to keep stock
up to its original value as "absurd" and "farcical" (86). The principal arguments against this provision were the drastic fluctuations which could occur in the value of stock, especially during times of economic recession.

A further practical difficulty cited was the inevitable seasonal variations in the value of stock. For example a sheep would be less valuable after shearing when its years clip of wool had been removed than before when it was carrying this extra asset on its back. Mr. Lynsar agreed that in view of the severe penalty imposed by the Act on a grantor who impaired the amount of his security it would be quite unjust and impractical to retain the value requirement:

"Everything is done to tie these unfortunate people up in an unmerciful way, without any consideration. Farmers do not understand business documents unless the language is plain." (87)

In reply the Minister of Justice the Hon. Mr. Parr said that ordinarily if a man gives a mortgage over anything, he cannot sell without the consent of the mortgagee but that there had always been a departure from that principle with regard to chattels and stock in particular. He considered it absolutely reasonable that if a farmer wished to sell his secured stock he was free to do so in

(86) Mr. Lynsar (Gisborne) stated: "I know any number of people who before the slump paid £12 and £14 for cattle. I myself bought at prices up to £18. But when the slump came those cattle were not worth more than £3." Hansard (1924) Vol. 205 p.633.

(87) ibid. 634.
the ordinary course of business, provided that the value of the stock was kept up to the value at the date when he gave the bill of sale. In the case where he wanted to sell and reduce the value, all he had to do was to get the consent of the mortgagee (88). However, the opposition prevailed and the Government agreed to omit any requirement for the farmer to keep up the value of his stock from the Bill, which is the position in the present Act (89).

The power of sale in the ordinary course of business was explained by Sim J. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in National Bank v. Dalgety & Co. (90).

"That power has been conferred for the purpose of enabling the mortgagor to carry on his business and to pay debts incurred in the course of carrying on that business. If in every case he had to pay the proceeds to the mortgagee it would mean a realisation of the mortgagee's security and would put an end very soon to the mortgagor's business."

This case was an action for damages for conversion by the allegedly wrongful sale of stock comprised in an instrument by way of security brought by the grantee against the grantor and the party to whom the proceeds of the sale had been paid. The Court rejected the argument that the proceeds of such a sale should be paid to the grantee. It also held that the covenant not to remove the stock must be read subject to the proviso that when the grantor was entitled to sell stock he was entitled to remove them from the

(88) ibid. 638-639.
(89) See p. 40 of this paper.
(90) [1925] N.Z.L.R. 250 at 255.
station for that purpose. The condition that the number of stock left on the station after a sale is not to be less than the number stated in the instrument must be construed distributively so that where the instrument includes several classes of stock the number of any particular class must not be reduced below the number of that class stated in the instrument. If a grantor made a sale in excess of the number which he was authorised to sell the sale would be bad only to the extent of the excess. In that case the instrument stated the number of cattle as "549 or thereabouts" and the Court found that a sale by the defendant which reduced the number to 503 unsold was justified by the terms of the instrument and the question of conversion did not arise.

In New Zealand Farmers Co-op. v. Canterbury Frozen Meat (1932) N.Z.L.R. 381 the grantee relied on a clause in the instrument which appointed the grantee to act as sole selling agent of all stock and produce of the grantor as negativing the grantee's implied covenant to sell in the ordinary course of business. It is understood that this type of covenant is invariably included in securities between stock and station agents and farmers. The Court held that this clause did not negative the grantor's power of sale but only regulated it. The implied covenant to sell in the ordinary course of business gave the grantor a right to insist on a sale of surplus stock. If the sale is made by the grantor in breach of the covenant the purchaser gets a good title and the remedy of the grantee is for damages for breach of contract.

Of all the covenants implied or expressed in an instrument,
it would be difficult to better clause 9 Fourth Schedule for a provision which gives the grantor the maximum of temptation combined with the maximum of opportunity. A careful reading of each obligation in clause 9 shows that unless a grantee is in a position to constantly supervise the grantor's farm and stock then it will be exceptionally difficult for him to learn of the non-observance of the covenants. For example the covenant forbidding removal is in practical terms quite impossible to enforce and almost as difficult to detect unless the grantee is sufficiently energetic to have the stock counted at regular intervals.

Nevertheless it is probably unrealistic to criticise the covenants in clause 9 since in the final analysis it would be impossible to devise any legal provision which would protect an innocent party against fraud in such circumstances. For reasons dealt with elsewhere in this paper (91), despite the theoretical difficulties involved, in practice most of these problems are obviated by the character and business methods of the parties concerned.

(g) Purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock

In the writer's opinion a curious anomaly is presented on the question of the protection afforded by s.19 of the present Act to the bona fide purchasers or auctioneers without express notice of encumbered stock. It is clear that such people are protected in the case of an unregistered instrument but what is the position where an instrument is "void to the extent and as against the

(91) See pp.
persons mentioned in section eighteen" through non-compliance with s.28? Surely such purchasers and auctioneers are equally deserving of protection as the persons mentioned in s.18(1).

In the 1908 Act s.16 (now S.18) had an additional subsection (3), absent from the present Act, which provided:

"No instrument comprising stock, or made or executed in respect of wool or crops, shall be valid or effectual against any bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without express notice, unless such instrument is duly registered under this Act."

Thus in The King v. Buckland & Sons Ltd. (92) Herdman J. held that:

"As s.25 (now s.28) of the Chattels Transfer Act 1908 provides that imperfectly described stock are not secured to the grantee of an instrument as against the persons mentioned in s.16 (now s.18) of the Statute, it would seem to follow that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice (being a person mentioned in subs. 3 of s.16) who buys stock which are not reasonably capable of identification by reference to brands, or marks, or by reference to the other means of identification referred to in s.25, is protected. If, then, the buyer of such stock is secured from attack, why should an auctioneer, who sells the same stock bona fide and without any knowledge of the existence of a security, be held liable for wrongful conversion?

To hold that such a person is responsible for moneys realised by the sale of the stock appears to savour of injustice, but nevertheless it seems that he is liable."

Now by virtue of the present s.18 not even a bona fide purchaser for value without notice will be protected as against the grantee of an instrument which fails to comply with s.28. It is submitted that this position is totally unsatisfactory. Why should the grantee have the benefit of an instrument which does not describe the

chattels therein so that they are reasonably capable of identification by a person who has gone to the trouble of searching the register?

This result in the case of stock securities does not appear to have been intended by the legislature when clause 2 of the Chattels Transfer Amendment Bill 1922 (93) was presented to the House. The then Minister of Justice, the Honourable Mr. Lee explained the purpose of the clause as follows:

"The object of this clause is that those who hold instruments by way of security and do not register them within the appointed time shall not be able to contest the right of a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration in respect of the ownership of the chattels. They have their opportunity to disclose their ownership by registration. It is also necessary to protect the auctioneer who sells those chattels. They are innocently sold, and it is wrong that the auctioneer should suffer." (94)

The Member for Wairau, Mr. McCallum approved of the clause because it extended the protection of the original Statute from stock, crops and wool to all property (95). However no one seems to have contemplated the result that extending subsection 16(3) to cover all classes of property and making it into a new section (96) could have on the rights of a grantee whose instrument fails to comply with the present s.28.

The writer suggests that the anomaly complained of could be cured by simply inserting the words "and section nineteen" after the words "section eighteen" in section 28.

(93) s.19 Chattels Transfer Act 1924.
(95) ibid. p.774.
(96) s.19; 1924 Act.
(h) Wool Securities

In every instrument by way of security comprising sheep there shall be implied, unless expressly negatived, a covenant by the grantor that he will deliver to the grantee the wool shorn from such sheep in each year during the continuance of such instrument (97). The Act has provided a number of important protections for grantees of securities over wool. Thus a grantee is entitled to the wool of the sheep not only while growing but afterwards when shorn from the sheep and wherever such wool may be (98). The subsequent sale, bailment of mortgage or other encumbrance of or affecting the sheep mentioned in the wool security shall not prejudicially affect a duly registered instrument or the rights of the grantee to the wool referred to therein (99). Where sheep are already mortgaged the grantor may within the terms of the written consent of the grantee give to a third person a valid security on the next ensuing clip of the wool of such sheep (100). If an instrument by way of security has been given over sheep and the instrument provides that the grantor will give to the grantee an instrument over the wool growing or to grow upon such sheep or to require the grantor to deliver to the grantee the wool shorn from such sheep during the continuance of such instrument, then, while the first mentioned instrument lasts the grantee is deemed to have a lien or security over each clip in all respects as if an instrument

(97) s.41(2) 1924 Act.
(98) s.38.
(99) s.39.
(100) s.40.
in respect of the wool had actually been executed and registered, and none of the subsequent dealings with the sheep referred to in s.39 will prejudicially affect the security (101).

A number of questions are raised by these sections. In s.38 there is no indication as to how the sheep whose wool is mortgaged, are to be referred to or described. One presumes that the same considerations would apply here as under ss.28 and 29 and clause 12 of the Fourth Schedule gives support to this view when it refers to:

"the flock of sheep mentioned in this instrument, and the increase thereof, and all other sheep which if this instrument were an instrument by way of security over sheep would be included therein."

However, if the s.28 and s.29 description requirements are to apply equally to s.38 then it would have been a simple matter for the Act to say so rather than leave the point in doubt.

Under s.39 two matters arise for consideration; the rights of persons possessing interests in the sheep which are (i) prior and (ii) subsequent to the interests of the grantee. On the question of prior interests the Act is not explicit and in s.39 it only mentions the position in the case of a "subsequent" dealing with the sheep and that such dealing shall not prejudicially affect the rights of a grantee under a duly registered instrument. What then are the grantee's rights against prior interests such as those of a landlord entitled to distrain for rent or a mortgagee of the sheep under a registered instrument? It is submitted that sufficient inferences can be drawn from the Act to imply a power in the grantee, on default of the grantor, to enter on the property,

(101) s.41.
take possession of the sheep and shear and or seize the wool clip. If this were not so an instrument under s.38 which "shall entitle the grantee to the wool of the sheep not only while growing" would be largely ineffectual unless the grantee had first obtained an agreement by the landlord whereby the latter consented to allow the grantee to enter on the property to enforce his security and to waive his right to distrain on the sheep and their wool for rent (102). In the case of a prior mortgagee of the sheep the question arises whether his "consent in writing" to the security over the wool under s.40 carried with it an implied power to enter on the property and shear or seize the wool or whether such a power must be expressly "authorised" in such consent. In the absence of any authority on this point the writer submits that the only way that proper effect can be given to s.38 is to imply a power on the grantee to enter the property and shear and or seize the secured wool clip. This view is supported by the power to be implied in instruments by way of security over wool in clause 12 of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. This power states that, on default by the grantor the sheep "shall be shorn either by the grantor or by the grantee, at the option of the grantee... and shall be delivered by the grantor to the grantee..." Obviously the grantee's option to shear the sheep himself is useless unless he has the right to enter on the land, take possession of the sheep for the

(102) It is understood that many lenders on the security of stock on leased land require an agreement by the landlord not to distrain before they will advance any money to the grantor of the instrument.
purposes of shearing and to remove the wool. Further support for
the view that the grantee's rights may prevail against the prior
interests in the sheep, provided of course that these interests
have not already been exercised, is the provision in clause 12
of the Fourth Schedule that:

"(the grantee) may from the proceeds (of the sale of
wool) pay himself the moneys hereby secured, and any
rent payable to any landlord, and any moneys payable
to any mortgagee or other person that he may be compelled
to pay in order to protect his security over the said
wool..."

This passage seems to imply that the grantee is not legally obliged
to pay any moneys due from the granter to the landlord or any
mortgagee out of the proceeds either before or after the grantee
has paid himself for the moneys secured by the instrument but that
he is empowered to make such payments insofar as they are necessary
to protect his security. Such a situation would arise where the
landlord or mortgagee had commenced to exercise his interests
and could thereby prevent the grantee from gaining access to the
sheep.

If the above view of the grantee's power as against prior
interests is correct why then did the legislature deem it necessary
in s.39 to expressly deal with the rights of grantees as against
the holders of subsequent interests in sheep? The same reasoning
that implies a power as against a prior interest holder who has not
exercised his interest applies a fortiori to a subsequent interest
holder since the latter has notice of the wool security by virtue
of s.4 of the Act. Therefore if the implied power applies to all
interest holders, both prior and subsequent, one may ask what is the purpose of s.39 which deals specifically with the rights of the grantee as against subsequent encumbrances. It is submitted that s.39 goes further than the implied power discussed above which subsists only between the grantor and the grantee. Whereas under the implied power the grantee is in effect given the same rights to deal with the wool as the grantor, s.39 extends the grantee's rights so that they operate not only against the grantor but also against all persons acquiring subsequent interest in the sheep. Thus the writer submits that the grantee has no right to the wool against a prior mortgagee or the holder of other types of prior encumbrances who were in possession or had taken other steps to enforce their interest. However, as against a subsequent interest the grantee would by virtue of s.39 enjoy full rights under his security to get possession of and sell the wool, irrespective of whether the holders of such subsequent interests had taken steps to realise their security or not. (103)

(i) Variation of Priorities of Registered Instruments

The present law relating to priorities among competing instruments is a cause of dissatisfaction and even uncertainty among practitioners. Section 22 provides that where two or more instruments are executed comprising wholly or partly the same

chattels, priority is given to such instrument or instruments in the order of the time of their respective registrations provided that where the grantee under a second or subsequent instrument claims priority by virtue of prior registration he must prove that at the time his instrument was executed he had no notice of any existing unregistered instrument.

The question which this Section raises is whether a subsequent grantee can achieve priority by obtaining the prior grantee's consent in a Deed of Variation of priorities. If this is not possible then at any time when grantees have agreed to vary the priority of their instruments from the order shown on the register then all instruments registered prior to that to which the grantees have now agreed to accord priority would have to be discharged.

The latter approach would appear to be unnecessarily cumbersome and a duplication of effort, for the prior instruments thus discharged would have to be re-registered immediately after the registration of the instrument to which the prior grantees have now agreed to yield priority. Not only is this method a duplication of effort but it also carries with it the risk that the re-registered instruments may become voidable securities under s.57 of the Insolvency Act 1967 (104) even though the identical form of such securities were originally registered over twelve months before the

(104) This section provides, inter alia, that every security or charge over any property of a bankrupt will be voidable as against the Assignee of the bankrupt's estate if it is executed or given by the debtor within the period commencing twelve months immediately before the filing of a creditor's petition in bankruptcy. This provision does not apply in the case of money actually advanced or paid or any other valuable consideration given in good faith by the grantee of the security to the grantor at the time or at any time after the execution thereof.
filing of a creditor's petition.

Only in the case of one lender, the State Advances Corporation, is this question of priorities clearly answered. Under s. 73 of the Rural Intermediate Credit Act 1927 any instrument by way of security given for the purposes of that Act shall have priority over any previously registered instrument if the grantee under the previously registered instrument joins in the instrument given for the purposes of that Act and therein agrees that such instrument shall have priority. The writer submits that the very existence of s. 73 raises a strong suggestion that in the absence of a special provision relating to categories of lenders other than the State Advances, the only way in which legal (105) priority can be achieved under s. 22 of the Chattels Transfer Act with absolute certainty is by ensuring that there are no prior registered instruments at the date of the registration of the instrument for which priority is sought.

It is submitted that this whole problem of priorities with its inconvenience and uncertainty could be easily rectified by enacting a provision in the Chattels Transfer Act along the lines of s. 103 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 which provides for the variation of priority of mortgages. This section provides, inter alia:

(105) As between the grantees a deed varying priority would confer perfectly valid equitable rights.

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(1)...the priority between themselves of the mortgages affecting any land may from time to time be varied by a memorandum of priority in Form J in the Second Schedule to this Act and registered under this Act.

(2) The memorandum of priority shall be executed by the mortgagor and also by the mortgagee under every mortgage that, by the memorandum, is postponed to any mortgage over which it previously had priority.
PART II: PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF FARM LENDING ON SECURITY OF LIVESTOCK

In the previous section of this paper the faults in the present New Zealand legislation governing livestock securities have been discussed. One might well ask how these rules have withstood the test of over forty years without being the subject of either extensive litigation or reform. The present section of this paper seeks to answer this question by dealing with the practical circumstances and practice surrounding this type of borrowing.

The vast majority of lending on the security of livestock is done by institutional lenders. The principal sources of such finance in the private sector are Trading Banks, Dairy Companies, and Stock and Station Companies. The main Government sources are the State Advances Corporation and Marginal Lands Board.

During 1970-71 the State Advances Corporation authorised $3.7 million for stock loans out of a total annual authorisation for farming finance of $55.3 (106). The Corporation policy has been to assist sharemilkers and lessees of farms to adequately stock properties and loans are made available usually for five years on stock and plant, interest being at the rate of 5 1/2%. The margin of security required is usually 60% of value and the normal limit is $8,000 for one man. Applicants between the age of 21 and 35 may obtain loans at 5 1/2% on an extended limit of 75% of value.

(106) Report of State Advances Corporation 1970-71. The balance of this amount was on the security of land.
available (107). It should be noted that these funds are primarily intended to encourage development and an established farmer would probably have to look to a bank or stock and station firm for this type of finance.

The Marginal Lands Board was set up under the Marginal Lands Act 1950 to assist those farmers who were unable to obtain capital or credit from the normal commercial sources to develop their farms to an economic level. Applicants to the Board must first have tried other avenues of finance such as the State Advances Corporation, stock firms, banks and insurance companies. The local Marginal Lands Committee must be satisfied that the farmer concerned has the experience and business ability to successfully carry out his development programme. Before approval for a loan is given a departmental field officer inspects the farm, discusses the development with the applicant, and makes a detailed report and valuation of the property which is submitted with the application to the Marginal Lands Committee which in turn inspects the property and discusses the development with the applicant. The Committee's report and recommendations are forwarded to the Board. If the Board approves the proposals as sound it also fixes the amount of the advance and the purposes for which it is to be used. Advances for stock are at 5 1/2% to 6% and payable within seven years from the date of the first advance (108). In 1969-70 $2.30 million was

(107) These figures are taken from Farm Finance by D.M. Ross, Farm Economics Section, New Zealand Department of Agriculture, printed in Appendix I of Lending to Farmers p.55, here referred to as Farm Finance.

(108) Ross, Farm Finance, p.63.
advanced by the Board bringing its total of outstanding advances up to $15.21 million (109).

It is therefore evident that the thorough investigation preceding the making of a loan by the Board protects any advances made. Assistance is not given to the inefficient but solely to those farmers whose only barrier to increased production is lack of capital. Despite this care there are sometimes failures. Where these are the result of circumstances beyond the farmer's control the board may sometimes postpone payment or in extreme cases even remit money due to it.

Although Trading Banks lend primarily on the security of land they also take charges over stock and a conservative 50% is the margin of security normally required. The overdraft interest rate has a maximum average of 6%, with current account advances varying from 6-7 1/2% and term loans generally 7% and upwards. Advances on current account, being essentially a form of short-term lending, are repayable on demand. Provided however, that the farmer makes regular reductions of the advance as seasonal or other farm revenue becomes available it is unusual for a bank to "call up" a current account. Term loans on the other hand are normally approved on the basis of repayment in regular monthly, quarterly or other periodic instalments (110). In June 1971 $27.1 million and $35.1 million was advanced to the dairy and sheep-farming sectors respectively out

(110) Ross, Farm Finance Ch. 6.
of a total Trading Bank loan to farmers of $93.0 million at that date (111).

The stock and station firms are the major lenders on the security of livestock and provide short-term and seasonal finance for sheep, cattle and mixed farming. The credit granted is "on demand" and repayment is expected over short or intermediate term. Security is not always taken especially in the case of long established and substantial clients. When however security is required the stock firms generally prefer to lend on 50% of the value of the established security. The rate of interest on current account varies from 7 1/2% to 8 1/2%. If no arrangement has been made or the account is overdue the rate is 9% (112).

When a farmer approaches his local stock firm seeking financial assistance an inspection of his property and full appraisal of his current financial commitment is usually made. The branch office manager will often know both the farmer and his practical circumstances through previous business dealings. When the proposal goes to head office for approval it will be considered by men who have in many cases themselves been branch managers and are well-versed in most aspects of farming in New Zealand. The prime consideration is the borrower's ability to maintain his farm and livestock at a reasonable level of efficiency after having provided the arranged debt reduction and debt servicing charges. It is

(112) Ross, Farm Finance, p.95.
generally accepted that over the last decade the stock and station industry has developed its management skills to a high degree and therefore the likelihood of a farmer being given a loan which he cannot manage has been correspondingly diminished.

The dairy companies lend to shareholding suppliers, sometimes on the security of the stock and chattels of the suppliers and sometimes fully against the coming cheques of the particular suppliers. In the latter type of lending a proportion of the gross proceeds are held back for a final end of season payment, thus giving the company a substantial security should a borrower fail to meet his loan commitments. The lending policy varies from one company to another ranging from 50 to 66 2/3% of the market value to a margin which is entirely flexible and discretionary. The term can vary from 3 - 6 months to 7 to 9 years, and interest can be from 3 to 6 to 7 1/2%. The usual security required is a bill of sale over the livestock though in the case of some of the shorter loans no security is required (113). In all cases the borrower will approach the dairy company which through the course of dealings or subsequent inspection and appraisal can form a reliable assessment of the applicant's ability to service the loan.

The other main sources of rural lending such as building societies, trustee savings banks, life assurance offices are not relevant to the present discussion since these institutions usually lend on the security of land and not livestock. Likewise solicitors

(113) Ross, Farm Finance pp. 92-94.
and private lenders need not concern us as these people do a negligible amount of lending on livestock.

The care and conservation with which the limited number of institutional lenders evaluate the ability of their borrowers is not of course the only explanation for the relative dearth of dispute and litigation in this multi-million dollar field of financing. An important reason has been the general prosperity of the farming sector and also the importance of farming to the nation as a whole. No government could allow a situation to develop whereby large numbers of farmers were forced to sell up their farms and stock through inability to pay off their loans. An excellent example of this political aspect to farm borrowing was seen in the 1967-71 slump in the industry, brought about mainly by the drop in wool prices. The stock firms found themselves involved with an increasing number of farmer customers who, due to falling prices and increased costs, were unable to pay off their "on demand" seasonal loans. The dramatic increasing burden of "hard-core" debt which the stock firms were required to carry, is illustrated by the following Reserve Bank figures.

(115) The first 250 sheep do not qualify, and qualify from 251 to 500 sheep 31 per head in value from $1,000 to 10,000 sheep $20. 251 head and over 10,000 sheep $50 per head.
(116) $15 million was contributed by the Meat Board and $90 million by the Government.
STOCK AND STATION AGENTS ADVANCES TO CUSTOMERS (114)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1965 - March</td>
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<td>1966 - March</td>
<td>80.7</td>
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<td>71.5</td>
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<td>1969 - March</td>
<td>71.1</td>
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<td>1970 - March</td>
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<td>61.3</td>
<td>138.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971 - March</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>148.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>130</td>
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</table>

Since neither the stock firms nor the farming community were able to continue to carry the burden this substantial increase in lending had placed on their respective resources, representations were made to the Government in 1970 for assistance. As a result a supplementary loan scheme was made available for farmers to ensure that they had sufficient working capital for the year. In addition the State Advances allocated about $15 million of their vote for farmers to utilise in the reduction of their "hard-core" debt with seasonal financiers. Further assistance was provided by the stock retention scheme whereby farmers were given a payment calculated on the number of sheep on hand at 30th June 1971 (115). Two thirds of a $45 million amount (116) was advanced during the

(115) The first 250 sheep do not qualify; from 250 to 5,000 sheep $1 per head is paid; from 5,000 to 10,000 sheep 60c. per head and over 10,000 sheep 20c. per head.
(116) $15 million was contributed by the Meat Board and $30 million by the Government.
1971-72 season and another third is to be advanced for the 1972-73 trading season. Although provision has been made for a third stage for the 1973-74 season due to the improved farming economic situation this is not likely to be necessary.

We may therefore conclude from the 1967-71 temporary recession that the days of large-scale foreclosures and mortgagee's sales, at least in the farming industry, are not likely to reoccur since the Government will be first constrained to give the necessary assistance. The words of Gilmore, with necessary modifications, are equally applicable to the New Zealand situation, when he accounts for the famine of farm security litigation in the United States since the 1920's and 30's:

"The organisation of farming and the structure of farm debt have, of course, completely changed since the great depression of the 1930's. The federal government has become, directly or indirectly, through a maze of agencies, the principal supplier of all kinds of farm credit. It is a safe political prediction that a collapse of real estate values, followed by a nationwide wave of foreclosures and evictions, will never again be seen: remedies, humanitarian and financial, will be applied far short of the point of total collapse which saw the enactment of the emergency farm legislation, state and federal, of the 1930's." (117)

The care with which the institutional lenders screen loan applicants is only one aspect of the control and supervision which they are able to exercise on borrowers. Thus whenever stock firms make loans to farmers they require in return that the farmer puts all his business through that firm. In this way the

lender has a continuous record of the farmer's income from the sale of wool, or sheep and cattle. At any stage when the account appears to be deteriorating the branch manager of the stock firm will take swift action to ascertain the problem and endeavour to help the farmer through strict budgetary control to extricate himself from the difficulties. Thus the danger of total financial collapse which would necessitate the realisation of a stock security, is usually averted long before it occurs.

Considering the millions of dollars advanced on the security of livestock in this country it is amazing that so few problems arise with the sale or other disposal of encumbered stock by borrowers. One of the principal reasons is the type of borrower involved. A number of solicitors who have expressed their views to the writer on this subject attribute the infrequency of such problems to the general honesty and reliability of the farming community. (118)

Even if a farmer does wish to make an unauthorised sale he will run into difficulties. At the local level, where all auctions occur, the stock and station companies will normally know a farmer and whether his stock is secured. The names of persons giving securities over their stock are available in the Mercantile Gazette

(118) In the words of a Hamilton practitioner: "I would attribute the absence of litigation in this field to the general credit worthiness of farmers as a group and the fact that they are tied to their farms and their need to retain a good credit standing."
and most branches keep a list of grantors and grantees in their area. Should auctioneers inadvertently sell encumbered stock the invariable practice is to account to the grantee the commission for the sale if such a demand is made. It is also clearly understood that the auctioneer will have to pay the proceeds of the sale of stock comprised in a duly registered instrument to the grantee should the grantor be unable to do so. (119)

The description requirements of the present Act are the cause of considerable criticism among some practitioners (120). It has

(119) A Gisborne practitioner has stated to the writer that:

"very few problems arise in Gisborne as the result of the sale of encumbered stock because the district is sufficiently small for each stock firm to know who is secured to whom and to know that unless they toe the line the local stock and station agents' Association will be taking them to task. The number of private sales in this district is limited and in practice have not given rise to any problems."

A Dunedin solicitor describes his experience with the sale of encumbered stock to a freezing company thus:

"The particular problem on sale of encumbered stock which my firm has encountered on several occasions recently has been the sale of stock to freezing companies. However, the legal position is clear and with a certain amount of "prodding" the companies have paid over the net proceeds to the moneylender."

(120) See p. 24 of this paper. The practical difficulties involved are clearly expressed by a Hamilton solicitor as follows:-

"The need to obtain an accurate description of livestock in terms of the Chattels Transfer Act is a source of particular difficulty, and in view of the substantial turn-over in stock, seems a rather useless exercise. One does one's best to endeavour to comply strictly with the Act but this can and does in some cases lead even to a measure of antagonism from the farmer, who sometimes has even to muster stock if the property is a large holding. Many farmers are uncertain as to the breed of some of their animals, particularly cross-breds. Even if a fully comprehensive and accurate description is obtained, the position can alter between the time of completion of the description and execution of the Instrument."
been suggested that the only reason why they survived in their present form is the fact that they have been so seldom tested by litigation.

Between the parties, of course, an insufficient description does not void the instrument but only deprives it of the benefits of registration. Since, therefore, grantees usually take action long before bankruptcy occurs, an equitable charge is usually a sufficient security.
PART III: UNITED STATES LAW OF LIVESTOCK SECURITIES

(a) The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9

For the purposes of comparison it is now proposed to deal briefly with the law relating to chattel securities over livestock in the United States. The principal legislation in this field is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 9 was intended to provide a simple and unified set of rules within which the immense variety and number of present day secured financing transactions could proceed with less cost and greater certainty. (121)

(b) Farm products - Section 9-109

Section 109 classifies "goods" into "consumer goods", "equipment", "farm products" and "inventory". Goods are "farm products":

"if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor inventory."

This classification is important in many situations in determining such matters as the rights of persons who buy from a debtor goods subject to a security interest (Article 9-307) certain

(121) "The growing complexity of financing transactions forces us to keep piling new statutory provisions on top of our inadequate and already sufficiently complicated nineteenth-century structure of security law. The results of this continuing development are, and will be, increasing costs to both parties and increasing uncertainty as to their rights and the rights of third parties dealing with them."

questions of priority (Article 9-312) the place of filing (Article 9-401) and in working out rights after default. The Official Comment to the Code states that goods are "farm products" only if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in farming operations (122) and have not been subjected to a manufacturing process. The term livestock is not defined but "it is obvious from the text that "farming operations" includes raising livestock..." (123). When livestock or their products come into the possession of a person who is not engaged in farming operations they cease to be "farm products".

(c) Description of Livestock

The sufficiency of description of goods subject to a security is dealt with in section 9-110 which states:

"for the purposes of this Article any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described."

The Official Comment states that a description under this section is sufficient if it does the job assigned to it, namely that it makes possible the identification of the chattel described. The section is intended to depart from the decisions often found in the older chattel mortgage cases, in which descriptions were held to be insufficient unless they were of the most exact and detailed nature.

(122) c.f. the New Zealand position as expressed by Edwards J. in In re Alloway (supra) that the occupation of the owner of livestock is irrelevant and see pp. 5-6 (supra).

At first sight section 9-110 deals with the problem of describing livestock in an eminently short and simple fashion. However, the discussion earlier in this paper (124) on the special difficulties in describing this type of security show that at least in the case of livestock Article 9-110 poses more questions than it answers. It is therefore necessary to turn to the case law on this question (125).

The summary of the common law description requirement of animals in the Corpus Juris Secundum (126) states that although the Courts recognise certain general principles determining the sufficiency of the description requirement of animals in a chattel mortgage, they are not uniform in the application of such principles when the rights of third parties become involved. Generally speaking a description is sufficient if it puts third parties on inquiry which, if pursued, would enable them to identify the mortgaged property. Thus in County Bank v. Hulen (127) a description of rules by reference to the location, possession, value and seller's name was held to be sufficient. However a number of cases have held that animals are sufficiently described by merely stating their characteristics with respect to age, colour, height,

(124) See pp.10-24 (supra).
(126) ibid pp.673-5.
(127) Mo. App. 195 S.W. 74.
sex and weight, or by indicating their marks and brands (128). Other cases have held such a description to be void as against third parties unless there is some additional means of identification such as a statement as to location, ownership, or possession, or some additional means of identification (129). The designation of animals merely by species or class and the number mortgaged has generally been held to be insufficient (130) without a reference to the location of the animals. Thus in Payne v. Boutwell (131)
"16 head of dairy milch cows of various kinds, colours and descriptions now located on my dairy farm in West Elba" was found by the Court to be a sufficient description.

Provided that the description of mortgaged animals was originally sufficient, the mortgagee does not lose his right to enforce his security because of a subsequent change in the animal's appearance (132). If the description is otherwise sufficient, errors such as in stating the age, colour, weight, or brand or the number included under a certain brand, will not vitiate the mortgage unless such errors are confusing and misleading. In Hourigan v. Home State

(128) Thomason v. Decatur County Bank, 111 S.E. 578.

(129) A description by colour, although alone insufficient, is rendered sufficient by a further description of the animals as being purchased from the mortgagee whose residence is stated in the mortgage. Burlington State Bank v. Marlin Nat. Bank. Civ. App., 207 S.W. 954.

(130) However in Sheffield v. Dean, 135 S.E. 109 "30 head of horses now located at the residence of... (the mortgagor)" in a named district of a certain county was held too vague and indefinite.

(131) 164 So. 753, 754.

(132) Stickney v. Dunaway, 53 So. 770.
Bank, 162 p.699, 700 cattle were described in a mortgage by classification, age, colour and a certain brand followed by statements that the described cattle comprised all cattle owned by the mortgagor and that the mortgage covered all the mortgagor's cattle "in the above brand or description or in any brand of the above classification". The Court held that the description was sufficient in that it cast upon a third party the duty of inquiring as to whether cattle of a brand different from that stated in the mortgage were covered thereby. However in Ehrke v. Tucker (133) a description of "native Kansas steers" by age, brand and location was considered by the Court to be insufficient to give notice that it embraced cattle not bearing the designated brand and found in a location other than that specified in the mortgage.

In the writer's opinion there is considerable merit in the more liberal American approach to the question of livestock description than has been shown by the Courts in New Zealand. Surely the most important purpose of the registered security agreement is to put parties who intend to give credit to a farmer on inquiry since few potential lenders would bother to catch all the animals concerned to ensure that all their brands earmarks or other means of identification corresponded with the registered agreement. Perhaps the greatest admission of the unsuitability of the New Zealand stock description requirements has been the need to invoke the fictional concept of the covenant to brand to obviate the results (133) 160 p.985.
which a strict interpretation of ss. 28 and 29 would otherwise give (134).

(d) After-acquired stock

Under Section 9-204(1) a security interest cannot attach until there is agreement that it attaches, value is given and the debtor has rights in the secured chattel (135). Under subsection (3) a security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement (136). This is a direct negation of the principles embodied in the New Zealand Act which require every instrument to have an inventory of the chattels comprised therein and render instruments void as against the persons mentioned in sections 18 and 19 in respect of any chattels which the grantor acquires or becomes entitled to after the time of the execution of the instrument. However, it will be recalled that the New Zealand provisions dealing with livestock securities (137) are not subject to sections 23 and 24 and therefore share the same underlying principle as section 9-204(3) of the Code.

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(134) See pp. 10-24 of this paper. A Masterton solicitor who wrote to the writer on this subject recommended an approach rather similar to that used by the U.S. Courts: "I see no reason why all livestock on a given property should not prima facie be deemed to be the property of the land occupier subject to any livestock being excluded from a security on satisfactory proof of a Bailiff or an Official Assignee that in fact the stock belong to some other person.

(135) For the purposes of Article 9-204(1) the debtor has no rights in the young of livestock until they are conceived.

(136) Although certain special rules in the case of crops and consumer goods are stated in subsection (4) of this Article.

(137) ss. 28 and 29.
namely that they allow a security interest to attach to after-acquired property.

Unlike s.29 of the Chattels Transfer Act, Article 9 does not imply a term by which the natural increase of stock comprised in a stock mortgage or stock of the same class are subsequently brought onto the land are also deemed to be included in the mortgage. Again we must turn to the American case law for an answer to this question. In determining whether a mortgage covers after-acquired property, the Court will, as nearly as possible, carry out the intention of the parties (138). The description will not, however, be extended beyond its terms and where the property to be acquired in the future is expressly limited to a certain class the mortgage will not be extended to another class. If, however, there is a covenant that after-acquired property of a certain class will be subject to the mortgage then such property will be included even if it is of a totally different quality to the property which is presently mortgaged (139). It would therefore appear that the covenant to brand after-acquired stock implied under the New Zealand Act (140) would be fully effective under American law.

The position in the United States as to the inclusion of the natural increase of stock in a mortgage is of course affected by

(138) Stockyards Loan Co. v. Nicholas 243 F. 511.
(140) See pp. 25-35 of this paper.
the laws of the various states. In some jurisdictions the mortgagor is vested with the legal title to the mortgaged property while in others the mortgage is considered a mere lien. In the former case it is generally held that the mortgage extends to the increase of the animals during the life of the mortgage, even though the mortgage is silent as to the increase (141). Generally, in these jurisdictions where the mortgage creates a mere lien without passing title, particularly where a statute so provides, the lien does not cover the increase of the animals mortgaged unless these are expressly included in the mortgage agreement. Thus in Brown v. Schwab (142) the Arizona Supreme Court had to consider a mortgage of "all cattle and horses branded OXO, O," running on a particular range, which was followed by statement, "The mortgagor agrees not to sell any more cattle than the amount of increase each year". McAlister, Ch. J. (143) held that on its proper construction the mortgage covered the increase of such cattle, and contemplated that such increase would be branded in like manner (144).


(142) 39 A.L.R. 150 (Arizona Supreme Court 1925).

(143) Ross & Lockwood, J.J. concurring.

(144) per McAlister Ch. J. at p.153 "It is appellant's contention that the term "branded" refers to the cattle bearing this brand at the time the mortgage was executed, and none other; but a consideration of the entire instrument, we think, leads to the conclusion that it refers not merely to these, but as well to their increase, which it was clearly intended should thereafter bear the same brand."
A lien on the natural increase of stock, does not continue after a reasonable period of nurture by the mother has elapsed as against a subsequent mortgagee or a purchaser without actual or constructive knowledge of the mortgage (145). This is of course, quite different from the position under s.29 of the New Zealand Act where no such limitation is placed on the duration of the security. Nevertheless as between the parties the lien may continue and in Holt v. Lucas (146) it was held that the fact that a chattel mortgage specifically covers the increase of livestock will cause the lien to continue during the existence of the mortgage.

(e) Sale of encumbered stock
Section 9-201 of the Code dealing with the general validity of a security agreement states:

"Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. The official comment to Section 9-201 emphasises that a security agreement is effective against third parties."

It is interesting to note that under the Code the mortgagee of farm products (which includes livestock) is singled out for especially favourable treatment: (147)

(146) 96 p.30.
(147) Gilmore. Security Interests in Personal Property. Vol. II p.707 questions why if the buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest in the case of inventory, he should not take free of such interest in the farm products case. "Yet, rightly or wrongly, and for reasons which are never precisely articulated, the agricultural financer comes off much better than the inventory financer."
"A buyer in the ordinary course of business... (148) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest treated by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." (149)

Under Section 9-306(2), except where Article 9 otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding a disposition thereof by the debtor, unless his action was authorised by the secured party. Since no section of the Article "otherwise provides" in the case of farm products, Section 9-306(2) gives the secured party the right to follow collateral into the hands of persons who have bought and paid for livestock over which, unbeknown to them, another party has a security interest.

Fortunately for buyers finding themselves in this predicament the common law rules of waiver and estoppel may be invoked against the secured party, and it may be argued that the debtor's authority to sell the collateral arises from an express provision in the security agreement or from the conduct and action of the secured party. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Clovis National Bank v. Harold Thomas d/b/a/ Clovis Cattle Commission Company (150) shows that the above defences may be powerful weapons in the hands of buyers or auctioneers of encumbered livestock.

(148) "The buyer in the ordinary course of business" is defined as one who buys in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party" 3 U.L.A. U.C.C. p.185.

(149) Article 9-307(1).

(150) 77 N.M. 554, 425 P. 2d. 726 (1967).
In the Clovis National Bank case the bank loaned money to a rancher who in turn gave the bank a promissory note and a security interest in his cattle. The security was properly filed in accordance with Section 9-401 of the Code. The security agreement prohibited the rancher to sell or transfer the cattle without the permission of the bank. The rancher consigned these cattle to the defendant for sale at public auction, although the bank had no knowledge of the consignment and had not consented to the sales. The auctioneer sold the cattle and remitted the proceeds to the rancher, but the rancher failed to repay the bank loan which the cattle had secured. It was established in evidence that the rancher had previously sold cattle covered by a similar security agreement without obtaining the bank's permission to do so. On that occasion he had paid the bank the proceeds of the sale under circumstances such that the bank knew an unpermitted sale of the collateral had been made, but the bank had raised no objection.

The trial Court held that the bank had consented to and acquiesced in the sales, and was estopped from recovery because of its conduct. On appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the bank by prior conduct had waived its right to require its authorisation for the sale of the cattle. The Court, basing its decision not on estoppel but on consent and waiver, stated that although the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to this case, the pre-code law result still prevailed.

Oman, J. delivering the majority judgment of the Court of Appeals considered that:
"By excluding "farm products" from the classifications of "equipment" and "inventory" and by expressly providing in Section 9-307(1)... that a buyer in the ordinary course of business of farm products from a person engaged in farming operations does not take free of a security interest created by the seller, the draftsmen of the code apparently intended "to freeze the agricultural mortgagee into the special status he has achieved under the pre-code case law."

2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, 714 (1965) (151)

Oman J. was therefore of the opinion that the holder of the security interest in farm products has the same protection under the code which he had under pre-code law, and that the cattle broker was still liable to the secured party for the conversation of the collateral. Nevertheless under the Code the secured party may consent to the sale of the collateral, and thereby waive his rights therein (152) and since there was no particular provision in the Code displacing the law of waiver, particularly waiver by implied acquiescence or consent, the Code provisions were supplemented by these common law rules (153).

A vigorous dissent to the majority opinion was recorded by Carmody J. (154) who considered that Section 1-205 of the Code

(151) 425 P. 2d. 731.
(152) Official Comment No. 3 Section 9-306 and Official Comment No. 2 Section 9-307.
(154) "The consequences and repercussions that today's decision will have on security interests involving farm products and the applicability of the Commercial Code to such are incalculable. Thus even though it may sound like "a voice crying in the wilderness" I feel required to respectfully voice my dissent. " ibid. p. 734.
was of particular importance to the facts of the present case:

The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade. (155)

The Judge was of the opinion that there was never an express written waiver nor sufficient evidence on which a common practice, usage or procedure could be based. Moreover the defendant auctioneer had no more right than the debtor himself to rely on a custom and usage which was contrary to the express terms of the contract.

This decision has been criticised by Thomas H. Emmerson (156)

"One purpose of the Code is to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices. The decision in the Thomas case is likely to restrict loans on livestock. The usefulness of providing livestock as collateral is now under question."

Emmerson suggests that an auctioneer or a person buying livestock directly from the owner should be charged with the duty to search the records for the presence of a security agreement covering the livestock (157). This is in effect the position in New Zealand under s.4 of the Chattels Transfer Act 1924, which provides, inter alia, that all persons shall be deemed to have notice of a registered instrument and of the contents thereof. The discussion earlier in this paper on The King v. Buckland shows that even where an instrument over livestock has not conformed with the description

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(155) ibid, p.736.
(157) ibid. 189.
requirements of section 28 the auctioneer will nevertheless be liable to the secured party. It was also shown that under the 1924 Act the protection afforded to auctioneers or purchasers under s.19 does not extend to the case of an instrument which fails to comply with s.28 (158).

It can of course be argued that the New Zealand position is too favourable to mortgagees. However in the final analysis the crucial question is whether the laws relating to a particular type of collateral offer sufficient protection to the lenders. If they do not then the lender will be reluctant to make finance available and the borrower himself will probably be the ultimate loser because it may be unable to obtain sufficient funds to carry on his operations efficiently (159).

(158) See pp. 44-46 infra.

(159) cf. Hansard (1858) Vol. 2, p.382, debate on the Wool and Oil Securities Bill: Mr. Stafford: "This measure was of a very simple and intelligible character, and one much needed in this country, where great inconvenience was frequently experienced from the want of ready cash. The difficulty of obtaining ready money frequently resulted in injury to stock, and materially retarded the producing powers of the country."
PART IV: CONCLUSION

The following are the principal aspects of the law relating to livestock securities which in the writer's opinion require clarification or amendment.

(a) "Class"

The reference to "all stock of the class or classes" in s.29 should be expanded so that it is clear whether the word "class" refers to animals of a particular genus or species or to a category or type of animals within a genus or species. The writer suggests the latter definition is not only preferable but also appears to be currently accepted as the correct meaning to be given to the word "class".

(b) Description of Stock

In the writer's view most efforts to describe a large number of animals with precision are impracticable. Consequently the exactitude required in the Act by reference to brand, mark, earmark or name, sex, age or colour should be deleted. This would then leave s.28 requiring that stock should be described so "as to be reasonably capable of identification". In addition, unless the contrary be expressed in the instrument, all animals (present and after-acquired) of a given class (i.e. species) depasturing on the lands of the grantor, such lands being referred to in the instrument, should prima facie be deemed to belong to the grantor in the absence of sufficient proof to the contrary. It could be argued that such an amendment is too favourable to the grantee since it includes all the animals of a class irrespective of whether these have been expressly referred to in the original instrument. The answer to this criticism is that the above proposal is in effect the present position by virtue of the Court's interpretation of the "covenant to brand" in s.29 (160). This proposal has the great advantage that it recognises the special problem involved in livestock description and obviates the "covenant to brand" fiction. Secondly if the grantor is unhappy that all of his stock of a class should be included in the security he can stipulate to the contrary in the instrument, provided the grantee will consent.

(160) Refer to pp. 31-35 supra.
(c) **After-acquired stock and the covenant to brand**

The proposals suggested in (b) above obviate the present problems discussed under the heading "After-acquired stock" earlier in the paper (161).

(d) **Description of land**

This is referred to in recommendation (b) above. It is submitted that the land should be the cornerstone of the description of stock because it is the easiest and most practical method of identifying the ownership of stock. Nevertheless it is recommended that if stock are described so as to be otherwise reasonably capable of identification then the fact that the land on which such stock are depasturing is not sufficiently described should not void the instrument. Nevertheless it is obvious that a failure to describe the land on which stock are depasturing will render the task of sufficiently describing the stock correspondingly more difficult.

(e) **Purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock**

Section 28 should be amended by inserting the words "and Section nineteen" after the words "Section eighteen" where the latter words appear in that section.

(f) **Description of sheep in wool securities: s.38**

Section 38 should require that sheep over which a wool security exists, be described or referred to so as to be reasonably capable of identification, in accordance with the proposal in (b) above.

(g) **Grantee's rights as against prior and subsequent encumbrancees of sheep subject to wool security**

Section 39 should be expanded to deal with the rights of grantees of wool securities as against prior encumbrancees. It is recommended that the grantee's rights over the sheep should be equivalent to those of the grantor until the prior encumbrancee takes steps to enforce his interests.

(h) **Variation of priority of instruments**

A provision should be added to the Act embodying a system for the variation of the priority of registered instruments similar to that in s.103 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 which deals with the variation of priority of land mortgages.

(161) ibid.
Despite the dearth of reported decisions in recent years on the livestock security provisions of the Chattels Transfer Act it would be wrong to assume that this is a reflection on the quality or suitability of the legislation. The writer has found among most of the experienced practitioners who have expressed their views to him, a general dissatisfaction with many features of the present system. Unfortunately in a comparatively non-controversial area such as livestock securities there is a danger that unsatisfactory provisions may be indefinitely retained or largely reproduced in new legislation. It is with the desire to avoid this danger that the writer has suggested that the foregoing amendments or clarifications should be made to the present Act or borne in mind should there be a general reform of the present law relating to chattel securities.

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Agency should have been elaborated - especially the agency for reward employed by Stock & Station Agent.
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A fine of 10¢ per day charged on overdue.