Indonesia’s National Role Conceptions: 
Continuity Amidst Regional Change

By

Henning Borchers

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Abstract

This thesis analyses Indonesia's foreign policy in view of role conceptions held by the country's policy and intellectual community and their impact on policy behaviour at the ASEAN level. These role conceptions capture the ways decision-makers perceive Indonesia’s standing and influence in the region and beyond and include the country’s ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine as well as widely held views of the country being a model democracy, a mediator and – increasingly – key actor in regional and global affairs.

The research draws attention to how these notions shape Jakarta’s role in ASEAN Community-building and security regionalism. It focuses on a range of initiatives that emphasise ASEAN’s ‘liberal agenda’, including the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution and the promotion and protection of human rights. In so doing, it critically reflects on Indonesia’s domestic performance, which stands in at times stark contrast to its agenda on the international stage. I argue that Indonesia’s commitment to promoting liberal norms and values in regional affairs is predominantly instrumental as it aims at consolidating ASEAN cohesion vis-à-vis the influence of external powers in order to advance the country’s regional leadership ambitions and desire to play a more active role at the global level.

Key words: National Role Conception, Indonesia, ASEAN
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Introduction

“Indonesian influence could be an overwhelmingly positive input as the world defines new frameworks and architecture” (Bower, 2011).

Since Indonesia began its transition towards democracy in the late 1990s, the country has increasingly built its international profile as Jakarta aspires to exert more influence at the regional and global level. This transition coincided with a significant geopolitical shift as the United States of America reduced its presence in the Asia-Pacific, creating a power vacuum that was readily filled by rising global power China. With the recent ‘rebalancing’ of the U.S. that commenced a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific Southeast Asia, and therein ASEAN, could play a crucial role in determining the course international relations will take in the Asia-Pacific in decades to come.

Indonesia has always occupied a prominent place in Southeast Asian affairs. While Indonesia’s global advances are only starting to unfold, Jakarta has played a pivotal role in shaping ASEAN regionalism, increasingly so since the beginning of its reformasi era, which was marked by an opening of political space. In reference to the domestic democratisation process, Indonesia has emerged as a strong proponent of liberal norms and values on the regional level. Policy objectives such as the rule of law, good governance, civil and human rights and the liberal peace significantly inform the direction regional cooperation in the political and security spheres has taken over the past decade. Yet in the domestic sphere, these norms are not nearly as entrenched as Indonesia’s regional advocacy would suggest. What, then, are the objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy in promoting this liberal agenda?

The factors influencing Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda are based on several national role conceptions that capture the ways decision-makers perceive Indonesia’s standing and influence in the region and beyond. They find their expressions in the foreign policy discourse of the policy and intellectual elite and in Jakarta’s foreign policy initiatives at the ASEAN level and beyond. These role
conceptions refer to Indonesia’s sense of how the country can increase its influence as a leading middle power in regional and international affairs. Indonesia’s national role conceptions are alluded to frequently in national and international media, and they are evident in foreign policy speeches, interviews and analyses by domestic and international think tanks and intellectuals. A comprehensive overview of the range of Indonesia’s national role conceptions and how they inform foreign policy at the ASEAN level is thus far lacking. This thesis aims to address this gap to identify the main rationale for Indonesian decision-makers as they help shape the new regional order.

I argue that Indonesia’s commitment to promoting liberal norms and values in regional affairs is predominantly instrumental as it aims at consolidating ASEAN cohesion vis-à-vis the influence of external powers in order to advance the country’s regional leadership ambitions and desire to play a more active role at the global level. Indonesian leaders consider ASEAN to be an ideal vehicle in pursuit of this agenda. Creating a cohesive regional bloc towards an ASEAN Community has been on top of ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s agenda since the end of the Cold War and the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Shifts in the global order, from America’s and Japan’s relative decline to China’s and India’s rise further underline the need for ASEAN to find a common ground. The role of China is significant in this development, as Jakarta perceives Beijing as a potential threat to regional cohesion and to Indonesia’s sense of entitlement to regional leadership status.

Indonesian decision-makers and leaders played a vital role in paving the way for major milestones of ASEAN regionalism over the past decade, such as the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Political Security Community. These initiatives are geared towards further integrating ASEAN and institutionalising liberal norms and values promoted by several member countries, most notably Indonesia. Paradoxically, Indonesia’s own record of upholding the principles it promotes regionally and globally in the domestic sphere is modest at best. Human rights abuse and conflict is prevalent across the archipelago, putting into question Indonesia’s own commitment towards this liberal agenda.
Current shifts in the regional security environment and the disparity of Indonesia’s own liberal foreign policy agenda and its conduct at home suggest that for Jakarta the promotion of a liberal agenda is predominantly determined by a functional rather than an idealistic conviction which is aimed at consolidating its status as a regional leader and global player. An analysis of Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse suggests that the promotion of liberal democratic policy objectives such as the rule of law, good governance and the protection of human rights is seen as an effective means of deepening regional cooperation and creating the regional cohesion necessary for Indonesia to realise its leadership ambitions. Furthermore, this policy agenda is in accordance with the norms and values of the current international liberal order and thus serves Indonesia’s own efforts of projecting the image of a liberal democracy and model world citizen onto the global stage.

This thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section I will outline Indonesia’s national role conceptions evident in the country’s foreign policy discourse. In the second section I will provide an overview of the geopolitical context within which foreign policy decisions are made, with a focus on the Sino-Indonesian relationship and its implications for Indonesia’s role conception as regional leader. In the third section I will reflect on how Indonesia’s role conceptions shape Jakarta’s approach towards ASEAN regionalism, by discussing ASEAN’s liberal turn and policy responses towards regional security cooperation.

Methodology
This analysis draws from a review of publicly available material, including foreign policy speeches, official policy documents, interviews, news reports and academic literature discussing Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and practice. Reflecting on a brief review of Indonesia’s early constitutional discourse evident in the constitution and Pancasila, the state philosophy, as well as the writings of former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, I have analysed statements by several members of the current administration, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. I have further consulted academic articles by some of Indonesia’s most prolific analysts, such as Rizal Sukma of the Centre for
Indonesian and international news media have also provided a useful perspective on the role conceptions discussed in this analysis. English-language news articles in the Jakarta Globe and the Jakarta Post, among others, are indicative of the level at which role conceptions like that of the regional leader, global actor and model democracy translate into popular sentiments among Indonesia’s policy and intellectual community. I have made limited use of Indonesian-language media, as I found English-language media to be sufficiently resourceful and representative for the purpose and scope of this paper. A more in-depth analysis that takes into consideration the extent to which the sentiments shared by Indonesia’s policy and intellectual elite are reflected amongst the general public should broaden the research to include Indonesian-language media. I substantiated my analysis with a review of academic literature on Indonesian democratisation and foreign policy as well as third-party reports by international think tanks and non-government organisations.

Lastly, the analysis is also based on personal observations and informal as well as formal conversations I have had with Indonesian officials about the changing political environment in Indonesia and the country’s regional and global role. I first visited Indonesia in 1995 and again shortly before Suharto stepped down in 1998. I have subsequently lived in a range of professional capacities in several localities across the country for over three years between 2000 and 2009, including most recently two years as a human rights monitor in Papua province. I have not referred to the anecdotal evidence I have personally obtained in the following analysis of Indonesia’s national role conceptions and their impact on foreign policy. But this experience corroborates the notion that led me to formulate my argument.

**Indonesia’s National Role Conceptions**

Jakarta’s regional promotion of the liberal norms and values that have marked the reformasi era in this country has elevated Indonesia among the leading democracy
advocates in the region. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 initiated wide-reaching reforms of the country’s social, political and economic spheres. Free and fair elections, good governance, the rule of law, and the promotion and protection of human rights have by now arguably become well established in Indonesia’s domestic sphere according to a majority of foreign and domestic observers. Whether or not Indonesia can live up to the high standards prescribed by the policy changes effected through reformasi is another matter, which I will address in more detail below. Suffice to say that the democratic transition the country continues to experience considerably shapes Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook and its sense of standing in the regional and global order.

These sentiments are captured in a range of national role conceptions, which are an essential feature in foreign policy-making. The concept of national role conceptions borrows from role theory, which has been applied to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) since the late 1960s (Holsti, 1970, p. 236). Role theory is based on the notion of roles as artificial phenomena and applies “to a dynamic system of interacting roles, considerations of organisational and societal settings as well as individual personality” (Adigbuo, 2007, p. 88). The use of role theory in political science currently experiences a resurgence as it potentially integrates FPA and International Relations (IR) theory (Thies & Breuning, 2012), providing in particular a useful framework to analyse the foreign policy of countries in the South, as it offers a multidimensional framework to explain the at times contradictory roles of Southern states in the international system (Adigbuo, 2007).

Role theory can explain the ways agents, i.e. leaders and decision-makers, interact with the structures of policy-making at the domestic and international level. The role conceptions held by these groups shape the imagination of decision-makers and inform the guiding principles and standards that outline a state’s foreign policymaking, suggesting “orientations, continuing commitments, actions, and functions” (Holsti, 1970, p. 306). As such, role definitions help explain continuity in a state’s foreign policy. There thus is a certain level of expectation, by society and other states, for a state to act in accordance with the roles it defines for itself in

“policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system ... It is their image of the appropriate orientations and functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment”.

Aras & Gorener (2010, p. 74) understand a national role conception to be “the core of a grand policy vision through which policy-makers explain the world around them and their state’s existence therein”. Their discussion of middle power Turkey’s growing regional profile between Europe and the Middle East is instructive in understanding Indonesia’s own role conceptions as ASEAN’s largest player in the dynamic geopolitical context of the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual elite is envisioning the country to consolidate its leadership role in the region and to increasingly play a global role as Indonesia becomes engaged in a range of issue areas and geographical contexts. Similar to Ankara, Jakarta’s foreign policy approach is guided by several national role conceptions, which are reflected in Jakarta’s foreign policy decisions as well as in its bilateral and multilateral relationships, and which constitute Indonesia’s ‘international identity’. These role conceptions are shared across the country’s foreign policy and academic communities. To some extent, they are also reflected in popular sentiments, suggesting that these role conceptions might not be solely shared by the elites, but might be notions that resonate with a wider public ("Indonesians think nation can become a superpower: Survey," 2012; Luftia, 2012c).

In view of the limited scope of this paper, I will focus on the role conceptions shared by Indonesia’s policy and intellectual communities, rather than attempt to determine whether and to what extent these role conceptions are shared at a societal level. To determine whether and, if so, how public opinion of these role conceptions might further support, or inhibit Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour
within ASEAN and beyond would require a discourse analysis of a wide range of Indonesian media representing sentiments shared by major political and ideological communities in the country. There is already a considerable body of work dedicated to the analysis of change and continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking and the interplay with domestic factors (Acharya, 1999; Anwar, 2010a, 2010b; Bünte & Ufen, 2009; Carothers & Youngs, 2011; Clark, 2011; Darmosumarto, 2011; Dosch, 2006; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2012; Rüland, 2009; Sebastian & Lanti, 2010; Sukma, 2011a, 2011b). There is thus far no comprehensive analysis that takes into account the range of national role conceptions that I will discuss in this paper and how they inform policies at the ASEAN level.

Following Holsti’s typology of national role conceptions, we can identify several types that shape Indonesian foreign policy discourse and action. Before discussing these national role conceptions in more detail, I will briefly outline them to emphasise their relevance in view of the historical context of Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and behaviour. Jakarta’s role conception as a regional leader and global actor is a principal feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and is, as I will argue, a determinant factor in Indonesia’s promotion of a regional liberal agenda and Jakarta’s approach to shaping regional security cooperation vis-à-vis the influence of external powers, therein China specifically. Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual community also emphasise the country’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine, which emphasises its non-aligned status, following “its own path through the various international problems” by working “energetically for the preservation of peace […] through endeavours supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations” (Hatta, 1953, p. 444). This notion also informs its role as mediator/integrator in the context of international and regional conflict resolution and the promotion of defence diplomacy. Indonesia’s policy actions towards the ASEAN Community and Asia-Pacific-wide forums further indicate the country’s role conception as a regional sub-system collaborator, delineating “far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265).

Another relevant role is that of the model, or example as Indonesia seeks to
establish itself as a regional and global promoter of liberal democracy. The role of *bridge*, i.e. “a translator or conveyer of messages and information between peoples and different cultures” (Holsti, 1970, p. 266), is more multi-facetted, as it can refer to Indonesia’s role conception as a liberal Muslim-majority democracy and related foreign policy behaviour as much as it can point to Indonesia’s role conception as a mediator and integrator.

There has been both continuity and change in Indonesia’s national role conceptions. In particular the dominant role conception of *regional leader* has been marked by continuity irrespective of Indonesia’s turbulent history. Also the role conception of *mediator* and related policy actions has been evident more or less consistently. Suharto’s close relationship with the West and frozen diplomatic relations with China were not always in accordance with Indonesia’s *independent and active* foreign policy doctrine. Also the roles of *sub-system collaborator, model/example* and *bridge* were less defined throughout the Suharto era, but have subsequently become more emphasised. A notable difference in Indonesia’s national role conception compared to Holstii’s (1970, p. 275) analysis is the absence, at least in the dominant foreign policy discourse, of a pronounced anti-imperialism, which still featured prominently throughout the 1960s under the first president Sukarno. This sentiment continues to enjoy some popularity among the populace and Islamist as well as nationalist and anti-globalisation groups. It is barely noticeable in the dominant discourse of the country’s foreign policy and intellectual elite but arguably continues to inform Indonesia’s foreign policymaking (Clark, 2011). This dimension would be significant in an analysis of the role conceptions reflected in popular sentiments.

Many domestic and international analysts see Indonesia’s commitment towards liberal democracy as a reflection of the liberal foundation of the Indonesian state and a return to the heydays of Indonesian internationalism (see, for example, the writings of Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Rizal Sukma. See also Sebastian & Lanti, 2010). But the factors shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy are varied and more significantly informed by security concerns and status considerations, confirming Holstii’s (1970, p. 243, emphasis in original) observation that “[i]n international
politics [...] the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy decisions and actions [...] derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment”. The country was among the leading post-independence Third World actors that advocated for an alternative international order beyond the East – West bipolarity that characterised post-World War II international relations. Indonesia’s early nationalists envisioned the country to play an independent and active role in regional and global affairs. Due to the destabilising dynamics of domestic politics Indonesia’s foreign policy endeavours did not achieve what the nation’s founding leaders had envisioned, a shortcoming Jakarta’s progressive policy and intellectual elite now intends to remedy.

The country’s foreign policy doctrine has been shaped by Indonesia’s history of foreign domination, anti-colonial struggle and the exposure of early nationalists to Western norms and values, which is reflected in the constitution and the ‘Five Principles’, or Pancasila. The preamble to the 1945 constitution outlines Indonesia’s commitment to democracy and the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, to which subsequent amendments post-Suharto added the rule of law and human rights (Anwar, 2010b; Hill & Menzel, 2010). The purpose of the Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the state was to reconcile different religious, social, ideological and ethnic groups (Wessel, 1994, p. 35) and “to seek fraternity among nations” (Hatta, 1953, p. 441). It was propagated by the political elite, and widely accepted by the populace as reflecting cultural and moral values held in common by the numerous ethnic and religious communities of the country (van Bruinessen, 2002). The Pancasila reiterates principles already laid out in the constitution, including humanitarianism and democracy. Both the constitution and the Pancasila find their origin in modern Western democratic and humanist ideas, along with the influence of the world-view and ethics of traditional Java, with its emphasis on collectivist values and harmony of the universal order (McVey, 1996, p. 18; Wessel, 1994, pp. 34, 41). They serve as the framework for Indonesia’s claim to

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1 A 1989 translation of the 1945 constitution can be found online (accessed 1 February 2013): [www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/indonesia/constitutionindonesia.doc](http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/indonesia/constitutionindonesia.doc)
being a model for democracy. Today’s promotion of a liberal agenda can thus be said to proceed on the legacy of Indonesia’s constitutional discourse.

The country’s comparably huge size in geographical and population terms as well as its geostrategic location between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, mainland Asia and Australia lends itself to the notion of Indonesia as a regional leader. During the 1950s, Jakarta’s desire to play an active role as leader, sub-system collaborator and bridge is evident in Indonesia’s part as one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia hosted the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, which led to the Movement’s formation in 1961. The first of the ‘Ten Principles of Bandung’ affirms “respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations”, a feature that continues to be popular in the country’s foreign policy discourse emphasising the significance of a rules- and norms-based international system.\(^2\) Indonesia’s commitment to the international system is further evident in its consistent contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) since the deployment of its first Garuda contingent to Egypt in 1957, which underlines the country’s support for global peace and security. As I will discuss in more detail below, this dimension is now growing in significance as it substantially informs the direction regional policies on conflict resolution and security cooperation are taking.

Indonesia’s regional leadership status and active foreign policy soon gave way to domestic political divisions, the implications of which would determine the country’s foreign policy behaviour for some time. Sukarno’s increasingly divisive left-leaning domestic politics, his confrontational regional advances vis-à-vis Malaysia and Singapore and a deteriorating economy led to ruptures in the domestic political sphere that facilitated Suharto’s rise to power in 1967. The formation of ASEAN and Indonesia’s support of the grouping was as much devised as an anti-Communist bloc, as it was aimed at affirming Indonesia’s

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abandonment of *konfrontasi* (Acharya, 2000b, p. 84; Clark, 2011; Severino, 2006, p. 7).

Suharto focused on strengthening the country’s economy and on stabilising the socio-political sphere, while Indonesia’s foreign policy profile remained less pronounced throughout the dictatorship. Jakarta’s notable engagements in regional security affairs during Suharto’s administration include Indonesia’s role in the Cambodian intervention in the 1990s and its facilitation of a peace settlement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996. The integration of Southeast Asian economies that produced the ‘Asian miracle’ helped entrench Suharto’s authoritarian rule, further aided by the West’s tacit support in view of Cold War strategic considerations and economic opportunities. Suharto’s Western-oriented economic development agenda raised the country among the new Tigers in the 1990s, before the Asian financial crisis brought to an end not only Indonesia’s economic ‘miracle’, but also Suharto’s authoritarian regime.

The repercussions of the financial crisis initiated a complete overhaul of Indonesia’s political system, which brought with it the introduction of a wide range of reforms in political, economic, and social spheres. The prominent civil and political human rights discourse that has marked this era had already taken shape in the early 1990s. It originated from growing domestic and transnational networks as well as regional developments that increased pressure on the Suharto regime and effected, among others, the establishment of the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*) in 1993, the second such body in Southeast Asia (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 111; Jetschke, 1999, p. 156ff). The country’s dynamic civil society as well as a surge in the number of political parties greatly increased the number of voices in the domestic political decision-making process. This played a pivotal role in advancing democratisation, with a ‘spill-over’ effect on the country’s foreign policy agenda.

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3 The first such body was instituted in the Philippines in 1987.
I will now turn to the different national role conceptions that are reflected in Indonesia’s current foreign policy discourse and that refer back to the constitutional and early nationalist discourse discussed above. It should be noted that these role conceptions cannot always be clearly differentiated, as some major themes permeate several of the types discussed below. Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine of independent and active is a common theme that applies to all role conceptions. The roles of Indonesia as a leading middle power, a model democracy, a bridge and a mediator and integrator in regional and international affairs are recurring notions in the international identity Indonesia intends to project. I will attempt to analyse these types in accordance with Holsti’s (1970) typology.

**Example/Model**

The transformation to democracy after Suharto’s downfall was comparably swift, and Indonesian politicians and intellectuals consider the country as *primus inter pares*, or the first among equals, in ASEAN for having successfully managed this process and for its leading role in the Association (Al-Anshori, 2012; Anwar, 2010c; Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 165; Sari, 2011, p. 8). Indonesia’s image as a stable and liberal democracy is a significant asset, which serves to project its status as a responsible member of the international community and advance its ambitions of exerting a higher level of influence on global affairs, returning to the Sukarno-style internationalist, or ‘lighthouse’, foreign policy as the global spokesperson for countries in the South (Acharya, 2000b, pp. 50-51; Anwar, 2010c; Laksmana, 2011b, p. 162; Sukma, 2011c). Indonesia has consolidated this image by promoting the norms and values of liberal democracy at the regional level, or, as some argue, by pursuing a ‘cosmopolitan’ foreign policy (Murphy, 2012, p. 86). Indonesia’s “normative and moral authority” (Laksmana, 2011b, p. 159), its promotion of human rights, democracy and the liberal peace are among the pillars

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4 Acharya (2009, p. 9-11) questions the norms discourse of ‘moral cosmopolitanism’, arguing that the process of diffusion is one-way and exogenous, rather than the local agency-led congruence proposed by the author. In moral cosmopolitanism, moreover, ‘Western and non-Western beliefs and practices tend to be dichotomized into good vs. bad norms. The Indonesian example is intriguing, as what could be considered cosmopolitan norms also find their expression in Javanese ethics and values which, as I discussed above, blended with Western liberal ideas to inform Indonesia’s unique constitutional discourse.
of its outward-looking foreign policy agenda at the ASEAN level and beyond (Anwar, 2010b, p. 132; Laksmana, 2011b; Sukma, 2011a).

The constitutional discourse provides the normative standard that has influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour since the country set out on its path of democratisation post-Suharto. Sebastian and Lanti (2010, p. 149) thus consider the prominence of Indonesia’s liberal discourse a reawakening of “primordial sentiments”. Subsequent to the turmoil of the post-crisis years and the breakdown of the New Order regime, “[s]pearheading the democracy drive in ASEAN was […] regarded by the Indonesian political elite as a noble cause legitimizing renewed claims to regional leadership” (Rüland, 2009, p. 397; see also Sukma, 2011c, p. 112). The perception that Indonesia as “the most democratic country in ASEAN” should take the lead in promoting democratic values is held across Indonesian state and non-state actors alike, including high officials (Dosch, 2008, p. 537). Indonesia’s democratic credentials also inform its image as a political model that successfully blends Muslim and democratic sensibilities, evident in the national role conception of the bridge.

*Bridge*

The country’s arguably successful democratization and its credentials as the world’s third largest democracy with the world’s largest Muslim majority are seen to project Indonesia’s image as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West (Anwar, 2010b, p. 132; Hitipeuw, 2011; Murphy, 2012, p. 96) and within Islam itself as Indonesia’s Islam is branded as “a force for peace, tolerance and harmony” (Sukma, 2011a). Yet despite Indonesia’s membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference and several peace initiatives in the Middle East, such as capacity-building in Palestine and Afghanistan and the hosting of the 2007 Sunni-Shiite Conference in Bogor, the government refrains from capitalising on a Muslim identity in conceptualising the country’s regional and, moreover, global role as a bridge between cultures and religions. Initiatives in the Middle East that got underway in the early years of the Yudhoyono administration received a lukewarm response. The country’s desire to be a bridge between Islam and the West is yet to be realised (Anwar, 2010a) and Indonesia’s success in affecting normative shifts in the Arab world has thus far been modest at best.
(Cullum, 2010; Greenlees, 2007; Rüland, 2009, p. 397; Sukma, 2011). This led Greg Fealy (cited in Greenlees, 2007) of the Australian National University to declare that “there is a huge gap between Indonesia’s rhetoric and aspirations, and what is achieved”, a view shared by Rizal Sukma of Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Sukma, 2011).

Jakarta’s hesitation to play the Muslim card too prolifically is also due to the fact that despite the increasingly defined Muslim identity domestically, the country is perceived by many Arab nations to lack religious authority (Greenlees, 2007; "Indonesia: Muslim bridge-builder?", 2008). This is due to the comparably moderate and syncretistic form of Islam, influenced by the historical traits of Buddhism, Hinduism and Javanese mysticism, which is practiced by a majority of the country’s nominal Muslims. Also because of this cultural and religious pluralism, Indonesia’s history has been characterised by secularist politics, and “despite santrification or re-Islamization, Islam in the largest Muslim [sic] country does not translate into a powerful political force” (Raillon, 2004, p. 5), both in Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour and in the domestic sphere (Priamarizki, 2013). But the notion of Indonesia as a bridge also permeates other role conceptions.

The role conception of bridge also lends itself to the popular historical notion of Indonesia as a country “steering between two reefs”, as Jakarta is advancing regional cooperation with global powers U.S. and China. The notion was coined by one of the country’s foremost intellectuals and, with Sukarno, celebrated founding fathers, former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and alludes to Indonesia’s independent and active role between Cold War superpowers America and Russia (Hatta, 1948, 1958). This role conception was later accentuated through Indonesia’s commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the challenges faced by Indonesia and other regional governments appear to be more complex, increasingly requiring transnational and cooperative or collaborative responses. Referring to traditional and non-traditional security (NTS) challenges of a multi-polar world order, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010), said
“our orientation now is to ensure that for every one of these issues, we are part of the solution. In other words, we are about building bridges. We are not interested in accentuating differences”.

The role conception of bridge thus also refers to Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda of advancing multilateralism and conflict resolution. These objectives are further accentuated in the role types of regional sub-system collaborator and mediator/integrator.

**Regional Sub-System Collaborator**

As a country straddling a geographical, political and socio-cultural crossroads, Indonesia perceives itself to occupy a prominent position as a facilitator of cooperative and collaborative efforts and dialogue, thus pursuing “all-embracing policies in regional matters, with a goal of constructing a new regional order” (Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 83). This role conception serves to rationalise Indonesia’s engagement in a range of issue areas in multiple settings, including in the Middle East and closer to home, in the Asia-Pacific, where the country’s foreign policy approach extends to “far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265) towards an ASEAN Community.

Indonesian leaders refer to the country’s role in maintaining and supporting the global order and its norms and rules-based system, highlighting ‘an order instituting role’ (Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 83). At the 2012 Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran, Natalegawa (cited in "Indonesia pushes for multilateral peace at Non-Aligned Movement meeting," 2012) called member countries to

> “invest in strengthening multilateral diplomacy to create a global culture of peace and security. The United Nations is the primary vehicle for promoting global peace and security”.

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As such, this role conception would extend to that of a ‘global sub-system collaborator’ (Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 84). Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to peace and diplomacy when he said that Indonesia has “a million friends and zero enemies” in the inaugural speech for his second term in office ("SBY: Indonesia has 'A Million Friends and Zero Enemies,'" 2009). This notion was later dubbed “‘a million friends’ diplomacy” in a Jakarta Post opinion piece (Pramono, 2010).

Most significantly, this role conception is evident in the policy initiatives Jakarta has been promoting at the ASEAN level, where Indonesia aims to fulfil the role of “the anchor of unity of ASEAN” (Syailendra, 2013). This endeavour is evident in the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Political Security Community, which I will discuss in detail below. It is demonstrated by Jakarta’s commitment to institute a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China, which Indonesia has been pursuing for several years ("Discourse: Marty lays out foreign policy priorities for 2013," 2012). It is further evident in Indonesia’s growing commitment to defence diplomacy and conflict resolution initiatives around the world, which I will also address in section three. President Yudhoyono depicted this foreign policy doctrine of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as “[a] regional architecture where no single power predominates, and every nation is in a win-win relationship with all others”. This role further relates to that of the mediator, a prominent image frequently alluded to by Indonesia’s policy and intellectual elite.

Mediator/Integrator

The mediator/integrator role type refers to the perception “of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265). Indonesia’s

5 In the literature the initiative is interchangeably referred to as the ASEAN Security Community, reflecting the original Indonesian proposal, and the ASEAN Political Security Community, reflecting the subsequent adoption by ASEAN leaders. In the following I will refer to the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC). The other two pillars of the ASEAN Community are the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015, online: www.aseansec.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf.

engagement as a ‘problem-solver’ and a mediator is grounded in the country’s constitutional discourse promoting ‘freedom, eternal peace, and social justice’ (Agensky & Barker, 2012, p. 116; Murphy, 2012, p. 96; Rüland, 2009). President Yudhoyono, in his Independence Day Speech on 16 August 2012, repeatedly alluded to the country’s constitutional commitments to international peace and order and the tradition of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine. He further reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to peace and justice in his inaugural speech to the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali in 2011. Also Foreign Minister Natalegawa highlights Jakarta’s recent initiatives as a return to the early values of Indonesian internationalism (Cullum, 2010). This presents a continuum, which reflects on the writings of Mohammad Hatta, whose philosophy was deeply influenced by the ideas of the democratic peace. Indonesia’s first line of defence, as Hatta pointed out, is “the achievement of a stable peace and a good understanding with our neighbours” (Hatta, 1956, p. 424).

On Indonesia’s credibility as a mediator, Marty Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) pointed out that

“*Indonesia is naturally a consensus builder because that's the makeup of our own country. We are [...] a very diverse country made up of hundreds of different ethnic groups, hundreds of languages spoken. So consensus building comes naturally to Indonesia [...] this is one quality that Indonesia is now trying to propagate, trying to project in international affairs. Whether it be on climate change, whether it be on disarmament issues, development issues, we always try to be part of the solution to many of our contemporary issues*”

Natalegawa continues to say that “Indonesia has been a country that other ASEAN countries turn to whenever they have some bilateral problems or challenges” (cited in Cullum, 2010). He noted that, for example, in view of the South China Sea

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8 “Fighting for peace, justice and prosperity in the 21st Century”.
dispute that shook the at times fragile unity of the Association in 2012 and the attempts of the United States and China to assert their roles in the region, Indonesia remained an important mediating force and a source for solution to regional challenges ("Discourse: Marty lays out foreign policy priorities for 2013," 2012; Sagita, 2013). Promoting diplomatic initiatives and solutions is a key feature of projecting the nature of “Indonesia’s benign rise” and the country’s role as “a positive force for regional peace” (Syailendra, 2012) and “a credible force of moderation” (Anwar, 2010c). Indonesia furthers this image as ‘problem solver’ in ASEAN through its commitment to finding a solution to the ethnic conflict in Western Burma, the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia and its long-time engagement with peace processes in the Southern Philippines. Jakarta also projects this image beyond the region. In the Middle East, Indonesia facilitated talks between Iraqi Sunni and Shiite groups and has been a significant contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping force in Lebanon. According to former Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia can “produce some fresh ideas that might be helpful in the quest for a solution” (cited in Greenlees, 2007). The country’s continued and increasing participation in UNPKO, which I will discuss in more detail below, highlights this endeavour.

These initiatives serve to project the country’s image as a responsible international actor in the wider region. Sebastian and Lanti (2010, p. 168) suggest Indonesia thus has a sense of playing a dignified central role in regional and global politics (see also Sukma, 2009a). Members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual community also highlight the fact that Indonesia is increasingly capitalizing on the country’s “soft power”, based on the claim of having successfully democratised its domestic political space (Hitipeuw, 2011; Laksmana, 2011b, p. 159). This is meant to underline Jakarta’s benign intentions in the region. This and other role types discussed above are meant to add to Indonesia’s credentials as a regional leader and global actor.

**Regional leader and Global Actor**

Indonesia’s national role conception as a regional leader and global actor is the most dominant role type evident in Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and is substantiated by the variety of other role types discussed above. The Indonesian
foreign policy and intellectual community perceives Indonesia as the natural leader of the ASEAN region (Al-Anshori, 2012; Bayuni, 2012; Cullum, 2010; Sagita, 2013; Syailendra, 2012), with its secretariat symbolically located in the Indonesian capital. Indonesia thus has a sense of entitlement to assume a bigger international role (Bandoro, 2008; Drysdale, 2011; "Indonesians think nation can become a superpower: Survey," 2012; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2012; Rüland, 2009, p. 397). Taking a leadership role in transnational issues is at the heart of Indonesia’s foreign policy and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa thus considers the assertion of Indonesia’s regional leadership status one of the priorities for 2013 (Sagita, 2013). Democracy promotion has emerged as a major foreign policy rallying point (Dosch, 2008, p. 537). The country’s promotion of a liberal agenda makes it a natural close partner of the West and adds weight to the ‘international identity’ Indonesia intends to convey as a country where Islam, democracy and modernisation go hand in hand (Agensky & Barker, 2012; Anwar, 2010a, 2010b; Clark, 2011; Katsumata, 2009; Sukma, 2011c, p. 112).

The perception that “Indonesia is […] one of the most under-estimated countries in Asia” also drives the agenda of consolidating its leadership status (Drysdale, 2011).10 As I had mentioned above, Indonesia’s early nationalists had envisioned the country to play a leading role internationally, an ambition that was never quite realised in the course of Indonesia’s turbulent history. Joining ASEAN was also rationalised with the notion that the grouping could potentially “serve as a forum for the expression of Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia” (Weinstein, 1969, in Acharya, 2000b, p. 84). With the country’s comparably successful rise from what many observers feared to be the looming disintegration after more than three decades of authoritarian rule and subsequent turmoil, Jakarta’s foreign policy community again envisions Indonesia to become an influential regional and global player. After Habibie’s and Wahid’s efforts of managing and containing the economic, political and social crises of the post-Suharto years, the Megawati administration projected Indonesia’s leadership claims onto the regional stage by taking the lead in regional initiatives. Milestones during the Megawati

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10 See also Anwar (2010c).
administration were developments towards the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community, which helped entrench Indonesia’s policy objectives at the regional level. This process was further advanced by the Yudhoyono administration, which also elevated Indonesia back onto the global stage by showing Jakarta’s commitment to a range of transnational issues in the security, economic, civil and environmental spheres (Acharya, 2007; Agensky & Barker, 2012; Clark, 2011; Murphy, 2010).

Indonesia’s international role in democracy promotion, conflict resolution, climate change and economic development has attracted much international praise, and Indonesians take great pride in their country’s growing international status, exemplified also by Indonesia’s membership in the G20, where Jakarta intends to be a spokesperson for countries in the South to change the global economic order in their favour (Anwar, 2010c; Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 166; Koesoemawiria, 2011; Sukma, 2011c; Suratin, 2012). Additionally, since 9/11 and the activities of domestic as well as regional terror groups, Indonesia became a key actor in the ‘war on terror’, and has battled home-grown terrorism with arguable success, in spite of some resentment from increasingly politicised Islamist forces in Indonesian society advocating anti-American sentiments (Agensky & Barker, 2012; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2010). These achievements have strengthened the confidence of Indonesia’s foreign policy elite, advancing their ambition to see the country assume a leading role internationally.

Thus far, Indonesia’s international profile is relatively modest, but Jakarta’s role in ASEAN and beyond clearly illustrates this level of confidence. Indonesia’s global impact, it has been argued, will only be effective if Jakarta can take the lead within Southeast Asia (Bower, 2011). ASEAN is perceived as the ideal vehicle to realise Indonesia’s global ambitions. Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) thus asserts

“certainly a foothold in ASEAN is a prerequisite for a role elsewhere [...] Indonesia’s role in ASEAN – when we chair ASEAN, for example – it's about exercising leadership”.
Most notable is Indonesia’s role in advancing and shaping security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, evident in Jakarta’s leading role in ASEAN security regionalism and defence diplomacy. This dimension also underlines Jakarta’s concerns over China’s rise and the resulting threat perception to its regional leadership status, which I will address in detail in the following section. When ASEAN governments discussed the inclusion of external powers in the East Asia Summit, for instance, Indonesia insisted on including the U.S., Australia, India and other external powers, whereas Malaysia favoured the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) configuration with China, Japan and South Korea. Indonesia succeeded in the end and Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) pointed out that

“we have been having a rather lengthy debate on what is called regional architecture building. And Indonesia has really weighed in on this debate and tried to take a leadership position”.

Whether Indonesia leads as the political heavyweight of Southeast Asia in regional policy decisions, as a model democracy to be emulated by ASEAN members and nascent democracies beyond the region or as a mediator/integrator in Asia-Pacific multilateralism and supporter of the liberal peace globally, the role conception of ‘leader’ is a recurring theme that permeates other role conceptions. The government’s foreign policy objectives at the ASEAN level and beyond are intricately linked with role types discussed above and substantially inform Jakarta’s foreign policy agenda. Jakarta aims to apply the democratic credentials it has established in the domestic sphere to the region and beyond as Indonesia’s foreign policy elite sees Indonesia play a leading role in numerous geographic and issue areas, most notably in ASEAN. This has led some observers to argue that Indonesia’s democratisation is informed by a neo-nationalist agenda among Indonesia’s legislature that likely determines not only the nature of Indonesia’s rise, but further the way it is perceived by Indonesia’s regional neighbours (Jetschke, 1999; Rüland, 2009). Indonesia’s leadership ambitions have caused some concern in the region. Moreover, other ASEAN governments question Indonesia’s own commitment to its liberal agenda, due to the country’s
questionable performance in implementing its liberal agenda in the domestic sphere.

**Regional Rhetoric vs. Domestic Action**

The discrepancies between Indonesia’s regional rhetoric and the domestic reality raise the question as to Jakarta’s rationale for promoting the norms and values of a liberal democratic order at the ASEAN level. The role conceptions of model democracy, bridge and mediator that the country conveys regionally and globally are not as apparent in the domestic sphere. Yet Jakarta’s promotion of a liberal agenda in the region and internationally has been instrumental in facilitating Indonesia’s rise to regional leadership, despite the concerns it caused among other ASEAN members. Several of the country’s ASEAN neighbours are concerned about Jakarta’s leadership ambitions and see the region’s norms of sovereignty and non-interference in the member states’ internal affairs threatened by Indonesia’s regional policy initiatives (Anwar, 2010b; Jones, 2010; Rüland, 2009, p. 379). Officials in Malaysia and Singapore, for example, consider Indonesia’s democracy agenda “a recipe for creating societal disorder” (Rüland, 2009, p. 398). Some analysts go so far as to suggest “Jakarta really does not care if ASEAN lives or dies” (Loveard, cited in Hunt, 2012). Jakarta has been accused of ‘bullying’ other members into taking unpopular decisions towards further democratisation, a sentiment that has not escaped Indonesian leaders (Emmers, 2005; Rüland, 2009, pp. 385, 387). According to Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010)

> “given Indonesia's status, it size, obvious size, population-wise, geographic-wise, we cannot exercise leadership by – in forcing ourselves. It has to be an earned leadership”.

It is this notion of ‘earned leadership’ that is subject to scrutiny from domestic and external observers, as Jakarta’s regional objectives are not always reflected in the domestic sphere. Critics question the ‘liberal image’ Indonesia aims to convey, as it contradicts the prevalence of corruption and of authoritarian and oligarchic elements in Indonesian society, as well as the authorities’ poor performance in protecting civil and human rights domestically (Anwar, 2010c; Sukma, 2011c). The quality and depth of Indonesia’s democracy has been questioned repeatedly,
with references made to Indonesia being a ‘pseudo democracy’ (Case, 2002), an ‘illiberal democracy’ (Hadiz, 2004), a ‘patrimonial democracy’ (Webber, 2006), a ‘messy democracy’ (Anwar, 2010b, p. 135), and a ‘hybrid regime’ (Bünite & Ufen, 2009), referring to the grey-zone between electoral and liberal democracy that includes both democratic and authoritarian elements.

Despite one and a half decades of advancing democratisation, decentralisation and liberalisation of the economic and political spheres, Indonesia has also experienced numerous setbacks that increasingly attract regional and international attention and criticism. The prevalence of corruption, weak law enforcement, communal tensions and continuing incidents of extremism continue to blemish Indonesia’s image (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 323ff; Sukma, 2011a; Weatherbee, 2011). The conflict in Aceh often serves as prime example of Indonesia’s commitment to solving domestic conflicts. Yet at the same time as the Megawati administration advanced Indonesia’s liberal agenda at the ASEAN level in 2003 with proposals for establishing a regional human rights body and a regional peacekeeping force, Jakarta declared martial law in Aceh. Had it not been for the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami it is questionable whether Jakarta (and the Free Aceh Movement) would have demonstrated as much political will to resolve the conflict as they did after the disaster struck.

The ongoing conflict in the Papuan provinces in particular provides a perspective on Indonesia’s failure to protect human rights domestically that stands in stark contrast to the image Jakarta aims to project internationally. Several foreign governments and international non-government organisations raised concerns with the Indonesian government throughout 2012 over incidents of human rights abuse in Papua along with ongoing impunity and lack of accountability of the security forces in Papua and beyond (Amnesty International, 2012; "Australia presses Indonesia on Papua killing," 2012; "Clinton urges dialogue in Indonesia's Papua," 2012; "Government urged to act on Papuan death squad claims," 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012; 2013, p. 324; International Crisis Group, 2012). The violent conduct of security forces continues unabated as hardliners in Jakarta support further militarisation in order to subdue secessionist sentiments ("House bangs
drum of war in Papua," 2012), a trend underpinned by changes to cooperation among security forces that potentially strengthen the military’s role in managing internal conflicts (Poling & Magpile, 2013). In a paradoxical sense Indonesia’s international profile as a promoter of democracy and human rights appears to allow Jakarta to evade increased international scrutiny of its security approach to the Papuan provinces, it’s overall international image thus far hardly tarnished by the ongoing injustices there.

Alongside conflicts over historical grievances, land and resources, religious tensions are also on the rise. Incidents of religious intolerance in Indonesia doubled between 2007 and 2012 according to a report by the Jakarta-based Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace (Setara Institute, 2012; Timur, 2012). Also the Wahid Institute concluded that religiously motivated attacks and intolerance rose by 50% between 2009 and 2010 ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the world," 2011). A radical Muslim minority has gained notorious prominence in the country. Christian minorities have been targeted on occasion since the end of the Suharto regime. But the Ahmadiya and the Shiite communities, two Muslim minorities in the Sunni-dominated country, are also increasingly targeted and attacked by Sunni Muslim mobs ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the world," 2011). Significantly, attacks on the freedom of religion are not limited to rioting mobs but at times receive tacit as well as explicit support from authorities. Security forces stood by attacks on minority groups and government officials issued discriminatory policies, such as passing a decree banning Ahmadis from proselytising or worshipping in public, and high officials made statements that increased tensions, including Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the world," 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 324; Setara Institute, 2012).

The country’s failure to protect human rights in the domestic realm reflects the tensions within Indonesia’s political and social sphere, where liberal forces oftentimes clash with an rising political Islam, a growing nationalism and the legacy of military and authoritarian rule (Sukma, 2011a). Rüland (2009, p. 399) refers to “the gap between the old (authoritarian, power and sovereignty-based)
norms and the new (liberal) norms” that pull the country’s political development into different directions. This paradox is also evident in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2010c) suggests that “[t]he push and pull between a Sukarno-style ‘lighthouse’ international stance and a more pragmatic, economically-focused effort will likely mark the course of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the years ahead”. More significant still is the role geopolitical considerations play in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. While Indonesia’s idealist foundations are a useful historical legacy upon which to rationalise Jakarta’s liberal agenda in ASEAN, the motivations behind its recent liberalisation policies are more functional.

Indonesia aims at advancing regional cohesion through the promotion of a liberal agenda, as Jakarta intends to consolidate its regional leadership status vis-à-vis the growing influence of external powers. China’s rise plays a central role in determining Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation as Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia grows. Following a discussion of the geopolitical context and the implications of the Sino-Indonesian relationship for Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour in section two, I will analyse to what extent Indonesia’s role conceptions are reflected in policy initiatives at the regional level in section three.

The Geopolitical Context

The Asia-Pacific region is emerging as the focus of 21st century international relations. The region contains a large share of the world’s population, strong and emerging economies along with some of the world’s most important trade centres and shipping routes, a vast array of natural resources and a kaleidoscope of peoples and cultures, co-existing mostly peacefully, though with prevalent and latent conflicts as a source of potential regional and global instability. ASEAN is one of the region’s central bodies and its performance and future relevance as a regional institution have been subject to a long and on-going debate (Amador, 2010; Anwar, 2010b; Beeson, 2003; Jones, 2010; Khoo, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2012; Leifer, 1973; Rüland & Jetschke, 2008). Its impact on the regional order since its inception in 1967, however, has without a doubt been a fundamental feature of international relations in the Asia-Pacific.
ASEAN has undergone significant changes over the past two decades. With increased membership, a changing regional and global order, and the acknowledgement that a range of economic, environmental, political and security challenges affecting the wider region require a concerted response, the Association has taken steps towards closer cooperation, with the goal of creating an ASEAN Community by 2015 to consolidate ASEAN’s centrality in regional affairs. ASEAN now plays a key role in a range of high-profile international forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), all of which further engage a range of external powers, including the U.S. and China. Alongside advancing multilateral dialogue on political, economic and security aspects, engaging the U.S. and China also serves to contain their mutual rivalry and dominance over weaker regional states (Acharya, 2007, p. 648; Jones, 2010).

Both Beijing and Washington are vying for influence in this strategic key region. China’s influence has increased considerably at political, economic and security levels over the past decade, while the U.S remained entangled in the ‘war on terror’ in Central Asia and the Middle East. China’s economic support has helped many national economies recover from the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The ASEAN-China Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2002 and bilateral FTA’s with China constitute a considerable opportunity for Southeast Asian economies. At the same time, China’s economic dominance, uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions in the region and prevalent conflict, most notably in the South China Sea, cause concern among regional governments. As the past few years have demonstrated, ASEAN is yet to form a cohesive unit, a vacuum that benefits Beijing’s efforts to increase its influence on regional politics, as it did at the 2012 ASEAN Forum in Phnom Penh, where the Association was divided over what action to take on the South China Sea tensions (Hunt, 2012). This has led several regional governments to deepen their relationship with external powers including the U.S., which has increased its diplomatic and military presence in anticipation of China’s challenge to its global leadership status, fanning fears of regional coalition-building as Washington and Beijing are set to compete for regional influence.
As a regional bloc, ASEAN seeks to be independent of the influence of external powers and intends to strengthen its own role and centrality in regional affairs. A cohesive and assertive ASEAN would not need U.S. leadership and would provide a strong deterrent to Chinese dominance in the South China Sea and the wider Asia-Pacific (Kurlantzick, 2012, p. 1). Yet in order to achieve unity within a grouping made up of a diverse range of political systems that is often weighed down by its own institutional arrangements, ASEAN might be in need of high-profile leadership to accelerate an otherwise protracted process of community-building. Indonesia has been all too willing to claim this role, as it emerges from years of crisis and conflict, to come forward as the ‘natural leader’ of the Association, a status potentially at threat from Beijing’s advances in the region. More than most other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and China have shared a difficult relationship in the recent past. Jakarta’s historical relationship with Beijing warrants a closer look, as this context is a significant factor in Indonesia’s national role conceptions and the way they shape Jakarta’s policy goals in the region, most notably Jakarta’s aspirations for regional leadership.

The China Factor

The role and influence of China in the region provides an important perspective on explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation as Jakarta’s attitude towards Beijing is determined by both cooperation and antagonism, informed by the two countries’ historically turbulent relationship. In May 2011 Foreign Minister Natalegawa suggested during a state visit by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao that the relationship between Indonesia and China was at an all time high ("China-Indonesia relationship at all time high: Marty," 2011). In fact, since Jakarta and Beijing restored diplomatic relations in 1990, common strategic and economic interests have furthered engagement at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. But an analysis of Indonesia’s relationship with China indicates that Jakarta continues to nurture a latent apprehension of Beijing’s influence and aspirations in the region, a perception that gains significance as Jakarta’s own ambitions become more defined and as China’s power and influence grow.
China’s participation in ASEAN-driven regional processes has helped Beijing develop closer ties with numerous ASEAN members, facilitated by deepening economic relations and the compatibility of the Chinese government’s worldview with some of the tenets of the ‘ASEAN Way’ of diplomacy, such as non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states (Bellamy, 2004, p. 103). Hugh White (2005, p. 472) of the Australian National University pointed out in 2005 that “China has had great success in converting economic opportunities into regional political influence”. Beijing’s influence is such that it can “balance” internal ASEAN rivalries, such as those between Vietnam versus Laos and Cambodia (Bolt, 2011, p. 280). The influence China thus exerts on some ASEAN members can have a considerable impact on the sense of unity and cohesion in the Association. This was evident when the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh for the first time in its 45-year history failed to produce a joint communiqué, due to Manila’s and Hanoi’s insistence on including a reference to the South China Sea dispute. Phnom Penh’s refusal was credited to undue influence of Beijing (Hunt, 2012) and raised questions as to ASEAN’s future ("Cambodia has put Asean's future in jeopardy," 2012).

Jakarta’s perspective of China has been marked by antagonism for centuries. This sentiment can be traced back to invasions in the 13th and 15th Century, and finds its 20th Century equivalent in Communist China’s advances in the region and antagonism towards Indonesia’s economically influential Chinese minority. Throughout most of Indonesia’s post-independence history, China was perceived as an expansionist regional power, indeed as the country’s “prime potential adversary” (Leifer, 1999, pp. 91-93).

Jakarta established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1950. Deepening ties between Sukarno’s Indonesia and Beijing marked the subsequent years as China supported the pro-Beijing Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI), on which Sukarno relied for domestic support (Bert, 1985, p. 970). But elements within the Indonesian Armed Forces were suspicious of China’s intentions in Indonesia. The killing of several generals that led to the army seizing control in 1965 was blamed on the PKI and portrayed as an effort to turn
Indonesia into a Communist client state as part of China’s hegemonic aspirations in Southeast Asia (Sukma, 2009b).

Following the abortive coup of 1965, Jakarta “froze” diplomatic relations with China in 1967 for Beijing’s alleged involvement in the incident. For China this was a “major foreign-policy disaster” (Mozingo, 1976, p. 13). But Beijing had little control over the factors leading to the rupture, which was brought about by competition for domestic power (Bert, 1985; Mozingo, 1976). Following the 1967 change of government and the further institutionalisation of the military’s influence on domestic and foreign affairs, China was construed as the main threat to national security and to domestic and regional stability (Leifer, 1999, p. 93; Storey, 2000, p. 147; Sukma, 2009b, p. 593). The military effectively manipulated the perception of the “China threat” that was to considerably shape Indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies for three decades as Suharto’s regime claimed legitimacy primarily as the shield that fended off the Communist take-over of Indonesia (Leifer, 1999, p. 94; Storey, 2000, p. 153; Sukma, 2009b, p. 604).

During Suharto’s ‘New Order’, Indonesia’s foreign policy was largely determined by economic factors, which eventually necessitated an improvement of the Sino-Indonesian relationship. Jakarta pursued relationships with those countries that were seen to contribute to Indonesia’s economic development by providing aid and investment, such as Japan and the West. As China’s opening improved relations in the region from the early 1970s, Beijing signalled readiness for renewed relations with Jakarta. Also Indonesian Foreign Affairs officials began promoting renewed ties with Beijing, but the military’s objection prevailed. China had “little choice but to wait patiently until the Indonesians [were] ready to move” (Bert, 1985, p. 977). ASEAN members Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had already established diplomatic and trade relations with China in the mid-1970s. China’s growing economic status was well posed to also accommodate Indonesia’s search for new markets for the country’s primary commodities.

The Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 further indicated that Indonesia was running risk of being left behind in economic and diplomatic terms was it to continue its
“calculated practice of disengagement” (Leifer, 1999, p. 88). It was Suharto, in a show of force suggesting his emancipation from military backing, who took the opportunity to eventually respond to China’s recurring overtures at a time when economically and geopolitically the benefits of a relationship with China outweighed the perceived threat to national security.11 Direct trade relations were already re-established in 1985. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1990, though they would not warm up significantly until after Suharto stepped down in 1998, since “Indonesia’s political elite, especially the military, remained suspicious of China” (Sukma, 2009b, p. 600). Once diplomatic relations were restored, however, both countries emphasised the positive impact this was to have on peace and stability in the region (Storey, 2000, p. 150).

Jakarta stood to benefit from restored ties both economically and strategically. ASEAN’s involvement in the Cambodian conflict provided Indonesia with an opportunity to consolidate the image of regional leader and mediator, which necessitated opening channels with Beijing (Suryadinata, 1990, p. 691; van der Kroef, 1986, p. 934). Jakarta further hoped to assume chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement. Continued “frozen” ties with one of the major regional powers would have sent the wrong message and could have put into question Indonesia’s commitment to its non-aligned status (Leifer, 1999, p. 89; Storey, 2000, pp. 148-149; Suryadinata, 1990).12 With diplomatic relations restored, Indonesia was set to pursue its leadership ambition of becoming the ‘prime manager’ of regional order within Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1999, p. 99).

The improvement of ties that set in at the end of the 1990s can largely be credited to China’s efforts at projecting a benevolent image to the region as a whole, of which also Sino-Indonesian relations benefited. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 provided China with an opportunity to increase its political clout in the region. By providing Indonesia and other ASEAN countries with bilateral aid packages to address the crisis, China projected the image of a responsible power

11 This eventual turn highlights the fact that Suharto was the final arbiter in the Sino-Indonesian relationship, rather than the Department of Foreign Affairs. The economic benefits accrued by the restoration of ties further cemented Suharto’s claim to be the nation’s ‘father of development’ (Leifer, 1999, p. 88; Suryadinata, 1990, pp. 686, 691).

12 At the same time, Indonesia does not yet maintain formal diplomatic relations with Israel.
that somewhat dissipated the notion of a regional hegemon (Lijun, 2007; Storey, 2000). The Wahid administration further advanced bilateral relations, in particular in trade, of which Indonesia stood to greatly benefit. But Jakarta was also offended by Western support for East Timor’s independence and criticism of Jakarta’s handling of the crisis. This soured relationships with the U.S., Australia and other Western countries for several years and led to a closer alignment with China. Beijing also quickly responded after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and provided aid along with expertise to Indonesia and other affected countries, which lent further credit to China’s “charm offensive” toward Southeast Asia (Sukma, 2009b).

The Megawati and Yudhoyono administrations continued to intensify bilateral trade relations. President Yudhoyono (cited in Sukma, 2009b, p. 603) said in 2005 “our target in [developing relations with] China is to look for an opportunity to fulfill [sic] our national interests. We have to get something from the rise of China, especially in economic terms”. Today, China is Indonesia's second-largest trading partner, with trade projected to rise from US$ 60 billion in 2011 to 80 billion in 2015 (Booth, 2011). Other ASEAN countries benefit equally from trade relations with China. China is now “the primary supporter of ASEAN’s aspiration to prosperity and prestige through multilateral economic liberalisation”, manifested in the ACFTA (Bolt, 2011, p. 280). Yet Indonesia’s trade deficit is increasing, suggesting that China holds the competitive advantage in the current economic structure (Booth, 2011).

Progress was also made in the defence and security sector (Sukma, 2009b, p. 596). The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 already served to expand ASEAN’s security cooperation and engage extra-regional powers, including China, by and large in less controversial aspects of non-traditional security. Traditional issues of defence cooperation were at the time largely reserved for bilateral relationships (Laksmana, 2011a, p. 89). This suited Beijing’s “new diplomacy”, which sought to advance international cooperation to foster economic growth and project China’s image of a responsible power (Bolt, 2011, p. 278). In 1997 Beijing announced its desire for multilateral security cooperation.
China’s multilateral engagement led to an improvement of relationships with ASEAN alongside deepening bilateral ties. Following the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and China’s accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN and China entered a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” at the ASEAN Summit in 2003.\(^\text{13}\)

Despite initial concerns, Indonesia came to actively support China’s membership in multilateral bodies such as the ARF (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). Starting with ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s engagement in the Cambodian conflict, the years of difficult relations with Beijing had already been replaced by a renewed commitment to regional cooperation. Jakarta subsequently transformed into one of the most active regional supporters of multilateralism as it “sees multipolarity as the best way of accommodating the great powers” (Storey, 2000, p. 165). Jakarta believes that China’s enmeshment in multilateral dialogues will consolidate respect for norms of peaceful coexistence, state conduct and good citizenship and that the ‘constraining influence of interdependence’ would trigger benefits in areas of divergence, such as the South China Sea dispute (Leifer, 1999, p. 100).

In 2005 both countries agreed on a strategic partnership, which “shall be a non-aligned and non-exclusive relationship aimed at promoting peace, stability and prosperity of the two countries and its peoples” (Republic of Indonesia & People's Republic of China, 2005). This partnership led to a joint missile production agreement ("Indonesia, China to strengthen defense cooperation," 2011), coordinated sea patrols (Adamrah, 2011), and joint military exercises ("Indonesia, Chinese armed forces stage anti-terror exercise," 2012).

At the same time, Indonesia perceives China’s rising influence in the region with some apprehension (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). Santo Darmosumarto (2011, p. 160) Assistant Special Staff on International Relations for the President, cautioned that if Indonesia failed to pursue a ‘well-calibrated engagement’ with China, “sooner or later Indonesia would find itself at the short end of the relationship, unable to

\(^\text{13}\) See the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, online available at: http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm.
stand shoulder-to-shoulder with China and its growing power”. The relationship with China thus is, according to Rizal Sukma, “one of the most difficult challenges in Indonesia’s foreign policy” (2009b, p. 592).

Indonesia’s own sense of entitlement for regional leadership, which is Jakarta’s dominant national role conception, puts it in a geopolitical rivalry with China as Jakarta shares with Beijing a “mirror image […] in its view of its rightful place within the regional environment” (Leifer, 1999, pp. 87,99). China’s economic and political ‘invasion’ of this region and its implication for cohesion in the Association threaten Indonesia’s sense of standing in Southeast Asia and strengthen apprehension and suspicion of China’s ambitions. Leifer asserted that China and Indonesia are natural geopolitical rivals within the wider region, yet this perception is unlikely to be shared equally by Beijing and Jakarta (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). Bert (1985, p. 978) noted in 1985, when diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Beijing were still “frozen”, that China perceived Indonesia as a serious rival for power in Southeast Asia. With China’s rise this rivalry perception on Beijing’s part has substantially diminished and there is no evidence in the current literature or in the media that suggests otherwise. Chinese decision-makers are probably well aware of Indonesia’s regional leadership aspirations. Chinese President Hu Jintao commented in 2012 that China attaches importance to Indonesia's status and influence in the region ("Chinese, Indonesian presidents meet on cooperation," 2012).

The legacy of the turbulent Sino-Indonesian relationship also continues to shape the thinking of influential elements within Indonesia’s policy and military elite. These groups share their ambition for Indonesia’s regional leadership and global role with those members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual community less concerned about China’s rise. The foreign policy elite is traditionally more inclined towards cooperation with China, but not free of antagonism towards Beijing (Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 164). The military is historically suspicious of China’s regional intentions and continues to command some influence over foreign policymaking, despite post-Suharto reforms that placed it under civilian control and substantially curtailed its political role (Dosch, 2006, pp. 53-54;
Laksmana, 2011a, pp. 82-83). As many former career soldiers enter politics, military elements also continue to exert influence on national politics. Anti-Chinese sentiments, while nowhere near their historical level, are still evident. The likely 2014 presidential candidacy of former Special Forces (Kopassus) commander and former Head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Prabowo Subianto, who was widely held responsible for the 1998 riots that targeted Indonesia’s Chinese minority, concerns many among the Chinese community (Gopalakrishnan, 2012).14 The notion of the “latent dangers of communism” is also still tangible in Indonesia (Mandari, 2012; Storey, 2000, p. 153).15

These perceptions thus far do not outweigh the mutual benefits derived from this relationship but China’s growing assertiveness increasingly concerns Jakarta. Indonesia’s strategy of engagement with Beijing is in accordance with the country’s role conceptions of regional sub-system collaborator, mediator, and independent and active. Yet this strategy is strongly informed by Indonesia’s historical antagonism towards China and the perceived threat a rising global power China could pose to Indonesia’s role conception of leader in ASEAN and global actor, as Jakarta would likely be hard posed to realise its global role without a solid regional footing in a cohesive regional bloc. Indonesian decision-makers thus already pursue, according to McArdle (2012) the beginnings of a “congagement” strategy that seeks to transcend a policy of engagement analogous to a policy of containment.16

This threat perception is also by no means limited to Indonesia. Several ASEAN countries are in dispute with China, including over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Some analysts see the balance of the ‘China threat’ as ASEAN’s key rationale for continued existence (Bellamy, 2004, p. 102; Leifer, 1999, p. 101; Storey, 2000, p. 162; see also Zin & Joseph, 2012, p. 108). A 2009 report by the

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15 In 2009 the Indonesian Attorney General’s Department banned several books with alleged communist content (Lane, 2010). More recently, the commander of Central Java and Yogyakarta, Maj. Gen. Hardiono Saroso, warned he would “steadfastly annihilate” suspected efforts to revitalise the defunct Communist Party of Indonesia (Timur, 2012).
16 See also Anwar (2010b, p. 138).
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that China was seen as the largest threat to regional peace and security by a majority of Asian elites, while the U.S. was valued for its stabilising role (Gill, Green, Tsuji, & Watts, 2009). It thus comes as no surprise that in “an expression of its uncertainty about the role and intentions of China […] in the region”, Jakarta insisted on the inclusion of the U.S., India, Australia, Russia and other external powers in the East Asia Summit (Sukma, 2009b, p. 607). The disputes in the South China Sea bring this perspective into focus.

**Conflict in the South China Sea**
The South China Sea disputes highlight the pivotal role China’s rise plays in Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour towards ASEAN security regionalism. The South China Sea is a rich fishing ground and harbours potentially extensive oil and gas reserves, while it is located in one of the most frequented commercial sea-lanes. Conflict in the South China Sea ensued in the mid-1970s, when China took over the Paracel Islands from Vietnam after a brief militarised dispute. The South China Sea is a potential flashpoint for confrontation between several claimant states. Disputes persist also around the Spratley Islands between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines for economic and strategic reasons (Acharya, 2000b, p. 137).

As a non-claimant state and in accordance with its role conceptions as leader, independent and active, bridge, and mediator Jakarta has actively facilitated dialogue between claimant states. Indonesia has pursued a diffusion of tensions since 1990 by hosting annual ‘track two’ workshops as a means of building trust and confidence. By providing an informal environment for government representatives, organisers hope to expand “mutual understanding among the participants through dialogues and concrete cooperation projects”, such as navigational safety, piracy and the environment. The impact of these workshops, is doubtful, however, and many officials involved voiced frustration over the Chinese delegation’s seemingly obstructionist tactics (Leifer, 1999, p. 95). There

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17 See also Bolt (2011).
18 See Statement of the 20th Workshop on “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea”, Bandung, Indonesia, 1-3 November 2010.
is, moreover, a dearth of recent scholarship on this initiative. The effectiveness and influence of ‘track two’ processes on regional political and security cooperation has been questioned elsewhere (Capie, 2010). While annual workshops continue to be conducted, this initiative’s influence on dispute resolution in the South China Sea would require further analysis. The workshops, however, further add to Indonesia’s image in view of above role conceptions.

Although Indonesia is not considered a claimant state in the disputes, China’s claims could potentially infringe Indonesia’s sovereignty. These claims extend to the territorial waters surrounding the Natuna Islands, part of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Natuna Islands hold substantial liquefied natural gas reserves. Jakarta and the military view the area as a potential major flashpoint (Jordan, 2012; McArdle, 2012). Following an inconclusive response by Beijing over the settlement of the dispute in the 1990s the Indonesian Government justified the resettlement of several thousand families to the islands under its transmigration scheme in order to assert its sovereignty (Storey, 2000, p. 158ff). The Armed Forces’ acquisition of air and naval capabilities in the early 1990s was also rationalised with the necessity to protect the Natuna Islands and surrounding waters (Storey, 2000, p. 158ff). In May 2012 the military announced plans to increase the number of troops on the islands ("Pasukan di Natuna sangat penting," 2012). In 1996 and 2008 Jakarta held some of the country’s largest joint military exercises there – a message to Beijing that Jakarta might consider using military force to ward off any challenge to its national assets (Bolt, 2011, p. 289; Laksmana, 2011c; Leifer, 1999, p. 103).

Beijing’s growing assertiveness over its claims in the South China Sea as well as its ambiguous defence capability build-up throughout the 1990s and 2000s have aggravated Indonesian fears of China’s intentions in the region. ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Code of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, a “high point in de-escalation” after the turbulent 1990s (Bolt, 2011, pp. 284-285). Yet divisions within ASEAN as well as China’s energy security

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19 In 2010, the Natuna natural gas project accounted for 25% of the country's overall commercially recoverable gas reserves (Thomas, 2012). Vietnam also claims some of the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands (Storey, 2000, p. 157).
interests and growing nationalism hamper progress towards a code of conduct, which Indonesia had hoped to finalise when it chaired the Association in 2011. Stand-offs between China and the U.S. near the Hainan Islands in 2009 (Sutter, 2009), China and Indonesia over the Natuna Islands in 2010 (Currie, 2010), and between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines in 2012 (Glaser, 2012) further added to the tension. The nationalist undertones of the dispute with Japan in the East China Sea also reinforce the image of an increasingly assertive China.

Indonesia’s efforts at addressing the South China Sea disputes capture the extent of Jakarta’s concerns. China’s sovereignty claim over much of the South China Sea could potentially put it in “command of the maritime heart of the region”, thus directly challenging Indonesia’s leadership aspirations in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1999, p. 90). Indonesia’s ‘intensive shuttle diplomacy’ in response to the failure to produce a joint communiqué at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012 over the South China Sea dispute highlights concerns over ASEAN cohesion and the impression this could create internationally ("ASEAN reaches consensus on 6-point principles on South China Sea," 2012). Foreign Minister Natalegawa was quick to dismiss claims that ASEAN was not united (Luftia, 2012a). In 2013, Indonesia seeks to advance the implementation of a declaration of maritime conduct agreed to by China and ASEAN in 2011 and to further pursue a code of conduct to reduce tensions in the region (Sagita, 2013). This is indicative of what is at stake for Jakarta.

ASEAN, long considered the ‘cornerstone’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Laksmana, 2011b, p. 161), provides Indonesia with a means to realise its ambition towards regional leadership. A weak ASEAN could prevent Jakarta from fulfilling this aspiration. A cohesive regional grouping that would find its expression in the successful creation of the ASEAN Community thus is a crucial prerequisite for strengthening the Association vis-à-vis the real and perceived influence of China and other external powers.

The disputes remain unresolved and the South China Sea could be the litmus test for regional peace and stability as well as for ASEAN’s unity and the emerging
shape of the regional order. The ongoing disputes in the South China Sea have contributed to China’s ‘charm offensive’ losing momentum, further aggravated by fears about China’s increasing economic leverage and resource and border tensions in mainland Southeast Asia. This is changing the perception China’s neighbours have of Beijing’s intentions in the region, to the extent that “the level of concern regarding the impact of China’s rising regional profile has increased markedly” (Storey, 2010).

This has led both claimant states and Indonesia to deepen relationships with other powers. Many regional governments welcome the recent ‘rebalancing’ of the U.S. as it could potentially offset China’s influence. At the ASEAN meeting in Hanoi in 2010 former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. role in regional stability and reiterated U.S. support for multilateral discussions on the disputes, an approach Beijing rejects in favour of bilateral talks (Bolt, 2011, p. 285).

Indonesia and the U.S. entered a comprehensive partnership in 2010, focusing on the key areas of democracy, the economy, and climate change, though most progress has been made in military-to-military ties and defence trade (Hiebert & Magpile, 2012). President Yudhoyono had proposed the initiative in 2008. Jakarta did not want to create the impression that this partnership was directed against Beijing, which led former defence minister Juwono Sudarsono (cited in Onishi, 2010) to suggest that Indonesia wants “to maintain a strategic space from the rivalry between the United States and China,” acknowledging the importance of both to Indonesia. This is in accordance with the national role conceptions of bridge, mediator and independent and active. This notion is also in the interest of Washington, which considers Jakarta’s middle-power status less threatening to Beijing and likely to influence China’s behaviour quite differently from Washington’s efforts (Gilley, 2012). This image suits Jakarta as it reinforces its profile as a positive influence on regional peace and stability.

Indonesia further advanced its security partnership with Australia, and in 2012 signed a new defence co-operation agreement with commitments to future joint
exercises and a focus on trading defence equipment (Bachelard, 2012). Indonesia further signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2005, which includes a commitment to advance defence and military cooperation. Other ASEAN governments also strengthen extra-regional ties. The U.S. is re-affirming ties with allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Thailand, respectively, and with new partners such as Burma. Also Japan’s growing presence in Southeast Asia is in response to China’s regional influence, a policy trajectory re-affirmed by the new administration that came into office at the end of 2012 (French, 2012; Shixin, 2013; Singh, 2013).

Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour in the shifting regional order can be explained through Indonesia’s role conceptions. Indonesia’s engagement with major external powers, in particular with China and the U.S. is reminiscent of Hatta’s notion of ‘steering between two reefs’, which has again entered Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse (see, for instance, Cullum, 2010). Jakarta’s current approach remains true to its constitutional discourse as Indonesia deploys diplomacy as the first line of defence (McArdle, 2012). This approach to national and regional security is reflected in the President’s ‘million friend diplomacy’ and in Indonesia’s support for multilateralism and regional security cooperation. Indonesia’s perception of China as a potential threat and rival for regional leadership thus does not preclude the high levels of cooperation and convergence that characterise the current relationship. To the contrary, the perception of a potential ‘China threat’ leaves Indonesia no choice but to engage Beijing “on a leveled [sic] playing field” (Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 165). Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa (cited in Acharya, 2011) thus posits that the “answer to regional tensions lies not in inviting the US to balance China militarily, but in expanding and deepening Asean's [sic] engagement with both the US and China”.

Despite Beijing’s resistance to internationalising the South China Sea disputes, China is an active participant in regional multilateralism, which thus far has arguably been centred on ASEAN as the main vehicle for managing regional order. Successfully implementing the ASEAN Community by 2015, still considered a rather ambitious goal (Brata, 2013), is a top priority in order to
strengthen ASEAN cohesiveness and advance regional security cooperation in order to consolidate ASEAN centrality. For Jakarta, which plays a pivotal role in security regionalism, this would be a significant step towards consolidating Indonesia’s status as the ‘natural leader’ of ASEAN and ‘prime manager’ of the regional order. The progress made towards deepening regional security cooperation could serve as an indicator of Indonesia’s leadership credentials and the country’s status as regional middle-power and global actor. Slow progress, on the other hand, could suggest a lack of ASEAN cohesion and could raise doubts as to Indonesia’s leadership potential and ASEAN’s credibility as a regional grouping. I will now turn to a discussion of ASEAN’s evolving security regionalism and how Indonesia’s national role conceptions translate into Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour in regional security cooperation.

**Policy Responses Towards Regional Security Cooperation**

The previous section outlined the domestic and geopolitical context within which Indonesia’s national role conceptions should be analysed. In this section I will analyse initiatives in ASEAN regionalism that emphasise how these role conceptions translate into Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour. In the course of these developments, the persistence of the principles entailed in the ‘ASEAN Way’, in particular the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs, has held back progress. The Association aims to maintain a delicate balance between the ‘old ways’ on the one hand, and the liberal agenda promoted by Indonesia and other ASEAN members on the other. This tension is evident in the ASEAN Charter and progress towards the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), as well as in ASEAN’s approach to human rights and conflict resolution. First I will discuss the context of ASEAN’s liberal turn, of which Indonesia is among the strongest proponents, with the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to human rights two essential indicators of these developments. I will then address the specific measures taken towards ASEAN security cooperation, focusing on the APSC, ASEAN’s approach to a regional mechanism for conflict resolution and the relevance of NTS cooperation for security regionalism.
The Liberal Turn

The promotion of liberal norms and values is not a recent phenomenon in ASEAN. Article 2 of the Bangkok Declaration (1967), ASEAN’s founding document, states that the aim and purpose of the Association is “[t]o promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law”. Yet for decades this commitment was evident merely in intergovernmental relations, not in the domestic sphere. The recent “pursuit of liberalism”, said to be the most urgent item on ASEAN’s agenda (Katsumata, 2007), is reflected in the pledge to the principles of the rule of law, good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights as articulated in the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to human rights. How this pledge translates into actual policy behaviour domestically is another matter. As I have indicated above, Indonesia at times shows more political will to promote such principles regionally than it demonstrates implementing these same principles domestically. This applies equally to other proponents of the liberal turn, such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. The commitment of countries inclined to resist related regional policy changes, such as Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, towards adhering to the rule of law and the protection of human rights domestically also must at times be questioned.

Developments in several Southeast Asian countries have over the past decade nonetheless been characterised by an opening of political space. This is evident in an increasingly prominent discourse on liberal norms and values, or a pro-democracy and human rights rhetoric at the ASEAN level, accompanied by some degree of political liberalisation across most regional polities including, most recently, in Burma. Catalysts of these shifts can be found in the people power movement of the Philippines in the 1980s, which led to the overthrow of the Marcos regime in 1986, and the public protests in Thailand in the early 1990s that ushered in democratic reforms in this country (Jetschke, 1999; Mewenkang, 2012). Southeast Asia’s ‘democratic moment’ (Acharya, 1999), triggered by the reverberations of the financial crisis of the late 1990s, turned out to be a lasting transformation, no matter how rocky the road has been and, arguably, continues to be. The varied responses by regional governments to the financial crisis and international pressure helped facilitate political reforms (Acharya, 1999, p. 421).
Most notably was Indonesia’s transformation from an authoritarian regime with a politically influential military to a liberal democracy with civilian-controlled security forces and Jakarta’s subsequent efforts to build on its image as a model and proponent of liberal democracy and leading force in ASEAN regionalism.

Domestic and regional factors have been highlighted as a key determinant in this regional development (Acharya, 1999; Mewengkang, 2012). The strengthening of civil society pro-democracy movements, a phenomenon Acharya (1999, p. 419) called the ‘democratic contagion’, increased the level of legitimacy and accountability of national governments and facilitated a more transparent approach to policy-making across all countries in the region (Dosch, 2008, p. 542; Mewengkang, 2012, p. 6). Dosch (2008, p. 530) considers this development a consequence of democratic norms and values diffusing from domestic to regional political spheres, in particular from ASEAN founding members Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. However, Burma’s opening of political space that surprised regional and international observers alike was not necessarily due to ASEAN’s engagement with the regime. Instead, Naypyidaw’s concessions were motivated by domestic and extra-regional factors (Zin & Joseph, 2012).

Several individuals from the policy and intellectual community across ASEAN and within Indonesia have played a pivotal role in advancing and institutionalising ASEAN’s liberal turn. Also ‘traditional’ civil society actors contributed to the emerging liberal agenda through values-based political linkages and activism, advancing a “parallel track of regionalism” (Acharya, 2000b, p. 140; see also Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 24). The ASEAN-ISIS, the track-two network of regional think tanks and research institutes is said to have “been instrumental in shaping the democracy and human rights agenda” in ASEAN, led by the Jakarta-based Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) and the Manila-based Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Dosch, 2008, p. 535). These actors promote a vision of ASEAN, which reflects on internationally accepted norms and values, captured in the contributions of intellectuals such as Rizal Sukma and Yusuf Wanandi, both affiliated with the CSIS and involved in Indonesia’s formulation of ASEAN policy proposals.
When Indonesia was chairing ASEAN in 2003 the government advanced a comprehensive proposal that outlined Jakarta’s policy approach towards closer security cooperation. At the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali the grouping had already committed to the creation of an ASEAN Community. Under then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and with substantial input from Rizal Sukma, the government presented a proposal that contained a range of propositions, including the creation of an ASEAN Security Community as part of the ASEAN Community and regional mechanisms for human rights and conflict resolution. Other ASEAN governments were initially apprehensive of Indonesia’s ‘democracy agenda’ that challenged the principles enshrined in the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Sukma, 2008, p. 138). A revised proposal was eventually adopted, but this episode highlighted the sensitivities around the regional preferences expressed in the ‘ASEAN Way’, as well as regional governments’ cautious approach to aligning too closely with what they perceived as a Western, or American agenda (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 17). This tension was most evident in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, which had been mandated in the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (Djani, 2009, p. 139).

The ASEAN Charter

The idea of creating an ASEAN Charter dates back to the early years of the Association, but it took 23 years for ASEAN to “raise the stake”, and Indonesia came to play a pivotal role in advancing the initiative (Djani, 2009, p. 138). The Charter had its forerunners in the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) and was designed to be a framework for ASEAN to ensure peace and stability in the region. The Charter was further envisaged as a constitutional framework that would strengthen regional cohesion towards creating the ASEAN Community, also vis-à-vis the emergence of powerful neighbours (Djani, 2009, p. 140). Adding clout to its leadership ambitions and its role conceptions as model democracy and regional sub-system collaborator, Indonesia played a key role in drafting the Charter as the concept of shaping and sharing of norms, which had been advanced by Foreign

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20 The ‘ASEAN Security Community’ was later renamed ‘ASEAN Political Security Community’.
Minister Wirajuda as a means towards community-building “became the basis for development of the Charter” (2009, p. 139).

The Indonesian delegation had already advanced a complete draft in 2004 to move discussions ahead, but their draft was met with resistance by other ASEAN members (Djani, 2009, p. 139). ASEAN governments instead mandated the High Level Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter (HLTF) with driving the process. Alongside the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law, the Indonesian delegation to the HLTF also raised the need for an ASEAN Human Rights Body and held an HLTF meeting with civil society and human rights experts to draft the framework for such a regional body (Djani, 2009, p. 143). ASEAN further tasked an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), made up of regional leaders, with making recommendations towards the HLTF. The EPG included former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who had represented ASEAN during negotiations to end the Cambodian conflict and who had been an advocate of democratic reforms in Burma. The EPG facilitated the key involvement of respected senior statesmen and intellectuals familiar with, yet not necessarily bound by, the political processes of the grouping, which allowed for broader and potentially bolder visions and ideas to be brought into the process.

Ahead of the final draft of the Charter, Jusuf Wanandi (2006) of the CSIS declared that the Charter should help “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Wanandi also argued that the Charter should facilitate a shift from the Association’s state-centrism to a people-centric approach, with a focus on human security, including not only the rights, but also the obligations of member states. Accordingly, the Charter “should promote and develop a community of caring societies” (Wanandi, 2006). Poverty and conflict are among the major factors underpinning most of the region’s serious human security concerns, which entail social, economic and environmental variables in addition to military and political dimensions of security. Emmerson (2007, p. 3), in reflecting on Wanandi’s comments, considers a people-centred approach a necessary step to account for the tensions stemming from domestic conditions of poverty and grievances that gave rise to violent
conflicts in several Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Wanandi’s proposition thus was aligned with Indonesia’s role conceptions as a model democracy and sub-system collaborator. It further reflects Jakarta’s role conception as a mediator and bridge, as his vision aims to reconcile the disparities between state and society.

The Charter was adopted by ASEAN leaders in November 2007 and was declared a success, yet the spirit and vision of the EPG was watered down in the final version. After eleven months of negotiation the final draft that was presented at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2007 aimed at translating the visions of the EPG into practical reality (Koh, Manalo, & Woon, 2009, p. xix). It established ASEAN as a legal entity, enshrined democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights among the Association’s repository of norms, and provided the mandate to create an ASEAN Human Rights Body (Rüland, 2009, p. 382). Some outside observers lauded ASEAN’s progress in democracy promotion. Dosch (2008, p. 533) argued “ASEAN’s explicit commitment to liberal concepts might be weak, but their inclusion in the charter indicates significant progress compared with 10 or even five years ago when any intergovernmental dialogue on democracy was out of the question”.21

The final draft also attracted criticism for its lack of progress in challenging ASEAN’s core norms that many considered detrimental to advancing the liberal agenda. The final draft of the Charter did not meet the expectations of many of ASEAN’s progressive leaders, such as Wanandi, for its continued reference to the ‘ASEAN Way’. The set of principles including sovereignty, non-interference and consensus-based decision-making is generally credited with having facilitated ASEAN’s maintenance of intergovernmental peace and stability throughout its existence. Yet the reference, in Article 2 of the Charter, to the norm of non-interference rendered effective regional approaches to conflict resolution, an integral aspect of ASEAN’s progress towards the APSC, difficult, if not impossible.22

21 See also Kelsall (2009, p. 6).
The drafting and ratification of the Charter reflected different perspectives on the norm of non-interference, which would begin to undergo a subtle revision throughout the following decade. Djani (2009, p. 142) commented that while ASEAN’s adherence to sovereignty and territorial integrity should be emphasised, “for matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN, enhanced consultation can be undertaken and should not be construed as interference, particularly since ASEAN is considered as a family of nations”. This notion once more refers to Indonesia’s role conceptions as regional sub-system collaborator and mediator. A more qualified approach to interpreting the norm of non-interference would find its most significant expression to date in ASEAN’s approach to addressing the human security situation in Burma after cyclone Nargis, an event I will discuss in more detail in the following section.

Ratification of the Charter was delayed in Indonesia due to resistance from legislators critical of the watered down final version, despite “massive campaign efforts” by the Department of Foreign Affairs (Djani, 2009, p. 146). Indonesia was, in October 2008, the last ASEAN member to ratify the Charter. Indonesian legislators had insisted on an addendum to address the uncertainty surrounding the framework for the ASEAN Human Rights Body, a reform of the Association’s decision-making process and greater popular participation (Rüland, 2009, p. 386). This was not well received by many of the other governments which asserted that Indonesia was bullying the Association with its size and political weight (Rüland, 2009, pp. 385, 387).

The Indonesian legislature played a key role in shaping the final outcome, which included an addendum addressing the establishment of a regional human rights body and a framework for democracy promotion. With the Indonesian legislative thus at times maintaining what amounts to a veto power over Jakarta’s decision-making ability (Anwar, 2010b; Laksmana, 2011b, p. 163), many other governments in ASEAN wondered how Indonesia could conclude binding agreements or honour and implement non-binding agreements when the country’s national interests or its regional and global ambitions are at stake (Rüland, 2009, p.
Indonesia’s foreign policy community is quite aware of how regional neighbours perceive the country’s weight and the domestic influence on regional decision-making. Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) quite explicitly affirmed Jakarta’s leadership ambition when he confirmed that

“our diplomacy has to be a bit more thought through [...] and well calibrated, and not to make it too obvious that we are trying to be imposing our thoughts and our will on our neighbors”.

Although it represented a considerable success for Indonesia to have included a framework for creating a regional human rights body in the Charter, questions as to its potential impact remained. Critics among civil society and regional think tanks, along with some government representatives such as Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo, also wondered whether the human rights body stipulated in the Charter would be an effective mechanism. ASEAN elites, they argued, lacked commitment to action and merely demonstrated rhetorical support for the idea (Durbach, Renshaw, & Byrnes, 2009, p. 214). With reference to Article 2 of the Charter, which reaffirms the principle of non-interference, critics pointed out that even in the event of gross human rights violations in a member state, other ASEAN members would have no legal grounds to interfere in the domestic affairs of the state in question (Kelsall, 2009, p. 3).

Also the forum for democracy promotion that Indonesian legislators had insisted on was criticised as a mere rhetorical device. In 2008, Indonesia, together with Australia, established the state-sponsored Bali Democracy Forum in an “attempt to carve out a niche for Indonesia in Asian diplomacy” (“Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the world,” 2011). The Forum is open to democratic and non-democratic states and promotes dialogue on democracy in the region that is not burdened with the image of a Western top-down imposition of liberal norms and values (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 13). This initiative led TIME magazine to conclude that Indonesia “has emerged as Southeast Asia’s unlikely star” (Beech, 2008). Critics, however, allege that the forum is only a superficial attempt at acknowledging universal human rights standards, while participants rarely address
some of the serious human rights issues in the region (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, pp. 13-14).

Ultimately, the final draft of the ASEAN Charter might have been perceived a partial victory by Jakarta for having achieved the inclusion of a human rights agenda, against the resistance of most other regional governments. The Charter had, after all, already been ratified by all the remaining member states when Indonesia insisted on the addendum to the Charter ("Senate ratifies Asean charter," 2008; "Surin welcomes Thailand's ratification of Asean charter," 2008). It was the pressure of Indonesia’s legislature that led Jakarta to insist on the provisos for democracy promotion and human rights. The persistence of legislators was likely informed by a desire to build on Indonesia’s credentials as a model democracy, which informs the international image Jakarta has been nurturing over the past decade. Moreover, it was a victory for those in Indonesia’s foreign policy community who see Indonesia in the role of the Association’s natural leader. But it is doubtful whether such a mechanism can further advance Indonesia’s role conception of mediator in regional affairs.

Although the Charter was lauded as a significant step towards Southeast Asian regionalism, the prevalence of the non-interference norm suggested that as far as human rights are concerned, it would be more of the same. Moreover, without a clear framework for sanctions to address violations of the principles laid out in the Charter, many critics, among them Indonesian legislators and scholars, considered the Charter ‘basically powerless’ (in Rüland, 2009, p. 384). I will now analyse recent developments towards a regional approach to the protection and promotion of human rights, to determine whether these allegations levelled at ASEAN still hold true following the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012.
**Human Rights in ASEAN**

“[T]he norms and precepts for the observation of human rights vary from society to society ... Nobody can claim to have a monopoly of wisdom to determine what is right and proper for all countries and peoples”, Mohammed Mahathir, former Prime Minister of Malaysia (Christie & Roy, 2001, p. 1).

Long perceived and shunned as an instrument of Western imperialism, the regional human rights agenda was at last advanced through the commitment expressed in the ASEAN Charter to establish a regional human rights body. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established in 2009, and was mandated with drafting the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights, which was adopted in November 2012. Considering the ongoing resistance since Indonesia had first advanced its proposal in 2003, ASEAN appears to have made remarkable progress towards incorporating a human rights agenda into regional governance, though for many regional and international observers it is too early to celebrate as many questions remain.

ASEAN’s regional approach to human rights in fact goes back to the early 1990s, and the slow evolution of determining a common ground highlights the historically ambiguous attitude towards the norm across the diverse member states. The objective of the promotion and protection of human rights was added to the Association’s agenda ahead of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993. ASEAN’s first official acknowledgement of a regional human rights objective was articulated in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, adopted ahead of the World Conference in April 1993 (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 110). This objective was conditioned, however, with the affirmation of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.  

“commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1993, where governments had first agreed to consider the establishment of a regional human rights body, an initiative that would take another 16 years and considerable pressure from some ASEAN member countries to materialise.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were the most active members in the multi-stakeholder Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism that commenced work on developing recommendations regarding the framework in 1994. The human rights body eventually stipulated in Art. 14 of the ASEAN Charter was included under Jakarta’s insistence with support from Manila vis-à-vis governments critical of the mechanism, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Durbach et al., 2009, p. 222).

This regional human rights agenda might be a notable development for ASEAN, yet the region is only catching up with a process that has long been instituted in other parts of the world. Regional human rights bodies in Europe, the Americas and Africa had been established earlier and have long adopted declarations outlining regional commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted in 1948. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) came into force in 1953. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) was adopted in 1981. The Arab Charter of Human Rights (Arab Charter) was adopted in 1994, revised and again adopted in 2004 (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 111ff; Durbach et al., 2009, p. 219). For ASEAN, the commitment towards establishing the body and drafting a declaration thus was clearly overdue, and possibly perceived as such as the Association was subject to growing criticism for its continued uncritical engagement with human rights in the region, most evident in international concerns about Burma (Close & Askew, 2004, pp. 113-114, 127ff).

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Once ASEAN realised the creation of a regional human rights body, the initiative attracted praise but also criticism for what observers saw as a lack of independence from regional governments. ASEAN policy-makers were particularly encouraged by the potential of the body to ‘raise ASEAN’s international standing’ (Durbach et al., 2009, p. 214). Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary General, emphasised progress made towards regional cohesion, as he suggested that ASEAN member states had increased their comfort level in considering human rights issues (Tisnadibrata, 2012). Critics, on the other hand, claimed “it is a long way from the cautious acceptance of general democratic values to the active promotion and regional enforcements of rules based on these norms” (Dosch, 2008, p. 542). Indeed, the AICHR has been criticised for lacking real power and for putting more emphasis on promoting, less on protecting human rights, a shortcoming credited to the region’s adherence to principles of non-interference and state sovereignty (Anwar, 2010b; Johnston & Brown, 2009). According to Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large, Tommy Koh, ASEAN member states are divided over the questions of whether the human rights mechanism should have the power to investigate and monitor human rights in member countries, whether the body should highlight the Association’s responsibilities as well, and how human rights principles can be reconciled with the principle of non-interference (Durbach et al., 2009, p. 225). Alongside highlighting once more the persistent sentiments of the ‘ASEAN Way’ these concerns also underline the centrality of regional governments in the current human rights discourse.

The Commission is not mandated to deal with individual claims, thus limiting its capacity to protect the human rights of ASEAN citizens vis-à-vis the state. The Commission has further been criticised for its lack of independence, as it is made up by and large of government representatives and diplomats. Only the Indonesian and Thai commissioners have civil society and academic backgrounds respectively.25 The Commission, which along with the ASEAN Secretariat is based in Jakarta, reports to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). This led critics to assert that the AICHR is not independent from governments but rather an

25 Rafendi Djamin, the Indonesian Commissioner, continues to be an active civil society activist as the Coordinator of the Coalition of Indonesian NGO for International Human Rights Advocacy, online (accessed 29 January 2013): http://aichr.org/about/aichr-representatives.
auxiliary body to the AMM ("In Indonesia, human rights body lacks teeth," 2012). Yap Swee Seng of the Bangkok-based Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development argued "[t]he AICHR has been given very weak terms of reference that limit its mandates, authority and powers to promote and protect human rights" ("In Indonesia, human rights body lacks teeth," 2012), a shortcoming further highlighted in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was adopted by member states in November 2012.

The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration elicited widespread critique from regional observers and civil society for containing too many loopholes to be anything but a toothless tiger. Prior to the publication of the final draft, Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa had already remarked “a document that must be reached via consensus will never please all parties” (Saragih, 2012). Critics point to the lack of transparency and stakeholder consultation in drafting the Declaration and the omission of several interest groups, such as indigenous peoples and the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) communities. Furthermore, they condemn the conditionality of ‘universal human rights’ that are subjected to cultural and national legal frameworks (Grebe, 2013; "In Indonesia, human rights body lacks teeth," 2012; Saragih, 2012). Ultimately, the declaration reflects provisos already formulated in the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights (1993), which recognised universal human rights, yet within the context of “national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”. 26

International partners also criticised the Declaration’s departure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The U.S. State Department was “deeply concerned that many of the ASEAN Declaration's principles and articles could weaken and erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms as contained in the UDHR” (Nuland, 2012). Among the points raised were concerns over the use of the concept of ‘cultural relativism’, which appears to suggest that rights expressed in the UDHR do not apply everywhere, prioritising domestic laws

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over universal human rights; the conditionality of rights and the impression that individual rights could be subject to group veto (Nuland, 2012). The centrality of the state, questioned by many regional leaders such as Yusuf Wanandi, continues to outweigh the rights of the individual.

ASEAN’s slow progress on developing an effective regional human rights mechanism reflects the challenge of finding a common ground, but the Declaration marks some progress, after all. The tension between ASEAN’s liberal agenda and the persistence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ continues to be an obstacle to strengthening cohesion and community-building. Yet many observers acknowledge the overall progress made. Kelsall (2009, p. 4) maintains that in combination with the ASEAN Charter and the Terms of Reference of the AICHR, the Declaration could promote “a more robust stance on human rights violations – particularly toward internal armed conflicts in the region”. Indeed, subtle changes in the language of the Declaration might indicate a change of attitude and that could facilitate more substantial changes in the long term.

Significantly, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights diverts from the ‘ASEAN Way’ by evading the sensitive principle of non-interference. The Declaration moves away from the principles of “respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states”, which had still been emphasised in the Joint Communiqué of the 26th AMM subsequent to the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993.27 It instead reaffirms “the respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance”.28 This parallels the omission of the principle of non-interference in another context, the framework for the APSC, which I will discuss below.

For Jakarta, which has steadily promoted the liberal agenda to deepen regional integration and cohesion, and which has played a leading role in advancing the

regional human rights framework, this is a notable success in that the Declaration indicates a shift away from the language of non-interference in domestic affairs towards further regional integration. The Declaration thus bears witness not only to Indonesia’s role as an advocate for liberal democratic values. It further highlights once more the leadership role Jakarta assumes in pursuing an ASEAN community that reflects the aspirations of Indonesia’s political and intellectual elite. Moreover, while in the traditional security realm of defence cooperation progress is still slow, Jakarta has promoted closer security cooperation through the APSC via the less sensitive sphere of NTS, with the noteworthy engagement of China and other external powers. Following a discussion of the context of regional security in ASEAN and the changing significance of the non-interference norm, I will analyse how Indonesia’s approach to security regionalism reflects Jakarta’s role conceptions.

The Security Context

Security has been a core concern of ASEAN since its inception as the Association initially focused on consolidating the nation-state, for which the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the norm of non-interference in particular provided a suitable framework. ASEAN’s founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, outlines the promotion of regional peace and stability as its main objectives and mentions security only in view of the extra-regional environment and the threat of interference in regional affairs.29 This obscured the fact that also within ASEAN, member states had to manage and contain threats to their national stability as these newly independent states were in the arduous process of consolidation and nation-building, further aggravated by the Cold War context that considerably shaped both national and regional dynamics. In order to ascertain regional peace and stability, ASEAN’s foremost strategy was to strengthen the state and advance economic development and regional prosperity (Bellamy, 2004, p. 93; Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 184; Rolls, 2012, p. 128).

29 The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 1967, online: www.aseansec.org/1212.htm.
Closer defence cooperation was not instituted in view of the perception this could have created in the volatile Cold War environment at the time. ASEAN’s founding members had considered deepening cooperation in security and defence to a level “short of a formal military alliance” (Rolls, 2012, p. 129). But the West-leaning founding members of the Association were concerned that Communist regimes in the wider region could have perceived the creation of a military pact as a threat (Acharya, 2000a, p. 26). A regional military bloc was further not considered necessary as most members of the Association entertained formal or de facto alliances. Thailand and the Philippines were tied to the U.S., and have, in the context of current geopolitical shifts, welcomed the U.S. initiative to reaffirm these ties. Singapore and Malaysia entered a pact with the UK, Australia and New Zealand in the Five Power Defence Agreement, which continues to be in force. Only Indonesia was non-aligned, in accordance with the country’s independent and active foreign policy doctrine. Among ASEAN members, cooperation in defence and security was limited to bilateral relationships (Acharya, 1990, 1991; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 19).

The steps ASEAN initiated towards closer defence and security cooperation as part of the ASEAN community-building effort has created tensions with the norms entailed in the ‘ASEAN Way’. Criticism of the ‘ASEAN Way’ gained prominence in the 1990s, and the principles this concept entails are often credited with obstructing ASEAN regionalism. Yet they can equally be credited with having facilitated the framework within which ASEAN regionalism has been able to evolve. Regular and frequent interaction, the literally hundreds of meetings annually that have gained the grouping the questionable reputation of being a ‘talk-shop’ have also strengthened the level of trust, comfort and confidence among regional state-makers and the bureaucracy, which helped shape a collective ASEAN identity.

Adler and Barnett argued that such shared norms can have a transformative impact as they shape interstate relations, leading to the establishment of a security community, which is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler & Barnett,
1998a, p. 30). The case of ASEAN has been subject to a wide range of studies considering the applicability of the security community framework.\textsuperscript{30} Establishing a Southeast Asian security community has, in fact, been an early feature in ASEAN’s concept of regional order (Acharya, 1991, p. 161). Yet while there is a general consensus that ASEAN’s success in maintaining peace and stability in interstate affairs lends credit to the notion of a security community, within individual member states of this community conflict prevails, with at times potentially regional implications.

ASEAN’s approach to engage with the domestic affairs of member states is only slowly changing. The principle of non-interference has been at the core of ASEAN’s ongoing struggle to effectively address regional security concerns (Emmerson, 2005, p. 176; Sukma, 2010a, p. 3). Internal conflicts are prevalent in the region and have regularly raised questions as to the Association’s accountability as it tends to refrain from addressing the domestic affairs of member states and the poor human rights record of regional governments. Open criticism, even comments on controversial domestic issues, is considered confrontational and not in the spirit of the ‘ASEAN Way’. This conundrum was most prominently demonstrated by ASEAN’s drawn-out engagement with Burma, which attracted considerable criticism and led to ruptures with many governments outside the region.

The norm of non-interference was first challenged with ASEAN’s engagement in the Cambodian conflict (Acharya, 2000a, p. 115). ASEAN’s decision to intervene was based on the perceived need to ward off the Vietnamese threat to Thailand’s sovereignty and regional stability. Indonesia led the ASEAN initiative through then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as the ASEAN Interlocutor on Cambodia, and hosted a round of ‘Jakarta Informal Meetings’ in 1988 and 1989. These meetings emphasised the role the UN had to play in resolving the conflict (Frost, 1991, p.

\[\text{30} \text{ According to Adler and Barnett's (1998b) taxonomy, ASEAN did not follow the proposed progression as the Association has moved from a 'nascent' security community (Acharya, 2000, p. 208) to a loosely-coupled mature security community (Bellamy, 2004, p. 88) in a short period, apparently bypassing the 'ascendant' stage. Adler and Barnett maintained that their framework is a mere heuristic device. ASEAN's process of security community-building does indeed defy a simplifying taxonomy (Acharya, 1991; Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Emmerson, 2005; Haacke, 2005; Kuah, 2004; Tomotaka, 2008).}\]
20), underlining Indonesia’s support of an international system bound by rules and norms. Despite the difficulty of arriving at a solution, for ASEAN this experience demonstrated a shared commitment towards the region in the spirit of the ‘ASEAN Way’, even though the nature of ASEAN’s engagement contravened the norm of non-interference (Bellamy, 2004, p. 101). The intervention, which helped facilitate the 1991 peace agreement between Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge, was ASEAN’s first successful participation in a regional conflict resolution initiative, alongside Australia and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Frost, 1991). The experience informed what was to become ASEAN’s preferred approach to regional peace and security through consultation, negotiation and diplomacy (Bellamy, 2004, pp. 99-100; Caballero-Anthony, 2005, p. 259).

For Indonesia this could be considered a successful initiative in showcasing its capacity to lead the Association in addressing regional conflicts, a role Jakarta would consolidate a few years later when Indonesia facilitated the peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996. These initiatives further highlighted the notion of Indonesia as mediator and bridge. These role types gain increased significance in view of Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s approach to addressing today’s changing security environment.

ASEAN’s role in managing regional security was transformed due to geopolitical shifts after the Cold War and the changing nature of security challenges, which were increasingly transnational in nature, requiring a concerted effort. A variety of traditional and NTS issues found their way onto the agenda of regional and extra-regional dialogues, which underlined the need to set up a multilateral forum to facilitate dialogue and cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 with the objective of instituting ASEAN’s style of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy across the wider Asia-Pacific region (Acharya, 2000b, p. 147; Rolls, 2012, p. 131; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 22). Yet the forum did not make considerable progress towards developing a framework for preventive

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31 Cambodia had not yet joined the Association at the time.
diplomacy. The slow pace with which it moved ahead, favouring consensus-based
decision-making in adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’, frustrated many participants
(Acharya, 2000b, p. 147). Moreover, the forum is predominantly attracting
government representatives affiliated with their respective foreign ministries,
lacking representatives from the defence and intelligence communities (Brandon,
2002; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 23). The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), established in
2002, aimed at addressing this gap. The SLD now is “Asia’s most prominent
exercise in defence diplomacy” and brings together intelligence, security and
defence officials from the ARF countries in one forum to raise common security
issues (Capie & Taylor, 2010, p. 359). ASEAN was yet to establish a similar
platform exclusive to the ten member grouping.

Through the APSC framework, ASEAN has since advanced military-to-military
ties through preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures along with a
deepening of cooperation in the sphere of NTS, which stands to also advance
traditional security cooperation. The APSC potentially is a significant step towards
ASEAN cohesion. Indonesia’s leading role in the initiative underlines Jakarta’s
strategy to consolidate its regional leadership status through ASEAN. This
development gains added substance as with the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) the APSC framework introduced an ASEAN-centred
mechanism that can play an important role in further engaging external powers
such as China in defence diplomacy and security cooperation. Following an
outline of the APSC, I will analyse ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution and
Indonesia’s role therein, followed by a discussion on shifts in security cooperation
in the NTS sphere.

The ASEAN Political Security Community

The original proposal for the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community
that Indonesia advanced in 2003 included several propositions that were met with
considerable resistance from other ASEAN members. The main proposal outlining
the creation of an APSC was adopted shortly after at the 9th ASEAN Summit with
the signing of the Bali Concord II. The Bali Concord II outlined member states’
commitment to the components of norm-setting, conflict prevention, conflict
resolution, post-conflict peace-building and the establishment of an ASEAN Political Security Community by 2020, a target that was later moved forward to 2015.\textsuperscript{32}

The Bali Concord II reflected Indonesia’s concept of ‘comprehensive security’, which entails both aspects of traditional and non-traditional security within the context of the adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’. The more contested elements of Jakarta’s proposal, such as a regional human rights mechanism and the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force, were rejected at the time. The Bali Concord II reiterated ASEAN member countries’ “rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs”.\textsuperscript{33} This continued adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’ was seen as obstructing ASEAN security regionalism and was criticised as “more of the same” (Rolls, 2012, p. 132).\textsuperscript{34} ASEAN’s preferred style of governance “at a pace comfortable to all” also underlined the Association’s reluctance to move Jakarta’s proposals ahead, due to resistance from other regional governments.\textsuperscript{35}

Following the objectives expressed in the Bali Concord II, the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme further advanced the gradual institutionalization of confidence-building measures and multilateral security cooperation.\textsuperscript{36} The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM, established in 2006) and the ADMM-Plus (established in 2010) have since become central platforms for advancing defence diplomacy and security cooperation in ASEAN as well as with dialogue partners, including the U.S. and China.\textsuperscript{37} The ADMM promotes “regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security” by means of military-to-military interaction.\textsuperscript{38} Field exercises under the ADMM “provide

\textsuperscript{32} Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), online: www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.
\textsuperscript{33} Bali Concord II, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{34} See also (Emmerson, 2005, p. 179; Kuah, 2004; Smith, 2004, p. 423; Sukma, 2008, p. 138; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 30).
\textsuperscript{35} Bali Concord II, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{36} Vientiane Action Programme, 2004, online: www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf.
\textsuperscript{37} The ADMM-Plus includes ASEAN dialogue partners Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.
platforms for ASEAN militaries to interact with the Plus countries’ militaries in responding to common threats in the region”, which includes Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), terrorism and maritime security. The ADMM is to date the main mechanism for multilateral defence cooperation in ASEAN and it aims to reaffirm ASEAN centrality in regional order and security. Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro emphasised in 2011 that “ASEAN's centrality must remain the working basis manifested through the increased performance of the ADMM” ("ASEAN must maintain centrality in programs: Indonesian minister," 2011). Jakarta considers these and other multilateral frameworks suitable mechanisms to address some of the most protracted issues in the region.

By addressing maritime security, the ADMM framework also opens opportunities to take up the disputes with China in the South China Sea. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, Yusgiantoro affirmed Jakarta’s support of the rule of law in managing maritime issues by acknowledging the significance of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to Yusgiantoro, the UNCLOS “is like an international constitution in the maritime domain, which we expect to be adhered to by the international community”, a clear affirmation of Indonesia’s role conception as responsible member of the international system and example in the region, as well as a message to Beijing, which despite having ratified the Convention in 1996, continues to insist on its historical claims (Malig, 2012). But also within ASEAN, regional mechanisms to directly address conflict have yet to be fully realised and Indonesia is a leading proponent of related developments, underlining its role conceptions of mediator/integrator and regional sub-system collaborator.

**Towards a Regional Mechanism for Conflict Resolution**

On several occasions in the 1970s and 1980s the possibility of a regional military arrangement, including a ‘joint command’, had been raised (Acharya, 1991, p. 161), but ASEAN is yet to find common ground in regional defence cooperation.

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The notion that ASEAN does not need a common defence pact in fact persists to this day (Sukma, 2010b, p. 21). This is a major shortcoming towards developing a regional mechanism for conflict resolution. Jakarta’s 2003 proposition for such a mechanism entailed the proposal for a peacekeeping force that could help address regional and internal conflicts (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004; Kuah, 2004). At the time, other ASEAN members rejected the idea of a regional force (Bandoro, 2004; Chongkittavorn, 2004; Kuah, 2004). Vietnam’s Foreign Minister (cited in Acharya, 2005, p. 149) argued that political and military policies were not sufficiently compatible for such a level of cooperation and considered the idea “too early”. Singapore’s Foreign Minister (cited in Acharya, 2005; and Kuah, 2004, p. 4) claimed that ASEAN was the “wrong entity to play a peacekeeping role”, pointing out that the grouping was not a security or defence organisation. Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Minister rejected the idea of an ASEAN force as unnecessary, arguing that there were no conflicts in the region that would justify the mobilisation of such a force (Kuah, 2004, p. 2).

The resistance to Indonesia’s proposal of closer traditional security cooperation indicated latent antagonism among members of the Association, where mutual distrust and competition persists. ASEAN is yet to successfully resolve border disputes on the Southeast Asian mainland, such as the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, as well as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, among others, (Acharya, 1991, pp. 173-174; 2000a, p. 128ff; 2000b, p. 137; Alexandra, 2011; "ASEAN, preventive diplomacy and bilateral conflict," 2011; Bandoro, 2004; Sukma, 2011d). Previous efforts to create mechanisms to address such issues have thus far failed, evident in the yet to be utilised High Council mandated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that was again put forward in the APSC framework (Acharya, 2000b, p. 128; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 21; Woon, 2011). Regional solutions to regional problems might not always be the option preferred by all members.

The resistance to Jakarta’s proposition also reaffirmed regional adherence to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states. Rizal Sukma, who was instrumental in drafting and presenting the original proposal to ASEAN
leaders, later conceded that Indonesia had not taken the issue of non-interference sufficiently into account to pre-empt these concerns. Sukma further pointed out that at the time Indonesia did not intend to question the principle per se, but that Jakarta favoured a more flexible interpretation of non-interference that would allow the Association to address some of the region’s persistent internal security issues (Khalik, 2003). This episode again highlighted the tension between the ‘ASEAN Way’ and efforts by regional governments and think tanks to adapt these principles, and the norm of non-interference in particular, to a changing security environment (Sukma, 2011c, p. 119). Prior to Indonesia’s proposal, Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim and Thailand’s Surin Pitsuwan had attempted to reinterpret ASEAN’s founding principles. Their concepts of ‘constructive intervention’ and ‘flexible engagement’, respectively, met with considerable resistance at the time (Acharya, 2005, p. 150; Bellamy, 2004, p. 97; Haacke, 2005). Acharya (2005, p. 149) thus observed that “the most significant barrier to peace operations in Asia […] is normative [sic]”.

In an effort to overcome these divisions and move core elements of their proposal ahead, Indonesia instead suggested the establishment of peacekeeping centres in a revised proposal. By emphasising the role of UN-led missions and disaster relief for regional peacekeepers, Indonesia thus avoided the contentious notion of regional intervention in domestic conflicts. For most ASEAN member countries, these objectives were better aligned with more popular priorities in regional non-traditional security cooperation, as peacekeeping missions with increasingly complex mandates nowadays have to meet a range of objectives, including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) (Uesugi, 2004). Jakarta thus refrained from explicitly implicating the potential of such an initiative for traditional security cooperation within ASEAN. Sugeng Raharjo, a former Indonesian foreign ministry official (cited in "Indonesia modifies peacekeeping proposal after ASEAN reservations," 2004), suggested that “[t]he wording was changed but the spirit is the same”. Although Indonesia’s desire to consolidate its role conception of mediator in regional conflicts would require the Association to advance the concept of a regional mechanism for conflict resolution, the inclusion

of a network of peacekeeping centres was a small, yet not insignificant, step towards further advancing security cooperation in the region.

ASEAN has recently begun to move beyond rhetorical commitments towards advancing the regional peacekeeping initiative. The 2009 APSC Roadmap refers to the idea of establishing “an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability”.\footnote{ASEAN Roadmap, p. 14.} This objective had already been laid out in the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme and thus does not constitute a substantial development. But the language of the 2009 APSC Roadmap departs from the 2007 ASEAN Charter, which had already indicated a more flexible interpretation of non-interference vis-à-vis the achievement of collective goals (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 189). The Roadmap makes no mention of the norm of non-interference, a notable change in view of its security context and a precursor to the omission noted above in the context of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Instead it indicates the possibility of regional initiatives to “strengthen efforts in maintaining respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of ASEAN Member States [by] addressing threats and challenges that may affect the territorial integrity of ASEAN Member States including those posed by separatism”.\footnote{ASEAN Roadmap, p.13.}

The establishment of such a mechanism to promote peace and stability within ASEAN is as relevant as ever. Territorial spats between Thailand and Cambodia as well as the conflict between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan province in Western Burma have again highlighted the prevalence of conflict within ASEAN and the inadequacy of ASEAN’s management of these issues. Indonesia has been at the forefront of trying to mediate in both cases. Jakarta has had observers on standby to be deployed to the Thai-Cambodian border (International Crisis Group, 2011). The possibility of Indonesian observers in Myanmar has been floated in light of the crisis in that country, and former vice president Yusuf Kalla, who was instrumental in facilitating the peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement, led relief efforts in Arakan province ("Jusuf Kalla welcomed to visit Myanmar conflict site," 2012). These conflicts have also raised

Yet while progress towards such a mechanism is cumbersome, initiatives towards capability development are promising as ASEAN alludes to the “view to developing a regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability”.43 In 2011, ASEAN defence ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Training Centre Network to facilitate planning, training and exchange of experience in order “to contribute to peacekeeping efforts in the world”.44 The institutionalisation of peacekeeping capabilities in the region is a significant step towards closer security cooperation, and with the slow erosion of the non-interference norm could indicate a change of attitude towards closer traditional security cooperation.

Many regional governments acknowledge the value of participating in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices, to advance their international standing, multilateral diplomacy and defence capabilities. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have substantially increased their contributions to UNPKO since 2003. Jakarta’s contributions have increased most significantly, and Indonesia intends to be among the top-ten contributing countries to UNPKO by 2020 (Luftia, 2012b), a goal that befits Jakarta’s ‘international identity’ and the notion of Indonesia as a model, mediator and global actor. Indonesia’s participation in UNPKO is said to be beneficial to advancing Indonesia’s diplomacy by building and improving relations with other members of the international community. Sukma (2010b, p. 23) also suggests that participation in such missions can help professionalise the military, which could have a positive impact on its capacity to approach the management of domestic conflicts.

Thailand’s contributions dropped after the 2006 military coup but recouped in 2010 and have since increased. Since deploying several hundred peacekeepers to

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43 ADMM Joint Declaration, 19 May 2011.
UNPKO in East Timor, Singapore’s contribution has been modest. Cambodia has contributed steadily since 2004. Brunei started contributing modest numbers of peacekeepers in 2006. Vietnam first expressed support for UNPKO in 2006, which signalled a significant shift in attitude towards the UN. Hanoi is yet to contribute peacekeepers to UNPKO, which might be due to political opposition as much as it is to capabilities ("Vietnam mulls participation in U.N. peacekeeping force," 2006). In developing its peacekeeping capacity Vietnam is also deepening bilateral relationships with extra-regional partners ("Australia expands military influence in Vietnam," 2012; "Vietnam, Bangladesh strengthen defence cooperation," 2012).

In 2010, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand established the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Association, a pro-active step towards the establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network that was endorsed by the ADMM in 2011. Myanmar and Laos are yet to participate in this development. But the shift is obvious. Carlyle Thayer of the Australian Defence Force Academy (cited in "Vietnam mulls participation in U.N. peacekeeping force," 2006) suggests that “[t]here is normative pressure building up regionally in support of peacekeeping under U.N. auspices”.

These initiatives will also benefit from developments at the level of multilateral mechanisms such as the ADMM-Plus and the ARF. Member countries of the ARF have conducted annual Peacekeeping Expert Meetings since 2007, focusing on capacity building, civil-military cooperation and regional cooperation in peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the ADMM-Plus meeting in Hanoi in 2010 defence ministers agreed to establish a Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, which focuses on

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identifying capability gaps as well as opportunities for collaboration to enhance member states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations.48

While ASEAN-wide initiatives continue to focus on peace operations under UN auspices and in areas of NTS, regional peace operations highlight the potential of a regional arrangement for conflict resolution, moreover as peacekeeping operations globally increasingly target internal conflicts. Indonesia’s original proposal suggested the establishment of ‘standby arrangements’ for a peacekeeping force as a “maximum security response […] that could one day help settle disputes such as those in Aceh and the southern Philippines” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). One such example is the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The IMT was established in 2004 under the Government – Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and has since been credited with successfully reducing the number of ceasefire violations (Bendahara & Au, 2012). In October 2012, in view of a final peace agreement, a Philippine government representative raised the idea of an international peacekeeping force through the existing IMT structure to facilitate demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the armed forces of the MILF (Arguillas, 2012). The mission’s success is also due to the favourable conditions of the constellation. Both Malaysia and Indonesia, which contribute a substantial share of the peacekeepers, have played significant roles in mediating conflicts in Central Mindanao.49 Malaysia was the facilitator of the recently negotiated agreement between the MILF and Manila. Indonesia had facilitated the peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996. The success of the IMT in facilitating conditions conducive to the peace agreement adds credibility to Indonesia’s proposal for a regional force and further clout to Jakarta’s role conceptions of mediator, bridge, regional sub-system collaborator and leader.


49 The IMT’s Security Component currently includes nine peacekeepers from Malaysia, 15 peacekeepers from Brunei, 13 peacekeepers from Indonesia and one peacekeeper from Norway. See online: http://imtmindanao.org.
It would be instructive, however, to test Jakarta’s commitment to such an initiative by scrutinising the government’s handling of the conflict in Papua and West Papua. Considering Jakarta’s current security approach in the provinces, it would appear that the deeper level of security cooperation Indonesia pursues at the ASEAN level could well contradict its national interest in the context of Papua if ASEAN neighbours push for a regional intervention to address the conflict. It could be argued that Indonesia’s desire to consolidate its ‘international identity’ and regional leadership credentials outweighs its domestic concerns, unless Jakarta is confident that its political weight in the Association allows it to restrict regional interference in its own domestic affairs, while it projects its credentials as mediator and bridge in other regional conflicts.

Beyond ASEAN, peacekeeping further is a potential area of convergence with Beijing, as also China has become a noteworthy contributor to UNPKO. Since China has been admitted to the United Nations in 1971, the country’s approach to security cooperation at the UN level has undergone a remarkable transition from outright resistance to UNPKO, to contributing troops since 1989, to becoming the largest contributor of personnel among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This shift has attracted considerable attention and there is a rich body of work that analyses China’s participation in UNPKO, in view of the country’s official adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Gill & James, 2000; Liu, 2012), China’s worldview and modernisation discourse (Davis, 2002; Suzuki, 2011), Beijing’s efforts to respond to the ‘China threat’ perception by demonstrating the country’s peaceful intentions, and attempts to building the profile of a responsible global citizen concerned with maintaining regional and global peace and security (Richardson, 2011). In 2007, when ASEAN was yet to make notable progress on its own regional initiative, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao hosted a China-ASEAN peacekeeping workshop, indicating Beijing’s desire to cooperate ("Chinese premier announces plan for China-ASEAN peace-keeping workshop," 2007).

It is in the area of NTS, however, where security and defence cooperation between ASEAN and China is most advanced, providing Jakarta with an opportunity to
engage Beijing in an effort to consolidate ASEAN centrality and Indonesian leadership. Furthermore, Indonesia’s promotion of a regional force has been most successful in this security context.

**Non-Traditional Security Cooperation**

The area of NTS advances a deepening of military cooperation at the ASEAN level as well as with China and other external powers outside the contentious context of traditional security. The 2009 APSC Roadmap, reflecting Indonesia’s proposal for ‘comprehensive security’, obliges ASEAN member states to create a “cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security […] which goes beyond the requirements of traditional security but also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and national resilience”.

The range of natural disasters that struck Southeast Asia in recent years, from tsunamis to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, forest fires, landslides and flooding has added to the sense of urgency to advance regional cooperation in this area.

Cooperation on NTS advances regional military-to-military ties through joint training, operations and exercises, including at the level of the ARF, APT and between China and ASEAN. Indeed, the partnership between ASEAN and China in the area of NTS has been highlighted as the potentially most effective approach to date to address the abundance of regional security challenges. Arase (2010) suggests Sino–ASEAN cooperation in NTS has already become an institutionalized process that affects both the strategic and political future of East Asia. The NTS agenda is set to become the platform on which to advance traditional security cooperation as it is “redefining perceptions and pushing the boundaries of security cooperation at regional and global levels” (Morton, 2011).

The NTS agenda might further help advance the intractable debate on the *modus operandi* of the ‘ASEAN Way’, which hitherto had been framed within traditional security concerns by taking a more functionalist approach towards regional security. ASEAN’s experience with a range of NTS challenges such as natural and

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50 ASEAN Roadmap, p. 11.
man-made disasters initiated a gradual shift towards a more qualified form of sovereignty that allows some degree of interference. Sukma (2008, p. 147) argues that while the doctrine of non-interference continues to remain relevant, it needs to be interpreted in the context of member states’ interdependence and their vulnerability to transboundary issues and spill-over effects of domestic events in member countries. Caballero-Anthony and Haywood (2011, p. 7) also note a gradual shift in attitudes towards the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference with ‘regional’ security concerns at times outweighing concerns over ‘interference’. They conclude “the ‘ASEAN way’ itself is not an entirely static concept and what is considered interference in the domestic affairs of a country is an ever-widening notion” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood, 2011, p. 5).

These dynamics were most evident in ASEAN’s – albeit belated – response to the Cyclone Nargis that hit parts of Myanmar in 2008. Former ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan (2008, p. xx) considered Nargis a defining moment for ASEAN. ASEAN’s engagement opened the debate on the implications of threats to human security and how the Association should respond to such threats vis-à-vis the prerogative of non-interference, thus advancing notions that had previously been raised by members of the EPG during the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. Nargis triggered the largest humanitarian operation ever coordinated by ASEAN. The grouping, therein Indonesia and Singapore specifically, successfully mediated between the Burmese regime and international aid donors, diminishing fears of political intervention to manage the humanitarian crisis (Emmerson, 2008a, p. 45). Some analysts went so far as to suggest that the cyclone “transformed Myanmar from ASEAN’s embarrassment into its opportunity” as the Association’s intimacy with the regime was said to have been an asset in the aftermath of the disaster (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 191; Emmerson, 2008b, p. 45).

Some observers proclaimed that ASEAN found a new purpose with the response to Nargis in building up its regional capacity to respond to future disasters (Baldwin, 2009). The experience at least highlighted the need for mechanisms to facilitate a coordinated regional response to such events, though earlier regional disasters, such as the haze that became a frequent occurrence since the late 1990s
and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami could have equally triggered a more comprehensive coordinated regional response. It is likely that only the efforts of advancing ASEAN’s liberal agenda and security cooperation provided the framework within which ASEAN could at last take concerted action in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis.

ASEAN’s response to the disaster was a notable step towards closer ASEAN security cooperation and coordination. The response to Nargis also illustrated the importance of cooperation with non-state actors and civil-military coordination. Initiatives such as this potentially widen the security discourse in the region, acknowledging the significance of a pluralistic response to security challenges, which could further erode the Westphalian logic of state-centred security (Emmerson, 2008b; Sukma, 2008, p. 147). ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan optimistically declared “[t]his is the New ASEAN – a community that puts people at the centre of concern” (S. Pitsuwan, 2008, p. xx). ASEAN is yet to achieve the people-centrism propagated by regional leaders such as Wanandi. But the response to Nargis exemplified ASEAN’s efforts at “working around the sensitivities to external interference and avoiding charges of intrusion by emphasising the cooperative character of the NTS agenda in which sovereignty is not trumped or superseded, but rather, pooled” (Caballero-Anthony, 2005, p. 266; 2008, p. 207). Since ASEAN’s experience with the Nargis response, this approach has been further institutionalised.

In 2009, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) came into force, four years after its ratification and without a doubt due also to ASEAN’s previous experience with the Nargis response. The legally binding disaster mitigation mechanism draws from the lessons learned and constitutes a “proactive regional framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance, and resource mobilisation in all aspects of disaster management”. 51 ASEAN had begun drafting the agreement in 2004, several weeks before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. ASEAN Foreign Ministers ratified the

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51 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), online: www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/13/13-02/asean_disaster_management.xml.
agreement in July 2005, but it took more than four years for it to come into effect and since then overall progress has been criticised as too slow in view of the frequent disasters in the region (Amul, 2012).

The agreement is the most significant step yet towards a more functional level of security cooperation. Article 9 of the AADMER mandates the establishment of an ASEAN Standby Arrangement for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) deployed on a voluntary basis and based on the state’s capabilities. In the 2011 ADMM declaration, defence ministers adopted the idea of the use of military assets and capacities for HADR operations. The establishment of the standby arrangement is perceived a matter of urgency that requires the acceleration of “the effective operations of the ASEAN military in HADR operations regionally and internationally […] to minimise loss to live and property due to natural and man-made disasters, while respecting the sovereignty of the affected State”. Indonesia and Singapore co-hosted the first ASEAN HADR Table-Top Exercise (ASEAN HADR TTX) in July 2011 as a step towards practical cooperation of ASEAN militaries. The second HADR TTX will be hosted by Brunei in 2013, possibly in the South China Sea “in order to promote trust and compatibilities between member nations” ("ASEAN HADR exercise next year," 2012). The attendance of the Chinese defence minister at the 6th ADMM in Phnom Penh in 2012, where the exercise was proposed, highlights the convergence of NTS cooperation and defence diplomacy and cooperation in ASEAN and with China ("ASEAN HADR exercise next year," 2012).

For Indonesia the development of this mechanism could be considered another modest success towards a collective security arrangement that along with the establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict resolution stands to advance security and defence cooperation and thus ASEAN cohesion, reflecting positively on Indonesia’s role in advancing these initiatives. The establishment in 2011 of the

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52 AADMER, See also Annex D: Concept Paper, The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, online: www.aseansec.org/18471-d.pdf.
53 Joint Declaration of the ADMM, 19 May 2011, p. 4.
54 Annex D, p. 2, see also ADMM Joint Declaration, 19 May 2011, p. 4.
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in Jakarta was not merely for practical reasons. The fact that also the ASEAN Secretariat is located in Jakarta along with the proposed location for the ASEAN Peacekeeping Training Centre in Sentul/Bogor near Jakarta is a strong symbol of the central role Indonesia intends to play in managing the Association’s numerous issue areas. The AHA Centre serves as the hub for coordinated disaster response, akin the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and will likely coordinate initiatives that also involve partners from beyond the ASEAN region, adding another dimension to Indonesia’s efforts of being “part of the solution” in NTS cooperation and beyond (Natalegawa, cited in Cullum, 2010).

Although it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of the AADMER, some aspects should raise questions about the feasibility of making the mechanism work in the near future. The establishment of the AHA Centre is the principal achievement to date but operationalising the initiative remains slow. So far, progress towards the standby arrangement has been limited to the on-going identification of member states’ assets and capacities, but policy, legal and financial infrastructure is still lacking. The implementation of the AADMER work programme is the primary responsibility of member states, which have to develop the policy and legal environment at the national level to facilitate the establishment of necessary structures and mechanisms for implementation, coordination and enforcement. Without a definite timeframe these processes will take time to be completed. Voluntary contributions by ASEAN member states, “preferably on a regular basis”, along with contributions from dialogue partners are meant to finance the implementation of the AADMER work programme. Without secure funding, the viability of the mechanism cannot be ascertained. Also the voluntary nature of the standby arrangement should not surprise critics of ASEAN’s *modus operandi*. The ‘ASEAN Way’ still sets the pace for the

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56 See [www.ahacentre.org](http://www.ahacentre.org).
58 Chairman's Statement of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the AADMER, Jakarta, 16 March 2012, online: [www.aseansec.org/26822.htm](http://www.aseansec.org/26822.htm).
development of a mechanism that provides the clearest outline yet for a regional force.

Resistance from within the Association’s less progressive governments has continuously bogged down progress, raising questions as to whether Indonesia should look beyond ASEAN. The slow pace at which ASEAN operates and the obstacles its style of governance presents to Indonesian initiatives have contributed to growing criticism of the Association in Indonesia, where decision-makers and intellectuals put forward the idea of looking towards a more globally oriented foreign policy (Rüland, 2009, p. 399; Sukma, 2009a). ASEAN’s relevance to Indonesia as a vehicle to realise Jakarta’s regional and global ambitions cannot be overstated. The benefits Indonesia derives from its commitments towards advancing ASEAN integration hinges on the Association’s success in strengthening cohesion and projecting the image of a strong regional grouping. A regional force for conflict resolution and HADR would be a powerful statement of ASEAN cohesion and community with Indonesia at its helm. For Jakarta, whose 2003 proposal provided the framework for these initiatives, the institutionalisation of security and defence cooperation within ASEAN and, moreover, with China, is likely regarded as a success, as it emphasises Indonesia’s role in shaping the regional order, adding clout to its image as a positive influence on regional affairs.

It is in Indonesia’s interest to ensure that these initiatives move ahead in due course. More importantly, in advancing regional security cooperation Jakarta will be on alert to pre-empt ASEAN from exposing existing divisions in the grouping, as demonstrated by Indonesia’s response to the recent failure of agreeing on a joint communiqué at the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh. The incident sparked an immediate debate as to whether ASEAN’s future was at stake ("Cambodia has put Asean's future in jeopardy," 2012). China’s role in this incident only underscores Jakarta’s concern and explains Indonesia’s rapid response to manage the situation.
Jakarta’s role conceptions of model, bridge, mediator, and sub-system collaborator are all geared towards ascertaining ASEAN’s potential as a regional platform to advance Indonesia’s leadership ambitions. The country’s policy and intellectual elite has been instrumental in promoting and embedding liberal norms and values within the regional framework of governance, and the Association has arguably made significant steps towards further integration. Yet divisions remain, and the China factor at times weighs heavily on regional relationships, with potentially damaging implications for the ASEAN Community idea. A weak and indecisive ASEAN could be detrimental to the realisation of Indonesia’s role conception as regional leader and global actor.

But Indonesia’s continued commitment to advancing its agenda at the ASEAN level is not guaranteed, as it is subject to possible shifts in domestic politics. Before concluding, I intend to touch on possible future scenarios of Indonesia’s regional and global role.

**Quo vadis, Indonesia?**

Indonesia’s liberal agenda has been a constant feature of ASEAN regionalism for the past decade, driven by domestic political changes and dedicated individuals. The policy and intellectual elite that advances democratisation of the regional sphere shares its foreign policy objectives of regional leadership and global influence with neo-nationalist elements that are concerned about China’s rise and its implications for Jakarta’s ambitions. Despite an Islamic resurgence in the social sphere and associated domestic political developments that could potentially threaten Indonesia’s pluralism, the government has thus far not capitalised on this identity and is unlikely to do so to any significant degree, as political Islam is not popular among the pluralist majority. Yet political changes could usher in subtle shifts that could also inform Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour.

Aras and Gorener (2010, p. 90) conclude “the dominance of a particular [role] conception has to do with the domestic political balance of power and leadership skills”. Indonesia’s championing of a liberal agenda sits well with progressive leaders such as Yudhoyono and Natalegawa. But “[r]ole theory allows for the
exercise of individuality” (Holsti, 1970, p. 298) and it remains to be seen whether a potential Prabowo administration would be equally supportive of ASEAN’s liberal turn if it fails to appreciate the effect this has on Indonesia’s regional and global ambitions, or if it perceives national interests to outweigh regional and international objectives. Indonesia’s changing political party structure means that policy will increasingly be elite- and personality-driven, rather than building on well-established party platforms with more predictable policy outcomes (Syailendra, 2012; Trajano & Kenawas, 2013; Ufen, 2006). The continued presence of members of the old elite among Indonesia’s policy and intelligence community also indicates that now and for some time still Indonesia’s liberal forces and authoritarian elements will continue to create tensions within the domestic sphere. Whether these potential shifts could alter Jakarta’s foreign policy outlook in any considerable way is questionable, however. Since embarking on its process of democratisation, Jakarta foreign policy has been marked by continuity. This is unlikely to change as Indonesia’s current foreign policy approach and predominant role conception is in the interest also of the country’s neo-nationalist forces.

Its national role conceptions as model for liberal democracy, bridge and mediator/integrator provide a suitable context for Indonesia’s liberal agenda, but it is its role conception as regional leader and global player that predominantly determines this foreign policy behaviour. Other ASEAN governments that promote the liberal agenda should equally be questioned in their motivation. Emmerson (2007, p. 8) argues that ASEAN’s interest in promoting liberal democracy is almost exclusively instrumental, not led by a commitment to democracy on ideal grounds in its own right. Rüland (2009, p. 396), while acknowledging processes of democratisation in most ASEAN countries, highlights the role played by ‘old’ national elites that pursue a neo-nationalist agenda, which benefits from the democratisation discourse purportedly championed by regional governments. Also Jetschke (1999) argues that Indonesia’s human rights rhetoric serves the agenda of the country’s nationalist elements. Carothers and Youngs (2011, p. 19) question “the idea that international democracy support is not intrinsically a pro-Western policy cause but rather an endeavor that can advance
the national interests of non-Western countries whose foreign policy goals overall are very different from those in the West”. Emerging democracies, they assert, “are more interested in increasing their own power vis-à-vis regional rivals than in seeing a more democratic world” (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 25).

In view of Indonesia’s questionable commitment to its ‘core values’ of democracy and human rights (Anwar, 2010b, p. 132) in the domestic sphere, this observation seems apt. Considering progress made towards institutionalising a liberal agenda at the regional level and towards softening the norm of non-interference it raises the possibility, however, that democratic norms and values might ‘trickle down’ from a liberalised ASEAN into the domestic sphere, rather than ‘diffuse’ from the domestic sphere to the region as argued by Dosch (2008, p. 530).

Promoting liberal democracy is nonetheless a pivotal part of Indonesia’s strategy to raise its regional and global image, and an asset when it comes to looking beyond ASEAN to realise Jakarta’s ambitions. There is growing discontent among civil society and members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual elite about ASEAN’s slow progress (Anwar, 2010b, p. 134). If ASEAN’s progress continues to drag, Indonesia might well decide to look beyond this ‘golden cage’ (Sukma, 2009a). India, another middle-power in the immediate neighbourhood, could be a natural partner on the global stage. Both states are emerging regional powers, members of the G20, the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. They are proponents of South-South cooperation and have historically been advocates of a liberal democratic order that, according to Mohan (2011), has more credibility than the ‘liberal imperialism’ of the West. The history of the Indian-Indonesian relationship highlights this convergence. Nehru and Sukarno were among the most vocal of Southern leaders that advanced the Non-Aligned Movement. But would an Indonesia, detached from its ASEAN grounding and in closer partnership with India, be a possible future scenario?

ASEAN without Indonesia’s pivotal influence is difficult to imagine and Jakarta’s continued commitment to the Association is essential for Indonesia’s security and

59 See also (Weatherbee, 2011).
prosperity in the region. So long as Jakarta’s regional and global ambitions persist
the grouping will continue to be the most likely vehicle for their realisation. This
policy is, moreover, in line with Indonesia’s constitutional discourse and the
‘million friends diplomacy’ that Indonesia has taken great effort to institutionalise
across the grouping. Indonesia will continue to play a key role and have
considerable influence on shaping ASEAN regionalism, notwithstanding domestic
changes and pressures. Thus far, this influence has provided a positive input to the
definition of new frameworks and the regional order towards regional peace and
stability.

**Conclusion**

I have argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy at the regional and global level is
motivated by several national role conceptions, which constitute a continuity from
the country’s constitutional discourse of liberal internationalism, and which are
dominated by a desire to strengthen Indonesia’s regional leadership status and
exert more influence on global affairs. The role conception of regional leader and
global player is advanced on a liberal agenda that is informed by the role
conceptions of bridge, model/example, regional sub-system collaborator, and
mediator/integrator. The continuity of Indonesia’s ‘independent and active’
foreign policy doctrine is significant as it serves to rationalise Indonesia’s
engagement in a range of issue areas and geographical contexts, further
consolidating its credentials as a liberal democracy, a model and a bridge as well
as “a source for solution” (Sagita, 2013) in the emerging multi-polar world order.

Indonesia’s liberal agenda is not an end in itself, but a means towards realising the
country’s regional and global ambitions by advancing ASEAN regionalism and
cohesion. In so doing, Jakarta and other regional proponents of this agenda, such
as Thailand and the Philippines, have to take into consideration the sensitive and at
times profound nature of the changes this agenda effects and the potential
repercussions this might have on ASEAN cohesion. Thus far, despite the
resistance from several regional governments, considerable progress has been
made in both policy rhetoric and, arguably, action. Significantly, ASEAN
mechanisms of security cooperation have also managed to engage rising global
power China and its potential nemesis in the region, the U.S. China’s engagement is a vital success for Jakarta as it enmeshes Beijing in a regional order bound by norms and rules that can diminish the perceived risk of Beijing marginalising Jakarta’s standing as regional leader. ASEAN cohesion and further progress in regional security cooperation thus is essential for Jakarta to realise this ambition.

Notwithstanding possible domestic political changes in the future, Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour in the region has been marked by continuity since the country embarked on its journey towards becoming the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy. Jakarta’s desire to build on Indonesia’s ‘international identity’, however, at times contradicts its domestic behaviour. Paralleling the projection of a liberal democratic order regionally and internationally is a resurgence of ethnic strife, regional conflict and religious intolerance in the domestic sphere. This trend is evidently not merely a popular one. It further extends into Indonesia’s domestic policy sphere, where authoritarian elements continue to exert influence. This development does not augur well for Indonesia’s nascent democracy if the government fails to adequately respond to these challenges. Now, more than ever, is the time to ‘put the house in order’ as the central government runs risk of losing sight of its domestic duties and responsibilities as it pursues its regional and global ambitions.
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