“Pulling the Tail of the Cat”: An exploration of Palestinian peacebuilders’ conceptualisations of men and masculinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

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ABSTRACT

To date, men as gendered beings have largely remained absent from the international literature on armed conflict and peacebuilding. In general, the literature omits men’s gendered experiences as civilians, non-combatants and peacebuilders and instead, men remain confined by stereotypes of violence, soldiering and war-making. In this thesis, I aim to break these silences by producing a qualitative analysis of discourses of men and masculinities within semi-structured interviews conducted with fourteen Palestinian peacebuilders in the West Bank. This analysis explores the impacts of the ongoing occupation and armed conflict on non-combat related Palestinian masculinities, and further, how men and masculinities are thought to interact with local peacebuilding initiatives.

Through the use of feminist critical discourse analysis, this study has uncovered a number of key themes relevant to gender and peacebuilding theory and practice. Firstly, it found that the ongoing conflict has resulted in a ‘thwarting’ of West Bank masculinities in which men are understood as finding it increasingly difficult to live up to social expectations of their traditional roles and identities. Secondly, this study found that men and masculinities have become somewhat estranged from civil society, informal peacebuilding schemes. Based on my findings, these initiatives seem to centre around feminised narratives that emphasise women’s peacebuilding capacities, while masculinities and the peacebuilding roles of men are overlooked. Nevertheless, this thesis also presents the notion that men are actively involved in the nonviolent resistance movement within the West Bank, which opens up room for a novel, alternative understanding of ‘masculinised’ peacebuilding in Palestine. In sum, this study articulates the need to ‘take masculinities seriously’ in the pursuit of more inclusive and effective peacebuilding and post-conflict development practice.
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And finally, to Palestine - my first love. You taught me how to hope, grieve, dream, and love. This thesis is dedicated to you and the ongoing struggle for peace.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Within studies on gender and its relation to armed conflict and peacebuilding, men have to date featured primarily as nothing more than “hazy background figures” (White 1997, 16). Similar to the propensities of Gender and Development (GAD) paradigms more generally to focus gender attention on women and femininities, literature focusing on gender in conflict and post-conflict development settings have similarly lacked engagement with men as gendered beings (White 2000; Chant and Gutmann 2002; Levy, Taher, and Vouhé 2000; Dolan 2002; Correia and Bannon 2006; Cleaver 2002; White 1997; Sweetman 2001). When they are mentioned in research and policy on armed conflict settings, men’s gendered experiences of armed conflict are largely confined to those examples that address ‘violent masculinity’ and men’s roles as real or potential combatants. By contrast, women are constructed as the archetypical vulnerable, innocent, and victimised ‘losers’ of war. In this sense, men and masculinities are presented as ‘the problem’ with respect to war and political violence but beyond this, we have very little understanding of how non-combatant, civilian men and masculinities are impacted globally by conflict situations.

This conceptual gap in our understanding of gender and armed conflict has also translated into a deficit of attention paid to men and masculinities in relation to peacebuilding programs aimed at conflict transformation and conflict related development. As such, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in peacebuilding tend to concentrate their gender mandates on women and femininities. Thus, similar to the ways in which narratives of war and political violence are intimately wound up with discourses\(^1\) of men and ‘violent masculinity’, peacebuilding has also become discursively associated with women and

\(^1\) See Chapter Two
‘peaceful femininity’. As a result, there is a dearth of literature (and peacebuilding policy) pertaining to men’s needs and gender issues as they relate to peacebuilding and armed conflict. In this way, men and masculine social roles have become somewhat estranged from civil society peacebuilding initiatives and narratives. Thus, despite the general emphasis on ‘men as the problem’ of armed conflict, peacebuilding literature and policy continue to ignore them within institutional approaches to reverse such violence. We are thus left with two central questions: Where are the non-combatant, civilian men? And where are the men as gendered beings in local peacebuilding initiatives?

Research Aims and Overview

As a result of the “paucity of work making explicit conflict/post-conflict and masculinity” (Paul Higate cited in Stern and Nystrand 2006, 102) there have been increasing calls for more research on men and masculinities in peacebuilding and conflict settings (Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon 2005; Stern and Nystrand 2006; Strickland and Duvvury 2003; Dolan 2002; El-Bushra 2008; Jacobson 2005a).

This study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by exploring peacebuilders’ accounts and perspectives of the effects of the ongoing conflict and occupation on West Bank men who are not considered combatants, and their respective gender identities. In addition, this thesis investigates how Palestinian men are understood as interacting with local peacebuilding frameworks to unearth how men and masculinities relate to peacebuilding theory and practice in the West Bank.²

² Please note that this research is focused on Palestinian men, and not boys. A similar study on the impacts of conflict on young boys would be a very interested avenue for further research.
In this thesis, I focus in on peacebuilding in the West Bank, Palestine. The
Palestinians have been in a state of conflict since before Israel declared statehood in 1948 in a
large segment of disputed territory that once made up Ottoman Palestine. Since then, conflict
has raged between the two sides not helped by the various, failed attempts at peace talks
between the Palestinian and Israeli leadership. Since 1967, the state of Israel has had the
West Bank under a military occupation further exacerbating tensions between themselves and
the Palestinians, and in addition crippling Palestinian social, economic and political
development.

Due to the extensive history of the conflict in the region, there is a longstanding and
widespread grassroots peacebuilding tradition in the West Bank making it an ideal location
for this research enquiry. As will be brought to light, this peacebuilding tradition involves a
wide range of activities and actors - some of which engage with the various approaches and
conceptions of peacebuilding reflected in the international literature\(^3\), and some that are
unique to Palestine. Furthermore, peacebuilding frameworks expressed by informal civil
society peacebuilding initiatives in Palestine reflect some of the key gender issues raised at
the beginning of this chapter.

Thus, this research seeks to engage with local Palestinian peacebuilders in a bid to
‘take masculinities seriously’ when exploring conflict and peacebuilding. To this end, from
interviews and my own observations while conducting field research in the West Bank, I aim
to address the following research questions:

\(^3\) See Chapter Three
1. What can be learned from Palestinian peacebuilders working in the West Bank about the ways in which non-combatant men and masculinities are impacted upon by the ongoing conflict with Israel?

2. How is informal civil society peacebuilding approached in the West Bank and how is it gendered?

3. How can an understanding of men’s contributions to nonviolent, confrontational resistance expand current understandings of informal peacebuilding as a feminised, women’s activity?

4. What are the implications of these findings for the general conflict and peacebuilding literature?

In answering these research questions, the main arguments I make in this thesis are twofold. The first being that men too are negatively impacted by the occupation as civilians, particularly in their gender roles as fathers, breadwinners and landowners. According to my findings, in the occupation setting, men’s gender identities are understood as being ‘thwarted’ in the sense that the political situation makes it increasingly difficult for men to live up to traditional, hegemonic ideals of masculinity. Consequently, Palestinian masculinities are increasingly defined by crisis, humiliation, and inadequacy.

Secondly, I argue that current gendered conceptualisations and discourses have resulted in the feminisation of informal, civil society peacebuilding approaches in the Palestinian context. By extension, while I argue that men as gendered beings are somewhat alienated from these programs, in the Palestinian context men often inhabit alternative, unorthodox peacebuilding roles. To this end, I explore the gendered nature of nonviolent resistance as emphasising the social roles of men, and argue that this represents an alternative, Palestinian
and masculinised form of peacebuilding that can work to expand our pre-established
feminised peacebuilding narratives and forms.

To support these stated research questions and central arguments, I have three key
objectives for this research:

1. To include the knowledge and expertise of local Palestinian peacebuilding
   practitioners in our understandings of men, masculinities, gender, armed conflict and
   peacebuilding;
2. To expand our understanding of armed conflict by exploring and analysing the non-
   combatant related experiences of men in armed conflict;
3. To highlight the need for the expansion of our conceptualisations of both gender and
   peacebuilding to include the experiences and roles of men and masculinities.

To answer these questions and support these arguments, I employ a feminist critical
discourse analysis (FCDA) to analyse interviews I collected while conducting research in the
West Bank in 2010. While in ‘the field’, I spent two months observing local peacebuilding
initiatives and conducted fourteen interviews with local practitioners. The semi-structured
interviews revolved around discussions of peacebuilding, the gendered impacts of the Israeli
occupation, and Palestinian gender configurations. In terms of the analysis of these
interviews, I emphasised locating and examining the discursive conceptualisations of men
and masculinities within these interviews. In this research, I approach language as "not a
neutral tool for transmitting a message", but instead "invested" in power structures dependent
on different ways of thinking and talking about the world (Griffin 2007, 8; see also Lazar
2007). Thereby, I examined my data by ‘situating’ peacebuilders’ narratives within broader
Palestinian and international political and social discourses to better understand the broader
gender hierarchies, and social, economic and political contexts that informed the various responses to my interview questions.

**Personal Standpoint**

Having been raised by two pacifistic, development workers in some of the poorest countries in the world, issues of peace, social justice and development were an essential part of my upbringing. When I was ten years old, my family relocated from Bangladesh to Jordan, where I attended primary and middle school. It was here at a local school in Jordan in which a large proportion of my classmates were a generation of Palestinians born to refugees, that I first encountered ‘the Palestinian issue’. The Palestinian narrative managed to infiltrate almost every aspect of my life during my time in Jordan. It was in my connections with my Palestinian best-friends and their families; it was in the nationalist slogans I learned to chant in Arabic through the school halls and at sports games without really understanding the meanings; it was in my parents’ endless dinner time discussions; and it was in the political art that adorned the streets and the walls of our friends’ houses. However, it was not until actually travelling to Palestine and Israel with my family that I really begun to understand what all this meant. As a young girl, witnessing the checkpoints, the Israeli soldiers and the crippling effects of the occupation on Palestinians, had a huge emotional impact on me. Further, I felt somewhat ashamed by the fact that I, as a New Zealander, was able to go and visit the ancestral land of my friends and their families, who to this day have not been given permission to visit let alone ‘return’.

This interest developed into a passion during my university years as I focused my studies on exploring different aspects of the conflict, and organised with anti-war and
Palestinian awareness groups in both Canada and New Zealand. While as a young, ambitious, and somewhat deluded teenager, I had dreamed of single-handedly solving the Middle East conflict, at university my ambitions became far more realistic. Through moulding this passion together with my additional academic interests in gender and masculinities, this thesis is envisioned as a small and humble contribution to the broader quest for peace between Israel and Palestine.

As such, my standpoint as an activist for social justice for Palestinians is intrinsically aligned with my positioning as a feminist researcher. Despite my focus in this study on men and masculinities, this research project remains located within a feminist post-structuralist framework, due to its “political agenda” (Willott 1998, 176) of gender-based “social emancipation and transformation, [and the] critique of grossly unequal social orders . . . in regard to discursive dimensions of social (in)justice” (Lazar 2007, 141). Linked with my concern for peace and social justice in the political sense, is my concern with unequal gender relations that victimise both men and women in diverging ways, but further facilitate violence at the individual, local and international levels.

**Thesis Structure**

Following the Introduction, this thesis is separated into six chapters. Chapter Two presents a discussion of the methodologies utilised within this research project. In this chapter, I explore in more detail the epistemological foundations of this study; FCDA as a method of analysis; the participants and NGOs involved in this project; data collection methods employed; as well as the ethical considerations that emerged throughout the duration of the research.
Chapter Three outlines the current knowledge and literature relevant to the study of masculinities, armed conflict, and peacebuilding. I intend to portray the current state of the literature with reference to my thesis topic, and to highlight the ways in which this research project enhances and contradicts this literature. Further, in this review of the literature I make reference to the dearth of attention to the potential incorporation of men and masculinities into gender and peacebuilding schemes. What I also show is that while there exist long-standing debates on violent masculinities and armed conflict, these have not been effectively utilised to inform peacebuilding practice to which these debates are inherently relevant.

In Chapter Four I explore the particular historical, social and political context of the West Bank around which this research is based. This exploration of the research context presents a historical exploration of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lens of Palestinian masculinities. This chapter suggests that, based on previous ethnographic and feminist research on Palestine, masculinities have played a fundamental role throughout the long history of the conflict. This chapter is particularly important for the conduct of FCDA as it provides a detailed analysis of the broader social and political structures within which the narratives I study in this thesis are located.4

Chapters’ Five and Six present the data I collected from interviews and the accompanying analysis. Chapter Five explores Palestinian peacebuilders’ perceptions of the impacts of the occupation on men and masculinities in the West Bank particularly with regards to the ways in which men’s gender roles and identities have been ‘thwarted’. Subsequent to this, Chapter Six explores Palestinian peacebuilders’ different narratives of peacebuilding and how men and masculinities are thought to interact with these varying paradigms. The concluding chapter ties together the findings presented in this study, suggests

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4 See Chapter Two
potential contributions these findings could make to peacebuilding theory, policy and practice, and suggests avenues for future research and investigation.

In sum, the overall motivation of this study is to uncover narratives of men and masculinities and how these are impacted upon by the occupation, as well as how they interact with peacebuilding narratives in the West Bank. As will be described in the next chapter, this overall aim requires specific methodologies involving engaging with local Palestinian peacebuilders and paying particular attention to ‘discourse’.
CHAPTER TWO – METHODOLOGIES

In this chapter, I outline the overall methodologies employed in this study to meet the research objectives articulated in Chapter One. Broadly speaking, this thesis explores West Bank peacebuilders’ discourses on men and masculinities to unearth some of the ways that the latter are understood to be impacted by the Israeli occupation, and how they interact with local peacebuilding mechanisms. Specifically, the objectives of this research project are threefold: to emphasise local Palestinian perspectives on masculinities within armed conflict and peacebuilding; to gain a deeper understanding from these viewpoints of how non-combatant men and masculinities are impacted by conflict settings; and to emphasise the need to incorporate men and masculinities within understandings and discourses of peacebuilding. This overview underlines the methodologies utilised with particular attention paid to how these correlated with the stated research objectives of this thesis.

To begin, I convey the post-structuralist feminist epistemological and philosophical underpinnings of this project and how the former correspond with my general research aims. Subsequently, I focus on the particular research methods utilised with reference to participant recruitment processes and data collection mechanisms. This chapter then outlines the particular analytical methods employed to sort through and (re)present the data collected into the two analytical chapters of this thesis. I conclude by reflecting on matters relating to ethics and positionality that arose during the execution of this research process. In this overview of methodologies, instead of manufacturing the semblance of uncomplicated, neat and clear-cut “hygienic research”, I have made a point of not censoring out “the mess, confusion and
complexity” that characterised this research process (Kelly et al 1994, 46). In this way, this chapter pays attention to the evolution and progression of the research topic and design. It aims to incorporate issues of positionality and reflexivity throughout its sections to highlight the influence of the researcher throughout the research process. It further speaks to the importance of maintaining a flexible, ‘negotiated’ project design and ethical framework in order to respect the context in which the research is based.

Qualitative Research

As a qualitative inquiry, I share Denzin and Lincoln’s (2003) definition of the qualitative research which

[stresses] the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry ... [and seeks to answer] questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning (10).

The questions and objectives this study aims to engage with necessitate such an approach. This project approaches the concepts of gender, peacebuilding and armed conflict as being socially constituted. As such, I explore the gendered meanings that peacebuilders ascribe to different manifestations of ‘peacebuilding’ in the West Bank, and how men’s gendered realities and constructed identities are impacted by armed conflict.

Post-Structural Feminism

Moreover, this research is located within post-structural feminist epistemological paradigms that seek to address the ways in which gender influences our understandings and approaches to knowledge and research practices (Anderson 2009). This paradigm discounts the possibilities of objective realities and absolute truths, and instead draws upon the elemental feminist tenet of “situated knowledges” (Haraway 1988) acknowledging that
knowledge and truth are constructed, “subjective, power imbued, and relational” (Hesse-Biber 2006, 9). I also employ the anti-essentialist and social-constructivist premises of post-structural feminist thought which among other things, challenges the assumption that there is an underlying “essential, usually biologically based, dichotomy between men and women” (Petersen 2003, 57) and instead I take the position that gender is socially constructed (Kimmel 2007).

That said, traditionally “the feminist preoccupation with problematising⁵ the essentialisation of ‘women’ has not been met by a corresponding problematisation of the essentialisation of ‘men’” (Hebert 2007, 33). As indicated in Chapter Three for example, within the literature on gender, violence and peace, “men’s gendered subjectivity . . . [and] men’s multiple locations within systems of oppression” (Greig and Esplen 2007, 7) remain somewhat invisible.

However, increasingly feminist scholars are recognising the need to explore the complex and multidimensional nature of masculinities and their construction, as well as the highly contested nature of men’s social positionings (Hooper 2000, 39; Parpart and Zalewski 2008; Gardiner 2002; Hebert 2007). This thesis is situated within this latter feminist approach to gender research as it problematises the construction of men and masculinities within conflict and peacebuilding discourses by underlining the existence of civilian and peacebuilder masculinities that consistently go ignored in the general literature.⁶ In so doing, this research engages with the political feminist epistemological mandate of challenging “the silences in mainstream research both in relation to the issues studied and the ways in which study is undertaken”(Letherby 2003, 4) with respect to men.

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⁵ “making strange that which we take for granted” (Gannon and Davies 2007, 81)
⁶ See Chapter Three
Thus, in taking a feminist post-structuralist standpoint the general aim of this research lies not in “‘revealing’ [the] truth, or ‘uncovering’ the facts” (Gavey 1989, 463) about men and masculinities in peacebuilding and the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Instead, this research has at its heart the figurative aim of “changing oppressive gender relations” through “disrupting and displacing (oppressive) knowledges” (Gavey 1989, 463) that make invisible men’s non-combat related experiences of armed conflict, as well as their peacebuilding roles. To this end, the overview of the literature presented in Chapter Three aimed at “making strange that which we take for granted” (Gannon and Davies 2007, 81) by unearthing and challenging the essentialisation of masculinities within dominant (and oppressive) ways of thinking about gender, armed conflict and peacebuilding in which men are framed as combatants and war-makers. Moreover, Chapters Five and Six will further ‘disrupt’ these gendered knowledges by unearthing alternative discourses of men and masculinities, illuminating the multiplicities of men’s gendered subjectivities in relation to armed conflict and peacebuilding settings.

**Discourse and Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis**

**Discourse.** I locate my research within the “‘discursive’ turn” (Gannon and Davies 2007, 80) of feminist post-structuralism in that this project considers meaning and subjectivity to be constituted through language and discourse. Language does not neutrally reflect the external world. Instead, the external world is given meaning through language (Weedon 1991). In a similar vein, discourse can be defined as,

- groupings of [thematic] utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a social context, which are determined by that social context and which contribute to the way that social context continues its existence. Institutions and social context therefore play an important determining role in the development, maintenance and circulation of discourses (Mills 1997, 11).
A key element of a post-structuralist discourse-analytic approach is its emphasis on the socially-constructive nature of discourses. From a gender perspective, this implies that our gender identities are not only reflected by discourse, but discourses play a significant role in shaping our gender identities (Lehtonen 2007). As such, my research focuses on interviews with fourteen peacebuilders as discursive events to uncover the ways that men and masculinities are constituted in their discussions of peacebuilding and the impacts of conflict. Therefore, a discourse-analytic approach is an ideal method for my study on masculinities, as based on my epistemological outlook, they ways that peacebuilders ‘talk’ about men can teach us a lot about Palestinian masculinities, their construction, their gendered expectations, roles, and ‘issues’.

**Feminist critical discourse analysis.** Feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) is an interdisciplinary analytical approach that combines textual and social analysis (Lehtonen 2007). Discourse is deemed political in the post-structural sense in that it is a “social practice [implying] a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258). FCDA focuses on how discourse reproduces, maintains, negotiates and challenges gender ideologies and hierarchies (Lazar 2007). Gavey (1989) uses the example of the ‘good mother’ discourse in which various social institutions (the media, religious and governmental institutions, family planning and welfare organisations and so forth) dictate through various discursive “normalizing techniques” the attitudes, behaviours and roles which make up what can be considered a ‘good’ mother as opposed to a ‘bad’ one (464). From an FCDA viewpoint, material power is exercised through these discursive constructions of gendered subjectivities. As Butler points out, we become subject to and a subject of, discursive regimes and frameworks simultaneously (Butler 1997),
and thus there is no escaping their power nor any possibility of living outside of ‘discourse’ (Gannon and Davies 2007).

The ‘critical’ impetus of FCDA is not the ‘critique’ of particular language use per se, but instead the “demystification” (Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002, 19) of language - to emphasise the interconnectedness of words, culture and ideology which may (or may not be) hidden (Wodak and Meyer 2009). Within a given text, there are often multiple, contradictory, gendered discourses competing with and complementing each other. This “interdiscursivity” (Reisigl and Wodak 2009, 90) means that altogether texts are ongoing “sites of struggle” (Lehtonen 2007, 5).

FCDA is also an example of “analytical activism” (Lazar 2007, 145) in the sense that it aims to unearth the ways in which particular discourses and language-use work to sustain a certain gendered social hierarchy. Awareness of the implicit and explicit linguistic perpetuation of power and inequality, as well as uncovering and exposing the varying methods by which we become socialised is a first step towards emancipation (Wodak and Meyer 2009). FCDA has an overt political agenda in this sense - to reveal the ways in which discourse participates in the social construction of gender identities and unequal gender relations. However, a level of agency is maintained for individuals within the FCDA framework as discourses while often oppressive, can also be utilised as tools for empowerment, or “creating something new” (Lehtonen 2007, 6). FCDA is thus concerned with the multitude of ways that discourses can be repressive, competing and empowering.
“Doing Reflexivity”

Also in line with Denzin and Lincoln’s aforementioned qualitative approach, this research emphasises the “social nature and constitution” of my research (Dowling 2010, 30-31; Denzin and Lincoln 2003) by practicing critical-reflexivity through acknowledging the influence that researcher values, aims, identities and so forth have on the stated research questions and results (Cunliffe 2004). As such, I have made a point of writing in the first person throughout most of this thesis, as a way of highlighting how my own experiences and perceptions are an inherent component of this research.

Nevertheless, I also share Skeggs’ (2002) concern with the power dynamics created through such researcher processes of self-reflexivity. Skeggs warns that long, autobiographical confessions and self-explorations have a tendency to rely on static images of research participants and ‘the field’, producing “reflexivity winners” with the luxury of self-expression and “reflexivity losers”, or those without that luxury (2002, 365). It is important to remember that research participants are not always afforded the same process of self-exploration and self-representation in research processes as are researchers (Adkins 2002).

Hence, I have attempted throughout this project to be sensitive as much as possible to the ways that I have influenced and prejudiced the research design and process, as well as within my own practice of critical reflexivity. One of the most important manifestations of this has been my interest in the words and discourse I employ myself, how I am located within the peacebuilding and gender discourse, and the impacts of this upon my research design. I have also prioritised “doing reflexivity” as opposed to mainly writing about it within my chapters (Skeggs 2002, 368). To this end, within the remainder of this chapter, I
underscore the ways in which I had to adapt my discourse, methods, and research questions
to attempt to counter some of the imbued prejudices as they became apparent along the way.

**Location**

In order to conduct this research, I spent two months living in the small Palestinian
town of Bethlehem located near the security fence that divides the West Bank from Israel.
While I conducted a number of interviews in other Palestinian areas including Ramallah and
East Jerusalem, the majority of my participants were based in and around Bethlehem.
Bethlehem proved to be an ideal location for me to carry out this research due to my
institutional contacts with the Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation (HCEF), with
whom I lived and volunteered, but also due to Bethlehem’s abundance of peacebuilding
organisations.

The small size of Bethlehem meant that I quickly became a temporary ‘insider’ of the
community and was able to gain an extensive network of contacts and friends. This, coupled
with my HCEF connections, meant I found it relatively easy to locate and approach potential
interviewees. On a deeper level, it also enabled me to interact in daily Bethlehem life which
granted me significant opportunities to learn more about my research from people I met and
situations I found myself in along the way.

This, along with my prior experience with Palestine, the Middle East and the Arabic
language proved invaluable to the interview and research process. Though the interviews
were conducted in English, occasionally Arabic words were used by either myself or the
interviewee in circumstances where the English equivalent did not suffice. Further, my
political, cultural, historical and linguistic familiarity with Palestine provided me with a more
nuanced understanding of the issues brought up in the interviews. This proved invaluable for the practice of FCDA which depended on a certain level of background knowledge of the research context.

This requirement of FCDA also led me to decide not to include Israeli peacebuilding organisations in this study. This decision was made on the basis that I did not have the same level of cultural familiarity with Israeli society, and did not speak any Hebrew. I felt that because I had so much more experience with Palestinian culture and Arabic, I would not have been able to provide an equal depth of analysis to both groups. On a different level, I also did not want to enter myself into a research situation that could be construed as comparing and contrasting different discourses in different cultural settings, particularly in political climate as tense as that between Palestine and Israel.

**Research Participants and Recruitment Processes**

This research is based on interviews I conducted with fourteen NGO workers from eleven different organisations engaged in informal peacebuilding work in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Appendix A gives a brief overview of the organisations and participants involved.

At the outset, based on the findings of my literature review, I approached peacebuilding as being “all activities which aim to eliminate or mitigate direct, structural and cultural violence” (Felice and Wisler 2007, 6) and endeavoured to locate materialisations of this in the West Bank. Moreover, I also wanted to work within the gaps highlighted in the review of the literature in Chapter Three, by ensuring that I was including a Palestinian

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7 See Chapter Three
understanding of peacebuilding and not simply reproducing another decontextualised and homogenised narrative. However, as the term ‘peacebuilding’ was not frequently used explicitly to classify peace and conflict work in Palestine, this proved a difficult endeavour.

To combat these ambiguities I chose to let my research contacts and participants guide the peacebuilding classification and sampling process. Before scheduling interviews, I aimed to discuss with most of my participants whether they considered themselves to be ‘peacebuilders’ and why. I also depended largely on “snowball sampling” (Berg 2006, 44). I contacted three organisations whom explicitly used the term peacebuilding on their websites and brochures, and conducted interviews with members of their staff. Through these initial contacts, I was able to gain contact information of other individuals and organisations my interviewees considered relevant to my study. In this way, I relied on Palestinian ‘experts’ to determine what peacebuilding meant in the Palestinian context. Consequently, my research took a more nuanced and context-specific approach to peacebuilding and included a wide-range of NGOs engaged in various different activities, than had I relied on my own rather simplistic perspective of peacebuilding based on the general literature. In addition, I also make room in my study for less conventional, non-institutional forms of informal peacebuilding in the Palestinian context.8

As such, it is important to consider the framework and context in which peacebuilding exists within the West Bank. The ongoing occupation of Palestine, the lack of Palestinian governmental services and authority and the ongoing deprivation of the Palestinian population in the West Bank have greatly influenced informal peacebuilding in the Palestinian context (Hassassian 2006). Informal peacebuilding activities in the West Bank

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8 As will be shown in Chapter Six
reside in a complex nexus of resistance to occupation, societal development, and nation-building with many local organisations involved in all three types of activities (Hassassian 2006). From this standpoint, informal peacebuilding in the West Bank involves not simply working for an end to the occupation and thereby peace with Israel, but it also entails the promotion of a culture of peace and security within Palestinian society as well. Thus, Palestinian civil society peacebuilding becomes intimately wound up with approaches to democratic transformation; gender equality; economic sustainability; psychological healing; religious tolerance and so forth (Moaz 2004). As it is impossible to divorce issues such as refugee rights, human rights, democracy, and women’s issues in Palestine from the ongoing occupation, Palestinian civil society’s approaches to peace are resultantly wide-ranging, and carried out by various different religious and secular groups. Collectively, the organisations included in this research project carried out activities such as conflict resolution training; human rights advocacy; peace and democracy education initiatives; international awareness raising; protesting inter-faith activities; bridge-building between Palestinian and Israeli communities; women’s groups; youth work; and medical and psychological relief services.

As most organisations I contacted were relatively small yet constantly busy, I interviewed one member of staff in most cases. However, the Arab Education Institute (AEI), with whom I spent a significant amount of my time, allowed me to interview with three members of staff. In many cases when I contacted the organisation itself, I was only granted permission to conduct interviews with organisational directors. This occurred perhaps due to the fact that NGO directors tended to be more proficient in English than other staff members, and what I suspected was their desire to maintain control over what was said. This was sometimes frustrating as I on occasion suspected that there may have been other staff members with more experience working on and discussing gender matters. In other
situations, however, I had been given contacts for particular individuals from others, and in this way I was able to gain access to the most relevant participants to interview.

**Data Collection**

To best answer my research questions, I chose to carry out semi-structured interviews, one of the preferred methods of feminist research (DeVault and Gross 2007). The use of semi-structured interviews proved extremely helpful in various ways. Most importantly, while I sought a level of consistency in terms of the types of questions I asked across all interviews conducted, I simultaneously reserved the freedom to probe at different themes as they arose. I also found that it often became necessary to reorder, reword and/or clarify questions at different points during the proceedings (Berg 2006). For example, I found that when using the term ‘gender’ in interview questions about men and masculinities, I often received responses that referred solely to women. While this asked important questions regarding conceptualisations of the term gender which may be an avenue for future research, I often found myself having to rephrase and explain my questions to ensure interviewees knew that I was also interested in hearing about men.

Another way in which the use of semi-structured interviews proved beneficial was the level of communication between myself and the interviewees during interviews. I followed down the path of Paget, and approached my interviews as a “search procedure” (Paget 1983, 78) where both myself and my participants underwent a process of meaning making through discussion of ideas, experiences and viewpoints. As such, I rejected the positivist interviewer’s “pretence of neutrality” (Oakley 1981, 51) and perceived my interviews instead as a “collaborative moment of making knowledge” (DeVault and Gross 2007, 181) as opposed to a mechanistic question-answer session. As Fontana and Frey (2003) report
“[methodologically], this new approach provides a greater spectrum of responses and greater insight into the lives of respondents” (83).

Interviews were carried out in the offices of interviewees. While this meant there were frequent interruptions in most of the interviews, I wanted to ensure respondents were in a place they felt comfortable. Interviews lasted approximately forty-five minutes and were recorded with the permission of the respondent onto a voice recorder and my personal laptop computer. Simultaneously, I took written notes during interviews to enable me to have a general written account of what was said for the purposes of crosschecking during the transcription stage. I also used note taking to record my own thoughts and responses as they arose during interviews.

With the majority of my research participants, I organised face-to-face meetings prior to the actual interviews so that I would have an opportunity to establish familiarity and rapport, as well as to gain a better understanding of the kind of work that each organisation carried out. In some cases, this process of rapport building and organisational familiarity translated into brief volunteering opportunities, as well as going along to visit specific projects, or being invited to sit in on workshops and meetings, not to mention the immeasurable amounts of Arabic coffee. To my excitement, one organisation invited me to host a series of workshops on gender, masculinities and peacebuilding for a group of Palestinian youth. This gave me an opportunity to reciprocate to the community the knowledge they were helping generate, as well as to gain a deeper understanding of how my research focus was conceptualised within the Palestinian context.
Transcription and Coding

The transcription process was unromantic. Like Kvale (1996), I too felt almost like a “traitor” as I transcribed my interviews from what were often warm, emotive conversations between myself and my research participants, to “frozen” (165–166) texts for analysis. I found that in this sense, something of the passion, emotion and humour that characterised some interviews, was ‘lost in transcription’. I transcribed verbatim but decided to remove the ‘ums’ and ‘ahs’ from each transcript as I felt by leaving them in their unedited form, “I was rendering [the] sincere and sophisticated thoughts [of my respondents] into singularly inelegant language” (Dortins 2002, 208).

Following transcription, I underwent sorting and coding procedures. As a first step, I sorted through my interview transcripts for key, umbrella themes to establish an organisational structure for my analysis. This was perhaps the most difficult step within my analysis process as I found that with my own research ‘data’ there were multiple ways in which I could have structured and organised my research each providing a slightly different outlook and ‘feel’. As a result, I found it difficult to strike a balance between effectively answering my research questions while simultaneously remaining loyal to the particular research context in which my study is grounded. In the end however, I settled on a simple and broad coding approach, in which I distinguished between passages that dealt with the impacts of occupation and armed conflict, and those that covered peacebuilding.

Following these preliminary rounds, I collated all the passages that related to the impacts of armed conflict, and all those that dealt with peacebuilding into two separate

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9 For example, I initially utilized a coding structure based on research conducted by a feminist scholar on peacebuilding – however, I found that the overall ‘narrative’ this coding organization produced was not representative of how gender features in Palestinian discourses of peacebuilding.
documents. From here, I read through each document, and colour coded for key over-arching themes. Within each theme, there emerged a number of sub-themes, each of which I assigned another colour. I subsequently matched the colour groups together within each document, and what resulted was the establishment of the different thematic clusters which make up both Chapters’ Five and Six.

**Application of Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis**

Following the coding stage, I employed Fairclough’s three dimensional analytical approach to critical discourse analysis which proved effective at “re-presenting” (Mansvelt and Berg 2010, 341) interviews about masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding with Palestinian practitioners. Fairclough’s device calls for a three-pronged strategy for approaching discourse, which I applied to my own analysis (Lehtonen 2007). Firstly, I conducted a textual analysis of the particularities of the coded and collated interviews including how gender was constructed and positioned within the texts. Here, I chose not to focus too intently on specific linguistic devices such as grammar, syntax, and sentence structure. To read meaning into the peculiarities of speech seemed somewhat unmerited as for all of my participants, English was a second-language. Alternatively, I adopted elements of Foucauldian analysis such as searching for gendered dichotomies and truth claims through “persuasion [which] entails establishing and maintaining sets of ideas, practices and attitudes as both common sense and legitimate”. Moreover, I made a point of noting down the various ‘silences’ through omission that I encountered in interviews and “privileged discourses” which silence alternative narratives and experiences (Waitt 2010, 233–236). Secondly, I conducted an analysis of discourse practice which was concerned with the ways in which the discursive event was produced, interpreted, and consumed (Lehtonen 2007; Janks 1997). At this step, I re-approached my data by trying to examine my own interference and influence
over the texts by applying critical-reflexivity to my analysis. To avoid over-complicating the analysis stages of my research and deterring from the voices of my participants, I chose not to explicitly discuss these findings directly in my analysis, but instead have endeavoured to incorporate them throughout this methodology chapter. Thirdly, I conducted an analysis of social context which concentrated on the broader social, historical and cultural environments in which the texts were located (Janks 1997; Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002; Lehtonen 2007; Fairclough 1989). Here, I related and connected the distinctive parts of my data to broader social, cultural and historical themes and research, including that which were discussed in both chapters Three and Four, where applicable.

FCDA as an analytical approach was well suited to my research questions and objectives for various reasons. It enabled me to look into interviewee comments at a profound level in terms of not simply addressing what was spoken but to delve deeper into the particular images and pre-conceived notions that informed these statements and explanations. This was especially pertinent in my research as I often found that what interviewees did not say about men and masculinities was often just as interesting and insightful as that which they did. Further, the contextual emphasis of FCDA proved invaluable for my ability to effectively tackle my research questions. By immersing the interviews within broader social, political and cultural narratives, I was able to add a deeper level of meaning to interviews than had I approached the interviews in isolation.

Ethics and Positionalities

Before travelling to Bethlehem, I sought ethical approval from the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee which was granted in April 2010. As required by this process, I designed a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix B) as well as an Informed
Consent Form (Appendix C) and an Interview Questions Guide (Appendix D). In the preliminary meetings I had with most participants, I explained to them my research project’s aims and objectives so that everyone involved was clear on what the topic was and what I intended to do with it. In these meetings, I also discussed the possibilities of reciprocation in the form of workshops, volunteer work, or sending of summaries of findings. Subsequently, at the beginning of each interview I gave each respondent a Participant Information Sheet and asked them to fill out an Informed Consent form which I went through with them. I explained that their participation was voluntary, and they had the right to withdraw at anytime without needing to explain. I also explained that their interviews would only be heard by myself, and destroyed after the final publication unless they requested a copy themselves.

In these meetings I also discussed issues of organisational and institutional confidentiality. I gave each respondent the opportunity to determine how they would like to be named or labelled in the final publications of my research. I also made sure that I had the organisation’s permission to be publicly named. In general most organisations agreed to be named, however a few chose not to. Further, as most respondents chose not to be named, I explained to them that they would be referred to in the thesis (and any further publications of its findings) as ‘Interviewee’ along with a number designation. I opted not to include gender classifications for these participants, as in some cases this would have made for easy identification of respondents who had wished to remain unnamed in my research, specifically in the case of very small organisations. Other participants chose to be named within my thesis, and in these cases I chose to refer to them by their first names only.

Please note that the research questions and thesis title as written on the attached Information Sheet and Participant Information Sheet are different to this final version. This is a result of a change to the overall direction of the thesis inquiry.
In addition to the University’s ethical procedures, in this project, I tried to stay attune to “contextual knowledges about appropriate ethic” in terms of “learning from others involved in research – organisations, research participants. . . – about what they want, what suits them and what they perceive to be ethical” (Hopkins 2007, 389). In a broader sense, I came to care quite strongly about the community in which I was living and the people and organisations involved in my research. This ‘care’ had profound impacts on my research design and outcomes in terms of the different ways that I chose to structure my research processes and analytical methods as indicated throughout this chapter. I did my best to be sensitive to the particular political, cultural and institutional contexts in which I was researching, and what could be perceived as ‘harmful’ in these unique environments. For instance, originally I had hoped to note the religious affiliations of the organisations I interviewed. However, I realised after some time in Bethlehem that highlighting the religious affiliations of my respondents and/or their organisations could potentially be perceived as an attempt to compare Christian and Muslim responses. In the context of the ongoing occupation, this was a deeply political concern as the Israeli occupation was commonly perceived as both intentionally and unintentionally exacerbating divisions between Muslim and Christian communities further weakening a Palestinian sense of unity. In response, I decided not to highlight the religious affiliations of participating organisations.11

Conducting ethical research also required acknowledging my own positionality and the impacts this had on my research and participants. As Sultana (2007) describes:

the knowledge produced in research occurs within the context of the research process, embedded within broader social relations and development processes that place me and my respondents in different locations (383).

11 In addition, due to the fact that my respondents lived under a military occupation, I made a point of being extra careful protecting my research notes, transcriptions and so forth in order to protect their identities. This meant memorizing code names and so forth so no names would be written down should I be searched by an Israeli soldier at a checkpoint or leaving the airport at Tel Aviv.
As a young, white, ‘Western’, female from New Zealand, I was definitely in a different position to that of my research participants. The fact that my participants resided in a territory under military occupation raised a number of concerns for me as a researcher. Not being a Palestinian, I had so many more rights and privileges than those granted to my research participants in their own land. One of these included my ability to travel wherever I chose (except for Gaza which remains under an Israeli imposed embargo) in Palestine and Israel. As suggested in Chapter Four this lack of freedom of movement within their ancestral homeland was deeply painful to many of my research participants. One interviewee emotively stated,

the Palestinian people, they suffer from the checkpoint from the occupation. They want to be treated equal... but they can’t to go Jerusalem. They can’t go, I can’t go, you can go. This is my land, this is my country, but I can’t reach Jerusalem. So I cut inside myself (Interviewee 8).  

Further, I was often confronted by a concern about how Palestinians were portrayed in the West, and was frequently asked if I would go home and ‘tell the truth’ about the Palestinians. While I was pleased that I had convinced those making the requests that I somehow ‘understood’, it also felt like a huge responsibility. Nevertheless, such occurrences made me realise that from the perspective of my participants, I had an additional ethical responsibility as a Westerner to tell the Palestinian story, and to ensure fair and respectful representation of not just my participants but also the Palestinian community in general.

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12 This was another reason why I chose not to conduct research with organisations in Israel (and East Jerusalem) as I chose to limit my travel outside of the West Bank as much as possible so as not to have to deal with the guilt of having more freedom of movement in a foreign land than its own inhabitants.
In addition to this, in my own experience I found that I often inhabited the lower end of the hierarchy in interview and meeting settings. This can be explained in a number of ways. Being a young, female researcher interviews with older Palestinian men occasionally became uncomfortable. In these instances, I felt that I was not taken seriously as a legitimate researcher, particularly due to my ‘unusual’ questions about men, but perhaps also as a result of my gender and age. In a couple of cases, I felt that respondents rushed their answers, or did not pay close attention to the questions I asked, and expertly balanced their attentions between the interview and their e-mails and/or texts. I sometimes felt restricted in these interviews, as I was aware of certain cultural norms in which as a young woman, I was expected to show a certain level of respect particularly for older men by not overtly challenging them through disagreements, particular if other people were present (Toine).

In another case, during a meeting with a female respondent I was told that as a female researcher, I was missing the mark with my research and that I should be asking questions about the experiences of women. Subsequently, in her interview, the respondent made a point of side-stepping my specific questions about men, and instead answering them as they concerned Palestinian women. On this, and a number of other occasions, I sensed that as a Western, female researcher, I was put under an obligation to focus on women’s issues, and thus by choosing to address the experiences and discourses about men, I was committing a small act of betrayal towards my sex. Moreover, my position as a Western woman, may have generated pressure for respondents, especially male respondents, to prove their ‘feminist-ness’ and their gender-sensitivity, to counter prevailing stereotypes about sexism in Palestinian culture. This may have been one reason for the propensity of some interviews to veer towards a gender analysis of women and girls in peacebuilding as opposed to men and boys. Further, I had to remain sensitive to the fact that most of the participating organisations
were already under donor pressure to demonstrate the existence of a gender agenda in their work to maintain funding, and I was perhaps viewed as part of this system.

In other cases, my positionality proved enabling. My linguistic and cultural familiarity, having grown up in Jordan, and my previous student activist experience raising awareness of the Palestinian plight, proved highly beneficial to building trust between myself and my respondents. Trust was important for numerous reasons specific to the Palestinian case. For example, in one case, my requests for interviews were in the process of being refused by one organisation, until I informed a member of staff that my parents had worked for a Mennonite organisation in the past. Instantaneously, the mood of the conversation changed and I was welcomed as a ‘Mennonite sister’ to the organisation and had my request for an interview accepted. I was considered trustworthy due to my familial Christian connections. While I generally felt very welcome during my time in Palestine, I did often feel that I had to undergo a process of proving my political loyalty to the Palestinian cause in order to be accepted. While discussing one’s political motivations and leanings may in some research situations be considered problematic, in my own case I found that expressing my solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians enabled me to garner trust from my research participants. Additionally, from an ethical perspective, it allowed me to be honest with my participants of my own political positionings and motivations for conducting my research.

This chapter has mapped out the particular theoretical foundations, methodologies and analytical tools utilised in this study. It aimed to show the personal nature of this research and how the research itself cannot be separated from the researcher who carried it out. It also portrayed how the study evolved as a negotiated research process, often being tweaked or altered to fit the context in which it operated.
CHAPTER THREE - LITERATURE REVIEW: GENDER, ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING

This chapter outlines the literature that informs my research on men, masculinities and peacebuilding. In the first section, I explore the scholarship on men, masculinities and armed conflict. This section uncovers the predominance of the ‘male combatant’ narrative, as well as silences surrounding the notion of men as civilians and non-combatants. In relation to these essentialising discourses, the first part of my own research works to challenge these stereotypes by examining the ways that non-combatant, civilian men are also present and victimised within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The second section examines the differing theoretical approaches to the concept of peacebuilding. Here I locate my research within the ‘emerging’ peacebuilding tradition, but also make note of the need to pay closer attention to endogenous manifestations of peacebuilding in different contexts. In this section, I also present an overview of the theoretical field of gender and peacebuilding. Here, I problematise the minimal and essentialist treatment of men and masculinities in the current literature, and highlight the need for more research on the involvement of men within informal peacebuilding programs and movements. The second portion of my research is situated within this research gap, as I aim to show the ways in which men are somewhat alienated from institutionalised informal peacebuilding schemes in the West Bank, and further, that men’s involvement in peacebuilding in the West Bank materialises in less conventional, and alternative ways.
Men, Masculinities and Armed Conflict

Men, Masculinities, Violence and Armed Conflict

“War is to man what maternity is to women” – Benito Mussolini

For decades, anthropologists, feminist international relations scholars and others have explored the links between gender, militarism and armed conflict (Dolan 2002; Moran 2010; Shepherd 2008; Cooke 1993a; Dubravka 2005; Moser 2005; Cockburn 2005; Enloe 1989; Elshtain 1995; Goldstein 2003). Within this literature, war and armed conflict have traditionally been considered as “men’s business” (Large 1997, 24). Men make up the large majority of the world’s combatants, and thus it is not unsurprising that men are largely stereotyped as warriors, soldiers, and combatants (Goldstein 2003). However, the majority of mainstream political, international relations and historical debate tends to take for granted the overtly gendered nature of war and armed conflict (Goldstein 2003; Handrahan 2004). Handrahan (2004) explains that the uncritical treatment of men’s near monopoly on soldiering and political violence as being because such “assumptions about what men do (and what women do not do) are so ingrained in essential ideas of manhood, or masculinity, such activities are seen as normal behaviour – behaviour so mundane that it is ‘unseen’ and unquestioned” (432).

Nevertheless, within the predominantly feminist literature that does deal explicitly with this “universal gendering of war” (Goldstein 2003, 10) there exist two over-arching schools of thought regarding the connections between men and war. On one side, biological arguments are employed by many scholars, feminist and not, to explain the disproportionate numbers of male combatants compared to those of women. This line of thought suggests that men are inherently predisposed to violence, and thereby war represents a natural extension of
this (Fukuyama 1998). Such arguments revolve around men’s apparent natural aggression due to: male hormones such as testosterone (George 1997); male sexuality “by the promise of a sexual reward for combat or possibly by aggression-enhancing properties of male sexuality” (Goldstein 2003, 333); and evolutionary “hominosocial competition” in which males compete for dominance over each other, females, resources and their respective social groups (Kimmel and Aronson 2004, 810). These attempts to decipher the gendered nature of war are founded upon particularly rigid and fixed understandings of gender identities, in which the male ‘sex’ share fixed behavioural traits and social functions relating to their biological make-up. This viewpoint has largely been discredited based on its inability to reconcile itself with the fact that most men never engage in combat (Connell 2001). Furthermore, its problematic equation of individual aggression with state wars on a much greater scale has also been challenged (Ehrenreich 1999). Moreover, the general lack of evidence of such vast biological differences and factors inherent in males that make involvement in war inevitable also discredits this perspective (Goldstein 2003).

By contrast, many feminist scholars have suggested a divergent interpretation for “men’s near monopoly on organised violence” contingent upon a clearer distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ (Moran 2010, 263; see also Pettman 1996; Connell 2000; Enloe 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). In this view, ‘sex’ refers to the biological, anatomical, and hormonal traits that characterise males and females; whilst ‘gender’ refers to the “the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women”, or masculinities and femininities (World Health Organization 2011, Para. 3). This implies a need to “move from asking about men’s violence to asking about masculine violence . . . [as masculinity] like war, is a cultural construction [emphasis added]” meaning we need to examine what masculinities are likely to become
disposed to violence (Pettman 1996, 94). Thus in reference to armed conflict settings, these feminists contend that boys and men are socialised into combat and soldiering based on particular militarised configurations of masculinities. As Enloe (1989) explains, brave soldiers are not born; they are made.

This gender perspective on militarism also builds on the concept of “multiple masculinities” (Collinson and Hearn 1996, 62) which proposes that instead of one, singular conceptualisation of a male gender role, there are in fact, many. Thus we speak of ‘men and masculinities’ as opposed to the latter’s singular form, to reflect the “complexity and multiplicity of men’s lives” and identities (Andrist, Nicholas, and Wolf 2006, 34). In theory, this perspective leaves room for both soldiering, warrior masculinities, as well as peacebuilder and nurturing masculinities.

Feminist studies have suggested that in times of armed conflict gender relations and ideologies undergo a process of dramatic disruption (Moran 2010). A process of militarisation occurs in communities experiencing conflict, and through this process, militarization can promote rapid shifts in the way men and women behave toward each other, the work they do, and what they expect of each other and of themselves. Intimately connected with the process of organizing human and material resources into permanent, legitimate institutions concerned with armed force, militarism requires men and women to consider how their supposedly natural talents and abilities may be put to the service of a larger cause (Moran 2010, 263).

In this way, expectations of men’s roles and traits become framed around soldiering and militancy. Nationalist discourses for example promote militarised manifestations of masculinities by idealising archetypical images of male warriors protecting their ‘motherland’ and ‘their women’ (Handrahan 2004). Consequently, as Goldstein (2003) states, gender

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13 Chapter Three expands on this idea within the Palestinian/Israeli context
identities prove a useful means to “induce men to fight” as “cultures mold males into warriors by attaching to ‘manhood’ or ‘masculinity’ those qualities that make good warriors” (252). Sasson-Levy (2007) comes to similar conclusions in her study of Israeli combat soldiers. In Israel, militarised combat masculinities become increasingly valued over other forms of masculinity, or more specifically, become established as the “hegemonic” version of masculinity (Carrigan, Lee, and Connell 1985, 551).

Hegemonic masculinity is considered the most socially valued and dominant form of masculine identity within a certain context, by which all other masculinities and femininities are subordinated (Carrigan, Lee, and Connell 1985). Feminists have increasingly employed this concept to explore why different men engage in conflict and how masculinities become militarised in particular settings. In Sasson-Levy’s (2007) study, it is through military and combat positions specifically, that the ‘ultimate’ Israeli male is constructed physically and psychologically. Highlighting the potency of these masculine archetypes, images of these men dressed up in their army uniforms are widely disseminated through the Israeli media to sell products such as insurance and cream cheese (Sasson-Levy 2007). Her study further argues that in present Israeli society words that characterise normative masculinity are also those that typify military service (honour, bravery, strength, and duty). These hegemonic narratives of combat masculinity are a powerful means by which ordinary men become seduced into military service in their quest to prove themselves ‘men’.

Nevertheless, this shift to thinking about the roots of men’s violence as being socially constructed has not always resulted in less essentialising analyses of men and masculinities in armed conflict settings. For example, in a large proportion of feminist theory, hegemonic masculinity is often applied universally, and uncritically. Thus, despite the theory’s emphasis
on the hierarchical relationships between different groups of ‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’ masculinities, many feminist studies on war neglect the existence of other non-militarised masculinities. Instead, the militarised, violent masculinities are discussed as if they are the only gender configuration for men (see for example, Handrahan 2004; Cockburn 2005; Obando 2008). In this way, violent masculinities are constructed as the ‘norm’ for men. For example, in 2004 the Association for Women’s Rights in Development produced an analysis which highlighted “masculinity as the root of public and private conflicts” linking political violence with patriarchy, rape and domestic violence (Obando 2008, Para. 1). The document called for the dismantling of masculinity within institutions which “promote and legitimize masculine power” (Para. 18), and highlighted the subordination of women as a result of rigid gender structures that arise in times of political violence (Obando 2008). Similarly, other scholars liken war to “patriarchy by other means” (Coomaraswamy and Fonseka 2004, 4).

Sharoni and McKeown (2002) critique such analyses by arguing that generally, feminist literature on the topic [of militarised masculinities] underscores the fact that in most cultures to be manly means to be warrior. As a result, the link between masculinity and propensity to violence has been conceptualized as nature-given and unquestionable (3).

Consequently, individual men are not discussed in terms of how their experiences relate to these themes of patriarchy and militarism, in fact men are barely mentioned at all. Instead, these particular themes of masculinity and conflict are conflated with men as individuals. While these arguments are based on a legitimate premise of gender inequality and gendered social structures, strategic silences within the general arguments obscure complex realities and deny the experiences of men who do not fall within the confines of pervasive gendered stereotypes. The fact that large amounts of men do not participate in armed conflict frequently goes unmentioned in discussions of violent masculinities and armed conflict (Connell 2001).
To rectify this problem in the literature, other researchers have suggested a more nuanced, contextual approach to understanding why some men engage in political violence. Dolan (2002) argues that in the case of Uganda, it is men’s inability to conform to traditional hegemonic ideals of masculinity that lead men to violence and combat, and not the fact that hegemonic masculinities are necessarily violent in themselves. Dolan contends that

in the face of the dynamic interaction between a [hegemonic] model of masculinity and a context of violence, the possibility of developing alternative masculinities collapses. Unable to live up to the model, but offered no alternative, some men resort to acts of violence (2002, 57).

His investigation suggests that it is the lack of employment; the inability to afford to get married; the inability to provide physical protection for oneself and one’s family, and so forth, that lead some Ugandan men to join armed groups, who often get paid higher wages than do non-combatant men. Ugandan hegemonic configurations are thus not necessarily shaped around violence, but it is the inability of men to live up to traditional, hegemonic ideals of masculinity that drive men into violence.

**Gendered Stereotypes and Invisible Non-Combatants**

The field of gender and militarism has been particularly silent on the existence and experience of non-combatant, civilian men in conflict settings. On this, Pankhurst (2008) argues that the feminist application of gender analyses in terms of exploring the “various and contrasting social roles, identities, sources of and constraints on power and control” have not been applied to men to the same extent that they are to women in conflict settings (313). Men remain subsumed by the combatant label and thus, Pankhurst argues that “we need to understand more about men who do not resort to violence, even when they have all the life experiences that would lead us to expect them to do so” (2008, 312).
The uncritical association made between men and combat correspondingly suggests that men are not civilians of armed conflict. For example, Carpenter (2006a) argues that through the use of “gender essentialisms political actors typically associate women and children, but not adult men, with civilian status” and as such, she finds that men are often not granted equal access to international protective services in conflict settings as these often use “sex and age as proxy variables for “civilian/combatant” (2). On this, Jones contends that this feature of both feminist and non-feminist literature, as well as international responses to armed conflict “suggests that battle-age men are neither vulnerable nor innocent, whether or not they are actually combatants” (Adam Jones cited in Carpenter 2006, 3).

As a result of early mainstream accounts of armed conflict neglecting the experiences of women and girls, there has been a growing body of feminist study aimed at addressing the divergent, gender impacts of political violence and armed conflict on “women (and men)” (Sweetman 2005, 3; U.N. Security Council 2000; Cockburn 2005; Moser 2005). As Sweetman (2005) reports, “there are aspects of women's and girls' experience of armed conflict which are not shared by men or boys. Gender identity affects the ways in which people are caught up in armed conflict, and what happens to them during and after it” (2).

The increased attention to the gendered impacts of conflict has resulted in an immense amount of research being conducted on women’s experiences of conflict as civilians, as well as a narrative in which women are positioned as being the “main victims of war” (El-Jack 2003, 11; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Gardam 1997). Consequently, male civilians inhabit an ambiguous position in this literature as their gendered experiences of conflict are overlooked (symbolically, men are often included in brackets as shown in the previous paragraph) or considered to be manifest within mainstream, gender-neutral scholarship. This exclusion not
only stereotypes women as civilians and helpless victims, but it further typecasts men as combatants, and also conceals alternative men’s experiences as civilians and victims (Gunda Werner Institute 2010).

Recently however, there have been sporadic attempts to reverse this research gap by some scholars. Examples include, the study of sexualised violence against men in conflict-zones (Sivakumaran 2007; Carlson 2006); men as victims of gender-targeted killings (Carpenter 2006b; Jones 2000; Dubravka 2005); the proportion men globally who fall victim to the direct and indirect costs of war and conflict (Human Security Centre 2005); and also, the experiences of male refugees (Turner 1999; Jaji 2009). Nevertheless, this drive for increased attention to men’s experiences as civilians as well as their victimisation in conflict settings remains marginal and is in need of further research. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the lack of published research on Palestinian men and masculinities and their experiences of the ongoing conflict with Israel. Chapter Five of this study aims at filling in this absence in the literature.

Men, and Masculinities within Gender and Peacebuilding

Theoretical Approaches to Peacebuilding

Before exploring the location of men and masculinities within gender and peacebuilding frameworks, it is important to first explore the different meanings of peacebuilding, and to establish the approach taken in this study. As Miller eloquently puts it, the concept of peacebuilding remains in “etymological adolescence . . . gangly and undefined” (Robert Miller quoted in Haugerudbraaten 1998, 1), and therefore providing a clear definition is a difficult task. In the literature, there exist a multitude of different
definitions and ways of understanding the term ‘peacebuilding’. For conceptual clarity, I focus briefly on two approaches, each inhabiting opposite ends of the peacebuilding spectrum.

On one side, there exists a traditional and formal understanding of peacebuilding that largely remains loyal to the conceptualisation of the term when it was originally coined by United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992. Within this framework, peacebuilding is defined as a post-conflict activity aimed at maintaining formal peace agreements by taking “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros Ghali 1992, Para. 21). Formal peacebuilding involves “high-level national and international” (Schirch 2008, 4) actors and actions “designed to prevent the eruption or return of armed conflict” (Barnett et al. 2007, 36; see also Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Cutter 2005). This traditional, top-down understanding of peacebuilding has as “immediate focus on ending direct violence”, with less emphasis on addressing the root and structural causes of violence and conflict (Schirch 2008).

On the other end of the spectrum, is the broader, informal approach in which peacebuilding is conceived as “an umbrella term for all work geared toward social change at all levels of society and in all stages of conflict” (Schirch 2008, 2). This approach emerged in the 1990s out of a “convergence between the notions of development and security” (Duffield 2007, 344; see also Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). This position maintains that peacebuilding necessitates development in order to successfully transform conflict between different parties, as sustainable peacebuilding requires the creation of,

a situation, a society or a community in which individuals are enabled to develop and use to the full their capacities for creativity, service and enjoyment. Unless
development in this sense can take place, no settlement will lead to a secure and lasting peace (Curle 1971, 174).

As such, the scope and mandate of peacebuilding inherent in this definition are far greater than those within the traditional conception. For example, Felice and Wisler (2006) describe peacebuilding as involving,

the creative and simultaneous political and social processes for finding transcendent solutions to the root causes of conflicts and efforts to change violent attitudes and behaviour. Peacebuilding is multidimensional and it includes the full range of activities from post-war reconstruction to preventive measures. Peacebuilding encompasses all activities which aim to eliminate or mitigate direct, structural and cultural violence (6).

While inclusive of high-level actions such as peace negotiations, disarmament campaigns, and humanitarian aid delivery as some examples, this emergent understanding of peacebuilding also encompasses ‘low-level’ and informal activities aimed at social justice, development, human rights and equality (Nelson et al. 1999).

Furthermore this view implies a concern not simply with bringing about (and maintaining) a cessation of the direct violence, but further, it necessitates paying attention to the root causes of conflict. As such, informal peacebuilding seeks to promote Galtung’s (2007) concept of “positive peace” (Para. 4) insofar as its mandate includes the removal of “structural violence”, or structural social injustice and inequalities at all levels of society (Para. 3). Galtung explains that simply pursuing the end of direct violence (known as “negative peace”) compared to aiming to root out structural violence “are as different as negative health, the absence of (symptoms of) illness and positive health, the feeling of wellness and the capacity to handle some illness” (2007, Para. 4). As such, informal peacebuilding mechanisms have a much broader scope than do traditional, formal conceptions whose main aim is to eradicate direct violence first and foremost.
Importantly, the broad nature of informal peacebuilding leaves much greater space for grassroots and indigenous initiatives, methods and customs. Within the general peacebuilding literature, recent debate has arisen around the need to move away from Western and liberal “formulaic” approaches towards that of ‘indigenous’ methods of peacebuilding (El-Bushra 2008, 24) involving local initiatives, structures and methods to complement more formalised, “top-down” approaches (Lederach 2000, 52; Morris 2000).

Moreover, contrary to the traditional, formal outlook which emphasises short-term, post-conflict measures, informal understandings of peacebuilding “pre-post-conflict” activities (Harris 2005, 60). By not necessitating a pre-existing, political cessation of violence prior to peacebuilding, the informal view highlights the roles that non-political actors (and factors) can play in “[decreasing] the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict” (Bush 1998, 33). This conceptualisation of peacebuilding draws attention to the roles that women’s peace movements, inter-group exchanges, religious groups, anti-violence campaigns and so forth, play in the cessation of violence (Schirch 2008).

My own research addresses peacebuilding initiatives located within the informal framework. In the general absence of formal peacebuilding actions at the government and international level due to the lack of a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, informal materialisations of peacebuilding take on a renewed importance. As Melville (2003) states in Palestine, peacebuilding is considered to be “any efforts aimed to resolve the conflict through non-military means” (Para. 1). Adopting this broad, informal approach leaves room to address localised and uniquely Palestinian conceptions of peacebuilding, which a more rigid and traditional understanding of peacebuilding may not have encompassed.
Gender and Peacebuilding

Gender as a concept has been receiving increasing attention within both formal and informal conceptions of peacebuilding. The theory and practice of gender and peacebuilding have in many ways been influenced by the shifting approaches to women and gender taken within the field of development. The inclusion of women and gender within development became especially prominent in 1970s in the Women in Development (WID) paradigm in which there occurred the establishment of development programs and organisational structures aimed at addressing women’s needs and roles in development processes (Ruxton 2004). WID however, was succeeded by the Gender and Development (GAD) framework, which promoted a shift from addressing women specifically, to exploring gender and gender relations as the central analytical concept (Moser 1993).

Though often critiqued for not appearing that different from WID as a result of the continued emphasis on women at the expense of men and gender relations in general, in theory GAD provides “greater space for the study of ‘the other side’ of the gender coin: that of men and masculinities” (Jones 2006, xii). Resultantly, there has been a growing body of “men-streaming” scholarship within GAD which looks at the possibilities of “the explicit inclusion of male issues as gender issues and the relational aspect of gender” (Correia and Bannon 2006, 246). This avenue of inquiry looks at the ways that men as gendered beings are also negatively impacted by underdevelopment and development processes (Dolan 2002; Barker 2005; Correia and Bannon 2006), and likewise, how men can be engaged in the pursuit of gender equality (Ruxton 2004; Chant and Gutmann 2000; Cornwall 1998).
These advances in the field of gender and development have provided a strong theoretical and practical foundation for debates surrounding the need to engender peacebuilding, particularly as peacebuilding has increasingly been adopted within the development agenda (Barnes 2010). Post-conflict development and peacebuilding thought involve both elements of WID and GAD. Women-only programs are seen as vital in relation to establishing “new norms and rules, engage new leaders, and build new institutions (and) to redress gender disparities in women’s access to essential services and resources” (Zuckerman and Greenberg 2004, 71) with respect to gender in a time of social and political upheaval. In terms of GAD theory, gender analyses have enhanced policy makers’ and researchers’ capacities to assess the differential impacts of armed conflict on men and women, as well as the gendered dynamics of conflict itself (Munro 2000; Purkarthofer 2006). However, despite this increased consideration of gender within its narratives, there has been a clear lack of ‘men-streaming’ debates and discourses within peacebuilding scholarship. As Dolan (2002) argues, the findings from the growing body of research on men and masculinities within conflict and development fields have yet to filter into peacebuilding and humanitarian practice.

**Gender and formal peacebuilding.** A dominant theme within the gender and peacebuilding literature is that ‘formal’ peacebuilding is a highly gendered process in that programs are dominated by men, neglecting both women and gender issues (Munro 2000, 2). This then translates into women’s interests not being taken into consideration in formal agreements and in reconstruction efforts (Simic 2005; Coomaraswamy and Fonseka 2004). From her observations as a gender consultant in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Simic (2005) argues that,

men present at the negotiating table are usually interested in distribution of the land and the future power in the state. Who will rule the country and who will have more
power in governmental structures are more of a priority than issues women might propose. Moreover, while transitioning from war to peace, men still keep high-masculinized [sic] society in which budget and all sources are tend [sic] to be allocated primarily to ‘security issues’ (Para. 24).

In a similar vein to Simic, Obando (2008) implies that placing security and peacekeeping responsibilities in the hands of men post-conflict is dangerous as men are traditionally ‘war-makers’. While there is certainly a lack of women’s representation in both formal peace processes and security infrastructures, the arguments surrounding this point runs the risk of further entrenching gender stereotypes surrounding men and masculinities (and by extension, women and femininities). Cornwall’s (1998) arguments on the construction of men in gender and development literature are relevant here. She argues that in these types of statements, men tend to be presented as an unquestioned, generic category where their “occasional appearances tend to be in the guise of Man the Oppressor, as custodians and perpetrators of male domination and as obstacles to equitable development” (Para. 3). Simic and Obando’s arguments above similarly rely on highly stereotypical and uncritical accounts of men as a monolithic category. In this way, the male political and military leaders who populate the peace negotiation tables are unquestionably framed as sharing the same gendered interests, characteristics, roles and concerns as all other men regardless of class, age, ethnic group, location and so forth. In her case study of Mozambique, Jacobson (2005) challenges this perspective by arguing that despite male dominance at peace negotiations alongside women, most Mozambican men were also not given voice. Jacobson argues that the positions taken by political elites do not inherently represent the views, aspirations and issues of ordinary Mozambican men, simply because the former are ‘men’ (2005b).

While yet to filter down into peacebuilding discourse, within the GAD literature more generally, there has been growing criticism of the ways in which men are “shown but not
said, visible but not questioned” (Hearn 1998, 786) in their positioning as a homogenous and static category. The tendency to remain “men-generic” and “men-static” occurs despite the increasing attention paid by GAD and peacebuilding scholarship to the fluid nature of women’s roles and identities and the intersections between women’s gender roles and other social categories such as age, race, and class (Barker et al. 2009, 11). My research aims to challenge these dominant and rigid representations of men primarily by looking at the alternative subject positions men inhabit in the Palestinian context. Moreover, my research also sheds light on men and masculinities that are also excluded from the official peace negotiations and political structures, and the ways in which they too attempt to partake in the struggle for social justice and peace.

**Gender and informal peacebuilding.** Correspondingly, there is also increasing global attention being paid to gender in informal, grassroots, peacebuilding processes (Cordero 2005; Pankhurst 2003; Anderson 2000; Sweetman 2005). This area of research tends to focus on women’s organisation for the cessation of violence and the maintenance of peace in different contexts, as it is stressed that “women may have distinct issues and processes from men” with respect to peacebuilding (De La Rey and McKay 2006, 142; McKay and De La Rey 2001). Such informal organising includes NGO groups, inter-group dialogue programs, micro-credit schemes, gender equality projects, protest organising and so forth. The involvement of women in this level of peace management is often heralded “as being a springboard for women to enter public and political arenas” (Bouta et al., 2005, 65) in spite of their exclusion from formal peace processes. Further, as formal peacebuilding initiatives are understood as largely neglecting such issues, informal initiatives are considered a key arena through which democratic inclusiveness, gender matters, and the quest for gender equality are promoted within the field of peacebuilding (Ray 2006; Bouta et al., 2005).
The emphasis placed on women’s ‘peace work’ by feminist peacebuilding and development scholarship has its roots in the gendered discourse of war and peace. Similar to the ways in which armed conflict and war have been associated with men and masculinity, the notions of peace and peacebuilding have been likewise gendered as being attributes and activities more commonly associated with women and femininities (Yesufu 2000). This “celebration of ‘peaceful women’” (Pankhurst 2003, 162) has taken different forms within the literature. Some highlight women’s ‘natural’ propensities towards peacemaking due to their reproductive roles as mothers, and their ‘inherent’ nurturing qualities (Coomaraswamy and Fonseka 2004; Yesufu 2000; Ruddick 1995). Correspondingly, others propose that women’s peacebuilding potential grows out of particular social processes and gender ideologies where women assume care-giving, nurturing roles in society. As such, women are generalised as being more peaceful, communicative, and cooperative than men, all of which are thought to correlate with the central aims of peace movements (Pankhurst 2003; Bates 2000).

By extension, it is difficult to establish how men fit within this gendered discourse of peacebuilding, and further still, how they are involved in such peace work. According to some accounts, women’s participation in these ‘unofficial’ peacebuilding schemes tend to be higher than that of men (Bouta et al. 2005, a point also raised by research participants Toine and Fuad). In addition, gender-based research and analysis of men’s involvement in informal peacebuilding processes are virtually non-existent. As Bouta et al. (2005) contend, men and men-led organizations are also involved in [informal peacebuilding in] various ways. For example, churches played an active role in building political consensus and supporting national reconciliation in Angola, Liberia, and Sudan. Male journalists, human rights activists, and students actively participated in informal peace processes in Indonesia and Rwanda. However, these activities have not been looked at
from a gender perspective and therefore do not increase our understanding of the different roles that women and men play (67).

This represents a major gap in peacebuilding literature, as informal processes are often the only arena through which people at the grassroots within different communities are able to participate in the maintenance and promotion of peace. The lack of theoretical attention to men and masculinities and informal peacebuilding has also translated into a lack of policy and practical interest. Stern and Nystrand (2006) state that within their extensive research on gender, conflict and its management, they were unable to “identify any example of a program or approach in program that focuses on men’s needs or masculinity in explicit relation to armed conflict” (100). This gap is problematic when considering the emphasis on men and masculinities within gender-based literature on the causes and structures of armed conflict. One would assume that since men and masculinities play such a central role in ‘the problem’ of armed conflict, by rights they should be considered within the quest for a ‘solution’.

Though these research gaps abound, while writing this thesis, a training manual was published by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation’s Women Peacemakers Program entitled “Together for Transformation: Men, Masculinities and Peacebuilding” (IFOR Women Peacemakers Program 2010). This document represents one of the first attempts to take masculinities seriously in peacebuilding theory and practice. While the resources included in the training pack tend to emphasise the inclusion of men and masculinities insofar as they can work to tackle gender inequalities and violence against women as opposed to tackling men’s own gender vulnerabilities, victimisations, and the broader manifestations of violent masculinities, this resource is a significant first-step towards men-streaming gender and peacebuilding.

14 Highlighted in Part One of this chapter
This thesis aims to follow this lead by exploring the ways that men and masculinities are discursively included within informal peacebuilding programs and initiatives in the West Bank. Chapter Six in particular examines the ways in which men are understood as interacting with informal institutional ‘femininised’ peace activities, and further, how men’s roles in the more ‘masculinised’ resistance movement in Palestine can be considered an alternative, informal peacebuilding narrative and approach.

This chapter has outlined the various ways in which men and masculinities interact with armed conflict and peacebuilding discourses. What has been shown is that collectively, the dominant trends within these fields appear to subscribe to and reinforce the fundamental notion that men make war while women suffer from it. Likewise these trends also promote the narrative that men and “men’s activities are . . . [part of the] ‘root causes of war’, whereas women ‘can bring peace, if only men will let them’” (Mary K. Burguieres quoted in Bates 2000, 77). This thesis challenges these notions by shedding light on the ways that West Bank men, like West Bank women, girls and boys, are victimised by armed conflict in their positions as non-combatants. In addition, this thesis goes on to examine how men too are actively engaged in working to end armed conflict despite their discursive invisibility within mainstream peacebuilding initiatives and discourse.
In order to provide the background necessary to best answer the research questions laid out in Chapter One, this chapter provides a general overview of the history and context of the West Bank. Instead of a traditional background chapter detailing the historical, political and socio-economic conditions of ‘the field’, what is presented here is a historical analysis of the West Bank context, stressing gender relations with a ‘masculinities’ emphasis. This method of recounting the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and exploring the socio-economic conditions of the West Bank allows the reader to gain a deeper conceptualisation of both Palestinian masculinities, and the ongoing conflict and military occupation. Likewise, this approach highlights the interconnections between the Israeli-Palestinian history and Palestinian narratives of masculinity.

This chapter is separated into two sections: the first touches on some issues relating to the method employed in this chapter and a discussion of how I have chosen to label the Palestinian territorial areas; and the second presents a chronological gender analysis of the tumultuous history between Israel and the Palestinians.

Background to this Context Chapter

A Note on the Method Taken in this Chapter

In my own research, providing a traditional foundation of ‘hard evidence’ relating to the historical, political, geographical and economic context and ‘truths’ upon which my ‘soft’ and subjective gender analyses would be grounded, proved counterproductive. In my early
attempts to draw up a chronological, historical and ‘hard fact’-based account of the conflict, I found that I was simply producing yet another allegedly ‘objective’, yet inherently charged narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Due to the deeply controversial nature of the history of the region, and the reality that the different ‘facts’ and events that make up the historical narratives of the conflict are all hotly contested by the different sides, all examinations of the conflict employ particular ‘lenses’ through which the history is viewed. These include for example, Zionist, pro-Palestinian, Marxist, religious, human rights based stances and so forth. One cannot explore this troubled history without adopting one or more of these ‘lenses’ with each constructing a very different narrative of the conflict. Hence, in keeping with the feminist post-structural roots of this research, in terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there is no ‘objective’, ‘hard-fact’-based reality which to report.

As such, I have chosen a gender lens through which to view and construct the history of the West Bank. This choice revolves around the old feminist mantra that “gender makes the world go round” (Enloe 1989, 1). Namely, this chapter is founded on the thought that ‘subjective’ issues like gender and masculinities also play a foundational role in the shape of the conflict and vice versa. As a result, gender and masculinities are not a separate issue to be slotted in and compartmentalised at the end of a more ‘important’ analysis of the ‘hard facts’ of politics and history. Instead, they play an integral role within that history. Therefore, in this chapter, I have chosen to merge the apparent ‘objective facts’ with the supposed subjective cultural analysis in an attempt to highlight that the two cannot be divorced from each other, and further, that masculinities really do matter in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Palestine, Israel, or the Occupied Territories? A Note on Terms

The controversies surrounding the different names and terms used to describe the collective Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, give a clear indication of the contentious and political nature of ‘constructing’ a contextual overview of Israeli-Palestinian history. Over the course of my research, I found myself alternating between the references ‘the Occupied Territories’, ‘Palestine’ and the ‘Palestinian Territories’ depending on my audience. There exist a multitude of different ways of ‘naming’ the territories, but it is important to understand that each conceals a deeply political history. For example, many refuse to use the term ‘occupied’ as they believe there is no Israeli ‘occupation’ of foreign land with regards to East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank, as they are all simply part of greater Israel, or at the least, ‘disputed’ territories. Likewise, others refuse to use the reference the ‘Occupied Territories’ as it does not put enough emphasis on the Palestinian claim to or history in the area.

As the headings used throughout the second part of this chapter portray, the name of these territories are constantly changing, reflecting different political and colonial arrangements all of which can be considered foreign constructs. Therefore, like many other academics, my research participants and most Palestinians themselves, I have chosen to employ the term ‘Palestine’ when referring to these areas. The term Palestine, though highly contentious to some, reflects the Palestinian desire for sovereignty, the pursuit for nationhood, as well as their existence as a people and a culture independent of the ongoing political situation with Israel. While from the outside, the name of these territories may frequently appear to be changing, and its geography and borders constantly shifting (mostly shrinking), for its inhabitants and my research participants, its name has always remained Palestine.
A History of the Conflict through the Lens of Masculinity

Traditional Man in ‘Ottoman Palestine’

Prior to the first Jewish “Aliyah” (meaning ‘ascent’ in Hebrew, referring to modern Jewish immigration) to Ottoman Palestine in 1882 (Peretz 1996, 109), traditional conceptions of Palestinian masculinity were intricate, and largely revolved around the concept of sharaf (roughly meaning ‘honour’). While sharaf is a difficult concept to translate into English, it has been described as “the sum of all moral virtues that gives a man a right to higher social status” (Lang 2005, 110). Sharaf is highly dependent on an individual’s social reputation concerning his perceived morality and integrity, but is also tightly intertwined with the notion of family honour, particularly that of his female family members (Lang 2005). Palestinian men were expected to be rulers of their domestic domains. This involved controlling female relatives particularly in terms of their sexuality and sexual purity, alongside playing the role...
of breadwinner and protector of the family (Hart 2008; Haj 1992). As Seidler (2006) describes,

Within cultures that emphasise codes of honour, individual behaviours can reflect on family names. Since women often carry the honour of their family, their behaviours are often regulated and policed. Their virginity can be crucial to the honour of the family within the community, so that their fathers and brothers feel responsible for their protection (73–74).

Thus in traditional Palestinian society, the hegemonic ideal of masculinity involved the acquisition and defence of *sharaf*.

Wisdom was also a major element of idealised masculinity – a ‘true’ Palestinian man was perceived to have acquired ‘*aql* (meaning ‘social sense’). According to Peteet (2000), the concept of ‘*aql* involved a complex rite of passage involving the attainment of knowledge and wisdom, as opposed to a physical or ritualistic transformation of the male body (323). A man who was perceived to possess both *sharaf* and ‘*aql* was often called upon to assume the role of mediator in *sulha*, an indigenous mode of Palestinian community conflict resolution, one of the highest social obligations of a Palestinian man in traditional society (Lang 2005; Peteet 2000). This normative ideal of Palestinian masculinity was largely confined to older men as only they were thought to be able to fully understand the intricacies of society (Peteet 2000).

Some commentators have pointed to the absence of a militarised understanding of manhood within early Palestinian society. Peteet for example, finds that Palestinian men often attempted to evade Ottoman military service as they found it lacked *sharaf*. Traditional Palestinian manhood was dependent on wisdom and authority, both of which were threatened by military service as it meant a man was expected to give up his self-autonomy, and to passively obey the orders of his superiors. Thus at this time in Palestinian history, Peteet
explains “masculine honor was more associated with one’s cleverness in evading conscription” (Julie M. Peteet quoted in Kanaaneh 2005, 262).

Man and Nation – Palestinian Nationalism in ‘Mandatory Palestine’

Following its defeat in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost a large amount of its territory to the Allied Forces, and by 1923, ‘Ottoman Palestine’ had become “Mandatory Palestine”, an official mandate of the British Empire (Peretz 1996, 10–11).

Historians and academics on both sides continue to debate the meaning of key documents, political intentions, and contextual interpretations concerning British actions during their time in the Middle East. Key to this controversy is the perceived discrepancies between British promises made to the Arabs, to European Jews, and the agreements the British signed with its European allies. For example, in the Hussain-McMahon letters of 1915-16, the British promised Arab independence in the Middle East should the Ottoman Empire fall during the war (Peretz 1996). This promise contrasted greatly with British intentions inherent within the secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, in which the French and British apportioned the areas of the Middle East into spheres of influence for themselves and their Russian allies (Pappe 2003). In a further litigious move, despite its promises to the Arabs embodied within the Hussain-McMahon correspondence, the British signed the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British Crown pledged to Lord Rothschild, the head of the British Zionist community, its support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Pappe 2003).

Zionism, a movement for the establishment of a homeland for Jews in pre-1948 Palestine, had been on the rise in Europe since the 1800s, as a direct response to Jewish persecution in Europe and Russia (Tessler 1994). The first Zionist-inspired immigration movement (aliyah) occurred in 1882, and since then there continued the systematic growth of
the “Yishuv” (Hebrew name given to the collective Jewish settlements in Palestine, prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948) (Tessler 1994, 43). While initially small in numbers, Jewish immigration to Palestine greatly increased following the establishment of the British mandate system. This occurred largely due to increased violent anti-Semitism in Europe, along with the removal of the previously existing Ottoman limits on Jewish immigration and landownership in Palestine (Tessler 1994).

This surge in Jewish immigration led to increased tensions between Palestinian and Jewish communities who had prior to this lived in peace, as there had been a sizeable Jewish population in the area for centuries (Pappe 2003). The result was, among other things, a rejuvenation and reformation of Palestinian national and gender identities. Perceptions of masculinity became deeply intertwined with mounting Palestinian nationalist sentiment which had been growing with intensity in response to these shifting demographics.

Ideals and images of masculinity played a significant role in shaping Palestinian nationalist discourse, as well as in fashioning individual responses to the Palestinian predicament. Massad suggests that these novel formations and symbols of idealised nationalist Palestinian masculinity was, “a new type of masculinity” with “little to do with tradition” (Joseph Massad quoted in Kanaaneh 2005, 261). For example, Palestinian masculinities and notions of sharaf became intricately connected to a man’s ability to defend his land (Katz 1996). One of the “meta-phrases” of Palestinian nationalism at the time was “arrdi-irrdi” which literally translated means “my land is my women” (Katz 1996, 88). This became an important nationalist ‘rally-cri’ for Palestinian men, due to the aforementioned links between Palestinian normative masculinity and the protection of the honour of ‘his women’. As Katz (1996) observes regarding this refocus, “[possession] and defence of land
and women were at the centre not only of emerging national consciousness but of individual men’s self-respect” (88).

To foment this process there occurred a discursive “feminisation of the land” within Palestinian nationalist rhetoric (Katz 1996, 88). Palestinian poetry at the time (then a key medium of nationalist communication) began framing the land as a wild female lover to be pacified and domesticated (Katz 1996). Similarly, poet Iskander al-Khuri al-Baytjali depicted the land of Palestine as a “vulnerable” and weak woman as a consequence of foreign occupation (Katz 1996, 85). As a consequence of the various challenges that foreign domination posed to Palestinian nationhood, the land was portrayed as a woman in order to create the understanding that if Palestinian males were able to protect this land, they would concurrently boost their masculine credentials. The taming of the feminine lover or the protection of the vulnerable feminine-land turned those who fought or resisted the Jews and later the Israelis into ‘real men’ (Katz 1996).

This indicates the emergence of a new form of masculinity within Palestinian society shaped by the changing political circumstances, whereby the ultimate male was the one that fought to protect his land. These nationalist ‘rally-cries’ became increasingly important as Palestinians lost more and more land to the encroaching Yishuv (Katz 1996). As Katz (1996) further notes, the “importance of the defence of land and the political conditions which made this goal ultimately impossible to achieve fostered a culture of martyrdom” (88). ‘Death by the sword’ became a new symbol of heroic Palestinian masculinity in which men died to protect their land and sharaf from not only Zionist land-grabs, but also the modern temptations the Jews were thought to have brought with them from Europe (Katz 1996). In his poem entitled Al-Shahid (‘the martyr’), one Palestinian poet declared, “O how joyous was
his face when he was passing to death; singing to the whole world: could I but sacrifice myself for God and my country” (Ibrahim Tuqan quoted in Katz 1996, 88).

**Al-Nakbah, the ‘State of Israel’ and Political Paternity**

In 1947, the British relinquished their control over the area due to rising hostility from the Palestinian and Jewish communities, and the Mandate was turned over to the United Nations (Peretz 1996). UN Resolution 181 was passed in this year which called for the partition of the area whereby a future Jewish state would receive 55% of the territory despite Palestinian protestations that the partition of mandatory Palestine equated "the division of Algeria between the French settlers and the indigenous population" (Pappe 2003, 124). The following day, war broke out throughout Mandatory Palestine, and continued past the declaration of Israeli independence following British withdrawal in May 1948. Surrounding Arab states also joined in the war effort (Smith 2000). In the aftermath however, the Arabs were defeated by Israel, who resultanty increased the land under their control from that promised to them in Resolution 181. In addition, Jordan took control over the West Bank, and Egypt seized the Gaza Strip (Peretz 1996).

The period between 1947 and 1948 also represents the period of *Al-Nakbah*, (meaning ‘the Catastrophe’ in Arabic) referring to the vast exodus of Palestinians from their homes to Arab controlled areas in Palestine and surrounding Arab states. This period represents the birth of the current Palestinian refugee problem, and to this day is an extremely significant element of Palestinian collective memory that must not be underestimated. The themes of displacement, indigeneity, and loss of land pervade all areas of modern Palestinian life (Tessler 1994). As Morris (2001) reports, between 1947 and 1949, approximately 700,000 Palestinians became refugees (252). Today, there are approximately seven million Palestinian
refugees throughout the world, many still living in refugee camps in Palestinian areas and in surrounding Arab states (BADIL 2007). Many of these families continue to display in their homes large, rusty keys once used to grant entry to their houses in their ancestral villages and towns in Palestine. The keys are a symbol of the resilience of these refugees, and their resistance to giving up on the right of return guaranteed them by UN Resolution 194 (Bennis 2007). Displacement of Palestinians however is not an exclusive phenomenon of 1948 and remains an ongoing issue. For example, West Bank residents continue to face demolition orders on their family homes and land to make room for Jewish settlement infrastructure (Missing Peace 2010).

*Figure 2: Large key display at Aida Refugee Camp in Bethlehem*

![Large key display at Aida Refugee Camp in Bethlehem](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Photo: Alana Foster

Following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Palestinians were left in a state of limbo with respect to political leadership. Surrounding Arab states offered no solutions to their predicament, and small nationalistic guerrilla groups materialised out of refugee camps and universities in order to fill the political vacuum (Bennis 2007). Unable to
control and direct these ad-hoc movements, Arab states created the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 in order to centralise the nationalist movement but in addition, to create the illusion of a unified Palestinian leadership (Morris 2001). Regardless, guerrilla nationalist groups seized control of the PLO under Yasser Arafat and Fateh (translated into English as the ‘Palestinian Liberation Movement’) following the PLO and Arab state loss in the Six Day War of 1967. The result of which saw Israel successfully occupy the remaining Palestinian areas (Massad 1995).

In his detailed analysis of the gendered nature of Palestinian nationalism, Massad (1995) highlights the significant impact of Al-Nakbah on Palestinian national and gender identities by examining the 1964 Palestinian National Charter of the PLO. He notes that in the Charter, Palestinian identity was described as “a genuine, inherent and eternal trait and is transmitted from fathers to sons” (472). Further, Article 5 of the Charter stated that “Palestinians are those Arab citizens who used to reside ... in Palestine until 1947, . . . and everyone who is born of an Arab Palestinian father after this date - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is a Palestinian” (Massad 1995, 472). Massad distinguishes this explanation of “Palestinianess” with that which existed prior to the 1947 Al-Nakbah manifest in the preamble of the Charter, in which Palestinian identity was defined as those living or having been born within ‘mother-Palestine’ (1995, 470). As Massad describes,

It is being born to a Palestinian father that now functions as the prerequisite for Palestinianess. . . . Territory was replaced by paternity. The disqualification of the land as mother in her national reproductive role, in the Charter, does not deny that the land, as mother, can produce children, but rather that, since the rape, it can no longer be relied upon to reproduce legitimate Palestinian children. Within this metaphoric schema, women clearly cannot be agents of nationality. Their role, thus, becomes secondary and supportive in the narrative of nationalism (1995, 472).

This redefinition of Palestinian identity implies not only the past failures of Palestinian men in their socially prescribed roles as protectors of ‘mother-Palestine’ in the
wake of the Zionist conquest, it concurrently diagnoses the need for a novel role for Palestinian men. Such includes the continuation of ‘Palestinianeness’ despite their exile from their homeland through a father’s reproductive relationship with his children. This catered to the conditions at the time whereby many Palestinian men had lost their control of their land and thereby a key feature of Palestinian masculinity. Following Al-Nakbah and the various military and political defeats suffered by the Palestinians, nationalist discourse switched from advancing symbols of heroic masculinity to those of a defeated masculinity (Amireh 2003). Amireh (2003) explains that,

The major nationalist milestones in the Palestinian narrative tend to be occasions of military loss. For generations of Palestinians especially the men, Palestinian nationalism was experienced as humiliation. According to this narrative, the Palestinian male fails to possess the land; the homeland in this narrative is a female body possessed by others. This metaphor of the loss of Palestine as rape, which has been a constant in the Palestinian and wider Arab political nationalist discourse, signifies the loss of Palestine as loss of female virginity but also of male virility, since the virile actor now is the rapist/enemy. This male loss of virility is inscribed as Palestinian defeat (753).

In sum, the events of 1947 not only symbolised the loss of the Palestinian homeland, but it also signified a major loss for nationalised images of heroic masculinity, and in its place emerged a dominant “melancholic male-centred narrative” of humiliation (Hochberg 2010, 587).

The First Intifada – A Gendered Rite of Passage

The First Intifada (translated as ‘shaking off’) began in 1987 and ended in 1993. By 1987, the Palestinians who remained in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, had endured life under Israeli military occupation for twenty years. With no end in sight and the dramatic upheaval of Palestinian life and society caused by the ongoing occupation, the situation was

15 See Chapter Five
uneasy (Tessler 1994; Morris 2001; Pappe 2003). Palestinians no longer had freedom of movement inside or outside of the newly occupied territories, and were often subject to violent attacks by Jewish settlers and occupation forces (Tessler 1994). In addition, to make room for even more Jewish settlements as well as Israeli defence infrastructure, many families based in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian areas, lost their homes as well as their agricultural and land-based livelihoods (Peretz 1996).

In turn, following the deaths of four Palestinian men from a refugee camp near Gaza in a road accident, mass demonstrations broke out throughout the Palestine in December 1987 (Tessler 1994; Peretz 1996). These soon materialised into a popular uprising called the Intifada (Peretz 1996, 89). It was largely non-violent and included among other things, blocking off roads; protests; refusing to pay taxes to the Israeli administration; flying the prohibited Palestinian flag; and ignoring curfews (Peretz 1996).

This was also a unique point in Palestinian history as it brought together previously divided political factions who began working together towards a common goal (Tessler 1994). Until that point the PLO’s influence was largely based in Arab States outside of Palestine however, during the Intifada they made a concerted effort to gain local Palestinian support and influence (Tessler 1994). The PLO worked alongside Islamic groups in the underground leadership of the Intifada. Apart from this, there were in addition a wide-range of local political, charitable, religious and advocacy groups also actively involved, including women's movements, civil society organisations and youth groups (Peretz 1996). The uprising ended with the signing of the first part of the Oslo Accords in 1993 however, these peace accords are considered to have failed and thus never brought about any real change for Palestinians (Pappe 2003).
The first Intifada also had profound effects on Palestinian masculinities. Once it began, a symbolic ‘rite of passage’ emerged, which was very different from the aforementioned traditional acquisition of ‘aql (Peteet 2000). Peteet (2000) calls this novel process a “ritual of resistance” involving violent engagement with Israeli soldiers where Palestinian males were able to acquire manhood and respect in the eyes of society (244). Contrary to what one might expect, this ritualised achievement of manhood did not necessitate violence on the part of Palestinian youths, rather the defining element was the violence directed towards the adolescent himself. Thus all Palestinian males who had been subject to violence at the hands of Israelis – be it through prison interrogations, being shot, or hand to hand combat with soldiers or settlers – were considered to be undergoing a transition into manhood (Peteet 2000). As Peteet explains,

a representation created [by Israelis] with the intent of humiliating has been reversed into one of honour, manhood and moral superiority . . . Marks on the body, though certainly unwanted, signal a resistant, masculine subjectivity and agency (2000, 255). The ‘punishment’ was thus reinvented and re-imagined by Palestinian society to become a ritual of resistance and sacrifice on the part on Palestinian men and boys.

Upon return to his community after a violent ordeal, a young man was welcomed back with visitors, special meals and new clothing (Peteet 2000). Peteet explains that often these young boys were given similar responsibilities to those of the community elders of the past in terms of being called on to mediate disputes, or sulha (Peteet 2000; see also Lang 2005). As Peteet describes during and after the first Intifada,

the power and status of the older generation were eclipsed. Young males took over the tasks previously the preserve of the mature, often notable men. For example, disputes were mediated in new judicial tribunals organized and staffed by the underground leadership (2000, 263).
This represented a dramatic shift from the past, as traditionally sulha responsibilities were confined to older men, as these boys would have been considered too young to have acquired the necessary wisdom and 'aql for such roles. However, it was obvious that Palestinian notions of manhood had transformed dramatically as a consequence of the ongoing political conflict with Israel.

*Al-Aqsa Intifada – Martyr Masculinities*

The *Al-Aqsa Intifada* marked the symbolic end of the Oslo 'peace process', and can be attributed to the breakdown of peace talks held at Camp David, in July 2000 (Bennis 2007). The Palestinian position at these talks was that the proposed division of land would disadvantage the Palestinians as Israel would remain in control of large portions of the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, Arafat was blamed for the breakdown of the peace process (Agha and Malley 2001). Tensions ran high in Palestine and Israel as a result. The second uprising began in September 2000, when Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon embarked on a provocative visit to “*Haram Al-Sharif*” (Temple Mount) a holy site to the Muslim faith, *Al-Aqsa Mosque* (Bennis 2007, 120).

This *Intifada*, while initially resembling the mass non-violent movement of the first, soon took a different turn. Clashes between protesters and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers frequently turned violent, and consequently fewer Palestinians participated in the struggle (Schock 2004). While there was an active and dominant nonviolent arm to the uprising, suicide bombings became the new symbol of the Palestinian resistance. The Israeli reprisals were violent and included the 'sieges' of 2002, where the IDF moved into different parts of the West Bank (Hammami and Tamari 2006). Curfews were established, and instead of the mass, popular uprising that symbolised the first *Intifada*, in this instance, most
Palestinians took refuge in their homes for weeks on end. As will be highlighted in Chapter Six of this thesis, the second uprising turned into an event that most Palestinians simply watched from a distance (Bennis 2007).

During the first Intifada the symbol of male resistance was the stone throwing adolescent with his keffiyeh (traditional Arab headdress) disguising his face, but the male prototype of the second Intifada was the ‘martyr’. Martyrs in Palestinian communities are considered those killed or sacrificed as active participants of the Palestinian resistance, or as innocent victims of Israeli attacks (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003). Although women and girls are also memorialised as martyrs, the popular, archetypical martyrs are boys and men (Hasso 2005). The escalation of violent and often fatal Israeli responses to stone throwing and demonstrations in the second Intifada (Allen 2006a), along with the spread of suicide bombing as a tactic of Palestinian resistance groups, has raised the bar on what epitomises sacrifice and heroism for the national struggle.

In contrast to Peteet’s (2000) discussion of young Palestinian males being beaten and/or imprisoned and returning to their neighbourhoods as heroes, the new heroes of the second uprising returned home in coffins, to mass public funerals, or on “posters plastered on the walls of refugee camps and urban main streets” (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, 9). Toine, a participant in this study discussed this phenomenon of martyrdom explaining that,

there is a distinguish a case between humiliation and frustration and power... There is a mental health organisation in Gaza which has made studies about this, this whole pattern. And really that creates also a lot of feelings of there is no value for me to live through, and this feeling that it is better to be a martyr, just to let yourself blow up (Toine).
This statement was made in reference to young people witnessing the loss of power and authority of their fathers who had been ‘humiliated’ in various ways by the occupation.\textsuperscript{16} Similar to Dolan’s perspective described in Chapter Three, to Toine, Palestinian martyrdom culture was bred out of male frustration at being unable to conform to traditional gender expectations, and young people seeing more value, status and power being accrued through martyrdom as opposed to experiencing the same humiliations as their fathers.

\textbf{Figure 3: Martyr poster in Al-Am'ari Refugee Camp, Ramallah}

This new male warrior-hero was matched by a novel, complementary female archetype - the \textit{Umahat Al-Shuhada’} (‘mothers of martyrs’), exemplified for her contribution of active sons to the national struggle (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003). These women became visible symbols of Palestinian resistance through their verbal and physical acts of pride and

\textsuperscript{16} See Chapter Five
jubilation at their sons’ martyrdom through singing and ululating (Johnson and Kuttab 2001). Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s (2003) analysis of these ‘mother’s of martyrs’, documents the immense pressure felt by these women by their extended families and communities, to celebrate the deaths of their sons in order to promote national pride and “hero worship” (Gerami 2005, 455) of those martyred by Israel. In a way, these women were given the important nationalist role of turning what otherwise would be considered a loss, into a symbolic victory in order to prevent feelings of helplessness within the broader community.

In sum, the resulting public status conferred upon young male martyrs encouraged others to sacrifice themselves for the cause through such acts as suicide bombings, which further exacerbated tensions between Palestinians and Israel (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003). Again, this shift in idealised masculine archetypes correlated directly with the shifting political realities of the occupation.

**Post Al-Aqsa – Crisis Masculinities**

While it remains unclear when exactly the second *Intifada* ended, its impacts on life in the West Bank are ongoing. Israeli imposed restriction of movement of West Bank residents has increased since 2000, mainly as a result of the construction of a ‘security barrier’ (otherwise known as ‘the Wall’), as an attempt to limit the amount of attacks within Israel. Israel's construction of the Wall around and within the West Bank has greatly hindered Palestinian freedom of movement, and Palestinians frequently talk of residing within a giant prison. As Shearer (2006) explains,

> [one] key impact . . . is the way it has isolated residents of the West Bank from East Jerusalem, the traditional centre of Palestinian religious and cultural life and where important health and education services are located. Reaching the *Al-Aqsa* mosque in Jerusalem, one of the most holy sites for Muslims, for example, is no longer possible for most West Bank Palestinians (22).
The Wall has also allowed for increases in the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements within the West Bank since 2000 (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem 2008). In July 2009, it was estimated that approximately 296,700 Israeli settlers are living in the West Bank within these settlements (Central Intelligence Agency 2011b) which are illegal under international law (Al-Jazeera 2011). In order to maintain and protect this settlement infrastructure and to control Palestinian movement for ‘security purposes’, Israel has erected a multitude of IDF checkpoints throughout the West Bank. The number of these checkpoints increased during the second Intifada to some 528 in the beginning of 2006 (Haaretz Daily Newspaper 2006). As will be expanded upon in Chapter Five, these checkpoints are a source of many hardships for Palestinians as they cut towns and cities in the West Bank off from each other, making personal and business-related travel very difficult. On their way to work or school, Palestinians are often forced to pass through multiple checkpoints meaning that what should be a short commute often turns into a full day ordeal (Goldman 2008). This restriction of movement of West Bank residents is particularly relevant for men, illustrated by the example of the travel ban on all men aged between 16 and 35 from the city of Nablus, in the North of the West Bank (Worldpress.org 2006).

Collectively, the Wall, settlements, checkpoints and bypass roads which link West Bank settlements to each other and to Israel, have seen multitudes of Palestinians dispossessed of their land and livelihoods (MIFTAH 2011). Israel effectively governs and administers what is called “Area C” of the West Bank, which is made up of approximately 70% of the total area of the West Bank (Bennis 2007, 23). Figure Four below illustrates how the settlement and military infrastructure permeates the West Bank.

17 Chapter Five will expand on this point
The extensive settlement, checkpoint and Wall infrastructure has not only destroyed large areas of agricultural land and cut farmers off from their crops it also has detrimental impacts on the transportation of goods within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel. World Bank statistics highlight that the current per capita income of the Palestinians would increase by 7% should international aid double, but per capita income would increase by 25%, should the checkpoints be removed (Farraj 2008, 4).

Historically, many Palestinian men had pursued active employment in Israel and Jewish settlements due to low wages and lack of employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza (Shearer 2006, 22). However, following the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and the
subsequent construction of the Wall, gaining work permits in Israeli has become increasingly difficult for Palestinians (Krauss 2009). Unemployment in the West Bank is at approximately 20% (Indexmundi 2010), and it is believed that the percentage of the population below the poverty line is 46% (Central Intelligence Agency 2011a). As a combined result of decreasing job opportunities in Israel, and the stagnation of the local Palestinian economy, many Palestinian men have lost their jobs, and are now “delaying entry into the labor market or are too discouraged to stay in” (World Bank 2010, Para. 5). These challenges on men’s breadwinner capacities have led to an immense amount of household stress including, as Mitchell (2009) reports,

> a variety of scenarios ranging from men being home more often (to avoid seeing people whom they are indebted to) to men staying away from home to avoid facing one’s wife and children because they cannot provide them with the necessary resources to greater marital and familial tension and arguing to high levels of emotional and mental stress and depression (25).

Unmarried men also face immense pressure as without income-generating opportunities they are unable to fulfil particular social roles expected of them in terms of being able to build a home, marry, and support their parents (Mitchell 2009). Chapter Five builds on some of these issues relevant to the post-Al-Aqsa West Bank environment, and takes a deeper analytical look into the impacts of unemployment, land dispossession and checkpoint encounters on Palestinian masculinities.

In conclusion, the political history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is intricately linked to the evolving nature of Palestinian masculinities. As shown in this chapter, the shifting notions of normative masculinities have played a significant role in the shaping of the conflict and military occupation, and vice versa. This chapter has endeavoured to provide the background necessary to explore in-depth the impacts of the armed conflict on civilian
Palestinian masculinities and the interaction of Palestinian men and masculinities with peacebuilding in the West Bank.
CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS: THWARTED MASCULINITIES AND THE GENDERED IMPACTS OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT ON WEST BANK MEN AND MASCULINITIES

I know when we talk about men and occupation, occupation is really stealing from men their masculinity and this way in order to understand Arabic culture, because you know, from every childhood, whether we agree or not agree, whether we like this type of social building or not, this macho mentality and behaviour is under humiliation for men. In this country in many segments of society including men are of course robbing their status in society, creating unhealthy conditions (Interviewee 7).

What Interviewee 7’s passionate statement here implores us to consider is that static, dichotomised discourses of gender and war have concealed alternative experiences that do not tend to fit within the male/combatant/winner vs. female/victim/loser binaries often employed within conflict and peacebuilding literature. Here, we are challenged to think of men as ‘losers’ alongside women, as well as to expand our rigid gendered narratives of war and armed conflict to comprehend them as being deeply almost emasculating affairs. This ‘thwarting’ of masculine identities stands in direct contrast to dominant outlooks in which conflict (where all men are inevitably stereotyped as being combatants), is reflected as being the ultimate ‘maker of men’ (Goldstein 2003; Kanaaneh 2005; Connell 2001; Fukuyama 1998). Interviewee 7 instead challenges us to expand our understandings of men and conflict, to see men also as civilians, individuals, and losers in conflict settings.

In response, this chapter aims to answer the first of my research questions outlined in Chapter One: What can be learned from Palestinian peacebuilders working in the West Bank about the ways in which non-combatant men and masculinities are impacted upon by the ongoing conflict with Israel? As such, by asking questions that are not usually asked about gender, this chapter is a step towards greater and more inclusive insights into the impacts of
conflict and occupation on different gendered individuals. To this end, this chapter addresses the discourses, narratives and perspectives of local Palestinian peacebuilders on everyday men and masculinities vis-à-vis the ongoing conflict and occupation. By utilising FCDA, this chapter unearths gender ideologies, expectations, and gendered power configurations regarding masculinities to facilitate a broader appreciation of some of the realities faced by men in the West Bank in general.

What surfaced out of the data collation process were a number of key meta-narratives of men’s experiences and masculinities under occupation. The peacebuilders I interviewed, focused attention on three key areas: the struggles of Palestinian fathers to sustain their respect and authority under the forces of the occupation; the impacts on men of land dispossession; and the increasing difficulties of men to maintain their breadwinner statuses within the family. While the consequences of conflict on gender identities are multiple, variant and complex, within my own interviews I found that underpinning the majority of peacebuilder accounts was an omnipresent theme of ‘thwarted masculinity’. Moore (1994) defines this ‘thwarting’ as:

> the inability to sustain or properly take up a gendered subject position, resulting in a crisis, real or imagined, of self-representation and/or social evaluation. . . Thwarting can also be the result of contradictions arising from the taking-up of multiple subject positions, and the pressure of multiple expectations about self-identity or social presentation. It may also come about as the result of other persons refusing to take up or sustain their subject positions vis-à-vis oneself and thereby calling one’s self-identity into question (66)

The premise of being unable to fulfil the ascribed roles of ‘a man’ as a consequence of the occupation took a central position within peacebuilders’ readings of the specific everyday mechanisms and manifestations of the occupation on West Bank masculinities. Or as Dalia

18 See Chapter Two
summarises, “in a man orientated community or society, it is hard for the man to keep his manhood, living under occupation” (Dalia). Thus in this chapter, I explore three key themes on men and masculinities in the West Bank context including fatherhood, breadwinning and land possession while simultaneously paying particular attention to the narrative of ‘thwarted masculinity’.

**Fatherhood at Checkpoints: Palestinian Paternal Masculinities and Encounters with Israeli Soldiers**

In my research, perhaps the most dominant narrative I encountered in interviews and general conversations was that of ‘failed fatherhood’. Kuttab and Johnson (2001) label the difficulties of men in fulfilling their social obligations as fathers including income generation, physical protection, ownership of land and so forth whilst under military occupation as a “crisis in paternity” (10). While men in their capacity as fathers feature frequently throughout the different sections that are covered in this chapter, this section focuses in on one particular aspect of the metanarrative of thwarted fathers that appears unique to the Palestinian community: that of losing one’s authority and status as a father following an interaction with Israeli soldiers. This particular narrative conveyed strong messages as to what a Palestinian father ‘ought to be’ in terms of the hegemonic ideal of Palestinian fatherhood, and how altercations at checkpoints or with soldiers in general, ‘crushed’ this ideal.

Palestinian fathers have not featured significantly within mainstream studies of gender in Palestinian society, except as indistinct, background entities dominating and controlling the lives of their womenfolk. Rubenberg (2001) as an example, paints a dictatorial picture of Palestinian fathers in the lives of their daughters and wives in terms of controlling their movement, educational and marriage choices and so forth. While interviews often echoed
these attributes, the manner used in framing Palestinian fathers suggested an element of fragility to these male identities not acknowledged by the mainstream. Understanding this fragility by way of paying attention to the discourse of ‘thwarted fathers’ as the remainder of this section attempts to do, leads to a much deeper understanding of how men, masculinities and gender relations are impacted upon by the mechanics of the Israeli occupation.

**Palestinian Ideals of Fatherhood**

While staying in Palestine, I was continuously reminded of the prominent role that fatherhood played in social power configurations. In everyday discourse, it was considered proper etiquette to refer to a man using his status as a father. For example, instead of referring to a man by his first name or surname, it was commonplace to call him *Abu Bassem* meaning ‘father of Bassem’, Bassem being the man in question’s eldest son. Political leaders were often referred to along similar lines. For example, the President of the Palestinian Authority, President Mahmoud Abbas, was commonly referred to as *Abu Mazen* (‘father of Mazen’).

The symbolic use of fatherhood to represent social authority was further made explicit in an interview:

> Now if you have a man on stage, a Palestinian man with the figures of a Palestinian man, like with his figure, with his anger on him and this man is calling for ending the conflict standing next to an Israeli, this is really powerful, because as the father in the family, in his family and as a son and as an MP or whatever, this man is... is responsible, he is really responsible for a lot of stuff, he is responsible for all the life responsibilities that he was given by God you know, not only by God but the community, being responsible for you know… securing and offering security to his family, offering and... security goes under food security whether, human security whether... and other things and at the same time being responsible to face the occupation and protect his family from all the practices of the occupation (Dalia).

While the intention of this statement was to highlight how male peace advocates are perceived and respected by a Palestinian audience, the interviewee chose to refer to the former’s social positions as fathers in order to attest to and certify, the authority and
legitimacy of the men in question. As the family is the key arena in which Palestinian patriarchy takes its form fathers, as the patriarchal heads of the family, are bestowed with an immense amount of respect and gender status in Palestinian society (Mitchell 2010). Supporting this, fatherhood proved to be a governing theme within my interviews in various ways. I found that often responses to my questions about men and male gender roles orbited around the experiences of fathers and men within the context of the family as opposed to their roles in the community more broadly.

This paternal authority was made explicit by Baha who stated that: “Of course when it comes to the male image in the society, like because, men or fathers let’s say, mainly fathers, represent authority in this society, they are the image of ... they are the representation of authority in here.” Baha’s self-correction from referring to men and then to fathers specifically suggests, similar to Dalia’s earlier statement, that hegemonic manly authority and status is attributed to one’s relationship with others as a father, not simply because one happens to be a man. This may be a result of the particular occupation context where as Mitchell (2010) argues, “in the absence of a Palestinian state, Palestinian households, families and kinship structures are arguably the most important social institution” (5). Thereby with respect to men and masculinities, the realm of fatherhood represents the key arena in which Palestinian masculinity is enacted upon, and around which, is centred (Peteet 2000; Monterescu 2007).

As implied earlier however, the manner in which fatherhood was ascribed gendered authority and status by interview respondents, hints at the fragility of this correlation. Baha for example, uses the words ‘image’, ‘represent’ and ‘representation’ when voicing the connection between fatherhood and authority, while the previous quote by Dalia refers to
how a man might be perceived ‘on stage’. The authority ascribed to fatherhood in interviews was thus produced by a social expectation rather than a given quality. This point is manifest in the following statement:

> the father is the big boss, the status symbol. So when at times when he cannot provide for the family, he is unemployed, that you know he is in prison... so then you have the conflict between what he is supposed to be - like a powerful person in the family, also an authoritative person in the family, and what he is in practice, being humiliated (Toine).

Here the term ‘symbol’ is used which also hints to this notion of social expectation. This quote goes further by making an explicit distinction between what society expects of individual fathers, and what these men experience in reality. Thus this statement exemplifies Dolan’s (2002) argument that,

> it is necessary to distinguish between men’s lived experiences of their own masculinities, which are necessarily multiple, and their lived expectations of masculinity, which are contained in a hegemonic normative model or set of ideas concerning what defines a man (60).

In parallel to Dolan’s analysis and what is argued throughout the remainder of this section, the political context in which West Bank fathers’ reside makes living up to these hegemonic ideals of masculinity near impossible.

**Thwarted Fathers**

The peacebuilders I interviewed commonly signalled to a divergence between gender expectations and gendered realities by telling stories or giving examples of the experiences of Palestinian fathers’ in interactions with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. In one interview for example, Rasha provided me with a particularly poignant example of an unnamed father’s battle to maintain this lived expectation of fatherly authority:

> a story... happened in Hebron at the checkpoint, that he was with his kids, a man, and they asked him to take off all his clothes and he refused to do. So they shoot him in
front of his kids... Yes he was shot and killed... because he want to protect his image in front of his son

Here the notion of ‘image’ emerges again rather poignantly wherein a father is situated at a symbolic crossroads where he struggles between the pressure to maintain a particular image expected of him as a father, while simultaneously being put in a situation where maintaining this image is impossible. This father, instead of portraying powerlessness in front of his children by stripping naked for Israeli soldiers, chose death in order to protect his image of authority and masculine status.

As there exists a strong infrastructure of segregation between the Palestinian and Israeli communities, for many Palestinians, checkpoints are the main forum in which they interact with Israelis – their perceived oppressors. Thus in many ways, checkpoints represent real and symbolic sites of struggle between ‘the oppressed’ and the infrastructure of their oppression making interactions at checkpoints highly evocative and political encounters.19 As Hochberg (2010) conveys, “[as] a visible display of military force, checkpoints sharply divide Israelis from Palestinians, occupiers from the occupied, according to ‘those who give permission and those who need to ask for it’” (577). However, depending on the gender and familial status of the Palestinian confronting the checkpoint, the social meanings ascribed to negative interactions with soldiers during these encounters alter dramatically. For fathers such encounters have a negative influence upon their gender status.

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19 See Chapter Four
The most common characterisation expressed by peacebuilders with regard to the gendered nature of checkpoint encounters for fathers was that of ‘humiliation’. The following quote typifies the construction of fathers in this vein:

and if he was himself arrested or stripped or humiliated or whatever, he should remain in the eyes of his children and his wife and his father and his mother, a hero, that’s why in a man orientated community or society, it is hard for the man to keep his manhood, living under occupation (Dalia).

Here, a father’s experience of humiliation at the hands of Israeli soldiers is directly correlated to his inability to maintain his ‘manhood’. Thus, what is implied is that the process of ‘humiliation’ that occurs for Palestinian men at checkpoints as a result of being stripped, verbally demeaned, ordered around and having to ask permission to move from place to place, is often interpreted as feminisation (Naaman 2006). However, references to femininity were not made explicitly in the interviews conducted for this study. Nevertheless, there remained a strong undertone of emasculation and the consequent loss of the masculine authority and status ascribed to Palestinian fathers. On this, one of my interview participants put it plainly by claiming that for a father to be
treated badly let’s say, and inhumanely by the Israeli soldiers in front of his family, I think this affects the... his personality, and it makes him like... a weak person, who can’t even say that I am a man who can defend themselves (Interviewee 5).

While typically gender analyses of masculinities in discourse tend to place masculinity as being in opposition to femininity, in many of my interviews I found this method of discourse analysis ineffective. Interviewee 5’s references to weakness here for example, do not easily conjure up characterisations of femininity as from my own understandings of Palestinian gender narratives, women were far from being understood as ‘weak’. Elsewhere, respondents also used alternative expressions to convey this theme of humiliation and emasculation, such as fathers being “crushed” (Baha) or becoming “powerless” (Toine). Again, however, these discourses did not match up neatly with narratives of Palestinian femininities who in the context of the occupation, were often discussed as having a different, ‘quieter’ sort of power and resilience that men were lacking.20

Another important element of this humiliated father discourse is the fact that to have a gendered impact, such humiliation requires the presence of an audience. For example, one peacebuilder, a father himself, explained that you feel that OK you can take the humiliation if you are on your own but you don’t want your family or your wife to... see that humiliation or...it affects your ego, it effects your dignity, so you know how it is so especially for men here they feel very proud about their dignity and think maybe macho or something or like, I think that so many times Israelis take... to destroy like the dignity especially of men by even having young girls, female soldiers interrogate you and sometimes humiliate you at checkpoints (Interviewee 6).

Here, Interviewee 6 insinuates that a father’s family witnessing his maltreatment at a checkpoint accentuates his feelings of humiliation and impacts on his ‘ego’. Along a similar line, another peacebuilder claimed that for men in Israeli prisons “no one will see how he was

20 See Chapter Six
treated in...indignity” (Rasha). Distinctively, Interviewee 6 asserted that at checkpoints “the masculinity will be touched” as the incident is not only witnessed, but it also shows that the man in question is unable to “help in protecting his father or his son [or other family members] from the Israeli soldiers” (Rasha). This reference to the ‘touching’ of paternal masculinity underscores the immense amount of pressure riding on a man’s ability to perform his subject position of father. Though as another commentator confirmed, these masculine performances are detrimentally impacted upon by the occupation as “children of all ages are watching their grandfathers and fathers—who they view as ‘almost holy’—be humiliated, stripped of power, and defenceless every day” (Dun 2007, 12).

These descriptions of thwarted masculinity and humiliated fathers diverge from the normative ideals described earlier of a father’s claim to power, and his role of providing security for his family. They suggest that the power of checkpoint encounters- or more specifically, the disempowering function of the encounters- lies not in the acts themselves, but instead within their social interpretation by the family and broader community. Again, this mirrors the earlier discussion about the importance of acknowledging a father’s gendered status as an expectation or a ‘representation’ as opposed to something inherent and lived.

In contrast to this metanarrative, for those not entrusted with paternal authority and status, such as women, mothers or young, unmarried men, negative encounters with Israeli soldiers seemed to have a different impact on their gender status. For example, as Peteet (2000) documents during the first Intifada, for shabab (‘young men’) being beaten or detained by soldiers was often interpreted by the community as a rite of passage into manly
maturity and honour.\textsuperscript{21} Peteet explains the different gender meanings ascribed to beatings which for example,

had a diminishing effect on elder victims' gender identity and moral status while it had an enhancing effect if the victims were youths. In the case of the older victims, abuse was publicly accorded the value of passive reception; in the case of younger victims, it was recognized as a sacrificial and heroic activity (2000, 102).

Correspondingly, the narratives surrounding the treatment of women at checkpoints tends to emphasise the brutality of the Israeli soldiers in for example, forcing women to give birth at checkpoints; separating mothers from their children; forcing them to strip at gun point; or in some cases inflicting sexualised beatings (Dun 2007; MIFTAH 2005; Loubani and Plyler 2003; Tiglao 2008). Here, ‘blame’ is levelled at the conduct of the Israeli soldiers as opposed to the woman in question’s inability to protect herself. Thus, the narratives surrounding fathers compared to those of young men and women at checkpoints differ greatly. As my research has shown, due to the elevated emphasis and expectation placed on a Palestinian father’s authority than that of a mother’s or a young man, there is thus more for them to lose in these settings in terms of status and fulfilment of gendered expectations of authority and power.

As has been shown in this section, within peacebuilder accounts of the occupation, there was present a strong gendered discourse of thwarted masculinity in reference to the experiences of Palestinian fathers at Israeli checkpoints. As argued, encounters at checkpoints are deeply gendered and the social impacts of which differ depending on one’s gender and familial status. For fathers, such encounters are framed by peacebuilders as deeply emasculating. This is but one example of the ways that men and masculinities are impacted upon negatively in armed conflict settings. It shows the need to move beyond merely

\textsuperscript{21} See Chapter Four
equating men’s experiences and masculinities with violence and soldiering in our conceptualisations of the gendered consequences of armed conflict, as men’s experiences are far more complex and multifaceted.

**No Man’s Land: Landownership and Masculinity in the West Bank**

An additional theme that I encountered within interviews and in general observations during my time in the West Bank was the strong associations made between normative masculinity and landownership. While in recent years increased attention has been paid to questions of land ownership and gender as they pertain to Palestinian women (Moors 1995; Farha 2000; Moors 1996), little scholarship has been dedicated to questions of property and male identity in the Palestinian context. While the particular correlation between land ownership and masculinity did not emerge in all interviews, the incidents in which it did pointed to a general need for more attention to the relationship between the two. This becomes particularly important in the occupation context, due to the ongoing seizure of Palestinian land by Israel (Missing Peace 2010) and the resulting growth of numbers of dispossessed families and refugees (BADIL 2007).

Furthermore, the majority of references made on this theme, were largely made in passing, which suggested to me that the intimate links between being a man and being able to own your own plot of land, was unquestioned, and somewhat taken for granted as a social ‘truth’. Thus in order to unearth these gendered narratives of land ownership and dispossession I had to search amongst the debris of other discourses of nationalism, women, breadwinning and refugees. What became evident through my own analysis, was that the current conditions of dispossession of land for many men was resulting in yet another
thwarting of Palestinian hegemonic masculinity in which the ultimate gender ideal was proving more and more impossible to meet.

**Palestinian Ideals of Landowner Masculinity**

While the connection to one’s familial land is of great importance for most Palestinians (Slyomovics 1998), in this study I am paying particular attention to that of men and the associations between Palestinian masculinities and landownership. This theme was brought to my attention when I was confronted with the following comment by Toine:

> in general, there is this high expectation that men provides for the good... should provide for the good life that you are able to pay the bills, but also that you have a home, house, land. . . So also that when you are being disowned by whatever means, that when they take your land, that also they take part of your body, part of your life. It is therefore the ‘48 Al-Naqba is sometimes for Westerners difficult to understand the depth of the level of disownership. It is really that your life collapses. Like now if you would, maybe if you leave your land, it is your own land, it is the land of your community...your village.”

Here, Toine draws our attention to landownership and the associated provision for a family’s ‘good life’ as being a key element of a man’s gender identity.

An alternative way in which hegemonic landowner masculinity manifested itself in my interviews was through the connection of a man’s gender status with his capacity to maintain control over and to protect his land. This control over land was continually connected with narratives of a man’s authority within his family. Baha described this importance of landowner masculinities:

> In... in the end of the day, the element of authority should be in the family, should be in like how much also you own, and how much you protect what is yours, you know? And basically [protection of land] definitely has an impact on the role played by males. . . like protect what is theirs.
Baha’s correlation between protecting one’s land and familial authority becomes clearer when situated within broader historical nationalist discourses, some of which have been documented in Chapter Three. For example, writing on early Palestinian nationalism in the 1900s one scholar claims that “‘to Palestinians, no phrase is more familiar-perhaps one should call it a metaphrase-than ardi- ‘irdi.’” (Fawaz Turki quoted in Katz 1996, 88). Ardi- ‘irdi translates from Arabic as “my land is my womenfolk”, but as Katz (1996) elucidates “[as] understood by Palestinians, the phrase reads, ‘my land is my nobility... my being what I am’” (88). As Katz goes on to explain, “the Palestinian Arab patriarch, whether peasant or poet, was supposed to defend his ard and his ‘ird, his land and his women’s sexual integrity” (1996, 87).

While the emphasis of Katz’ work was on the location of women in these nationalist discourses, these narratives also speak strongly to the masculine gender relations tied to land. Maintaining control of one’s land in the context of increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine, became in this sense, part of a man’s claim to the hegemonic ideals of sharaf (‘honour’), which, as Chapter Three describes, revolved around a man’s ability to protect and maintain the honour of ‘his’ womenfolk (Katz 1996). This protection was likewise understood as extending to the defence of one’s own land and the greater ‘lady Palestine’. As a famous Palestinian poet and martyr, Abd al-Rahim Mahmud exclaimed: “I will guard my land with my sword so that all will know that I am a man!” (quoted in Katz 1996, 87). This suggests the emergence of a new form of hegemonic masculinity within Palestinian society, whereby the ultimate male was the one that fought to protect his ‘ard and his ‘ird; a masculinity which is understood through this discursive link between land ownership and the protection of a feminised land.

22 See Chapter Four
Thwarted Landowner Masculinities

According to my interviews, landowner masculinities have become another component of Palestinian hegemonic masculinities that men are finding increasingly difficult to achieve. Peacebuilders alluded to the loss of territory as deeply psychological and painful experiences for all Palestinians, but particularly for men. Toine dwells on the experiences of male refugees who lost their land and the impacts of dispossession on individual men:

The issue of powerlessness goes very, very deep. In a context like the refugees... you know they lost their land, they lost also their status. You know the story of the refugees who you know, who are stiffened and frozen in the camp after they lost their land and felt as if they were nothing.

Such descriptions by peacebuilders of feelings of powerlessness, frustration and weakness highlight the considerable discrepancies between normative ideals of masculinity and landownership and men’s lived realities. While the entire family - men, women, boys and girls alike are equally dispossessed, this occurrence creates an added pressure on men upon whose shoulders the responsibilities of provision of shelter, income and security traditionally lies.

Such divergence between the social expectations of men and their lived realities, especially within the growing crisis in Palestinian landownership,²³ causes anguish for men, their families and the surrounding community. Interviewee 8 explained to me that,

Many men depend on their land. And the wall divided their land. So now there is a shortage of their land. . . now they can’t plant their land what they want. . . and buy it to other people. Now there is no land for them. . . So they become more aggressive. . . It affect his... psycho... psychologically. He maybe, he come aware I don’t know ... he shout his fears to others, at others. Shouting, or sometimes hitting, or preventing the daughters to attend school or university, or lectures.

²³ See Chapter Four
Interviewee 8 points to the impact on a man’s capacity for income generation and by extension the impact on gender relations of dispossession of land, suggesting that men who suffer this fate can react by the increasing use of violence and control over the movement and life choices of their female family members. This trend resonates with ardi-‘irdi nationalist narratives in that it alludes to the intimate discursive relationship between land and women within the framework of hegemonic Palestinian masculinity. The rhetorical association between land and women as the symbolic foundations of Palestinian sharaf based masculinity in practice can translate into a situation where loss of one, results in the need to prove his ability to dominate the other.

Conversely, other interviews highlighted divergent and perhaps contradictory themes regarding the behaviour and expectations of men concerning their responses to threats to their land by way of dispossession. One respondent who worked with West Bank farmers facing land disputes with the Israeli government, suggested that male and female landowners reacted differently to such situations based on gendered social expectations. For example, Baha suggested that female landowners were often more active in fighting dispossession due to their role in the family as educators and carers of children. In this sense, working to protect ones land became a family initiative led by the woman. Baha further contrasted this with the role of men in these situations:

if you have a father who wants to protect, or who wants for instance to stop doing their work, because it is a full time job to stand for their land, it is a full time job. So the father has to stop working, earning money, and focus on the land. And this way, like the family would not approve his behaviour.

On this, Baha also stated that while he did work with a large proportion of male landowners to prevent the loss of their land, often they did not have the support of family members. Notably, this stands in contrast to discourses like that of ardi-‘irdi, which promote
masculinised images of heroic martyrdom and defence of one’s land by the sword to maintain manly honour (Katz 1996; Rothenberg 2006). Instead, Baha’s statement suggests that for contemporary Palestinian society, such masculinised roles are no longer representative of various individuals’ experiences, and alternative gender roles such as that of provider, might now play a larger part in shaping men’s gendered behaviour.

Moreover, Baha suggests that, in contrast to their female counterparts, male landowners often stand down “usually because like men feel like helpless in front of Israeli occupation. Rather than embarrass, they do not want to look weak so they withdraw”. This observation correlates with the broader notion of thwarted masculinities presented in this chapter. In the cases alluded to here by Baha, men are unable to embody early normative, heroic masculinities for various political and logistical reasons - not least the sheer difference in military capabilities between Palestinians and the IDF. Thus, the Palestinian idealised masculine role as protector of land appears unachievable for most landowners, so much so that men who fear losing face and appearing weak if they fight for their land and lose, instead choose non-action to save themselves the embarrassment of failure.

Correspondingly, female landowners, based on the Baha’s experience do not seem to undergo the same level of identity crisis as men by losing land to the Israelis. Men stand to lose not just their land, but in addition their masculinised honour and status. Contradictorily, here female landowners are depicted as having more social freedom in which to fight for their land, in comparison to their male counterparts on whom those duties have traditionally fallen (Katz 1996; Lang 2005; Rothenberg 2006).
In conclusion, as this section has shown, land ownership has featured throughout Palestinian discourse as a key element of Palestinian masculinity. However, what I have argued here is that based on peacebuilder’s descriptions of the current context, this hegemonic ideal does not line up with the lived experiences of many Palestinian men. By placing peacebuilder statements within the context of early Palestinian nationalist narratives, what became clear was that discrepancies were present between hegemonic ideals of masculinity, and more subordinated, ‘failed’ masculinities around the question of land ownership. Again, the peacebuilders’ accounts reflected upon in this section highlight yet another area in which men’s experiences and gendered realities are overlooked by gender and peacebuilding literature.

**Unemployed Breadwinners: Palestinian Masculinities and Unemployment**

Related to fatherhood and landownership, a lack of men’s employment opportunities and income generation prospects were also presented as a central concern with respect to men’s and their families’ experiences of the occupation. Similar to the findings of the previous two sections, the theme of ‘thwarted masculinity’ played a central role in peacebuilders dealings with men’s roles as breadwinners. According to a number of studies on the topic, and evident throughout my discussions with Palestinian peacebuilders, the gendered division of labour in the West Bank has been adjusting to the socio-economic realities of life under occupation. Owing to the tightening of restrictions on Palestinians from the West Bank being allowed to work in Israel, and the worsening of the West Bank economy itself, many men are no longer guaranteed fulltime employment and thereby lose claim to their socially prescribed status as breadwinner (World Bank 2010; Yaish 2009; Mitchell 2010).
In this section, I address the discourse of thwarted breadwinners by unpacking the ways that peacebuilders framed men’s employment to portray the existence of an hegemonic masculine ideal, and the concurrent inability of many men to fulfil this gender ‘norm’. I focus on the popular image of ‘idle men’, as well as the connections made between unemployment and domestic violence. At the end of this section, I deal with the connections made between discourses of “men’s economic retreat” and the simultaneous supposed, “women’s advance” (Mitchell 2010, 9).

Palestinian Ideals of Breadwinning Masculinity

Traditionally, Palestinian gender ideologies have been structured around a gendered division of labour allocating ‘breadwinning’ and other economic provider functions to male family members while women shouldered the bulk of reproductive and child rearing labour as well as unpaid domestic work (World Bank 2010). While recent academic study on this topic shows that this male breadwinner discourse is somewhat illusory based on the informal economic activities that women have customarily carried out to supplement male income generation, the prevailing gender ideologies tend to overlook these realities (Mitchell 2010; Tucker 1985). As outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis, prior to 2000, this traditional gendered division of labour was sustained by the infrastructure of the occupation. Many families depended on the relatively high wages that men were able to earn as labourers in Israel, and the concurrent weakness of female manufacturing work within the West Bank (Mitchell 2010). In the past, the high wages associated with labour in Israel allowed many families to rely on a single income, thereby boosting the male provider role within Palestinian society (Mitchell 2010).
Interviewee 9 highlighted this traditional breadwinning discourse as a “wrong belief system”:

one part of issue that we see a lot in the school, is for the man to take care of his family, and be the only person who is responsible for taking care of his family, it is not that the man should take care of his family that is natural, but that to see that he is the main person who has to deal with his family and there are many societies here, especially in villages, who refuse for their wives to go out to work, while their wife will be a partner in this and supporter, so this is also what I call it you know, some kind of wrong belief system - that as male you are the only caregiver of your family.

Here, Interviewee 9 indicates that these rigid gender stereotypes commonly prevail in ‘villages’. Villages and rural areas were references that I encountered frequently in interviews, often used to symbolise areas of more rigid and traditional patriarchal gender relations in contrast to the more modern gender relations supposedly prevalent in urban areas. Interviewee 9 thus suggests that elsewhere the gendered division of labour is changing. Despite these suggested changes, it was evident in interviews that breadwinning remained considered a masculine role: “here, it is the sole responsibility of men to provide for their family. . . Here people expect that a father should provide everything” (Interviewee 6).

**Men’s Declining Breadwinning**

Respondents placed most of the focus on this topic on how the changing nature of the occupation and the Israeli settlement-checkpoint infrastructure was producing a thwarting effect on hegemonic breadwinning masculinity:

You know men that work in Israel for example, they get up very early in the morning in order to reach their work you know in Israel, let’s say in Jerusalem. . . and sometimes it is very difficult as well to obtain permission in order to go to Israel. So the only income for the... their families is to work in Israel. So when they are unable to go or when they face ah... such difficulties eh... it will be quite hard on the family as well (Interviewee 5).

Due to the growing weaknesses of the West Bank economy employment is becoming increasingly inaccessible to many Palestinian men as many of my interviewees suggested. As
a consequence, the male-breadwinner model has become an ideal that fewer and fewer families are able to embody. However, as will be shown, this traditional male breadwinner metanarrative remained prevalent even if increasingly threatened and unachievable.

**Idle Men**

Accordingly, throughout my interviews I encountered the presence of a strong ‘men’s retreat’ discourse which featured strong narratives and images of ‘idle men’. For example, unemployed men were discussed as remaining at home, on the streets or just generally ‘hanging around’:

Or in the occupation many men they don’t work, so they sit at home. . . they don’t have much money, or any money for the family. So what should they do? There will be tension. Smoking all the time. They say ‘it helps me to express myself when I smoke’. Many men said so. But it is wrong of course (Interviewee 8).

The images depicted here have strong connotations regarding the perceived emotional experiences of unemployed men. Men are depicted here as anxious due to their incapability to provide for their family. Correspondingly, Rasha explains,

there is a high percentage of youth, of shabab ['young men'], who are not working or who are unemployed, and they are like frustrated from life, and they just sitting on the streets, or spending time with other colleagues or other shabab. . .and suffering the bad economy situation of his family, he will smoke and he will act these actions. . . because there is no, let’s say, places for them and no choices for them to go and spend in for example youthful clubs.

Both of the above statements not only construe unemployed men as deviant and ‘idle’, but further, they also highlight the spatial restrictions upon certain narratives of masculinities. Traditionally, work carried out in the home has been considered a woman’s responsibility and by extension the home is seen as the woman’s sphere. Thus, Interviewee 8’s reference to men staying at home signals failed masculinity as men’s roles are traditionally associated with the public sphere or being “out there” (Willott and Griffin 1997, 115). Similarly, socialising ‘on
the streets’ is commonly referred to alongside discussions of idle and sometimes deviant masculinities - while unemployed women were able to take up roles inside the home, men and boys (not associated traditionally with domestic tasks) would congregate on the streets (Arko-Cobbah 2001; Barker 2005). Above, Rasha refers to hanging out on ‘the streets’ as being a result of having nowhere to go.

Another commonality to the imagery employed by Interviewee 8 and Rasha was the emphasis on cigarette-smoking. The references to smoking seemed to allude to the assumption of negative and risk-taking behaviour. While smoking did not seem to carry negative social connotations to the extent of that which it does in certain parts of the West, it did appear to be utilised as a literary device to symbolise a level of misbehaviour and deviancy. Further, the reference to smoking also connoted attempts to deal with the inner frustration and stress that is a consequence of men’s lack of employment.

A corresponding narrative that emerged out of discussions of unemployment in my interviews was that of perceived gender identity frustration in a society where breadwinning remains a bastion of manhood. Men face strong pressures both from themselves and from others to perform particular masculinities, particularly that of the breadwinner - even within a constantly shifting political and economic environment. In terms of ‘internal’ pressures, relating to men’s self-perceptions, interviewees framed unemployed men and their thwarted breadwinner status in the following ways: “[they have a] feeling of hopelessness that there is nothing in his hand to do” (Interviewee 11), and “shabab who are not working or who are unemployed, and they are like frustrated from life” (Rasha). Here, the narrative revolves around men’s inner turmoil and feelings of helplessness and discouragement at their inability to earn a living. On this, Mitchell (2010) argues, the unwavering gender expectations
surrounding men as breadwinners often causes men to internalise “their inability to provide adequately for their households as personal failure. . . [which] depoliticizes the structural effects of decades of colonization and colonial practices on the Palestinian economy”(42).

This blame levelled at individual Palestinian men was extended by the broader community as well, as the following quote suggests:

[unemployment] erodes the authority of the man I think. . . So when at times when he cannot provide for the family, he is unemployed, or that you know he is in prison... so then you have the conflict between what he is supposed to be like a powerful person in the family, also an authoritative person in the family, at what he is in practice, being humiliated (Toine).

Despite the changing economic conditions referred to earlier, the increasing economic struggles faced by most Palestinian men, and the growth of numbers of women entering the labour market (as will be discussed later on in this section), the gender narratives surrounding men as breadwinners remain fixed. According to Toine, even in such an extreme economic setting as that under the occupation, men who are incapable of getting work still stand to lose their masculinised authority and power, and face humiliation in the eyes of his family. This underlines the power of gendered expectations even in an extreme period of social stress such as that of the occupation. Thwarted gender roles or the inability to carry out normative, traditional gender functions in conflict settings does not essentially lead to a loosening of preordained gender prescriptions, nor do they necessarily allow for the individual to absolve himself/herself of blame for their ‘thwarted identities’. Instead, as both Toine and Mitchell’s statements above convey, men themselves not only internalise blame for their ‘failures’ through inner frustration, and hopelessness, but further, the broader community can work to intensify men’s ‘thwartedness’ by retaining strict gender requirements even in situations where their fulfilment is near impossible.
Domestic Violence and Breadwinning

Interviewees recounted the perceived frustrations of unemployed Palestinian men in various ways, particularly relating to the recourse to violence. For example, I found that references to unemployment and economic hardship were commonly followed by allusions to family violence and/or male aggression within the community, as the following quote illustrates:

the fathers they are so much under pressure because they have to bring food for the family. And most of the times, when they are not allowed to go to work, you know, and they couldn’t bring money and they couldn’t support their families, they are very angry. And... and the problem is... sometimes they are... bring out the angry towards the mother and towards the children... So if they ask for something, or they need something, he will be angry and sometimes aggressive too. This is what we mainly see, in our work. Fathers are really under pressure, that even they don’t have any way to help (Interviewee 11).

Interviewee 11’s statement echoes a number of themes referred to in this section thus far. It implies that men’s powerlessness to gain adequate employment has resulted in a “crisis of ‘breadwinner model masculinity’” which has been accompanied by widespread male domestic and community violence (Ikeda 2007, 113; Bourgois 1996). Toine reiterates this idea: “[unemployment] creates reactions on the side of the man I think. Sometimes they want to reinstall their authority, and then violence can be one means of that.”

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse in-depth the particularities of violence against women and children in the West Bank, the connections made in statements such as that of Toine, between unemployment and domestic violence are important. Significantly, they make clear the urgent need to take masculinities seriously in conflict settings. As Kuttab and Johnson (2001) note, “the crisis of the male breadwinner is a gendered crisis and a family crisis” and both themes played paramount roles in peacebuilders’ interview responses (11). Significantly, in the context of my interviews, male
domestic violence was constructed as being a consequence of a broader social, political and economic environment as opposed to an inherent quality of men. These types of influences have been noted elsewhere by gender scholars. Ikeda (2007) reports that recent global economic trends such as globalisation and neo-liberal economic policies has created a “crisis of ‘breadwinner model masculinity’” both in the global North and South which has been accompanied by widespread male domestic and community violence (113).

The phenomena of violence against women in conflict settings has received increasing attention over the last few decades, however, there remains a need for more research into the experiences of individual men to gain a deeper understanding as to why they resort to violence. The treatment of such male violence in my interviews subscribes to the earlier described position taken by Dolan (2002) in which he suggests that violence is not necessarily a masculine quality, but rather an outcome of men being unable to live up to hegemonic models of masculinity (57). In other words, men may exert domestic or other forms of violence as a reaction against their perceived inability “to live up to their ideas of ‘successful’ manhood” (Jewkes 2002, 1424). Violence from this perspective represents both an expression of power and dominance and simultaneously an expression of disempowerment and male vulnerability. While interviewees were not attempting to justify or explain away violence within families, they did remind us that the discourse of ‘natural male violence’ is not sufficient and instead we should focus our attention on the social processes involved in making violence a common expression of male vulnerability and frustration.

**Women’s Economic Advance**

Alongside their discussions of men’s apparent ‘retreat’ from the workforce, peacebuilders paid particular attention to women’s seeming advancement in the labour
market. For example, Rasha’s statement below is highly representative of the observations of peacebuilders on the shifting gender dynamics of the West Bank labour market:

What changed? Exactly, the occupation enhanced this [economic] role for women, because for most of the women the men were imprisoned, so they have to practice their life normally in absence of their men, you know? So they get used to do the masculine or the men role also.

Thus while it was a common conception that men were losing their breadwinning positions due to imprisonment, stagnation of the Palestinian economy, and the decrease of available work in Israel, women were by contrast, framed as gaining employment opportunities. Women’s advance discourses interacted with the theme of ‘men’s retreat’ through men’s and women’s employment being discursively established as in opposition to each other:

Now those who are still here, they are also unable to have equal chances to get... work. Because infrastructure is very, very low, very few industries still flourish. Agriculture life is not so prosperous. Now all these affect the men’s identity… and women’s identity too. And you see that there are, in some parts of our Palestinian society, men are competing with women on certain, in certain working places (Fuad).

Through Fuad’s use of the term ‘competing’, men’s and women’s employment is pitted one against the other. Here, after establishing the growing crisis of employment for men, Fuad highlights that in this situation, men have found themselves competing with women in certain instances for employment as a result of the impacts of the occupation on the Palestinian economy. Rasha for example stated that, “as I see now, yanni [‘you know what I mean?’], I hear that men usually say ‘Oh women are taking our place now, you know any, any, for example, any job is given the priority for women’” (Rasha). Emanating from this statement, and others following along a similar line, was the notion that women’s employment was coming at the expense of that of men. Rasha’s statement also implied that men themselves believe that women secure work more easily than men, as another participant Rania explained: “really the women’s opportunity for work is easier... for men... according to men.”

I encountered this specific perspective on labour competition frequently during my time in
the West Bank, despite my own observations that it was exceptionally rare to see women working in restaurants, cafes, shops, tourist venues and so forth.

Correspondingly, despite the prevalence of this ‘women’s advance’ theme in my own interviews, it is important also to place these perspectives in context. For example, according to the Palestinian National Authority, the unemployment rates of women, young and old, educated and uneducated who are actively seeking work, remained much higher than those of men (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2010). Further, Mitchell’s (2009) report on West Bank gender and economic coping mechanisms suggests that there is little statistical evidence that points to a marked female advance (and simultaneous ‘male retreat’) within the labour market. Elsewhere, Mitchell (2010) summarises her findings: “While there has been considerable erosion of male breadwinning work, there has not been an accompanying, considerable increase in the opportunities for women in the labor force to offset this imbalance” (28).

Though peacebuilder assertions of women’s employment at the expense of that of men may not be backed up by the ‘hard facts’, this narrative remains pertinent for the insight it provides into men’s perceived vulnerabilities by way of their diminishing capacities to maintain a breadwinner status. As Moore (1994) claims, thwarting of one’s gender identity “may also come about as the result of other persons refusing to take up or sustain their subject positions vis-à-vis oneself and thereby calling one’s self-identity into question” (66). What is clear here is that men’s breadwinner status is challenged by the presence of women in the labour force, advancing or not, despite the fact that women’s unemployment rates remain higher than those of men. Consequently, men and women’s employment are framed as being in opposition to each other.

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Another key point to note here is that despite these higher rates of unemployed women relative to men, in interviews women’s unemployment remained invisible. Within interviews, women were framed as either working in the private, domestic sphere or employed in the public, labour market. Men by contrast, were portrayed as either unemployed or employed, and there was no reference to them picking up additional responsibilities within the home. This perpetuates assumptions that the ‘norm’ for men is to be formally employed and in financial support of their family while women’s employment outside the home, remains exceptional and a challenge to male breadwinner status.

This section has provided descriptions and analysis of another key area in which men and masculinities are negatively impacted upon by the ongoing occupation in terms of the increasing struggles to fulfil social expectations of them as providers and breadwinners. The shifting economic and political environment in the West Bank has produced enormous changes and strains on men’s traditional breadwinning identities. However, despite these altered realities, social expectations on men have seemed to remain inflexible, producing even more experiences of ‘thwartedness’. As a result, peacebuilders acknowledged growing levels of domestic violence as symptoms of men’s feelings of disempowerment. Further, the incremental increases of women’s employment in the West Bank, is seen to be met with a level of discursive resistance as it places even more ‘salt in the wound’ in terms of men’s often unachievable desires to fulfil social expectations of them to be providers for the family.

The central aim of this chapter was to answer the initial question posed within Chapter One of this thesis in terms of exploring the ways that men and masculinities were perceived to be impacted by the ongoing conflict with Israel and the occupation of the West...
Bank. To this end, I explored three dominant areas in which peacebuilders focussed their attention during interviews: the authority of fathers, landowner masculinities and male breadwinning. What I found was that men’s experiences and identities are far more complex and problematic than the rigid stereotypes outlined in Chapter Two of ‘men at war’ imply. The peacebuilders involved in my research problematised these generalisations by drawing attention to men’s non-combat related experiences and roles under occupation and conflict.

Interestingly, interview respondents did not utilise gendered discourses with which to feminise these non-combatant, civilian and victimised men who were ‘failing’ at being ‘real’ men. Instead, they framed this emasculation as a humiliated, and ‘thwarted’ masculine subject position. Thus instead of not being considered ‘real men’ anymore due to the crisis surrounding Palestinian masculinities, these male identities have been reconsidered to embody this crisis, thereby resulting in a novel humiliated, thwarted masculine identity. Thereby, throughout this chapter references have been made to the intense psychological struggles and tensions associated with men as they fight to embody hegemonic gendered subject positions in an extremely difficult setting. As Safilios-Rothschild (2000) eloquently states in response to such gendered tribulations, men often “do not feel needed, proud and powerful. They are at a loss as to how they are now to define themselves so that they can be respected, needed and loved” (89). As will be expanded upon in the final chapter of this thesis, such revelations provide vital information for the pursuit of effective and inclusive peacebuilding and conflict-related development work in the West Bank.
CHAPTER SIX – ANALYSIS: MEN AND MASCULINITIES IN CIVIL SOCIETY
PEACEBUILDING AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

In this chapter, I examine discourses of masculinities as they interacted with narratives of peacebuilding within my interviews. While the previous analysis chapter sought to uncover the ways that men and masculinities were impacted by the occupation itself, this chapter aims to shed light on the ways that men and masculinities are framed with regard to their participation in grassroots, informal peacebuilding efforts. This line of questioning is particularly important due to, as Chapter Three illustrated, the existing literature’s preoccupation with men as war-makers and the resulting silence surrounding men as gendered participants of peacebuilding efforts. By contrast, women are discursively constructed as the ‘natural peacemakers’ and thus the main participants of informal peacebuilding programs internationally. Together these trends raise important questions as to where men interested in peacebuilding fit within these frameworks.

This chapter approaches this topic by addressing the research questions laid out in Chapter One. Within the first part of this Chapter, I address civil society, informal peacebuilding as it exists in the West Bank, and outline the ways in which it is gendered. As such I begin by exploring the two feminised discourses of maternalism and sumud, which underpin and shape Palestinian civil society peacebuilding. I then explore the female peacemaker/male combatant discourse in detail highlighting perceptions of women’s ‘natural’ potential for, and by extension, men’s ‘natural’ tension with, established conceptualisations of peacebuilding. As a result of all of these discourses, the spaces left for men and masculinities within all of these narratives suggest that civil society, informal peacebuilding in the West Bank is largely constructed as a feminised activity. In the second
part of this chapter I explore grassroots, nonviolent resistance as a gendered activity. In the initial section of Part Two I begin by briefly examining unarmed resistance as it occurs in Palestine. I then analyse its gendered nature through examination of the first and second Intifadas, and show that especially recently this form of peacebuilding has largely been considered a men’s activity, and one based on ‘masculine characteristics’. To conclude this chapter, I make connections between unarmed resistance and peacebuilding, suggesting the need to expand our understanding of peacebuilding to include alternative, more masculinised manifestations.

Feminised Peacebuilding: Gender and Civil Society Peacebuilding

Gendered Narratives of Civil Society Peacebuilding

This section builds on the introduction to peacebuilding in the West Bank presented in Chapter Three of this thesis. While there exists a multitude of different tactics, focuses and aims to civil society peacebuilding programs in the West Bank, in this section I explore two underlying and dominant narratives that emerged out of interviews as informing Palestinian conceptualisations of peacebuilding in the West Bank in general. Firstly, I explore the manifestation of maternal discourses in interviews as being foundational to civil society approaches and conceptualisations. Subsequently, I examine the sumud (meaning ‘steadfastness’) narrative as being another fundamental Palestinian peacebuilding discourse that is also centred around conceptions of femininities. By looking at both maternalism and sumud, this section denotes the juxtaposition between the concept of informal peacebuilding and idealised Palestinian femininities, and the simultaneous silences surrounding masculinities within these discourses.
Maternal Peacebuilding

Frequently within interviews the themes employed concerning the forms that peacebuilding took in the West Bank context often reflected and built upon the maternal roles of Palestinian women as the sustainers of Palestinian culture and educators of the next generation. Peace education for example, is a prominent peacebuilding approach in the West Bank and is utilised by many peacebuilding practitioners, including over 70% of the organisations I interviewed (Salomon and Nevo 2002; Abu Nimer 2004). While peace education is institutionalised by different organisations running workshops and school programs involving men in various capacities, there remained a strong discourse of peace education as being primarily a woman’s role in conflict settings. For example, women were framed by participants as being the main potential peace educators in the wider Palestinian community. As one interviewee described,

[women] is the main one in the society it depends on her. Also we believe that women can change the society. So she gets the help to change, or to know about change, to adapt her family, her small family and her extended family. . . So we affect on women how to change... she will affect the society most (Interviewee 8).

Within numerous interviews, this manner of ‘change-making’ was put down to women’s reproductive roles in the Palestinian family. As mothers, they are considered the primary caregivers and therefore the principal agents in the raising of children. Thus extending out of her maternal role, according to many of my respondents, a Palestinian woman is imparted with the responsibility of “raising [her children] in a peaceful methodology and towards inspiring them with hope” (Dalia).

On a similar theme to peace education, oral, historical and cultural preservation and maintenance of the Palestinian identity is also considered to be a necessary focus for Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives (Chaitlin 2004; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
This form of cultural education and identity preservation was also shaped as a maternal duty. For example, on the topic of Palestinian refugee communities forced to live outside Palestinian territory, one respondent claimed:

Palestinian society in the refugee camps still exists, and it is the women who took care of that. . . not only in bringing up and raising the children, but also keeping the cultural memory alive by telling the stories, the oral histories and so on, from one generation to another generation (Toine).

In statements like this, interviewees positioned women as being the primary educators, sustainers and passers-on of Palestinian identity, culture and oral history. Similar to the statements presented regarding peace education, Rao (1995) argues that historically, women have been regarded as the repositories, guardians, and transmitters of culture. Women represent the reproduction of the community. Women usually are the primary caregivers in the family and therefore the earliest inculcators of culture in the child (169).

Altogether, these gendered peacebuilding roles based on maternal education are founded upon rather rigid assumptions of men’s and women’s roles in the family whereby the duties of child-rearing fall solely on women, pushing men roles as fathers to the sidelines. The roles that men play as educators and carers of their children is overlooked and concealed, and instead priority is placed on that of the mother.

Maternal peacebuilding discourses also interact with rather contradictory discourses of Palestinian mothers as promoters of Palestinian nationalism, and in some occasions as socialisers of their sons into violence. As outlined in Chapter Four, Palestinian mothers have often been utilised as tools of political discourse. For example, the symbol of the Um Al-
Shaheed (‘mother of the martyr’) raising her sons to partake in, and sacrifice for, the national struggle, and then celebrating and ululating at his funeral.24

Peacebuilders in this study tended to use the same genre of imagery however to very different political ends. Similar to the Um Al-Shaheed, the ‘peacebuilding mother’ is also framed as playing a key public and political role through the passing on of values to the next generation of Palestinian ‘activists’. While the former maternal icon advances a more ardent nationalist agenda of self-sacrifice and martyrdom for the Palestinian cause, the latter archetype imparts the values of nonviolence and peace (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003). Fathers, by contrast, are largely absent from these discussions of the reproduction and education of the next generation of Palestinians which downplays the important roles that they also play in the lives of their children.

In sum, the narratives employed by respondents to frame some of the key elements of peacebuilding approaches which emphasises the maternal roles of women, leave very little space for men as fathers. The raising of children is stereotyped as a woman’s duty, and therefore peacebuilding through these discourses is further feminised as not only a mother’s responsibility, but importantly, not a masculine undertaking. This leaves us questioning what roles men and fathers play in the education of Palestinian cultural identity, and in addition, in the education of their children in peace and peaceful methodologies. How Palestinian fathers are involved in peace education is an important avenue for future research.

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24It is important to note that these public displays and celebrations are often the result of intense pressure by a mother’s family and the broader community to conceal her grief and loss and to celebrate the ‘noble’ death of their offspring (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003).
**Sumud**

Another theme that I encountered as playing a significant role in Palestinian conceptions of peacebuilding, was the uniquely Palestinian practice and ideology of *sumud* (roughly translated as ‘steadfastness’) (van Teeffelen 2009). Similar to the theme of maternalism, *sumud* narratives pervaded interviewees discourses of peacebuilding. In this section, I briefly outline the concept of *sumud*, and then proceed to analyse its gendered and feminised manifestations within my research.

The concept of *sumud* is complex and dynamic (Giacaman 2000). As Van Teeffelen (2009) summarises, “on the one hand, it is about preserving a presence on Palestinian land, on the other about keeping a presence in time, having patience. . . *sumud* is about persevering despite all the oppression and hardships that Palestinians face” (Para. 1). *Sumud* is inherently inclusive, grassroots and dynamic as it involves collective and individual acts of endurance and perseverance under the occupation. As a concept, it embodies acts of peaceful resistance to conflict and oppression, comprising of simply ‘carrying on’ in the pursuit of a ‘normal life’ in the face of adversity (van Teeffelen 2009).

*Sumud* also exemplifies Palestinian peacebuilding pursuits as they are not only institutional embodiments of *sumud* in the occupation context, but *sumud* is a theme that underlies and characterises Palestinian peacebuilding and resistance approaches. For example, remaining steadfast in the drive for human rights for Palestinians; encouraging, enabling, and acknowledging the *sumud* of Palestinian women through women’s groups and/or development schemes; or the unrelenting pursuit of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. As described by Tessler (1994), *sumud* involves not simply remaining on
Palestinian land, but also the construction of “viable community institutions in order to survive under occupation” (684).

Despite its inherent inclusivity, *sumud* has however, largely been “associated with female qualities” (Interviewee Toine; see also Richter-Devroe 2008; Khalili 2007; Peteet 1990). As Peteet (1990) explains,

> "The qualities that comprise *sumud* are also those that are characteristic of femininity – silent endurance and sacrifice for others (family and community). When in fear of imminent expulsion [from one’s land or home], nonaction, the act of not acting, of staying put, became an act of political will and commitment (153)."

These characteristics described by Peteet and the “quiet, patient form of courage which is *sumud* [which] you see. . . especially with women” (Toine in this study), has resulted in interpretations of *sumud* as a form of “passive nonresistance” and critiqued for its association with remaining ‘passive’ in the face of injustice (Richter-Devroe 2008, 48; Tamari 1991; Tessler 1994). As will be shown later on in this chapter, men and masculinities are by contrast associated with more confrontational and ‘active’ forms of resistance to occupation and peacebuilding. Put together, the narratives that construct these two different approaches to peacebuilding in Palestine reverberate with the more general gendered dichotomy of female/passive vs. male/active. 25 Again, this results in the characterisation of peacebuilding as a feminine activity due to its foundations in *sumud*.

On a different level, *sumud* was also connected with the notion of acquiring “inner-peace” (Toine) which in the context of the occupation was an attribute thought to characterise

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25 These gendered stereotypes are altogether unhelpful as women have been actively involved in confrontational resistance, and men with ‘passive’ *sumud* and further, more and more researchers and activists are trying to underline the active and challenging nature of *sumud* (Interviewee3; see also Richter-Devroe 2008). Further, the incredibly strong and courageous actions that women and men perform in order to challenge the occupation by maintaining a Palestinian presence and sense of identity within Palestine, are difficult to label as ‘passive’.
women as opposed to men. Inner-peace was understood as self-confidence and love for oneself as well as others (Rania). Importantly, it also related to “not being haunted by your frustrations” (Toine) as well as solving “all the inner conflicts that you have” (Rania).

Elsewhere in interviews, these characteristics of emotional health and peacefulness were often described as being lacking in men. For example, a careful reading of my interviews illuminated a strict code of etiquette with regards to appropriate emotional responses for boys and men to these (and other) experiences. A theme of ‘boys don’t cry’ emerged due to the discursive construction of masculine/feminine dichotomies: “now women cry so they get their... they try to get all their negative anger outside, but men do not cry, it is part of not being, you know, it is part of their masculinity” (Dalia). In this one example of many, the ‘stoic men vs. emotional women’ discourse constructs male and female emotional behaviour as polar opposites. This dichotomous relationship constricts the behaviour of Palestinian men by associating crying, or talking about one’s feelings, as feminine mannerisms. Thus any divergence from the established norm of stoic masculinity translates into, not an alternative genre of masculinity, but instead an equation with femininity. As Seidler (1998) articulates: “This creates a fear of emotions which come to be identified with the ‘feminine’ and are often treated as a sign of weakness. . . It is acceptable for women to be emotional, for this only confirms their weakness” (193).

Nevertheless, the dogma of stoic masculinity in interviews was frequently juxtaposed with inner-turmoil or “inner-conflict” (Rania). Despite emphasis on masculinity requiring the suppression of pain and fear, there was a strong belief in interviews that men were suffering ‘on the inside’. As another peacebuilder explained to me:

if there is an attack, or there is a checkpoint, and the child, the boy, and whose 6 years old began crying because he was afraid, the family the mother, the father, whoever is
with him – will tell him, stop crying you are a man! Shame on you! You can’t cry! So they think by this way he will be stronger, and he will know that he is a man and the man is strong. But by this, doing this, they... they keep the... he ... hides inside. And he will have sometimes symptoms like, you know, nightmares in the night because he couldn’t... he is not allowed to show his fear, or to express his fear, that he can be afraid (Interviewee 11).

Interestingly, unlike popular narratives in the West, which centre on the concept of men being emotionally devoid (Galasinski 2005; Clare 2001), in Palestinian peacebuilder discourses male emotionality and feelings of fear, grief and hopelessness, were presupposed. As a number of peacebuilders suggested, men could have more emotional baggage as a result of the ongoing conflict an occupation, than women or children: “say you have a man and a woman and let’s say the children. The man was not healed from whatever he got inside him due to the occupation [this should be a target of peacebuilding] where they can feel life again” (Dalia).

The notion of men harbouring an immense amount of bottled-up emotion can be connected to the ‘thwarted masculinity’ narrative outlined in Chapter Five. Such emotional vulnerability of men was constructed as being at odds with the pursuit of sumud and peacebuilding in general. According to many interviewees this inner-turmoil often translated into acts of physical and structural violence within families, communities and the resistance movement. The following two statements highlight this point:

watching the news … finding five... hearing that five Palestinians were killed, just like that, for example. At work, all the stress and anger will just appear, and it will appear also on the effectiveness of your work, in the way you talk to the others. . . Now women cry so they get their... they try to get all their negative anger outside, but men do not cry, it is part of not being, you know, it is part of their masculinity, so anger, anger is the only way to get it out, which affects by the end, which affects us as... as females (Dalia).

In this statement, Dalia suggests two diverging gendered reactions to the occupation and its hardships. On the one hand, women are expected to release their emotional turmoil directly,
through weeping and sharing with others. Men by contrast, are expected to remain stoic, and unemotional which often indirectly translates into ‘anger’ and violence on the part of men.

Further, Interviewee 8 claims that,

because this situation we are living - Intifada, the first Intifada, the second Intifada,. . . they [men and boys] show, they feel... and their situation, economic situation that... the Wall and you know, it affects on you. So maybe they will become more violent.... Not they want to be violent, No! . . . Its outside, and they felt... Sometimes the violence will be inside them.

Here again, violence is constructed as an emotional response of men to the ongoing hardships imposed upon them by the occupation. While Interviewee 8 does not specify who this violence is targeted against, there is a suggestion through emphasis on the economic situation, that such emotional violence can also be seen an outcome of men’s thwarted abilities to be men.26

In sum, this anger, violence and men’s inability to communicate or come to terms with the emotional strain of the ongoing occupation and armed conflict, insinuates that men are unable to effectively embody sumud and the ‘inner-peace’ it requires. As Toine explains,

the model of man feeling powerlessness in the public eye and being humiliated, that is not a good model for peacebuilding. So... peacebuilding means that you, you know, to some extent, that you accept yourself. . . You need to have this inner quiet, in order to.. like when you are only... only angry. . . it can be really very debilitating. So when people become like boiling pots all the time being at risk of overflowing, you know this model of anger in essence, boiling over... that is not good for peacebuilding, because you need to have this sense of control, this sense of quiet, this sense of a clear mind of what is happening around you.

Unsurprisingly, there were very few examples given of men’s sumud experiences and activities. Rania gave the example of her father who taught people English in his own how during the first Intifada despite the closures of schools and so forth. This embodies sumud as it is an example of a quiet but courageous effort to ‘live a normal life’ and continue the

26 As outlined in Chapter Five
development of Palestine despite the constraints of the occupation. Much more research is needed on men’s experiences and materialisations of *sumud*. Nevertheless, the qualities linked to *sumud* which informed civil society narratives of peacebuilding in the West Bank, in interviews tended to stand in direct opposition to those associated with masculinities under occupation.

What I have argued in this section is that current, informal, civil society peacebuilding narratives tend to correlate with ideals and discourses of Palestinian femininities. Conceptualisations of peacebuilding correspond with discourses of maternalism and *sumud* which are shaped by particular narratives of men and women and their varying roles in society. Both maternalism and current constructions of *sumud* leave very little space for Palestinian men and masculinities within informal peacebuilding.

**Men, Women and Peace**

Alongside these discourses of maternalism and *sumud* emerged an additional and more explicit gendered narrative that further estranges men from civil society peacebuilding schemes. When examining interviews I encountered a ubiquitous use of binaries that upheld the “mystique of the unquestionable masculinity of soldiering, [and] of the essential femininity of peace advocacy” (Cooke 1993b, 178). Explicitly, interviewees often relied upon an underlying conception of a fixed, gendered division of labour with respect to war-making and peace-making in which men make war and women make peace. This binary-logic was produced and justified in my interviews in three distinct ways that I explore below: essentialised physicality and biological ‘nature’, historical trends, and established gender roles.
Essentialised physicality and biological nature. Perhaps the most explicit narrative associated with the gender-based dichotomisation of men/war vs. women/peace was structured around perceived biological differences between men and women. These ‘inherent’ variations were in turn used by interviewees to justify the gendered division of labour within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Fuad argued that, “because of sexuality, the physiology, sociology, all these together, tell us, as it tells you, that women are more peaceful, while men are warlike, more violent.” Here a gendered binary is established associating men naturally with violence and war and by contrast, women with peace and peacemaking. This naturalised dichotomy is reaffirmed when Fuad goes on to say,

There have been - throughout our history- oppression, injustices, and the big responsibility was taken mainly by men in defence of our land, our property throughout colonial and occupational periods. And the main task- main responsibility- was taken by men because they were more physically more ready to react, more equipped physically, bodily than women. This doesn’t mean that women didn’t participate, they used to take care in the war in providing medical care etcetera.

Here, an essentialised understanding of pan-male physiology is employed to justify male participation in conflict. Dalia echoed this notion of male physicality translating into men’s war-making tendencies by stating that,

as a female maybe, I don’t feel that I need to protect anyone except for example, as a mother she might feel that feeling of protection to her kids. . . but as a man [maybe] it is just the belief that men are stronger [in] body weight [and] needs to be protecting.

Both Dalia and Fuad’s statements point to the existence of a particular male physicality that is not only inherently different and stronger than that of all women, but also as something that is shared by all men. While these suppositions of inherent male largeness and strength are not backed up by science (see Goldstein 2003 for an extensive study of this issue), they are representative of a hegemonic configuration of men and masculinity in which men are idealised as large, fit and strong. While this notion may be pervasive within the discourse of
men and war, it is questionable whether in reality all men and women can be neatly fit into the categories male/fitter/larger/stronger vs. female/unfit/smaller/weaker.

Carrying on from this, Dalia and Fuad’s statements also suggest that due to men’s assumed physicality and biological make-up, they naturally assume the role of protector in conflict settings. Again, rigid distinctions are formed here where assumed male physicality is framed as a prerequisite for defending and protecting the nation and community, and as such ‘unfeminine.’ As Dalia declared, as a woman she did not feel such inclinations towards protecting others. Instead, peacefulness, nurturing and caring are portrayed as ‘normal’ feminine activities and traits. Both Fuad and Dalia make reference to women’s perceived nurturing roles as providing medical care, or protecting one’s children as being what women ‘do’ in conflict settings and thus by extension inherently ‘unmasculine’. As Fuad describes, unlike men, women are predisposed in their “nature, inherently, in their instincts. . . to peace and nonviolence” (Fuad).

This metanarrative of ‘inherent’ sex-based differences also have their place in mainstream literature on peacebuilding where there is “a widespread belief that it is simply in the nature of men to behave violently” as opposed to women who do not have those same urges (Holzmann 2006, 43). These biological urges, and physical make-ups are used to rationalise men’s near monopoly over armed political conflict. In comparison, women’s ‘nature’ is often understood as being “gentler and more peace loving” (Pettman 1996, 108), making them ideal candidates for peacebuilding programs.

**Established gender roles.** Along with biological characteristics, interviewees also called upon diverging social roles to account for the links between men and war-making, and
women and peacebuilding. Rania’s reminder to me of the outcomes of a workshop with
Palestinian women I attended encapsulates this tendency:

on Wednesday you heard a woman say, ‘when our husbands are really angry and tired
and they come back home and we say one beautiful word to them or smile at them –
peaceful.’ Really they will change something. The most basic peacebuilder as ...let us
say, who can end conflict, hatred, anger are really women. . . And we must do
something because the community is depending on us because we are women. Not
just women, we are mothers, sisters, wives, grandmothers... so I think. . . we can put
love, hope, tenderness, forgiveness, sumud, everything which really builds peace.

Here, peacebuilding is structured as being yet another element of women’s social roles
extending from their nurturing, reproductive and familial roles as mothers, sisters, and wives.
This narrative fuels the belief that women’s qualities are fundamentally a product of their
social and gender roles thus making them “essentially different from men” who do not have
the same social roles (Richter-Devroe 2008, 35). Furthermore, present in Rania’s statement as
well as others I encountered, there exists an underlying suggestion that women in their roles
as mothers, wives, and grandmothers bear the onus of responsibility for ending male
violence. As the roles and qualities described here as being indispensible to peacebuilding are
largely associated with femininities, men’s nurturing and peace-making capacities are
discursively obscured. Can fathers and grandfathers not also be caring, nurturing and peace-
making?

Richter-Devroe (2008) extends these perceptions of women’s peaceful social roles as
being considered imperative components of Palestinian/Israeli people-to-people
peacebuilding initiatives: “[women] are often considered to be particularly suited to people-
to-people contacts. It is claimed that they are more likely to feel empathy and thus to build
bridges with representatives of the other side or to engage as ‘female mediators’” (34). While
women’s involvement in peacebuilding in general is highly important, the discourses
presented in this section run the risk of further entrenching gender stereotypes and
essentials of women’s reproductive roles and nurturing ‘traits’. Moreover, they estrange men and nurturing, empathetic masculinities which do not fit neatly within the peace-making women vs. war-making men dichotomy upon which all the statements in this section are based.

**Historical trends.** Respondents also constructed a gendered binary discourse by referencing perceived historical and universal trends of war and peace-making. Noah for example, refrained from employing biological explanations for men’s predominance in armed conflict, but instead relied upon historical arguments:

> Unfortunately it is not a positive difference, you know like, men are more taking more action side in the arm or something. I don’t know it’s.... even this is not just in Palestine, but in all over the world. . . Because... all... you know, historically, men are participating in wars more than women. If you look to the arms of the world, it... it’s the same. And that’s... also in Palestine. But I... think in Palestine we can witness when it is non-violent, there are more women coming to the streets and...

Like biological justifications, historical associations between men and ‘arms’ also “[reinscribe] the naturalized link between masculinity and violence” (Shepherd 2008, 47) as well as femininity and nonviolence. Here a normative masculinity is produced and classified based on assumptions of what men have always done, everywhere.

Again, this narrative leaves very little space for nonviolent, non-‘soldiering’ masculinities. References to history and universal applicability have a tendency to obscure the fact that while, “almost all soldiers are men, . . . most men are not soldiers. Though most killers are men, most men never kill or even commit assault” (Connell 2000, 22). In a sense, these recourses to “the whole reality throughout history, because of tradition, because of religion” (Fuad) effectively attribute the actions of a minority of individuals (here, male
soldiers and violent combatants) as being characteristic of their gender category as a whole. As such, the existence of a majority of non-combatant men is effectively made invisible.

Naturalisation discourses surrounding the male war-maker/female peacemaker assumptions have a number of implications for both masculinities and peacebuilding work. Primarily, they work to “cement existing stereotypes and turning them into virtual ‘gender prescriptions” (Holzmann 2006, 44) in the sense that they transfer into normative assumptions that inform peacebuilding theory and policy. In other words, the conjecture of static violent masculinity not only homogenises all men as violent perpetrators, but also plays a role in the construction and maintenance of beliefs that male violence is somehow normal and inevitable. That said, it is pertinent here to note that many of the above statements were made by male peacebuilders, and it would have been interesting to investigate how they reconciled their own identities as male peacebuilders with the gendered assumptions regarding male violence that they were utilising.

Furthermore, non-violent and non-combatant men are not only concealed from our frame of reference, but by extension they are established as abnormal in the sense that they fall on the ‘feminine’ side of the gendered dichotomy of violence and peace (Moran 2010). By extension, these gendered narratives shape conceptualisations and narratives of idealised peacebuilding. Within this section, peacebuilding was predicated on seemingly feminine qualities of softness, gentleness and nurture. These narratives not only shape socially constructed assumptions of ideal femininities and masculinities, but they also play a significant role in outlining normative ideals of peacebuilding. On this, Dalia stated that “I can’t say we target [men] in a way that we are specifically targeting them. Because… this is missing in our part of the world. We are concentrating on women usually. We don’t target
As will be shown in the next section of this chapter, these gendered peacebuilding prescriptions conceal alternative, more masculinised manifestations of peacebuilding.

**Alternative, Masculinised Peacebuilding: Nonviolent Resistance**

By asking about masculinities and peacebuilding another key theme emerged in interviews which can add to our understandings of informal peacebuilding in the West Bank and perhaps in other settings as well. This section departs from the theme of the positioning of men and masculinities within feminised, civil society, informal peacebuilding, and instead explores an alternative, masculinised form of peacebuilding present in the West Bank. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the discourses of nonviolent, confrontational resistance as they emerged in my interviews and make the case that such can be considered a form of informal peacebuilding in which men are actively involved. This section begins by briefly addressing what is meant in this thesis by nonviolent, confrontational resistance. Subsequently, I explore the first and second Intifadas as general examples of this form of resistance, and outline the shifting gendered narratives used by peacebuilders to frame each of these. This section suggests that the dividing line between what constitutes a ‘combatant’, a ‘non-violent resistor to war and occupation’, and a ‘peacebuilder’ is not as clear-cut as the gendered binaries of war vs. peace, and war-maker vs. peacebuilder, would suggest. As such, in closing I position men’s nonviolent resistance activities as a masculinised form of alternative, masculinised peacebuilding.

**Nonviolent Resistance in Palestine**
In this chapter, I utilise Schock’s (2004) understanding of unarmed insurrections to inform my approach to Palestinian resistance as involving, popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods of nonviolent action rather than on armed methods. They are “popular” in the sense that they are civilian-based and carried out through widespread popular participation. That is, civilians, rather than being relegated to the position of providing support for an armed vanguard, are the main actors in the struggle (xvi).

This understanding is inherently broad and leaves room for a wide range of different ‘challenging’ activities. Similarly, Palestinian resistance to occupation is likewise complex and multilayered and is characterised by a variety of different tactics and ideologies. The informal peacebuilding schemes referred to in the previous section of this chapter can also be understood as partaking in the broader resistance movement as they represent civil society actions aimed at pressuring Palestinian, Israeli and international governments to end the occupation of the Palestinian people. On another level, separate from the nonviolent, unarmed materialisations of resistance, violent activities such as rocket-shooting and suicide-bombing also fall within the rubric of Palestinian resistance in general. However, as Schock (2004) and others argue, acts of violence are often carried out by a small minority faction and should not be considered representative of the broader popular movement despite the high amount of attention this armed minority receive from the international media (see also Hammami and Tamari 2006; Shinar 2003). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the physically violent aspects of the Palestinian resistance, and instead I focus on the nonviolent yet somewhat confrontational elements.

While resistance is thus a broad term, in this thesis I focus on what I label as confrontational, yet nonviolent acts of resistance in the West Bank context. Specifically, I aim to address those activities that fall somewhere between more typical ‘peacebuilding activities’ (such as women’s groups, peace education, conflict resolution and so forth) and
violent actions. Confrontational nonviolent resistance involves actively defying and challenging the forces of the Israeli occupation and those actions in which, as Toine described, “sometimes nonviolence and violence is close” (see also Stamou 2001). Examples of this include popular actions of civil disobedience such as demonstrations, confronting soldiers at checkpoints, stone throwing27, defying Israeli soldiers’ orders, defying curfews, boycott campaigns, road blocking, and so forth. While such activities were popularised and implemented on a grand scale during both the first and second Palestinian Intifadas,28 they are still practiced every-day. As Richter-Devroe (2008) reports,

> every single day Palestinians engage in everyday forms of resistance, such as resisting closures, roadblocks, curfews, invasions, land-grabs. . . [and] formally organized nonviolent direct action, resisting the occupation through demonstrations, sit-ins, or protests (45).

A very recent example of this form of unarmed resistance is the recent strategy employed by scores of Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and in surrounding Arab countries, of storming en masse the Israeli borders in an attempt to reach their historical homeland (Mohaisen 2011). In addition, the recent ‘Arab Spring Protests’ that have been sweeping the Middle East throughout 2011 can also be considered examples of the type of unarmed insurrections and movements referred to here. These have been largely non-violent popular movements aiming to bring about change within their respective government structures and to put into place more democratic and just systems of political organisation.

27 While some may find my inclusion of stone throwing within the paradigm of non-violent, confrontational resistance as problematic, I have chosen to include it for multiple reasons. First of all, within the perspectives of my research participants, there was division as to whether or not it constituted ‘violence’ from a Palestinian perspective, and I often heard views along the lines of “a stone is not a weapon” (Rania) and by contrast, that stone throwing could be considered a symbolic act of resistance. Elsewhere in the literature on Palestinian resistance, stone throwing has been discussed as falling “into a gray area between violence and nonviolence. . . as nonlethal force or unarmed resistance”. For example, Rigby (1991) states, “The Intifada can be characterized as an unarmed form of resistance, insofar as the tools of confrontation used by the Palestinians have not been lethal. Whilst the stones. . . have on occasion caused death, they fall into a different category from some of the weapons used by the Israeli military, notably guns that are designed to maim and kill – a task to which stones are not specially suited” (1). While I do not wish to actively participate in this debate, I have chosen to incorporate stone throwing due to the frequent references made to it within my interviews.

28 See Chapter Four
(Abu Sarah 2011). That said, these types of confrontational nonviolent resistance are often framed or viewed as militaristic or ‘war-making’ by the ‘other side’ - meaning that what is viewed as nonviolent popular action on one side, can be simultaneously viewed as threatening and dangerous by the other (Stamou 2001).

**Gendered Combatants within the Two Intifadas**

When discussing the subject of nonviolent resistance, participants frequently referred to the two Palestinian uprisings (1987 and 2000) as being symbolic of the changing nature of resistance in the West Bank. The two *Intifadas* were framed as contrasting in various ways with reference to the shifting gender relations and levels of militarisation that characterised each of them. 29 Throughout this section, to represent the aforementioned ambiguities between the oversimplified dichotomisation between what constitutes violent versus peaceful resistance, like Kuttab and Johnson (2001) in their similar analysis, I employ the term ‘combatant’ as representative of confrontational resisters engaged in nonviolent activities.

**The first Intifada.** Based on the descriptions put forward by peacebuilders in my interviews, the first *Intifada* was largely understood as a peaceful, nonviolent Palestinian insurrection. Noah summarises this point in his comparisons of the levels of militarisation between the first and second *Intifadas*:

its not a positive thing, but that’s a fact, that in the second *Intifada*, because it is more like... armed struggle...and shooting, fighting, guns... you can see it is less contribution from women in this *Intifada* than the first *Intifada*, which was more non-violent struggle. So you know you can see that more men when it is like armed struggle and these things, it is more men who are contributing. When it is more civil and non-violent struggle, it is more equal between men and women in contributing to the actions, or struggle.

29 See Chapter Four for background
According to this view the non-militarised nature of this first uprising in comparison to that of the second, resulted in a mass, gender inclusive popular movement with all elements of society taking on different roles. As one interviewee recollected of her own experience in the first Intifada:

so really me, myself, I was still young, small so I thought that war was just when some of the boys yelled “Ahh! There is a jeep there!” Men, women, big or small both are in the street helping to put stones, big stones on the street, not to allow the jeeps to come. . . So all the people, all the neighbours they come together, in hand to participate for example. And I think... I love the first Intifada, not because I love war, no. But I feel the first Intifada was really the pure Palestinians. The Palestinians at the time were really one family.” (Rania)

This type of narrative regarding popular struggle of men and women alike was especially common in peacebuilders’ accounts of the first Intifada. As Toine described, there existed countless neighbourhood committees that worked within a “revolutionary atmosphere [at the] grassroots” in which everyone was expected to participate. A number of interviewees described how the Intifada was even carried out within Palestinian homes – people would open their homes to their neighbourhoods to organise, and to offer services that had been disrupted as a result of the ongoing conflict (Rania); Palestinians wanted by the IDF would be taken in and hidden within peoples homes (Rania); and every home/family was judged based on how many of its occupants had been injured or arrested (Baha).

Thus, as Kuttab and Johnson (2001) note, “in the first Intifada, the site of struggle was the community, its streets, neighborhoods and homes” (6). This congruence between battle front and home front in peacebuilder discourses was complemented by an ambiguous line between ‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant’ in which there was no clear distinction even in terms of gender, between those who were participating in the national struggle and those who were not. On this, some scholars argue that the sexual divisions of labour in war become far more blurry and fluid when there is no distinct frontline (Johnson and Kuttab 2001; Yuval-
Davis 1997). Interviews framed women as being alongside their male counterparts on the streets throwing stones and attending demonstrations. Thus, a clear gendered dichotomy between male combatant and female civilian was not evident in these reflections. Instead, they produced narratives of male and female civilian-combatants – quite a different discourse to that of the more traditional, male soldier hero vs. female innocent victim, we are more accustomed to in the general literature.  

The second Intifada. In contrast to the narratives of nonviolence, gender inclusivity, and a blurred battle-front that characterised peacebuilders discourses of the first Intifada, the second Intifada was described very differently. In reference to the second uprising and thereafter, nonviolent confrontational resistance is depicted as an increasingly masculinised activity as will be shown.

The primary distinction put forward between the two uprisings was the increased level of militarisation in the most recent Intifada compared to that of the first. Rania refers to the militarised nature of the Al-Aqsa Intifada as being symbolised by the use of guns:

In the past, first Intifada, men and women both were in the street throwing stones. Both of them put masks and shout and demonstrate... and putting stones on the streets to block the streets. Men and women both were stopping the occupation... But totally different second Intifada, women’s role wasn’t there. Just men participate in the second Intifada which I feel was not... I don’t want to say good or bad but sometimes using guns, which I hate.

In order to avoid replicating gendered dichotomies around violence, it is important to point out here that interviewees largely agreed that it was not all men who partook in the violent segments of the second Intifada. As another interviewee reminded me, “it was not just every

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30 See Chapter Three
[man]. It is more men who are... well able to carry a gun” (Interviewee 7) that were able to partake in the violent and militant actions that occurred.

Another interesting point emanating from Rania’s above statement is how she distinguishes between the militarisation of stone throwing and the use of guns - implying tacit acceptance of the former though not the latter. While, as argued previously, I am including stone throwing as an example of nonviolent, confrontational resistance, it can be referred to as an example of the militarisation of the Palestinian resistance against the occupation. Though Palestinian women have historically partaken in throwing stones at Israeli tanks and so forth, it was largely framed as masculine activity. Interviewee 5 reveals:

well boys in general... I will give you an example about my childhood. When I was a child, I used to follow the demonstrations for example, without thinking. And without no idea about why I was following... just...following the people what they are doing. Ok? Here in this country, boys learn from their parents. From their friends, and from what they see as well. So... when you see... children throwing stones for example, its just because when they see the Israelis, they think that they are not accepted in this society. Or in the Israeli army let’s say.

This particular response is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, Interviewee 5 here uses the term ‘following’ to describe the involvement of boys in demonstrations and stone throwing, depicting their participation as replicating the behaviour of others without fully comprehending why. On this, Hudson (1995) suggests that for male youth in Palestine, demonstrating and stone throwing have become a type of rite of passage turning male children into young men. Through stone throwing young boys achieve a form of ‘resistance masculinity’ whereby they attain manly credentials through confronting the occupation head-on. Hudson quotes a Palestinian journalist as saying, “[to] throw a stone is to be ‘one of the guys’: to hit an Israeli car is to become a hero; to be arrested and not confess to having done anything is to be a man” (1995, 131). Importantly, Hudson reminds us that this rite of passage emerged out of the gendered vacuum created by the occupation in which traditional rites of
passage and traditional masculine ideals were destroyed or made impossible for Palestinian men to achieve (1995). Interestingly, stone throwing was largely framed by peacebuilders as a masculine activity when discussing the second \textit{Intifada}. Conversely however, in discussions of the first Palestinian uprising, multiple references were made to how even women were throwing stones and as such was not considered a male-only activity. These diverging references to stone throwing however can be seen as indicative of the broader gender narratives of the two \textit{Intifadas} in which women were ‘equally’ involved in the first, but largely left out of the second.

Though stone throwing was a key feature of both \textit{Intifadas}, as documented in Chapter Three of this thesis, some of the other tactics and methods of ‘resistance’ varied immensely between the two \textit{Intifadas}. The first uprising was characterised by community and individual acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations and stone throwing skirmishes between Palestinian neighbourhoods and Israeli soldiers. By contrast, the second \textit{Intifada} was typified in the media and popular discourse by its violent gun fights, bombing raids, and suicide attacks (Elmer 2010). However, these acts of violence were, minor compared to the many other mundane acts of resistance. ‘Marching to the checkpoint every Friday is not armed resistance; going to school under curfew is an act of peaceful resistance. . . It’s the media, both local and international, which has focused on the armed actions. But this is a misrepresentation of the situation’ (Palestinian activist quoted in Allen 2006b, 292–293).

It is these ‘mundane’ acts that are focussed on in this section as confrontational, non-violent resistance.

\footnote{Like those referred to in chapters Four and Five}
Nevertheless, the increased levels of violence and militarisation that characterised the *Al-Aqsa* uprising generally, caused a major shift in the gendered division of labour between the first and second *Intifadas*. As a number of peacebuilders told me:

So... I do think that like in the first *Intifada* which was just non-violent resistance, certainly it was found that there was much more participant of society, but also of women. In the second *Intifada* because of the militarisation, and of militancy it became much more male dominated *Intifada*. And you can say that also women, they felt also kind of they are completely out of the struggle... victims (Toine).

Due to the increased militarised and ‘war-like’ nature of the second *Intifada*, this uprising became more associated with the generalised discourses of men/violence/soldiering vs. women/peacefulness/victimisation, like those referred to in the general literature. Despite sharing similar tactics to the first *Intifada* including stone throwing, resisting curfews, disobeying soldiers, and popular demonstrations, the militarised narratives and structures of the second *Intifada* resulted in a gendered association between participation and men.

Interviewee 5 shares this perspective in stating that,

the first Palestinian uprising... was a popular struggle that 90% of the whole population joined. Whereas in the second one or the one which is called *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, only 20% of the population joined. Let’s say 1-2% of this number were, you know, women, or female. And that is why we think sometimes that we should go back and think about how the... community or the Palestinian community in general, were organised, or was organised perfectly [in the first *Intifada*].

Here, popular involvement is clearly established as a key point of difference between the two *Intifadas*, as the second uprising had a far lesser amount of community involvement than that of the first. Additionally, inherent within Interviewee 5’s statement is a clear gendered division of labour with respect to participation in the ‘struggle’ beginning in 2000.

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*32* See Chapter Three
With respect to nonviolent resistance in this latter \emph{Intifada}, men were justified as having higher levels of participation as a consequence of Israel’s increasingly violent responses to Palestinian resistance activities compared to that of the first. For example, Fuad argued:

Well the involvement of our people in our society whether men or women in the national struggle for ending occupation and getting independence, has been mainly men because of the reaction mainly of the Israeli occupation which is violent side of reaction. . . In the second part of our struggle, the role of women or the involvement of women in the protests, in the non-violent were less because of the reactions of the Israeli occupation forces.

Correspondingly, as Kuttab and Johnson (2001) note, the geographical and symbolic locations of the confrontations associated with the latter \emph{Intifada} occurred ‘outside’ the community and neighbourhoods and were largely confined to Israeli manned checkpoints and border lines. Parallel to this, Hammami and Tamari (2006) highlight the augmented dangers associated with non-violent resistance by citing the “narrowed battlefront” scenario of the \emph{Al-Aqsa Intifada} (266) located at checkpoints and particular ‘hot points’, quite the reverse to the 1987 uprising. As Hammami and Tamari explain, these isolated pockets of confrontation, allowed the Israeli army immediately to turn clashes into a military confrontation. According to Ma’ariv [an Israeli newspaper], the army used more than one million pieces of ammunition against unarmed demonstrators within only the first few days (2006, 266).

Consequently, the gendered distinction between combatant and non-combatant became increasingly visible and rigid as Rania claimed, “they can’t both of them participate in a demonstration because they are afraid they need one to be... if the man something happen to him, the woman would take care of her children.”

Explicitly, the increased militarisation on both sides which popularly characterised the second \emph{Intifada} resulted in a stricter definition of ‘combatant’ along the lines of gender – men
were still expected to participate in the non-violent struggle (and in addition, the violent struggle) whilst women were expected to remain at the ‘home-front’:

But the second *Intifada* everything changed. Men was involved, they participated many demonstrations, but we can’t be there like the first *Intifada*. And really women feels that out is not your work, you have to stay at home for example, if there is a man and his wife and they have children. (Rania)

In sum, this comparison of the two Palestinian uprisings has aimed to portray the gendered nature of confrontational, nonviolent resistance in the West Bank. While the first *Intifada* saw high levels of men and women participating in the popular struggle, the second *Intifada* was largely carried out by men. As shown, within interviews there was general acknowledgement of the increased masculinisation of this form of resistance. This grew out of socialisation process which necessitated the construction of ‘active’ men (and passive women), and further, particularly in more recent years, the increased levels of militarisation associated with the Palestinian resistance in general. As Toine summarises,

in non-violent activities... challenging activities. . . that comes to like you know kind of... kind of... really a stand-off with [Israeli] soldiers, then maybe you can say that is more close to more kind of traditional forms of kind of military behaviour and that is more masculine. And of course all kind of resistance is. . . sometimes nonviolence and violence is close.

**Active Men vs. Passive Women**

As hinted at earlier in Part One of this chapter, as a result of women’s exclusion from the active, confrontational arm of the non-violent resistance movement in Palestine more recently, there has evolved a gendered dichotomy of ‘active vs. passive’ in relation to involvement in the resistance to the Israeli occupation. In contrast to the more ‘passive’ forms of resistance including *sumud* peacebuilding which are associated with femininities and women’s roles, confrontational, non-violent resistance have become discursively connected to masculinities and men’s activities particularly during and after the second *Intifada*. 

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For example, upon describing the pressures on young boys specifically to participate in stone throwing and public demonstrations, Interviewee 5 summarised these expectations as follows: “Men in general ... I mean we were born like people who like politics” (Interviewee 5). Such public engagement with ‘politics’ that Interviewee 5 refers to here is framed as a masculine activity, typically associated with the public roles of men and boys, in contrast to the more feminised private, and domestic spheres (Richter-Devroe 2008). It is important to note here that the peacebuilders I interviewed made a point of noting women’s ‘political’ involvement in demonstrations and stone throwing particularly in the first uprising. This dynamic shifted however with respect to the second Intifada, and it was implied that the socialisation processes involved in producing Palestinian ‘resistors’ and ‘political’ agents more broadly, emphasised the involvement of men and boys particularly.

Interviewee 9 for example, echoes this sentiment by describing the socialisation of men and boys into being ‘active’:

You know, it’s in general the Palestinian culture is male culture, so it is that the man should always be on the frontline and the man should be always be the one who is taking the initiative, and that’s growing up with boys and with little children, in the school.

Here, Interviewee 9 notes the gendered social pressure on men and boys to be poised for action suggesting engagement with the resistance (be it violent or in most cases, nonviolent) is part of the hegemonic configuration of Palestinian masculinities (see also Punamäki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997). ‘True’ masculinity from the perspective of the statements in this subsection, consists of one’s ability to be ready to participate on the metaphorical frontline of battle. The various roles and positions of women in this statement as well as those of uninterested, inactive, and fearful men and boys are concealed here. Through their absence women are positioned as distant and/or not necessary on the symbolic ‘frontline’ while
Similarly, men and boys who choose not to partake in the resistance in its different forms, do not fit within the confines of the acceptable masculinities alluded to. Correspondingly, Rania states on the general discourse of the Palestinian resistance that “from the past we hear that men is involved in war, in peace, in demonstrations and everything. But we didn’t hear so much about women”. Men, more so than women, are placed with the responsibility and expectation of being ‘active’. This narrative contrasts strongly with earlier references made in this chapter to the “quiet, patient form of courage” (Toine) which is associated with women’s actions in peacebuilding and sumud. This corresponds with more traditional gender dichotomies surrounding the notion of female/passive vs. male/active, and more specifically passive/feminine/sumud vs. active/masculine/active resistance or combat.

Corresponding to this gendered ‘active vs. passive’ framework within interviews, there were often references made to ‘inactive’ men who were framed in a distinctly negative light. Mostly, they were referred to as people caring only about material consumption or in one case as, “youngsters who look shiny and they care more about their hair than they care about their next door neighbour” (Baha). This statement is particularly interesting in the way in which it feminises inactive men by suggesting that they are preoccupied by their hair and physical appearance, a trait often associated with women and femininities (see for example Sowad 2010).

Elsewhere, men who did not conform to the masculinised ideals of being at the ‘frontline’, or ‘liking politics’ were framed as “careless, they don’t even care about the Palestinian peace, they just want to work their own business and they don’t mind if it is . . . if there is a wall or whatever” (Rania). Such ‘careless’ men were in these cases framed as being
“[distracted] from our main target and goal which is resisting occupation” (Fuad) and blinded by consumerism and the focus on earning money by whatever means (Baha and Rasha).

In sum, such men were structured in interviews as deviating from the hegemonic model of resistance masculinity through their preoccupation with less ‘important’ issues such as their physical appearance and earning money. These alternative masculine interests were treated as deviant and subordinate to those of the more acceptable and hegemonic image of politically active and engaged men. Interestingly these negative allusions to being ‘idle’ were confined to inactive men, and not their female counterparts. This was perhaps a result of differing gendered expectations of ‘being active’, as women were not called upon to constantly prove their allegiance to, and participation in, the resistance while men were expected to subscribe to the hegemonic ideal of ‘resistance masculinity’.

**Nonviolent Resistance as a Masculinised Form of Peacebuilding?**

Following on from this discussion of the increasingly masculinised nature of nonviolent, confrontational resistance, in this section I situate discourses of resistance within Palestinian approaches and conceptualisations of peacebuilding. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that resistance can be seen as a context-specific, Palestinian materialisation of peacebuilding. By extension, this chapter finishes by arguing that by understanding men’s contributions to non-violent resistance as a form of peacebuilding, we can begin to challenge conceptualisations of informal peacebuilding as feminised, ‘quiet’ and conciliatory. This section endeavours to make room for men within conceptualisations of informal peacebuilding, and further promotes the need to expand our conceptualisations of peacebuilding to make room for more confrontational and ‘challenging’ approaches.
Resistance as a form of peacebuilding. Regardless of the gendered nature of Palestinian peacebuilding and nonviolent resistance activities, for Palestinians, the building of ‘peace’ is a highly complex endeavour due to the simple fact that they remain under the conditions of a military occupation. The key ingredient required for Palestinians to be able to live a life of justice, equality, nonviolence and freedom, therefore, is the immediate dismantling of the Israeli occupation forces in their entirety (Middle East Monitor 2010). This sentiment was made evident in many practitioner accounts of their understanding of ‘peace’ in that they envisioned peace as being the ultimate state of freedom, nonviolence, dignity and human rights achieved subsequent to the end of the occupation of Palestinian lands. The two following quotes highlight this point:

But in like peace in the ... in this context is like when ... its the condition that we will live in when everybody’s rights are fulfilled. And part of it is the absence of violence, but the other part is like... when we come to the point where we have nothing to fight for or against, you know? In the Palestinian context I think yeah maybe peace in our situation would come once everybody rights are restored (Baha).

Even if a person is 100% lives in inner peace, it is so confident and comfortable with himself... living under the occupation practices will just make him forget everything he reached to, so... conflict is the biggest enemy for this. So usually in our work we concentrate on ending the occupation, ending the conflict, which will by the end reach to a peaceful, society, a peaceful life (Dalia).

From a Palestinian perspective therefore, peacebuilding inherently involves and is a key feature of, the struggle to end the occupation of the Palestinian territories by Israel (Norman 2010). Only after this, can peace be realisable for Israelis’ and Palestinians alike because the quest for peace is greatly hindered by the occupation, as it creates a scenario in which peace negotiations are carried out by vastly unequal partners (Roy 2002). Thus, peace education projects, capacity building schemes, democracy building programs and so forth, while imperative, cannot exist in isolation and must be accompanied by broader national, international and political schemes that aim to bring about the end of the Israeli military
occupation of Palestine. Only then does ‘peace’ become plausible. In this type of context, it becomes unsurprising then that the concept of peacebuilding becomes intimately married to the Palestinian plight of resistance to the occupation described earlier. Consequently, the civil society approaches to peacebuilding described in the previous section do not simply fall under the international literature’s rubric of peacebuilding initiatives, but further, they are also strong examples of Palestinian NGOs and individuals playing vital political roles in the broader Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation (Norman 2010). As one Palestinian researcher and peacebuilder notes on this issue in relation to his own projects:

Peace-building is part of resistance in [the Palestinian] situation. What we do in PRIME [Peace Research Institute in the Middle East] is also resistance because we are resisting the dominant narrative of the occupation and ideology. It is also resisting the traditional perspective of seeing the conflict. So, by creating a generation of children who look at the situation from a critical perspective—that is resistance, because you resist the taken-for-granted, the legitimatized, monolithic approach to history or narrative. I would say resistance takes the military and non-military, the peaceful and the not peaceful (Sami Adwan quoted in Richter-Devroe 2008, 46).

In this statement, Adwan makes clear that Palestinian peacebuilding cannot be separated from the larger discourses of resistance to occupation. Correspondingly, it is possible to conceptualise the efforts discussed in the previous section on feminised peacebuilding as examples of peacebuilding and resistance activities. For example, a women’s peace group run by a Palestinian NGO is a form of peacebuilding in the sense that they are promoting nonviolence and empowering local women to partake in the broader movement for an end to the conflict with Israel. However, it is also a strong example of Palestinian resistance in the sense that the NGO is encouraging women to confront the occupation of Palestine and call for a cessation to violence, occupation and social injustice.

Masculinised, confrontational peacebuilding. Thus, if peacebuilding as a concept is inseparable from the broader narrative of ‘resistance’ in the West Bank setting, can certain
elements of grassroots, nonviolent Palestinian resistance therefore become envisioned as examples of Palestinian manifestations of peacebuilding? As Richter-Devore (2008) states, the “dividing line between the two theoretical concepts of peacemaking and resistance in Palestinian reality is . . . very fine” (46). It is with this in mind that the masculinised, confrontational activities described earlier in this section can be conceived of as an alternative, Palestinian addition to peacebuilding models.

This need for a broader, less traditional understanding of what constitutes peacebuilding was introduced to me explicitly in one particular interview, where Toine hinted at the existence of a very different manifestation of peacebuilding from the more traditional, formal and informal approaches. This alternative form of peacebuilding to Toine is, the activist type which challenges soldiers and these groups challenge the building of the wall etcetera. Several work at checkpoints in direct, in situations of direct contact which could be risk... not to obey the soldiers... that is a model which is spreading.

This alternative model of peacebuilding is presented as involving more direct, confrontational and in some ways belligerent in character, approaches and tactics to creating the conditions in which peace may be possible. Toine compared this genre of peacebuilding/resistance to those described above in terms of sumud and informal peacebuilding projects in the sense that while the methods were different, the aims were similar - to bring about the end of the occupation and the pursuit of peace and social justice.

Thus, by addressing men and masculinities within the nonviolent resistance movement, we can begin to see ways in which men too are involved in the broader peacebuilding project. Further, expanding our discourse of peacebuilding to include more ‘masculinised’ narratives such as political activism, militarism, and confrontation we broaden
the scope of peacebuilding beyond its ‘feminised’ manifestations.\textsuperscript{33} In the West Bank, it can be argued that this resistance-based peacebuilding is perhaps one of the most common forms of Palestinian peacebuilding as it occurs every day, and includes both individual and popular, as well as spontaneous and organised activities and actions. That said, it receives very little media or academic attention as it does not fit neatly within either the category of traditional ‘peacebuilding’ initiatives, or traditional war-like, armed resistance and ‘terrorist’ activities. Due to its confrontational and challenging nature, resistance-based peacebuilding challenges the oversimplified dichotomisation between war-making and peacebuilding.

In sum, this chapter has highlighted two central points relevant to gender and peacebuilding mandates. Firstly, that civil society-based, informal, peacebuilding initiatives tend to alienate men as ‘peace-makers’ and uphold women and feminised approaches to creating peace, thereby omitting alternative materialisations of peacebuilding in which men are also engaged. Secondly, this chapter has shown that despite their estrangement from conventional peacebuilding approaches and discourses, men and masculinities feature strongly in the Palestinian nonviolent resistance movement. In sum, I argue for the need to acknowledge men as peacebuilders both in pre-existing civil society approaches, but also in their less conventional, alternative activities. Moreover, this chapter highlights the need to expand our discourses of peacebuilding to include those masculinised activities that directly challenge and confront the status-quo head-on as a particular indigenous Palestinian form of informal peacebuilding, complementing and coinciding with the more feminised civil society efforts.

\textsuperscript{33} This is not to say that one gendered form of peacebuilding is better or more effective than the other. Or alternatively that men only practice resistance-based peacebuilding while women are confined to the more conciliatory, traditional approaches. Both of these claims were disputed by my research participants. Palestinian women have a long history of resistance-based peacebuilding as evidenced throughout my discussions of the first Intifada, and there are a number of Palestinian men engaged in the more feminized and traditional approaches to informal peacebuilding

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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined discourses and conceptualisations of men and masculinities within the context of armed conflict, occupation, and peacebuilding. Chapter Five presented Palestinian peacebuilders’ understandings of the unique gendered impacts of the mechanisms of the Israeli occupation on West Bank men. Subsequently, Chapter Six examined the multiple and distinctive manifestations of peacebuilding in Palestinian discourse and how men and masculinities are located within these approaches. Further, this study has introduced political resistance as a unique, ‘masculinised’ form of peacebuilding standing in contrast to the more traditional ‘feminised’ approaches promoted within the general peacebuilding literature. In this final chapter, I discuss the broader conclusions of each of the chapters and of the thesis overall, followed by an assessment of the possible insights this research could present to the broader theoretical literature on masculinities, armed conflict and peacebuilding. Subsequently, I propose possible policy recommendations as well as avenues for further research.

Thesis Findings

In the opening chapter of this thesis, I acquainted the reader with the general essence of this research project. This chapter established the overarching research questions and research objectives, and also laid out the contextual, theoretical foundations of this study. I also introduced my own standpoint and personal rationale for this study.

The methodologies I employed throughout this study were described in Chapter Two. The research was based upon a feminist post-structuralist foundation. As such, this research prioritised “changing oppressive gender relations” through “disrupting and displacing
(oppressive) knowledges” (Gavey 1989, 463). By investigating the (re)production of gender ideologies within peacebuilders’ ‘talk’ with reference to men and masculinities, this study endeavoured to challenge discourses in circulation that make invisible both men’s experiences of political violence, in particular those of non-combatants, and men’s active but overlooked engagement with peacebuilding in Palestine.

Moreover, this chapter outlined the recruitment, data collection, and data analysis methods employed in this study. Importantly, this chapter also detailed the means by which I endeavoured to maintain the integrity of my research process and relationships. In particular, this included the ways in which I had to adapt the theoretical and practical approach of this research to reconcile with the ‘military occupation’ context within which my research was based.

Within Chapter Three, the literature review, I explored the broader literature relating to masculinities, armed conflict and peacebuilding programs. To this end, I looked specifically at debates surrounding men and masculinities in armed conflict. Here I argued that while men’s gender issues in conflict settings are being given increased attention, the focus still remains on men as combatants and potential combatants. There is a significant gap in the literature concerning men’s non-combat related experiences in situations of political violence.

Subsequently, I briefly introduced some of the different conceptualisations of peacebuilding that can be found in the general discourse, highlighting the significant distinctions present the between formal and informal concepts. This chapter also presented the current state of the gender and peacebuilding literature, in which I highlighted the dearth
of literature dealing with men as beneficiaries, or masculinities as an area of interest for peacebuilding schemes. Contemporaneously, these deficits in the literature have a tendency to structure men and masculinities as being at odds with the discourses surrounding ‘civilians’ or non-combatants, and thus, as being at odds with peacebuilding initiatives. It was these features of the mainstream narratives of gender, conflict and peacebuilding that this research aimed to address.

Building on the general research concerning men, masculinities and armed conflict, Chapter Four concentrated on the specific background and context relevant to the study of masculinities and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In so doing, this chapter explored the conflict through a gender lens by weaving existing research and knowledge on Palestinian masculinities throughout the analysis of the historical and political context. This chapter worked to lay out the relevant Palestinian social and political conditions and background required for the execution of a feminist critical discourse analysis of my interviews. In this way, I was able to situate peacebuilder discourses within broader gender and political narratives in order to contextualise them for deeper understanding.

Chapters Five and Six, the analytical chapters, attended to the research questions of this study more specifically. Both chapters exhibited the transcripts from the interviews organised thematically and interlaced with my own analysis. Specifically, Chapter Five presented interviews and analysis that dealt specifically with the impacts of the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians on West Bank men and masculinities. While the gendered effects of this conflict on men are widespread, this chapter converged on the three most frequently referenced themes that emerged out of interviews: the authority of fathers, male landowners, and finally, men as breadwinners. This chapter paid close attention to
established Palestinian ideals of hegemonic masculinities and the effects of conflict on men’s abilities to fit within these gender moulds. As such, this chapter concluded that despite the dearth of research on men as non-combatants highlighted in Chapter Three, Palestinian civilian men’s experiences of conflict are vast and deeply complex.

Chapter Six departed from this theme of understandings of men’s experiences of conflict, and instead analysed Palestinian peacebuilders understandings of how men and masculinities interact with ‘peacebuilding’. Corresponding to the research questions outlined in Chapter One, this chapter looked specifically at the different manifestations and perceptions of peacebuilding in the West Bank context, and concurrently analysed the gendered ideologies that informed them. It noted that more formalised, institutionalised examples of peacebuilding have become associated with women and femininities alienating men as actual and potential ‘peacebuilders’.

Subsequently this chapter explored the gendered nature on nonviolent resistance in Palestine, suggesting that despite the gender inclusivity of the first Intifada, since the Al-Aqsa uprising broke out in 2000 nonviolent resistance has become increasingly ‘masculinised’. As such, I argue that men are hence actively engaged in the broader peacebuilding movements as defined broadly as “efforts to resolve the conflict through non-military means” (Melville 2003). This chapter ends by suggesting the need to expand the narrow ways in which peacebuilding is constructed to be inclusive of these more ‘masculinised’ and ‘militarised’ materialisations of peacebuilding.
Theoretical Implications of this Research

The research and findings encompassed in the chapters summarised above raise a number of points for the ways that men as gendered beings are incorporated within GAD, peacebuilding, and armed conflict theory. The perspectives accommodated in this thesis have complicated and challenged the ways that these literatures depict men, in particular the uncritical and essentialising use of the ‘male, war-making, combatant’ ideology. The preoccupation with this hegemonic gender order has meant little attention has been paid to alternative masculinities in conflict and peacebuilding settings. Furthermore, these ongoing discursive (re)productions of hegemonic assumptions of ‘male warriors’, have meant that theoretical accounts of political violence and peacebuilding indirectly partake in the very normalisation of male ‘warriordom’. Stern and Nystrand (2006) for example urge that scholarship and practice around armed conflict recognise “the power of stereotypes . . .
because they can be seen as productive of reality (we expect men to be violent and [thus] through various mechanisms of socialisation produce a violent form of masculinity)” (43; see also, Breines, Connell, and Eide 2000; Young 2003).

Moreover, this work has attempted to enhance existing analysis of the impacts of armed conflict on civilians by encouraging debates to move beyond established civilian/victim discourse and narrow ideas of “womenandchildren” (Enloe 1993, 14) to looking at men as civilians impacted by war in complex ways. Broadening the gender, development, war and peacebuilding theory and narratives to include civilian masculinities will expand our understanding of the gendered effects of armed conflict on different communities, families and individuals. However, as the attributes and ideologies of ‘masculinity’ deviate throughout and across different societies, so too will the experiences and ‘gender concerns’ of civilian men across the globe. For example, landownerships is seen as a critical component of hegemonic Palestinian masculinity, however this may not be the case elsewhere in nomadic, or more industrialised settings where people dwell in apartments and/or rent their homes. Consequently, future research should be conducted into men’s experiences as civilians, and men’s non-combat related realities in relation to different conflict settings throughout the world. Not only will this mean a deeper understanding of men’s experiences but as men’s identities and actions have direct impacts on the lived realities of women, by extension this suggests that through considering the complexities of men’s experiences and identities we can also learn more about women.

In sum, the ‘male/protector/warrior vs. female/protected/civilian’ dualism has been a particularly useful and powerful tool for war-making over the centuries. It has been employed as an effective call-to-arms for noble, able-bodied men the world over to head to the
frontlines to protect the honour and livelihood of their communities embodied by their womenfolk (Elshtain 1995; Katz 1996; Enloe 1989; Moran 2010). It has entrenched the belief that in times of conflict, men must fulfil their ‘natural’ roles as protectors of the weak and so forth (Stiehm 1982). Furthermore, it has structured the division of labour in conflict settings and formed militaries as elite, masculinised institutions (Higate and Hopton 2005; Enloe 1989; Goldstein 2003). It has cemented the almost universal male monopolisation of violence which plays a significant role in maintaining unequal power relations between men and women (Kimmel 2007; Watts and Zimmerman 2002). Lastly, it has played a powerful role in the correlation of the destructive, brutal and inhumane forces of war, with conceptualisations of elements of what it means to be a man. Chapters Five and Six of my thesis complicate this powerful gender dichotomy by addressing men as civilians and peacebuilders. GAD, peacebuilding and conflict theory should similarly work to deconstruct and denaturalise dangerous gender stereotypes and dichotomies not only by looking at examples of women as combatants, but by taking the issue further to include alternative configurations of masculinities as well.

In addition to the above, this thesis also contributes to ongoing debates concerning the theory and practice of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding becomes a far more complex issue when considering an occupation setting in which one side has almost complete military, political and economic control over the other. Thus for Palestinians, building peace was as much about the realisation of Palestinian human rights and challenging the crippling Israeli occupation of Palestine, as it was about creating conditions of nonviolence and demilitarisation. Therefore, I chose to explore manifestations of a more context-specific understanding of peacebuilding within the West Bank, specifically sumud and Palestinian confrontational resistance activities. Here, I included more ‘conventional’ examples of peacebuilding such as
nonviolence education, economic development, reconciliation and religious co-existence programs. Furthermore, beyond these internationally applied models of peacebuilding, I also examined alternative and endogenous Palestinian attempts at ending the occupation and building peace including *sumud* and nonviolent resistance. As a number of scholars have already stated on this, peacebuilding literature must make room for, and promote further research on different indigenous, as well as culturally and contextually specific models of peacebuilding (Lederach 2000; El-Bushra 2008).

Finally, this research also raised a number of issues relevant to gender and civil society peacebuilding paradigms. As stated in the beginning of this section, the relatively uncritical and universal usage of the male/violent/combatant vs. female/peaceful/civilian binary must be recognised and questioned due to its tendency to essentialise and normalise war-making as an inherent, male activity. That said, as my research has demonstrated, this gendered dichotomy still features strongly in international and local Palestinian NGO peacebuilding philosophies to such an extent that peacebuilding and nonviolence are largely conflated with women’s interests and activities. It is important that more research be conducted on the gendered nature of peacebuilding and the positive and detrimental effects of this in different settings. With this, more awareness can be gained as to the extent that men are currently being alienated by these feminised discourses of peacebuilding, and in addition how these gendered narratives play a role in further constructing violent masculinities.

More attention also needs to be paid to men as peacebuilders and peaceful masculinities as a way to reverse these alienating tendencies of civil society peacebuilding and making peacebuilding models more applicable to men and masculinities. Correspondingly, as increased scholarship is focused on assessing women’s unique
contributions to both peacemaking and war-making, we need to focus efforts on making visible men’s unique and less conventional contributions to peacemaking. Such ‘masculinised’ peacebuilding forms, such as confrontational resistance activities in the West Bank, while they may not always resemble the more feminised and conventional materialisations of peacebuilding built upon foundations of dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation, they do share a similar mandate – the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the resulting construction of peace. This again represents a direct challenge to the aforementioned gendered dualism as it necessitates the expansion of our understandings of peacebuilding to encompass men’s roles as peace-makers in conjunction with those of women. This represents a further avenue for future research into peacebuilding masculinities, and begs the following questions: Why do some men become peacebuilders? What are some of the less visible, alternative ways that men as men promote peace in different settings?

**Practical Implications for Peacebuilding and Conflict-Related Development**

In addition to recommending specific areas of further research, this thesis points to a number of areas for the enhancement and improvement of conflict-related development and peacebuilding practice. However, before specific policy recommendations related to men and gender are established here, it seems important to emphasise the need for institutionalised development and peacebuilding initiatives both local and international, to prioritise the cessation of the ongoing military occupation of Palestine. As Le More (2004) contends while the explicit aim of donor assistance [to date] has been to support the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, donors have nonetheless acted as if the development effort ... could proceed independently of the evolution of the bilateral process and developments in Israel and the OPT [Occupied Palestinian Territories] (20).
Peace and development cannot occur within the context of an occupation, and as such, peacebuilding and conflict-related development schemes must go hand-in-hand with campaigns to end Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

With respect to men’s experiences as civilians in conflict settings, within development and peacebuilding organisations priority should be placed upon the inclusion of men and masculinities within needs assessment research in different communities. Institutional gender assessments of conflict settings should place equal emphasis on the needs and experiences of men alongside those of women. It is important that increased acknowledgement is made of the multidimensional and unique ways that men too lose out in conflict settings. Correspondingly, it is pertinent that organisations endeavour to ensure the discourses they employ within their policy and practice reflect the nuances and varied gender experiences, instead of aiming to simplify and homogenise them within simplistic dualisms.

In response to some of the specific ‘men’s issues’ disclosed in Chapter Five in particular, there are a number of possible avenues that can be taken in the absence of an end to the occupation. For example, increased funding and attention should be paid by donors to existing initiatives that aim to place international witnesses at checkpoints to circumvent and document human rights abuses by Israeli soldiers at military checkpoints. Pressure should be placed on Israel to dismantle all of its checkpoints, particularly those littered throughout the West Bank that control and hinder the movement of Palestinians within their own territory. Peacebuilding groups should foster the growth of ‘men’s groups’ as ways for men to create their own psychological support networks, to give voice to shared experiences, and significantly to work together to come up with plausible solutions.
Further, peacebuilding and development organisations should become more active in the Palestinian quest to prevent the ongoing seizure of Palestinian land by the Israeli government which has resulted in the increase in landless men, women and families. One of the participating organisations in this research, the YMCA and YWCA Joint Advocacy Initiative, was actively involved in this type of resistance peacebuilding by running an olive tree sponsorship program in which trees belonging to international sponsors were planted and cultivated on threatened land. This activity raised international awareness of land seizures, worked to protect land as in theory, cultivated land cannot be seized, and further worked as a small scale agricultural enterprise giving Palestinian farmers employment and income. These types of activities however should also involve a gender mandate to ensure they are considering the different land and property-related needs of men and women. This may involve extra assistance for male (and female) landowners who do not have their families support to resist land seizures. It may also involve gender equality education for men dispossessed of their land and occupation to prevent recourse to domestic violence. Further, support networks need to be in place to help financially and psychologically, male and female landowners and their families following dispossession.

Finally, development programs should increase the amount and effectiveness of programs that aim to generate income for Palestinian men and women alike. Lack of employment has a very detrimental impact on Palestinian men’s sense of self-worth, and thus every effort should be made to improve these conditions. Similarly, the establishment of youth centres, programs and income generation projects could also work to engage young shabab giving them a sense of purpose beyond hanging out on the streets.
In terms of peacebuilding practice, the policy and practice based implications of this research are multiple. While many of the participants highlighted their attempts to achieve a fifty-fifty balance between men and women in their programs, this did not amount to the ‘men-streaming’ (or gendering) of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding practitioners should find ways to expand their discussions and approaches to ‘gender’ as to include men and masculinities, and not just stop at women and femininities. Workshops conducted by men, for men relating to questions of gender, violence and peace should be promoted as a means to engage men as gendered beings within conventional peacebuilding approaches. Men’s peacemaking activities should be explored and promoted to make NGO peacebuilding programs more applicable to men and masculinities. For example, NGOs should explore men’s embodiments of *sumud* and not just emphasise those of women.

In addition, more peacebuilding focus should be placed on how men are involved in civil society peacebuilding at the grassroots in order to combat stereotypes of men as combatants. The practical barriers to men’s participation also need to be addressed. For example, Rania noted in her interview that, “men have many concerns I think, so because of that they are not free they are working in the morning, they don’t have time to participate in workshops. . . Because men can’t leave their work to come to listen to some workshop”. Issues such as the specific timing of when projects run during the day can, as Rania implied, have significant gender impacts. Questions need to be asked as to how civil society programs can most effectively target men both practically and psychologically. Finally, there needs to be increased acknowledgement and support given to the less formal and less conventional manifestations of peacebuilding such as confrontational resistance activities as a means of legitimising more masculinised approaches to building peace.
The approach taken to gender, armed conflict and peacebuilding in this thesis is vastly different to most other research on these topics. While merely a first step towards thinking seriously about ‘men-streaming’ conflict-analysis and peacebuilding, and what this might mean in practice, this thesis has raised some significant questions and posed some serious challenges to current theory and practice. This thesis has addressed armed conflict and peacebuilding in the context of the West Bank, primarily by trying to ‘take masculinities seriously’. In so doing, we are able to approach and examine armed conflict and its effects from novel and unique angles. Furthermore, we are also able to see peacebuilding – its materialisations and its gendered nature – in a new light. As such, I have tried throughout this process to present (and remember) the humanity of men and masculinities within the context of war and occupation. From descriptions of humiliated fathers at checkpoints; unemployed husbands hiding their shame from their wives by hiding away in West Bank coffeehouses; landowning men shying away from fighting for their plots out of fear of seeming ‘weak’; to the Palestinian man marching to the Gilo checkpoint in Bethlehem with his son and thousands of other unarmed civilians to protest the occupation – this research begs us to remember that men too can be vulnerable, powerless, and peaceful.
REFERENCES


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## APPENDIX A – TABLE OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Brief Overview</th>
<th>Research Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Education Institute (AEI)</td>
<td>An NGO based on supporting education around issues of peace, social justice, democracy, culture, identity and so forth, within the Palestinian community. Runs summer schools, youth and women’s groups as well as media and communication programs.</td>
<td>Fuad, Toine, Rania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency &amp; Refugee Rights</td>
<td>An organisation aimed at promoting and defending the rights of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced peoples. Runs a resource centre and a campaign unit, and consults various UN agencies.</td>
<td>Interviewee 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation V (identity remains confidential)</td>
<td>Local sector of an international development organisation. Focuses primarily on issues of development, runs micro-loan and gender equality programs. Promotes development as a means of creating conditions for peace. Is also actively involved in Palestinian peace-building networks.</td>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Advocacy Initiative – The East Jerusalem YMCA and YWCA of Palestine (JAI)</td>
<td>A YMCA and YWCA advocacy initiative aimed at raising awareness about the Palestinian situation, empowering youth advocacy groups, mobilising international networks, and active anti-conflict campaigning.</td>
<td>Baha, Interviewee 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WI’AM</td>
<td>A local organisation aimed at promoting non-violent conflict resolution. Practices traditional Palestinian mediation and conflict resolution methods. Has women’s, children’s and youth groups aimed at providing a space for vocational training, peace education, and trauma relief.</td>
<td>Interviewee 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Brief Overview</td>
<td>Research Participant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation W</td>
<td>A joint Israeli and Palestinian organisation campaigning for a two-state solution. Aimed at pressuring international, as well as Palestinian and Israeli governments to end the conflict by signing a peace deal. Has a vast online network of universities. Runs local workshops for women and youth to encourage them to pressure their governments to end the conflict.</td>
<td>Dalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation X</td>
<td>A medical organisation running a range of medical programs and initiatives, including a rehabilitation program for those injured by the conflict. Also holds workshops throughout the West Bank regarding peace and conflict resolution. Actively involved in campaigning for the end of the occupation, and uses issues of health as a way of shedding light on the occupation as a structural issue negatively impacting Palestinian health and health services.</td>
<td>Interviewee 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Flowers School</td>
<td>A not-for-profit primary school for underprivileged Palestinian children. Education programs centre around peace and democracy. Used to run inter-group programs involving Israeli children and Palestinian children. Provides psychological support for students and families.</td>
<td>Interviewee 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation Y</td>
<td>An organisation working around goals of nonviolence and social justice. Runs nonviolence education programs, capacity building programs to develop local leadership in the peace movement, organises international visits to the West Bank, and runs its own media network.</td>
<td>Interviewee 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’awon – Palestinian Conflict Resolution Institution</td>
<td>A youth-based initiative aimed at training Palestinian youth in non-violent and peaceful means of conflict resolution. Engages youth in various campaigns and volunteering positions: election monitoring, integration of a culture of peace into government institutions, women’s groups, leadership training.</td>
<td>Rasha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Brief Overview</td>
<td>Research Participant</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR)</td>
<td>An NGO dedicated to the promotion of peace, human rights and democracy. Coordinates and runs programs and training on nonviolence, and conflict transformation.</td>
<td>Noah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Project Participant,

You are being asked to take part in an interview for my master’s thesis at Victoria University of Wellington. The project will investigate the approach of peacebuilding programs in the West Bank, to men’s gender issues. The aim of my research is to investigate how men and masculinities are understood to be impacted by the ongoing conflict and how they are incorporated into peacebuilding programs. The study will answer the following question(s):

1. How are men and masculinities impacted by the ongoing conflict?
2. What do practitioners think about the relationship between men’s issues, masculinities and peacebuilding?

The study will use a variety of research methods including literature reviews, participant observations of participating organisations, and semi-structured interviews. I have been granted ethics approval for this research from the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington.

I am inviting you to participate in a semi-structured interview which will not exceed more than 45 minutes to one hour.
Confidentiality
In my thesis, it is required that I produce a profile of participating organisations and their work. This means that participating organisations will in fact be named in the final publication. However, this is not the case for individuals involved in the study. The Informed Consent Form (attached) will ask you whether you require confidentiality or not, and how you wish to identify yourself in the research. If you require confidentiality you will be referred to as an ‘interviewee’ or in any other way you so request (see Question 3 on the Informed Consent Form). If you do not require confidentiality, you will be asked to circle the relevant statement (see Question 4 on the Informed Consent Form), and only then will your identity be published. No names will appear on the transcripts, the title specified by each participant will be assigned to each interview respondent, and only this title will appear in the published results (unless confidentiality is waived as described above). The real names associated with the titles will be kept securely by me, and never made public without the permission of the individual(s) involved.

Storage and Disposal of Data
Access to the written and electronic material will be restricted to me. All written material will be kept in a locked file, and all electronic material will be password protected. Five years following the conclusion of the research, any interview material, or similar will be destroyed and the audio recordings of the interviews will be electronically wiped.

The results collected will be reported in my thesis, and will be potentially presented in academic journals and conferences. The research project will lead to a report delivered to New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency (NZAID), and a copy of the thesis will also be made available to the Aotearoa Development-Zone Library, in Wellington. The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, and deposited in the Victoria University’s Library.

Right of Withdrawal
You have the right to withdraw any time up until eight weeks after the date of the interview. During the course of the interviews, you will have the right to withdraw from the interview or refuse to answer any question(s) at any time. You may request that the transcript of your interview be destroyed and not used in the study, for any reason.

Provision of Feedback
You have the right to check the interview transcript, and will be able to provide any corrections at any time, prior to final analysis of data.

Community Access to Research Results
In order to ensure that the results of this research project are accessible to the participants, a summary of the completed research output will be available. You may request it by circling ‘Yes’ in Question 8 of the ‘Informed Consent Form’ (attached), or on later request (by email to fosteralan@vuw.ac.nz). Furthermore, copies of the completed research output will be available from the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences.
APPENDIX C – INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Master’s Thesis Research Project:
’Men-Streaming’ Peace?- An analysis of men, masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding programs in the West Bank”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher:</th>
<th>Alana Fay Foster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>TBA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile:</td>
<td>TBA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:fosteralan@myvuw.ac.nz">fosteralan@myvuw.ac.nz</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor:</td>
<td>Megan Mackenzie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:megan.mackenzie@vuw.ac.nz">megan.mackenzie@vuw.ac.nz</a></td>
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<td>Victoria University of Wellington</td>
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Introduction
The Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee, which has approved this research project, requires that all research involve Participants who are: 1) fully informed about the nature of the research; and 2) consent to participate. This “Informed Consent Form” has been designed in accordance with these requirements, to inform all Participants about the nature of the project and their participation in it. It is meant to ensure that research Participants and their communities are protected from any harm potentially arising from their participation in the research process.

Purpose of the Study
This study is intended to answer the following questions:

How are men’s issues and masculinities understood to be impacts by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and how are they incorporated into peacebuilding activities in the West Bank?

1. How are men and masculinities impacted by the ongoing conflict?
2. What do practitioners think about the relationship between men’s issues, masculinities and peacebuilding?

Please also see the attached ‘Information Sheet’

Research Format
Qualitative field research will be undertaken by interviewing staff members from a variety of different organisations in and around Jerusalem. Participants will be asked to take part in a semi-structured interview, at a time and a place that suits them. Participants are being asked to consent to the attribution of information to them in the final publication of my thesis, as well as any academic or professional articles and/or reports that may come out of this research. The interview will be semi-structured. Questions are not of a personal nature but will concern participant experiences, perceptions and work around conflict resolution and men’s gender issues. Some questions will also revolve around gender mainstreaming policies. Each interview will last approximately 45 minutes and will not exceed one hour.
1. The organisation which I represent agrees to being publicly named in the publications of this research  
   Y / N

2. I wish for my identity to remain confidential.  
   If yes, please answer 3. If no, please skip to 4.  
   Y / N

3. I would like to be identified as (please circle/fill in the blank space):
   a) An ‘interviewee’ (numbered)
   b) Other, please specify:……………………………….

4. I consent to information or opinions that I have given being attributed to me in any reports on this research.  
   Y / N

5. I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed.  
   Y / N

If yes: My address is:

   My email is:

I agree to take part in this research

**Participant:**
Name: ___________________________ Date: ______________

Signature: _______________________

**Researcher:**
I certify that this form and its attached “Information Sheet” cover letter provide a complete and accurate description of the aims and processes of this research project.

Name: ___________________________ Date: ______________

Signature: _______________________

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APPENDIX D – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE

What does the concept of ‘peace’ mean to you and your organisation?

What does gender mean to you and your organisation?

Is gender relevant to conflict-reduction work? Why or why not?

Are gender issues primarily women’s issues? Explain why or why not.

Do men have gender issues in the West Bank? If so, what are they?

Would you say any of your programs address men's situations, problems, identities etc? How so?

What different roles do men take on in the current conflict?

Would you say the conflict has had an impact on ‘what it means to be a man’ in Palestinian/Israeli society? Explain

Do men’s gender issues have any relevance to conflict-reduction work? Explain why or why not.