Reading Between the Lines:
Representations and Constructions of Youth and Crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand

By

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Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy.

(Foucault, 1994b, p.456)
Abstract

In this thesis, I examine constructions of youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002. In 2002, New Zealand had a national election in which adult commentators and observers concentrated and speculated on the reasons for a supposed increase in youth deviance and a spate of extraordinarily violent youth crimes. Youth-at-risk, early intervention, the family, and education were words that emerged continuously in commentator discussions. There was no critique of these words, or the practices they implied, and very little discussion of the implications the use of these words and practices posed for young people.

In this thesis, I address this gap in the discussion by critically exploring the ways in which authors in institutional contexts constructed deviant youth and the implications of these constructions for youth. In this research, I sampled published texts in 2002 from academia, government, and media; three institutions which produce and reproduce knowledge in New Zealand. I applied a form of discourse analysis to the texts to explore and contextualise evident constructions. This analysis involved a bricolage of poststructural methodologies in the attempt to make an accessible argument, which effectively addressed the purposes of the research.

I found that authors did not apply a knowledge devoid of power. Whether used to construct a picture of the deviant youth, or to describe necessary interventions into deviance, they used knowledge to construct the deviant youth as powerless effects of development and risk. Authors used knowledge to divide young people into the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk and the normally-deviant adolescent.

Applying knowledge allowed those writing about youth crime to construct and position young people as powerless. Authors reinforced this when they used knowledge to inform practices and interventions, which allowed adults to control the young person’s access to, and use of, power. In particular, authors and other experts saw mass education as a powerful practice of control and socialisation. Through education, adult society could remove the abnormally-deviant youth from the dysfunctional family environment and re-socialise the young person into conformity. Those writing applied a similar reasoning in other described interventions such as surveillance, conferencing, and early intervention. Interventions allowed adults to control the deviance of youth.

I finish this thesis by arguing that interventions and contradictions in constructions show that power is not one-sided. That is, power is not always in the hands of adults. Rather, sociological theory can be applied to demonstrate and explore a power struggle between adults and young people where resistance coexists with power. I argue that resistance can provide an alternative explanation to the dominant ideas held by those working with, and
talking about, deviant youth. Resistance allows for a concept of agency in which both deviance and non-deviance can be seen as a reactive response by the young person.
The last few years have been a challenging time for me as I have travelled two journeys. Not only have I felt myself transformed through this PhD but also through needing to address my past through an unexpected onset of PTSD. Hence, in this part of the thesis, I want to thank those who have helped me on both of these journeys because it has only been through the conquering of PTSD that I have been able to finish this doctoral thesis.

First, I want to thank my God who has been there in my own struggle and is there in the struggles facing young people today. Thanks for the opportunities you have opened for me in Wainuiomata and for the young people you have brought into my life.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: A dissection of knowledge

... knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.
(Foucault, 1984, p.88)

For Michel Foucault (1984), knowledge is something to be critiqued, questioned, and reflected upon; that is, knowledge is “made for cutting”. This thesis is my attempt at a cutting of the institutional knowledges used in New Zealand discussions about youth and crime. I had three aims in my research: to expose commonsense and expert understandings about youth and crime used in the institutional contexts of academia, government, and media; to critique these understandings; and, to conceptualise an alternative construction of youth deviance.

These aims led to two overarching questions. First, how are criminally-deviant youth represented and constructed within the institutional contexts of academia, government, and media? Second, what alternative possibilities exist for the ways in which youth and crime are constructed and represented in institutional contexts? The assumption that any construction entails implications for those being constructed underpins these questions. In this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions and pose an alternative explanation of youth deviance. I had several sources of motivation for exploring this topic of youth crime.

Sources of Motivation

My motivations for this thesis came from prior experiences in research, from my own personal experiences, and from topical youth issues in the media during the year I started my doctorate (2002). In my Masters research (Beals, 2002a), I explored the ways in which women who had committed a crime positioned themselves into, and out of, criminological knowledge. This was a psychological investigation into subjectivity, knowledge, and positioning (e.g. Butler, 1993, 1995a; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1998). However, I found my Masters unsettling in a theoretical and methodological sense because the psychological focus in my analysis resulted in a ‘dissection’ of each woman’s concept of self into categories of subjectivity, power, and resistance. Furthermore, my experiences gaining ethical approval (which took some time as the committee wanted to ensure that I was safe from ‘criminal violence’), and my literature review of academic theories of criminality and punishment implied that in many ways these women were defined

\[1\] I use the word “academia” to refer to tertiary education institutions as defined by the New Zealand 1989 Education Act.
and confined within institutional knowledges of criminality. It was these knowledges that they resisted through their own conceptions of who they were as individuals. Consequently, I finished my Masters feeling that I needed to focus on institutions and the forms of knowledge produced and reproduced in institutional contexts (c.f. Chomsky & Foucault, 1997).

My second motivation was more personal in nature. During secondary school, my teachers told me to prepare myself for a negative future. I was destined for prison, unemployment/low paid employment, and/or early parenthood because I came from a lower socio-economic one-parent (i.e. disadvantaged) family. The ‘commonsense’ reasoning of my teachers positioned me as a ‘youth-at-risk’ of desolate outcomes due to the presence of multiple risk factors in my life. This motivation flowed through to my doctoral research, as I attempted to explore and question the institutional commonsense/s which enabled adults to construct and position me in the 1990s and which continue to be evident in contemporary New Zealand society.

Finally, in addition to academic and personal motivations, institutional discussions that took place in 2002 also influenced my thinking. These included a national election and public discussion about several unrelated and violent youth crimes in the mainstream court system. Being an election year, many ‘experts’ and commentators focused on “New Zealand’s worsening youth offending problem” (Ryall, 2002, para.1), which was exacerbated by the extraordinary youth crimes that were in the courts. The youth crimes of 2001 and 2002 were not only extraordinary in that they involved young people, they also were unique in the profiles of the young people involved. One crime involved the youngest person ever convicted of manslaughter in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Bailey Kurariki Junior in the death of Michael Choy). Another crime involved three young females in the murder and manslaughter of an adult male (Renee O’Brian, Puti Maxwell and Kararaina Te Rauna in the death of Kenneth Pigott). Consequently, youth crime was a focus of academic, government, and media discussion. Within each of these contexts, adult ‘experts’, such as researchers, criminologists, psychologists, educationalists, police, media reporters, ministers of parliament, and local government councillors, spoke out about youth crime and constructed young offenders as pathological and problematic. It was this institutional expertise and the ways in which adults applied ‘expert’ knowledge in constructions and representations of deviant youth that I attempted to explore and question in my doctoral research. However, my reasoning for the need for this research did not just arise from personal motivations. The events of 2002 and the institutional focus on early intervention provided a further rationale for my research.

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2 Several of the crimes that featured in the courts in 2002 had been committed in 2001.
3 'Aotearoa/New Zealand' combines the Māori and English names of New Zealand. Whenever possible I have used both terms together. However, I have used ‘New Zealand’ at points in order to simplify reading.
4 Youth were also involved in the deaths of Detective Constable Duncan Taylor (Daniel Luff), Marcus Doig and John Vaughan (Ese Junior Falealii), Tanya Burr, and Mamoe Kaisala.
Rationale

In 2002, writers in academia, government, and the media focused on identifying the causes of youth crime. Identifying common causes broke down the disparity between individual crimes by focusing on commonalities shared by individuals committing crimes. Whether voiced in a language of blame or a language of responsibility and accountability, writers associated causes to a wide range of risk factors from individual factors within young people and their families to breakdowns in societal structures. A reflection and critique on media coverage of youth crime by Steve Price (2002) provides an excellent summary of the variety of causes given by institutional experts in 2002:

In their quest for context, the papers carried dizzying numbers of finger-pointing stories. The police blamed CYPFS [Children, Young People, and Families Service] for not following up on its duties. Phil Goff [a government minister] blamed the bickering between police and welfare agencies. A youth aid officer blamed the government for not properly funding early intervention. Criminologist Greg Newbold blamed violent computer games, videos and music lyrics. Columnist Garth George blamed youth lawyers, liberal politicians and educationalists for failing to set boundaries. The Richmond Fellowship blamed a lack of multi-systemic therapy. The Sunday Star Times suggested it might be genetic.

(Price, 2002, para.15-16, media context, radio commentary)

Experts also used statistical analysis to quantify the youth crime problem. Election campaigners and media reporters focused on increases in police apprehensions whilst university academics and government spokespeople argued that the reporting of these statistics misled the public. With the adult public having most access to news and current events publications (i.e. media reports), it was generally perceived that youth crime was out of control and needed a solution (c.f. Sternberg, 2004).

Early intervention and prevention was the commonsense solution proposed for youth crime, particularly by institutional experts in public media forums like radio and television. For example, on National Radio, broadcaster, Linda Clark (2002) interviewed a panel of crime experts (a criminologist, retired police officer, lawyer, advocate for punitive sentencing, and a victim’s family member) about the causes of, and solutions to, youth crime. The panel agreed that causes stemmed from dysfunctional families and that prevention/early intervention was the only solution to youth crime. Prevention/early intervention would reduce crime through the early identification of young criminals in public institutions of socialisation, such as the school. Once identified, practitioners and professionals would redirect the youth on to a ‘path’ of positive and productive citizenship within institutional environments like the classroom. Government policies, such as The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) and The Youth Justice Plan for Child, Youth and Family (Child, Youth and Family, 2002) and popular discussions of youth crime, such as

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5 Police apprehension statistics focus on individual offences; not number of offences per individual. They also include offences in which a person may have been later found ‘not guilty’.

For example, Lashlie, a former prison officer and self-named ‘social advocate’, argued in 2002 that the “destiny” of young people was in place by the age of five and teachers could identify and influence the youth’s future:

> In classrooms around New Zealand, right now, there are a number of children whose destiny is already in place – unless a miracle occurs in their life, they will come to prison ... And the age of these children? It would be serious enough concern if the answer to that question was 17 or 18 years of age, the ‘stuff’ of rebellious adolescence and children whose desire to experience life fully means they don’t stop to think until the concrete walls of a police cell detain them ... the children I am thinking of are currently only 5, 6 and 7 years of age. They are children who occupy the thoughts of their teachers as they try to change the destiny already visible; children who will struggle every moment of their life simply because of the reality into which they were born.  

(Lashlie, 2002, p.12)

The argument for early intervention is not a new argument – evidence can be traced back to 1939 and the Cambridge-Somerville intervention (Dodge, 2001). Nor is the argument new in Aotearoa/New Zealand. For example, in 2000, two government reports (one by Kaye McLaren and one by Debbie Singh & Clem White) identified early intervention as a key crime control strategy. In these reports, the authors argued that New Zealand social institutions should identify young people destined for a criminal future “as early ... as possible, and then shepherd them into effective interventions” (McLaren, 2000, p.18). Within these arguments, we can see that early intervention centres on two central practices – identification and social control.

Early intervention requires practitioners and professionals to use a psychological knowledge of risk and protective factors to identify adult offenders whilst they are young children and construct them as ‘youth-at-risk’. In this logic, these young people are at risk of a criminal future and as such are a potential threat to society (c.f. Donzelot, 1979; Poynting & White, 2004). That is, they pose a risk to society. Strategies like early intervention control this risk.

Through applying an early intervention argument, adults writing about youth crime reinforce a division between youth and themselves where youth are in a position of powerlessness succumbing to the effects of risk factors. In contrast, these writers position youth practitioners as powerful influences on child development nurturing or “shepherd[ing]” (McLaren, 2000, p.18) the young person into adulthood through early intervention. Those applying this argument rarely question it and assume it to be logical and near one-hundred percent effective.

However, there are three pragmatic problems with early identification/intervention. These problems intensify the positioning of young people as powerless. First, there is a risk of generalisation where the definition of youth-at-risk includes youth who later develop into
normal adults and do not need early intervention (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002). These youth may manifest some of the risk factors but, if left to ‘develop’ on their own, they will not develop into criminals. Second, and directly related to the first, there is also a risk that intervention/prevention initiatives may encourage criminal behaviour (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002; Poynting & White, 2004; Singh & White, 2000) or result in ‘undesirable’ outcomes (Bessant, 2001). Indeed, the Cambridge-Somerville intervention demonstrates this point, where the young people who participated in the early intervention later posed a greater risk of criminal deviance in adulthood than those in the control group (McCord, 2002). Finally, the subsequent role that institutions, such as the school, have with young people may, as Michael Apple (2001, p.xi) notes, “create tensions that last forever” between society and the young people identified.

Possible tensions between youth and society can be either structural or linked to knowledge. For example, in The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.16) the writers express caution about “labelling” young people; the reasoning being that, when practitioners identify young people before they commit a crime as ‘at-risk’, they position the youth or child as a criminal. Hence, in a structural sense, a society can ‘label’ the young person through formal institutional practices. There can also be implications at the level of knowledge where practitioners and other experts apply knowledge to separate, or divide, young people into particular positions (Foucault, 1972b, 1983). For example, experts and practitioners may apply psychological knowledge to position some individuals as pathological and others as normal. They might also use psychological knowledge to argue for early intervention. For youth-at-risk, the early identification/intervention argument positions them as pathological through a knowledge of psychological risk; thus, removing them from a position of normality. In these circumstances, it takes a strong resistance from the young person to oppose such positioning.

Consequently, there is a need to analyse and critique the early identification/intervention argument. This involves exploring dominant ways in which adults in positions of authority construct deviant youth, the types of interventions they argue for, and the logic of their presented argument. It also involves exploring the implications for young people of constructions and arguments. This means looking at the positioning of young people in constructions. Such an exploration into knowledge opens a space for the examination of alternative and neglected constructions of youth. Overall, this ‘cutting’ of knowledge involves making the familiar strange (Lesko, 2001) – exposing knowledge/s about youth and crime held by adult New Zealand society and questioning its legitimacy. It is about applying a method grounded in a theory of critique.

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6 This is a contradiction in the Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) as the Strategy cautions against labelling whilst advocating for formal risk assessment tools. In effect, these formal tools would allow for practitioners to name young people and subsequently ‘label’ these youth ‘at-risk’ (c.f. Becker, 1963).
In Chapter 2, I expand upon the theoretical underpinnings of the methods I applied in this research. In this section, I give a brief overview of the methodology I applied. Primarily, I focused on institutional constructions of youth and crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand during 2002. I limited my investigation to a single year and to Aotearoa/New Zealand as it allowed me to construct a feasible and workable project. Because of the institutional focus on youth crime and youth justice, 2002 was an apt year for investigation. Living in Aotearoa/New Zealand encouraged me to focus on what was happening within the country. Furthermore, the youth justice system in Aotearoa/New Zealand is unique in its incorporation of restorative justice principles and recognition of the indigenous people of New Zealand – the tāngata whenua or Māori people (Watt, 2002).

I also limited my study to the institutions of academia, government, and media. I chose to focus on these institutions because of the role that they have in the re/production and dissemination of knowledge. This role has been shown in several examples of research exploring a variety of topics (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Foucault, 1970, 1976, 1977; Fowler, 1991; Griffin, 1993; Panelli, Nairn, Atwool & McCormack, 2002; Rose, 1990, 1996a; Van Dijk, 1991). Most recently, in New Zealand youth studies, Susan Jacka (2003) looked at media and government constructions of truant youth in Aotearoa/New Zealand during the 1990s.

However, researchers looking at institutional knowledge have tended to focus on one institution or on institutions separately; thus neglecting the interaction that occurs within institutional contexts and the complexities of the role of institutional experts. Whilst the actual production of texts may differ across institutions, authors, and the evidence they draw upon, indicates a complex relationship between institutions. For example, institutions may share particular theories and jargon about a phenomenon; additionally, experts may be located in one institution but speak in a variety of institutional contexts. Furthermore, an expert may be located in one institutional context, such as a research institute at a university, but could just as easily be located in another context, such as a research division of a governmental department. For this reason, when referring to data, I have cited the institutional publishing context rather than calling the author an ‘academic author’, ‘government author’, or ‘media author’. Thus, I have attempted to endorse the focus of my research on institutions and the texts produced rather than individuals or the methods of production.

Furthermore, gathering data from three institutional contexts allowed me to triangulate the institutional meanings and knowledge/s surrounding youth crime and to acknowledge the complexities surrounding the application of same and different knowledges in institutions (c.f.

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7 Tāngata whenua’ means ‘people of the land’ and is used to refer to the indigenous people in Aotearoa/New Zealand – the Māori people.
Janesick, 1998). It allowed me to work with the data closely and work with data in a variety of formats.

Texts published and archived in printed and recorded form comprised the data selected for analysis. Published texts are a major form of knowledge production, reproduction, and dissemination (c.f. Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991). Academia, government, and media produce a weight of information, both published and unpublished, which can range from commentaries (e.g. news reports, live interviewing, press releases, academic commentaries, and political commentaries) to formal articles and reports (e.g. conference papers, journal articles, documentaries, policies, current affairs articles, feature articles, keynote papers, and website information pages). In this research, I endeavoured to ensure a workable sample of data by focusing on the formal articles and reports published in each context. Overall, I found thirty-one texts published in a media context, fifteen texts in a government context, and fifteen\(^8\) in an academic context\(^9\). The frequency of media-based publishing, and the focus of media-based publications on newsworthy and spectacular events, explains the slight dominance of media articles (c.f. Fowler, 1991). Once I brought these texts together, I began to focus on analysis and the answering of my initial research questions.

As my research questions focused on constructions and representations of youth and crime, I applied an analysis methodology that allowed me to explore the knowledges that construct criminally-deviant youth. For this research, I used a discourse analysis to explore the constructions and representations of youth in academic, government, and media texts. The type of discourse analysis I applied was poststructural as it focused on the positioning of individuals through a combination of power and knowledge. Consequently, much of the theory behind the discourse analysis I applied came from the work of Michel Foucault (1972a, 1972b, 1976, 1977, 1980e) and the work of Nikolas Rose (1990).

However, my following of Foucault and Rose was only on a theoretical level. In this research, I did not follow the archaeological or genealogical methods of Foucault, which focus on providing a historical investigation into a phenomenon. Theorists have criticised these methods for being internally flawed (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) and not allowing for alternative possibilities (Hoy, 1986a; C. Taylor, 1986). Rather, the method of discourse analysis I applied was an analysis of a phenomenon (youth crime) in a historically located time (2002). History was important as it laid the context for my analysis, but history was not the object of analysis; it was institutional knowledge. Hence, although the theory of discourse I applied had roots in the work of Foucault, the methodology of discourse analysis I applied had roots elsewhere.

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\(^8\) This includes one text (Panelli, Nairn, Atwoo, & McCormack, 2002). In this text, Panelli and colleagues applied a textual analysis of constructions of youth in media texts. Because this text is a critical analysis of media texts, I chose not to include this text in my final analysis.

\(^9\) I have placed complete lists of these articles in the three appendices at the end of this thesis.
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1997, p.3) describe qualitative research as a “bricolage” of methodologies, where the researcher uses a variety of methods to explore a phenomenon. My primary aim was to provide a critique of knowledge. In order to do this I drew upon several methodologies, but I did not limit my analysis to one methodology such as Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992), psychological discourse analysis (Parker, 1992) or political discourse analysis (Howarth, 2000). Instead, I drew upon these methodologies with the methodological ideas of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) and the approaches to research analysis by Michelle Fine (1992) and her work with Judi Addelston, (1996). Bringing these approaches together, I devised a methodology that would enable me to look at the use and application of knowledge.

Through using a discourse analysis, I was able to explore the commonsense and expert knowledge used in constructions of youth and crime. This enabled me to look at the limitations that exist for young people in relationship to knowledge and structural conditions. This is quite different to the critical research currently occurring in Australasia (e.g. White, 1998; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997, 1998, 2000). These researchers tend to give partial recognition to the implications of developmental knowledge on young people. Their focus is on structural limitations for young people, particularly class. In contrast, in this doctoral research, I attempted to explore the complexities of the relationship between knowledge and the production, and reproduction, of structural conditions.

Chapter Overview

I finish this chapter by giving an overview of the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 is a theoretical discussion of the methods I applied in this research. I define the key concepts of discourse, commonsense, and expertise, and expound upon the type of discourse analysis I applied to the texts analysed. I examine the importance of context in my research as well as exploring how I have defined and used contexts. I also discuss the strengths and limitations of discourse analysis I applied to the texts analysed. Finally, I look at the ethical implications of this research. Essentially, in Chapter 2, I provide the reasoning to the methodology outlined in this chapter.

The chapter that follows is a literature review on youth theory. In this chapter, I explore the construction of the concept and the object ‘youth’ in youth theory – particularly developmental-psychology. I have divided this chapter into two sections. In the first section, I explore the developmental-psychological construction of youth. This construction has been central to adult commonsense understandings of young people. I finish this section by
introducing critical youth studies research and contextual understandings of youth. This research questions the status quo of current, and popular, conceptions about youth. I have consequently found critical youth studies research invaluable in my own research. I look at theories of youth deviance in the second part of this chapter. In this section, I look at three representations of youth – the normally-deviant, the abnormally-deviant and the socially-created deviant. These constructions resonated throughout the institutional constructions of youth and crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002. In this chapter, I introduce the knowledges central to my analysis and argue that definitions of youth are not static but contextual.

I start the presentation of the formal analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 by outlining the two dominant constructions of young people committing crime. Reflecting the literature review, I describe these two groups as the abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant. Using examples from the text analysed, I demonstrate how a knowledge of human development and an expertise of risk dominate discourses and constructions of youth. Finally, I discuss the contradiction that exists when the words ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ come together and the absence, and at times, contradictory presence of the socially-created deviant.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I discuss the key intertextual knowledges of human development and risk. In these chapters, I expand upon the literature review and findings as I explore the knowledges within the context of their own historical development and within the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Within these chapters, I attempt to show the complexities and contextual nature of these knowledges. I critique the assumption that these knowledges allow for the truth about youth and youth deviance to be exposed. I then posit that these knowledges may be a technique used within societal institutions to maintain some order within an unpredictable climate. I argue that, within a neo-liberal climate, many adults have redefined risks associated with modernisation and technology as human risk, or developmental risks, within the individual.

I explore the rationality and objectives of crime interventions in Chapters 8 and 9. In Chapter 8, I examine the application of a concept of ‘family’ in crime prevention arguments in 2002. I explore the relevance of this concept in New Zealand youth justice and how it is connected to an idea of the self-governing and autonomous family. I also look at how, within institutional texts, the school and mass education have become a form of pseudo family – a central point of identification, division, and intervention into dysfunctional families and/or abnormally-deviant young people.

In Chapter 9, I take this notion of intervention further by exploring the relationship between power, knowledge, practice, and expertise within described interventions. I build upon the idea that interventions illustrate a site of struggle between adults and young people. I describe how, through interventions, adults attempt to control the deviance of young people and transform them into self-governing individuals. I discuss the difficulty of this strategy as adults need to position youth as objects of power in order to control their deviance whilst at the same time there is a requirement that, at some time, the young person will become a self-governing subject.

I present an alternative construction to the young deviant in Chapter 10 based on an idea of agency. I argue that agency is about power and, concurrently, resistance (Foucault, 1980b). That is, agency occurs within points of struggle and is about forms of resistance that not necessarily involve choice. I show that possibilities for agency manifest, or occur, in the internal contradictions and indeterminate moments of constructions. At this point, agency is directed either towards the socialising mechanisms of interventions or towards the structural and material limitations (produced and reproduced through knowledges) surrounding the young person. Hence, agency and deviance are contingent and reflective of the unpredictability of the human condition (c.f. Douglas, 1992).

Chapter 11 is a chapter of conclusions. I look at the continual implications that the crimes and youth justice policies of 2001 and 2002 are having on New Zealand society. I summarise the conclusions and possibilities that arise now that this research is finished.

My key argument is that the application of an expertise of development and risk allows adult experts and commentators to divide young people (and their families) into the normally-deviant and the abnormally-deviant. These people then argue that these young people can be socialised into self-governing, controllable individuals through intervention practices – a position necessary in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s neoliberal climate. This combination of knowledge and practice produces and reproduces structural, material, and ideological limitations. It also produces and promotes deviance through positioning particular types of young people as pathological and needing socialisation into a norm. Consequently, there is a need to bring the concept of agency and resistance into conceptions of deviance, and to conceptualise young people as resisting, consciously or subconsciously, structures and knowledge. These young people are not ‘risks’ but are resisting the flows of power constructed and developed through knowledge. These young people are engaged in a struggle.
Chapter 2

Methodology: Thinking beyond methods

You take your first step into discourse research as you take your first step away from language … Language is so structured to mirror power relations that often we can see no other ways of being, and it structures ideology so that it is difficult to speak both in and against it.
(Parker, 1992, p.xi)

In Chapter 1, I gave a brief overview of the methods I used in this research. In this chapter, I expand upon those methods. I will present the logic behind the method or the methodology. As such, this chapter is a blend of theory and method as I define central theoretical concepts and elaborate on the form of discourse analysis applied to the institutional publications in my research. The theory that informed my research originated in the theoretical works of Foucault (1970, 1972a, 1976, 1977, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d, 1980e) and, later, Rose (1990, 1996b), whilst, how I applied this theory involved a bricolage of poststructural discourse methodologies found within sociological and psychological research.

I started this research with the assumption that the researcher holds theoretical positions in research a priori to the research (Honan, Knobel, Baker, & Davies, 2000; Lather, 1986). As such, poststructural and postmodern ideas about the contingent ‘nature’ of truth and knowledge influenced my initial thinking, the research questions, and the developed methodology. These ideas also provided parameters to the later analysis. In addition to this ‘poststructural’ positioning, the work of researchers in critical youth studies (such as Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997 and the others referred to on p.9) on the connection between knowledge and context also influenced my research.

Bringing the postmodern, poststructural, and critical youth studies research influences together, I developed the following research questions. These questions allowed me to examine constructed truths about criminal deviance in young people, implications of these truths for youth, and alternative possibilities for constructions of criminally-deviant youth:

1. How are criminally-deviant youth represented and constructed within the institutional contexts of academia, government, and media?

1 One part of my research involved designing a suitable methodology to ensure effective answering of research questions. Although there are many types of discourse analysis methodologies, I found that most were unsuitable for the purpose of my study as they focused too heavily on either semiotic features or historical traces. Consequently, a key objective that emerged during my doctoral research was to design a discourse analysis method which would focus on knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense; a tool that would also be usable by other researchers. I also wanted to expand some of the feminist work in discourse analysis (e.g. Fine, 1992; Fine & Addelston, 1996), in which the analysis does focus on knowledge and power but does not provide a ‘step by step’ methodology.
2. What alternative possibilities exist for the ways in which youth and crime are constructed and represented in institutional contexts?

Through these questions, I sought to examine five specific theoretical concepts – knowledge, power, positioning, commonsense, and expertise. These theoretical concepts stemmed from the philosophical underpinnings of my research and come from my understanding of discourse. I used these concepts, and the theories that informed them, to apply a theoretical position for myself as a researcher.

**Philosophical Underpinnings: Foucault, Rose, and others**

Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the theory and methodology within my research. In this section, I will expand upon and explain this diagram, starting with Foucault’s (1977) writing on the development of the disciplinary society.

![Figure 1: Theoretical and Methodological Representation of Discourse Analysis](image)

In 1975, Michel Foucault first published his famous book *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* which was later translated, in 1977, into the English *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison*. In this book, Foucault introduces us to an alternative history of the prison and he begins to challenge our understanding of psychology as a natural and truthful knowledge.
He, instead, encourages us to see psychology as a constructed knowledge, reflective of the contexts in which it arose, and as a contingent knowledge which ‘just happened to be’ the right knowledge at the right time.

Foucault (1977) argues that prisons are a relatively new phenomenon of contemporary industrial societies. He does this by charting the development of the prison system in Europe. He argues that, before the industrial revolution, people in European society tended to see crime as being an act against the body of the sovereign. Hence, punishment for crime tended to display the sovereign’s power on the criminal’s body. Common punishments, such as hanging and stocks, demonstrated the power of the sovereign and reinforced the structure of society.

Foucault (1977) then argues that sudden changes occurred in Europe, within the industrial revolution, which transformed governance and punishment. On one dimension, the stability of society no longer depended on a sovereign wielding power but, instead, depended upon individuals contributing to society and governing themselves. Hence, power moved from being an overt demonstration of the sovereign to a covert force within the individual. On another dimension, reflecting the changes in governance, forms of punishment transformed from an overt demonstration of power on the individual into techniques of self-discipline exercised by the individual. Hence, power became internalised within the human body. Foucault argues that in this emerging and developing context, psychology as well as other ‘psy’ knowledges (for example, psycho-analysis, and psychiatry) emerged as the sciences of the body. People within these changing societies were able to use the psy knowledges to reconceptualise the body, and to instigate practices of governance, that encouraged the development of self-discipline.

Foucault (1977) allows us to look at the role of knowledge within the societies we live. He allows us to see knowledge as more than the ‘natural truth’ but as something that arises at particular times in reflection of change in society. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault presents an argument that knowledges, like psychology, just appear. In this thesis, I want to suggest that there is a constitutive nature between ourselves and knowledge where our understanding of ourselves is determined, to a certain extent, by the knowledges to which we have access, but also that knowledge is fluid and changing all the time as we interact with others on a social dimension. In a way, we do have a role in the production and reproduction of knowledge. Knowledge is not a deity that produces itself. So, using Foucault as an example (with this caveat about the development of knowledge), I brought to my research several assumptions about knowledge.

I brought to the research an assumption that truths of criminal deviance in young people are socially and institutionally constructed knowledges (c.f. Sarup, 1993). In this way, we do not use knowledge to *discover truth*; rather, we use knowledge to *construct a truth* (Foucault,
This knowledge, in itself, is a social construction. In this way, over the last 200 years we have used psychology to construct a truth about ourselves.

Following the notion that knowledge and truth are socially constructed, I also assumed that knowledges, or truths, are reflective of the contexts they arise from – contexts of time, location, ideology, and societal group (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995; Foucault, 1972a; Rose, 1990). In such a way, the knowledges we use to construct ‘truth’ are also contingent because differing constructions of ‘truth’ arise from differing social contexts (Foucault, 1976, 1977). These knowledges are reflective of, and conducive to, the contexts in which they are embedded (Foucault, 1977). This is true of the development of psychology which arose from a particular context in history.

In this way, I assumed that knowledge is constructive, contextual, and contingent. This same assumption directly reflects the argument found in critical youth studies (Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1998). These theorists agree that researchers should recognise the contextual construction of youth in developmental psychology in order to establish the structural and material implications for youth. This assumption also reflects the research questions I developed where the focus is on constructions, and constructing, rather than discovering the truth of deviance in youth.

It is clear within Foucault’s (1977) writing on the history of prisons that knowledge also implies power. Foucault encourages us to see the history of psychology as a history that is not power-neutral but intermingled with the governance of society. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) poses a very similar argument about ‘western’ academic knowledge. Smith argues that academic knowledge privileges scientific knowledge. Smith finds this problematic as the history of science involves the colonisation and ‘othering’ of indigenous peoples. Like Foucault (1977, 1980c) Smith argues for a connection between knowledge and power.

From Michel Foucault (1977) and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) we are able to understand that when we construct knowledge, we are also applying power. We can never use or assume knowledge to be pure power; rather, when we use knowledge, we involve an exercising of power in communication and practice (Foucault, 1977, 1980c; Hoy, 1986b; Parker, 1992) (Figure 1, p.12). As Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish (1977), and later in Power and Strategies (1980c), knowledge and power always imply and involve each other:

Power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information ... The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power ... It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (Foucault, 1980c, pp.51-52).

The relationship between power and knowledge can be described as constitutive, where the application of knowledge (and, therefore, power) through communication and practice
produces and reproduces knowledges and ‘truths’. This moment of constitution between knowledge and power appears in Figure 1 (p.12) as the shaded box between power and knowledge. Hence, when we apply knowledge, we are engaged in producing, reproducing, changing and challenging structural and material conditions in a society. Each time we do this, we position individuals differently (Bordo, 1993; Foucault, 1977; Hoy, 1986b; Lacombe, 1996; Mills, 1997; Ransom, 1997, L.T. Smith, 2002).12

So, when we apply knowledge we produce and reproduce difference. Often this difference is based on power. For example, in a construction of truth we may position one group as ‘powerful’ and another group as ‘dependent’ or powerless. Hence, we combine knowledge and power in social communications and practices to position individuals (c.f. Foucault, 1977). This constitutive relationship between knowledge and power also influences the types of relationships possible between individuals and societal institutions (Foucault, 1977). Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (2002) work on academic knowledges and methodologies highlights how an application of knowledge positions individuals and reproduces difference. Taking a post-colonial approach, Smith describes how researchers using ‘western’ research methodologies have continuously positioned indigenous people as ‘other’ through classification and the reaffirmation of ‘western’ values and knowledge. We can find the same argument about classification in Foucault’s (1977) work on prisons and Nikolas Rose’s (1990) work on psychology. Both Foucault and Rose argue that we use methods of classification to position different groups of people into abnormal and normal categories.

Dany Lacombe (1996) and Charles Taylor (1986) argue that Foucault’s presentation of the relationship between power and knowledge is deterministic as it assumes human subjects to be the effect of power and knowledge. To a certain extent, I agree with their argument – Foucault’s original presentation is a deterministic portrayal of society as he does describe and portray individuals as nothing more than ‘cogs’ on the wheel of power and knowledge. His original argument is also limited, as he does not account for the ways in which change can occur in contexts of power and knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). In my own analysis, I draw upon later developments in Foucault’s (1980b) writing about resistance to address these issues. In this writing, Foucault argues that there cannot be any relationship of power without resistance and that the subject is formed in this relationship. In this way, change is possible in the moments of freedom between power and resistance. These are the indeterminate moments (Bhabha, 1995) in which we cannot be certain about others and ourselves. They are moments of possibility and impossibility – they are moments in which contradictions become freedom. It is these moments that I focus on in Chapter 9.

I approached my research seeing the need to focus on the constitutive role of knowledge and power, and the possibilities that are apparent when resistance is brought into the

12 Foucault (1977, p.27) used a hyphen (“power-knowledge”) to illustrate the constitutive relationship between knowledge and power.
analysis. I used the theoretical notions of expertise (Rose, 1996b) and commonsense (Griffin, 1993; McWilliam, 2002; Rose, 1990, 1996b) to explore the constitutive relationship between knowledge and power. The notion of expertise allowed me to explore institutionally constructed knowledge, whilst, the notion of commonsense allowed me to explore how individuals apply expertise as popular knowledge.

Rose (1996b) argues that expertise is a combination of institutional knowledge and institutionally validated practices. In other words, expertise is a validated and specialised knowledge with a specific language or terminology that has arisen from institutional practices – particularly research. Validation of expertise knowledge tends to occur at an intertextual level where authors and others refer to ‘experts’ and ‘proven’ practice. These people also apply a theoretical language, common to the discipline in which it has arisen, to verify the constructed knowledge as truth. Academic research and academic writing are clear examples of expertise. Academic authors often validate their statements and research with reference to others and reference to validity and reliability.

In contrast, commonsense is a societal group’s popularly held knowledge and beliefs about a particular phenomenon (c.f. Griffin, 1996; McWilliam, 2002). Unlike expertise, those using commonsense appeal to an inherent ‘Truth’ and use tautological references to a supposed universality of truth (c.f. Douglas, 1992). Often an author may use the rhetoric of the text to bury these tautological references so that they are difficult to pinpoint. This can often happen when they use both tautological references to universal ideas (through metaphors, proverbs, and stories) and terms of expertise. For example, an author might talk about the youth-at-risk (expertise term) as being on a pathway (metaphor) to deviance. Although we would expect to see clear evidence of commonsense knowledge in media writing, we can also see examples of this knowledge in the use of metaphor and symbolism in other institutional writing. Authors often appeal to metaphors to portray their arguments as clear commonsense. Across chapters 4 to 9, I will explore the complexity between expertise and commonsense as it appeared in the New Zealand texts of 2002.

Hence, expertise and commonsense do not exist independently of each other; both expertise and commonsense exist within a societal group’s dominant knowledge/s, or ‘ideologies’. Hence, there can be a cyclic relationship between expertise and commonsense. Rose (1990, 1996b) indicates this in his discussion on the application of psychology in contemporary society. According to Rose, psychology has become so dominant that now everyone refers to it – even if they are not aware of it. It is recognised as an expertise – but it is also seen as a universal truth. Psychology is now the ‘Truth’ of contemporary society.

Psychology is an institutional and socially constructed knowledge, which we use to position individuals in knowledge and practice. This psychology is never pure expertise or pure commonsense. Often researchers use a psychological expertise to construct a truth of youth. However, this expertise is never pure and distinct, as it has stemmed from other
commonsense knowledge and popular ideas. It has arisen again later in expertise but has become so entrenched in a society that it is now commonsense. Hence, researchers have used expertise to give new words to old assumptions, which, in turn, become new metaphors for understanding social contexts. Furthermore, both expertise and commonsense involve knowledge, power, and positioning.

Through expertise and commonsense we create a knowledge to communicate meaning and to inform practice. This combination of knowledge and practice in expertise and commonsense neatly depicts the operation of knowledge and power, where the application of knowledge not only constructs (which in itself is an exercising of power) but it also informs practice. Both knowledge and practice lead to a particular positioning of all those involved (Rose, 1990, 1996b). For example, educational psychologists position teachers and students differently. They tend to see the teacher as an older, more mature, person who is there in the classroom to educate students – teachers are the instrument of education. In contrast, educational psychologists would see the student as being in the classroom to learn by, or with, the teacher – students are the target of education.

In my own research, I used commonsense and expertise in my analysis to explore how authors applied knowledge, power, and positioning to construct and represent criminally-deviant youth. This entailed my questioning the taken-for-granted truths surrounding youth criminal deviance (c.f. Sarup, 1993; Walkerdine, 1990). In other words, I was involved in a critique of knowledge, in which I did not use knowledge to understand youth but, instead, I attempted to cut, dissect, and deconstruct the knowledge, or ‘Truth’, constructing criminally-deviant young people (Foucault, 1984). I then brought together the gaps existent within differing constructions to explore alternative possibilities. In order to achieve this, I used the theoretical elements (knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense) together within the poststructural concept of ‘discourse’ and applied a discourse analysis. This allowed me to explore current constructions of criminally-deviant youth and to develop possible alternative constructions.

**Defining Approach: Discourse analysis**

I want to first define what I mean by the word ‘discourse’ before describing the discourse analysis approach I applied\(^{13}\). I used a bricolage of discourse methodologies found within psychology and sociology to build a definition of discourse that enabled me to use knowledge as a primary unit of analysis. I did not follow explicitly one approach to analysis;

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\(^{13}\) Researchers and theorists have developed many discourse analysis approaches. Each of these approaches concentrates on differing aspects of discourse and/or language. My own approach incorporated a variety of theoretical concepts about discourse found within psychological and sociological writing. For further information on the types of discourse analysis approaches see Fairclough (1992). Fairclough provides an excellent summary of approaches available and their historical development.
instead I drew upon elements in approaches that allowed me to focus on the theoretical concepts of my analysis.

I use the term ‘discourse’ in a poststructural sense to encompass my idea that we construct truth or truths in social contexts (see Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972b; Fowler, 1991; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Van Dijk, 1991). By using discourse as a concept of analysis, I was able to explore knowledge, power, and positioning. Various theorists (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1976, 1977; Howarth, 2000; Mills, 1997; Willig, 2001) recognise these elements as essential components of any one discourse. For example, the constitutive relationship between knowledge and power, and the associated positioning of individuals, are evident in Fairclough’s (1992) description of discourses:

Discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or ‘constitute’ them: different discourses construct key entities … in different ways, and position people in different ways as social subjects.

(Fairclough, 1992, pp.3-4)

Hence, I took the term discourse to mean a social practice or communication that produces and reproduces social understandings. When we use discourses we incorporate knowledge, power, and positioning in practices that involve language and silence (i.e. the implied but not said) (c.f. Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1977; Mills, 1997). In short, we apply discourses to understand our world and ourselves. When we use discourses, we also position ourselves whilst positioning others (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1977; Howarth, 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; Mills, 1997; Willig, 2001). In other words, discourses are languages in action in particular contexts. This is evident in the work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002), but we can also see an example of how discourses can be used to position people in the work of Michelle Fine and Judi Addelson (1996). In their study on gender and power, Fine and Addelson describe how gender is often conceptualised through discourses of sameness and difference. These discourses often tend to exclude women from full participation in society or require the woman to ‘behave like a man’.

The contexts of discourse

Because we socially construct and use discourses, we also need to recognise that discourses insinuate contexts of time, social group, ideology, and location (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1984, 1999) (Figure 1, p.12). We can understand the context of time to be that of a historical moment. However, in saying this, we also need to recognise that a particular point of view, or a particular group’s knowledge, often dominates our understanding of history. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) says this quite aptly in Decolonizing Methodologies:

History is also about power. In fact history is mostly about power. It is the story of the powerful and how they became powerful, and then how they use their power to keep them in positions which they can continue to dominate others.

(L.T. Smith, 2002, p.34)
Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) points out that the history we have access to often reflects, and is, the history of a dominant social group. For Smith, this group is the colonizing Anglo-American. However, we can also find social groupings across many structural dimensions such as class, gender, sexuality, and age. In my research, I primarily based the groups of my analysis around age (adults and young people), although I was analysing one group’s perspective of the other (that of adult authors). However, as my analysis will show, social groups are often far more complex. They are often not defined through single dimensions (such as class) but, instead, must be seen as involving a cross-section of dimensions that lead to complex positionings that others often consider contradictions. For example, those writing about youth in 2002 structured and positioned young people along age dimensions, but they also constructed and positioned young people along gender, ethnic, and economic dimensions. Often the ways in which authors wrote about youth led to contradictions and gaps in their definitions as their definitions could never fully define young people. These authors drew upon different knowledges and values in their constructions – they drew upon a shared ideology.

Ideology is a complex term meaning different things to different people. Terry Eagleton (1991) argues that we should see ideology as a contested “text” (p.1, author’s italics) of divergent meanings and histories. He argues that we cannot bring the many meanings of ideology together into a ‘Grand Theory’ but that we should develop our own definitions whilst recognising the arguments concerning ideology. I initially drew my definition of ideology from Marxist theory (Marx, 1978)\textsuperscript{14} \textsuperscript{15}. In short, I used ideology to refer to the ideas and beliefs that come to represent the essence of a significant social group and enable social cohesion within that group and, at times, between groups (c.f. Eagleton, 1991). In other words, I saw ideology as an interpretation of reality from one significant social group often in the form of socially-constructed knowledges with associated values and beliefs (c.f. Entwistle, 1979; van Dijk, 1998).

However, in adding a Marxist dimension to my interpretation of ideology, and in acknowledging the role of power, I also saw ideology as political in that dominant social groups tend to present their ideology as a truthful and accurate representation of reality (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977). They then use their claim for truth to justify the way in which a society is structured and to produce and reproduce this reality (Marx, 1978; Reiman, 2007). This does not mean that other groups (or individuals within a dominant group) do not contest a dominant ideology; however, overall, different groups in a society generally accept that, in some way, a governing ideology does reflect a reality of that society (see Williams, 1977).

\textsuperscript{14} Although there are many definitions to ideology, I will only expand upon the approach I used. Terry Eagleton (1991) and Teun van Dijk (1998) discuss other definitions and provide a multi-disciplinary analysis to the term ‘ideology’.

\textsuperscript{15} Although I drew upon Marxist theory, I did not agree with the Marxist connection between ideology and false consciousness.
Foucault (1980d) is critical of the term ideology and its use in Marxist theory. One of the arguments he makes is that the Marxist conception of ideology tends to refer to ideology as a mistruth or falsity. Although I agree with Foucault that Marxist conceptions of ideology do refer to a falsity, I do not agree with him on the point that we should refer to ideology in an analysis of discourse. A good example of this is Jeffery Reiman (2007) who looks at the inequalities in capitalist judicial systems. However, I disagree that this means that we cannot use reference to a power-induced, or political, ideology in a discourse analysis. Rather, I would suggest that ideology is an apt term to use to describe the contested nature of socially constructed knowledges, and the relationship between power and knowledge – particularly with regard to positioning (c.f. van Dijk, 1998). Rather, than seeing ideology as a false consciousness, in this analysis, I saw ideology as an interpretation of reality open to contestation (c.f. Hirst, 1979).

What makes an ideology dominant is how well ‘we’ perceive it to interpret reality at any point in time. It is this perceived fit, between ideology and reality, that ensures whether an ideology is accepted as a true representation by more than one social group (Bourdieu, 1996; Williams, 1977). When this fit is strong, there is little critique, contestation, or change, and the ideology may remain stable for some time. However, as I will show in my analysis, this fit between ideology and reality is not always as close as it appears and that there are moments in which the gap between reality and ideology becomes apparent and we reconstruct our thinking and knowledge into new ideologies in which to view our world.

There are also moments in which we cannot explain what is happening with our interpretation of reality and when our interpretation is challenged by another point of view or we see contradictions in our understandings of reality. Often these times can be marked by particular changes in society – like the gradual changes that occurred in Anglo-American societies during the industrial revolution. It is at the point of ideology that change occurs most often. That is, in moments of social instability, we often find that what we thought to be a clear ‘Truth’ or discourse about our reality is being questioned by apparent contradictions coming to the surface. At this point in time, an ideological struggle occurs in which we try to gain meaning about ourselves and our world through a negotiation between ourselves, others, and the world as we perceive it. The ideological struggle leads us to reconstruct a discourse that enables us to gain understanding and to ‘feel’ some control – we may not be able to control change fully – but through constructing a new truth we can attempt to exercise some control over something we consider to be out of control.

We can find a similar argument in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (2001) analysis of political revolution where ideological change occurs in moments of articulation and rearticulation. Laclau (1994) sees many of the truths and values of contemporary industrial countries as “empty signifiers” (p.167) or key political concepts (such as democracy) in which people associate with particular meanings. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue that there are moments of instability when these meanings become contested and rearticulated. In my
own study, these moments are points of ideological struggle where truths and values about ourselves and society are rearticulated.

Finally, alongside time, social group, and ideology, I also considered contexts of location. This meant primarily that I focused on New Zealand. However, New Zealand does not have a distinct history and identity separate to the rest of the world. New Zealand shares a history with other countries, such as Great Britain and America. New Zealand is often seen as a ‘western’ country as it accepts a western interpretation of reality – or ideology. For this reason, in looking at New Zealand, I also looked at other contemporary industrial societies (or ‘western’ countries) and at the shared knowledges on which these countries based their ideas about adolescence and youth.

Looking at discourse and knowledge in context
The contextual elements of discourse on which I based my thinking, alongside the argument for context in critical youth studies (Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1998), encouraged me to explore the contextual elements of constructions. Theorists and researchers (e.g. Foucault, 1970, 1976, 1977, 1989; Jacka, 2003; Rose, 1990, 1996b; Walkerdine, 1998) have attempted to capture this contextual dimension by applying a genealogical (Foucault, 1984) or archaeological (Foucault, 1972a) approach to their research. Researchers use these approaches to locate ‘historically’ the emergence of discourses or shared understandings (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). In contrast, I was more interested in examining the relationship between knowledge and context. At times, this meant that I needed to historically locate the construction used because history influences current knowledges. However, I found that many researchers, both locally (e.g. Jacka, 2003) and internationally, (e.g. Aries, 1962; S. Brown, 1998; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1977; Griffin, 1993, 1996; Lesko, 1996b, 2001; Rose, 1990, 1996b) have already located the emergence of particular knowledges such as psychology. Because of this, I decided to draw upon this research for an historical analysis rather than repeating a similar methodology to tell a similar story. By doing this, I was able to build upon the research already done to present an original analysis for a different context.

So, contexts envelop and influence discourses. In this sense, the discourses we use produce and reinforce contexts and the contexts we live in influence the types of discourses we use. Like power and knowledge, the relationship between discourse and context is cyclic in nature. In a way, the discourses we use represent those socially-constructed knowledges we see as true. Those discourses change in moments of ideological struggle in which we need to develop a new way to see and understand the world.

Hence, within my research, I used ‘discourse’ as a synonym for ‘truth’ because I interpreted both in the same way; both are socially constructed and contextual, and both involve practices of power and knowledge in the positioning of individuals. However, in contrast to ‘truth’ which we use to assert some proven reality, the term ‘discourse’ allowed me to
emphasize the contingent and contextual nature of knowledge. However, a focus on
discourse is different to a focus on truth.

In a focus on truth, a researcher tends to assume that the relationship between concepts is
somewhat linear and that commonsense and expertise have little, or no, relationship to each
other. In this linear focus on truth, a researcher’s communication of ideas and practice leads
to knowledge. This, in turn, leads to expertise, which then leads to power.

In contrast, in a contingent and socially-constructed theory of discourse, a researcher
assumes that each concept draws upon others. That is, each concept implies that another
exists. This means that a researcher cannot separate these concepts in an analysis. I have
shown this in Figure 1 (p.12) by using double arrows between concepts.

In summary, I applied a discourse analysis approach to explore how authors applied
knowledge, through expertise and commonsense, to the phenomenon of youth crime in
Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002. This involved me in exploring both the application of
knowledge and the implications of knowledge when authors applied it. I also located my
research in an understanding of the relationship between knowledge, institutions and texts.

**Locating My Research**

Primarily, I understood discourses (and the knowledges used in discourses) to be
institutionally-bound or connected to the social practices of knowledge production and
reproduction within social institutions (Foucault, 1983). Foucault (1983) and Chomsky and
Foucault (1997) argue that institutions are a key site for the analysis of knowledge and
power in a society. This is because the production and reproduction of knowledge and
power occur at an institutional level, particularly through the construction of texts (c.f.
Fairclough, 1992). So, in order for me to explore the associated elements of discourse, I
needed to take institutionally and socially constructed texts as the item of analysis
(Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Mills, 1997) because it is through texts authors apply the
elements of discourse (Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Parker, 1992; Van Dijk, 1991). Both
institutions and texts are bound to social contexts; as such, it can be argued, authors
construct texts, in a variety of formats, to reflect and inform contexts.

Texts are not just written texts, texts are also visual and aural (Parker, 1992). Discourse
theorists argue that texts can be conversations (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), written texts
(e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Van Dijk, 1991), visual texts (e.g. Foucault, 1970;
Jones, 1991), and/or recorded texts (see Hartley, 2002). Following the idea that through
institutions we produce and reproduce discourse and knowledge, I chose to focus on
institutionally published texts in the analysis, particularly written (incorporating illustrations)
and recorded texts.
No matter what type of text authors choose to construct, they use, and have to use, language. Hence, I focused on language, as it appeared in written, aural, and visual texts, in my analysis\(^{16}\). Through focusing on language, I was able to explore the elements of discourse, as they appeared first through language (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972a; Fowler, 1991; Mills, 1997; Parker, 1992; Van Dijk, 1991; Weedon, 1987). However, I did not focus my analysis on the words alone – this would have resulted in a semiotic or textual discourse analysis (e.g. Panelli, et al., 2002). I also wanted to focus on the gaps or silences in discourses used by authors and those to whom they referred. These were the assumed knowledges and implied positionings (c.f. Horrocks & Jevtic, 1997). This involved me going beyond exploring constructions to exploring implications. It also encouraged me to explore constructions for new possibilities (c.f. Anderson & Jack, 1991).

How I defined ‘discourse’ did allow me to explore discourses in terms of knowledge, power, and positioning. However, I needed to provide some elaboration so that I could explore the elements of discourse within expertise and commonsense. To do this, I brought to the analysis the argument that we use knowledges *intertextually* on a textual and discursive level. At the textual level, we validate the truthfulness of a text by referring to other texts, proven practices (usually through research), or writers (Fairclough, 1992). On the discursive level, we validate the truthfulness of a text by referring to other knowledges, to an inherent truth/knowledge, or to a generalised institutional expertise or discipline (such as psychology, sociology, and biology) (Foucault, 1972a). Intertextuality and the ways we use it can show both expertise and commonsense. Intensification of an expertise occurs when a knowledge becomes intertextual and a society continuously refers to it on a textual or discursive level in conversations. These knowledges and their associated positionings become evident in an analysis of intertextual expertise and commonsense.

Additionally, the knowledges we apply through expertise and commonsense, we also use to inform practice/s. We also use practices to endorse particular positionings of individuals (Rose, 1990, 1996b) and to validate particular knowledges. For this reason, I felt it important to examine the practices informing and informed by expertise and commonsense. This allowed me to identify expertise and commonsense and the types of intertextual knowledges used by authors to inform practices. Focusing on practices added another layer to my analysis. Focusing on practice and knowledge also allowed me to explore the elements of discourse rather than discourse itself\(^{17}\).

So, rather than focusing on discourse, I focused on the elements of discourse. This is because I assumed that discourse did not equate to knowledge, rather that there is a close

\(^{16}\) I choose to focus on language in texts rather than language in conversations to keep an institutional focus to my analysis.

\(^{17}\) I struggled with whether I should attempt to locate discourses or knowledge. I chose to focus on knowledge as I found that there was a tendency by some discourse researchers to label and name any social practice ‘discourse’. It seemed to me that the word ‘discourse’ has been overused and, perhaps reified to a much higher status than necessary).
relationship between discourse and knowledge. That is, we draw upon knowledge to construct a ‘truth’ – a discourse. We use this discourse in expertise and commonsense and apply it in practice. By applying this understanding in my research, I developed three levels of analysis.

The levels of my analysis allowed me to explore all the elements of discourse and the dominance of particular knowledges. In the first level, I looked at the applied knowledge through locating points of expertise or commonsense. This involved looking at what and how those writing assumed a particular construction of youth deviance. Secondly, I looked at the positioning of young people (and others) and the implications of the application of knowledge. This second level allowed me to look at the complexities of power as they related to knowledge. Finally, I looked more closely at expertise and commonsense or the ways in which writers validated their assumptions through intertextuality and how they used this constructed knowledge to inform practice.

Through focusing on knowledge and its application via discourse I was effectively able to apply an approach that would address both questions – it enabled me to explore constructions, discrepancies, indeterminate moments, and contradictions. I used this later to develop an alternative possibility or construction of deviance. This also allowed me to explore the implications of knowledge, in context, whilst also moving away from a solely structural/material analysis or focus. To do this I divided the research into three stages.

**Working With the Data: How I applied the discourse analysis**

The criteria I set to outline discourse and discourse analysis set two clear boundaries to my research – a focus on institutions and a focus on texts. Hence, my assumptions about knowledge and its association to discourse/s set institutional texts as the items of my analysis. From this point, I placed parameters around my research to ensure that I would recognise the contextual nature of knowledge and I would locate and explore knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense. I used these parameters to determine the sample of texts in my research.

**Determining the Sample**

Rather than exploring many unrelated institutional contexts, I limited my analysis to the knowledge producing and disseminating institutions of academia, government, and media. This focus corresponded well with my theoretical focus on knowledge. It also allowed me to acknowledge the ways in which authors in New Zealand society construct knowledge within institutional contexts.

By investigating three institutional contexts, I was able to explore the differing ways knowledge (and, therefore, expertise, and commonsense) is produced and reproduced, whilst also exploring the effects of power that occur alongside the application of knowledge.
(i.e. positioning). My focus on three institutions also brought a level of triangulation (Janesick, 1998) to my research, as I was able to explore the dominance of themes and constructions. Triangulation also meant I could explore the extent to which differing constructions and knowledges were bound to one institution or were dispersed amongst the differing institutions.

Alongside institutions, I also placed parameters around the types of institutional texts I would explore. This allowed me to have a workable and feasible project that would fit within the constraints of a doctoral degree. Furthermore, a poststructural discourse analysis is an indepth analysis and is quite intensive. For this reason, a researcher needs to limit the amount of text analysed or the type of text analysed. I chose to limit the type of text analysed as I felt there was a risk to the authenticity of findings when the number of texts are limited. Limiting the type of text allowed me to focus the research on construction of a youth deviance within specific genres.

Specifically, I focused on published and nationally archived texts (written and recorded) focusing on youth crime and youth crime prevention/intervention in Aotearoa/New Zealand. These texts were published during April to November 2002. This focus allowed me to have a workable number of texts from a time where there was much public and institutional discussion about youth crime. It also meant that others could later critique my research because the texts analysed could be easily accessed again. Additionally, I focused on formal articles and reports published from each institutional context to ensure a workable sample not saturated with media news items.

My focus on institutions and on formal published and archived articles and reports allowed me to gather all those texts recorded in database catalogues, institutional publication catalogues, national/institutional libraries, and storage archives. In this process, I searched archives, websites, and databases, and made formal requests to storage archives, libraries, and government departments. I then used purposive sampling (Davidson & Tolich, 1999) to select formal articles and reports fitting the parameters of my research. This focus assured me that I could tell a story from the data that was applicable to the contexts of academia, government, and media in Aotearoa/New Zealand during 2002. In the end, I found fifteen texts published in government contexts (Appendix 2), fourteen published in academic contexts (Appendix 1), and thirty-one published in media contexts (Appendix 3). The higher number of articles published in media contexts reflected the shorter length of publication size and the prominent focus of the media on youth crime and responses to youth crime during 2001 and 2002 (c.f. Fowler, 1991).  

It did surprise me that I found only 31 recorded and archived current event, feature, and focus articles from the media. I had originally anticipated a much higher number, but as my pilot research showed the media interest tended to be based around a direct reporting of day to day news and commentary (items that I did not include in the analysis as I did not want to have a saturation of media content.)
Although all the texts gathered focused on youth crime, I found that, in contrast to government and academic texts, authors writing from a media context were more concerned with informing the public about the progress of cases through the court system and with analysing the causes of an assumed ‘growing’ youth crime problem. Authors writing in an academic context tended to focus on presenting findings from evaluation and research. These authors also provided some theoretical discussion of youth crime in New Zealand but, even through using statistics, they did not present youth crime as a growing problem. Authors also presented research findings in texts published through government contexts; however, as expected, authors writing in this context also contributed to the development of youth crime policies. Although these authors expressed caution about the reading of youth crime statistics, they engaged in reading statistics and examining the variables that, they assumed, led to particular cases of youth crime (such as ethnicity and socio-economic status).

The differences within purpose and intention of the different publishing context did not clearly situate authors within a certain context. For example, authors writing in media contexts sourced, and referred to, writers and researchers from academic and government contexts. Furthermore, writers from academic contexts (such as universities) also published and contributed to government texts. Authors coming from government institutions (such as the courts) published texts within academic contexts (particularly conferences) and provided commentary on media texts. Furthermore, despite the differences in publishing intentions and purposes, across the institutional contexts authors drew upon, and used, particular ideas, and knowledges of, youth which I found through applying a discourse analysis.

**Applying the Method of Discourse Analysis**

In order to conduct a discourse analysis, I had to take a step back and first establish a contextual picture of Aotearoa/New Zealand and its young people. I used this contextual picture to expand and contextualise the discourse analysis. Hence, I separated my research into three stages: contextual, analysis, and reconstruction.

**Stage One: Contextual**

In the contextual stage of my research, I focused on establishing the historical, political, judicial, ideological, and social contexts that surrounded New Zealand youth in 2002. I broke the contextual stage into four substages. First, I reviewed secondary historical texts and academic research texts. In these texts, writers discussed and reflected upon the
positioning, and historical construction, of youth in New Zealand and other contemporary industrial societies\(^\text{19}\).

After looking at the first group of texts, I reviewed and informed my analysis with three government policies specifically pertaining to youth in Aotearoa/New Zealand. One of these policies established New Zealand’s current youth system (Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989); whilst, two of these policies were published in 2002 (*The Youth Offending Strategy* and *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa*).

Finally, as a juxtaposition to this analysis, I also reviewed central research projects used in Aotearoa/New Zealand to establish a picture of New Zealand youth and youth deviance. I initially used two projects published in 2002 (Blaiklock, et al., 2002, Maxwell & Morris, 2002a) which both gave a contextual overview of young people in New Zealand in 2002 (in the youth justice system and in the social climate of New Zealand). They further show that the New Zealand adult understanding of youth is not necessarily limited to Aotearoa/New Zealand but reflects wider contemporary constructions and understandings of youth.

This contextual stage to my research allowed me to locate my analysis in a specific time and location. It also meant I could explore the complexities of knowledge and acknowledge that knowledge is both localised (connected to a geographic location) and generalised (used across geographic locations). Aotearoa/New Zealand is a contemporary industrial and liberal society with unique attributes. The types of institutions in New Zealand society, as well as the liberal-democratic form of state governance, situate Aotearoa/New Zealand alongside other contemporary industrial societies. This positioning allows writers and producers of texts in Aotearoa/New Zealand to apply, produce, and reproduce a ‘shared’ or ‘universal’ knowledge about young people, whilst also expressing a uniqueness to the country. So, the themes I found within the contextual stage of my research, fed into, and informed, my analysis.

Stage Two: Analysis

In the second stage of my research, I applied a discourse analysis to the texts. In this stage, I focused on answering the first research question by establishing the ways those writing in Aotearoa/New Zealand constructed and represented criminally-deviant youth through knowledge and power, expressed as expertise and commonsense.

Before conducting the analysis, I conducted a pilot study on constructions of youth in newspaper reports published in 2002. This pilot helped me to establish the approach I would take to discourse analysis. Furthermore, whilst it highlighted some potential problems with

\(^{19}\) I use the words ‘contemporary industrial’ to refer to societies that emerged during the industrial revolution of the 19th Century. These societies share ideas of truth, systems of governance, and various values and beliefs and are commonly referred to as ‘western’; however, this term is problematic as it does not fully encompass societies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand.
the way I was applying discourse analysis in the beginning, it also highlighted some potential themes that might emerge in my research. Following Ruth Panelli and colleagues (2002), I used the approach of codifying and quantifying general themes within the located newspaper items (in excess of 200 newspaper news reports) in order to establish a dominant construction and a dominant type of knowledge. This approach did evidence the dominance of psychological-developmental knowledge. However, it proved ineffective because it did not capture implied or covert messages (the silences) about youth. It also was not conducive with my theoretical positioning and understandings of discourse. However, it did show that I needed to develop a systematic approach to discourse analysis (c.f. Willig, 2001).

I developed this ‘systematic approach’ by returning to my theoretical positioning and understanding of discourse analysis. I broke the discourse analysis into three levels, which I turned into three questions to focus on knowledge, positioning, and expertise/commonsense. First, I focused on the types of knowledge (both covert and overt) used by the producers of texts to construct youth. Second, I focused on the implications of knowledge and looked at the construction and positioning of criminally-deviant youth (this involved exploring the positioning of other players in a discourse (such as, adults, other young people, adults working with young people, and families). Third, I looked at expertise and commonsense in the intertextual validations of a point of view or knowledge through authors’ references to texts, experts, practices, a shared knowledge, and/or other knowledges. I drew upon secondary commentary (particularly philosophical commentary such as Philippe Aries (1962), Ulrich Beck (1992), Mary Douglas (1992), Jacques Donzalot (1979), and Michel Foucault (1977)) to further analyse and critique the forms of expertise and commonsense the authors used.

Using this approach, I also attempted to manage the ways in which I applied these levels of analysis to the located texts. Essentially, I read and re-read each text separately several times. In this reading, I attempted to find out how authors incorporated knowledge within the texts – within the whole text, within separate paragraphs, and within sentences. Once, this was completed, I re-read all the texts to examine intertextuality and the use of expertise and commonsense across the texts. Exploring the implications for youth in terms of positioning was an important aspect of my analysis. For this reason, I analysed positioning and the implications of such a positioning alongside the analysis of knowledge, expertise, and commonsense. In this way, I wove an examination of power through the analysis by interpreting power as occurring in the positioning of individuals and groups through knowledge. Finally, I looked at each construction of youth for possible contradictions and gaps in order to reconstruct an idea of youth criminal deviance.

**Stage Three: Reconstruction**

The final stage of my research was the identification of an alternative construction for the deviance of young people or lack of deviance in those constructed as deviant. Essentially,
this involved focusing on the indeterminate gaps or moments in the texts where authors positioned youth in more than one, and often contradictory, positions or could not provide an absolute definition to deviance. I broke this reconstructive analysis into two stages. In each stage, I focused on the discursive constructions of youth.

In the first stage, I focused on the implications of constructions for young people and attempted to explore how those writing about youth crime did not construct young people. To achieve this, I used critical youth studies literature to explore and compare constructions of criminally-deviant youth with constructions of other youth (deviant and non-deviant), adults, and children. This involved me in analysing power with regard to the positioning of young people in knowledge-informed practices. To do this, I explored how authors did, and did not, position young people in practices and interventions. This enabled me to identify possible contradictions and to begin to conceptualise an alternative possibility for constructing ideas of youth deviance.

In the second stage, I looked directly at contradictions in the representation of young people; namely, the simultaneous positioning, and indeterminate moments in differing constructions of youth. Rather than seeing these contradictions and indeterminate moments as points to be resolved (c.f. Wyn & White, 2000), I saw them as points of possibility where young people could be positioned as ‘either’, ‘neither’, and ‘both’ at the same time (c.f. Derrida, 1981). This enabled me to explore and conceptualise possible alternative constructions to youth seen as criminally-deviant. These alternative constructions could explain some of the contradictions in discourses and offer a perspective that diverts from developmental psychology. In effect, the alternative construction I developed challenged institutional constructions whilst concentrating on the moments of possibility found within knowledge.

I based the reconstruction stage of my research on the understanding that the current constructions of criminally-deviant youth disenfranchise youth and cause social divisions. I took this understanding from the rationale for my research, from my understandings of critical youth studies research, and, later, from my own analysis. Hence, institutional practices of knowledge production and reproduction have ethical implications for youth as they position youth and inform the ways in which many adults understand youth. I further saw the connection between ethics and knowledge production and reproduction as being central in the ethical decisions that I made in my own research.

**Ethical Decisions and Implications**

It would have been possible for me to assume that my own research was devoid of ethical implications because I did not ‘involve’ human subjects. Indeed, most writing on ethical practices in research focuses on research with human subjects (e.g. Parsons, 1969; Snook, 1981; Tolich, 2001) and New Zealand university human ethics committees tend to review research projects that involve human subjects. However, my own experiences in research...
and the implications of research showed me that research not conducted on human subjects is not devoid of ethical considerations.

My theoretical understandings about truth, knowledge, and positioning meant that my own research, which in itself constructed and deconstructed knowledge, would have ethical implications in its positioning of young people and others. Hence, ethics was a central feature in my research as ethics guided my decision to focus on institutions and my research had ethical implications beyond the research project.

So far, I have established that I made a theoretical decision to focus on institutions. However, I also saw it as an ethical decision. From writing about researching with disenfranchised and marginalised groups (e.g. Beals, 2002a, 2002b) I found that it is important to ensure that the methodology itself (this includes the analysis) does not cause any harm to the individuals being researched (c.f. Snook, 1981; Tolich, 2001). This is particularly so in a discourse analysis, which involves a level of deconstruction of reality and/or truth. As I found in my Masters research (Beals, 2002a), when researchers question the reality experienced by disenfranchised groups (such as criminally-deviant youth) they can potentially cause harm to a participant through questioning a participant’s own understandings of self. I concluded that researchers should first question institutional knowledges rather than the experienced reality of those researched. My doctoral research was an ethical response to my findings and experiences in my Masters as I attempted to question how institutions constructed young criminal deviants rather than how these young people positioned themselves.

I also had ethical considerations within the implications of my research. One of my aims was to give those writing in institutions an awareness of the ways in which they applied knowledge to construct criminally-deviant youth. Another of my aims was to give an alternative possibility to those writing about, and working with, youth. It was important for me to attempt to ensure that this alternative possibility could lead to positive change or debate rather than another construction of marginalisation. This positive aim is also a limitation of any piece of research as no author can control how their research is used, rather they can only attempt to ensure that what they intended occurs.

**Strengths and Limitations**

There were strengths and limitations to the approach that I took. These were in addition to the future application of my own research and the ethical implications. The strengths distinguished my research from other research in youth studies and ensured that my research had a robust methodology; whilst, the limitations were embedded within the methodology and theory of discourse analysis.
Strengths

As I will discuss in Chapter 3, much of the research in critical youth studies (such as Wyn & White, 1997 and the others referred to on p.9) acknowledges a link between knowledge and positioning but does not explore this relationship in any detail. Indeed, the focus of many of these researchers has tended to be, first, on structural inequalities and then, second, on developmental knowledge. These researchers assume that structural inequalities come first and then the social construction of knowledge is an attempt to reproduce these inequalities.

My research differs as I assume that the relationship between knowledge and structural conditions is more complex and that the ways a society uses knowledge both produces and reproduces social conditions. This is reflective of the contextual, contingent, and constitutive ‘nature’ of knowledge where we use knowledge to reflect current understandings (reproduce) and contribute to the ways we understand ourselves (produce). For this reason, the exploration of knowledge, power, and positioning is a strength of my research as it separates my research from that currently produced in youth studies and critical youth studies within the Australasian region (e.g. Wyn & White, 1997).

In addition, there were several methodological strengths in my research. The strong congruence of my theoretical positioning with the methodology meant that the discourse analysis approach I developed allowed me to address both research questions whilst exposing implications. The focus on three institutions and a particular type of institutional text ensured that my research findings were, to some extent, an authentic representation of formal New Zealand institutional publications in 2002.

Additionally, I also applied a multi-dimensional analysis where I looked at context, knowledge, and reconstructive possibilities. Fairclough (1992) argues that effective discourse analysis should be multi-dimensional. Although my dimensions differ to those of Fairclough, they ensure that the research findings are authentic for the period of time in which I have set the research. Furthermore, the reconstruction dimension to my analysis allows for an intervention of sorts into established understandings, expertise, and commonsense. Fairclough argues that any discourse analysis should have an intervention as it ensures that the argument presented has some resolution. So my research had clear strengths but it also had limitations. These limitations fell into two groups: methodological and theoretical.

20 In contrast, Ulrich Beck’s (1992) analysis of risk shows how societal conditions can be, on some level, produced through the application of knowledge.
21 In contrast, Nancy Lesko (2001) from the United States and Christine Griffin from the United Kingdom (1993, 1996) both explore the productive dimension of knowledge in their research.
22 Fairclough’s (1992) three dimensions are: textual practices, discursive practice, and social practices. My dimensions differ to suit my research questions and research methodology.
Addressing Limitations

The absence of a ‘youth voice’ in my research was a key methodological limitation. Not involving youth placed my research at risk of being called ‘youthless’ and unrelated to the realities experienced by youth (Wyn & White, 1997). However, I chose not to involve youth for ethical reasons – rather than deconstructing the actual lives of young people, I chose to deconstruct and reconstruct institutional knowledge.

Connected to the limitations of youthless research is another limitation tied to the methodology used. I had a risk, through discourse analysis, of making young people invisible through focusing on text, language, and ideology (see Wyn & White, 1998). Within my own research, I attempted to address this limitation by making youth the focus of my analysis. I used the key theoretical concepts (knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense) as points through which I could analyse the concept of ‘youth’. However, any discourse analysis also has potential theoretical limitations.

Through some forms of discourse analysis approaches, a researcher may ignore the materiality or the reality experienced by individuals; instead, these researchers may argue that discourse constructs and determines the lived reality of individuals (see Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). In other words, these researchers argue that everything an individual experiences as reality is discursive and limited by language. To counter this limitation, I followed the ideas of Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) and Valerie Walkerdine (1990), who argue that reality and the material exist before discourse. In this way, humans use and construct discourses to give meaning to reality and existence. Discourses and humans share a constitutive relationship similar to that shown by the arrows in Figure 1 (p.12) where both rely on, and imply, the other. I will show this theoretical understanding in my own writing by wording sentences in such a way that the message is conveyed that authors and others use discourses to construct ideas about youth, rather than discourses constructing, in themselves, reality.

A second potential theoretical limitation in my research arises from the work of Foucault (1977) and concerns the relationship between power and knowledge. This is also reflective of the first theoretical limitation and the idea that all reality is discursive. As I have mentioned earlier, Foucault’s presentation of the constitutive relationship between power and knowledge depicts individuals as objects, or consequences, of power, knowledge, and discourse (Al Amoudi, 2002; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Hoy, 1986b; Lacombe, 1996; Ransom, 1997). This perspective reifies discourse and shows humanity and reality to be the consequence of discourse (e.g. Jones, 1997). In such a way, authors construct discourses as agents, or subjects, and people as the objects, or consequences, of discourses. Alongside avoiding reifying discourses, I also attempted to counter this limitation by looking at both the moments in which authors construct young people as objects and the moments in which they construct young people as subjects (Foucault, 1983; Henriques, et al., 1998). My
focus on the construction of young people as subjects and objects fed into the reconstructive stage of my research, as I was able to explore the implications when writers constructed young people as object and/or subject.

Implications of My Methodology and Research

Before I started the research, I had the assumption that institutional constructions of criminally-deviant youth could be potentially harmful for youth. The questions that I designed and the theoretical and methodological approach I took from these questions allowed me to explore the implications of institutional constructions in Aotearoa/New Zealand for those young people seen as criminally- or potentially criminally-deviant. However, I did not leave my methodology at the exploration and analysis stage; instead, I moved my methodology on to a reconstructive stage and attempted to explore alternative constructions.

Hence, there are two implications of this methodology. First, there is the questioning of taken-for-granted truths, expertise, and commonsense. Second, there is the reconstruction of an alternative construction of criminal deviance in young people. I hope that my research will encourage those who read it to question the knowledges and practices that they have taken for granted for so long. In this way, I hope that my research, alongside other research in critical youth studies, will be a catalyst for change, particularly at the institutional level in the ways that ‘we’ understand young people and criminal deviance.
Chapter 3

Placing the Research in Context: Academic constructions of youth in theory and research

Adolescents’ status as raw material establishes adults as ‘engineers’ who know how to utilize raw materials to the best advantage, who will transform those unfinished materials into productions in their own image. Development means becoming like the developer.
(Lesko, 1996a, p.469)

In contemporary industrial and liberal societies, most adults define young people as those individuals in the process of becoming adult. These adults construct an understanding of young people with references to ‘development’ and ‘adolescence’, and developmental-psychological knowledge and theory permeate this commonsense notion (Besley, n.d., 2002; Wyn & White, 1997). In this chapter, I explore this developmental knowledge – both how it has been constructed in theory and literature, and how, in more recent times, it has been critiqued by researchers and authors in critical youth studies. I will show that many adults tend to use developmental-psychology to confine and locate youth in biological and social dimensions defined through age, and, using critical youth studies research, I will argue that a more contextualised understanding of young people is needed, which locates youth and adolescence in contexts of time, location, and knowledge.

Constructing Youth

Developmental-psychology re-emerged in the 1980s, from a period of stagnation, as the science, truth, and commonsense of adolescence and youth (Besley, 2002; Farrington, 2000; Wyn & White, 1997). Now theorists, researchers, practitioners and other adults use developmental-psychology to construct young people as developing, or changing, into adults, and they describe the developmental time of adolescence as a liminal space of becomingness (Lesko, 1996a, 1996b, 2001). In this state of becoming, youth experience change as they move away from childhood.

Developmental researchers typically use longitudinal research and empirical data to construct the becomingness of adolescence as a time of turmoil and vulnerability (c.f. Dodge, 2001). This construction is not a new construction; indeed, researchers in critical youth studies and human development (e.g. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; Furstenberg, 2000; Griffin, 1993, 1996; Lesko, 2001; Santrock, 2001) argue that contemporary representations of youth reflect, and are influenced by, the early theories of Granville Stanley Hall (1905). G.S. Hall argued that adolescence was a time of “storm and stress” (pp.xiii, xvi), which he verified
through a detailed statistical and literal measurement of young people’s anatomies. G.S. Hall, like contemporary theorists of adolescence, attempted to prove a difference between adolescents and adults (Besley, 2002; Wyn & White, 1997). The setting of age parameters around the phenomenon called ‘adolescence’ was one of the steps G.S. Hall took in this differentiation.

The Influence of Age
Like G.S. Hall’s theory, contemporary constructions of youth are dependent upon constructions of adulthood (Wyn & White, 1997). Many contemporary developmental researchers and theorists construct differences between youth and adults through references to age, the developing body, differing rights, and differing abilities (Furstenberg, 2000; Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; White, 1994). They apply this idea of youth as becoming to show adolescence as a series of biological and social ‘stages’ or movements into adulthood within aged-defined parameters of maturation (Lesko, 2001). In developmental stage-based theories (e.g. Elkind, 1979; Erikson, 1968; G. S. Hall, 1905; Piaget, 1973), the young person, or adolescent, gradually matures into an adult. As the young person matures, they are given more responsibilities.

Consequently, adults in authority restrict and dictate the rights and choices of youth through policies and practices based upon a developmental-psychological concept of age (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997). As such, adults in institutional settings control young people through ideas of age. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, policy defines young people as those between 12 and 25 years-of-age inclusive (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002). However, different age limitations based on theories of biological and social maturation also exist, each with its own definitions of when a young person is and is not an adult. For example, young people at the age of 16, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, no longer come under the responsibility of their guardians, can have sex, own a gun, and leave school. However, it is not until the age of 18, that young people can drink, gamble, and enter into contracts. Furthermore, policy also assumes that young people are financially dependent upon their guardians until the age of 25 (Ministry of Youth Affairs, n.d.) despite many young people seeing themselves as adults. The following series of young people’s comments, cited by Jane and James Ritchie in the 1980s, clearly shows this contradictory space:

‘When I was still at high school, I was old enough to vote, to marry, to drive a car, but I was still required to bring a note from Mummy to explain my absence from school.’

‘At my school, the teachers started telling us we were ‘responsible adults’ as soon as we reached the sixth form. It wasn’t our age, it was our academic qualifications that made us into adults.’

‘At fourteen years I was charged full price at the pictures but not allowed to see adult films’
(Ritchie & Ritchie, 1984, p.13)
Hence, there are many blurred boundaries between youth and adult, even when people use age as a definite defining mechanism. In adult understandings of youth, concepts of age and difference combine with biological and social understandings of youth to give a very complex picture (Besley, n.d.; Lesko, 1996a; Ritchie & Ritchie, 1984). However, adults applying ideas of age cannot define young people through references to age alone – there must be a biological and social dimension to that definition.

The Biological Dimension to Developmental-Psychological Constructions

A biological dimension to youth development is first apparent in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory. G.S. Hall ‘created’ a psychological-biological theory of adolescence in which he combined recapitulation theory and evolutionary theory to explain ‘biological’ degeneracy in young people (Lesko, 2001; Muuss, 1988). G.S. Hall constructed young people as biological adolescents experiencing a progressive staged development into adulthood.

The biological dimension of developmental-psychological constructions, such as G.S. Hall’s, attempts to explain what is biologically natural and universal for adolescents. In the 20th century, theorists have focused on the biological through emphasising puberty and abstract thought (c.f. Steinberg, 2000). In their theories, the biological dimension of adolescent development represents an inherent essence of all youth (Griffin, 1993). Hence, theorists and authors have constructed the pubescent and thinking adolescent as a young person in the process of physically becoming an adult. As Mary Bucholtz argues this can be both useful (as a theoretical concept to look at the differences between adults and adolescents) and problematic:

The emphasis on adolescence as a universal stage in the biological and psychological development of the individual usefully highlights selfhood as a process rather than a state, but it also inevitably frames young people primarily as not-yet finished human beings.

(Bucholtz, 2002, p.529)

Biological dimensions emphasize the incompleteness of adolescents as well as the lack of control adolescents have over their biological development. They are captive to their body, which is out of control because of raging hormones (G. S. Hall, 1905; Lesko, 1996a, 2001), and to their newly developed rational thought (Elkind, 1979).

Because many assume the biological dimension as universal, references to the biological dimension tend to be devoid of context and structural, material, and ideological conditions (Lesko, 1996b). Biological dimensions of development are also difficult to determine and are often marked more by social transitions rather than biological changes (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; Griffin, 1993).

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23 In recapitulation theory, the development of humankind is theorised in terms of race. Recapitulation theorists see humankind as developing from the savage races to the civilised Arian race.
The Social Dimension to Developmental-Psychological Constructions
When theorists apply a social dimension to development, they continue to concentrate on the ‘becomingness’ of youth. These theorists tend to focus on two key points: adult role/identity development and, associated to this, social transition. Many developmental theorists consider role/identity development as a socially universal and essential psychological feature of adolescence (c.f. Steinberg, 2000). Furthermore, in theories such as Erikson’s (1968), the psychosocial construction of identity development depicts an aged and staged progression to adulthood, whilst also assuming that young people are irrational, lacking individuality, and autonomy.

Theorists using role/identity development ideas construct the youth as lacking the skills to move fully into the adult role (White, 1994). Due to this ‘lack’, youth experiment with different roles and attempt to fill the void with peers (Wyn & White, 1997). Peers also provide a context for role experimentation (Erikson, 1968). Part of this role experimentation is the engagement of young people in risk behaviours (Irwin & Millstein, 1990). In effect, what young people experience is an “identity crisis” (Erikson, 1968, p.15) in which they are subjected to an individuation that ‘turns’ them from a socially-orientated child and youth into an autonomous individual (Wyn & White, 1997). Some theorists from a sociological standpoint (Emler & Reicher, 1995) also describe it as a time of turmoil when the adolescent experiences strain moving between the two differing roles.

Developmental theorists also construct the social dimension of adolescence as a time of transition where young people move into new social roles and take on new tasks and responsibilities (Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997). Transition is an extension to identity/role development; however, it differs through its focus on external social outcomes indicating adulthood (such as finishing secondary education) (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001) – whereas, identity/role development tends to focus on the internal ‘biological’ movement to adult autonomy. However, both identity/role development and transition focus on a single transition – the movement from childhood to adulthood.

Identity/role development and transition have ruminations in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory through his depiction of adolescence as the movement between animality (childhood) and humanity (adulthood) (Lesko, 1996b). Since G.S. Hall’s theory, developmental theorists have shown identity/role development and transition as natural and essential (Besley, 2002) and both are often shown through metaphors of “pathways” (Wyn & White, 1997, p.99) or developmental trajectories. Such a conception validates the application of longitudinal research by researchers (e.g. Farrington, 1997; Fergusson & Horwood, 2002; Fergusson, Horwood, & Nagin, 2000) as they follow, measure, and quantify the trajectories of young people.

Johanna Wyn and Rob White (1997) question the naturalness of the social dimension to developmental constructions. They argue that the focus on the movement to adulthood is
too restrictive. In particular, Wyn and White claim that there are many transitions between institutional contexts and statuses, and each, individually, define the adult role in often complex and contradictory ways:

The use of a concept of transitions which assumes that the process is simply from ‘youth’ to ‘adulthood’ does not take sufficient account of these complexities – of the multiple transitions involved, their synchrony, and the circularity (or more accurately, the spiraling nature) of the processes of ‘arrival’ and ‘departure’ at different statuses throughout life – leaving and reentering education or moving from employment to unemployment.

(Wyn & White, 1997, p.97)

Because of this, White (1994) argues that there is a need to separate biological transitions from socially-determined transitions. When this occurs, the relationship between youth and adult can be articulated and youth can be seen as a contextually-constructed social process (White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997). An exploration of the complexities of choice and transition within contemporary contexts surrounding young people is also important to any conceptualisation of youth (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001).

**Contextual Understandings of Youth**

In contrast to biological and social constructions of adolescence, we can use contextual understandings of youth to locate, not define, youth, in contexts of location, time, and knowledge. Theorists using a contextual understanding see ‘youth’ as a “flexible social category” (Pearson, 1994, p.1192) dependent upon society and the changing definitions of child and adult. In other words, youth is a fluid and “elastic concept … [meaning] different things at different times, and in different places” (Newburn, 1997, p.613). Consequently, a contextual understanding of youth attempts to show that the way that adult society understands and conceptualises ‘youth’ is dependent upon context. Whereas the word ‘adolescence’ implies a psychological and biological definition, the word ‘youth’ implies a sociological construction (Besley, n.d.).

Theorists using a contextual understanding of youth embed constructions of youth in contexts of time, location, and knowledge. These contexts interact with material and structural conditions to provide boundaries to, and possibilities for, the positions inhabited by youth (Emler & Reicher, 1995; Wyn & White, 1997). For this reason, a critique based on a contextual understanding of youth allows for the exploration of the implications for youth of constructions, particularly the structural, material, and ideological implications. It also allows for the critique of knowledge, where the analyst looks at how others have used knowledge to construct, not discover, the ‘Truth’ of youth. Often this can show a variety of contradictions
and complexities in a once assumed stable and coherent knowledge (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; Wyn & White, 2000)\textsuperscript{24}. Rather than providing an alternative construction to youth, contextual understandings allow the analyst to explore youth and the knowledge that constructs youth in context. It also allows the analyst to explore the complexity of ‘youth’ where the analyst sees youth as more than just passive objects of knowledge. A contextual understanding of youth is central to critical youth studies research (e.g. Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997) and underpins my own research. Part of this contextually-based exploration involves identifying how others have constructed the deviant youth in theory and knowledge.

The Deviant Youth

Wyn and White (2000) argue that contemporary society bases ‘commonsense’ ideas about youth and criminal deviance in developmental psychology. Hence, contemporary society tends to explain deviance with ideas about the individual rather than structural factors such as social strain, structural inequalities, and stigmatisation. Following developmental-psychological theories of adolescence, researchers into youth deviance see the time of adolescence as a time of risk and vulnerability to societal influences (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; G. S. Hall, 1905; Irwin & Millstein, 1990) and limited self-control (Emler & Reicher, 1995; Wyn & White, 2000).

These researchers tend to construct the deviant youth through developmental research (e.g. Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 2000; Furstenberg, 2000), developmental-psychological theory, and the consistent use of empirical and statistical data (e.g. Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 2000). This is evident in the Christchurch and Dunedin development studies (which I will later discuss in Chapter 5), where the researchers combine longitudinal research and empirical data to construct the deviant youth\textsuperscript{25}.

The Normally-Deviant Youth\textsuperscript{26}

Theorists constructing ideas of normal deviance tend to use developmental-psychological understandings of general adolescent development. These theorists often draw upon ideas in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory of storm and stress, Eric Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity development, and David Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development to describe the

\textsuperscript{24} For Wyn & White (2000), contradictions create even more limitations for young people. However, in contrast to this position, I want to later argue in Chapter 10 that contradictions open moments of possibility.

\textsuperscript{25} Empirical and statistical data also encompass much of what the adult public see and read about youth offending in media publications. Often the focus of authors in the media on statistical and empirical data creates a bias and distorted picture of youth through the focus on specific, often violent, crimes or status offences (age-related offences such as under-age drinking) (Cohen, 2002; Pearson, 1994). Media publications also distort youth offending through constructing the problem as new and out-of-control (Cohen, 2002; Glassner, 1999; Wyn & White, 1998).

\textsuperscript{26} The normally-deviant is a contradiction in terms because adult society tends to associate deviance as abnormality. In contrast, the normally deviant is both normal and deviant. I look at this contradiction further in Chapter 6.
normally-deviant as the ‘naughty’ youth going through a passing phase of deviance in adolescence (e.g. Moffitt, 1993). This young person is in the process of individualisation and is vulnerable to external influences (Wyn & White, 1997) whilst experimenting with their newly found individuality. As shown in the following quote, this experimentation is termed “risk taking” or the engagement in risk behaviours:

The behaviours associated with the major mortalities and morbidities of adolescents share a common theme: risk taking. Young people with limited or no experience engage in potentially destructive behaviours with or without knowing the consequences of their actions. Although some risk taking is necessary in the normal developmental process, too often the results of risk taking are disastrous. (Irwin & Millstein, 1990, p.339)

Wyn and White (1997) are critical of the connection between risk-taking and adolescence. They argue that the connection is too simplistic as it limits risk-taking to the time of adolescence:

… it is far too simplistic to characterise ‘risky behaviour’ as an inevitable part of growing up. Behaviours that are described as risky from the youth development perspective may be understood as the result of young people’s negotiation of the complexities of gender, class, race and age relations. The results may appear to be risky, but for the young people themselves they are simply a conventional response to a complex situation. (Wyn & White, 1997, p.70)

Furthermore, in their 1997 text, Wyn and White argue that risk-taking assumes that the young person is rationally able to choose between two alternatives. Although they are critical of psychological constructions, Wyn and White question whether this sort of rationality is possible during adolescence.

Constructions of youth through developmental-psychological theory also position youth as a social problem (Apple, 2001; Lesko, 2001; Santrock, 2001). Hence, the normally-deviant young person is vulnerable to societal influences whilst also being a potential threat to society – they are both the source and the victim of social problems and risk (Griffin, 1993, 1996; Newburn, 1997). Lesko (2001) argues that the construction of young people as a problem and, therefore, risk is evident throughout developmental-psychological theory.

For example, G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory of storm and stress depicts the youth as breaking away from a savage past (Griffin, 1993). This breakaway is psychologically and physically turbulent which affects the adolescent’s position of vulnerability; the adolescent becomes vulnerable to their ‘savage’ body and to the economic and social pressures of society. Any negative influence from society can potentially cause degeneracy in the adolescent creating a propensity to deviant behaviour (G. S. Hall, 1905). This leads to the adolescent becoming a problem for adult society.
This double risk is also evident in Erikson’s theory. Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity development associates adolescence with a time of crisis. The young person is in a state of struggle between developing an autonomous identity or being trapped in identity confusion. This youth strives to develop an autonomous identity and, because of this, engages in risk-taking behaviours. This leads to a social risk of the young person forming a deviant identity. Hence, identity development means vulnerability, problematic behaviour and potentially problematic outcomes. The same scenario can be found in Elkind.

Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development builds upon the work of Jean Piaget (1973). Elkind’s theory conceptualises adolescence as a time of out-of-control abstract thought. The troubling behaviour of adolescents reflects their lack of mastery over a developing abstract cognition. For normal adolescents, problem behaviour is normal because of an increased self-consciousness (the “imaginary audience” (p.93)), egocentrism, and self-delusion (“personal fable” (p.95)) (c.f. Irwin & Millstein, 1990).

Although these theories appear to argue for a universal construction of youth based on developmental-psychology they are contextual because they arose through time, location, and knowledge. Furthermore, each of these theorists has tended to base their theories on the white middle-class male youth. Hence, the adolescent they describe is a gendered, ethnic, socio-economic adolescent. Erikson (1968) even cautions about the applicability of his theory to other contexts; despite this caution, contemporary developmental writers (e.g. Kroger, 1989; Papalia & Olds, 1992; Santrock, 2001, 2002; Sigelman & Shaffer, 1991; Steinberg, 2000) continue to apply his theory and his concept of adolescent identity crisis. Now it is hard for adults to conceptualise adolescence without any reference to identity, egocentrism, storm and stress, and ideas of ‘normal’ deviance.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, neoliberal policies such as the Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and the Children, Young Persons and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989 focus on the normally-deviant youth. Policy makers and practitioners, using the justice penology, design interventions with the youth’s vulnerability in mind as they ‘gently’ guide the youth into rational thought and the adult role. This youth will potentially be a productive member of adult society and interventions aim to foster this potentiality. However, this is not the case for all youth, and researchers and practitioners also use developmental psychology to divide youth.

When we apply theories of adolescent development, we run the ‘risk’ of dividing youth (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001). This particularly happens when individuals take theories out of context and generalise the ideas through to all youth. First, those applying developmental knowledge run a risk of dividing youth on a level of gender, ethnicity and so forth where they apply theories constructed on a normality of a particular group of male youth onto all youth. Second, those applying developmental knowledge also tend to divide ‘normal’ youth from ‘abnormal’ youth.
The Abnormally-Deviant Youth

Youth justice policies in Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as the Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) focus on the abnormally-deviant youth. This young person is extremely vulnerable from a very young age and has a potentiality of pathology. Whereas, the normally-deviant youth engages in risk behaviours, the abnormally-deviant is commonly called the ‘youth-at-risk’. Like the normally-deviant, the youth-at-risk is both vulnerable and a potential threat to society (Poynting & White, 2004).

However, the youth’s pathology or the pathology of the youth’s family raises this dual risk. Unlike the normally-deviant, this youth is abnormal and pathological, and through a developmental logic, there is a tendency for many policy makers and developmental researchers to describe their deviance as lifelong (Wyn & White, 1997). They are at risk of abnormal development and problematic pathways and transition/s into adulthood (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997). The ‘story’ of pathology is evident in developmental theories of deviance.

Early developmental theories into abnormal deviance use medical knowledge alongside developmental psychology and criminology to construct the abnormally-deviant youth (Farrington, 2000; Lundman, 2001). Through combining each of these knowledges, theorists are able to construct a ‘simple’ explanation of youth deviance, which connects deviance to other pathologies. Contemporary explanations of the youth-at-risk continue to combine the medical, psychological, and social. The “biopsychosocial” model of deviance created by Charles Irwin and Susan Millstein (1990, p.339) is an example of such a model. Now, combination of theory, research, and statistics has meant that a “science” (Dodge, 2001, p.63), or expertise, has developed around the abnormally-deviant youth.

Unlike the normally-deviant youth, who only offends in adolescence, the abnormally-deviant displays problem behaviours early in their childhood. Results from the Sommerville-Cambridge intervention found that abnormally-deviant youth could be identified as early as 10 years-of-age (cited in Farrington, 1997). More recently, the Australian Temperament Project (Dussuyer, 2002) found that problem behaviours leading to at-risk behaviours in adolescence manifested as early as five years-of-age. In these studies, potentially ‘pathological’ children are those who exhibit “risk factors” in their lives (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 1997; McLaren, 2000, 2002; Wasserman et al., 2003).

Risk factors exist across two domains: the individual and the social environment (the family, peer group, and community) (Farrington, 1997; Fergusson & Horwood, 1996; Fergusson, Horwood, & Lynskey, 1993; McLaren, 2000, 2002; Moffitt, 1993, 1994; Wasserman, et al., 2003). Often risk factors reflect structural and material inequalities (Poynting & White, 2004; White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004). Practitioners can use the presence of one or more risk factors to predict a child’s potentiality for offending (Farrington, 2000; McLaren, 2000, 2002;
Closely connected to risk factors are “protective factors” (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; Farrington, 2000; McLaren, 2002). Protective factors moderate and mediate the potential effects of risk factors and promote the development of resilience within the young person (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001). Risk and protective factors change throughout the youth’s life and have different effects at different times (Abbott, 1997; Dodge, 2001; Maxwell & Morris, 2002b). This does not stop practitioners and researchers using risk factors to divide and define youth.

When adults use risk factors to separate abnormal youth from normal youth there is a risk of marginalizing groups of youth. This is particularly so for youth in minority societal groups (Poynting & White, 2004; White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997). Furthermore, although context can be identified as a risk factor (e.g. family and community) many developmental thinkers apply a generalised construction of youth-at-risk to different groups of marginalised youth (White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004). Poynting and White (2004) argue that this can potentially ‘create’ deviant youth. Even in New Zealand policy (e.g. Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002), it is contended that risk identification could possibly stigmatise young people and encourage them into deviance.

The Socially-Created Deviant

In contrast, some researchers have used sociological theory to construct the deviant youth in relation to social processes such as stigmatisation (labelling theory (Becker, 1963)), modernisation, and subcultural resistance. Stigmatisation occurs when a ‘society’ or community ‘labels’ an individual’s behaviour as deviant (Becker, 1963, 1985; Lemert, 1985; Schur, 1984). In this context, ‘society’ ascribes the label ‘deviant’ onto the individual (Mankoff, 1985). In criminal deviance, labelling results from a combination of individual behaviour, or identified potential risk, and societal reaction. Deviance is …

not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application of others’ rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.
(Becker, 1963, p.9, author’s emphasis)

We can use labelling theory to describe what happens to the abnormally-deviant youth when practitioners use risk factors to identify and intervene into deviant behaviour (societal reactions) but, despite good intentions, the youth continues to offend (c.f. McCord, 2002). In this way, labelling theory allows researchers to give a context to youth deviance – the reaction of a ‘society’. However, others (Mankoff, 1985; Pearson, 1994) have criticised labelling theory because it does not explain the motivations of deviant individuals. Nor does it explore the meanings that deviant individuals give to deviant behaviour and the processes
by which ‘society’ sanctions a particular type of behaviour as ‘deviant’ (Mankoff, 1985; Pearson, 1994).

Labelling theory attempts to explain the stigmatisation of any individual or group in society. In contrast, some thinkers have focused on the effects of modernisation to explain youth deviance. Like G.S. Hall (1905), these thinkers see youth deviance as reflecting the instability of contemporary society (Glassner, 1999; Pearson, 1994) and they describe it in three differing ways – consequence, problem, and metaphor. In the first, the deviance of youth is seen as a consequence of an unstable society (c.f. Wyn & White, 2000). Consequently, thinkers (e.g. Dekker, 2002) looking at youth deviance romanticise past conceptions of society and see these as idealistic. Second, youth crime is conceptualised as a problem, which only occurs in societies that have been through modernisation. As a problem, thinkers looking at youth deviance romanticise past conceptions of youth and adolescence and see these as idealistic (Pearson, 1994). Third, the deviance of youth is seen as a metaphor for wider social problems associated with modernisation (Griffin, 1993; Pearson, 1994). Reflecting G. S. Hall’s (1905) theory, thinkers looking at youth deviance associate the period of adolescence with the development of civilisation. In this association, the period of adolescence is a time of turmoil and rupture observable in youth and in society.

Those applying sociological understanding may also use subcultural resistance to conceptualise youth deviance. Subcultural theories stem from the work of the Chicago School (Muncie, 1999). The Chicago School conceptualised subcultures as a form of fashion and style in which young people engaged. Later, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (the Birmingham School) in Britain developed subcultural theory further to explain youth deviance in terms of struggle and resistance (Clarke, S. Hall, Jefferson, & Roberts, 1993; S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993a; Muncie, 1999; Rock, 1997). To some extent, subcultural theory, as developed from the Birmingham School, expands on the idea that modernisation and youth deviance are connected. This is because these subcultural theorists explicitly concentrate on youth cultures in post-war contemporary industrial society and the development of these cultures within technological environments (fordism, consumerism, music, style, and so forth) in which they reside (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b).

A subcultural theory of youth deviance concentrates on the class struggles that exist within post-war contemporary industrial societies (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Muncie, 1999; Rock, 1997)27. Subcultural theorists from the Birmingham tradition (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b) examine and explore the deviant behaviours of working-class young people and theorise

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27 This view is very much from the Birmingham School tradition. Over the last twenty years, various subcultural researchers (e.g. Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Thornton, 1995) have questioned the Birmingham focus on class and on resistance. These researchers argue that subcultures can now be seen as classless and centred more on conceptions of style and space. However, this view is not without opposition. Tracy Shildrick & Robert MacDonald (2006) argue that we should continue to use the Birmingham School’s analysis of class and subculture as it allows for the recognition of resistance, difference, and inequality. In my research, I chose to focus on the Birmingham tradition of subcultural theory because of the strong articulation of resistance – a concept in which I go on to develop in Chapter 9.
these behaviours as a form of class resistance (Besley, n.d.; Clarke, et al., 1993; Muncie, 1999). However, there is an explicit hopelessness within subcultural explanations as the resistance exercised by working-class youth does not lead to change; instead, subcultural resistance reconstitutes and reproduces the working-class position which these young people occupy (Muncie, 1999). Indeed, even the attachment of the word ‘sub’ to culture by subcultural theorists implies that these young people are subordinate and inferior to the middle-class position and, as such, can never attain the position that they are resisting – even their resistance is hopeless as it is powerless (see Clarke, et al., 1993).

In contrast, subcultural theorists (e.g. Clarke, et al., 1993) construct the resistance exercised by middle-class youth as a “counter culture” in which middle-class young people change and influence the society in which they live. As such, subcultural thinkers and theories construct two groups of young people – the middle-class (with power) and the working-class (without power who exercise this ‘lack’ in resistance). Because of this, these theorists (Besley, n.d.; Muncie, 1999) have criticised subcultural theories for a disempowering focus on resistance. Instead, some critical youth studies theorists (e.g. Besley, n.d.) argue that researchers should look at deviance differently to avoid oppositional explanations between power and resistance. However, it is possible that the problem with subcultural theories of resistance is not the focus on resistance but the predetermined theories and assumptions about class on which they are based (Muncie, 1999) and a theorisation of oppositional power and resistance. The focus on class in traditional subcultural theories does not recognise other structural marginalisations, such as gender and ethnicity (McRobbie & Garber, 1993; Muncie, 1999), and the possible complexities that exist within conceptions of power and resistance. In other words, resistance may not be an oppositional reaction related only to reproduction of social conditions. Resistance may also be conceptualised as a productive force (Foucault, 1980e).

Like references to developmental-psychology, references to stigmatisation, modernisation, and subcultural resistance give us an answer and a reasoning to the phenomenon of youth crime. Each of these ‘knowledges’ has its own construction of youth and of youth crime and comes with particular implications for youth and adult society. With its reference to contextual understandings of youth, critical youth studies research allows for the exploration and critique of these knowledges and their implications.

**Implications of Youth Theory**

Wyn and White (1997) argue that developmental-psychological understandings of youth objectify, categorise, and judge young people. When adults apply developmental-psychological understanding of youth, they position youth as powerless and ignore any power and agency that young people may have (Wyn & White, 1997). Theoretical constructions of youth are also ‘youthless’ because they do not include the perspectives and opinions of young people. Indeed, the way that adults see young people in theory is often
contradictory to the way that young people see themselves (Tupuola, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997).

Wyn and White (1997) also argue in particular that many adult institutions in society marginalise young people in their application of developmental knowledge. In effect, adults in these institutions enforce an unequal power relationship between young people and themselves in which they render young people powerless (c.f. Apple, 2001; Furstenberg, 2000). Griffin (1993) describes this power relationship as ‘hegemonic’ where adults force an ideology of difference upon young people – subsequently, dividing youth from themselves (see also Dwyer & Wyn, 2001). To do this, these adults use, in particular, differences of age and developmental ability which allow them to define who has access to, whilst marginalising young people from, activities of mainstream adult life (e.g. driving, voting, and drinking) (White, 1994).

Adult-based institutional control of youth deviance is another technique of hegemonic marginalisation. Through developmental-psychological knowledge, many adults in authority construct young people as lacking the self-control of adults and, consequently, engaging in deviance. This leads to the development of interventions aimed at developing self-control (Wyn & White, 2000) or providing institutional control (Panelli, et al., 2002; White, 1996; Wyn & White, 1997). Further, adults in authority use developmental-psychological knowledge to enforce, and argue for, age-based interventions (Fitzgerald, 2003; Panelli, et al., 2002) in two adult-controlled environments – the family and the school (Fitzgerald, 2003; White & Wyn, 2004).

Theories on the socially-created deviant also have elements of marginalisation and dependence. Whether theorists describe the socially-created deviant in terms of stigmatisation, modernisation, or subcultural resistance, the young person is seen as ‘lacking’ power. This reinforces a dependence between adults and young people where young people are dependent on adults. Hence, in these explanations, the young person is devoid of power or exercising their lack of power in resistance.

Consequently, researchers from a critical youth studies perspective (e.g. Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997) argue that popular constructions of youth position young people as powerless and marginal. By positioning youth as powerless, adults are then able to control young people. Some researchers (e.g. Nairn, 2001; White, 1996, 1998; Wyn & White, 1998), have posed a counter-argument to this where they encourage adults to empower youth and to give youth opportunities to participate. However, there is a need to recognise that these adults tend to define what ‘participation’ is and how young people can participate (Bessant & Hil, 2003; White & Wyn, 2004).

In effect, there are differing levels of participation (White & Wyn, 2004) in which adults in authority determine the extent of youth participation. In this context, real participation would
involve adult society involving young people “meaningfully” (Nairn, 2001, p.25) in decisions about their own lives. However, even in this ‘real’ participation, there is a level of definition and control. Furthermore, even when adults in authority create opportunities for meaningful participation, they tend to define and separate youth into those who can participate and those who cannot (White & Wyn, 2004).

So, we do need to find ways of involving youth in society. However, these solutions may not be in developmental knowledge. Instead, we need to explore alternative conceptions of youth deviance in an attempt to devise alternative solutions which move away from positioning adults as powerful and youth as dependent. This movement would involve a return back to knowledge, where researchers critique and deconstruct knowledge whilst acknowledging the interplay between knowledge and power.

Furthermore, we need to recognise that the resolution of marginalisation is more complex than those who are doing the marginalising (adults) providing opportunities to the marginalised (youth) to move out of their marginalisation. To do this, we need to recognise that power has an opposing force – resistance (Foucault, 1980e). This resistance is not a subcultural lack but a productive force. Through exploring resistance, we are able to see that marginalisation is not a final effect; marginalisation, itself, has structural, material, and ideological implications. Resistance can be productive and reproductive. It may not lead to a direct change but provides a point of agency for the young person.

I did not find this account of resistance in the reviewed literature. Theorists looking at resistance showed it reinforcing marginal positionings. Furthermore, although some researchers (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Hil & Bessant, 1999) have explored the relationship between adult society and youth resistance, these researchers have yet to explore the productive potential of resistance, particularly concerning the social construction of understandings or knowledge. Instead, these researchers have explored the reactive deviance of young people to adults, institutional practices of control, and class structures as it is demonstrated in the ‘lack’ of power – or reactive resistance. In this thesis, I argue that resistance is central to understanding deviance and that this resistance is more complex than a reaction to a position of hopelessness. Instead, resistance is productive and implies a form of agency on the part of the young person.

Critical youth studies research establishes some of the ways in which researchers can undertake an analysis of knowledge, power, and resistance. First, researchers should move beyond constructing youth to focusing on the established relationships between adult society and young people (Wyn & White, 1997). Second, researchers should investigate and include context in their research (Lesko, 1996b; White, 2003). These contexts should include time, location, and knowledge. Finally, researchers should see youth as active participants and the ‘development’ (or growth) of young people as contingent and embedded in context (Lesko, 2001; White, 2003).
Most writers looking at young people and youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand focus on constructing youth through developmental-psychological knowledge; very few seek to question or critique these constructions. In contrast, critical youth studies researchers (e.g. Griffin, 1993; White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1997, 2000) attempt to expose the structural and material effects of constructions for youth. However, this can also have a deterministic effect due to the overemphasis of structural constructs and hegemonic marginalisation (Hil & Bessant, 1999). So, when researchers focus on structural or material implications and hegemonic marginalisation they risk ignoring any conception of productive resistance. However, this does not mean that researchers should omit structural and material implications. Instead, researchers should explore resistance in the context of structural and material conditions. This is because resistance is embedded in context.

Furthermore, some critical youth studies researchers (such as Griffin, 1993; Wyn & White, 1997) neglect, or present in an abstract manner, implications connected to power, knowledge, and resistance. These researchers bury these implications within the structural or material effects or describe them as an effect of structural conditions. However, it is possible that the application of knowledge as ‘Truth’ produces and reproduces these implications (c.f. Beals, 2004). For this reason, there is a need for researchers to explore the knowledge in the contexts in which it occurs, that of institutions. Additionally, researchers should avoid the possible deterministic implications of critical youth studies research through directly looking at power and at possible sites of resistance. It is this direction in which I wish to take my research. In the following chapter, I start to present the findings of my research in order to examine these theoretical ideas and gaps.

28 In 2002, there were two New Zealand publications that attempted to apply a critical analysis to constructions of youth (i.e. L. T. Smith, et al., 2002) and youth deviance (i.e. Panelli, et al., 2002).
Chapter 4

Constructing and Dividing Youth: The abnormally-deviant youth

‘You’re stealing from yourself, no one else,’ he tells Robert. ‘You’re stealing your own future. If you keep on the way you’re headed, you can only end up in one of two places, the cemetery, or the penitentiary’. (Humes, 1996, pp.38)

I established in Chapter 3 that adults tend to use a knowledge of adolescence and/or youth to establish differences. This is indicative of the ways in which people, in general, use, and apply, knowledge. Taking this further, individuals and groups use knowledge as a dividing tool to define and separate members in a society into those who can participate and those who cannot participate (Foucault, 1972b; Rabinow, 1984). Foucault (1983) argues that contemporary society tends to use a knowledge of abnormality and normality in “dividing practices” (p.208) to govern and control different groups. In this context, societal groups apply dividing practices to prohibit and exclude the voice of particular groups in the social construction of truth and in societal participation.

In the context of youth and young people, many adults apply a knowledge of difference and adolescence to divide young people across two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the age of young people. In this dimension, all young people are defined as different to adults and as having an immaturity. Young people’s status as immature youth excludes them, momentarily, from full participation in meaning-making and adult society. The momentary ‘nature’ of this exclusion means that at adult-defined times (such as an age specified in policy or transition into the workplace) the young person can take on the position of an adult.

The second dimension centres on a knowledge of abnormality and normality. This dimension does not contain a momentary point. Instead, those applying this knowledge in adult society define some young people as different and abnormal even before, and beyond, the biological beginning of adolescence. Hence, young people are positioned, or even trapped, in an abnormality or pathology. Using this knowledge, adults in authority are able to exclude particular groups of young people, even as adults, from full societal participation.
Across the texts I analysed, authors and writers attempted to define the differences in, and between, children and young people. As they attempted to come to terms with the series of extraordinary crimes, there was a tendency to focus on abnormality in order to shift the causes, or blame, from general social structures to abnormal ‘factors’ of development. Authors tended to describe and define two different groups of deviant youth – the abnormally-deviant and the normally-deviant. Through this definition, within institutional writings, they reinforced an idea and ‘Truth’ that deviance was abnormal in society. As such, authors were able to go further to argue that some young people (the ones that start deviant behaviour early on in life and continue outside of the limits of adolescence) were more abnormal than others. For these authors, ‘society’ needed to define and control these young people in order to maintain stability. An illustration of this comes in a headline from a feature article published in the media context in 2002. Here, Phil Taylor focuses on locating the cause/s of abnormality in young people (nature or nurture). However, he implies that abnormality is not the ‘fault’ of normal families who have normal children – rather it is a combination of abnormal genes and abnormal upbringing:

Born bad or brought up to be bad?  
(P. Taylor, 2002a)

In the following two chapters, I present the findings of my research on institutional publications in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2002. I focus on the constructions of abnormality and normality because authors and commentators used this division to communicate and apply a knowledge of deviance. In particular, writers used a knowledge of deviance and development in institutional texts to focus on abnormally-deviant youth. In a way, they used this construction as a clearly defined and visible maker to construct both the normal and the abnormal deviant (c.f. Jones, 1999). So, in this chapter, I explore constructions of abnormal deviant youth. These constructions were located in discussions of developmental psychology, risk, and education.

**Disguising Pathology: Psychology and risk in constructions of the abnormally-deviant young people**

Those writing about abnormal deviance in 2002 used a language of trajectories, pathways, and growth to construct the abnormally-deviant youth. As such, they constructed criminality as an effect of pathological developmental outcomes. In this construction, developmental conditions influence and affect the young person and the young person's susceptibility to criminality. However, the language they used to construct these young people did not explicitly focus on pathology. Instead, examining outcomes coincided with a language of risk

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I have used the words to ‘author’ and ‘writer’ to generally refer to the producers of texts (both written and recorded). Included within the words ‘author’ and ‘writer’ are the other commentators, experts, and young people cited by authors.
where writers focused on the potential risk of criminality to construct the deviant youth as the ‘youth-at-risk’. Furthermore, as the following quote from a media feature article demonstrates, when those writing constructed the young person as ‘at risk’, they linked it to a variety of pathological outcomes or societal problems – not just crime:


Through focusing on “indicators” found in “research”, opinions of practitioners in youth justice, and a “common sense” of youth crime, writers fused together notions of development and growth with ideas of pathology and becomingness. In this construction, the young person developed into (rather than being born into) pathology and abnormality. Through focusing on pathology as an outcome, writers implied that all young people could, in some way, have the ‘same’ outcomes in life and that the deviance of some young people (whether it be crime or any other pathological behaviour) was due to factors inhibiting them from reaching these ‘same’ outcomes. It was due to pathological development.

Many authors explicitly acknowledged the ‘development’ of abnormal criminal deviance in young people through using the word ‘risk’ in constructions of youth as abnormally-deviant. In the literal sense, when authors applied the word ‘risk’, they focused on the past and the present to identify the future. They associated risk with pathology through implying that risk was a negative construct that unpredictably threatened New Zealand society. Hence, the term ‘youth-at-risk’ made apparent two dimensions to risk – the youth’s own vulnerability to pathological outcomes and the threat that the youth (and their potential pathology) posed to society. This double risk is explicitly evident in the following quote from a local government programme evaluation. Within this quote, the Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council and Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services refer to this double risk as, first, the “safety” of young people (their personal risk) and, second, the “threatening” behaviour of young people to the “public” (the social risk):

This pilot was initiated due to increased concerns regarding the safety of unsupervised young people in the city late at night. It was also a response to concerns regarding the rising number of young people who were threatening public safety, causing property damage and committing other offences. (Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, p.5)

By focusing on risk, those writing about abnormal deviance described the abnormality of the youth-at-risk in terms of cause and effect. In this construction, risk factors caused adverse deviant outcomes. The following quote from an academic journal article is evidence of this. David Ferguson, Nicola Swain-Campbell, and John Horwood attempt to argue here that
negative peer affiliations cause criminality and they imply that crime is a clear pathological outcome of pathological development:

This analysis strongly suggested that the overwhelming direction of causation was for peer affiliations to influence crime rather than crime influencing peer affiliations. (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.429, my emphasis)

Authors developed persuasive arguments through focusing on risk and development. In this way, they avoided any negative connotations evident through a direct focus on pathology. Instead, by focusing on risk and development, they were able to ‘empower’ adults with knowledge – through developmental knowledge adults could intervene and control development. That is, the combination of risk and development led to a logical argument by authors – because young people are growing, because they are born with the same potential, and because deviant behaviour has causes, then adults can identify these young people and counter risk factors. Adults could control the potentiality of development. The following quote from a governmental ministerial report shows the power in risk factors knowledge. Although the Ministry of Justice is retrospectively reflecting on the development of criminal pathology, it clearly implies that, if practitioners had a knowledge of “static” (unchangeable) “risk factors”, they could have “predicted” this young person’s outcomes:

However, as xxxxxxxxxxx was the only offender to exhibit two of the static risk factors, he was the only young person who was at high-risk of offending and for whom agencies could have predicted that he would continue to offend. (Ministry of Justice, 2002b, pp.6-7, my emphasis)

Although those writing about abnormal deviance grouped risk factors differently30, they generally used risk factors to refer to individual attributes (those psychological and biological factors found within the young person) and social environmental attributes (those factors found outside the young person within the family, peer group, school, and community). The following quote from an academic conference paper discusses some of these risk factors. Philip Kilmister and Brenda Baxter use international research to validate their argument that the social environment (the family and the school) is a source of risk for the development of pathological (“antisocial and criminal”) behaviours:

Risk factors (National Crime Prevention, 1999) associated with antisocial and criminal behaviours highlight a range of family factors – such as family violence and disharmony, father absence, negative interaction, poor supervision, child rejection and neglect – as well as some negative school factors which are instrumental in limiting the child’s ability to feel a sense of belonging or to succeed. (Kilmister & Baxter, 2002b, p.7)

Although some authors used these two sets of risk factors to discuss the differing roles of nature and nurture (e.g. Caspi et al., 2002; P. Taylor, 2002a), many authors argued that the

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30 Across texts authors grouped similar risk factors together. However, they tended to give these groups different names depending on the audience or on the expertise referenced.
social environment nurtured any individual predisposition to criminal deviance. Conversely, many authors would also argue that practitioners could use the social environment as a tool of intervention into any individual predispositions. For example, in the following media feature article, Taylor examines psychological research (expertise) to ascertain whether it is the genes or nurturing of a young person that leads to criminal deviance. He concludes that the environment asserts more power over the development of criminal deviance in the young person – even when there appears to be some genetic influence:

But don’t rush to proclaim nature the victor over nurture. The gene seemed to have no bearing on a propensity for violence in those who were not maltreated as children. (P. Taylor, 2002a, p.C5)

The next quote gives an idea of the intertextuality of texts and institutions. Published in an academic journal, Avshalom Caspi and colleagues present research findings shown in the above citation. Although they ascertain a link between genetic predisposition and crime, they focus their findings on the opposite – the genetic ‘resilience’ in young people:

Maltreated children with a genotype conferring high levels of MAOA [genetic] expression were less likely to develop antisocial problems. These findings may partly explain why not all victims of maltreatment grow up to victimise others, and they provide epidemiological evidence that genotypes can moderate children’s sensitivity to environmental insults. (Caspi et al., 2002, p.851)

When writers argued that the environment ‘nurtured’ any predisposition to criminal deviance, they endorsed the trajectory idea central to developmental theory in which criminal deviance was the consequence of time (development) and factors (risk). In this way, they implied that no-one was born a criminal; instead, they implied that children were born innocent and deviance was a consequence of pathological socialisation over time. Any ‘resilience’ to pathological socialisation was located within the individual or other mechanisms of socialisation (such as the school). In this way, whether a young person became deviant or not was out of the young person’s control – they were a product of nature and nurture and an effect of risk factors. In this way, writers positioned young people as objects upon which risk factors and the environment worked. Consequently, they argued that the family and the community were central environmental risk factors.

**The Family and the Community**

Across institutional contexts, authors constructed the family as a source of risk and a cause of pathological outcomes. They described families (particularly one-parent, or two-parent Māori families31) living in lower socio-economic conditions as environments of risk negatively influencing the development of young people. In the following extract, written in a policy document in 2002, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development locate the

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31 To a lesser extent, authors associated Pacific families with youth offending.
family as a key source of dysfunction and pathology. They explicitly mention “healthy development and socialisation” as well as “life outcomes” as key functions of the family and describe dysfunctional families as environments of “inappropriate parenting”, “abuse”, “neglect”, and “poverty”:

Promoting and facilitating the health and well-being of children is not only critical to their healthy development and socialisation, but fundamental to the prevention of poor life outcomes, including youth offending. Among the strongest predictors of youth offending are inadequate or inappropriate parenting, child abuse and neglect, early childhood cognitive or behaviour problems, and family poverty. (Brown, 1999). (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.26)

As the previous quotation shows, many authors connected socio-economic factors to families and the communities in which the family resided. Rather than being dysfunctional, they would convey these families as being disadvantaged due to their economic position. In turn, this disadvantage led to dysfunction and pathological outcomes in the family and in the children. Using this context, authors described crime as an outcome of desire and want. The following quotation from a media feature article explicitly shows this when the interviewed lawyer argues that crime is a “lower socio-economic” activity of “people who have little and … want more”:

[Former youth court lawyer:] ‘But for the most part, most crime comes from the lower socio-economic groups - people who have little and, of course, they want more’. (M. Tait, 2002a, p.A7)

**Ethnicity and Gender**

Authors also attributed socio-economic conditions to the disproportionate number of young Māori offenders in the youth justice system. Hence, they did not explicitly construct ethnic crime as an effect of ethnicity; rather, they connected ethnic crime to socio-economic disadvantage. In rare instances, authors would imply a link to ethnicity through locating a loss of cultural identity as a risk factor. This risk factor was only evident in discussions on Māori and Pacific crime. In this way, these authors implied that ethnicity was only a ‘problem’ for non-European youth. In the following example from an academic book chapter, Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris make an intertextual reference to a longitudinal study to describe how “social deprivation” and the police focus on ethnic groups leads to “higher official crime figures” for ethnic groups:

Fergusson, Horwood, and Lynskey (1993) attribute the higher official crime figures for Māori to both social deprivation and to a greater probability of being reported to the police and dealt with ‘officially’ by them. (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.204)

Those writing about ethnicity and crime implied that Māori young people and their families were pathological sites of risk. In doing this, they used statistics, about the ethnic composition of deviant youth, and focused on ‘culturally-inclusive’ intervention programmes.
In this way, they implied a direct association between ethnicity and risk. This argument justified practitioners, such as the police, identifying young Māori as offenders and formally processing them through the youth justice system (as shown in the previous extract)\(^{32}\). The following example from a local government evaluation shows the use of statistics to emphasize ethnic crime rates:

The majority (54.3\%) of referrals were Māori. This is disproportionate to the proportion of Māori in the Christchurch population (7.1\%).

(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, p.6)

In contrast to ethnicity, authors directly associated gender with risk. However, their connections between gender and risk also had covert or implied implications – particularly for young women. For example, in the following extract from a government policy document, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development directly associate gender with crime by arguing that “being female” is a “protective factor” (a factor that reduces the likelihood of pathological outcomes). However, within this argument, they also imply that female offending is “more” pathological and of deeper concern for adult society:

Being female is a significant protective factor … Notwithstanding this, concern has been expressed, particularly by practitioners such as the Police, that offending by young females is becoming more serious and violent.

(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.12)

Generalising the offending ‘nature’ of males to all young people was a second way that authors implied an abnormality to the offending, and even non-offending, by females. The following extract from a media feature article shows this generalisation. Through describing the dysfunctional family, the interviewed expert uses the masculine pronoun, thus implying that deviant young men tend to offend:

People have to take responsibility but it’s a matter of how you get them to do it,’ says Detective Sergeant Steve O’Connor, youth coordinator for the Hutt district. ‘You can’t make someone do something they don’t have the skills to do. It’s the same with (parenting) kids. ‘I want you to look after that kid, bring him up correctly, otherwise you will be punished’ -- it doesn’t work. If they don’t have the skills, energy or motivation, then how do they do it? That’s what we’re working with’


In any construction of youth offending, readers could be forgiven if they automatically assumed that female offending showed an abnormality with the young woman’s gendered character. Readers could even be forgiven if they assumed that the offending young person was ‘naturally’ a male. However, authors needed to give readers more information so that readers could ascertain whether the offending male was normal or abnormal. To do this,

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\(^{32}\) Furthermore, in 2004, Maxwell and colleagues found that New Zealand police, without evidence of any criminal activity, were more likely to identify young Māori as criminally-deviant than any other ethnic group.
authors would identify the presence of other risk factors in a young male’s life (including ethnicity).

For young males, risk factors led to deviance. However, the presence of risk factors in a young woman meant something different. Those writing about gender and crime constructed the at-risk female as being a risk and threat to society because she could nurture future criminals. They identified young women as the teen mothers of young criminals and the future victims of domestic violence. In the following excerpt from a radio commentary, Steven Price refers to a government report in which at-risk girls ("girls from disadvantaged families") are seen as being “likely” to parent the “criminals of the future”:

And the Herald’s Brian Rudman seems to be the only journalist to mention Matt Robson’s ‘About Time’ report from last year that advocates targeting help at young ill-educated girls from disadvantaged families who are on alcohol or drugs. It’s their children who are likely to be the criminals of the future.

(Price, 2002, para.17)

Hence, through using risk factors, authors constructed the abnormally-deviant young person as a young male from a dysfunctional and/or disadvantaged family living in a disadvantaged community. Additionally, they assumed, or implied, that this young person would most likely be Māori – indeed, with the exception of the extraordinary death of Kenneth Pigott (which involved young Māori women); these traits were present in most of the youth crimes of 2001/2. The following extract from a current affairs article provides an example of this type of description. In this extract, Hamish Carnachan combines the family environment with individual risk factors to position the young person as a pathological consequence of negative development. The trajectory metaphor is evident through the references to the young person going “off the rails”:

Over the course of his 13 years he [a young Māori male] has experienced such neglect and such a hostile upbringing that it wasn’t simply a matter of if he was going to go off the rails but when. He is the son of a violent father, an abused and battered mother, and a product of a wholly dysfunctional family unit.

(Carnachan, 2002, p.54, author’s emphasis)

Consequently, those producing texts about youth crime in 2002 constructed the abnormally-deviant young person as an object lacking power. This young person was dependent upon adult society for healthy development and any necessary intervention into risk factors. Writers tended to explicitly construct this lack of power as a risk factor – lack of self-control.

**Power and Self-Control**

Across the institutional contexts, writers discussing abnormal deviance described a lack of self-control as an explicit risk factor present in abnormally-deviant youth which manifested in childhood and in institutions such as the school (institutions that require some self-discipline). The following extract taken from an academic conference paper shows this. Paul Kennedy describes abnormally-deviant young people as “failing at … school” because
of deficits in their brains. He argues that this lack can be tracked back to the functioning of the brain and implies that the young person is at fault because he or she is “using the executive functions of the brain for things other than schoolwork”:

Teachers will recognise, in one form or another, behaviours exhibited by students who are failing at their school. Hollin and Howells (1996, pp.31,32) state ‘the ‘executive functions’ of the brain, located in the frontal lobes, include sustaining attention and concentration, abstract reasoning and concept formation, anticipation and planning, self monitoring of behaviour and inhibition of inappropriate or impulsive behaviour ... Deficits in these executive functions are conducive to low measured intelligence and to offending.’ Youth who are caught up in the offending cycle are often using the executive functions of the brain for things other than schoolwork. This seriously detracts from their ability to do well at school. (Kennedy, 2002, p.3)

Authors describing the youth-at-risk also described how, by adolescence, the lack of self-control evident in the youth-at-risk solidified into an outcome – the youth lacking self-control became out-of-control. The deviant youth became a problem for their family, community, and, ultimately, society. From the perspective of authors, this young person experienced risk factors in their life to such an extent that their impulsive behaviour became evident in risk behaviours or criminal activities. The following extract from a current affairs television programme illustrates the problematic nature of out-of-control behaviour. Janet McIntyre attempts to analyse the reasons for Alex Peihopa’s involvement in the death of Michael Choy and identifies Alex’s out-of-control drug use as a possible risk factor or behaviour. She explicitly notes that the parents of Alex Peihopa could not “control” his behaviour and, as such, his behaviour resulted in negative outcomes for him (unconsciousness) and society (Michael Choy’s death):

[Home video of Alex Peihopa playing guitar] Richard and Rose tried to control Alex by allowing him to drink and smoke in a backyard shed … But one day Richard [father] found his son unconscious. With a group of mates, Alex had taken a cocktail of drugs. (McIntyre, 2002a, 4.45-5.25min)

Consequently, authors described how a young person’s inability to control their own behaviours combined with environmental risk factors to produce negative outcomes such as deviance. To counter the effect of risk factors (individual and social), they argued for intrusive institution-based interventions. These interventions would override, or counter, the effects of risk factors and socialisation, re-socialise the youth and move the youth onto a trajectory of normality before adulthood. Authors described identification, particularly within education, as a key function of interventions.

**Interventions: Identification and education**

Those writing about interventions into abnormal deviance used a knowledge of development and risk to inform the types of interventions aimed at the abnormally-deviant youth. They
described how interventions, based in the present, focused on addressing changeable risk factors (such as current pathological behaviours, family conditions, and educational experience) whilst trying to reduce the effects of unchangeable factors (such as individual attributes like gender, genetic predispositions to violence, and historical experiences). Writers based interventions on a logic of development and risk (the young person ‘becoming’ a criminal) and focused interventions on the socialisation and re-socialisation of the young person. This involved practitioners identifying abnormally-deviant youth through risk factors early in life. At this point, practitioners would establish and promote environmental protective factors in order to build resilience within the young person.

The following extract from an academic conference paper illustrates the logic around intervention. David Carruthers argues that effective interventions involve practitioners identifying and controlling risk and risk factors. To this end, he points out that the family presents a key risk to the development of the child. He also uses a metaphor of a “developmental pathway” on which the child is travelling. Further to this, he constructs the youth-at-risk as a “child” or “problem” rather than an adolescent or youth. Hence, the language used by Carruthers refers subtly to a notion of developmental becomingness. To counter this, Carruthers emphasises the control of the future by asserting that “long-term outcomes” are the goals of early intervention (or intervention in the present). To this end, he presents youth offending as a pathological outcome of child development:

One of the strongest suggestions to come from research is that to effectively intervene to prevent youth offending the risk factors associated with offending must be targeted and removed. Successful strategies to address poor long-term outcomes for children and young people are those that: (Ministry of Social Policy, 2002)
- Identifying at risk and high risk families;
- Ameliorate risk factors and build resilience in the child and their family;
- Are responsive and flexible in their delivery and not limited by agency or sector boundaries;
- Are provided as early as possible in the developmental pathway of the child or presenting problem.

Initiatives that adopt these strategies can be expected to have a positive impact on youth offending.
(Carruthers, 2002, p.7)

Authors emphasised the school as a key social institution in interventions and early intervention. They argued that education, particularly in the public school, had a role in risk identification and social control. The following extract, from a media feature article, illustrates the argument that education has a role in identification. Reflecting the previous extract, Diana Dekker argues that “early intervention” is the answer for youth crime. Again, using a logic of development and becomingness, she suggests that at some point pathological behaviour becomes “habitual”. To counter this, she argues that early intervention would ‘save’ “most ... if not all” potential criminals. Dekker implies that this, at least, should occur in “primary school” (between the ages of 5 and 12) where “children with
the potential for criminal behaviour can ... be spotted” before any ‘naughty’ behaviour became “habitual”:

Forensic psychiatrist Sandy Simpson, of Auckland’s Mason Centre, says it’s obvious that broad-based early intervention is necessary ... Mr Moore [Police community services coordinator] agrees. He believes that ‘if you get in early enough, before it’s habitual, most can be saved, if not all.’ Mr Moore, like other people in the youth field, agrees that children with the potential for criminal behaviour can usually be spotted at primary school.
(Dekker, 2002, p.F1)

In the analysed texts referring to education, when authors used ideas of becomingness, they did not just refer to ‘developmental outcomes’ but also to ‘educational opportunities’. As such, they constructed the abnormally-deviant youth as failing to take up the opportunity of education. In this construction, authors assumed schooling empowered young people and enabled young people to become subjects or ‘agents’ of their own future. They conceptualised having an education as a valuable experience, which transformed young people into participating adults. Having an education inevitably led to good outcomes; conversely, not having an education led to adverse outcomes. The following extract from an academic journal article illustrates this form of reasoning about educational opportunities.

Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, and Horwood focus on the ‘vulnerability’ of young people surrounding the effects of school failure and conceptualise school failure as leading to adverse outcomes directly affecting the young person. The tone in which they write this segment suggests that adult society should be concerned about the hopelessness that results for the young person when they cannot fully participate in society as adults. As such, the failure of the young person to take up educational opportunities (in the form of “qualifications”) restricts and inhibits their future opportunities:

In recent years there has been increasing research and interest in the issue of young people leaving school without qualifications ... There is a growing literature on this group, who are seen as being vulnerable in a number of ways, and it has centred around two major themes.
The first and dominant line of research has examined the individual, social, family and school factors that place young people at risk of leaving school without qualifications. This literature has reported that those at most risk of school dropout are those from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, who show early educational delays and associated behavioural or adjustment problems (Achenbach et al., 1998; Cairns et al., 1989; Campbell & Duffy, 1998; French & Conrad, 2001; Vitaro, Larocue, Janosz & Tremblay, 2001).
Second, interest has focussed on the extent to which leaving school without qualifications may place young people at increased psychosocial risk. Specifically, leaving school without qualifications has been associated with increased future risk of alcohol abuse and dependence (Crum, Ensminger, Ro & McCord, 1998; Silbereisen, Robins & Rutter, 1995), drug use (Mensch & Kandel, Savage & Marchington, 1977), crime (Farrington, Gallagher, Morley, St. Ledger, & West, 1986; Hency, Caspi, Moffitt, Harrington & Silva, 1999), unemployment (Lamb, 1994), and delinquency (Jarjoura, 1993). There is little doubt that, as a population, those who leave school without qualifications are an at-risk group for later psychosocial adversity.
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002b, p.39-40)
Those authors writing about abnormal deviance in 2002 also suggested that education works as an equaliser in a society in that it provides all children and young people an equal starting point. They conceptualised education as providing an equal opportunity to all children and young people despite any structural differences. The following quote taken from a media focus article shows this. The interviewed principal describes education as a “passport” allowing anybody who takes up the opportunity of education to change the future. However, Kelly Andrew also implies the use of education as a form of control and socialisation. That is, education is a powerful force that can ‘make’ “young offenders better citizens”. Consequently, Andrew constructs education as a social panacea resolving problems in society:

She [a teaching principal at a residential centre] believes education is the key to making these young offenders better citizens, and she has an inspirational quote from Malcolm X written on the board in her classroom: ‘Education is the passport to the future, for tomorrow belongs to the people who prepare for it today’.
(Andrew, 2002, p.D5)

Socialisation and Social Control
Authors saw the school as more than just an identification mechanism, they also saw the school as a site of socialisation and control. In particular, they argued that schools could do this through promoting protective factors in the young child’s life. Across institutional contexts, authors argued that practitioners could establish or identify what protective factors a young child had and then foster and promote the development of protective factors in order to control deviance. In particular, they argued that adult society could control environmental factors in institutions of socialisation (such as the school). Through focusing on protective factors, schools could counter the influence of the pathological family and socialise or redirect the youth into a position of normality. The following extract from an academic conference paper illustrates this argument. Across the extract, Carruthers emphasizes that society should develop interventions focusing on the development of protective factors, particularly within the school. He, reflecting the above examples, implies that an emphasis on educational opportunity is a key intervention goal. Carruthers also associates protective, and risk, factors with other socialising environments outside the school such as the peer group, the community, and the family. Through this, he suggests that something is ‘inherently’ wrong with the young person and the environments with which they interact:

As children grow older, factors outside the family/whānau, such as peers and community, begin to have a greater impact on their lives. The associated risk factors must therefore be addressed and protective factors such as ensuring success at school and developing friendships with pro-social peers also need to be supported and reinforced...
Programmes in this area focus on addressing risk factors such as poor attendance or underachievement at school, anti-social behaviour, lack of parental support or lack of pro-social peers. Programmes include Social Workers in Schools, anti-bullying programmes, specialist education services, drug and alcohol abuse education and treatment, alternative education, community-based recreational/leisure activities, life
Alongside protective factors, writers also argued for cognitive behaviour therapy to address the abnormally-deviant young person’s lack of self-control. This was particularly evident when they talked about the abnormally-deviant youth who had actually offended. For example, in the following extract from a government official publication, Ashley Seaford and Shirley Johnson stress that within residential programmes addressing problem youth:

… ongoing work has led to the development of anti-offending programmes based on cognitive-behavioural methods.
(Seaford & Johnson, 2002, p.11)

Across institutional contexts, those advocating cognitive behavioural interventions focused on the development of ‘self-control’ as a form of re-socialisation. Through developing self-control, the young person could control their own behaviours and urges (i.e. individual risk factors) and/or resist the influences of social risk factors. In effect, the young person would conform to the behaviour patterns deemed acceptable by dominant adult society and become a self-controlling and governing subject through an internalisation of psychological power. In cognitive behavioural therapy, practitioners could re-programme the young person’s mind and thinking patterns through an adaptation of behavioural therapy.

Authors based cognitive behavioural interventions upon an intensive thinking-based re-socialisation where the young person analysed risk in their own life and developed ‘positive’ or ‘normal’ ways of thinking. Such interventions specifically addressed individual risk factors (such as lack of self-control and predispositions to deviant behaviour), whilst also directing the youth away from any pathological influences in their social environment/s. Cognitive behavioural interventions also allowed practitioners to introduce and develop alternative and ‘normal’ ways of reacting to challenges in the young person. The next extract continues from the previous to describe a cognitive behavioural intervention. Seaford and Johnson describe a programme focused on the development of ‘normal’ thinking and reacting. They imply that the abnormally-deviant youth cannot function in a group, cannot communicate or think correctly, cannot control their own reactions, and has unhealthy values:

What follows is an outline of the present format of the programme … Group Development … Communication Skills … Thinking Skills … Participants are taught techniques to help them think of the consequences of their actions on themselves and others, to think before they take action, and to think critically and logically. Problem Solving … Mood Management … Conflict Resolution … Understanding Offending: Group members are asked to recollect their offending histories and to identify triggers to their offending … Values: The final module looks at values and moral development and attempts to instil an empathic attitude to others, especially victims.
(Seaford & Johnson, 2002, p.13)

33 ‘Whānau’ is used to refer to family groupings including immediate and extended family.
Writers emphasised structure, alongside cognitive behavioural interventions, as aiding in the development of self-control. Through a structured programme or routine in an institutional setting (such as, the school, army, boot camp, or residential home), practitioners could influence the thinking and behaviour of young people. It was within social institutions that a practitioner could create an environment in which the young person could engage in ‘positive’ and ‘normal’ thinking and acting. In effect, institutions provided spaces where adults could establish an environment of re/socialisation and could exercise cognitive behavioural approaches without the intrusion of other social risk factors. The following extract from a media focus article illustrates a described relationship between structure and offending. Eugene Bingham describes explicitly the link between a strong “external structure” (that is, structured routines) and self-control. He implies that abnormally-deviant young people are internally ‘out-of-control’ or lacking self-control:

Above all, the centres try to impose structure. ‘Each day in the residential centre will be structured around a set of routines,’ says a CYF paper on its residential services. ‘Routines provide children and young people with a sense of external structure and order that will contribute to their being more calm and settled within themselves’. (Bingham, 2002, p.B5)

Consequently, described interventions aimed at the abnormally-deviant youth continued to focus on a developmental-psychological knowledge of risk. Interventions focused on identification, education, socialisation, and self-control. This construction of youth and the associated interventions had particular implications for youth.

The Implications of the Abnormally-Deviant Construction

When authors used knowledge to construct and position the abnormally-deviant youth, their family, and other adults working with the youth and their family, they also applied power. Because authors positioned the abnormally-deviant young person as an object or a target of risk (i.e. the youth-at-risk), they implied that this young person was without power and dependent upon adults (within the family and other social institutions). Authors reinforced this conception through the notion of socialisation and re-socialisation where they implied that families and other socialising institutions in society, such as the school, held the power to direct and influence a young person’s development. These environments enabled practitioners, in a controlled fashion, to ‘give’ the young person power through psychological interventions, which would reposition the young person as a subject. The young person’s dependence on adult society for ‘positive’ or ‘normal’ socialisation reinforced a conception that young people, in general, have vulnerabilities due to their age and subsequent relationship to adults. The following extract from an academic conference paper illustrates this form of reasoning where Carruthers associates vulnerability directly to age. Carruthers also emphasises the idea of education as an opportunity and intervention into negative outcomes. In particular, he notes literacy and numeracy skills as key requirements to
positive and healthy development. Consequently, he implies that healthy development is not necessarily a personal or individual outcome but, instead, is directly associated with societal outcomes:

To a certain extent, all children and young people are at risk of poor outcomes in their lives. This fact is recognised in many of the policies governments adopt. For example, the New Zealand policy of providing free health care to all under six year old children is aimed at reducing the risks associated with poor health during those crucial formative years. Similarly, the provision of free education to all children is a vital part of reducing the risk of poor outcomes for children and young people. Failure to give children basic skills such as numeracy and literacy has a serious impact on their potential outcome. (Carruthers, 2002, p.4)

In comparison to general childhood and adolescence vulnerabilities, authors constructed the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as a consequence of multiple and intensive risk factors. This youth was not only vulnerable because of their age, but also because of other individual and social risk factors present in their life. In particular, authors described how a ‘vulnerable’ age intensified the presence of other risk factors and a likelihood of deviance, and argued that the pathological influence of the dysfunctional and/or disadvantaged family was a key risk factor, which could affect development.

Additionally, those writing about abnormal deviance positioned the family of the abnormally deviant youth-at-risk as an effect of risk – socio-economic risk. This disadvantaged and/or dysfunctional family was without power and an object of socio-economic disadvantage, dependent on ‘normal’ society for the outcomes of its children. The following extract shows this construction of the family as an effect and object of disadvantage. The referenced quotation describes these families as being on a “cycle of entrenched disadvantage”, experiencing poverty and poor health, and failing in educational outcomes. It further describes how risk (as in the unpredictable future) for these families is particularly negative due to “unforeseen events” – as such, future risk is future “disadvantage”:

Research suggests that approximately 25,000 families (5 per cent) are at high risk of being caught in a cycle of entrenched disadvantage. These families experience a range of adverse circumstances, which may include persistent low income, family disruption, poor parental health and educational achievement and poor housing ... A further 45 per cent of families are in situations where some of these risk factors are present. For these families the experience of unforeseen events such as serious illness, separation, or unemployment may be enough to push them into a position of entrenched disadvantage. (Ministry of Social Policy cited in Carruthers, 2002, p.5)

In contrast, authors constructed adult practitioners working with youth-at-risk and their families as ‘holding’ power (which came through a knowledge of developmental-psychology) and, consequently, having the power to intrude and intervene upon the effects of risk factors. The following extract illustrates this type of reasoning. Within this extract, the interviewed practitioner identifies adults in social institutions surrounding the family as agents or subjects
who are “able to turn things around”; conversely, the interviewee positions the family as an object needing the intervention and help of those holding power:

[CYF manager]: ‘We need to work together with the family to get that young person through so they can get on with their lives. We may be able to turn things around or make things better for them’.
(Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article)

Consequently, in constructions of abnormal deviance, authors reinforced a position of dependence between the youth-at-risk (and their family) and ‘normal’ society. In this, they implied that these young people and their families desired and/or needed the normality seen within other families. Hence, authors constructed abnormal deviance as a measurable effect of disadvantage in which practitioners could determine through risk factor identification tools. They also constructed abnormal deviance as a condition of powerlessness with adults working in societal institutions having the power to change the direction of a young person’s life. In such a way, society could ‘empower’ (or give power to) young people and their families and then turn them into subjects through the application of developmental-psychological expertise. In effect, authors constructed abnormally-deviant youth as objects to be controlled. I look at the alternative construction of normal deviance in the next chapter.
Chapter 5

Constructing and Dividing Youth: The normally-deviant youth

[Police officer]: ‘Generally speaking, I think our youth justice system is really good for most kids. Most of them do stupid things once or twice. But we deal with only a really small percentage of children. ‘People think kids are out of control and that’s just not true. There are difficult kids, but for the vast majority, most kids don’t offend’.

(Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article)

In Chapter 4, I presented the construction of abnormal-deviance as portrayed in the analysed texts. In this chapter, I present the findings on three constructions of normal deviance: the vulnerable youth, the threatening adolescent, and the socially-created deviant. In these constructions, authors continued to use a knowledge of abnormality. In particular, they referred to abnormalities (or risk factors) to imply what normality was and who ‘normal’ children were. However, the manifestation of deviance in ‘normal’ children presented a contradiction to a construction of abnormal deviance – if deviant youth had a variety of risk factors, why were normal youth deviant?

Developmental ideas of youth and adolescence mitigate any apparent contradiction because the adult-defined period of adolescence, in itself, is a period of difference and abnormality. In this way, a knowledge of adolescence (and childhood) is a knowledge of the ‘other’ in human development. Taking this further, we use dividing practices to define and divide normal from abnormal. When we use a knowledge of developmental-psychology we are, first, assuming that all adolescents are abnormal because they are not quite, and different to, adults. This reasoning makes it possible for adolescents to be developing normally but (because of an age-based abnormality) to be deviant. However, ‘normal’ deviance stops when the adolescent becomes an adult (or normal). Using this reasoning, it is also possible for a young person to be developing abnormally and, as such, to be ‘at-risk’ of criminal deviance in adulthood (the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk). In this sense, we might use developmental-psychology to construct the normally-deviant adolescent as developing into an adult, not developing into a criminal. When we apply this sort of reasoning, we see the ‘normal’ youth as presenting deviant behaviour because we assume it a ‘natural’ part of development.

Additionally, when we bring the words ‘normal’ and ‘deviance’ together we draw attention to the problematic nature of language and knowledge. Developmental theorists construct deviance as an expected manifestation of adolescence. They have very few words to draw
upon which imply both normality and deviance and this was evident across the analysed texts. As I will show in later extracts in this chapter, authors attempted to bring together normality and deviance by placing one of the associated terms under question in scare marks. In this way, they acknowledged the contradictory relationship between normality and deviance and, as such, constructed the majority of young people as normally-deviant.

**Just a Passing Phase: The vulnerable but normal deviant**

Those writing about deviance in 2002 constructed the *abnormally-deviant* youth through references to time and the future; in contrast, they constructed the *normally-deviant* youth through references to age and the present. To achieve this, they used a concept of adolescence and an understanding of adult expectations. The following extract from an academic journal article shows this. In this extract, Ferguson and Horwood examine the association between deviance and adolescence. They directly associate the onset of offending with the developmental stage of adolescence and note that adults can use age-groups to further divide this group (“early, intermediate, and late onset”). By examining the differences between male and female offending, they suggest “the onset of puberty and social maturity may play a role in [the] timing” of offending. Ferguson and Horwood imply, in this suggestion, that females start puberty earlier than males, hence offend at an earlier age:

> What this finding suggests is that those who have been described in previous research as ‘adolescent-limited’ offenders are unlikely to be a single homogeneous group and may vary in the age of onset of offending and the duration of offending, with the result that it is possible to identify early, intermediate, and late onset patterns of adolescent-limited offending. The developmental significance and correlates of the age of onset of adolescent-limited trajectories remain to be explored. However, the fact that females tend to predominate in the early onset group, whereas males predominate in the later onset groups, may suggest that factors such as the onset of puberty and social maturity may play a role in this timing. (Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.174)

Consequently, writers constructed deviance as a normal part of development – something that adults could expect. The following quotation from an academic book illustrates this emphasis on the normality of youth deviance. Within this quotation, Maxwell and Morris directly compare and divide deviant young people into age-groups: “younger children”, “older … children” or “young people”, and “adults”. They imply an association between adolescents (“older … children”) and offending and describe this as a normal “phase that they [young people] go and grow through”. Confirming the contradictory relationship between normality and deviance in young people (and insinuating a difference between adults and youth), Maxwell and Morris place the word ‘normality’ in scare marks to confirm that deviance is not a ‘normal’ behaviour in adult society but is a ‘normal’ expectation of human development. However, they further associate this expectation to older male youth and, as such, imply an association between abnormal deviance and female youth. Finally, they list a series of deviant behaviours: “fighting”, “smoking marijuana”, and “stealing”.

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Self-report information comes from the Dunedin longitudinal study (Moffitt & Silva, 1986) on offending behaviour by the same cohort of children at different points in their lives. The percentages of young people admitting to delinquent acts increased with age and a greater proportion of older than younger children admitted engaging in the more serious offences. The study also confirms the ‘normality’ of much offending behaviour. For example, almost a quarter of young people admitted to fighting over the last year. More than two-fifths admitted smoking marijuana over the past year, and almost 10% admitted stealing in the past year.

Despite concern about juvenile offending increasing rapidly over recent years, it is apparent that this increase is not out of line with increases in adult offending. Though there are increases in offending by younger children and by females, the vast majority of juvenile offenders remain older males. Overall, the proportion of crime attributed to juveniles has remained remarkably consistent over the past 10 years. Self-report data are broadly consistent with official data in terms of the characteristics of juvenile offenders, though they do indicate that, for most children and young people, offending is a phase that they go and grow through.

(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.205)

In representations of normally-deviant youth, authors constructed adolescence as a time when the young person gradually became an autonomous self-governing adult. They described adolescence as a biological process in which the young person struggled with a changing body, hormonal urges, and illusions about themselves. Instead of manifesting risk factors, this youth engaged in ‘risk behaviours’ such as sex and drug/alcohol use. Without the word ‘risk’, these behaviours tended to be ‘rights’ of adulthood and maturity – rights into which young people and children matured. However, when authors associated the word ‘risk’ with these behaviours they portrayed young people as being in two developmental processes. First, they described these behaviours in young people as showing a type of experimentation by a young person as they gradually learnt the rules and limits of adulthood. Second, they described these behaviours in young people as indicating a dangerousness or inherent vulnerability in the youth due to a young person’s lack of maturity and knowledge of self.

The following quotation from a local government evaluation report illustrates this dualism of risk and behaviours. Reflecting the above extract, the Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council and the Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services engage with the contradiction of attaching a degree of normality to deviance by placing the word “problems” within scare marks. Following this, they associate these “problems” with a “part of the normal maturation process”. They particularly focus on the risk behaviours of drug and alcohol use. Engaging in this behaviour allowed adolescents to learn “how to behave and think like adults”. However, because of its problematic nature, engaging in this behaviour was also dangerous particularly at a “much younger age”. At this point, the authors construct alcohol and drug use as a risk factor. However, they emphasise that, for normal young people who are going through adolescence, alcohol and drug use is normal. For this reason, they quote a respondent’s argument that society should not criminalise youth for engaging in risk behaviours or even see these youth as abnormally-deviant. Even when the authors note a concern with alcohol and drug use, they follow with the findings that alcohol
and drug use was not a “problem” amongst the young people participating in their programme:

Most respondents commented that there had always been youth “problems” and that this was part of the normal maturation process. Some noted that it reflects the difficulties some groups of adolescents experience in learning how to behave and think as adults. One respondent noted:

‘We must not criminalise being young’.

However, respondents noted that youth problems were becoming apparent at a much younger age, particularly alcohol and drug abuse:

‘Young people have always been attracted to lights and alcohol … now the lights are simply on longer and the alcohol is available to them from an earlier age’

Significant drug and alcohol problems were not reflected in the admission forms.

(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, pp.32-33)

Consequently, authors constructed the normally-deviant youth passing through a developmental phase as naïve youth. These young people did not know the rules of adult society and their deviance showed their naïveté. The following extract from a media feature article illustrates this. In this article, Maggie Tait refers to a lawyer to argue that young offenders are not all bad. The lawyer explicitly constructs the abnormally-deviant youth as “real little buggers’ [who know] ... what they were doing”. The interviewed lawyer implies that for other ‘normal’ young people, offending is an incident that has “spiralled out of control” and, as such, these young people have not been fully aware of their actions or the consequences. The lawyer emphasises the child-like and masculine nature of this naiveté by referring to a Family Group Conference (FGC) where the victim sees the young person and expresses an opinion – “They would ask ‘is that the person who did it? Why doesn’t someone take him home and knit him a cardigan?’” (my emphasis):

Scott [former youth lawyer] said victims at family group conferences were often surprised to come face-to-face with the offender. ‘They would ask ‘is that the person who did it? Why doesn’t someone take him home and knit him a cardigan?’’. While some youth offenders were ‘real little buggers’ and knew what they were doing, often incidents spiralled out of control for those involved.

(M. Tait, 2002b. p.23)

In addition to using naïveté, writers also constructed normally-deviant youth as ignorant of their behaviour or the consequences that would follow, not only for them, but also for the victims of their crimes. The following extract from an academic book chapter shows this. Allison Morris describes the functions of FGCs in this chapter and explicitly mentions two key aims of FGCs – giving “offenders a sense of the consequences of their actions and an understanding of how victims feel”. She verifies these aims by giving personal experiences of FGCs and how these FGCs “touched” the young offenders. In such a way, she positions youth as ‘normal’ because they are not in the control of risk factors and out-of-control minds. Instead, these youth are malleable to the effects of their crimes and have the ability to experience empathy:
One of the aims of family group conferences is to give offenders a sense of the consequences of their actions and an understanding of how victims feel. This is done not by a process which emphasises disapproval (shaming), but by a process which emphasises the effects of the crime on the victim.

For example, I observed a victim at a family group conference telling the offender who had trashed her house as part of a burglary what it felt like to vacuum from the floor the spilled ashes of her dead parent. And I observed another victim speaking of her sadness at the theft of tapes which included a farewell from a dying sister. I have no doubt that these stories ‘touched’ the young offenders concerned in ways that judges never can and, importantly, victims see this and may feel better as a result.

(Morris, 2002, p.171)

As shown in the above quote, those writers discussing normal deviance in 2002 recognised that normally-deviant youth were also vulnerable, or malleable, particularly to “shaming”. This construction of vulnerability and malleability did not imply or represent them as youth-at-risk, but, rather, as being susceptible to societal influences and pressures. In particular, authors emphasised the vulnerability and malleability of the youth to processes of labelling. In the following extract from the same academic book, Allison Morris describes a crime intervention technique called “reintegrative shaming”.

In this form of shaming or punishment, practitioners focus on the “offence” so that the “offender” can be “reintegrated rather than rejected by society”. In this way, the offender is not the focus of the punishment ‘ceremony’ and as such avoids any labelling or stigmatisation. Instead, practitioners focus on reintegration and forgiveness in the ceremony. Hence, practitioners are able to encourage the young offender to develop disapproval for offending whilst recognising the vulnerability of young people to stigmatic processes:

Reintegrative shaming means that the offence rather than the offender is condemned and the offender is reintegrated with rather than rejected by society. It is said (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994, cited in Harris & Burton, 1998, p.231) to be achieved through certain steps: disapproval of the offence while sustaining a relationship of respect for the offender and without labelling the offender as ‘bad’ or ‘evil’; ceremonies to certify the offending followed by ceremonies to decertify it; and not allowing the offending to become a master status trait ... Thus the shaming must be followed by efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community through ‘words or gestures of forgiveness’ (Braithwaite, 1989, p.100).

(Morris, 2002, p.163)

Across the institutional texts, those writing about normal deviance also constructed normally-deviant youth as vulnerable to influences from their peer group. In this way, they implied that the peer group could turn the normally-deviant youth into an abnormally-deviant youth by encouraging the youth into a life-course of deviance. In the following extract (a sub-section of a media feature article), Chris Mirams uses knowledge to define and divide young people into different risk groups. As expected, Mirams represents the abnormally-deviant youth in the “HIGH RISK” group. She then places the normally-deviant youth into the “LOW RISK” and “MEDIUM RISK” groups. She describes their offending as representing their age – it is

34 Morris (2002) then goes on to describe FGCs. She argues that FGCs avoid shaming altogether and, as such, are more beneficial to the young person.
either “part of the maturation process” or something to “grow out of ... by mid 20s”. Mirams shows how the presence of risk behaviours, such as “substance abuse” and “anti-social peers” increases the vulnerability of this group to adverse outcomes. However, in comparison to abnormally-deviant youth, these youth are experiencing some normality in their lives, as their deviance does not occur in all “environments” and may “end ... abruptly”:

**What constitutes an at-risk youth**

**LOW RISK**
Will commit many offences, their offending is part of the maturation process.

**MEDIUM RISK**
Tend to start offending after 13 years of age and grow out of it by mid 20s. Some may begin and end their offending abruptly. They may behave badly in some environments (such as with friends) and not in others (such as school). Tends to exhibit two particular risk factors - substance abuse and anti-social peers.

**HIGH RISK**
May comprise less than five per cent of under 17-year-olds but account for a large proportion of offences committed by children and young people. They begin offending early - some at 10 years old - offend at higher rates and often seriously. Continues into adulthood. Characterised by major personal, social and family disorder.

(Mirams, 2002, p.B5)

Consequently, writers also relied on ideas of difference in constructions and representations of normal deviance. They constructed the normally-deviant youth as different to adults through ideas of immaturity, naiveté, ignorance, malleability, and vulnerability. Texts referring to normal deviance clearly showed these constructions. Writers also constructed this youth as different to abnormally-deviant youth. One way they did this was through general references to the normality of deviant behaviour in youth. Another way they did this was by referring to risk and protective factors. The family is a good example of this implied construction. Writers argued that abnormally-deviant youth came from dysfunctional and/or disadvantaged families. These families tended to be single-parent, Māori (or Pacific) families, and were possibly environments of abuse and risk. This had implications for the types of families writers constructed. They connected abnormal families to risk factors; whilst, normal families had the opposite – protective factors.

Furthermore, in the texts analysed, many authors never discussed protective factors outside of the context of risk factors; rather, they used protective factors to supplement and offer an alternative to risk factors. This placement of risk factors directly alongside protective factors allowed for them to construct and separate the normal and the abnormal, the effect of which was the implying, and privileging of, middle-class Pakeha3⁵ two-parent families. Whereas, these authors saw the family as a site of risk in constructions of abnormally-deviant youth, they saw the family as the site of positive nurturing power in constructions of normally-deviant youth.

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3⁵ “Pakeha” is a complex term which originally referred to the European settlers in New Zealand. In the context of this thesis, I have used ‘pakeha’ to refer to non-Māori Caucasian New Zealanders.
Building the Family: Interventions into the passing phase of deviance

In contrast to ‘targeting’ the abnormally-deviant youth’s family, authors described interventions into the passing phase of normal deviance as being based in the family. In these interventions, practitioners recognised the age of the young person and the need to be gently ‘nurtured’ into adult maturity. The following extract from the Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) illustrates the reasoning concerning interventions for normally-deviant youth whilst also highlighting the need for early intervention for abnormally-deviant youth. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development recognise the construction of deviance as a normal developmental expectation. One reason for this is the link these principles have with Children, Young Persons and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989 and the underlying justice penology of this legislation. Within this extract, the authors construct the young person as vulnerable and, consequently, needing “protection” and the “least restrictive” intervention. To achieve this, they emphasise “age”, “developmental level” and “developmental appropriateness”. In recognising vulnerability, they argue for the separation of youth and offending so that interventions focus on the offending – “Criminal proceedings should not be brought if there is an alternative way of dealing with the offending” and “…determine the most appropriate response to their offending” (my emphasis).

The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development also stress the importance of interventions with the family. In such a way, they encourage practitioners to ‘share’ power with the family and to only remove the young person when they were a risk to the community (symptomatic of abnormal deviance). Hence, these authors are emphasising the positive socialising role of the family where practitioners do not target the family but support the family – enabling the family to take up this socialising role.

Another factor the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development emphasise is the encouragement of young people to develop into responsible and accountable adults. In this way, they reinforce an idea that young people ‘naturally’ offend and are, therefore, guilty before proven. The authors here support interventions, which encourage young people “to take responsibility for their behaviour. There, adults give the “opportunity” to young people to participate in the justice process so that young people can learn the consequences of their actions and have their offending addressed. In this extract, young people do not necessarily choose to offend but rather must be taught that offending is a choice. In contrast to constructions of abnormal deviance, the authors stress that practitioners should allow the normally-deviant to become a subject of the process (rather than a target or object of the process that is turned into a subject):

Principles to guide activity in the youth justice environment are based on the youth justice provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, as well as recent research on what works to prevent and reduce offending by children and young people.

It is proposed that all activity in the youth justice sector should be consistent with the
following set of principles:

1. **Accountability**
   Children and young people who offend are to be held accountable for any offences they commit and encouraged to take responsibility for their behaviour.

2. **Recognising the Interests of Victims**
   Measures for dealing with offending should consider the interests of any victims of the offending.

3. **Early Intervention**
   Effective intervention should be directed at the earliest recognised point of a child or young person’s development toward possible offending, wherever this is cost-effective and practicable. Early interventions should also be directed at key points in the youth justice process.

4. **Protection**
   The vulnerability of children and young people entitles them to special protection during any investigation relating to the possible commission of an offence.

5. **Age and Developmental Appropriateness**
   Interventions should be age-appropriate and recognise the child or young person’s developmental level. Age is a mitigating factor in determining whether or not sanctions should be imposed on a child or young person.

6. **Best Practice**
   Interventions should be based on research about what works, for whom and where, and on what doesn’t work.

7. **Consistency with the Treaty of Waitangi**
   Responses to offending by Māori children and young people should be consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and support the aims and aspirations of Māori.

8. **Cultural Responsiveness**
   Responses to offending by children and young people should reflect the values, perspectives and cultures of the children and young people concerned and strengthen the relationship between the Government and the different communities it serves.

9. **Youth Participation**
   Young people should be provided with every opportunity to fully participate in the youth justice system. This will enable them to identify ways to provide redress to victims, as well as determine the most appropriate response to their offending.

10. **Holistic Approach: Strengthening Families and Community Connections**
     Measures for dealing with offending by children and young people should involve and aim to strengthen the family/whānau. A child or young person who offends should be kept in the community where practicable, unless there is a need to ensure the safety of the public.

11. **Limiting Involvement in the Formal Youth Justice System**
     Sanctions should take the least restrictive form appropriate in the circumstances. Criminal proceedings should not be brought if there is an alternative way of dealing with the offending (unless the public interest requires otherwise), or solely to provide assistance or services to advance the welfare of the child or young person, or their family/whānau.

(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.5-6)

Consequently, where authors constructed the normally-deviant youth within texts as going through a passing developmental phase there tended to be a congruence between the construction that these youth were immature, naïve, ignorant, malleable, and vulnerable, and the construction of less-intrusive and diversionary intervention. Congruence was also evident between constructions of normal deviance as a social threat and coercive surveillance-based interventions.
More Than Just a Phase: The threatening but normal deviant

Although less evident, a small number of writers did construct some normally-deviant youth as a threat to society due to the youth being an adolescent. This construction was unique when compared to other constructions because writers tended to validate their argument with young people’s voices. This showed that constructions of youth deviance also involved young people in taking up a construction; adults did not just create this construction of youth, both youth and adults played a part (c.f. Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002). As I have shown so far, this is a complicated relationship where writers positioned different groups of youth differently in an attempt to define them. To achieve this, they positioned young people in a variety of ways in constructions of normally-deviant, but threatening, youth.

In constructions of youth as a threat to society, authors emphasised the potential danger youth posed to the safety of adults, and other societal members, particularly in public places such as malls, shopping centres, and carparks. The following extract from a media focus article illustrates this form of reasoning. Sheriee Smith attempts to arouse ‘public’ fear through associating places of safety (“playgrounds”) with places of danger. The word “playground” is usually associated with children and harmless exploratory play. In a playground, a child is able to explore, develop, and grow. However, in the context of this text, she associates a playground with “serious assaults, disorder and damage”. Rather than being a place adults take their children to, it is a place “feared by many [adults] in the community”:

Buxton Square carpark, a playground for serious assaults, disorder and damage and a place feared by many in the community. But now the Nelson City Council and the police want to work together to make it a safer place for the public. Sheriee Smith looks at the problems.
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13)

Writers constructed and differentiated normally-deviant youth through a knowledge of adolescence. Within texts applying this construction, writers described these young people as subordinate to adults. The following extract, which comes from the same article as in the above extract, shows this. In this extract, Sheriee Smith quotes a young woman’s description of the behaviour of the offending young people. The young woman provides a metaphoric description of these young people as animals ‘marking’ their “territory”. Through this metaphor, she implies that there is a masculinity about these young people:

[A young woman]: ‘The kids sitting around there feel it is their turf and when people come into it they feel it is important to mark their territory’.
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13)

Authors often depicted the threatening, but normally-deviant, youth in a contradictory way in which the youth was both threatening but vulnerable. This tended to occur when authors implied that the threatening behaviour of young people was a manifestation of hormonal and adolescent development. In a way, authors implied that these young people (despite the
'power' that they seemed to exercise) were vulnerable to their own adolescent development. To authors, this vulnerability meant the young person posed a threat and unpredictable risk to adult society. Like the young person of G.S. Hall (1905), the New Zealand youth of 2002 were going through a time of storm and stress. In such a way, the youth’s own development made them subordinate to adults because of their inability to control their own development. Within this construction, authors represented adolescence as a time of turmoil where the body became subject to hormonal changes. This turmoil intensified when the young person engaged in risk behaviours. An example of this is in the following extract from an academic conference paper. Alison Greenaway and Kim Conway open this paper with a quotation from a young person. In this quote, the youth describes the effects of alcohol on their peer group and suggests that alcohol inhibits the behaviours and reactions of young people. The youth makes a hidden reference to psychological theories of youth development. As in Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development, these young people have a personal fable about themselves when they drink – “they get freaked out superman”. The interviewed youth connects this “superman” attitude to the period of adolescence and to policy – “Nah you know what started it – was when they lowered the drinking age”. However, the youth also describes adolescence as being more ‘child’ than ‘adult’, because adolescents are “little kids” and “young kids at 18”:

[Quoting youth] ‘I don’t start the trouble. It’s just my mates are arguing and people are scared of them. Nah they just drink, and when they drink they get freaked out superman – nothing will beat them up. Nah you know what started it – was when they lowered the drinking age. Man, too many little kids thinking they’re fucking superman. There are a lot of young kids at 18 that get drunk and come on the street and think they’re mister man’.

(Greenaway & Conway, 2002, p.1)

As shown in the above quote, authors continued to use risk behaviours in their constructions of threatening, but normal, deviance. However, they emphasised the risk and threat these behaviours posed to others. Authors did acknowledge some vulnerability within the youth; but this was to a lesser extent. The following extract from a local government evaluation provides an example of this. The Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council and the Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services imply that young people are problems and engage in problematic behaviour. The authors list behaviours with each referring to inappropriate action occurring in a public context. They have explicitly given behaviours, such as “loitering”, and “cruising”, a problematic identity through their choice of words. In other contexts, it is possible to describe these behaviours in a more positive and socially acceptable way (such as ‘enjoying the company of friends’). Furthermore, the authors imply that “known to the police”, means that these young people have engaged, or will engage, in criminal behaviour. In this way, they ignore any possibility that the police may

36 It could be assumed that this is not a conscious reference to Elkind’s theory but instead a reference to a psychological commonsense of adolescence and drinking.
The authors suggest that being out late at night poses both a vulnerability and a public danger as it is at this time these youth can engage in the other behaviours listed:

- abusive towards members of the public;
- committing a criminal offence;
- intoxicated or with intoxicated people in town;
- arrested for disorderly behaviour;
- known to the police or with people “known to the Police”;
- interfering with vehicles;
- loitering;
- gate crashing a party;
- “cruising”;
- driving or a passenger in a stolen car;
- thought to be tagging; or
- out late considering their age.

(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, p.20)

As shown in the above quote, writers used the role of the peer group as a central point of discussion in constructions of normal deviance. They saw peer groups as sites of encouragement influencing the young person’s conduct. This next extract from an academic conference paper illustrates this. Starting with a quotation from a young person describing the effects of congregating young people in “town”, Greenaway and Conway present their own findings. They describe young people congregating in groups as looking for fights (“sizing them up”), fighting, and drinking. They use the young person’s age-range, being “16-17”, to differentiate this group from children and adults. Greenaway and Conway finally verify the quotation from the young person by describing the youth involved in the fights as wearing “gang type identification” clothing and carrying weapons. They come to this conclusion even when they only observed fights on five nights over a two-month period:

[Quoting youth] ‘There’s a lot of troubles happening downtown. Like far out people, like gangsters. Like spoiling it for the rest of us. Trying to dominate town.’

Just under half of all interviewees had been involved in some sort of trouble in town. This trouble ranged from people sizing them up to minor scuffles, violent fights confiscation of alcohol and apprehension by the police. Notably a higher proportion of 16-17 year olds had been involved in trouble than other age groups. On four weekends in November and December our observers witnessed mainly minor incidents. Where there was physical fighting police were very quickly on the scene. Fights were observed on 5 occasions. On one occasion the people involved were wearing bandanas, a symbol of gang type identification. On four occasions our observers noted young people carrying baseball bats and/or knives.

(Greenaway & Conway, 2002, pp.2-3)

Although authors generalised a construction of normal threatening youth deviance to all young people, they also implied deviance was gendered and ethnic. That is, authors argued
that all youth posed a threat but that some youth posed a stronger threat. In particular, authors constructed males as a social threat whereas they constructed females as vulnerable to the behaviours of males (adolescent and adult). The next extract from a media feature article indicates the masculinity of this deviance. David Clarkson explicitly points out that the offenders are “belligerent young men” who make a public space, “inner Christchurch”, a place of danger and threat. Clarkson appeals to adult witnesses asking them not to intervene by implying that there may be a danger and threat to their own safety:

Witnessed any casual violence lately? It pays to keep your mouth shut and walk right on by.
It is the dead of night, when groups of belligerent young men can make inner Christchurch a dangerous place.
(Clarkson, 2002, p.7)

The following extract from a media focus article shows a construction of young women as vulnerable to the actions of males in public spaces. In this article, a young woman, interviewed by Sheriee Smith, describes rape and pregnancy as a key effect of risk behaviour engagement for young women. The young woman appeals to constructions of abnormal deviance to argue that these girls “were not bad girls from rough families”. However, she cautions that early pregnancy may result in abnormal deviance and a “cycle” of disadvantage:

Chisnall [a young woman] says she knows of girls who believe they have been raped in the toilets and others who became pregnant after sex in the carpark to nameless men.
They were not bad girls from rough families, she says. The people who hang out in the carpark are from all walks of life.
‘It is a vicious cycle’.
(S. Smith, 2002)

Writers also implied that these threatening youth were Māori. To do this, they referred to the disproportionate representation of Māori youth involved in deviant activities in public places (e.g. Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002) or the need to involve Māori wardens in crime intervention (e.g. S. Smith, 2002). Furthermore, writers also interviewed youth to discuss the deviance of ‘other’ youth. By doing this, these writers implied that not all youth were deviant and that those interviewed represented the ‘mainstream’ group of ‘good’ youth.

Hence, even though authors generalised deviant behaviour to all youth, they implied that the abnormally-deviant youth was the greatest threat. However, the public nature of this youth’s behaviour and the engagement of mainstream youth in general risk behaviours, such as drinking, driving, and sex, meant that authors used developmental theory to generalise this risk to all youth. This validated coercive interventions targeted at all youth.
Controlling Youth: Interventions into the threatening nature of adolescence

Authors discussing the threatening youth also advocated for intrusive interventions into the public threat of youth. They described these interventions as targeting all youth, not just to those offending. In interventions, practitioners used spatial, technological, and social dimensions to counter the uncontrollable nature of adolescence. Essentially, authors described interventions involving forms of visible and invisible power, which would make young people suspicious of surveillance and would further promote the development of self-discipline in the individual or remove the individual altogether from the public place. The following extract from a media focus article provides an example of this dualistic and intrusive power in crime interventions. Sheriee Smith describes interventions reducing the opportunities available to youth to hide themselves from the eyes of the adult public and police. She depicts these interventions as a form of surveillance promoting self-discipline and outlines two main aims in these interventions: removing youth altogether from the carpark or controlling the behaviour of youth at the carpark through self-control:

Nelson Bays area controller inspector Jim Wilson and a group of community representatives have looked at ways to curb the number of problems in the carpark. They have made several recommendations, including closing the toilets, cutting back vegetation and increasing video surveillance and lighting. (S. Smith, 2002, p.13)

Authors also described interventions operating through public (e.g. the council and police) and private (e.g. the family) institutions of governance and authority. In this context, public institutions of governance, or authority, worked in a dual role of information gathering and crime control. This occurred in a reciprocal manner where the information gathered (knowledge) about youth crime verified and provided reasoning for coercive and/or intrusive interventions. The following extract from an academic conference paper shows this, where Robin Moore describes, or gives, a contradictory role to the youth advocate. The given name of the role implies that they are advocating for the needs and rights of young people, but, in the context of this extract, Moore constructs them as information gatherers who identify trouble spots for youth workers and police officers. Other information gatherers are council “park officers” and council “noise control” officers. As such, Moore implies that the problems youth pose are of, and stem from, congregation (at homes or in parks):

On Friday nights the three Youth Workers and the Police Youth Liaison Officer undertake patrols in the Central City, focusing on areas where young people tend to congregate. They will also travel to suburban areas if things are quiet in town. Sometimes during the week the Council’s Youth Advocate gets to hear of a particular

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37 Foucault (1977, esp. pp.195-228), labeled this form of power ‘panoptic power’. This concept brings together ideas of surveillance and self-discipline. It shows that there is a complex relationship between power and the self, where power is invisible and capillary-like and the subject is self-conscious of being surveyed under the ‘gaze’ of power and, therefore, engages in self discipline.

38 I use the word ‘governance’ in its simplest sense to refer to the institutional practices in society that enable that society to function with minimal disorder. In effect, I use governance to refer to practices of authority that enable social stability. Often these practices incorporate ideology and are not overtly authoritarian although there can be elements of authoritarianism such as law enforcement.
suburban location that is causing concern. This information is passed to the team to check out on Friday night should time and circumstances permit. The information received by the Youth Advocate tends to come via Council channels – parks officers, and noise control being two examples. Sometimes elected members contact the Youth Advocate directly when constituents complain about behaviour in a particular area.  
(Moore, 2002, p.4)

In constructions of normal but threatening deviance, writers constructed the institution of the family as a site of blame and intervention. They argued that families were sites of governance in which parents took responsibility for the surveillance of their children. The following extract from a media magazine article illustrates this argument for the governance role of families. The interviewed subject argues that the causes of crime in society are associated with parents not “controlling their children”. Additionally, and connected to this, he also associates youth deviance with general changes in society, particularly a lowering in “supervision” which, he argues, has reduced the development of self-discipline and ‘respect’ for those in positions of governance and control, such as the police. The interviewee suggests that the “Armed Forces” might be a way to re-instmt self-discipline:

Dennis Sprague (82), retired: ‘Parents are not controlling their children as much as they should. You get good families and bad families. It doesn’t matter how rich or poor they are but I don’t think there’s enough supervision these days. We used to be more afraid of the policeman in my day. I think maybe young people should go into something like the Armed Forces to teach them a bit of discipline’.  
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25)

Hence, through arguing for interventions into the deviance of the threatening adolescent, authors positioned the youth as a ‘target’ and object of power. As such, the necessary authorities in a society (including parents) ‘dealt’ with young people. However, as the above extract shows there were times when authors did not directly associate the deviant behaviour of youth with young people themselves, or even their environment; instead, authors questioned the changes in society and linked deviance to such changes.

It’s Society, Not Them at Fault: Socially constructing deviance

In a very small number of media articles (two articles (Dekker, 2002; M. Tait, 2002a; M.Tait, 2002b\textsuperscript{39}) looked directly at social changes whilst others included some reference to social change), writers explored changes in the family, education, and society as possible reasons for youth crime. When this happened, writers attempted to explore and investigate whether society or youth in general was corrupted. The opening quote to a feature article from a newspaper provides an example of this type of questioning. Dekker gives a romanticised construction to young people through references to innocence and experimentation within the activity of play – “kids who skateboard and learn their maths and play on computers” and

\textsuperscript{39} The two articles from Maggie Tait are, essentially, the same articles in two different newspapers.
children of “trick or treat age”. However, this childhood has been corrupted which has, in
turn, led to violent young people. She further suggests that the causes of this corruption
could be in society – some “playback for some creeping national deficiency” and “a society
rotten at birth”. Dekker goes on to suggest that this problem is far worse than could be
imagined – the innocence displayed in the faces of Bailey Kurariki Junior and Kararaina
Makere Te Rauna can be also seen in the faces of the “kids next door” and no adult is
immune from the effects of child violence:

Peach-skinned Bailey Junior Kurariki killed at 12, Kararaina Makere Te Rauna at 14.
Their faces are too young to be giveaways for the violence that festered and flared and
struck out.
They look disturbingly like the kids next door, like kids who skateboard and learn their
maths and play on computers.
Are our children worse than they used to be? Is this the onset of a wave of hideous
child crime, payback for some creeping national deficiency? Who will be the next
person going happily about their business to be belted over the head and murdered
for nothing? Kurariki and Te Rauna were not alone. Other kids were there at the kill.
Are we becoming a society rotten at birth where doors need to be locked not just
against ingrained criminals but children of trick-or-treat age?.
(Dekker, 2002, p.F1)

Within texts highlighting that youth deviance may be a social creation, authors focused on
young people being children and within the stage of childhood. As such, they discussed the
assumed innocence (or as shown in the above extract, a corrupted innocence) and the
malleability and vulnerability of children to the environments around them. Hence, although
these young people posed a threat to society, authors positioned them as an effect of
malleability and vulnerability. The following extract from a media feature article shows this.
In this example, Maggie Tait uses quotes from a sociology lecturer to locate the causes of
youth offending in technological-social developments and the young person’s own
vulnerability and malleability. Rather than being adolescents or youth, she describes these
young people as “very young”, “kids” and “young teenagers”. She further positions them as
objects or effects of technology and argues that exposure to violent video games promotes
self identification with violent “heroes” and then mimicry. This process builds on the
malleability of young children and “takes a large portion of the blame”. This extract finishes
with the dismissal of the expert’s argument by a former practitioner who suggests that some
people have attributed too much blame to society and technology:

Canterbury University senior sociology lecturer Greg Newbold said there was no
significant increase in violent crime but, while up-to-date police figures are
unavailable, he thought there seemed to be a greater number of youth involved.
‘There appears to have been an increase in the incidence of very young people
committing very serious offences.’
He blamed exposure to violence in computer games, videos, and other media. ‘I think
kids are growing up a lot quicker now and becoming a lot more sophisticated.’
He said children and young teenagers listen to hip hop music with extremely violent
lyrics.
‘They begin to identify with these violent images and then some kids start acting them
out and I think that takes a large portion of the blame.’
Some music and videos presented people behaving violently as heroes, which
encouraged bad behaviour, he said. ‘There’s vivid violent and sexual images transmitted through those (media) that are easily accessible to kids and it becomes mundane to them and some kids are acting it out.’

However, Mr Scott [former youth lawyer] disagreed. ‘I think it’s rubbish. It’s easy to blame -- let’s blame television this week. It’ll be the music next week and gracious me it’ll be the funny clothes they wear after that’.

(M. Tait, 2002a, p.A7)

In general, authors using societal conditions in their argument tended to describe the normally-deviant young person as an effect of societal development. In a way, this mimicked the theories of G.S. Hall (1905) who associated the period of adolescence with the storm and stress experienced in the development of modern society.

The Implications of the Normally-Deviant Construction

Authors constructed abnormal deviance on ideas of normal developmental outcomes. In effect, they did not construct abnormal deviance on developmental theories or ideas of adolescence. This was apparent even when an author used a knowledge of developmental-psychology. In contrast, in constructions of normal deviance in young people authors drew upon ideas of adolescent development and childhood. By doing this, they were able to differentiate the behaviour of adolescents apart from adults. In this context, they constructed young people with references to childhood and the traits assumed universal in children, such as, vulnerability and malleability.

This meant that authors did not construct young people as autonomous individuals – a position limited to fully developed adults – instead, they constructed young people as vulnerable and malleable to the influences of society, communities, and peer groups. Authors argued that practitioners could use this vulnerability in interventions to encourage positive development and responsibility. Hence, even though these young people appeared to exercise more ‘agency’ over their actions than their counterparts (the abnormally-deviant youth), their development was still a process in effect (like that for the abnormally-deviant), a process over which authors constructed them as having no control.

Consequently, like the abnormally-deviant youth, normally-deviant youth were dependent on adults and adult-based institutions for their development. Even though their behaviour was symptomatic of a ‘healthy’ developmental stage, these young people still needed adults and adult society and depending on the threat they posed to society, authors described intrusive (high threat), such as surveillance and curfews, or non-intrusive (high vulnerability) interventions, such as FGCs, designed to promote responsibility and autonomy. In these interventions, adults could exercise power over the young person.

Finally, authors did not construct young people as being able to exercise power or resistance properly or in an adult-like manner. Like the construction of abnormal deviance, they used ideas of development and risk to position the normally-deviant young person as ‘powerless’
to the influences on their physical, emotional, and psychological development. Authors even implied that the threatening youth, who appeared to be exercising power, was reacting against the uncontrollable changes in his/her developing body. As such, as in constructions of abnormal deviance, authors did not locate any motivation for deviance within the young person and, further, did not fully acknowledge the complex power relationship between youth and adults/adult society. In the following chapters, I explore this further by examining the associations between developmental knowledge, risk knowledge, and youth deviance. In effect, I present the analysis to the findings of these last two chapters.
Chapter 6

You Can Pick a Criminal at Age 5: Developmental knowledge in constructions of youth deviance

The New Zealand Herald can reveal that BJ had been running riot for years before the killing - terrorising, beating and robbing other children, encouraging friends to wag school, shoplifting, tagging, sniffing glue and smoking cannabis.

It seemed there was nothing his family, education and welfare agencies or police could do to stop his out-of-control behaviour. Until now, he was never charged with a crime because children under 14 can be charged only with murder and manslaughter.

Police have scotched defence suggestions that BJ was just following along with his older friends. They say he would often be the ringleader, encouraging older boys to follow him, and that he was easily the most experienced criminal of those on trial for the Choy murder.

‘He wasn’t scared of anything,’ says Senior Constable Len Johnson of Papakura, who dealt regularly with BJ over a two-year period from 1999. ‘He was just so gung-ho, he would go in first with no fear and without thinking. Once he loses his rag he’s just overcome, he’s overwhelmed, he just can’t control himself.’

Mr Johnson says he could hardly believe it when he took the boy to do community work one Saturday last year and he began picking a fight with a 16-year-old over a pie. ‘He was just causing havoc’.

So far, I have discussed developmental knowledge as one of the key discourses surrounding youth development. However, developmental knowledge is a contextual knowledge – it is not devoid of context and is not fully objective. Indeed, developmental knowledge is an adult knowledge constructed, in the main, by middle-class adult experts (often men) to explain the phenomenon of youth and adolescence. Developmental knowledge is also a knowledge of division and social control. It allows adult society to divide and define the normal and the abnormal in order to dissipate and control any threat young people may pose to a society’s stability.

In this analysis, I take as a starting point Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (2002) argument about ‘western’ knowledge. Smith argues that academics and writers often present ‘western’ history (a knowledge developed through European-Anglo-American traditions and in European-Anglo-American institutions) as the accurate and true history of development. Often academics refer to particular knowledges as, not only ‘Truth’, but universal and applicable to all people. Developmental knowledge is one of those knowledges. Often, as teachers of development, we are encouraged to present developmental psychology as truthful and universal and we are encouraged to see development in stages from childhood to adulthood. Hence, I would like to use the following chapters as an opportunity to critique this knowledge by looking at its roots and the events that led to its conception in industrial countries and in contemporary industrial countries – those countries we tend to call...
‘western’. In doing this, I may miss out the stories and perspectives of the ‘others’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand and other countries. However, missing out these voices is not an effect of my analysis – instead, it is a reflection of the texts I analysed and the types of knowledges the authors drew upon. In 2002, authors did not draw upon diverse voices, knowledges, and opinions in constructing an argument about youth deviance.

In this chapter, I provide a contextual analysis of the use of developmental knowledge in industrial societies and in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Using the texts as a starting point, I explore the relationship between contemporary industrial historical developments and the rise of particular knowledges about childhood and adolescence. I discuss how early applications of developmental knowledge allowed for the control of young people’s activities and opportunities. I also look at the local application of developmental knowledge in the political and social contexts of Aotearoa/New Zealand. However, before I start this discussion, I will return to an examination of context and knowledge.

**Social Control: The relationship between knowledge and context**

*Provide appropriate interventions as early as possible*

Early intervention in offending behaviour has the potential to be much more effective over the long term. In youth justice terms this means both a focus on the youngest offenders and the earliest/first interactions with the youth justice system. It also implies some assessment and targeting to ensure that the appropriate level and type of intervention is available ‘the first time round’.


To understand the relationship between knowledge and context, it is necessary to return to some of the theoretical and methodological ideas I presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I described how we apply knowledge within a social context to develop a social understanding or ‘truth’. I explained how we use this understanding to position different social groups. In effect, when we use knowledge, we apply power.

When we apply knowledge in dividing practices, we do not position all individuals as the ‘same’; rather, we tend to apply an ‘us’ and ‘them’ division. In effect, individuals and groups tend to apply knowledge in a struggle to control the other. This struggle for control occurs in social and ideological contexts and it often becomes apparent in moments of social and/or ideological instability. This necessarily may not be a causal relationship as traces of a social truth may preclude any instability. However, it is possible that, at moments of instability, those in social institutions attempt to explain, examine, and control any instability through specific knowledges aimed at positioning and controlling deviant groups. Figure 2 on the following page illustrates this relationship between knowledge, context, and control.
Figure 2: Social Understanding in Contexts

In one sense, it is possible to describe the relationship between knowledge and social control as ‘hegemonic’ (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977) as it involves one group applying knowledge through ideology to control another group. To verify this further, there can also be moments in which the controlled group accepts the dominant ideology as ‘Truth’. However, as I will show later, there are moments in which ‘subordinate’ groups do not, or may not, fully accept a dominant ideology – they resist. In this sense, a group can never fully apply a knowledge to assume total control because, in knowledge, there are always moments of contradiction where the ‘other’ cannot be totally defined or determined (Laclau, 1994). It is not a relationship of pure hegemony between the dominant and subordinate, rather it is a relationship of struggle. Control and struggle are evident in relationships between adult society and young people.

In an understanding of youth deviance, adults often apply development and risk knowledge to control youth. As I will show in these next two chapters, adults have applied these knowledges over the past two-hundred years. Even in this, the reality is, they have not fully controlled and stopped youth deviance through applying these knowledges. Instead, at some point, youth have, and still are, resisting and struggling against these knowledges of control. Despite this struggle, many adults (especially in authority) still attempt to define and control youth through knowledge. Central to this is the development of a knowledge-specific language.

A knowledge-specific language is central to any knowledge and practice of social control. When we use a knowledge it tends to make ‘sense’ when we use a language, which embeds the knowledge in the present and connects the knowledge to the past (Foucault, 1972a). In this way, we can use a knowledge to present a ‘new’ or ‘developed’ truth without making it
too ‘new’ or too ‘different’. When we use developmental knowledge, we tend to apply a language focused on current scientific knowledges as well as popular metaphors and proverbs.

The Language of Development

Which gets us back to the quotation at the beginning of this article [To plan for a year, plant a rice paddy field; to plan for a decade, plant a forest; but to plan for a generation, nurture youth - Indian proverb]. The role of social workers is a pivotal and responsible one. Yours is the chance to help fire ‘the best shot’ on behalf of the community. There is no more challenging yet rewarding task than to nurture youth, especially youth at risk of offending.

(Becroft, 2002, p.3, government context, official publication)

Developmental knowledge is a blend of both expertise and commonsense. Many of the commonsense ideas presented by New Zealand authors in 2002 about youth crime came from theories of expertise. However, the ‘original’ developmental theorists also drew upon other expertise and commonsense knowledge evident in their period of history. As such, we should not assume developmental knowledge as the ‘Truth’ of youth deviance bestowed upon us through scientific truth. Rather, we should understand that the power of developmental knowledge comes through the blending of commonsense logic and scientific claims. When we use developmental knowledge, we use expertise and commonsense in a language of liminality where we describe the young person as being in a moment of becomingness and development.

The Liminal Youth: The language of becomingness

... babies don’t commit crime, so what makes an originally-good kid turn bad?
(Carnachan, 2002, p.51, media context, current affairs article)

Delinquent youths have long been the target of intervention programmes, not least because of the negative outcomes they likely face (Borduin, 1999).
(Milne, Chalmers, Waldie, Darling, & Poulton, 2002, p.191, academic context, journal article)

Key Focus Area 3: Early Intervention
Objective: To pro-actively create well being in families and whānau through the provision and support of appropriate interventions
Outcomes: Desired outcomes include the healthy development and socialisation of young children, preventing risk-factors from accumulating and interactively cumulatively strengthening protective factors, preventing youth offending, and cost efficiencies.
(Ministry of Justice, 2002c, p.7, government context, action plan)

Reflecting the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, when adults construct texts, that use developmental knowledge, they focus on the liminality of youth. That is, they see adolescence as a time of in-betweeness where the young person becomes an adult. These adults use ideas of childhood vulnerability and adolescent in-betweeness to reinforce a
position of dependence between young people and adults. Through focusing on developmental outcomes, many adults tend to see young people as lacking adult abilities and responsibilities. This was evident in 2002 when New Zealand authors constructed abnormally-deviant youth as never reaching adulthood or as lacking any experience of adolescence. These youth were trapped in a liminal childhood. In contrast, authors constructed normally-deviant youth as engaging in their adolescent liminality and developing progressively towards adulthood.

What we see here is that developmental outcomes are adult-defined outcomes. Often these outcomes are connected with productivity and whether or not the young person becomes an adult contributing to society (i.e. a taxpayer) (White & Wyn, 2004). This explains why many commentators connect any abnormal or pathological ‘developmental’ outcome to lower socio-economic levels. In this sense, they construct and connect deviance and pathology to developmental outcomes in marginal, often lower socio-economic, groups. However, in 2002, authors did not explicitly mention higher socio-economic levels as desired ‘healthy’ outcomes. Instead, they associated unhealthy and pathological developmental outcomes, and deviance, with poverty. They focused on these outcomes with a scientific language of development and a popular language of metaphoric pathways.

**Dichotomous Outcomes: The scientific language of developmental knowledge**

... recently there have been attempts made to devise statistical methods for classifying subjects into groups based on their developmental trajectories. (Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.161, academic context, journal article)

Specifically, the model assumes that the offending trajectory of each group is described by a series of T parameters atj where atj denotes the probability that a member of the group j will be observed to offend at time t. (Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.161, academic context, journal article)

**Key Focus Area 2: Information**

Objective: To develop consistent and comprehensive information about youth offending by children and young people to support effective interventions, policy and practice

Outcomes: Desired outcomes include the ability to track a child or young person’s progress through the youth justice system, compatibility of data between agencies and between the youth and adult justice systems, and regular and high quality evaluation of the response to youth offenders to inform youth justice practice. (Ministry of Justice, 2002c, p.4, academic context, action plan, my emphasis)

Statistics and references to research inform a scientific language of development. Through using a statistical language, developmental researchers reinforce an idea of becomingness in a young person’s development by focusing on ‘cause and effect’ or the scientifically discovered consequences of abnormal risk factors. In such a way, these researchers can develop an objective expert truth around youth deviance, which they validate through a commonsense logic of what makes “developmental sense” (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.428). In Aotearoa/New Zealand, researchers and others have used
statistical analysis about youth development in censuses (e.g. Statistics New Zealand, 2002; Statistics New Zealand & Ministry of Youth Affairs, 1998), cross-sectional research (e.g. Adolescent Health Research Group, 2003; L. T. Smith et al., 2002), and longitudinal research (e.g. Fergusson & Horwood, 2002; Fergusson, Horwood, & Nagin, 2000; Moffitt, 1993, 1994). Furthermore, New Zealand developmental researchers have extensively used longitudinal research to inform ideas of youth deviance.

In particular, the Christchurch (Fergusson, 1998) and Dunedin (Silva & Stanton, 1996) longitudinal studies have followed, recorded, and measured the lives of young people from birth to adulthood. Researchers in both of these developmental studies have focused on pathological outcomes for young people. These studies have been internationally recognised, particularly, in their discussion of developmental factors associated with abnormal and normal offending. Both pieces of research continued to inform policy and research in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2002 (e.g. Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002; Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and reflected many of the ideas of normal and pathological youth development evident in contemporary industrial societies. In 2002, New Zealand writers used ideas of developmental trajectories along with popular notions of youth development found in metaphors and popular proverbs.

**Stepping Stones, Pathways, and Trajectories: The popular language of developmental knowledge**

There are a number of programmes in New Zealand that attempt to rehabilitate adult offenders back into the community. Few try to address the root of the problem – how can we stop young offenders going down the slippery slope that leads to a life of crime?

(Woolf, 2002, p.41, media context, journal article)

We tend to use metaphors and references to popular proverbs to embed an idea into a commonsense logic or truth. In 2002, New Zealand authors used metaphors in an attempt to illustrate the naturalness and normality of developmental becomingness. Those writing about youth deviance described young people as ‘moving’ into adulthood where they were on a “journey” (Bingham, 2002, p.B5), “road” (P. Taylor, 2002b; Welham, 2002, p.4), ‘pathway’ (Carruthers, 2002; Kilmister & Baxter, 2002a, 2002b; Welham, 2002), or “trajectory” (Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, throughout). Authors described deviance, through the use of metaphors, as a divergence from a normal pathway where the young abnormally-deviant person was “wayward” (Humphreys, 2002b, p.17; Mirams, 2002, p.B5; Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25; Wellwood, 2002, p.A1) “off-track” (Humphreys, 2002b, p.17), “off the rails” (Dekker, 2002, p.F1; Humphreys, 2002a, p.17, 2002b, p.17; Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25; P. Taylor, 2002b, p.C2), the “product” (McIntyre, 2002a, 15.00min) of a pathological family nurturing, or on a family “cycle” of deviance (Carruthers, 2002, pp.2.5; S. Smith, 2002, p.13).
Additionally, writers used proverbs or references to other historical eras to reinforce a commonsense conception of the developing young person within a nurturing environment. In doing this, they produced, reproduced, and reinforced the developmental-psychological conception of youth becomingness and vulnerability. In such a way, they presented developmental-psychology as a natural, universal, and timeless knowledge inherent to humankind – a logical knowledge of commonsense. In 2002, this knowledge appeared in the analysed texts as objective and devoid of context. However, contemporary industrial societies have developed developmental ideas over time and in response to moments of social instability.

**The Developmentally Deviant Child: Produced through time**

The existence of a separate court for young offenders is relatively recent in Western legal systems. Historically, young offenders were convicted and punished as adults in adult courts, and age offered no exoneration. The justice system was characterised by the ‘Classical’ approach where crime was seen as a rational act of free-will. Punishment consequently focused on deterrence rather than reform and was applied equally to adults and children. However, in the latter part of the 19th century there was an acknowledgement that children are uniquely vulnerable and a subsequent move towards child-centred, welfare-based treatment ... The existing court practice of granting pardons to young offenders was soon formalised in English Common Law through the doli incapax rule, (inability to do wrong). Children under seven were given immunity, and those between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of doing wrong unless there was evidence to the contrary. Children over the age of fourteen continued to be tried and convicted as adults. Many countries also established reformatories in recognition of the need to keep young offenders separate from adult criminals. (Watt, 2002, para. 1-2; part 1, government context, web page)

The youth justice system, in contemporary industrial society, is relatively new in a historical sense. In countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand, it was not until the late 1800s that a separate and independent youth justice system appeared (S. Brown, 1998; Jensen & Rojek, 1998; Watt, 2002). However, I am not going to focus on this history in this chapter; rather, I am going to look at a parallel history that has informed the social control of young people across the family, school, social welfare system, and youth justice system – that of developmental knowledge. As I have shown so far, we use developmental knowledge to understand the types of deviance considered normal and abnormal in young people. We also use this knowledge to inform interventions into deviance.

Philippe Aries’ (1962) examination of the history of childhood and adolescence provides a good analysis on the expansion of developmental psychology as a social truth. According to Aries, children have always been a physical reality of adult society. However, before the 1600s, philosophers saw children as little adults. During the 1600s (the time of the Enlightenment), philosophers and other adults became interested in childhood as a discrete separate period of life, separate to adulthood. They saw adults (particularly men) as being
connected to culture and the intellectual development of society. In contrast, they associated children with nature, naïveté, ignorance, and innocence (Hendrick, 1990).

**Explaining Deviance**

Self-report studies tell us that most children and young people do something illegal at least once while they are growing up. A number of New Zealand studies would certainly support this (Moffitt & Silva, 1986; Fergusson, Horwood & Lynskey, 1993; MRL Research Group, 1993; Moffitt et al., 1994; Maxwell & Carroll-Lind, 1996). For example, the study for the New Zealand police by the MRL Research Group (1993) found that more than half (56%) of the children aged 10-14 knew someone who had broken the law in the past 12 months - mainly this was shoplifting. They were also asked if they had committed offences. Just under half (46%) said that they themselves had, though only 6% admitted to shoplifting and 11% admitted to drinking alcohol without their parents’ permission.

(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a p.204, academic context, book chapter)

The European romantic conception of childhood was problematic, as adults could not clearly explain childhood deviance through this conception. To counter this, adult thinkers applied an idea of childhood ignorance to argue that, although children were essentially innocent, they were also ignorant of cultured society (Aries, 1962). Hence, they did not conceptualise deviance in childhood as purposeful and decisive behaviour; instead, they constructed deviance as ‘naughty’ and experimental behaviour in which children engaged in order to learn the rules of adult society. In 2002, authors in Aotearoa/New Zealand continued to use these ideas to explain normal deviance.

However, through applying an idea of ignorance these authors could not completely resolve the contradiction between a perceived innocence and an observed deviance. At some point, they attempted to explain deviance through discussing the predisposition children could have to evilness (c.f. Hendrick, 1990). Often this was evident when they engaged within the psychological debate of nature verses nurture. However even in this, when authors discussed the differing influences, they expressed caution about associating childhood with essential evilness. Instead, they tended to refer to the essential vulnerability and malleability of all children to social influences rather than the genetic makeup of the child.

Hence, those writing about youth deviance assumed that children were not born evil ... but that they became evil. This was particularly evident in constructions of abnormal deviance. Using an argument of the malleability of the child and overtly positioning the child as vulnerable, writers were able to disguise and hide the social need for the control of an explicit risk or threat posed by a child. They were then able to show institutional interventions as being in the child’s interest rather than a social interest. Furthermore, in the texts analysed, writers applied an understanding of childhood malleability and abnormal deviance to describe the young person as either a child or an adult. They did not connect adolescence to malleability and abnormal deviance; instead, they saw malleability being limited to childhood with deviant adult status being determined at the end of childhood, not in the liminal stage of adolescence.
Becoming Evil: The malleability of the working-class child

He [a former principal youth court judge] says many factors contribute to youth crime, among them a child’s experiences at home as well as alcohol and mental disorders. ‘Often these people have already been robbed of their childhood,’ laments Mick. ‘I think by the time they come before the court, it is too late’.
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.24, media context, magazine article)

Philippe Aries (1962) associates the 1800s with the cementation of a romantic construction of childhood. He argues the middle classes applied this construction as a form of social control as they struggled for social stability in a time of change. As industrial societies changed during the industrial revolution so did the family, the school, and the ways adults defined and understood children and young people. During this time, as the demand for urban mass labour increased, families gradually moved from farms to cities. As this occurred, the family was reconceptualised.

Governing groups in industrial society connected this new concept of family to childhood and saw the family as the place in which children were nurtured and socialised into productive adults (Hultqvist, 1998). That is, families became places of governance with governing groups establishing the concept of the self-governing family as the desired norm (Donzelot, 1979). However, this concept was a class concept where the governing middle-class depicted and represented the middle-class family as desired and normal and other ‘poorer’ families as pathological (Aries, 1962).

The governing middle-class constructed the children of working-class families as a social problem and threat. Whereas the middle-classes saw their own families nurturing and socialising children, they saw poorer families failing to achieve this. In reality, poorer children were not ‘children’ because, during the industrial revolution, they continued to be small adults working in industries. If these ‘children’ were not working for money, they were engaging in acts of criminal deviance in order to get money. Rather than seeing this as a possible implication of social change, the middle-classes applied psychological knowledge to locate this problem within the poor family. They further implemented practices to control development and deviance through a nurturing socialisation occurring in compulsory and mass schooling (Walkerdine, 1992).

Controlling the Problem: Education and psychology to the rescue

Hodgson [a teaching principal at a residential centre] is well aware of public perception of her students -- reaction to her role ranges from, ‘that must be a challenging job’ to ‘they should just take those kids outside and shoot them’ – and she does not want to give an impression that the students’ offending is ignored.
‘We are ever mindful of their crimes. I know what they’ve done, but our job is to educate them. In the end they are children and I couldn’t do my job if I thought they were all bad.’
(Andrew, 2002, p.D5, media context, focus article)
During the early 1800s, middle-class women attempted to address child labour through protesting and philanthropic services (Donzelot, 1979). These women argued that industries exploited children and that society needed to remove these children in order to allow them to develop into productive citizens. To effectively argue for change, these women stressed, and assumed, a developmental difference between children and adults evident through universal ideas of childhood vulnerability, malleability, naivety, and innocence (Burman, 1994; Hendrick, 1990). In this way, all children were constructed as dependent upon adults and lacking the adult traits needed to participate in society. Children depended upon adults for the protection of their innocence and for the ‘positive’ nurturing of their malleability. This positioning of difference between children and adults paralleled the introduction of child labour protection laws in contemporary industrial societies (Aries, 1962; Burman, 1994; Hendrick, 1990).

However, these early child protection and welfare laws exacerbated the problem and threat of poor children in society (Donzelot, 1979). Removing children from the workplace made working-class families poorer. Consequently, incidences of child abuse and neglect alongside child crime rates increased. Working-class children became an object that ‘society’ needed to control. In particular, their malleability and vulnerability posed a developmental risk to society.

Mass schooling was introduced and enforced in industrial societies as an answer to this problem (Aries, 1962). Mass schooling provided a space for the education and socialisation of masses into productive individuals. Educationalists and other thinkers began to conceptualise mass schooling as a countering influence of the pathologically poor family and taking advantage of the developmental position of the child. In effect, the governing middle-class introduced the education system as a substitute parent where teachers ‘nurtured’ the developing naïve and innocent child and ‘moulded’ them into adults. Educational thinkers used psychological concepts to inform this ‘new’ pedagogy. It made ‘sense’ to these thinkers as it reflected and drew upon the romantic ideas of childhood from the earlier Enlightenment.

In 2002, New Zealand authors continued to use education and schooling as ‘solutions’ to youth deviance. However, because deviance existed beyond schooling and continued to exist since industrial societies introduced mass schooling in the 1800s, they also argued for interventions that would occur earlier in the problematic youth’s life. According to these authors ‘early interventions’ would assist the role of mass education in nurturing and fostering the ‘positive’ or, rather, productive development of young people. Education and early intervention would address the problems posed by the abnormally-deviant child. Not only would education address the problem of the deviant child, but as it started to do in the late 19th century, education would also address the problem of adolescent deviance.
A New Time, a New Construction: The adolescent

... an important issue in developmental psychopathology concerns the ways in which the effects of peer influence vary with age. It is clear from the available developmental evidence that as youth people enter adolescence they undergo a period of heightened susceptibility to peer influence. However, as young people enter young adulthood and establish greater personal autonomy it is likely that the influence of peer groups declines (Costanzo & Shaw, 1966).

(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.421, academic context, journal article)

Near the end of the 19th century, many industrial societies went into economic depression. Again, the governing groups in these societies struggled to maintain control and ensure social stability. It was during this time that a new problem and ‘underclass’ was discovered – the deviant and poor adolescent (Aries, 1962). Before this, thinkers in industrial societies saw the transition between childhood and adulthood as a pure and sudden biological change. However, near the beginning of the 20th century, they added a social dimension to this transition as they used psychology to explain the new problem and phenomenon of adolescence. So, like childhood, adolescence did, and does, have a biological dimension (Griffin, 1993). Also reflecting childhood, adolescence did, and does, have a historical context surrounding its conceptualisation in psychology and its application in education and other social control practices (Baken, 1971; Griffin, 1993).

At the end of the 19th century, the emergence of adolescence did reflect the emergence of a group of people in-between childhood and adulthood. Compulsory schooling in the 1800s meant that many, particularly male working-class, young people left school between 10- and 12-years-of-age. During the depression of the late 1800s, these young people found themselves in competition with experienced adult workers and, consequently, could not find employment. The increased ‘youth’ crime rate in industrial countries was a possible effect of this condition (Aries, 1962; Shuker, 1987b). Post-primary education was enforced in many industrial countries as a social control response to youth crime (Harker, 1990; Murphy, 1998; Shuker, 1987a, 1987b; Shuker, Openshaw, with Soler, 1990; Sturt, 1967; Walkerdine, 1992, 1998).

Alongside these events, psychological theorists, such as G.S. Hall (1905) developed a conception of adolescence as a developmental ‘in-betweeness’ and time of transition where young people ‘became’ adults by ‘shaking off’ their childhood traits. The post-primary school was conceptualised as the site where this transformation would occur. However, schools bringing young people together en masse created another problem where young people could affect and influence each other. In this way, many adults began to see the peer group as a threat intensified by young people’s developmental closeness to adults (they were physically bigger and stronger than children). In the texts analysed, authors still reflected on this threat by discussing the effects of ‘peer pressure’ and ‘anti-social’ peer groups on a young person’s development.
In the 1800s, adults in authority did not just focus on the peer group but also the male youth and the deviance of male youth. In a way, this reflected the reality of the late 1800s as deviant young people did tend to be male (e.g. Shuker, 1987b). During this time, psychological theorists also focused on the development of male adolescents. Indeed, even as a history of adolescence continued to develop throughout the 20th century, research, theories, and discussions focused on ‘normal’ outcomes, behaviours, and traits of male adolescents. By 2002, writers in Aotearoa/New Zealand tended to assume that the youth they wrote about were essentially male. They used this gendered concept to discuss the deviance of abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant youth.

The Development of Ideas of Normal Deviance: The adolescent in the 20th century

Nelson Mayor Paul Matheson has already dismissed the idea of chaining off the carpark. As far as he is concerned, no public area will be blocked off because of the actions of a small minority.
He says he has been aware of the problems in the carpark since his election as mayor in 1998 but believes it is not a major issue.
‘You are always going to have a bunch of highly strung young men playing territory games,’ he says. ‘I think the problems are minor and it is something the police can handle. We are going through a bad patch.’
‘A group intent on causing trouble is going to do it no matter where they are. We are talking about pea-brains who carry on and in the end they get caught and convicted’.
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article)

Although a knowledge about adolescence gained dominance at a time when there was a focus on working-class deviance, those using a knowledge of adolescence did not use it to focus necessarily on working-class youth. Many of the developmental ideas that arose during the 20th century to explain the youth phenomenon tended to focus on ‘normal’ middle-class youth whilst positioning ‘other’ young people as abnormal. Theorists focused on developing theories, which gave a normalcy to an idea of adolescence.

Aries (1962) describes the 20th century as the time of the adolescent where adults became obsessed with understanding the different and universal ‘nature’ of adolescents. Aries shows this by focusing on the early developments of the 20th century where the ideas of G.S. Hall (1905) described adolescence as a time of uncontrollable development. His ideas of storm and stress and the unpredictability of adolescent development reflected the instability of industrial societies as they moved into the 20th century.

However, G.S. Hall (1905) based his theory on recapitulation theory. This, in turn, posed an ethnicity dilemma (Lesko, 2001). Industrial society used recapitulation theory to position Caucasians as civilised. Other groups, in turn, would aspire to this position but would never really achieve it – they possessed a lack. G.S. Hall replaced this Caucasian position with the position of adult. This was a logical move at the time as it reflected the romantic ideas of children moving from nature to culture (or savage to civilised). However, G.S. Hall implied in his theory that only the Caucasian child could become civilised; by applying recapitulation
theory, he trapped all other groups in uncivilised positions (Lesko, 2001). Hence, young people from other ethnicities could never really become an autonomous civilised adult – human development knowledge would confine them in development as either a child or adolescent. Although this was not explicitly evident in the 2002 texts analysed, it was evident on a covert level in discussions of ethnicity where writers associated young Māori and Pacific youth with abnormal and pathological outcomes (uncivilised). In contrast, they described Pakeha children in a position of normalcy where they would outgrow deviance (to become civilised). This is a highly problematic association and it gives evidence to the academic critique of Hall (Lesko, 2001) in which, the use of ‘western’ developmental knowledge continues to displace young indigenous and ethnic minority youth (c.f. L. T. Smith, 2002).

Reflecting the events surrounding G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory, there were other moments of societal instability in the 20th century. Further reflecting the time of G.S. Hall, youth deviance increased, and changes in youth behaviours occurred, in these times. These changes, again, challenged the stability of adult society; and, theorists used developmental knowledge to incorporate these events into an idea of adolescent becomingness (Pearson, 1994). In these theories, theorists continued to construct young people as lacking control over their own development and, therefore, needing and depending upon adults for ‘healthy’ development.

Capturing a New Identity: The rise of the consumer society and adolescent identity development

Youth Self Report (YSR). This included 149 items which were subjected to a standardised summing and scoring protocol to yield three competency scales (activities, social and school) and seven problem behaviour scales (depression, unpopularity, somatic, identity, through to, delinquency and aggression) ... There was no ‘identity’ scale for females as the developers of the YSR found that principal component factor analysis yielded seven components for males (as listed) but only six for females (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1987).

(Milne, et al., 2002, p.193, academic context, journal article)

The depression and two world wars occurred across the first four decades of the 20th century. Ideas of adolescence remained static over this period as governing groups in emerging contemporary industrial societies concentrated on maintaining internal stability and many young people, particularly men, were required to assist their countries. The end of World War Two heralded a baby boom in many of these societies and a new consumer-based market economy. By the mid 1950s, the baby boomer generation had reached adolescence and adult thinkers began to use the word ‘youth’ to describe this generation (Muncie, 1999).
As the market economy developed, industries started to focus their products on the young (Stuart, 2004). Young people took up this ‘opportunity’ and became consumers of the market society⁴⁰. However, not all young people had access to this new consumer society; those from minority groups with limited resources were also limited in their participation in society (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b). Some of these young people engaged in deviant activities; and, although sociological thinkers attempted to focus on the contextual factors leading to this deviance (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b), psychological thinkers focused on the developmental difference of all young people (e.g. Erikson, 1968)⁴¹.

Theories, such as Erikson’s (1968), associated adolescence with a stage of crisis where the young person engaged in developing an adult identity. Developmental theorists, like Erikson, re-conceptualised young people’s engagement in consumer activities as experimentation with different identities. In this construction, theorists positioned young people again as dependent upon adults for the development of a ‘healthy’ identity. These theorists did not see young people’s behaviours as a reaction to societal change or as a purposeful goal-orientated activity; rather, they constructed their behaviours as an uncontrollable reaction to their psychological development. This construction is still apparent in developmental constructions of normal youth deviance where researchers continue to see identity development as a key concept in adolescent development. However, like G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory, Erikson’s ideas focused on the development of male middle-class white-American youth. Subsequently, there was a tendency for some people to assume that other young people (from other ethnicities, genders, socio-economic groups) could never fully achieve an autonomous identity. These people associated the behaviour of these youth with pathology, not experimentation.

Controlling the Risk: The rise of the risk society and the adolescent risk-taker

He [a youth social worker] is amazed at how long people stay in the carpark – some hanging around there for several hours. ‘They hang out with their friends and let off some steam at the end of the day,’ he says ‘They think they are bulletproof and they are risk-takers. You have to understand that a lot of the people that hang out there have back-grounds of violence. It has been a part of their lives so it is not such a shock for them as it would be for you or me’. (S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media focus, focus article)

A further development of the idea of identity arose in the 1970s. It was at this point a knowledge of risk merged with developmental knowledge. I will provide an overview of these changes here but will expand upon this discussion in the next chapter. In general, the 1970s

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⁴⁰ Through engaging in consumer activities young people were able to experiment with a variety of identities and this had implications in how adults interpreted their engagement in identity construction. Unfortunately, the ways young people took up this opportunity is not a focus of my thesis. For some recent discussion of this see Tina Besley (2002), Jane Kenway & Elizabeth Bullen (2001), Sarah Thornton (1995) and Gill Valentine, Tracy Skelton & Deborah Chambers (1998).

⁴¹ Although the New Zealand context at the time differed to the contexts described by Anglo-American sociologists and psychologists, people in New Zealand drew upon this work in an attempt to understand the deviance of young people. Like the United States of America and the United Kingdom, during the 1950s New Zealand went through a clear moral panic about the ‘rising’ deviance of young people (Shuker, Openshaw with Soler, 1990).
was another period of economic and social instability in contemporary industrial societies in which technological and scientific risks such as a global oil crisis, a threat of nuclear warfare, and a collapse of the welfare state in many contemporary industrial countries threatened the stability of society (Beck, 1992). During this time, those in positions of authority began to use a concept of ‘risk’ to capture and expand upon these global threats (Beck, 1992, 1999; Douglas, 1992). Developmentalists also began to use the term to describe and define the behaviours and pathologies of young people.

It was during this period that Elkind (1979) developed his theory of cognitive development to describe and discuss the reasons for the risk-taking behaviour of normal young people. In a similar fashion to G.S. Hall (1905) and Erikson (1968), Elkind attempted to explain the manifesting behaviours of young people as an uncontrollable reaction to immature cognitive development. Again, his theory positioned the male middle-class white-American youth as normal, and his theory conceptualised risk-taking behaviours as an adolescent expected norm. In 2002, New Zealand authors continued to use this theory – particularly as a commonsense conception of youth. Reflecting earlier theories, they associated a concept of adolescent risk taking with ‘normal’ male youth.

For the abnormally-deviant youth, authors used a concept of being ‘at-risk’ and ‘a risk’. Through using a focus on risk, they used psychological knowledge in a way that mirrored the techno-scientific ideas of risk (c.f. Beck, 1992). That is, through psychological knowledge, authors were able to identify human threats to social stability. The association they made between psychology and risk was not new but had surfaced in the political developments of the 1980s.

The idea of human risk emerged in the 1980s at the same time as the rise of neo-liberalism. The emergence of risk allowed for governing groups in society to control marginal groups within the social contexts of family and school. By 2002, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, many people applied a knowledge of development and risk in policy and research to differentiate between normal and abnormal youth in order to control the pathology of the abnormal and to ‘nurture’ the healthy development of the normal.

**Aotearoa/New Zealand 2002: The use of developmental knowledge in policy and research**

The youth offending strategy recognises that early intervention to deal with the causes of offending is more effective than trying to break entrenched patterns of offending later in life. It also recognises that interventions are more effective when the various agencies involved are working well together. The strategy therefore focuses on ensuring that interventions are made as early and as effectively as possible. (Dalmer, 2002, p.16, government context, official publication)

During 2002, the New Zealand Government introduced two policies specifically with youth in mind. Although both these strategies used developmental knowledge and attempted to
focus on the needs of youth, they were about two completely different groups of young people. The Ministry of Youth Affairs developed the first strategy (the *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa*). This strategy focused on adults and institutions ‘fostering’ the healthy development of ‘all’ young people; however, a closer reading of this strategy suggests that these young people were generally ‘normal’. The Ministries of Justice and Social Policy developed the second strategy (*The Youth Offending Strategy*). This strategy focused on adults and institutions ‘controlling’ the development of ‘at-risk’ children and young people.

The *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa* was the more liberal of the two in that it attempted to ‘give’ youth freedom and autonomy over their own lives. In contrast, *The Youth Offending Strategy* attempted to centralise state control over the behaviour of some youth and the environments in which they lived. These strategies provide an interesting context to the New Zealand texts on youth crime published in 2002.

**The Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa**

The aim of the *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa* was to drive youth policy through a focus on human development knowledge. The Strategy outlined six key principles of youth development, which emphasised the contexts in which development occurred, the factors that affected development and the role of academic research in developmental knowledge. From these principles, the Strategy encouraged an institutional relationship with youth that would support young people through their development.

McLaren (2002) published a literature review after the Strategy to inform and enforce the Strategy’s recommendations. McLaren investigated both human development theories and literature to identity the ways in which “good outcomes” (pp.7, 9, 11, 13) could be achieved for young people. Although she focused on the ways young people could achieve positive development, she tended to look at the impact of negative factors on human development. For example, in looking at the importance of school success, she argued:

> Being involved in school, attending regularly, learning basic skills and acquiring basic qualifications are also important for well-being … Leaving school early without qualifications can result in employment difficulties … Young people who drop out usually feel rootless, hopeless and estranged from school, home … there is also another group of ‘underachievers’ …

(McLaren, 2002, p.29)

Despite it being about positive development, McLaren (2002) had a stronger emphasis on risk in her review. This was apparent in the number of times she talked about risk and protective factors. In the index, she had 64 entries on risk in contrast to 10 entries on protective factors. The language used in the review showed how it is difficult to create a positive construction of youth from human development – a knowledge that focuses on risk, abnormal development and pathology (c.f. Foucault, 1988; Griffin, 1993, 1996; Lesko, 1996b, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997).
The Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa focused on building supportive relationships with youth so that positive development could be encouraged. Like policies in other countries (such as Australia (White & Wyn, 2004)), it was a policy that employed ideas of development and participation to focus on the end-product of adolescence – adulthood. In contrast, the Youth Offending Strategy focused on putting effective systems in place to reduce youth offending, to control the immediate behaviour of deviant youth, and to control developmental outcomes in the youth (Ministry of Justice, 2001).

The Youth Offending Strategy

The Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending was established in 2000 to perform two tasks: to produce a strategy that would address youth offending by improving practice in the youth justice sector and to foster a collaborative approach to address youth offending through interagency projects (Carruthers, 2002; Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002). These projects were in the areas of youth alcohol and drug abuse, education, mental health, recidivist offending, mentoring, and early intervention.

The Youth Offending Strategy had links with several other developed Government policies including Action for Child and Youth Development (which combined Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa with the child equivalent Agenda for Children (Ministry of Social Development, 2002)) and Children Young People and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989. Consequently, like the Youth Development Strategy, psychological and developmental research extensively informed the Youth Offending Strategy. Furthermore, the Strategy focused on the identification of risk and protective factors for young people, especially in the argument for early intervention.

The Strategy endorsed the “streaming” (p.16), or dividing, of young people into different groups based upon risk and protective factors. In such a way, practitioners could target interventions effectively and efficiently at a particular group of children to control their development. This coincided with the development of a national ‘tracking’ database and an early intervention assessment tool to intervene in a child’s life at the earliest stage possible (Dalmer, 2002; Maxwell et al., 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2002c; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002).

In addition to the use of human development knowledge, the Strategy argued for an interagency approach to the addressing of youth offending (Dalmer, 2002; Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002). On one level, this involved closer links between Child, Youth and Family (CYF) and the New Zealand Police (NZ Police), on another level, this involved links between CYF, NZ

Police and the other agencies working with youth (including courts, health and education). This targeted approach to youth offending allowed for developmental knowledge to be put into practice as practitioners could identify and control young people across a number of institutional contexts.

**Implications of Developmental Knowledge for Youth**

Since children and youth are in the state of always-becomingness, they do not exist in the present, and therefore we can do what we want with them ... Here again is a similarity between adolescents and colonized peoples: they are described as wholly other, of a different time and a different psychological make-up. (Lesko, 1996b, p.469)

The ways people have used developmental knowledge over the last two hundred years shows how they, in some way, have transferred economic and social instability in a society onto youth. This is evident in the history of childhood and in the history of adolescence over the last century. A struggle is evident here where governing groups in adult society have attempted to maintain stability and have attempted to do so by defining and controlling ‘problematic’ groups. In the case of contemporary industrial societies, this group has been youth. This has particular implications for youth, which we can see through the policies of 2002.

The ways in which New Zealand society applied developmental knowledge in the *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa* (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and the *Youth Offending Strategy* (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) highlight two key implications for young people. First, governing groups in society tend to marginalise all young people through the understanding that they lack the ability to participate fully in society. These people see young people as ignorant children, engaging in deviant or ‘naughty’ behaviour as they learn the rules of society or as adolescents lacking any control over their developing adult body and engaging in risk behaviours as a part of an adolescent experience. In this way, these adults use developmental knowledge to construct all young people as problems needing social control. Consequently, by using this knowledge they position young people as powerless and dependent upon them. So, governing groups use developmental knowledge as adequate reasoning for the social control of all young people. In strategies like the *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa*, adults define and set parameters around youth participation.

However, there is a second division of marginalisation. In this division, those using developmental knowledge position different groups of young people as pathologically deviant. In this positioning, adults do not use developmental knowledge to construct these young people as passing through a phase. Instead, they use developmental knowledge to construct these young people as a childhood risk, which transforms into a pathological outcome on the onset of puberty. In explanations of possible reasons for abnormal youth
deviance, those using developmental knowledge ignore any social instability coinciding with an onset of youth deviance and locate the problem within the youth or the young person’s family. During times of instability, governing groups have applied developmental knowledge as a tool of social control to overcome any challenge or problem marginalised groups pose to society. In this way, developmental knowledge allow adults to project a fear of future instability onto youth and to regain some perceived control over the future (through focusing on the future development of youth).

In both these constructions of the young person, people have positioned youth as an object of development. These people use developmental knowledge to not only validate a need to control some young people but also a need to control all young people with the reasoning that deviance does not just occur in pathological populations. This shows an inherent contradiction in the reasoning of developmental knowledge which I have alluded to previously. Through developmental knowledge, adults are able to divide young people into the normal and the abnormal; however, this division is not clear and one-way as some, supposedly, ‘pathological’ youth may never engage in deviant behaviour and many normal youth do engage in deviant behaviour despite their positioning. Hence, through applying developmental knowledge, adults provide normally-deviant youth with an opportunity to change and become adult, whereas, when they use developmental knowledge, they position abnormally-deviant youth unfairly, albeit unintentionally, as a lost cause if not identified in childhood. In 2002, authors applied a knowledge of risk with developmental knowledge. I investigate this use of risk in the next chapter.
The word ‘risk’ could well be dropped from politics. ‘Danger’ would do the work it does just as well. When ‘risk’ enters as a concept in political debate, it becomes a menacing thing, like a flood, an earthquake, or a thrown brick. But it is not a thing, it is a way of thinking.

(Douglas, 1992, p.46)

Alongside developmental knowledge, authors used a knowledge of risk to create a shared conception of youth. In the texts analysed, risk could be assumed to be another aspect of developmental knowledge because authors appeared to directly associate ‘youth-at-risk’ and ‘risk behaviours’ with ideas of normal and abnormal development. However, as I began to suggest in the previous chapter, the connection between risk and development is one that occurred within a particular social context of risk during the 1970s (Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992).

In this chapter, I explore the concept of risk as it has appeared contextually over the last two centuries. Using the texts as a starting point, I examine how risk emerged in criminal psychology in the 19th century and later re-emerged in the 20th century in developmental psychology. Hence, I will also discuss the merging of developmental psychology and risk as a method of social control which enabled those in New Zealand institutions to exercise power over the development of young people (both those positioned as normal and abnormal). Many adults in authority have used both knowledges in the attempt to maintain control in a struggle for social and structural stability. This has entailed them using a specific language – a language of risk.

The Language of Risk

Childhood maltreatment is a universal risk factor for antisocial behaviour. Boys who experience abuse - and, more generally, those exposed to erratic, coercive, and punitive parenting - are at risk of developing conduct disorder, antisocial personality symptoms, and of becoming violent offenders ... The earlier children experience maltreatment, the more likely they are to develop these problems ... But there are large differences between children and their exposure to maltreatment. Although maltreatment increases the risk of later criminality by about 50%, most maltreated children do not become delinquents or adult criminals ... The reason for this variability in response is largely unknown, but it may be that vulnerability to adversities is conditional, depending on genetic susceptibility factors.

(Caspi et al., 2002, p.851, academic context, journal article)
Writers and commentators readily used a language of risk across institutional contexts. This, in itself, gave evidence to a normalisation and popularisation of risk. Nardini and Antes (cited in G. Tait, 1995, p.123) argue that risk has become a “buzz word” in academic constructions of youth. My analysis revealed that risk has become popularised, not just in texts published in academic contexts, but also in texts published in government and media contexts. This should be expected as other analyses of risk have shown that risk is a dominant concept within political (e.g. Beck, 1992, 1999; Douglas, 1992) and media (e.g. Wilkinson, 2001) discussions.

Consequently, using risk allows for a perceived ‘commonsense’ between the author and the consumer of the text. However, people use risk differently in different constructions – in the analysed texts, authors constructed the youth-at-risk very differently to the adolescent engaging in risk behaviours. What they brought together was a concept and a language, not a construction. This meant that constructions had many contradictions even when authors used a consistent language of risk.

Risk theorists (Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988) argue that a language of risk is a scientific language based on probability. However, my own analysis found that the language of risk is also political and economical (c.f. Douglas, 1992; Withers & Batten, 1995). Hence, risk is not only scientised, it is politicised. By using a language of risk, we are able to bring the future into the present. We can attempt to control the unpredictable.

**Controlling the Future in the Present: Focusing on outcomes**

Given Kurariki’s offending history and the intensity of the other negative influences in his life, he was at high-risk of a range of poor life outcomes, including continuing to offend.

(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.5, government context, ministerial report)

When we use a language of risk, we usually focus on predicting and controlling the future in the present moment (Beck, 1992, 1999; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988). In this sense, this strategy works nicely alongside ideas of human development as both focus on outcomes. This was also evident in the texts of 2002.

In 2002, the public were clearly anxious about the potentially negative developmental outcomes of young people. The public saw a resolution to this anxiety in the identification and control of deviant young people. In the analysed texts, writers merged a knowledge of development with a language and knowledge of risk to describe young people. They particularly focused on the abnormal youth-at-risk. They applied statistics and probability in an attempt to predict the future of the youth-at-risk and control the youth-at-risk in the present. Usually these writers applied expertise and a scientific language of risk in this prediction.
The Scientific Language of Risk

Broadly speaking the risk ratios show the increase in the odds or rate of the outcome behavior at a given level of deviant peer affiliations relative to odds or risk of those in the lowest quartile. Table VI reports estimates of the risk ratios and confidence intervals for each outcome and each year of observation. The table shows:

1. For violent crime there is an increase in the rate of crime with increasing deviant peer affiliations at each age. However, the strength of the association reduces substantially with age: at age 14-15 years those with high deviant peer affiliations are estimated to have risks of violent crime that are over 8 times higher than those with low deviant peer affiliations. However, by age 20-21 this difference reduces to 1.6. (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.426, academic context, journal article)

When we use a knowledge of risk, we tend to involve an institutional expertise to give a scientific language to concepts of danger. This language of risk is an objective, rational and scientific rhetoric looking at what industrial societies once referred to as danger (Castel, 1991; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1996a). Mary Douglas describes the scientisation of risk as a “bogus objectivity” in which contemporary society has turned things that, at times, have quite human elements (i.e. dangers can be caused by human error) or can be described as unpredictable fates of nature into something predictable and manageable. One such way that this occurs is when researchers ‘objectively’ identify risk factors or use probability and statistics to draw conclusions.

Having a One-In-Six Chance: Probability in risk identification

High-risk offenders (or serious young offenders) may comprise less than 5% of under 17 year olds, but they account for a large proportion of offences committed by children and young people … They engage in five to 20 times as much offending as lower-risk offenders. They begin offending early (before age 14 and as early as 10), offend at high rates and often very seriously, and are likely to keep offending into adulthood. They start their anti-social behaviour with minor problems in early childhood, move onto more serious problem behaviours, and then begin serious and/or repeat offending. As they continue offending, they commit serious offences along with numerous less serious offences. These young people are characterised by major personal, social and family disorder. (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.17, government context, strategy document)

Probability is a key element of expertise in risk language (Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988). When researchers and authors apply a language of risk, they tend to refer to statistics and use words of probability, such as ‘likely’, ‘probable’ and ‘chance’. This was evident in 2002 when those writing referred to statistics to describe and deconstruct youth crime. By doing this, they were able to divide and separate youth into two groups – the abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant youth.

However, when people use statistics and probability, they do not create an argument devoid of commonsense. Indeed, these people may also use metaphors of probability to validate their reasoning through a tautological logic. This is particularly evident when people
combine one knowledge with another to emphasise the ‘natural’ truth of a posed argument. In the analysed texts (particularly those published in a media context), writers used ideas of development and a language of probability to place abnormally-deviant young people on a ‘pathway’ to criminal deviance. This pathway to deviance was a pathway of risk where each writer, in their ‘own’ words, placed the youth on a “downward spiral” (Dekker, 2002, p.F1) or a “slippery slope” (Woolf, 2002) to deviance. Alongside this path metaphor, writers described risk behaviours as ‘stepping stones’ (Wall, 2002) to deviance. Once deviant developmental outcomes had become finalised, they described the young offender as ‘graduating’ into deviance (Ministry of Justice, 2002c), becoming a “career” criminal (Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.28; Wall, 2002, p.A8; Welham, 2002, p.4), and being a “lost cause” (Welham, 2002). This reasoning strengthened their arguments for intrusive interventions. In these interventions, adult ‘society’ would put power into the hands of youth justice practitioners so that they could ‘point the young person into the right direction’ (Woolf, 2002) or ‘put the young person back on track’ (Kilmister & Baxter, 2002a, 2002b; Moore, 2002). In this way, writers not only incorporated risk into developmental reasoning but also constructed a political language around risk identification.

The Political Language of Risk

In a political language of risk, those applying the language of risk debate the worth of particular risk interventions (Douglas, 1992). This occurs on two levels: first, those using the language identify the causes of a particular problem (Foucault, 1988); second, they identify the fiscal costs and benefits of particular programmes (c.f. Withers & Batten, 1995).

Identifying the Causes

But it was Alex Peihopa who hit Mr Choy with a baseball bat. One brutal swing taking a life and potentially ruining his own. What sort of kid does this and why?
Well it might surprise you to learn that Alex Peihopa came from a stable loving family and as Janet McIntyre reports they are asking the same questions that we are.
(McIntyre, 2002b, 0.00-0.17min, media context, current affairs article (television))

In a language of risk, people attempt to apportion blame (Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992). Ulrich Beck (1992) describes this facet of risk language as an international language of accountability. Beck (1992, 1999) argues that in contemporary society, where risks tend to come simultaneously from everywhere and nowhere, people cannot attribute risk, and, therefore, accountability, to any one person or institution. So, in a reading of youth crime based on Beck’s (1992) Risk Society, we would expect to see authors attributing blame to society or the ‘system’ and no one individual or factor.

In the texts I analysed, authors publishing in a media context used a language of blame in their search for the causes of youth crime. Reflecting Beck’s (1992, 1999) analysis of technological risk, these authors placed blame on the effects of modernisation. For example, they blamed technologies (such as video games), changes in the family unit
(particularly solo parent families) and general changes in New Zealand society. In this sense, they blamed a ‘process’ in society – the evolution of modernisation. When they did this, there tended to be an undertone of ‘nothing could be done about this’.

In contrast to unattributable blame, across the three institutional contexts, writers also attempted to find the causes of youth crime (c.f. Foucault, 1988). Rather than locating causes in a process, these writers located causes in societal structures, institutions and individuals. Causes of youth offending existed in society (such as socio-economic level), in the family (such as neglect) and in the youth (such as vulnerability). In this way, these writers diffused causes across society and, consequently, appeared to place blame on everyone. However, they attempted to find a solution to these diffused causes by concentrating on problems in the individual and their family. Ultimately, they saw the individual as being at-risk, not society. Furthermore, these writers argued that the family, being one key environment in which the individual developed, could increase or decrease an individual’s vulnerability. These writers located risk in the individual and family and, therefore, found these two sites as key causes to youth offending.

In the analysed texts, those writing about youth crime placed the causes of youth offending on the family and/or the individual. However, they placed the responsibility for the offending on society and the family. They assumed that children and young people needed nurturing into adult citizens. Society and the family were responsible for this. They also argued that, because society had a responsibility, society needed to debate the economic costs of crime prevention.

Identifying the Costs

The costs of failing to halt a young person’s progress into the adult criminal justice system are even more considerable. It costs at least $50,000 per year on average to keep one person incarcerated in a New Zealand prison. The indirect costs of losing a young person’s positive participation in society and the impact on future generations are much more difficult to quantify but no less significant.

Resources should be focused towards children and young people who are demonstrating a strong risk of becoming, or have become, serious and recidivist offenders (the high-risk group). This will ensure that those youth offenders who have greater and more complex needs receive the most intensive and comprehensive interventions, while scarce resources are not inappropriately directed at those who require only a minimal intervention (although some resources will always need to be targeted at the lower-risk groups).

(Graeme Withers and Margaret Batten, 1995) claim that arguments for fiscal costs are a central aspect of youth-at-risk interventions. My analysis showed a further level to Withers and Batten’s findings as New Zealand authors in 2002 focused on economic costs in their constructions of youth deviance. In constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, authors argued that any money adult society spent now would return a greater profit because these young people would be contributing to society (through work and tax), not
living in prisons. In such constructions, these authors allowed a space for recalculation by focusing arguments on a distant future probability. If, for some reason, the intervention did not work society would have time to develop an alternative argument about why an intervention failed to return benefits.

Economic arguments were less apparent in the constructions of normal deviance – particularly when authors constructed the deviant youth as a social threat. This could be because of the immediacy of risk in the discourse – these young people were engaged in immediate risk behaviours and needed immediate intervention. Hence, these authors could not allow room for recalculation as in constructions of youth-at-risk. However, they used statistics and probability to show the effectiveness of immediate interventions. Furthermore, they provided or wrote programme evaluations to justify fiscal spending.

Across the texts analysed, those writing applied a language and knowledge of risk by arguing for the control of developmental potentiality through probability, cause identification, and cost-effectiveness calculation. Risk theorists, such as Beck (1992) and Douglas (1992) argue that this conception of risk is very much a condition of contemporary industrial society. They argue that this society is more contingent and unpredictable than those in the past. However, by looking at the history of risk in crime interventions over the last 200 years, we can see that risk knowledge has a longer history, connected to technological developments, criminal psychology, developmental psychology, and social control.

The Dangerous Risk - Produced through time

Nearly every generation has at one time or another been labelled as rebellious. A 1954 issue of Newsweek in America made it a front-page issue: 'Let's Face It: Our Teenagers Are Out of Control'. The article went on to quote a sociologist warning darkly of a ‘national teenage problem -- a problem that is apparently getting worse. And why? There’s too much divorce, too few normal homes.’ Others blamed ‘salacious, sadistic comic books’. In reality, the young are hardly ever the root cause of youth problems. Almost without fail, there is a direct adult influence. Because of that, today’s attempts by government agencies at controlling the problem are mostly directed at the family unit. Research has shown that family is the number one influence on a child’s decision-making, followed by school, peers and the wider community.

(Mirams, 2002, media context, feature article)

Unlike a history of developmental knowledge, a history of risk knowledge in contemporary industrial societies is not directly connected to a control of childhood and adolescence. A history of risk shows a connection between risk and danger (Douglas, 1992). Across time, societal groups have either associated risk with a feat of adventure or a social threat. When theorists began to apply this concept to ideas of criminality in 19th century industrial societies, they focused on dangerous groups in society – groups posing a threat to the stability of society (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1988; G. Tait, 1995). Like the history of developmental knowledge, risk knowledge emerged in a time of instability and change.
We know from Chapter 6, changes in industrial society in the 19th century coincided with the emergence of social classes in these societies. During this time, in emerging industrial countries like the United Kingdom the working-classes emerged as a social problem. People in the governing middle-class began to use population statistics to identify and control this group (Foucault, 1994a). However, rather than being defined as a risk population, they used criminological psychology and a concept of dangerousness to describe this group (Castel, 1991). By using ideas of dangerousness, governing groups were able to connect explicitly particular social groups in society to a potential social threat. By focusing on danger, they were able to focus on risk and apply risk management tools (such as statistics) in practices of governance (Pratt, 1997).

When governing groups in industrial society began to combine psychological thought with penological practices in the 19th century, it heralded in a “psychiatrization” (Foucault, 1988, p.130) of crime and crime control. Those governing began to associate danger with individuals, not social groups (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1988; Pratt, 1997). This meant that thinkers in industrial society started to analyse and focus on the psychological character of the adult individual and the conditions that lead up to the committing of a crime (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1988). Through the individualisation of risk, the adult middle-class struggled to maintain control over social uncertainty and unpredictability by transferring structural risk to the individual criminal. These people did not construct these criminals as resisting or reacting to social conditions (or being engaged in a struggle themselves); instead, they constructed these criminals as having a deficit psychological character which needed to be re-conditioned in institutions (Foucault, 1988). They used the prison and punishment as tools for social insurance and designed statistical measures to predict individual risk (Pratt, 1997).

At the beginning of the 20th century, when a knowledge of adolescence began to emerge, theorists used psychological knowledges of eugenics, medico-psychology, and criminal anthropology to inform ideas of criminality and punishment (Pratt, 1997). By using these knowledges, they suggested that the problem of criminality was unchangeable, located in the individual, and a genetic condition. People in authority then began to use these ideas to inform practices of division where the pathological criminal was separated from other ‘normal’ people who had, mistakenly, shown a moral weakness and immaturity in a moment of criminal activity. It was at this point, that criminological psychologists began to associate criminality as an outcome of pathological development and an unchangeable end-product of childhood. Through this form of reasoning, those in positions of authority could not change adult criminals but could effect change through interventions targeted at young criminals:

Now the habitual criminals had been subdivided: between the younger ones, for whom, it was thought, there was hope, and who would respond to corrective training, where psychological knowledge would become part of the programme of government for them within such institutions, and the older habituals for whom nothing could be
Consequently, risk emerged in 19th century industrial societies as the danger posed by working-classes to the stability of middle-class society. The sciences of psychology and criminology allowed criminal deviance and risk to be located within the individual. Hence, 19th century risk was very much a concept of criminological psychology. By the mid 20th century, risk knowledge had altogether disappeared in discussions of youth crime. Instead, psychologists drew upon ideas of abnormally, pathology, and psychological dysfunction. It was not until the 1970s that risk and psychology came together in descriptions of youth deviance. Ideas of risk and dangerousness re-emerged to describe youth crime and risk became a concept of developmental psychology. However, as risk theorists such as Beck (1992, 1999) and Douglas (1992) suggest, contemporary industrial society was also a society of scientific technological risk.

Youth and Risk: Produced through age

Douglas (1992) and Beck (1992, 1999) both describe risk as a form of thinking or rationalisation dominant in many post 1970 contemporary societies. For them, risk is associated with the modernisation of society and with science and technology. Beck's (1992) contemporary society is a “risk society”. This is a global society threatened by ecological and biological disasters caused by the technologies of modernisation (e.g. nuclear fallout). Beck argues that it was in the 1970s that this risk society first began to emerge in many contemporary industrial countries when people realised that previous technological developments posed uncertain, unpredictable, and uncontrollable risks to society (c.f. Lacy, 2002). The demise of the welfare state, in countries such as New Zealand, a global oil crisis, and the international take-up of risk management tools (such as risk assessments and insurance) in the 1970s exacerbated this uncertainty and uncontrollability (Beck, 1992).
The changes of the 1970s also affected young people (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001). According to Peter Dwyer and Johanna Wyn (2001), by the 1970s, traditional theories of human development could no longer predict developmental outcomes. This was because the unpredictability and uncertainty of contemporary society challenged a determinable linear model of development. However, as shown so far, this has not restricted or hindered people applying developmental ideas of outcomes and trajectories in descriptions of youth deviance. Perhaps this is because the unpredictability of development, in itself, poses a risk to society (c.f. Pratt, 1997).

As such, anxiety and a desire for control are key conditions of contemporary risk society (Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992). It is possible to observe this anxiety and desire in the texts describing youth deviance in 2002 New Zealand. Authors focused on ascertaining a cause for youth crime. They were clearly anxious about the unpredictability of crime and desired to control it. On another level, some critical youth studies research also shows this idea of anxiety and control, where theorists (e.g. Wyn & White, 2000) express a concern about the negative effects of contingency and unpredictability for young people. In contrast, other theorists (e.g. Beck, 1992, 1999; Kelly, 2001) have argued that contingency opens up spaces of freedom and possibility (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001). It is this argument that I will take further when I explore the alternative possibilities that are available for youth in Chapter 10.

It is difficult to see how youth (a word not logically connected to technology) can be associated with risk in this society. Laterally, youth may be described as a technological hazard – a consequence of modern society (c.f. Lesko, 2001; Newburn, 1997; Pearson, 1994) as contemporary ideas of youth did arise in times of technological and social change. Taking this idea further, young people could be conceptualised as an effect of modernisation – a metaphorical time bomb threatening to explode. Developmental theories constructed over the 20th century about adolescence reflected this idea of youth as unpredictable threat.

In 2002, New Zealand authors did associate youth with risk and societal threat. Explicitly, they constructed this threat, not because of modernisation, but rather as an inherent part of these young people’s developmental ‘nature’. Conversely, they argued that modern technology posed a threat to youth. For example, authors constructed youth-at-risk in the texts as being biologically vulnerable to criminality due to environmental influences. Although they saw the social environment as posing the greatest risk to these young people, they also saw technology (e.g. violent video games and television programmes) as posing a risk. In contrast, authors implied that youth themselves posed a risk to society. Authors seemed quite anxious about this human risk. This was particularly evident when they talked about, and constructed, the youth-at-risk. In a way, it appeared as if they had transferred any risk caused by social instability onto youth people themselves.
For Beck (1992, 1999), modern technology posed risks to society; in contrast, in the texts I analysed, young people posed risks to society. In *Risk Society*, Beck (1992) was very clear about the transference of risk from groups of people to technology. However, I found that authors clearly associated risk within a group – youth-at-risk. Others (Lash & Wynne cited in Beck, 1992; Elliott, 2002) have criticised Beck’s risk thesis for reducing all of society down to one concept – risk; I found Beck’s initial thesis limiting as it reduced all concepts of risk down to one – technological risk – which ignored any complexity of risk. Beck appeared to ignore any relationship technological developments had with the use of expertise and risk technologies in the control of human risk.

**Controlling the Risk: Risk technologies in the control of youth deviance**

CYF now takes a more extensive assessment of the child and their life so that the service does not focus purely on the child’s crime but all the wider issues in their life. The fresh approach was developed after research in the late 1990s uncovered high rates of self-harm among young people in New Zealand. The child’s well-being assessment focused on reducing that self-harm as well as the criminal behaviour and looked into the child’s family, their bond with the family, their community activity such as sports, emotional wellbeing, delved into their attitudes (such as to society and law), peer relationships, spiritual and cultural identity (Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article).

People using a knowledge of risk claim authority by referring to an institutionally-based objective and scientific construction of youth (c.f. Douglas, 1992). By using this expertise, they are able to validate any surveillance or ‘diagnostic gaze’ used in a society to identify and control a problem (Castel, 1991; Rose, 1996a; G. Tait, 1995; Kelly, 2000). Castel (1991) and G. Tait (1995) argue that in a risk society this form of surveillance involves complex techniques of risk knowledge production, in which a society looks within its population to identify those individuals posing a risk.

Castel (1991) and G. Tait (1995) claim that risk surveillance has replaced the spatial surveillance of disciplinary society (see Foucault, 1977). My own analysis did not confirm this; rather, authors described risk surveillance as involving both techniques of knowledge production and techniques of spatial control. For example, they described how practitioners could use knowledge production techniques to survey and ‘observe’ youth and identify abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk. However, they also identified spatial surveillance techniques such as surveillance cameras and the architectural control of space as key techniques to intervene into youth deviance.

Writers used risk language, knowledge, and knowledge-informed practices to construct the youth-at-risk. In this construction of youth, they argued that “risk factors” allowed practitioners to identify variables of risk (c.f. Castel, 1991). However, writers also used “protective factors” to reinforce covertly a construction of risk. This is because they talked about how protective factors allowed for the elimination or reduction of risk within individuals. In this way, protective factors existed only because of a notion of risk. So, writers used both
protective factors and risk factors to construct the youth-at-risk. When this happened, they brought together the knowledges of development and risk.

Within the analysed texts, when those writing on youth deviance focused on risk, potentiality, and development, they developed an argument for early intervention. Early intervention worked on the premise that practitioners could identify potential criminals before adulthood (and the solidification of deviant characteristics), and then, due to the child’s developmental level, they could re-direct the child onto a ‘path’ of normality. Reflecting developmental knowledge, these authors conceptualised schools as key institutions for risk factor identification and control. In the school, practitioners, like teachers, could apply risk factor observations and assessments to identify the youth-at-risk.

Castel (1991) and G. Tait (1995) argue that in contemporary society, risk factors are a common instrument of governance. Governing groups in these societies are able to apply risk factors to survey a population, identify potentially threatening groups and, consequently, control any threat. G. Tait argues that a concept of risk has allowed governing groups and those in authority to replace the delinquent of disciplinary society with ‘youth-at-risk’:

A youth no longer possesses a seed of delinquency, visible to the competent expert, rather delinquency lies within any number of statistically validated ‘risk’ factors. (G. Tait, 1995, p.127)

**The Effect of Risk: The youth-at-risk**

You could call Rick an angry child. He’s been dubbed the kid from hell more than once and has been thrown out of schools because he’s a serious risk to others. Fighting, enjoying dope-filled sessions with his mates, terrorising anyone who got in his way and taking on all-comers, Rick was out of control.

New Plymouth’s Young People’s Trust, which picks up those kids nobody else wants to know about, have had a lot of dealings with Rick. They have no hesitation in saying he could kill one day. (Humphreys, 2002a, p.17, media context, feature article)

Across the texts, authors used a construction of the ‘youth-at-risk’ to separate and define abnormal and normal deviance. When authors used the words ‘at-risk’ to talk about a youth they meant, and implied, two things. They explicitly conveyed the youth as vulnerable but covertly implied that the youth was a potential threat. As such, the youth-at-risk had a duality of risk – s/he was individually at-risk and socially a risk (c.f. Donzelot, 1979). In contrast, authors constructed the normally-deviant youth as vulnerable as a child but a social threat as an adolescent. What made these constructions possible was the merging of development and risk knowledges from the 1970s.

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43 When I first began my doctorate, I was sceptical about using this construction. I felt it had been overused and that it restricted possibilities for youth (c.f. G. Tait, 1995). However, this construction was central in my analysis as authors explicitly used the words “youth-at-risk” to identify and construct a particular group of dangerous youth. I could not avoid this construction, I needed to return to it and critique it.
The Merging of Knowledges

Children and young people who offend are not a homogeneous group. They differ in both the seriousness of their offending, and the presence of risk and protective factors in their lives. Streaming children and young people into different groups based on these characteristics can facilitate more effective and appropriate interventions. (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.16, government context, policy document)

By 2002, it was evident that authors discussing youth crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand used a combination of risk and developmental knowledge to identify and construct the deviant youth. Furthermore, societal groups have used both developmental knowledge and risk over the last 200 years to identify and control deviant individuals and populations. However, as I have shown in these last two chapters, these groups have not always combined developmental knowledge with risk knowledge to explain youth deviance. Instead, both knowledges shared particular aspects – both emerged in popular thought and expertise at the beginning of the 19th century; both informed, and were informed by, psychology; both arose in times of societal instability; both, in some way, were connected to the control of marginal groups (particularly the working-classes); and both involved the use of statistical data. However, before the 1970s, developmental knowledge and risk were two different knowledges. Whereas those in industrial societies used developmental knowledge to focus on the development of children and young people, those in industrial societies originally used risk knowledge to focus on the pathological character of the (usually adult) criminal. Building on Figure 2 in Chapter 6 (p.84), Figure 3 illustrates this relationship between developmental knowledge and risk knowledge prior to 1970.

Figure 3: Developmental Knowledge and Risk Knowledge Prior to the 1970s
The technological and social changes to contemporary industrial societies in the 1970s saw a merging of developmental knowledge and risk knowledge. Developmental knowledge and risk knowledge mirrored the unpredictability and uncertainty of contemporary industrial societies. In these societies, adults focused on the potentiality of young people and any risk they posed to the future of society. In the analysed texts of 2002, this was evident through a shared language of risk and development. Figure 4 shows the merging of these knowledges with their shared concepts.

Centrally, writers constructed age and becomingness as an unpredictable concept – a concept that drew together the vulnerability of the young child and the unpredictable threat that young people posed to society. In constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, they coupled this with a language of potentiality and focused on statistically determining possible outcomes. These outcomes could either help or hinder society and writers argued that practitioners should use developmental risk knowledge to identify, divide, and separate problematic youth. In contrast, writers coupled a concept of age with a concept of liminality in descriptions of the risk posed by normally-deviant adolescents. In this context, they constructed youth as being in an unpredictable present in which youth needed the guidance and support of adults. Hence, by combining risk and development, writers displaced societal instabilities onto young people. As a social problem, they constructed deviance as an individual psychological condition, controlled through the application of knowledge and knowledge-informed practices.
Consequently, writers used knowledges of development and risk to construct youth deviance in 2002. As I have shown so far, groups in contemporary industrial societies have used these knowledges since the 1970s to construct and control youth deviance. Being one of these societies, Aotearoa/New Zealand shares a similar history; and, since the 1970s, those working in New Zealand’s political and justice systems have further situated risk and developmental knowledges in context.

Aotearoa/New Zealand 2002: The use of risk knowledge in policy

The initial excitement that greeted the 1974 Act soon gave way to criticisms similar to those levelled at welfare models of youth justice around the world: too many and inappropriate arrests of young people for minor offences and the subsequent stigmatising; the inherent injustice of open-ended sanctions; and the realisation that many young people who offend do not have any special family or social problems, meaning welfare dispositions are thus inappropriate.

In line with international trends, New Zealand also faced a public loss of faith in the welfare model as it seemed to be having little impact on the levels of youth offending. This was exacerbated by the perceived increase in numbers of street kids (Wittman, 1995) and a belief that the system was unable to deal with persistent young offenders. Later amendments to the Act exemplify attempts to counter these accusations: a 1977 amendment allowing children to be tried for murder, and in 1981 and 1982 police were granted greater powers to deal with street kids. The public was calling for control rather than benevolence.

There was also strong criticism of the lack of accountability for young offenders. As Robert Ludbrook observed (cited in Ministerial Review Team, 1992, p.4) ‘Our juvenile justice system prior to the 1989 Act had the effect of cushioning young people from the human, social and economic consequences of their behaviour. By parading young people before a line of public officials – Police, Judges, lawyers, social workers and residential care workers, they were sheltered from the consequences of their misbehaviour. They often came to see themselves as victims of the system rather than as the cause of suffering and anxiety to ordinary people in the community. Both the welfare and the punishment philosophy stressed the role of the young offender as “victim” …’

(Watt, 2002, para 42-44, part 2, government context, web page)

Before the 1980s, Aotearoa/New Zealand was a welfare state in which healthcare and education were free to all with the state supporting those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. This form of governance saw the state having control over individuals’ lives. During the 1970s, this welfare state began to collapse. This led to a series of Government policies in the 1980s aimed at reducing national debt and devolving and decentralising political power. Liberal forms of thinking entered into governance, and many in the country began to privilege individual autonomy, choice, and freedom over state control and support (c.f. Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996).

In 2002, the political context of Aotearoa/New Zealand saw a mixture of welfare (left wing) and liberal (right wing) ideals. As such, it is possible to describe the political climate as a paradoxical climate, where political argument was at times in states of tension, flux and contradiction. For example, liberal ideals stressed the autonomy of the individual with little
state control; in contrast, welfare ideals emphasised the power of the state to create a system of equality for all people.

Up to the 1980s, the guise of the welfare state subsumed any differences and inequalities. However, the reforms of the 1980s formed, or brought to the surface, a “newly poor” (Kelsey, 1995, p.271) – a new social threat to society. Divisions of gender, race, and culture began to appear in New Zealand society (Kelsey, 1995; Kelsey & O’Brien, 1995). By 2002, some researchers (Blaiklock, et al., 2002; Maxwell & Morris, 2002a) began to connect the welfare reforms of the 1980s with the increased marginalisation of societal groups, particularly children and young people. These researchers found that the changes of the 1980s affected the welfare of children and youth crime.

Like in the history of Western society, youth crime increased during the unstable time of the 1980s (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a). Also reflecting international trends, by the mid-1980s authors in Aotearoa/New Zealand began to talk about youth-at-risk (e.g. Kelsey, 1985) and youth passing through a phase of deviance (e.g. Doolan, 1988).

**Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989**

Agencies failed to fully utilise the youth justice provisions of CYPF Act to deal with Kurariki’s offending. The CYPF Act is very clear that child offenders are to be held accountable for their offending. A youth justice family group conference should have been convened to hold Kurariki accountable for the assaults he committed on other young people. In hindsight, poor communication between Child, Youth and Family and Police impeded this process being utilised.

(Ministry of Justice, 2002a, p.9, government context, ministerial report)

Alongside this changing climate, the New Zealand youth justice system began to change and reflect a decentralisation of power. This began with the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 (CYPF Act 1989) which established New Zealand’s present youth justice system. Morris and Maxwell (1998, p.247) describe this current system as a “family-centred approach” to youth justice. Essentially, through the CYPF Act 1989, Aotearoa/New Zealand moved juvenile justice from a focus on welfare to a focus on justice (Doolan, 1988, 1993; Morris & Maxwell, 1997; Watt, 2002).

Before 1989, Aotearoa/New Zealand applied a welfare approach to youth offending to focus on the individual who had committed the crime. Developmental and psychological knowledge of pathologies and offending informed this penology. This meant that welfare-based policies described the offending young person as either pathological or from a pathological family. Court intervention focused on the care and protection of the young offender (Watt, 2002) and early intervention into offending (Doolan, 1988, 1993). In a way, the old system reflected current conceptions of the youth-at-risk; however, it differed as it assumed the deviant youth to be inherently pathological and an explicit threat to society. Finally, the welfare penology gave the state overall power and control over the lives of families and young people. Using a welfare-based reasoning, the state assumed absolute
power and directed interventions at the assumed threat the youth and their family posed to society.

In contrast, the justice penology that Aotearoa/New Zealand, applied from 1989, reflected a liberal ideology stressing a decentralisation of power and interventions that were more family-based. These interventions defused any focus on social threat and focused on the assumed ‘normally’ deviant behaviour of young people, something that was “a relatively common aspect of growing up” (Doolan, 1993, p.18). A central advocate of the justice penology in the 1980s, Mike Doolan (1988, 1993), argued that early intervention did more harm to the individual than good. Using arguments from labelling theory, Doolan (1993) claimed that formal sanctions such as care and protection orders and early intervention reinforced the young person’s behaviour. Furthermore, Doolan argued for the minimisation and delaying of state treatment and intervention. Policies using the justice penology concentrated on the offending, not on the individual, and on the state providing social support to the family (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a; Morris & Maxwell, 1997, 1998).

In 2002, key features of the justice penology in Aotearoa/New Zealand included: the use of diversion or alternative action by police as a first response to youth offending, Family Group Conferences (FGCs) and the establishment of a separate court for young people (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a; Maxwell, Robertson, & Anderson, 2002; Ministry of Justice, 2002a; Morris & Maxwell, 1997, 1998, 2003). The FGC has become the hallmark of the justice penology in Aotearoa/New Zealand as, through conferencing, practitioners can encourage the young person to develop responsibility and accountability (Maxwell, et al., 2004; Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Morris, 2002; Morris & Maxwell, 2003). Since the 1980s, other countries have adapted and used conferencing in their youth justice system (e.g. Bargen, 2001; Hil & McMahon, 2001; Maxwell & Morris, 2002a; Morris & Maxwell, 1997; Schmid, 2001). However, FGCs seemed biased towards a particular type of individual and family.

Families and the CYPF Act 1989

At these conferences, a youth and family members, the victim and a support person, a police representative, and possibly a social worker or probation officer can meet with a youth justice coordinator to discuss the offence, and arrange an appropriate (noncustodial) resolution that takes account of the concerns of the victim and the needs of the youth and family, as well as the interests of society. The youth is encouraged to be actively involved in this process and take responsibility for his acts. (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.189, academic context, book chapter)

The CYPF Act 1989 did not empower all families as intended. Whilst some families were able to resolve the offending of their children, many were not (c.f. Maxwell & Morris, 2002b) as the CYPF Act 1989 brought to the surface differences between families. These differences resided within the economic and neoliberal reforms of the 1980s.

Through the 1980s the Government transformed social services, such as education and health, into commodities, whilst, concurrently, slashing welfare assistance to low-income
families (Kelsey, 1995). The Government assumed that making families on welfare assistance poorer would encourage them to seek employment; however, many families got poorer and found they could not access adequate social assistance. Mass unemployment in manufacturing and public service jobs, and minimal welfare assistance exacerbated this poverty. Consequently, New Zealand society divided families between those who could effectively self-govern and those who could not because they could not access resources (Kelsey, 1995). Reflecting the early history of developmental knowledge, these lower socio-economic families began to pose a risk to society and, by 2002, lower socio-economic level became a key, if not the key, risk factor for youth offending (Jacka, 2003).

In 2002, many authors and commentators still praised the CYPF Act 1989. However, by 2002 law professionals and those who worked with young people began to advocate for early intervention and treatment provisions to help serious offenders (e.g. Dalmer, 2002; Henwood, 2003; Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002; Ministry of Justice, 2002a). Practitioners would direct these interventions at the family of the youth-at-risk (Carruthers, 2002). This is in contrast to families of normally-deviant youth who would continue through a diversionary system of youth justice. The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) was one political example of a return to a welfare ideal of early intervention alongside, and coexisting with, a justice penology. In effect, the Strategy allowed for the division of young offenders into two groups, a division based on risk with particular implications for young people.

Implications of Risk Knowledge for Youth

It all started on a May morning much like this. It was nearly 18 years ago, in Invercargill, and a young couple were welcoming a second child into their crime-filled world.

He was a baby boy ... they called him Aaron ... His father was career-criminal Robert ... his mother ... a bubbly redhead who was developing a terminal illness which would kill her before this child’s 15th birthday.

Experts say the story which follows was virtually inevitable: At six, a smiley boy who likes building playhuts with his big brother is sent to live with his uncle Eric ... Uncle Eric is a car thief, just like Aaron’s Dad. So when his little nephew comes to stay, Uncle Eric takes the opportunity to pass on a little McDonald know-how.

At seven, Aaron picks up his first conviction. Over the next decade, he will clock up 64 convictions ranging from driving offences, to unlawfully taking cars, to theft ... He spends his childhood shuttled between homes ... Aaron leaves school altogether after a couple of years split between ... high schools. He is 14 when his mother dies. He is 17, and in prison, when his father dies in a truck crash. He smashes his cell, and later attends the funeral.

(Welham, 2002, p.4, media context, focus article)

Through applying risk knowledge with developmental knowledge, authors constructed youth as objects, not subjects (c.f. Castel, 1991). These authors tended to do this through expertise and language in which they objectively described young people without allowing for any contingency. As such, they positioned youth as ‘objects’ to be governed, by the state or
their family, rather than as subjects with the ability to exercise power and self-govern (Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990, 1996a).

Rose (1996a) argues that identifying populations-at-risk is a governmental attempt to produce self-governing individuals. My analysis did not fully support this finding. Although authors aimed interventions at producing self-governing individuals, they constructed young people as being unable to self-govern because of a knowledgeable risk in the young person. This particularly occurred in constructions of the youth-at-risk and of the normally-deviant adolescent where they used a language and practice of risk to give reason for the control (not the self-control) of youth.

When societal groups use risk knowledge to justify the control of youth, they also re-create inequalities through applying that knowledge. Beck (1992) describes risk society as a classless society, or a society in which other social divisions exist. Inequality still exists in this society, but, using Beck’s language (1992, p.101), it is an inequality of “ascribed characteristics”, such as race, culture, sexuality, and gender. Beck argues that characteristics are no longer determined through economic variables but through variables of risk. In a risk society, groups in authority use risk factors as ‘ascribed characteristics’ to group people by variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, family, peer group, sexuality, socio-economic status, and community. Indeed, these groups use ‘ascribed characteristics’ to reinforce, often classic, structural differences. This form of ascribed marginalisation is evident in Aotearoa/New Zealand where the events of the 1980s have led to increased marginalisation through a variety of ‘ascribed characteristics’.

In constructions of youth deviance, writers clearly, however unintentionally, reinforced inequalities of ascribed characteristics. Within the analysed texts, they struggled with a concept of ethnicity because of the disproportionate representation of young Māori people in the criminal justice system. Writers clearly did not want to ‘ascribe’ ethnicity as a characteristic of offending. Instead, they highlighted this discrepancy and focused on attributing it to other risk factors such as socio-economic levels. However, their continual focus on Māori youth subtly constituted all Māori youth as at-risk. So, by focusing on ethnicity, writers did not address inequalities, they just reinforced them. Furthermore, rather than positioning young Māori as subjects of development, they used risk to position them as victims of social circumstances.

Through using risk, these authors also reinforced inequalities along the line of gender. They constructed youth-at-risk as male youths. In this way, authors problematised female’s access to constructions of criminality. When authors constructed young ‘deviant’ women, they saw them as doubly deviant or acting outside of any feminine disposition (c.f. Carlen, 1983). This meant that, when adult society read about and saw female deviance, they were doubly anxious.
Hence, when authors used risk factors, they increased marginalisation of young people through ascribed characteristics. This particularly happened for the youth-at-risk where they constructed this youth as a young male from a dysfunctional and disadvantaged family. Authors added ethnicity to these characteristics by arguing that this offending youth would most likely be Māori. However, they also marginalised young females by denying a place in this construction and implying that only males had ‘right of access’ to deviance. Alongside all of this, they also used age as an ascribed characteristic. Authors constructed all young people through risk as being vulnerable and prone to deviant behaviours. Governing groups in a society could then use this argument to justify the marginalisation of young people from societal participation.

Finally, authors also constructed and positioned families through a knowledge of development and risk. In the next chapter, I further examine this construction of the family.
Chapter 8

Blame the Parents: Constructions of the family and school in discussions of deviant youth

Parents and teachers were now to take responsibility for regulating not just [children’s] habits and morals, but their feelings, wishes and anxieties, if they were not to produce troubled and troublesome children … [This would be achieved through love] … Love was no longer merely a moral duty or a romantic ideal, it was the element in which were produced normal and abnormal children.
(Rose, 1990, p.156)

So far, I have established that New Zealand authors in 2002 constructed the family, alongside deviant youth, as a key site of risk and intervention. In this chapter, I will explore and discuss further the ways in which these authors constructed families. Reflecting constructions of deviant youth, the construction of the family is very much a contextual construction. These contexts reflect the development of contemporary industrial societies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand. By 2002, authors were constructing the New Zealand family as a site of pathology and an instrument of governance and representing the school, and mass education, as a ‘pseudo’ family through which the state could counter the influence of pathological or dysfunctional families. Like constructions of deviant youth, these constructions of family and the school have a history.

Families in History: The pathological family

A number stated that the ‘youth problems’ simply reflect the problems in the wider community, for example community-wide alcohol and drug abuse. Similarly, some stated that young people tend to be the victims of social and community problems, for example socio economic. This was confirmed by the literature review … A small minority identified that poor parenting was the cause of the youth problem. However, most respondents acknowledged the association between parenting and socio economic disadvantage and argued that poor parenting was often a symptom not a cause. Similarly, a minority cited that single parenting or lack of a ‘father figure’ was a problem. However, others noted that sole parenting is associated with poverty and that in the absence of social or family disadvantage sole parenting is not a factor that makes a major contribution to childhood risk. This was not supported by the other respondents or by the findings in the literature review.
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, p.33, government context, evaluation report)

A history of the contemporary family is a history of governance during a time where liberal forms of government replaced sovereign forms of government in industrial societies. During these reforms, the family was established as the smallest governing unit in a population
(Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1994a). Governing groups used the family unit to reproduce social order and the ruling ideology (Donzelot, 1979).

In order to maintain stability, those in power constructed deviant families as pathological and dysfunctional. These families engaged in deviant activities, threatened social order, and were perceived as failing to reproduce the dominant ideology. Reflecting the histories of development and risk knowledge, those in power saw the working-class family as this pathological and/or dysfunctional threat (c.f. Donzelot, 1979). This family became the site of pathology and the cause of deviance (Hil & McMahon, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004). Even in 2002 New Zealand, this type of positioning was still apparent.

In New Zealand institutional texts in 2002, authors continued to connect poverty to pathology. However, they renamed ‘working-class’ families ‘lower socio-economic’ families; thus displacing or suppressing any class factors. In this way, authors did not directly associate economic structural differences with the structure of New Zealand society. Instead, they tended to assume that socio-economic factors were changeable and accidental – something into which the family ‘fell’ rather than being ‘positioned’ and something that could be addressed and eliminated. Authors considered lower socio-economic factors as key reasons for a family’s inability to govern and authors still considered other factors, such as sole parenting and negligent parenting, as pathological and often a consequence of dysfunction. In this way, they positioned the middle-class two-parent family as the only type of family from which ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ governance could occur. Furthermore, authors implied, across the texts analysed, that signs of family dysfunction (such as abuse and negligent parenting) were not factors evident within middle-class two-parent families. Instead, they clearly associated the ability to self-govern with middle-class families.

**Families in History: The governing family**

Michelle Temarua (26), unemployed

‘I’d hold the parents responsible because they should be there to discipline, educate and support their children. I don’t think tough sentences are any good when you’re dealing with wayward kids because they won’t stop them. We need more education – people going into schools because if you teach them when they’re young there’s more chance it will stick in their heads’.

(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25, media context, magazine article)

From the late 18th century, families in industrial societies were constructed and positioned as instruments of liberal governance (Bell, 1993; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990). This construction was based on a concept of the middle-class two-parent family in which the patriarchal father governed and controlled his family (Foucault, 1994a). Such a construction dispersed governance throughout society rather than locating it in a sovereign, or visible, Aotearoa/New Zealand has been considered a ‘classless’ society – a claim academics and researchers (e.g. Kelsey, 1995) have consistently questioned.
power-holder. The contemporary family became a site in which governance occurred through its members rather than social institutions directing governance at it (Bell, 1993). However, alongside this, this ‘new’ construction of the family allowed for a covert surveillance to occur in which the gaze of the parent brought about order and conformity within the family (Foucault, 1994a). In effect, the self-governing family became a site of normalisation where those in authority could apply developmental knowledge in practice to ‘nurture’, ‘mould’ and ‘normalise’ the young person (Rose, 1990).

Later, in the development of neo-liberalism in many countries in the 20th century, the family became a site of responsibility (Hil, 1998; Hil & McMahon, 2001; Rose, 1990). In this re-construction, the family came to be seen as responsible for the behaviour and the deviance of its members (Hil & McMahon, 2001). As such, those in positions of authority constructed deficits in the self-governing family as parents not taking up their responsibility to govern and nurture. Irresponsible families were viewed as contributing to the behaviour of normally-deviant and abnormally-deviant young people and required interventions that encouraged the development of self-governance (Hil, 1998; White & Wyn, 2001). This description of the family was evident in the 2002 texts analysed.

CYPF Act and FGCS: The ‘ir’reponsible family in New Zealand

The founding objective of the legislation is ‘to promote the wellbeing of children, young persons, and their families and family groups’ … The Act thus seeks to empower families and communities, rather than professionals, in deciding the best measures to respond to offending behaviour in children and young people. (Watt, 2002, para 2, introduction, government context, web-page)

A clear link has been identified, according to the Ministry of Social Policy in New Zealand, between persistent youth offending and social disadvantage … ‘While some offending behaviour is widespread amongst young people, the most serious and persistent offending is confined to small groups who often come from disadvantaged and disrupted families. Moreover, these groups are often associated with particular neighbourhoods or communities’. (Ministry of Social Policy, cited in Carruthers, 2002, p.5, academic context, conference paper)

Through the Children Young Persons and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989, the Government in Aotearoa/New Zealand began to encourage the development of self-governing families. However, the introduction of the Act actually divided and reproduced structural inequalities between families. Through the CYPF Act 1989, the Government effectively marginalised poor and lower socio-economic families by not providing these families with the resources needed to implement the requirements of the Act. By 2002, those writing about youth crime and families reconstituted the lower socio-economic family as the dysfunctional and disadvantaged family (c.f. Hil & McMahon, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004).

Those writing in institutional contexts in 2002 divided families into two groups. Writers based the first group on a concept of the self-governing family as the unit in which the normally-
deviant youth was more likely to come from. They described how interventions aimed at this family utilised the family's ability to self-govern and encouraged the development of responsibility in the family and in the young person. Those writing about families based the second group on a concept of the dysfunctional and/or pathological family and argued that this family did not have the capability to self-govern. Writers constructed this family as the unit from which the abnormally-deviant youth was more likely to come. They used an understanding of socio-economic levels to describe and distinguish between these two families.

Although, those writing about families in the context of youth crime explicitly used a socio-economic division to divide families into the two groups, they did not overtly position middle-class two-parent families as the norm. Instead, they focused on socio-economic disadvantage and constructed dysfunctional families as a divergence from the two-parent model. Hence, writers implied that middle-class two-parent families could be used as a benchmark to measure and construct dysfunction (c.f. Hil, 1998). Problematic families were not only poor but they tended to diverge from the two-parent model. It was from these types of families that authors argued abnormally-deviant young people came (c.f. Hil & McMahon, 2001), although it was possible for these families to produce ‘normal’ children.

Authors writing about families and youth crime did not consider, or paid very little attention to, certain ‘realities’ or contradictions to their constructions. In particular, they did not consider that dysfunctional families from lower socio-economic communities could produce functional children. When authors did mention this, they only expressed it as a known anomaly to an expertise of development and risk. Neither did authors attempt to engage with the economic structure of New Zealand society, which requires some people to be ‘lower socio-economic’. New Zealand society has a differential pay system like most capitalist societies. In reality, Aotearoa/New Zealand needs people like cleaners and road workers; but, these workers cannot earn the same amount of money as those in professional work.  

It would be difficult to eliminate socio-economic differences, as New Zealand requires low-waged workers for essential jobs. And, it is also possible to assume that middle-class workers would be resistant to paying the same salary they get to their household cleaner. Hence, it is almost impossible to devise an intervention to eliminate socio-economic ‘risk factors’ – such an intervention would, at some point, either require substantial changes to the economic structure of Aotearoa/New Zealand or the importation of other groups to fill lower waged jobs (hence, reproducing socio-economic difference).

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45 Although New Zealand has had times of near full employment, authors such as Jane Kelsey (1995) would argue that it is problematic to assume that during these times New Zealand was classless. Indeed, in the late 1960s, in a time of economic prosperity, New Zealand imported vast amounts of ‘cheep’ labour from the Pacific Islands.
In this sense, lower socio-economic groups remain, and will remain in New Zealand’s current economic structure, a key point of risk and threat to the stability of middle-class society. Furthermore, when people in positions of authority locate the causes of deviance within dysfunctional and lower socio-economic status, they create and reinforce the assumption that all young people raised in different environments are potential threats to society (c.f. Hil, 1998). At the same time, these people reinforce an assumption that, because normal deviance is a developmental trait that young people outgrow, middle-class families are ‘naturally’ normal. This construction reinforces the reasoning that a ‘society’ needs to target interventions into abnormal deviance at dysfunctional families (Donzelot, 1979). In a society, like New Zealand, families are constructed as both the cause of deviance and the site of intervention (Bell, 1993; Hil, 1998; White & Wyn, 2004) and rather than eliminating socio-economic disadvantage, interventions control the family through surveillance and institutional control.

The Dysfunctional Family as a Point of Support and a Target

‘What we’re into is prevention, which is addressing causes,’ Mr O’Connor [Police youth coordinator for the Hutt district] says. ‘It’s also about making them accountable. For this age group, if you can’t get into the family, if you can’t work with them, there is very little you can do.

‘The parents don’t have the resources themselves often, and are really tearing their own hair out as to what to do. A lot of them are also action learners, they won’t go along to a course and you have to go into the home and become an educator. To do that you need their trust’.

(Mirams, 2002, p.B5, media context, feature article)

When governing groups target interventions at the dysfunctional family, they are generally not applying a direct coercive action through social institutions. Indeed, when these groups target interventions at the family, the interventions are often philanthropic in nature and appear explicitly to be a genuine attempt by others (typically those who are seen as being ‘normal’) to make things ‘better’ for the less advantaged people in society (c.f. Donzelot, 1979). However, whilst these interventions may help to support families, over the last 200 years these interventions have not eliminated poverty or deviance. Poverty and deviance are both a consequence of contemporary industrial societies and cannot be completely eliminated (c.f. Foucault, 1977). Because of this, interventions are really a form of social control in which governing groups target the family from a variety of institutional angles (Donzelot, 1979).

One angle used in societal interventions is that of educating and controlling the dysfunctional family (Donzelot, 1979; Hil & McMahon, 2001). Additionally, on a covert level, these interventions also work as a form of surveillance in which institutional experts can supervise and direct the development of the child or young person (Bell, 1993; Donzelot, 1979; Hil & McMahon, 2001). The surveillance by institutional experts may explicitly appear to support the family but, also, covertly it encourages the dysfunctional family to become self-governing
as the family recognises that it is the target of surveillance. Those applying these interventions assume that this dual function of support and observation is able to target and reduce criminal activity.

However, structural differences (such as socio-economic differences, ethnic differences, and gender differences) are reinforced in these interventions and, consequently, do not fully eliminate deviance. Instead, governing groups reinforce difference through the assertion that families cannot be normal unless they are middle-class, two-parent, and white. Hence, there is an inherent incompatibility between the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk’s family and the family of the normally-deviant youth. This incompatibility shows a point of struggle between the different groups in a society. In this struggle, both groups attempt to maintain some control over their own identity and position, and the identities and positions of other groups. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, authors demonstrated this focus and showed how New Zealand society attempted to control lower socio-economic groups.

In the analysed texts, authors argued that institutions needed to target lower socio-economic families in interventions. They constructed philanthropic services such as youth work, social work, community work, and education as key tools in the addressing of socio-economic problems and youth deviance. However, they also showed how targeting philanthropic services at the family assisted New Zealand ‘society’ in the control and observation of youth deviance. They described social workers and youth workers as gathering data about youth offending which researchers and police could later use. Authors identified schools as key sites of deviance identification and control. In a way, authors positioned schools as a state pseudo family.

**Countering Family Risk: The state’s pseudo family**

Once upon a time, says Dr Maxwell [a criminologist], before the deterioration of family circumstances and support in the mid-1980s, there used to be adjustment classes in primary schools into which a child such as Kurariki would have been put. ‘It’s always difficult to manage these children but we have had better options in the past. We need better options now.’ She says she is shocked that a 13-year-old could have been out of school since he was nine.

‘We can’t just say the education system can’t cope. If a child is not being educated he’s being a risk to himself and others. Education has to manage to provide for every child in society.’ Yes, says Wellington High School teacher Shona Grenfell -- who has been in secondary and primary classrooms for four decades -- problem children can be identified very early.

‘Primary school teachers know which kids are going off the rails and it’s really hard to get help for them from within the system.’ She doesn’t believe that children’s behaviour is worse.

‘I’m horrified at the way children behave at school, but I was when I started. The biggest problem is that no one is doing anything about the poor kids without breakfast or no raincoat. That worries me more than their behaviour.’ Many years ago, ‘I had my lip split by a primary school kid who got angry. That hasn’t happened again.’ Children have not got worse but society has changed.

(Dekker, 2002, p.F1, media context, feature article)
In the 19th century, governments in industrial counties (such as New Zealand (Harker, 1990; Shuker, 1987a, 1990; Shuker, et al., 1990), Great Britain (Gleeson, 1992; Sturt, 1967; Walkerdine, 1998) and the United States of America (Murphy, 1998)), implemented mass schooling in order to counter deviant groups in society. Mass schooling allowed the state to intervene into the dysfunction of some families and, in effect, worked as a pseudo parent (Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1990). The school system positioned teachers, typically female, as nurturers and empowerers countering the negative influence of the pathological parent (Rose, 1990; Walkerdine, 1992, 1998; Wyn & White, 1997). In order to be effective, these schools needed young people to attend – they needed young people to be there.

Like the philanthropic social services supporting the family, education through mass schooling also allowed for the surveillance and control of deviant children (Foucault, 1977; Walkerdine, 1992). Through a supposed function of ‘care’, schools were able to identify those children in ‘need’ and socialise them into civilised workers contributing to society (Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1990). The teacher played a major part in this socialisation as they gently guided the development of young people through an institutional ‘love’ (Rose, 1990; Walkerdine, 1992). However, through identification and socialisation, schools did not eliminate deviance but, rather, reproduced social difference (which encouraged and reproduced deviance) (c.f. Wyn & White, 1997).

**Social Control: A function of schools**

Overall, the plans developed to address P Kaukasi’s offending were not effective. He continued to offend with increasing frequency. It would appear that the plans were ineffective because they did not address the underlying causes of the behaviours exhibited – namely boredom, and a lack of structured environments and adult supervision in his life. With hindsight, it was clearly not a good option to allow P Kaukasi to complete community work instead of attending school, as school would have provided him with a structured environment, activity during the day, and adult supervision.

(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.10, government context, ministerial report)

There are evident flaws in the argument that schools can effectively address and can potentially eliminate deviance. This is mainly due to the function schools have in society in producing and reproducing inequalities (Harker, 1990; Wyn & White, 1997). Schools and education produce and reproduce inequalities through the function of social control. As a form of social control, educationalists intervene into deviance, first, through the removal of the deviant from the street into a structured and supervised environment and, second, through the controlling of outcomes. As a function of social control, governing groups in industrial societies assume education to be a powerful force turning the deviant or the potential deviant into a civilised individual through socialisation (Bessant, Sercombe, & Watts, 1998; Murphy, 1998; Shuker, et al., 1990).

Arguments for education as a form of social control involve reference to a perceived good of education. That is, advocates subsume the socialising role of education within an argument...
that education is essentially good. These advocates assume that education offers ‘equal opportunities’ to all young people no matter what structural differences exist. In other words, young people can use education as an access to upward mobility. In the analysed texts, equality of opportunity and the promise of upward mobility permeated arguments about education as a crime intervention. Those writing reiterated the ‘good of education’ through references to educational opportunities and the capability of education as an effective intervention into ‘negative’ outcomes. They constructed deviance as a negative outcome connected to lower socio-economic circumstances. For deviant and potentially deviant young people, education, supposedly, allowed for upward mobility beyond the structural and material confines of a criminal life.

However, authors limited this upward mobility and education to a particular type of education. They assumed that lower socio-economic level was due mainly to illiteracy and, as such, they argued that being able to read and write were essential, if not the only needed, tools for upward mobility. Authors did not mention, discuss, or emphasise other forms of literacy (such as technological literacy, creative literacy, and critical literacy). Whilst they emphasised written literacy for abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, it is debatable as to whether this literacy alone provides opportunities for upward mobility.

So, especially for the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, the function of education was not to provide equal opportunity and upward mobility; instead, the function of education was to control the young person through surveillance and socialisation. First, being in the classroom and under the gaze of an adult teacher ensured that the deviant youth was removed from any opportunity to commit crime or plan crime. Second, through socialisation, education could transform the young person into a conforming and obedient adult.

Despite the continual reference to equality of opportunity and upward mobility in the analysed texts, it is questionable whether the egalitarianism principle of education is truly achievable. Educational theorists (Bessant, et al., 1998; Harker & McConnochie, 1985) have described the egalitarianism principle as one of the “myths” (Harker & McConnochie, 1985, p.136) of the mass education system occurring in “unequal societies” (Bessant, et al., 1998, p.148). Furthermore, education as a form of social control tends to work as a tool of social division or stratification in which educational experiences influence the life outcomes of young people (Harker & McConnochie, 1985). This involves an education of difference and division, where practitioners, through pedagogical practices reflective of a dominant norm, divide a group of young people into different life outcomes.

**Separating and Dividing: A function of schools**

He [a former principal youth court judge] believes prevention is the key to solve the youth offending problem. ‘Schools are important – they are the people who theoretically have access to youngsters and are in the best place to identify any problems before people start offending. ‘I don’t think harsher penalties work. I would rather we saved someone from
Traditionally, theorists (c.f. Harker & McConnochie, 1985) have argued that education as a dividing practice works as a class-dividing mechanism. In contemporary education, a form of division based on deviance occurs, which divides the normal and the pathological. The first way this division occurs is through the identification of ‘problems’ (either by the teacher, other educational professionals or people in other social agencies). Identification allows practitioners to separate the deviant young person from other ‘normal’ young people in the classroom. Across the 2002 texts analysed, authors argued that educational practitioners needed to apply a knowledge of child/youth development and risk (particularly risk factors) to identify youth-at-risk and separate them from the potentially normally-deviant youth.

After identifying the potential deviant, a practitioner could design pedagogical practices that would influence the outcomes of the young person. In 2002, those writing described this through specialist adaptations of class programmes that educational practitioners designed to meet the ‘needs’ of individuals. For the deviant or potentially deviant, writers described how these programmes focused on thinking and/or disruptive/abnormal behaviour. In effect, these programmes would allow for a more direct form of socialisation to change the young person’s thinking. Adapted programmes also focused on curriculum needs like written literacy and numeracy.

Those writing about education in the context of youth crime in 2002 also described how education-based interventions in other settings continued to, and needed to, concentrate on thinking, behaviour, written literacy, and numeracy. These interventions attempted to replace the outcome of criminality with an outcome of work and vocation. Rather than ensuring the young person from a disadvantaged background had an opportunity of upward mobility, authors described interventions focusing on manual vocational work. In this way, authors constructed deviant youth as ‘limited’ people – lacking the skills and abilities for professional work. Hence, once a young person offended, authors had two possible outcomes for them – low-paid manual employment or criminality.

**Reflecting on Education**

... the number of young Māori male truants is disproportionately higher for groupings by ethnicity and gender over the three years: 23 (out of 66) in 1999, 40 (out of 97) in 2000 and 19 (out of 41) in 2001. The Ministry of Māori Development found in 1998 that, on average, Māori have lower levels of educational achievement than non-Māori. While the reasons are complex, a factor may be the failure of the mainstream education system to adequately meet the educational needs and aspirations of Māori. (Kilmister & Baxter, 2002b, pp.5-6, academic context, conference paper)

Disappointingly, youths’ school performance and attitudes towards school did not appear to benefit from their increased attendance. (Milne, et al., 2002, p.201, academic context, journal article)
A young person cannot fully enjoy an education that is designed to control them because it is an education of socialisation. Those in authority see these ‘potential criminals’ as needing to be socialised not ‘educated’. Teachers and others working with them may see young deviants and potential young deviants as individuals, but the mechanism of education attempts to push them into a homogeneous position of self-discipline and self-governance.

If, through education, a ‘society’ could effectively identify, control, and socialise a young deviant, deviance would have been dealt with years ago. However, this is not the case. Something is going wrong. Identification and separation of the deviant in education has not eliminated deviance; and, as research suggests (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002), there is a group of young people who continue to be deviant through to adulthood.

Consequently, education, like other family-based interventions, does little to intervene into deviance; in contrast, education, through the identification and separation of deviants/potential deviants, plays a part in producing deviance (c.f. Foucault, 1977). In effect, governing groups in industrial societies did originally conceptualise, and continue to conceptualise, education as a panacea to social problems. However, the effect of education is more like an ineffective placebo covering up the ‘real’ structural problem. Since its conception in the 19th century, industrial society has assumed mass schooling capable of countering the risk that problematic families and socio-economic groups pose to society. Education has not been effective in its function. Instead, we are now faced with the implications of constructing families, and their children, in divisive ways.

Implications of Family and Pseudo Family Constructions

Results revealed that those who left school without qualifications were more likely to have had a young mother, who had no school qualification, and belong to families characterised by low socioeconomic status, and below average living standards. The child’s parents were more likely to have used illicit substances, to have alcohol problems, to smoke, and to have participated in criminal offending. At 15 the children had poorer attachment to these parents. The young people who left school without qualifications were also more likely to have low IQ scores at 8 years and low TOSCA scores at 13 years. They had higher truancy levels, greater risks of early conduct problems, school suspensions and were more likely to have associated with deviant peers. They were also more likely to be smoking at 15 years, have low self-esteem and high neuroticism scores. Those who left school without qualifications were also slightly more likely to be males. (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002b, p.47, academic context, journal article)

Essentially, when authors constructed the family and school as sites for intervention, they emphasised ideas of socialisation and counter-socialisation. Reflecting developmental theory, authors built on ideas of childhood malleability to see institutions, like the family and the school, as contributing to, and affecting, developmental outcomes. They also saw these sites as points of governance in schools.
However, through constructions of the family and pseudo family (the school), those writing also reinforced a construction of society as one in which governance is not overtly visible but rather is internal to the governmental structures in society – public institutions, private institutions, and, ultimately the individual. By constructing the family as a mechanism for governance, writers rejected a need for overt and direct governance and reinforced the current governmental structure in which governance occurs from a distance (Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1994a). This resulted in writers dividing families.

Through covertly focusing on governance, those writing were able to divide families and young people into the dysfunctional and functional. They positioned the middle-class two-parent families as a norm and saw any diversion from this as pathological and abnormal (c.f. Hil & McMahon, 2001). This meant that, even when writers focused on fostering difference through interventions, they still reinforced difference as a problem. For example, in culturally-based interventions for Māori youth, writers talked about using the extended family in the care and protection of children and young people. In some instances, the extended family might have adopted several children from other family members. However, in discussions about the causes of youth crime, writers implied that cultural differences also were problematic by discussing how the abnormally-deviant youth was disadvantaged because they did not live with their natural parents and/or lived in over-crowded households. In this way, they conceptualised differing cultural approaches to parenting as abnormal, pathological, and dysfunctional.

Like the abnormally-deviant youth, authors described the dysfunctional family as an object in which the state needed to target interventions. They encouraged practitioners and policymakers to target interventions at the family and at the young person in the state school system. In contrast, authors constructed the normal and functional family as subjects through which society could exercise governance. These two types of families were reflective of Jacques Donzelot’s (1979) analysis of the 19th century family. Like Donzelot’s analysis, authors connected the family to the functioning of contemporary society and the exercising of governing power. As a site of governance, the family became a site of struggle, power, and resistance. In the following chapter, I explore the functioning of power further in interventions.
Chapter 9

Get Them When They Are Young: Interventions and power in the control of youth deviance

What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there - that is to say - where it installs itself and produces its real effects.
(Foucault, 1980e, p.97)

Previously I showed how the relationship between power and knowledge is a reciprocal relationship where any application of knowledge also involves the application of power. So far, I have focused on the application of knowledge in communication – or the construction of deviant youth through texts. In this chapter, I focus on a discussion of practice by examining the types of interventions argued for by authors – interventions informed by developmental and risk knowledge.

Interventions are the logical site to investigate the complex relationship between power and knowledge (c.f. Foucault, 1980e). Interventions can be described as programmes in which a conception of power is essential because interventions, particularly in youth deviance, explicitly involve the use of power to control or redirect outcomes. Hence, through reconceptualising power it is possible to address the implications of knowledge for young people. In this chapter and Chapter 10, I want to pose the idea that re-conceptualising power should be the focus in re-constructions of youth deviance rather than re-conceptualising knowledge. Positioning involves both knowledge and power. Therefore, any ‘intervention’ into positioning has to address both knowledge and power at the point of fusion. Interventions are the site of struggle.

Struggling to Maintain Control

The majority of respondents believed that the venue needed to be a Police Station, for a variety of reasons, such as the ability to respond in emergency or violent situations, the overflow capacity and the ability to do police computer checks. For example, one respondent stated:
‘It needs to be at the Police Station when such things as computer checks are required, weapons are detected or disruptive/fighting type behaviour - good to have use of cells if required …’
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services, 2002, p.27, government context, evaluation report)

So far, I have discussed how authors applied knowledge in 2002 in such a way that they positioned young people, and, at times, their families as objects. At times, they also
constructed these young people as powerless and an effect of social conditions. Clear contradictions existed in these constructions but, when authors discussed these contradictions, they tended to give a tokenistic acknowledgment to the known anomaly. They did not acknowledge or explore how the existence of a contradiction could pose a questioning of ‘Truth’ to developmental knowledge and risk knowledge. Hence, even when young people exercised any power and control over their own lives, authors countered this in their constructions of deviance with the positioning of the youth as a powerless object.

This was apparent in both the construction of abnormal deviance and normal deviance. In constructions of abnormal deviance, those writing would acknowledge that some ‘youth-at-risk’ would not grow into criminals. However, they were quick to point out that these youth were an exception to the norm – an exception to the truths of risk and development. In constructions of normal deviance, authors would construct the young person as exercising a threatening power over adult society. However, they would associate this ‘power’ as the effect of adolescent development rather than constructing this power as being an intentional action of the youth.

However, it is possible that these contradictions not only point out problems in constructions of ‘Truth’ but also show that young people were not absolute objects or effects. That at some point, and in some way, these young people were also subjects. This possibility suggests that the adults of New Zealand society could not exercise full and absolute power over young people. Instead, adults and young people were engaged in a struggle in which some adults attempted to position the youth as an object and young people attempted to reassert themselves as a subject (c.f. Foucault, 1980b; Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002). Power was not one-sided.

Foucault (1976, 1980b) argues that power and resistance have a reciprocal relationship in which any relation of power coexists with relations of resistance. Brought together power and resistance show a struggle, which is apparent in the relationships between adults and youth. In this struggle, each party attempts to regain or maintain control over their own identity and the identity of the other. In a way, struggles of power and resistance are struggles for control. We can see these struggles as we look back at the historical contexts of knowledge.

Previously, I suggested that knowledges of development and human risk arose in times of instability. In these times, governing groups in industrial societies attempted to resist the threat of social and structural instability through transferring the point of struggle onto young people. In a sense, these groups attempted to control social and structural instabilities by controlling the futures and outcomes of young people. In Chapter 10, I will discuss a possible youth reaction to this adult attempt at control, that of resistance. In this chapter, I will explore how the site of intervention into deviance is the point in which adults struggle to
control the young person in differing ways. Adults base these interventions on the risk the youth poses to themselves and to society.

**What are Interventions?**

If we look closely at interventions, we can see that there is more to interventions than adults trying to help young people. Interventions are the adult side of the struggle in which adults attempt to control young people with knowledge-informed practices. Technically, interventions are knowledge-informed programmes and strategies by adults and adult-based institutions into a social problem. Whilst adults may use knowledge alone to attribute reasons of social instability onto youth, when they combine knowledge with power, they construct the problem of ‘youth’ as a point on which programmes and strategies can be targeted. Interventions in the form of programmes are, in effect, a centralising force combining power and knowledge to address issues and enforce stability (Gordon, 1980; Lacombe, 1996):

... a programme is always something more than a formulation of wishes and intentions. Every programme also either articulates or presupposes a knowledge of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or which is calculated to bring into being. The common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is and must be power which knows the objects upon which it is exercised. Further, the condition that programmatic knowledge must satisfy is that it renders reality in the form of an object which is programmable. (Gordon, 1980, p.248, author’s italics)

Hence, knowledge allows groups in authority to ‘know’ a problem or object, and practice allows these groups to position the problem or object in such a way that programmes and interventions disrupt and diffuse any threat that the problem or object poses to society (Gordon, 1980). In 2002, New Zealand authors used developmental and risk knowledge in such a way to attribute societal instability to young people and position them as objects. They designed interventions into youth deviance as intentional social strategies controlling the threat or risk youth pose to society (c.f. Foucault, 1976). Authors needed to do this. They needed to have adults in a position of power and youth in such a position that knowledge would render them somewhat powerless to the developmental changes in their bodies.

Adults writing on interventions into youth deviance need to position the youth as an object. If they position the youth as a subject, there is a possibility that these adults might not change the young person through an intervention. If adults construct the young person as a subject, there is a possibility that the youth might resist the intervening actions of adults, but, as a developmental object, adults are able to, metaphorically, mould and change the young person like a piece of clay. Indeed, developmental conceptions of malleability and vulnerability reflect this metaphorical positioning. In contrast, if adults construct the young person as a subject, interventions cannot ‘work on’ the young person; rather interventions
have to ‘work with’ the young person⁴⁶. To some extent, in 2002, this was evident in constructions of the normally-deviant youth. However, even in this construction writers still referred to the young person as a malleable and vulnerable object situated in the developmental stages of childhood and adolescence.

Through interventions, adults attempt to reposition the deviant youth as a self-governing subject or attempt to change the young person into a self-governing subject. In this way, interventions represent a liminal moment in which transformation occurs (c.f. Turner, 1977). In the moment of an intervention, the young person is neither a complete object nor a subject but is in the process of becoming a subject. This contradictory dual positioning is difficult to represent fully and, as such, it is possible to slip between constructions of the subject and object. In the analysed texts, authors constructed many interventions as intrusively intervening into the object ‘deviant youth’. The outcome practitioners aimed for (the construction of the subject) meant that there were times in which authors simultaneously positioned youth as being both subject and object (c.f. Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002). For example, they described abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as objects of development and risk and subjects of their future; in contrast, they described normally-deviant adolescents engaging in deviant behaviour as objects of development and subjects with the ability to choose.

As expected, at times this dual positioning led to contradictions in the texts, especially in constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk and the normally-deviant young person as a social threat. It was during these points that the moment of struggle between adults and young people became clearly apparent. Those writing no longer described interventions as points of transformation. Rather, they described interventions as points in which the young person had to be overpowered – practitioners had to control the power of development in order to stop the young person misusing power or exercising resistance. In this struggle, practitioners directed the flow of power.

The Flow of Power: Power as a capillary

Foucault (1980d, 1980e) uses notions of networks and capillaries to describe struggles that occur within power and the role of power in contemporary society. Foucault (1980e) argues that classical notions of power (based on repression and subjection), do not capture the complexity of power in contemporary society. This is because they tend to concentrate on local or immediate power relationships between two parties (Foucault, 1976).

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⁴⁶ This construction is somewhat contradictory to the actual practices of youth work in which youth workers actively attempt to work with the young person. However, what this construction highlights is the difficulty many of these youth workers experience as they attempt to work with the young person with a knowledge of the young person that sees the young person as an object of development which needs to be ‘moulded’ and ‘shepherded’ (e.g. McLaren, 2000) onto the right developmental path.
In contrast, Foucault (1994a) argues that, by using a capillary notion of power, we can acknowledge the placement of local struggles within a wider governmental framework. In youth deviance, if we use a classical notion of power, we would see deviance as “one-dimensional” (Krips, 1990, p.174) in which an individual's deviance is an immediate reaction to immediate and identifiable circumstances. Hence, we would focus our analysis on the immediate and local relationship between the youth and law-enforcement. In contrast, if we use a capillary of power, we would recognise the relationship between the deviant and society as representing part of a wider societal structure. That is, we would see power exercised on a local level as representing, and being part of, the wider governmental network. We would see young people engaging in deviance as not just performing an immediate reaction but also taking part in a wider societal structure.

Foucault (1980e) argues that by applying a capillary notion of power, we can recognise the productive relationship between power and knowledge in which a society reproduces ‘reality’ and ‘Truth’ through the combination of power and resistance. In this sense, individuals create themselves through power but also rearticulate themselves in their exercising of power. For example, the relationship between adults and young people creates and rearticulates many positions, one of which is youth deviance. In contemporary industrial societies, such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, social stability is maintained through the rearticulation of each member’s position and this occurs through the application of power and knowledge. Self-governance and self-discipline enable power to be internalised and social control to occur without the need for coercive and repressive technologies (c.f. Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1990, 1996b).

As such, Foucault’s notion of capillary power tends to be more suited to contemporary industrial society than to earlier, and other, societies in which other modes of governance occur. For the New Zealand context, which is neo-liberal in its governing style, we can use a capillary notion of power to analyse the complexities in the relationships between youth and adults. We can see this complexity in interventions into youth deviance at the point in which adults want to, and attempt to, position youth as self-governing subjects, but need to, and end up, positioning youth as objects in order to exercise some control them. We can see interventions as the site of a complex struggle, and a point of strategy, where adults attempt to exercise some control over the development of youth. One way they try to achieve this is by dispersing and networking power.

**Networks of Intervention: The diffusion of power**

*Intervention*

Information about problems, strengths and goals for the future was used to formulate individualised management plans for each youth. These detailed how to meet each individual’s goals and needs in the following four areas:

*Education.* The primary goal in this area was to re-establish regular school attendance. This was achieved by, for instance, providing transport to school in the mornings if getting to school or oversleeping was a problem, or enrolling youths in a
different (less structured, more work-skills orientated) school if school structure or child-child/child-teacher conflicts were factors contributing to school nonattendance. Where required, tutoring for particular subjects was arranged (n=7).

Health. Individuals who had a drug or alcohol problem were provided with information about the health dangers of substance abuse. Some were enrolled in a drug education programme (n=6). Those youths attempting to cope with a pregnancy or STD were referred to a family planning or sexual health clinic (n=4). Those with mental health problems were referred to the appropriate services for assessment and treatment (n=11).

Social/family. Youths who had to fulfil the requirements of a court sentence by doing community service were aided in doing so by liaising with Youth Justice to arrange appropriate times, and endeavouring to ensure that the youth attended by offering transport or making a reminder telephone call. If parents were having difficulty dealing with their child, they were given guidance in the form of educational material and details on parenting courses. Individuals needing assistance with motivation, anger or stress were advised of courses that would help them in these areas.

Recreation/work. As a means to foster self-worth, sporting, cultural and occupational pursuits were encouraged. For example, youths with an existing sporting or cultural interest were encouraged to increase their involvement, while those with no current pursuits were encouraged to develop some, based either on their talents or what they enjoyed doing, or around the recreational interests of their friends. Where appropriate, active involvement in these was facilitated by offering transport to venues. Work opportunities were fostered by arranging a meeting between the youth and an employer in the field of work of the youth’s interests.

(Milne, et al., 2002, p.194, academic context, journal article, author’s italics)

The described interventions into youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, not only incorporated an explicit use of power but also illustrated the capillary nature of power. Through a knowledge of development and an understanding that young people needed to be socialised, authors diffused the use of interventional power across a variety of institutional contexts. Through diffusing the sites of intervention, they positioned the young person as an object of power. In this way, authors described how practitioners and other adults could control the flow of power, or even, control the possibilities for struggle or resistance by the youth. They reinforced this positioning through constructing the youth as powerless and predominately (but not always) without resistance.

Those writing about youth crime identified the family, the school, and the youth justice system as key and typical sites for intervention. To a lesser extent, they included other institutions connected to health, recreation, work, and defence. Perhaps due to the separation in New Zealand policy of welfare and justice in 1984, authors were unlikely to describe social and welfare institutions as part of this intervention network. They even separated Family Group Conferences (FGCs) into those aimed at welfare and those aimed at justice.

Authors described multiple and diffused intervention sites for normal and abnormal youth deviance. However, in abnormal deviance, they explicitly recognised this approach, within expertise, as an ‘effective’ intervention called ‘multi-systemic therapy’. According to those writing about multi-systemic therapy, practitioners could use a knowledge of abnormal deviance to target the youth from a variety of institutional angles. In this way, they
positioned the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as an object and a target of intervention. This approach differed to that used for normally-deviant youth.

Writers presented the diffusion of power for the normally-deviant youth in quite a covert way across texts. In interventions into passing phase deviance, they described the application of diversion across the youth justice system as involving a variety of groups and members including the family, the community, and the youth justice system. For example, described FGCs involved each of these institutions and focused on encouraging the development of responsibility or self-governance in the young person. In this way, power was spread across a variety of institutional contexts.

In contrast, those writing described interventions into the normally-deviant youth posing a threat to society as being diffused and networked through social institutions and spatial arrangements. Police, youth workers, social workers, and council workers played a central role in these interventions as they utilised technology to centralise power onto, and into, the youth. For example, writers highlighted lighting, surveillance, and adult presence as key technologies in the control of youth deviance.

Hence, the way writers described power differed across the constructions of the deviant youth. However, all interventions shared a concept of power diffusion and networking. As well as this, writers described this networked power as promoting or creating self-governance in the young person. In this way, they positioned youth, through interventions, as both the object and the subject of power.

Creating a Subject of Power: Power and developmental knowledge in constructions of youth deviance

In considering these issues today, I would like to look at the role of the community in the lives of our young people. I would like to suggest that in focusing on crime prevention, we must think about the need for our communities to comprehensively support and sustain our young people as they grow and develop. As a community we must confront the problems our youth face, and offer solutions to those problems. In doing so we are able to eliminate some of the poor consequences those problems have for our youth. (Carruthers, 2002, p.2, academic context, conference paper)

On my first reading of the analysed texts, there appeared to be a clear one-dimensional power struggle between adults and young people. Often authors’ description of power ran contrary to the capillary notion of power and, instead, they constructed adults as possessing, or holding, power over a young person’s development. Furthermore, they presented this relationship as being one devoid of any larger context, or picture – it was simply a struggle between adults and young people and did not represent any challenge to the ideological structure, or stability of, New Zealand as a society. Typically, through using developmental and risk knowledge to inform interventions, authors constructed young people as effects of
power whilst constructing adults as the ones being able to exercise power in order to change the course of development. By doing this, they were able to reassure adults that they were in control and that they could control the threat of young people.

Authors reinforced this power relationship by applying a developmental construction of the malleable objectified ‘youth’. Through using developmental knowledge, they reinforced a conception that young people were powerless because they could not control their own development and depended upon adults for ‘healthy’, or socially-determined, outcomes. In a way, they presented this as a repressive relationship between adults and young people where adults and adult-based institutions were constructed as the ‘we’ whilst children and young people were constructed as a different and dependent ‘other’.

Through positioning youth as targets or objects of power, those writing about youth crime described how practitioners and other adults could transform young people and children into self-governing and self-disciplined adults. Hence, they described the developmental transformation from childhood to adulthood as one in which the object ‘youth’ developed into a subject – an autonomous and self-governing adult. This knowledge-informed construction continued through to interventions where writers constructed power in a more possessive sense in that young people and children were the effects of power whilst adults were the subjects of power. Through interventions, writers depicted adults transferring power to young people in a controlled manner.

By using a developmental idea of becomingness, writers produced and reinforced a construction of young people as powerless to the influences of developmental risk and adults being able to control that risk (i.e. as having the ability to exercise power). Through using the concept of becomingness, they constructed children and young people as essentially different to adults. They depicted children and young people as ‘lacking’ any power to control their development and needing the assistance of adults. Once these young people became adults, those writing implied that they would be able to access power and would be, therefore, able to resist any intervention into their deviance.

Writers further demonstrated this assumption through the idea of early intervention. According to those writing about early intervention, adults could intervene into a young person’s life at a young age and transform the young person. These writers assumed, within this idea of early intervention, that younger children were more powerless and dependent than adolescents and adults. As the child developed into an adult, the child became less susceptible to the effects of development making interventions less effective.

By using developmental knowledge, authors described interventions targeting the deviant youth. In this sense, they described how practitioners could direct interventions onto a youth from a variety of angles in order to control the developmental and social outcomes of a young person. Additionally, authors implied that practitioners could also position the young
person in a network of governance and power. In this sense, authors described how practitioners could use interventions into youth deviance to ‘hold’ power over a single youth in order to control their deviance. Hence, authors implied that through knowledge and knowledge-informed practice, adults in authority could develop an understanding of a young person’s development and reproduce stability through interventions into developmental risk.

However, the interventions described by authors were not societal reactions to the deviance of one or two individuals; they were societal attempts to maintain stability by controlling the behaviour and outcomes of all young people. Hence, those writing did not construct the deviant youth as a single individual; rather, the deviant youth represented a group of individuals. By using a knowledge of risk and development, these authors reinforced the need for adult society to ensure that young people developed into productive and self-governing adults. This enabled them to construct young people as the object on whom practitioners could direct developmental knowledge and as the point of intervention into social stability. Authors implied that adult society could use interventions as the point in which power could be gradually internalised or transferred to the young person until the young person could be ‘trusted’ and left to develop on their own. The types of interventions and the degree to which authors would construct the young person as a powerless object depended on the construction of the young person.

**Targeting the Youth-at-Risk: Interventions into the abnormally-deviant youth**

Inside Kingslea, the day begins for Kurariki and the others at 7.30am, followed by hours of work designed to end their criminal careers. They are supervised at a ratio of about one staff member to five youths.

Under the guidance of manager Shirley Johnson, the staff at Kingslea have developed a seven-week programme called ‘Challenging Offending’ which all new arrivals are put through.

The programme, which CYF hopes to introduce to the other two youth justice centres, targets specific areas that may have led to their journey into crime - problems such as poor decision-making and problem-solving skills.

‘It’s about getting young people to think about what triggers them and to think about the consequences [of their behaviour] and the impact on their families,’ says Pakura [CYF’s chief social worker].

(Bingham, 2002, p.B5, media context, focus article)

When authors constructed the youth-at-risk, they tended to conceptualise power as a repressive relationship between adults and young people in which adults possessed power. In doing this, they constructed abnormally-deviant young people as powerless to the effects of development. This powerlessness reinforced the youth’s abnormality and dependence on adult society. They were, first, powerless to counter the influence of adverse developmental factors on their life and they were, second, powerless to control their abnormal deviance. Additionally, the threat that these young people posed to the stability of society reinforced a need for authors to position them as powerless. By constructing the youth as powerless,
those writing could encourage adult society – adults could make a change and control the youth. In contrast, if authors constructed youth as having access to power then the ‘power’ of adult society would diminish.

Those writing about interventions for the youth-at-risk, did not completely draw upon the idea that a society could only control the young person if the young person had limited or no access to power. Indeed, ‘true’ powerlessness is not possible in a contemporary industrial society. In these societies, power is everywhere rather than being in someone’s possession (Foucault, 1980d). For this reason, interventions also needed to direct the flow and use of power by the abnormally-deviant youth. In the analysed texts, authors demonstrated this in descriptions of therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT).

Authors described how practitioners could use CBT to redirect the young person’s thinking processes\(^47\). Through CBT, practitioners could counter deviance and develop conformity in the young person. In this sense, practitioners could reconstruct and reposition deviant youth as a self-governing subject. When authors described CBT, they did not promote a construction of the young person as lacking power; rather, they constructed the young person as lacking the ‘right’ knowledge to effectively direct and use power. However, to some extent, this involved them positioning adults in a controlling position. In this positioning, adults could control the types of knowledge to which the young person had access and the developmental outcomes of the young person. So, even though authors attempted to use interventions, such as CBT, to position and acknowledge the young person as a subject, they still constructed young people as objects of CBT and other interventions.

Education was another intervention that writers argued for, which simultaneously positioned the young person as internalising power as well as being an object of educational power. Those writing described how, through education, the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk could internalise the power of socialisation and, thus, become self-governing. However, at the same time, these writers constructed this young person as an object of development and risk on which practitioners directed this socialising power.

Consequently, in construction of interventions into abnormal deviance, writers simultaneously positioned the young person as a subject and object of power. Through ideas of risk and development, writers constructed young people as objects or effects of the conditions around them. Furthermore, when writers described interventions, they tended to reinforce this position as well as attempt to transform these young people into self-governing adults. Hence, the ways in which those writing described normal deviance tended to focus on building self-governance.

\(^{47}\) Authors describing CBT provided a somewhat superficial description of it. Keith Hawton, Paul Salkovskis, Joan Kirk & David Clark (1989) provide an indepth description of the therapy.
Re-directing the Missguided Youth: Interventions into the normally-deviant youth

... involving young people in the decisions about how to deal with their offending is seen as a technique for holding them responsible for their offending. And about a third of young offenders in the research on conferencing by Maxwell and Morris (1993) said that they had felt involved in the process.

(Morris, 2002, p.170, academic context, book chapter)

There is only one surveillance camera in the carpark. A second is to be installed but Wilson [a police inspector] says the group would like to see four, with monitoring carried out by volunteers or security firms. It also wants an emergency telephone in the carpark with a direct line to the police station.

(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article)

Those authors discussing normal deviance constructed young people in two differing ways – youth were either going through a passing phase or being a threat to society. In both of these constructions, authors represented young people as objects of development. However, there were also times in which authors described them as subjects. Reflecting interventions into abnormal deviance, these authors described how, through interventions into normal deviance, practitioners could attempt to transform the young person into a self-governing subject whilst simultaneously positioning young people as a controllable object. This occurred in constructions of deviance as a passing phase and constructions of deviance as a threatening adolescent behaviour.

In constructions of passing phase deviance, writers positioned youth as becoming a responsible self-governing adult. These writers described how, in interventions into normal deviance, practitioners needed to focus on the development of self-governance. In this way, in less intrusive interventions such as FGCs, practitioners worked on the principle of encouraging the development of acceptance and responsibility. So, writers described how, through the diffusion of power, adults and adult-based institutions could surround the young person and ‘care’ for the young person and their outcomes. However, like interventions into the abnormally-deviant youth, these writers also described power differently in relation to adults and young people.

In constructions of normal deviance, those writing implied that practitioners, and other adults, needed to control the ways they directed power onto the young person. In this way, authors positioned adults as subjects of power. When authors focused on diversionary interventions, like FGCs, they implied that power, as a force, became more visible and coercive as the young person’s offending worsened. Like in constructions of interventions for the youth-at-risk, constructions of interventions into the offending of normally-deviant youth demonstrated a complexity in the operation of power where authors simultaneously conceptualised power as a repressive and controlling force as well as a productive and governing force.
In constructions of social threat deviance, authors positioned youth in a captive adolescent body. They simultaneously constructed young people as powerless (unable to control their own development) and powerful (having some of the traits and rights of adults). It was their access to power that rendered them dangerous to society and symbolised a struggle between adults and young people.

In argued somewhat more intrusive interventions, such as surveillance, writers described how adult society could control the young person through a form of diffused, flowing, and invisible power, which would make the young person self-conscious. As a result, this would build self-discipline and self-governance in the young person. In interventions such as surveillance, writers described how practitioners could apply a capillary understanding of power to direct and target power at young people. These writers did not separate these interventions and argue that interventions, like surveillance, were the only solution. Instead, they argued that these interventions needed to incorporate coercive disciplinary techniques and the direct intervention of family, police, community wardens, youth workers, and social workers.

Hence, reflecting constructions of abnormal youth deviance and the interventions into abnormal youth deviance, writers described how interventions into the deviance of normal youth involved practitioners positioning the young person as an object in which power could be internalised. Through the internalisation of power, practitioners could transform the young person into a self-governing adult.

The Implications and ( Desired) Implications of Interventions

… clients are referred by Police Youth Aid Officers and are aged between 12 and 16 years. Typically they have appeared in the Youth Court two or three times and it is common for them to have significant family issues. They often appear disconnected from their communities and many have problems within the education system. When meeting a newly referred client for the first time the Youth Workers make it clear that the project is affiliated to the police and that if the Youth Workers become aware of criminal activity undertaken by the client, they will tell the police. Young people with curfews are told that if the Youth Workers find them in breach of the curfew, they will inform the police. With this information on board, prospective clients are free to choose whether or not they want the support of the Youth Worker to make positive changes in their life.

(Moore, 2002, p.3, academic context, conference paper)

Whether coercive or diversionary, authors described how interventions could transform the young person from a powerless and dependent child into a self-governing adult contributing to New Zealand society. In a way, this positioning reflected New Zealand society in 2002, a society Jane Kelsey (2002) describes as neo-liberal. Neo-liberal societies are built on concepts of self-discipline and self-governance (Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990). They are societies of self-regulation rather than overt and clearly visible institutional regulation (Fraser, 2003; Hindess, 1996; Rose, 1990). These societies promote and develop self-governance in order to maintain stability and coherence.
Ideas of self-governance suit a capillary notion of power where no individual or institution holds power. In these societies, power is diffused and decentralised. So it is of no surprise that interventions into youth deviance are diffused and centred as well as being focused on the development of self-discipline and self-governance. In this way, interventions are a societal attempt to build self-governance; but, is self-governance a reality of interventions?

For young people, self-governance may not be an immediate reality and we can see this in the analysed texts. Once combined with developmental knowledge, authors assumed that only adults had the ability to self-govern; children and young people needed to develop self-governing behaviours. They used developmental arguments to show young people and children lacking the ability and developmental level for self-governance. This ‘lack’ meant that interventions could never truly involve young people in self-governance and if adults, through interventions, ‘gave’ power to the young person they risked making this young person a greater threat to society.

Additionally, those writing about interventions into youth crime in 2002 implied that the outcomes of development (one being self-governance) tended to be determined by societal structures rather than biological development (c.f. Rose, 1990) (i.e. the development of the child into a productive adult, rather than a biological adult). Along with this, authors suggested that the society needed to have self-governing people to maintain economic and social stability. Furthermore, society needed to determine and control any threat to stability through knowledge (c.f. Foucault, 1999; Fraser, 2003; Hindess, 1996; Peters, 2000; Rose, 1996b).

On the surface, researchers and practitioners gathered data and knowledge to assist in the young person’s development. However, the need for social stability covertly justified the need for these groups to gather data about young people and the risk they posed to society. Once these data were gathered, practitioners could implement intervention programmes focusing on controlling ‘developmental’ outcomes (Foucault, 1999; Hindess, 1996; Rose, 1990).

It is at this point, that the complexity of power becomes apparent as adults use interventions to encourage self-governance whilst also governing or controlling the young person. This reasoning positions the youth as a subject and an object. This reasoning was also evident in the analysed texts. Authors constructed young people as both objects and subjects of power. However, they also constructed adults as determining the position of young people. So, they positioned young people into contradictory positions by using ideas of development and risk to construct young people as an effect and an outcome of knowledge, whilst showing interventions countering this by making youth subjects or agents of their future. However, authors argued for more objectifying interventions when the developmental risk of the young person was high. These interventions would target the youth from many angles.
In this sense, the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk was not just an object of knowledge but also became an object of power as interventions attempted to transform them into subjects.

However, any attempt to intervene and reposition the young person as a subject or as having some form of agency cannot resolve problems of youth deviance. We can see this when authors described interventions aimed at the individual and their family but downplayed any intervention into structural differences in society (including age). For example, in 2002, New Zealand writers attributed crime to socio-economic level but did not describe any direct intervention into socio-economic status. Instead, these writers suggested that the family and young person needed skills to move up the socio-economic ‘ladder’. In effect, writers did not engage in a discussion of the ‘reality’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand where there is a need to have low-paid workers.

Furthermore, through positioning the individual as an object of knowledge and power, writers failed to acknowledge any apparent struggle between the young person and adults. When such a struggle became apparent, writers would quickly apply developmental knowledge to reposition and reassert the youth’s position as an object. In such a way, they did not see young people as exercising power over their development or, at times, even having the ability to access power or assert resistance. In this way, writers tended to show deviance as a purely negative construct in society. They also ignored the possibility that deviance may be a reaction or a form of resistance by the young person, which the young person directs at the limitations of social and ideological structures in a society, a type of resistance that is productive.
Chapter 10

Acknowledging Power and Resistance: An alternative construction of youth deviance

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. (Foucault, 1983, p.216)

Up to this point, I have represented the relationship between institutions, adults, and young people in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, as one of control – particularly a one-sided control where authors described adults and adult-based institutions attempting to manage the development, outcomes, future productivity, and deviance of young people through knowledge and practice. In Chapter 9, I problematised this relationship by suggesting that adults and adult-based institutions were not maintaining control over youth but, rather, were struggling to maintain control. In effect, authors could not fully represent power as a one-sided object that adults held and wielded over young people. Instead, there was a need to see power as being more complex – something that flowed, working on specific individuals, but also insuring social stability.

Indeed, if adults did hold power and if young people were nothing but objects, then adults could fully control the young people through interventions. This would be especially evident with children at a young age and further away from adulthood, and it would mean that we could use an absolute and complete knowledge about youth deviance. We could be certain that we could use this knowledge to fully and completely predict, and then control, developmental outcomes of young people. We would know that any intervention we applied from this knowledge would be effective. However, this was not the case in the texts analysed. Instead, whenever authors constructed youth, there were possibilities for contradictory outcomes; in a sense, they replaced absolute developmental predictability with probability – where there was always a chance of an unpredictable outcome. Authors did not concentrate on any apparent contradictions; they did mention these contradictions but stressed that they were a rarity – something adult society should overlook and dismiss.

In this chapter, I want to concentrate on these moments of contradiction. I want to suggest that these moments of contradiction are actually moments of freedom. These moments of freedom demonstrate a struggle within the young person or between the young person and the adult society in which they live. In a way, the struggle at the moment of contradiction indicates two issues: first, a struggle between the young person and ‘society’; and, second, the existence of, not only, power, but also, resistance. I want to suggest that constructing young people as engaging in struggles of power and resistance offers another perspective
on youth deviance. Young people, themselves, and people working with/writing about young people can use resistance to offer another, potentially more ‘positive’, construction of youth deviance, which causes a society to look in on itself, in interventions, and work with the young person rather than concentrating on deficits in the young person and working on the young person.

**The Space of Uncertainty and Freedom: The ‘power’ in contradictions**

Of course, negative experiences in early childhood do not affect everyone in the same way ... Not all children who are at risk of poor outcomes actually experience those poor outcomes. Where some children grow up in relatively deprived circumstances but go on to lead productive lives, others grow up in stable and positive environments yet still experience poor outcomes in adulthood.

(Carruthers, 2002, p.8, academic context, conference paper)

Those writing about youth crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, referred to unpredictable developmental outcomes as contradictions. They acknowledged that there were possibilities that abnormal youth might not offend and that normal youth might develop into criminal adults. However, these writers reasoned that this was a small possibility and, because of this, interventions needed to be directed at abnormally-deviant youth and the threatening behaviours of adolescents.

The unpredictability of outcomes showed that, even in constructions of youth deviance verified by expertise, there was a moment of uncertainty – an "indeterminate" moment where writers could not determine the 'truths' of youth deviance (c.f. Bhabha, 1995, p.47). Although some critical youth studies theorists (e.g. Wyn & White, 2000) argue that contradictions actually limit the possibilities available for youth, postcolonial theorists, such as Homi Bhabha (1995), argue that contradictions are moments of freedom and uncertainty.

For the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, the indeterminate moment of contradiction provides a moment of positivity – their life may not be one of 'poor outcomes' or, in a colloquial sense, 'doom and gloom'. Instead, somehow, this young person could resist the effect of risk factors – they could resist the influence of their circumstances and the 'negative' influences in their life. The moment of uncertainty provides this youth with a possibility for resistance (c.f. Foucault, 1980b).

Bhabha (1995) also notes that these moments of freedom and possibility are indeterminate moments. Indeterminate moments are not just moments of contradiction but also the moments between the word and the object being described. In a sense, they are liminal moments, where the word is not quite fixated on the object. Youth, itself, is a liminal construct and, as such, the 'not quite' nature of youth enforces an unpredictability even when adults apply an expertise or science to fixate the object youth.
In this sense, the moments of indeterminacy and freedom are also moments of self-negotiation in which the subject, or individual, negotiates, and in a sense ‘creates’, their self through the forms of knowledge to which they have access and the structures in which they are embedded (c.f. Bevir, 1999; Foucault, 1976, 1997; Viriasova, 2006). In this sense, it is possible for a young person to occupy several positions simultaneously and to consciously, or subconsciously, position themselves, or find themselves positioned, differently in accordance to the different situations they face (c.f. Besley, n.d.). Hence, it is not only authors that may construct the youth simultaneously in several contradictory positions (such as deviant and normal) but young people themselves may position themselves, or be positioned, in more than one position simultaneously. Furthermore, young people may draw upon the different positions to which they have access to resist the ways in which adults construct them. The direction that a young person takes is an event of contingency and unpredictability, dependent upon other alternative constructions available to a young person within the structural and material contexts in which they live.

As well as freedom and possibilities for resistance, moments of contradiction and indeterminability can also illustrate a moment of struggle and contestation between the young person and adults (c.f. Edwards & Ribbens, 1998; Foucault, 1980b, 1980e). These moments of contestation and struggle are points in which youth and adults attempt to define themselves and the other. In effect, we can see this struggle as a relationship of power and resistance where adults and adult-based institutions attempt to control the development of the youth into a subject (and, therefore, in the attempt of repositioning, they position the youth as a powerless object of developmental knowledge). In this relationship, we can read the deviance (and, at times, non-deviance) of the youth as a resistance to this adult-determined positioning. Therefore, adults attempting to understand youth and make meaning of their lives can never fully construct young people as ‘powerless’. They may attempt to dominate and control youth but can never fully achieve this because knowledge of ‘youth’ is never complete and closed. There will always be moments of resistance.

Although it is easy to represent this relationship as a clear two-sided struggle between adults and young people, we must also acknowledge the complexity of identity and positioning on both sides. In theoretical discussions, or written texts, often a theorist, or writer, may provide a two-dimensional representation of the objects, or subjects of, research without acknowledging the complexity of the object, or subject, being studied. Indeed, we can see this in the author descriptions of youth deviance – where often authors ‘labelled’ or positioned particular types of youth as deviant with brief acknowledgement to the contradictory aspects of their argument. In effect, many authors implied that an ‘us’ (adults) and ‘them’ (youth) relationship existed. In reality, the two groups ‘adults’ and ‘youth’ were more complex and consisted of many more contradictions – it was more than just an ‘us’ and ‘them’ relationship.
For example, the argument developed by authors showed practitioners working with youth simultaneously although many authors emphasised the need to control deviant outcomes (or the ‘on’ side of the relationship). In reality, many practitioners working with young people daily (like teachers and youth workers) are actively having to work at the interface of with and on. In reality, many practitioners are working with youth, and with youth knowledge, to contest the spaces in which youth are positioned. These people are not only having to question current youth knowledges but having to negotiate their own identity as ‘youth workers’. There are adults attempting to make a difference in young people’s lives (to be a significant someone)48 and there are adults contesting the ways in which youth have been positioned (such as critical youth studies theorists). Both kinds of people attempt to work with young people, and with youth knowledge, in the struggle for identification.

In this sense, in the negotiation of the self and the exercising of resistance, there is a social element. Just as we socially construct knowledge, we also construct ourselves in social contexts. Young people understand and position themselves in their negotiation with institutions, adults, and other young people. Their construction of identity occurs in the moments where they ‘learn about’, or negotiate, themselves through the knowledges and people to which and whom they have access. Hence, we have to be aware of the types of relationships we develop with young people and the ways in which the contestation of identity can affect and influence the young person in the now and in the future (c.f Apple, 2001). Perhaps, instead of searching for better and more comprehensive interventions in the control of deviance, we need to find opportunities for young people to negotiate themselves and their identity. Perhaps, in the struggle for identity, we need to be looking at the possibilities for power and resistance.

**Foucault: The struggle between power and resistance**

He [a 15 year-old male] thinks changing the lighting or video surveillance won’t stop the problems but will move them somewhere else.

‘If they close down Buxton, we will go to Montgomery and then the Church Steps and Queen’s Gardens,’ he says.

(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article)

Foucault (1976, 1980b) argues that power cannot be conceptualised without resistance because in any incidence of power there is also resistance. Even though Foucault offers very little expansion on this theory (Grimshaw, 1993; Lacombe, 1996; McNay, 1992; Said, 1986) or very little development on his ideas of resistance (Hoy, 1986a), the idea that power and resistance are intertwined allows for an explanation of the complexity of youth deviance. It first allows for the acknowledgement of a struggle. In this sense, individuals and groups do

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48 During the time in which I researched and wrote this thesis, the most supportive group towards my study were actually youth workers and other practitioners working with youth. These people are aware of the difficulties young people experience with developmental and risk knowledge and are looking for alternative ways to construct their ideas of youth so that they can work with youth to make a difference.
not own or possess power; rather, power is a force, which individuals or groups attempt tactically to use in order to control or dominate others (Foucault, 1980b; Lacombe, 1996). However, one group can never fully dominate the other; rather, it is the interplay of a struggle and the exercising of power and resistance.

Furthermore, this struggle for domination is not physical or material in the traditional sense of violent political revolutions, although it may have physical aspects. Rather, this struggle for domination is first ideological in that it is a struggle for ‘truth’ and, in the case of an adult middle-case Pakeha society, it is the application of a ‘truth’ in order to maintain a sense of social stability and cohesion:

The government of men by men — whether they form small or large groups, whether it is power exerted by men over women, or by adults over children, or by one class over another, or by a bureaucracy over a population - involves a certain type of rationality. It doesn’t involve instrumental violence.
(Foucault, 1999, p.152)

Foucault (1999) argues that there is an intrinsic link between power and knowledge in any struggle for domination and control. We can find a similar argument in Marxist writing where theorists such as Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Raymond Williams (1977) argue that a ‘hegemonic’ struggle occurs, particularly in capitalist societies, as one group (often the middle-class) attempts to control another through forcing a particular ‘truth’, or view, of reality. To these theorists, hegemony consists of:

… a whole body of practices and expectations ... It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.
(Williams, 1977, p.110)

Critical youth studies theorists (esp. Griffin, 1993) have used this concept of hegemony in their attempts to explain the application of knowledge by adults on young people to control their development. To a certain extent, this is true as the struggle that is occurring between adults and youth is one of identity and the ‘reality’ of that identity. However, we are limited when we use a conception of hegemony. On a purely theoretical level, when we focus on hegemony within an analysis of resistance, we focus the class struggles that occur within a society. Furthermore, in focusing on hegemony, we may find ourselves slipping into the Marxist argument that hegemony and ideology are simply mistruths and that scientific reason may lead us to the ‘Truth’ (c.f. Williams, 1977). In a way, we may find ourselves returning to an assumption that the subject and knowledge are completely separate (i.e. that we can discover our true selves if we take ourselves away from hegemonic knowledge), instead of recognising the complex constitutive relationship between the subject and knowledge. Finally, on an analytical level, if we focus our analysis of youth resistance to an analysis of hegemonic struggles, we may find ourselves overlooking the micro acts of resistance that
occur when a young person attempts to negotiate their own being, and make meaning of their own life, within a particular context.

Moreover, when we use references to hegemony, we tend to assume that groups, to a varying extent, accept and believe another group’s position as ‘Truth’ (Shuker, 1987b; Williams, 1977). In doing this, we limit the forms of resistance in which an individual may engage. On one level, we may imply that that ‘real’ resistance can only be collective resistance and that ‘real’ resistance leads to a group’s emancipation (see White & Wyn 1998; Wyn & White, 1998). In effect, when we might focus only on overt oppositional resistance, the type of which manifests in collective conscious raising movements (c.f. Freire, 1993) and neglect to see that an individual’s or group’s choice to ‘play the game’ may also be an act of resistance.

So, even though we can use hegemony effectively to investigate these struggles as they occur across class dimensions, we do need to broaden our understanding of resistance to acknowledge the complex interactions between a variety of structural dimensions (such as gender, class, ethnicity, and age). We also need a concept of resistance that acknowledges the less visible forms of resistance – the types of resistance that occur by, and through, individuals in silent conformity and in moments of contradiction. However, like hegemonic class struggles, we also need to recognise that there is a connection between acts of resistance and struggles of identity and agency.

A struggle cannot be one-sided; even the word struggle implies that there are opposing forces. Subsequently, a struggle for domination and control should involve more than one party and, as such, an analyst should be able to observe both power and resistance. David Hoy (1986b) uses a metaphor of programming a computer for a game of chess to illustrate this:

To program a computer for chess, presumably one must include some considerations about counter-attacks ... the strategy explains why the one piece can or ought to capture the other, but it does not determine that the piece must capture the other. (Hoy, 1986b, p.136, author’s emphasis)

A game of chess is about domination and control where one player exercises power over another. However, as Hoy (1986b) rightly points out, in a game of chess there are also moments of resistance. Each time one player exercises power in the form of attack there is always a possibility of a counter attack. Hoy also describes a moment of indeterminability in chess – a moment of freedom and unpredictability – where the attacking player cannot determine their opponent’s move or counterattack, even with an established knowledge or logic of chess. In a struggle for domination and control, Hoy’s illustration shows us that domination may be used to restrict any possible moves of resistance, but this does not extinguish any possibility of resistance (even in a game of chess the losing opponent might decide to flip over the chess board). We can also see evidence of these moments within the
texts of 2002, even through using developmental reasoning and techniques of risk assessment, authors acknowledged a possibility of contradiction – that young people may not do as predicted. Hence, although authors used knowledge to describe, and to a certain extent, determine the deviant youth, they could never fully determine the youth as the youth could, at times, contradict, and in effect, resist the predictions of authors. Furthermore, even in the methodical and systematic theorisation of interventions, authors were unable to fully determine the youth – instead the ‘gap’ between adult society and young people became more evident.

We can see the ideas of struggle, domination, and resistance in Foucault’s (1999) own explanation of power and government:

First, power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals. Such relations are specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, production, communication, even though they combine with them. The characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively. A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt.

(Foucault, 1999, p.152)

In this quote, Foucault acknowledges the presence of a struggle in which one group attempts to determine the actions of another. Foucault argues that, although these moments might involve domination and actions of violence, a governing group can never fully determine the subject. He argues that the subject does have the ability to resist – for Foucault, in any action of domination there are always points of resistance. We are able to find examples of this in the everyday ‘reactions’ of young people to adults as young people defy or manipulate adult rules to their advantage. We can also find examples of this in literary works such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Beecher Stowe, 1966), which describe the struggle for identity in contexts of slavery. In Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe describes how, in a moment of domination and control, Tom (a slave) is able to assert some resistance and reconstruct himself within a particular context (not as a slave but as a believer):

"Mas'r Legree, as ye bought me, I'll be a true and faithful servant to ye. I'll give ye all the work of my hands, all my time, all my strength; but my soul I won't give up to mortal man. I will hold on to the Lord, and put his commands before all, – die or live; you may be sure on 't. Mas'r Legree, I ain't a grain afeard to die. I'd as soon die as not. Ye may whip me, starve me, burn me, – it'll only send me sooner where I want to go."


As the above quote suggests, it is within struggles of domination, and the exercising of power and resistance, that the self is formed (Butin, 2001; Foucault, 1976; Lacombe, 1996). In one sense, adults and adult-based institutions force a positioning of deviance upon
particular youth. In this positioning, adults may use the knowledge and supposed ‘Truth’ of developmental growth and risk to construct and control the young person (c.f. Foucault, 1980e). It is in this positioning that they attempt to define the self of the young person as ‘adolescent’, ‘child’, ‘deviant’ and so forth. However, this knowledge cannot determine the young person – the young person may consciously, or subconsciously, resist this positioning, or may consciously, or subconsciously, take up this positioning – which, in itself, may be read as a form of resistance against other factors in the young person’s life. In this sense, the young person is also involved in the taking up, or resisting, of positions. The young person is never fully determined through knowledge but actually plays a role in the construction of self. Hence, even in the internal construction of self there is both power and resistance (Foucault, 1976; Hindess, 1996).

As I have already shown in this thesis, New Zealand authors in 2002 tended to position young people as lacking the power to control development. They did not consider any construction of resistance. If they did this, they would need to conceptualise what agency was, or could be, for young people.

**Bringing Agency into the Discussion**

… the ways in which agency is conceptualised has important political implications in relation to our understanding of the nature of social order, and hence likewise for the development of particular institutional interventions and strategies for social change involving young people.

(White & Wyn, 1998, p.325)

Using a concept of agency in a thesis that is claiming some poststructural tenets can be problematic. For poststructural authors (see Bevir, 1999; Viriasova, 2006), agency is a debatable concept because of the differing views of the relationship between discourse and the ‘subject’. These authors argue that traditional notions of agency connect agency to autonomy and the actions of an authentic self in making rational decisions. That is, traditional notions of agency tend to construct agency as a concept of liberal society in which the self-determined and autonomous individual has the ability to choose and make decisions on their own lives. Poststructural theorists (e.g. Jones, 1992) consider this construction of agency problematic because of its connection to a particular discourse (liberalism) and its distancing from the relationship between the subject and knowledge (in which particular discourses limit the subject positions available).

However, we can reconceptualise agency in a way that acknowledges resistance (c.f. Tobias, 2005). This involves taking the position that agency is not a concept limited to a single discourse that claims an authentic autonomous self (i.e. liberalism) but can be reconstructed across, and through, many knowledges. White and Wyn (1998) argue that “[a]gency is something which is ‘done’” (p.315). One of the ways agency can be ‘done’ is through choice – another way, which may involve some form of choice, is through
resistance. Although both positions, at times, acknowledge the complex relationship between the subject and knowledge, it is this second way that does not reify the position of the subject as an autonomous ‘choosing’ individual separate to discourse. Rather this second position acknowledges that the individual is located in the moment of the indeterminate, at the point in which knowledge is exercised on an individual, but does not determine the individual. However, before I go on to discuss how agency can be conceptualised as resistance, I want to outline the traditional conception of agency as choice and highlight why this conception of agency would not work in a reconstruction of youth deviance.

**Agency, Freedom, and Choice**

Canterbury University criminologist Dr Greg Newbold says children of career criminals still make their own decisions, still opt to commit crimes – but research shows they are hugely disadvantaged. ‘Just as boys follow their fathers into law or the police force or cricket or rugby, so boys with criminal families follow their fathers into crime.’

There are three hopes: he needs to find a paid job, a clean-living girlfriend, or a positive male role model.

Canterbury police youth aid co-ordinator Sergeant Chris Roper says: ‘There are no two ways about it: quite significant recidivist offenders can turn their lives around’.

(Cwelham, 2002, p.4, media context, focus article)

Critical youth studies (White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1998) arguments for increased opportunities for agency tend to connect agency to freedom and choice. That is, they tend to base their theory of agency on the traditional notion of choice made by an autonomous and authentic self. These theorists define agency as conscious and rational goal-directed activity occurring on three dimensions – the personal, the immediate social, and the wider social (or collective) (White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1998). White and Wyn (1998) have described effective agency as occurring on this third level and involving conscious action, challenging existing structures, and involving collective activities:

Effective agency, we argue, embodies the three dimensions previously outlined. That is, it involves consciousness of the potential to take action, the willingness to engage in collective action in the interests of the group and, importantly, the knowledge and willingness to challenge existing structures. Thus, agency is about knowledge, power and the ability to activate resources. Social divisions and inequalities have an impact on the extent to which individuals and groups have access to each of these aspects of effective agency. Furthermore, agency is a continuous process, involving constant ebbs and flows depending upon immediate material circumstances and group dynamics.

(White & Wyn, 1998, p.318)

Within my own research, I found White and Wyn’s (1998) construction of agency initially problematic, in a theoretical sense, as I attempted to locate their concept of agency into a poststructural framework. This was particularly difficult because of the conceptualisation of agency as conscious and rational choice. We can see discussion of this theoretical problem in the work of Mark Bevir (1999) and Inna Viriasova (2006). Both Bevir and Viriasova use Foucault’s ideas about power and knowledge to explore agency in liberal societies. Like me,
Bevir and Viriasova both come from the position that there is a complex and constitutive relationship between knowledge, power, and the self. To Bevir and Viriasova, traditional concepts of agency as rational choice are awkward as they assume an autonomous subject who exists outside of knowledge and who makes discrete and objective decisions and choices. In a poststructural sense, this is problematic as the subject can never be fully autonomous and that any choice or decision made by the subject is, in itself, influenced by the knowledges and power that imbue the subject. Taking this argument further, when we associate a concept of agency with rational choice, it could be said that we risk returning to a concept of agency that is devoid of context and ignores the constitutive connection between the subject and knowledge. Additionally, in associating agency with choice and then defining that choice, we might overlook the moments of agency where an individual makes irrational choices and decisions.

However, if we read White and Wyn’s (1998) theorisation closely, it is possible to see that White and Wyn do acknowledge that agency can never be an authentic autonomous choice devoid of power. White and Wyn clearly see an association between knowledge and agency; to them, the use of developmental knowledge has had an impact on youth agency – developmental knowledge has limited agency by positioning the youth as powerless and dependent upon adults. In turn, White and Wyn argue, the opposite, that is that the use of liberal knowledge, has totally decontextualised agency and has ignored the role of structural and material limitations for, and on, youth. White and Wyn encourage us to contextualise agency and to acknowledge the role that contexts (material, structural, and knowledge-based) play on the exercising of agency:

We must attempt to understand the way in which different groups of young people are situated within the local community, group or school, and how these relationships are, in turn, shaped by wider processes and social divisions associations with the dominant mode of production and power relations in society.
(White & Wyn, 1998, p.325)

So, to White and Wyn (1998), agency is about rational choice but that choice is affected by the contexts in which it is embedded. In this sense, even in a claim to rationality, White and Wyn, to a certain extent, reflect a poststructural argument of agency, in that they acknowledge the influence of knowledge, power, and context. They do not see agency as absent of context but totally imbued within power, knowledge, material, and structural boundaries.

Perhaps a more problematic feature of White and Wyn’s (1998) argument is that effective agency needs to occur at the social (or collective level). In this latter argument, even though White and Wyn acknowledge that agency can occur on a micro level, they minimise many micro acts of agency (such as an individual’s acts of deviance or non-deviance) and, therefore, downplay the importance of these acts in the construction of self and the exercising of agency.
However, there are also practical problems in discussing a theory of agency as choice, particularly around the definition of choice, the groups of young people that get to make choices, and the outcomes of choice. For example, White and Wyn (1998) tend to define choice as a positive, collective, and rational action that leads to the development of “emancipatory projects” (p.324). In effect, even though they have defined agency as a “process” (p.318), they have limited this process to choices that lead to emancipation. Furthermore, in focusing on emancipation, White and Wyn, in effect, have defined the concept of ‘rational choice’ and, although their reading of rational choice acknowledges the existence of complex power relationships between adults and young people, their theory depends upon adults being open to challenge from young people and providing opportunities for young people to exercise agency.

In this moment of dependency between adults and youth, there is also a risk that this choice might become adult-determined choice, not youth choice, as adults may (and this may be unintentional) pre-determine whatever choice the young person may make. In effect, agency as choice may reflect a questionnaire with listed issues where the researcher asks the participants what issues affect them by providing them with group of issues from which to choose. Hence, in connecting effective agency to choice, adults might give young people opportunities to choose but place those choices within clearly determined boundaries. Adults might also attempt to determine the types of choices young people should not make. For example, in discussions of youth deviance in 2002, authors implied that deviance was not an appropriate ‘choice’ for young people.

We can see this problem of choice restriction and determination in philosophical discussions of choice, where theorists (such as Rose, 1990; Vaughan, 2001) argue that there is a complex and contradictory relationship between choice and restraint in liberal societies. These theorists argue that it is difficult to connect agency to authentic choice because in order to have more choices we often need to determine and set up more restraints around the types of choices we can make. That is, in opening up more opportunities to choose, we also ‘over’ situate those choices within defined and complex limits. Foucault (1977) shows this in his book *Discipline and Punish*, where he describes the transformation of feudal society into liberal society. Foucault argues that we often associate freedom and choice with liberal societies; however, to him, in liberal societies, the function of power is transformed and actually leads to a different kind of regulation – one in which practices of self-discipline and practices of surveillance restrict and determine the freedom of the individual. As, Dany Lacombe (1996) describes:

> It soon became obvious that every attempt to reform society, to give people more freedom ineluctably becomes its opposite – a technique of domination. (Lacombe, 1996, p.332)
Connected to the restraints surrounding choice, it is possible that when adults and adult-based institutions open up opportunities for choice for youth they are selective on the types of youth to whom they give choice. Indeed, the types of youth who participate in emancipatory projects may not be deviant youth. In effect, in ‘giving’ youth opportunities to participate, adults might find themselves giving opportunities to some groups of youth whilst denying opportunities to others. A good example of this, in New Zealand, is the development of the *Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa* (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002). Although the Ministry of Youth Affairs developed this strategy as a policy to work with all young people between the ages of 12-25 and as a model of youth participation, the young people surveyed for this strategy came from New Zealand secondary schools. In effect, young people outside the school system, young people working, young people in intermediate schools, and young people in tertiary institutions were not included (although the policy included these young people in its framework). We can also see this in the constructions of youth deviance in New Zealand texts in 2002, authors often associated choice with the normally-deviant youth; whereas authors constructed the abnormally-deviant youth as an effect of knowledge. In doing this, authors often restricted the ‘irrational’ choice to be deviant to a particular kind of youth.

As such, choice is a loaded and problematic concept. It is particularly problematic when we use it to understand the actions of youth. At a conceptional level, it becomes problematic when we attempt to reconstruct youth deviance through an idea of rational choice (even if it occurs within contextual restraints) because, at some point, we could find ourselves mistaking deviance as an act of limited agency involving irrational decisions that do not lead to emancipation. Indeed, we could find ourselves arguing conclusively that deviant youth (particularly abnormally-deviant youth) have limited, or no, agency because of the contextual constraints in which they live.

Furthermore, we also risk ignoring the power relations occurring between adults and youth in the exercising of agency. In effect, in allowing youth to choose, someone needs to determine what choices are available, any restraints needed (who should do the choosing and how) and the types of outcomes to which that choice should lead. Instead, what we need is an alternative conception of agency, which attempts to explain the anomalies in the current ideas about youth deviance, the implications of current ideas of youth deviance, and to provide a possible alternative conception of youth deviance, which acknowledges that, in some way, young people are exercising resistance. We also need an interpretation of agency that acknowledges that the ‘choices’ young people make may be both irrational and acts of agency. A concept of resistance can help us develop this new interpretation. On the surface, agency can be both resistance and choice – however, through connecting agency with resistance, we are able to acknowledge the struggle that occurs in the construction of

49 A single focus group of selected Wellington young people were also included in the development of the strategy.
the self and we are able to recognize the constitutive role of knowledge in the formation of self without reinforcing a traditional notion of agency based on notions of rational choice. We are also able to acknowledge that ‘we’ do not have total control over the ‘choices’ young people make and that, sometimes, the choices young people may make will challenge us and the knowledges we see as ‘Truth’.

**Agency, Freedom, and Resistance**

Respondents identified a range of reactions of young people referred to the Centre from frightened to aggressive and from cooperative to uncooperative. Some young people were reportedly annoyed about being detained or resented being picked up as they reportedly felt that they ‘weren’t getting into trouble’. For example, one commented that young people were:

‘A bit cranky as their plans for the evening had been disrupted but were okay.’

Respondents reported that some young people were:

‘Abusive to Police, angry, dishonest about personal details, resistant to giving information about themselves’, and

‘… those who were intoxicated [were] often full of smart comments - vocal but mostly complaining, one or two abusive’.

Respondents stated that some young people were confused as to why they were at the Police Station ‘when they were not offending’. They reportedly found the safety aspect ‘difficult to grasp as nothing had actually happened to them’. However, others were reportedly well behaved and understood why they had been referred to the Centre after the objectives were explained to them.


We achieve three things when we conceptualise agency in terms of resistance. First, we are able to acknowledge that the self (our own identity) occurs through a struggle for domination (c.f. Butin, 2001; Foucault, 1976; Krips, 1990; Tobias, 2005). Second, we are able to move away from choice and, as such, better reflect the contingency of contemporary society and the human condition (c.f. Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992). Third, we are able to acknowledge that agency is a ‘creative’ or an unpredictable process of self-negotiation that occurs in moments of indeterminacy. Hence, when we conceptualise agency as resistance, we acknowledge that a society is contingent – continuously being formed in the moment through struggles for domination and control. So, we can see that, at any point in time, the members of a society cannot be fully determined and that the struggles for domination are just one attempt to enable some form of determination to occur. These struggles are the attempts in a society at closure to any apparent contradictions to the ‘truths’ or indeterminate moments. Agency is about the indeterminate moment in this struggle (c.f. Tobias, 2005). It is about the moments of unpredictability and creativity in which the individual uses the resources to which they have access to negotiate and position themselves within a framework:

Agents, in contrast, exist only in specific contexts, but these contexts never determine how they try to construct themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the actions they can attempt to perform. Agents are creative beings; it is just that their
creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it.  
(Bevir, 1999, p.67)

Like agency in the form of choice, some theorists (Davies, 1997; Ginwright & Cammarota, 2002) argue that there needs to be a conscious element to resistance. In other words, in order for someone to be able to resist a construction or positioning, that person must be conscious of that construction and consciously resisting or accepting that construction. To a certain extent, there is some truth to this position, as people do actively choose to resist. We can find an illustration of this in moments of hegemonic struggles, where, through consciousness raising, oppressed groups actively resist and reposition themselves as active subjects. However, other people or groups may not interpret these choices of resistance as rational; indeed, to other groups the choice to resist may be irrational. This is the ‘power’ of resistance as it enables us to see the irrational choice as an act of agency – even if it does not lead to change or emancipation. Perhaps a better example of irrational resistance comes through explanations for normal deviance where authors describe the youth going through a passing phase as choosing to be deviant – but, in being deviant, authors interpret their choices as irrational and needing redirection.

Although an individual may exercise resistance in the form of choice, there are often times of contradiction and indeterminacy where there is no evidence of a conscious choice. We can see this, across the texts analysed, in the moments where authors describe the abnormally-deviant youth who does not ‘become’ a deviant adult. Often authors are perplexed as to the reasons for this and, instead of looking at the actions of the youth, look to developmental explanations in protective factors or resilience. In this, authors imply that the young person has not consciously chosen to resist a deviant position. Indeed in my own Masters research (Beals, 2002a), I found that women who had been through the prison system had resisted particular constructions of criminality. These women re-positioned themselves outside of the criminological construction of the criminal woman. They only became ‘conscious’ of their resistance during the course of their involvement in my research. Resistance was not an explicit conscious choice before the research.

Judith Butler (1995b) would agree with the argument that resistance may not be a conscious action of the subject. For Butler, resistance is located in the psyche or subconsciousness of the individual. Like Michel Foucault (1976) and Dan Butin (2001), Butler argues that power and resistance occur in the construction of the self where power is directed at the self and the self attempts to resist power. The subject of power is not produced in one moment but is always in the moment of being produced – it is this contingent and indeterminate positioning of the subject that enables resistance and new possibilities (Butler, 1995b; Lacombe, 1996). Other authors such as Bevir (1999) agree with Butler and develop the argument for freedom and resistance further by arguing that the process of becoming a subject occurs in moments of freedom and is a creative process in which an individual consciously and subconsciously negotiates their identity.
Although, Butler (1995) and Bevir (1999) provide us with interesting insights into the subconscious elements of resistance, we must also acknowledge the role of structural elements. That is, even in a negotiation for identity, the subject is somewhat limited to the types of self they can fashion. The moment of indeterminacy is not a moment of ‘pure’ freedom where the individual can totally reconstruct himself or herself as someone else through choice or subconscious action. In a moment of indeterminacy, a young person cannot completely and absolutely reconstruct themselves into another position, such as adult; and, at particular points in history, it would be difficult for a young person to position themselves as adolescents. Indeed, the possibilities for resistance are somewhat restricted, but not limited to, the positions available, and accessible, at a certain point in time to the individual. Furthermore, the ways in which an individual may exercise resistance (through conscious ‘choice’ or subconscious action) may move towards a reconstruction of positions available to themselves and others. In this sense, resistance involves the individual within acts of ‘self’ negotiation as the individual uses the resources (including knowledges and their relationships with other people) available to them to reassert their identity within particular contexts in a way that is meaningful to them, but not necessarily meaningful to others.

Hence, there is a productive element of resistance as current structures and ideologies are challenged; but, there is also a reproductive element of resistance as current conditions may be, and are, reproduced. This does not suggest that structural and ideological conditions determine the types of positions available, rather that, as White and Wyn (1998) remind us, the positions a young person can occupy are embedded within a contextual framework. That is, there is a constitutive relationship between the individual and the contexts in which they are embedded in that contexts provide boundaries and gaps for possibilities of agency. Using this, we can argue that same structures that ‘limit’ the agency of an individual may also provide points for resistance:

… if we understand the ubiquity of power as an expression of the fact that the subject always exists in a social context that influences his agency, then we must allow that any regime of power will provide him with resources for challenging social norms as well as pressures to follow them.

(Bevir, 1999, p.71)

In 2002, authors did not construct young people as unquestionably deviant. Indeed, across the institutional contexts, authors allowed some slippage in constructions. For example, in constructions of abnormal deviance, although authors described the deviant youth as an effect of developmental knowledge, they also acknowledged the contradictions in their constructions – it was possible for a young person in ‘abnormal’ circumstances to resist deviant outcomes. Indeed, the fact that in all constructions of youth, authors argued that development was a process of becoming meant that adults could never really determine the end-point of development. These indeterminate moments, to use Bevir’s (1999) words provided young people with some “resources” of resistance.
Furthermore, if we apply this understanding of resistance and power to constructions of the youth deviant it becomes apparent that it is not just adults constructing young people as deviant; but, rather, there is a complex relationship where the young person is constructed as deviant through an interaction between adult society and their own self. This means that the reproduction of inequalities, particularly age inequalities, for young people do not just occur through some adults imposing an unequal power structure on young people – instead, somehow, young people themselves are involved in reproducing constructions about young people. Indeed, the relationship between the individual and knowledge is a constitutive relationship as knowledges do not determine the individual but provide the individual with the resources to understand him or herself and, in a sense, construct him or herself. In effect, we are not constructed by knowledge but constructed through the negotiation between other people, ourselves, and knowledge; and that knowledge must, in some way, be reflective of who we are. In his early work, Foucault (1972a) argues that we only tend to accept discourses as truth if we sense that a discourse is reflective of our society and ourselves. In this sense, as represented by ideas of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977), young people, at some point, recognise a knowledge as truth about themselves and construct an understanding about themselves through that knowledge – they are not constantly resisting knowledge but are, instead, negotiating themselves through knowledge. For example, a young person might consider him or herself a youth-at-risk because they may feel that ideas of developmental risk reflect and explain their reality to them.

So, adults and young people are both involved in producing and reproducing the construction of the youth deviant. However, this does not mean that this power relationship positions adults and youth as equal. Indeed, at times, the adult reaction to any possibility of deviance by the youth is to limit the opportunities for resistance by constructing the youth as a powerless object through knowledge.

**Objectifying the Youth Through Knowledge: The adult side of domination and possibilities for resistance**

... it is only by occupying - being occupied by - that injurious term that I become enabled to resist and oppose that term, and the power that constitutes me is recast as the power I oppose.

(Butler, 1995b, p.245)

Up to this point, I described how developmental knowledge and risk knowledge have been used in contemporary industrial societies to control particular groups of people posing a threat to social stability. As I have shown in previous chapters, these groups tended to cross lower socio-economic, ethnic, gender, and age dimensions. Often governing groups in industrial societies attempted to control young people coming from these groups. Adults as well as adult-based institutions were able to control the risk that these young people posed through knowledge and practices such as education. The histories of developmental
knowledge and risk knowledge illustrate clearly the adult side of the struggle for domination in which particular adult groups have attempted to control young people through knowledge.

In this struggle for domination, adults making meaning of youth deviance applied developmental and risk knowledge in practices to control the potential threat the deviant youth posed to society. These practices attempted to transform or socialise the deviant youth into a self-governing person ready for adulthood and participation in adult society. These interventions were logically compatible for the normally-deviant youth where their risk was evidence of a passing phase or maturation process because this youth possessed factors of normality in their lives – they tended to come from middle-class, white, two-parent families. Age was the only dimension providing an adequate reasoning for the adult domination of this group of youth. The normally-deviant youth’s deviance in adolescence could be a resistance towards future expectations or their non-deviance could be a resistance to the expectation that they would be deviant. In other words, adults attempting to make meaning of deviance used age to construct these youth as deviant. However, these adults also used factors of normality to construct this youth as non-deviant. Hence, young people had two possible positions to occupy and resist – and many points of freedom in which society did not attempt to control them – many points in which adults had not tried to fully determine and dominate.

However, the aim of interventions to reconstruct the abnormally-deviant youth as a self-governing subject demonstrated a stronger struggle for domination. In these interventions, adults and adult-based institutions attempted to override and control the influence of other ‘risk’ or threatening factors in the young person’s life. Rather than being just dominated and objectified through a knowledge of age, adults attempting to understand these youth attempted to dominate and objectify these youth across many dimensions (or ‘factors’) of difference.

This placed the young person in a difficult position. They could do one of two things. First, young people could resist the influence of the various different dimensions in their lives to become non-deviant. For many young people this is difficult because it requires resisting an aspect of oneself. Second, young people could resist the controlling intention of interventions by becoming deviant. In other words, a young person’s non-deviance demonstrated a resistance towards the expectation that structural inequalities would lead to deviance; and, a young person’s deviance showed a resistance towards a socialising intention of interventions to transform the young person into a self-governing individual.

What Does This Resistance Look Like?

Resistance may take the form of running away or standing still, of saying no or not saying anything at all. Likewise, even the acceptance of the imposition, the lack of resistance, is an act.
(Butin, 2001, p.168)
Researchers taking a sociological standpoint (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Merton, 1999) typically conceptualise resistance as a physical reaction to social positionings in the form of deviance. However, we do not have to associate resistance with deviance. Instead, it is possible to see an individual’s resistance to deviance as a form of resistance in itself. This is especially apparent in young people when adults expect them to be deviant (either because of risk factors or because of a developmental position). Hence, resistance can be deviance and non-deviance. In short, it is when someone takes up one position to resist another.

As I have shown already, just the construction of youth itself as an object provokes and elicits some form of resistance. Through resistance, young people might try to resist the factors that position them as an object (age, socio-economic level, developmental level, social environment, gender and so forth) or they may attempt to resist practices in adult society that attempt to socialise them into a self-governing, and conforming, subject. For example, young people may participate in a programme in an attempt to ‘play the game’ or just get through it so that they can be themselves again. Hence, we can see their deviance here as a form of conformity (c.f. Dayle & McIntyre, 2003). In this sense, resistance does not have to be revolutionary (c.f. Walkerdine, 1990) and does not need to be a physical reaction to something.

When an individual resists a position or expectation by doing the opposite, they are also engaged in resistance (c.f. Butler, 1995b). This form of resistance is evident in the contradiction in constructions – where normally-deviant youth become deviant adults and abnormally-deviant youth become productive working adults. In this sense, resistance allows the unpredictable to become probable.

Hence, resistance may not be an intentional reaction of the young person towards adults and adult-based institutions, but it is a reaction. Through understanding that young people can, and do, resist, we are able to recognise that young people do have some agency and they can react against the constructions they are ‘forced’ into or they can take up a construction to react against some other ‘force’ in their life (c.f. Nairn, Panelli, & McCormack, 2003).

Furthermore, through understanding resistance in terms of a struggle for domination we can explore and explain why it is so difficult for young people constructed as ‘youth-at-risk’ to resist deviance. In the struggle for domination, practitioners and experts identify many, if not all, dimensions of the young person’s life as problematic. They then construct interventions to target these dimensions. By diffusing power across many dimensions, practitioners and experts limit the possibilities for resistance. So, adults, through interventions, place a young person in a difficult position where any non-deviant outcomes require the young person to resist who they may be as a gendered, ethnic, socio-economic individual.
So resistance is more complex that a simple reaction. Resistance is about a struggle for identity, a struggle for domination. Nevertheless, this concept of resistance is different to traditional sociological concepts of resistance and to psychological concepts of resilience.

**Resistance and Resilience**

More recently, resilience has been conceptualised as a dynamic process involving an interaction between both risk and protective processes, internal and external to the individual, that act to modify the effects of an adverse life event ... Resilience does not so much imply an invulnerability to stress, but rather an ability to recover from negative events ... [it is] ‘normal development under difficult conditions’. (Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003, pp.1-2)

Psychologists (e.g. Olsson, et al., 2003) use the term resilience to describe a young person’s ability to resist the influence of risk factors in their life. Resilience tends to refer to some inner strength within the young person, which experts can locate with scientific investigation, build through interventions, and predict. In contrast to resilience, resistance does not depend on the existence of risk factors, rather it depends on an inherent struggle for domination. Adults cannot predict and manipulate resistance. Even though adults could attempt to control possibilities for resistance, they cannot completely control the possibility for resistance.

Those using psychological theory connect a concept of resilience to ideas of normality: resilience does not lead to deviance; instead, resilience leads to the ‘healthy’ developmental outcome of autonomy and economic productivity (although these people do not explicitly claim the second). In contrast, resistance is different to resilience, because it may lead to ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ outcomes. In other words, the needs of a society do not determine how resistance manifests but they do ensure that there is some struggle over the definition of these ‘needs’. So, in the context of my research, I have not defined resistance through psychological terms. Instead, I have defined it sociologically as the struggle between individuals and groups although it differs to traditional sociological concepts of resistance.

**Two Types of Resistance**

Resistance is no longer to be seen centrally as an intentional and violent response by an individual to his or her oppression. Instead, resistance must be reconceptualized so that it can be both nonactive (unintended) and dispersed, manifested in localized acts of defiance which together form a global pattern of resistance that transcends the intentional engagement of any of the agents. (Krips, 1990, p.177)

My use of resistance to describe and reflect upon youth deviance is not new. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 3, theorists from a sociological standpoint (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b) have looked at resistance and youth for some time. However, these theorists tend to focus on one type of resistance (class resistance) manifesting in the form of deviance (not
conformity). Indeed, critical youth studies theorists (Besley, n.d.; Bucholtz, 2002) have been critical of using the term ‘resistance’ in youth analysis because of its association to class resistance and the complexity of youth experience in contemporary society. Their criticism is valid as these ‘subcultural’ explanations of resistance tend to focus on the negativity and inherent ‘hopelessness’ of the working-class position.

However, we should not remove resistance from analyses into youth deviance and non-deviance because of the ways some theorists have used resistance. As I have shown in this chapter, resistance works alongside power in a productive way – alongside power, resistance makes things including ourselves. Through using resistance with the idea of a struggle for domination, we can see that using resistance and power allows for a relational analysis, an analysis, in which, we can explore the relationship between adults, adult-based institutions, and young people. If we neglect to analyse this relationship, we run the risk of ignoring any role young people have in constructing or resisting constructions of youth.

Furthermore, those using subcultural theory tend to conceptualise resistance as an act or event – it is a pure reaction. However, resistance is also connected to the construction of the self. In this sense, resistance is not an event but a process where the self is negotiated, formed and transformed within a struggle (Besley, n.d.; Bucholtz, 2002; Butin, 2001; Foucault, 1983). This struggle for domination is not just a class struggle; rather, it is more a struggle for ‘truth’ and control. In this way, we are able to see resistance as a concept connected to knowledge and the production, reproduction, resistance, and transformation of structural inequalities.

Finally, traditional subcultural theorists tend to connect resistance directly to deviance. They do not explicitly see acts of conformity as acts of resistance. It is this ‘non-connection’ that, perhaps, leads to the inherent hopelessness in subcultural analysis where the deviant youth becoming a conforming adult is no longer resisting but rather just accepting their unequal positioning in a society. However, individuals can resist through conformity. By conforming, an individual may be resisting another construction or expectation of their self. Resistance shows us that, whether individuals conform or deviate, they are engaged in a struggle. The implications this construction open up are new possibilities for both the ways in which adults see youth and in the ways youth see themselves.

**Implications of a Knowledge of Resistance**

I used to like to call myself a delinquent – at least I got my resistance acknowledged. (my own personal reflection on my own ‘adolescence’)

Rather than positing a new knowledge of youth, I have argued in this chapter that we should begin to see young people as being in a moment of contradiction or indeterminability where anything is possible. Within this moment, young people are engaged in a struggle with adults and adult-based institutions about the constitution of themselves. Young people,
themselves, are involved in the social construction of knowledge about young people. This construction of youth has particular implications – implications we can see through using the work of Dan Butin (2001).

First, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth deviance, we are able to see that young people are neither passive nor autonomous (Butin, 2001). On one level, young people are fully involved in the construction of themselves. However, this does not make them autonomous because they are also an effect of knowledge and they have structural and ideological limitations surrounding them, which inhibit them independently constructing themselves.

Second, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth deviance, we are able to begin to include other knowledges into this discussion (Butin, 2001). My analysis of youth deviance has shown that psychological knowledge and risk knowledge have been predominant knowledges in New Zealand’s discussion of youth deviance in 2002. Through bringing resistance into the discussion, it is possible to enter into different discussions, which could lead to some subjugated or less known knowledges being heard and being included. It is possible to include young people in discussions about themselves and let young people, themselves, participate in constructing a knowledge about deviance.

Third, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth deviance we are able to add another theoretical tool to the toolkit (Foucault, 1980b). Psychological knowledge and risk knowledge have been useful but, unfortunately, because many individuals and institutional groups of individuals see these knowledges as the ‘Truth’, there has been a reluctance to critique or question these knowledges. As I have shown in this thesis, there are problems with these knowledges and, because of this, we should be prepared to use other knowledges and other methods of analysis.

Finally, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth deviance, we can begin to experiment with new truths (Butin, 2001). We do not have to succumb to the idea that knowledge is a truth that we need to discover or that we are the direct powerless effects of knowledge. We use knowledge to construct the truths that keep our society stable. We use these same knowledges in constructions of youth and youth deviance. The socially-constructed nature of knowledge means that we can challenge, question, and even change this ‘Truth’, whilst experimenting with other truths.
Chapter 11

Conclusion: bringing it all together

The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an advisor. The project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of analysis ... What’s effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured and implanted themselves by a system of organisation dating back over 150 years. In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield – that is the intellectual’s role. But as for saying, ‘Here is what you must do!’, certainly not. (Foucault, 1980a, p.62)

Like most doctoral theses, this thesis is a symbolic journey. I started this research in 2002 hoping to make a difference, but not knowing that this could be possible. Indeed, in the second half of 2005, I began to share the findings of this research, and the general ideas found within critical studies research, with practitioners and researchers in youth work and youth studies here in New Zealand. Their positive and enthusiastic response encouraged me to get this research finished so that they could take it and apply it in practice. Therefore, it is with excitement and apprehension that I approach this final chapter in the thesis, because this journey is only really beginning and I am yet to confront the challenge this research posits. This challenge occurs when this research begins to be translated into action and the stories of young people are told in new ways and with their voices.

In this final chapter, I will review the findings and the argument that I have presented in this thesis. I will then explore the relevance of the year 2002 for Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2006 and beyond. I will finally discuss what comes after this research and the possibilities for knowledge and practice. I will not outline what we must do; but rather, I will suggest what may be possible (c.f. Foucault, 1980a).

The Thesis and the Argument

In this research, I explored how authors constructed youth in New Zealand institutional discussions of youth deviance in 2002. I examined the implications of these constructions and posited an alternative construction of youth deviance. In order to achieve this, I applied a form of discourse analysis, which focused on knowledge, power, and positioning through expertise and commonsense. Context was an important element in my analysis and I attempted to use historical, political, and social contexts to examine the implications of knowledge and knowledge-informed practice for young people.
I used arguments from critical youth studies to inform my analysis and critique of the constructions located in the texts. As such, early on in this thesis, I explored how critical youth studies research has questioned and critiqued dominant constructions of youth found within developmental psychology. It was in my overview of critical youth studies research in Chapter 3 that I introduced three constructions of youth deviance – the normally-deviant, the abnormally-deviant and the socially-created deviant. As I showed later, authors applied these constructions in their discussions of youth deviance.

I presented the findings of my research in Chapters 4 and 5 and showed how those writing about youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002 used developmental knowledge and risk knowledge to describe young people. Developmental knowledge and risk knowledge allowed these writers to divide and separate young people on the premise of developmental and psychological differences. First, they used developmental knowledge to define and separate all young people from an understanding of adulthood, in that, a youth’s age and their susceptibility to negative influences (biological and social) rendered them powerless. Second, they used developmental knowledge to divide young people into the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk and the normally-deviant adolescent engaging in risk behaviours. Although writers did not explicitly state this, the existence of both these groups posed a threat to the stability of adult society. To a much lesser extent authors referred to the socially-created deviant; instead authors focused on the abnormally-deviant and the normally-deviant youth and the ways in which these youth could be described through development and risk.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I suggested that it was through developmental knowledge and risk knowledge that adults attempted to control any potential threat posed by young people. Indeed, at least in the last two hundred years, adults based in institutional contexts have used developmental psychology and risk psychology to define, divide or separate, and control different and deviant groups in society. In 2002, developmental knowledge and risk knowledge were still evident in the analysed texts and in New Zealand policies and practices.

I took this idea of definition, division and control further in Chapter 8 where I explored the function and role of the family in the control of youth deviance. I described how the family represented a unit of governance in contemporary industrial societies. Governing groups in these societies used the family as the target of interventions or the site of support. However, often for the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, authors described the family in the analysed texts as a site of risk, and as such, authors positioned the school and public education as a pseudo family. Authors suggested that, in schools, practitioners could identify potential deviants and separate them from others in order to intervene into their life and control any potential risk. Hence, it was through schools, and other interventions, that adults could control deviance.
In Chapter 9, I looked at interventions further by positing that interventions symbolise a site of struggle between adults, adult-based institutions, and young people. I explained how adult society attempted to transform the young person from an object of development and environmental conditions to a self-governing subject through interventions. I argued that interventions, in themselves, required the young person to be positioned as a passive object, which can be transformed by adults. In this sense, the young person could never fully ‘have’ power; the young person could only ever ‘have’ power on the terms and conditions of adults. Any resistance by the young person was difficult, if not impossible, in this construction.

I took the ideas of power, resistance, and struggle further in Chapter 10 and argued that an alternative construction is possible about youth deviance, which centred on an idea of agency as resistance. I argued that traditional notions of agency (in terms of choice) were problematic, particularly, for young people because adults needed to first determine the choices young people could make. Alternatively, I argued that resistance allows us to see deviance and non-deviance as a manifestation of a struggle between the youth and adults. I further argued that, if we see agency in the form of resistance, we can explain the indeterminate or contradictory moments that occur through, and between, knowledge and human action. This alternative explanation of deviance allowed for a different perspective of youth deviance, one grounded in sociological theory but not limited to subcultural theory. And, one that may still be relevant in 2006.

What About Today? Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2006

Celia Lashlie: The middle class – our kids if they get into trouble – they have to step onto the pathway to prison. I know a significant number of kids that as they emerge from the womb their feet are firmly planted on the path to prison because of circumstances. And before everybody says – ‘Well that’s parenting.’ That’s nonsense. That’s about well ‘They are one of those families’, and they get treated that way by teachers, by police, and by the system.

John Campbell: I want to read to you from the Department of Corrections, an amazing report that I urge everyone to access on the web. It is readily accessible on their website – it is readily available there: “Young people who are at-risk of becoming serious adult offenders are recognisable with increasing certainty as new-borns, as school entrants, as young offenders and …” In other words, you are popping out of the womb and you are already in trouble – Why?

(Campbell, 2006, 6.18-6.59 minutes)

In 2006, observers and commentators in Aotearoa/New Zealand continued to debate, and show concern about, youth deviance. Like 2002, this debate has focused on the causes of youth deviance and the ways to control youth. Much of this debate is evident in media discussions, which involve interviews with government and academic experts. As in 2002, media reporters continued to interview, and position as ‘expert’ social advocate and ex-prison officer Celia Lashlie.

Adults in Aotearoa/New Zealand are still very anxious about the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk. Many adults still see their developmental pathway into deviance as problematic and
some commentators continue to argue that practitioners should identify these young people so that adult ‘society’ can counter the powerless vulnerability of young people. By 2005, the media was reporting that adults could identify a youth-at-risk as early as age three (Neville, 2005). By 2006, commentators had lowered this age to birth (Campbell, 2006). Reflecting the discussions of 2002, there continued to be limited, if any, critical discussion of the implications of early identification. Instead, these commentators continued to imply that identification is more than a social good, in that all society benefits; it is also an individual good, in which the individual can benefit. They continued to use this implied ‘positive’ individual good to reinforce coercive interventions.

Some policy makers and commentators in 2005 suggested that giving identification numbers to all children and youth (Chalmers, 2006), and electronic tagging of high risk young people (Thomas, 2005) could be realistic and effective measures to control deviance. Despite a concern for the young person’s privacy, these people have posited that identification numbers are an effective intervention, which would enable practitioners and experts to track a young child through the education, welfare, and justice systems. Other commentators have also suggested electronic tagging, as an alternative solution to youth detention, would enable a young person to stay within the community and would reduce any exposure of the young person to ‘career’ criminals.

In addition to electronic tagging, in 2006 the New Zealand’s youth justice system went through a dramatic change where the New Zealand Government increased funding to New Zealand’s social welfare service (Child, Youth and Family). In effect, this reversed some of the changes that happened in 1989, in which the New Zealand Government separated youth welfare and justice. It brought together the reasoning of commentators, such as Judge C. Henwood (2003) who argued that the New Zealand youth justice system failed the most vulnerable youth – the youth-at-risk. In effect, it centred the control of these youth with one Government agency.

In Parliament, increased discussion of the control of young offenders occurred through Ron Mark’s (Member of Parliament) bill (Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill). The Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill was developed in response to the crimes of 2002 and aimed to legislate the ability for the state to prosecute and institutionalise young offenders – as young as ten – in the adult court system.

As shown by the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill in 2006, New Zealand society was still debating the difference between young people and adults. The way Mark wrote the bill implies that young people can and do make rational adult decisions. However, he did not ask for equality of age across all government policies. Although he argued that young people can be rational enough to kill, he did not argue that young people are rational enough to vote. In this way, his definition of the rational youth seemed to be quite contradictory as it served the adult intention to control youth rather than any intention to allow young people
opportunities for participation. As such, opponents of Mark’s Bill argued that young people are more childlike than adult. That is, young people continue to be vulnerable, malleable, and ignorant – that young people were different to adults, and, as such, committed different crimes, which were more reflective of their ignorance than their inherent deviance:

The effect of [the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill] would be that a young person charged with stealing a litre of ice cream would be dealt with next to adult criminals in the District Court. This sort of over-reaction to offending by a young person and their possible placement in a prison-like environment can only lead to an increased likelihood of future offending by these young people and certainly does nothing to rehabilitate or improve outcomes for themselves or society. This is completely unacceptable as well as being in breach of a number of international conventions including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. (Kiro, 2006, p.1)

It seems that many adults in Aotearoa/New Zealand society are still falling into the same trap by using developmental knowledge and risk knowledge to try to answer questions of youth deviance – knowledges that are limited and cannot provide definitive criteria to differentiate between adults and young people. As long as those using developmental knowledge and risk knowledge use and apply these knowledges as absolute truths inherent in the individual, it is difficult for them to recognise the contradictions that exist in these knowledges and even recognise that these knowledges have a context. That is, these knowledges are not definitive truths and they do not provide all the answers. Instead, the debate needs to shift from what the difference is between adults and young people to what are different ways we can work with young people. This shift would acknowledge that there is difference, a tension, and struggle in the ways in which adults and youth are positioned. It would require researchers, policy makers, and practitioners to work at the point of tension where relationships between adults and youth meet. A focus on this point of tension and struggle could offset any focus on control.

What Happens Next?

On the other hand, as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible. (Foucault, 1994b, p.457)

We already have a toolkit of psychological knowledges and practices in the ways that we work with young people. It is now time to add some other tools to the kit, which allow for other possibilities (c.f. Foucault, 1980b). The sociological approach and analysis I have given in this thesis adds another dimension to youth deviance. This idea is not completely new (sociological theories have, in the past, talked about resistance) but it does see deviance, and even non-deviance, as a form of agency exercised by the youth at a point of struggle.
I finished this thesis excited. This is an idea we can test, use, and work with. The few young people who have inspired me to the completion of this thesis share my enthusiasm. For them, like for me as a youth, their relationship with the ‘system’ is a struggle where the ‘system’ only hears their voice under adult terms and conditions. This small sample of young people is not enough to draw conclusions from but it is enough to encourage a researcher to continue to pursue a passion to make a difference somehow, somewhere, and for someone. Over the last four years, I have had the opportunity to establish an argument. I am excited and apprehensive because, now, the challenge for me, and for others, is to make some of this argument a reality.
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Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill (2006).
Appendix 1: Analysed Texts (Academia)


Appendix 2: Analysed Texts (Government)


Appendix 3: Analysed Texts (Media)


