Vietnamese response to the Sino-Russian cooperation and rivalry since the end of the Cold War

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ABSTRACT

A thesis presented on the Vietnamese response to the changes in the Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War, beginning with an overview of the Sino-Russian relations during and after the Cold War, with an emphasis on the changes in the Sino-Russian relations, covering the overview of Vietnam’s relations with both Russia and China during the Cold War and the impact of the Sino-Russian relations on Viet Nam. Especially Vietnam’s reactions to the changes in the Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War from the perspective of small and middle power’s foreign policy as well as policy recommendations for Viet Nam in order to balance its relations with both Russia and China to exploit the potentials and deepen its relations with these two countries for the objectives of security, development and influence of Viet Nam.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AFTA: ASEAN Free trade Area
AFR: ASEAN Regional Forum
APEC: Transpacific Economic Cooperation
CPV: The Communist Party of Viet Nam
DRV: Democratic Republic of Vietnam
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
ODA: Official Development Aid
PLA: People’s Liberation Army
PRC: People’s Republic of China
RF: Russian Federation
SRV: Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN: United Nations
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and rationale

Relations between great powers have a crucial role in international relations. The Russian federation and the People’s Republic of China are the two giant neighbors, sharing a common border of more than 4,300 km (Lampton, 2008, p. 201). Russia and China are two great powers in the world, having an important role in international relations. China is the world’s most populous country as well as the largest country in Asia, while Russia is the world’s largest area spreading over two continents of Asia and Europe. Both countries are members of UN Security Council, having an important influence in the world. Sino-Russian relations have special significance regionally and globally. In the early 90s, China’s foreign policy with the Soviet Union based on peaceful coexistence, no debating awareness morphology (Lan, 1998, p. 25). After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, China’s diplomatic strategy is diplomacy with great power is key; diplomacy with neighbor is of primary importance; diplomacy with developing countries is the basis (Ha N. A., 2002). In its comprehensive foreign policy, China values relationship with key great powers, friendly relations with neighboring and regional countries. Chinese global diplomatic strategy is formed from 4 basic axes: neighbor diplomacy, great power diplomacy, regional diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy (My, 2007, p. 103).

China’s Russia policy is “strategic cooperative partnership of equality, mutual trust towards 21st century”, with the motto “no alliance, no confrontation, no against third country”, “friendly neighbor” and “balance of great power” (Vy, 2004, p. 27). This means China implement policy of neighbor, peace and stability; promoting the political-security, economic and trade tie with Russia; strengthen the relation with Russia to balance great power in the region, against US hegemony, fighting for a multipolar order. Meanwhile, Russia’s China policy also occupies an important position. In the first years, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia prioritized its relations with USA and Western countries. Since 1994, Russia has implemented policy of “Eurasian orientation instead of the West leaning policy (Hung N. Q., 1999, p. 23). Russia has considered its relation with the CIS countries is the top priority,
with the US and Western countries are key priority, while promoting bilateral relations with China and focus relations with Asia-Pacific region. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has changed its evaluation, perspective about China, from “despise” China to “respect” China”. China is an influent and great power. China is an economic power which has capacity to compete with US and has political prestige and voice in the international relations. China lies in the East of Russia as well as the largest neighboring country. China’s geopolitics is reliable prop in the east of Russia. China is indispensable in creating peaceful surrounding and stability for the security and development of Russia. In international affairs, Russia has interests and closed stance with China on the issue of anti-hegemony and unilateralism of US. Russia need to cooperate with and need support from China to combat the USA restraint and domination, to curb the penetration of Western expansionism in Central Asia, the traditional scope of its power projection and buffer zone in this area.

Viet Nam is neighboring country of China, and has traditional friendship with Russia. Both China and Russia are the great powers, having very important influence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the foreign policy of Viet Nam is to combine the national power and era power, creating favorable conditions for the country’s development, improving Viet Nam’s position in the region and the world. Therefore, Vietnam has paid special attention on the promotion of relation with both China and Russia.

The thesis aims at analyzing how Vietnam has responded to the changes in the Sino-Russian relation since the end of the Cold War. In order to clarify Vietnam’s response, beginning by the overview of Sino-Russian relations during and after the Cold War, then assesses of the impact of Sino-Russian relations on Vietnam, especially Vietnam’s reaction to this relation. Lastly, a number of policy recommendations will be offered for Vietnam to balance relations with Russia and China, for the development objectives of Vietnam.

Therefore, there will be four chapters. The first chapter includes a general introduction, theoretical framework and literature review. The second chapter gives an overview of Sino-Russia relation in the Asia Pacific region during and after the Cold
In this chapter, the author will focus on analyzing the rise and fall of this relation; the interests and objectives in each country’s foreign policy as well as outcomes of the relation. The third chapter—the main chapter of the thesis focuses on Viet Nam’s response to the change in the Sino-Russian relation from the perspective of the middle power’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. This includes the assessment of the impact of Sino-Russian relations on Viet Nam, the analysis of interests and objectives in Vietnamese foreign policy to Russia and China as well as the evaluation of the measures implemented in each specific area of cooperation such as economics, security and defense. By analyzing Vietnam’s reactions to the changes in the Sino-Russia relations, we can see the development, adjustments, changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy to each of these two countries as well as the interests, objectives, implemented measures, existing problems and policy recommendations in the relations between Viet Nam and these two countries. The last chapter will go back to the theory and examine the meaning of the findings of the thesis in the light of the theory that author purport to use.

**RESEARCH QUESTION:**

How is Vietnam responding to the context of changing in the Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War?

1.2. **Theoretical framework**

**State motivation in realism in international relations theory**

The concept of national interests is an important one in international relations where the pursuit of national interests is a foundation in the realist school, is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. National interests are subjective for each nation. The conception of national interests lies at the core of the predominant "paradigm" governing the state's foreign policy (Deng, 1998, p. 308). Peter Byrd, a scholar of realist school, argues that national interest is used as a sort of foreign policy version of the term ‘public interest’—indicating what is best for the nation in its relations with other states (Byrd). Followers of realism often linked the two terms
“The interest of a State, National interest” to the issue of “National security interest”. They are closely allied terms. Peter Byrd emphasized that national interest is also the way of using this figurative term of the politicians. National interest is simply understood what the politicians desire in the interests of their country (Byrd).

States act to maximize what is often called the national interest. In other word, states try to maximize the likelihood that they will achieve whatever objectives they have set. These objectives include high level political concerns of assuring state survival—security matters—as well as the more mundane or low-political objectives in such fields as trade, finance, health and monetary exchange (Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 1993, p. 36). States use the power they have to serve their interests or achieve their objectives.

Having a look at the arguments of the other schools of theory, although there is some disagreements with realist school of thought, but generally there is agreement on the issue of national interest. Liberalism is a typical example. Followers of this school said that all countries pursue national interest, but this pursuit can be regulated and controlled, therefore it does not necessarily lead to conflict as realism forecast. While realists traditionally, and constructivists more recently, claim that 'the national interest' is a key explanatory tool in the analysis and understanding of contemporary foreign policy, Scott Burchill argues that beyond the narrow aspect of security policy, the national interest has little residual value as an insight into the motivations of state policy in the external realm (Burchill, 2005). Meanwhile, Constructivism asserted that national identity can not break away from the national interest. Identities are the basis of interests (Wendt A., 1992, p. 398). Thus, national interest is the highest goal to which all countries pursue and it is also the root of the problems: Cooperation and competition, peace and war in international relations from the past to present. The cooperation takes place when there is a parallel in interest and contradict each other when conflict of interest (Wendt A., 1992). However, even within realism school, there are not the same approach and consistent conception of this concept. An important cause is that the connotation of national interest is not invariable and depends on the specific circumstances and in certain contexts. At the same time, the
identification of the connotation of national interest as well as the order to pursue different interests is a matter of political decision-making area. Thus, in each period, each country with different political, cultural and economic situation will define differently the connotation of national interest in the different policy making process and of course also a such specific conditions and context, the implementation of policy to achieve national interests is also different.

However, if states are driven solely by the requirement to maximize their own interests, then those with more power will use or abuse diplomacy and international law to their own benefit and to the detriment of others (Mirbagheri, 2000, p. 79). Several other scholars said that base solely on the national interest would create one of “might is right”, or power politics (Mirbagheri, 2000).

According to Bruce W. Jentleson, respected scholar and foreign policy practitioner, the national interests of any countries will be the basis for making foreign policy, because no one has rejected argument that pursuing national interests is the core of the foreign policy choices of a country (Jentleson, 2007). According to another view, national interest is to be understood that is the best conditions for a country in relation to other state entities and at the same time as a tool for politicians to seek a support for a specific activity and target, especially in international relations (Byrd). National interest is a multifaceted issue, but first and foremost is the issue of security and survival of a nation. Some scholars also want to distinguish national interest related to external relations of a subject and public interests that are inside interests (Neuchterlein, 1973). However, due to the changes in the world political system, most researchers have combined two inclined interests in the concept of “national interest”. All countries are making policies for the interests of government—said John F. Kennedy—former US president. Han J. Morgenthau- a realist argued that the foreign policy of a country should promote the interests of the nation and should remove crusading spirit and ideal. A good foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits (Morgenthau, 1951). In the foreign policy of Viet Nam, the concept of state interests, national interests and national state interests are usually considered to be general connotation and is used interchangeably. However, in
today’s external activities, “serving national interest” is increasingly recognized as the supreme principle of the foreign policy of any countries and of Viet Nam (Ha H., 1992). It can be said that, so far, in the implementation of the foreign policy of most countries, national interest is understood to include two aspects: the minimum requirements for the integrity of geography, politics and culture; and the flexibility in foreign policy in general.

Balancing and balance of power is a key point of realism. Balancing refers to two forms of a state’s response to threats posed by an- other state. The more visible form of the two is external balancing, which involves building alliances with third parties on the international stage. The less apparent but more popular form is internal balancing, where a country builds up its domestic strengths to enhance its preparedness. These two forms of behavior rest on a common rationale As Kenneth Waltz has remarked, “Weakness invites control; strength tempts one to exercise it, if only for the ‘good’ of other people.”. Because disparity in power generates insecurity, the way of providing for security is to establish a balance of power (Waltz, 1979). In view of realist school of thought, characteristics of international politics are that there has not a nation or an international super power, which has the right to rule the world. However, this anarchy will not lead to confusion, as the world politics revolves around the principle of power balancing. Kenneth waltz said that balance of power is a property of the system of international relations. States joint alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Walt, 1985, p. 5). It is in the interest of states to curb a potential hegemony before it becomes too powerful so that they avoid falling victim to its rule once it achieves a dominant power status. It becomes a safer alternative to either improve ones own capabilities through self-help mechanisms or join alliances with states who cannot readily dominate in order to restrain and curb the one who can potentially dominate the system and undermine the survival of actors within it. Another reason why states in a majority of instances choose to balance and not bandwagon is because joining the balancing alliance allows them to have more influence and play a more important role in that alliance, whereas the alliance with a major power would not
allow them opportunities for a great deal of contribution and decisive capability as they would inevitably be dominated by their powerful ally (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). States prefer to preserve their freedom of action in an alliance rather than have orders imposed on them by aligning with a potential hegemony. If states are extremely vulnerable and insignificant, bandwagoning may be their only choice, however middle powers and states that have something to contribute and protect, will always balance in face of a rising power and a potential hegemony (Walt, 1985, p. 15).

**Small and middle states in the international relations.**

As Waltz argues, “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided of course, that the coalition they join achieve enough defense or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). Eduard Jordaan also argues that middle powers are states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system. All middle powers display foreign policy behavior that stabilizes and legitimizes the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives (Jordaan, 2003, p. 2). After the cold war, the vast majority of countries have adjusted policies, tried best to avoid direct confrontation, taking national interest as objective and basis in order to behave in international relations. In domestic policy and foreign affairs, practicality and efficiency are put to the forefront. Primary basis for political force gathering between countries is still the national interest, on each issue, in each specific time, on many different levels with the intertwined and overlapping. The force gathering of middle and small countries is diverse and flexible, primarily by the geographic area. The role of middle and small countries is increasing, but decisive factor for status and trend of forces gathering is still relations between major powers. In international relation, small and middle countries often pursue the foreign policy of nonalignment. That is policy option for these countries. In operational terms, it may be considered "a tactical principle designed to extract the widest range of advantages from a particular
kind of power configuration" (Rothstein, 1966, p. 405). Small and middle states have freedom to determine their own foreign policies without interference from outside powers. Practically nonalignment may mean noninvolvement in superpower politics, or more simply, maintaining a diversity of ties or commitments so as not to have to follow blindly the demands of any one patron. Small and middle countries use this policy as an attempt to avoid dependency on any one source of aid without going so far as to be totally isolated from international contacts (Gitelson, 1972, p. 31). However, this policy choice can be disadvantageous when the major powers accuse the small or middle state of opportunism or refrain from competing for its support during a period of detente, or will probably be unable to obtain military, political, or economic support during a crisis (Gitelson, 1972, p. 32). Despite force gathering is in any form, the security and development of the middle and small countries, at last still depend heavily on relationship with directly affected great powers. However, the middle and small countries will also try to make force gathering at the global scale to protect the public interests, in forums such as United Nations and non-aligned movements. The small and middle countries also increasingly demonstrated their importance in a current world of interwoven contradictions, complexities. Success in the socio-economic development, ideological factors did not play a key role in international relations, the major powers have not settled relations with each other, all of these have created for small and middle countries a great opportunity to enhance their roles. For the first time, in Asia-Pacific, an organization that includes small and middle countries have taken the lead and held leadership roles in the organization in the creation of a multilateral security forum with the participation of all the great powers and centers in the world. ASEAN Regional forum (ARF) has demonstrated the central role of ASEAN with consensus principle, emphasizing the dialogue process to build trust. Cooperation model of ASEAN is particularly well suited for regional security environment in the post cold war period, when there was no specific security threat. It can be asserted that regionalism is forming in Asia, where the small and middle countries have shown their roles the most clearly (Huong, Nguyen Thai Yen and Tuan, Pham Minh,
Two world wars and the cold war in the XX century, after all, just for controlling market and area of influence. Today, this can be done quite effectively through high-tech goods with cheap price or economic aid. Consequently, all of nations and states, large or small, weak or powerful will strengthen their cooperation and link together in different levels, first and foremost for their national state interests.

For Viet Nam, the balance of relations with great powers is one of a focus in its foreign policy. In the study of international relations, the concept of “balance of relations” seems to be the derivative concept of other terms of “balance” or “equilibrium” that has been analyzed deeply in the Realism school like “balance of power”, “balance of threat”…However, the practical application of policy of the nations show that the idea of “balance of relations” has been applied by quite a lot of countries, especially small and medium-sized countries. Viet Nam’s relation balancing policy is policy to ensure the “balance of power” is done. This means that, a country, especially, a small and medium-sized one implement foreign policy harmoniously, making sure not to rely on any other country in foreign relation, leading to dependence and being taken decisive affect to the fate of the nation by such country. States, when they are threatened, tend to attempt balancing the threatening power, alone if they can or with other if necessary (Telhami, Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and foreign policy, 2002, p. 159). Shibley Telhami also argues that to the extent that superpowers are the most powerful states, their power, their relations in relation to each other, their competition, and their foreign policy can affect the behavior of smaller states in dominant way (Telhami, 1990, p. 33). Alexander Vuving also asserted that balancing is all too familiar to Vietnamese policy makers. Considerations of relative power (“balance of forces”) are among the chief strategic imperatives taught by both the traditional and communist Vietnamese political cultures (Vuving, 2006, p. 808). Vietnamese foreign policy-making was formerly based on Neo-Realist notions: as capabilities in the international system are distributed inequitably, Vietnam has adopted these policies to enhance its limited capabilities. This was done through the adoption of guerrilla tactics and
by balancing against its enemy at each particular time — at first with the USSR and China against America, then with the USSR against China (Abuza, 1996, p. 407).

1.3. Literature review


Vietnam’s relations with Russia and China have caught the attention of the research community inside and outside Vietnam. To date, there has been a large body of literature on bilateral relation between Viet Nam with China and between Vietnam with Russia in the some fields of politics, diplomacy, culture, education, trade, economy, security and defense. However, the works on Vietnamese response to the changes in the
Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War still very limited, even less. Hence, the thesis is an attempt to provide an overall view on Vietnam’s response to the Sino-Russian relation from the perspective of middle power foreign policy, while waiting for further studies to be published. This is also the very gap that the thesis is trying to fill.
CHAPTER 2:
OVERVIEW OF CHINESE AND RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC DURING THE COLD WAR

2.1. The period of 1949-1959

In the period 1949-1959, China and USSR are allies and anti-imperialism. After the success of the 1949 revolution, China was viewed as the Soviet Union's 'best friend' (Williams, 2009, p. 152). This time, China implemented “lean to one-side” policy. In 1950, Chairman, Mao Zedong led the delegation of senior Chinese officials visited officially Soviet Union. On that basic, in February 1950, the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed between Soviet Union and China. The alliance relationship was essential to China’s security and its military, economic and social development in the 1950s. (Sutter, 2008, p. 327). Sino- Soviet relations began developing in many fields, especially in politics and economy. Soviet granted long term loan of $300 million in credits for five years, which it would have to pay back with raw material at a one percent rate for China (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 101), helped China build 152 new industrial plants and supplied equipment to renovate and expand 141 firms (Hiep, 2007, p. 19). In addition, the Soviet Union also trained thousands of Chinese professionals, scientists and other technicians. Thanks to the help of the Soviet Union, China recovered very fast. In short, Soviet aid, advisors, and guidelines were key features fostering the changes underway in China (Sutter, 2008, p. 327).

However, the Soviet Union-China relation has only existed for a short time until the appearance of conflicting viewpoints between the two countries on major international issues and socialism. Following Stalin's death in 1953, and Khrushchev's rise to power after 1955, Russian perceptions changed and China was seen as Russia's 'enemy' (Williams, 2009, p. 152). In 1956, after the 10th Congress of Chinese
Communist Party was publicly against the Khrushchev’s doctrine of “Peaceful Coexistence”, “the peace movement from capitalism to socialism”. During the 64th Congress of the Communist Party and in November 1957 in Moscow, two Communist Parties of Soviet Union and China did not agree on some issues of principle in the communist and international workers movement. Consequently, in June 1960, the Soviet denounced Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed in October 1957, for nuclear technology cooperation, under which the Soviet Union was to provide China with a sample atomic bomb and technical data on its manufacture (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 102). In November 1960, conflict between two Communist Parties become more intense than ever and can not be resolved. Soviet Government declared the cancellation of economic, scientific and technological contract and total withdrawal of 10,000 Soviet advisors in China. Soviet aid was cut off. (Sutter, 2008, p. 327). This withdrawal of advisors signaled to the world that the two Communist giants were no longer partners (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 102)

2.2. The period of 1960-1979

From 1960 to 1979, the Soviet Union and China implemented hostile policies. Sino-Soviet relations collapsed completely. In the event of Kinmen, Matsu in August 1958, China wants the Soviet Union to exert tremendous pressure on the United States. However, the Soviet Union thought that Taiwan should not deserve in order Soviet Union clash with the United States. China said that the Soviet compromised. As the Soviet Union also criticized the “triple red flag”, “Great Leap Forward” movements of China (Quy, 2004, p. 40). In April 1960, the People’s Daily newspaper of China openly criticised the leadership of the Soviet Union, started a fierce battle with the direction of Communist and international workers movement. The ideological struggle between the two communist parties of Soviet Union and China become more extreme harsh and public. China accused the Soviet revisionist, right-wing, “socialist imperialism”, “big hegemom”. The Soviet Union considered China as dogmatic and leftist. China evaluated Khrushev as revisionist, Khrushev’s communism is essentially deform of socialism of bourgeois style. In this period, the
Soviet Union announced the doctrine of “three revolutionary cascade” include the
global socialist system, the national liberation movement, workers’ movement in the
capitalist empire countries. In contrast, China proposed the theory of “three worlds”:
the United States and the Soviet Union is the first world, the developing countries in
Asia, Africa, Latin America and other countries around the world are third world, the
other developed countries are the second world.

The climax of this conflict was the Soviet and China border war in 1969. Armed
conflict broke out between the Soviet Union and China in Ussuri border areas,
fighting also broke out in the islands in the Damman river of on-going Sino-Soviet
dispute and some other places in the Soviet-China border. On 11 September 1969, the
two sides agreed to reduce their troops at the border and opened negotiations to
resolve the dispute. The Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1960s, culminating in border
clashes in 1968-69, added to this negative view, and in the 1970s as both Russia and
China got closer to the US, they continued to see each other as enemies (Williams,
2009, p. 156). After the border clashes in 1969, the two countries’s relations saw
positive signs. In 1970, the two sides exchanged views and discussed a number of
issues such as normalising the situation of border and exchanging ambassadors and
strengthening economic ties. The two parties have agreed to negotiate the border at the
Deputy Minister level. In 1971, the bilateral trade agreement was signed. However, a
positive sign does not last long due to the impact of tensions in the two countries’s
border areas. Soviet shares a 4,300 km common border with China (Williams, 2009,
p. 155), where a large forces of both sides concentrated. Both sides continued
propaganda against each other. China agitated its people about the Northern threat.
At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the Chinese Government
declared the protest, requests to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and said the
action of the Soviet Union created a threat to the China’s security from the West.
China, with the return of Deng Xiaoping, implemented the policies in favor of US and
fiercely anti-Soviet. China accused the Soviet Union as “big hegemon” (Hiep, 2007,
p. 56).
2.3. The period of 1979-1991

From 1979-1991, Sino-Soviet relations improved toward normalisation. In 1979, the Chinese announced their conditions for a normalisation of relations: reduce of Soviet troops in the borders areas, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Mongolia, an end to Soviet support for Vietnam’s invasion in Cambodia (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 105). In 1982, the XII Congress of the Chinese Communist party’s determination to take economic development as the key task. Instead of always considering the class struggle as the driving force of social development. At the same time, China began to implement foreign policy of peace, independence and autonomy. By 1982, the Soviet leader concluded that its post-1969 strategy toward China had backfired (Sutter, 2008, p. 328). In 1985, the Soviet Union made reform, moving away from confrontation to dialogue with the previous enemy (Dittmer, 1992). Russian attitudes towards China did not soften until the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev made his historic visit to Beijing in June 1989 (Williams, 2009, p. 152). In July 1986 and in September 1988, the Soviet leader announced, the Soviet Union would reduce troops in the east and withdraw armed forces from Afghanistan, Mongolia toward normalising relations with China. In 1987, talks began between the Soviet and the Chinese on issues including demarcation of the frontier (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 105) in The official visit of China by Soviet Union General secretary Gorbachev in May 1989 marked the complete normalisation of relations between the two countries. Two sides issued a joint statement about the two countries, the two Communist Parties were completely normal. Changes within China itself, as a result of Deng Xiaoping's shift towards reform and liberalization in the same period, also paved the way for a more open Chinese foreign policy facilitating a gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet relations (Williams, 2009, p. 152). After normalisation, the Soviet Union and China were initially made friendly relations of cooperation between the two countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual benefits. Soviet-Chinese cooperation developed in many areas, but the highlight is the field of economics, trade, politics and solve the border issue. In 1989, the total value of Sino-Soviet foreign trade reached 2.4 billion rubles, increased

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by 13 times compared to 1986; in 1990, approximately 3 billion rubles, while the same year, the total China-US trade was 12 billion rubles (Quy, 2004, p. 65). In May 1991, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin paid an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union marked a new development in the Sino-Soviet relations. In 1989, Soviet Union and China have back to discuss the Soviet-Chinese border issue. Two countries have their troops on the common border down to the lowest level; implementing a number of measures to ensure the stability, the security of national frontiers, building, consolidating the mutual understanding and trust. In May, 1991, The Soviet Union and China signed an Agreement on border issues, nearly 300 years after the first Russo-Chinese border treaty (Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, 2005, p. 107). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the end of 1991, the Soviet Union and China relations are transformed into Russian-Chinese relations (Hiep, Quan hệ Liên Xô và Trung Quốc thời kỳ chiến tranh lạnh {Relations between the Soviet Union and China in the Cold War era}, 2007).

About this relation during this time, Shlapentokh writes: 'In the 50 years after the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, Russians saw China as an ally for seven years (1949-56) and for thirty years they looked at China as a dangerous enemy (1957-87) (Williams, 2009, p. 152). In sum, during this time, Russia and China have worked hard to overcome the consequences of the confrontation for nearly 30 years between the two countries. This rivalry has caused great damage on both sides in terms of politics, materials and spirituals. The first milestone opening precondition for a recovery period of diplomatic relation, neighborliness is the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from the border of Mongolia and China in early 1991.

2.4. The Sino-Russian relations in the Asia Pacific in the post-cold war era

2.4.1. Bilateral political ties

Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation and China have established diplomatic relation (27 December 1991) and then conducted a series of high level meetings to develop bilateral relations in many aspects. The relationship
between Russia and China improved steadily to the extent that it is enjoying the best
time of its history at the governmental level (Guang, 2008, p. 239). The picture in
Central Asia has been changed, creating a wide buffer zone between the two
countries. The Sino-Russian relationship has gained some typical achievements in the
several aspects such as the establishment of strategic partnership; formation of an
effective mechanism of summit meetings; the resolve of historical problems that once
obstructed the development of their relationship; consensus and implementation of
effective cooperation in the international arena; steady development of security
cooperaion of the two countries. Instead of the perception of each other as threat,
both are finding more and more common interests in the region and in the world
(Guang, 2008, pp. 239-240)

During Yeltsin administration (1991-1999), two countries have established a
strategic cooperative partnership that is now institutionalized in the form of legal
document. during his tenure, president Boris Yeltsin paid state visits to china four
times. first visit took place in December 1992, and two countries made joint
declaration on foundation of Russo-Chinese relation, affirming the two countries
viewed each other as friendly. in September 1994, in second visit to China, Boris
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed Sino-Russian joint statement. The two countries
determined to build the relationship of constructive cooperation. In 1996, both sides
declared their intention to set up a strategic cooperative partnership oriented toward
the twenty-first century, during the president Yeltsin’s third visit to China. When
president Jiang visited Russia in April 1997, both countries signed the joint statement
by China and Russia on multipolarization in the world and establishment of a new
international order, showing consensus on both the opposition to group politics and
the strengthening of their role (Guang, 2008, p. 240). In 1999, when president
Yeltsin visited China, both countries signed an agreement, agreeing to find a way to
resolve the last dispute on three islands in the Amur river, on the principle of shelving
disputes for joint development (Guang, 2008, p. 239). In 2000, President Putin visited
china two times in January and July. china and Russia emphasized the further
development of good neighborly friend ship on the basis of strategic cooperation in
21st century and a series of documents were signed as such anti-missile declaration of Sino-Russia and Beijing declaration. On 16 July 2001, in Moscow, China and Russia signed good neighborly treaty of friendship and cooperation, symbolizing the initiation of a new stage of the bilateral relationship. In December 2002, President Putin also paid three-day visit to China. During this visit, the two sides signed Sino-Russian joint statement. Russia was the first foreign country that President Hu Jintao visited in May 2003 after his 2002 elevation to the position of general secretary of the CCP (Chinese communist party) (Lampton, 2008, p. 200). In October 2004, President Putin and President Hu signed a final agreement about the Amur river islands. The disputes surrounding the 4,300 km-long Sino-Russian borders are now completely resolved (Guang, 2008, p. 239). In 2005, the last territorial issues between China and Russia were thoroughly settled. Beijing and Moscow also cooperate in the context of SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), with a shared objective of keeping the US military presence and influence in Central Asia to a minimum as well as enlarging regional economic cooperation and confronting terrorists. Russia and China also agreed on insisting on a dominant role for the UN in search for and use of political, diplomatic, economic, even military lever for influencing the international situation (Lampton, 2008, p. 200). In 2007, the two countries set up a hotline to jointly resolve quickly issues of mutual concern.

In May 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev visited China. During this visit, the two countries made joint statement on world’s issues. In 2008, President Medvedev and President Hu Jintao met 5 times. Russia and Chinas have resolved border dispute lasted for more than 40 years (the dispute has been pushing the two countries to the conflict in 1960s and 1970s). This is one of clearest sings of the warming in the Russo-Chinese relation. Russia and China focused more attention on strategic issues as such promoting global cooperation on economy and protection of environment and multipolarized trend in the world as well as anti-terrorism, nuclear weapons monitoring, against using human rights to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It can be said that, the most important achievement of the Sino-Russian relation since the end of the Cold War is that the two countries have built partnership
relation, strategic partnership- a new paradigm of international relation, creating the solid foundation for the long term and sustainable development of the relation between the two countries. Russia and China have steadily consolidated the relation, resolved many problems in the relation left by the history, creating preconditions for economic cooperation and coordination in the international arena.

2.4.2. Bilateral economic and trade ties

The Chinese and Russian economies have become more integrated during the post-Soviet era. As early as 1991, Sino-Russia’s economic-trade relation was quickly restored, strengthened and developed. The regular visits of the leaders of the two countries have created favorable conditions for the expansion of economic relations between the two countries. The government of two countries signed range of economic-trade agreements, provided range of policies and specific directing measures to expand economic and trade cooperation. Bilateral cooperation achieved good results in various fields such as construction, infrastructure development, steel industry, chemicals, oil and gas drilling, consumer good production, food and financial and baking sectors. If the trade turnover between the two countries reached $5.2 billion in 1992, $8 billion in 1993. In 2001-2005 period, bilateral trade grew three times, from $10.67 billion to $29.1 billion (Lampton, 2008, p. 200). In late 2004, President Putin welcomed Beijing’s expression of interest in making $12 billion of investment in Russia. From $11.7 billion in 2003 up to nearly 60 billion dollars in 2010, and respectively in 2012 was nearly 100 billion dollars. Currently, China is Russia’s leading partner in Asia-Pacific region. Two parties contribute capital to establish joint stock company to create free zone along the borders. Nearly 30 joint ventures were founded in Russia specializing in agricultural products, leathers, garments, wood and hotel services. After 1992, Russia and China signed 613 labor contracts with capital of more than $1 billion. China has sent more than 16000 laborers to work in Russia and constructed 347 companies in Russia. Russia and CIS countries have built 318 companies in Heilongjiang, China (www.mid.ru). The two countries also have established financial investment company, Sino-Russian and Russo-Chinese joint venture banks to develop trade and economic relations. The two
sides had reached an agreement that Russia will construct oil refineries worth 5 billion dollars in Tianjin, China, and build at least 500 gas distribution stations in China, construct nuclear power plants and modernize 250 current Chinese enterprises that was built with the help of the former Soviet Union. China also pledged to extend credit to the Russia, worth 25 billion dollars to build an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia of Russia to the Asia-Pacific region, in return, Russia will supply oil for China in 20 years, from 2011 to 2030 with a volume of 30 million tons / year and the price of 2/3 of the market price. Since 2015, every year Russia will sell China 30 billion m3 of gas. Sino-Russian trade and economic cooperation is marked by mutual complementariness. It has a great potential and vast prospects. Along with economy, China also focused on economic cooperation with Russia in the transfer of technology and science such as aerospace, defense and high-tech of Russia. Militarily, Beijing is one of biggest purchaser of Russian armaments and related technology.

2.4.3. Cooperation in the international and regional matters.

Russia and China have many parallel interests in the international and regional matters. Regional cooperation is an important aspect of the Sino-Russian relations. In April 1996, the two countries jointly organized Shanghai Cooperation Forum with the participation of China, Russia and 4 Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). In 2001, the forum has expanded into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization- a new model of cooperation in the post Cold War world. This organization has worked effectively in a range of issues such as terrorism, separatism and promoting cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and security.

In terms of international arena, as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations, the two countries have shared interests on many fundamental international issues, from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the reform of the world financial institutions, hot issue of the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear issue, the Korean peninsular...As a member of BRIC group, Russia and China have not accepted a unipolar world with America’s dominant position. Russia and China have had agreed stance for the adoption of political and diplomatic measures to reach a comprehensive and long-term agreement on the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea. The two
countries also have jointly promoted the process of reforming the United Nations, ensure supremacy of institutions in solving the problems of security, protest the abuse of economic sanctions in solving international crises, prevent unilateralism, striving for a space without "between stars war." weapons.

2.4.4. Military cooperation

Most analysts agree that Russia’s commercial motivations have dominated in its arms sales relationship with China (Robert H. Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 2003, pp. 719-720). Over the last years, weapons and equipment provided to China accounted for more than 40% share of exports of the Russian military, giving Russia from 1.8 billion dollars to 2.5 billion dollars each years. The Russian military has provided weapons to China for more than 30 years (since 1990), mainly aircraft, naval equipment, worth in excess of 25 billion dollars. The first exchange of military visits in several decades occurred in June 1990, and resumed arms sales were apparently on the agenda. The same year, Moscow agreed to sell 24 SU-27s to China. Combat aircraft have continued to be the chief component of Russian deliveries; China has now purchased at least six dozen transcontinental SU-27 fighters, which are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow trip in two and one-half hours with one mid-air refueling. In 1999, China concluded an agreement, valued at more than $2 billion, for 40 to 60 SU-30sF two-seat multipurpose fighters capable (with certain modifications) of carrying nuclear weapons. China currently owns more than 280 combat aircraft Su-27 and Su-30 of Russia (Robert H. Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 2003, pp. 719-720). China also buying a large number the combat aircraft Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171 as well as motors for these aircrafts of this type. Russia has built 4 Sovremennyi-class destroyers for the Chinese navy equipped with supersonic missiles, 12 diesel-powered submarines. All these submarines are equipped missiles with nuclear warheads. Beijing also purchased 60 air defense systems, several armored vehicles, artillery and helicopters of multifunctional type from Russia, S-300 surface-to-air missile complexes, T-72 tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and the technology for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for MIRVed missiles (Robert
H. Donaldson & John A. Donaldson, 2003, pp. 719-720). Large numbers of Russian scientists and engineers with long-term contracts are working in Chinese design bureaus and defense plants, Chinese engineers are training at Russian facilities, and more than 100 joint production projects have been launched.
CHAPTER 3:
VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO THE CHANGES IN THE SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR


3.1.1. Vietnam’s relation with Russia

In 1950, formal diplomatic relations between the So Viet Union and Vietnam were established. Vietnam-Soviet Union Relations was a cornerstone of the Vietnamese foreign policy (Ha H., 1992, p. 153). Soviet Union provided great help and assistance to Vietnam during the French war, anti-American war and nation-building cause of Vietnamese people. Vietnam is always grateful to the former Soviet Union and Russia for their wholehearted and effective assistance to the country during its national liberation and reunification in the past and construction and socio-economic development at present. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Viet Nam and Russian Federation has set up an official diplomatic relation on the principles of equality and mutual benefits. Vietnam-Russian relation is the legacy of the past Vietnam-So Viet Union relations. In the period of 1991-1993, Vietnam-Russian relation developed in the difficult stage. The relationship was in the stagnation and declined sharply and apparently. The main reason is that during this period, Russia implemented Atlantic-oriented policy, focused mainly on the development of relationship with USA and the Western capitalist countries, on contrary, Vietnam considered relationship with neighboring and Southeast Asian countries as a top policy (Giap N. H., 1999). Vietnam actually found it’s was so difficult to find feasible plan to maintain normal relation with Russia. Moreover, Vietnam’s debt to Russia(inherited from Soviet Union) also became the main obstacle for Vietnam-Russia relations. Since 1994, The Russia implemented “ Eurasian”
orientation foreign policy instead of “Atlantic” orientation with more emphasis on developing partnership with Asia-Pacific countries, especially with CIS countries, China, Indian and ASEAN. This is a stage of which the relationship between Vietnam and Russia has been gradually restored and improved positively (Phach, 1999, p. 155), with the groundbreaking effort to create a new legal framework to meet the development needs of relations between Vietnam and Russia. From 1994 to 1996, Vietnam-Russian relation has started a new development with positive and realistic signs. Russia has developed with East Asian and Asia-pacific countries in order to balance “East-West relation”. Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s first official visit to Russia with the signing of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of friendly relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Russian Federation (6-1994) has reflected the determination of both two sides to create basis for new comprehensive platform for the development of the bilateral relations in the new situation. This treaty creates a new legal foundation and the guiding principles of respect for national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. From 1997 to 1999, the Vietnam-Russian relations were raised to a new high with road-opening role of the field of politics and diplomacy. The first visit to Vietnam by Russian Prime Minister V. Chechnomudin in November 1997 reflected the growing concern of Russia’s demand for the development of comprehensive cooperation with Vietnam. In August 1998, State President of Viet Nam visited to Russia. The visit marked the highest-level efforts, contribute to boosting the bilateral relation to a high development. During this visit, Vietnam and Russia signed Mutual legal assistance agreement; agreement on cooperation in construction and operation of Dung Quat Oil refinery Factory; agreement on payment between the two banks; agreement on cooperation between two Ministries of Justice. Vietnam-Russian relation under Boris Yeltsin administration was not commensurate with the demand of the two sides. Bilateral relation was stalled in the long time. Cooperation in all fields declined sharply, until 1994, this relations saw a positive signs. From 2000 to 2008 under Putin administration. in September 2000, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited Russia; in October 2002, and July 2010, Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh visited
Russia; Vietnamese State President visited to Russia in May 2004, October 2008; President of Russian Federation visited Vietnam in 2001, in 2006 and in 2010; Prime Minister of Russian Federation visited Vietnam in March 2002 and February 2006 (http://www.vietnam.mid.ru/vn/viet_01.html) and recent visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in May 2013. Vietnam and Russian relations in this period reflected the recognition of the urgency and effort in putting forward this relation over the long term and stable strategic relation (Giap N. H., 1999). The frequent exchange of high-level visits between Vietnam and Russia reinforces closeness, mutual understanding of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the two governments. Vietnam-Russian relation after 1991, especially in the late 90s of 20th century has created an important premise to establish strategic partnership (Vu Dinh Hoe & Nguyen Hoang Giap, 2008, p. 91).

3.1.2. Vietnam’s relations with China

In the feudalistic period, Vietnam had nearly a thousand years under direct rule and domination of Chinese State. Vietnam was a district in the administrative structure of Chinese State. During this long period, while the Vietnamese selectively assimilated much of Chinese culture, they remained intensely nationalist (Guan, 1998, p. 1122). The links between China and Vietnam were indeed close, and China and Chinese values had great influence on Vietnamese society (Amer, 1993, p. 316). In the colonial period, both Vietnam and China had to face colonialism. Vietnam was under French domination, both countries were weak and had to come to terms with the intrusion of the West. Although Vietnam was colonized and China was not, they shared a sense of having common weaknesses and fates (Guan, 1998, p. 1139). On 2 Sep 1945, State of Democratic republic of Viet Nam was born and on 1 October 1949, People’s Republic of China was established. Since then the Sino-Vietnamese relation entered the new stage. China was the first country to recognize the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. During the two decades beginning in the mid-1950s, China provided the DRV with extensive economic and military assistance. Apart from material assistance, China also sent thousands of advisers to Vietnam to assist in various areas of society...
China also helped Vietnam open the Vietnam’s way of communication with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, gave Vietnam a large rear, strongly provided Vietnam with materials (weapon aid, military equipment, food, medicine). During the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, relations between China and the DRV were very close and there were no obvious issues of disagreement between the two states, politics, spiritual; cleared the transit route through China for foreign aid to Vietnam (Amer, 1993, p. 317). In the war against French, China has sent advisors to help Vietnam to train staff for number of industries, provided important and effective assistance (Giap V. N., 1999, pp. 14-15). China was a biggest providing weapon country for Vietnam at the end of the war of the Vietnamese people against the French (MOFA, 1979). Prior to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) victory over the South in 1975, China had been Vietnam's largest benefactor, contributing $20 million of military and development aid to Hanoi (Roper, 2000, p. 1019). In the war against the United States and the South Vietnamese regime, especially during the 1950s and early 1960s, China was Hanoi’s most enthusiastic backer. China extended economic and military aid, provided sanctuaries inside South China, and made available logistic lines running across China from the Soviet Union, even deployed a large numbers of Chinese troops to the Vietnam during 1965-1968 (Garver, 1981, p. 447). In April 1975, the Sai Gon Government (South Regime) was collapsed, the Southern of Vietnam was entirely liberated, and Vietnam reunified. Also since 1975, Pol pot (in Cambodia) has increased invasion operation over Vietnam, and in 1978, the conflict at Southwestern Border of Vietnam have grown into major war. Cambodian issue has made Vietnam-China relation deteriorated. In the end of 1976, border conflict between Vietnam and China broke out at Cao Bang and Lang Son region. Vietnam and China has carried out negotiation without results. In 1978, China always acted unfriendly to Vietnam such as claims of the “Hoa people” (Vietnamese of Chinese origins) about alleged mistreatment in Vietnam (Leighton, 1978), cut off 72 aided works, cut off totally economic aid and total withdrawal of its experts. On 17 Feb 1979, 300,000 Chinese troops attacked Vietnam across wholly Vietnam-China border (Bin, 2001, p. 311). The issues involved in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict are
numerous and complex (Burto, 1979, p. 700). The origins of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict leading to the border war in early 1979 are deeply rooted in history, geography, clash of national interests, and policy differences between the "dragon" and the "smaller dragon (Hung N. M., 1979, p. 1037). While Carlyle A. Thaye argues that the central issue in the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations were both ideological factors and national interests (Thaye, 1994, p. 513). Other scholar explained it was Vietnam's failure to maintain a balance in its relations with China and the former Soviet Union. When China cut off all economic aid to Vietnam in 1978 and Vietnam-U.S. negotiations to normalize relations broke down, Vietnam turned to the Soviet Union (Guan, 1998, p. 1122). In 1986, Vietnam has carried out Renovation reform. Vietnam has actively promoted the normalization of relation with China and finally succeeded on November 1991. Vietnam and China issued a joint statement confirming the bilateral relations was re-normalized.

3.2. The impact of the Sino-Russian relations on Vietnam

Both China and Russia have an important role in the Vietnam’s foreign policy of diversification and multilateral independence. China is the major power, the socialist country and neighbor while Russia also both great power and traditional friendly country of Vietnam. Both countries have a certain influence in the region. Thus, the good development of relationship between Vietnam with China and Russia will create favorable conditions for Vietnam to expand its relations with other countries in the world. Therefore, Vietnam attaches great importance to developing relations with China and Russia. Sino-Russian strategic partnership in Asia-Pacific make chance for Vietnam to take advantage of both Russia and China for its socio-economic development, as well as enhancement of its capacity and competitiveness in the process of regional and international integration. As Russia and China have relations with Vietnam, so this is an opportunity for Vietnam to take advantage of the help and assistance of two countries in terms of investment in capital, technology, and exploit the potential of the two countries to successfully implement the industrialization and modernization of the country. Meanwhile, Vietnam will have more favorable
conditions to the struggle against external forces on the political issues, religion and human rights. At the same time, the mutual restraint between Russia and China contributes to increase Vietnam’s role in particular, and other Southeast Asian countries in general as well as contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation in the region.

For multilateral mechanisms, both China and Russia are big power, having role in the region as well as multilateral institutions (such as permanent member of Security Council of United Nations, APEC, ARF), so Vietnam can leverage strategic partnership relations with China and Russia to promote the role of these mechanisms in order to improve its position in the region and around the world. This is also the way to balance relations with major countries. However, the cooperation between two great powers, China and Russia could cause disadvantages for Vietnam. First, Vietnam will have to suffer disadvantages and negative effects when Russia and China make mutual restraint policy. The separate and the difference in force gathering between Russia and China on many issues will affect the interests of Vietnam. As a small country, Vietnam can not avoid being sucked into certain vortex and inevitable threat from the other side. In particular, Vietnam now is facing enormous challenges due to the China’s rising and its many political ambitions in the region, along with pragmatic policies and intentions to entice ASEAN countries, making the ASEAN’s unity and consensus seriously eroded. This will affect the role and strength of ASEAN in general and the individual member State in particular, including Vietnam. On the other hand, with its rising role, China will implement the intent of advance toward the South, to make its own calculations in the East China Sea strategy. In short, the Russo-Chinese relations have two sided impact on Vietnam.

3.3. Vietnamese response to the Sino-Russian relations in terms of economy

Viet Nam has strategic partnership with both Russia and China. However, the level of Vietnam’s partnership with each country is different. Basically, Russia-China partnership has positive impact upon the relationship of each country toward Viet Nam.
Russia and China seem to have a division of interest quite clearly in Southeast Asia and in Viet Nam. Southeast Asia is first of China’s area of influence. Russian penetration in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam at a certain level and will not harm the interests of China. Russia and China would never for Viet Nam to have conflict directly, thus Russia-China relations create stability in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam. Balanced foreign policy in relation to Russia and China, on the one hand, will help the healthy development of Viet Nam-Russia and Viet Nam-China relations, on the other hand, will not make the relations with Russia to impede the relations with China and vice versa, nor for these two countries to take advantage of Viet Nam as bargaining chip in their relations with each other. Viet Nam as a small and middle country, as neighboring country of China, and as traditional friendship country of Russia, will have both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, Viet Nam can take advantage of this relationship to economic development and politics. On the other hand, Viet Nam can limit the negative impacts based on its foreign policy of openness, multilateralism and diversification.

From 1991, along with the normalization of political relations, Vietnam’s economic relation with China has been restored and developed steadily. Viet Nam has signed more than 20 documents covering trade and economy cooperation matters. (Gu Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, 2000, p. 1045). These agreements have covered a range of matters, including economic and trade issues; air, sea, and rail transportation; cultural affairs; public security questions; customs and taxation matters; and other subjects, such as trade agreement in 1991, agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 1992, agreement on payment and cooperation between banks of the two countries in 1993, agreement on the establishment of Committee on economy and trade cooperation between Vietnam and China in 1994; agreement on border trade in 1998…In addition, many Vietnamese central ministries and local governments also signed documents on bilateral economic cooperation, especially between Yunnan, Guangxi of China and the northern border province of Vietnam. So far, Vietnam and China have opened 25 pairs of international and national border gates on the common land border between. Two-way trade turnover between
Vietnam and China is growing fast. From 32 million in 1991 to $2.8 billion in 2001, increasing 87 times (Truong, 2013). In 2001, the leaders of Vietnam and China set out the target till 2005, two-way trade turnover will be achieved $5 billion. In 2003, this target was achieved, in 2005, it increased nearly double with $9.8 billion. In 2003, two Prime Ministers set out goals of getting $10 billion in 2010, and then lift up to $15 billion in two-way trade. In 2007, this target was achieved up to $15.8 billion. In 2008, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and his Chinese counterpart pledged to implement two-way trade target of $25 billion in 2010, but at the same time, this target was achieved up to $27 billion. In 2011, that figure was $35.1 billion and in 2012 was up to $41 billion (Truong, 2013). However, in trading with China, Vietnam always in the state of deficit as in 2012 was $16.3 billion. Vietnam exports to the Chinese market more than 100 products, while China exports to Vietnamese markets up to 200 items. The Vietnam’s deficit from China, in constant years, always accounted up to 85-90% total level of Vietnam’s deficit. It is clear that Vietnam depends so much on goods imported from China and Vietnam trade balance was largely deficit in trade with China (Truong, 2013). Vietnam’s export also being dependent on China. In addition, Vietnamese enterprises are increasing dependent on raw material imported from China. On the other hand, China’s FDI in Vietnam is growing up. After 9 years since the normalization in November 1991 to December 1999, China has 76 invested projects with total capital of $120 million. Within 10 years, from 1999 to 2009, China has increased to 657 projects with total registered capital of more than $2.67 billion. In 2009, China ranked 11 among 43 countries and territories investing in Vietnam (Hoa, 2010). Currently, Chinese investment has presented in 52 provinces/cities of Vietnam (Hoa, 2010). Field of Chinese investment in Vietnam is very diverse from hotels, restaurants services to food processing and production of beer. Over time, the Chinese government has also dedicated to Vietnam a number of grants and concessional credits, such as technical improving project of Thai Nguyen steel plant and Bac Giang fertilizer plant by approximately $55 million (of which one third is non-refundable). Nearly $300 million loan with no interest to invest for a number of projects such as Cao Ngan power plant, Rao Quan hydroelectric work, Da Nang textile mill.; Non-refundable aid worth $30 million and
concessional credit $ 40.5 million were signed during the visit to China by Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh in December 2001. Chinese investment in Vietnam in the first 9 years (1991-2000) the average investment capital of a project was relatively small, about $1.5 million, much smaller than the average size of the project. Investment rate has increased, but not mutant, scale of project is small and slow growth. These characteristics demonstrate Chinese investors are in the exploration phase of the Vietnamese market. In this period, Chinese investment mainly focused on light industrial sector, consumer industry, and in the form of Joint venture with Vietnamese companies, the company with 100% foreign capital is limited. In the period 2000-2011, especially after 2001, when China joined WTO, Chinese investment in Vietnam was so strong. So far, China has more than 842 investment projects in Vietnam with a total investment of more than $ 4.3 billion, ranked 14 out 96 countries investing in Vietnam, while, Vietnam has only 10 investment projects in China with a total investment capital of $ 13 million, mainly focused on service sector. Two-way trade in 2011 reached $ 35.7 billion, in 2012 was $ 41 billion (Dong, 2012).

Before the rise of China today and the past lessons and immediate and long-term strategy of Vietnam is strongly develop in all aspects, of which if economy is strong will lead to other strong ones. Vietnam sees ASEAN as an important means through which Vietnam can promote its position. Through ASEAN, Vietnam is simply trying to moderate Chinese behavior through interdependence, though indirectly. Simply, Vietnam is too small to influence China through direct linkages. Only through full participation in Asean, including the Asean free trade area (AFTA), Vietnam can attempt to engage China in a degree of interdependence. Vietnam should continue to use Asean to support its own agenda as well as use the annual Asean foreign minister's meeting, the multilateral approach to security issues, and the resolution of the south china sea disputes against China's wishes. Vietnam should further embrace the ARF's call for more military transparency and confidence-building measures. Besides, Vietnam should also get involved in as many international organizations and regional bodies as possible, which implicitly constrains its independence. in its relationship
with China, Vietnam must remain cognizant, that “the more we identify with a group, the more likely we are to discriminate against out- groups” has tremendous implications for Vietnam security. Whereas Alexander Wendt suggests that a more developed collective self will lead to "another-help" security policies. The current international system is as favorable to Vietnam as it has ever been. For its security concern, notably China, the only realistic way for Vietnam to cope with this is by engaging China in indirect interdependence through its membership of ASEAN, and increasing the economic development of the country. Vietnam should strengthen cooperation, limit the disagreement, avoid confrontation, expand common points. The stable maintenance of friendship with China will bring many benefits for Vietnam. In contrast, if this tie is pushed in the strained and confrontational state, it will only bring many disadvantages for Vietnam. The best choice of Vietnam’s China policy, in the current context, is the general strategy, include, firstly, efforts to strengthen the country, along with ASEAN member States, entice China more involve in the international and regional issues, more active participation in regional mechanism institutions; attract the more active participation of Russia and the world major powers such as USA, Japan, India and EU on regional issues. This strategy will create a dynamic and flexible balance, ensuring the best place for Vietnam’s national security. Secondly, strengthening multifaceted tie with ASEAN members, especially with Laos and Cambodia. This will ensure Vietnam’s national security, especially its ability to handle the changes in the Sino-Russian relations. Enhancing relations with Southeast Asian countries will ensure both the security environment and economic momentum and is also foundation to achieve consensus in settling the issues with China.

China is so skilled in the application of pragmatism in relations with great powers, especially in relations with Russia and the USA. That’s what Vietnam should be very careful in handling issues in the relationship with Russia in particular and with great powers in general, especially with China to avoid falling into “honey traps” in strategic competition between major powers, in which small countries is very easy to become a victim. In relations with both Russia and China, Vietnam needs to keep independent and autonomous position to proactively adjust relations in an appropriate way, to keep

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reasonable distance as not to fall into the entirely dependence position on these two countries, or fall into the orbit of this country against other country.

Inheriting the good results of the Vietnam-Soviet relations, since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the Vietnam-Russia relationship has turned to a new page. This relationship was formed and based on the very basic facilities, such as the need for cooperation to develop socio-economic development, proximity and coincidence of stance and views on many international and regional issues, fine traditional friendship, solid legal foundation. Vietnam has made good advantage of the Russian factor in its policy of balancing relations with great powers, especially with China. This plays a very important role to implement the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, openness, multilateralism and diversification of international relations, the proactive and active global integration of Vietnam. Vietnam attaches great importance to promote comprehensive relations with Russia as a great power and a traditional friendly country. Overall, Vietnam-Russian relation since the end of the Cold War has reached many achievements from various fields of politics, economy, education, national defense and security to international cooperation on a range of important issues of security and external cooperation.

Vietnam-Russian economic link in the period of 1991-1993 saw unprecedented decline. The volume of trade (1.911 billion rubles) between Vietnam and Russia in 1992 was only 10 % of Vietnam-Soviet Union trade turnover in 1989 (Giap N. H., 1999). Vietnam had to face great difficulties due to limited supply of essential items from Russia such as fuel, materials, equipment, machinery and spare parts. On the other hand, Vietnam’s traditional export items to Russian market such as fruits, vegetables, food, agricultural products, handicrafts and light industry has shrunk sharply in Russian market. Vietnam and Russian economic and trade cooperation in the period 1994-1996 further saw positive developments. Under the agreement, Vietnam continued to receive essential goods and equipment from Russia to serve all the works built by the Soviet Union. Vietnam also more active in the supply of goods to debt payment for Russia (each year more than $ 100 million). Vietnam-Russian trade turnover in 1994 reached $ 378.9 million, but turnover in 1995 and 1996 was
small just $ 453 million and $ 280 million. As of 1996, Russia has 36 ongoing projects with a capital of 160 million, of which 32 joint ventures, 02 of 100% of Russian owned enterprises and 02 of joint business agreement. Russia ranked 18th among 54 countries and territories investing in Viet Nam. Vietsovpetro Joint venture company is outstanding success of Vietnam-Russian economic cooperation. In 1994, this Joint venture exploited 7 million tones of crude oil, in 1996 was 68.2 million tones. The total oil sale from 1991 to 1997 reached $ 6.3 billion, its contribution to Vietnam’s budget was $ 3.4 billion (Giap N. H., 1999). During period of 1994-1996, many Vietnamese private companies operated successfully in Russia. The number of over 300 companies in the form of 100% of foreign owned capital or joint ventures between Vietnam-Russia with capital of about $ 200 million. The scope of activities of these companies are so diverse from export - import of consumer goods, materials, equipment manufacturing, public catering, tourism, services, investment, banking, insurance and education. From 1997 to the present, Vietnam and Russia further develop cooperation in all fields like oil and gas industry, energy and mining resources, mechanical engineering, metallurgy, electronics, ship building and repair, light industry, chemical industry, microbiological and pharmaceutical, agricultural and forest products processing, fishing and seafood processing, transportation, postal and aviation, construction, environmental protection, health protection; science and technology training; tourism and culture.

The statistics from the Vietnam Ministry of Commerce show that in 2000, the total export turnover between Vietnam and Russia reached $ 367.1 million, of which exports to Russia was $ 122.5 million, imports from Russia was $ 244.6 million. In 2004, it amounted to $ 887.3 million, an increase of 142% compared to 2000, exports to Russia reached $ 671.2 million, an increase of 174%. In 2005, trade between the two countries further saw positive development, two-way import and export turnover reached $ 1.02 billion, up 14.5%. Vietnam’s trade deficit was $ 516 million. In 2006, export turnover reached $1.1 billion, up 8% compared with 2005, imports reached nearly $ 700 million (down 8.9% compared with 2005); export reached $ 400 million, 5.87% increase over 2005; $ 300 million deficit. Compare over the previous years,
trade deficit between Russia and Vietnam was $1/3$, but recently, it has fallen to $1/1.5$. In recent years, a number of key commodities exported to Russia increased relatively high: seafood increased 6 times ($60$ million), apparel increased $69\%$ ($31.3$ million), rubber increased $54\%$, vegetables by $51\%$, footwear increased $89\%$... In 2006, imports from Russia slowed down, only $3003$ million, by $73\%$ over the same period, of which iron and steel reached $99$ million (down $50\%$), machinery, appliances and spare parts reached $20.4$ million (decreased $2$ times). The most important field in coordinating economic activities between Vietnam and Russia is oil and gas, of which Vietsopetro— the oil and gas joint venture, leading the bilateral cooperation. For years, this enterprise has achieved high production and commercial targets, contributing greatly to Vietnamese state budget. As of early January 2006, Vietsopetro has earned $28.43$ billion from crude oil export, of which Vietnam’s state budget and profit was $17.43$ billion, Russia’s benefit was $5$ billion. Besides exploration of oil and gas, Vietsopetro also exploit the available capacity to participate in technical services from offshore petroleum foreign companies, which have signed contracts on exploration, exploitation and distribution of oil and gas with Vietnam.

In the period 2000-2009, two-way trade turnover Russia-Vietnam increased 5-fold from 367 million dollars to 1.83 billion dollars to stabilize commodity structure. In 2010, the Russian market is the second largest export commodity of Vietnam 24. Meanwhile, in the opposite direction, Russia is the largest source of imports of 14 enterprises in Vietnam (Ha N. A., 2011, p. 65). Currently, Russia has 67 direct investment projects in Vietnam with a total registered capital of over $755$ million dollars. Vietnam's investment in Russia has increased rapidly, currently has 18 projects with a total investment of $1.7$ billion dollars (Ha N. A., 2011, p. 65). According to the statistics from Vietnamese General Administration of Customs that from 2010 onward, the balance of trade of Vietnam always deficit when trading in Russian market, from 2011, Vietnamese goods were strongly exported to this market, the trade balance has tilted toward Vietnam. In 2011, Russia is $22^{nd}$ largest trading partner of Vietnam (ranked $22^{nd}$ in terms of both exports and imports). In the 7 months of 2012, the total value of goods exchanged between Vietnam and Russia was
$1.34 billion, an impressive growth of 34% over the same period last year. Trade turnover between Russia and Vietnam in 2012 reached the historic highs of nearly $4 billion. Assistant President of Russia Elvira Nabiullina said that since 2006, the bilateral trade has more than triples. She also noted that the basis of the economic synergy between Vietnam and Russia is a combination of oil and gas industry. Currently there are several Russian groups working in Vietnam like “Gazprom”, “Lukoil”, “TNK-BP”. In addition, there are great prospects of construction the first nuclear power plant in Vietnam (http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2012_07_30/83368983/). Vietnam and Russia also signed an agreement on energy cooperation, the provision of equipment, research collaboration, joint venture establishment in the fields of mechanics, coal mining. The power plants: Hoa Binh, Thac Mo, Tri An, Yaly…also have received cooperation, investment, equipment supply, technology transfer of Russia. Power Machines JSC of Russia has cooperated with Uong Bi Thermal Power and, Pha Lai Thermal Power companies in equipment supply. The Russian’s energy technology export group (Technopromexport-TPE) was involved in the design, construction and supply of equipment with total capital of $87.7 million for Yaly hydropower Plant, supply of mechanical equipment for Da Mi hydropower Plant. The two plants were put into operation and provided electricity to the Vietnam’s national electricity system.

In investment area, Russia is gradually becoming one of the key partner in the strategy to attract foreign capital in Vietnam. Russian’s FDI in Vietnam is increasing, has been actively contributing to the economic reform and development of Vietnam. From 1998 to late 2002, when compared the scale of FDI in Vietnam, the Russian Federation accounted for 1.8% of the total of 4,215 projects and 3.8% of the total capital of over $20 billion. Russia ranked 9th investor in Vietnam (after Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, France, Virgin islands, UK). Russian investment mainly focused on the construction industry for 23 projects (with a total investment of $143.5 million occupied 50% of projects and 53.15% registered capital of Russia in Vietnam) and services for 16 projects with total registered capital of $70 million (35% of projects and registered capital of 25.93%). The field of agriculture -
forestry attracted 7 projects with a total registered capital of $37.5 million (15% of total projects and registered capital of 13.89%). Russia's FDI present in Vietnam’s important economic sectors as oil and gas, energy, engineering, chemical industry, metallurgy, agro-processing industry, forestry and seafood. As of 2009, the total investment capital of Russia to Vietnam at about $300 million (excluding Vietsovpetro -Petroleum Joint Venture) with 55 projects in the power sector, engineering, agriculture, ranked 23rd out of 81 countries and territories investing in Vietnam. Cumulatively, on 31/12/2012, Vietnam has 14,522 valid projects with a total registered capital of $210.5 billion, of which the sectors of processing industry, manufacturing accounted for the highest proportion with 50.3% of the total investment, followed by the field of the real estate business (23.6%), accommodation services catering (5%). As of now, there are 100 countries and territories investing in Vietnam, in which Japan is the largest investor with a total registered capital of $28.6 billion, respectively, followed by Taiwan, Singapore and Korea. In the first 6 months of 2013, Russia ranked third with a total registered capital increase is new and 1,015 billion, accounting for 9.7% of the total capital investment (http://fia.mpi.gov.vn). Vietsovpetro is rated as one of 10 oil companies in the world with the highest profitability. Moscow – Mill helicopters production company is one of the project partners to build repair and warranty plant in Da Nang city to serve the needs of the entire East Asian region. Mill branch in Vietnam mainly serve to prolong the life of helicopters manufactured by Soviet and Russia. Ulianopxky– an automobile production factory, installing a production line in Vietnam with 5 year operation license. In 2003, the factory provided 1200 cars. Treliabinsc-heavy tractors manufacturing plant is also on stereotype with spare parts were assembled in Vietnam.

Russia is also one of the investment areas of Vietnam investors. As of 2009, there are 11 investment projects to the Russian Federation (occupied 11% of projects of Vietnam, outward investment) with a total registered capital of $34 million, ranked 2nd in terms of total outward investment of Vietnam, and ranked 3rd in terms of number of the projects after Laos (33 projects) and the USA (14 projects). Vietnam
businesses primarily invested in the fields of industry, agriculture and forestry, services and ranks third after Iraq and Laos with 11 valid projects. As reported by the Ministry of Planning and Investment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, since the beginning of 2013, Vietnam has invested $1.4 billion into the Russian Federation. This is a project of National Petroleum Corporation Vietnam in the expansion of Russian-Vietnamese joint venture "Rusvietpetro" to develop oil fields in the Nenets autonomous region of Russia. (http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2013_04_09/110215886/).

As of 20/03/2013, Vietnam has 742 investment projects abroad with a total registered investment of $15.5 billion in 59 countries and territories.

Vietnam-Russia relations after the Cold War, so far, has been more than 20 years of development. Vietnam has determined the form and framework of its bilateral relations with Russia.

Vietnam has been successful in regulating its relationship of comprehensive cooperation from basis of ideological relations to “strategic partner”, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and meeting its interests in the new situation. Through advancers in the Vietnam-Russia relations, it can be seen the geopolitical and economic factors, especially Russia’s calculation fro the region, Vietnam still an important partner that could help Russia back to the region with the position of a great power. For its part, Vietnam has benefited important politico-security and economic interests in relations with Russia. The good maintenance of its relations with Russia has helped Vietnam access the modern defense technology of Russia in order to modernize its defense forces. From the Cold War to the present, Vietnam has not only received Russia’s great help in the process of its economic recovery and development, but also received the strong support to restore and maintain a number of important industrial items which the Soviet Union built for Vietnam before. Currently, Vietnam is stepping up cooperation with Russia in the construction of infrastructure items of energy and nuclear power, such as Hoa Binh and Yaly hydropower plants and the coming first nuclear power plant in Ninh Thuan province. Inherit and promote the achievements of the Vietnam-Soviet Union, Vietnam has raised its bilateral relation to “strategic partnership” relation and cooperated with Russia in all fields. However, lessons learned from the past, Vietnam is
not consistently advocated an alliance with Russia against other countries, particularly against China, as China had previously claimed Vietnam was allied with the Soviet Union against China in 80s, that has led to the Chinese border war against Vietnam in March 1979 in order to “Teach Vietnam a lesson”. This was one of reasons that made Vietnam-China relations come to deadlock, hostility, lasted until 1991, when the two leaders of the two countries decided to close the past and normalize the Vietnam-China relations. Along with strengthening political relations with Russia, since 1991, Vietnam has strived to promote its economic relations on par with political ties, and corresponds to the potential and expectations of both countries. To this point, compare the economic relations, trade and investment between Vietnam and Russia with a number of other countries like China, USA and Japan may not be great, reversely, also not commensurate with the degree of political relations. Although Vietnam has a long-term economic relations and good knowledge of Russian market, but in order to achieve new progress, Vietnam must have an overall policy and long-term ties with Russia with the principle of “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, not against any third country”. Vietnam should continue to strengthen its cooperation in the economic sector that both Vietnam and Russia have advantage and strength, such as exploitation of oil and gas and developing new energy projects, such as Ninh Thuan nuclear power plant, further expand trade relations between the two countries with high quality goods to meet the needs of the market. Economically, Viet Nam and Russia have great potential, especially in the field of energy (nuclear power), oil and gas, mining, telecommunications, technical engineering…that is not commensurate with the size of the strategic partnership. Viet Nam should pay special attention on economic cooperation with Russia. Russian investment in Viet Nam is not only economic benefits, but also great sense of security defense, and independence maintenance of Viet Nam. Bilateral economic cooperation should focus on 4 main fields: oil and gas, energy and electricity, investment and trade. In addition to that, Viet Nam needs to have new agreement to expand cooperation in these fields such as the joint venture with a third party and investment outside the Vietnamese border. In addition to the priority of the oil and gas cooperation, Viet Nam needs build projects such as hydropower, thermal power, nuclear power by Russian equipment, technology ( and capital from both sides).
Initially, Viet Nam should create favorable conditions for Russia to bid to provide the technology for nuclear power plants in Viet Nam as well as more attraction of Russian investment in Viet Nam, especially large corporations such as Gazprom, Lukhoi, Alfagroup, Rusall, Power machine... on the oil and gas industry, electric power, mining, telecommunications, mechanical engineering, rial transport and road... Viet Nam should also have policies to encourage its investment in Russia, especially in the areas that Viet Nam has strengths such as production of consumer goods, foodstuffs, construction materials. Request Russian government to give more ODA for Viet Nam in the coming time to upgrade and modernize USSR’s previous assisted works, especially create favorable condition for large cooperative projects in the power and transportation sectors (subway construction). Viet Nam needs to expand joint venture with Russia in new fields such as mining, financial and banking services, telecommunications and defense equipment. In addition, Vietnam should strengthen its customs cooperation, facilitate the paperwork, the records processing time for business. Vietnamese government need request Russian government to grant long-term visa Vietnamese businessmen as well as soon announce the criteria and conditions of quality of export goods to the Russian market. In addition, Viet Nam needs enhance measures to trade promotion, advertisement of Vietnamese high quality goods. Vietnamese trading centers need to set up in major cities of Russia.

In sum, in relations with Russia, Vietnam has been successful in adjusting its foreign policy from the relation based on ideological ties to long-term strategic partnership based on equality and mutual benefit. Vietnam has also achieved a number of important benefits of security, politics and economy.

3.4. Vietnamese response to the Sino-Russian relations in terms of defense

3.4.1. Security and defense tie between Vietnam and Russia

Field of security and defense is one of the traditional areas of cooperation between Vietnam and Russia. Previously, 90% of military weapons was offered by the Soviet Union. For Vietnam, this tie contributes to the strengthening of its national
defense and security. For Russia, this tie facilitates its influential role in Vietnam and the Asia-Pacific region and bring revenues from the sales of weapons to Vietnam. Since 1995, the two Defense Ministries has been very positive to coordinate the implementation of the exchange of military delegation at all levels, including the exchange of “the annual resort program for General level”. Both sides sent delegations of Secretary of Defense and Public Security, mutual visits made by the delegations of General Department of Intelligence under Ministry of Defense, General Department of Security under Public Security Ministry, in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and signed the memorandum on intelligence sharing related the international and regional security situation, especially the terrorist activities and the fight against international terrorism, counter-narcotics…

Also since 1999, every year, the two sides held meetings of the intergovernmental Committee of Vietnam-Russia on military technical cooperation. From 2003 to the present, the total contract value of military weapons import from Russia reached several billion of usd. From the mere procurement of weapons and military technical equipment from Russia, Vietnam and Russia started to implement technology transfer of repairing, upgrading and improving production in Vietnam. Russia coordinated with Vietnam both on scientific and technological research in the Vietnamese institutes and building centers of technical training and weapons and equipment repair. By the end of 1990s, Vietnam has started buying some Russian naval engineering vehicles and Vietnam can also produce these equipment by Russian design. Russia also helped Vietnam upgrade its air defense system by modernizing its modern air defense missile complexes of S-125 "Pechora". In recent years, Vietnam has bought many Russian Su30K2 fighters and a number of S300 anti-aircraft missile system. Costal mobile complex “Bastion” with “Yakhont” auto-positioning supersonic missiles against ships and “Iгла” air defense complexes. In 1998, Vietnam signed agreements on military technical cooperation with Russia with emphasis that the expansion that military-technical cooperation will be carried out under the direction of modernizing the Navy, the Air Force, the missile defense system as well as expansion “The Tropical center”- where unique experience for the activities of
Russian technology in tropical condition. (Ha N. A., 2007, pp. 341-369). In 2003, Vietnam signed a contract with Russia to buy Uran missiles worth $120 million, and contracts worth $300 million till 2005 to replace the weapon of the two Vietnamese Missile Divisions (replace C-75 missiles produced in 1965 by the modern missile C-300 PMU-1). In November 2005, the Fleet of Pacific Fleet of Russia landed in Da Nang (Hiep, 2007, pp. 358-372). Vietnam’s military cooperation with Russia was upgraded into new height. As Russian President Putin explained that upgrade will mean moving from normal trade relations to collaboration in research, production and manufacturing weapons as well as military equipment, establishment of service centers, warranty and upgrade weapons, cooperation in exporting weapons and military equipment to third country markets. In recent years, Vietnam has signed a series of major contracts to buy Russian weapons. By the end of 2009, during Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Russia, Vietnam contacted to buy 6 kilo-class submarines from Russia. The value of the contract was $2 billion. This is one of the largest contract for export of Russian naval weapons in the history. The Project 636 submarines of Vietnam navy will be equipped with the Club-S missile system. In 2011 and 2012, Russia has delivered 12 aircrafts for Vietnam. Vietnam also received a total of 6 project 10412 patrol ship of Russia, worth nearly $15 million per vessel. The second largest project in the small warships segment was program of providing and producing Molnia Class ships under license. (Hiep, 2007, pp. 358-372). In the early twenty-first century, Vietnam has purchased 04 class missile boats, 02 "lightning", missile patrol boats, 11 fighters Su-27. In January 2007, Vietnam Ministry of Defense has signed with the Russian weapon import export company a contract worth $300 million, according to which by the end of 2007, Russia supply "3.9" class corvette of type 11661 and na advanced ‘Linpao’ missile system equipped with anti-ship cruise missile. Before that, with the help from the Northern shipyards of Russia, in early 2003, Vietnam has made in Ho Chi Minh City class C-2200 corvette, equipped with anti-aircraft missiles "dagger". The small and medium-sized shipbuilding companies of Russia also agreed in 2006 to conduct 10 "lightning" rocket ship in the Vietnam shipyard equipped with missile "Uranus-E" (Hiep, 2007, p. 366). In early 2009, Russia signed a contract with Vietnam worth nearly $400
million to provide 8 Su-30Mk2 fighters without weapons attached. In February 2010, Russia signed second contract to supply Vietnam 12 Su-30Mk2 fighters with air weapons, valued at nearly $1 billion. This contract also provides aviation weapons and spare parts for the Su-30Mk2 of the first batch ordered in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, Vietnam received 02 inshore advanced missile defense system K300 Bastion-P. In 2011, Vietnam received 02 missile guardian ships Dinh Tien Hoang and Ly Thai To. This contract was signed in 2006, worth $350 million. In his recent visit to China in May 2013, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said the total of 6 kilo-class submarines, that Vietnam contracted to buy from Russia, will be put into service in 2016 in the Vietnamese Navy. “the submarine contract is a vivid manifestation of the friendship and trust between the two countries” (http://vietnamese.ruvr.ru/2013_07_04/117226913/). In addition, with the support of Russia, Vietnam will establish submariner training center at Cam Ranh Bay, Khanh Hoa province, Vietnam. So far, many Vietnamese military experts was educated at the universities of Russia and is fluent in Russian language. The total number of military experts have been trained in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is 13 thousand people. From 2004 to now, the Russian Federation Agency on cooperation in military Science and Technology has provided the Vietnam Ministry of Defense with 50 civil scholarships. Russian President Putin has approved the Degree on providing preferential scholarship to Vietnam on the basis of free training at training institutes of Russian Defense Ministry, starting in 2006-2007. Vietnamese military relation with Russia is considered stable, solid, high efficiency, contributing to increase mutual understanding and trust (Vo Dai Luoc & Le Bo Linh, 2005, p. 73)The security and defense is not only traditional cooperative area, but also more important, is one of areas to protect Vietnamese territorial integrity and national security. So, cooperation should be actively promoted and priority must be given in the Vietnam-Russia strategic partnership. Maintaining and expanding annual exchange of high raking military delegation; early establishment of the Vietnamese-Russian strategic dialogue mechanism at Deputy-ministerial level of three Ministries: Defense, Public Security and Foreign Affairs, is required. Besides, new form of cooperation such as joint exercise for rescue, sea rescue, anti-terrorism need to be considered. Continue to
maintain the traditional visits of Russian Navy Ships to Viet Nam, especially, the joint venture plants to produce weapons, defense equipment in Vietnam. Further cooperation with Russia to expand training military officers for Vietnam.

To put the Russo-Vietnamese strategic partnership into essential, effective and mutually beneficial way; further improve reliability and increase its position and importance, Viet Nam should do its best in terms of politics. Although in its both thinking and external actions in the past, at the present and in future, Viet Nam has always considered Russia as not only major power, the traditional friend, the leading strategic partner, but also as “natural ally”, especially on national security. However, for more effective, Viet Nam should put this relationship in a spirit of mutual benefit, avoid bias “sentimentism”. Vietnam should also continue to exchange high-ranking delegations to create trust between the two countries, while expanding relations between the ministries, branches, unions of friendship and localities. For problems in relations between the two countries, Vietnam should pay attention to the interests, motives and position of Russia, so that there is clear direction and proactively solve problems exist. Vietnam need to be patient in advocating negotiations with Russia on the overall debt problem, the Vietnamese community in Russia, on the basis of cooperation, mutual benefit as well as immediate and long-term benefits. Political ties should strongly strengthened, provide basis for improving the efficiency of economic cooperation through several measures like strengthening exchanges of high ranking delegations, exchange of delegations of parliament, ministries, localities, gradually turn the interactions into a regular mechanism; promoting the relations between the ruling parties; increasing the exchange of information, experience, and coordinating with the Russia in solving the problems of democracy, human rights and maintenance of security and internal political stability; closely cooperating in the forums and organizations on regional and international issues of mutual concern; promoting ASEAN mechanism plus Russia. Viet Nam also promotes its public diplomatic activities, enhance exchanges and interactions between socio-political associations of provinces, cities of the Viet Nam and Russia. Taking advantage of support and emotion of Russian people to Viet Nam to strengthen tie of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
Strengthening two-way information to make ministries, businesses to have better understanding of situation, prospects and potential for long term plan of business, cooperation of mutual benefit. Of course, cooperation in the fields of science, technology, education, culture, arts and tourism also should be further promoted, especially in human resource training and transfer of technology, protection of the intellectual rights, teaching Russian language and culture, attraction of tourists, citizen protection, export of Vietnamese labor.

3.4.2. Security and Defense tie between Viet Nam and China

Recognizing the importance of China, just as a neighbor and a great power for security, development of Vietnam as well as in the region. Vietnam continues to attach importance to handle this relationship, particularly special attention must be paid to the intentions, objectives and policies of China. Vietnam-China relations has normalized in the international context of having many advantages. The trend of cooperation and dialogue, focus on economic development has created opportunities for both countries to expand international relations, utilizing the external conditions for economic development, solving problems by peaceful means. Since the normalization of relation, on the basis of the principles recognized on the Joint Communique and joint Declaration, the relationship of traditional friendship, mutual trust, mutual benefit between the two countries have developed rapidly and gained significant achievements in all areas of political, economic, security, defense, education, culture as well as territorial boundary issues exist between the two countries. Overall, compared to the overall relationship between the two countries in history, it can be seen that the Vietnam-China relations after normalization have seen many changes. This relation is built on the national-state interest of each country rather than based on ideology. Vietnam continues to attach great importance to this special relationship, well understanding two faceted policy of China in order to be flexible or assertive with China in an appropriate manner; firmly keeping the spirit of self-reliance, developing internal resource in combination with enlisting external resource; combine bilateral diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy; Closely incorporates the fields of politics, diplomacy, economics, security and defense, culture, ideology with more focus on the
economic relations with China. The overall development and stability of relations between Vietnam and China has not only met the basic and long-term aspirations of the people of the two countries, but also in line with the trend of peace, stability and development in the region and around the world.

Since 1991, security and Defense tie between Viet Nam and China has strongly promoted. In the Joint Statement 21 June 2013, Viet Nam and China actively evaluated the 4th Defense Strategic Dialogue at Deputy Defense Ministerial level, agreed to maintain high-level contacts between two militaries, better promote the role of mechanism for the strategic defense dialogue and direct telephone line between the Department of Defense to enhance mutual trust; strengthen the exchange of experiences of the party and political work in the military as well as personnel training and exchanges of young officers. Viet Nam and China also compromised to implement border cooperation agreement between the two Departments of Defense, continue to implement the land border patrol, deepening the border cooperation on land and at sea. In 2013, the two sides will launch two joint patrols between the two Navies in the Gulf Of Tonkin; strengthen exchange and coordination in the multiregional security issues. Exchanging and researching the new form and new content in the deployment of Defense cooperation, deepening the cooperation between the two militaries.

On 22 June 2013, two Vietnamese warships HQ 011 and HQ012 with more than 200 military officers and crew have started to participate in the 15th combined patrol with Chinese Navy and visited Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province, China. So far, the Navy of the two countries has conducted the joint patrol 15 times. Vietnam and China military has conducted many search and rescue exercises on the sea. It could be said that cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf has implemented smoothly. Since 1991, Vietnam and China have actively solved the problems that exist between the two countries, especially the territorial boundary issues left over history. In 1999, the two countries signed an agreement on the delimitation of the border; in 2000, the Tonkin Gulf Delimitation and Vietnam-China Fishery Cooperation Agreement was also signed. "Agreement on Vietnam-China land boundary in 1999 and the agreement on
the Vietnam-China of the Tonkin Gulf forms a solid legal base to border, territory management and achieve the objective of building Vietnam-China border of of peace, friendship, long-term stability and create motivation to further strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries " said Le Cong Phung- Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister (Phung, 2000, p. 23). Regarding the South China Sea (East Sea), the leaders of the two countries repeatedly asserted through friendly negotiation, peaceful and satisfactory settlement of all matters arising from the sea between the two countries on the basis of international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS 1982), the spirit of the declaration of Code of conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea and suitable friendly relations between the two countries, contributing to maintaining peace, stability and cooperation in the region. For infringements of the territorial sovereignty of China, Vietnam has struggled with persistent and appropriate forms.

At the 4th Vietnam-China Defense Strategy Dialogue just held in Beijing on 5 June 2013, in which the two Ministries of Defense has agreed to construct security telephone line directly connected the two countries’ defense ministries to further enhance contact and exchange between senior military leaders of the two countries through negotiation and friendship. To strengthen strategic trust between the two militaries, Vietnamese Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh emphasized 5 specific ways of cooperation including special interest to the party and political work in the army; promote the exchange of information between the strategic agencies to properly assess the situation, taking Defense Strategy Dialogue at Deputy Minister’s level as center in assessing the situation and offering effective solutions for cooperation; enhance cooperation between navies, coast guards of the two countries with the aim of the two navies cooperation is the highlights for the two party leaders of the two countries have a favorable environment in making decisions at the strategic level, instruct the two navies met, use the hotline between the two countries’ naval commanders to exchange necessary information (TTXVN, 2013). In the security area, the relationship between the two Public security Ministries has increasingly strengthened in a more comprehensive and practical way. So far, two ministries of
Public Security has held Cooperation Conference for prevention of crime three times. Two ministries has also regularly exchanged high-ranking visits. In the visit to Vietnam on 23 October 2012, Chinese Minister and Vietnamese Minister of Public Security co-chaired the 3rd Conference on cooperation for prevention of crime. Both sides agreed that, over the past years, two ministries of Public security has closely cooperated, actively implemented the common achieved perception and effectively fight criminal activities that has threatened the security and order of the two countries; jointly safeguard peace and stability at border areas. Police forces of the two countries continue coordinate in prevention and fight against crime such as terrorism, transnational crime, trafficking, sale and transportation of weapons, explosives, women and children trafficking, gambling, production, transportation and trade of drug, and other economic crimes (Vu, 2012). Police of the two countries further strengthen cooperation in the field of domestic security, effectively fight against destructive, divisive operations of the hostile forces; intensify professional exchange information and coordinate investigation in accordance with the provisions of the law of each country; and intensify cooperation on the forums within ASEAN-China. In relations with China, Vietnam also has successful in its foreign policy adjustments, establishment of comprehensive strategic partnership with China. Bilateral relations between Vietnam and China has developed extensively in all areas of politics, diplomacy, economy, security, culture and education.

Responding to the Sino and Russian cooperation, Vietnam has the appropriate response, the necessary adjustments in its foreign policy to maximize the advantages of this relationship to serve the objectives of security, development and influence in its foreign policy. Viet Nam has promoted partnership with both countries in many aspects such as political diplomacy, economy, defense, education. Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam has many changes in its foreign policy toward Russia, especially by upgrading its relations to strategic partnership, focusing on economic relation, defense. Vietnam’s China foreign policy has also changed so much since the end of the Cold War, from the normalization of relation to comprehensive strategic partnership. Responding to the Sino-Russian cooperation, depend on each period, based on its real power, Vietnam has appropriate policies in relation to each country,
in each sector of cooperation to balance relations with these two countries. The changes in Vietnamese foreign toward China and Russia have been proven in terms of economy and defense. Since the end of the Cold War, the priority in the Vietnamese foreign policy toward Russia is cooperation in defense and economy, while economic cooperation with China is a priority.

Responding to the Sino-Russian competition, after the Cold War, Viet Nam also has the appropriate adjustments to avoid direct conflict with each country. Vietnam did not express their views on issues that China and Russia has disputes or conflicts. Policy of balancing relations with great powers has helped Vietnam avoid negative relations from these two powers. Vietnam did not go with Russia against China, not ally with China against Russia. This has helped Vietnam get a peaceful environment to develop its social economy.

Since the end of the Cold war, in response to the Sino-Russian relations, Vietnam has gradually showed an active and dynamic way of handling relations with Russia and China in the direction of balancing, making full most favorable conditions from the positive impact of this relationship in order to serve its socio-economic development, political stability, independence, sovereignty and national security. Vietnam has been actively renewing its foreign policy in relations with great powers, politico-economic centers in general, and with Russia and China in particular. The simultaneous development of relations with both Russia and China, on the one hand, helped Vietnam success in attracting investment capital, technology, markets of these two countries, on the other hand, helped Vietnam maintain political stability, strengthen national security as well as enhance its position in the international arena. Vietnam has applied its foreign policy towards balancing of interests in relations with Russia and China, not as to these two countries manipulate, impose or entice, so that Vietnam’s position was improved significantly. Relations with Russia and China in particular, and with other key major countries are generally related to the security and development strategy in Vietnam. It can be said that in the relations with Russia and China after the Cold war, Vietnam has changed, adjusted properly, cleverly and exploited the positive aspects of the Sino-Russian relations and has limited the adverse compromise to security, development and influence of Vietnam. In order to better respond to the
context of changing in the Sino-Russian relations, Viet Nam should have reasonable, proactive and flexible policies to ensure its national interests before the evolution of the Sino-Russian relations. Vietnam need to promote the Vietnam-Russian and Vietnam-Chinese relations, contributing the balance of forces on the basis of consistent goals of peace, independence, autonomy and territorial integrity. Viet Nam needs diversify its relations in order to take advantage of favorable conditions to develop the country. Do not go with this party against other party, do not place Russia and China in awkward position, to choose Vietnam with one side or the other, because if place Russia and China in such way, Vietnam will suffer loses. Viet Nam also needs to avoid being pushed into the situation for the relationship with this party but destruct relationship with the other party. Viet Nam should be cautious in expressing its view on issues related to Russia and China, especially the issues that two sides still have contradiction and conflict of interests. At the same time, Viet Nam needs to relations balancing policy with both Russia and China, as in the present context, due to the location of Vietnam, so both China and Russia are taking advantage of relations with Vietnam. Vietnam needs to stand firm on the comprehensive and long-term benefits of the country to keep balance. However, in each period, Vietnam should prioritize relations with each country on each particular sector, for the development and security of the country.

On the other hand, Vietnam needs to develop relationship, create more deepened interdependence in its relations with Russia and China to limit the negative impact caused by the relations between these two countries. As a small country, so Vietnam should strengthen regional cooperation, attaching itself to the region, particularly ASEAN countries in order to provide support for Vietnam in its relations with the two countries; strongly promote its relations with other great powers like USA, EU, India and Japan, cleverly use relations with these countries to counterbalance, and to impact on the Vietnam’s relationship with Russia and China. In certain extent, Vietnam can also take advantage of the contradictions and differences in strategic interests between China and Russia in order to serve the interests of Vietnam. The final and the most important thing is that Vietnam must increase its inner strength to cope successfully with the changes in Russo-Chinese relations. Over time, the Vietnam-Chinese
relations, Vietnam-Russian relations have seen many major changes. To promote relations with China and Russia in the coming time, Vietnam should exploit the advantages of cooperation in every relationship, do not let this relation thwart other relation. Vietnam should keep steadfast goal of peace, independence, autonomy and territorial integrity. Vietnam supports Russia and China to strengthen their bilateral relations, contributing to the promotion of peace, stability, security in the region and around the world.
CHAPTER 4:
CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam attaches great importance to relations with China, consolidates and develops the framework of Vietnam-China trusted cooperation by 16-word motto of “friendly neighborliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability and direction to future”. Relation with China is vital important issue to the security and development of Vietnam, because China is big neighbor, has traditional and long historical ties with Vietnam. Vietnam also considered the relationship with Russian Federation is the primary importance in relation to the traditional friendly countries. Russia today is no longer a key ally that help Vietnam ensure the security and defense, but has the role of “relation balance” with great powers, including China. Russia can support to Vietnam in the field of science and technology, including military technology. It is the goal of the foreign policy of Vietnam in relations with Russia and China. Since the end of the Cold war, in response to the changes in the Sino-Russian relation, Vietnam has gradually adjusted its foreign policy, evaluated the nature of changes in the Sino-Russian relation, on the basis of undertaking that redefine relations and have proper response to Russia and China-one of great powers related to security and development strategy of Vietnam. After the Cold War, Vietnam’s foreign policy pays special attention to the factor of relation balancing with the major powers. Vietnam- a small and middle country has conducted its foreign policy in harmony with the response to change in the Sino-Russian relations. Vietnam’s policy of balancing relations with Russia and China in particular and with great powers in general is self-help policy, based on itself, consolidate its power in relation to other countries, and seek to resolve its weaknesses. In relations with Russia and China, Vietnam’s thinking in foreign policy making has also changed. Vietnam has seen Russia and China is a friend and partner to protect its national interests, but not for Russia and China in its foreign policy. Drawing lessons learned from past failures. Due to rely on Soviet policy in its foreign relations, Vietnam was imposed sanctions and implemented deeply hostile policy by the US, the West and China, especially after
Vietnam’s invasion on Cambodia. Vietnam was forced into a situation where space for international activities was narrowed. In addition to a comprehensive partnership with the Soviet Union, Vietnam did not have normal relations with other major countries. Vietnam was under siege, economic sanctions, political isolation and was falling into heavy socio-economic crisis, threatening the security and survival of the country. Therefore, Vietnam has actively and determined to carry out the policy of “no alliance, no confrontation” in relations with Russia and China. This is the essence of relation balancing policy of Vietnam. This also always makes sure for Vietnam to have some other options in case of trouble. It can be confirmed that, since the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy of Vietnam has changed much. Firstly, it is a policy based mainly on itself (self-help policy), an independent and autonomous policy. Secondly, in relations with partners, Vietnam implemented “no lean one-sided policy” and thirdly, Vietnam is ready to be friends with all countries based on national-state interests. With the characteristics, it can be said, thinking in Vietnam’s foreign policy has shifted from emotion to reason, based on national interests. And to do that, Vietnam has set the way of balancing relations with other countries, especially with the great powers in the world. Russia and China are the great powers that has capability of governing the contemporary international relations. As great powers, it is likely that Russia and China will seek to impose the policies on Vietnam- a small and middle country, having an important position in geography, politics and potential economic development. Containing the small countries in developing orbit consistent with the benefit of a great powers or take advantage of small countries to serve their strategic goals- that a common objective in the foreign policy of great powers in general and Russia and China in particular. Therefore. Vietnam should have wise policy to exploit the positive aspects of the Sino-Russia relationship. Being independence and activeness will help Vietnam more clear and sensible in recognizing timely the changes in policy strategy of China and Russia in order to have proper policy.
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