Thinking differently about leadership: a critical history of
the form and formation of leadership studies

by

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Abstract

We have come to live in an age where leadership is the solution, regardless of the problem. Today, managers are called on to provide leadership which is ‘visionary’, ‘charismatic’, ‘transformational’ and ‘authentic’ in nature. This is what ‘followers’ are said to need to perform to their potential. The efforts of the academy in promoting these ideas means they are typically understood as modern, enlightened and grounded in scientific research. Taking a critical step back, this study examines why we have come to understand leadership in this way.

Adopting a Foucauldian methodology, the study comprises three case studies which examine Classical Greek, 16th century European and modern scholarly discourses on leadership. The analysis foregrounds change and continuity in leadership thought and examines the underpinning assumptions, problematizations and processes of formation which gave rise to these truth claims. The relationship and subjectivity effects produced by these discourses along with their wider social function are also considered.

What the study reveals is that our current understanding of leadership is not grounded in an approach more enlightened and truthful than anything that has come before. Rather, just as at other times in the past, it is contemporary problematizations, politically-informed processes of formation and the epistemological and methodological preferences of our age which profoundly shape what is understood to constitute the truth about leadership. Through showing how leadership has been thought of at different points in time, this thesis argues that far from being a stable enduring fact of human nature now revealed to us by modern science, as is typically assumed, leadership is most usefully understood as an unstable social invention, morphing in form, function and effect in response to changing norms, values and circumstances. Consistent with this understanding, a new approach to theory-building for organizational leadership studies is offered. This study shows, then, why we ought to think differently about leadership and offers a means by which this can occur.
Acknowledgements

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Chapter One: Why leadership?

The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently (Foucault, 1985, p. 9)

Leadership is not a “mystical or ethereal concept”. Rather, leadership is an observable, learnable set of practices. Certainly leaders make a difference. There is no question about it (Bass, 2008, p. 10).

Introduction

In recent decades leadership has been extensively promoted by management scholars and practitioners alike as a vital force for good, crucial to overcoming the myriad challenges facing groups, organizations and even societies and securing a better future (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Kotter, 1996; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Such is the confidence of proponents of this view that Bass can even claim, as above, that the value of leadership is now beyond debate. However, while it has recently been argued “the fundamental question we must ask is, what do we know and what should we know about leaders and leadership” (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009, p. 209), I contend the emphasis and expectations now placed on leaders and leadership instead demands analysis of why it is we have come to such an understanding.

Critically informed interest in leadership has grown in recent years (e.g. Ford, Harding, & Learmonth, 2008; Sinclair, 2007; Western, 2007). However, as Alvesson and Sveningsson have recently noted, analysis of the “culture- and Discourse-driven nature of leadership is neglected in most of the literature” (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012, p. 209). In Michel Foucault’s inquiries into the form and formation of expert-driven discourses (e.g. 1977; 1978) he argues that we must question the past in order to free ourselves to think differently about the present and the future. Responding to these ideas, this thesis examines key features of past and present-day scholarly discourses on leadership in the West, calling into question conventional understandings of both form and formation and thereby providing a basis from which we can think differently about leadership in the future.
Leadership today

Effective leadership is commonly understood in the modern West as having ‘visionary’ (Bennis & Nanus, 1985), ‘charismatic’ (House, 1977), ‘transformational’ (Bass, 1985a) and, more recently, ‘authentic’ qualities (Luthans & Avolio, 2003). Collectively, these ideas are known as the ‘new leadership’ school (Bryman, 1986; Jackson & Parry, 2011). Leadership of this intense, powerful and compelling nature has, over the last quarter century, come to constitute the expected standard for managerial performance and to be widely accepted as something which employees, ‘followers’, both need and benefit from (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Jackson & Parry, 2011).

With the development of ‘new leadership’, leadership is now generally understood as valuable and desirable for every situation and context (Bass, 1985a; Heifetz, 1994; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Leaders are held up as admirable persons in possession of highly desired and valued qualities or skills (e.g. Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Zaleznik, 1977). Effective leaders are said to generate quantitatively and qualitatively superior results (e.g. Bass, 2008; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1988). Central to the credibility of these claims has been the understanding that our grasp of leadership now derives from robust, scientific methods of inquiry (e.g. Antonakis, Cianciolo, & Sternberg, 2004; Bass, 2008; Yukl, 2012). As a consequence of all these factors, the confident expectation that we must have ‘leadership’ in order to overcome whatever challenge a group, organization or society faces and to achieve our individual and collective potential has become natural and normal, perhaps even automatic.

Several significant problems arise from this state of affairs. Firstly, the more this positioning of leadership as the solution to every challenge comes to seem ‘normal’ and ‘natural’, the more difficult it is to think both critically and creatively about leadership (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Foucault, 1985). Thought itself is disciplined, channelled in a particular fashion, constrained, when a discourse exerts such a hold on our understanding of what is real, true and good (Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1978). Secondly, the current approach places expectations of almost super-human capability and performance on people in leadership positions. This creates enormous pressures on those striving to meet these expectations (Ford et al., 2008; Sinclair, 2007), as well as encouraging hubris by those who come to see themselves in such grandiose terms (Kellerman, 2004; Kets de
Vries, 2003; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). Thirdly, it both relies on and reinforces the assumption that the vast majority of people are somehow lacking, incapable of overcoming challenges without the exceptional few leading the way (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2012; Sinclair, 2007). This assumption undermines the values necessary for sustaining a liberal democratic society, where active participation from all citizens on issues of common concern is understood as highly desirable and egalitarian attitudes inform the interaction between persons (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Parker, 2002; Russell, 1984). Cumulatively, the current understanding and positioning of leadership thus poses manifold problematic consequences in diverse matters such as inhibiting theoretical innovation, producing harmful effects for leaders and followers sense of self and facilitating power relations which favour the ‘gifted’ minority (‘leaders’) and diminish the role and status of the ‘ordinary’ majority (‘followers’).

However, leadership has not always been held up as the answer to every problem. Early 20th century management scholars, for example, gave leadership little attention, focussing instead on systems and processes as key drivers of organizational performance (e.g. Fayol, 1930; Taylor, 1919). Earlier, Enlightenment era political philosophers were deeply concerned to limit the power and influence of leaders for they claimed individuals and society as a whole were better served by so doing (e.g. Locke, 2010 (1690); Mill, 1851). They wanted leaders to have less influence. From their perspective leadership was a problem to be managed, not a solution. How, then, did we end up where we are now, seemingly at the very opposite end of the spectrum to the founding assumptions of modernity? Why has leadership come to be understood in the way it now is? What has made this particular way of thinking about leadership possible and what are its effects?

**Theoretical underpinnings and scope of the study**

To understand why we have come to our current understanding of leadership, in this thesis I deploy a Foucauldian approach (see, in particular, Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1980,1985, 1986, 2010) to analyse the content (‘form’) and development (‘formation’) of selected past and present leadership discourses. Consequently, my analysis examines the problematizations which have informed the emergence of these leadership discourses.
The processes of formation leading to the production of truth claims about leadership, the epistemic conditions of possibility and the implicit rules governing these discourses are considered. The subjectivities and relationships arising from different ideas about leadership, as well as the underlying assumptions relied upon in these discourses also constitute key elements of the Foucauldian analysis offered here. Infused throughout these various elements of the analysis is a sensitivity to the workings of power and power/knowledge. As a result of these analytic moves, the study challenges conventional accounts of leadership and how we have come to understand it in the way we now do.

The study explores how ‘leadership’ has been discursively produced and constructed in different ‘epistemes’, including our own, where ‘episteme’ is understood as being “something like a world-view... a certain structure of thought” which prevails at any given point in time, shaping what is thinkable and say-able (Foucault, 1972, p. 191). Using the same research strategy which Foucault took in his extended inquiry into the history of sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986), this study comprises three case studies which examine scholarly discourse on leadership in three different epistemes, focussing on specific times within those when leadership was a topic of active scholarly debate: Classical Greece of the 5th and 4th centuries BC, 16th and 17th century Europe, and the modern West, beginning from around the middle of the 19th century and through to the present day. These discourses are, conceptually, equivalent in standing, insofar as each constitutes and articulates the prevailing scholarly understanding of leadership of their time. Each discursive regime articulates what was understood to be a credible claim to speak the truth about leadership at the time of its enunciation.

A critical limitation placed on the scope of this study to ensure its feasibility is my focus on those ideas about leadership which dominated the scholarly literature in the periods examined by this study. While understanding the diversity of opinions about leadership in each period is of inherent value, it is simply not the focus here. Instead what I look at is the prevailing scholarly understanding of leadership, based on the pre-supposition that these dominant ideas had, or have, the most influence.

As a result of its design and focus this study reaches into times and spaces not previously subjected to analysis of the type offered here, revealing previously unacknowledged connections between the past and the present. Contemporary leadership ideas are here
placed within a much broader historical context than has previously been done, enabling a more fulsome assessment of the ‘progress’ that has been made in recent decades. This research strategy is one which seeks to achieve critical distance from the present in which we are normally embedded in order to “…free thought ....and so enable it to think differently” (Foucault, 1985, p. 9). The subsequent comparative analysis arising from this approach enables the assessment of both change and continuity in thought, further supporting the achievement of critical distance from the current norm.

Analysis of historical developments in scholarly accounts of leadership can not only explain how and why we have come to our current understanding. It can also enhance our ability to develop new approaches. Therefore, in this study I take the main findings and use these to explore ways of conceptualising leadership in a manner which seeks to address the pitfalls and tensions I identify in extant models. A contribution of this study is, thus, theoretical innovation.

Through showing why and how different ideas about leadership have been accepted as truthful at different times, the study foregrounds the vital influence time, place, circumstances and assumptions have upon both past and current versions of the truth about leadership. From this I extend my argument to a questioning of the very ontology of leadership. What I show is that the ‘truth’ about leadership currently so widely accepted is an elaborate but contingent, constructed and ultimately fragile invention. Other truths about leadership have existed in the past, have been similarly elaborate, contingent, constructed and fragile. From better understanding these developments we are much better placed to make choices about the way in which we might reinvent leadership to suit current concerns and values. This study therefore proceeds on the basis that recourse to teleological or progressivist narratives of ever greater enlightenment ( Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Dean, 1994) will not suffice in accounting for our current understanding of leadership.

**Research questions, thesis and theory**

The primary research question driving this study is “why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does?” With this question I treat the current
state of affairs as problematic, consistent with the Foucauldian approach I have adopted for this study. My secondary questions also focus attention on matters of particular relevance to a Foucauldian analysis:

1. What problematizations have informed the development of the leadership discourses examined here?
2. What key themes and assumptions inform these discourses?
3. What subjectivities and relationships are produced by these discourses?
4. What is the social function of these discourses?
5. What changes and continuities are notable when comparing these discourses?

My thesis is that the conventional understanding of leadership now prevailing is profoundly problematic, not least for its apparent confidence in itself, but that, being a contingent construction and not something grounded in nature or science, this situation is open to change. To substantiate this thesis the case studies demonstrate just how ‘new’ and other forms of leadership have been constructed in various ways at various times and highlight the effects arising from different accounts of leadership. The cases also bring to light both changes and continuities in leadership thought and thus provide examples from which we can begin to think differently about leadership.

The theorisation I advance is that the phenomenon we call ‘leadership’ is fundamentally a social, political invention. Its ontology is fluid, unstable and not something fixed in ‘human nature’. What leadership is, therefore, is open to adaptation. What we call on leadership to do and to be depends on what we problematize, what we value, and the specific workings of power and power/knowledge that are in play.

This way of accounting for leadership runs entirely counter to the objectivist, essentialist and universalist approach which dominates contemporary leadership studies (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012). It implies there is no singular, objective truth about leadership ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered by the deployment of the scientific method. It means we need to change how we typically think about leadership.

Taking on this challenge, I show how adopting this account enables theoretical innovation and thereby encourages new approaches to leadership which seek to overcome or ameliorate the problematic consequences of current understandings for
leaders and followers which have been identified (e.g. Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford et al., 2008; Sinclair, 2007)). Liberating ‘leadership’ from the discursive frame in which it is currently trapped, as I seek to do here, therefore supports recent calls for leading that liberates (Sinclair, 2007).

Structure of the thesis

This chapter provides an introductory overview of the topic of inquiry and how it is to be tackled in this study. It also previews what is to be argued and the overall conclusions that will be drawn from the findings. Chapter Two both problematizes the extant literature and identifies the specific gap in knowledge to which this study makes a contribution. Chapter Three addresses in more depth the theoretical and methodological basis of the study. It explains the rationale for the design of the study and provides more detail on the Foucauldian method of inquiry I have used and how the study was conducted.

Starting with Chapter Four I move into the body of the study proper, which comprises four chapters. The first of these deals with the modern era of leadership discourse. I begin with an analysis of the origins of modern leadership science by examining the work of Thomas Carlyle. From there I progressively trace the dominant theoretical developments through to the present day where the so-called ‘new leadership’ theories dominate. In Chapter Five I leap back in time to examine European leadership thought of the 16th and 17th centuries, while in Chapter Six I make a further leap back to explore the leadership thought of the Classical Greeks. As noted earlier this research strategy is consistent with Foucault’s own approach to his study of the history of sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986). Analyses of this ‘time-travelling’ nature disrupt the conventional narrative of continuity and progression, making it possible to better see change, continuity and contingency in the development of knowledge. For each major theoretical paradigm I consider the problematizations which informed its development and its processes of formation. The key ideas of each discourse, its subjectivity effects, social function and its epistemic conditions of possibility are also assessed. Chapter Seven then examines the notable changes and continuities in leadership thought by comparing these discourses.
Cumulatively, chapters four to seven constitute my detailed answers to both the primary and secondary research questions. In Chapter Eight, I consolidate the key findings in respect of my research questions, discuss the implications for future research, limitations and contribution of this study, before turning, finally, to offer a new approach to theorising organizational leadership arising from this research.
Chapter Two: Literature review

... the leadership field over the past decade has made tremendous progress in uncovering some of the enduring mysteries associated with leadership...The period that leadership theory and research will enter over the next decade is indeed one of the most exciting in the history of this planet (Avolio et al., 2009, p. 442).

Perhaps one day people will wonder at this....People will wonder what could have made us so presumptuous... (Foucault, 1978, pp. 157−158).

Introduction

My overarching purpose in this chapter is to explain why we ought to wonder about the triumphalist stance, exemplified in the quote from Avolio et al. (2009) above, which is being taken by mainstream leadership scholars today in respect of leadership and our knowledge of it. I begin, however, by providing an overview of Western leadership literature so as to orient the reader to the overall scope and nature of this field of knowledge. Following this, I turn to the social science literature for which I also provide an orienting overview before then critically reviewing the state and focus of the mainstream of contemporary leadership studies. I then adopt a problematizing approach (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2010) to the assumptions informing this mainstream thought, thereby further building the case for the critical approach taken in this study. After that I examine the critical literature on leadership and prior analyses of the history of leadership thought, these being the two key literatures from which this study draws and to which it makes a contribution. Finally, I identify how the key findings which arise from my review of the literature link directly to the research questions guiding this study.

Overview of the Western leadership literature

Leadership has been studied and analysed in the West for literally thousands of years (Adair, 2002; Avery, 2004; Bass, 2008). From ancient times through until quite recently, moral and political philosophers, historians and practitioners were the primary sources of scholarly work on leadership, but today it is social scientists and practitioners who now produce most of the leadership literature (Bass, 2008; Hargrove, 2004; Schruijer &
Vansina, 2002). While these disciplinary divisions are themselves a quite recent way of categorizing knowledge, each of these approaches has nonetheless tended to produce particular kinds of knowledge.

Philosophers have tended toward prescriptive or normative accounts of what leaders should do or analytic accounts of what leadership entails. This literature therefore typically lacks a robust empirical basis (Bass, 2008). Historians have produced many accounts of leaders’ lives, with a particular focus on monarchs, politicians and military leaders (Hargrove, 2004; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). The resulting knowledge is therefore typically descriptive and a-theoretical (Bass, 2008). Practitioners have sought to elucidate the practice of leading as they have experienced it. Texts of this nature by business leaders are now very popular (Guthey, Clark, & Jackson, 2009) whereas in the past political and military leaders tended to be the source of practitioner texts. This literature tends, however, to be anecdotal, idiosyncratic and at times hagiographic or self-serving (Jackson & Parry, 2011).

Social scientists, in particular psychologists, have largely focussed on empirical testing of formal theories, continuously plugging perceived gaps in our understanding of the causes and effects of leadership, bolstering prescriptive advice with research (Avery, 2004; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004). Social science is now the dominant approach to understanding leadership today. This knowledge is primarily produced by way of positivist, quantitative research methods (Bryman, 2004; Hunter, Bedell-Avers, & Mumford, 2007; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). However, the limitations of these epistemological and methodological approaches are infrequently considered and leadership has been the subject of very little critical social science (Collinson, 2011; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002; Western, 2007). Table 2.1 summarises this overview of the literature.
Table 2.1: Overview of the Western literature on leadership

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<th>Disciplinary base</th>
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<th>Key limitations</th>
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<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>“should do”</td>
<td>Non-empirical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historiography</td>
<td>Biographies/histories</td>
<td>A-theoretical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practitioner</td>
<td>“how to” Auto-/biographies</td>
<td>Anecdotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
<td>Formal theories and models</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly positivist;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tools and applications</td>
<td>little critical attention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Empirical studies</td>
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Overview of the social science literature on leadership

Turning to examine the social scientific literature in more depth, there are three main disciplines which inform the contemporary study of leadership: political science, sociology and psychology (Bass, 2008; Gardner, Lowe, Mossa, Mahoney, & Coglisera, 2010; Lowe & Gardner, 2000). This could imply significant diversity in thinking about leadership and the common adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach. In the study of organizational leadership, however, psychology constitutes the primary, and often exclusive, disciplinary underpinning (Collinson, 2011; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002).

Political science treats political leadership as a topic within its disciplinary ambit. Specific issues of interest include leaders’ strategies, tactics and use of power, analysing leader styles and individual leaders, the effects of leaders on voter behaviour, and analysing the formal roles of leaders in different political systems (e.g. Barber, 1992; Goodin & Klingeman, 1996; Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, & Jones, 2000; Wolff, 2006). While the political science literature makes some limited use of psychological concepts and theories, there is minimal interaction between the political-science-based leadership literature and the psychology-based, organizational leadership-focussed literature (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe & Gardner, 2000). This may in part be due to the much greater use of qualitative research methods within political science, which the psychology-based leadership scholars typically do not favour (Antonakis, Schriesheim et al., 2004; Bryman, 2004;
Gardner et al., 2010). Such theory as is produced by political scientists in respect of leadership tends to be conceptual or heuristic in nature (e.g. Barber, 1992; Quatro & Sims, 2008; Wolff, 2006).

The primary contribution from sociology to the modern study of leadership has been Weber’s account of charisma (Eisenstadt & Weber, 1968). His broad depiction of charisma has subsequently been operationalised according to the standards of psychological research and developed into various formal theories of charismatic leadership (e.g. Conger, 1989; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; House, 1977). Most sociologically informed research tends to be qualitative or conceptual and this work has had limited influence in the area of organizational leadership (Alvesson, 1996; Sinclair, 2007; Western, 2007). Concerns with power, domination, inequality and exploitation which inform critical studies of leadership are typically founded in sociological accounts of these matters.

The psychology-based leadership literature, which focusses mostly on leadership in and of organizations, draws primarily on social psychology concepts, constructs and theories, with the key issue of interest being to identify the effects of leaders on followers (Avolio et al., 2009; Bass, 1985a; Bolden, Hawkins, Gosling, & Taylor, 2011). Psychological theories and research on personality, behaviour, cognition, motivation, adult development, influence and social process are key influences on this body of literature (Avolio et al., 2009; Bass, 2008; Yukl, 2012). Because of its focus on organizational leadership, most of this literature constitutes a specialist area within the broader field of organizational behaviour (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Northouse, 2004). To date, critically informed studies constitute a very small proportion of this literature (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Bolden et al., 2011; Collinson, 2011).

Empirical studies typically focus on the effects of the behaviours of formally designated leaders (i.e. managers) within a work organization setting (e.g. Wang & Howell, 2012; Zhang, Tsui, & Wang, 2011; Zhu, Avolio, Riggio, & Sosik, 2011), with the legitimacy of their authority going largely unquestioned (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012; Hunter et al., 2007). Measuring the correlation between leader behaviour and follower motivation, commitment or performance constitutes the primary focus for this body of literature (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Gardner et al., 2010; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). The research undertaken by these scholars is mainly survey based and designed to test a
specific hypothesis, consistent with the underpinning positivist epistemology adopted by most scholars (Bolden et al., 2011; Bryman, 2004; Gardner et al., 2010). Psychiatric and psychoanalytic theories have been used in a small number of leadership studies (e.g. Gabriel, 1997; Kets de Vries, 2003, 2006). Some scholars have also adapted the formal, quantitative research into prescriptive or heuristic models, often then illustrated by way of case studies. This work is then distributed via books and through consulting work (e.g. Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; Kotter, 1988), thereby spreading scholarly ideas to a much broader, practitioner audience.

The common aim of much work on organizational leadership is to test and refine formal theories of leadership and address gaps in existing knowledge, so as to produce greater predictive and prescriptive accuracy and validity (Antonakis, Schriesheim et al., 2004; Avolio et al., 2009; Bass, 2008). My estimate is that somewhere between 80 and 90% of contemporary leadership research comes from within this perspective or relies upon it. It is this body of literature which therefore constitutes what I term the ‘mainstream’ of leadership studies and to which I now turn to examine in more depth.

The preceding analysis of the key characteristics of the social scientific literature on leadership is summarized in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: The social scientific literature on leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Key issues of interest</th>
<th>Main research methods &amp; outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Effects of leaders on followers’ motivation, commitment and performance</td>
<td>Survey based studies</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Formal theory</td>
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<td>Heuristic models/case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political science</td>
<td>Leader style/behaviour; impact on voters; leader roles in different political systems; power, tactics</td>
<td>Polling based studies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other qualitative methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>Charisma, power, inequality, domination, exploitation</td>
<td>Conceptual theory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Heuristic models</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The mainstream of leadership studies today

Many leaders of world religions, such as Jesus, Mohammed, and Buddha, were transforming. They created visions, shaped values, and empowered change (Bass, 2008, p. 618).

“…effort was being made to reverse this monotonous discourse…” (Foucault, 1977, p. 288).

The mainstream of contemporary studies of organizational leadership is the specific literature which is of most interest to me as a leadership researcher and which I seek to problematize (Foucault, 1972, 1977). This mainstream can currently be characterized as one which is in a state of Kuhnian ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1996), with scholarly consensus over key assumptions, theories and methods of inquiry being a marked feature. ‘New leadership’ theories, which emphasize a leader’s ‘visionary’, ‘transformational’, and ‘charismatic’ qualities and behaviours, have achieved widespread acceptance amongst scholars as fundamentally sound, desirable and valid (Bass, 2008; Fletcher, 2004; Jackson & Parry, 2011). The ‘monotony’ of this discourse thus makes it particularly worthy of scrutiny.

Whilst there is some continuing debate over both key concepts as well as finer points of detail (for an overview, see Yukl, 1989, 1999, 2012), ‘new leadership’ thinking nonetheless strongly coheres around the positioning of leaders as highly influential persons capable of bringing about dramatic changes in both followers and organizations (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Goleman et al., 2002; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). In the various ‘new leadership’ theories leaders are said to produce an intensity of impact and connection with followers which unleashes enhanced performance (e.g. Bass, 1985b; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Conger, 1989).

As the quote at the beginning of this section demonstrates, ‘new leadership’ thinking has sought to associate itself with the most famous, divinely gifted and revered of persons in all of human history. Leadership is presented as comprising a blend of intellectual, moral and emotional influence such that followers are moved to pursue the goals articulated by the leader with selfless enthusiasm and determination (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978). Through this experience followers are said to experience
personal growth (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Burns, 1978), facilitating the presentation of ‘new leadership’ theories as progressive in nature.

The common implication is that what ‘new leadership’ thinking presents to us is a true account of leadership, a model which is of enduring significance, meaning an essentialist positioning plays a central role in ‘new leadership’ thinking (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Bolden et al., 2011; Collinson, 2011). Because of its affinity with these factors, the development of ‘authentic’ leadership theory over the last decade (e.g. Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Gardner, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2005) can be seen as a continuation of ‘new leadership’ thinking.

Following an initial period when different ‘charismatic’, ‘visionary’ and ‘transformational’ versions of these theories and their key concepts, constructs and measurement instruments underwent constant development, acceptance of their validity became and remains widespread (Bass, 2008; Bolden et al., 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011; although, for a recent critique of the predominant instrument measurement used for studies of transformational leadership, see Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013). Quantitative measurement of the positive effects on followers arising from the leader characteristics and behaviours described in these theories now constitutes the core focus of many empirical studies (e.g. Braun, Peus, Weisweiler, & Frey, 2013; Hu, Wang, Liden, & Sun, 2012; Wang & Howell, 2012). Theoretical refinement proceeds incrementally, with the basic ideas, constructs and underpinning assumptions now largely accepted with demur. Authentic leadership theory, which has only emerged over the last decade, is still in a state of active development. However it has quickly attracted the attention of well-respected scholars such as Avolio, Gardner and Walumbwa (e.g. Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans, & May, 2004) and is being actively promoted to practitioners, despite very limited empirical support to date (Caza & Jackson, 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011) and significant concerns being raised as to its ethics (Ford & Harding, 2011).

With the advent of ‘new leadership’ the community of leadership scholars saw their field as having reached new heights of theoretical sophistication well in advance of what had been previously achieved (e.g. Antonakis, Cianciolo et al., 2004; Bass, 1985a; Hunt, 1999). The widespread appeal which ‘new leadership’ has had with practitioners has been critical in sustaining scholarly support (Hunt, 1999; Jackson & Parry, 2011). While the key
ideas of ‘vision,’ ‘transformation’ and ‘charisma’ are no longer actually ‘new’, I suggest this framing of these theories as such remains in use because leadership scholars largely believe ‘new leadership’ offers approaches to leading which are attuned to the modern organisation and business environment. While these theories have ‘matured’, they have not been seen to have ‘aged’ or become outdated. Given all this, accounts of developments in the field commonly offer a narrative of current confidence and success as a result of ‘new leadership’, leaving behind an earlier period of struggle for both credibility and relevance (e.g. Antonakis, Cianciolo et al., 2004; Avery, 2004; Hunt, 1999).

The emergence of ‘new leadership’ has been widely presented and understood as enlightened and modern thinking (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1988). Traditional conceptions of management or, for some commentators, management without leadership, have been positioned in this literature as constraining, rule-bound, mundane and out of date (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Peters & Austin, 1985; Zaleznik, 1977). ‘Management’ alone has thus been held to be incapable of responding to increasingly dynamic market conditions. It is said to be unable to contend with employees seeking to be ‘empowered’, customers expecting innovation or shareholders demanding dramatic improvements in returns (e.g. Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1988; Peters & Austin, 1985). ‘Leadership’, in contrast, has been positioned in this literature as liberating for both leader and follower alike, as unleashing the latent potential of both managers and employees which ‘management’ had suppressed (e.g. Burns, 1978; Collins, 2001; Goleman et al., 2002). Leadership has been held up as what is now needed to succeed in this more demanding operating context. A new foundation for the manager-subordinate relationship is said to have been established, one which relies on mutual trust, mutual benefit and the personal growth of both leader and follower (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978). From this, it is claimed that only good things follow.

Interest in leadership amongst both scholars and practitioners has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s with the advent of ‘new leadership’ thinking (Bass, 2008; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Northouse, 2004). Leadership studies now number in their thousands (Antonakis, Cianciolo et al., 2004; Avery, 2004; Jackson & Parry, 2011). Government and business expenditure on leadership development has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, as have university research and teaching programmes and consulting firms’ interest in leadership
The sought-after return on this investment is both more, and more effective leaders who are said to be capable of moving organisations and societies forward in a positive direction and manner (e.g. Bass, 1999; Kotter, 1996; Kouzes & Posner, 2007).

In reviewing the state of the field in the mid-1990s, Alvesson argued that while “thousands of studies have been conducted... (the) outcome of these enormous efforts has been meagre” (1996, p. 457). He concluded the “field fails to meet to meet its own criteria of knowledge accumulation” (1996, p. 457). He called for a “radical re-thinking” of the philosophical assumptions and methods used by leadership scholars (1996, p. 458). Despite this, Jackson and Parry recently concluded “hard evidence about the impact of leadership is surprisingly and tantalizingly hard to find” (2011, p. 7), indicting little progress since Alvesson’s 1996 review. Further, while leadership is beginning to attract more critically informed attention, the mainstream view remains remarkably dominant (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Bolden et al., 2011; Collinson, 2011).

Beyond the academy, conventionally accepted truths about leadership appear strongly tied to the mainstream of leadership scholarship: practitioner discourse, if not practice, has been found to draw heavily on the ‘new leadership’ terms, concepts and ideas used by researchers (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b; Ford et al., 2008; Grugulis, Bozkurt, & Clegg, 2010). The ‘new leadership’ theories which have dominated the scholarly literature in recent decades have been very widely disseminated through texts and university programmes aimed at practitioners and have, by and large, become part of the accepted discourse of contemporary managers (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003b, 2003c; Bolden et al., 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011).

It is, thus, now commonplace to speak of ‘management’ as being something different from, and inferior to, ‘leadership’ (e.g. Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Goleman et al., 2002; Zaleznik, 1977). Concepts and ideas such ‘visionary’ leadership (Bennis & Nanus, 1985), ‘charismatic’ leadership (Conger, 1989; House, 1977), ‘transformational’ leadership (Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978), and the leader as ‘modelling the way’ (Kouzes & Posner, 2007) have become common parlance amongst practitioners (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford et al., 2008; Grugulis et al., 2010). Whilst there are undoubtedly differences in how practitioners may interpret or apply these terms from the precise
propositions developed by researchers, practitioners nonetheless have strong reasons for believing their understanding of leadership is one based on science and all that would normally imply in terms of rigour and objectivity.

This widely accepted ideal of the manager-as-leader now goes largely unquestioned. ‘New leadership’ ideas today provide a generally understood and accepted standard against which managers are measured (Bolden et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2008; Jackson & Parry, 2011). This approach has, therefore, become both a hegemonic and a disciplinary discourse from which it is increasingly difficult to escape in order to consider alternatives (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Collinson, 2012). It is hegemonic in the sense that, despite a proliferation of alternative theories of leadership which have been developed in recent years, the leader as visionary, charismatic, transformational agent remains not just the dominant way of thinking about leadership but for many scholars and practitioners the only way of thinking about leadership (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Collinson, 2011; Ospina & Uhl-Bien, 2012).

It is also a disciplinary discourse (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1980) in that it provides norms and standards of behaviour against which ‘good’ managers are expected to measure themselves and to then act to close any gaps. Variation against this norm is seen as failure on the part of the manager/leader (Ford et al., 2008; Sinclair, 2007), while the exploration of different ways of leading is effectively discouraged because of the positioning of this account of leadership as ‘natural’, ‘normal’, ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’. In Foucauldian terms, these expectations are not simply “a procedure of heroization” but instead they also function as “a procedure of objectification and subjection” (1977, p. 192).

Ideas which rely on asserting the naturalness and normality of inequality between persons need to be treated with considerable caution (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Willmott, 1992). For centuries, inequalities between men and women and between people of different ethnic or cultural backgrounds have been subject to the defence that these differences are ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ (e.g. Filmer, 2004 (1648); Plato, 2007). Today it has become widely accepted as ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ that ‘charismatic’ leaders-managers should develop ‘visions’ which will ‘transform’ their organisations and their ‘followers’. Yet implicit in this is the idea of leaders as superior beings to whom others ought to defer. What is constructed with ‘new leadership’ discourse is not only the idea
of someone who can both conceive and execute radical visions for change which others will find inspiring. What is also constructed is the idea and the ideal of the exceptional few directing the ordinary many. What is implied is deference and dependence, not democracy, not participation and not empowerment (Fletcher, 2004; Gemmill & Oakley, 1992; Western, 2007).

No sector and no issue appears to be beyond the bounds of where leadership might usefully reach: be it climate change, the ‘Global Financial Crisis’, the performance of your favourite sports team or the election of parent representatives for the school board, leadership is today promoted as being of central importance (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; George, 2003; Goleman et al., 2002). The dissemination of these ideas at least in part via the imprimatur and authority of the university system makes it seem highly likely that practitioners believe this emphasis on leadership to be one founded on scientific evidence (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Tourish et al., 2010). This way of thinking about leadership is thus presented as ‘enlightened’ but, at the same time, appears to be quite ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ due to its alleged status as a feature common to all times and places: the evocation of great leaders from the past to serve as endorsements for current thinking is a common enough rhetorical move in mainstream accounts of leadership (e.g. Adair, 2002; Burns, 1978; Wren, 2005).

In these mainstream studies doubt is rarely cast on the value and potency of leadership. Bernard Bass, for example, a prominent ‘new leadership’ scholar, argues that “in industrial, educational, and military settings, and in social movements, leadership plays a critical, if not the most critical, role…” (2008, p. 25). However, the influence of factors such as organisational systems and processes, technology, competitors, and economic and regulatory conditions are hardly ever accounted for in studies of leadership (Pfeffer, 1977; Porter & McLaughlin, 2006). The effects of leadership are hardly ever compared with other ways to organise collective effort, such as teamwork (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a; Pfeffer, 1977; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). The authority of leaders to influence and potentially change others is almost always treated as an unproblematic imbalance of power in mainstream leadership studies (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Kotter, 1988; Peters & Austin, 1985). A unity of interests between leaders and followers is typically taken for granted (Calás, 1993; Collinson, 2005; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007).
Mainstream leadership studies are, therefore, very partial and partisan while claiming to be objective and unbiased. Critique from the margins of the field is largely ignored and has had little impact to date (Collinson, 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Sinclair, 2007). Typically, leadership takes centre stage in formal studies, examined in splendid isolation, largely oblivious to other factors which could affect performance and immune from politically informed analysis and critique (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Pfeffer, 1977; Porter & McLaughlin, 2006).

The development of an agreed definition of leadership has proved impossible, despite decades of scientific research (Bass, 2008; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Rost, 1993). From his analysis of definitions put forward by numerous scholars, Yukl (1989) suggests there is a common theme of conceiving of leadership as an influence process. However salespeople and advertisers also enact influence processes and they are not normally thought of as leaders. It would therefore seem that this vague consensus definition is unable to distinguish leadership from other influence processes and is of little value. The field of study is, thus, one which examines something it cannot define but which it nonetheless is convinced exists (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003, 2012; Ford et al., 2008).

Perhaps as a consequence of its ubiquity, the conventional approach now taken to leadership has come to seem natural, normal and self-evident: it simply seems obvious that leadership is important and desirable and that leaders are both entitled and able to bring about change in their followers. This way of thinking, this reification of leadership, has become so persuasive, pervasive and normalized that it effectively disarms the credibility of any dissenting view (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). This context is deeply problematic if one expects an objective, impartial scientific approach to the topic: leadership scholars are not removed from, or immune to, societal norms and values, and, indeed, the knowledge produced by these scholars may serve either to reinforce or to challenge those norms and values (Alvesson, 1996; Barker, 2001; Gemmill & Oakley, 1992).

Leadership has, then, come to be portrayed as the solution of choice for every problem facing organisations or societies. It is seen as valuable and desirable for every context, a key driver of results and potent in its effects. Despite the proliferation of definitions even within the mainstream of the leadership literature, leadership is most typically conceptualised as ‘leader-ship’; what leaders do or who they are. This ‘leader-centric’,
heroic notion of leadership, while regularly criticised, continues to dominate most leadership studies and practitioner understanding. Whether born or made, therefore, it hardly matters, so long as there are leaders to inspire, guide and transform the vast majority of people, who need to be led, whose role is to follow, to be made better than if left to their own devices. The stark inequality in the status of leaders and followers invoked by this way of thinking hides in plain sight, there for all to see but accepted without question. Such is the state of our contemporary truths about leadership.

Key assumptions in the mainstream of leadership studies

Leadership is part and parcel of the human condition. A mystery as modern as the nation state and as ancient as the tribe, it brings together the best and worst in human nature: love and hate, hope and fear, trust and deceit, service and selfishness. Leadership draws on who we are, but it also shapes what we might be – a kind of alchemy of souls that can produce both Lincoln’s “better angels of our nature” and Hitler’s willing executioners (Harvey, 2006, p. 39).

This quote is drawn from a collection of essays written by highly regarded leadership scholars who jointly explored the possibility of developing a general theory of leadership (see Goethals & Sorenson, 2006). Hence, it can be read as expressing a view which would likely be taken seriously by mainstream leadership scholars, despite its colourful language. I particularly like that Harvey appreciates that leadership has sometimes been used for nefarious purposes, a recognition lacking in most studies which consider only positive effects (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011b; Ford et al., 2008; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002), a one-sidedness I continue to find disturbingly naïve. If we accept his ideas at face value, then leadership is enormously important to social well-being and warrants the most serious of attention. However, Harvey also positions leadership as something derived from human nature, as something enduring, timeless, fixed and essential and this, I argue, is problematic.

Like Harvey, most mainstream leadership scholars treat leadership as a natural phenomenon, as part of human nature, which itself is taken to be largely fixed rather than contingent (e.g. Adair, 2002; Bass, 2008; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; see also Alvesson,
Leadership is also commonly assumed to comprise universal and timeless qualities, to have an essence. Bennis and Nanus, for example, argue “leadership competencies have remained constant, but our understanding of what it is, how it works, and the way in which people learn to apply it has changed” (1985, p. 3). Bass asserts “leadership is a universal phenomenon. It is not a figment of the imagination ...” (2008, p. 25). Given Bass’s critical role in advancing transformational leadership theory, it is hardly a stretch to conclude that when he argues “leadership is a universal phenomenon” what he is also implying is that transformational leadership is similarly universal.

These assumptions are, however, at odds with the simultaneous claim of mainstream scholars to have discovered ‘new’ approaches to leadership which are of specific practical relevance, right here, right now. These assumptions logically lead to the unasked and, for mainstream theorists, extremely awkward question of how far might human nature be flexed to respond to current demands? This a priori expectation that leadership exists because given by human nature and hence presumed to be enduring may be so influential in shaping what is observed that leadership is discovered time and time again simply because that is exactly what researchers are primed to see (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).

These assumptions that leadership is part of human nature and comprises universal and timeless qualities in fact rarely stand alone. Instead they are typically combined with contradictory assumptions that modern approaches to leadership are something new and unique to our age and that leadership is amenable to scientific manipulation and able to be adapted to current conditions (e.g. Adair, 2002; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004). These latter assumptions, taken alone, warrant the proliferation of theories and models that exists in the contemporary literature. However, taken in combination, as they typically are, surely demands that attention be given to determining what it is about leadership that can and cannot be changed, providing a potential boundary for the field of inquiry. This is not so, however, as these contradictory assumptions, which sit at the very heart of contemporary mainstream leadership research, have been left largely unquestioned. The mainstream approach thus effectively seeks to have a dollar both
ways at the level of ontology, a shaky foundation for a field claiming the status of a science.

It is, of course, very appealing to believe one is studying something timeless, enduring and essential to the human condition, just as it is very appealing to believe one is at the cutting edge of a scientifically informed approach to shaping leadership. However, the two views are nonetheless logically at odds: they cannot both be true, unless one was to (perversely) treat human nature as being endlessly flexible, begging the question as to what value the concept of human nature then adds to our understanding. Nonetheless, the mainstream of leadership scholarship proceeds by drawing on both of these contradictory assumptions about the very nature of leadership.

This logical contradiction is not the only concern. When it is assumed leadership is a natural phenomenon, then leadership knowledge produced via the scientific method can be presented as a discovery, in the same sense a biologist might discover something about the functioning of bumble bees and wasps. This conception of leadership knowledge as scientific discovery has the effect of shaping what constitutes credible, intelligible critique: to critique a scientific ‘fact’ for its ‘facticity’, one must proceed along the lines of assessing ontology, epistemology, hypotheses, methodology, methods, data sources, data collection and analytic techniques for their technical and logical rigour (Alvesson, 1996; Foucault, 1970, 1972). This is a privileged conversation in which only a few can participate. Questions about rights, values and power, for example, may be dismissed as illegitimate in the face of ‘scientific discoveries’: one cannot argue with credibility that bumblebees should have more power relative to that of wasps.

By conceiving of leadership as a natural phenomenon about which discoveries ought and can be made, leadership and our knowledge of it is de-politicised and made a-historical (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Foucault, 1970, 1972). The interest then given to leadership and our ideas about it can also be seen as natural, constraining both critique and the exploration of alternatives.

In contrast, if leadership is conceived of as a contingent construct, something fashioned through individual and collective effort in response to a particular social context, knowledge claims about leadership can also readily be seen as contributing to its ongoing construction (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). Such knowledge
claims then have the status of being derived from inventions, not discoveries, rendering their unavoidably partisan and partial perspective open to scrutiny (Foucault, 1970, 1972). Questions about whose interests are served by a particular invention, why it is relevant now, and what effects it creates become legitimised and the ability to ask them is less reliant on specialised knowledge (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Foucault, 1970, 1972).

Grint has argued that leadership is not amenable to scientific measurement because “what counts as a ‘situation’ and what counts as the ‘appropriate’ way of leading in that situation are interpretive and contestable issues” (2000, p. 3). Ford et al. (2008), using Derridean methods of analysis, claim leadership is an empty signifier, a word which can be loaded with different meanings as it bears no direct relationship to some definite object but rather exists in discourse, subject to competing claims over its meaning. They also suggest talk of leadership is best conceived of as identity work. Alvesson (1996), and Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003a, 2003b, 2012) have also objected to claims of leadership as having fixed, essential qualities or as involving definite practices, suggesting it be understood as a discursive resource and regime. However to date these findings have not impacted on the mainstream of leadership studies.

The bulk of contemporary leadership research, then, proceeds on the basis of problematic assumptions which it compounds through its claims to have discovered the truth about the nature of leadership. I am testing here an alternative view, that ‘leadership’ is contingently constructed (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2012). The proposition is that leadership scholarship contributes to the on-going invention of leadership. My study sets out to explore the pathways those inventions have followed with a view to analysing what has triggered them, what they entail and their effects. The value in considering what scholars thought was the truth about leadership at different times from our own is that it provides a comparison for seeing more clearly our contemporary constructs as such (Foucault, 1985, 1986).

The various problems I have indicated which arise from the adoption by mainstream leadership scholars of a naturalistic, essentialist and scientistic conception of leadership and its study constitute a key reason for the approach taken in this study. If it is assumed that leadership is given by nature and the aim is to discover facts about its nature,
important questions will simply elude us. Moreover, if we treat leadership today as something both natural (and therefore old) and as simultaneously something new, then we are trapped in a logical contradiction that cannot be reconciled. If instead we treat leadership as something that is contingently constructed and seek to understand its construction, then we are better placed to question the received wisdom of our own time.

**Critical studies of leadership**

There is a small but now rapidly growing body of critical literature on organizational leadership (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011b; Bolden et al., 2011; Collinson, 2011). This literature tends to be informed by sociological concerns and post-structuralist theories about such matters as power, inequality, identity, subjectivity and domination, and often forms part of a wider project to critically analyse contemporary workplaces and managerialist discourses and practices (e.g. Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford et al., 2008; Knights & Morgan, 1992). Post-positivist epistemologies and ontologies also typically inform this work (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Collinson, 2011). Critically informed leadership studies point to some problematic effects at both the micro and macro level arising from contemporary mainstream thinking about leadership and offer examples of new ways of thinking about leadership.

Critically informed studies have revealed a contemporary cultural tendency toward ‘talking up’ the value and impact of leadership in a way that simplifies and thus distorts reality (e.g. Alvesson & Spicer, 2011b; Collinson, 2011; Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich (1985) famously demonstrated that a romantic bias gives rise to a tendency to attribute positive outcomes to leadership, irrespective of evidence indicating that other factors were influential. They also found that negative outcomes were less likely to be attributed to leadership, again irrespective of evidence. This bias, they say, constitutes a cultural norm which distorts our understanding of leadership.

Related to this, Calás and Smircich (1991) found that contemporary leadership discourse constitutes an exercise in seduction, wherein managers are incited to produce themselves as exceptional, compelling individuals. Sinclair subsequently found it is not
only leadership which involves seduction but also the teaching of leadership, as “seductive manoeuvres” are played out which incite aspiring leaders to “feel blessed”, offering an experience whereby they are “transported out of the ordinary” and feel enabled to respond to “desires and longing” through the experience of learning about leadership (2009, p. 281).

Other studies have shown that actual persons cannot live up to the idealised accounts of leadership which are foisted upon them but that simultaneously these idealised accounts bolster managerial identities and status. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003a) found that managers have great difficulty in describing coherently what they actually do as leaders and what leadership is. They suggest this lack of coherence calls into question the validity and utility of ‘leadership’ as a construct which describes the daily reality of managerial experience. They theorise that talk of ‘leadership’ constitutes a discursive resource to help bolster a fragile sense of professional identity, as well as enhancing managerial legitimacy and status. Sinclair found that the gendered assumptions and expectations embedded in conventional understandings of leadership meant female leaders “camouflage” their sexuality or engage in behaviours which conform to stereotypical expectations of women, thereby harming what would otherwise constitute an important “source of self-esteem” (1998, p. 173). More recently, Ford et al. (2008) found that contemporary leaders face existential pressures in maintaining a leader identity in the face of leadership theories which offer an image of perfection to which managers are expected to aspire.

The development and effects of leadership discourse have also been examined (e.g. Knights & Morgan, 1992; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007; Sinclair, 2007; Western, 2007). What these studies point to are the connections between leadership discourse and social, political and economic power, as well as the dynamic relationship between the broader social context and how leadership is conceived. Sinclair, for example, suggests that the growth in interest in leadership in the latter half of the 20th century is related to its connection with business interests, resulting in a situation whereby “capitalism and the managerial agenda have installed many assumptions into leadership, focussing it especially on the heroic performance of the individual” (2007, p. 28). Trethewey and
Goodall Jnr argue that in accounting for developments in the field since the post-WWII period:

theories of leadership provide a story that is largely ahistorical. Divorced from the social and cultural discourses that shaped them, disconnected from the political and economic realities that surrounded their making, and seemingly immaculate in their conception as ideas, these free-floating signifiers we call theories of leadership are the bastard children of all that has been omitted from their lineage” (2007, p. 457)

A common thread in many critically informed studies, then, is a concern with the recent dominance of visionary, transformational and charismatic notions of leadership and the excessive status and power these ideas grant to leaders, along with the difficulties in actually living up to such idealistic accounts (e.g. Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford et al, 2008, Sinclair, 2007). In seeking to address this concern, several critically oriented scholars have sought to develop in depth new ways of conceptualising and theorising leadership, drawing inspiration in particular from history, philosophy, the arts and practice and it is to these works I now turn.

Keith Grint has been especially active in offering alternative ways of understanding leadership. In “The arts of leadership” (Grint, 2000) he proposes we understand leadership as a socially constructed and contested terrain which involves, most centrally, an on-going engagement between leaders and followers over questions of identity, strategic vision and tactics, and which is reliant on the leader’s ability to engage in persuasive communication “to ensure followers actually follow” (2000, p. 27). These matters, he argues, in turn give rise to the four arts which inform the practice of leadership, namely philosophy, the fine arts, the martial arts and the performing arts (Grint, 2000). He elucidates the potency of this theorisation through detailed case studies of historical events and of specific high profile leaders.

In a later effort to further re-think leadership, Grint (2005a) used historical case studies to develop and demonstrate a contextually sensitive heuristic model which acknowledges the common connection of ‘leadership’ with formal authority in organizations and hence with both ‘management’ and ‘command’. In this model he proposes that choosing between ‘leadership’, ‘management’ and ‘command’ ought to be informed by an analysis as to whether the challenge at hand is understood as being
‘wicked’, ‘tame’ or ‘critical’ in nature, this understanding being itself a contested process. In yet another work he proposed that leadership is an “essentially contested concept” but that it typically involves ideas about leadership as to do with person, result, position and process (Grint, 2005b, p. 1). In order to overcome these limited understandings, Grint foregrounds the paradoxes involved in leadership, its hybrid nature as it connects people, processes and technologies and the difficulties in assessing cause and effect when it comes to leadership. He advocates that the ethical assessment of leaders relies both on the results achieved and on followers, from whom leaders learn how to lead. He also proposes that leadership is a function of what goes on in the interaction between leaders and followers, this now being the focus of relational theories of leadership (Uhl-Bien & Ospina, 2012). In all these accounts what Grint offers is a less grandiose and anti-essentialist account of leadership.

Ladkin (2010) also offers a non-conventional account of both how we might come to understand leadership and how it might most usefully be practiced. Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenological framework, Ladkin argues leadership is a phenomenon which involves multiple dimensions in which the perception of the perceiver is of central significance. She also foregrounds a focus on purpose, wisdom and the leader-follower relationship in her account, which she frames as an attempt to offer new answers to old questions. Sinclair (2008) has also sought to move beyond conventional analyses to offer a new way of understanding leadership that is grounded in humanistic concerns and values. Sinclair argues for the importance of psychoanalytic factors as a source of our fears and desires in respect of leadership. In addressing the problematic of power, she offers a framework of options involving advocacy of change, covert subversion, activism and critique and collaboration and experimentation as productive ways of working with power. In drawing attention to the embodied nature of leadership practice, Sinclair draws on her experience as a yoga practitioner and her study of various Eastern philosophies, connecting leadership to issues of breath, mindfulness, spirituality and the letting go of the ego which such perspectives offer. Infused throughout Sinclair’s efforts to re-conceptualize leadership is a concern to overcome the gendered assumptions which are embedded in conventional understandings, and to ground our understanding in leadership in a focus on the purposes or ends that it serves.
What Grint, Ladkin and Sinclair offer, then, are in-depth attempts to reconceptualise leadership in ways that overcome or move away from the problematic assumptions and effects they see as dominating current understandings. These examples serve as inspiration for this study, albeit that the object of analysis here is limited to scholarly discourse on leadership, rather than leadership per se. In their most recent assessment of the state of critically informed leadership research, Alvesson and Sveningsson note that inquiry into the “culture- and Discourse-driven nature of leadership is neglected in most of the literature” (2012, p. 209). My aim here is to go some way towards redressing this neglect.

The history of leadership thought

There are many historical texts which consider leadership. Notable philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Lao Tzu, Sun Tzu, Seneca, Cicero, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Locke, and Hobbes are all known to have addressed different aspects of what we today call leadership. Added to these is the vast number of written histories from Herodotus (ca. 484–425 BC) and Plutarch (ca. 46–120 AD) onwards which focus on the character and deeds of monarchs, politicians and military leaders (see also, for example, Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Hook, 1945; Olechnowicz, 2007). Collectively, these works can be understood as constituting a widely diffused and inchoate ‘history of ideas’ about leadership, for in these texts we find something of what has been thought about leadership. For the purposes of this study, however, texts of this nature actually constitute data, rather than literature, for these texts typically analyse leadership rather than analyse the history of thinking about leadership.

Remarkably little effort has been made over the last century to analyse the history of thinking about leadership (Schruijer & Vansina, 2002). This may be due to a perception that leadership ideas from times past are now irrelevant or of dubious credibility, as not having been produced in accordance with modern scientific methods. Ideas from the past have at times been used as inspiration for contemporary work, and it is not unheard of for scholars to imply that their thinking connects in some ways with the “great minds” of the past (e.g. Adair, 2002; Burns, 1978). However the focus over the last century in social
science-based studies of leadership has been to produce ‘new knowledge’ and new theories (Antonakis et al., 2004; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004).

While scholars frequently chart developments in social scientific studies of leadership, the aim is typically to identify the gap which their own study or theory will address, or to provide a descriptive account of major developments within the field (e.g. Conger, 1999; House & Aditya, 1997; Hunt, 1999). Work of this nature does not generally seek to problematize the assumptions contained within the literature in order to subject it to fresh analysis, nor does it seek to situate leadership within its wider social context (Schruijer & Vansina, 2002; Sinclair, 2007). Instead, such accounts typically produce a progressivist narrative of increasing enlightenment in our understanding of leadership, portraying today’s knowledge as superior to that of the past (e.g. Antonakis et al., 2004; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004). Consequently, there is a need to find some way of disrupting this progressive narrative and offering an alternative interpretation of developments in the field.

Only rarely have modern leadership scholars sought to critically analyse the history of thinking about leadership, and the analysis which has been done to date is quite limited in its scope. Knights and Morgan (1992) address the ‘strategic leadership’ discourse since the mid-1980s. Trethewey and Goodall Jnr (2007) focus on changes in leadership theories in post-WWII USA, identifying social and political factors which they argue were important in rendering those theories relevant. Western (2007) considered theoretical paradigm shifts in leadership knowledge over the course of the 20th century, linking these to changing production methods, the workings of capitalism and theoretical shifts in the human sciences. However, the scope and focus of these analyses is, as is unavoidably the case, limited. Here I offer an alternative scope and focus of analysis which ventures into times and issues not previously addressed.

**Key findings from my review of the literature**

Whilst traditionally there existed a strong moral and political philosophy base to the Western study of leadership, today it is the psychology-based study of organizational leadership which constitutes the main body of contemporary literature. The research
being produced is overwhelmingly positivist and quantitative in orientation. Within this
literature, ‘new leadership’ theories have matured to such a degree that their key claims
are now widely accepted amongst scholars and dominate the field. Consequently, a state
of ‘normal science’ currently prevails in the mainstream of leadership studies: the field is
focussed on a small number of key ideas and relies on a limited set of ontological and
epistemological assumptions and methodologies. Despite the extensive nature of this
literature, the knowledge it produces is, thus, profoundly narrow in nature and, as my
analysis has shown, it rests upon some problematic assumptions.

The key ‘new leadership’ ideas about leaders who are ‘visionary’, ‘charismatic’ and
‘transformational’ have been widely promulgated and have come to constitute the
disciplinary norm for many practitioners. ‘New leadership’ has also come to be
understood as a highly valued and potent force for good, with little questioning going on
as to why this is so and what problematic effects may arise from this. Given all these
factors, it has become increasingly difficult to conceive of alternatives to our current
dependence upon leaders as offering the answer to every problem. Critically informed
examination of the form and formation of this literature would, therefore, constitute a
useful contribution to knowledge.

Critical leadership studies are still at a nascent stage of development. In particular, critical
historical analysis has to date been very limited. However, while the critical literature is
limited in its scope the findings to date are provocative, for they suggest the conventional
narrative of leadership science as a progressive, humanistic endeavour is a profoundly
problematic account. Expanding the scope of extant analysis to examine theories, times
and issues not previously explored would, thus, also constitute a useful contribution to
knowledge.

These findings give rise to my primary research question, namely why has our
understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does? This question has not
been examined in sufficient depth; however, the now normalised status and pervasive
influence of ‘new leadership’ demands it be given urgent attention. My secondary
questions focus attention on issues of relevance to a Foucauldian inquiry, matters which
have also received insufficient attention in the literature, namely:
1. What problematizations have informed the development of the leadership discourses examined here?
2. What key themes and assumptions inform these discourses?
3. What subjectivities and relationships are produced by these discourses?
4. What is the social function of these discourses?
5. What changes and continuities are notable when comparing these discourses?

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have offered an orienting overview of the broad scope of leadership studies past and present, before focussing in on the mainstream of the contemporary literature focused on organizational leadership, the starting point for this thesis. I have identified a range of problematic effects and assumptions associated with this literature which indicate the potential utility and timeliness of more critically informed research. The limitations of current critical and historically oriented studies of leadership to which this study will contribute have also been identified. Arising from this analysis I have shown the relevance and potential value of the research questions informing this study. In the next chapter I will explain the theoretical and methodological approach used to carry out the research.
Chapter Three: Theoretical framework and methodology

...after all, what I have held to, what I have tried to maintain for many years, is the effort to isolate some of the elements that might be useful for a history of truth. Not a history that would be concerned with what might be true in the field of learning, but an analysis of the “games of truth”, the games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and must be thought” (Foucault, 1985, pp. 6−7).

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the research process, in particular the intellectual ‘equipment’ I have relied on and the various decisions and procedures which informed the conduct of this research. I begin by setting out my position with respect to the nature of reality, how we may come to know it and the key values which inform my approach to research. I then canvas the various theoretical frameworks I considered for this research before setting out the key reasons for my decision to rely on the work of Michel Foucault to guide this project.

To familiarise the reader with Foucault’s approach, I offer an introductory overview of his intellectual position and the nature of his work before moving to offer an extended explanation of the specific methodological and conceptual apparatus he developed and which I have used. After that I set out how I have actually operationalized the Foucauldian approach across all aspects of the research process. I then assess the methodological strengths and limitations of the study before concluding with an assessment of the credibility standards relevant to a study of this nature and how I have sought to meet these standards.

Philosophy of science assumptions

In this section I set out my stance as regards issues of ontology, epistemology and axiology. I take what Blaikie terms a ‘constrained idealist’ ontological stance (2007, p. 17), a position which can be understood as a form of nominalism (Blaikie, 2000). This means I believe there is an external world that exists beyond the realm of our minds which constrains what we can and cannot do: if I trip I expect to fall and I believe an external
reality governs these effects. However, I also hold that what we think is real matters a great deal, irrespective of whether it is an accurate reflection of what is actually, objectively real, and that our access to ‘reality’ is unavoidably mediated by a culturally informed interpretation (Blaikie, 2000, 2007). Consistent with this position, our ideas and beliefs, most especially in the domain of social relations and our sense of self, demand assessment to understand where they came from, how they developed and what they give rise to. As a consequence of this stance, setting aside the question of whether ideas are true or false relative to objective reality becomes a valid move for a researcher to make and that is what I do in this study.

Epistemologically, I take a social constructionist perspective. This means I believe that all knowledge is developed through interpretation, negotiation and debate as we try individually and collectively to make sense of the world (Blaikie, 2007; Hacking, 1999). Our culture and the theories we have about the world are, I believe, deeply implicated in how we come to know it, rather than there being some completely objective, neutral process which leads us to the discovery of ‘facts’ (Blaikie, 2007; Cresswell, 2003). Consistent with this, my stance is that claims to know the ‘truth’ rely on a wider set of shared but contestable assumptions, beliefs, values and norms about what constitutes an acceptable truth claim (Blaikie, 2007; Cresswell, 2003).

For a social constructionist, what people say and write about a topic cannot simply be dismissed as just noise or fiction, even if one thinks what is being said is ‘objectively’ false (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Hacking, 1999). This is because language is not understood as simply representing in words some pre-existing external reality, but is instead crucial to the very production of social reality (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Consequently, talk and writing creates effects, including material effects, which shape people’s identities and experiences in profound and visceral ways (Foucault, 1972; Hacking, 1999). Analysing the form and formation of talk/writing on a given topic, therefore, constitutes a fertile focus of inquiry from a social constructionist perspective, because doing so can lead to insights into the very construction of social reality.

A social constructionist perspective holds that social reality is not given by nature but is rather produced through a constant mix of individual and collective actions which have real effects (Blaikie, 2007; Hacking, 1999). Therefore, uncovering past and present-day
processes of construction can help us understand that what seems normal and natural is not fixed and could be changed (Hacking, 1999). This in turn aligns with my axiological stance regarding the role of research: I believe an important aspect of a researcher’s role is to challenge what is taken for granted in order to facilitate the possibility for change (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

These assumptions have informed all stages of the research process. Critically, they mean that I do not regard leadership texts as more- or less-accurately reporting facts about leadership. Rather, I treat leadership texts as part of the very production of ‘leadership’ as something that is constantly being made real. I put aside the question of whether the claims made in these texts accurately reflect some pre-existing, external reality or not (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Consistent with my philosophical assumptions I believe that, regardless of their ‘truthfulness’, these texts demand consideration of their form, their processes of formation and the effects to which they give rise. When I connected these philosophical positions with my problematization of ‘new leadership’ thinking and my concern to understand why this situation had developed, what became apparent was that I needed a theoretical framework and methodology that was both critical and historical.

**Aligning my assumptions, questions and strategy with a theory**

In exploring possible theoretical frameworks and research methodologies to guide my study, Alvesson and Deetz’s (2000) advice to strive, in critical studies, to de-familiarize social phenomena otherwise commonly understood as natural, normal and common sense resonated strongly for me. As an approach, “de-familiarization aims to turn the well-known into something strange, thus making it less self-evident, natural and unavoidable” (2000, p. 190). As I showed in Chapter Two, ‘new leadership’ thinking has become natural, normal and common sense and I want to offer up a challenge to the ready acceptance of this discourse. De-familiarizing extant understandings of leadership would constitute a contribution to the literature. In order to pursue this strategy of de-familiarization, I also needed a critical, historical theoretical framework and methodology that promoted and enabled such an approach.
There are a variety of approaches to critical analysis and to historical analysis which I explored but ultimately rejected. Habermas (1970a, 1970b), for example, is arguably the most influential critical theorist and has produced a prolific body of work which other scholars have used to guide their studies (Burrell, 1994; Held, 1980). Habermas provides a range of conceptual tools for challenging conventional knowledge (e.g. 1970a, 1970b). However, his focus is on diagnosing capitalist society (Burrell, 1994; Held, 1980). This means that he has less to offer when seeking to understand non-capitalist social forms as his conceptual categories are designed specifically to analyse capitalism. Moreover, Habermas is best understood as a modernist philosopher, whereas the sensibilities governing this study are post-modern as the search for truth has been bracketed off (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000; Burrell, 1994; Cooper & Burrell, 1988). Given this point, Derrida constitutes another obvious option.

Derrida (e.g. 1978) offers a method for critically analysing texts which he calls deconstruction. This approach derives from his view of the nature of language as unavoidably indeterminate and metaphorical, meaning texts are open to multiple readings (Derrida, 1978). A Derridean reading of leadership texts would enable a de-familiarizing effect, as Ford et al. (2008) have already demonstrated. However, the deconstructive method is not well suited to addressing the full range of my research questions, in particular my interest to examine the problematizations in response to which leadership discourses have emerged at various times.

An alternative place I looked for theoretical frameworks was in the work of historians, in particular historians of ideas and intellectual historians whose approach is informed also by sociological perspectives (Dean, 1994). In his work, Norbert Elias has examined social practices which today appear as natural and normal, tracing their development over time (Dean, 1994; Mennell & Goudsblom, 1998). This is consistent with my strategy. However, Elias’s work has been criticised for evincing a search for “universals of social development” which is suggestive of a modernist outlook and, therefore, at odds with the assumptions guiding this research (Dean, 1994, p. 27). Eventually, then, I selected Michel Foucault as offering a theoretical framework and methodology which would allow me to answer the questions which my review of the literature had identified as warranting attention, and support my desire to de-familiarise our current understanding.
of leadership. In the next section I identify the particular attributes of Foucault’s approach which lead me to this decision.

**Why Foucault is suitable for my study**

In addition to there being a good degree of alignment as regards issues of ontology, epistemology and axiology between my own position and that of Foucault’s, there are four key reasons Foucault’s work offers a suitable framework for conducting this study. Firstly, Foucault’s approach enables the disturbance of conventional understandings (Burrell, 1988; Dean, 1994; Guttung, 1994). Using Foucault is therefore consistent with my strategy of de-familiarization. This ability to generate disturbance is, I suggest, a particular approach to critique which is not merely negative in its intent and effect (Guttung, 1994; Foucault, 1985). Instead, it is pivotal to enabling us to think differently, an important aim of my research and Foucault’s work.

Secondly, Foucault’s work is primarily historical analysis, which aims to explain the development of contemporary, expert-driven thought and practice on a given topic deemed problematic (Burrell, 1988; Dean, 1994; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Guttung, 1994). This is also consistent with the approach I wish to take. Foucault explained, however, that his aim was not to write “a history of the past in terms of the present” (1977, p. 31), in which current understandings are imposed onto past events thereby creating a seamless and progressive account of human history. Instead, Foucault set out to write “the history of the present” (1977, p. 31), an interpretive, analytic account of the past which suspends any assumption of progress in respect of social practices, seeks traces of the past still shaping the present and calls into doubt whiggish and progressivist accounts of both the past and the present. Foucault’s work was unashamedly that of an activist scholar seeking to facilitate change through research. As my problematization of ‘new leadership’ demonstrated, such an approach is warranted in respect of the current state of leadership thought.

Thirdly, the topics which Foucault chose to examine were ones where contemporary expert knowledge and practice portrayed itself as superior to that of the past; more truthful, scientifically grounded, humane or morally desirable (e.g. Foucault, 1977; 1978).
Contemporary leadership experts make just such claims about the current state of leadership knowledge and practice (e.g. Antonakis et al., 2004; Bass, 2008; Hunt, 1999). This similarity in focus further reinforces the suitability of a Foucauldian approach to my study.

Finally, Foucault’s approach directs analytic attention to both change and continuity; to underlying assumptions; to the problematizations to which knowledge claims are directed; to the subjectivities and relationships invoked by different ideas; and to the wider context in which ideas come into being (e.g. Foucault, 1977; 1985). These are all matters which in terms of leadership have been under-examined to date. In making the decision to adopt a Foucauldian approach, therefore, I developed my secondary questions to focus on these issues.

**Situating Foucault**

Veritable lakes of ink have been spilt assessing Foucault’s work: he emerged as and remains a controversial figure (Prado, 2009). His work falls within the broad tradition of European critical thought, with Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger all important influences on his thinking (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Miller, 1993; Wicks, 2003). While he typically rejected the labels others applied to his work, substantively and stylistically his approach can nonetheless be characterised as post-modern in its orientation (Dean, 1994; Flynn, 1994; Wicks, 2003). Foucault has been described as both philosophical historian and historical philosopher, labels indicative of the complexity, sophistication and unique nature of his work (Dean, 1994; Guttung, 1994; Wicks, 2003). Rather than simply rehearse the many debates about his work here, in what follows I set forth my own interpretation based on my reading of his key works and those of key commentators.

In terms of basic assumptions, Foucault is a nominalist, meaning he treats ideas (knowledge) about the world as a construction or interpretation and not as a direct representation of what actually exists (Flynn, 1994; Blaikie, 2000). Further, while ideas may develop through empirical observation, Foucault argues that what gets noticed and how it is interpreted is very strongly influenced by social norms, beliefs and values (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1980). He further contends that discourses can bring into existence social
practices and ways of being which later appear to be entirely natural (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1985). In this sense Foucault proposes that what we ‘know’ is never simply a reflection of what exists, but rather is shaped by social norms and that knowledge is thus active in constructing what exists, including our selves (e.g. 1980, 1986, 2005).

Foucault’s attention is, therefore, not directed toward discovering what really exists, for he eschews great scepticism about the existence of objective truths outside the realm of the physical sciences (e.g. 1970, 1972). Instead, Foucault’s focus is on what people regard as the truth at different times, including our own, how this came about and what are its effects. His emphasis on the contingent, constructed and constructive nature of knowledge, and his critique of existing social practices and ways of being means that his approach falls within the social constructionist paradigm, according to Hacking’s definition (1999). By this definition, a strongly social constructionist perspective not only seeks to bring to light the contingent, social foundations of practices typically understood as being ‘natural’, it also seeks to challenge the hidden politics of those practices and to encourage change (Hacking, 1999).

Dean (1994) proposes that Foucault focussed on issues in three broad domains: firstly, reason, truth and knowledge; secondly, power, domination and government; and thirdly, ethics, the self and freedom. Gutting claims that Foucault’s goal “was always to suggest liberating alternatives to what seem to be inevitable conceptions and practices” (1994, p. 3). This, he suggests, was achieved by way of “histories of ideas, histories of concepts, histories of the present, and histories of experience” (1994, p. 7). In their analysis of his later works, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that Foucault provides a method “which replaces ontology with a special kind of history that focuses on the cultural practices that have made us what we are” (1983, p. 122). Prado, however, does caution us that such is the diversity and nature of Foucault’s oeuvre that it “resists holistic interpretation” (2009, p. 3).

Foucault proposes three reasons for undertaking historical analysis. Firstly, because he contends that knowledge is not innocent and removed from power but is rather entwined with power, he argues we should seek to examine ‘knowledge’ for its origins and foundations so that we can better understand the workings of power and its effects (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1980). Secondly, Foucault proposes that we should study the past
because it may be influencing what we know and do today in ways not readily apparent to us (e.g. 1985, 1986). Finally, Foucault contends that we should study the past because doing so enhances our ability to think differently about the challenges we face today, through exposing us to different ideas and even modes of thinking (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1985).

Turning to Foucault’s major historical analyses, these provide a contingent account of developments in expert knowledge and expert-informed social practices (see 1970, 1977, 1978, 1985, 1986, 1989). The contextual factors that were held to be problematic, to which a given discourse emerged in response, are identified. Socially constructed and historically situated ways of thinking and acting, events, chance, power, networks of influence and strategies are placed centre stage, rather than a progressive and teleological account in which truth, knowledge and ever greater enlightenment constitute the driving force for social change (Burrell, 1988; Dean, 1994; Prado, 2009).

Foucault once described the task he had set for himself as “to trace the history of the games of truth and error” (1985, p. 8). However, in so doing he also shows how things have been different in the past, how arbitrary social change can be, and, therefore, he opens up space in which we can think differently about the present and our future (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000; Cummings & Bridgman, 2011). The aim, Foucault says, is “to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known” (1985, p. 9).

Foucault’s most famous works comprise detailed studies of the form and formation of expert discourses on madness (1989), crime and punishment (1977) and sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986). In each of these studies he offered an analysis which dramatically defamiliarized conventional understandings of both the past and the present. In examining madness he challenged the allegedly modern and scientific basis of psychiatry, linking it to back medieval practices and beliefs (Foucault, 1989). His analysis of developments in the punishment of criminals threw doubt on whether modern approaches are really a positive, ‘humane’ advancement on the medieval practice of torture (Foucault, 1977). His analysis of sexuality showed the conventional understanding that sex was until recently a taboo subject was deeply problematic and that present day understandings are best understood as an adaption of medieval confessional practices (Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986). In each case he was, therefore, able to demonstrate the influence of ideas from
the past on current thought and practice and thereby change how we understand both the past and the present. Moreover, in his analyses Foucault points to the potentially problematic consequences for human freedom of expert knowledge, thereby calling into doubt our assumption that modern thought and practice is superior to that of the past, grounded in rationality, science and enlightened ways of thinking.

Over the last decade a series of Foucault’s lectures not previously published in English has become available (see Foucault, 2003, 2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Some of these date back to lectures given by Foucault in the early 1970’s (e.g. 2008b), while others cover the very last of his lectures prior to his death in 1984 (e.g. 2011). What these texts point to is Foucault’s enduring interest in questions about how we come to be as we are, how forces beyond ourselves act upon us, and how we can come to know the truth (e.g. 2004, 2008a, 2011). A sustained critique of modern systems of governing society and the power of expert knowledge and its effect on our freedom is also a key focus in these works (e.g. 2008b, 2009, 2010). However, while these lectures offer further insights into Foucault’s thinking and points of clarification, they do not indicate any fundamental shift in the primary methods and key concepts which he had been developing over the course of his life and which I address below, referencing earlier works.

**The Foucauldian method used in this study: Interpretive Analytics**

Foucault developed a range of methodological approaches over the course of his life, as he sought to respond to criticisms made of his earlier works (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dean, 1994; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). The particular Foucauldian method to be used in this study is Interpretive Analytics. This is not a term which Foucault himself used; rather it was developed by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) who had extensive dialogue with Foucault about his work. Interpretive Analytics seeks to understand and explicate both the form and formation of a body of knowledge, and its associated social practices, by way of a series of historical case studies (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). In this research I wish to understand and explicate both the form and formation of our contemporary understanding of leadership by way of a series of
historical case studies. The starting point of such an analysis is an account of the “…problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought” (Foucault, 1985, p. 11, italics in original).

**Discontinuous histories**

Interpretive Analytics is the term Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) use to describe the methodological approach taken by Foucault in his extended exploration of the history of sexuality (see Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986). Foucault intended to undertake six distinct but related case studies of the history of sexuality (1985), however only three were completed at the time of his death. Prior to these works, Foucault’s histories typically commenced at a certain event or point in time which he held to be of direct relevance to the current day (e.g. 1977, 1989). His analysis then concerned developments from that point forwards through to the current day. This approach I term a continuous history. In contrast, his approach from the second volume in his extended exploration of the history of sexuality was to select several times (and spaces) chronologically (and geographically) separated from each other for examination as the component parts of a broader study (see Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986). This approach I term discontinuous histories, and it is one key aspect of the Interpretive Analytic approach that I employ.

The strategic rationale for such an approach is to facilitate our ability to think differently, something Foucault regards as important but extremely challenging to achieve (1985). By choosing to examine how a given topic had been understood in different epistemes, Foucault hoped he might find different ways of thinking about that topic which could assist in addressing our present day concerns (1985, 1986). Equally, we may find surprising commonalities, traces of that past which inform our present.

At the detailed level of analysis of each individual case study, Interpretive Analytics involves the combined use of the main methodological approaches which Foucault had utilised largely in isolation of each other in his earlier work, namely Archaeology and Genealogy. In what follows I discuss the key features of each of these methods, before turning to their combined use.
Archaeology

Archaeology comprises two components. First, it analyses what the experts of a given period claim to be ‘the truth’ on a particular topic, paying particular attention to the assumptions and effects of those claims (e.g. Foucault, 1970, 1972). Second, it postulates the underlying “structure of thought”, or episteme, which make it possible for those ‘truths’ to be considered intelligible and plausible at the time they arose, even if they later came to seem nonsensical (Foucault, 1972, p. 191). Archaeology thus seeks to identify and analyse the form of a set of claims to know the truth, a form which has two levels, that of particular truths about a specific topic and that of the general truth, which underpins and governs all truths in a given period.

Interpretive analysis is needed to identify the features and form of an episteme, as it operates at the level of taken-for-granted assumptions and values and is rarely explicitly enunciated (Foucault, 1970, 1972). Epistemes can and do change over time; however, such changes are not assumed to be inherently progressive or teleological, but rather are examined for their specific assumptions and effects (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Guttung, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999). In both its components Archaeology focuses on what was said and done, specifically what was said by experts and done under their guidance. These Foucault termed ‘discursive practices’ and they constitute the primary data for Archaeology (1970, 1972). It is through the examination of discursive practices that one can discern the form of the specific and general ‘truth’ then operant.

Archaeology “examines the ‘moment’, however temporally extended that moment might be”; it “provides us with a snapshot, a slice through the discursive nexus” (Bevis, Cohen, & Kendall, 1993, p. 194). Archaeology can be understood as a bounded piece of historical analysis: bounded by the particular ‘truth’ topic on which it focuses and bounded temporally by the episteme it exposes and examines (Burrell, 1988; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Kendall & Wickham, 1999). One may, of course, conduct multiple archaeologies within the scope of one project by examining multiple epistemes.

Through its analysis of both the specific features of a given episteme and the truth claims made about a particular topic, Archaeology provides an account which reveals how a particular notion of what is ‘true’ was (or is) possible. With Archaeology, Foucault sidesteps ontology (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dean, 1994; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983):
the aim is not to discover what really exists and what is really true, rather it is to assess the effects of what people claim to be true on who we are and how we live. Archaeology thus produces an analytics of truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Archaeology helps us figure out ‘what is the shape of this truth’, and ‘what makes this truth possible’ by way of reference to the epistemic underpinnings which render such an account of the truth as viable to begin with. Such accounts can be deeply disturbing, as they make our truths appear much more contingent than we would normally believe them to be. Archaeological analysis can, therefore, make the strange seem sensible and at the same time it can make what we see as sensible seem strange. It constitutes a de-familiarizing approach to analysis.

Foucault is known to have argued that epistemes determined what could be known, that we are, in effect, prisoners of our own episteme (see, for example, 1970, 1972). This view is both bleak and impossible to prove or disprove. Moreover, it is arguably a view he moved away from as his thought developed (see, for example, Foucault, 1985, 2005, 2011a). However, irrespective of this there remains no necessity to adopt a deterministic view of the influence of epistemic conditions. Rather, one can hold to a softer view, that due to the specific form of a given episteme, it is an influence rather than a determinant of what can be known or, alternatively, that all epistemes are influential rather than deterministic. I adopt a non-deterministic view. Moreover, I limit my epistemic analysis by keeping it focussed on the topic of my inquiry, discourse on leadership, rather than venturing to offer a broader social analysis as was Foucault’s aim. Foucault was no strict disciplinarian when it came to methodology, including those methods he himself developed (Guttung 1994; Prado, 2009). Accordingly, I suggest these adaptations do no mortal damage to the Archaeological method.

Archaeology, therefore, analyses what a particular episteme held to be the truth about a specific issue. It offers, also, an exposition of the underpinning intellectual conditions which made that account viable. What it leaves open is the question of ‘how did this come about’? Foucault’s other main method that contributes to Interpretive Analytics, Genealogy attends to this.
Genealogy

Genealogy provides a method which attends to how ideas and social practices change, develop, and come to be seen as correct and truthful (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978). It does this without privileging individual actors as the source of change and without assuming that social change follows some natural progression to a higher state of perfection (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978). Instead, genealogy looks to the social context in which discourses develop, looking for connections between what was seen as problematic at a given point in time and how discourses which claim to speak the truth form in response to these perceived problems (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dean, 1994; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Genealogy involves examining the networks of relationships, strategies and tactics that have facilitated certain ideas and practices coming to the fore (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978). There is no assumption of necessity or a pre-determined outcome or direction in Genealogy; instead, chance, opportunism and the capacity to dominate and to resist are treated as potential sources of social change (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978).

Power is central to such an analysis (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Attention goes to how social practices act to shape who we are, and how power relations influence how people use and experience their selves and their bodies (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1980). Whatever effects or ways of being which are created, constrained or disciplined in some way in a given discourse, and whatever is held up in that discourse as laudable or abominable, are matters of particular interest in a Genealogical analysis. It examines both the effects of a given discourse on persons and interpersonal relationships and how this situation developed (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1978). It, too, is a de-familiarizing approach.

A genealogy is an analytic history which traces the formation of knowledge about a certain topic over a given period (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dean, 1994; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). It foregrounds how ideas and practices that may over time have come to be accepted as true, or right, actually developed and in so doing helps us realise that things could have developed differently. Genealogy has been criticised because its heavy emphasis on power as the source of both change and stability makes it seem as if we can never escape from its clutches (e.g. Hoy, 1986; Wicks, 2003). However, one need not
adopt a deterministic account of power in order to conduct a Genealogical analysis; one can instead treat power as influential but not determinative (Hoy, 1986; Wicks, 2003).

**Archaeology and Genealogy combined**

Genealogy on its own leaves unanswered the question of how can one free oneself from the power/knowledge effects of one's own episteme and its claims to know the truth (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Hoy, 1986). This question remains even if one adopts a less deterministic view of power. By combining Genealogy with Archaeology and by conducting multiple, discontinuous histories a broader analysis is created. It becomes possible to identify change and continuity in both the form and formation of knowledge about a particular topic in different epistemes (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Foucault, 1985, 2011a). By combining these methods and applying them to multiple cases we can see, for each case, both the substantive form of knowledge on the topic being examined and the formative processes which lead to its creation. We can then compare across the cases. Consequently, Genealogy can change our understanding of how past developments in discourse arose and its effects while Archaeology can change our understanding of what renders a given form of knowledge intelligible and its effects. Deployed in combination the insights then gained from such an analysis can, thus, facilitate our capacity to better understand the past and the present and to develop new ideas to address issues of present concern. In this research I put Genealogy and Archaeology to work to produce results and effects of this nature.

**Dispositif**

A specific outcome of an Interpretive Analytic study is the production of one or more dispositives, an analytic summary charting key commonalities and differences across the epistemic cases studied (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). A dispositif identifies the key elements of a particular discourse in a given episteme compared with its articulation in a different episteme so as to identify both change and continuity. It constitutes a specific means of de-familiarizing our understanding of both past and present. To explicate this concept, Table 3.1 provides an extract from one of the
dispositives which I have developed from my research, the substance of which I explain in 
Chapter Seven.

Table 3.1: Sample dispositif: the person of the leader in different epistemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Managerial leadership (post WWII)</th>
<th>16th C Europe</th>
<th>Classical Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>committed to organizational goals; discourse silent on other issues of lifestyle</td>
<td>combines majesty and prudent use of state funds so as to live in a manner consistent with their status and duties</td>
<td>lives an ascetic lifestyle – restrains eating, sleeping and sexual urges in order to serve others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discourse is silent on issues of faith; leaders assumed and expected to act ethically</td>
<td>loves God; upholds Christian faith and morality</td>
<td>loves the gods; morally without fault</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, there are five key aspects to the Interpretive Analytics method. As noted earlier, the starting point of any analysis is the identification of the problematizations to which a given discourse arose as a response. Archaeology is used to examine the form of a body of knowledge about a particular topic and identify the underlying epistemic framework which renders such knowledge claims possible and intelligible. It focuses on discursive practices, attending to both the rules which govern their existence and the effects of the discourse. Genealogy is used to examine the processes of formation of that body of knowledge, looking at how it came into being and its effects. It focusses on the impact of discourses on who we are and how we live and, thus, a concern with power is infused throughout a genealogical analysis. Discontinuous histories are used to examine a given topic in different epistemes from which, finally, a dispositif can be developed to reveal both change and continuity over time. These key features of the method are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Key features of the Interpretive Analytics methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problematization</td>
<td>Identify that which was deemed problematic to which a discourse emerged as a response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeology</td>
<td>Describe the form of a discursive regime in a given period, its effects and its underlying epistemic conditions of possibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genealogy</td>
<td>Describe the formation of discursive regime in a given period and its effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinuous histories (multiple cases)</td>
<td>Examine the same topic of interest in different epistemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositif</td>
<td>Identify change and continuity in how different epistemes have understood the same topic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foucault’s key concepts**

In addition to his methods of inquiry, Foucault developed an extensive suite of concepts which constitute a further fundamental feature of his work and to which I now turn. Some of Foucault’s concepts pertain to specific topics of inquiry. For example, his concept of “scientia sexualis” denotes his assessment of the modern Western approach to sexuality (1978, p. 55). Other concepts such as ‘governmentality’ explain a feature of modernity, a specific social system and historical period (Foucault, 1977, 2003, 2011a). However, Foucault’s key conceptual apparatus, discourse, power, power/knowledge, and subjectivity, can be applied to potentially any topic and any historical context, and in what follows I explain these concepts and their application in my study.

For Foucault, social reality is continuously constructed through language, through our shared, and contested, interpretations of what exists, what is true and what is right (see, for example, Foucault, 1970, 1972). However, *discourse*, arguably the most central of Foucault’s concepts, comprises not only what is said and written (e.g. Foucault, 1970, 1977, 1978). It also includes social practices such as different ways of organising time and space, of classifying and training persons, or of evaluating and ordering knowledge, which arise from our ideas about what is real, true and proper (e.g. Foucault, 1977, 1985, 1986). Consequently, both the ideational, or symbolic, and the material domains are
captured by Foucault’s understanding of discourse (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Dean, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Moreover, this relationship is understood as being dynamically co-producing: language use shapes and informs the production of social practices, but so too can practices, when they are problematized, inform the development of new words and new language use. This, in turn, reshapes our understanding of practices and helps to bring about changes in them (Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986).

What Foucault proposes is that by analysing discourses and their processes of development we can come to understand how it is that we have been constructed into being who and what we are: from this analysis we can begin to make choices for ourselves as to who and what we wish to become (see, for example, Foucault, 1985). My study focusses on assessing scholarly discourse about leadership and tracking its development over time. Practitioner discourse is simply not accessible across all the epistemic cases, hence the focus solely on scholarly discourse. I look at who and what leaders and followers may become as a consequence of this scholarly discourse, as well as social practices associated with varying ideas about leadership for which documentary evidence is available.

Foucault conceives of power as being dispersed, potent and ever-present within the social system and as possessing both constructive and oppressive potential, depending upon its specific deployment (see, in particular, Foucault, 1980, 1985). It is not expressed or possessed only via formal authority. Rather, power is a dynamic resource which permeates human interactions and relationships, informing the arrangement of social spaces, knowledge, bodies and selves. The use of power comprises both covert and overt acts: its exercise and effects can be harsh, visible and physical in orientation, or subtle, invisible and psychological.

For Foucault, power is a motive force in all social arrangements and developments (e.g. Foucault, 1978, 1980, 1985). By subjecting these arrangements and developments to an analysis which focusses on the operation and effects of power, Foucault argues that new insights can be obtained which call into question the veracity of conventional historical analyses that commonly assume social change to be inherently progressive. Foucault argues we should focus on power not only because it is influential but because an analysis of this nature has the potential to disrupt existing power relations, possibly helping to
trigger a shift to something more constructive (1977, 1985, 1980). Consequently, through deploying the Foucauldian conception of power in my analysis of scholarly discourse on leadership, I seek not only to expose its workings in the formation of claims to speak the truth about leadership but also to render the status quo more open to challenge.

Because leadership, especially when it is tagged to positions of authority, fairly self-evidently involves power, I do not see that any contribution is made by labouring this basic point in my analysis. Rather, what I focus on is how power is given specific, often subtle and multi-faceted, expression in the form of different discourses, in the subjectivity effects produced by these discourses, in the social function they play, and, how its workings shape the process of formation and conditions of possibility informing different discourses. Consequently, the reader should understand that at every point when I am addressing these matters, which comprise the key elements of my analysis, what I am constantly pointing to is the detailed workings of power.

Closely connected to his concept of power is Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge. With this concept he proposes a co-producing relationship between power and knowledge, which strips knowledge of any claims to be ‘pure’ or apolitical (see, in particular, Foucault, 1980). Instead, power-knowledge draws our attention to the influence of power in both the development and deployment of knowledge, and the influence of knowledge in informing how, where, by whom, for what purpose and to what effect power is deployed. In my analysis I examine how power has shaped the development and deployment of leadership knowledge and how leadership knowledge produces effects in terms of power. Here the same proviso applies as applies to my use of power: the reader should understand that in dissecting leadership discourses my analysis proceeds on the basis of treating these as power-knowledge phenomena and that in tracing out their form and formation I am thereby constantly pointing to the workings of power-knowledge.

The end focus of Foucault’s examinations of discourse, power and power-knowledge is to both identify and challenge the effects of these on human subjectivity and, thus, ultimately human society. For him, we are each the historically situated product of these factors acting upon, enabling and constraining our sense of self, producing the limits of what is doable, sayable and thinkable (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1985). Foucault claims that we are
subjected to these forces, that we are subjectified by knowledge which has disciplinary effects, and yet simultaneously our very existence as the subjects we specifically are arises from these forces. To analyse discourse, knowledge and power-knowledge is thus to analyse the production of our very selves in order that we may critically reflect upon that and potentially change it. In my study I examine the production of the leader and follower as subjects about whom leadership scholars claim to speak the truth. I examine the effects of these discursively produced subject positions in order to challenge them.

A major benefit of the use of these concepts is they enable analysis to occur at two levels. The first of these is what might be termed the ‘micro’ level, where the focus goes to examining the effects a specific discourse, a specific configuration of power and power-knowledge, has at the level of individual subjectivity and of relationships between persons. The second is what might be called the ‘macro’ level, where the focus goes to examining the broader social function of a given discourse. In my analysis I examine both these micro and macro levels.

**Operationalizing Foucault**

Sympathetic commentators (e.g. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Flynn, 1994; Gane & Johnson, 1993) have gone to considerable effort to explicate Foucault’s methodological insights. The limitation of these works is that they do not include a focus on the practical steps of research and analysis that may be necessary or useful when working in a Foucauldian manner. Kendall and Wickham (1999) have considered such practical questions, providing advice on the types of issues his archaeological and genealogical methods attend to, considered in isolation of each other. However, they do not specifically address their conjoined deployment as was used by Foucault in his later works (e.g. 1985, 1986).

Graham notes “... it is quite difficult to find coherent descriptions of how one might go about ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analysis...” but that in spite of this “...should one claim to be drawing on a Foucauldian framework there is a very real danger of one’s work being dismissed as unFoucauldian – if one doesn’t get it right” (2011, pp. 663−664, italics in original). Graham seeks to address this danger by providing advice on the type of question a Foucauldian analysis should ask of a text, statement or discursive formation,
and further advises the analyst to connect those texts and statements with their wider
context, in particular what is produced by way of objects, subjects and power relations,
and to examine how that state of affairs came about (2011). However, even this guidance
remains more at the level of concept and research strategy than at the level of practical
application. Moreover, it is evident that organizational scholars deploying a Foucauldian
approach in their own studies offer a variety of different insights and emphases in their
interpretation of Foucault (e.g. Eagan, 2009; Jacques, 1996; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte,
2011). Consequently, to establish how to operationalize the Interpretive Analytics method
I needed to test each component of my research for its alignment with my foregoing
account of Foucault’s methods. In what follows I explain how I did this, beginning with
the development of my research questions. I then progressively address how I
operationalized Foucault’s methods in respect of my research design, data selection,
analysis and the writing up of the results.

Research questions
To ensure the full integration of Foucault’s methods and key concepts into the design of
my study I firstly examined the kinds of questions he asked of the objects he studied and
the focus of his analyses. For example, Foucault asked if the common belief that the
modern approach to human sexuality offered a more liberated model than the Victorian
era had experienced was true (Foucault, 1978). To answer this question he traced
historical developments in thought on this topic and analysed its effects in relation to
issues of power, freedom and subjectivity. In examining the modern penal system
Foucault (1977) counter-intuitively asked if this was more humane than its medieval
precursor. He traced the history of penal thought and practice from the medieval era
through to the 20th century, identifying a range of problematic effects arising from the
modern formulation of punishment practice. In these analyses he identified both change
and continuity and the micro and macro level effects of different ideas.

Noting these techniques and foci of analysis I assessed whether similar questions had
been asked (and answered) by leadership researchers. Through an iterative process, and
taking into account my analysis of the current state of knowledge, I was able to refine my
research questions, ensuring both that they had not been adequately addressed in the
leadership literature and that they were, by their very nature, Foucauldian questions. For example, my primary question asks “why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does?” Examining the ‘form’ a body of knowledge takes is Archaeological. Examining how that body of knowledge developed is Genealogical. Examining the “history of the present” is Foucauldian (Foucault 1977, p. 31). My secondary questions point the analysis toward examining the problematizations giving rise to discourses, their conditions of possibility, their processes of formation and the effects of truth claims about leadership and are, therefore, very explicitly Foucauldian questions. Putting aside the assumption of progress to examine change and continuity in thought is Foucauldian. In answering these questions I deploy Foucault’s key concepts to inform my analysis of the data.

**Research design**

Given the potentially unbounded nature of my main research question it was necessary to carefully consider how best to design the shape and scope of my study to ensure its feasibility and alignment with the Interpretive Analytics method. In terms of that methodology, the key research design decision was to conduct three case studies drawn from different epistemes. For reasons of feasibility, I decided to limit my data set to scholarly literature and to focus on dominant rather than marginal ideas within the literature.

I chose to look at leadership discourse in the ancient world, the medieval period and in modernity because this way of characterizing Western history, despite its inevitable limitations, is nonetheless widely understood as highlighting the fact that there are crucial differences in how society functions and what constitutes valid knowledge in each of these periods (Russell, 1984; Tarnas, 1991). Again for reasons for feasibility, the specific focus of my analysis is on times and places within these epistemes when leadership was being actively discussed by scholars, namely Classical Greece around the time of the Athenian democracy, 16th century Europe, and the modern era, beginning with Carlyle’s work in the mid-19th century and continuing through to the present day. The decision to focus this study on the Western understanding of leadership derives from my own location within that culture, meaning both its past and present directly affect me. Given
the specific nature of my questions the design of this study is qualitative in nature (Blaikie, 2000; Silverman, 2005). The design could also be characterised as exploratory as I am not testing a specific hypothesis, although the overall aim is to produce a theoretically informed explanation (Blaikie, 2000).

**Data collection**

The nature of this study means that what might count in other studies as literature counts here as data. The approach taken to data selection was theoretical, which is to say I was guided by the research questions and theoretical framework in determining what constituted relevant ‘data’ (O’Leary, 2004). Given my focus on analysing the dominant scholarly views of leadership, texts which credible sources confirmed as influential in their time and/or texts which offered an account of leadership which I assessed as being largely consistent with other contemporaneous texts were treated as primary sources of data¹. These texts were identified by various means including tracing references, using existing accounts of developments in leadership thought and drawing on my own prior knowledge of medieval and classical political thought. History texts were used both to identify possible primary sources as well as for the accounts they offered of the broader social context in which the primary sources were written. My sampling procedures were intended to achieve confidence (O’Leary, 2004; Silverman, 2005) that the primary texts I compiled for analysis were sufficient to grasp in detail the dominant view of the time. The range of secondary sources I used to inform my data selection added independent support for those choices. Only texts available in English were used, although in some cases these were not in modern English. Where I sourced a recent edition of an older text for analysis my in-text citations note also the original date of publication if this is known.

**Data analysis**

An abductive approach was taken to the analysis of data (Blaikie, 2007), consistent with the research design decision to treat leadership texts as data requiring analysis informed by a theoretical framework. Abduction involves “cyclic or spiral processes, rather than

¹ Where relevant, in my in-text citations I provide the initial date of publication for historical texts, as well as the date of publication of the edition I used, in order to give the reader a clear indication as to when the text was first published, if that is known.
linear logic”, as the researcher moves reflexively back and forth between the data and
the theoretical lenses they are using to interpret the data (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson &
Skoldberg, 2000; Blaikie, 2007, p. 82). Blaikie notes that this approach fits with an idealist
ontology and constructionist epistemology (2007).

In order to analyse my data I developed two aids to inform my reading and subsequent
theoretical interpretation of the data. The first of these was an extensive set of detailed
questions which I used to support my reading of each text. These questions arose from
what I had observed about the kinds of issues that Foucault addresses in his studies, but
are made specific to my particular topic of inquiry and to my research questions. My
intention was not that I need answer every question for every text, but rather that this
aid would support me in adopting a Foucauldian perspective when reading a text. This aid
is set out in Appendix 1.

The second aid I developed was designed to allow me to synthesize and interpret the
accumulated raw data in theoretical terms and was crucial in moving from
description/summation of data to a genuinely Foucauldian analysis. This aid is set out in
Appendix 2. In this I cluster my analytic questions according to their predominantly
archaeological or genealogical nature and their focus of analysis.

The detailed analysis process began with an examination of each primary source text
using the first aid to focus attention on issues of relevance to this study. Next, the ideas
and themes identified in each of the primary sources I had examined were combined to
draw out the common themes for that particular case study. At this point the second aid
was crucial to ensure the consolidated themes were then interpreted in a theoretically
informed manner. At each stage of analysis attention was paid both to the Archaeological
issue of the form of leadership knowledge and to the Genealogical issue of how the
formation of leadership knowledge occurred (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Foucault,
2010). Foucault’s key concepts discussed earlier further also informed how the data was
analysed in theoretical terms.

These steps were repeated for each case study as I conducted them separately over a
period of time. Once each of the three case studies had been completed I then undertook
a comparative analysis across all three cases. This stage of analysis allowed me to attend
to the last of the four elements of the Interpretive Analytics method explained earlier, the dispositif.

Throughout my analysis I remain tightly focussed on the object I am analysing. Unlike Foucault, the ambition here is not a work of philosophy per se, nor am I offering a social commentary which extends beyond the topic of leadership. Rather, this research is a Foucauldian analysis of leadership texts and it does not seek to go beyond this scope.

Presentation of results

In presenting the results of each case study I address each of the components depicted in Diagram 3.1 below. My account begins with a statement of the problematization which I propose the discourse developed in response to, this being a specific component of Genealogical analysis. I offer an Archaeological analysis which addresses the key features and themes in the discourse of relevance to my research questions so as to understand the form of the discourse. I examine the Genealogical processes of formation and the Archaeological conditions of possibility which have rendered the discourse viable. I also address the social function and the subjectivity and relationship effects of the discourse of relevance to my research questions, combining Archaeology and Genealogy. The actual sequencing of the analysis is adapted to suit the demands of presenting the data in each case study.
Writing style

Foucault has a distinctive writing style, which has often been criticised for being unnecessarily complex or difficult (Dean, 1994; Hoy, 1986; Knights, 2002). His de-centering of the human subject as the driving force for change and his/her replacement with the forces of discourse, power, and power-knowledge produces a written account which is immediately disturbing as it runs so counter to the Western narrative tradition. Moreover, the structure of Foucault's work does not follow conventional (Anglo-American) approaches. Arguably part of what makes for a Foucauldian analysis is one which seeks to replicate this writing style, although studies deploying Foucault do vary in this regard (see, for example, Eagan, 2009; Jacques, 1996; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011).
For this thesis I have needed to make conscious decisions to adapt Foucault’s writing style in several ways. First, I have applied a conventional structure to this work so as to meet the standards required for a doctoral thesis. Second, because of my exclusive focus on scholarly texts as the data for the study rather than the broader range of archival material that Foucault examines, the focus placed on the writers of those texts is greater than would normally be the case in a Foucauldian study. Third, what I have sought to develop here is my own voice and to not simply imitate that of Foucault. Thus, in terms of style I try to offer a clarity of writing which nonetheless results in that same sense of disturbance which Foucault offers his readers. In examining how these issues have been addressed in other Foucauldian studies, I suggest that Jacques (1996) offers a similar approach to the one I have adopted here.

**Methodological strengths and limitations of this study**

The key strength of critically oriented studies is they offer an alternative perspective to conventional understandings (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Collinson, 2011). By shaking up what is normally taken for granted, analyses of this nature offer the potential for new insights to be generated. To be critical is also, unavoidably, to be political (Parker, 2002). Attention to the political dimensions and consequences of ideas enriches our understanding of social phenomena and enhances our ability to challenge existing power structures, norms and values. In respect of our understanding of leadership, which typically entails a relationship based on an inequality of power, critically informed analysis is particularly called for (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Spicer, 2012; Gronn, 2003).

A key strength of thematic analysis is that it results in the nuanced consolidation of complex, qualitative data, while a key limitation is the sheer volume of potential themes which could arise (Silverman, 2005). The two analytic aids mentioned earlier which I developed to guide my analysis were of value in addressing this challenge. However, I did need to treat these as guides only, otherwise there was a risk that interesting data which fell outside their scope could have been ignored.

The philosophical and epistemological assumptions underpinning this research mean that no single, correct, objective interpretation of history is presumed to exist (Blaikie, 2007;
Hacking, 1999; O’Leary, 2004). Rather, this is a work of interpretation only. It is guided by a particular theoretical framework which focuses on some matters while ignoring others: Foucauldian analysis emphasizes scholarly and official discourse and the material practices associated with that discourse, but it pays less heed to the everyday doings and sayings of people who are not scholars or officials (Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Fairhurst, 2007). Moreover, one cannot simply make the evidentiary leap to claim what scholars write about, and the formalised practices deployed by office holders, are clear indicators of what the majority of people actually think and do: other evidence is needed to make such claims (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000) and the gathering and analysis of such evidence has not been the focus of this project.

Accordingly, while I argue for the value of the interpretation provided, I do not contend it is the only interpretation which could be made of the material examined or that the material examined is exhaustive. Using a different framework to examine this material might well lead to a different interpretation, as might the analysis of additional material which I have not accessed. My sampling process (O’Leary, 2004; Silverman, 2005) was designed to ensure that what I examined was representative of the dominant view of the time. The material I have examined is unavoidably incomplete: it is neither feasible to analyse nor possible to access the complete written record for all the periods of time considered here.

In addition to its theoretical and data-based partiality, this study is also limited by the unavoidable partisan nature of my own positionality (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000; O’Leary, 2004): it is me, not a machine, which has conceived of this study and interpreted this data. In doing this I have continually sought to challenge my own assumptions and values, striving for reflexivity as a researcher (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Specifically, I have tried to understand the world views and social context of the writers whose work I examined so as to mitigate the risk of simply imposing my values on their work. I also worked with the assumption of their positive intent and capacity for rational thought, accepting that what counts as ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ is not fixed. Over time as I became more practised at adopting this reflexive attitude toward what I came to think of as my research participants, my appreciation for their efforts grew, even though, at the same time, I still sought to critique that work.
There is no precise standard to aim for in adopting a reflexive approach, but remaining sensitive to the unavoidably ambiguous nature of data and how one’s own values and experiences colour its interpretation is what I have sought to do (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson, Hardy, & Harley, 2008).

**Assessing credibility**

A social constructionist perspective implies a relativist position with respect to truth values, but this doesn't mean ‘anything goes’ (Hacking, 1999). The established standards for assessing qualitative research thus constitute the criteria by which this research’s findings should be judged. O'Leary proposes that for research such as this study, based on post-positivist assumptions, the relevant standards for achieving credibility are a transparent and actively managed subjectivity, dependability, authenticity, transferability and auditability (2004).

I have sought to demonstrate a transparent subjectivity by firstly explicating my key assumptions and the steps I have followed in conducting this study. The processes I used to operationalize Foucault’s Interpretive Analytics method entailed an end to end assessment of my research for its fit with the methodology and I have set this out in detail earlier in this chapter to enable scrutiny of my decisions. The analytic aids I developed also supported the active management of subjectivity in the analysis process and have been provided for review.

Most crucially, however, in interpreting the data I have sought to take these scholars’ efforts seriously and understand them on their own terms, and then to analyse that using Foucault’s methods and concepts rather than applying my own values. As noted, I have assumed a positive intent and a valid rationality on their part, even if their rationality and values are at odds with my own. I have sought to be conscious of the risks of being hyper-critical (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) which could easily occur with a Foucauldian approach, especially one which examines something already widely understood as involving power. Drawing attention to this is hardly a significant contribution to knowledge. In my analysis I have, therefore, sought to draw out the subtle dimensions of power in both its positive
and negative dimensions: this has allowed me to reveal aspects of the power dynamics of the various discourses I examine which have not been addressed before now.

Dependability rests on the use of systematic, documented methods designed to manage subjectivity (O’Leary, 2004), which I have discussed earlier. I acknowledge freely the potential for multiple readings of the data, thus supporting the achievement of authenticity (O’Leary, 2004). To aid auditability I present illustrative excerpts throughout the body of this thesis so that readers can judge for themselves the credibility of my interpretations. Moreover, unlike the case in interview-based research my ‘data’ is fully accessible to the reader to access themselves, and extensive, detailed citation is provided to support this. Transferability derives from the use of the findings from the case studies as a basis for theorizing new forms of leadership, which is addressed in the latter part of Chapter Eight.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have set out the theoretical and methodological foundations and decisions which have informed this study and explained how I have dealt with all aspects of the research process. In conjunction with Chapter Two, where I identified the rationale for the research questions driving this research through identifying both gaps and problems with the extant literature, these two chapters explain both the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of my study.

In the next chapter I move into the actual body of the research, focussing on my analysis of developments in leadership thought from the middle of the 19th century through to the present focus on ‘new leadership’ ideas. This constitutes the first of the three case studies of different leadership epistemes which the study addresses, consistent with the Interpretive Analytic method of discontinuous histories. I begin with my case study of leadership discourse in modernity because it is that with which we are most familiar, it is that in which we are embedded and it is that which I wish to demonstrate we ought to be concerned about: it is not as rational, modern and enlightened as might be expected.
Chapter Four: The modern scholarly account of the truth about leadership

All things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realisation and embodiment, of thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world (Carlyle, 1993 (1840), p. 3).

The evidence is all around us. It is in our daily lives – in our schools, businesses, social groups, religious organizations, and public agencies. It is in our local community, in our more distant state government and national government, and on the international scene. Leadership makes the difference (Bass, 2008, p. 3).

Challenging leadership science

Contemporary leadership scholarship is generally understood as according with the standards, values and norms of modern social science (e.g. Antonakis, Schriesheim et al., 2004; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004). Most critically, this means it is understood as applying an objective assessment to independently verifiable evidence leading to findings that, whilst always provisional, can nonetheless be trusted as accurate, fair and reliable until proven otherwise (Blaikie, 2000, 2007; O'Leary, 2004). Scientific knowledge is expected to be continuously improved, authoritative and to serve all of humanity, not just partisan interests (Cresswell, 2003; Hacking, 1999; O'Leary, 2004). This chapter will, however, challenge the normal confidence that what has been produced in the era of modern leadership studies is a reliable and progressive science.

To be clear, I am not assuming that a truly objective, ‘scientific’ account of leadership can, in fact, be established, nor am I assuming that leadership exists outside or prior to its discursive construction. However, those are the assumptions to which most leadership scholars today hold (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Barker, 2001). Accordingly, in this chapter I directly challenge the extent to which a credible science of leadership has been achieved according to the standards and assumptions by which the field typically operates. I offer an alternative account of developments in the field.

As the quotes above from Carlyle and, nearly 170 years later, from Bass exemplify, the central preoccupation and positioning of modern leadership discourse has been its highly
optimistic stance as regards the nature, value and impact of leadership. According to conventional understanding, this confidence that leadership is the answer regardless of the question has been subjected to the rigours of modern science over this time (e.g. Antonakis, Schriesheim et al., 2004; Bass, 2008; Northouse, 2004). Beginning with the original theorisation developed by Carlyle, it is generally accepted that since that time leadership knowledge has progressively become broader, deeper, more sophisticated and more firmly grounded as an account of the truth through applying the standards expected of the scientific process (e.g. Avery, 2004; Bass, 2008; Hunt, 1999).

In the mainstream of leadership studies the established form and methods of social science are indeed followed faithfully. The careful definition of constructs, the use of anonymous surveys and advanced statistical methods of data analysis are common practices now used in studies of leadership (Bass, 2008; Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe & Gardner, 2000). These studies predominantly rely on an ‘established’ leadership theory and seek to expand knowledge of its characteristics, effects and antecedents (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe & Gardner, 2000). It is, therefore, now widely accepted that certain important ‘facts’ about leadership have been established to the level of social scientific proofs (e.g. Avolio et al., 2009; Bass, 1999, 2008; Gardner et al., 2010). Developments in the field are typically explained as emerging from the scientific process wherein error is weeded out, ignorance progressively overcome and reliable knowledge is accumulated (e.g. Bass, 1999; Hunt, 1999; Yukl, 2012).

Against all this I will argue that it is the periodic power/knowledge ‘revolutions’ in theoretical paradigm, themselves a response to shifting problematizations and epistemic conditions, which have provided both the foundations and driving force for ‘leadership science’ and that these are not scientific in nature or origin. I propose that what is revealed in the archive is the skilful deployment of the discursive norms of science, all the while relying on largely unquestioned yet problematic assumptions and aims which are profoundly political rather than scientific in nature. Moreover, the dominant ‘truths’ which have been produced in this discursive regime are ones that I contend produce troubling effects for ‘leaders’, ‘followers’ and their relationship. The ‘truth’ about leadership which now dominates contemporary thinking is one which I argue insidiously seeks to control leader subjectivity so as to bring about its complete conformity with
organisational interests. Simultaneously, follower autonomy and self-responsibility is subjugated in the name of personal development. Such is the freedom from ignorance now on offer.

My contention is that what has emerged is most plausibly understood as a highly sophisticated, faith-based discursive regime, both driven by and attuned to address political, economic and social concerns. My argument is that ‘leadership science’ is neither scientific at its base nor is the mainstream of knowledge produced via this ‘science’ progressive in any sense of the word. Here I will argue what is ‘known’ relies on what is ignored or denied, what is claimed as the truth rests on what cannot be objectively determined, and what is promoted derives from a faith that is largely unquestioned because it has become normalized.

**Structure of the chapter, and sources**

The chapter proceeds in chronological order, exploring each of the main theoretical paradigms which have shaped the development of modern leadership scholarship. The shifts in theoretical paradigm which have occurred are conventionally explained as being due to advancements in knowledge, resulting in the pursuit of a new research direction (e.g. Bass, 2008; Hunt, 1999; Yukl, 2012). These major schools of thought and when they held sway are summarized in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1: Major theoretical paradigms in leadership science**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Dominant theoretical paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca 1840 – late 1940s</td>
<td>great man/trait theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca late 1940s – late 1960s</td>
<td>leader behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca late 1960s – 1978</td>
<td>situational/contingency models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca 1978 – present day</td>
<td>‘new leadership’ (charismatic, visionary, transformational theories)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bass, 2008; Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006; Jackson & Parry, 2011.
For each of these paradigms I begin my analysis by identifying the problematizations which I argue shaped that paradigm’s emergence. I then examine the key features of that discourse, its processes of formation, social function and subjectivity effects. After examining each of these theoretical paradigms, I move to an examination of the epistemic conditions governing the production of leadership science, before finally offering an overall assessment of the leadership science discourse. These analytic moves derive from the Interpretive Analytics method as outlined in Chapter Three, and mean this chapter is comprised of four complete sub-case analyses which combine to produce one overall case analysis.

The norms of knowledge production and validation in modern social science favour journal publications rather than books. Books, however, are often used by scholars as their preferred means of advancing theoretical and conceptual positions ahead of empirical studies, and to reach a broader practitioner audience than can be achieved by journal publication alone. Taking these factors into account means that in this chapter, journal articles as well as books constitute both primary and secondary sources.

For the period prior to WWII no consensus seems to exist as to what constitutes the most important studies, although Carlyle (1993 (1840)) and Galton (1970 (1875)) are clearly acknowledged as key influences (e.g. Clarke, 1916; Hook, 1945; Smith & Krueger, 1933; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932). I have therefore examined a range of texts which are illustrative of the use of trait theory which dominated at that time (see Bogardus, 1934; Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Galton, 1970 (1875); Lehman, 1966 (1928); Sorokin, 1925; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936; Visher, 1925). For the period since WWII there is a solid degree of consensus amongst influential commentators as to the key theories, theorists and significant texts (see, for example, Bass, 2008; Bedeian & Wren, 2001; Jackson & Parry, 2011).

For this chapter I have also examined texts which offered broad reviews of the literature or which offer compilations of what was, at the time of publication, seen to be the most important issues and ideas then demanding scholarly attention. Other primary texts

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2See Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Antonakis, Cianciolo et al., 2004; Avery, 2004; Avolio et al., 2009; Barrow, 1977; Bass, 2008; Bolden et al., 2011; Bowers & Seashore, 1966; Browne & Cohn, 1958; Bryman, 2004; Bryman, Collinson, Grint, Jackson, & Uhl-Bien, 2011; Caza &
upon which this case study is based are as cited throughout the chapter.

The establishment of leadership science: 1840-1940’s

There can be no question of the fact of inequality....Its significance depends upon the proportion of men with great capacity and high faculty to those of the lower and lowest orders of gifts. Obviously there are fewer of the former, more of the latter... the human race (is divided) into a few clever individuals, many ordinary, some decidedly stupid (Lehman, 1966 (1928), p. 7).

The gene-and-genius theory of leadership is that the source of the special ability that accounts for leadership is to be found in the relationship of the genes. That is a biological theory of leadership which has a eugenic phase, namely, that a person can select for marriage a mate who has special ability and can thus predispose his offspring to superior achievement and leadership (Bogardus, 1934, p. 41).

Problematization

The established order of things was undergoing dramatic change in mid-19th century England. Industrialisation was bringing about dramatic changes to traditional forms and relations of production (Daunton, 2011; Feldman & Lawrence, 2011; More, 2000). Greater social mobility and rapid developments in science and technology were occurring, while the influence of the Church was waning (Daunton, 2011; Feldman & Lawrence, 2011; More, 2000). The 1832 Reform Act resulted in a broadened political franchise and undermined traditional privileges (Brock, 1973), while slavery was legally abolished in most British territories in 1833. A more egalitarian approach to the rights of persons was, thus, gaining momentum, developments which threatened the traditional social order. The French revolution (1789) and the loss of America from the British Empire (1783) had already pointed to the potentially dramatic consequences of these ideas.

For Carlyle, many of these developments were seen not as progress but as social breakdown. His response was to advocate the worship of heroic leaders as the means to

reinvigorate a society he saw as increasingly immoral, lacking in cohesion and damaged by many of the developments noted above (see Carlyle, 1993 (1840)). Carlyle’s solution called on both the ‘human spirit’ so central to the Romantic worldview he held and the new science of psychology. In doing this he sought to overcome what he problematized as the excessively rationalist accounts of human nature and life promoted by the Enlightenment and simultaneously separate his ideas about leadership from those of the medieval era (Carlyle, 1993 (1840)). Most important of all the problems as Carlyle saw it was to reinvigorate admiration for individual boldness and respect for leaders, which he saw as being undermined by the increasingly rational, secular, egalitarian spirit of his age (see Carlyle, 1993 (1840)). This politically conservative, Romanticist problematization of the emerging modern industrial democratic society thus shaped Carlyle’s development of the first modern theorization of leadership which he first presented by way of a series of lectures in 1840. Leadership science began here, with Carlyle’s invention of the modern hero-leader to whom obedience and worship was due.

By the end of the 19th century, the problematization informing leadership scholars was different, and from this came a changed approach to speaking the truth about leadership. Social Darwinian thought had influentially problematized social ills as arising from a mismatch between a person’s natural abilities and their social position (Bannister, 1979; Gillham, 2001). The task of leadership studies was thus to determine how best to identify those naturally fit to lead, thereby avoiding the harm to society which could arise if those not properly suited to leadership were wrongly selected. Establishing credibility according to the standards demanded by modern science meant that the use of statistics was now needed, so as to proffer quantitative evidence of leadership (Benjamin, 2007; Brush, 1988). For leadership scholars these factors demanded a focus on statistically identifying leader traits. For political conservatives what was needed was evidence that leaders were indeed born to rule, thereby ‘proving’ that the inequality in society now being so strongly challenged by liberal, progressive thinkers was in fact natural. In the first part of the 20th century leadership science duly responded to these problematizations, inventing trait theory as the route to discovering the truth about leadership.
Key features of the discourse

From around the middle of the 19th century through to about WWII, the scholarly discourse on leadership focussed almost exclusively on the personal qualities of leaders (Avery, 2004; Bass, 2008; Jackson & Parry, 2011). While scholars varied as to whether they considered leadership qualities were inherited, and there was debate over the extent to which environmental factors were also important (see, for example, Galton, 1970 (1875); Gowin, 1919; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932), there was a widespread consensus that leadership was a personal trait (Shartle, 1979; Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948).

Beginning from around the end of the 19th century, the key task was generally conceived as determining to a scientific standard of proof those traits that marked someone out as a leader (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Taking their lead at this point from the natural sciences, early leadership scientists set out to map the terrain of leader traits in much the same way a biologist of the time would seek to identify the distinguishing characteristics of a newly discovered species of moth. The primary aim of this project became the progressive accumulation of knowledge and the discovery of the universal laws which were assumed to govern the nature, prevalence and distribution of leadership (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948).

The measuring and documenting of bodily, social and psychological ‘traits’ and the accumulation of biographic and demographic data about leaders’ family backgrounds feature as the key components in this endeavour (see, for example, Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Galton, 1970 (1875); Lehman, 1966 (1928); Sorokin, 1925; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936; Visher, 1925). Physical factors marked out for attention included matters such as tone of voice, manner of speaking, height, weight, appearance, physical prowess and health (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Personal characteristics of interest included intelligence, talkativeness, originality, adaptability, self-confidence, dominance, mood control, courteousness and the tendency to depression, anger and fighting (Stogdill, 1948). Biographic and demographic factors of interest included marital status, birthplace, father’s occupation and education, and the age at which certain achievements occurred (e.g. Galton, 1970 (1875); Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936). Followers existed here merely as the deficient, the non-leader, the counter-point, the great mediocrity from which the leader stands out, exceptional, superior.
For those adopting the ‘inheritance’ thesis, the potential for their findings to contribute to the efforts of the eugenics movement to ‘improve’ the human population through selective breeding practices would have been evident. This strand of leadership research was informed by and connected with studies of ‘superior men’ more generally (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Galton, 1970 (1875); Sorokin, 1925; Visher, 1925). For those not focussed on issues of inheritance, effective selection of leaders into positions of authority was understood to constitute the key application of their findings (e.g. Bogardus, 1934; Gowin, 1915, 1918, 1919).

The definitional criteria which informed this latter strand of research on leadership of small groups was that “it is primarily by participating in group activities and demonstrating a capacity for expediting the work of the group that a person becomes endowed as a leader” (Stogdill, 1948). This meant that a key interest for these early leadership scientists was identifying the characteristics of those whose actions were seen as enabling a small group to function more effectively: those who engaged in such actions were defined as leaders. However, what is notably a very minor aspect of this early work is a connection between organisational authority and leadership; indeed, in the empirical settings often employed in this work no such formal authority relationship existed between research subjects (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). The workplace was not at this time understood as being an important research site for building leadership knowledge.

In terms of methodology, the analysis of biographies, biographical data and biographical dictionaries was the focus of those exploring the inheritance thesis (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Ellis, 1904; Galton, 1970 (1875); Sorokin, 1925; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932). Those focussed on leadership in a small group context favoured methods such as observation, time sampling, peer rating, surveys, psychometric testing and interviews (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Arising from the belief that leadership was something innate, a significant proportion of studies in the first half of the 20th century used children, teenagers or young adults as their research subjects (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Irrespective of methodological differences and scholars’ varying interest in the question of inheritance, whatever was understood as desirable, admirable or in some way
exceptional was examined for its association with leadership, be it strength, beauty, intelligence, artistry, melancholy, wealth, aggression or athleticism.

As the field developed, a commitment to the compilation of statistical data became increasingly de rigueur, for the aim was to produce knowledge that could be held up as representative and generalizable (e.g. Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Sorokin, 1925). Quantitative analysis was expected to render the workings of nature visible, removing mystery and overcoming ignorance. This means of establishing the truth about leadership came to be understood as being of such importance that extensive methodological explanations and defences are often to be found in these early texts, seeking to enhance the credibility of the conclusions reached in the reader’s mind (see, for example, the efforts of Galton, 1970 (1875); Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936).

In terms of power and power/knowledge, trait theory promoted the allocation of power and authority to an ‘exceptional few’. It sought to render this state of affairs the result of nature and to confirm this by means of statistical evidence, drawing on the seemingly objective status of science for validation. It sought to directly counter the discourses of equality and democracy which, through the likes of the emerging Women’s, Black and Civil rights movements, sought to challenge existing gender-, race- and class-based distinctions in legal and political rights and to advance the Enlightenment ideal of natural rights. With trait theory, the question of who should lead was positioned as a matter beyond the purview of political contest: the ‘right’ to lead was to be a ‘natural talent’, legitimate and inalienable. While initially the pet project of Victorian gentleman scholars such as Carlyle and Galton, as it developed in the early 20th century leadership science adopted in full the emerging norms of modern social science. Formal hypotheses were tested in structured studies, with scholars aiming for generalizable results and disseminating their findings via peer-reviewed journals. These moves sought to legitimate and establish its standing as a scientific discourse.

Processes of formation

Turning now to the genealogical processes of formation shaping this discourse, early leadership scientists understood themselves as entering unknown territory: the work of earlier times was from the outset rejected as untrustworthy, because it was not produced
via what they held to be proper scientific methods (Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Galton, 1970 (1875)). However, the decision to focus on leader traits throughout the first four decades of the 20th century, why particular ‘traits’ were held to be of interest and the choice of statistical analysis as central to establishing the truth about leadership was not random. Instead, these features of the discourse all derive from early influences, in particular the work of Thomas Carlyle (1993 (1840)), who advocated the naturalness of inequality, the morality of obedience and the dangers of democracy, and Francis Galton (1970 (1875)), who advocated the role of heredity factors in producing exceptional persons, the value of statistics and the importance of eugenic practices in shaping the future of humanity (Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007). It is from these sources and the problematizations which concerned them that 20th century leadership science first took inspiration.

Carlyle’s influential 1840 lectures and their subsequent publication in book form, reprinted eight times in his lifetime, focussed on the naturalness and desirability of ‘heroes’, great men of exceptional ability who, he argued, shaped the course of human history (Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Goldberg, 1993; Hook, 1945). Carlyle advocated strongly for the value of worshiping such men as role models whose life and works should serve as the example for others to follow (1993 (1840)). Further, for Carlyle the capacity and willingness to worship such heroes, to adopt the role of loyal follower, was itself deemed a mark of one’s nobility and morality of character (1993 (1840)). He positioned ‘hero worship’ as a natural and desirable phenomenon which produced the necessary degree of order and bonds of affection to hold society together (1993 (1840)). For Carlyle, both leadership and loyal obedient followership were necessary, desirable, natural and moral (1993 (1840)).

Carlyle identified six types of hero-leaders: gods, prophets, poets, priests, men of letters and kings, with the last being regarded as the most important. Linked with his notion of evolutionary progress in society, he saw men of letters and kings as the only two modern forms (1993 (1840)). Carlyle’s methodology for assessing the specific individual case studies he used to exemplify his argument included a biographical analysis of a leader’s life and works, a physiognomic assessment (via portraits) of facial features to identify underlying character, an assessment of their style of speaking and a concern to determine the sincerity of their faith in god (1993 (1840)).
Carlyle’s thinking was profoundly influenced by the 19th century English Romantic movement, this being a reaction to what was seen as the overly rationalist, mechanistic and atheistic focus of Enlightenment thought and the perceived negative impacts of industrialisation on society and nature (Ferber, 2010; Goldberg, 1993). As a Romantic Carlyle sought a return to a world more in love with nature than with machines, which valued passion rather than ‘cold’ reason, and which accepted and valued the ‘natural inequality’ between men because, he argued, “there is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience” (1993 (1840), p. 171)). However, as Table 4.2 shows, the ‘traits’ later identified by leadership scientists in the early 20th century bear a strong resemblance to characteristics of interest to Carlyle.

Table 4.2: Similarities between Carlyle’s Cromwell and 20th C trait studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carlyle’s assessment of Oliver Cromwell as ideal modern leader</th>
<th>Some trait studies mentioned in Stogdill’s literature review (1948)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘rugged stubborn strength’ (p. 182)</td>
<td>physique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a clear determinate man’s-energy’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>energy/activity levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘with his savage depth, with his wild sincerity ...he looked so strange among the elegant...dainty...diplomatic’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“did not speak with glib regularity’ (p. 180)</td>
<td>self-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘an impressive speaker...who, from the first, had weight’ (p. 188)</td>
<td>appearance and dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘rude, passionate voice’ (p. 188)</td>
<td>fluency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘decisive, practical eye’,</td>
<td>tone of voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘has a genuine insight into what is fact’ (p. 184)</td>
<td>practical ideas to solve problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘nervous melancholic temperament indicates seriousness’ (p. 182)</td>
<td>sound judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘excitable, deep feeling nature’ (p. 182)</td>
<td>adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘sorrow-stricken’</td>
<td>depressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘almost semi-madness’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>unhappy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘sharp power of vision’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>excitable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘a man with his whole soul seeing and struggling to see’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘courage and the faculty to do’ (p. 187)</td>
<td>restless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grappled like a giant, face to face, with the naked truth of things’ (p. 180)</td>
<td>persistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Stogdill, 1948.
Stylistically Carlyle offered romantic, gothic accounts of leaders which vividly and dramatically depicted the ideal to aspire to (see 1993 (1840)): a rollicking good read if nothing else, intense, passionate and in no way disinterested, for so much was held to be at stake. However, later trait discourse deployed the credibility of science to coolly, dispassionately portray leadership as an innate quality of superior persons in statistical form (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Galton, 1970 (1875)). Carlyle’s too passionate depiction of leadership did not survive the transition to a more formal ‘scientific’ discourse, even though his ideas provided influential clues for later studies to follow.

By the 1870s, Carlyle’s methods were strongly criticised as lacking scientific rigour, most notably by Herbert Spencer, an influential early sociologist (Goldberg, 1993). Subsequently, while Carlyle and, by association, the politically conservative concerns and interests of 19th century English Romanticism provided one set of influences on early leadership scientists, Francis Galton, himself influenced by Spencer (Gillham, 2001; Goldberg, 1993), provided two others. Drawing on his cousin Charles Darwin’s ideas, Galton focussed on inherited traits as the source of what marks someone out as superior (Galton, 1970 (1875)). This focus formed the basis of a whole stream of subsequent research (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Sorokin, 1925; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936; Visher, 1925). Galton’s second point of influence was his use of statistics which has subsequently proved to be the core method of analysis still favoured by leadership scientists right down to the present day (Alvesson, 1996; Gardner et al., 2010). Galton initially studied ‘hereditary genius’ providing a statistical analysis of inherited traits (see Galton, 1892 (1869)). Another major study examined English men of science (1970 (1875)). His broad concern was to identify patterns of inherited inferiority and superiority amongst the population, such that “it would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriage during several consecutive generations” (1892 (1869), p. 45).

Carlyle’s ideas about leader characteristics, along with Galton’s claims about inherited traits and his use of statistics, thus provided the basis for leadership studies in the first part of 20th century, a combination of thinking that was substantively both Romantic and eugenic and procedurally quantitative. While Carlyle and Galton offered radically different
methods of analysis, both sought to promote the status and influence of ‘exceptional men’ at a time when proponents of democratic and egalitarian modes of governing were gaining greater influence. Both sought to promote the ‘virtue’ of obedience to ‘superior men’. Their common aim was a social order which valued and enforced hierarchy and inequality, founded on what was held to be a naturally occurring biological-meritocratic order of inequality.

Galton was able to deploy his ideas about inherited traits in combination with statistical analysis to provide what was then understood as being an impressively scientific, modern and objective account of superiority and inferiority. He was a leading proponent in the eugenics movement (Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007) and his influence was of long standing in the field of leadership studies: Taussig and Joslyn’s 1932 conclusion that ‘natural inferiority’ is the most likely cause of labourers’ sons being under-represented amongst American business leaders, and, moreover, that this under-representation cannot be due to environmental factors, is bolstered through explicit reference to Galton’s work.

Galton’s strong association with the, later, much discredited eugenics movement, along with that of other leadership scholars such as James McKeen Cattell (1906) and Havelock Ellis (1904) (Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007), may well account for his absence in post-war accounts of developments in leadership studies; his work is not referenced, for example, in Stogdill’s influential 1948 review of the literature, although Galton, Cattell and Ellis are all cited in Smith and Krueger’s 1933 review. Carlyle was also discredited from the 1920s onwards as a proponent of proto-fascist thought, a view later reinforced by Hitler’s reputed enthusiasm for his work (Goldberg, 1993). However, the methodological distance by then established between ‘leadership scientists’ and Carlyle’s approach meant that this reassessment of Carlyle posed a less direct threat to the credibility of the field. The accepted history of leadership studies thus has it that trait theory was discarded because of inconsistent findings and a general lack of proof: Stogdill’s 1948 review of the literature is often credited with having established this point (see, for example, Bass, 2008, Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006).
Trait discourse positions ‘leadership’ as a ‘good’ and ‘natural’ quality, meaning that its advocacy of deference to leaders can similarly be positioned as ‘good’ and ‘natural’ (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Ellis, 1904; Thorndike, 1936; Visher, 1925). The Galtonian perspective, with its particular focus on establishing the hereditary basis of leadership, forged a link to a broader agenda wherein science was to be deployed to support selective breeding policies and practices designed to improve the human race (Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007; Hasian Jr, 1996). All in all, the social function of this discourse can be understood as providing a biological and scientifically warranted explanation not only for patterns of difference but for patterns of inequality between persons and, through its association with eugenics thinking, a means for ‘improving’ the population. It was a discourse not only of discovery but also one with reforming ambitions: both Carlyle and Galton sought not merely to describe, but also to change society with their work (Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007; Goldberg, 1993), and subsequent participants in this discourse contributed to this project.

Trait discourse functioned, then, to reinforce attitudes and values of a more conservative orientation, countering competing discourses of a democratic or egalitarian orientation as well as discourses which emphasized ‘nurture’ rather than ‘nature’. ‘Superiority’ here was not simply greater ability, responsibility or impact. It was also equated with morality, for it was claimed that “persons of superior intellectual ability can be trusted to average high in decency, dependability, good will, and other social virtues” (Thorndike, 1936, p. 339). This capacity was said to be “part and parcel of his original nature, based on the genes which co-operated with his environment in making him what he becomes” (Thorndike, 1936, p. 339). Victorian morality, the Romantic attachment to the exceptional and the natural in opposition to the norm and the manufactured, the eugenicists interpretation of Darwin and the modern scientists’ desire for precise measurement all found expression in this new science of leadership.

The subject of the leader constructed here is one predetermined by fate, biology or ancestry to be a superior being. Sketched initially as Carlyle’s divinity, prophet, priest, poet, man of letters or king, rendered vivid through case studies of individual lives and works, facial characteristics, character and faith (1993 (1840)), later depicted as a
statistical outlier in Galton’s work (1892 (1869); 1970 (1875)), the image of the leader that first emerged in this discourse is of one who is consistently masculine, strong, capable and exceptional. The leader here, however, is also often troubled with melancholia, with the intensity of their passions and the isolation that comes from the basic fact of their inescapable difference from others (see Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Galton, 1970 (1875)).

With the shift, around the turn of the century, to the use of structured scientific studies testing specific hypotheses, this rich and colourful gallery of leader portraits disappeared, leaving the subject of the leader to emerge incrementally, study by study, trait by trait. Leaders were now discursively constituted by way of the statistical compilation of attributes with ‘proven’ association (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Sorokin, 1925). However, the challenge of piecing together this mosaic was surely one of frustration, as while one study might confirm a particular attribute’s association with leadership another would disconfirm it (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948).

By 1948, according to Stogdill’s review, the leader could be confidently depicted as one who “exceeds the average member of his group in the following respects: (1) intelligence, (2) scholarship, (3) dependability in exercising responsibilities, (4) activity and social participation, and (5) socio-economic status” (1948, p. 63). Other ‘traits’ then claimed to have a high correlation with leadership included “originality, popularity, sociability, judgement, aggressiveness, desire to excel, humor, cooperativeness, liveliness, and athletic ability, in approximate order of magnitude of average correlation coefficient” (Stogdill, 1948, p. 63).

While for Carlyle (1993 (1840)) followers’ willingness to worship and obey a leader was an indication of their morality, by the time the discourse had moved into a formal scientific mode, followers provided the norm, the average, the unexceptional majority from which leaders stood out as both different and superior (e.g. Clarke, 1916; Ellis, 1904; Sorokin, 1925). The leader-follower relationship itself was of interest to trait theorists only to the extent that followers might be asked by researchers to nominate who was the leader of their group (Stogdill, 1948). Studying followers was relevant only to the extent that their ‘averageness’ helped distinguish the ‘exception’ which was the leader. Followers were constituted as the undifferentiated mass to which the leader-as-exceptional-man was to
direct his attentions; effectively the follower had no specific subjectivity but was simply to be understood as inferior, as non-leader.

**The shift to behavioural theory**

I can recall the excitement and stimulation ... the feeling of being in on an exciting new venture, breaking new ground. At that time, leadership was thought of as a personality trait... the catch was that it was difficult to get hold of what the traits were (Fleishman, 1973, p. 2).

**Problematization**

At the end of WWII, America’s newly established military, political and industrial dominance was a source of national pride (Hodgson, 2005). It was also a state of affairs seen as by no means assured (Hodgson, 2005; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007). With the felt need to keep enhancing the productivity and technology gains achieved as part of the war effort, leadership in the workplace quickly became the critical domain of interest for leadership studies (Fleishman, 1973; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979).

Among management thinkers, a continued move away from a Taylorist orientation to workplace control (Taylor, 1919) toward the ‘harmony’ offered by a human relations perspective (Mayo, 1945, 1946 (1933)) was being strongly advocated (Jacques, 1996; Wren, 2005). This shift was seen as vital to ensuring that poor labour-management relations did not impede the future development of American industry (Jacques, 1996; Bruce, 2006). The perceived threat of communism, moreover, demanded that workplace control remain in managerial hands (Bruce, 2006; Bruce & Nyland, 2011).

Trait theory was, whether openly acknowledged or not, poisoned by way of its association with eugenics and hence Nazism. Advancing the notion that leaders were by nature superior beings when the ashes of the Holocaust were still warm was unlikely to attract a positive response. However, the war had also reinforced to observers of leadership the idea that those in positions of authority varied greatly as regards their approach and the impact of that (Shartle, 1979). In an episteme committed to ‘progress’ as one of its most cherished ideals, in which the quest to know ourselves through the application of science constituted a major pre-occupation, better understanding of these differences called out for attention.
To respond to these various developments, a new approach to leadership science needed to be carved out in such a way that it could command the interest of those with authority to allocate research funds, secure managerial support and meet the norms of the wider field of the human sciences. A focus on leader behaviour rather than traits was the response to these problematizations. This invention came to provide the basis of the next few decades of research.

**Key features of the discourse**

A rapid and fundamental shift in the truth about leadership occurred, then, around the end of the Second World War. By the late 1940s talk of leadership had been re-oriented to a focus on patterns of supervisory behaviour (Avery, 2004; Bass, 2008; Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006). Trait theory, which had dominated the field for so long, was still advanced occasionally (e.g. Jennings, 1960). However, most leadership researchers were instead pursuing a different agenda, one now dedicated to enhancing workplace productivity and morale via supervisory behaviours conceived of as ‘leadership’ (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a; 1953b; Katz, Maccoby, & Morse, 1950; Likert, 1961). These behaviours were presumed learnable and teachable; the assumption of leadership as an innate quality of superior persons was specifically abandoned (Fleishman, 1953a, 1953b, 1973; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979).

Commitment to the perceived virtues of theoretical parsimony now shaped this discourse, in direct contrast with the never-ending list of leader traits previously collected (Fleishman, 1973; Shartle, 1979; Stogdill, 1948). By the early 1950s, leadership was held to be adequately described as comprising two patterns of supervisor behaviour, according to the influential Ohio State University studies (Fleishman, 1973; Hollander, 1979; Shartle, 1979). The first of these was ‘consideration’, meaning a supervisor’s inclination to “behaviour indicating friendship, mutual trust, respect, a certain warmth and rapport between the supervisor and his group” (Fleishman, 1973, pp. 7–8). The second was ‘initiating structure’, meaning “acts which imply the leader organizes and defines the relationships in the group, tends to establish well defined patterns and channels of communication and ways of getting the job done” (Fleishman, 1973, p. 8).
Studies at Michigan State University developed similar constructs: production orientation and employee orientation. Lewin, Lippitt and White’s (1939) notion of leadership as ranging along a continuum from autocratic-laissez faire to democratic styles of supervisory behaviours also received some continuing attention. However, their deployment of terms which carried with them overtly political connotations was not an approach adopted by most leadership scholars.

With this new means of accounting for leadership, the leader as a specified coherent subject possessing its own needs and will disappeared from view. This new conception of leadership could be more thoroughly dissected into what were claimed to be its component parts than trait theory had ever permitted. Now precisely defined behaviours became the focus of attention, along with the promise that these could be attached to any person in a supervisory position (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fleishman, 1953a, 1953b; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961). It became the norm to conceive of leadership purely as a set of discrete behaviours, independent of considerations of ‘character’ or context.

With an accumulating body of evidence it became viable to speak of the correlation of specified leader behaviours with issues of organisational concern such as morale, turnover, grievance rates, and productivity (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961). ‘Leadership’ became a formula, a behavioural recipe of universal potential and utility (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964). It could, here, be considered separately from issues of politics, ethics and power, for the assumption of the legitimacy of supervisory authority rendered such matters redundant. Moreover, the recommended focus on both tasks and people positioned this new discourse as one that was humane and concerned with questions of employee well-being.

Subordinates were now automatically classified as followers and, drawing on human relations conceptions of the worker, presumed to be dependent upon supervisors/leaders for both guidance (“initiating structure”) and support.

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3 The Michigan State studies initially understood these two constructs as being at opposite ends of one spectrum, meaning that it was thought that a supervisor/leader could be either production oriented or employee oriented, but not both. In light of Ohio State’s findings that a supervisor could score highly on both ‘consideration’ and ‘initiating structure’ (or low/high, high/low, or low/low), the Michigan State data were re-evaluated and the constructs were reconceptualised in a manner that replicated the Ohio State model (Bowers & Seashore, 1966).
(“consideration”) (Bruce, 2006; Bruce & Nyland, 2011). The effect of leaders’ behaviour on followers’ job satisfaction, morale and work performance was what was considered interesting and relevant, with the consequence that follower agency was positioned here as being of lesser importance and impact than leader agency (e.g. Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961; Morris & Seeman, 1950). The basic project of leadership research thus became one entirely dedicated to enhancing managerial influence and effectiveness, this being assumed as something good for the organisation, the supervisor/leader and the follower/employee (Hollander, 1979; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979).

With behavioural theory, the power to claim to speak the truth about leadership was derived from conducting large-scale formal studies and then proclaiming the results as proof of certain facts about the world (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a, 1953b; Likert, 1961, 1967). That challengeable assumptions and the privileging of selected values and interests were unavoidably embedded in the design of these studies (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) was typically expunged from the discourse as a means of establishing credibility. That the use of survey methodology could not overcome the indeterminacy of language and that such data can be interpreted in more than one way (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) was ignored when asserting the value and validity of what was now on offer.

As an exercise in power, behavioural discourse relied on the communicative ease offered by its use of parsimonious models to help garner attention and pose ideas in a form that was readily digestible and memorable. It made use of accepted channels of scholarly discourse and drew on the credibility offered by its governmental and business backers (Hollander, 1979; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979). It sought to produce supervisor-leaders who were both humane and effective, ensuring compliant, productive followers who would meet the needs of their employers whilst simultaneously being ‘satisfied’ with their work (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961, 1967). Behavioural theory also countered traditional notions of innate superiority, treating leadership as something teachable, learnable and open to all in supervisory roles, thereby positioning it as being consistent with the democratic ideal of equality of opportunity.
Processes of formation

In accounting for the formative processes which shaped this move to behavioural theory, Stogdill’s 1948 review of the trait literature is, as noted earlier, normally portrayed as the key turning point (Bass, 2008; Hollander, 1979; Shartle, 1979). Yet by 1944 researchers interested in “leadership for and in a democracy” had already asserted that “leadership as a particular or unique combination of traits… is a fabrication” (Hendry, 1944, p. 385). Lewin claimed experiments had shown that:

...in a precise manner... the character and the abilities of the individual, his ideals, his goals, his motivation and his values, his perception and his productivity, his friendliness and objectivity, his tendencies to domination and submission... can be changed to a large extent by changing the social atmosphere or the group belonging of this individual (1944, p. 394).

It would seem, therefore, that history has incorrectly attributed the first major social science-based critique of trait theory to Stogdill (1948) rather than to Lewin (1944).

Stogdill did, nonetheless, assess much of the previous four decades worth of social science-based leadership research in a highly influential paper published in 1948. One of his often quoted conclusions was that the findings from this research demonstrated “an adequate analysis of leadership involves a study not only of leaders but also of situations” (1948, p.65). However, he also noted that a number of traits had been repeatedly identified as showing strong associations with leadership, a contradictory finding from those noted above by Hendry (1944) and Lewin (1944). In light of a number of his findings it seems by no means inevitable Stogdill’s review should have been taken as sounding the death knell of trait-based research. Yet that is indeed how it has come to be understood and, moreover, by and large what subsequently happened.

At the time of publication Stogdill was employed at Ohio State University and an active member of a substantial leadership research programme initiated at the end of World War II (Hollander, 1979; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979). That programme had, from its inception, determined to focus on leader behaviour, not traits (Shartle, 1979). According to Shartle, who held the position of project director, this focus derived from his pre-war and war-time experience with the U.S. Department of Labor where he had directed a research programme involving job, process and organisational analysis
associated with planning for the war effort (1979). This lineage positions Shartle as a direct intellectual descendent of the scientific management paradigm.

Shartle later explained “my own interest was primarily leader behaviour. I felt that if we could get a handle on it, the program would be worthwhile” (1979, p. 132). Bowers and Seashore report the Ohio project had developed by 1945 an instrument with “nine dimensions or categories of leadership behaviour” (1966, p. 240). What is noteworthy, then, is that the decision at Ohio State University to focus on leader behaviours pre-dates Stogdill’s analysis of the limitations of the then predominantly trait-oriented research. Neither Shartle nor Stogdill make any mention of Hendry or Lewin’s 1944 texts, so it is impossible to know if these influenced their thinking. However, what the archive indicates overall is that it was Shartle’s personal determination for research to be focussed on leader behaviour, and not the review of the trait-based evidence produced by Stogdill, which triggered the behavioural focus chosen by Ohio.

Fleishman also reports that the focus on behaviour was not without its sceptics:

…in the late forties, some felt that leadership was almost entirely a function of the type of group led and that it might be impossible to predict whether a leader in one group would be successful in another. This, of course, is a pretty pessimistic view if we consider the problems of selecting and training for leadership. Subsequently, the pendulum swung toward the middle ground with assumptions made that the group situation is highly important, but there are some general principles about leadership which allow certain generalizations (1973, p. 3)

Shartle’s determination to change the direction of leadership discourse can be understood as an astute assessment of the wider social climate in the post-war period. By this time Hitler’s claims of racial superiority and inferiority could be seen as disconcertingly similar to claims of natural superiority in terms of leadership. Indeed as early as 1933 Grierson (1977 (1933)) had identified links between Carlyle’s ‘great man’ theory and Hitler’s politics, while Galton’s eugenics had also by this time been strongly rejected by most American social scientists (Gillham, 2001).

More broadly, amongst the many effects of the war were a heightened interest in the effective functioning of large-scale organisations, in issues of productivity, morale, absenteeism, the dangers of authoritarianism and an optimistic belief in the practical potential of science and technology to resolve such problems (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Hodgson, 2005; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007). These concerns provided a fertile set of interests which rendered a focus on leader behaviour and its impact on workplace performance attractive to researchers and to funders of research such as the military, government and major corporations. That the field of psychology was also at this time strongly influenced by Skinner’s behaviourist perspective is a further factor informing the choice to focus on leader behaviour (Benjamin, 2007). The “pessimism” which Fleishman (1973) reports came from a strongly situationalist perspective on leadership may also have helped sway the focus toward a focus on leader behaviours for researchers seeking to ‘advance’ the field.

Also immediately in the post-war period, Michigan State University established a leadership research programme (Bass, 2008; Bowers & Seashore, 1966). The intellectual antecedents and predilections of this programme were informed by the ‘human relations’ perspective (see, for example, Mayo, 1945, 1946 (1933)) (Bowers & Seashore, 1966). From this perspective the relationship between supervisors and subordinates was understood as affecting productivity and workers were understood as having ‘needs’ and potentially destructive tendencies if those needs were not addressed by management (Bruce & Nyland, 2011; Likert, 1961; Mayo, 1945, 1946 (1933)).

Advocates of the human relations perspective such as Mayo saw themselves as redressing the focus on rational planning, organising and controlling which classical management theorists Taylor (1919) and Fayol (1930) had emphasized as being the key concern of managers. The aim of leadership scholars adopting this perspective was to position the ‘leadership’ dimensions of managerial work as warranting more attention, and the chosen method for demonstrating the value of this was by measuring the link between these dimensions and organisational results. In combination, the Ohio and Michigan State studies had by the early 1950s begun to produce a steady stream of behaviour based studies and models which came to dominate the field through to the mid 1960s (Hollander, 1979; Korman, 1966). These models reflected their dual heritage of both scientific management and human relations.

There were dissenting voices which have subsequently been lost from the conventional narrative of progress in the field. A special issue in 1944 of the Journal of Educational Sociology focussed on ‘Leadership in Democracy’ set forth an approach informed by quite
different political and methodological perspectives from those informing the Ohio and Michigan studies. Notably amongst those contributing to this effort was the already influential social psychologist Kurt Lewin. Having fled Germany in 1933 because of the rising tide of anti-Semitism, and having then gone on to study discrimination and prejudice (Benjamin, 2007), Lewin (1944) advocated for the contextually rich framework offered by field theory and the participatory nature of the action research method to inform leadership studies. For him the future of leadership research was also one that should be strongly informed by political and ethical concerns:

... particularly in a democracy, the right of the common man is upheld. Vigilant criticism and a jealous watch over the limitation of the leader's power are considered basic virtues... the success of the war should strengthen the belief in the superiority of the democratic form of leadership... the danger that in politics, in education, and in industry after the war fascistic leadership forms will be propagandized in the name of democratic discipline is by no means past (Lewin, 1944, p. 392–393)

Lewin’s aspirations for the future direction of leadership research were not fulfilled: following his death in 1947, those who took on his work at the then newly established Research Centre for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) pursued a limited notion of workplace democracy with little radical intent or potential (Benjamin, 2007). Instead, a small network of scholars centred on Ohio State and Michigan State universities provided the driving force to change the focus of leadership discourse away from traits onto behaviour (Fleishman, 1973; Schriesheim & Bird, 1979; Shartle, 1979). Their attentiveness to changing circumstances and mind-sets allowed them to propose a new approach of appeal to those with the money to fund major research programmes. The optimism which marked the early stages of this discourse was, however, fairly short lived, as the utility of the crisp and clear leadership recipes on offer proved variable in different settings. By 1966 Korman’s meta-review of studies using the Ohio State model found “there is as yet almost no evidence on the predictive validity of “Consideration” and “Initiating Structure” (Korman, 1966, p. 366).
Social function and subjectivity effects

In terms of its social function the behavioural theory approach to conceptualising leadership initially carried with it the then radical impact of undermining the pre-existing, long-standing essentialist notions of leadership, by separating ‘leadership’ from ideas about personhood and natural superiority. This move aligned leadership thought with broader notions about equality of opportunity and democracy which were then being strongly emphasized as central aspects underpinning America’s success in the war, along with its scientific and industrial capability (Hodgson, 2005; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007). However, the more enduring historical impact has been the pairing of ‘leadership’ with managerial work, as this has provided the basis for all subsequent major developments.

In the selection of a recommended focus on both relationships and tasks as the desired leader behaviours, this approach sought to overcome what it saw as the limitations or dangers of an excessive or inadequate focus on only relationships or only tasks, thereby challenging both the Taylorist and human relations traditions (Bowers & Seashore, 1966; Fleishman, 1973). Leader behaviour discourse implied that leadership required a balanced approach in which both people and production were of equal importance, positioning leader-supervisors as guardians of the interests of both capital and labour and adjudicator of how those interests were to be reconciled (see, for example, Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961; Morris & Seeman, 1950). Here, leader-supervisors were held to have a duty of care in respect of those they led, affirming the view that those persons were to be treated with respect and consideration for their opinions and needs (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fleishman, 1953a; Likert, 1961). Equally, the needs of the organisation were also expected to be taken seriously: work was to be organised efficiently and effectively and standards of work were to meet the level demanded by the organisation (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fleishman, 1953b; Katz et al., 1950). Conceptually at least, there was a radical potential in the idea of raising the status of human concerns to equal that of economic concerns in the running of organisations. However, by focussing on measures of organisational performance to demonstrate the value of ‘leadership’ this potential was lost and has yet to be reclaimed. ‘Leadership’ was
captured by, rendered subservient to, and put to work in the service of organisational goals.

By connecting ‘leadership’ with both supervisory positions and with task and relational outcomes seen as desirable, it came to be understood as an important source of managerial influence on firm performance. This in turn meant that ‘leadership’ could become a topic of legitimate concern and interest to management, rendering their opinions, expectations and aspirations of importance to researchers. By adopting the prescribed behaviours, leader-supervisors could be expected to improve workplace relations and performance (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1967), meaning the discourse functioned as a disciplinary regime in which supervisors were expected to behave in a certain fashion, irrespective of personal preference. The broader interests this regime of truth thus served were managerial and organisational.

With this particular approach to leadership what is valued is both reason and reasonableness, the latter being understood as the skilful moderation of potentially conflicting interests, respectful interactions between persons, and the achievement of a work output that can be met without undue pressure (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fleishman, 1953a; Likert, 1961). What is valued and promoted is the right of the organisation to demand certain results and to expect those results to be achieved, and, simultaneously, what is valued and promoted is the right of followers to be heard and treated with care and respect (see, for example, Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961; Morris & Seeman, 1950). These outcomes were understood as being both aspirational and entirely within reach, however, what is simply assumed is the validity of these particular ways of defining reason and reasonableness. The approach implies a limited notion of workplace democracy, absent of union influence, wherein followers may legitimately seek to influence leader decisions, but only within the parameters of production requirements set unilaterally by senior management acting reasonably. Politically this was a highly loaded move, as union influence had grown significantly during the war (Bruce, 2006; Bruce & Nyland, 2011). Leadership discourse functioned to render this influence unnecessary, as reflective of a pathology which ‘leadership’ could remedy.
The discourse also functioned to reinforce broader attempts to build a post-war consensus that American business was fundamentally ‘on track’ with a managerial hierarchy as its key organising model (Cornuelle, 1975; Hodgson, 2005). Supported by this new understanding of ‘leadership’, the discourse contributed to the wider aim of ensuring that America maintained its proven ability to outstrip every other nation in terms of productivity and standards of living. At the same time, a further social function of this approach to conceptualising leadership was to reinforce an expectation of stability in the work environment. Leadership was understood here as an exercise in on-going interaction between persons, with no particular emphasis given to issues of change and creativity (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961, 1967).

Behavioural discourse constitutes a unique scenario compared with all other discursive regimes examined in this study, for it neither produces nor relies on an account of the leader as a human subject. Here there is no broader conception of leader interiority, of leader aims, values, needs or desires; it speaks only of those behaviours it defined as constituting leadership. These behaviours are attached to the position of the supervisor, but without any further interest in the characteristics of the person who holds that position. Here the discourse claims to have discovered and defined leader behaviours so that these may be enacted by whomever it is that holds the position of supervisor. Consequently it is as if leadership were a set of clothing which could be put on at the beginning of the work day and removed at the end, having no deeper impact, meaning or relation to the person of the supervisor, connecting only to their position. This intriguing possibility runs counter to the rest of the Western tradition examined in this study, wherein the exceptional and knowing agent appears time and again in various forms as the foundation and source of leadership.

Relatedly, behavioural discourse also offers no clear conception of followers as persons with particular characteristics which typify them and define them as such. Followers instead exist here as ‘everyman’ and ‘everywoman’. They are credited only with having legitimate and reasonable needs to be treated with care, consideration and respect, and are presumed to be normally amenable to fulfilling reasonable requests made in a reasonable manner by a person with formal authority over them (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961, 1967). Consequently, what can be seen here is a
basically egalitarian conception of ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ as persons, with the only basic point of difference between them being the positional authority of the leader and the particular duties and responsibilities which come with that. Here, leaders and followers are potentially interchangeable, for it is the position one holds that renders one a leader, not a fundamental aspect of the self.

**Contingency/situational theories**

Our theory provides a conceptual framework and a preliminary set of guidelines for determining how to match the leadership situation and the man (Fiedler, 1967, p. 248).

The essence of the theory is the meta proposition that leaders, to be effective, engage in behaviors that complement subordinates’ environments and abilities in a manner that compensates for deficiencies and is instrumental to subordinate satisfaction and individual and work unit performance (House, 1996, p. 323, italics in original).

**Problematization**

From around the mid-1960s, American society quite suddenly entered into a period of rapid and dramatic change. The so-called counter-culture which emerged at this time rejected many established norms, values and ways of doing things and, in particular, directly challenged traditional systems of authority (Gitlin, 1993; Hodgson, 2005). Individual freedom of expression was increasingly valorised, and enacted in often dramatic fashion (Gitlin, 1993; Hall, 2005; Hodgson, 2005). The personal became understood as political (Hanisch, 1970). Established class, race and gender relations were all subjected to intense scrutiny, while social protest movements became extremely active and even, in some cases, violent (Gitlin, 1993; Hall, 2005; Hodgson, 2005). Breaking the law became in many instances a deliberate act driven by political aims. Elements of the anti-war movement not only criticised the Vietnam War as bad foreign policy but also more broadly promoted peaceful, harmonious modes of interacting, and problematized the use of force and coercion as morally untenable under any circumstances (Hall, 2005; Hodgson, 2005). The actions of the masses now seemed more potent than had previously been understood (Gitlin, 1993; Hall, 2005). Accordingly, at work, at home and in the world at large, American values and practices were suddenly seen as problematic. In amongst
all this turmoil the role, conduct and status of manager-leaders was not immune (Capitman, 1973; Cornuelle, 1975; Roos, 1972).

The challenge for leadership scholars at this time was, thus, to craft an approach which recognised these changing social mores whilst still sustaining the status of leadership. They needed, moreover, to account for leadership in a manner which recognised the shift in organizational theory towards open systems thinking (e.g. Katz & Kahn, 1966), as well as broader shifts within psychology toward cognitive perspectives (Benjamin, 2007). A growing concern with bureaucratic inflexibility and a growing interest in the influence of contextual factors on businesses were further elements demanding attention (see, for example, Cornuelle, 1975; Fiedler, 1967; Whyte, 1963 (1956)). The inventive response to these factors was to conceive of leadership as situationally contingent.

**Key features of the discourse**

Contingency and situational theorists proposed that there was no one best way to lead and that attending to both leader behaviours and situational factors was necessary to understand and practice leadership (see, for notable examples, Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The contextual matters now deemed to be of critical relevance were strictly delimited to those within the workplace setting, maintaining the separation of supervisory-leadership from questions of politics which had developed with the advent of behavioural theory.

Proposals to account for situational factors in leadership theorising had been made even when behavioural theory was dominant, but did not initially attract much focus or support (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a; 1953b; Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958). However, in 1967 Fiedler developed a multi-faceted model in which he argued that leaders should be matched to situations which best suited their behavioural preferences. The novelty of his approach attracted immediate attention, offering as it did a potential solution to the dilemma posed by Korman’s (1966) recent review.

House (1971), Vroom and Yetton (1973) and Hersey and Blanchard (1974) quite quickly put forward their own contingency/situational models, all of which argued that different situations demanded different leadership approaches. Each proposed specific models for
conceptualising both the situation and the leader response. Regardless of these points of difference, having largely assumed for more than 20 years that there was one best way to lead, the field now switched assumptions, focusing on the discovery of multiple approaches to leadership, arguing that matching leader behaviour with situational factors was key. This shift was rhetorically presented as an advancement in knowledge, rather than a sudden reversal in a core assumption.

For early advocates of this mode of conceptualising leadership, Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), leadership required either a democratic, autocratic or laissez faire approach depending on the nature of the work, the workplace and the workers: the choice to dictate, to abdicate or to share authority was assumed here as being the sole prerogative of supervisor-leaders. Fiedler’s model (1967) advocated a matching between a leader’s task or relationship preference on the one hand and the degree of structure in the work tasks, the leader’s positional power and the state of the leader-follower relationship on the other. A careful assessment of these factors was intended to ensure that leaders were placed only in situations which would play to their preferences and not expose them to followers who might challenge their lead.

Vroom and Yetton (1973), drawing on decision science methods, sought precisely to define the range of situations a leader might face and to prescribe for each the best approach to decision making. This model can be understood as a means of mitigating the uncertainty and risk which was now seen to be facing leaders in securing followers’ willing compliance. House’s path-goal model (1971) proposed that leaders assess a prescribed range of both environmental factors and follower characteristics: from that assessment leaders were to then select their approach from a prescribed set of options. Hersey and Blanchard (1974) proposed an approach in which the extent of latitude granted to followers depended on the leader’s assessment of their ability and psychological ‘maturity’ (or docility?) to perform the task required of them.

Factors such as the nature of work and the workplace were, thus, important aspects of situational/contingency models, while more attention also now went to the ‘problem’ of followers and the leader-follower relationship. With the development of these models there was an increased concern to manage and mitigate the difficulties followers and other contextual factors might pose for leaders.
Researchers moved away from offering a standardised ‘one size fits all’ recipe for leading based on the findings of large-scale empirical studies with this shift to contingency/situational thinking. Instead, what developed was a competing suite of ‘set menus’ based on smaller studies or ‘lessons’ drawn from consulting experience, with theorist A recommending for context B to use leader style C, while theorist D set forth what they considered to be a relevant contextual factor E and proposed leader behaviour response F (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The basic nature of contingency/situational thinking is such that it lends itself to the production of a proliferation of different models, and that is indeed what occurred.

In abandoning the shared search for the one best way to lead which behavioural theorists had largely adhered to, it became much more viable for scholars to advance their own favoured perspective largely irrespective of what others might propose. Now, so long as the contextual factors examined differed between theorists, each could claim to have produced findings relevant to those specific factors which need not be directly compared with other findings (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). That these varying models could not be tied together to produce a coherent account of the truth about leadership (Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Lombardo & McCall, 1978) was hardly now a concern for most, given the assumption that there was no one right way to lead and given the commercial and professional success on offer for those able to develop and promote their own models.

The expectations placed on leaders were heightened with the move to contingency/situational theories: skilled diagnosis of follower ‘needs’ and, excepting Fielder (1967), the tactical capacity to then shift one’s approach became the new standard for leaders to meet (e.g. Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Followers’ state of mind toward their work and workplace became a focal point for leader attention, with leaders expected to asses and respond to that (e.g. Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). This was a rapid and dramatic change from behavioural theory where leaders were given a set formula to adopt, quite irrespective of any assessment of the situation or of followers.

With the shift to contingency/situational models, more attention was given over to followers, although the nature of this attention was one now increasingly focussed on
extracting optimal work performance and managing their problematic behaviour. Followers were now presented in varying forms and ascribed varying merits according to their actual performance, ability to perform and willingness to meet the leader’s expectation (e.g. Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Followers were understood as potentially being reluctant, hostile, suspicious, merely compliant or enthusiastic, diligent and committed (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Followers’ tendency to enter into or remain in varying states of capacity and willingness to perform was understood as being a direct consequence of the approach taken by leaders. Followers’ state of mind about their work and workplace was now of legitimate concern and of importance to leaders, demanding constant leader scrutiny (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The capacity of leaders to shift followers’ state of mind was here both assumed and rendered more powerful than followers’ own will.

Yet if followers were now understood as a problem, leadership was the nonetheless heralded as the answer, producing a self-sustaining, self-fulfilling dynamic. The situation was, thus, that “while disagreeing with one another in important respects, these theories and models share an implicit assumption that while the style of leadership likely to be effective may vary according to the situation, some leadership style will be effective regardless of the situation” (Kerr & Jermier, 1978, p. 375, italics in original). That alternatives to leadership and the limits of leadership had been identified in a number of recent studies (e.g. Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Pfeffer, 1977; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) did not constrain the confidence of the claims now made for the efficacy of leadership. That leadership might be understood as an attribution rather than a definite pattern of behaviour or personal characteristic (Calder, 1977) did not impede this new discourse.

Rather, a multi-faceted frame wherein the leader-follower relationship, follower state of mind with regards to their work and workplace and leader diagnosis and response to that were now all positioned as central components of the truth about leadership (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The workplace focus and the expectation and legitimacy of leader authority over followers were matters entirely taken for granted. The assumption of the relative weakness of follower agency to determine their own state of mind about their work and workplace
compared with that of leaders was so embedded that it demanded neither attention nor explanation. In this new account of the truth, leaders were authorised to reach much further into the minds of followers, to colonise their thinking more completely and to enhance their productivity and job satisfaction to a much greater extent. Stripped of its ostensible goal of achieving a balance of both human and production needs, what was now on offer was a series of guidebooks on managerial manipulation.

Contingency/situational thinking, however, very quickly led to a proliferation of competing theories (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). While advocates of different theories could claim there was a steady building up of knowledge in respect of a given theory, the challenge of bringing together a coherent body of scientifically validated knowledge was increasingly seen as a serious concern. Consequently, a further key feature of the archive during this time was a growing sense of frustration that the product of scholarly efforts was deeply problematic.

As early as 1959, Bennis had claimed that “of all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, leadership theory undoubtedly contends for top nomination. And, ironically, probably more has been written and less is known about leadership than about any other topic in the behavioural sciences” (pp. 259-260). Miner went as far as proposing “the concept of leadership itself has out-lived its usefulness” (1975, p. 200). Melcher argued “the study of leadership these last seventy years has resulted in little accumulated knowledge that permits one to understand or predict the effects of leadership approaches, or that provides a better understanding of how to be an effective leader” (1977, p. 94). Soon after, Lombardo and McCall characterised the field as marked by a “mindboggling” number of “un-integrated models, theories, prescription and conceptual schemes”; they claimed “much of the literature is fragmentary, trivial, unrealistic and dull” and “the research results are characterised by Type III errors (solving the wrong problems precisely) and by contradictions” (1978, p. 3). Thus, while proponents of contingency/situational theories continued to advocate their efficacy, others raised serious doubts about the state of leadership knowledge.
Processes of formation

That the move to contingency/situational thinking arose at least in part as a consequence of the difficulties in establishing the validity of behavioural theory is not contested here. As noted earlier, Korman’s 1966 meta-review of studies deploying the Ohio State behavioural model was damning. The inherent limitations of a static, two-factor model to sustain a whole field of research were likely also evident to scholars wanting to enhance the influence of their efforts. However, the extent to which behavioural theory was directly imported into the suite of contingency/situational models which came to prominence should not be overlooked.

Fiedler (1967), for example, took for granted that leaders could be divided according to their task or relationship preference, replicating the key conceptual componentry used in both the Ohio and Michigan behavioural models. House’s model (1971) also included a not dissimilar notion of the key elements of leader behaviour. Hersey and Blanchard (1974) explicitly built off the ‘consideration’ and ‘structure’ components of the Ohio State studies, complementing this with their concept of follower psychological maturity.

Consequently, while contingency/situational theories constituted, on the one hand, a dramatic reversal in the prior assumption that there was one best way to lead, they simultaneously continued to assume that leader behaviours were central to explaining leadership, and that these could be adequately captured in a few key dimensions. This type of intellectual mutation is, of course, commonplace, but given the lack of evidence for behavioural theory, as established by Korman’s meta-review, it meant that ‘progress’ in leadership ‘science’ was more rhetorical than substantive in nature.

Other factors were influential in facilitating the appeal of contingency/situational models. The 1960s had seen an increasingly hostile attitude develop toward ‘bureaucratic’, impersonal or inflexible modes of functioning by those in positions of authority (Ackerman, 1975; Cornuelle, 1975; Roos, 1972). Social norms and expectations were shifting rapidly; Whyte’s ‘organization man’ (1963 (1956)) was increasingly seen as a straight-jacket which inhibited individual expression and fulfilment. An approach to theorizing leadership which offered choice was, thus, well suited to the broader cultural milieu of the time: acknowledging individual needs and differences, and acknowledging that specific conditions carried with them different opportunities and dilemmas, was in
accordance with wider developments in thought (Reed, 2006; Wren, 2005). Within the discipline of psychology, cognitive approaches were gaining ascendency as the critique of a strict behaviourist perspective gathered more support (Benjamin, 2007). The importance for leadership scholars to demonstrate the alignment of their work with this and with developments in the broader management literature (Reed, 2006; Wren, 2005) would also have facilitated the appeal of contingency/situational models.

**Social function and subjectivity effects**

In abandoning the earlier pursuit of a singular model of effective leadership, contingency/situational discourse functioned to open up new opportunities for leadership scholars: this approach to conceptualising leadership facilitated publishing and consulting opportunities for entrepreneurial researchers able to develop a model that could be claimed as uniquely tailored to situations or contingencies of interest to particular audiences. These entrepreneurial researchers could now establish status and credibility much more readily through the development of their own models than was possible when the field focussed on coherence and accumulation of knowledge pertaining to a singular version of the truth about leadership. A milieu in which the existence of many truths about leadership was rendered both possible and desirable was, thus, also one wherein leadership scholars could readily compete for commercial gain and status.

The broader social function of contingency/situational discourse was to elevate the status of leadership as an activity which entails the skilful, considered and legitimate manipulation of others, resulting in improved organisational results. Leadership was now increasingly positioned as a solution to the problem of employees dissatisfied with inflexible or bureaucratic modes of interaction (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The heightened complexity this discourse ascribed to leadership serves to enhance the status of leaders, for they were now understood as persons in possession of sophisticated diagnostic and decision-making skills deployed responsively. Leadership was thus increasingly emphasized as being of critical importance with the advent of contingency/situational thinking; bolder claims were made as to its necessity, potency and complexity.
In contingency/situational thinking, the person of the ideal leader is portrayed as a skilful and considered diagnostician of worker/follower behaviours, whose aim is to secure willing compliance, satisfaction and productivity. Excepting Fiedler, who regards a leader’s preference for a task or relationship focus as largely fixed, as with behavioural theory leaders are positioned as being persons concerned to satisfy the needs of both organisations and those who work within them. Leaders appear here as persons highly attentive to the human dynamics of the workgroup, able to carefully analyse and then flexibly (other than for Fielder) respond to those dynamics. Here the leader’s behaviour may be directive, collaborative or passive, depending on their analysis of the situational requirements.

With this development leaders were once again understood as knowing agents, via the assumption that leader cognition precedes leader behaviour. Fiedler’s interest in the leader’s interior life, for example, sought to determine the “underlying need-structure of the individual which motivates his behaviour in various leadership situations” (1967, p. 36). As with behavioural discourse, the primary issues of concern demanding leader attention remained workplace relationships and task performance. The overall effect of these developments constituted a raised expectation of leaders when compared with behavioural theory, as leadership was no longer a set recipe to follow but rather involved assessing and selecting from a set of ingredients to bring about the optimal approach and result.

Followers remained, as with behavioural discourse, persons with legitimate needs and concerns. However, they were now also understood as persons whose agency may be problematic, potentially even posing a threat to the leader’s ability to exercise his/her rightful authority (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Followers’ state of mind was thus something to which the leader must be alert and responsive, due to its potentially disruptive capacity. This in turn suggests a relationship between subjects who each seek to influence the other but where the expectation is that the leader, through skilful diagnosis, will bring the follower around to willing compliance and satisfaction.

The leader-follower relationship as portrayed here suggests a constant state of assessment on the part of the leader as to the follower’s state of mind, technical
capability and willingness to comply with the leader’s wishes (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). In what was seen as its ideal state the relationship was said to entail mutually respectful and trusting connections between leader and followers. In what was understood as being an undesirable state, the relationship was said to be marked by follower mistrust, hostility and overt or covert resistance; here the pressure was on both leader and follower to change that dynamic. With Fiedler’s model, follower power and opinion was explicitly positioned as a potential problem to be managed, and so carries with it the constant risk of leader failure. Overall, the leader-follower relationship in contingency/situational discourse was understood as being potentially unstable, with the expectation always that where the relationship was other than trusting and respectful it is the leader who can and should change this state of affairs.

‘New leadership’

The crisis in leadership today is the mediocrity or irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power, but leadership rarely rises to the full need for it…We fail to grasp the essence of leadership that is relevant to the modern age…No central concept of leadership has yet emerged... (Burns, 1978, pp. 1−3).

...a crucial contribution of transformational/charismatic leadership has been in terms of its rejuvenation of the leadership field, regardless of whatever content contributions it has made. This rejuvenation came about because of what most would consider a paradigm shift that has attracted numerous new scholars and moved the field as a whole out of its doldrums (Hunt, 1999, p. 129).

Problematization

By the late 1970s, claiming to an American audience that leadership was now in a state of crisis was quite easily done. The turmoil generated by Watergate, the failure of the Vietnam War, the OPEC oil crisis, stagflation and the competitive challenges now eroding America’s industrial supremacy all added to the sense that America had somehow lost its way (Ackerman, 1975; Hodgson, 2005; Magaziner & Reich, 1982). Simultaneously, positioning leadership as a vital force which could produce dramatic and widespread change was also readily done at this time, when the likes of Martin Luther King, John F.
Kennedy, Malcolm X and Gloria Steinem had attracted such great attention, affection and regard for their efforts to bring about change (Gitlin, 1993; Hall, 2005). Connecting this case for a new approach to leadership with an appealingly optimistic view of human potential (see Burns, 1978) both demanded, and helped to create, a radical reconceptualization of the truth about leadership.

Coming from outside the workplace-focussed leadership literature, political scientist James MacGregor Burns (1978) tackled this task largely without reference to that literature. In so doing, he simultaneously created a means for those workplace-focussed leadership scholars to simply step away from the troubles facing the field and to begin exploring ‘new leadership’. Since then, this discourse has sustained itself by continuously problematizing modern society as being so complex, ever-changing and demanding that leadership is vital to the continued progress of human society. Followers’ inability to realise their full potential in the absence of ‘new leadership’ has been continuously problematized over the course of this discourse. ‘New leadership’ was invented to address these concerns.

**Key features of this discourse**

James MacGregor Burns’ *Leadership*, the key foundational text informing the development of the ‘new leadership’ paradigm, was first published in 1978. By the mid 1980s contingency/situational models were by and large eclipsed as ‘new leadership’ thinking came to dominate the field of leadership studies (Bass, 1999; Hunt, 1999; Jackson & Parry, 2011).

The portrayal of the leader as first proposed by Burns is that of an agent of morally uplifting change who has a transformative effect on followers. In this account, a leader’s relationship with followers is said to be one “not only of power but of mutual needs, aspirations and values” (Burns, 1978, p. 4). It is claimed “leadership emerges from, and always returns to, the fundamental needs and wants, aspirations, and values of the followers... (it) produce(s) social change that will satisfy followers’ authentic needs” (Burns, 1978, p. 4). A key assumption at this early stage is that “followers have adequate knowledge of alternative leaders...and the capacity to choose among those alternatives”
(Burns, 1978, p. 4). An expectation that leaders and followers have common interests is thus an important feature of Burns’ original thinking, as is the assumption that followers can choose their leader. These assumptions in turn provide a basis for expecting the ethical conduct of leaders will accord with what followers would expect and deem acceptable. Should it not, follower support can and will be withdrawn.

The return of the leader as exceptional person pre-dates Burns via House’s (1977) theory of charismatic leadership. This theory was grounded in a psychological understanding of charisma as that which excites a devoted follower response (House, 1977), rather than in Weber’s sociological notion of charismatic leadership as an emotionally based form of authority relations (Eisenstadt & Weber, 1968). While House’s work led to a stream of further research (e.g. Conger, 1989; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Shamir & Howell, 1999), its broader impact is its contribution to the process of positioning leadership as the work of exceptional individuals and for the emotional responses of followers to be seen as an important aspect of leadership.

Burn’s account of ‘transforming leadership’ assumed mutuality between leaders and followers not only in terms of shared needs, wants, aspirations and values, but also in terms of psychological functioning (1978). Here, leaders are understood as persons driven to express themselves through leadership, while followers are understood as persons whose potential can only be released through the leader’s influence: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was adapted through Burns’ introduction of the leader as the motive force which impels followers toward self-actualisation (1978). A psychological co-dependency is thus held to function between leader and follower wherein each needs the other to achieve their potential.

Burns’ initial attempt at reforming the nature, scope and direction of leadership discourse constituted a strongly normative and qualitative plea for change (1978). Grounded in both a sustained critique of current thinking and practices and the careful selection of exemplars deemed indicative of what was desirable, undesirable and emergent, Burns’ work evoked a sense of untapped potential to theorise and practice leadership in a dramatically different way than what was on offer via situational/contingency theories (1978). Read in conjunction with House’s initial work (1977), while narrower in scope,
these developments provided a basis from which leadership could be radically reconceptualised.

Burns argued that a psychological universal underpinned the phenomenon of leadership, positioning leadership as something which arises from the natural workings of the human psyche (1978). He argued the achievement of change was a central focus for leaders and spoke of ‘transforming’ leadership as constituting both the ideal and the necessity for the modern context. His model confidently assumed that adherence to the norms and values of American democracy were such as to place leaders who followed those norms and values on morally unquestionable ground.

A number of leadership theorists were quickly attracted to Burns’ ideas and ideals. Peters and Waterman (1982), for example, spoke of ‘the search for excellence’ as the defining characteristic of successful business leaders, arguing that pressing for change and bold goals was both a virtue and a necessity. Bennis and Nanus (1985) focussed on ‘visionary’ leadership, placing the emphasis on the ambitious goals effective leaders were held to advance, these visions being derived from the leader’s creative capacities. However, it was Bass’s (1985a) reformulation which sought to substantiate the claims made by Burns by deploying social science norms of speaking the truth.

Bass (1985a) developed a specific set of leadership processes which he claimed are the means by which what he renamed transformational leaders achieve the dramatic changes in performance now positioned as being the true value of leadership. Developed through various iterations, Bass’s model came to comprise four ‘transformational’ and two ‘transactional’ components and it is this which has come to be the most influential and extensively researched theory in ‘new leadership’ discourse (Bass, 1999; Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006; Jackson & Parry, 2011).

In this model ‘intellectual stimulation’ refers to the leader’s capacity to identify new ideas and opportunities which challenge followers accepted ways of thinking and acting (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999). ‘Individualised consideration’ means the leader’s treatment of followers as unique persons with their own hopes and fears in which the leader showed interest, always encouraging them to grow (Avolio et al., 1999). ‘Inspirational motivation’ is the leader’s capacity to articulate a vision or goal which followers find highly appealing and which excites their support, while ‘idealized influence’ means the
leader acts as a role model, with their standards of behaviour setting the bar for others (Avolio et al., 1999).

Burns (1978) had claimed that leadership took two different forms: transforming and transactional leadership. For him, the latter was understood as lacking a higher purpose, as concerned only with instrumental exchange, while the former was positioned as being both necessary and desirable to bring about social change for the benefit of all. Bass (1985a), however, reconceptualised Burn’s proposition, arguing transformational and transactional approaches could and should be combined. The driver for this reconceptualization was that Bass’s model was intended for application to the workplace environment.

In paving the way for the ready integration into organizational life of these new ideas, Bass (1985a) took it for granted that ‘leadership’ would be enacted by ‘managers’ who held positions of formal authority. Consequently, Bass’s model incorporated into his conception of ‘leadership’ the by-then standard expectation that managers could issue rewards and sanctions to workers depending on their performance (see 1985a). This deliberate coalescing of the moral authority of leadership with the formal authority of managers provided the basis for both extending managerial influence and enhancing their social status. Burns’ (1978) original assumption of follower choice in regard to who shall lead was simply ignored when ‘new leadership’ discourse entered the workplace.

This combining of leadership with management, however, simultaneously enabled the discursive division of people deemed ‘leaders’ from those who were simply ‘managers’, positioning the former as superior to the latter. Building on Zaleznik’s influential HBR article (1977) which argued ‘leaders’ were psychologically different and achieved superior results to ‘managers’, Bass’s thinking (1985a) also aligned with Bennis and Nanus who claimed that “managers are people who do things right while leaders are people who do the right thing” (1985, p. 21).

This positioning has continued largely unchallenged through to the present day (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Sinclair, 2007). The effect is that while one might hold managerial authority, it is only through engaging in ‘visionary change’ which ‘transforms’ others that one’s credentials as a leader can be firmly established. This effective takeover of ‘management’ by ‘leadership’ in terms of social status in turn
positions leadership knowledge as highly desirable and generates demand for access to this knowledge. Those who know the secrets of leadership hold the keys to success and fame in this version of the world. Leadership texts and development programmes aimed at practitioners have become big business on the back of this repositioning of the status and nature of leadership.

With Bass’s model (1985a), a ready-made leader identity, available for wider dispersion and intended for replication, was placed on offer. The ‘new leader’ here is fully and formally specified as a charismatic individual with high levels of “self-confidence and self-esteem” (Bass, 1985a, p. 45), capable of defining priorities and meaning in a manner which others find persuasive. Leaders are portrayed here as persons motivated to inspire others through emotional appeals and intellectual stimulation and concerned also with the needs, views and development of individual followers. The leader is expected (and warranted) to induce changes in thought and practice in regards to such diverse matters as “who rules and by what means; the work-group norms, as well as ultimate beliefs about religion, ideology, morality, ethics, space, time, and human nature” (Bass, 1985a, p. 24). To achieve these kinds of results, the leader “invents, introduces, and advances the cultural forms” resulting in change to “the social warp and woof of reality” (Bass, 1985a, p. 24). Because it is now assumed that the leader functions in a workplace setting with formal authority, withholding or granting rewards dependent on performance also becomes part of the leader’s role.

Followers are portrayed in ‘new leadership’ discourse as persons with unmet needs and unrealised potential: to address these gaps in their lives consequently requires the intervention of the leader (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). It is said that followers may not fully understand their own true needs and hence the leader is to be the one who can reveal these to them (Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). Matched to this the follower is portrayed as someone in need of guidance, amenable to change, needing to be changed, requiring someone else to prompt this change, and benefiting from this change (see Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). Followers are said to be naturally self-serving but amenable to becoming self-denying. Via the leader’s intervention, followers are expected to “transcend their own self-interest for the good of the group, organization, or country” (Bass, 1985a, p. 15).
This focus on followers’ potential for good is markedly more positive than the distrust evident in contingency-situational accounts.

**Processes of formation**

The emergence of the ‘new leadership’ discourse in America of the late 1970s and 1980s can most usefully be understood as a strategic response to a range of social, political and economic factors and events. At this time the America had experienced for some time high profile political leaders whose rhetorical flair, as well as the content of their ideas, had excited a strong emotional response from both supporters and opponents (Heath, 1975; Hodgson, 2005; Roos, 1972). President Kennedy and Dr King are particularly noteworthy examples. These experiences rendered American culture especially receptive to a concept of leadership which was dramatic, bold and which focussed on the achievement of change. While charismatic leadership theory sought to account for the appeal of such individuals, transformational leadership theory offered a broader agenda with a greater focus on substantive change, and was perhaps also more palatable at a time when charismatic leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini remained etched in living memory.

While both the Vietnam War and Watergate provoked significant unease about the moral authority of leaders (Heath, 1975; Hodgson, 2005; Roos, 1972), ‘new leadership’ theory seemed to offer a solution to such concerns via its (ostensible) focus on follower needs. The on-going effects of the so-called counter-culture which questioned established ways of doing things meant that it was increasingly difficult for those in positions of authority to secure willing obedience simply by reference to their authority (Ackerman, 1975; Capitman, 1973; Cornuelle, 1975). ‘New leadership’ recommended persuasion by appeal to both facts and values and encouraged the development of each individual follower. Here too, then, the alignment between issues of interest in the broader cultural context and the specific form of ‘new leadership’ was strong, and helps to explain its appeal.

During the 1970s and 1980s America’s industrial sector had also been struggling to retain its competitiveness, with challenges such as the oil crisis and stagflation eroding confidence that American business and political leaders knew what to do (Ackerman,
placed the achievement of change at its very heart. It claimed that leadership could overcome resistance to change, and positioned change as of inherent virtue (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). It positioned leaders as beings with superior levels of insight, foresight and strength of character such that others could rely on their guidance and direction (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Peters & Austin, 1985).

The seductive appeal of these ideas (Calás & Smircich, 1991) for a business audience contemplating the need for a radical overhaul of American industry can hardly be underestimated. The discourse of ‘new leadership’ spoke directly to an audience contemplating an environment which was seen as having dramatically changed and which appeared to require widespread reform and new ways of doing things to regain American dominance. ‘New leadership’ theories put themselves forward to offer “new answers to new questions…using a new paradigm or pattern of inquiry” (Bass, 1985a, p. 4).

The bold claims made about leaders’ ability and right to shape others’ reality, values and beliefs was readily asserted and accepted in a cultural context already primed to see those in authority as fundamentally benevolent in intent and effect (Hodgson, 2005; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007). This context shapes what is sayable in respect of leadership as much as it shapes the silences and omissions we can see in this discourse. The appetite to so readily accept the claims made about leaders, to grab at them with such enthusiasm, serves as an endorsement of Meindl et al.’s (1985) contention that a romantic view of leadership colours contemporary perceptions, generating a focus on the potentially positive aspects of leadership and a turning away from the potentially problematic aspects of a relationship based on inequality.

Proponents of ‘new leadership’ have sustained interest in its efficacy and truthfulness for over two decades by effectively deploying the full range of techniques for dispersing ideas which are at the disposal of the modern academy. Research programmes and degrees, conferences, executive education programmes and publishing combined have resulted in an active, credible discursive regime whose underpinning assumptions are now rarely questioned (Alvesson & Spicer, 2011a; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Jackson & Parry, 2011). Key advocates such as Bass and Hunt have held editorial positions in what
is now accepted as the leading journal in the field (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe & Gardner, 2000), while emerging scholars have been encouraged by their mentors and supervisors to build on existing theory (e.g. Avolio et al., 1999; Zhu et al., 2011).

‘New leadership’ approaches are now mature and widely accepted (Bolden et al., 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Sinclair, 2007). The successful dispersion of this account of the truth about leadership has rendered legitimate, even expected, the idea that manager-leaders are entitled to work on the psyche of employee-followers. Rather than being understood as a gross invasion of personal autonomy and abuse of managerial authority this is positioned as nurturing the follower’s potential. Yet when these ideas are placed in the context of the longer term development of ‘leadership science’, as examined here, what seems evident is that ‘new leadership’ is an alchemic mix of trait and behavioural modalities firmly attached to a conception of change as both necessary and desirable, a framing which happily coincides with the requirements of advanced capitalist economics.

**Social function and subjectivity effects**

As we have seen, in this discourse ‘leadership’ and ‘stability’ are placed in opposing camps. ‘Leadership’ is here associated with change, reform and upheaval, with whatever is bigger, better, faster, stronger and newer, expected to conquer whatever is smaller, slower, weaker and older (e.g. Bass, 1985a, 1985b; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Peters & Austin, 1985). In the context in which it arose, then, ‘new leadership’ discourse can be understood to function as a strategic power/knowledge formulation which supports the requirements of capitalism to find new sources of profit by asserting the desirability and inevitability of constant change and improved performance.

The role granted to leaders positions them as facilitators to the requirements of capitalism, while followers function as consumers of leadership with the promise that such consumption will satisfy their ‘authentic needs’ for someone else to direct their work and re-shape their self (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Goleman et al., 2002; Kotter, 1988). The discourse functions to enhance the moral authority of managers and to extend the scope of managerial intervention (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003c); with the development of ‘new leadership’ discourse, managerial intervention extends beyond
merely motivating the employee to work harder to defining the employee’s values, beliefs and reality.

This extension of leadership into new realms was a clear break from previous models. In claiming that leaders can and should change followers’ reality, values and beliefs, individual autonomy and responsibility for such matters are pushed aside, yet we are told that this is really in followers’ best interests. Instead, those in authority are tasked with addressing these concerns on followers’ behalf. ‘New leadership’ has sought to colonize domains of existence not previously understood as the purview of managers; in so doing it serves the interests of organizations desirous of securing the willing compliance and wholehearted enthusiasm of their employees. There seems to be no issue too challenging for the ‘new leader’ to take on, no problem beyond their capacity to solve. It is as if leadership is the answer, no matter what the question or problem, an essential force for good, and only good, in which leaders are imbued with special gifts. Here, their corner offices are akin to holy places while their utterances have become the source of truth and salvation.

With ‘new leadership’ came the full blown return of the knowing, intentional, exceptional subject as both the central focus of leadership discourse and the source from which the desired effects and results emanate. As constructed here, the leader is someone who expresses themselves through and in others, who influences others to become more like the leader (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Goleman et al., 2002; Kotter, 1988). Leader success is thus here akin to reproduction by way of cloning. The new visionary, transformational, charismatic leader may take a male or female form and can be found in factories and offices everywhere, encouraging others to become like them, appealing to both reason and emotion.

Leaders as depicted here are persons who harbour no doubts as to their own capacity (e.g. Bass, 1985a, 1985b; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Peters & Austin, 1985); the only challenge may be to find followers whose ‘authentic needs’ match those of the leader. Leaders’ ability and apparently fundamental need to change the beliefs, values and reality of others is said to be governed by a relationship of symbiosis that is to be formed between leaders and followers (Bass, 1985a). This apparently will suffice to ensure that leaders do not abuse their position. Leaders’ capacity to imagine a different future, to engage
others’ enthusiasm for that, to enhance others’ performance and to nurture their development means that leaders function here in creative, strategic, operational and interpersonal modes with equal ease. There is apparently nothing of which the new leader is incapable.

However, the self of the ‘new leader’ is also one which can never be satisfied with what exists outside itself, because change is rendered a compulsive requirement for the new leader (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Goleman et al., 2002; Kotter, 1988). There is always to be something in the ‘new leader’s’ environment needing improvement or change. There is no scope for stability, for modest goals or merely adequate performance. In this conception of leadership, everything and everyone must shine, always. Nothing is ever quite good enough. There is a demand for constant movement: so long as something is changing the ‘new leader’ warrants their own existence, their very being. If nothing changes it is as if the ‘new leader’ ceases to exist as such.

Complementing this conception of the leader, the follower exists in this discourse as a person whose potential can be achieved only through the actions of a leader (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978; Peters & Austin, 1985). Hence, the ‘new leader’ is one who frees followers from a life of unrealised potential to which they are otherwise condemned. Here it is as if followers are perpetually in limbo in the absence of the leader, waiting for the leader’s inspiration, advice, sanctioning or reward to guide their next move. Followers as depicted here offer a passivity which serves as a perfect counter-weight to the energy of leaders. While followers are credited with possessing values, goals and dreams of their own, these are simultaneously discredited as being self-serving and inauthentic in the absence of the leader’s influence (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978; Peters & Austin, 1985).

The relationship between leader and follower in this discourse is full of (unexamined) paradoxes: leader self-expression is intended to bring about follower self-denial, yet this is simultaneously said to be in the follower’s authentic interests, of which she/he may be unaware (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Goleman et al., 2002; Kotter, 1988). A follower’s potential can here only be achieved by leader intervention, implying an inadequate or non-existent agency on the part of followers. However, the leader’s very existence relies on followers being willing to change themselves (to become more like the leader), suggesting that the agency to resist resides in followers, posing a threat to the leader’s success.
Problematically, it seems that if followers become leaders, a proposition posed as the ultimate achievement of leadership (Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978), this would result in both leader and follower losing their distinctive subjectivity and role and in the loss of their raison d'etre. As a potential identity script for actual persons to deploy (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a; Ford et al., 2008), the ‘new leadership’ discourse thus offers a precarious existence.

**Conditions of possibility: Epistemic foundations and rules governing leadership science**

Having now completed each of the four sub-cases which make up this chapter, in the remainder of the chapter I move to consider the epistemic foundations and rules which have shaped leadership science, before offering an overall assessment of the issues discussed in this chapter.

Carlyle’s epistemology comprised a mix of whiggish historiography, biography and physiognomy, the study of faces to determine underlying character (see Carlyle, 1993 (1840)). When combined with the author’s own determination to search for the ‘truth of the matter’, the result was an account which claimed to offer insight into the nature and character of the leaders whose lives he analysed. However, this approach to establishing the truth about leadership would not survive the transition to the deployment of natural science techniques in leadership studies which Galton championed.

Galton’s methods included the use of questionnaires which he then interpreted using both quantitative (counting of occurrences) and qualitative methods (e.g. 1892 (1869); 1970 (1875)). He drew on ‘faculty psychology’, in which various personal qualities were thought to be located in different parts of the brain and able to be detected through measuring the head or through assessing behaviour (Cowan, 1970), along with his interpretation of Darwin’s work on inheritance. This resulted in a focus on family characteristics including race and place of birth, parental occupation, temperament and appearance relative to that of the leader (e.g. 1892 (1869); 1970 (1875)). His analysis of the qualities of exceptional men included such factors as the assessment of their health, head size, perseverance, impulsiveness, memory and interest in religion. Other matters
deemed of relevance included educational experiences and the self-assessed origins of their interests (e.g. 1892 (1869); 1970 (1875)).

From around the beginning of the 20th century, building on Galton's work, the mode of knowledge production became less exploratory and more focussed on testing specific hypotheses (Bass, 2008; Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Initially, not only great men but also small children were the objects of analysis: the task was to establish the markers which separated leaders from followers (Bass, 2008; Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). As the field developed it came to rely almost exclusively upon the methods, norms and ethics of positivist modern social science, aiming to produce research findings that were generalizable, quantifiable and repeatable (Bass, 2008; Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). Over the course of the 20th century much effort has gone into testing hypotheses that aim to define and measure the components, antecedents and effects of leadership and to identify (statistically) the relationships between these variables: establishing the correlation of constructs has been the standard to which scholars have aspired (Alvesson, 1996; Hunter et al., 2007; Yukl, 1989). Changes in theoretical paradigms have meanwhile provided the context for determining which variables and constructs are deemed most worthy of attention.

Consistent with the wider project of modern social science, leadership scholars have also been concerned to improve the human condition (e.g. Burns, 1978; Fiedler, 1967; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961, 1967). Since WWII leadership discourse has strongly directed its attention to improving workplace performance, this being understood as something of benefit to everyone (e.g. Bass, 1985a, 1985b; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Likert, 1961). This focus has marked the outer limits of what has been rendered valuable and relevant, providing a rationale for the production of knowledge oriented to instrumental and commercial concerns. A focus on the bodies of leaders as demanding analysis has declined since the demise of trait theories: behavioural, contingency/situational theories and ‘new leadership’ theories have focussed on behaviours and techniques from which the presence of leaders and followers bodies has been removed.

With the strong emphasis leadership discourse has placed on quantitative data as the gold standard for reliable evidence (Alvesson, 1996; Antonakis, Schriesheim et al., 2004; Bryman, 2004), establishing the truth about leadership has seen a turning away from
matters not amenable to ready quantification. Consequently, contextual and political concerns and the lived experience of leading and following, matters not easily confronted in surveys, have effectively been rendered marginal and indeed almost irrelevant in this epistemic milieu. Tracing the long-run impact of leadership has proved to be largely beyond the limits of the favoured epistemology (Jackson & Parry, 2011). Instead, the correlation of constructs, established by means of administering a one-time survey to a sample group, has been treated time and again as proof positive of the value and desirability of leadership (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2012; Hunter et al., 2007; Sinclair, 2007).

Modern scholars have by and large rejected as irrelevant or unreliable all previous leadership knowledge not produced via scientific method (Bass, 2008). In adopting the model of the natural sciences as the standard which should inform ‘rigorous’ and ‘reliable’ leadership studies, the most basic assumption informing research efforts has been that the object of study, leadership, exists as an ontological fact, prior to or beyond discourse and subjective interpretation, possessing naturally occurring regularities and thus governed by ‘universal laws’ (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Drath et al., 2008). The aim of leadership research within this intellectual framework is, thus, one of discovering ‘what really exists’.

However, with the shift by most scholars to the assumption that there is no one best way to lead following the failure of behavioural theories to sustain support, a subtle but profound move away from the norms of the physical sciences also occurred at the level of basic epistemology. The careful definition of constructs, the use of anonymous survey techniques and the subjection of data to complex statistical analyses all go to suggest that scientific rigour and discipline guide the production of authorised texts in this discourse. However, the acceptance by the field of a proliferation of competing models also clearly implies an acknowledgement that there is no one truth to be found in respect of leadership. This situation poses no great difficulties for those of an interpretivist or post-modern persuasion in matters of epistemology. However, most leadership scholars have remained decidedly positivist in the claims they make (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Consequently, a key epistemic feature of the field is its surface level commitment to the establishment of a scientifically credible
‘Truth’ about leadership, combined with an underlying and unacknowledged assumption that many versions of the truth about leadership can be established and need not cohere. This in turn means that the discourse rests on norms that are simultaneously both scientific and not scientific. The result is an alchemic mix in which fact and faith, disciplined knowledge and pet theories combine to produce many versions of ‘The Truth’ about leadership whose inconsistencies need not be addressed.

As a result of these foregoing developments, the following implicit rules now govern the mainstream of leadership discourse:

- position leadership as offering a powerful solution to the most pressing concerns of the day, so as to continuously reinforce its desirability, inevitability and value;
- assume leadership is timeless and natural on the one hand and modern and amenable to change on the other, and ignore the contradictions in these assumptions;
- treat that which can be readily quantified according to accepted standards of statistical analysis as being most credible and worthy of attention and dismiss as irrelevant that which cannot be quantified;
- assume social progress is inevitable and that humans, in particular leaders, are perfectible provided only that we strive for this goal;
- assume there exists no conflict between the interests of leaders and followers, or between organisations and those who work for them;
- assert one’s commitment to the scientific endeavour, but make no effort to reconcile competing versions of the truth about leadership.

These rules function to sustain the mainstream of leadership scholarship as being apparently scientific in nature.

**Leadership science reconsidered**

The ‘scientific’ truth about leadership has repeatedly been subject to fundamental shifts in thinking. What my analysis has shown is that the key driver of these developments is not improved knowledge but power and power-knowledge, expedient but skilful responses to changing problematizations. As we have seen, in the era of leadership science, initially leadership was thought to comprise innate, possibly inherited, qualities
of superior persons. Then it became a pattern of supervisory behaviour, a recipe which all those holding such positions were expected to adopt. Next, leadership became a selection of supervisory behaviours deployed according to an assessment of the circumstances at hand. It was now a set of ingredients rather than a recipe, and was understood as requiring sophisticated skills whose value to organisations was increasingly emphasized. For the last quarter century, the charismatic leader as the agent of visionary, transformational change has dominated our understanding of leadership, an approach which supports, reinforces and normalizes the demands of advanced capitalism for constant change. These shifts in understanding leadership were not driven by the progressive accumulation of scientifically robust knowledge. Rather, what was deemed problematic and demanding of response changed; scholars skilfully deployed the mechanisms of knowledge production and distribution at their disposal, connected their ideas with widely accepted beliefs and values, and then repeatedly produced a new version of the truth aligned to these factors.

As part of these developments, an implicit acceptance that contradictory truths about leadership may exist has developed, relieving scholars of the need to reconcile their varying results and models. This fracturing of the field’s epistemological standards enabled more opportunities for scholars to pursue their own favoured interpretation: producing the truth about leadership now requires obeisance to the methods of modern science but not its’ most fundamental claim, namely that through science we can come to know ‘The Truth’. Notably the ‘control group’ study, an examination of follower behaviours and results in the absence of their managerial leader in order to fully test the impact of leadership, is not a feature in this discourse. This leaves the ‘romance of leadership’ (Meindl et al., 1985) and ‘attribution’ theory (Calder, 1977) as equally plausible explanations for the effects claimed for leadership, for how can we know to the level of certainty normally expected of a science what the effect of ‘x’ (leadership) is on ‘y’ (followers), unless we study ‘y’ in both the presence and absence of ‘x’.

At the level of core assumptions, the field has been one in a state of flux. Model 4.1 (see over) shows that the major theoretical developments examined here have relied on changing basic assumptions about the extent to which leadership is an innate or learned
quality and in the degree to which they advocate a singular or flexible approach to how leaders ought to lead.

*Model 4.1: Basic assumptions in leadership science*

What this reveals is not a domain of knowledge where continuous progress has occurred, but rather one where core assumptions have been subject to rapid and fundamental change. Indeed, with ‘new leadership’ discourse we have moved to a position which is closer to that of the trait theorists. Were these shifts in thinking due to compelling evidence revealing the error of extant understandings, then this could be understood as an example of scientific progress. However, I contend what my study reveals is that political, social and economic factors have been critical factors driving these changes, while ‘evidence’ has had a very limited role to play in ‘advancing’ leadership knowledge.

From the perspective of the current day, the critical shift which occurred mid-century was the combining of managerial authority with leadership such that it has now become normalised to speak of one in relation to the other. The radical potential of treating the human issues to which leaders were expected to attend as of equal importance to economic considerations in the running of organisations was lost when the value of leadership was measured in terms of organisational performance. This development has instead had the effect of rendering leadership a means of advancing managerial interests.
and a function enacted in pursuit of organisational goals. The initial fascination with leader traits offered no basis for these developments. Rather, post-war political sensibilities and concerns with productivity were the driving force, drawing on and adapting both human relations and scientific management.

Leadership ‘science’ has, by and large, produced knowledge which claims to be context free, aiming for findings that will be accepted as generalizable accounts of the truth about leadership. What has been constructed is a science of correlations derived largely from the administration of surveys to American managers and workers. The approach typically taken relies on the expectation that universal and discoverable laws shape the phenomenon of leadership, which itself is presumed to have a stable ontology.

To commit to such an approach requires that leadership scholars either forget or ignore their own history and presume that an inevitable superiority is imbued in current knowledge. However, the historical fact of the repeated failure of different approaches to theorising leadership surely demands a more circumspect view of its ontology, along with a greater acceptance of the epistemological limitations the favoured methods of inquiry carry with them. These irksome matters are only infrequently acknowledged as the field is characterised by the virtual absence of critical reflexiveness towards its own assumptions and predilections (Alvesson, 1996). Consequently, at every point along the way leadership researchers have been able to find what they wanted to find at least for a period of time, be it traits, standardised behaviours, contingent responses, charismatic, visionary transformers or, most recently, authentic leaders.

The production of leadership knowledge has consistently been over-determined by a prior conceptualisation of leadership and its perceived value: leadership research thus typically functions to confirm researcher expectations rather than challenge them (Alvesson, 1996; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Consistently here we find a commitment to leadership understood as a vital source that can bring about an improved social and industrial order. Repeatedly, ‘leadership’, however it is conceived, is understood as carrying with it the promise of improvement, of ‘progress’ however that might be understood. ‘Leadership’, however conceived, is continuously connected with whatever is broadly understood as being desirable, with whatever is generally accepted as constituting an aspirational goal, a positioning which helps explain its enduring appeal.
and fascination. ‘Leaders’, however defined, are consistently depicted as persons warranting admiration, deserving of recognition and to whose guidance we ought to defer. Alternative perspectives have failed not only to dent the collective faith in the value of leadership, but even to bring about a more modest or cautious stance by the mainstream of leadership scholars.

Wider concerns to improve the human condition and, post WWII, organisational performance, have also been crucial influences providing energy, funding and endorsement for the work of scholars whose stance has never been that of the disinterested scientist. While worker grievances, labour turnover and team and individual output were early matters to be correlated with leadership, as management concerns have shifted from control of workers’ bodies to influence of their minds and selves, so too has leadership come to be correlated with organizational citizenship behaviours, employee satisfaction, and other concerns now deemed relevant to the sought after release of discretionary effort. The presumption of the legitimacy of manager-leaders to influence worker-followers has increasingly been naturalised in the leadership discourse at the same time as the scope of that influence has been extended. Leadership knowledge has thus contributed in important ways to identify mechanisms and processes which enable work intensification and a more complete colonisation of worker subjectivity.

At the same time, the expectations placed on leaders have grown rapidly as the discourse functions to discipline both leaders and followers to adopt a prescribed set of attitudes, behaviours and subject positions. Initially, leaders could simply ‘be themselves’, as their innate superiority gifted them something which others could merely admire and never hope to replicate. When leader traits were deemed irrelevant, the expectation which then developed was for supervisor-leaders to adopt a standardised approach which balanced a concern with both output and amicable employee relations. Matters became more complex when supervisor-leaders were expected to conduct a careful diagnosis of their context before adopting a suitable response. When managers were rendered into visionary transformational leaders as their core identity, the expectations placed on them rose exponentially. Now ‘reality’, ‘meaning’, ‘values’ and the ‘vision’ of the future to which all efforts were to be directed derived from leaders, was theirs to shape. Leaders
were explicitly tasked with being role models for all that was thought good and desirable in the modern workplace. More recently, leaders are now being asked to manufacture their own authenticity so as to ensure its complete alignment with organisational needs and interests (Ford & Harding, 2011).

Consequently, while leadership discourse has functioned to support work intensification and the greater control of worker subjectivity, leaders too have been more comprehensively disciplined by this discursive regime, and the demands placed upon them have risen dramatically. ‘Leaders’ have been more fully defined, their actions, attitudes and sense of self more fully prescribed, while the expectation that they have the answer to whatever troubles us has been placed upon their shoulders.

Only rarely have concerns about the potential for abuse of their position by those favoured with such authority over others been considered a relevant topic for modern leadership scholars to explore (see, for notable exceptions, Gabriel, 1997; Kellerman, 2004; Kets de Vries, 2003). Rather, leadership knowledge has typically been produced with instrumental outcomes in mind, in full acceptance of the norms and requirements of capitalist economics, without demur and without consideration of any risks of exploitation or domination by leaders of those they lead. While we might now talk of leadership as having a transformational potential, this capacity has not been intended to be directed toward any fundamental aspect of the broader economic system, but rather only to its advancement and our collective commitment to that.

Since WWII, consistent attempts have been made to establish and maintain the relevance of leadership knowledge to managerial interests. This in turn has made it necessary for those who would claim to speak to the truth about leadership to maintain a broader appreciation of developments in organizational life, along with a constant monitoring of the commercial, legal, economic, technological and political trends and events that affect the functioning of organisations (e.g. Avolio & Luthans, 2003; Bass, 1985a). This connectedness likely provides a broader contextual basis to inform the production of leadership knowledge, yet typically the methodological preferences that are deployed remove from view this broader knowledge which scholars may have. Instead, adherence to the methodological orthodoxy of the field seems to prevail over the making of comments which rely on interpretivist perspectives drawn from more ethnographically
oriented interaction with practitioners. The norms governing the publication of texts sanctioned as authoritative by this discursive regime function to maintain a narrow account of leadership. Philosophical and political concerns are now largely absent, and the question of what all this leading and following is actually for is rarely examined (Kempster, Jackson, & Conroy, 2011; Ladkin, 2010).

Even though ‘new leadership’ has dominated the field since the 1980s, trait, behavioural and contingency/situational perspectives have also continued to attract attention, right through to the present day (e.g. De Neve, Mikhaylov, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2013; Kant, Skogstad, Torsheim, & Einarsen, 2013; Kuvaas, Buch, Dysvik, & Haerem, 2012; Piccolo et al., 2012). With few exceptions (e.g. Goethals & Sorenson, 2006), effort has not gone into reconciling these competing perspectives: the visible presence of a fractured and inconsistent field of truth claims is accompanied by silence about this overall state of affairs.

In recent years a variety of different perspectives such as relational (e.g. Uhl-Bien & Ospina, 2012), distributed (e.g. Gronn, 2002), discursive (e.g. Fairhurst, 2007), practice (e.g. Carroll, Levy, & Richmond, 2008) and phenomenological (e.g. Ladkin, 2010) accounts of leadership have developed at the edges of the field. Many of these developments are founded on a less scientistic epistemology, adopt a social constructionist perspective, favour qualitative methodologies and show greater sensitivity to issues of context and power. These developments point to a potentially very different future for what may be claimed as the truth about leadership at the same time as they intensify the fracturing of the field. Prominent scholars have openly abandoned the search for a general theory of leadership (see Goethals & Sorenson, 2006). However, this poses no impediment to the continued production of research, as most scholars rely on the use of a specific theory, meaning that they can avoid grappling with these broader and deeper problems.

As things currently stand, theoretical proliferation, incommensurability of perspectives and a splintering of the field into different ‘camps’ with little interaction between them are marked features of the contemporary archive. Leadership ‘science’ in this regard is a failed project, for it cannot establish its most basic truths even among its own community. This dilemma arises due to the inherent limitations of a project whose driving force has become that of ensuring its own continuance by avoiding any serious
questioning of its own most deeply held assumptions. So long as ‘leadership science’ lacks a strongly felt, philosophically informed scepticism as to the nature, value and effects of its object of analysis, it likely ensures its continued failure as a science. The evidence to date demonstrates that the unquestioning faith in leadership which has provided the foundation upon which modern theories have been built is highly unlikely to produce a robust, reliable science. Moreover, so long as ‘leadership science’ continues to avoid treating the political values and effects of its utterances as central concerns, it will likely continue to offer a technocratic, functionalist account of leadership which ultimately serves organisational interests but not the interests of those who work in organisations. If philosophy and politics were brought into the centre of ‘leadership science’, perhaps the faith which has driven this discourse over the last 150 years might finally be questioned.

This analysis of the archive of modern leadership studies demonstrates that pre-WWII a mix of romantic, biological and eugenicist concerns shaped the truth about leadership. Since that time a strict adherence to the scientific form, coupled with an on-going inability to fulfil its core purpose of establishing the truth, has developed. What we have is knowledge production which has been increasingly dedicated to serving the interests of capitalist economics. As a result leader and follower autonomy and subjectivity have been more and more extensively colonized. What now exists is a discursive regime in which both ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ are packaged into neat and tidy bundles and expected to fulfil the increasingly demanding performance expectations placed upon them without demur. What is largely absent is a valuing of the contributions of the many as well as that of the few. What is typically missing is the desire to challenge our prejudices, romantic ideals and prior assumptions.

What has been produced is, by and large, the utterings of those dedicated to preserving our faith that leadership is the answer, regardless of the question. It could perhaps, therefore, be said that Carlyle offered us both the earliest and the latest account of the modern truth about leadership when he argued “there is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience” (1993 (1840), p. 171), for the view which still prevails today is that leadership is inherently virtuous and desirable and not inherently problematic for both the leader and the led. However, Carlyle was in many ways simply
reviving an even earlier account of the truth about leadership, for in the sixteen century
Lipsius had already argued “what greater thing is there among men than that one is at
the head of many...” (Lipsius, 2004 (1589), p. 227). The accumulation of more and more
data thus offers no guarantee of progress, nor does it guarantee that was has been
produced constitutes a soundly based science.

Conclusion

Whilst leadership science follows the methods and rituals of modern science, its key
developments have been grounded in power and power-knowledge and the main
theories it has offered fail to meet the expectations normally applied to science of
generating knowledge that is objective and progressive, in both senses of the word.
What I have highlighted is the constructed and contingent nature of this body of
knowledge and its problematic assumptions and effects. The contribution here is, thus,
an in-depth reappraisal of the modern scholarly understanding of leadership and its
conventional positioning as offering a progressive, scientific account of the truth about
leadership. In the next chapter I move back in time to consider the 16th and 17th century
thought against which Carlyle wrote when he set forth what later came to be the
foundations of modern leadership science.
Chapter Five: The 16th century European scholarly account of the truth about leadership

... a prudent prince has been a rare bird in the world since the beginning of time, and a just prince an even rarer one. As a rule, princes are the greatest fools or the worst criminals on earth, and the worst is always to be expected, and little good hoped for, from them... (God) will have them receive riches, honour and fear from everyone in heaped measure. It is his divine will and pleasure that we should call his hangmen 'gracious lords', fall at their feet and be subject to them in all humility (Luther, 2010 (1523), p. 30).

Introduction

In the previous chapter I examined major developments in leadership thought from the middle of the 19th century through to the present day. As I showed, despite the major shifts in leadership theory which have occurred during this time, modern scholars have consistently looked to scientific methods of inquiry as the route to discovering the truth about leadership. That discourse is therefore situated firmly within the modern episteme. In this chapter I turn to examine a very different episteme in which the truth about leadership was proclaimed by reference to medieval European standards, values and concerns. Specifically, I trace here the final stages of the medieval discourse on leadership and the emergence of an alternative based on Enlightenment thought. This case study, therefore, offers further evidence of the contingent, constructed and ultimately fragile nature of the truth about leadership and its processes of invention.

Over the course of around 900 years Medieval European scholars developed a comprehensive body of leadership knowledge which sought to prescribe how princes ought best to carry out their responsibilities. A specific genre of texts known as ‘mirrors for princes’ set out this knowledge, and princes themselves were its intended audience (Gilbert, 1938; Morrow, 2005; Skinner, 2002). Gilbert (1938) estimated that around one thousand such texts were written between 800 and 1700. These texts were so popular “throughout Western Europe for centuries that it is difficult to imagine a renaissance library wholly without them” (Gilbert, 1938, p. 5).
This chapter examines the form, formation and the demise of this medieval truth about leadership, with a particular focus on texts from the 16th century. This body of knowledge is predicated on the fact of inherited, monarchical rule which was, at the time, the most dominant form of government and was understood as being both natural and desirable (e.g. Bodin, 2009 (1576); Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Talk of leadership at this time thus pertains exclusively to the person of the prince and his activities.

I begin by considering the problematization informing this discourse before turning to examine its key features. Recent research has shown that there was some diversity of opinion within earlier medieval thinking about leadership (e.g. Bejczy & Nederman, 2007; Strack, 2007; Verway, 2007). However, for the later texts on which I focus, the major themes I have identified are: determining the appropriate set of leadership virtues a prince should possess or apply; policy and practical advice on substantive issues; debate on the basis and limits of princely authority; and advice on enacting the state of majesty that was held to be that of the princely leader (see, for key examples, Bodin, 2009 (1576); Calvin, 2010 (1559); Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Filmer, 2004 (1648); James VI of Scotland (later James I of England), 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Each of these four themes is considered in detail leading to my conceptualisation of how the medieval model of leadership may be summarised.

I then turn to examine the processes of formation which gave rise to this discourse, before considering the epistemic foundations and rules which rendered these ideas sensible, viable and truthful to their proponents. After that I examine the social function and subjectivity effects of this account of the truth about leadership. Finally I look at the demise of this discourse and its replacement by an alternative conception of leadership informed by Enlightenment ideas.

The decision to focus primarily on 16th century texts arose because there was a particular intensity to the debate about the truth of leadership at that time (Allen, 1951; Gilbert, 1938). Craigie specifically contends that the 16th century was “the most prolific period for books of this nature” (1950, p. 74). At this time the diffuse and complex developments we call the Reformation and the Renaissance certainly intensified old tensions, as well as creating new ones and new possibilities (Cameron, 2001; Hopfl, 2010; Skinner, 2002). These developments helped unleash a process of change which, in terms of the discourse
about leadership and associated practices, resulted initially in both ‘absolutist’ and ‘enlightened’ variants of monarchical rule in the 17th century and, later, in the emergence of ‘social contract’ theory and other enlightenment ideas in the late 17th and early 18th century (Black, 2001; Craigie, 1950; Laslett, 2010; Tooley, 2009). These enlightenment ideas posed profound challenges to those truths about leadership which had been developed and largely accepted over the previous millennium.

This chapter, then, covers the final stage of the discursive regime which had developed over the course of the medieval era and considers the key elements of what came to supersede it. Today only medieval political theorists and latinists show any interest in this body of work (e.g. Bejczy & Nederman, 2001; Strack, 2007; Waszink, 2004). Indeed “when...kings ceased to control the destinies of Europe, such works became rarer and rarer and their readers fewer and fewer” (Craigie, 1950, p. 74). However, despite its now obsolete status, this knowledge constitutes an important but neglected chapter in the history of western thinking about leadership. It has, moreover, helped to shape current understandings in ways not normally understood, a matter I will return to in Chapter Seven.

For this study I have focussed on a selection of ‘mirrors for princes’ texts for which there exist credible, albeit not unanimous, references as to their importance and for which there is an English translation available (i.e. Calvin, 2010 (1559); Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Luther, 2010 (1523); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). These writers and texts will be well-known to students of late medieval/early modern European history. Other key texts, while not strictly part of the ‘mirrors for princes’ genre, nonetheless deal with the basis and limits of princely authority which are a feature of the ‘mirrors for princes’ literature (see Bodin, 2009 (1576); Filmer, 2004 (1648)). Finally, emblematic of the ideas which contributed to the demise of the medieval truth about leadership is John Locke’s (2010 (1690)) Two treatises on Government.

**Problematization**

Sixteenth century Europe was a difficult and dangerous place, especially for leaders and those vulnerable to suffering the consequences of leaders’ decisions (Allen, 1951;
Cameron, 2001; Skinner, 2002). Long-standing tensions between Church and State were intensified during this period, while the Church itself was riven by the turmoil generated by the Reformation (Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001; Jardine, 2010). Religious disagreement generated conflict within and between States, adding a further layer of complexity to pre-existing dynastic tensions and territorial disputes (Allen, 1951; Gunn, 2010; Skinner, 2002). European society generally remained highly vulnerable to crop failure and disease at this time, meaning life was tenuous for the vast majority of the population (Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001). However, literacy rates were rising and advancements in science and technology were beginning to emerge (Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001). Meanwhile, the intellectual movement known as the Renaissance stimulated 16th century scholars to re-examine many long-held ideas and practices, as their medieval world-view was increasingly exposed to Ancient Greek and Roman thought (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Russell, 1984).

In this context, a challenge of particular moment to 16th century leadership scholars was how best to educate a young prince-leader for the diverse and demanding duties that lay ahead of him (Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Of concern was how best to persuade princely leaders, who claimed status as an instrument of God’s will, that though they might start a war “on impulse”, their personal lack of military experience in the proper conduct of war could result in “a vast tide of misfortune” (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 20; see also Lipsius, 2004 (1589); and Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Further, because “the common man is becoming more knowledgeable and a mighty plague is spreading” (Luther 2010 (1523), p. 32), this trend was understood to threaten the stability of monarchical rule.

Promoting the word of God was understood as vital to sustaining society (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Securing peace, ensuring adherence to Christian values and making the advice handed down from the ancient Greeks and Romans available to leaders, to support their betterment, were understood as matters of great moment (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Luther, 2010 (1523)). However, as a matter of some delicacy, “for some reason (it is the truth, though not spoken here without proper respect) either by age, education, or nature, those in the palace do not attain to the very first degree of mental and intellectual capacities” (Lipsius, 2004 (1589), p. 351). Consequently, the
dilemma was how to speak ‘truth’ to ‘power’ when that power claimed it came directly from God, yet it was, potentially, rather limited in its intellectual prowess. Such were the problematizations facing medieval scholars of leadership. In response, they continued to develop the earlier medieval invention of a rich, multi-dimensional account of leadership that sought to guide leaders from the cradle to the grave.

**Key features of the discourse**

I focus here on four key themes of the 16th century leadership discourse identified through my examination of the archive. I look firstly at the virtues said to be of importance for princes.

**The virtues of leaders; leadership as virtue**

Let the teacher therefore depict a sort of celestial creature, more like a divinity than a mortal, complete with every single virtue; born for the common good, sent indeed by the powers to alleviate the human condition by looking out and caring for everyone... Let the happiness of the whole people depend upon the moral qualities of this one man; let the tutor point this out as the picture of a true prince (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), pp. 26-27).

Defining the virtues required by princes is the most central pre-occupation of the ‘mirrors for princes’ discourse. The unique contribution of different authors is to proffer their own recommendations on the most important virtues. For Calvin, “integrity, prudence, clemency, moderation and innocence” feature as his favoured virtues (2010 (1559), p. 53). Erasmus argues for “wisdom, a sense of justice, personal restraint, foresight, and concern for the public well-being” (2010 (1516), p. 5). Lipsius (2004 (1589)) offers us a highly formalised and hierarchical depiction of the core virtues required for civil, communal life which I have summarised in Model 5.1 below. Reading from left to right, the two most important virtues of prudence and virtue are conceptualised by Lipsius as being underpinned by, or made up of, a subset of other virtues.
Model 5.1: Justus Lipsius’ basic model of core civil virtues

```
  experience
/          \
prudence (= the rudder) /  learning (in moderation)
\          /  remembrance (learning from history)
```

```
  faith in god
  |
  goodness
```

```
  worship of god
  |
  conscience
```

```
  belief in scripture
  |
  acceptance of fate
```

Source: developed from Lipsius (2004 (1589)).

A more detailed and precise account of *leadership* virtues is also offered by Lipsius later in this text, speaking more specifically to the challenges he saw as facing princes in sustaining orderly rule.
A striking feature of these virtues is the sheer breadth of knowledge they entail. Leadership here requires a depth of military knowledge from the strategic through to the operational level (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). It requires knowledge of Christian doctrine, of judicial processes, of the characteristics and skills needed in senior
government officials and of ways to dress, speak and move that will evoke both fear and love from others (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). The ‘virtues’ of leaders here comprise personal characteristics, behaviour, attitudes, habits, lifestyle choices, knowledge, skills or practices deemed desirable (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). Here, the virtues relevant to leadership comprise substantive, moral/ethical, procedural, lifestyle, physical, behavioural and presentational components. The concept is rendered sufficiently elastic to include both that which is seen as ‘necessary’ and that which is more conventionally ‘virtuous’ in a moral sense (e.g. see Lipsius, 2004 (1589)).

While royal status, and hence the right to lead, is conceived as being an inherited and divine gift from God, the development of the virtues required to lead well is held as being the result of learning combined with faith in God (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). Erasmus advocates the inculcation of leadership virtues “from the very cradle” (2010 (1516), p. 5), with the selection of the young leader’s tutor being a critical decision that affects the future well-being of the state, for “a country owes everything to a good prince; but it owes the prince himself to the one whose right counsel has made him what he is” (2010 (1516), p. 6). The young leader’s nurses are to be “women of blameless character”, his companions are to be “boys of good and respectable character”, and he cautions that it is important to “keep at a distance from his sight and hearing the usual crowd of pleasure-seeking youngsters, drunkard, foul-mouthed people, and especially the flatterers, as long as his moral development is not yet firmly established” (2010 (1516), p. 8).

A central aspect of the leader’s virtues is ensuring he has “the best possible understanding of Christ”, because “what Christ teaches applies to no one more than to the prince” (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 13). James VI articulated a similar view, claiming leaders have a “double obligation” to God: “first, for that he made you a man; and next, for that he made you a little God to sitte [sit] on his throne, and rule ouer [over] other men” (1950 (1599), p. 25, text in brackets added). Leadership is thus said to necessitate knowledge of both secular and spiritual affairs. This focus on virtues, and the particular virtues which various writers proposed, typically accord strongly with the Christian morality of the time (Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001; Jardine, 2010).
However, we also find here repeated efforts made to contend practically with what was understood as being the realities of rule (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). There is variability in the extent to which faith in God and the use of scriptural sources is emphasized. However, even Machiavelli, whose focus is primarily on how leaders can maintain their position and their state, and who proposes that it is acceptable if conditions so demand to act against religion, argues nonetheless “it is useful to seem...religious” (2005, (ca 1516), p. 95). Fundamentally then, the virtues required of leaders as articulated in this discourse comprise both secular and spiritual dimensions, both ethical/moral and practical dimensions.

The texts vary in whether what is held to be desirable for leaders to do is strictly paired with the moral, ethical and religious norms of the day: at times, what is positioned as being ‘necessary’ or having practical value is recommended rather than a strict adherence to these norms (see, for example, the stance taken by Erasmus, 2010 (1516), Lipsius, 2004 (1589), Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516) to these matters). Despite these differences in emphasis, what nonetheless coheres here is a common concern to advise leaders how best to lead taking into account contextual factors that were broadly similar in nature: a monarchical and theocratic basis of authority; a feudal class system; competing dynastic interests; limited machinery of government; religious dissent (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001). Importantly, none of these writers saw fit to offer an account of leadership which avoided completely issues of realpolitik.

The ‘necessary virtues’ are many and various and attract a good deal of attention. They include, for example, the calculated and prescribed use of deceit (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589); adopting a taxation policy that is not too onerous (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)); techniques for dealing with conspiracies, contempt and hatred (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)); and the best approach to take to censorship (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). Ensuring the character of the government is stern, limiting the enactment of new laws, understanding both the character of the people and having knowledge of the land from a military perspective are promoted as important elements of leadership (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). Being generous and mild whilst also instilling a fear and respect of princely authority, and not delegating matters which could undermine princely esteem or authority, also feature as relevant virtues for leaders (e.g. Lipsius, 2010 (1589)).
Machiavelli’s perspective on these matters of ‘necessity’ is of course well known: “it is necessary for a prince, if he wishes to maintain himself, to learn to be able to be not good, and to use this faculty and not to use it according to necessity” (2005 (ca 1516), p. 87).

**Foundations and purpose of leadership**

...such as light or darkness from the sun are to the world below, so too are most good or bad things from the Prince to his subjects (Lipsius, 2004 (1589), p. 229).

I turn now to consider a second theme in the discourse which speaks of the foundation upon which leaders’ authority rests and the purpose of leadership. The truth about leadership as presented here is typically predicated on the understanding that hereditary monarchy is the best, most natural and/or divinely ordained form of government (e.g. Calvin, 2010 (1559)). Reference to God’s will combined with the example of history is used to establish both the legitimacy and desirability of monarchic rule, of inherited rule, and of the scope of leader authority (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). These key assumptions provide the platform upon which the balance of the advice about how best to lead rests.

These assumptions profoundly inform the understanding of both leaders and leadership expressed here. Leaders, as God’s representatives on earth, are expected here to uphold God’s laws and to live according to God’s commandments (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). At the level of discourse at least, these laws and commandments constrain leaders’ scope of action, positioning them as instruments of God’s will rather than as independent, self-determining agents.

This means that leaders are here persons of both great and humble standing: great because they have been gifted with the authority to enact God’s will, and humble because they are God’s servants, only serving his will. Their greatness is also not without a price: the consequential responsibilities it creates results in leaders being especially vulnerable to failing God and thus losing their chance of achieving eternal life in God’s heaven, while their humble standing renders them no more worthy of God’s love and redemption than any other sinner (e.g. Luther, 2010 (1523)). Leaders are warned that “the
judgement after death is not the same for all: none are treated more sternly than those who were powerful. No other achievement will better enable you to win God’s favour than if you show yourself to be a beneficial prince to your people” (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), pp.18-19).

The secular and spiritual scope of leadership as proposed here is also consistent with these key underpinning assumptions. Leadership here comprises responsibility for acting in a manner which supports the sustenance of both mortal and immortal life; both bodies and souls fall within the purview of leadership (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). The intellectual achievement is a conception of leadership wholly consistent with the assumptions upon which it rests, deeply connected with the social milieu in which it arose and which seeks to address the critical social problems of the day as understood by those who expressed these views.

The purpose of leadership here is to maintain the public well-being, understood as comprising the promotion of religious adherence and civil order, as well as contending with all affairs of state. Leaders here are expected to be “protectors and vindicators of public innocence, propriety, decency and tranquillity... their own endeavour must be to provide for the common peace and well-being” (Calvin, 2010 (1559), pp. 59–60). Leaders are held up as “God’s jailers and hangmen” so that “his divine wrath makes use of them to punish the wicked and maintain outward peace” (Luther, 2010 (1523), p. 30).

The centrality of princely leadership to social and spiritual well-being expressed here positions leaders as God’s agents on earth (e.g. Luther, 2010 (1523)). This view both reflected and reinforced the long-standing tension between church and state which was such a central political issue throughout medieval times (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Hopfl, 2010). However, putting that tension aside for the moment and taking the discourse at face value, the purpose of leadership in this discourse is to be no less than God’s deputy in a milieu whose prevailing worldview was to understand God as the source and centre of all things. The exalted status of God here flowed directly and barely diluted into the exalted status of leaders.
The substantive requirements of leadership

draw(e) all your law(e)s and processes to be as short and plain(e) as ye can (James VI, 1950 (1599), p. 147).

Within this discursive regime, to purport to have knowledge of leadership necessitates speaking of the substantive issues to which leaders are expected to attend (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Similarly, for princes to be credible leaders they are here expected to acquire knowledge of a diverse range of what we today call public policy issues. This includes, for example, matters of diplomacy and state security, trade policy, the administration of justice, taxation policy, the control of public conduct, the selection of government officials and a strategic view of legislative change (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). The advice that is given in respect of these matters includes how to think about these issues, identifying the kind of results leaders should seek to achieve, as well as advice on the “how to” – techniques, tactics, strategies, and methods (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). The essential technical knowledge the leader must possess was also addressed.

In respect of state security, for example, Machiavelli recommends active and constant preparation. This hands-on process by the leader goes “beyond keeping his men ordered and trained”. Rather “he must be frequently on hunts, and through these accustom his body to hardships, and meanwhile learn the nature of terrains...”. This knowledge is said to be critical because it develops the skills needed to “find the enemy, select encampments, conduct armies, order battlefields and besiege towns to your advantage” (2005 (ca 1516), pp. 85–86).

When it comes to change, Erasmus recommends “the prince should avoid all innovation as far as proves possible: for even if something is changed for the better, a novel situation is still disturbing in itself. Neither the structure of the state, the customary public business of the city, nor long established laws may be changed without upheaval” (2010 (1515), p. 71). Erasmus advocates incremental, subtle and gradual change if the status quo is intolerable, but argues that if the current situation is tolerable then change is not needed and should be avoided.
To uphold the standards of moral conduct, Lipsius (2004 (1589)) recommends leaders act to curb greed by limiting interest rates and profits and constraining excessive spending. Associated with this he argues that leaders must act to limit the pride people take in buildings, statues and tapestries, “condemn ingenious and exotic” food and ensure that the manner in which people dress maintains a clear distinction between the sexes and the different social classes (2004 (1589), p. 489). Lipsius recognises that achieving these results will not be easy and so recommends the gradual application of fines and rewards, public shame and praise and role modelling of the desired standards by the leader as necessary techniques and tactics for the leader to deploy (2004 (1589), p. 493).

In respect of issues of law and order, James VI provides advice on the range of crimes which leaders cannot forgive: “witchcraft, murder, incest, sodomy, poisoning and forging money” (1950 (1599), p. 64). However, because he regards treason as possibly arising from the leader’s own failures, he recommends each case be considered “according to the circumstances….and the quality of the committer” (1950 (1599), p. 64). Maintaining law and order via the prompt exercise of coercive powers balanced with clemency, where such will enhance the leader’s standing amongst the people, constitutes the prevailing recommendation in this discourse.

The attention in this discourse given over to substantive issues, of which I have here addressed only a few by way of illustration, is a central feature of the 16th century conception of leadership. Here, to speak of leadership is to also speak of any matter that falls within the public domain, as then conceived, as well as matters affecting the saving of souls and the sustenance of Christian values. The broad scope of this discursive regime serves to both reflect and reinforce the broad scope of leader authority entailed by the system of monarchical rule.

‘Majesty’

And because every city is divided into guilds or wards, he should take account of these collectivities, meet with them sometimes, and offer himself as an example of humanity and munificence, while nonetheless always keeping firm his dignity’s majesty, for he does not want this ever to be lacking in anything (Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516), p. 111).
A further aspect of this account of the truth about leadership which I propose warrants attention is the special but rather tenuous qualities of the leader which are captured by the term ‘majesty’. This is something which leaders are held to possess by virtue of their divine status, but equally it is something leaders must actively work at to develop and sustain (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). The state of ‘majesty’ is something akin to an aura of the divine as well as of earthly power which circulates about the person of the leader. ‘Majesty’ is an embodied skill or practice which includes the tone, content and extent of what leaders may say (e.g. Lispsius, 2004 (1589)). It can be diminished if leaders are seen too frequently by the common people (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)), suggesting that it is something which can be gazed upon but which will fade from view if seen too often by too many. ‘Majesty’ is enhanced by the clothing with which leaders cover their bodies, but can also be undermined if this clothing is unduly immodest: ‘majesty’ is grand but never garish (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). ‘Majesty’ is exerted via the leader’s bodily movement, which should imply dignity, power and authority (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)).

To maintain the aura of their earthly power, ‘majesty’ requires leaders to ignore matters beneath their dignity and to act decisively in response to dissent (e.g. Luther, 2010 (1523)): anything that could be understood as impinging on or denting their earthly power risks a diminution of their ‘majesty’, and hence becomes personal. This in turn means that attacks on the state are understood here as constituting attacks on the ‘majesty’ of the leader; not only does the prince embody the state, the security of the state in turn underpins and reinforces the ‘majesty’ of the leader (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). This interdependence between, on the one hand, the person of the leader and their ‘majesty’, and the security of the state on the other, has the effect of strongly incentivising the leader’s focus on the well-being of the state, for his very ‘majesty’ is inextricably tied to that. This concept of ‘majesty’ thus constitutes a mechanism for promoting a sense of responsibility and accountability by leaders for the well-being of the state they lead. Equally, however, it creates an incentive for leaders to expand their state, via marriage, alliance or war, as doing so is understood to enhance their ‘majesty’.

‘Majesty’, however, also functions to place all non-leaders in a subservient position vis a vis the leader, for it is an attribute available only to him. While courtiers and advisors may, through the careful exercise of their skills be permitted to spend more time gazing upon
the leader’s ‘majesty’ than the average person, this quality nonetheless remains exclusive
only to the leader (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). There is no sense here that ‘majesty’ may
‘rub off’ in small quantities to those upon whom the leader relies most closely.

The concept of ‘majesty’ thus functions to direct leaders’ bodily expression, to inculcate a
sense of responsibility and accountability by leaders toward their followers, and to
exclude and render lacking all others. Its emphasis on bodily and verbal expression and
clothing reflects the focus of the elite of early modern European society on courtly
manners and the use of clothing as an expression of wealth and power (Allen, 1951;
Skinner, 2002; Waszink, 2004).

**Overall model**

In this account, then, leadership is unavoidably about the administration of the state on
behalf of God. It is about passing judgement and determining the appropriate
punishment for those who have transgressed. Determining the appropriate laws under
which society should operate, upholding the faith and making strategic choices about
matters of state security are core requirements here. Leadership is also about the
embodied display of ‘majesty’ by the leader so as to induce awe, obedience, fear, loyalty
and love in followers. It is about choices made in terms of lifestyle by the leader: the time
and effort dedicated to conducting official duties rather than engaging in leisure; the
quality and quantity of food and drink consumed by the leader and his entourage; the
quality of clothing which with the leader dresses. It is about the ways and frequency with
which the leader makes himself visible to the led, for an excess of visibility is said to
undermine the desired level of mystique with which leaders should be shrouded in order
to maintain their majesty.

The clear sense conveyed in this discourse is that leadership is a precarious and often
dangerous matter for leaders. Followers are portrayed as typically unreliable in their
loyalty, prone to “judge and speake rashlie of their Prince” (James VI, 1950 (1599), p. 93)
while fate may also intervene at any time to undermine the leader (e.g. Lipsius, 2004
(1589)). Moreover, “God ever looketh to your inward intention in all your actions” (James
VI, 1950 (1599), p. 63), and “he is present with them, and indeed presides over them,
when they make laws and pronounce equitable judgements” (Calvin, 2010 (1559), p. 52), so the leader’s soul and afterlife are here continuously at risk.

The compound effect of these various themes is a conception of leadership which can be visually depicted as follows:

**Model 5.3: 16th century European leadership model**

**Processes of formation**

The state is being undermined by party rivalries and afflicted by wars, robbery is everywhere, the common people are reduced to starvation and the gallows by rampant extortion, the weak are oppressed by the injustice of those in high places, and corrupt magistrates do what they please instead of what the law says: and in the middle of this, is the prince playing dice as if he were on holiday? (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 47).

This account of the truth about leadership developed over the course of hundreds of years (Allen, 1951; Skinner, 2002; Waszink, 2004). There is evidence to indicate that the discourse was repeatedly sensitive to developments in religious, legal, and political theory throughout this time, adapting itself to maintain currency and credibility. Verway (2007), for example, in his examination of the 13th century work of William Peraldus notes the specific ordering that leaders love god first, then themselves and then others as
consistent with then prevailing medieval worldview. Strack (2007) reports in his analysis of a range of 15th century German texts advice covering what leaders should do at various points during a church service, the specific religious knowledge they should possess and the qualities they should bring to their own confessional practices. Yet in the 16th century texts I have examined, these specific features have disappeared, replaced by others deemed more relevant to their contemporary context, even while the discourse still depends on other ideas which had accumulated over time. This sedimentation of knowledge, the sheer longevity of the key elements of this discursive regime, and the practical reality that political and social arrangements were typically consistent with the ideas expressed in the discourse likely rendered these truths as self-evident, compelling and ‘natural’ in the eyes of those who lived in this time.

The production and dissemination of this discourse followed the then existing conventions for the production and dissemination of scholarly work: pamphlets and letters both attributed and anonymous were circulated amongst the intelligentsia, who themselves were to be found in the church, in universities and in royal courts (Allen, 1951; Skinner, 2002; Waszink, 2004). The development of the printing press substantially increased the readership of such texts, but typically these texts were written by elites, for elites (Allen, 1951; Hopfl, 2010; Jardine, 2010).

The 16th century texts examined here reflect a strong interest in current events and repeatedly expressed grave concern about the practical and moral state of affairs, such as shown in the quote from Erasmus as the beginning of this section. One of the most marked features of the 16th century was the extensive conflicts which arose out of the schism in the Christian church known as the Reformation (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001). This intra-faith conflict of Christian against Christian was profoundly disturbing to conservative thinkers such as Erasmus and Lipsius (Jardine, 2010; Waszink, 2004), whilst Luther, a leading reform thinker (Cameron, 2001; Hopfl, 2010), can be seen to have supported his goal of religious reform in his writing on secular authority by way of his generally disparaging account of leaders as poor adherents to God’s commands (see Luther, 2010 (1523)).

The issues raised in these texts can also be understood as a response to the rather more tenuous hold on power which 16th century monarchs faced when compared with those of
prior centuries (Allen, 1951; Skinner, 2002; Waszink, 2004). This arose for a variety of reasons, such as more vociferous claims by the aristocracy for a greater influence in law-making as occurred in England and France, or popular unrest arising from the harsh conditions faced by the vast majority of the people, as seen in the German peasant revolts of 1524–1526 (Allen, 1951; Gunn, 2001; Skinner, 2002).

What came later, in the 17th and 18th centuries, were ideas (and actions) that directly threatened the foundations of monarchical rule (Black, 2001; Briggs, 2001; Hampson, 2001). However, in the 16th century it is not so much alternative ideas that threaten the sustenance of this discourse as the practical risk of armed conflict (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001). Consequently, the likes of Erasmus (2010 (1516)), Lipsius (2004 (1589) and Machiavelli (2005 (ca 1516)) do not actively address fundamental issues about the legitimacy of monarchical leaders because such issues were not those of the day. Rather, their efforts were more focussed on the practical problems of achieving and maintaining oneself in power.

Thus, these 16th century texts functioned to sustain a system of practice and thought whose intellectual foundations were not perceived as being under serious threat at the time. The nature of the 16th century challenge was practical rather than intellectual. Consequently, what occurred in in the 16th century was a strong interlocking of scholarly discourse and social practice as each served to reinforce the validity of the other: the practice of engaging tutors for princes was reinforced by the focus placed on childhood development in leadership texts, for example. Leadership texts assume the validity of monarchical rule and, thus, addressed themselves to monarchs as their intended audience. The interweaving of church and state is reflected in the texts, as is the practice of direct princely involvement in affairs of state, leading in turn to the need to speak of such matters when speaking of leadership. What we see in these ‘mirrors for princes’, then, is a mirror between discourse and practice, a mutually reinforcing dynamic which functions to legitimise, stabilise and normalise the status quo.

The Reformation affected the stability of this regime of truth because it resulted in conflict which greatly intensified long-standing tensions between Church and State about issues of whose authority was to prevail on various issues, and between State and individual subject on issues of religious freedom (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001).
However, in arguing that all Christians should directly access the word of God, unmediated by the interpretation and authority of the Church, protestant reformers (perhaps unwittingly) also unleashed a shift in understanding about how persons might access the truth which was later to have more enduring and radical impacts (Cameron, 2001; Gunn, 2001; Hampson, 2001).

In the medieval era, the word of God was understood to be the truth; the challenge was how best to understand what that word meant (Morrow, 2005; Russell, 1984; Skinner, 2002). This in turn gave rise to the large body of medieval scholasticism as scholars, mostly clergy, debated the best interpretation of God’s word (Russell, 1984; Skinner, 2002). Renaissance humanism began to erode this focus on biblical and patristic sources by treating Ancient Greek and Roman knowledge as having, despite its paganism, relevance, legitimacy and authority (Jardine, 2010; Skinner, 2002; Waszink, 2004). Sixteenth century reformists such as Luther and Calvin sought to refocus attention on to the bible but also posed the radical proposition that it was up to each individual to make their own interpretation and to form their own judgement (Cameron, 2001; Hopfl, 2010; Russell, 1984). This proposition, along with the notion of the natural equality of all and the revolutionary movements which committed themselves to these ideas, came in the 18th century to pose an unanswerable challenge to the discourse examined here leading to its demise (Black, 2001; Hampson, 2001; Russell, 1984).

The constructive intent of this 16th century discourse to both challenge and find a way to overcome what was perceived as poor or bad leadership by specifying what good leadership entailed is clear. Machiavelli’s Prince, for example, ends with a plea that Lorenzo de Medici the Younger, to whom it was addressed, act to reverse Italy’s decline which, according to Machiavelli, “all proceeds from the weakness of the leaders” (2005 (ca 1516), p. 121). Calvin claims “it is very rare for kings to exercise such self-control that their will never differs from what is equitable and right. And it is equally rare for kings to be equipped with such prudence and acuity of judgement as to be able [always] to discern what is good and useful” (2010 (1559), p. 56–57).

This discourse was clearly political in intent, seeking to define and distinguish what constitutes right and wrong, effective and ineffective, for those who hold princely office. It constructs arguments by means of which leaders may be judged, found wanting,
criticised or praised. It creates standards for assessment at the same time as it offers advice on how to achieve those standards. However, all of this it does within the confines of its accepted assumptions: its politics are, thus, inherently conservative, or at most reforming, rather than radical. It constitutes a disciplinary form of knowledge, seeking to shape what is permissible and desirable by leaders. Key players in this discourse are ‘insiders’ who have varying degrees of standing within the systems of government then extant: prince’s tutors, advisors, actual kings themselves, as well as theologians all participated directly in the production of this discourse over many centuries. The texts in turn serve to both enhance and reflect their standing and reputation, for only those close to leaders can credibility claim leadership knowledge.

**Conditions of possibility: Epistemic foundations and rules governing this discourse**

I turn now to consider the underpinning epistemic foundations which I propose rendered this discourse sayable and sensible to those who participated in it, after which I identify the implicit rules governing this discursive formation.

The all-encompassing scope of the leadership discourse is characteristic of the broader medieval episteme within which it developed. Here a key assumption guiding thought is that of the inter-connectedness of all things, as each is understood as being part of God’s design (Russell, 1984; Skinner, 2002; Tarnas, 1991). This holistic and profoundly religious understanding of the nature of reality, of all that is both seen and unseen, is infused in all aspects of this conception of leadership. Here, one cannot talk of leadership without also talking of God and his divine gift to leaders which renders them as such (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). One cannot talk of the practical or secular matters to which leaders attend without reference to issues of Christian teaching which are to inform how those practical matters are to be dealt with (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)).

Renaissance humanism, as an intellectual movement, also constitutes an important feature of the epistemic paradigm shaping this discourse (Allen, 1951; Jardine, 2010; Waszink, 2004). Consequently, to establish the credibility of the recommendations made, to affirm its status as both truth and wisdom, the deployment of both scholastic and
humanist norms of citing biblical, patristic and classical sources is de rigour in these texts. Lipsius’ work is perhaps the most masterful of all the texts I draw on for this study in terms of how he satisfies these Renaissance norms, for his work comprises a patchwork of “2669 quotes from 116 authors” (Waszink, 2004, p. 5). The impression constructed by the use of this form is that Lipsius has compiled the best of ancient wisdom to put before the reader and that his account is, thus, authoritative; indeed, this work was widely circulated and continuously reprinted for over two centuries (Waszink, 2004).

The nature and influence of religious beliefs and the intellectual and cultural values and norms of the Renaissance, thus, strongly inform this discourse. Here, issues of ethics and morality cannot be separated in accounting for leadership, nor can the substantive issues of governance. Accordingly, issues of form and substance, of process and morality, of power and ethics, of public and private cannot be pulled apart one from the other as they all have a part to play in this all-encompassing conception of leadership. These ‘requirements’ which shape what is sayable and sensible in respect of leadership reflect the underpinning epistemic conditions then prevailing.

The implicit rules I have identified in this discursive regime of truth are as follows:

- talk of leadership is to pertain only to the person of the prince, as something unique and divinely gifted to him;
- talk of leadership must be tied to talk of God’s will and the upholding of Christian values;
- God’s will and God’s wisdom must be treated as ultimately unknowable but always right, without error;
- Consequently, it must be assumed that in exercising God’s will leaders can never err, so the key task for participants in this discourse is determining what advice will best help leaders understand and carry out God’s will;
- talk of leadership necessitates talk of the substantive issues to which leaders are expected to attend and requires expert knowledge of these matters;
- posit only that which will maintain the monarchical form of leadership intact and beyond question;
- identify that which will maintain the king in his estate and further enhance his majesty.
Machiavelli (2005 (ca 1515)) tended toward lip service in respect of the religious elements of these ‘rules’, but apart from this there is a remarkable degree of consistency in the texts examined in their adherence to these ‘rules’.

**Social function and subjectivity effects**

The social function of this discursive regime is multifaceted. The aim is clearly to uphold monarchical rule through the claims it makes about the desirability and divinely ordained inevitability of such a system (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). However, at the same time the aim is to persuade monarchical leaders of the value of acting in a manner consistent with selected Christian values and focussed on the well-being of the people: ethical and social concerns are absolutely central issues here (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). The discourse challenges and seeks to advise leaders on how to be ‘better’, both morally and in terms of their effectiveness. It also enables and encourages the giving of direct and blunt advice to leaders by those who can claim credibility for the advice given according to the standards of the time. Consequently, this is no mere hagiographic enterprise, nor can it be treated simply as offering an apologist account of monarchical leadership. This constitutional model is assumed and not questioned, but, within the constraints of that model, the aim here is to generate results that will better serve the interests of the many and not only the few.

The discourse seeks to sustain its own viability through claiming both the necessity and desirability of its own existence and that of which it speaks (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Through the claims made to possess privileged knowledge of what it takes to lead well, the discourse positions itself as being of great value not only to leaders, but also to others who would wish to better understand leaders or who are destined to become leaders in future (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). To the extent that leadership is positioned as being difficult, problematic and yet vital to social well-being, the discourse in so speaking warrants its own relevance and importance.

In respect of substantive issues of government policy, multiple effects are sought. By way of example, a conservative attitude toward making legislative change is promoted, preferring established laws over new laws (e.g. Erasmus, 2010, (1516)). The discourse
advocates a restrained approach to taxation policy, such that tax is not overly burdensome upon the people and leads to dissent or even rebellion (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). The attitude promoted toward religious freedom is variable but generally errs toward a cautiously liberal stance, provided that the exercise of religious freedom does not result in threats to the maintenance of social order (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). A cautious and cautionary approach to war is offered (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). At a time when monarchical leadership was the accepted norm, the truth about leadership as advanced here was, thus, one which sought to materially influence government policy. Leadership knowledge here required not just knowledge of leadership behaviours, attributes, characteristics and techniques, but also knowledge about a wide range of public policy issues. What we today call ‘political science’ was here conjoined seamlessly with ‘leadership studies’.

In terms of power this discourse seeks emancipatory and repressive effects, for its aim is to both empower and constrain leaders. It offers both a disciplinary regime of truth which seeks to control every aspect of the leader’s life from birth to death (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). At the same time it warrants the system of monarchical rule which provides to the leader enormous power subject to very limited constraints (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). The relations of power constructed here are determinedly unequal, reflecting the unique, divine status which marks out the leader as inherently superior, making his will more legitimate and more powerful than others. A surfeit of agency is granted to the leader in this discourse and this is clearly at the expense of the agency deemed legitimate to all others bar God (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599). Here, to seek to impose one’s will or one’s agency in direct contradiction to the will or agency of the leader is positioned as a most serious crime, an offence not only against the leader but against God himself (e.g. Lipsius, 2010 (1589)). The case that is made for the validity and utility of controlling follower agency could hardly be more comprehensive or intimidating. It reflects the appreciation that followers, particularly en masse, possess the power to frustrate, undermine and potentially impede the leader’s rightful exercise of his power. This threat which followers pose is ever present.

The social function of this discourse is not only multi-faceted: it also operates at multiple levels. It seeks to influence leader behaviour in terms of both personal conduct and in
respect of wide range of policy issues, by prescribing the standards and strategies leaders should strive to adopt. It seeks to influence those who work directly with leaders in official roles, by setting a standard for what constitutes good advice and defining the responsibilities of such advisors to offer frank advice. Although it does not address itself to the ordinary person, the discourse does function to reinforce the enormous distance between such persons and their leader in terms of power, responsibilities, knowledge and status in the eyes of God. In the attitude it evinces toward the ‘common folk’ it seeks to maintain their lowly status vis a vis leaders and offers both encouragement and threat to ensure the acceptance of this situation.

Because leadership is inextricably tied to the powers and responsibilities of princely rule, the concept of leadership as expressed here cannot, by definition, apply to anyone other than the person of the prince qua the prince. A key concern is for leaders to ensure that followers respect, love and fear them for this is considered necessary to maintain the leader’s position. Lipsius associates hatred with the nature of kings and kingship, claiming that “god made hatred and kingship together” (2004 (1589), p. 411). Accordingly, “kings live in fear” (Lipsius, 2004 (1589), p. 413).

This balance of respect, love and fear is to be achieved through a multiplicity of means. The prudent balancing of the use of force and acts of generosity, virtue and cunning, punishment and clemency are all deemed aspects of effective leadership (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). A reliance on laws and formal procedures combined with the use of personal judgement and intervention according to the king’s will is expected (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Visible displays of ‘majesty’ balanced with a distancing of the leader from the led are demanded, because “the prince should be removed as far as possible from the low concerns and sordid emotions of the common people” (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 24). To further maintain this distance of the leader from the led, while it is accepted that “we have all our faults which (privately betwixt you and God) should serve you for examples to meditate upon and mend in your person”, these “should not be a matter of discourse to others” (James VI, 1950 (1599), p. 66).

For leaders, this discourse produces a disciplinary regime which aims to govern the totality of life, “from the very cradle” through to entry into heaven (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 5). Here, there is no aspect of the leader’s life which sits outside the scope of what is
deemed relevant to leadership; no space is permitted for a private self or a self that extends beyond the duties of the leader (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). The leader is expected to conceive of themselves as both master and servant, focussed only on doing that which will protect and enhance the well-being of the people and the state (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). The notion of ‘majesty’ serves both to sustain the leader’s sense of their unique and superior status and to render matters of state as being of deep personal significance insofar as they may either enhance or diminish the leader’s majesty ((e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)).

The leader subjectivity constructed here is one that is grandiose yet also humble, outwardly calm and dignified yet inwardly perpetually anxious due to the onerous burdens placed upon it and the tenuous access it has to God’s grace (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). The leader is also expected to function as a role model for all citizens in terms of how to live a good and moral life: “teach your people by your example, for people are naturallie [naturally] inclined to counterfaite [copy] (like apes) their Princes maners [manners]” (James VI, 1950 (1599), p. 53, text in brackets [ ] added). The advice that leaders limit their exposure to the view of the ‘common’ people and consider themselves immune to their more ‘base’ concerns and tendencies suggests that this role modelling process occurs either via rare glimpses or via second-hand transmission of accounts of the leader.

The accumulation of worldly knowledge and sound judgement on complex affairs of state is positioned in the discourse as a life-long expectation, incentivising leaders to understand themselves as perpetual learners (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). As learning from history is treated by humanist thinkers as a key source of wisdom, the kind of knowledge leaders are expected to acquire is the capacity to compare and contrast between different situations in order to discern what may be relevant to the situation at hand. So, for example, Machiavelli counsels that “the prince ought to read histories, and in them consider the actions of the excellent men. He should see how they governed themselves in war, and examine the causes of their victories and losses, so as to be able to avoid the latter and imitate the former” (2005 (ca 1516), p. 86). The emphasis placed on the value of being surrounded by wise counsellors also positions leaders to understand themselves as dependent on these others to assist them in carrying out their duties and to value
expertise in others (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). Cumulatively, these elements in the discourse result in a strong emphasis on the on-going accumulation of knowledge as a key aspect of leader subjectivity.

For followers, the subjectivity effects are various, as some followers are marked out in the discourse as having specific responsibilities toward the prince: to educate him in his childhood; to nurse him; to provide prudent counsel to him; to not flatter him; and to execute his instructions and laws in accordance with his will and without corruption ((e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Most followers, however, are to understand themselves as not marked by God as especially deserving, but rather as prone to varying weaknesses or errors and thus needing the leader to guide, to judge and to punish if required to bring them back in line with God’s and society’s expectations (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Followers are to understand themselves as privileged if they are permitted to gaze upon the leader, yet also potentially dangerous to the leader should their own immorality or lack of grace somehow ‘rub off’ onto the leader (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)).

The leader-follower relationship as expressed in this discourse is one that is wrought with tension and profoundly unstable. The leader is to serve, to love, to fear, to judge and to punish the people ((e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Followers for their part are expected to love, to fear, to obey and to hate leaders (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Little of this relationship is to occur via direct interaction between the leader and the led (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). Mutual distrust and distance is central to the leader-follower relationship here, reflecting the perceived underlying tension that followers are conflicted in their desire and willingness to be lead: while they may at times understand and accept it is in their best interest to follow the leader, they also resent and fear the leader’s power over them. That this way of viewing leader-follower dynamics was widespread is reflected in the focus the discourse places on leaders actively managing the realpolitik of achieving and maintaining office.

What is sought of leaders in this discourse is extremely demanding (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Morally, they are typically expected to be as unsullied and upright as Christ was understood to be according to Christian doctrine, yet unlike Christ they were also expected to contend with the complex requirements of governing society (e.g. James VI,
These demands are rendered especially onerous because of the view that most people were:

“ungrateful, changeable, pretenders and dissemblers, avoiders of dangers, and desirous of gain, and while you do them good they are wholly yours, offering you their blood, their property, their life and their children... when the need is far off, but when it comes close to you they revolt” (Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516), p. 91).

This rather dismal depiction of the type of relationship that is said to exist between leaders and followers is a central assumption which shapes the conception of leadership seen here. Because followers are understood as being prone to capricious, disorderly and immoral behaviour, leaders are consequently warranted to use force and to authorise punishment so as to bring the people to order (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Leaders must also deploy the aura of ‘majesty’ and invoke the backing of God for their actions, so as to persuade followers toward compliance. The deployment of both force and persuasion, of both reward and punishment, and of both a religious and secular authority are, thus, inherent to this account of leadership.

In this discourse, the account given of the leader-follower relationship thus evokes a sense of a battleground: on the one hand there is the leader’s prudence, restraint and good judgement and on the other the impulsive, licentious and short-sighted actions to which followers are prone (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Leaders are a critical source of constraint upon followers, cajoling and coercing them to act more prudently and morally (e.g. Luther, 2010 (1523)). However, follower compliance is also central to leaders maintaining their ‘majesty’, while their resistance threatens not only this but also the expectation that he will bring about social order and encourage the saving of their souls (e.g. James VI, 1950 (1599)). Thus, while leaders and followers are here joined into a relationship of mutual dependency, there appears to be a very restricted sense of common interest. In this relationship the potential for a battle of all against one seems ever present: that leadership is dangerous and tenuous for leaders, that hatred of the leader by the led is inevitable, are central messages in this discourse.
Epilogue: the end of this discursive regime and its replacement

The 16th century truth about leadership is no longer accepted as true today. In fact, by the end of the revolutionary age those truths had been largely discredited intellectually, morally and practically in many parts of Europe and even more so in the ‘new world’ (Allen, 1951; Briggs, 2001; Hampson, 2001; Skinner, 2002). A new episteme had arisen, one in which the ‘problem’ of leadership was now resolved by a focus on the rule of law as opposed to rule arising from a specific, special individual. The debate between Filmer (2004 (1648)) and Locke (2010 (1690)) captures the key intellectual elements of this shift.

Filmer, writing in 1648, put forward an emphatic and dogmatic assertion of princely authority as based on biblical authority and inheritance right back to Adam. This authority, he argued, is absolute in nature and cannot be shared or disobeyed as to do so is to go against God’s will. The inequality between leaders and the led is held to be both natural and unchangeable. Absolute monarchical rule is consequently positioned by Filmer as the only form of leadership that is proper and leaders are accountable to God and God alone. What is so important about Filmer’s work for our purposes here is the mere fact of its existence.

As seen from the foregoing examination of 16th century works, Filmer’s claims were not in any significant sense new. The proposition that kings held their position as a consequence of God’s will was, as we have seen, a long-standing feature of the ‘mirrors for princes’ genre. However, in Filmer’s text his only concern is to sustain the validity of this view from what he perceived as dangerous threats arising from the anti-royalist movement. The sheer intensity of the debate over the origins, nature and scope of royal authority was a critical factor giving rise to the English Civil war (1642–46; 1648–49; 1649–51) (Black, 2001; Russell, 1984; Somerville, 2004). Filmer was at one point jailed for his support for the royalist cause and his house was sacked (Russell, 1984; Somerville, 2004). In the high stakes context posed by these events, Filmer chose to focus his efforts on defending the fundamental assumptions upon which the body of leadership knowledge examined here rested. His work effectively constitutes a defence of first principles and of last measures.

The eventual outcome of the English civil war and the subsequent Revolution of 1688 was the establishment of a system of constitutional monarchy, wherein the monarch’s role
was largely symbolic, their powers formally constrained, and parliament claimed sovereignty in law making and directly oversaw the administration of government activities (Miller, 1983; Russell, 1984). In the case of England, these changes were wrought more by force of arms than force of ideas (Miller, 1983; Russell, 1984). Yet writing in 1690, Locke treated Filmer’s thesis on the divine right of kings to rule as still sufficiently credible and influential as a regime of truth to warrant a direct and in-depth rebuttal. That rebuttal constitutes the first of Locke’s Two treatises on Government.

Locke’s work is widely regarded as having played a central role in the Enlightenment, informing various democratically-inspired revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries and materially shaping the American Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution (Laslett, 2010; Russell, 1984; Tarnas, 1991). Locke’s key proposition is that the natural freedom of all people is both God’s will and human nature, meaning, consequently, that leadership of the state can only legitimately arise through a process of consent for none has the inherent right to rule over others (2010 (1690)). Here Locke was building on the liberal potential of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1996 (1651)) wherein the relationship between individuals and society was conceived as having arisen by way of agreement, or social contract. Locke rejected Hobbes’ defence of the consequential absolute authority of the sovereign that Hobbes claimed existed subsequent to the agreement to enter into society. Instead, Locke held that the consent of the majority constitutes the basis of legitimate leadership, meaning in turn that democracy is the best form of government. Consequently for Locke, only within the confines of a constitutionally governed democracy may leadership occur, and, leaders are formally accountable to their fellow ‘man’.

In Locke’s hands ‘leadership’ was re-invented as an institutionalised concept, embedded in constitutional arrangements and not reliant on individual will. Leadership is here de-personalised and infused into processes of election and legally prescribed rights and powers. Leadership here is disembodied, diffused and distributed into systems and processes of government. It is everywhere in the formal machinery of government, but also in no one person.

Today we conceive of Locke’s work as being the expression of a political theory. However, it emerged as a direct challenge to Filmer’s assertion of the validity of
monarchical rule, which in turn constituted a central element in the 16th century (and earlier) European conception of leadership. Locke’s intention was, thus, clearly to challenge the leadership model of his times, an ambition so dangerous that he continued to deny authorship of his work until his death (Laslett, 2010). Today, this disembodied, institutionalised and constitutionally expressed conception of leadership is barely recognisable to our eyes as such.

**Conclusion**
Late Medieval scholars produced an account of leadership wholly consistent with the long-standing system of monarchical rule and the religious and intellectual norms of their time. In so doing this discourse also had its challenges for it sought to speak ‘truth’ to those in positions of immense power, to guide their thought and actions in a certain direction. This multi-dimensional account provided knowledge deemed vital for leaders to acquire, beginning from early childhood and continuing through the whole of their adult life. It offered guidance for living a ‘good’ and ‘proper’ life as a leader, addressed itself to all aspects of the leader’s duties and to the safety of his body and soul. It sought to promote an approach to leading that served the well-being of the people and the state at the same time as it preserved the leader’s superiority, legitimacy and power.

When political, intellectual and religious understandings changed with the emergence of Enlightenment thinking, this medieval construction of the truth about leadership faltered and was undone by challenges to its most basic assumption of divine, natural inequality. Moreover, despite its centuries of development this account of the truth about leadership could not be sustained as valid separate from its institutional expression in hereditary monarchical government. As kings fell from the throne throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, so too was this body of knowledge consigned to the past, deemed false and irrelevant. Here, then, subject and object were co-dependent, just as Foucault theorised can occur (e.g. 1977, 1978, 1985). Given that I have earlier argued that modern leadership science is similarly founded on precarious assumptions, and has come to be similarly entwined with the institutional arrangements of the modern organisation and the requirements of capitalist economics, there may, therefore, be an important lesson for us here as to its potential sustainability should those arrangements change. In the
next chapter I move back in time again to consider Classical Greek leadership thought, ideas which themselves influenced the late medieval thinkers considered here.
Chapter Six: The Classical Greek scholarly account of the truth about leadership

The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of day, and there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed... of humanity itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come into the same hands, while the many natures now content to follow either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred from doing so. This is what I have hesitated to say for so long, knowing what a paradox it would sound; for it is not easy to see that there is no other road to real happiness either for society or the individual (Socrates, in Plato, The Republic 473d).

Introduction

According to the above, effective leadership rests upon the leader’s “capacity to grasp the eternal and immutable” truth, entails the right to exercise absolute authority and is fundamental to the happiness of followers (Plato, Rep 484b). Here, it is only when a leader with great wisdom and unlimited authority is in charge that the well-being of humanity can be achieved. The leader, he⁴ who knows best, is consequently said to be entitled not simply to respect, but, also, deference to all his decisions, without dialogue and without dissent: followers are to submit their will to that of the leader, to silence their voices, to do his bidding. A totalitarian model of leadership which produces transformational effects for followers is thus the proposition. Complete submission and total obedience to the leader are said to be critical to securing happiness. In what follows I show how this understanding of leadership came to be.

This chapter examines the form and formation of the Classical Greek scholarly understanding of leadership, a body of knowledge deeply informed by the social context in which it developed. I begin by considering the problematization informing this discourse before turning to examine its key features. Four key themes are identified and

⁴ While Plato in The Republic envisages women playing an equal role in his Guardian class, on balance I favour the interpretation that he later rejects the possibility of female leaders in The Statesman. In the case of the other primary sources it is unequivocally clear that leaders are thought of as exclusively male.
examined: the characteristics of leaders and followers; the responsibilities of leaders; the
definition and purpose of leadership; and the scope of leader authority. I then turn to
examine the processes of formation which helped to give rise to this discourse, before
considering the epistemic foundations and rules which rendered these ideas sensible,
viable and truthful to their proponents. Finally, I examine the social function and
subjectivity effects of this discourse before offering some concluding comments.

Primary sources for this case study are Aristotle’s *The Politics* (*Pols*) (2009); Plato’s *The
Republic* (*Rep*) (2007) and *Statesman* (*St*) (1995); and Xenophon’s *Agesilaus* (*Ag*) and *Heiro
the Tyrant* (*HT*) (2006), and *Oeconimicus* (*Oec*) and *Memorabilia* (*Mem*) (1997)\(^5\). These
primary sources, partially excepting those by Xenophon, have been the subject of
extensive on-going commentary and are, thus, widely acknowledged as being important
texts from this time (Grant, 1991; Russell, 1984; Tarnas, 1991). In the modern era
Xenophon’s status has waned but he, like Plato, was a pupil of Socrates and there seems
little doubt that he was influential in his day (Cartledge, 2006; Gray, 2007). It is known
that his work was studied by Roman thinkers and practitioners and in the medieval period
(Cartledge, 2006; Gray, 2007). More recently, Adair (2002) credits Xenophon as a key
thinker on strategic leadership. For these reasons the inclusion of Xenophon’s works in
this study seemed clearly warranted. Secondary sources comprise a variety of texts which
consider various aspects of Classical Greece history and culture; these are deployed to
assist in situating the discourse within the context in which it arose.

**Problematization**

Classical-era Greece, despite its many great achievements, was a society marked by
disorder, class conflict and frequent wars (Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006; Russell,
1984). Athens, the base of the scholars considered here, endured constant political

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\(^5\) For the purposes of this case I adopt the Stephanus pagination regime for in-text citation
of specific elements of work by Plato and the Bekker numbers system for Aristotle. For
specific elements of work by Xenophon, in-text citation follows the book.chapter.section or
chapter.section method as used in both Oxford Classical Texts and Loeb Classical Library
publications of Xenophon’s works. In selecting which of the various editions of these texts to
draw from, late 20\(^{th}\) century translations have been preferred due to their usage of modern
English, however earlier translations (e.g. Jowett’s translations of Plato and Aristotle) have
been used to cross-check the interpretations.
upheaval as it struggled to establish law, practices and ways of governing that were acceptable to the competing classes and interests within it (Finley, 1963; Irwin, 1989; McNeill & Sedlar, 1969). Beginning from around 550 BC, the Athenian democracy posed a particular challenge to traditional norms and values (Finley, 1963; Irwin, 1989; McNeill & Sedlar, 1969). By the end of 4th century BC, the extended and damaging Peloponnesian War with Sparta (431-404), along with various other controversial decisions made by the Athenian democracy, meant that there was an intense concern in some circles with this approach to governing society and with the state of society more generally (Cartledge, 1993; Grant, 1991; Russell, 1984).

Over this same period, the emerging standard for speaking the truth for scholars became the deployment of reason, in which conclusions were derived logically from the preceding propositions (Finley, 1963; Irwin, 1989; McNeill & Sedlar, 1969). Laying arguments out for debate and scrutiny was now proclaimed as the philosopher’s duty, following the lead offered by Socrates (Annas, 2009; Lane, 2001; Morris & Powell, 2006). Reference to the gods and tradition alone was no longer an adequate basis for sustaining one’s position as correct and truthful: new propositions and analyses were now needed (McNeill & Sedlar, 1969; Russell, 1984; Vernant, 1995, 2006).

Striving to uphold morality and social order was also claimed as part of the philosopher’s duty (Aristotle, 2009; Plato, 1995, 2007; Xenophon, 1997, 2006). But, it was generally believed by these scholars, the system of democracy at Athens posed a serious threat to morality and social order (Aristotle, 2009; Plato, 1995, 2007; Xenophon, 1997, 2006). A frontal attack on the Athenian democracy, however, was dangerous when exile or execution were the favoured means of dealing with dissenting views (Cartledge, 2006; Grant, 1991; Lane, 2007). Socrates’ conviction for sedition by the Athenian democracy, which led to his suicide in 399 BC, had likely sheeted this reality home to his students. In the face of these problematizations, the invention of the perfect leader with absolute authority arose as the recommended means of securing morality and order. This invention, moreover, had the simultaneous effect of ‘proving’ that democracy is contrary to what is natural and good.
Key features of the discourse

I focus here on four key themes of the Classical Greek leadership discourse identified through my examination of the archive. I look firstly at the characteristics of leaders and followers.

The characteristics of leaders and followers

...when god fashioned you, he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers (which is why their prestige is greatest)... (Plato, Rep 415a).

Imbued with this golden quality, a leader is said to be “second only to the Gods” (Xenophon, Ag 11.13). However, while thought to be immortal, the gods were also typically seen as flawed, somewhat unpredictable, and prone to spiteful or foolish acts (Vernant, 1995, 2006). In contrast, the leader here is said to be unwavering in his wisdom and morality, incapable of wrong doing, lacking only the gift of immortality (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1260a:15). A true leader is said to know the truth about leadership, knowledge which is held to be both morally virtuous and wise (e.g. Plato, St 297a). Consequently, mistakes are rendered impossible because, it is claimed, to possess knowledge of leadership is to act accordingly (e.g. Xenophon, Mem, 3.9.5). However, while perfection is seen as having arrived on earth the leader is not omnipotent, for both the gods and other people are said to be capable of impeding the achievement of a leader’s goals (e.g. Xenophon, Ag 11.1).

The domain of leadership here is largely restricted to those who are head of state, although military generals, senior government officials and businessmen are sometimes thought to require similar attributes and to have duties that are a subset of those expected of the head of state (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.4.12, Oec 21.2). The leader as head of state, however, is said to be a person concerned only with the well-being of the state and its people: he is said to be totally devoted to the betterment of those he leads (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1265a, 1333b:35). The existence of a true leader is regarded as a rare occurrence (e.g. Plato, Rep 503d) and extensive discussion of various substitutes for the ideal of a single leader form a key feature of the wider discourse within which debate
about leadership occurs (e.g. Plato, *Rep* Part 4; *St* 297a). Seen as being equipped with a
divine capacity, then, leaders are regarded as rare individuals who stand for civilised
society and against chaos and degeneracy (e.g. Xenophon, *Oec* 21.11–12).

Personality and behaviour, adherence to moral and religious values and beliefs, and what
we would understand as the public and private realms of life are regarded as important
here: to understand leadership, indeed to determine if a man is a true leader, every
aspect of the leader’s life is thus subject to scrutiny (e.g. Plato, *Rep* 484–487). A leader’s
eating and sleeping habits, his capacity to restrain his sexual desire for other men, his
attitudes toward, and treatment of, both friends and enemies, and his willingness to use
his personal wealth to benefit others are all part of this inquiry into the truth about
leadership (e.g. Xenophon, *Ag* 3.2, 4.3, 5.1–5.7). The sincerity of a leader’s reverence for
the gods, his refusal to allow paintings or sculptures of his likeness to be made, the
plainness of his own clothing compared with that of the soldiers whose uniforms he
supplies, and his loathing of malicious gossip are further examples of the matters that are
treated as relevant to understanding leadership (see Xenophon *Ag*).

To understand leadership here, then, meant knowing every thought and every action of
the leader. Even the smallest of things could reveal the purity of the leader’s wisdom and
knowledge. Similarly, such details could also be used to separate out the “shams” who
are said to pretend to love virtue and wisdom but whose true goal is said to be to serve
their own interests (Plato, *St* 303c).

Nature and nurture are both treated as important influences by the Classical Greeks (e.g.
Xenophon, *Ag* 1.5). A man’s leadership potential is said to be a birth right because “from
the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule” (Aristotle,
*Pols* 1254a:20). The vast majority of people are, however, regarded as inherently incapable
of leadership (e.g. Aristotle, *Pols* 1279a:35). A proper education, which includes “choral
performances, hunting and field sports, athletic competitions and horse-races”, is
considered influential in leader development (Plato, *Rep* 412b). Developing a love of
honour, virtue, reverence for the gods, courage, knowledge and wisdom are seen as vital
for a leader (e.g. Plato, *Rep* 503a).

A leader’s actions throughout his childhood is said to be an important testing ground in
both establishing his status as a true leader and in learning the many requirements of
leadership (e.g. Aristotle, *Pols* 1332b:35). The advice given is that a young leader should be constantly observed and continuously challenged to see if he can remain true to the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. Plato argues that “a close watch must be kept on them, then, at all ages, to see if they stick to this principle, and do not forget or jettison, under the influence of force or witchcraft, the conviction that they must always do what is best for the community” (*Rep* 412e). The young leader is to be placed in frightening situations to test his courage and tempted with various pleasures to test his capacity for self-restraint (*Plato, Rep* 413d–e).

What is produced in this discourse, then, is the most perfect of men; the one who is equipped to lead. He exhibits all and only that which is honourable, virtuous and admirable in every action: it is this exacting completeness, this fulfilment of human potential, which distinguishes the true leader from the fake. The true leader here exemplifies a masculine ideal in the very prime of life, comprising a well-honed, mature strength of body, mind and soul (e.g. Xenophon, *Ag* 6.1; 11.6). There is no weakness, no flaw, not even the merest hint of the feminine, the elderly, the weak, the vulnerable or the damaged in this account of the true leader. Here, the leader is a superior being, yet it is vital too that he is sincerely humble, modest and understands the limitations of other people, for it is they who are said to be in such great need of his guidance (e.g. Plato, *St* 309a–b, d).

The leader’s perfection is understood as being achieved through a combination of calculated and determined self-restraint, ebullient and free-flowing self-expression and a focussed intense desire to excel (e.g. Plato, *Rep* 475b, 485e;). It is portrayed as an act of will, the product of knowledge and as destined by nature into being (e.g. Aristotle, *Pols* 1325b:1–10). Here, each and every moment of the leader’s life is both an achievement and an expression of the multi-faceted, all-encompassing nature of leadership.

Looking up at the leader, the follower is portrayed as their very opposite: ignorant of what is true, what is right and what is proper (e.g. Plato, *Rep* 372e–374e). Said to suffer

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6 Aristotle argues at one point that “kings have no marked superiority over their subjects” (*Pols* 1332b:20), but he has in mind here only those with citizen status: slaves, i.e. the then vast majority of people, were certainly not regarded as equal. Elsewhere the tenor of his comments in respect of rulers who are deserving of praise makes it clear he sees them as the best of men (e.g. *Pols* 1260a:15; 1279a:35)
from an excess of courage or self-restraint, followers are presented as having fundamental, unavoidable and irremediable flaws (Plato, St 309). They are not said to live in despair, however, for they are not held to be completely without merit: with careful education and through exercising complete obedience to the leader it is claimed that followers may achieve a greater degree of knowledge and virtue, although never to such a degree as that possessed by the leader (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1325b:1–10, 1337a:10).

**Leader responsibilities**

...the legislator must mould to his will the bodies of newly-born children” (Aristotle, Pols 1335a:5).

Here, the range of issues to which it is said a leader must attend is very extensive; this is no mere processual or behavioural formulation of leadership. Leaders are expected to focus on certain specified issues and to achieve certain specified outcomes. Leadership is understood as something which entails particular actions in respect of particular matters. There is extensive detail about what the leader should actually do, not simply behaviourally, but substantively. Leadership is said to have a critical role to play in the achievement of the desired social outcomes, and what that role entails is expounded at length.

The leader is expected, for example, to make decisions about the “number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country” (Aristotle, Pols 1326a:5). He is to determine how to grow the state’s revenue, reduce excessive expenditure, plan for food production to meet the population’s requirements, identify the state’s strategic strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of the enemy, and deploy troops accordingly (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.6.4-14). Knowledge of the art of war is expected of a leader (e.g. Plato, St 303e). Deciding on the location of the state is said to be part of the leader’s duties, requiring consideration of such matters as effective defence, access to farm land and perhaps also to the sea, depending on the leader’s view about foreign trade and the presence of foreigners in his state (Aristotle, Pols 1327a–1327b).
Here a leader, using his knowledge and wisdom, is to decide the age at which people may marry and who shall marry whom, because, it is claimed, by ensuring that the right mix of character types is joined in marriage the leader can secure the future well-being of the state (e.g. Aristotle, \textit{Pols} 1334b:30; Plato, \textit{St} 309c). The leader is said to need to monitor and, when necessary, punish people’s use of indecent language and to ensure that inappropriate visual images are not distributed amongst the population (Aristotle, \textit{Pols} 1336b:1–20). The exercise undertaken by pregnant women, the number of children a couple may have, child-rearing practices and oversight of those responsible for children’s education are also issues for which a leader is seen as having direct responsibility (e.g. Plato, \textit{St} 308d, 310e).

A leader is held to be responsible for actively maintaining legal, moral and religious standards and traditions (e.g. Xenophon, \textit{Ag} 1.27). This includes such matters as issuing laws for general application, making case by case decisions, ensuring religious festivals are properly conducted (e.g. Plato, \textit{Rep} 425, \textit{St} 305d) as well as punishing or exiling those who are “driven to violate religion, justice and morality” (Plato, \textit{St} 309a). The leader’s whole attention is expected to be given over to ensuring the physical, moral and spiritual well-being of the people, attending to threats from both within and external to the state (e.g. Xenophon, \textit{Ag} 7.1). Instilling discipline and obedience amongst the citizens is treated as a key concern for leaders; it is claimed that only through obeying the leader’s directives will good order and good outcomes be achieved (e.g. Aristotle, \textit{Pols} 1326a:30).

Ultimately, it is the achievement of an orderly society in which people stick to their allocated class and role, obey the leader without question, comply with legal, moral and religious conventions and where “consensus and loyalty” prevail which the leader is expected to create (Plato, \textit{St} 311b). This is what the Classical Greek scholars claim leadership demands. This is what they said people should expect of leaders and what they claim to be the truth in respect of leadership. Here, then, leadership is not so much about means, but about a specified set of ends held to be of great importance.

\textit{The definition and purpose of leadership}

...to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power – of such a power as holds together the universe (Aristotle, \textit{Pols} 1626b:30).
The third feature which I have identified is the attention given to defining what leadership is and its purpose. In this discourse ‘leadership’ is who the leader is, what might be called their individual character, temperament or what we today understand as personality⁷ (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1326b 1–10). It is also what the leader does, incorporating every moment of every day and every action (e.g. Xenophon, Ag 11.1–11.16). It is about the outcomes which leadership is said (and called on) to produce, such as order and obedience (e.g. Plato, St 301a, 309d). Finally, it is about the underpinning knowledge and virtue which guides the leader in their being and doing (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1325b:1–10).

This holistic notion thus incorporates the intellectual, moral and personal attributes of a leader, the full suite of activities in which a leader engages, and the outcomes of those activities: for the leader constructed here, nothing about who he is, what he does and the consequences thereof is to be beyond the reach of this definition.

Leadership is generally treated as a capacity exclusive to the person who is head of state or to those rare few who have the capacity to hold that position (e.g. Plato, St 297b; Xenophon, Mem 3.4.10). It is portrayed in such a way that it does not include anyone else, even though it is upon other people that leadership is enacted. Limited attention is paid to the nature of the interactions between a leader and followers, nor is leadership understood as being something that is co-created between them (e.g. Xenophon, Ag 8.2).

Leadership here is not about a style or a process or a selected list of key behaviours. Instead, it is portrayed as including anything and everything in the leader’s life. Here, leadership resides in the leader: it is not something which exists simply by virtue of his formal position, rather it is in him, it is of him, the whole of him, not just particular parts (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1260a:15, 1333a:30–4). It is said to be about his every action as well as the specific actions he must take as he attends to the complex suite of issues which threaten or sustain the well-being of the state and its people (e.g. Plato, Rep Part 7–8).

Leadership is thus claimed to incorporate every facet of the leader’s character, every facet of their life, every action, everything they know and are and do (e.g. Xenophon, Ag 11.1–11.16). This diffuse and all-encompassing notion, however, is intensely centred on what these scholars saw as the purpose of leadership: to secure the well-being of the

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⁷ Plato dismisses contemporary commentators for their “unphilosophic preoccupation with personalities” (Rep 500b) so ‘character’ and ‘temperament’ are terms more consistent with Plato’s account of ideal leaders.
state and its people (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.1.2–4). Everything comes back to that duty, that purpose, and anything and everything about who the leader is and what he does is expected to contribute to that purpose. Thus, while leadership is said to be exclusively about the person of the leader, with no role for other people, it is also said to be exclusively about service to the people, with no scope for the private interests of the leader (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1259b:35, 1265a:15)). In this discourse the leader can be seen as both master and slave of the people, ruling over them but permitted to act only in their best interests, denied any capacity to act in his own interest.

**Scope of leader authority**

... it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey” (Socrates, in Xenophon, Mem 3.9.11).

...although from one point of view legislation and kingship certainly do go together, the ideal is for authority to be invested not in a legal code but in an individual who combines kingship with wisdom” (Plato, St 294a).

To carry out the extensive range of duties discussed above a leader is said to require complete and absolute authority on any matter to which he directs his attention (e.g. Plato, St 293d). The consent of the people is claimed to be irrelevant and there is no mechanism of independent review or appeal envisaged, meaning that the scope of the leader's authority is effectively unlimited (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1326b:1–10). A true and wise leader is said to defer to those who possess specific expertise, such as a doctor in respect of health care, a farmer in terms of farming practices or a ship's captain in terms of sailing (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.9.11–12). However, the “branch of knowledge” which is leadership is claimed to possess a broader, higher and deeper wisdom than any specialist area and so ultimately prevails over all others (Plato, St 305e).

Obedience to the leader is positioned as both an expectation and a moral virtue in this discourse and the use of coercive force is said to be justified if, in the leader’s view, the situation makes this necessary (e.g. Plato, St 309a). Laws are said to have their place in terms of codifying the will of the ruler and in enabling justice to be dealt with administratively (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1269). However, laws are also said to be insufficiently
flexible to account for specific circumstances, leading to the claim that the leader should always retain the ability to make the final decision (Plato, St 297a).

It is claimed that granting such unlimited authority to a true leader will produce a system of government that is “as far apart from all the rest as God is from humankind” (Plato, St, 303b). Because a true leader is said to be not only wise but also completely moral, it is argued that there is no need for concern about the potential for abuse of the unrestricted authority a leader is to have over all others:

... People doubt that anyone could ever live up to this ideal rulership; they doubt the possibility of a moral and knowledgeable ruler who would dispense justice and deal fairly with everyone in the matter of their rights; and if such a ruler were possible, they doubt he would be prepared to rule in that way, rather than injuring and killing and harming any of us whenever he felt like it. And yet, if they were faced with the kind of ruler we're describing, people would feel perfectly comfortable; he'd take sole command of the only system of government which, if we were speaking strictly, we would call authentic, and he'd govern in a way which guaranteed their happiness” (Plato, St 301d).

Here, then, what is claimed is that leadership creates happiness for all. The proposition is that only through ceding complete and absolute authority to the leader can this be achieved (see also Xenophon, Mem 3.2.4). The difficulty, so clearly signalled, is to overcome the doubts borne of bitter experience about the plausibility of the all-perfect, all-powerful leader.

These four key themes are summarized in Table 6.1

**Table 6.1 Key features of ‘leadership’ in the Classical Greek discourse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key features of 'leadership' in the Classical Greek discourse</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• leaders are perfect, divine, knowledgeable and moral and this is part of the natural order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• leaders act only in the interests of the people: their purpose is to create order, security and well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• leaders are rare</td>
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<tr>
<td>• every aspect of the leader’s life is part of leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• followers are inherently flawed and require leaders to guide them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• leaders should attend to all and any issues which affect the well-being of the state and be obeyed without question</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Processes of formation

That some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient (Aristotle, *Pols* 1254a:20).

Much of the Classical Greek account of the truth about leadership may seem offensive or bizarre to today's reader. That the so-called founding fathers of Western philosophy held such views therefore requires some explaining. I turn now, therefore, to consider the processes of formation which shaped the development of this account of the truth about leadership.

Ancient (ca 750–510 BC) and Classical (ca 5th–4th centuries BC) Greek society is known to have been strongly affected by both inter-state warfare and intra-state conflict which occurred between its various class groupings (Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006; Thucydides, 2006). The institution of the polis, or city-state, with a population of only several thousand, was the core social and political unit of these times (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006). However, while the city-state was a fairly stable form of social organisation, the constitutional form of government which applied within city-states was not (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Herotodus, 1998). Athens, of particular relevance here, experienced monarchical, oligarchical, aristocratic, democratic and tyrannical forms of government and was also, for a brief period, subjected to direct foreign rule by Sparta during these times (Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006; Russell, 1984). Movement between the social classes was generally restricted and the different classes had differentiated levels of wealth, prestige and legal and political rights (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006). These times, then, were marked by continuous political and military conflict and upheaval between and within small city-states whose population was divided into different social classes.

This social context profoundly informs the account of leadership examined here. A common concern connecting the multitude of issues to which it is said leaders should attend is ensuring order and stability (e.g. Aristotle, *Pols* 1326a:30; Plato, St 301a, 309d; Xenophon, *Mem* 3.9.11). The stated need for leaders to decide who shall marry whom, for example, can be seen to reflect a concern to preserve rather than challenge the class system. The small population base of the city-state in which a leader knows the people he
leads is also taken as a given. The requirement for leaders to attend to issues of food production, troop deployment, and the location of the city-state reflect an unstable security environment, with limited means of defending key assets and limited capacity to stock-pile essential items. The expectation that a leader be directly involved in moral, religious as well as political and military matters reflects both the limited administrative machinery of the city-states and a world-view which saw such matters as inherently connected (Cartledge, 1993; Finley, 1963; Irwin, 1989).

This account of leadership, despite being produced largely via the new method of philosophy, was also strongly influenced by pre-existing Ancient ideas: the preoccupation with striving for perfection which is an important feature of the Homeric genre (Finley, 1963; Vernant, 1995, 2006) is an example of this. Now, perfection was tied to the person of the leader (e.g. Plato, St 297b). Viewed as a political move, the new person of the perfect leader, and his follower, function as a strong case against those who promoted democracy; if these ideas about the characteristics of leaders and followers are accepted, then democracy is rendered undesirable as a consequence (e.g. Plato, St 294a, 296e).

With this particular conception of leadership any urge to distribute decision making, to hold leaders to account for their action, or even to question their choices can be readily positioned as contrary to both nature and wisdom. That Socrates was convicted of sedition by the Athenian democracy, that Plato and Xenophon were his pupils, and that Aristotle in turn was a pupil of Plato is widely accepted as historical fact (e.g. Grant, 1991; Russell, 1984; Tarnas, 1991). Here, the case against democracy derives from the case built for this particular conception of leadership. Consequently, this ‘truth’ about leadership which they promoted is not innocent and pure but is rather one imbued with political intent and impact.

A key strategy used to establish this truth and cloak its political intent is to deploy the then new philosophical method. The method presents itself as above and beyond political motive and influence, as pure and impartial in its deployment of logic and reason, such that all that flows from it is to be regarded as the unvarnished honest truth, finally revealed. It implicitly promises a process of discovery, in which ‘The Truth’, understood as being knowledge which is both universal and timeless, is revealed (e.g. Plat, Rep 500c– e).
Tactically, the deployment of this method typically begins with the assertion of an unquestioned (but highly questionable) assumption. It then moves rapidly through to a series of interim findings reliant upon this assumption before, finally, moving to a major conclusion which, advanced in isolation, would generate immediate critique. Founded on assumptions about the inadequacy of most people and the possibility of there being a perfect leader, Plato, for example, draws his reader inexorably through to the conclusion that

“as long as these wise rulers have the single overriding concern of always using their intelligence and expertise to maximise the justice they dispense to the state’s inhabitants there’s no defect in what they do, is there. After all, they’re not only capable of keeping their subjects safe, but they are also doing all they can to make them better people that they were before” (St 297a-b).

Using this power/knowledge technique, the goal of making people ‘better’ is used to justify a totalitarian model of rule. That the organisation of public affairs was of such interest to early philosophers perhaps indicates the potency of the philosophical method as a strategic device to cloak the influence of power in shaping knowledge.

The conception of leadership developed here also reflects certain intellectual preoccupations and habits of the Classical Greeks. Scholarly Greek thought prior to and during the Classical period tended to place a heavy emphasis on attributing social events to individual human or divine causes, rather than, say, systemic factors such as inter-class conflict or inter-state competition for access to strategic assets (Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006; Vernant, 2006). Both Herodotus (1998) and Thucydides (2006), for example, typically attribute wars to individual or group actions and motives, rather than accounting for such events in economic, geo-political or sociological terms. Indeed, the Classical Greek intellectual oeuvre does not appear to have a sociological mode of analysis at its disposal. Their preferred mode of thinking about causation in the social world tended to place the individual human actor at the centre and to pay attention to both his motives and his actions (Cartledge, 1993; Vernant, 2006). It is this tendency to focus on individual motives and actions which informs the approach taken to formulating the truth about leadership. It results in the individual leader being placed centre stage, while the influence of followers, for example, or processual perspectives, remains beyond thought.
Ancient mythology and religious beliefs also shaped this account of the truth about leadership. By way of example, in ‘The Republic’ Plato had a broad and ambitious agenda; to define what it would take to create the perfect society (Lane, 2007). The question of what kind of person should rule was an important part of his design (Plato, Rep Part 4; 7). Establishing the truth about the perfect society was understood to be immensely challenging (Plato, Rep 374e). However, it was nonetheless seen as an important, legitimate and worthy challenge: the philosopher's commitment to the use of rigorous logic and careful reasoning is contrasted favourably here with traditional, conventional or sophistic modes of reasoning (e.g. Plato, Rep 475b, 493, 521c). Indeed, the scholars whose work is included in this study make considerable effort to found their conception of leadership in logic and reasoning. The philosophic method was portrayed as the pre-eminent route to the truth (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.1–3).

However, Plato (or at least his mouthpiece Socrates) does at times simply abandon philosophy and turn to the power of the mythic and poetic traditions. In seeking to promote his philosopher-king as the best and most truthful approach to leadership he asks “...I wonder if we could contrive one of those convenient stories”...“some magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to our whole community” (Rep 414b). This story is to be “nothing new – a fairy story like those the poets tell and have persuaded people to believe about the sort of thing that often happened ‘once upon a time’, but never does now and is not likely to: indeed it would need a lot of persuasion to get people to believe it” (Rep 414c). In fact, the estimate is made that this story would not be believed “...in the first generation”, “but you might succeed with the second and later generations” (Rep 415d). Despite this challenge, it appears that the story is worth telling, for “it should serve to increase their loyalty to the state and to each other” (Rep 415d). Fantasy is thus deployed in pursuit of order and unity, which in turn rests on the leader.

This is not the only example where recourse to traditional, mythic or conventional knowledge can be seen within the then newly-emerging philosophical paradigm. Aristotle makes appeal to the conventional knowledge of his time (e.g. Pols 1259a:1–35, 1273b:25), to the poetic knowledge of earlier times (e.g. Pols 1260a:30, 1267a:1), and to the gods (e.g. Pols 1259b:10, 1325b:25). For Xenophon the gods are especially important: no leader is
regarded of worthy of endorsement as such unless he proves his love of the gods (e.g. Xenophon; Ag 11.1). Accordingly, to ignore the influence still granted here to the gods in human affairs, for example, or to ignore the occasional recourse to mythology is to overlook an important continuity that connects the Ancient and Classical eras. Despite the efforts made, thought itself did not begin anew with the advent of philosophy.

A specific concern of relevance to these scholars was the abuse of power and authority, this being something they had experienced in their own lifetime (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006). In Classical Greek society there was no ‘free press’ to challenge those in positions of authority (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006). The majority of the population comprised slaves or women denied any political rights (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006). The appropriate constitutional form of government was repeatedly under challenge and the institutions of government were typically small and fragile in their operations (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Morris & Powell, 2006).

All these factors gave leaders quite considerable scope to act as they saw fit, something which clearly concerned the scholars whose work I have been examining. Accordingly, the heavy emphasis given to the claim that true leadership requires the leader to serve the people, to attend only to their welfare and never to his own interests is informed by the context in which this idea arose. The morally righteous leader who walks about in the papyrus scrolls which record this discourse serves as a pointed critique of the self-serving leaders who actually lived and breathed.

Plato, for example, describes the political leaders of his time as a “motley band” (St 291b), a “gang” (St 291c), as “practitioners of sectarian politics” and “agents of a massive sham”... “supreme imposters and illusionists” (St 303c). A strong theme in Statesman is Plato’s concern to “distinguish a king with his wisdom from those who merely pretend to be a statesman, but in fact aren’t in the slightest, however widely their claim may be believed” (St 292d). It is generally accepted that Plato spent time in Syracuse trying to educate the tyrant Dionysius II to change his approach to leadership (Finley, 1963; Grant, 1991; Russell, 1984). In Heiro the Tyrant, Xenophon’s aim is to persuade the character of Hiero away from self-serving tyrannical rule and toward ruling in the interests of the people.
To centre truth claims about the purpose of leadership so strongly around the idea of ‘serving the interests of the people’ can, thus, be seen as a strategic response founded on these scholars concerns and values. The goal appears to be to produce an intellectual and moral basis for constraining leaders. However, coupled with the idea of service to the people as the purpose of leadership is the perfect person of the leader and the expectation of complete obedience to him. Liberation from tyrannical abuse may, therefore, have been a strategic goal of this discourse, but liberation from authority most certainly was not.

As a consequence of these many and various connections between what was said about leadership and the social context in which it was said, the discourse is not best understood as an abstract theoretical or philosophical inquiry. Rather, it is more usefully understood as a comprehensive manifesto which formed to deal with the problems of the time; leadership, wisdom, virtue and order are the solutions it offers. What can be seen when this discourse is placed in its social context is that what it entails is an exercise in invention, not discovery. This is not “The Truth”, but a strategic response to a set of problems. This is not knowledge which is innocent or pure, but is instead knowledge which has been shaped to address certain values, concerns and interests. This is, therefore, knowledge which serves the interests of power. These findings are summarized in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Contextual influences shaping the formation of the discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual influences shaping the formation of the discourse</th>
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<tr>
<td>• the discourse draws on the mythic and poetic traditions as well as the philosophic method</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the discourse arises as a response to a social context of conflict and (perceived) degeneracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the idea of ‘leadership’ here acts as a counter to the idea of ‘democracy’</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the discourse acts as a counter to the (perceived) abuse of power by contemporary leaders, providing an alternative conception which claims to be grounded in both nature and reason</td>
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Conditions of possibility: Epistemic foundations and rules governing this discourse

I turn now to examine the underpinning epistemic foundations which I propose rendered the discourse sayable and sensible to its intended audience. I then demonstrate how
these foundations informed the intellectual ‘moves’ which allow the discourse to cohere. Finally, I present what I suggest are the unwritten rules governing the discourse.

First, a marked preference for philosophical reflection and reasoning rather than empirical observation as the route to the truth is central to this episteme (Cartledge, 1993; Russell, 1984; Vernant, 2006). Second, the belief in a stark and natural inequality between persons is a pivotal assumption which shapes the Greek concept of leadership. It is through recourse to ‘natural’ inequality that the “excellence of character in perfection” which belongs to the leader alone is both established and sustained (Aristotle, Pols 1260a:15). Others may have their own “special attributes”, such as the “silence” that is “a woman’s glory” (Aristotle, Pols 1260a:30). However, none shall compare in wisdom, honour and morality with that of the leader: a special, unique and intentionally superior space in the social fabric is consequently carved out for the leader from this core assumption.

This ‘natural’ inequality is called on to advance the case for leaders in other ways. The inherently flawed nature of most people, prone as they are said to be toward disorder and degeneracy, makes leaders, superior beings without such flaws, both necessary and desirable. It also requires the leader to constantly deflect people away from wrong-doing or error, and hence functions to legitimate the absolute authority to be granted to leaders. An assumption of natural inequality between persons, then, is so critical here that without it the discourse would lose its internal coherency.

This binary and hierarchical division of reality between leaders (perfect) and non-leaders (flawed) is typical of a more general feature of Classical Greek thought which other scholars have identified (e.g. Cartledge, 1993; Vernant, 2006). This division can also be found in their conceptions of male/female, gods/humans, natural/unnatural, good/bad, Greeks/barbarians and order/chaos (Cartledge, 1993; Vernant, 2006). This approach to the ordering of the universe carried with it a dialectical relationship between pairings, resulting in the perception of an inherent unstable universe riven by conflicting forces (Cartledge, 1993; Vernant, 2006). As we have seen, ‘leadership’ is positioned to play a key role in addressing social and moral instability, acting as a counter-veiling force toward morality and order. A key implication of this general structure of thought is that ambiguous or contradictory aspects of a phenomenon cannot be contemplated;
accordingly, the possibility of conceiving of (true) leadership as having both positive and problematic aspects is effectively rendered unthinkable by the norms of the Classical Greek episteme.

The fourth epistemic feature of relevance is the Classical Greek notion of ‘truth’. Here the influence of Socrates on Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle is especially strong because as noted earlier for all these thinkers whatever is ‘true’ is also morally ‘good’ (Cartledge, 1993; Russell, 1984; Vernant, 2006). The equating of truth with moral goodness, opposed to what is false and therefore morally wrong, is an important element of the leadership discourse. It helps explains why, for example, Plato and Xenophon place such a great emphasis on seeking to define and describe what constitutes true leadership, distinguishing this from fake and therefore morally bad leadership.

Fifth, a particular understanding of nature also plays an important role in Classical Greek thought: nature functions as the exemplar for the social world (Cartledge, 1993; Irwin, 1989; Vernant, 2006). Consequently, analogous reasoning from the physical universe to the human realm is a key method here for understanding ourselves. Thus, for example, herding animals provides an analogy for leadership in the early stages of Plato’s Statesman (267). Their conception of nature also provides the template for what is good and true, “for nothing which is contrary to nature is good” (Aristotle, Pols 1326b:5). Consistent with this understanding of nature, then, the leadership discourse seeks to define leadership as something that is a natural phenomenon in order to secure its status as something that is “good” and “true”.

Sixth, the notion of the self is another feature in the Classical Greek episteme (Cartledge, 1993; Vernant, 2006) which can be seen reflected in the leadership discourse. Here, the self is one that is to work on improving itself, but this pertains to taking wise and honourable actions and engaging in proper conduct which others can see. There is no assumption of an interior self which governs action; rather, to be seen is to exist and it is what others see that matters (Cartledge, 1991; Vernant, 2006). Thus, for example, Xenophon speaks approvingly of Agesilaus’ habitual observance of religious rituals even in battle, of his treatment of friends and enemies, his clothing and his eating and sleeping habits (Ag). Not only does this exemplify the importance of the connectedness of all
things for the Classical Greeks, it also demonstrates that it is that which can be seen which matters, which warrants comment, which reveals one's true character.

Finally, in the Classical Greek episteme, all things were thought to be connected in some way (Cartledge, 1991; Finley, 1963; Vernant, 2006). Consequently, the leadership discourse is connected into talk on such matters as the nature of reality, how we should live both individually and as a social group, educational policy, military strategy, diplomatic theory, town planning, food production, and questions about how do we ensure justice, order, cohesion and good behaviour in society and what is the role of government and the rights and obligations of citizens. This connectedness of thought about what we would today conceive of as a set of separate topics or disciplines is not simply a crucial aspect of the leadership discourse itself; rather it provides the substantive issues to which talk of leadership is directed. This could hardly be further from the decontextualized and processual orientation of contemporary leadership discourse, but it is this very difference which allows us to see so clearly that, in contrast with our contemporary discourse which focuses on the means, the Classical Greeks’ leadership discourse was largely interested in the ends, the results of leadership.

To demonstrate how these factors can be seen playing out in the leadership discourse, an indicative sample of these types of claims is as follows:

...to acquire these powers a man needs education; he must be possessed of great natural gifts; above all, he must be a genius. For I reckon this gift is not altogether human, but divine – this power to win willing obedience: it is manifestly a gift of the gods to the true votaries of prudence (Xenophon, Oec 21.12).

Here the equation is: leadership = proper education + ‘nature’ + ‘genius’ + a ‘divine gift’ = prudence. What is clearly implied as a consequence is ‘morality’ and ‘good outcomes’. The order is not critical: for example, ‘genius’ means ‘prudence’ but also means leadership.

As long as these wise rulers have the single overriding concern of always using their intelligence and expertise to maximise the justice they dispense to the state’s inhabitants there’s no defect in what they do, is there? After all, they're not only capable of keeping their subjects safe, but they are also doing all they can to make them better people than they were before (Plato, St 297a).

Here the equation is: leadership = intelligence + expertise, which = justice, leader perfection, morally good outcomes for the people, and changing the people. The order is
not essential to the logic: ‘intelligence’ is inextricably tied to ‘the leader’ whose perfection in turn leads to ‘justice’ for example.

to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power – of such a power as holds together the universe (Aristotle, Pols 1320a:30).

Here the equation is: leadership = the production of order = a divine power, which implies infallibility + a pure morality + the desirability of order. Here too the order is irrelevant: the production of order requires infallibility, for example, while pure morality equates with leadership.

With this discourse, then, what is produced is a multi-faceted and mutually reinforcing defence of totalitarian rule, founded in specific understandings of ‘nature’, ‘reason’, ‘morality’ and ‘truth’, with additional support coming from ‘genius’ and ‘the gods’. The chain of reasoning may begin or end with any element, for in this discourse ‘morality’, ‘truth’, ‘nature’, ‘knowledge’, ‘reason’, ‘wisdom’, ‘experience’ ‘genius’ and ‘divinity’ are deeply connected and imply each other. So long as the premises are accepted the conclusions follow. This is an elaborately interwoven intellectual construct.

These claims to speak the truth about the perfect leader, however, also stand in opposition to the empirical examples most frequently cited of self-serving, far-from-perfect leaders, examples which may also be true (e.g. Plato, Rep 545a–576b, St 303c). Consequently, these truths about leadership can, therefore, be understood as having been constructed out of a fiction which cannot be acknowledged: the fiction of the perfect leader. This (fictional) truth is built upon another truth whose existence is repeatedly acknowledged: the truth of the imperfect leader. This truth of the perfect leader is, therefore, surely more invention than discovery, for it directs itself away from the evidence of the imperfect leader, it dismisses it, it seeks instead to establish the truth of a perfect leader and present him as a discovery.

Viewed as a “game of truth” (Foucault, 1985, p. 6), this discourse is hyperactive, productive and unrelenting. The persuasive strategies deployed here are mutually reinforcing and comprehensive: so long as one follows the chain of reasoning on its own terms then the conclusions reached are rendered unavoidable and inescapable. However, what is put before us is a discourse which asserts the truth of the existence of the perfect leader while, simultaneously, referencing a contradictory empirical reality, namely the
existence of the far-from-perfect leader. Consequently, the Classical Greek truth about leadership is founded on fictions, assertions and myths but presents itself as a rigorous search for the truth grounded in reason. What can be seen in Foucauldian terms as a strategic attempt to define what can be known and said about leadership, to carve out who shall rule, the terms of that rule, and who shall be subjected to that rule, is no less than an uncompromising game of power which presents itself as the impartial search for the truth.

From the foregoing analysis I propose there are several implicit rules which govern this discourse. To be successful in this discursive regime these norms are followed in order to be understood by others and to render what is said as credible. First, ‘good’ things contain only goodness. That which is held to be ‘good’, which leadership is, is held to be unambiguously ‘good’ as well as being ‘true’, ‘natural’ and ‘divine’. Correspondingly, whatever is held to be ‘bad’ is held to be completely bad, as well as ‘fake’, and ‘unnatural’.

Second, to succeed within the confines of the discourse one may ‘discover’ only those truths which do not threaten the existing social order. The aim here is never to challenge the elite but rather to sustain their interests and status, to ensure that the ‘truth’ provides confirmation and support for the class and gender system then operant. Consequently, what is produced is an account of leadership which satisfies the interests of the aristocratic audiences to whom these scholars spoke: this ‘truth’ is saturated with political intent and effect whilst portraying itself as a neutral, open-minded enquiry.

Third, the tenor of the discourse, despite the variety of narrative techniques that may be deployed, is one that produces confidence about what is and what is known. This is a reassuring discourse. It seeks to simplify, not complicate matters. It does not seek to disturb or critique what is already thought to be so, which exists prior to its undertaking its own ritual, which is primarily one of form not substance. It does not critique its own assumptions but affirms them. The goal is not discovery of new truths but rather a sophisticated rendering of pre-existing ideas into truths and from which the truth about leadership is invented before our very eyes.
Social function and subjectivity effects

The macro-level function served by this conception of leadership is to warrant a benign dictatorship where there are no limitations placed on what the leader may do beyond those derived from his own morality and wisdom. As we have seen, laws can be overridden as the leader sees fit, and there is to be no right of appeal (e.g. Plato, St 294a). The small city state as the best social form is taken as a given (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1326a). Obedience to leaders is presented as both a virtue and a necessity (e.g. Xenophon, Mem 3.9.11). Extensive leader involvement in what we would today understand as matters in the personal and private domains of life is warranted here because those matters are deemed of collective interest (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1326a).

This account of leadership functions to bolster anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian ideas through its strong emphasis on the naturalness of inequality between persons. It simultaneously functions to reinforce the class, slavery and gender divisions of the time. Ultimately, follower interests are served here through complete subservience to the leader and rest on the assurance that true leaders will act only in their followers’ best interests (e.g. Plato, St 297a; 301d). As a power-knowledge formation aiming to secure social cohesion, albeit at the expense of liberty and democracy, this conception of leadership is highly productive.

The subjectivity of the leader constructed here is, as we have seen, that of one driven to do that which is truthful, just, moral, honourable and in the best interests of others (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1324a:30). Here, no sacrifice is too great, no hardship is too much to bear and no task is too onerous provided it serves the well-being of the people and the state (e.g. Xenophon, Ag). There is to be nothing followers cannot ask of this leader; there is nothing this leader may deny them, provided only that what is sought is in their best interest. If it is not, then his right to deny it is said to be beyond question. Every moment of every day is to be dedicated to the precious cause of the well-being of the people and the state.

It is also, however, an unending experience of duty, of scrutiny, of denial of the leader’s own interests and passions which has been proposed (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1331:30–40). The leader, while master, is simultaneously servant and even slave. While all others must obey
the leader, they are not to serve him; they do not exist to meet his needs. They may be subject to his rule and his authority but he is to serve them: his power over them is rendered legitimate only because it is said to serve them. Like a slave he is permitted no private interests. He must serve the state and the people only, and never himself. In all that he does and all that he is, the leader here is a creature of and for the people. Simultaneously, however, the leader is positioned here as akin to a slave owner: the people may continue to exist only if he so decides. Their lives are to be in his hands, for he is to have complete unquestionable authority even as to matters of life and death (e.g. Plato, St 309a). Whatever he seeks from them they must give.

Consequently, in this account the leader has absolute power yet at the same time he has none. In this discourse, moreover, power suppresses and denies its existence through the language of ‘service’, ‘nature’ and ‘morality’ at the same time as it expresses and justifies its overwhelming presence and reach in the language of ‘obedience to authority’. Despite these many tensions what is clear, at least, is that the people are never to exercise power. Followers are deemed incapable of knowing or expressing even their own best interests: the leader will determine for them what they are.

The leader self which is constructed here admits of no flaw and denies any potential for error (e.g. Xenophon Mem 3.9.5): a supreme arrogance is simultaneously created and suppressed or, at least, directed toward serving others rather than serving itself. This self must convince itself and others of its perfection. It must remain distant and disconnected from normal human limitations and human pleasures. This complete outward focus of attention is derived from an ‘inside’ which is filled only with honour, reverence for the gods, courage, wisdom and virtue. What is to be ‘top of mind’ is the perpetual issue of how the leader may best act to ensure he makes the people “better people than they were before” (Plato, St 297b). In doing so his task is to make them more like himself, for he is the epitome of all that is good and wise and truthful. This exercise in transformation, then, is intended to result in followers who resemble as far as is possible the leader himself. This transformation is akin to reproduction by way of cloning. The enactment of leadership here seeks the endless production of imitations of the leader himself and the elimination of all alternative subjectivities.
The leader’s belief in his superior capability coupled with a devoted concern for the well-being of the people seems also strongly akin to what a parent is expected to feel in relation to their infant child. Followers are perpetually infantilized in this discourse, presumed to be incapable of ever growing up (e.g. Aristotle *Pol* 1254b:20). The leader is to be as devoted as a loving parent, as powerful as an adult is compared with an infant, and as prepared to sacrifice their own needs in pursuit of the welfare of the people as a parent is expected to be for their child. Here there is no more scope for meaningful dialogue and debate between the leader and followers than there is between parent and an infant who has yet to learn to speak.

The inherently deficient follower self which is created here seems induced to being awestruck by the leader’s capacity for truth, virtue and wisdom and directed toward passivity, deference, subservience and obedience (e.g. Plato, *St* 308d): who are they, after all, to question or challenge the leader? The follower, then, is one who implies a childlike dependency and frailty that is exquisitely matched to the all-powerful, moral and wise parental figure of the leader.

The relations of power that are established between leader and follower are full of contradictions, simultaneously empowering the leader and denying him any scope to act outside of the comprehensive script of leadership that is laid out for him to follow; simultaneously productive of a life-affirming nurturing attitude toward followers and productive of an intense need to deny them any scope to develop their own subjectivity. The leader is perhaps as much dominated and subjugated in this discourse as the follower, for neither is granted any meaningful freedom to choose; each has a prescribed role to play and there is to be no negotiation on this point.

The knowledge produced in this discourse provides a theoretical, conceptual and moral foundation to ‘leadership’ as a natural, empirical reality. This knowledge presents itself as having revealed something essential and enduring about the nature of the world. It constructs leadership as something that is knowable and describable but also as fundamentally difficult to replicate, because of its divine and rare ontological basis. Leadership is rendered both desirable and legitimate via the variety of persuasive techniques used in the discourse and not just through arbitrary force or tradition. The discourse sets a standard for leaders in terms of their conduct, the issues to which they
should direct their attention, the scope of their authority and the kinds of outcomes they should seek to achieve. Leader power is made natural, desirable and without limitations for the true leader is said to act only in the interests of the people.

Equally, though, this knowledge is disempowering to all others. Followers become raw material for the leader to “mould to his will” (Aristotle, *Pols* 1335a:5) not active participants and they are granted no valid wishes or rights of their own. Follower freedom and authority is rendered a nonsensical idea by the action of this discourse. Ideas of accountability or participation in decision making are crowded out, silenced even before they can be given voice.

There is a totalising gaze in the Classical Greek quest to know the truth about leadership. This gaze attends to both regularities, to common characteristics of leaders, as well as to the unique attributes of each leader: these are treated as exemplars from which other aspiring leaders may draw inspiration as well as evidence relevant to determining whether that particular leader was a true leader or merely a “sham” (Plato, *St* 303c). This knowledge presents itself as pure, impartial reason, and cloaks many of its power effects in talk of nature, divinity, morality and service to others. This knowledge presents itself as having solved real problems but it also suggests it has no limitations, no imperfections, no potential for adverse consequences. This knowledge cannot critique itself.

The overall effects produced by this discourse are manifold. A leader self is produced who is without flaw, is dedicated to serving the people, and who is to be subjected to an unrelenting, all-encompassing gaze. A follower self who is to accept its inherent limitations, obey the leader and seek to become more like the leader emerges as the leader’s dialectical opposite. Their relationship is to have parent-child dimensions to it, yet the leader is also akin to a master, a servant and a slave to the people. Leaders and followers are inextricably linked: neither is to be able to survive without the other.

A coherent body of knowledge is produced which presents itself as a pure, impartial truth, removed from concerns about power. Yet power saturates this knowledge, enabling it to warrant a system of government which is totalitarian in its reach and unlimited in the exercise of its powers. A social order wherein order, unity, obedience and the well-being of the whole are key priorities is enunciated and rendered natural and desirable.
The overall function the Classical Greek concept of leadership serves is as a device for securing social cohesion. Complete obedience to those in positions of authority is rendered a necessity, a natural behaviour and a moral good. This conception of leadership provides a mechanism for suppressing conflict between persons and reassures us that someone does have the answers and will take care of us. Leaders provide an example of the divine and unlimited nature of human potential. Combined with a presumption that such potential is a rare quality, beyond the reach of most people, followers are left only to admire and obey those who do rise so high.

Conclusion

The Classical Greek leadership discourse offered a comprehensive solution to the problems which were perceived to plague Greek, particularly Athenian, society at the time the discourse emerged. Its emergence was, thus, no random event. The philosophical method offered a means for speaking old truths in new ways, while the perceived state of decline in Athenian society provided the motive to speak. The solution the discourse offers is leadership, conceived as something which pertains to both means and ends, conceived as something which both draws on traditional knowledge and which is also new.

‘Leadership’ here offers a new solution to old problems. At the same time it functions to uphold the traditions, norms, values and interests of the Classical Greek aristocracy, for whom these scholars cared most. The knowledge produced is expressed as a genuine inquiry into the truth of things in which power is simultaneously exposed and hidden. Nature, morality and power are inextricably entwined in this conception of leadership. Ultimately, leadership emerges here as a mechanism for securing a totalitarian social order intended to benefit existing social elites while proclaiming to serve the interests of all.

My analysis of the Classical Greek leadership discourse constitutes the last of the three case studies of leadership discourses in modernity, the medieval era and in ancient times. In the next chapter the focus is on bringing together the findings from across these epistemes and the various leadership theories which have been developed. This will
further demonstrate the contingent nature of the truth about leadership as well identify changes and continuities in thought, further calling into question the normal assumption of progress in our understanding of leadership.
Chapter Seven: Contingency, change and continuity in the truth about leadership

...this was the proper task of a history of thought, as against a history of behaviours or representations: to define the conditions in which human beings “problematize” what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live (Foucault, 1985, p. 10).

Introduction

The preceding three chapters have been dedicated to examining what Western scholars have claimed to be the truth about leadership in different epistemes, including our own. The focus in these chapters has been on providing detailed answers to the first four of my secondary research questions, namely:

1. What problematizations have informed the development of the leadership discourses examined here?
2. What key themes and assumptions inform these discourses?
3. What subjectivities and relationships are produced by these discourses?
4. What is the social function of these discourses?

In this chapter attention turns to the last of my secondary research questions; what changes and continuities are notable when comparing these discourses? To answer this question the analysis now moves back and forth across the whole gamut of leadership discourses previously examined. Changes in thought which are of particular interest here are those that are unexpected, which run counter to the normal expectation and assumption that what we have today is superior to that of the past. Similarly, the continuities in thought of particular interest here are also those which run counter to the normal expectation that the present is significantly different from the past. Identifying these possibly unexpected changes and continuities extends the scope of my earlier analysis by identifying connections between the present and the past in leadership discourse. This approach is consistent with Foucault’s concept of the “history of the present” (1977, p. 31).

The examination undertaken here offers insight into the historical influences embedded within current understandings. It also enables consideration of past truths no longer
operant for their potential utility in respect of current concerns and values. Cumulatively, surfacing these matters could help provide us with a potential “rallying point for the counterattack” to challenge current norms and understandings (Foucault, 1978, p. 157). This focus on identifying both change and continuity in leadership thought calls into doubt conventional assumptions about the accumulation of knowledge. At the same time it seeks to generate fresh insights into our present condition such that new possibilities may begin to become evident.

In addressing this last secondary question, I retain my focus on the same themes addressed in response to the first four of my secondary questions. I begin by looking at the invention of the truth about leadership as a response to the problematization of some aspect of human life. From there I turn to review how the person of the leader has been understood before turning to examine the person of the follower. Next I consider the leader-follower relationship after which I move to an assessment of the social function which ‘leadership’ has been deployed to serve before finally considering issues of epistemology and methodology which scholars have relied upon in making claims to speak the truth about leadership. As part of my analysis I provide three dispositives, the analytic device Foucault proposed for specifying the key elements of a discursive regime: this is deployed to compare discourses across different epistemes, enabling the identification of changes and continuities (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).

**Contingent truths: inventing leadership as a solution**

From my foregoing analysis of developments in leadership thought what emerges is that time and time again calls for ‘leadership’ have arisen as a response to moral, social, political and economic trends or events which are problematized. ‘Leadership’, whatever form it may take, has been repeatedly proffered as a solution to matters that are understood as troublesome, threatening and in need of fixing. The particular form of ‘leadership’ proposed to deal with the issues of concern draws on existing values, norms, epistemologies and methodologies, thereby rendering what is said relevant and plausible
Specifically, the Classical Greek scholars examined were concerned with disorder, class conflict, war, moral degeneracy and a loss of respect for tradition and the gods (Cartledge, 1993; Finley, 1963; Morris & Powell, 2006). Linking these to a democratic approach to governance, this problematization gave rise to the articulation of a particular leadership model in which standards of behaviour were to be imposed by a single leader whose only concern was to be community well-being (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Plato, 1995, 2007; Xenophon, 1997, 2006). Here, it was positioned as “the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey” (Xenophon, Mem, 3.9.11). In this model, upholding a specified set of social practices, norms and values, as well as attending to strategic and operational issues affecting the security and stability of the state all formed part of the leadership model that was proposed (e.g. Aristotle, Pols 1326a). Here, leadership in the form of a wise and divinely gifted leader granted unlimited authority was presented as the answer to every problem facing the community (e.g. Plato, St 296e, 309a).

In response to their problematization of political and religious conflict and self-serving or incompetent leader behaviour, the medieval leadership model positioned the king as god’s representative on earth, endowing him with God’s power, authority, divinity and goodness (e.g. Calvin, 2010 (1559); Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Luther, 2010 (1523); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). The leader here was said to be “more like a divinity than a mortal” upon whom “the happiness of the whole people” depended (Erasmus, 2010, pp. 26–7). This positioning bolstered the leader’s legitimacy, thereby helping to maintain monarchical rule. However, the discourse also set out in extensive detail a standard of conduct to which leaders were expected to adhere, thereby addressing concerns about poor leader behaviour. The model incorporated specific policy advice on substantive issues of governance, thereby further shaping ‘leadership’ as a solution to issues threatening the stability of the existing social order. All the key components of this model were, thus, designed to provide answers to the problems of the day.

In the modern episteme, Carlyle (1993 (1840)) initially problematized what he saw as the excessive rationalism of Enlightenment thought and the effects of the industrial
revolution, factors he believed were damaging the ‘human spirit’, morality, faith and social cohesion. To remedy this he proposed a model of heroic leadership which extolled the value of passion and religious fervour as more powerful and more truly human than reason alone. He also advocated hero worship, through which he claimed we could reconnect ourselves to the best of human nature and to God, as well as tighten the bonds of community. For Carlyle, “there is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience (1993 (1840), p. 171). Here again, then, the formulation of the truth about leadership was tightly matched to the issues of present concern.

Next, underpinning the efforts of trait theorists, was the problematization of ensuring that only those ‘fit’ to lead, in a social Darwinian sense, were selected for leadership positions (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Galton, 1892 (1869), 1970 (1875); Lehman, 1966 (1928); Sorokin, 1925; Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936; Visher, 1925). This desire arose from the belief that social problems originate in a mismatch between people’s ‘natural talents’ and their actual role and position in society, a problem which they claimed modern science could now remedy. Here it was claimed that “there can be no question of the fact of inequality” (Lehman, 1966 (1928), p. 7). Leadership research was, thus, focussed on establishing criteria for ‘weeding out’ those not suitable for ‘leadership’ by defining the traits of ‘genuine’ leaders. For some of those assuming that leader traits were inherited, eugenicist policies formed part of the solution, offering a programme for reforming the population through selective breeding practices. The overall aim for these thinkers was to “produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriage during several consecutive generations” (Galton, 1892 (1869), p. 45).

For behavioural theorists, the broader problematization of worker motivation, performance, absenteeism and workplace conflict in managerial discourse of the time was an important source of influence (e.g. Mayo, 1945, 1946 (1933)). All these issues were presumed amenable to resolution by way of leader intervention. The task here was to determine through careful analysis the particular pattern of leader behaviour which would have most effect in addressing these problems (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Bowers & Seashore, 1966; Fleishman, 1953a, 1953b; Katz et al., 1950; Likert, 1961, 1967; Shartle, 1979). For a period of time this pattern was widely believed to comprise “behaviour indicating friendship, mutual trust, respect, a certain warmth and rapport...
between the supervisor and his group” (Fleishman, 1973, pp. 7–8) in conjunction with behaviour that “organizes and defines the relationships in the group” and “tends to establish well defined patterns and channels of communication and ways of getting the job done” (Fleishman, 1973, p. 8).

Essentially situational and ‘new leadership’ theorists have pursued this same basic formulation of a combined focus by leaders on both tasks and relationships deriving from the continued problematization of worker performance. However, each has also been informed by other factors being problematized and offered specific formulations of the truth about leadership as a result. With situational theory, bureaucratic inflexibility and enhancing leader responsiveness to contextual factors were problematized (e.g. Capitman, 1973; Cornuelle, 1975; Roos, 1972; Whyte, 1963 (1956)) meaning that leaders were now said to need the skill to diagnose a situation and respond accordingly (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; House, 1971; Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). The key was thought to be to “match the leadership situation and the man” (Fiedler, 1967, p. 248) so that leaders “engage in behaviours that complement subordinates’ environments and abilities in a manner that compensates for deficiencies and is instrumental to subordinate satisfaction and individual and work unit performance” (House, 1996, p. 323).

The initial emergence of ‘new leadership’ relied on recent economic, moral, cultural and social trends and events in late 1970s America being problematized as constituting a crisis of leadership (e.g. Ackerman, 1975; Burns, 1978; Heath, 1975; Magaziner & Reich, 1982; Peters & Waterman, 1982). The concerns were said to be caused by this crisis in leadership but also able to be solved by leadership, provided it was re-formulated so as to offer “new answers to new questions...using a new paradigm or pattern of inquiry” (Bass, 1985a, p. 4). In this new formulation, leadership that produced change became the key requirement and so a leader’s ‘visionary’, ‘charismatic’ and ‘transformational’ capacities came to the fore (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978; Conger, 1989; House, 1977). Here, the achievement of change was overtly positioned as benefitting both followers and organizations, reinforcing the positioning of leadership as a force for the common good. The discourse has sustained itself over time through a continuous problematization of the modern world and its complex and ever changing
nature as so challenging that leadership is said to be vital if we are to have any hope of continuing to progress human society (e.g. Avolio & Luthans, 2003; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Goleman et al., 2002; Kotter, 1996; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Throughout its history, followers have been continuously problematized as being unable to reach their full potential in the absence of ‘new leadership’ (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Burns, 1978).

What my case studies reveal, then, is the highly contingent nature of the ‘truth’ about leadership. In response to various problematizations, leadership scholars have repeatedly invented a response that they contend will address the issues of concern, referencing current values, norms, beliefs, epistemologies and methodologies so as to render their ideas relevant and plausible. This is arguably no bad thing: needs, values and norms change, and adapting our ideas about leadership in response to this seems a valid and desirable move.

However, what pre-eminent modern scholars who claim to be offering us an accurate, truthful and scientific account have been telling us is that leadership is a natural, enduring phenomenon and that the truth about leadership is, therefore, a matter for discovery. Recall Bass’s claim that “many leaders of world religions, such as Jesus, Mohammed, and Buddha, were transforming. They created visions, shaped values, and empowered change (Bass, 2008, p. 618). The clear implication is that transformational leadership is both enduring and universal. Recall Bennis & Nanus: “leadership competencies have remained constant, but our understanding of what it is, how it works, and the way in which people learn to apply it has changed” (1985, p. 3). My findings indicate that the essentialist and universalist understandings which inform the work of mainstream scholars today are problematic. In Chapter Eight, I will explore further the implications of this finding for theorising leadership in the future.

**Continuity and change in the truth about leaders**

As the problematizations to which the solution of ‘leadership’ arose changed, the notion of the true leader also changed. Yet some things have also remained the same. In this section I therefore examine both change and continuity in what has been claimed as the
truth about leaders. This includes examining ideas about the person of the leader and the role, responsibilities and rights claimed for leaders.

**Continuities: the person of the leader**

Defining the personal characteristics of the true leader has been the primary focus of the leadership discourses examined here (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Fiedler, 1967; Fleishman, 1953a; Galton, 1970 (1875); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Plato, 1995). With ‘leadership’ repeatedly being understood as something which emanates from leaders, establishing who leaders ‘really’ are has been, and remains today, a key concern for leadership scholars (e.g. Avolio & Luthans, 2003; Zhu et al., 2011). What my analysis has shown is that almost without exception the leader is understood as being a person of superior capability to others: think ‘leader’, think ‘superior being’ is the most fundamental, enduring and dominant equation that prevails.

Illustrative of this, leaders were depicted by the Classical Greeks as “possessed of great natural gifts” that were “not altogether human but divine” (Xenophon, Oec 21.12). Even Aristotle, whom we today understand as a political moderate compared with Plato or Xenophon’s more conservative bent (Annas & Waterfield, 1995; Everson, 2009; Lane, 2007), claimed that “from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule” (Aristotle, Pols 1254a:20). In the late medieval discourse, leaders were “a sort of celestial creature” (Erasmus, 2010 (1516), p. 26), made by God to “sitte [sit] on his throne and rule ouer [over] other men” (James VI, 1950 (1599), p. 25, text in brackets [ ] added). Carlyle retained the notion of divine intervention claiming that the “great men” he studied had been “sent into the world” (1993 (1840), p. 3). Trait theorists drew on social Darwinist notions and typically concluded that natural differences rendered leaders superior (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Galton, 1970 (1875); Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Thorndike, 1936). Recall here Lehman’s confidence about the “fact of inequality” (1966 (1928), p. 7).

Since WWII, proclaiming the superiority of leaders as an innate quality has been politically tenuous, because of its tension with democratic values and its similarity to the ideas that gave rise to the Holocaust. Instead, it is the leader’s ‘behaviours’, ‘style’, ‘skills’ and ‘attitudes’ which have been the focus with scholars at pains to claim these are learnable
(e.g. Bass, 1985a; Fleishman, 1953a; House, 1971; Likert, 1961). However, the growing interest in ‘neuro-leadership’ (see http://www.neuroleadership.org) and other recent trait-focussed studies (e.g. De Neve et al., 2013; Kant et al., 2013) may yet herald a full return to the overt declaration of innate differences being the discursive norm within the field. As noted in Chapter Three, ‘new leadership’ has depicted leadership as a deeply held and embedded set of values, attitudes and behaviours and has, therefore, already brought us closer to once again treating leadership as an innate quality than was the case with behavioural and contingency/situational discourse (see Model 4.1, p. 112).

In fact, for the last quarter century we have been fed a steady diet of claims that leaders are those who can out-think, out-pace and exceed in quality, quantity, intensity and impact on the efforts of non-leaders. Leaders are presented to us as quite simply a different, and better, class of person. With ‘new leadership’ discourse, leaders are the people who “do the right thing”, in contrast to those who are merely managers who “do things right” (Bennis & Nanus, 1985, p. 8). ‘New leadership’ discourse claims “the secret of transforming leadership” is that “people can be lifted into their better selves” by leaders (Burns, 1978, p. 462, italics in original), suggesting an alchemic art constitutes the secret which only leaders truly understand. With ‘new leadership’, we are told that the leader is one who is capable of bringing about change in “...who rules and by what means; the work-group norms, as well as ultimate beliefs about religion, ideology, morality, ethics, space, time, and human nature” (Bass, 1985, p. 24). No ordinary mortal indeed.

The second factor which has also remained largely constant is that those personal characteristics and ways of living which have been held at various times to be admirable, exceptional and powerful have been linked to the person of the leader and claimed to be part of their nature (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Erasmus, 2010 (1516); House, 1971; Likert, 1967; Thorndike, 1936; Xenophon, 2006). At every point the attributes ascribed to leaders align with, and simultaneously reinforce, then widely accepted values, norms and expectations as to what constitutes an admirable person to whom deference is due by others lacking such gifts. Later, in my analysis of discontinuities in how leaders have been understood, I will focus on what the specific characteristics ascribed to leaders are and how they have changed. For now, what I attend to is that regardless of what the
characteristics of leaders were said to be, they were understood at the time of their
enunciation as being worthy of admiration and deference, as exceptional and desirable. Think ‘leader’, think ‘the good person/life’ is, thus, the second key enduring equation.

Illustrative of this, in the Classical Greek discourse leaders were expected and said to possess “excellence of character in perfection” (Aristotle, Poli 1260a:15). In the Late Medieval discourse leaders, at their best, were said to be “complete with every single virtue” (Erasmus, 2010, p. 26). Carlyle’s focus was on leader-heroes who took the form of gods, prophets, poets, priests, men of letters and kings, thereby covering off every kind of person he considered worthy of ‘hero worship’ (1993 (1840)). Trait discourse, following Carlyle’s lead, also focussed on examining factors deemed admirable or desirable (see Table 4.2, p. 71 which addresses this linkage). These characteristics of the leader were assumed by trait theorists to be “part and parcel of his original nature” (Thorndike, 1936, p. 339).

In the post-WWII period, with the focus shifting to workplace leadership, factors which are said to enhance worker performance and, hence, organizational and even national success have been directly linked to leaders by behavioural, situational/contingency and new leadership discourses (e.g. Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Fiedler, 1967; Likert, 1961). However, ‘new leadership’ discourse has gone further than its immediate predecessors, connecting leaders with innovation and change, with strategy, vision and the empowerment of others, all factors now deemed admirable, desirable and even essential to sustain the viability of the modern organization (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kotter, 1988; Peters & Austin, 1985). In a culture where economic success is constantly heralded as desirable and admirable, leaders have been positioned as potent and vital influencers of this success, ensuring that today when we ‘think leader’ we think ‘the good person/life’.

The third enduring characteristic of ‘the leader’ is his masculinity. In recent decades the explicit discursive exclusion of women from ‘leadership’ has, finally, disappeared. However, the attributes ascribed to leaders across all the cases examined here are those which repeatedly bear a strong connection with attributes ascribed to idealised notions of masculinity then prevailing (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Fiedler, 1967; Fleishman, 1953a; Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516); Plato, 1995; Visher, 1925). Today, leadership
is associated with characteristics such as ‘charisma’, ‘vision’, ‘drive’ and ‘moral strength’, attributes more commonly associated with contemporary masculine ideals (Calás & Smircich, 1991; Fletcher, 2004; Sinclair, 2007). By contrast, leadership today is not often associated with characteristics such as ‘caring’, ‘nurturing’, and ‘supporting’, characteristics associated with contemporary feminine ideals. Think ‘leader’, think ‘male’ is thus the third equation which endures.

Dispositif 7.1 summarizes these three key continuities in the discursive construction of leaders.

Dispositif 7.1: Enduring characteristics of the leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation in the discourse</th>
<th>Status of the equation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>think ‘leader’ think ‘superior being’</td>
<td>enduring, unbroken, dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think ‘leader’ think ‘the good person/life’</td>
<td>dominant but has been broken at times; has been strengthened with new leadership discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think ‘leader’ think ‘male’</td>
<td>enduring but now not explicit; embedded in the characteristics deemed leader-like</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintaining the equation of ‘leaders’ with ‘superior beings’ and ‘the good’, however understood, is critical for ‘leadership’ as an idea to continue to hold its mystique, promise and appeal: the outpourings of scholars enunciating on this topic have been a critical facilitator of this. Today ‘personal growth’ is widely understood as desirable, admirable and potent. Little wonder then that the intense leader-follower relationship directed toward achieving follower growth as promoted by ‘new leadership’ discourse seems so attractive. What is applauded today is embracing the performativity requirements and demands for constant change which come with our current economic system. ‘New leadership’ discourse endorses and reinforces this expectation in its account of what constitutes a leader.

As I have shown, this relationship between ‘the good’, ‘the superior’ and ‘the leader’ has a substantial history. At every step in the cases examined here it has been dependent upon an interconnecting suite of factors. This includes truth claims being accepted as valid. Constitutional and organizational arrangements have typically reinforced and sustained its enactment. As best as historians can determine and our own contemporary
experience confirms, actual persons have striven and continue to strive to align their actions with whatever was claimed to be the truth about leadership. However, the mere fact of its apparent longevity is no guarantee as to its future, for this arrangement is a human one, not one determined by nature. Diagram 7.1 provides a visual depiction of this dynamic.

*Diagram 7.1 The production of the perfect leader*

On two occasions identified in this study this linkage has broken down. The first was Locke’s (2010 (1690)) attempt to place the ‘natural freedom’ of all at the centre of his understanding of leadership, rendering it an impersonal concept expressed through the constrained exercise of legal authority. Locke’s account placed the person of the leader as one rightfully and wholly subservient to the higher authority of the law and largely regarded their personal characteristics as irrelevant, so long as they did not impede the proper exercise of legal authority. Locke’s position depended on a basic mistrust of persons in positions of authority. He neither assumed the possibility of human perfection nor did he consider it desirable for society to be held sway to the personal preferences of the leader. With a less favourable view of the nature of leaders, and an emphasis on ensuring freedom from authority as critical to protecting ‘natural rights’, Locke thus broke the equation of ‘leader’, ‘superior being’ and ‘the good’. 

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The other occasion this linkage was broken was post-WWII when leadership was theorised as constituting behavioural patterns focused on ‘consideration’ and ‘initiating structure’ (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a; Katz et al., 1950). These patterns were not attached to a broader conception of the leader persona. Because behavioural theory was seeking to distinguish itself from trait theory (Fleishman, 1973; Shartle, 1979) it carried with it no account of the leader as human subject. It also assumed an inherent capacity for reasonableness on the part of followers and a right to self-determination on issues of values (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Likert, 1961). This in turn meant that it proffered a limited scope for leadership action (e.g. Fleishman, 1973). Developed at a time of heightened sensitivity to the potential dangers leaders could create, its claims were deliberately modest in scope. What it offered was an approach to ‘doing leadership work’ rather than ‘being a leader’. This model was intended to be effective in enhancing workplace performance consistent with the need to respect individual freedoms and rights, thus limiting the scope of action of those in positions of authority.

As a point of historical coincidence both Locke’s approach and behavioural theory emerged at times when extremes of authoritarian, autocratic and quite simply murderous leadership had recently occurred. This likely contributed to their willingness or even desire to limit leadership to something rather modest in scope and impact.

**Discontinuities: the person of the leader**

While the overall characterization of the leader as a ‘superior being’ and a ‘good person’ who lives a ‘good life’ has remained largely constant, the specific characteristics ascribed to, sought after and admired in leaders have been remarkably changeable. Illustrative of this, for the Classical Greeks leaders were those possessed of “manly virtue” (Xenophon, Ag 11.6) that ensured they were “resolute in times of danger” (Xenophon, Ag 11.10). They “love truth” (Plato, Rep 485c), possess a strong “religious sensibility” (Xenophon, Ag 3.5) and “revel[ed] in hard work and totally avoid[ed] idleness (Xenophon, Ag 5.3). A leader is said to be “quick to learn” and “have a good memory” (Plato, Rep 494b). He possesses “natural gifts” and a “natural bent for reason” which “draw(s) him toward philosophy” (Plato, Rep 494e), this being the highest form of knowledge (e.g. Plato, Rep 494d). The
picture that emerges in this discourse is of a warrior-philosopher who lives a devout and ascetic life focussed on ensuring the well-being of the state and the people.

In 16th century Europe, advanced knowledge of statecraft, warfare, and religion were deemed critical for leaders to develop, complementing their divine birth-right, enhancing their innate but tenuous ‘majesty’, enabling them to combine virtue and prudence (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Contrary to the Classical Greeks, the accumulation and ostentatious display of wealth and power was now seen both to confirm the leader’s favoured status in God’s eyes and to help instil the fear and respect needed to render followers loyal and obedient. For Lipsius, the specific characteristics emphasized comprised prudence, virtue, majesty, clemency, and modesty, (see Model 5.2, page 127, for a fuller summary of his account of core princely virtues). Erasmus emphasized “wisdom, a sense of justice, personal restraint, foresight, and concern for the public well-being” (2010 (1516), p. 5). The key attributes of leaders highlighted by Calvin were “integrity, prudence, clemency, moderation and innocence” (2010 (1559), p. 53). Here the picture that emerges is of someone possessed of extensive practical knowledge of all aspects of statecraft, grounded by their faith in God, ‘majestic’ in their demeanour and able to navigate in a complex context. Here the leader is the dignified, masterful practitioner of real-politic whose power commands fear, respect and loyalty.

From Carlyle through to WWII, leaders were understood as possessing innate qualities which rendered them such (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Galton, 1970 (1875); Thorndike, 1936). Qualities such as courage, determination, intelligence and an intensity of feeling were thought to be typical characteristics. See Table 4. 2 on p.73 which summarizes Carlyle’s account of Oliver Cromwell and its connection with later trait studies. Leaders in this discourse were heroes, men of good breeding and usually good manners, well educated, physically and mentally strong, determined and capable, possessing a refined sensibility. They were the perfect Victorian gentlemen.

The characteristics attributed to leaders by behavioural theorists was a mix of behaviours that were focussed on ‘consideration’ and ‘structure’ and which rendered someone able to gain the respect of a group, instil harmonious relations, and secure willing compliance to the instructions issued (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1964; Fleishman, 1953a; Katz et al., 1950).
For situational theorists it was these approaches deployed in a manner suitable to the situation at hand (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; House, 1977; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Illustrative of these claims, Stogdill’s meta-analysis of 52 studies published since 1945 concluded:

...leadership involves certain skills and capabilities – interpersonal, technical, administrative, and intellectual – enabling the leader to be of value to his group or organization. These skills allow him to maintain satisfactory levels of group cohesiveness, drive, and productivity. He is further assisted in execution of the above functions if he possesses a high degree of task motivation, personal integrity, communicative ability, and the like (1974, p. 96).

The picture of the leader that emerges here is the well-rounded practical man of action, able to get along well with those he directs. This account of a thoroughly good chap seems to suggest a civilianised version of a military unit leader whose troops’ morale was high and who would tackle any assignment with vigour.

With ‘new leadership’ discourse it is the leader’s ability to drive through rapid and dramatic change in organizational performance and ‘culture’ which has become the focus of attention (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kotter, 1988; Peters & Austin, 1985). Leaders are here understood as persons who are ‘charismatic’, who intellectually and morally stimulate others, encourage others’ personal growth, who develop and pursue visions for a better future (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978; Conger, 1989). The image here is of the ideal Fortune 500 CEO, admired by employees, shareholders and market analysts alike, transforming the organisation and those who work for it as he pursues his visionary strategy. Leadership scholars have crafted a mirror into which these persons can look and take pleasure in what they see glittering back at them.

Dispositif 7.2 summarizes this analysis of changes in what has been claimed as the truth about leaders.
### Dispositif 7.2: Key characteristics of the leader in different discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical Greek</th>
<th>16th century Europe</th>
<th>Great man/trait theory (ca 1840–WWII)</th>
<th>Managerial leadership (post WWII)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>divinely gifted; driven to serve others</td>
<td>divinely gifted; duty to serve and lead</td>
<td>driven/enabled by nature to lead others; ‘nurture’ enhances what ‘nature’ gifted</td>
<td>personal attributes plus acquired skills produce the desire and ability to lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loves the gods; morally without fault</td>
<td>loves God; upholds Christian morality</td>
<td>assumed and expected to be good Christians</td>
<td>discourse is silent on issues of faith; leaders assumed and expected to act ethically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has perfect knowledge of what is right and wise; knowledgeable about all matters that affect community well-being</td>
<td>knows Christ’s teachings; knowledgeable about worldly affairs of statecraft; possesses majesty; acts prudently</td>
<td>sound judgement; foresight; strength of character; ‘can do’; superior intelligence; dependable; educated, courageous, socially active</td>
<td>knows how to motivate/change others to achieve higher levels of performance, commitment and personal growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ascetic lifestyle – restrains eating, sleeping and sexual urges in order to serve better</td>
<td>combines majesty and prudent use of state funds so as to live in a manner consistent with their status and duties</td>
<td>lifestyle expected to be consistent with Christian values</td>
<td>committed to organisational goals; discourse silent on issues of lifestyle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My analysis shows that what has been claimed as the truth about the nature of leaders has changed repeatedly and significantly over time. Leaders have been variously constructed as warrior-philosophers, dignified and masterful practitioners of real-politic, heroic Victorian gentlemen, well-rounded practical men of action and visionary, change-focussed CEOs. This suggests that no stable psychology of ‘the leader’ is likely to be found, for no ‘human nature’ exists in respect of leadership, if such a thing is assumed to be timeless and enduring. It further suggests that these truth claims are more usefully and plausibly understood as inventions designed to address different values and problematizations rather than discoveries about the true nature of leaders.

The alternative interpretation is that we have only just recently, finally, established the ‘real truth’ about leadership and that all that has come before is simply wrong. In this interpretation the constant changes in the conception of the leader as noted in Dispositif...
7.2 is simply a record of past failures and errors. To hold to such a view requires a greater degree of confidence in positivist social science than I believe is warranted, as the limitations of this epistemology and its methods are well established (see, for commentary and analysis, Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Austin, 1962; Russell, 1984). However, the interpretation I favour does not constitute a body blow to leadership scholarship. Rather, it serves as an incitement to begin future theorising with an eye to developing a concept of leaders tailored to present concerns and values, rather than wasting further effort in the search to discover the ‘true nature’ of the ‘true leader’.

A further shift in thought pertains to the place of the leader’s body, knowledge of which has basically disappeared since WWII. As noted in Chapter Six, the Classical Greeks’ interest in leaders’ bodies included, for example, concern about their exercise regime during their youth. An ascetic approach to eating, sleeping and sex was promoted. Illustrative of this, Xenophon tells us that Agesilaus as an exemplary leader “would no more choose drunkenness than madness” (5.1), that “he never used to eat the two portions he was served at feasts” (5.1). We are told Agesilaus “treated sleep as the subject rather than the master of his activities” (5.2) and “where sex was concerned, his self-control was masterful” (5.4). In the 16th century European discourse, as discussed in Chapter Five, the leader’s ‘majesty’ was embodied through their dress, their voice, and their remove from the potentially damaging gaze of the masses. Illustrative of this concern about the body of the leader and how it was seen, Erasmus counselled that it was “of considerable importance” that “artists should represent the prince in the dress and manner that is most worthy of a wise and distinguished prince” (2010 (1516), p. 58).

In the 19th century both Carlyle (1993 (1840)) and Galton (1970 (1875)) were interested in matters such as physical strength, facial characteristics and voice, while various trait theorists explored a range of physical characteristics for their association with leadership in the decades leading up to WWII (Smith & Krueger, 1933; Stogdill, 1948). However, since that time the embodied aspects of leadership have not been part of the mainstream of leadership theorising (Sinclair, 2007).
The leader's role, responsibilities and rights

The role, responsibilities and rights of leaders has also been a recurrent yet changing theme in the discourses examined here. As we have seen, in Classical Greece and 16th century European thought the leader’s role was that of head of state. As part of this leaders were held to have extensive rights and powers on matters deemed critical to the well-being of the people and the state, as the leader’s primary responsibility was to safeguard these (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Erasmus, 2010 (1516)). Illustrative of this Plato argued that leaders were devoted to “keeping their subjects safe” and “doing all they can to make them better people than they were before” (St 297a). Lipsius claimed “the common interest has been placed in your lap by God and men; but indeed in your lap, in order that it be cherished” (2004 (1589), p. 229).

In these discourses leaders were expected to attend to issues such as the economy, state security, immigration, inter-state relations, infrastructure, education and moral and religious practices, and extensive advice was offered on these matters (e.g. Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Plato, 1995, 2007). Complete obedience to the leader’s instructions was also strongly endorsed. Aristotle tells us that leaders are those whom “we ought to follow and obey” (Polis 1325b:1). For Lipsius, to maintain society required “a well-defined ordering of commanding and obeying” (2004 (1589) p. 295).

For Carlyle history was made by the gods, prophets, priest, poets, men of letter and kings who constituted the various forms of leadership he analysed (1993 (1840)). Regarding kingship as the highest and most modern form, Carlyle’s expectation was, like the Classical Greek and medieval discourses before him, that these leaders would rule the state, promote religion and foster the development of the human spirit. Their role was to “make what was disorderly, chaotic, into a thing ruled [and] regular” (1993 (1840), p. 175). Later, trait theorists envisaged their Victorian gentlemen leaders as promoting virtuous behaviour and group cohesion through their efforts, advancing human society to a more advanced level (e.g. Cattell, 1906; Clarke, 1916; Thorndike, 1936). Eugenicists’ hope was to “produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriage during several consecutive generations” (Galton, 1892 (1869), p. 45).

However, the break here from earlier discourses was that neither Carlyle nor the trait theorists addressed themselves to the substantive issues of statecraft. Instead of
engaging in the giving of advice on the leader’s substantive role and responsibilities as had Classical Greek and medieval scholars, the focus now was elucidating the character and deeds of exemplary leaders. Carlyle’s work, thus, marks the beginning of what later became the exclusive focus on the psychological domain of leadership, a distinct stepping away from the interest in public policy and statecraft which are such a strong focus of earlier discourses. In modernity, to know what the leader’s role, rights and responsibilities are entails a focus primarily on issues in the psychological domain.

Consistent with this, the role claimed for leaders since WWII initially focussed on the ‘consideration’ of the worker’s needs and ‘structuring’ the organisation of work activities (Fleishman, 1973; Shartle, 1979). With the development of contingency/situational theories, the need to assess situational variables in determining a response was added to the leader’s responsibilities (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Now, with ‘new leadership’ being the dominant discourse, the leader’s role is seen as being the management of meaning (Smircich & Morgan, 1982) and ensuring a fundamental change is wrought upon followers’ sense of self (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978; Conger, 1989). The expectation is that leaders are responsible for lifting follower performance and capability via the transformational process which is deployed in pursuit of the leader’s visionary strategy. Today the focus is placed on leaders’ powers to change the psyche of followers, this being understood as both a potent and legitimate domain of action. Recall Bass’s expectation that leaders produce transformational changes to “the work-group norms, as well as ultimate beliefs about religion, ideology, morality, ethics, space, time, and human nature” (Bass, 1985, p. 24). Contemporary leadership discourse is largely silent as regards leaders’ formal powers as these are matters now understood as being outside the domain of leadership scholarship. Instead, scholars with expertise in politics, law and HRM are left by leadership scholars to determine questions of formal authority.

The psyche of followers, which is now the primary focus expected of leaders, is, meanwhile, one largely unencumbered by the legacy of the Enlightenment with its focus on ensuring a balance of formal power, checks on authority, transparency of process and the right of appeal (Hampson, 2001; Morrow, 2005). Consequently, while the visible, formal aspects of leaders’ rights and powers have been severely constrained by means of formal rules and processes in the modern era (Morrow, 2005; Russell, 1984), in the
domain of followers’ psyche, the role, responsibilities, rights and powers of leaders have expanded and intensified dramatically in the last quarter century. Debate on boundary conditions as to the extent of appropriate leader influence has been marginalised because of the association made between ‘leadership’ and ‘the good’, with the follower’s self treated as terra nullius, open for colonisation.

**An unstable ontology**

What the foregoing analysis reveals is that leaders have been consistently positioned as superior beings, as good people who live good lives and, mostly, as men. The specific characteristics which define someone as a leader as well as the roles, rights and responsibilities credited to leaders have, meanwhile, undergone extensive change. At the level of basic ontology, while the Classical Greeks and 16th century thinkers argued that leaders were rare (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Erasmus, 2010 (1516)), today the vast sums committed to leadership development programmes (Jackson & Parry, 2011) rely on the claim that many people possess the potential and ability to lead (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Goleman et al., 2002).

The prevalence of a phenomenon is a key ontological characteristic requiring explanation if we are to claim a scientific grasp of that phenomenon, so the shift in understanding demands our attention. Why has leadership changed from something rare amongst the population to something now widely distributed? Perhaps it may be argued that certain aspects of modern society are more suited to releasing the leadership potential that otherwise lies dormant. This possibility warrants further research as it is not something leadership scholars have attended to thus far. Alternatively, the conflict could be dissolved by dismissing the Greek and medieval accounts altogether and arguing that “true” knowledge commenced in 1978 or some other date when positivist social science achieved a firm grip on leadership. However, pending further research which can explain why leadership may have changed so markedly, this finding further demonstrates that leadership is an unstable, contingent invention.
Continuity and change in the truth about followers

The ‘follower’, or more often ‘followers’ as a largely undifferentiated mass, appear as the necessary but typically problematic ‘other’ in the leadership discourses examined here (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Fiedler, 1967; Fleishman, 1953a; Galton, 1970 (1875); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Plato, 1995). Their existence is repeatedly invoked in justifying the necessity of leadership. The problems which followers are said to cause are a common focus of attention, be it lack of obedience and immoral behaviour in ancient and medieval times (e.g. Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516); Plato, 1995, 2007) or inadequate motivation, and task and moral ‘immaturity’ in modern times (e.g. Burns, 1978; Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974). The nature of attention directed toward followers has, thus, largely been negative: followers are a problem to which leadership is the answer.

Followers have morphed over time from their ancient Greek and medieval European status as inherently and irremediably flawed beings (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Erasmus, 2010 (1516)) to their contemporary position as persons-of-unrealised-potential (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). However, despite this, the follower’s enduring position is as a fundamentally deficient being who requires the leader’s intervention. It is arguably merely a change in social norms of what constitutes an acceptable way to speak of others rather than a fundamental change in the status of followers that has occurred.

So long as the equation of ‘leader’ with ‘superior being’ prevails in how leadership is understood, it is simultaneously a ‘logical’ necessity that followers be understood as lacking in some way deemed important: the leader cannot be rendered superior by definition unless the follower is also rendered inferior. Thus, this positioning of followers is used to prop up the necessity of leadership, the desirability of leadership and the rights and powers claimed for leaders.

Illustrative of this, Aristotle tells us that “the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the role of a master” (Pols 1254b:20). Erasmus speaks of “the low concerns and sordid emotions of the common people” (2010 (1516), p. 24). For Carlyle, “the subjects without king can do nothing” (1993 (1840), p. 197). For situational/contingency theorists, recall that followers varied in their ability and willingness to perform. They might be enthusiastic, diligent and committed,
but they could also be reluctant, hostile, suspicious or merely compliant (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958). With the development of ‘new leadership’ discourse an apparently benevolent, empowering approach to followers was adopted. Here we are told that “leaders see and act on their own and their followers’ values and motivations” (Burns, 1978, p. 19). Yet this discourse also relies on the understanding that “followers’ attitudes, beliefs, motives and confidence need to be transformed from a lower to a higher plane of arousal and maturity” (Bass, 1985, p. 3).

A fundamental lack on the part of the follower thus continues even now to hold a dominant place in today’s leadership discourse. This inequality is so embedded into the conventional way of understanding leaders and leadership that even now it can hide in plain sight and yet not attract comment, other than from non-conventional perspectives such as is being advanced here. So entranced have we become by the promise that the leader shall transform us into something better than we believed possible, that this Faustian pact which demands the subjugation of the follower in the name of their very salvation goes largely unrecognised.

Repeatedly, leadership discourse has relied on a belittling, patronising account of followers to sustain its claims. However, here again Locke and the behavioural theorists of the post-WWII period offer variations that move us away from this norm. Locke (2010 (1690)) reversed the prevailing assumptions by adopting a suspicious, even hostile attitude to leaders, seeking to limit their scope of action. For him this was absolutely vital to safeguard the ‘natural freedom’ he saw as being the birth-right of all humanity. For Locke, leadership was more a danger than a solution, meaning the rights and powers of leaders ought to be clearly prescribed so as to protect from their interference the more important rights and powers of everybody else.

More recently, behavioural theorists understood followers as persons in possession of both rights and needs, assuming they possessed a natural inclination toward rational thought and action (e.g. Fleishman, 1953a; Katz et al., 1950). They were also highly sensitised toward limiting the scope for authoritarian leadership and disinclined toward any account of leadership as an innate capacity (e.g. Fleishman, 1973; Shartle, 1979), intent as they were on distancing themselves from trait theory and all that that potentially implied in a post-holocaust world. Taking these factors into account,
behavioural theorists promoted patterns of behaviour for those in supervisory positions which took for granted managerial rights in decision-making, but did not go that extra step of assuming followers were by definition deficient and leaders were by definition superior. Instead the focus was on behaviours, separated from any wider account of the human subject.

In ancient and medieval texts the inadequacy of followers is thought to be overcome through demanding follower obedience to the leader’s commands and warranting the use of force should such compliance not be forthcoming (e.g. Lipsius, 2010 (1589); Plato, 1995, 2007). In contemporary texts the approach to addressing followers’ inadequacies has shifted to that of ‘motivating the follower’ through appeals to their values, to group goals, and, as part of ‘new leadership’, offering inspiring visions, support for personal growth and using ‘corrective’ actions such as variable rewards dependent on follower performance (e.g. Bass, 1953; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978). The aim has been to capture the hearts and the minds of followers and engage these in pursuit of the leader’s vision. The techniques are designed to persuade rather than coerce the follower to adopt the course of action sought by the leader.

The abolition of physical coercion reflects the modern boundaries on formal authority arising from the Enlightenment emphasis on the rule of the law (Hampson, 2001; Morrow, 2005; Russell, 1984). This in turn has informed the widespread use of formalised procedures and rules in organizational life so as to limit the scope for personal whim. However, while the means of influence today exclude the use of force, the ends that are being sought remain essentially the same, namely follower compliance to the leader’s will. The focus of attention has shifted over time from followers’ obedient bodies and devout souls in ancient and medieval times to the productivity of their bodies in the post-war period and on to the commitment of their psyche to corporate interests in recent decades. This is the progress we have achieved in our understanding of leadership.

Followers’ alleged practical, intellectual or moral inadequacy has also rendered them dangerous at times. Both Classical Greek and 16th century texts see followers en masse as potentially disruptive of social order and emphasize the need for constant leader vigilance. Illustrative of this, Aristotle claimed “a very great multitude cannot be orderly” but that order was what “holds together the universe” and the “divine power” that
produced this result was the role of leaders (Pols 1326a:30). Recall Machiavelli argued that:

> the following may be said generally about men: that they are ungrateful, changeable, pretenders and dissemblers, avoiders of danger and desirous of gain, and while you do them good they are wholly yours, offering you their blood, their property, their life and their children … when the need is far off, but when it comes close to you they revolt (2005 (ca 1516), p. 91).

More recently, Fiedler’s (1967) contingency model explicitly assesses leader and follower power as key variables in determining what type of leadership style is best suited to a given situation. However, by and large the danger posed by followers which can be found in ancient and medieval texts has today been reduced to a potential for disruption or frustration of the leader’s wishes.

The fact that followers have not been problematized as dangerous in recent decades may reflect the extent to which ‘new leadership’ discourse has been successfully positioned as positive, empowering and legitimate, rendering the idea of follower resistance as a potential danger to the leader’s continued authority largely unthinkable as a problem. However, recent mass ‘follower’ resistance, be it to the austerity measures adopted by EU governments, to talks aimed at advancing globalisation or as part of the ‘Arab Spring’, constitute potent real world examples of what can happen when leaders today lose their legitimacy in the eyes of followers. The growing scholarly focus on ‘authentic leaders’ (e.g. Avolio & Luthans, 2003; Gardner et al., 2011; Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsig, & Peterson, 2008) and on ‘followership’, in which it is positioned a lá Carlyle as a laudatory act (e.g. Kellerman, 2012; Riggio, Chaleff, & Lipman-Blumen, 2008), can usefully be understood as responses to the increasing fragility of our faith in leaders.

Dispositif 7.3 offers a summary of the basis on which followers have either been praised or critiqued in the different discourses examined here.
### Dispositif 7.3: Followers’ merits and demerits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Followers are criticised for:</th>
<th>Followers are praised for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek texts</td>
<td>being immoral; unruly; lacking understanding of what is right and true; self-interested</td>
<td>complete obedience to the leader and adherence to religious and social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th century texts</td>
<td>being unruly; immoral; ignorant; unreliable in their love and loyalty for the leader</td>
<td>love and loyalty to the leader; adherence to religious and social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke’s model</td>
<td>not actively defending their liberty from interference by leaders and others in positions of authority</td>
<td>seeking as much independence as possible from the influence of leaders in how they think and act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle’s model</td>
<td>being unruly; immoral; ignorant; not appreciating the excellence of the true leader</td>
<td>worshipping leaders, which improves the followers’ morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>not subject to criticism per se as not a topic of interest; attributes described in order to distinguish leaders from non-leaders</td>
<td>not subject to praise per se as not a topic of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>lack of motivation, absenteeism and poor productivity are positioned as problems but not located in the person of the follower; acknowledged but not criticised for having needs for ‘structure’ and ‘consideration’</td>
<td>not subject to praise per se; actions are presumed as typically being reasonable and legitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency/situational theory</td>
<td>lack of motivation; absenteeism; poor productivity; possible threat to leader power (Fiedler)</td>
<td>responding positively to the leader in terms of perceived motivation to perform, reduced absenteeism, and increased productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>being self-interested; moral immaturity; lacking vision and sense of higher purpose</td>
<td>sacrificing self-interest for the corporate interests of the group; enthusiastically supporting the leader and accepting their guidance; becoming more like a leader and less like a follower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What this demonstrates is that the specific characteristics and expectations placed on followers have varied over time, in the same way that the specific characteristics ascribed to leaders have varied (see Dispositif 7.2 earlier and associated commentary). Despite this, barring Locke and the behavioural theorists, followers are generally positioned as problematic and troublesome. Follower compliance to, or support for, the leader’s
requests also constitutes a recurrent source of praise against which only Locke and the behavioural theorists offer alternatives.

If followers were to be understood as capable, either individually or collectively, of making decisions, motivating themselves, developing and executing visions, building their own moral compass, or whatever it is that various theorists argue ‘leaders’ with their special abilities bring to the table, then the requirement for leadership would very quickly come into question, as would the rights and powers claimed for leaders. While some scholars have explored ‘substitutes for leadership’ (e.g. Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Pfeffer, 1977), perhaps not surprisingly this has not been an approach embraced by leadership scholars more generally. However, what this analysis reveals is that the whole intellectual edifice of the dominant understanding of leadership is tenuous: as soon as we concede that ‘followers’ possess the capacity to act as rational, reasonable adults, the necessity and desirability of ‘leadership’ as conventionally theorised suddenly seems much less certain while the authority and scope of influence now granted to leaders suddenly seems far too extensive and intrusive.

**The leader-follower relationship**

Today the leader-follower relationship is understood as being one of respect, trust and even intimacy in terms of the leader’s expected understanding of the follower (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978). The close connection which leaders are now expected to have with their followers carries with it the impression of egalitarian values where all persons mingle freely and equally in the same social space. This warmth and closeness is a quite recent occurrence and is generally understood as a progressive move away from old hierarchical models where leaders were much more remote.

As we have seen, Classical Greek thinking positioned the leader as head of state at a considerable remove from those he led (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Plato, 1995; 2007). The leader’s focus here was understood as being the welfare of the state overall, with the concerns of individual followers being of very limited interest. The understanding the
leader was expected to have of the follower was thus rather abstract and impersonal and their interaction was limited.

Sixteenth century texts were at pains to ensure that the leader’s ‘majesty’ was not damaged by being overly visible to the polluting gaze of the masses (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). The relationship here was also distant and the leader was not expected to ‘lower’ themselves to attend to the mundane concerns of ordinary followers. The leader’s immediate advisors were also regarded with some caution, as possibly prone to flattery or unsound advice until their loyalty and competence was proven (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Lipsius, 2004 (1589); Machiavelli, 2005 (ca 1516)). Even then, the leader’s divine status rendered him existentially distinctive and separate from all others.

For Carlyle and trait theorists alike, the value of ‘hero-worship’ or, later, learning from one’s betters, meant that the leader constituted a role model for the follower, someone whom they should seek to copy (e.g. Carlyle, 1993 (1840); Taussig & Joslyn, 1932; Visher, 1925). At a group level the leader served as guide and decision-maker. The distance between leader and follower here was in terms of ability, but regular interaction was now assumed both necessary and desirable. Leaders were now to be looked at in order that followers might learn from them.

Post-WWII, with the move to managerial leadership as the focus, the relationship between leader and follower has been understood as demanding regular, friendly interaction and a depth of leader understanding of both the individual follower and the group (e.g. Fleishman, 1973; Katz et al., 1950; House, 1971). This understanding is expected to assist the leader in encouraging the follower’s better performance and, more recently, personal and moral growth (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978; Hersey & Blanchard, 1974).

This understanding of the leader-follower relationship rejects the earlier fears that the leader might be polluted or distracted through close contact with followers. It replaces it with the expectation that the greater the contact between leader and follower the more the leader’s qualities will ‘rub off’ onto followers (e.g Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). Thus, rather than being isolated so as to enact leadership through strategy and policy decisions, leaders should now be ever present, enacting leadership through working directly on the person of the follower. This development relies on the re-positioning of the follower
noted earlier from fundamentally-flawed-being to person-of-unrealised-potential. It also relies on the shift of the leader from the divine and the rare to the extraordinary yet prevalent mortal, offering every employee the potential to benefit from exposure to a leader.

Consequently, the leader-follower relationship is now one which requires followers to expose their innermost self to the greatest degree possible so as to maximise the beneficial effects of the leader’s influence (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978). This process of continuous revelation of the follower self in order that it may be reshaped to better fulfil the leader’s vision renders followers both vulnerable and dependent. Thus, not only egalitarian concerns inform this greater closeness between leader and follower: governmentality, the intensive controlling, monitoring and measuring of the self of another by those in positions of authority (Foucault, 1977; 2008) is also a key driver. This intensive, never-ending surveillance extends to the self-monitoring in which leaders are expected to engage (e.g. Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Goleman et al., 2002; Kouzes & Posner, 2007) so as to meet the formulaic requirements of ‘new leadership’.

The developmental focus of ‘new leadership’ discourse, based on an understanding of the follower as possessing hitherto unrealised potential, is central to the positioning of leadership today as a progressive, humanistic endeavour (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Burns, 1978). This unleashing of the follower’s true abilities which the leader is expected to facilitate is critical to leadership being said to function for the good of the follower. Its entwinement with a focus on lifting follower performance arises from the simultaneous unitarist expectation that leaders and followers both serve organizational interests and in so doing benefit themselves (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kotter, 1996; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). The conflict inherent in a dual focus on developing followers for their own sake and on lifting follower performance to better serve the needs of the organization is rendered invisible through appeal to the humanistic elements of this relationship.

While a move toward greater closeness in the leader-follower relationship has occurred, the reciprocity previously emphasized has become less of a feature in the discourse. For the Classical Greeks, the complete obedience due to the leader was matched by the leader’s complete devotion to the well-being of the state, irrespective of how demanding
that might be for the leader (e.g. Plato, 1995; 2007; Xenophon, 1997; 2006). In the medieval discourse, the love, loyalty and obedience toward the leader was to be reciprocated by his unceasing diligence in safeguarding the well-being of the people and the state (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Lipsius, 2004 (1589). By the time we reach the trait theorists the sense of the duty the leader previously owed to the led has disappeared, leaving only the respect and admiration of the leader which the follower was expected to have (e.g. Clarke, 1916; Thorndike, 1936; Sorokin, 1925).

While followers are now expected to reveal themselves to the leader and then change that self in accordance with the leader's advice, the leader now seems to owe less and less to the follower by way of duty, obligation or self-sacrifice. Now, simply through expressing their leadership, leaders are thought to serve others, as leadership per se is presumed as a good, as inherently positive, irrespective of the specific goal it acts in aid of (e.g. Avolio & Luthans, 2003; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kotter, 1996). Moreover, while follower self-interest is held automatically to be problematic and wrongly directed until it comes under the leader's influence (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Burns, 1978), leader self-interest is presumed benign unless proven otherwise; in such case the individual leader's status as such is then rendered doubtful, inauthentic, false, yet all the while 'leadership' as an ideal remains intact (e.g. Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999).

If we directly contrast Classical Greek with 'new leadership', then the shift is from a relationship of obedience, subservience, and distance but with clear leader obligations for follower well-being to one of intimacy in order to bring about a change in the self of the follower resulting in enhanced performance. The change is from a reciprocal relationship between unequal parties to one where the follower is now both end and a means to an end, human and human resource, and where the duty of all is the achievement of enhanced performance. What seems lost is the sense of what the leader might owe to the follower by way of duty or obligation. What is instead emphasized is what the leader is able to bestow upon the follower, the process and experience of being transformed to become more like the leader (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Burns, 1978). This now is the service which leaders are expected to offer.

The parental nature of the leader-follower relationship that we saw in Classical Greek discourse has meanwhile become something much more ambiguous in the 'new
leadership’ discourse. This is because of the dependency leaders have in this discourse to express their very selves through achieving change in followers (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Burns, 1978). This requirement entwines leaders and followers in a dynamic where ‘success’ implies the possibility of mutual psychic extinction: if leaders succeed in transforming followers into leaders, as is promoted here, then their raison d’être is extinguished while followers cease to exist as such. This discourse demands that followers pass over their selves and their lives to leaders, to exist in a state in which leader self-expression is realised through follower self-denial.

The results sought and expected from the leader-follower relationship in Classical Greek and 16th century thought were nothing short of the maintenance of social order and the saving of souls (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Plato, 1995; 2007; Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Lipsius, 2004 (1589)). Locke’s interest was in freedom in the earthly realm in order that we might determine our own conscience and course in life (2010 (1690)). To achieve this he sought to limit the leader-follower relationship, but Carlyle (1993 (1840)) then resurrected the earlier concern with saving society and souls via the potency of leadership. Today that focus has moved to the maintenance of the economic order through the realisation of continuous improvements in performance (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Bennis & Nanus, 1985). This is said to occur through the unleashing of follower potential in pursuit of the leader’s vision. This process is depicted in terms acceptable to the norms of modern social science. Yet inherent to the very notion of ‘transformation’ is that of a fundamental change in the very nature of a thing. Like the miracle in which water becomes wine, ‘new leadership’ carries with it an appeal to supernatural forces that will relieve us of our worries and bless us with their divinity.

**The social function of leadership discourse: the promotion of order, inequality and the extraordinary**

In terms of its social function, three recurrent features of leadership discourse are evident. The first is that ‘leadership’ is associated with the upholding of order as a vital social good. For the Classical Greeks leadership was seen as an ordering force which was so fundamental and so powerful that it ‘holds together the universe” (Aristotle, Pols
Here, leadership stood between civilised society and a slide into anarchy, degeneracy, licentiousness, disrespect of the gods and social customs, immorality and a war of all against all. Similarly in the medieval discourse, leadership was positioned as crucial to the maintenance of social order and public morality (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); James VI, 1950 (1599); Luther, 2010 (1523)). Carlyle argued that worship of leaders enhanced the morality of followers, and created bonds of affection which maintained social order (1993 (1840)). He saw leaders as shaping and directing human history, creating order and progress where otherwise chaos and a lack of progress would prevail. Trait theorists, in assuming leadership was an innate personal quality, positioned leaders as responsible for ensuring social order (e.g. Galton, 1970 (1875); Lehmen, 1966 (1928); Thorndike, 1936). Since WWII, with the shift to a workplace focus, the order that is now the centre of attention is ensuring the efficient production of goods and services in conjunction with worker/follower satisfaction and, more recently, transformational change (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Fleishman, 1953a; House, 1971). This in turn is understood as contributing in important ways to the maintenance of social order more broadly (e.g. Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kotter, 1988; Peters & Austin, 1985). Implicit to all these accounts is the belief that without the leader’s steadying, guiding hand, disorder will prevail.

At various times leadership discourses, whilst still promoting the upholding of social order generally, have sought to reform the existing social system, to critique the status quo and challenge accepted norms. As we saw, the Classical Greek leadership discourse constituted an alternative model to that of the Athenian democracy, arguing for the superiority of a single, wise, appointed leader and against what it saw as the unstable, unreasoning, unwise nature of collective, democratic governance (e.g. Plato, 1995; 2007; Xenophon, 1997; 2006). Carlyle (1993 (1840)) also had a reforming agenda, seeking to counter what he perceived as the problematic legacy of enlightenment ideas which promoted reason and collective participation. Some trait theorists such as Galton (1892 (1869), 1970 (1875)), Cattell (1906) and Ellis (1904), through their association with the eugenics movement (Cowan, 1970; Gillham, 2001; Godin, 2007), also pursued a reformist endeavour built upon their conception of leadership as an inherited quality and their belief in the potential value of selective breeding practices.
In contrast, the leadership discourse of the 16th century was fully integrated into, aligned with, and reinforced the existing social system (Allen, 1951; Craigie, 1950; Jardine, 2010). Since World War II, leadership discourse has also played a similar role, taking as a given the requirements of capitalist economics (Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007; Western, 2007). It has promoted and supported the ceaseless search for enhanced productivity and performance as being something which is natural, normal and inevitable (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Peters & Austin, 1985). Contemporary leadership discourse has also been a key player in the broader shift in management discourse from a focus on producing compliant bodies to a focus on producing compliant minds (Alvesson, 2001; Ford & Harding, 2007; Parker, 2002). To do this it has appealed to widely accepted beliefs about human potential and to the tradition of the leader as exceptional being. These are linked to an acceptance of the demand for a constant improvement in performance. Consequently, leadership discourse currently functions to uphold order in the workplace and to uphold the existing economic system more broadly. It thus serves to reinforce the current order of things, just as 16th century texts served to reinforce Christian monarchy.

The second recurrent feature of the social function of leadership discourse is that it has continuously, barring Locke, offered a justification for the unequal distribution of rights, power and authority between leaders and followers (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Bass, 1985a; Erasmus, 2010 (1516); House, 1971). Mostly this arises from the positioning of followers as deficient while leaders are rendered superior. Behavioural theorists offer the exception to this because they base the differentiation of rights, power and authority solely on positional authority rather than on the superiority/inferiority thesis. However, that thesis at all other points provides a critical building block from which the advocacy of unequal rights, power and authority can readily be advanced. As we saw, both the Classical Greeks and medieval scholars regarded the majority of people as unruly and typically lacking in the capacity for right action, absent the leader's direction. Today the deficiency in followers is recast into the language of ‘unrealised potential’ which only the leader can release, but the overall effect remains a justification for the unequal distribution of rights, power and authority.

Associated with the positioning of leaders as superior comes the third recurring social function of leadership discourse, the promotion of leadership as something
extraordinary, something supernatural. The divinity of the leader was clear cut and overtly stated in both Classical Greek and 16th century texts. Carlyle also saw leaders as having been sent by God (1993 (1840)). Thus, for much of the Western tradition leaders have been connected with the divine, essential, immortal and supernatural realm, separated from and superior to the mundane, prosaic and ordinary. From Galton onwards the discourse became overtly secular and scientific in tone. Yet despite this shift, again barring behavioural theory, there remains a reverential, admiring tone to the mainstream of leadership discourse which positions leaders at a remove from the mundane and ordinary (e.g. Bass, 1985a; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Conger, 1989). ‘New leadership’ discourse has intensified and heightened this long-standing trend.

In the Western tradition, then, to speak of leadership is to speak about the maintenance of social order, the deficient nature of most people and the exceptional, super-natural leader. The direct link made between a fear of chaos, direct access to the extraordinary and leadership likely accounts for its enduring appeal. This linkage simultaneously presents us with the problem and the solution to the problem. It simultaneously takes us down to contemplate the worst of all scenarios, the breakdown of society, and lifts us up, so that we may see the spark of the divine made accessible to us in human form. Today the seductive appeal (Calás & Smircich, 1991) of this has been intensified, because it is now claimed that everyone has within them the potential to lead. Moreover, with existential fears growing about the survival of the planet, terrorism and the on-going economic crisis, the necessity for leadership is readily presented to us as being greater than ever. My question is, must we persist with a model of leadership which relies on the assumption that most people are inadequate?

Whether leadership discourse has functioned to support or reform the existing social system, with the exception of Locke it has repeatedly offered an account which serves elite, anti-democratic interests. The combination of a positioning of order as a critical social good with followers rendered deficient and leaders as superior beings constitutes the three key enduring elements of the Western tradition. Changing any of these elements thus constitutes a potentially potent basis for reconceptualising leadership; I will return to explore this further in the next chapter.
Producing the truth about leadership: what have we gained and lost along the way?

The epistemological and methodological basis on which claims to speak the truth about leadership are made has changed dramatically over time. These changes largely mirror major developments in the Western intellectual tradition (Morrow, 2005; Russell, 1984) reflecting the influence those developments have had on leadership scholars. Hence we find a shift from an analytic philosophy reliant on both reasoning and myth in Classical Greece (Cartledge, 1993; Grant, 1991) to a renaissance philosophy in the 16th century, this being a blend of ancient Greek and Roman traditions and medieval Christian thought (Allen, 1951; Cameron, 2001; Skinner, 2002). Over the course of the last century the trend has been toward an increasingly empirical, quantitative and scientistic mode of reasoning and inquiry (Bass, 2008; Morrow, 2005; Russell, 1984).

We would normally understand these developments to mean that our knowledge today is superior to that of the past because it is grounded on more robust, reliable premises and methods of discovery. However, as I showed in Chapter Four, the major theoretical developments in modern leadership knowledge have not arisen from scientific discoveries but, rather, as inventive responses to varying problematizations. The modern account of leadership is also much closer in nature to those developed in both the Classical Greek and medieval epistemes than is normally understood. I have, therefore, already argued that the ‘progress’ made may not be as great as we might have expected. Having done that, here I am interested in focussing on what we might have lost as a result of these developments, further challenging the normal expectation that what we have achieved today is a superior access to the truth.

The truth about leadership in both Classical Greek and renaissance Europe literature was, as detailed in Chapters Five and Six, multi-dimensional. As we have seen, this meant that the leader’s childhood experiences constituted an important topic about which leadership scholars considered they ought to know and comment upon (e.g. Erasmus, 2010 (1516); Plato, 1995, 2007). As identified earlier, the leader’s private life, including his eating, sleeping and sexual habits, his clothing and housing arrangements, his friends and his use of money, all these matters have in earlier times demanded attention in
establishing the truth about leadership. As noted, the care and use of the leader’s body
were issues of interest in the past. Spiritual and religious aspects of life were also
previously matters of considerable importance in understanding leadership.

These dimensions of life which used to constitute important aspects of knowledge about
leadership in the past are today largely excluded and ignored. Generally, this is not
because these matters have been scientifically proven as being irrelevant. Rather, current
social norms place leadership in the public domain and treat the private domain as
irrelevant to leadership knowledge. I am not advocating here that such matters ought to
be resurrected as domains of inquiry for leadership scholars, but I do think we ought to
be debating the boundaries we operate within and not simply taking them for granted.
Our knowledge of leadership is narrower today than in the past and this is not what we
would expect to be the case.

One consequence of our current boundaries is that the private lives of business leaders
(the focus of the contemporary literature considered here) remain largely unexamined by
scholarly researchers. This space has been instead dominated by autobiographers and
biographers offering us hagiographic accounts (e.g. Branson, 2002; Welch & Byrne, 2001).
Depending on whether privacy is considered more important than a broader
understanding of the lived experience of leaders, or followers for that matter, this
limitation may not be seen by some as a problem. Politically, of course, independent
scholarly research which examined the lifestyles and benefits some leaders achieve might
be considered inconvenient, especially if compared with that of followers. However, this
is not a valid reason for ignoring these issues.

Another consequence of current boundaries is that both leaders and followers appear in
our contemporary discourse as disembodied beings. Only rarely do leadership scholars
seek to examine the embodied experience of leadership (although, see Sinclair, 2007), yet
effective interpersonal communication, a key element of mainstream models, entails the
use of voice, gaze and bodily stance. Why bodies have become largely off-limits for
leadership knowledge warrants further investigation. To reiterate, the claim here is not
that these matters are definitively important to our understanding of leadership: that
remains to be established. Rather, the concern is that the domains of leadership
knowledge have narrowed and the field is not today debating its boundaries.
Classical Greek and 16th century knowledge was also profoundly substantive in its orientation while current knowledge is essentially processual and behavioural. As we have seen, knowledge of issues as diverse as town planning, crop management, trade policy, warfare and statecraft comprise central features of Classical Greek and 16th century leadership knowledge (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; James VI, 1950 (1599)). To establish their credibility as experts in leadership demanded that these scholars understood and could provide advice on the substantive issues with which leaders had to contend. Today, because of the orientation toward producing knowledge which is claimed to be universally applicable, along with the specialization expected of scholars, the emphasis has moved completely away from an understanding of what all this leading and following is actually for. Instead the emphasis has switched to the processes and behaviours of leading that are said to be transferable to any context, relevant to any issue.

As part of this move, questions of philosophy and politics are now placed into separate domains of knowledge from leadership knowledge. Barring those scholars which are advocating for a central place for ethics in leadership knowledge (e.g. Ciulla, 2004; Ladkin, 2010; Sinclair, 2007), the actual issues that leaders and followers come together to work on are not a matter of active debate within the mainstream of the leadership literature. Today we have the ‘how’, but our texts are typically absent the ‘of what’, ‘where’, ‘who for’ and the ‘why’ of leadership (although, for an exception to this, see Kempster et al, 2011).

Important political and contestable choices and consequences are ignored when what leadership scholars offer up is a recipe for changing others without any assessment as to who actually benefits from that change. What is largely being produced is knowledge whose political effects are hidden, in which leadership is portrayed as a matter of technique whose aim is enhancing human potential. This apparently benign account ignores the micro and macro political and ethical issues that are inevitably associated with a relationship based on inequality. It assumes that the actual issues that leader and followers contend with are amenable to a global approach. It is hard to see that this narrowing of the debate constitutes an overall advancement of knowledge.

Despite these profound changes in the foundation, nature and scope of leadership knowledge, what has remained constant is the optimistic tenor of the discourse vis a vis
the positive effects of leadership. Always the belief that a person of outstanding ability can have a positive impact on others lies at the core of the discourse (e.g. Aristotle, 2009; Bass, 1985a; Erasmus, 2010 (1516); House, 1996; Likert, 1961). At every point the aim has been to articulate an account of leadership that will achieve beneficial results for followers. The specific results that are sought varies, but always the desired outcome is to benefit followers. Consistently, what we see in the archive is the production of a disciplinary regime which seeks to govern and inform the actions of leaders, ensuring their conduct and decisions are conducive to what is said to be in the best interests of followers. Consistently, leadership as a topic of inquiry creates for scholars the sense of labouring for the betterment of all, a worthy aim without doubt. However, insofar as the discourse remains reliant on the belittling of the follower its effects likely remain problematic.

Conclusion

This and the preceding three chapters now cumulatively constitute the detailed answers I offer to the research questions informing this research. As this chapter has shown, our present understanding of leadership is just the latest variant in a long process of both change and continuity, but one where the overall distance travelled is much shorter than we might have expected. Plato might not recognise our contemporary methods of searching for the truth, but he would likely applaud the attention now being given over to the transformational visionary to whom all others should defer judgement. Where this leaves us is alarmingly close in our supposedly scientific, modern and progressive thinking to Plato’s defence of totalitarian rule.

Positioning leadership as the answer to every question as we have done (yet again) over the last quarter century is not only destined to result in disappointment as actual, real human beings fail to meet such grandiose and naïve expectations (e.g. Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford et al, 2008). It also encourages a dangerous passivity from the great majority of people. As ‘followers’, they are positioned as limited creatures who are to rely on leaders, in most case managers, let us not forget, for guidance and motivation on who to be, how to act and what to think. To position leaders
as we now do as ideal persons without fault is both to ask the impossible of them and to incite them to developing a distorted, narcissistic sense of their own capabilities. To position followers as we now do as merely latent, unrealised potential is to absolve the majority of adults from self-responsibility. With this the motivation (and freedom!) to be had from pursuing one’s own goals, thoughts and dreams along with the requirement to grow up are removed, rendering followers perpetual adolescents. In the ideal world as implied by ‘new leadership’ theory, the important decisions and the constant monitoring needed to keep these immature followers on track is to be left in the hands of a small, non-elected group of manager-leaders: Plato’s Republic is just down the road from here.

The basic facts and chronology of the developments documented in the foregoing case studies are readily accessible in the archive for those who care to look. The interpretation I have placed on those basic facts and chronology is, of course, my own and open to challenge. However, for most of the last 150 years leadership scholars have shown remarkably little interest in this history. Lacking the broader perspective an appreciation of our history can bring, the field has assumed it possesses a modern worldview and is producing new knowledge. Yet in many ways it is reworking old ground. Absent a concern with the problematic of power it has also naively assumed its outputs will have progressive political effects.

What my incursions into past truths demonstrate is that leadership theory can readily be entwined with substantive knowledge of a diverse range of matters. The effect of this has, in other times, been to produce leadership knowledge that is not merely processual in orientation, but is also concerned with both substantive issues and with questions about the ends and not simply the means of leadership. If we were today to turn our minds to these matters, leadership studies could be radically reinvented. If we were to focus attention onto the actual challenges facing leaders and followers, on the outcomes being sought and the ends we seek as well as the means deployed to achieve them, then we could seek to build a new approach to theorising leadership. In the latter part of Chapter Eight I will explore where this way of thinking could take us.
**Chapter Eight: Conclusion and future trajectories**

Never before has so much attention been paid to leadership, and the fundamental question we must ask is, what do we know and what should we know about leaders and leadership? (Avolio et al., 2009, p. 423).

There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all (Foucault, 1985, p. 8).

**Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to offer concluding comments on what this research has revealed, consider the implications of this study and assess its credibility, limitations and contribution to knowledge. I also offer a new approach to theory building arising from the findings I have made, and offer examples of how this could be operationalized. I begin by recapping the rationale for the study, the extant literature, the questions I have addressed and the approach taken to addressing those questions. Next I provide a series of dispositives summarising the key findings in regards to the secondary questions, before turning to offer my key conclusions in respect of the primary question guiding this study, why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does? I then consider the key implications of my findings for future research. After that I review the credibility standards which I proposed in Chapter Three ought to govern this study, examining how these have been maintained, before turning to assess the limitations of the study and its contribution to knowledge. I then turn to the future, demonstrating how the insights gained from this study could be put to use so as to enable us to think differently about leadership.

**Recapping the rationale for and approach taken in this study**

Whilst Avolio et al. report with enthusiasm that “never before has so much attention been paid to leadership” (2009, p. 423) this study has taken the critical step back to ask why this is even happening. Why has leadership come to be seen as the answer to every
problem? Why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does? The super-human expectations we now have of leaders, the permission now extended to these manager-leaders to change the psyche of their follower-employees, the assumption that most people are somehow deficient in the absence of leadership are key features of the current mainstream of scholarly discourse on leadership which demand scrutiny (e.g. Bass, 1985a, Bass & Riggio, 2006; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). The heavy focus now given over to strategy, vision and change in leadership discourse, and the disregard for the ordinary and mundane aspects of organizational life which occupies most of the people, most of the time, are matters which need explaining.

Critically oriented scholars have begun the task of scrutinising this now normalized, disciplinary discourse. The results of these efforts reveal that despite its surface level benevolence and apparent scientificity, troubling assumptions inform ‘new leadership’ and concerning consequences arise for people trying to enact its prescriptions (e.g. Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Ford & Harding, 2007, 2011; Ford et al., 2008). These studies point to the potential value of further critical examination of ‘new leadership’, and so as part of my review of the literature I set out my own critique of the key assumptions underpinning the mainstream of leadership studies (see pp. 21-25).

However, despite the promise of critical studies of leadership, thus far precious little research has focused on examining why the current understandings came about. Only rarely have contemporary leadership scholars seriously investigated the history of the field in order to better understand why we got here (e.g. Knights & Morgan, 1992; Trethewey & Goodall Jnr, 2007; Western, 2007). Consequently, one key contribution of this study is that it extends that critical ‘history of leadership studies’ literature in scope and thematic focus.

What my review of the literature revealed is that research into the problematizations which have informed the development of leadership discourses warranted further attention. So too did the key assumptions underpinning leadership discourses, the subjectivities and relationships they produced, and their social function. Analysis of change and continuity in leadership discourse was the final key matter in need of further research and so from this, and taking into account the theoretical and methodological framework guiding the study, emerged the questions to drive this research.
The approach taken to tackle the research questions was to deploy the Foucauldian strategy of de-familiarising the present in which we are normally embedded, seeing this move as “absolutely necessary if one is go on looking and reflecting at all” (1985, p. 8). This approach was chosen over other options as Foucault’s own studies demonstrated the utility of his methods for examining both past and present expert discourses and to address the issues of interest here.

The specific approach taken deployed Foucault’s Archaeological method to examine the form of discourses and their conditions of possibility, revealing key underpinning assumptions shaping claims to speak the truth about leadership. The Genealogical method was used to examine processes of formation, beginning with identifying the problematizations in response to which claims to speak the truth about leadership have developed. These two methods were also combined in order to examine the social function and subjectivity and relationship effects arising from these discourses. Case studies which span different epistemes were used to support the de-familiarization strategy and from which an analysis of both change and continuity could be derived. This resulted in three points of focus: Classical Greece, 16th century Europe, and modern leadership studies beginning from the 1840s.

Through these methodological moves and through its deployment of Foucault’s key concepts of discourse, power, power-knowledge and subjectivity, the study sets forth a detailed and multi-faceted explanation of why we got here. It offers, I hope, a “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p. 31) revealing why and how present understandings of leadership are problematic and, moreover, that these understandings are no modern scientific discovery. They are, rather, deeply informed by ideas from the past and their development is founded in changing problematizations.

Consistent with my thesis, the study shows that, contrary to conventional understandings, ‘new leadership’ thinking is profoundly problematic but, being a contingent construction and not something grounded in nature or science, this situation is open to change. To substantiate this thesis, the case studies reveal how ‘new’ and other forms of leadership arose, and the underpinning assumptions and effects arising from these accounts of the truth about leadership. The cases have also brought to light both changes and continuities in leadership thought, providing examples from which,
later in this chapter, I draw in order to create and demonstrate an approach for ensuring we can think differently about leadership as a consequence of this research.

**Summary of key findings**

In this section I provide a series of dispositives which summarize my key findings for each of my secondary questions. Dispositives are proposed to constitute a specific outcome of an Interpretive Analytics study, charting key commonalities and differences across epistemic cases and thereby de-familiarizing our understanding of both past and present (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Where relevant I incorporate my own propositions arising from this research. I then turn to consider the overall research question, why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does.
What problematizations have informed the development of the leadership discourses examined here?

**Dispositif 8.1 The problematizations informing leadership discourses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Problematization</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek</td>
<td>Disorder, class conflict, war, moral degeneracy, loss of tradition and respect for the gods linked to democratic governance.</td>
<td>Standards of behaviour to be imposed by a single leader head of state whose only concern is community well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; C Europe</td>
<td>Political and religious conflict; the disorderly nature of the people; self-serving or incompetent leader behaviour.</td>
<td>Leader as God's representative on earth, head of state, possessing God's power, authority, divinity and goodness. Set out standards of conduct for leaders to adhere to and provided policy advice to mitigate leader incompetence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Excessive rationalism of Enlightenment thought and the effects of industrial revolution damaging to 'human spirit', morality, faith and social cohesion.</td>
<td>Heroic leadership in which passion, religious fervour and bold deeds lift the human spirit, and improve human society. Worship of hero leaders will build faith and morality, enhance social cohesion and bring out the best in human nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Only those ‘fit’ to lead in a Dawinian sense should be selected, as social problems arise when there is a mismatch between a person’s ‘natural talents’ and their role in society.</td>
<td>Identify traits of leadership and only place people with those traits in leadership positions. For eugenecists, adopt selective breeding practices to improve the quality of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>Ensuring managerial control of the problems of workforce motivation, performance, absenteeism and conflict so as to help sustain America's new dominance and continued progress.</td>
<td>Leader behaviour focussed on ‘consideration’ and ‘structure’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency / Situational theory</td>
<td>Social context challenges old modes of authority and seeks an end to bureaucratic inflexibility so leadership must become situationally contingent.</td>
<td>Match leader behaviour to situational variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>Initially a crisis in leadership in 1970s America. Sustained through problematizing the modern world as needing leadership which produces change. Followers have potential but this can only be released through leadership.</td>
<td>Visionary, charismatic, transformational leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What key assumptions have informed these discourses?

Dispositif 8.2 Key assumptions informing leadership discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Key assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek</td>
<td>Leader is superior by divine nature; follower is deficient by nature; the truth is established through the use of reason and by reference to traditional knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\textsuperscript{th} C European</td>
<td>Leader is superior by divine nature; follower is deficient by nature; the truth is established through examining ancient and biblical sources and the use of reason.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Leader is superior by divine nature; follower is deficient by nature; the truth is established through reason, examining biblical sources, studying the life history of leaders and the scientific study of faces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Leader is superior by nature; follower is deficient by nature; the truth is established through statistical analysis of bodily, social and psychological ‘traits’ and biographic and demographic data about leaders’ family backgrounds, personal characteristics and achievements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>Leadership is behavioural and is therefore learnable; the truth is established through statistical analysis of survey results through which various ‘constructs’ are tested to determine the one best way to lead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency / situational theory</td>
<td>Leadership is behavioural but also influenced by context; those who can adapt their behaviours to different needs are superior and best able to remedy the deficiencies of followers; the truth is established through conceptual models which are then tested by the statistical analysis of survey results to determine the appropriate way to lead in a variety of different situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>Leaders are superior (and this is likely due to a combination of nature and nurture); followers have potential but need the leader to unleash this; the truth is established through testing precise theoretical propositions using complex statistical analysis in order to develop a prescriptive model for universal application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My proposition</td>
<td>What we understand as constituting ‘leadership’ is a social construction with an unstable ontology and hence is open to adaption; contextual factors are critical; assumptions of superiority and inferiority are problematic; the political dimensions of leadership knowledge are unavoidable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### What subjectivities and relationships are produced by these discourses?

#### Dispositif 8.3 The subjectivity of the leader produced by these discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Leader subjectivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek</td>
<td>Masculine warrior-philosopher who lives a devout and ascetic life focussed on ensuring the well-being of the state and the people; divinely gifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th C Europe</td>
<td>Divinely gifted; devout; learned but practical expert in all aspects of statecraft; majestic; masterful practitioner of real-politic; can also be imprudent, lacking in virtue, self-serving and manipulated by flattery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Divinely gifted; heroic man of good breeding; devout; well-educated; physically and mentally strong; determined and capable; possessing a refined sensibility; perfect Victorian gentleman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Man of good breeding (and possibly superior genes); devout; well-educated; physically and mentally strong; determined and capable; possessing a refined sensibility; perfect Victorian gentleman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>Behaviour is skilful in relating to people and organizing tasks; well-rounded, practical man of action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Contingency / situational theory | Skilful and considered diagnostician of worker/follower behaviours; able to respond variably to the demands of different situations. |}

- **‘New leadership’**
  - Visionary, charismatic, strategic, able to change others. Perfect CEO.

- **My proposition**
  - Leaders are as we invent them to be; scholars must carefully address the risk of producing an ideal which is impossible to uphold and which renders leaders superior and grants them excessive power; there need not be a defined ‘leader’ in every model of leadership we develop.
### Dispositif 8.4 The subjectivity of the follower produced by these discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Follower subjectivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek</td>
<td>Prone to immorality and unruly behaviour; lacks understanding of what is right and true; self-interested; needs the leader's intervention to live a good life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th C Europe</td>
<td>Prone to being unruly, immoral, ignorant and unreliable, but can also be loyal, loving and obedient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Prone to being unruly, immoral and ignorant in the absence of a focus on the leader as role-model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Lack whatever it is that leaders possess to render them such.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>May have needs for support or direction but naturally inclined to reasonable action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency / situational theory</td>
<td>May have needs for support or direction; may be reasonable but can also be difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>Possesses unrealised potential which needs the leader’s intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My proposition</td>
<td>Followers are as we invent them to be; scholars must carefully address the risk of producing an ideal which renders followers inferior, passive or weak; there need not be a ‘follower’ in every model of leadership we develop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The leader-follower relationship produced by these discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Leader-follower relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical Greek:</td>
<td>Distant; demands follower obedience; leader is simultaneously master, servant and slave to the people; relationship is akin to cloning as leader seeks to make followers more like himself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th C Europe:</td>
<td>Followers are the subjects of leaders and owe him love, loyalty and obedience; relationship is distant so the leader's 'majesty' is not harmed by follower's gaze; the leader's key duty is to protect the well-being of followers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Followers worship leaders; leaders offer themselves as role models from whom others can learn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Leaders are admired by followers who look to them for guidance, advice and direction; leaders offer this service to others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>Friendly; respectful; focussed on achieving organizational results and entails leader guidance and, if needed, support to the follower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency / situational theory</td>
<td>May be friendly, respectful but can also be challenging; requires a watchfulness on the part of the leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>Close and intense; the leader works on the follower's psyche to unleash their potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My proposition</td>
<td>The relationship varies with the different models we develop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is the social function of these discourses?

Dispositif 8.6 The social function of leadership discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Social function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to undermine the legitimacy of democracy and to position a singular ‘warrior-philosopher’ leader as the only thing that stands between order, morality and chaos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th C Europe</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to maintain the legitimacy and status of monarchical leadership and to simultaneously prescribe to monarchs how best to lead, setting a standard for their conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to promote romanticist, aristocratic values, undermining the push for greater democracy and promoting the worship of heroic individuals as vital for morality and social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait theory</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to promote the naturalness of inequality and to provide a ‘scientific’ basis for weeding out those not ‘fit’ to lead, reinforcing social Darwinian and eugenicist discourses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to advance organizational and managerial interests and does this by promoting the value and necessity of leadership and prescribing the one best approach to leading in the workplace that will secure enhanced productivity and willing compliance from follower-employees. The discourse also functions to protect follower’s rights and dignity by attempting to ensure that leaders act in a reasonable manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency/</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to advance organizational and managerial interests and does this by promoting the value, necessity, highly skilled and variable nature of workplace leadership, seeking to secure enhanced productivity and willing compliance from follower-employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New leadership’</td>
<td>Leadership discourse functions to advance organizational and managerial interests and does this by promoting vision, strategy and constant change as the hallmarks of the modern age and the modern leader, offering leaders an attractive identity script and seeking to secure the active engagement of follower-employees in allowing the leader to work on changing their psyche.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My proposition</td>
<td>Leadership discourse ought to function as a sceptic in respect of its own utterances, seeing itself as a contingent invention and not a discourse of truth, and evincing an ethical and political awareness in respect of the interests it serves and the effects its proposals produce.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What changes and continuities are notable when comparing these discourses?

Dispositif 8.7 Change and continuity in leadership discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Continuities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problematization</td>
<td>What is problematized varies so that, in conjunction with extant values, norms, epistemologies and methodologies, a specific, tailored form of leadership then emerges.</td>
<td>Calls for leadership arise as a response to moral, social, political and economic trends or events which are problematized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>The specific characteristics ascribed to leaders have undergone constant adaptation. There is no stable persona to be found and hence no stable ontology. The leader's responsibilities and rights have also changed from head of state to manager and while now constrained by laws and rules, the right to work on the self of followers has expanded with new leadership discourse.</td>
<td>Think ‘leader’, think ‘superior being’, ‘the good ‘person/life’, and ‘male’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower</td>
<td>The follower has morphed over time from an inherently and irremediably flawed being to being a person of unrealised potential.</td>
<td>Followers are a problem to which leadership is the answer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader-follower</td>
<td>Has become much closer and more intensely focused on changing the follower’s psyche.</td>
<td>The leader is more powerful and capable than the follower who needs the leader’s help, guidance, support and direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relationship</td>
<td></td>
<td>Functions to uphold existing institutional and structural arrangements and the values and norms of the ruling class of the day, typically by rendering the unequal leader-follower relationship as something that is natural, necessary and good for followers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social function</td>
<td>The focus has shifted from heads of state to managers, whose depiction as leaders functions to enhance their status and influence at the same time as it increases the expectations placed on managers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology and</td>
<td>Mirrors shifts in the western tradition from philosophy + traditional knowledge to Christian philosophy through to Darwinian and then modern positivist social science.</td>
<td>An optimistic and idealistic attitude is adopted toward leaders and the potential of leadership to solve problems of concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>methodology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why has our understanding of leadership come to take the form it now does?

My study reveals that our current understanding of leadership has not come about because we have been successful in producing something more scientific, enlightened and truthful than anything that has come before. We have not rid ourselves of idealistic, contingent constructions of leadership, informed by contemporary problematizations and underpinned by the epistemic and methodological preferences of our age, any more successfully than those who came before us. Indeed, just like those scholars of the past, those of today also work consistently from a basis of deeply held concerns about what is going on around them, hoping that their account of leadership will be one that brings about positive results. Good intentions have paved this road in abundance.

The sheer proliferation of ‘new leadership’ discourse and its repeated endorsement by scholars of note are important factors which help to explain why this particular formation dominates current understandings of leadership. Its form is also tailored to focus on the issues of the day and it offers, at the surface, an apparently benign, developmental approach which aligns well with current values and norms. ‘New leadership’ discourse is infectiously optimistic: it is excited and bold about what we can achieve. It speaks both to our fears and to our hopes.

The incorporation of ‘new leadership’ discourse into everyday practitioner usage (as reported by Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, for example) has been critical in supporting its naturalisation and normalization. In a society where ‘management’ was already naturalised and normalized (Parker, 2002), layering ‘new leadership’ into and onto this was not an especially difficult task. However, this has had the critical effect of adding a material, structural basis to ‘new leadership’, embedding it into the way our workplaces are organized and run. In the same way that the 16th century discourse was reinforced by, and acted to reinforce, the system of monarchical rule, so too is ‘new leadership’ now reinforced by, and acts to reinforce, managerial structures as the preferred mode of organizing work. ‘New leadership’ may have overtaken mere management in status terms, but it nonetheless relies heavily on managerial structures to sustain and continuously normalise it. This entwinement likely helps explain the struggle to advance distributed models of leadership as an alternative to ‘new leadership’. Now, when we challenge what ‘leadership’ is and how to do it, we find ourselves immediately
caught up in arguments about managerial rights and authority, taking us directly to the heart of what is arguably the most pervasive power system in contemporary society (Parker, 2002).

By focussing ‘new leadership’ discourse on issues of ‘strategy’, ‘vision’, ‘charisma’ and ‘transformation’, what has been put to managers is a compelling means of lifting themselves out of the often mundane nature of managerial work and positioning themselves as someone much more powerful, attractive and capable (see also Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003c; Calás & Smircich, 1991). That their alleged right to work on, let me be blunt, to manipulate the self of followers, that this is presented as enabling the follower’s development only adds to the appeal. How could any manager who wants to be successful in an age which cherishes the ideal of progress and which is obsessed with the continuous improvement of performance resist these claims to speak the truth about leadership? When we live in a world of constant and unsettling change, when we are told that realising our potential is both our birth-right and our duty, and when we are told that just along the corridor sits our manager ready, willing and able to help us meet these challenges, who could reject such an offer?

In its specific formulation of the truth about leadership, ‘new leadership’ discourse has drawn on a much longer tradition, some parts of which I have explored here with the specific aim of foregrounding these very links. Using this tradition it has told us, yet again, that leaders are superior to followers. The value of this tactic is that we are culturally attuned to such messages. This idea does not shock us in the slightest, but rather has a familiar and even reassuring ring to it. In an age when we spend so much of our lives inside organizations, which themselves are overwhelmingly organized hierarchically, deference to our ‘superiors’ is hammered into us from an early age. So here again is the leader, coming to save us from ourselves, coming to tell us what to do: situation normal in the Western tradition of the truth about leadership.

However, this time, responding to the issues and values of the day, the leader will strategize, envision and transform both us and our world in the process of saving us. This time the leader is kind and friendly: they realize we have potential and they want to help us achieve that. That the greatest potential we are said to have by this discourse is to become more like the leader does not cause dismay, for the leader is our idealized model.
Here our success, our salvation, our greatest achievement is said to lie in striving to become clones of our manager. This is what is being presented to us as science, as truth, as enlightened and modern thinking.

In his study of sexuality Foucault concluded that we had mistaken modern thinking as a form of liberation, when in fact we had become increasingly subjected to “that austere monarchy of sex, so that we become dedicated to the endless task of forcing its secret, of exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow” (1978, p. 159). He proposed that the demand that we speak of sex and seek to find ourselves in it was simply a modern adaptation of the medieval practice of the confession. He also concluded from his study of the development of the modern prison system that it is a mistake to believe ours is a society more free and humane simply because torture has by and large been abolished. This was because what has developed in its place is a society where “the judges of normality are present everywhere”, a “new modality of power” in which we are endlessly surveilled and made docile (1977, pp. 305–6).

Taking inspiration from these ideas and reflecting on my findings, I suggest that the mistake we have made with ‘new leadership’ is to believe that achieving our potential relies on subjecting ourselves so utterly to the guidance of our manager. I think we have mistakenly come to believe that unleashing what lies within demands first that we place ourselves in their hands, that it is both legitimate and helpful to allow ourselves to be so colonized, to be made so docile in the name of personal growth and enhanced workplace performance. If this is so, then ‘new leadership’ might be more usefully understood as constituting a modern, secularized, workplace-based confessional practice on the part of the follower, through which they more completely align themselves with the requirements of the organization. This formation could also be understood as extending managerial surveillance into the self of both the leader and the follower, with the leader simultaneously the workplace judge of our normality, the agent who promotes and assures our docility.

In the case of the leader, ‘new leadership’ can also be understood as a form of devotional practice in which leaders constitute our priestly caste, dedicating and subjecting themselves to adopting its prescriptive requirements, its specified rituals of strategizing, visioning and transforming others. The call to service for would-be leaders is to imagine
that we might be the one capable of bestowing the gift of our vision, our strategy, our transformational capacities, upon others, hence the ready supply of those presenting themselves up for consideration. That, and perhaps also the rewards we now heap upon leaders.

In seeing ‘new leadership’ in these terms, what becomes apparent is that ‘new leaders’ have become more and more powerful servants not of God, and not of the people, but of the modern organization, and that both they and their followers are called into being to serve that. Here Foucault’s advice is vital, least we become dismayed with where we have come to, for despite its presently entrenched state this “does not mean it can not be altered, nor that it is once and for all indispensable to our kind of society” (1977, p. 305).

**Implications for future research**

If the findings of this research were accepted as valid then significant implications arise for future research. For a start, ‘new leadership’ theory would as a minimum require a fundamental reassessment to determine if its troubling assumptions and effects can actually be overcome. The essentialist ontology which underpins most of the theories, ‘new’ or not, which are still under active research would also need to be put aside and substituted with the contingent, constructed understanding of the ontological nature of leadership which my findings indicate.

A third implication is that leadership theorising and research ought, most usefully, to commence with a contextual assessment of the problems for which leadership, in whatever form it takes, is being considered as constituting part of the response. Grounding our theorising and research in specific problematizations overtly positions leadership scholars as interested parties, not neutral observers, and, thus, renders our efforts more open to scrutiny for the interests our propositions serve. As part of this, the substantive issues to which leadership is directed ought then to take a more central place in leadership research, therefore demanding a multi-disciplinary approach. This has implications in turn for the content of leadership-focussed degrees, shifting the field away from the current dominance of psychology as the base discipline of most leadership researchers.
The findings here could also be regarded as the tentative beginnings for a renewed focus on examining the history of leadership thought as a source for new ideas, and to help us more fully understand the present in which we are normally embedded. There are many times and places from the past which are crying out for attention, most especially, I think, those from beyond the Western tradition with its typically individualistic orientation. The final major implication for further research is that the conceptual componentry and approach to theory building which I set out later in this chapter could form the basis of a new research approach.

Least the reader be alarmed, I do not actually think that these fairly dramatic implications will eventuate. Too many entrenched interests are in place to sustain the current version of the truth about leadership and how this ought to be produced for one little doctoral thesis to, oh how ironic, ‘transform’ the field with its new ‘vision’ and ‘strategy’ for the future of leadership research. However, social constructionist approaches to leadership are having a growing influence and so this thesis serves to reinforce the potential utility of approaching leadership as something that is open to invention and reinvention.

At a more detailed and modest level, then, the specific findings here could be explored in more depth, using more extensive sources, in particular those not available in English. This could challenge or refine the findings I have made. Attention could also go to examining minority or dissenting views within these discourses as a contrast to the focus I have given to the dominant views, thereby enriching our understanding of these discourses. Certainly other times and spaces could be examined using the methods deployed here, thereby adding to the body of knowledge we have about the form and formation of leadership. Other themes in these discourses could be identified for focus. As an example, the childhood education of leaders is something I note as being of interest to the Classical Greek and medieval thinkers but do not examine in detail. Intriguingly, New Zealand schools now increasingly have leadership development programmes. A comparative analysis of the ancient, medieval and modern problematizations, conditions of possibility, form, and processes of formation of child leader development is, therefore, one idea to build on from this research. In expanding our understanding of modern leadership discourse, combining both big “D” and little “d” (Alvesson & Karreman, 2002) data sources could also be used to build on this research.
Assessing credibility

In Chapter Three I argued that the established standards for assessing qualitative research constitute the criteria by which this study’s findings should be judged. I noted there that O’Leary proposes for research such as this study, based on “post-positivist” assumptions, that the relevant standards for achieving credibility are a transparent and actively managed subjectivity, dependability, authenticity, transferability and auditability (2004, p. 58).

A transparent subjectivity was addressed by setting out in Chapter Three my key assumptions and the steps I have followed in conducting this study. The processes I used to operationalize Foucault’s Interpretive Analytics method entailed an end-to-end assessment of my research for its fit with the methodology and this was also set out in detail in Chapter Three to enable scrutiny of my decisions. The analytic aids I developed also supported the active management of subjectivity in the analysis process and have been provided for review.

Most crucially, however, in interpreting the data I have sought to assume a positive intent and a valid rationality on the part of the writers whose work I examine, even if their rationality and values are at odds with my own. I have sought to take these scholars’ efforts seriously and understand them on their own terms, to then analyse that using Foucault’s methods and concepts rather than applying my own values. I have sought to be conscious of the risks of being hyper-critical (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) which could easily occur with a Foucauldian approach, especially one which examines something that is already widely understood as involving power. Drawing attention to this is hardly a significant contribution to knowledge. In my analysis I have therefore sought to draw out the subtle dimensions of power in both its positive and negative dimensions and this has allowed me to reveal differences in the power dynamics of the various discourses I examine which have not been adequately identified before now.

Dependability rests on the use of systematic, documented methods designed to manage subjectivity, which I addressed in Chapter Three. I continue to acknowledge the potential for multiple readings of the data, thus supporting the achievement of authenticity. To aid auditability I have presented illustrative excerpts throughout the body of this report so
that readers can judge for themselves the credibility of my interpretations. Moreover, unlike interview-based research my ‘data’ is fully accessible to the reader to access themselves and detailed citation of sources has been provided to allow for this. Transferability derives from the use of the findings from the case studies as a basis for theorizing new forms of leadership, which I set out later in this chapter.

Limitations and contribution to knowledge

The major limitations of this research pertain to its scope in respect of the periods studied, the data sources used, the themes I chose to focus on and the theoretical framework I used to interrogate the data. In all these matters the research is partial and not comprehensive. While I contend that the conclusions I reach are grounded in a plausible, carefully considered and reasoned interpretation of the data using the theoretical framework I adopted, the material I reviewed is limited in scope and my questions were such as to direct my attention only to some aspects of that material. All research suffers from limitations of this nature.

Putting aside these inevitable limitations, however, what might I have done differently in conducting this research? One option would have been to adopt a more exploratory approach, using only the main research question to guide the study and deploying either grounded theory methods or research software such as NVIVO to identify the major themes in the texts examined. I was reluctant to do this for several reasons. First, the themes I identified interested me and I felt they were central issues to any understanding of leadership. Second, I was conscious of Alvesson and Deetz’s (2000) critique of grounded theory. Third, I felt the need to ‘time travel’ and dwell in the worlds created by these writers to the greatest extent possible, so as to sensitise myself to their perspective rather than relying on software. Nonetheless, using grounded theory and/or NVIVO (or a similar tool) would have been a legitimate approach to addressing my main research question, and may have produced results regarded as more trustworthy by those who are supporters of these approaches to qualitative research.

Another approach I could have taken is to adopt Alvesson and Deetz’s (2000) advice to play off different theoretical perspectives against each other when analysing data. This
would have helped to mitigate the limitations of using one theoretical framework and resulted in a series of counter-readings, thereby more strongly emphasizing the indeterminacy of language and the variable interpretations we can draw from others words. However, given that my purpose was, pragmatically, to produce a thesis for doctoral examination, this added complexity was a move I decided against making. The material remains open to such an alternative reading in the future, however, as Ford et al.’s (2008) work serves as an inspiration to me for the richness that can come from such an approach.

The major contribution of this research is to place the form and formation of ‘new leadership’ in a wider historical context than other studies have done, such that its apparent grounding in modern, scientific and enlightened thinking now seems questionable. The analysis presented here calls into doubt what has been so widely promoted and accepted as truthful and positive in recent decades. My findings give us pause to ask ourselves: have we got it right? Is this approach to leadership really what we want? Denting and de-familiarising the naturalised, normalized status of ‘new leadership’ discourse is, thus, the major contribution of this research.

More specifically, the analysis I offer in Chapter Two of the problematic assumptions informing the mainstream of contemporary leadership research extends and deepens prior analyses of these matters such as those offered by Alvesson (1996), Alvesson and Sveningsson (2012), Calás and Smircich (1991), Collinson (2005), Fletcher (2004), Grint (2000, 2005a, 2005b), Ladkin (2010) and Sinclair (2007). The contribution here comprises a novel critique of the underpinnings of the mainstream of leadership science.

The approach I set out in Chapter Three to operationalizing Foucault’s Interpretive Analytics method constitutes a novel, detailed, step by step approach that has been lacking in the literature on Foucault methods. It demonstrates one way of operationalizing the guidance offered by the likes of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), Kendall and Wickham (1999), and Graham (2011) and of course Foucault himself (e.g. 1972, 1978). The specific analytic aids I have developed (see Appendices 1 and 2) could be readily adapted to the analysis of different topics and constitute a further aspect of the methodological contribution.
Each of my three case studies (Chapters Four, Five and Six) constitutes a new contribution to extant understandings of both the form and formation of the discourses they examine. My analysis of the modern leadership discourse (Chapter Four) offers a new account of the processes of formation of this field which challenges conventional understandings (e.g. Bass, 2008; Huczynski & Buchanan, 2006; Hunt, 1999), expanding also the scope of the few critically oriented studies which have examined the history of leadership thought (e.g. Knights & Morgan, 1992; Trethewey & Goodall, Jnr, 2007; Western, 2007). It highlights linkages between trait theorists and the eugenics movement that as best as I can determine have not previously been acknowledged by leadership scholars. It challenges the convention of attributing the demise of trait theory to Stogdill’s famous 1948 review (see, for example, Bass, 2008). It challenges the major theories of leadership which have dominated at different times by offering a novel assessment of their social function and subjectivity effects, thereby challenging conventional understandings, and extending the dimensions of existing critically informed analyses.

My analysis of the 16th century discourse (Chapter Five) attends to a time that has simply not been of interest in recent leadership studies, as well as challenging what little commentary there has been (e.g. Bass, 2008). In respect of the political theory literature to which it also contributes, my analysis expands recent work examining the texts I use such as that of Connell (2005), Hopfl (2010), Jardine (2010) and Waszink (2004). It constitutes a novel interpretation of these texts through the themes on which I focus and the theoretical framework I have used.

My analysis of the Classical Greek leadership discourse (Chapter Six) contributes to both the leadership and Classics literatures. In the case of the leadership literature the findings challenge extant understandings of Classical Greek leadership such as those offered by Bass (2008) and Adair (2002). It too attends to a time that has simply not been of interest in recent leadership studies. In respect of the Classics literature, my analysis expands recent work examining the texts I use such as that of Annas and Waterfield (1995), Cartledge (2006), Everson (2009) and Lane (2007). As with my examination of 16th century texts, the contribution here is also that of a novel interpretation of the texts via the themes I place in focus and the theoretical framework I use.
Chapter Seven provides a novel comparative analysis of both change and continuity across the discourses examined in this study. Arising from this, connections between the past and the present not previously identified have been brought to light. A conceptual model which explains how the production of the leader as a superior being and good person takes place is developed (Model 7.1, p. 190). The assumption of progress which is pivotal to conventional accounts of developments in the field is challenged by the analysis set out in this chapter. The dispositives I develop in the chapter summarize key points of change and continuity.

This final chapter offers summary responses to each of the five secondary questions guiding this study by way of a series of dispositives. It also provides a summary statement of my answer to the main research question guiding this study as well as connecting my findings with Foucault’s broader analysis of contemporary society. These answers constitute a new and novel interpretation of the form and formation of the leadership discourses examined here. In the remainder of this chapter I set out a new approach to theory-building for organizational leadership studies, based on the findings of this study. The nature of the contributions made by this study, then, are conceptual and theoretical in nature, but informed also by the understanding that critical analysis is also political (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). The overall result is, I hope, to call into question conventional understandings of both the past and present, thereby enabling us to think differently about leadership in the future.

**Future trajectories**

The point was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently (Foucault, 1985, p. 9).

The critical influence of assumptions and problematizations in giving shape to a conception of leadership relevant to current concerns and values has been brought into sharp focus by this study. Rather than treating leadership as a naturally occurring phenomenon whose enduring truth we must seek to discover by means of the scientific method, I have proposed that we understand leadership as an invention, one which
history demonstrates can be tailored to respond to different priorities and be informed by different values and norms. In this last section, therefore, I work from this perspective to explore leadership for a 21st century context.

My analysis identified a number of conceptual components which have repeatedly formed part of the Western tradition. I propose that these components can be used, adapted or rejected in seeking to develop forms of leadership relevant to our current needs and values. Each form of leadership which I have examined in this study has configured some or all of these component pieces in a specific way, supported by a particular set of epistemological and methodological assumptions: it is this insight which I propose constitutes a model for theory building. In the preliminary theory building which I offer here, I adopt a social constructionist epistemology and ontology and make the assumption that the models I propose could be (and ought to be!) subjected to empirical assessment via a range of social scientific methods.

In what follows I firstly provide an overview of these components before examining each in detail. I consider briefly how each component has been previously understood, what a different understanding might comprise and how this component might be deployed in a different way to what has occurred to date, depending on what we choose to value and prioritise. After that I sketch out two new models of leadership by drawing on these components, demonstrating how this approach offers a means for future theorising.

My aim here is simultaneously bold and modest. It is bold insofar as I seek to demonstrate a new approach to leadership theory building which both draws on and breaks with the past. However, my aim is also modest insofar as I am interested in building theories of leadership which are tailored to contend with quite specific, limited problems rather than purporting to be the answer to every problem. Moreover, I also assume leadership can only ever constitute part of the solution to that which concerns us and never a complete response. What I aim to demonstrate here is that theories of leadership can be developed which are humble and human, moving us away from the historical tendency to proffer grandiose accounts of perfection.
Conceptual componentry for inventing leadership

In no particular or fixed order of priority, the key conceptual components I have identified in the various forms of leadership considered in this study are as follows:

- contextual issues (problems, values, norms) deemed of salience to leadership;
- purpose of leadership;
- domains of leadership activity;
- leader (personal attributes, behaviours, rights, responsibilities, roles);
- follower (personal attributes, behaviours, rights, responsibilities, roles);
- leader-follower relationship.

In what follows I propose some ideas for how each of these could be deployed in building new theories of leadership.

Contextual issues (problems, values and norms)

What my analysis has shown is that leadership theories have repeatedly arisen as a response to the social context of their time. This process is not easily understood if leadership is assumed to be a natural phenomenon. The relevance, credibility and attractiveness of the various theories examined here has, however, relied heavily on the extent to which they claimed to be offering a solution to issues of current concern and accorded with existing norms and values.

The contextual issues I identified as repeatedly being deemed of salience to leadership have been moral, social, political and economic trends or events which are seen as problematic, usually because they are thought to pose some kind of threat to the existing social order. As we have seen, these concerns are time and again linked to the troublesome characteristics attributed to followers. Strong claims are repeatedly made about the effectiveness of leadership which arise from the superiority gifted to the person of the leader, positioning the leader and leadership as a comprehensive solution to the issues of concern. Associated with this, the focus has been on developing leadership theories which are claimed to have broad, even universal, application.
An alternative approach to all this is, firstly, to focus leadership theories on contending with much more tightly specified ‘problems’. By way of example, potential ‘problems’ on which leadership theorising could focus include creativity in the knowledge-intensive workplace, or leadership in a start-up business context. Secondly, leadership could also be positioned as offering a partial solution to these ‘problems’. This would mean efforts would be needed, both theoretically and practically, to connect ‘leadership’ with other sources of influence such as policy, legislation, procedures, systems and rules, or shared values, norms and behaviours thought conducive to addressing the problem at hand. This focused and multi-faceted response to contextual challenges would, thus, see the particular form of leadership as having targeted rather than universal application and position leadership as comprising only part of the solution. This approach to theorising begins with the context and works from there, rather than beginning with the assumption that leadership will provide the answer regardless of the problem.

Values and norms are also important contextual factors. Those which have informed leadership theorising have typically been conducive to upholding the status quo, but this need not necessarily be the case. Instead, challenge to existing norms and values could be incorporated into models of leadership. For example, blending leadership, economic, political and environmental theories, ‘sustainable workplace leadership’ could be theorised as a particular form, focussed on securing a balance between employee, shareholder, customer and community interests and, consistent with this, requiring distributed decision-making rights and responsibilities. This form of leadership would require supportive policies, procedures, behaviours, etc., to enhance its effectiveness: employee share ownership could be one such mechanism, while conflict management could be positioned as a key skill. Another leadership form designed to challenge the status quo could be ‘environmental leadership’, where environmental sustainability is prioritised as the overarching goal, and only those decisions and practices which had a neutral or positive environmental impact would be deemed consistent with such a model. Organisations, nation states and/or individuals could be assessed for their alignment with such a model. Again, political theory, economic theories and environmental theory combine with leadership theory here, to produce an enriched, substantive form of leadership knowledge.
Importantly, there exists a vast set of choices as to which matters, among the many problems, norms and values which form part of our wider context, we choose to deem as being of relevance to leadership. We can continue to treat leadership as the answer to every problem and to develop models which claim universal relevance but lack sensitivity to contextual specifics. We can continue to separate leadership theory out, taking it away from substantive issues. Or, we can be more selective in the problems we hold as being amenable to some form of a leadership response, develop leadership models that focus on addressing specific issues or upholding specific values and norms, and fortify these by combining them with other types of interventions.

A significant implication of such an approach is the development of leadership models in which substantive knowledge of particular matters becomes a key component. Thus, ‘environmental leadership’ would likely require knowledge of such matters of climate change science, ‘green’ technologies, local and international policy and political developments on environmental issues, as well as of particular methods for influencing others on environmental issues. Contextually driven leadership theorising could, I propose, be endlessly inventive, and connect theory building much more intimately with practical problem solving. It would also help direct leadership studies away from the search for universals, which my analysis shows is founded on faulty ontological assumptions. Beginning with the context as the source for our thinking about leadership has the particular benefit of positioning leadership as something demanding continuous adaptation at the same time as it allows us to create forms of leadership uniquely tailored to current needs and values, rather than being trapped by the past.

**Purpose of leadership**

The purpose of leadership has commonly been positioned as safeguarding and enhancing community and follower well-being, albeit that this has usually relied upon assumptions of follower inadequacy. As we have seen, this broad brush, universalizing tendency has been a common feature of theorising about the purpose of leadership. However, more choices exist for theory building if we ‘play’ with the theoretical componentry gifted to us by history.
Abandoning the assumptions of follower inadequacy and leader superiority is one way to shift our thinking about the purpose of leadership. This, in turn, directs us toward a processual focus, seeing the purpose of leadership as that which supports and enables collective effectiveness. This is quite different from the current focus on changing the self of the follower-employee. Yet even in situations with highly capable individuals, where there is a need to work together to achieve results, process matters. A theory in which the purpose of leadership is to enable collective effectiveness could be conceptualised in functional, processual and/or behavioural terms but it need not attach itself to a conception of leaders or followers as persons with distinctive abilities.

Another approach is to adopt more localised, specific notion of purpose, linked to the contextual issues upon which, as proposed above, a given model is focussed. Accordingly, the purpose of the ‘sustainable workplace leadership’ model sketched earlier could be to achieve a workplace where employment security is prioritised, where shareholder, community, employee and customer input is incorporated into the decision-making processes and where a focus on securing the future of the enterprise was actively pursued. By providing a more localised conception of the purpose of leadership, substantive knowledge and associated interventions again rise up as of critical relevance in producing leadership knowledge that is of practical value, informed by a politics not wholly captured by shareholder interests.

Philosophical and political concerns about issues such as personal autonomy and the care and respect we might wish to show and expect from others are also matters that could inform our thinking about the purpose of leadership. Leadership models which abandon the assumption of leader superiority and follower inferiority serve different political purposes than those that promote follower subservience and dependency. Models which seek to limit the extent to which managers may reasonably act on the subjectivity of their employees are informed by different philosophical concerns about the nature of the self, its autonomy and its relations with others, and suggest a different purpose for leadership than the transformation of others.
Domains of leadership activity

What my analysis has shown is that up until quite recently leadership knowledge demanded attention be given to an extensive range of issues across the public, private, earthly and spiritual domains of life. As we have seen, for centuries to speak of leadership automatically and necessarily meant to speak of morality; of political, social, economic and military policy and strategy choices; of power and its legitimate uses; of the leader’s self, body and personal life; of the divine; of leader development from the cradle to the grave. Since WWII the dominant focus of scholarly effort has narrowed dramatically to a focus on the workplace, concerning itself with issues affecting the productivity, performance and human relations of the modern organisation and equipping ‘leaders’ to address those matters. This focus broadened somewhat when ‘new leadership’ brought in issues of strategy, vision and change. However, placed in the broader historical context considered here, what we have today is still a remarkably narrow approach to understanding leadership. Consequently, while this current focus now seems quite natural, history shows there are choices to be made in leadership theorising as to the domains of life to which attention is directed.

What is evident is that current leadership theorising, while in some respects grandiose in the claims it makes about the leader-manager’s rights to work on the self of their follower-employee, is also very narrowly focussed on just one aspect of life, that of the workplace. As noted in Chapter One, the mainstream of leadership studies, as channelled through The Leadership Quarterly, only rarely moves beyond the workplace domain. However, consistent with my foregoing propositions about how we might take a different approach to theory building, exploring different domains of life constitutes another opportunity to reshape leadership theory.

The leader (personal attributes, behaviours, rights, responsibilities and roles)

Turning now to the leader, they can be conceived, consistent with the dominant Western tradition, as possessing a fairly fixed, conscious unity of self. Alternatively, drawing on post-modernist thought, the self of the leader can be understood as more fluid and contradictory, as continuously produced in relation to others and events and not in full
awareness of all its motives. Varying degrees of agentic power can be assumed and then tested, relative to external factors.

Leaders can be conceived as possessing certain personal attributes, the source of which we may postulate as being from nature and/or nurture. Alternatively, leaders can be thought of as persons in positions of authority which require certain learned skills, as with behavioural theory, meaning that their personality is of no particular relevance to our understanding of leadership. We could adopt an admiring, sceptical or even hostile stance in conceiving of those who seek to lead others. As relational and distributed theories of leadership (e.g. Gronn, 2002; Ospina & Uhl-Bien, 2012) are already doing, we could also de-emphasize the leader, treating leadership as a co-produced or shared phenomenon, not something vested in individuals. If we do wish to have ‘leaders’ as part of our understanding of leadership, then the rights, responsibilities and roles we grant to them can be defined according to the values we hold about such matters as individual freedom, collective responsibility, privacy, and the legitimate scope of leader action.

The follower (personal attributes, behaviours, rights, responsibilities and roles)

To break with the problematic tradition of denigrating followers, a leadership theory could deploy a conception of the follower as simply a positional ranking within an organizational hierarchy, and make no further assumption as to the attributes of such persons. This in turn might imply that the focus of leadership theorising should go to matters of strategy, structuring work or facilitating group processes rather than on fixing the self of the follower. A strong reliance by adults on another person for leadership could be treated as problematic, thereby pushing us toward the development of an approach to leadership entirely directed toward enhancing ‘follower’ autonomy and self-reliance. We could take the stance that ‘followers’ are not inferior to leaders in any way that actually matters to us, but are, rather, equal partners. This would have implications for theorising issues such as decision-making rights and processes and setting boundary conditions for leader activity so as to safeguard the equality of the partnership. Followers could be conceived as being the people whom leaders must serve, thereby focussing attention on identifying what issues concern them, what expectations they have, what it is they want, reversing the current assumption that the leader is the one who knows best.
What is apparent from all this is that as soon as we change the assumption that there is something lacking in followers our whole current conception of leadership loses its plausibility.

**The leader-follower relationship**

If we develop theories of leadership in which there are no persons defined as leaders and no persons defined as followers, then logically enough there is no leader-follower relationship to be theorised or researched. There may be manager-subordinate relationships or peer relationships, but if leadership is conceived as a process, if it is distributed amongst many players, if it is understood as something co-produced or emergent, then the leader-follower relationship could be rendered conceptually redundant. Alternatively, we could draw from Enlightenment thinking in particular and seek to develop boundary conditions for governing this relationship, aiming to overcome the risks of exploitation, domination or manipulation. Rather than conceiving of this relationship as comprising transactional and transformational components as ‘new leadership’ discourse does, a focus on duty or mutual responsibilities could also be developed.

What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is that these key components of leadership theory can be deployed in many different ways. In what follows I sketch out two preliminary theorisations of leadership, drawing on the conceptual componentry identified above, in order to demonstrate my approach to theory building.

**Inventing leadership: two models to demonstrate a new approach to theory building**

My aim here is not to argue the merit of any of these theories, but rather to offer these as samples of how rich and diverse our theorising of leadership could become through adopting the approach developed here.
Leadership as facilitation of group effectiveness

One form of leadership that we could seek to invent is to conceive of leadership entirely in processual terms. The context I am particularly interested in addressing here is the challenge of organizing a group of people to achieve a common goal, a situation absolutely endemic to modern life.

The critical assumptions here are as follows:

- assume that the co-ordination of the efforts of people with different responsibilities, skills and perspectives does not happen spontaneously but rather demands attention and effort;
- assume that there are multiple methods for co-ordinating a group to perform effectively;
- assume that common interests and shared goals are not always the case within a group;
- assume the inevitability of conflict within a group;
- assume the potential for rational, reasonable behaviour by all;
- assume the risk of unreasonable behaviour by some people sometimes.

Taking these factors into account, leadership-as-facilitation would entail activities focussed on supporting a group to function effectively. The ‘leadership approach’ taken might be highly inclusive, participative and fluid or more structured and formal, depending on the nature of the group and its collective responsibilities and aims. Responsibility for this leadership/facilitation work could be allocated to one person, rotated within the membership of a group or even potentially shared among multiple members. Leadership-as-facilitation would not automatically entail decision-making responsibilities in respect of substantive matters. Such responsibilities could be defined according to the preferences of the group members involved.

Reconceptualising leadership as fundamentally a facilitative function reorients attention away from the person of the leader. By removing an idealised and prescribed identity script from our conception of leadership this approach opens up a space for all persons to consider their leadership contribution in terms of how they can support their colleagues.
to achieve shared goals. In this, the presumption of leader control and superiority over others embedded in previous models is also removed. There is also no follower position in this model, instead there are simply group members. The problem to which leadership is directed here is that of group co-ordination, something assumed as endemic to all groups and requiring no assumption of follower inadequacy.

Theorising leadership as primarily a facilitative function would shift our focus to process rather than the current emphasis given over to the attributes of the leader. A conception of leadership which focusses on its facilitative functions also offers a model in which the holding of a formal position becomes a secondary consideration, thus embedding a more egalitarian assumption into our understanding of leadership. However, calling this facilitative work ‘leadership’ risks dragging in these extant conceptualisations which were clearly intended to deal with different needs and priorities and reflect different values.

Developing this form of leadership as a model would entail fleshing out both conceptually and empirically the techniques and skills which are of particular relevance to different group dynamics or settings. Criteria for different approaches to allocating the leadership role and assessing the effects of these approaches could also be the subject of research and conceptual development.

*Leadership for workplace democracy*

As I highlighted earlier, modern discourses have adopted an approach to speaking the truth about leadership in which the substantive issues to which leaders attend is typically ignored. Specifically, moral, political, religious, economic and governmental issues have been treated as issues separate from (modern) theories of leadership, which have offered trait, behavioural, situational and processual accounts of leadership. Reversing this discursive closure, I propose a theory of leadership focussed on enhancing workplace democracy as one warranting attention. This approach overtly blends political theory with leadership theory and proposes a model of leadership intended to challenge the status quo.

In this model, workplace leaders, managers, would be elected by the workforce. Constitutional models and processes could be developed to ensure that owners,
shareholders and customers also formed part of the electoral system. However, the goal of any such approach would be to have leaders who are formally and directly accountable to those to whom they claim to offer leadership. A duty to serve those interests is, thus, prioritised. From understanding their expectations, leaders would adopt a course that would be subject to on-going validation by those who elect the leader. Opinion polls or other forms of gathering feedback would be critical tools for assessing leader effectiveness. Ensuring the success of fora which enabled on-going dialogue between leaders and followers about issues of strategy, policy and execution would be a critical focus for leader attention. Leader behaviours which demonstrated respect for the rights and perspectives of others would become of critical importance. Speaking up and participating in debate would become a key expectation of ‘followers’.

Such an approach no doubt seems idealistic and even fanciful at present. In the face of the failure by the current mainstream of leadership scholarship to explore a purpose for leadership beyond the colonisation of the worker’s psyche enacted in the name of enhanced organisational performance no doubt this is so. However, we should not forget that Burns (1978), the so-called founding father of ‘new leadership’, originally offered up a model in which leaders were expected to serve and were accountable to followers. His focus was leadership that “emerges from, and always returns to, the fundamental needs and wants, aspirations, and values of the followers” (1978, p. 3). Burns explicitly assumed that “followers have adequate knowledge of alternative leaders... and the capacity to choose among those alternatives” (1978, p. 3). It was only when Burns’ original conception was ‘captured’ by the psychologists interested in workplace performance that the democratic ideal he promoted got swept aside. Perhaps now is a good time to recapture this ideal and try to put it to work properly, for as Foucault (1977) would have it, what is the point of studying the past if not to change the present.

**Conclusion**

This thesis seeks to rise to Foucault’s challenge of ‘thinking differently’ in regards to leadership. Through my critical historical analysis of the form and formation of different leadership discourses, it has become apparent that the confidence we might expect to
have in contemporary knowledge produced under the auspices of science is not warranted in respect of ‘new leadership’ thinking. Despite its proliferation and repeated endorsements, it is an account no more grounded in truth and reason than any of its predecessors. Like them it is a well-intentioned, carefully considered inventive response to a specific problematization, relying on troubling assumptions and giving rise to unintended but nonetheless concerning consequences. Through this analysis, however, certain conceptual componentry that we might deploy in theorising leadership have become apparent. In this chapter I have put these to use, demonstrating how they offer a fertile basis for inventing new forms of leadership, hopefully with greater attentiveness to the assumptions we make and the potential consequences that might flow from claims to speak to the truth about leadership. When all is said and done, the very simple proposition arising from this research is that leadership is what we make it to be. We should, therefore, make it with care, learning from the past in order to help bring about a future we actually want. We ought, in other words, to start thinking differently about leadership.
Appendix One: Reading aid question bank

What problematizations have informed the development of this discourse?

- What issues are being problematized by this discourse?
- What strategies and tactics are being used to substantiate these?

What key assumptions underpin this discourse?

Ontological assumptions:

- What is leadership said to be?
- Where is it said to come from?
- What is said about its purpose/function?
- What attitude is taken towards it?

Epistemological assumptions:

- How do they say they know it when they see it?
- What is the nature of the data they use?
- Do they think leadership is knowable?

Axiological assumptions:

- What moral status is attributed to leadership?
- What moral purpose, if any, is leadership said to serve?
- Is leadership a “good”, and if so is it primarily a social good or an individual good?
- Is leadership a positive aspect of society or a problem to be managed?
- If it is problematic, in what respects is it problematic?

What subjectivities and relationships are produced by this discourse?

- Who is involved in leadership and what do they do?
- Who is excluded and on what basis?
- What is said about the relationship between leaders and followers?
- What is said about leaders’ roles and responsibilities?
- What is said about leaders’ rights, powers and abilities?
- What is said about leaders’ duties and obligations?
- What is said about who is allowed to lead?
- What is said about the person of the leader?
- What is said about followers’ roles and responsibilities?
- What is said about followers’ rights, powers and abilities?
• What is said about followers’ duties and obligations?
• What is said about who is allowed to follow?
• What is said about the person of the follower?
• Are there any other persons involved in leadership?
• What do they do?
• What are the power relations in this view of leadership?
• What are bodies expected or trained to do in respect of leadership?

**What is the social function of this discourse?**

• Whose interests are served by the truth claims made in this discourse?
• Whose interests are constrained by the truth claims made in this discourse?
• In which domains of life is leadership said to be relevant? (e.g. home/personal, political, business, religious, education, voluntary/civil society, science)
• Is leadership excluded from some domains? On what basis?
• In respect of what specific issues is leadership said to be relevant?
• In what way is leadership said to be important?
• Is leadership specifically excluded from some issues? On what basis?
• When leadership is called for, what, specifically, is being sought? What is it expected to do?

**What changes and continuities are notable when comparing these discourses?**

• What has stayed the same across these discourses?
• What has changed?
• What has stayed the same that we might have expected to change?
• What has changed which we might have expected to change?
• Were these changes evident to them, i.e. were they commented on in the primary sources?
• To what, if anything, did they attribute these changes?
• What events or wider social factors do secondary sources say gave rise to these changes?

**What were the processes of formation through which this discourse developed?**

• How did these ideas gain credibility and support?
• What strategies and tactics were used to promote these claims?
• Were there particular events or persons who shaped these ideas?
• Where did the idea of leadership fit in relation to the balance of this society’s worldview?
• What institutional arrangements existed in respect of leadership? How did these develop?
What are the conditions of possibility underpinning this discourse?

- What epistemic norms inform this discourse?
- What specific rules govern this discourse?
Appendix Two: Theoretical interpretation aid: Archaeology and Genealogy

What is the *social function* of this discourse? (big picture view)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archaeological questions</th>
<th>Genealogical questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>what notion of “the good life” is portrayed by this discourse?</td>
<td>was this discourse promoting change or stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what form does power take in the world that is articulated by this discourse?</td>
<td>what problems did this discourse attend to?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who wins and who loses under this view?</td>
<td>whose interests were served and in what way?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What *contributory factors* enable this discourse to be expressed as it is? (processes of formation and conditions of possibility).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archaeological questions</th>
<th>Genealogical questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>what assumptions about the nature of reality inform this discourse?</td>
<td>what network of power/knowledge does this discourse rely on/form part of?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what assumptions about the nature of knowledge inform this discourse?</td>
<td>what strategies of power/knowledge does this discourse utilise?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what assumptions about human nature inform this discourse?</td>
<td>what tactics of power/knowledge does this discourse utilise?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what renders these claims to speak the truth possible?</td>
<td>what other discursive resources are drawn on to support this view?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what other discursive resources are drawn on to support this view?</td>
<td>what events, if any, are influential in accounting for the emergence of this discourse?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What effects does this discourse seek/serve to construct? (detail view)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Archaeological questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Genealogical questions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>what is empowered/freed up and what is constrained/disabled?</td>
<td>what disciplinary practices are promoted in this discourse and what were undermined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who is empowered/freed up and who is constrained/disabled?</td>
<td>what control of the body is promoted in this discourse and who is to exercise this control?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what subjectivities exist in this discourse?</td>
<td>what new subjectivities came into being with the development of this discourse and what existing ones were reinforced or undermined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what objects exist in this discourse?</td>
<td>what new objects came into being with the development of this discourse and what existing ones were reinforced or undermined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what is known and what is not worth knowing in this discourse?</td>
<td>what knowledge became valid and what became invalid with the development of this discourse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what form of social organisation is constructed by this discourse?</td>
<td>what domains of life does this discourse seek to influence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what social practices and institutions exist in this discourse?</td>
<td>what new social practices and institutions came into being with the development of this discourse and what existing practices and institutions were reinforced or undermined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what constitutes valid and invalid knowledge in this discourse?</td>
<td>what existing knowledge was reinforced or undermined by this discourse and what new knowledge was developed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what rules govern this discourse: what is unsayable or illegitimate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-textual analysis: change and continuity**

- what new ideas does this text promote?
- what pre-existing ideas does it reinforce/rely on?
- in what ways are those pre-existing ideas adapted or changed?
References


Princely virtues in the middle ages: 1200–1500 (pp. 259-280). Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols.


