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LANGUAGE-GAMES
IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

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**Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.**
Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness; first published, 1921; Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Abbreviated: T; references standard, e.g., T 4.005.


**The Blue and The Brown Books.**


**Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.**

**Philosophical Investigations.**

**Zettel.**
On Certainty.
Translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe,
Abbreviated: OC; References: section number, e.g., *256.

Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and
Religious Belief.
Compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush
Rhees and James Taylor; edited by Cyril Barrett,
Abbreviated: LA; References: page number.

The reader is urged to read all passages cited from
Wittgenstein's work rather than rely upon his memory there-
of. To make this easier the most important passages from
The Blue and The Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations,
and On Certainty referred to in this thesis are included as
an appendix.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 When I first looked into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work; it was the enigmatic style and the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.

This fascination was certainly augmented when I read Von Wright's biography and Norman Malcolm's memoir (see Malcolm, (2)). The man himself was at least as fascinating as and no less enigmatic than his work. This was a problem; it must have been a very great problem for those who knew Wittgenstein personally and also tried to write on his work. I was still at primary school at the time of his death, but I still fell victim to a kind of "personality cult." Everything he said was"brilliant" and "how perceptive." Such an attitude needs to be taken in hand; Wittgenstein's own writing must be taken at face value and treated as the only real evidence of his thinking; his work must stand on its own feet. These efforts led to the inevitable reaction; Wittgenstein could say no right and even that he said ineptly and with contrived and unnecessary obscurity. Neither attitude gets one far in trying to understand his work.

Having become superficially acquainted with PI and its
difficulties, the next step was to read the articles in the learned journals that purport to explain various parts of that work.

Here the perplexities really begin. Why did these writers ignore so much of Wittgenstein's writing? Why, when Wittgenstein states explicitly that he does not advance theses (cf., e.g., PI **109, 128) do they persistently find theses in his work? How can they pretend to accurately interpret his work when they quote only part of a passage, leaving off the part that might cause them problems? Why, when Wittgenstein so obviously did not waste words, do they dismiss so many remarks (e.g., PI **119, 123, 127, 255, 309) as"Wittgensteinianisms" and unimportant? Why, when everyone (including Wittgenstein himself) says he did philosophy in a new way, is there nothing new in style, method, or argument form, discussed in these articles? (Of course I have since found that there are some good and, I believe, fairly faithful writers on Wittgenstein.)

It was the last of these questions that prompted the study which led to this thesis. (And I have no doubt that it is not immune from the criticisms implied in the preceding questions.) What was it that was so new and different about Wittgenstein's philosophy that so many remarked upon, but so few described? Language-games (henceforth "l-g") offered a starting point. These were at least not found in earlier philosophy and Wittgenstein did refer to them, quite early on in his later philosophy, as a new method (cf., BIIB, p. 17). There were also remarkably few articles devoted to the subject for all that l-gs were undoubtedly prominent in the later philosophy. In most articles on Wittgenstein in which the expression "l-g" occurred the writers seemed to assume that it was either self-explanatory or very easily understood, for they did not go to any pains to make it clear. A survey of Wittgenstein's own uses of "l-g" showed that it was certainly not transparently clear what was to be understood by the term.
Hence the following study. Were 1-gs really a new method of doing philosophy? Were they perhaps a thesis in disguise, or the disguise for a thesis? I do not claim that the following provides a true account of what Wittgenstein actually thought (whatever that may mean); nor do I claim that it is the only viable account of that part of his writing studied; it is only an attempt to provide a plausible account of certain recurrent and important themes in Wittgenstein's later work.
1.2 Most of what has been said in justification of this topic has already been mentioned. L-gs are quite clearly important in Wittgenstein's later philosophy; the frequency of occurrence of the expression "l-g," given that it was both new to philosophy and, at the time, peculiar to Wittgenstein, should be adequate evidence of this. There are also many remarks in the later philosophy which either state explicitly or imply that Wittgenstein saw them as new and important.

Many writers make some mention of l-gs, but among the earlier ones, such mentions are usually very brief and little attempt was made to explicate the notion. Strawson, for example, in his review of PI mentions them only in a footnote, (see Strawson (1), p. 24). Even the two articles on l-gs that appeared in the 1950's seemed to assume that the notion was either well understood or at least in itself presented no difficulty. Gahringer's article is so superficial as to be virtually useless (see Gahringer 1959); Smart (see Smart 1957) seems to assume that we all understand Wittgenstein's l-gs and proceeds to criticise the notion. In the late 1960's, however, articles and books started to appear that recognised the importance of an understanding of l-gs to an understanding of Wittgenstein. E.K. Specht's book (Specht, 1969--first published in German in 1963) is a notable example, for all its treatment of l-gs is somewhat superficial. Other writers took up the notion for their own works, mostly on religion, (e.g., Phillips, 1965; High, 1967). Attributing the notion to Wittgenstein lends a great air of respectability to such a work and thus these writers made some attempt to come to grips with it. However, nowhere was there to be found a serious attempt to provide an understanding that would account for all of Wittgenstein's many and varied uses of this, and related notions. Thus such a study, it seemed, would be both interesting and useful.
Of course in starting the research that led to this thesis I was strongly prejudiced in favour of Wittgenstein and of there being something genuinely new in his work. No one would embark on such a programme without such a prejudice. However, there were times when I thought that most of what Wittgenstein wrote was ill founded and a product of his ignorance of and isolation from the "normal world"—especially in the area of language acquisition. Oddly enough I still maintain both prejudices. However, the problems of the latter are, I believe, either surmountable without doing any harm to the overall picture Wittgenstein presents, or fairly trivial in comparison with the power and scope of that picture.
1.3 The method of research used was basically serendipitous: read and re-read Wittgenstein's later works, collect and collate similar passages, read articles and commentaries gleaning what one may and following up various leads; then try to "encapsulate" 1-gs by traditional methods—necessary and sufficient condition definitions—noting the problems involved, and developing from there. The format of the thesis follows much the same pattern: collect and set out the data, look at the commentaries, try definitions, and work towards a description of Wittgenstein's use of "1-g" treating side issues as they arise.

The basic text for the work is PI. However, Wittgenstein's writings in other works are both interesting and helpful and are thus used whenever necessary. PI, as is well known to anyone who has looked into it, is in an unusual and difficult form. Wittgenstein expressed doubt as to whether he was capable of producing a work in more usual form (see PI, Preface, p. ix). I wonder about this; Part 2 of BrB, and part 2 of PI both have a much more coherent form than the first part of PI, indicating that perhaps he could have written a more usual book, had it suited his purpose and had he had the time. It is notable in this respect that neither BrB nor Part 2 of PI had been "polished" for publication. Also, remarks such as that reported by Max Black:

In later life, Wittgenstein proposed more in earnest than in jest to arrange the sentences of a philosophical book in alphabetical order. (Black, p. 2)

seem to indicate that the difficult form of PI was a matter of deliberate policy rather than lack of capability. One thing is clear—Wittgenstein had no desire to spare his reader any effort:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. (Preface, p. x)

The format of PI has, for good or ill, made easier the task of those who wish to find theses therein. You take a quote from here, another from there, etc., put them
all together and you have not only a thesis but also an argument to support it. This is a familiar procedure with the Bible, but in that case it is generally clear that the results in no way reflect the thought of the authors of that book. This is not clear in the case of PI. For what else is one to do? This is a problem which I think one just has to live with. However, it means that special care must be taken not to offend the overall "feeling" of the work.

Of course, in the following I have developed what might be called a thesis and attributed it to Wittgenstein. Any description of the thought in the later philosophy which purports to help understanding of it will be open to this charge to some extent. This is also a problem which I believe we lesser mortals just have to live with. However, the "thesis" presented here is a very general and basic one; it is not about any particular problem in philosophy and does not, itself, solve many such problems. It might be best called a "world picture"--a "Weltanschauung" (cf. PI, *122).

There is a more general problem that one has to face in trying to approach Wittgenstein's later work: his deliberations are on problems which lie at the very roots of our accepted philosophical practice. In philosophy we use argument which proceeds according to rules; Wittgenstein (especially in RFM) questions our accepted concepts of rules and proofs. In rules, in arguments and in proofs we rely heavily on the acceptability of certain generalisations about language; it is these generalisations perhaps more than anything else that Wittgenstein questions in PI.

But if we do not have the use of our usual philosophical procedures, how can we understand, assess, and possibly evaluate Wittgenstein's work? I think we must, as we go through it, use all available traditional procedures to examine Wittgenstein's work. Only thus can we possibly hope
to understand it and, in the end, see that the overall impact of it is not really dependent upon the successfulness, on traditional criteria, of any particular part.

In the following (see Ch. 3 below) two famous arguments from PI are treated to such a traditional scrutiny and both are found wanting. The first is the famous argument about the definability of "game" (see PI *65 ff.). This failure is, however, later seen to have little effect on the overall "l-g thesis" presented in PI; and, it is important to note, the argument was found convincing by its audience at the time it was first presented. The second is the argument of PI *185 regarding what is to count as the "correct" continuation of the sequence of natural numbers after some given point. Although this argument, as Wittgenstein presented it, also fails, it was effective when presented, and his overall point about rules is well made.

It is important to make such traditional examinations of Wittgenstein's work, just as it is for any great philosopher. Only thus can we come to understand, and, by contrast, see the originality and importance of the overall work. This, I believe, is especially so of Wittgenstein.
CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORY OF "LANGUAGE-GAME"

2.1 In this section we shall outline the history of l-gs in Wittgenstein's work. Occasional comments and queries will be added in an attempt to keep the remarks in some sort of perspective.

The first hints of the idea of l-gs are to be found in "the Moore lectures" (henceforth referred to as ML, all references being to: G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers). G.E. Moore attended and took notes of Wittgenstein's lectures from 1930 to 1933; these notes, with comments and discussion, were published in Mind LXIII, 1954 and LXIV, 1955 under the heading "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33."

Wittgenstein's earliest reference, expressis verbis, to l-gs is to be found in ML p. 261:

On the statement 'Words, except in propositions, have no meaning' he said that this 'is true or false, as you understand it;' and immediately went on to add that, in what he called 'language games,' single words have meanings by themselves in our ordinary language.

According to Moore this comes from Wittgenstein's lectures in the academic year 1931-2. There are no other such express uses of "l-g" in ML. There are, however, two other passages which clearly foreshadow the later use of "l-g."

On p. 268 ML, in a discussion of the sense of mathematical propositions compared with experiental propositions Moore reports:

Indeed, he said, at least once, of an expression which would commonly be said to express a necessary proposition, 'if it is to have any meaning it must be a mere rule of a game'—thus implying that, if used to express a rule, it has a meaning.¹

This section of ML is notable for the many references to "rules of grammar." The invitation to compare language with a game and rules of grammar with the rules of a game is quite clear.
On p. 273 we find:

... where we say 'This (proposition) makes no sense' we always mean 'This makes nonsense in this particular game.'

This occurs in the context of a discussion of the proposition "Either it is raining or it is not." In one sense (or game, or context) the speaker has so far exhibited no knowledge of the weather; but in another sense (or game, or context) of course he has exhibited such knowledge. The emphasis here is on different uses of a certain word or sentence for different purposes in different social situations. The rules for interpretation, or meaning of the word or sentence, vary from context to context, game to game.

It is also worth noting that it is in ML (p. 312-13) that we find the first mention of the famous argument to the effect that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of "game." Moore places this either in the May term of 1932 or the (northern) academic year 1932-3. It occurs in a discussion of aesthetic predicates, "beautiful" in particular:

He illustrated this problem by the example of the word 'game,' with regard to which he said both (1) that, even if there is something common to all games, it doesn't follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a 'game' and (2) that the reason why we call so many different activities 'games' need not be that there is anything common to them all, but only that there is 'a gradual transition' from one use to another, although there may be nothing in common between the two ends of the series. And he seemed to hold definitely that there is nothing in common in our different uses of the word 'beautiful,' saying that we use it 'in a hundred different games'—that, e.g., the beauty of a face is something different from the beauty of a chair or a flower or the binding of a book.

The remark "(1) that even if there is something common to all games, it doesn't follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a 'game'" is especially interesting for two reasons: (a) he does not seem to mention it in later versions of the argument, and (b) the argument might
be more convincing along these lines than it is in its usual form (see sec. 3.1 below). Also notable is the remark "we use it ('beautiful') in a hundred different games"--the first use of the idea in other than the philosophy of language.

The above quotes are clear forerunners of later uses of the expression "l-gs" and of l-gs. They do not, however, given any clear indication of the use of l-gs first mentioned in the Blue Book. Wittgenstein dictated the Blue Book in 1933-4. The first mention of l-gs occurs on p. 17. This is, quite clearly, a most explicit statement of one of the types of l-g used as method in Wittgenstein's later work.

In his introduction to the Blue and Brown Books, p. viii, Rush Rhees notes the following:

In one of Wittgenstein's notebooks there is a remark about language games, which he must have written at the beginning of 1934. I suspect that it is later than the one. . . from p17 (see above); anyway it is different. 'When I describe certain simple language games this is not in order to construct from them gradually the processes of our developed language - or of thinking - which only leads to injustices (Nicod and Russell). I simply set forth the games as what they are, and let them shed their light on the particular problems.'

Here there is no mention of how a particular l-g might be derived, or constructed, although quite obviously this is important (otherwise any l-g will do to shed light on any problem); this is a clear statement--in fact nowhere in Wittgenstein's work do we find a clearer statement--of the usefulness l-gs (one type of l-g at least) are supposed to have in philosophy. Together these two passages tell us (a) what Wittgenstein's conception of a l-g was at the time and how l-gs in general might be derived, and (b) the philosophical use to which he proposed to put them.

On p. 25 B13 Wittgenstein makes two further remarks indicating that he already saw the virtues of l-gs over formal languages as philosophical method.
Wittgenstein dictated the Brown Book during 1934-35. Here we find the first definite construction of and use of a 1-g. He begins by suggesting the idea of a description of chess, but without mention of pawns; we might say that this is a simpler game or a part of chess, or a different game along similar lines.

Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things. (p. 77 BrB).

(Here Wittgenstein is referring to Augustine's Confessions, presumably to the passage quoted at the beginning of PI., viz. Confessions, 1.8.)

"In this sense we can say that Augustine's description of learning the language was correct for a simpler language than ours." He then constructs the first 1-g (BrB p. 77). This is the familiar builder's 1-g, the prototype of the builder's 1-g in PI. It is used in BrB for much the same purpose as in PI, which we shall examine in detail in Chapter 5. It is notable that in describing the 1-g Wittgenstein does not simply give a list of words with rules for combining them into sentences as we find in the formation rules of formal languages. He begins by giving the function and social setting in which the language is used, thus being in line with his dictum that a language cannot be separated from its use.

The 1-g is then extended to include in 2). (p. 79 BrB): "... the series of words from one to ten;" in 3). (p. 80 BrB): "... a new instrument of communication, a proper name;" in 4). (p. 80 BrB): the demonstrative pronouns "this" and "there;" and in 5). (p. 81 BrB): "Questions and answers: A asks "How many slabs?" B counts them and answers with the numeral." Thus the final 1-g of 5). contains words of five very different kinds. Of this difference Wittgenstein says:

The difference of kind is much more obvious when we contemplate such a simple example than when we look
at our ordinary language with innumerable kinds of words all looking more or less alike when they stand in the dictionary. (p. 79, BrB)

This system of l-gs is then further extended by the addition in 6) of questions as to the forms of building stones, e.g. "What is this?" and answers to these questions, e.g. "This is a . . ." and in 7) of a table of written signs correlated with pictures of objects such as a table, a chair, etc. (pp. 81-2 BrB). This notion of pictorial correlation and its suggested connection with meaning is made more use of later.

It is not immediately clear whether we are supposed to regard each of these (1), . . ., 7.) as separate l-gs, complete in themselves, or as a set of progressively increasing l-gs, with, e.g. l-g 3) including 1) and 2). Remarks in 5) (p. 82 BrB) seem to indicate the former, whereas remarks in 11) (p. 83 BrB) seem to indicate the latter.

These l-gs, and variations of them, are then discussed with the aim of showing the variety of possible ways that we might classify words, and further, the variety of possible ways in which the same word might be classified in different situations. To make this last point, Wittgenstein simply gives a plausible variation of l-g 2) in which we would be inclined to classify a certain word differently than we would in l-g 2) itself.

In 12) and 13) (BrB p. 84) Wittgenstein constructs two simple l-gs, but it is notable that he calls them "systems of expression" rather than "l-gs."

The l-gs 1)-7) are later (BrB pps 89-90) again referred to in a brief discussion of language acquisition. In BrB this occurs as a preliminary to a discussion of rules; however, it is clearly an early version of the more detailed discussion in PI (see sec. 3.2 below for a closer examination of this.) In this discussion there is an interesting remark that would seem to indicate that Wittgenstein, at least at this time, thought it possible that some innate
capacity is a prerequisite of the acquisition of language (BrB p. 90). The choice of analogy is, perhaps, unfortunate, for cats can make excellent retrievers.

The discussion of the idea of a rule begins with a discussion of the difference between counting with no upper limit to the numbers used and counting where there is such a limit, as e.g., in l-g 2). He begins with the example of two card games (and these are not referred to as l-gs), one with a limited supply of cards marked with numerals up to the number of cards, the other differing in that players are free to make new cards bearing higher numbers. The question is, what would be the difference between the two games, one of the first kind, the other of the second kind but in which it happened that only cards up to the maximum of cards in the first game were used? This problem is then developed through a series of l-gs and thus back to the problem of rules. The importance of this is that it suggests fairly clearly that one of the ways Wittgenstein intended l-gs to "shed their light on the particular problems" was by way of analogy. (See Ch. 5 below.)

In 33) Wittgenstein introduces a new kind of l-g to discuss the question: "What do we call a rule?" (BrB p. 95). That Wittgenstein did regard this as a l-g is indicated in 41): "The game is similar to 33), . . . ." (BrB p. 98). That he did so regard it is interesting, for 33) is different from previous games in respect of both its arbitrariness, and its small and exceedingly artificial use. L-g 41) is similar to 33) (see BrB p. 98).

He neglects to point out that sentences in both these l-gs have the character of instructions, or orders, and to this extent are unusual. It is also difficult to detect here just what is l-g 41); the particular instruction set given differs in no important way from 33) and thus cannot itself be l-g 41). It seems that l-g 41) may be meant to be all (or any) tables of the kind used in 33) and 41);
but then what are tables "of this kind?" If they are to be delimited by means of a general rule, then how can one of them be used to explain what is a general rule? Thus it becomes difficult to make sense of the last sentences of 41) (BrB pps 98-99) containing as they do a reference to "the symbol in 41)."

In 44) (BrB p. 100) Wittgenstein begins a long discussion to "Let us see the role the words 'can' or 'to be able' play in our language." For this purpose there is a series of seven very clear examples of l-gs, l-gs 44) to 49) and 58). From 50) to 57) there is a diversion into discussion of tense and the language of time, which also proceeds by means of l-gs. In respect of this method, in 56) Wittgenstein makes two interesting remarks (BrB pp. 108-9).

There are several remarks that could be made about these arguments. However, for present purposes the important point is that in the light of these remarks it becomes quite clear why Wittgenstein, in describing l-gs, first describes the social settings in which they are used; hence his frequent use of the device: "Imagine a tribe who . . . " He already saw quite clearly that language could not be separated from its use, which, of course, occurs within some social context (cf. the Tractatus theory of language and, on the other hand, later more explicit expressions of this point, e.g. BrB p. 134; PI *19). Thus in l-gs 44) to 49) and 58) he describes tribes and their activities and then the expressions they use in association with these activities (see, e.g., BrB pps 100-1).

One would wonder whether l-gs are essential to establish the points Wittgenstein wishes to make in this section of BrB (cf. 61), p. 111 BrB). (See Ch. 5 ff. below.) If not, do they, in this case at least, have merely heuristic value?

The remainder of Part 1 of the Brown Book contains many more examples of the use of l-gs. However, none of
these is essentially different from those already discussed, and hence shall not be detailed here. The discussion of ability words continues into a discussion of what it is to say that someone can read. In the later part of this discussion Wittgenstein uses examples of people transcribing letters from one script into another. These he calls "examples" and not "games" or "1-gs;" however, they are similar to some previous examples which he did call "1-gs" and thus remarks on their use may be taken to apply also to his use of 1-gs. His concluding remarks are of special interest (BrB p. 125).

In Part 2 of the Brown Book Wittgenstein continues to use 1-gs. However, his use of them is not, so to speak, as self-conscious as it was in Part 1. That is, the 1-gs become assimilated into the argument rather than, as in Part 1, having the argument built on them. (See for example, Sec. 5, p. 141.)

There are no further uses of 1-gs until p. 172, which is also the last use of a 1-g in the Brown Book. This game is very clear and thus an interesting example (BrB p. 172). It is used to examine "the relation between a name and the object named" (BrB p. 172). For this purpose the use of this 1-g has some obvious value. For instance, it puts a useful, if temporary, restraint on the range of the discussion; and the use of "a scribble" rather than more familiar forms of names helps avoid the prejudices according to which we so often prejudge such issues. But such a device, while helping to provide clarity, is in no way essential to such a discussion. In essence it does not differ from any simple, everyday example, such as: "A man follows the instruction: Go to 135 West 32nd Street and ask for Joe Bloogg ... etc."

We now come to the main text for this work, the Philosophical Investigation (PI). With respect to 1-gs, PI divides up in much the same way as BB. In the earlier sec
tions there is a clear and comparatively self-conscious use as a method to be applied to problems. Later l-gs become more integrated into the arguments in much the same way as in Part 2 of the Brown Book. It is interesting that this division corresponds roughly with a division in subject matter in both cases. Like Part 1 of the Brown Book the first one hundred and thirty three sections of PI are on the philosophy of language and philosophy; the later parts of both works are on various problems in philosophy, to some extent applying the results of the earlier work.

In PI, however, Wittgenstein develops the use of the idea of l-gs somewhat further than he does in BB. In later parts of PI it is treated almost as a thesis about language. It is this, the "l-g thesis" which is very clearly expounded by Pears in the Fontana Modern Masters series book on Wittgenstein. The thesis is, very briefly, that language is divided into a multiplicity of l-gs; i.e. it is internally subdivided into l-gs, although the boundaries or lines of demarcation between these l-gs are not clearly defined. As Pears puts it:

By that time he had come to the conclusion that it was no good looking for the essence, because there was nothing worthy of that title there to be found. There was only a crowd of differing, but variously related forms of factual propositions. So a network of internal lines began to spread over what had been the homogeneous logical space of factual discourse. (Pears, pp. 97-98)

The diversification of linguistic forms, he now thought, actually reveals the deep structure of language, which is not at all what he had taken it to be. Language has no common essence, or at least, if it has one, it is a minimal one, which does not explain the connections between its various forms. They are connected with one another in a more elusive way, like games, or like the faces of people belonging to the same family. (Pears, pp. 13-14)

It is the later conception of l-gs that is used (misused) by some philosophers à la the naturalistic fallacy: i.e., as a club with which to beat (or, more accurately in this
case, as a maze with which to baffle) opponents in philosophical debate.

L-gs appear very early in PI, in fact there is an example in *1. However, the first important example comes in *2, with the construction of the famous builders l-g. This is obviously a development of the builders l-g in BrB and, although slightly different in some respects, it presents no theoretical development and thus shall not be detailed here. (A detailed examination of its use will be found in Ch. 5 below).

The next important example of the use of a l-g occurs in *48. The argument in which it is used begins at *46 (see Ch. 5 below for a detailed examination of this) and has as its aim the discrediting of "the idea that names really signify simples..." (*46 PI), and the simple-complex distinction. In *64 there is a modification of l-g *48. It is interesting to note that in this development Wittgenstein places some importance on our being able to imagine a people using a similar l-g, and also that he gives an example in support of this. (This also indicates that he is not using "able to be imagined" in the sense of logically possible.)

In *60 Wittgenstein begins an examination of the idea that a proposition has only one final analysis. This is the next best example of his use of a l-g.

These three, the builders game and l-gs *48 and *60 are especially good examples of Wittgenstein's use of l-gs as philosophical method. That he does regard l-gs as a method of doing philosophy is quite clear from the first sentence of *48.

The next important l-g begins in *143. But here Wittgenstein gets sidetracked into a discussion of how a child is taught to write the natural numbers. However, in *185 he returns to the subject. The argument, of which this is part, is of course very well known and very difficult. An understanding (in the sense most common among philosophers,
i.e. I only understand argument if I see why it is correct) of it as yet eludes the writer. However, we shall return to it in Ch. 3 below.

Also among the explicit uses of 1-gs in PI I must mention 1-g *258, the famous "private 1-g," "S," if for no other reason than that no discussion of Wittgenstein's later work would be complete without it.

The next examples are in **556 and *630, PI. It is interesting to compare these two examples of 1-gs with the earlier ones in PI. Both *556 and *630 are simply parts of everyday life and language. In *556, as Wittgenstein points out later in the section, "'Y' is like a shake of the head" (*556 PI). That 1-g *630 is a normal part of everyday life and language needs no further explanation. Thus, from the above examples, it can be seen that there is a transition in the nature of the explicit 1-gs in PI, from the rarified builders 1-g (of which R. Rhees, at least, has expressed doubts as to whether it can be reasonably be called a language--Rhees, p. 76) and 1-g *48 through *143, to the everyday of 1-gs *556 and *630.

As mentioned earlier, in later parts of PI 1-gs tend to become less overt and more integrated into the text. It would probably be more correct to say that whereas in earlier sections Wittgenstein deliberately constructs a 1-g to use in discussing a point, in later sections he proceeds with the discussion using examples, instead of 1-gs. Clear examples of this occur in *151 and *409. It is easy to see how these examples could be put into an explicit 1-g form. This again suggests the possibility that 1-gs have merely heuristic value.

There is also, as noted above, the "1-g thesis," a horse of quite a different kettle of fish from the uses of 1-gs shown in the preceding excerpts. These 1-gs we shall later call "natural 1-gs" (abbreviated NAl-g). *23 is important in this respect. In *66, the famous "proof" of the
non-definability of "game" Wittgenstein says:

66. And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

It is this idea that is taken up in the use of "l-g" in much of the later PI. The development and use of this idea is illustrated, for example, **116, 156, 195, 249, 261, 300, 655, 656, 669, and Part II on pps 180, 188, and 224.

As well as the above uses of l-gs (or: varieties of uses of "l-g"), there are in the PI various statements about l-gs and their use in philosophy. Many of the above mentioned passages give us hints. In *7 Wittgenstein provides the most clear statement in PI of what he intends by "l-g." This passage is clear enough, especially the last sentence, which, for that reason, is oft quoted. However, it is interesting to note that although this last sentence is his most straightforward enunciation of a type of l-g, Wittgenstein does not thereafter make use of it.

*23, PI, which provides the next remarks on l-gs, is, I think, as important as it is confusing. That it is confusing is obvious: Wittgenstein starts by talking about sentences but immediately slides into talk of l-gs, in this case apparently identifying the two; then he gives us a list of examples of l-gs, one of which—"Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)"—need not include any language at all (at least not in any commonly accepted use of the term "language"). Finally he talks about the "multiplicity of tools in language and of the ways they are used." As he continues straight on in *24:

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view . . ." (PI *24)

it seems reasonable to assume that these (tools in language) are also being identified with l-gs. (Even worse: if we take *669 as expressing some sort of identity between l-gs
and "one's thought," then this too becomes identified with sentences, tools of language, etc.) This passage (i.e., *23) is important, not only for its relevance to l-gs, but also because it is the introduction to and one of the bases of the above mentioned "l-g thesis." All these difficulties can be sorted out, however, and this will be attempted in Ch. 6 below.

In *27 there is another relatively clear remark on the nature of l-gs.

In *130 Wittgenstein makes his only clear statement in PI of what he intends to be gained by the use of l-gs in philosophy. There are here obvious echoes of the remark (mentioned above) on p. 17, BB and that reported by R. Rhees from Wittgenstein's notebooks. *131 should be read along with *130 because of the suggestion implied therein that Wittgenstein may have intended l-gs to be used as a model-concept.

The following passages all contain some further information on the nature or use of l-gs: **260, 656, and Part II, pps 183, 224(b) and 225.

Between late 1934 or early 1935 and March 1936, Wittgenstein made notes for lectures on sense data and privacy of experience in notebooks. An edited version of these, under the title: "Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on 'Private experience' and 'sense data'" was published by Rush Rhees in Philosophical Review, 77 (1968). These were mostly in English, but were, very clearly, just notes and not intended for publication. Such remarks as "Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? (Elaborate this)." (NLp. 282) are obvious evidence of this. Thus they shall be treated here as a subsidiary text.

These notes do, however, provide evidence of a transition in Wittgenstein's use of "l-g." In BB the l-gs are all artificial and used in the examination of various philosophical problems; i.e., they are used as a method of doing
philosophy. They were also used thus in the earlier sections of PI, but in the later parts of PI natural 1-gs (as in the "1-g thesis") become more prominent and the artificial 1-gs virtually disappear. The uses of "1-g" in NL follow exactly this latter pattern.

There is only one artificial 1-g in NL:
Can two people have the same afterimage?
Language game: 'Description of the picture before one's mind's eye.'
Can two persons have the same picture before their mind's eye?
In what case would we say that they had two images exactly alike but not identical? (NL p. 281)

and even this is, at least, very much akin to a natural 1-g. Presumably the kind of evidence we would count in discussing the last point would be from the expressions we do, naturally, use when discussing afterimages in natural language.

The remaining nine uses of "1-g" are all in the natural or "1-g thesis" sense of that expression. Six of these are of special interest as they provide relatively clear information on Wittgenstein's conception of natural 1-gs.

They are:

'Surely if he knows anything he must know what he sees!' - It is true that the game of 'showing or telling what one sees' is one of the most fundamental language games; which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game. (NL p. 283)

In fact, if he is to play a language-game the possibility of this will depend upon his own and other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions; i.e. they must call the same things 'red.' (NL p. 287; cf. PI 241)

The language games with expressions of feelings are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie. (NL p. 293) (re teaching a child sensation expressions)
In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language-game. (NL p. 296)

What if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the room? Is this a language game? (NL p. 299)
We call something a language-game is it plays a particular role in our human life. (NL p. 300)

The remaining three uses of the expression are:

In our private language-game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression - in order, of course, to use the name for this impression in the future. (NL p. 291)

This is an odd remark as it seems that one of the conclusions we should draw from Wittgenstein's deliberations on privacy is that the so-called "private language" (or 1-g) is not a language (or natural 1-g) at all. Thus it may be that here "1-g" refers to an artificial 1-g (cf. the artificial 1-g "S" of PI *258). Further passages of interest are:

And I am drawing your attention to this: that the language games are very much more different than you think. (NL p. 302)

This object is inadequately described as 'that which I see,' 'my visual image,' since it has nothing to do with any particular human being. Rather I should like to call it 'what's seen.' And so far it's all right, only now I've got to say what can be said about this object, in what sort of language game 'what's seen' is to be used. For at first sight I should feel inclined to use this expression as one uses a word designating a physical object, and only on second thought I see that I can't do that. (NL p. 311)

The last sentence of this remark is most interesting for it shows that, to Wittgenstein, using words to designate physical objects is a (natural) 1-g.

There is one other remark which is worth noting here, for future reference as well as for the insight into Wittgenstein's idea of philosophy that one may or may not derive from it.

... and you may see that the expression stands and falls with its usefulness. (NL p. 316)
2.2 In this section we shall examine the characterizations of Wittgenstein's l-gs offered by three notable commentators. Wittgenstein's remarks on l-gs surveyed in the preceding section, provide a bewildering array of information. At least some initial idea of what Wittgenstein might be getting at is thus valuable in sifting through this information, even if we do, later, considerably modify that initial ideal, or even reject it.

P.F. Strawson, in his "Review of Wittgenstein's PI," says:

Wittgenstein uses the phrase to refer to any particular way, actual or invented, of using language (e.g. to a particular way of using a certain sentence, or a certain word); and also 'the whole consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven.' (Strawson (1) p. 24)

The reference is to *7, PI.

W. Stegmuller says:

Wittgenstein understands by language games sometimes those methods, mostly playful, by means of which children learn the use of their mother-tongue, but then also simple models of language and finally the whole of everyday language together with the activities with which it is interwoven, is also so called. (Stegmuller, p. 238)

E.K. Specht combines both the above:

... we accordingly understand by language game:
(a) certain primitive and simplified forms of language such as, say, those used by a child when learning a language, or such as can be artificially drawn up.
(b) ordinary everyday language together with all the activities and performances indissolubly belonging to it. (Generally in the locution 'the language-game').
(c) certain individual partial language systems, functional entities or applicational contexts that constitute part of an organic whole. (Specht p. 42)

All the above treat "l-g" as a simply classificatory term, as if the meaning of the expression was simply the class of entities picked out. While this will do for a start, there may well be a lot more to it than that. Why did Wittgenstein want to pick out these entities anyway? And why did he pick the expression "l-g"? (At least one
commentator, Harold R. Smart, considers the term singularly inappropriate to Wittgenstein's purpose.) How are different l-gs to be distinguished? How do we know when we have one? If these questions can be answered then I think we can get much closer to Wittgenstein's own conception of a l-g.

There is only one point upon which Strawson, Stegmüller, and Specht are in complete agreement. This is obvious, as it comes directly from Wittgenstein's most precise and clearcut pronouncement on the subject in PI, i.e. *7. However, as noted in section 2.1, Wittgenstein does not seem to make further use of this use of the expression "l-g," and thus, while obviously correct, in that it must be one of Wittgenstein's intended uses of the expression, this would seem somewhat trivial (see Ch. 4 below).

Strawson's description of Wittgenstein's use of "l-g" is clearly misleading. "Wittgenstein uses the phrase to refer to any particular way, actual or invented, of using language..." seems to imply that Wittgenstein drew a distinction between language and its use—on this hand language and on the other, various uses thereof—and that he did this is unclear to say the least. In support of it we might quote the famous tool-box analogy in PI *11. However, this lends only partial support; we may think of tools as objects to be put to use in various ways, their functions deriving from their being thus used; or we may note that each of the objects has been constructed for a different purpose—which might be called the "natural function" of the tool—and that other uses to which they may be put are more or less deviant. (Which is not, of course, to suggest that words have some natural meaning somehow following from their form.) Against the claim that Wittgenstein distinguished language and its use we may cite any of a number of passages. With respect to meaning, which is surely a centrally important feature of language, Wittgenstein says:

43. For a large class of cases — though not for all —
in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (PI *43)

We should also note that even when setting up the most artificial (i.e. most unlike natural language) l-gs, e.g. l-g *48, Wittgenstein thinks it necessary to describe something of the way of life of people who might use the language. And in this respect we have, of course:

19. And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (PI *19)

This puzzling remark will be discussed in detail in section 6.2 below.

Strawson continues, "... (e.g., to a particular way of using a certain sentence, or a certain word)." Here he seems to be construing Wittgenstein as using the expression "l-g" to bring out the analogy of playing a game with words, as, for example, we play Rugby with a ball. As should become clear later, this is not correct. Wittgenstein uses the analogy of language as a game, not as something with which we play a game. In defence of Strawson we should note that in the review from which comes the above quote, Strawson did not pay very much attention to l-gs, nor did he seem to regard them as very important. In fact the above quoted passage occurs only as a footnote.

Stegmuller finds three different kinds of l-g. The first he describes as "those methods, mostly playful, by means of which children learn the use of their mother-tongue. . . ." This comes from *7. Wittgenstein gives as an example:

Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses. (PI *7)

This presents a problem: ring-a-ring-a-roses is clearly a game with words (cf. my objection sup. to including these among l-gs). However, I think this problem arises from Wittgenstein's general misunderstanding of the process of language acquisition, a problem which shall be dealt with more fully in Ch. 5. Given an understanding of language acquisition in accord with the most recent theoretical
developments, Wittgenstein's use of "1-g" for children's language fits in well with his various other uses of the expression (but not with the example of ring-a-ring-a-roses, about which I'm sure social anthropologists could say much in terms of ritual, etc.) For example, "children learning to speak Russian, in which word order is crucially important, use a consistent word order quite unintelligible in the "adult" language; thus their language is best seen as a different (more primitive?) language. The second type Stegmuller describes as "simple models of language." In this Stegmuller is importantly wrong; more correct would be: "simple model languages." That there is a difference and that Wittgenstein explicitly denies the former, can be seen in **130, 131, PI. Also, the passage quoted from Wittgenstein's notebooks by R. Rhee in his introduction to BB shows Wittgenstein's ideas on this (see sec. 2.1 above for a full quotation of this).

Stegmuller's third type of 1-g is, of course, that noted at the beginning of this section.

Specht's tripartite characterization of 1-gs is of considerably greater interest. His second type of 1-g:

(b) ordinary everyday language together with all the activities and performances indissolubly belonging to it. (Generally in the locution "the 1-g")

is, of course, quite straightforward, coming straight from *7, PI. Some problems associated with his first type of 1-g, (a), viz., those to do with the supposed use of 1-gs in children's language acquisition, have already been noted above. The other type of 1-g in Specht's group (a):

(a) certain primitive and simplified forms of language . . . such as can be artificially drawn up. (Specht, p. 42)

clearly covers 1-gs such as the baby's game, 1-g *48, etc.

Specht's third type of 1-g:

(c) certain individual partial language systems, functional entities or applicational contexts that constitute part of an organic whole. (Specht, p. 42)
is a brief description of the use of l-gs in the "l-g thesis." This would be, perhaps, better expressed in terms of Wittgenstein's use of the expression "l-g;" however that is a very minor criticism. Overall, I think Specht's characterization of l-gs is as clear and as comprehensive as could be expected in such a brief summary.

However, although the above does provide a reasonably clear idea of the uses of "l-g" in BB, PI, etc., its does so only in a classificatory way and does not answer the questions posed above. Thus, for example, given an arbitrary set of words, or words and actions or social setting (or even diagrams without words, etc., cf. sec. 2.1 above), how are we to know whether or not it is a l-g? What is it that distinguishes one l-g from another? etc. It may be that, especially to Wittgenstein, such questions do not have hard and fast answers. In the following section we shall look at this problem: the problem of the definability of "l-g."

Notes

1Cannot be dated from ML.
CHAPTER THREE

ON THE DEFINABILITY OF "LANGUAGE-GAME"

3.1 In this section we shall discuss whether we should expect "l-g" to be definable. Thus we shall examine Wittgenstein's views on definition in general. This will, of course, involve a detailed discussion of the famous argument of PI *66, to the effect that "game" and many other words do not have defining characteristics -- that even to ask for a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of such words is misguided. In discussing this argument we shall confine ourselves to what Wittgenstein actually wrote. In this way two ends may be achieved: firstly, this discussion is a necessary preliminary to the discussion of what is a l-g; secondly, by examining this argument as Wittgenstein presented it we may help rid ourselves of the aura of infallibility surrounding much of his work.

Although the clearest and most oft-quoted version of Wittgenstein's argument starts in PI *66, he had presented it at least as early as 1932, in lectures at Cambridge (see sec. 2.1 for G.E. Moore's report of this). At this time Wittgenstein also made another point regarding definitions, but which he does not seem to have used in later work:

... even if there is something common to all games, it doesn't follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a 'game.' (NL, p. 312-313)

This is quite a compelling suggestion. We need only to think of the use of "game" in such contexts as, e.g. "It's only a game!" said to a bad loser or a bad winner, to see how Wittgenstein might have made much more of this point had he pursued it.

As noted above, Wittgenstein's clearest presentation of this argument occurs in PI *66, and its conclusion has gained wide acceptance. However, until recently it does not seem to have been subject to much critical examination. This is a pity for on close examination the argument appears
to be somewhat less than convincing.

The basic procedure used in this argument is simple enough. Wittgenstein takes characteristics that have been suggested as common to all the things we call "games" and shows by counter-example that they are not common to all games. The first thing to note is the very small range of possible common characteristics of which Wittgenstein treats. There are only four: (a) that games are amusing; (b) that there is competition between players; (c) that games involve winning/losing; (d) that games require skill (as contrasted with luck). Not only are these possibilities very few, they are also exceedingly superficial ("simpleminded"—Katz). Further, only two of them, (b) and (c), are eliminated by counter-example. In the case of (b), the counter-example is patience; in the case of (c) it is: "but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared." (PI *66). The remaining two, (a) and (d), are not thus eliminated, but the difference between the skills required for different games, and the difference between kinds of amusement gained from different games is pointed out. We shall come back to this point shortly.

Even if Wittgenstein had eliminated possibilities (a) and (d) by counter-example the argument would still not be convincing. What is required to complete the argument is a proof that the examples used exhaust the possibilities of common features of games. Thus, say, given a proof that the only possibilities were (a), (b), (c), and (d), and then counter-examples to each of these, the conclusion that there were no features common to all the things we call "games" would follow. But without the preliminary proof of exhaustivity the ensuing argument proves very little, for there are many other features of games which might prove to be common to all. An exhaustive list of possibilities would, I think, be considerably more than four long. Thus, although Wittgenstein urges us to "look and see whether
there is something in common to all," (*66 PI) he himself did not look very far.

To return to the rejection of (a), amusement, and (d), skill, as common features of games, fire-engines, stop lights and sunburns are all very different things and different shades of red; but this does not mean that they do not have that redness in common. Likewise, of course, the skill required of a Rugby player is different from that of a chess player, but that does not mean that they are not both skills. Similarly with amusement. It would seem rather odd to say that, e.g., skill is not common to all games simply because the skills vary from game to game. This is like saying that whiskey is not common to all Tom Collins because some use scotch, some rye, and some bourbon. There is, however, more to be gained from this problem.

Wittgenstein seems to require that some one particular skill be common to all games for skill to be a defining characteristic of "game" and it is with this that we shall take issue. There are, of course, many well defined expressions, even although Wittgenstein never tells us how they are to be distinguished. The examples that most readily come to mind are from science, the "new suburbs of language" (cf. *18, PI), although expressions such as "Tom Collins" are also readily found. Let us take, for a simple example, the word "molecule": nothing can be a molecule unless it is composed of atoms; and yet, the atoms of which, say, common salt (NaCl) is composed are quite different from those of which water (H₂O) is composed; thus, on Wittgenstein's argument, atoms are not a common feature of all molecules. But this is absurd and thus I think we must reject the requirement in question.²

In PI *67 Wittgenstein raises and rejects another possibility. The rejected suggestion is not unfamiliar. It is the theory that the meaning of a word, X, be given by a disjunctive set of properties of which an object must have
a certain number--how many is not clear and may vary from context to context--if it is to be properly called an X.
This is, of course, Searle's theory of the meaning of proper names. (Proper Names, John R. Searle, Mind, Vol. 67 (1958), pp. 166-73). Wittgenstein's rejection of this as "only playing with words" is a bit swift, especially as, only four pages later in PI, he himself proposes just such a theory for proper names (see *79 PI, a debt Searle acknowledges; cf. Ch. 7, footnote 1).

Here it is appropriate to make some remark on the consistency of Wittgenstein's approach to this question and related remarks elsewhere in PI. Thus, in PI **371 and 373 we have:

371. Essence is expressed by grammar.
373. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.

In the light of developments in grammatical theory these remarks have become quite intelligible. Co-occurrence restrictions and strict sub-categorization rules do exactly this, i.e., they tell us what kind of an object a thing is. Thus they are regarded by many philosophers and some linguists as being essentially semantic rather than syntactic. However, I do suspect that this is merely a difference in terminology and of no great consequence here. The point to be made here is that Wittgenstein, in discussing possible answers to the question: "What is common to all the things we call games?", nowhere mentions let alone discusses grammar.

Further, there is the view, expressed by Wittgenstein in PI **111 and 664 that "problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes ..." As mentioned above, the arguments of PI *66 ff. are quite superficial. Nowhere in that section do we find any discussion that might be construed as deep.

Thus, so far we must conclude that this famous argu-
ment is quite unconvincing. Wittgenstein has established that two simple particular features are not common to all games, but this is surely not enough to establish that no particular features are common to games. He has totally failed to establish that no general features are common to games and his rejection of a "disjunctive set of features" theory is much too swift to be acceptable. Later I shall argue that certain general features are common to all games. On the credit side, however, Wittgenstein has alerted us to

the fact that definitions are not simple and readily accessible, as we may previously have thought. Jerrold J. Katz sums this up nicely:

The linguistic complexity he exhibits thus might shame a logical empiricist into becoming more careful about what he says concerning the way we use words, but it certainly cannot be grounds on which he would be reasonable to stop looking for definitions of the usual sort. Moreover, Wittgenstein totally ignores obvious cases that conflict with his position that there is nothing common to the instances, and only these instances, to which a word is correctly applied. Consider cases such as 'brother,' 'aunt,' and 'highball,' where it is quite clear that, for each, there is a unique defining condition: in the case of 'brother,' it is that the person be a male sibling of another; in the case of 'aunt,' it is that a person be someone's parent's sister; and in the case of 'highball' it is that something be a drink of diluted spirits served with ice in a tall glass. It might be replied that these cases are somewhat different from cases like 'game,' but Wittgenstein gives no relevant distinction on which to support his position. (Katz, p.73)

In place of the traditional "necessary and sufficient condition" definition, which he believed he had discredited, Wittgenstein in PI **66 and 67 offers us a new mode of expressing meaning, the familiar family resemblance theory. Wittgenstein offers no real argument in support of this theory. What I gather is supposed to happen is that the audience, having dramatically lost their beloved necessary and sufficient conditions, will, like the drowning man, clutch at the first straw—in this case the brilliant and equally dramatic family resemblance. And it worked!
Such criticism may be unduly harsh. For example, it is difficult to see what, short of a complete list of English linguistic expressions, would count as the preliminary proof of exhaustivity required for the "anti-necessary and sufficient condition" argument of *66. Likewise in the case of family resemblance it is difficult to see what it would be like to prove that this was the correct representation of meaning of linguistic expressions. It should be noted, however, that Wittgenstein at no stage claims that his family resemblances can provide a general explication of meaning. He simply proffers it as a useful way of handling expressions for which the traditional modes of definition prove inadequate.

Part of the problem here seems to be the underlying requirement: that the ultimate analysis of meaning is the correct analysis of meaning. Expressed as baldly as this, such a requirement looks somewhat obviously misleading. For example, what is to count as the criterion of correctness? In contrast with notional definitions, notional analyses, etc., we have operational definitions, analyses, etc. By comparison with notional definitions and analyses, the cash value of an operational definition or analysis is how well it works. The criterion of this (how well it works) will be in terms of the type of problems we want to use it on. In this case the problems are philosophical, and:

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. (PI *133)

However, in this latter respect, Wittgenstein is not very helpful for he provides only one hint on how we are to use the concept of family resemblance. This hint itself is unfortunate as, if anything, it diminishes the intuitively, apparent usefulness of the concept. It occurs in PI *67 and uses the example of "number." On this, for example, C.W.K. Mundle offers the following picturesque argument:

Shooting pheasants is like playing football in some respects and so may be called 'a game;'
The trapping of insects by a sundew is like shooting pheasants in some respects, and so may be called 'a game.'

The eruption of a volcano is like the trapping of insects by sundew in some respects, and so may be called 'a game.'

If we did permit our 'concepts' to be extended in this way it would produce linguistic anarchy. (Mundle, p. 192)

It has been suggested that Mundle's argument misses the point—that it indicates a lack of understanding of Wittgenstein. Perhaps so, but it does not show any lack of understanding of what Wittgenstein actually wrote in the relevant passages. One suggestion to counter Mundle is that family resemblances are at "rock bottom"—that basic area in which we can only say: "this is what we do, and that is what we don't do." This is not so. To anticipate a little (see Ch. 6 below for a full discussion of "bedrock"), at rock bottom we can only describe, further explanations being either impossible, irrelevant, or unintelligible. The idea of family resemblance clearly belongs to the realm of explanation; it is on a par with necessary and sufficient condition definitions. A plain description, by comparison, might be an ostensive definition (especially in the case of a proper name) or a list of uses, even if, as Wittgenstein suggests is the case with "game," there is no one thing common to all members of that list.

No, Mundle's argument is neither off the point nor farfetched. It is precisely in accord with the analogy of a thread with overlapping fibres in PI *67. Here we have a clear case of such overlaps. If the analogy of spinning a thread is supposed to indicate how a "family" grows then either Wittgenstein must provide some further restraints to the nature and direction of this growth—which he does not—or the above argument holds against him. This argument is in accord with the writings of some notable enthusiasts for Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance. For example, Farhang Zabeh says of PI, **66, 67:
What this boils down to is that relations among games, or alternatively, among various species of natural language are nontransitive. A may resemble B and B may resemble C and C may resemble Z - but A does not necessarily resemble Z. (Zadeh, pp. 354-55)

This consequence of the thread spinning analogy makes the earlier presentation of the family resemblance theory considerably less plausible. On a plausible family resemblance theory we may say that a word—a general term such as "game"—unites a specifiable set of characteristics some of which are present in each of the objects for which the word is used. Here we must be careful to distinguish using a word in one only sense for different objects and using a word in different senses, a crucial distinction of which Wittgenstein failed to take account (Katz, p. 73:

... nor does he try to analyze his case to show that they amount to more than multiple senses of the same orthographic element.)

Thus, to follow the family analogy, we have, for example: "Young Sammy hasn't got the family nose, but he has the eyes, hasn't he Eff? And of course the Fothergill-Smith bad circulation." But as Mundle's argument shows, there is no such unity in Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance, given the spinning thread analogy.

Even if we accept Wittgenstein's argument it is still clear that he does not answer the question that leads him to this investigation and which relates this argument to the study of l-gs. This occurs in PI *65. Thus we might, reasonably, now require of Wittgenstein a list of those features which distinguish the l-g family.

To some extent Wittgenstein reduces the pressure of this requirement in PI *69. However, to the extent that he does so he also reduces the usefulness of the family resemblance concept as applied to "game." Descriptions of a selection of games plus the generalization "... and similar things" (PI *69) have nothing to do with family resemblance, except insofar as this latter might be said to
affect the nature of the generalization intended. In PI *69 Wittgenstein really is talking of a procedure that might be construed as being at "rock bottom." Insofar as he considers this necessary, he might also consider his family resemblance rather inadequate (or useless) as an explication of "game."

As any Wittgensteinian would no doubt argue, the preceding discussion does not do justice to Wittgenstein's thinking. I would most readily agree; as pointed out earlier, I have tried only to throw light on what he wrote. However, before we proceed I think it will be worthwhile to speculate, on the basis of the feelings one gets from the "Investigations" as a whole, as to what was intended by the passages under discussion.

First we should remember that PI, especially the earlier sections, is directed against the theory of T. Now a logical atomist might still argue as follows. Those characteristics which are prominent features of the "game family" are themselves in the main family resemblance concepts. Take for example "skill" or "entertainment;" these are both probably family resemblance concepts. If you carry on this analytic process, in terms of family resemblances or necessary and sufficient condition definitions when applicable, you will indeed arrive at a set of "atomic elements" which are neither definable nor family resemblance concepts but which are names of elements of the world. For only thus can language have meaning. Clearly Wittgenstein would reject such an argument. The rejection of such views is, as noted above, an important part of his programme in PI. Many of the elements of the logical atomist theory of T have already come under severe attack in sections of PI previous to *66 (for examples see Ch. 5 below).

The claim of PI **66 ff. is, presumably, that such a continuing analytic search for general, or almost general features of most concepts is not only futile but very likely
to be misleading. It is just as important to emphasize differences as similarities if we want to get clear about the use of some word. However, we are mostly very good at finding similarities and in doing so are very often led astray. Further, despite its scientific elegance and (in this scientific age) intuitive appeal, there is no good reason to believe that one must ever arrive at a logical stopping point in an "atomist analysis," and even if one does, no good reason to believe it unique. The procedure of such analyses rests heavily on the notion of synonymity of expressions which would be, for Wittgenstein, very much involved with natural language-games (NAl-gs). NAl-gs will be discussed in detail in Ch. 6 below, and the impact of the results of that discussion on the concept of synonymity will be considered in Ch. 7.

The overall feeling one gets from PI is, perhaps, more in accordance with the point Wittgenstein made in ML (see Ch. 2 above), viz., that even if there is some feature common to all uses of "game," this is not necessarily what is important to any given use of that word. Thus singling out this feature as somehow special to "game" will very likely be misleading. Again this points to our taking more account of differences in the various uses of a word.

It is important not to overlook the historical importance of the argument of PI, **66 ff. It certainly convinced most of its audience, and did so despite not being in accordance with the standards of argument espoused by that audience. Consequently philosophers have tended to "look and see" rather than to assume that certain features must be common. This awakening to the complexities of the use of language has been philosophically most productive.

However, even given the above account, we must still "look and see." Thus we shall have to look further into the possibility of there being characteristics common to all games. I shall argue that there are at least two plausible
candidates: (a) all games are rule governed, and (b) all games involve skill. Further, there are two other features which are also strong candidates: (c) games are purposive, and (d) games are social. These latter features, while not, perhaps, characteristic of all games, are, it shall be argued, certainly characteristic of most.

Before beginning this investigation, we shall embark on an important sidetrack, viz., an investigation of Wittgenstein's conception of rules and what it is to follow a rule.
3.2 As with most other concepts that he examines, Wittgenstein in his discussion of rules tries to bring "rule" "back from its metaphysical to its everyday use." (cf. PI *116). Thus the idea of which he seeks to be rid is that rules must be somehow fixed and immutable—that if it is not always precisely clear what it is to behave in accord with an expression X, then X is not the expression of a rule. This is especially important in the philosophy of language where we are misled (as was Wittgenstein in T) into lines of thought such as we find, for example, expressed in PI, *92. The languages of formal logic proceed according to fixed rules (although even here there is some scope for choice; e.g., given a fixed rule for substitution of propositional variables, in a given instance an I to substitute "p" or "q" etc.) and it is, perhaps, this that leads us into this mistake, as Wittgenstein argues in PI *81.

That rules are not necessarily unambiguous, unalterable, or capable of covering every possible case, and yet are in no way impaired in their functioning because of this, is central to Wittgenstein's argument. His rule/sign-post analogy in PI *85 is very useful in making this clear. In PI *86 he gives another illustration making this point even more dramatically. (It might be noted with respect to PI *83 that the second schema for reading the table is not at all far-fetched: we do in fact use such a schema in writing the answer to simultaneous equations in terms of determinants.)

There is, further, an important argument in PI *185 ff. to show that, even in mathematics, rules do not necessarily guide behaviour clearly and unambiguously. As noted above (sec. 2.1) this argument really begins in PI *143 with the intervening sections being taken up with a sidetrack. However, for present purposes we need not concern ourselves with PI *143, nor with the fact (which turns out to be irrelevant) that Wittgenstein calls this a l-g.
The argument is set out in PI, **185 and 186.

This is a very famous argument. The section has been praised by Strawson for its "great brilliance and clarity" (Strawson (1) p. 35); on the other hand, Dummett, in introducing a discussion of the argument says:

Wittgenstein's hostility to mathematical logic is great; he says that it has completely distorted the thinking of philosophers. (Here Dummett cites RFFM, iv, 48) Because this remark as it stands is so plainly silly, it is difficult to get a clear view of the matter. (Dummett, p. 427)

One consequence of this argument that we may be tempted to draw is misleading; this is that there can be no rule governed behaviour—that no matter what rule we make, even in mathematics, since at every move we must make a new decision the rule clearly does not govern, or even guide, behaviour. Obviously in Wittgensteinian terms this is incorrect. For if a person accepts a practice, participates in a form of life, then his behaviour will have the regularity, in those respects in question, which we would call following a rule. What Wittgenstein is arguing against is the idea that a rule will tell us what to do in a determinate way even if we do not participate in the form of life of which that rule forms part of the description. This, it seems to me, is quite reasonable, or would be, provided one could understand what is meant by "form of life" (see sec. 6.2 below). For the present purposes, we must note that we have a peculiarly Wittgensteinian conception of following a rule: following a rule is part of a form of life which, in the end, philosophy can only describe (cf. PI **109, 124, 126, etc.). However, this need cause us little concern, for, if anything, it serves to re-establish a naive conception of rules, thus allowing us to proceed without further ado.

These conclusions have an immediate appeal. However, for the purposes of this thesis we must examine the argument of PI *185 to see whether it does, legitimately, establish such a thing. In discussing this argument there is one
point that most commentators completely overlook, viz., the second sentence of PI *185:

Now - judged by the usual criteria - the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers. (PI *185)

So he can count. But what does this mean? To answer this we shall look at how he might have learned to count. We are justified in making this move because how the pupil has learned to count and what he has thus learned, has considerable impact on the next learning situation, on which the main argument in PI, *185 is based. Wittgenstein's answer to the question, "How do people learn to count?" is "By training and practice" which is as unexceptional as it is useless.

When we first learn to count we learn the names of the first ten or twenty natural numbers off by heart, as if they were a sequence of meaningless sounds, valuable in some way we as yet know not. The use of these sounds for counting is then pretty easily acquired, although exactly how is not important here. What is important is that we do not learn the use of numbers much beyond twenty, if even that far, as independent sounds put in a certain order. We learn, very quickly, that numbers grow by systematic repetition; i.e., we learn that counting is recursive. It is essential that we do so for otherwise even moderately large numbers, say in the middle hundreds, would require feats of memory quite beyond most of us. We also learn, either explicitly or implicitly, that the operation "+1" is the same as going one further in the sequence of natural numbers, i.e., counting one more.

The next step is learning to follow the instruction "+n." We might do this in one of three ways:

(a) We might learn properties of the sign "+" as set out in, say, various formalisations of arithmetic. Thus, where "x" is the successor function, with which, of course we are already familiar because we can count:

(i) \((0 + n) = n\)
(ii) \((a^* + n) = (a + n)^*\)

i.e., we might learn addition as a recursive function. This is highly implausible.

(b) We might learn to add \(n\) by counting out \(n\) more and then counting the lot thus obtained; as, for example, we do when shunting beads along abaci, or counting on our fingers, or any of the many variations on this theme. This is much more plausible.

(c) It is probably more common than either (a) or (b) to learn to add by first learning a set of addition tables off by heart and then learning an algorithm for their application to any case. Thus we learn to recite, e.g., "two and one is three, two and two is four, two and three is five, two and four is six . . . etc." until we have learned the sums of all possible pairs of the numbers zero through nine. We then learn that in larger addition sums we treat one column at a time, starting with the right-hand column, and to "carry" the tens value when the sum is over ten for later addition and to carry the final tens value on to the next column to the left which is added next. In this way we need never use memorised addition tables other than those learned in the first step, and obviously, can handle all cases.

Now Wittgenstein continues:

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say \(+2\)) beyond 1000 - and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. (PI \(*185\))

Now I respectfully suggest that the only conclusion we can draw from his doing so is that the pupil cannot count. That is, we must reject the opening statement of \(*185\). If he can count then he will either not continue the series as Wittgenstein says he does, or he will recognize that he has made a mistake.

As noted above, learning to count is the same as learning to follow the instruction "+1," so on the order "continue the series +1 from 1000" if he can count he will write: 1000, 1001, 1002, etc. Suppose he learned addition
by method (a). Then, in the case in question, if he can count (and note that Wittgenstein does not say he can only count up to 1000, or that his counting has only been tested up to 1000), that is if he understands the successor function (and if he can substitute and knows that "-" is transitive), he cannot correctly go on as Wittgenstein says he does. For his procedure in making the sequence will be something like:

1). 0
2). 0+2=2
3). (0*+2)=(1+2)=(0+2)*=2*=3
4). (1*+2)=(2+2)=(1+2)*=3*=4
5). (2*+2)=(3+2)=(2+2)*=4*=5
6). (3*+2)=(4+2)=(3+2)*=5*=6
7). (4*+2)=(5+2)=(4+2)*=6*=7
8). (5*+2)=(6+2)=(5+2)*=7*=8


and so on until
999). (996*+2)=(997+2)=(996+2)*=998*=999
1000). (997*+2)=(998+2)=(997+2)*=999*=1000
(note that the pupil has performed tests correctly up to here)
1001). (998*+2)=(999+2)=(998+2)*=1000*=1001
1002). (999*+2)=(1000+2)=(999+2)*=1001*=1002
etc., etc.

noting that only the first and the even numbered steps produce a member of the required sequence. What we must note here is that in this way the sequence is produced by the successor relation, by substitution and by the transitivity of "-;" there is no independent use of "+". So if the pupil continues as Wittgenstein's does then it is because he does not have a grasp of one or more of these, and thus Wittgen-
stein's hypothetical student's answers do not apply.

Suppose he learned addition by method (b). Then again it is easily seen that the operation of addition is most readily reduced to counting; in fact this reduction is the essence of this method of learning addition. If Wittgenstein's pupil, after he gets to 1000 understands by "2" what we understand by "4," or if he thinks the next number after 1000 in the natural numbers is 1002 (which are reductions in this method of teaching of the answers Wittgenstein suggests his pupil might make), then we can only say that he cannot count.

Suppose he learned addition by method (c). Then it is clear that the application of the algorithm, in treating columns in addition sums separately, does not allow the kind of mistake that Wittgenstein's pupil makes. The steps involved in this method of addition are boringly familiar. Thus, e.g., for the step "998+2=1000" the pupil will go: "Two and eight is ten, put down zero, carry one; one and nine is ten, put down zero, carry one; one and nine is ten, put down zero, carry one; one and zero is one, put down one;" for the crucial step "1000+2=1002": "Two and zero is two, put down two, nothing to carry; etc." Thus, clearly, the mistake "1000+2=1004" is, on this method, the same as the mistakes "0+2=4," "10+2=14," "100+2=104" which we have already been told the pupil did not make. The point here is that being at the level 1000 is completely irrelevant to the method of addition and thus Wittgenstein's pupil's hypothetical answers do not apply.

The essence of the above argument, in cases (a) and (b) is simply that addition is always nothing more nor less than counting, or a convenient jargon for counting, and that this is how we teach it. And thus Wittgenstein's argument in PI §185 proves nothing. In Wittgensteinian terms we might say that once a person can count he is already too immersed in this form of life for these mistakes not to be
demonstrable to him. It is interesting to note that Dummett says that Wittgenstein's argument in PI, *185 is correct, but then goes on to provide the following argument which seems to shew the former's incorrectness:

Consider the case of an elementary computation, for example "5+7=12." There might be people who counted as we do but did not have the concept of addition. If such a person had found out by counting that there were five boys and seven girls in a classroom, and were then asked how many children were present, he would proceed to count all the children together to discover the answer. Thus he would be quite prepared to say that on one occasion there were five boys, seven girls, and twelve children altogether, but on another occasion five boys, seven girls, and thirteen children altogether. Now if we come across such a person, we should know what kind of arguments to bring to show him that in such circumstances he must have miscounted on one occasion, and that whenever there are five boys and seven girls there are twelve children. If he accepts these arguments it will be quite true that he has adopted a new criterion for saying that there are twelve children present, and again a new criterion for saying, "I must have miscounted." Before, he would say "I miscounted," only when he noticed that he had, for example, counted one of the children twice over; now he will say, "I miscounted," when he has not observed anything of this kind simply on the ground that he got the result that there were five boys, seven girls, and thirteen children. But we wish to say that even before we met this person and taught him the principles of addition, it would have been true that if he had counted five boys, seven girls, and thirteen children, he would have been wrong even according to the criteria he himself then acknowledged. That is, he must have made a mistake in counting; and if he made a mistake, then there must have been something that he did which, if he had noticed it, he himself would then have allowed as showing that he had miscounted."

(Dummett, pps 430-1)

The argument of PI, *185 has, due to the remarks of many commentators, achieved a position of some historical importance and is thus worth the detailed examination accorded it above. That the argument, as Wittgenstein wrote it, does not hold is thus also important. The argument might be altered to look more plausible. For example if a person's ability to count had only been tested up to 1000 then it may
be that for him the intuitively most obvious way of going on after 1000 is as Wittgenstein's hypothetical student does. Such an argument would fit quite well with an interpretation of some sections of RFM. If it comes naturally to the members of a society to call the same things which we would call different then we cannot say that they are wrong (in some absolute sense). If they consider that, in counting, going on in the same way after 1000 (up to which point they proceeded as we do) is: 1002, 1004, 1006 ... etc., then they will, quite obviously, be wrong according to our system; but so will our system be wrong according to theirs. Mathematics is "after all an anthropological phenomenon." (RFM, V-26. See also, for example, RFM, I-141 to 149.) However, this is not what Wittgenstein wrote in PI, **185 and 186.

Thus we have here another example of an important and famous argument which, as it is written and according to standard procedures and criteria, fails. That it fails only as it is written is so of any unsuccessful argument, and I see no reason why we should allow less from Wittgenstein than from anyone else. That it fails only according to standard procedures and criteria is more interesting, for the argument was addressed to, and apparently was found convincing by, the experts in those procedures and criteria. It also raises a problem. One of the points that Wittgenstein makes is that what counts as a proof, what are acceptable procedures and criteria of goodness thereof, is not something universal but, like all rules and standards, variable and culturally relative. To show this is, no doubt, one of his aims in PI **185 and 186. However, even if we accepted and fully supported this view, it does not mean that we should not examine Wittgenstein's arguments according to the criteria and standards of our society. Firstly, if we could not do this, then we would have no philosophy as we know it. Secondly, Wittgenstein wrote for a certain audience
and thus must have expected to be judged according to the
criteria and standards of that audience. His remarkable suc-
cess without, in some cases at least, meeting those stand-
ard[s, is one of the more fascinating aspects of his work.
However, although the argument of PI, **185 and 186 is in-
correct, we should not let this overshadow Wittgenstein's
aim in using it, or the points he could have made had the
argument been worked out more carefully. Thus the last pa-
ragraph of PI, *185 deserves special emphasis.

There are difficulties in this account of rules, but
they are overcome by Wittgenstein in various passages in PI.
One such difficulty is obvious: "But how can a rule shew
me what to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some in-
terpretation, in accord with the rule." (PI, *198) This,
the problem of what it is to comply with a rule, is present-
ed and discussed in *198. Thus we see the ultimate appeal
is to a custom, a practice, a form of life (cf. PI, *23 for
the identification of a form of life with a custom). Forms
of life, for all they are only mentioned five times in PI,
are the corner-stone of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
Thus, for example, H.R. Smart says, somewhat scathingly, al-
though I believe essentially correctly:

"Forms of life" evidently play the role, in Wittgen-
stein's own l-g, of a metaphysical ultimate in terms
of which the functioning of language is to be un-
stood. They must be accepted, and they are given -
that is to say, they are regarded as an indubitab-
l basis, a rock of certainty, like the Cartesian cogito.
(Smart, p. 232)

In PI, *202 Wittgenstein goes on to say this explicitly:
"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice." (PI, *202)
Here he also observes that thinking one is obeying a rule
is not the same as obeying a rule and that hence it is im-
possible to obey a rule privately.

At this stage the argument is open to a fairly obvious
charge of circularity. If "order" and "rule" are defined
by means of regularity, how then is the meaning of "regular,"
"uniform," "same," to be explained. This is not an especially difficult problem here, although it is of a form which is to be met time and again in this kind of investigation (and in this thesis). In PI, *208 Wittgenstein argues that the circle is not vicious. It is the possibility of learning to use words correctly without prior knowledge of a language which allows us to break the circle. Furthermore, learning to use words correctly and to obey rules, is a matter of "falling into line," i.e., of adopting a practice, a custom, a form of life. It is only in the context of a form of life that rules guide behaviour, be it linguistic or otherwise.

This same argument (PI, *208) serves to refute another important objection to Wittgenstein's conception of rules. This objection might be presented as follows: a rule is an expression in a language; but the words in that expression are themselves rule governed in that to learn the meaning of the words one must learn the rule for their use; these latter rules will themselves be expressions in a meta-language, which in turn must be understood . . . etc., a vicious regress. Thus, if, as Wittgenstein argues, rules do not of themselves determine, or unambiguously guide behaviour, then to use this rule we need a rule to tell us in what way it is to be used, etc., thus starting the same regress. (It is worth noting that the regress does not get started in the case of the formal languages of logics, for here there is always an antecedently understood meta-language in which one can introduce the new language.) Wittgenstein raises this question in PI, *84. Here he answers it by saying that simply because there exists the possibility of a doubt it does not follow that one must entertain that doubt. The refutation provided by PI, *208 is a much more satisfying and convincing one. We can and do learn to partake in forms of life in which rules play an important part. We learn this by the example of others, by practice, and by the correction provided by initiates when we go wrong. Learning
is a moulding and shaping process. We fall into line, are nudged into line, and when we fall out of line we are nudged back into line (cf., PI, *495). Of course, it is possible to go wrong continuously, and Wittgenstein was well aware of this, but it is not possible to make continual, logically undetectable mistakes. Thus the meaning of "rule", as used in "rules of language," "rules of society," may be more akin to its meaning in "As a rule I go to town on Fridays" than its meaning in, say, formal logic. Following rules is part of a form of life and this is where justifications stop.

217. "How am I to obey a rule?"—If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (PI, *217)

To obey a rule, to make a report, to given an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). (PI, *199)

What has to be accepted, the given, is — so one could say — forms of life. (PI, p. 226)
3.3
(a) Are all games rule governed?

The sense in which "rule governed" should be understood in this context is that a game is rule governed if it has rules (in the sense determined in 3.2) which delimit the range of possible behaviour of a person who can appropriately be said to be playing that game. Thus if games are rule governed then players of a game will be following (behaving in accord with) the rules of that game; cf. PI p. 227:

And 'false moves' can only exist as the exception. For if what we now call by that name became the rule, the game in which they were false moves would have been abrogated. (PI, p. 227)

This remark, we should note, only holds if the character of a game depends upon its rules, and consequently if the game in question does have rules. Thus it is not clear that Wittgenstein thought that being rule governed was not a characteristic of all games. Furthermore, the passages indicating that Wittgenstein may have thought games were not rule governed are difficult enough to make misinterpretation very easy. Thus, for example, Pole seems to take it for granted that Wittgenstein thought games were rule governed; on p. 29 he says:

(the comparison of language and games) . . . serves his purpose in at least two ways. It serves him first in that a game is usually a form of social activity in which different players fill different roles; secondly in that games observe rules. (Pole, p. 29)

We shall first look at some of Wittgenstein's own remarks on the subject and examine their plausibility. As noted above not all Wittgenstein's remarks are against the possibility of games being rule governed. For example, PI, **53, 54 might well be construed as supporting the view that games are rule governed. PI, *54 is particularly interesting in that in it Wittgenstein explains how a game might be rule governed without those rules ever having been precisely formulated. However, most of Wittgenstein's remarks on the subject seem to support a rejection of rules as a char-
acteristic of games.

The first explicit remarks of this kind occur in B1B, p. 25:

To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules. (B1B, p. 25)

Against this we might immediately paraphrase Wittgenstein's own words in PI, *69: "Very well, they play according to unstrict rules. - Though you still owe me a definition of strictness." This move, while as legitimate as Wittgenstein's own in PI, *69, is a bit swift. There are some rather more important points to be made.

Children playing a game with or without a ball, even if the game is one of those wonderful creations no adult can fathom, seem to have a very good idea of what is fair and what is not fair. They also have good methods for deciding border-line cases; the most common is trial by combat although dictatorships founded on ownership of the only ball are not uncommon. This obviously implies that there are rules to the game in question; standards, the transgression of which is considered unfair.

One is, when playing, not necessarily playing a game. We play a piano, play the fool, play dead, play "Home Sweet Home," etc. We also practice for games, and although this may well involve throwing around a ball, it is not playing a game. That this practice is clearly distinguished from any actual game can be seen at any football ground. People exercise to develop various skills and physical condition and then may have a practice game—often not the exact game for which they are training, but still a game. Examples are "touch" rugby, or "out on the off" in cricket. These games are clearly distinguishable from the previous practice; obviously, a man at the nets is not playing cricket. Similarly, children may often play with a ball without playing a game.

These points clearly shew just how weak Wittgenstein's
analogical argument, quoted above, is. In the light of this we shall now look at some further remarks of Wittgenstein on the subject of rules in games. First, PI, *83. The first part of this presents no problem in the light of the above; the hypothetical suggestion is wrong, but on two counts, not just the one the argument suggests. It is quite probably inappropriate to say that they were playing a game, as much as it is probably inappropriate to say they were following definite rules at every throw. The second part also presents little problem to the claim that games are rule governed; even if we do make up the rules of a game as we go along, that game still has rules. Most of our games are, in fact, like this.

Next, let us look at PI, *68. This is a difficult passage and one that is often misinterpreted. Fortunately, Wittgenstein was not so naive as to suggest that tennis is not rule governed because there is no rule for how high to throw the ball, although this has been suggested. On the other hand the straw man (i.e., the hypothetical objector) is this naive; if Wittgenstein's analogical refutation is to have any weight then the straw man must require that for the use of a word to be rule governed, there must be, for example, a rule saying, "Thou shalt use the word 'game' in circumstances x, y, z, etc." which is absolute nonsense. As to whether this remark supports the view that games are not necessarily rule governed, I think it is impossible to say. Similarly, PI, **205 and 567, although containing statements about rules in games, give no clear indication either way.

However it is clear that, following the argument of PI, *66 regarding skill and amusement it seems that Wittgenstein must have thought having rules was not a defining characteristic of games. For his requirement here would be that all games should have one particular rule in common, and this plainly is not so. Also, as Wittgenstein thought
there wasn't anything common to all games, it follows, trivially, that having rules was not common to all games.

It is important to note that the last remark applies only to what Wittgenstein thought; it does not follow that having rules is not common to all games. An example of this inappropriate use of the argument of PI, *66 (a use which we might compare with the once common misuse of the "naturalistic fallacy") is:

There is no one set of characteristics - and this is the most obvious comparison - which everything we call 'games' shares, and hence, no characteristic called 'being determined by rules.' (Cavell, p. 171)

Obviously Cavell has swallowed PI, *66 hook, line and sinker. Such claims must be established for every suggested possible common characteristic of games.

Cavell also presents another confused but important argument claiming rules are not common to games.

There is a more radical sense in which rules do not 'determine' what a game is. One may explain the difference between, say, contract and auction bridge by 'listing the rules' but one cannot explain what playing a game is by 'listing rules.' Playing a game is 'a part of our (that is, we humans') natural history' (*25 PI), and until one is an initiate of this form of activity, the human gesture of 'citing a rule' can mean nothing. And we can learn a new game without ever learning or formulating its rules (*31 PI); not, however, without having mastered, we might say, the concept of a game. (Cavell, p. 171)

We must distinguish between playing a game and using the word "game," for what could be more distinct? Again, as noted repeatedly above, it is obviously silly to suggest that there is one list of rules whose members are common to all the things we call games. However, this is not to say that having rules is not one of the conditions a thing must satisfy before it may be properly called a game.

The second part of the argument is more interesting; it is part of the form already mentioned in sec. 3.2 above, an argument form which we shall meet again later (see sec. 4.2 below). Cavell argues that "... we can learn a new
game without ever learning or formulating its rules (*31 PI); not, however, without having mastered, we might say, the concept of a game."

Bees on returning to the hive go through a very complex and highly organised series of turning and wiggling, a ritual dance which also communicates to other bees the direction and distance of the food source from which they have returned. Cavell's argument commits us to the view that the bees, in order to learn this, must antecedently have the concept of a dance, and in order to learn to interpret the pattern must antecedently have the concept of language, or at least, of a symbolic system. This is obviously quite implausible (cf. Sellars, p. 325).

There are many "do's" and don'ts" that children learn, even before they can talk, let alone formulate or understand verbal expressions of rules. In fact it is plausible to suggest that humans learn the concept of a rule by this very method; i.e., they learn that a rule is a verbal formulation telling you to do or to abstain from doing those things you already knew to do or not to do.

Thus it seems that Cavell's argument only works if we always require the "initiation" cart to be before its horse. On these grounds it becomes clear that we might well learn to play rule governed games, and learn what it is to transgress, long before we learn the concept of a rule. (It is said that the great Morphy learned chess this way.) And likewise with games. It must be noted, however, that once a person has the use of language it is very easy to communicate rules by that means. The claim being made here is the logically prior one that it is not necessary to have the concept of a game before one can behave in accord with, or have one's behaviour restricted by, a rule (just as it is not necessary for the bees to have the concept of a dance before they can perform their dance).

So far I have only shewn that none of the arguments
examined prove that having rules is not a common characteristic of games. I have yet to produce an argument shewing that rules are such a common characteristic. This is a problem that we have already met: just what sort of argument would prove this? The problem is akin to that of shewing that, for example, all copper expands on heating. It can be easily shewn to be false, simply by finding a piece of copper that does not expand on heating. However, to shew it true would require us to test every piece of copper in the universe at all times, the very suggestion of which is absurd. The situation with words is not so bad as this; it might be possible to make an exhaustive list of all the things we call games, and to list their characteristics, although such a pursuit would seem somewhat foolish to say the least. Further, a single counter example in science may be held to disprove a generalisation, but with language we can be free to maintain the generalisation while noting the deviant case. Thus, for example, a three-legged horse is still a horse, a hooved quadruped of the genus equus; he is just a deviant horse. However, apart from making such an exhaustive examination of games, which I do not propose to do, I do not know what would count as a proof that all games are rule governed. So, following Wittgenstein's example (cf. *66 PI) I shall simply make the somewhat bald claim, that whatever example is brought up, then if it is a game, it can very likely be shewn to be rule governed.

There is one rather trivial point that must be mentioned for the sake of completeness. The word "game" has crept into modern slang to the extent that it now means almost anything. For example, "What's your game?" may ask at what you are employed, what you intend doing next, or even what is the point of your argument. Such is progress in language.
(b) Do all games require skill?

Here it is quite clear that Wittgenstein thought not. In *66 he is quite explicit:

Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. (PI, *66)

That it is absurd to suggest that all games might have one only skill in common is a point we have already laboured sufficiently above. However, the more general claim that if a thing does not require skill then it is not a game is in no way affected by this. Again, we run into the problem of what would count as a proof that skill is a feature of all games, and again must answer that, although we can easily disprove it, we cannot prove it. This problem is nothing new; it is simply an instance of the general problem of how to establish the truth of a generalisation. In scientific cases general claims are often true by definition--e.g., "All copper conducts electricity"--but, for obvious reasons, this course is not available here. In the following I shall simply take examples of games, especially those which look as though they might be counter-examples to the generalisation in question, and shew how they do, in fact, involve skill.

First, what sort of evidence will shew that a game does or does not require skill? Any game of which we can say that one player is better than another, or at which there are good players and bad players, or which some people can play and some cannot, or even at which some are more skillful than others, for that very reason may be said to involve skill.

Games are sometimes classified into games of chance and games of skill. However, it would be wrong to assume that in games of chance one requires only luck and no skill, and, conversely, that in games of skill luck plays no part. For example, chess is often taken to be a paradigm game of skill; however, in the recent world championship match be-
tween Spassky and Fischer, it was said by certain authoritative commentators that Spassky was unlucky at certain crucial points. At the other extreme games with dice are often held to be paradigms of games of chance. Here we must be careful to distinguish between playing a game with dice, playing with dice but not playing a game, and using dice as, say, a statistics teacher might, or as John Cage does in composing music. Games with dice very often require considerable skill. For example, Craps requires, if one is to play it well (i.e., not lose too much money), a knowledge of the probabilities involved and an ability to assess them quickly. Thus there are good players who, in the long run, lose a little, and there are bad players who lose a lot. Even in roulette there is not inconsiderable skill involved in minimising one's losses. And it requires skill to exercise the gambler's first commandment: "Never stop a winning streak and never follow a losing one," a skill many gamblers unfortunately lack.

Another example which, for obvious reasons, comes readily to mind is ring-a-ring-a-roses. Paraplegics cannot play it; stutterers have great difficulty with certain aspects of it; some children are bad players because they will not accept the social conventions of the game (e.g., in "The Rake's Progress" Tommy was not acceptable in the game because he was "too rough"). Thus, although the skills required may seem pretty trivial when compared with the skills involved in croquet or bridge, ring-a-ring-a-roses nevertheless does involve certain skills.

The above does not constitute a proof that if a thing does not involve skill then it is not a game. It is, further, subject to many of the criticisms made above of Wittgenstein's argument in PI, *66: the examples taken are exceedingly few and, perhaps, somewhat trivial. As with rules all that can really be said in reply is that, whatever example is brought up, if it is a game, then it can be demon-
strated that it involves skill.

(c) Are games purposive?

There are several senses of "purposive," all of which are relevant to this question. If the purpose of a game is whatever a player answers to the question, "Why do you play this game?" then games are purposive; however, this is quite trivial. Answers to this question might be: "To get fit;" "To take off weight;" "To amuse myself;" "To win because I like winning;" "For prestige;" "Because everyone else does;" "Because nobody else does;" etc. All these answers may be said to give indirect purposes for playing a particular game. A more interesting sense of "purpose" and one which, if it could be shewn to be common to all games, would be of much more use is that which is similar to "aim" or "objective." This might be called the direct purpose in playing a particular game.

Thus, for example, Bobby Fischer may play chess because he likes to win (indirect purpose) but in any particular game his aim (direct purpose) is to checkmate his opponent or force a resignation. The former is associated with the player, the latter with the game played.

The purpose (in this latter, more interesting sense) of the game is very easy to find in competitive games such as chess, rugby, bridge, tennis, etc. In most noncompetitive games it is also quite easy to find: patience, for example, presents no problem; similarly, when children play games of throwing a ball against a wall and catching it, they usually go through a progressively more complicated series of movements, the purpose of the game being to complete the series without a mis-catch.

It is interesting also to note that in most competitive games the purpose is independent of the skills used in attaining it. In running events this is not so—winning here is simply a consequence of superior skill—but then we do not normally call these games. Certainly, in rugby, for
example, superior skill will usually achieve the purpose of the game, but this purpose is not presented in terms of those skills.

It is, however, very difficult to see the purpose in ring-a-ring-a-roses. Wittgenstein's suggestion that it is used to learn language is, as I have already noted, highly questionable, and even if correct, this suggestion would provide an indirect purpose only. There are probably other similar children's games (which might be roughly grouped under the heading: "Ceremonial games") for which it is likewise difficult to find a purpose; another example is "Here we go around the mulberry bush." It is for this reason that in first introducing this characteristic I expressed doubt as to its being common to all games. However, it does seem common to most games, and thus, we might say, is a fairly prominent feature of the "game family." Another possibility, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, is that definitional use may be made of such features (common to most but not all of the things in question) by means of the mathematical notion of a filter and its consequences.

(d) Are games social?

Here it is quite clear that not all games are social. Patience is a very obvious counter-example. However it is useful to note that most games do involve social behaviour, even social intercourse of a certain kind. Examples of this are much too obvious to list. In another sense of "social" it might be said that games are social institutions--i.e., they are features of and dependent upon the society in which they are played. This is, however, a rather different point to which we shall return later.

As noted above with respect to "purpose," it is of some importance that being social is common to most, if not all, the things we call games.

However, even if it is allowed that the above four characteristics are necessary conditions for the use of
"game" it is quite obvious that they do not, either jointly or severally, provide a definition (a sufficient as well as necessary condition) of that word. Neither driving a car nor etiquette, to name but two examples, are games, and yet both are rule governed, both require skill, and both are social and purposive. Nevertheless it can plausibly be claimed, with respect to the four characteristics in question, (a) that they do restrict the possible "linguistic anarchy" in respect of "game," and (b) that they are at the very least, prominent characteristics of the "game family."
3.4 In the preceding section I have argued that, contrary to what Wittgenstein tells us, there may very well be characteristics which all games have in common. Specifically I have argued that if a thing is not rule governed and does not require skill, then it is not a game. Further, being purposive and being social are features common to most, if not all, games. However, as pointed out repeatedly above, none of these arguments prove that any of the features in question are common to all games (for example, see 3.3 above). Proof of these hypotheses is not impossible and is within the scope of Wittgenstein's conception of the philosopher's task at least. However, being empirical, such a proof would be considered by most to be outside the philosopher's domain.

Following the suggestions of PI, *43, *373, and *654-5, we would proceed as follows: first we would draw up lists of typical but various uses of the word "game" and lists of exactly similar sentences but with "game" replaced by synonyms such as "sport," "amusement," "skill," etc., the most useful of which would, presumably, be determined in the normal way by discussion groups; then a list of uses of "game" in unusual contexts and with unusual co-occurring words (cf. 3.1, above) would be compiled. These lists would be shewn to a large number of English speaking people in a wide a variety of social and geographic settings as possible, these people being asked to assess the sentences on the lists for acceptability and deviance. The very dubious method of asking people straight off such definitional questions as: "If something is not rule governed can it be a game?" might be a useful preliminary. The results of such a survey, analysed in the appropriate manner, would provide a definition of the word game, or demonstrate that there really was none. Of course the result might vary from place to place, social group to social group, but this presents no problem. There may also be isolable deviant
cases—for example, Moore's definition of a horse ("A hooved quadruped of the genus equus") does include three legged horses. Thus extraordinary counter-examples would not immediately discredit such a definition. This method would be quite in accord with Wittgenstein's recommendations. It is not, however, in accord with Wittgenstein's own procedures.

In 3.1 above, I remarked that the four features considered and rejected by Wittgenstein as common to all games were "exceedingly superficial." So also, by the same token, are the four that I have considered and claimed to be characteristic of games. Examination in depth (cf. PI **111 and 664 and 3.1 above) of the use of "game" and of the place and function of games in society might provide another means of finding a definition of "game." The former is within the province of empirical linguistics and is roughly as outlined above. The latter falls within the province of anthropology. It has been suggested that the games played in a society are an important, integral and dependent part of the culture of that society (i.e., of that in virtue of which the society in question is individuable). Following this suggestion some anthropologists have studied games as well as religious institutions, myths, folklore, etc. in order to try to understand different cultures. Their analyses are not of the superficial "this happens and this happens . . . plus correlations" kind; they do have the character of depth" (*111 PI). For example, the women of Bellow's Arnewi tribe (see Henderson, the Rain King by Saul Bellow, a work of fiction but factually based) play cats cradle whereas the games played by New Zealand women tend to be highly competitive: one would expect to find corresponding differences in other aspects of the social behaviour of these groups. How this kind of data is to be handled, analysed, will depend on the type of anthropologist: A structuralist would, in studying games, look for the underlying principles found also in other aspects of social life. A symbolic interactionist would be
more concerned with the manner in which games are conducted and how individuals comported themselves in the context of a game; he would then relate this back to wider aspects of the society. In the above example, if one's expectations proved correct (which in this case, of course, they do, the Arnewi being highly socialistic compared with New Zealand) one might hypothesise that games are used to reinforce the learned rules of other aspects of social behaviour (cf. Bali Studies and Growing Up in New Guinea by Margaret Mead; "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," Clifford Geertz, in Daedalus, Winter 1972). And such an hypothesis is testable in other comparative situations. It is in this relating of the place, use, and function of games to wider aspects of a society that the possibility of a definition of "game" presents itself. Of course, such a definition would be theory relative and of a quite different kind to the "necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of" kind we favour in philosophy, but nevertheless it would be a usable definition. It would also be much less superficial than the kind we have been discussing above, which would, of course, be in accord with what we learn from Wittgenstein.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of games in natural social settings is the difficulty found in classifying them in terms of social categories. The concept "game" is a "grey" one. At one extreme we find the most serious of religious rituals treated as games: e.g., participants in Easter plays in western Belgium (where it is also a great honour to be a participant) play tricks on each other during actual performances (in much the same way as actors in pantomimes do here) and report that they have never had so much fun in their lives; cf. also Prof. J. Powier's study of the ritual dances for appeasing the dead among the Mimika people of New Guinea. At the other extreme manual workers commonly make games of their work: e.g., I have worked on a ship unloading matches in 20 lb. packs where we
formed an "All Black" backline, complete with names and commentary, along which we passed the cartons; also we now have competitions in brick-laying, truck driving, etc. Further, we might cite professional games, the occupations of the players and the big business associated with them, or the strange place of "National Games" in many countries. The relevance of this to this thesis will become apparent in sec. 5.2.
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NOTES

1 And here we might also note a remark made by Wittgenstein in BB, p. 81, which indicates that at some time at least he may have thought that being entertaining was common to games. Of the languages which he claims children use in language acquisition he says: "... and here they even have the entertaining character of games." Note also RMN, Pt. II, *77, where Wittgenstein discusses a game "such that whoever begins can win by a particular simple trick. But this has not been realized—so it is a game. How someone draws our attention to it—and it stops being a game."

2 That atoms may best be considered as theoretical entities, and that the word "atom" is, by comparison with most words in more common currency, well defined, makes no difference here. What is in question here is the form of the argument. Thus if the argument form can be shown to produce nonsense in one case, there is little reason to hold it good in others. An objection to this may be that molecules and atoms are not relevant, similar to games and skills in that molecules can only be comprised of atoms selected from a relatively small finite class, easily specified by scientists. But such an objection would not hold, for skills also form a small and finite class which is—potentially at least—specifiable.

3 It is from *664, PI, that Chomsky says he got the surface/depth distinction (see Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, footnote 12)

4 This sentence is ambiguous, but I cannot find a better way of expressing the point. It is intended to be read in such a way that "ultimate" is in terms of "correct;" i.e., we require a correct (true) account of the notion of meaning, how words in fact succeed in meaning.

5 For Wittgenstein this move requires no justification—see, for example, PI, *189—but Wittgenstein himself never says a word to establish the legitimacy of it, i.e., of answering "How is it used?" or "What does it mean?" questions with how it was learned. And, of course, there are situations in which we use training in one thing to develop ability in another; e.g., to improve someone's ability at crawl it is very useful to make him swim a lot of backstroke. Similarly, note the use of logic in first year philosophy,
CHAPTER FOUR

WHY "LANGUAGE-GAME" IS AN APT CHOICE

4.1 Aversion to the notion of essence carries Wittgenstein so far in the direction of subjectivism and relativism that he is apparently unable to see that there is something important about games and something important about languages (even if these somethings are not describable as fixed and unalterable essences) which makes his use of the phrase language-game seriously misleading instead of positively enlightening.

For it is certainly the case that languages and games differ profoundly, and even if this difference cannot be formulated in terms of difference of essence, it can be formulated in other terms. In other words, there are certain characteristics, certain features — if you like, certain criteria — which one gradually learns to regard as trustworthy, subject to modification with the growth of experience and knowledge though they may be, and not reducible to a single, fixed and unalterable essence, which yet distinguish games from other things, in a sufficiently unambiguous manner.

Among other things a game, unlike a language, is something one can look upon from the outside, something one can comment upon, and toward which one can adopt the attitude of an impartial spectator, without becoming in any way involved in it oneself. In the case of a game, one can "look and see" just what is transpiring; it has a limited purpose and a prescribed rationale lending itself easily to a "perspicuous representation." So far as the game is concerned, the "meaning" of the pieces and implements is determined by the uses to which they are put in the course of the game. In other words, playing a game always involves the manipulation (the "use" in the sense of manipulation only) of "pieces" (chess-men, cards, balls . . .) and of the tools of the game.

No game is of vital importance; it is least of all a "form of life," but rather is an unessential activity, lacking a serious purpose.

In all of these and numerous other significant ways games differ profoundly from languages. Only the operation of a symbolic calculus bears some remote analogy to the playing of a game, and it may well be that his early preoccupation with symbolic logic tended to encourage Wittgenstein in the erroneous belief that such an analogy could be generalized so as to cover all language, and thus justify coining the phrase "language-game."
No; a game is not, in any sense, an instrumentality, such as language essentially is. Thus one can hardly imagine a more inappropriate linking of terms than the one incorporated in the phrase "language-game." Instead of serving any useful or enlightening purpose, it can only tend to confusion and obscurity. In particular, a theory of meaning based, in part at least, upon a presumed analogy between games and languages has nothing to commend it, and everything to justify hesitation in adopting it. (H.R. Smart, pp. 232-3)

Thus, Harold Smart sums up Wittgenstein's use of the expression "l-g." If this attack is substantiable then it would seem that Wittgenstein was seriously astray in thinking that l-gs could throw light on problems in philosophy. A brief synopsis of the points Smart makes against l-gs will shew more clearly what is involved here.

a.) Language and games are different even although this difference may not be formulable in terms of essence. We can and do make this distinction in a sufficiently unambiguous manner.

b.) Games are observable and describable "from the outside." (He does not say that language is not, although this would seem to be implied.)

c.) That the meaning of a piece in a game is given by its use is very clear. (Again this is presumably supposed to be in comparison with language, although Smart does not say so explicitly.)

d.) "No game is of vital importance; it is least of all a 'form of life,' but is rather an unessential activity lacking a serious purpose." (Again the implied contrast is with language.)

e.) Language is an instrumentality, whereas games are not.

It is on these five points that Smart bases his conclusion that the phrase "l-g" has no utility in philosophy. Set out thus it becomes apparent that the first four points are reasonably easily answered, and the fifth, while leading to more interesting and difficult problems, should also
be answerable. In answering these charges we shall need to investigate thoroughly Wittgenstein's reasons for using the idea of "1-g."

Before proceeding further it is necessary to distinguish between the artificial 1-gs Wittgenstein uses as a method in doing philosophy and the natural 1-gs, as they occur in what I have called "the 1-g thesis." (See sec. 2.1 above.) Following Zabeek I shall use the notation "ARl-g" and "NAI-g" for artificial 1-gs and natural 1-gs respectively. Wittgenstein did not, himself, draw this distinction. However, it is quite clear that there are these two distinct uses of the expression in his later work and that he changed from the one use (ARl-gs) to the other (NAI-gs) as he progressed in the later work. A complete survey of this distinction can be found in sec. 2.1 above.

In the case of ARl-gs we can say, from Wittgenstein's own writing, what they are, as can be seen, for example, on p. 17, B1B. Further such passages and examples are detailed in sec. 2.1. In the case of NAI-gs, quite obviously, we would not expect to find such clear accounts of their nature. This problem will be studied in Ch. 6, below.

Why Wittgenstein should have chosen the expression "1-g" for use as in ARl-g does not seem to offer many problems. What he wanted to do with them is also fairly clear in several passages. For example, in the preface to BB, p. viii, on p. 17, B1B or P1, *130. How ARl-gs can be used to achieve the desired end will be examined in Ch. 5 below. For our present purposes this does not really matter. From the above passages it can be seen that the fact that Wittgenstein called ARl-gs "1-gs" is of very little consequence. As far as their use as a philosophical method goes, it would not matter what he called them. As to Smart's criticisms, they clearly do not apply to ARl-gs.

It is at NAI-gs, the "1-g thesis," that Smart directs his attack. By way of contrast with Smart's remarks it is
worth noting the remarks of an enthusiast for Wittgenstein's idea of "I-gs.

The claim for the multiplicity and diversity of meaningful speech uses is reinforced by the analogy Wittgenstein draws between language-using activities and games. For this he uses the now well-known term "language-games." In addition the analogy calls to our attention the contextual environs upon which users depend for some regularity and order in "getting along" or understanding what is being done with words, symbols, and sentences. (D. High, p. 70)

The most important point to note here is that the expression "I-g" is an analogy. Wittgenstein himself refers to it as such in PI, *83. An analogy is not an identity; it is "an agreement or correspondence in certain respects between things otherwise different." (Chambers 20th Century Dictionary). Thus there may be an analogy between X and Y if there are some features of X that are paralleled by, are similar to, or follow the same pattern as some features of Y. It is not necessary that all features of X should be paralleled by or in one-to-one correspondence with all features of Y.

Take for example a rather beautiful analogy used by the late Hemi Baxter: there were some Maoris paddling up the Wanganui in a canoe; some Pahekás came by in a jet boat swamping the canoe; the Pahekás invited the Maoris to join them in the jet boat, which they did; but the engine proved too powerful for the jet boat, shaking it so that the boat opened up, and grounded; thus both parties had to join together in the building of a raft. The point is obvious and I doubt whether it could have been expressed more clearly or effectively in any other way. The mode of expression might be analysed thus: the traditional Maori way of life is to the canoe as the Paheka way of life is to the jet boat (or, equivalently, the Maori way is to the Paheka way as the canoe is to the jet boat); the consequent fate of both groups is as the fate of the jet boat, the remedy as for the combined crew. This analogy holds in many respects, e.g., man powered/machine powered, slow and quiet/fast and
noisy. But quite obviously there are many features of canoes and jet boats that it is patently absurd to compare in this context, e.g., descriptive characteristics of the hulls—e.g., the displacement ratios, or prismatic coefficients. This points to another important feature of analogies: their effectiveness in communicating insights depends to a great extent upon the sympathy of the reader, and, to a lesser extent, upon his imagination. Any analogy can be made to look pointless and/or inappropriate by a determinedly contrary reader (which is not to say that all analogies are good or useful analogies). Finally, there is the dramatic impact of a well chosen analogy, which is admirably illustrated by Baxter's story.

Thus, by simply taking a cursory look at the nature of analogy we are in a position to deal with Smart's first point of criticism. Of course, language and games are different; it would be very odd indeed to assert that they are the same, in any sense. But this in no way detracts from the potential usefulness of the expression "l-g;" rather, it is a precondition of that usefulness. One would not expect to get very far, philosophically or otherwise, by, say, comparing ichthyologists with scientists who study fish. But of course this criticism (Smart's) is a very general one. He does proceed to point out ways in which he considers language and games are importantly different. Whether or not these differences will be relevant to the effectiveness of the use of "l-g" will depend upon the purpose of using that expression. As this is a criticism of Wittgenstein's use of "l-g" then it is only in relation to his purpose that the differences Smart points out between language and games can be assessed.

There are many passages in PI from which we can get some idea of Wittgenstein's purpose in using "l-g." An especially important passage, to which we shall often have cause to refer, occurs in PI, **23 and 24. This is a quite
clear account of the virtues of "keeping l-gs in mind;"
keeping in mind the multiplicity and diversity of l-gs frees
us from the constraints of certain hard and fast theories
of language--"pictures, which hold us captive" (cf. PI, *115).
The prime example is, of course, Wittgenstein's own theory
of the primacy of descriptive language as expressed in the
Tractatus: e.g.,

The general form of a proposition is: This is how
things stand. (T, 4.5)

This, however, is of no help in answering Smart's
criticisms. His criticisms are, so to speak, prior to the
results, or purpose of using l-gs, as expressed above. His
argument is that the expression "l-g" is ill-chosen: that
it is an inept, inappropriate and misleading way of achieving
this aim. Why then did Wittgenstein choose it? The
answer to this is contained in PI *65 ff.

In the ensuing explanation he discusses not language,
or l-gs, but "game;" see PI, **66, 67. Here it is quite
clear that he is explaining, by way of the clear example of
"game," that "language" also is not definable in the tradi-
tional sense, and the various uses of language are best
characterised by way of family resemblance. Thus the pri-
mary point of his use of l-gs is to remind us that language,
like games, does not have an essence.

If this lack of essence is the only point of similarity
intended in the use of the analogical expression "l-g"
then the case for Wittgenstein looks pretty thin. However,
there is a lot more to it than this.

The problems involved in this argument have been dis-
cussed in Ch. 3 above. There also, certain features which
might be common to all games were discussed. It was also
noted that in his initial explanation of the notion of fam-
ily resemblance Wittgenstein refers to various features of
the "family"--"build, features, color of eyes . . ." (see
PI, *67)--but does not mention any of the "family features"
of "game." Thus, even if the characteristics studied as
possibly essential to games are not so, it was suggested that they are very prominent among the "game family characteristics."

Of course the same sort of considerations apply to the case for "language" being indefinable in the traditional "necessary and sufficient condition" sense, and being better characterised by a family resemblance notion. Thus, given the nature of the argument to show language has no essence and its problems, we must, just as in the case of "game," look further into the possibility of there being characteristics common to all that we call language. Such an investigation should, at least, produce prominent features of the "language family."

In this light we shall examine the same four features as we examined the case of "game": viz., that language is rule governed, that use of language requires skill, that language is purposive and that language is social. However, before proceeding, a further clarification of the subject of this investigation is required.

We are not here looking for linguistic universals in the sense in which a linguist uses that term. It is of no direct consequence to this thesis that all language has a deep and a surface structure, or that the sounds used in a language should be drawn from a fixed and finite class of sounds, although, of course, such things have considerable related interest. Wittgenstein was concerned with different uses of language, for example, in ethics, law, science, etc. (cf. PI, *23), or in asserting facts, asking questions, etc. However, there is also much in PI on the use of language in general that is relevant here, especially the question of languages being rule governed (for example see PI, *92). And of course there is Wittgenstein's over-riding dictum that language should not be separated from its use. Linguists are not guilty of separating language from its use; on the contrary, among all recent philosophers of
language, linguists are the only ones who collect empirical data on language use. But this field of study has developed since Wittgenstein's death and thus he could not be expected to take account of it. Nevertheless, I am quite sure it is an approach to language of which he would have greatly approved (cf., e.g., PI, **124, 340).

However, linguists study language as scientists, even although certain features of their subject matter make theirs a somewhat extraordinary science. The universals that linguists look for might be called "general facts of nature," and this is not the primary concern of philosophy (cf., PI, p. 230).

4.2 (a) Is language rule governed?

As with the question of whether or not games are rule governed (see sec. 3.3 above) it is necessary here to be clear about what is meant by the expression "rule governed." The sense in which it should be understood in this context is that language is rule governed if there are rules (in the sense determined in sec. 3.2 above) which delimit the range of possible behaviour of person who can appropriately be said to be using language (cf. sec. 3.3 above). It is most important here to understand "rule" in the sense gleaned from Wittgenstein's various remarks in sec. 3.2 above. Further, much of the argument and arguments forms discussed in sec.s 3.2 and 3.3 above apply here. One restriction that is, however, worth noting at the outset is that we cannot use the analogy between "language" and "game" to establish or illustrate any points in this section (as Wittgenstein does, for example, in PI, *83). As one of the main objectives of this section is to establish the usefulness of the "game" "language" analogy it would be quite obviously circular to use it for that same purpose.

It is not transparently clear whether or not Wittgenstein thought that language was rule governed. However, I think that on investigating his remarks in PI it is most
reasonable to conclude that he did think so, but only in the sense of "rule" already outlined (see sec. 3.2).

Two remarks from PI which suggest that Wittgenstein thought language rule governed, are PI, **68 and 199. Again, it cannot be over-emphasised that the relevance of this remark can only be assessed here in the light of Wittgenstein's own conception of rules. Similarly with PI, *207; note especially the last sentence and compare this with PI, *208, which has been remarked upon already in Ch. 3 above and will be again noted below. Note also PI, *355, especially the bracketed part on Wittgenstein's conception of rules—"To obey a rule . . . are customs (uses, institution)" (PI, *199)—it would seem that here at least he thought understanding a language meant being able to use or act within its rules.

On the other hand, the important argument beginning at PI, *81 might be interpreted as claiming language is not rule governed. This would, however, be a wrong interpretation. The claims made in this passage do not conflict exactly with the preceding passages. What Wittgenstein is arguing against here is the idea that language must proceed according to fixed rules after the fashion of a logical calculus, an appealing idea to which he himself had previously fallen victim (cf. sec. 3.2):

To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules. (B1B, p. 25)

This analogical argument has already been discussed in sec. 3.3 above.

There are further facets of the phenomenon of language which, although not considered by Wittgenstein in PI, have considerable bearing on the question at hand. The first and most outstanding of these that we shall consider here is what is commonly called "the creative aspect of language." In everyday life we produce, either verbally or in written form, hear, read, thousands of linguistic expressions most
of which we understand (for an explanation of what it is to understand, see, e.g., FI, **150, 182, 269, 433) without any effort. But an (empirical) examination of this data shews that around ninety-nine percent of these expressions we have not previously produced, heard, or read. Thus the ability which a native speaker of a language has, in virtue of which we say he can speak that language, is a generative, or creative ability. The only plausible way of explaining this is that language is rule governed and that the rules of language are generative. It is this hypothesis that led to the development of generative and transformational grammars by linguists during the last fifteen years.

Not only is the native speaker of a language able to understand this potentially infinite range of expressions in his language but he is also able to criticise deviant expressions as offending the grammar of his language. However, very few native speakers are ever able to produce a rule which has been offended in such cases. Usually he will say something like: "I get the point but you should say it like this: '...'." Thus of the native speaker we say that the rules of his language are internalised and he does not, usually, have ready access to expressions of those rules.

Even more extraordinary is the fact that most spoken language—and spoken language is generally considered to be the primary form of language—is not in accord with its rules. For example, we do not always speak in sentences: we make false starts; we change track part way through; we fill in large parts with "You know's" and other devices. This does not, however, indicate an absence of rules. If it did then we would not have grounds for saying that such expressions were odd, deviant, or ungrammatical, and all native speakers can, upon reflection, do this.

This last point assumes even more importance when we realise that we learn these rules without being exposed to language in accord with them. Children learn to speak the
language to which they are exposed, and this is spoken lan-
guage. Whether or not they are prompted, corrected, or just
left alone in learning has no impact on their rate of acqui-
sition of their first language (see McNeill, Language Acqui-
sition).

There is, however, an important problem yet to be
overcome. This is a counter argument that we have already
met in one form or another, and of which Wittgenstein was
well aware. A very clear presentation of it is to be found
in W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, p. 321:

It seems plausible to say that a language is a system
of expressions, the use of which is subject to certain
rules. It would seem, thus, that learning to use a
language is learning to obey the rules for the use of
its expressions. However, taken as it stands, this
thesis is subject to an obvious and devastating refu-
tation . . .

The refutation runs as follows:

**Thesis.** Learning to use a language \((L)\) is learning
to obey the rules of \(L\).

But, a rule which enjoins the doing of an action \((A)\)
is a sentence in a language which contains an expres-
sion for \(A\).

Hence, a rule which enjoins the using of a linguistic
expression \((E)\) is a sentence in a language which con-
tains a expression for \(E\). - in other words, a sentence
in a meta-language.

Consequently, learning to obey the rules for \(L\) presup-
poses the ability to use the metalanguage \((ML)\) in
which the rules for \(L\) are formulated.

So that learning to use a language \((L)\) presupposes
having learned to use the metalanguage \((ML)\). And
having learned to use a metametalanguage \((MLL)\) and
so on.

But this is impossible (a vicious regress).

Therefore, the thesis is absurd and must be rejected.

(W. Sellars, p. 321)

That Wittgenstein saw the problems raised by this type of
argument is quite clear, as has been pointed out already
in sec. 3.2 from, for example, PI, *84. His refutation of
the argument is also quite clear. To obey a rule is to
adopt a practice, a form of life; rules do not, by them-
selves tell us what to do (see sec. 3.2 above). How we
learn the rules of the rule governed behaviour we call
language is explained, for example, in PI, *208. As this has already been discussed with respect to rules in sec. 3.2 above I shall not repeat that discussion here. The specific question of language acquisition will be discussed in some detail in sec. 5.2 below. The point remarked above, that we do not in general have access to formulations of rules of language but can still understand an indefinitely large range of expressions and also pick those which are not in accord with the rules of language. In the end we must say, simply, "This is what I do, that is not what I do" (cf. PI, *217).

Thus we might reasonably conclude that language is rule governed (in the sense given at the beginning of this section) and that Wittgenstein also so regarded it. However, before doing so we must first examine this conclusion in the light of Wittgenstein's purpose in PI as outlined in this respect in sec. 4.1 above. As noted there his concern was with the different areas of language, the different uses to which language is, or might be put.

We would not expect rules to be the same for different languages—i.e. English, German, Chinese, etc.—although against this we must note, in passing, the structural universals posited by linguists. Nor would we expect to find the same rules in all the multifarious different uses to which a single language is put. Thus, let us take, for example, rules of the kind that Sellars suggests, i.e., rules governing the use of linguistic items. We would not expect to find the rules for the use in, say, logic, ethics and literary criticism of a given linguistic item used in those fields to be the same. For a dramatic example, the rules for the use of "fuck" and its cognates would seem to be quite different in, say, the study of old English literature and the everyday conversation of longshoremen. And yet this is clearly not a straightforward case of ambiguity—of different senses of the same orthographic item.
However, this in no way upsets our tentative conclusion; on the contrary, all the discussion in this section establishes the very point that would seem closest to Wittgenstein's own view: that language has rules, but that these rules are different in different uses (suburbs—cf. PI, *18) of language.

(b) Does using language require skill?
There seems to be little problem here. We do commonly and appropriately say "he is good with words," "he is a fine speaker," "he is a good writer," "he is bad at expressing himself," etc. We also appropriately say that someone has not yet learned a language, or has yet to master a language. All these expressions are indications that the use of language involves skill. Such expressions are also used for different areas of a language. Thus someone might be very good at writing on chemistry but hopeless at cocktail parties, or be good at most uses of language but fail to master legal language. A prime example of this sort of thing would be Oliver Goldsmith, who, it is said, "Wrote like an angel, But talked like a poor Pol."

(c) Is language purposive?
This question as it stands is much too general and any sort of answer to it will thus be confusing. It is worth noting, however, that Wittgenstein does consider and reject such an answer, for example, in PI, **501 and 304. We shall discuss two more specific questions which are more relevant to this thesis and which might be answered without too much confusion. These are: "Is the use of language purposive?" and "Are the various uses of language purposive?" In sec. 3.3 (c) we discussed the question, "Are games purposive?" drawing a distinction between the purpose a player has in playing a game (the kind of things he might answer to "Why do you play this game?") and the purpose of the game itself. This is the kind of distinc-
tion intended here.

Thus the first question asks after people's purpose in writing or saying things; i.e., what they might answer to "Why did you say/write that?" As such it is not a very interesting question. What it boils down to is whether people speak (or write), i.e., use language, with some end in view, or make random and gratuitous utterances. The answer is clear: while the former is obviously the primary and most common use of language there is an unfortunately prevalent tendency to the latter.

The second question is the more interesting and relevant here. The form of the question suggests a necessary "Yes" answer, and while I think this is the correct answer its apparent necessity is unintended and unfortunate. Putting the question thus is simply a matter of convenience and clarity. It would, of course, be much easier to ask: "Are language-games purposive?", but as pointed out in sec. 4.1, this might well be found question begging. By "uses" is, in this question, intended the various "suburbs" (cf. PI, *18), or areas of language (in more recent jargon, "universes of discourse" expresses a similar, although not identical division).²

Wittgenstein took some pains in emphasising that all of language did not have a single nor a primary purpose (cf., e.g., PI, **23, 24, 304, 501). He also emphasised the instrumental nature of language—language is an instrument, or a collection of instruments, or tools. This comparison is made quite explicitly in PI, **11 and 569. Instruments and tools are things with which we do things. They are made for a purpose and are usually best or most efficient when used for that purpose. Tasks for which we use tools or instruments are extremely varied and so tools and instruments are correspondingly varied. However, many instruments are inter-changeable although generally with some loss of efficiency. A carpenters' hammer and a 12 lb.
slogging hammer can be used for the same purposes (cf. PI, *569!).

From PI, *23, etc., it seems that Wittgenstein not only thought that the different uses of language are purposive, but also that they are best distinguished on the basis of purpose. (This will be discussed in detail in Ch. 6, below.) This seems a very reasonable position.

There are, however, exceptions to be noted. It is not difficult to find, especially in poetry and some other forms of literature, uses of language which are quite independent of the purpose for which that language is primarily or usually used. An example is Mog Edwards' dreamy listing of cloth types in Under Milkwood by Dylan Thomas. It makes a beautiful sequence of sounds but otherwise, for the purpose for which it is used, it is irrelevant that it is the language of drapery. Nevertheless, we would call this a use of language.

Thus we shall conclude that language (in this sense) is purposive: the language of ethics is for doing ethics, the language of logic is for doing logic, questions are for asking things (cf. PI, *24), descriptions are for describing, etc. However, language is sometimes put to uses quite independent of its primary purpose, for example, in poetry, songs, etc., while still remaining language, and thus purposiveness is not completely general in the different uses of language.

(d) Is language social?

There would seem to be very little problem in answering "Yes, with known exceptions" to this question. We talk to each other, we write to each other. As Dr. Eric Berne shows (see e.g., The Games People Play) not only do we shew a great propensity for making meaningful linguistic communications, despite usually having nothing to say, doing so is essential to the maintenance of a healthy balance of trace elements in the spinal column. However, we also talk to
ourselves, soliloquize. This seems clearly to be an unusual or secondary use of language, but nevertheless it does stand as an exception to the generality of language's being social.

Thus it seems that being rule governed and requiring skill is common to all language and being purposive and social is common to most. However, no one rule and no one purpose and no one skill can be found to be common. These features of language obviously do not constitute a definition of "language" ("Language use") as they are also common to both car driving and etiquette. However, all that is being claimed here is that they are, at the very least, very prominent features of the "language family."

4.3 The similarity between sections 4.2 and 3.3 are quite obvious. In the case of sec. 4.2 (a) most of the crucial points have already been covered in sec. 3.3; however, this was not only because of the similarity of the problems arising therein, but also because many of the problems regarding games' being rule governed required discussion of the logically prior problems of language and rules. Of course, the parallel development of these two sections was deliberate. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this was achieved without any noticeable straining of the subject matter or stretching of the various points involved. This might well be taken as an encouraging indication of the aptness of the language/game analogy.

Taking the points of sections 3.3 and 4.2 we see, clearly, four points of agreement, or correspondence between language and games. Both language and games have rules, although these rules vary from game to game and from language use to language use. Both language and games are purposive although the purpose involved in different games varies, and the purpose involved in different language uses varies. In all these first three cases no single feature--i.e., a particular rule, skill, or purpose--could be found
common to all games or to all language uses. In case of purpose, exception could be found to its generality in both games and language uses without much difficulty. Both language and games are social, although again exceptions could be found. The parallels are quite striking.

There are further points of similarity between language and games. One, which might at first glance seem too trivial to be worthy of mention, is that both language and games are human activities: in language we have the speaker(s) or writer(s) and hearer(s) or reader(s); in games we have player(s). There are also parallel exceptions to the plurality of participants: soliloquy parallels the various solo games—solitaire, patience, etc. This point has considerable importance in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

He intended PI to be read in contrast to his earlier work in T; in the preface to PI he writes that he would like to have had published both works together:

that the latter (PI) could be seen in the right light only be contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. (PI, Preface, p. x)

In T Wittgenstein treated language in an austere theoretically way, paying little attention to human involvement. In PI he continually emphasised that language is a human activity—“Words are also deeds” (PI, *546). Thus this similarity between language and games, far from being trivial, may be seen as centrally important.

There are many, many different games; there are many, many different uses of language. Language and games are thus similar in respect of their multiplicity. This on its own should not occasion much interest; there are many different types of fish, many different haircuts, etc. However, if we take into account the various anthropological phenomena noted at the end of sec. 3.4 it assumes somewhat greater importance. Games, like language, are found in all spheres of human behaviour. Furthermore, if we look at this similarity against the background of the points of similar-
ity between language and games already discussed it becomes of considerably more interest. The multiplicity and multifarious nature of our different uses of language was, in fact, one of the main points for which Wittgenstein used the language/game analogy. This is a feature of our use of language more readily overlooked than recognised, as Wittgenstein notes in *304 and on p. 224 of PI. The language/game analogy helps to point out the error of assimilating different uses of language and to guard against doing so. We make much mistakes, not only in assimilating the languages of different topics, but also in philosophy of language. The former is the kind of mistake Ryle later called "category mistake:" in this respect the expression "l-g," or, in earlier parts of this chapter, "language use," is similar to "universe of discourse." The latter mistake is, as pointed out in sec. 4.2, one of which Wittgenstein himself was guilty of in T. This is another use of "l-g" (see PI, *23).

If we combine two of the points of similarity between language and games noted above, viz., both are social and both involve "performers," then another important feature of the analogy comes into prominence, viz., language use is a human activity. This is, in fact, mentioned by Wittgenstein later in PI, *23:

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI, *23)

Thus, in analysing sentences, or uses of words, we must keep in mind the entire social setting and background of the l-g (use of language) which is its "natural home." That is, we should take into account the features of the entire social circumstance in which the expression in question would naturally be used. This point has long been taken for granted by linguists and anthropologists. For example, Malinowski suggested: "Language, in its primitive function, (is) to be regarded as a mode of action rather than a
countersign of thought."

(Reported by K.L. Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behaviour*) Pike also, interestingly enough, reports that he first heard language compared to a game (a game of tennis!) by the linguist Edward Sapir in 1937. In the same work Pike reports R.H. Robins as saying:

The cardinal principle of linguistics, at least in Great Britain, (is) that language must always, and in every analysis, be studied as a part of social process and social activity, and every utterance must be considered and understood within its context situation... and it is contextual function alone that constitutes and guarantees linguistic meaning.

This, a comparatively recent remark, seems to bear the clear stamp of Wittgenstein's thinking, or that of J.L. Austin, who might reasonably say, carried on in a more practical and programmatic way, the theoretical developments made by Wittgenstein.

Let us now return to Smart's criticisms of Wittgenstein's use of the expression "l-g" (see sec. 4.1 above). These were five, the first of which, being very general, was discussed earlier. I shall refer to the remaining four by the letters under which they were summarised, in each case repeating the summary.

b.) Games are observable"from the outside"—language is not. In the text Smart enlarges upon what he means by "from the outside":

(a game is) something one can comment upon and toward which one can adopt the attitude of an impartial spectator, without becoming in any way involved in it oneself. (H.R. Smart, p. 233)

It is not at all clear to me that this is correct, insofar as it is supposed to be in contrast with a use of language. Prima facie we might argue as follows: a person quite unfamiliar with a given game, say rugby, or chess, etc., may watch an instance of it and perceive all the activity, the moves, involved in that game—that is, he may observe the same "factual activity" as an afficionado watch—
ing the same game. But by the same token, to take an extreme example, a monolingual English speaker may listen to a lecture in Chinese and hear the same sound sequence as does a fluent speaker of Chinese listening to the same lecture. At a more relevant level, a person with no knowledge whatsoever of, say, chemistry may in listening to a discussion on that subject, hear the same sounds as a skilled chemist. Stated so bluntly, it becomes quite clear that Smart's is a uselessly superficial view.

A person who plays a game will, in watching it played by others, be aware of much more than will the uninstructed observer. He will be aware of a complex pattern of relationships not apparent to the other. Likewise, someone familiar with a particular use of language will be aware of far more in observing an instance of it than will the observer to whom it is unfamiliar and, it is important to note, we can and do observe uses of language. As noted above, language involves speaker(s) (or writer(s)) and hearer(s) (or reader(s)), and on this ground it may be claimed that in any supposed observation of a use of language because the observer must either be a hearer or a reader he is, ipso facto, a participant. (And by way of contrast, we can and do observe games without taking part.) If this is the only distinction Smart wishes to draw, then it would seem somewhat spurious, to say the least. However, even so, there are doubts one can raise about even this distinction. Would a monolingual New Guinea hill tribesman hearing a discussion on relativity theory by first class monolingual Chinese scientists really be participating in that discussion? When we hear a fragment of the conversation of some passers-by in a crowded street are we really taking part in that conversation? It is not my wish to get into a discussion on the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a participant in a use of language (Does one have to understand? (cf. Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding in PI) Does the speaker have
to intend his words for the hearer? etc.); that would seem a somewhat futile endeavour. Suffice it to say that the distinction is far less clear and far more complicated than would do for the spurious use mentioned above.

These same considerations throw doubt on Smart's suggested distinction on the grounds of "adopting the attitude of an impartial spectator, without becoming involved in it oneself." However, Smart continues:

(a game) has a limited purpose and a prescribed rationale lending itself easily to a "perspicuous representation." (Smart, p. 233)

There does seem to be a point here. Most games have a set of rules which are externally accessible in the sense that one does not have to be a player of the game to understand a formulation of them, whereas this is not the case with most areas of language. We do, of course, have rules of language. By prescriptive grammar we learn do's and don'ts of sentence construction, etc., and certain stylistic rules of thumb; however, it is perfectly clear that one can be a competent speaker without such rules. In descriptive grammars we find sets of rules describing how the "language faculty" might work; however, as linguists are very quick to point out, such sets of rules are models, the ideal of which would serve to generate all and only the acceptable sentences of the language it describes, but that the question: "Is this in fact how we do it" is not answerable, or does not make sense. Games, on the other hand, have a clear-cut and open relationship with their rules. However, the "niceties" or finer points of most games are not so amenable to "perspicuous representation;" examples from chess come most readily to mind, but also anyone who has, without previous experience thereof, tried to decipher an article on American football, even with a copy of the rules at hand, will get the point.

Despite the above, there is in Smart's criticism, the essence of an important point. Games do seem more readily
accessible, more open to examination, than do the various uses of language. However, far from counting against Wittgenstein's use of the language/game analogy, this would seem essential to it. If one wishes to use an analogy, one of the essentials to choosing the analogue is that it be more readily understood by the audience than the initial subject matter. In the example used in sec. 4.1, the analogue, canoe travel, jet boat travel, and raft travel are familiar and intelligible to all; on the other hand, the complex of relationships between Maori and European society does not lend itself to such a perspicuous representation.

c.) That the meaning of a piece in a game is given by its use is very clear (in contrast with language).

Here, of course, the reference is to the much quoted Wittgensteinian dictum: "Don't look for the meaning, look for the use." The basic source is PI, *43:

For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

First let us look at these remarks, as against common misrepresentation of them. The dictum referred to should be looked at in a plausible context. Thus the fact that there is no identification of meaning and use in it will be obvious. It might well occur after long debate on the necessary and sufficient conditions for use of a word, i.e., on the definition of a word, where problems have been found at all steps. Then we might say, "If you want to avoid confusion and make some progress in understanding, don't look for the meaning, look for the use."

PI, *43 also does not claim a hard and fast identity of meaning and use, or a definition of meaning as use as a general stipulation, or explication of our notion of the meaning of words, for all that much has been said on that basis. (Cf. the book, Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as Use by Garth Hallet, S.J., a thoroughly exhaustive study
of the evidence for and ramifications of such a definition.) Wittgenstein's choice of words is extremely cautious. "For a large class of cases - though not for all . . . ." needs no comment. Presumably one of the exceptions will be names, of which Wittgenstein says in the same section:

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. (PI, *43)

Nor does Wittgenstein say that meaning is use, or that meaning is defined as use; he says: " . . . the word 'meaning' can be defined thus: . . . .", thus allowing that it might also be defined otherwise.

Wittgenstein also speaks of the meaning of a piece in a game as its role (use) in the game, e.g., in PI, *563. But it is worth looking at what he is doing with this suggestion. He is showing that doubts can be raised as to what is to count as the use of the piece in the game. Another example he uses is the placing of one piece on top of another to make a king in draughts.

However, insofar as Smart's criticism does carry weight, the same considerations apply as to criticism b.) above. Insofar as it is important to look at the use of a word in order to gain an understanding of its meaning, then Smart's remark can only emphasise the virtue of the language/game analogy.

d.) "No game is of vital importance; it is least of all a 'form of life,' but is rather an unessential activity lacking a serious purpose." (Smart, p. 233). This depends on what you count as serious. In sec. 3.3 I argued that games are purposive, they do have a purpose in several different senses. There is the purpose for which a player plays (what he would answer to "Why do you play this game?"); the purpose associated with the game itself, e.g., check-mate in chess; and there is the overall function of games in the society. If Smart means by something's having a serious purpose that human life could not go on without
it—as might be plausibly said of language—then one can only agree that games do not have such a serious purpose. However, even so, we should note that human life as we know it would suffer a radical change if we were to do away with games. And, of course, in many senses of "serious purpose" games are not lacking. This presumably covers "vital importance" also. As to games' not being a "form of life" I shall, for now, only remark at the remarkable glibness with which many writers, Smart included, use this expression, as if they knew exactly what Wittgenstein meant by it, and the equally remarkable lack (at least until recently) of any study of Wittgenstein's own use of it (see Ch. 6, below).

Even given an interpretation of the criticism in question that makes it correct I cannot see that it in any way detracts from the effectiveness of Wittgenstein's use of "l-g." In sec. 4.1 I pointed out that the linking up of the terms "language" and "game" was an instance of analogy, citing various remarks of Wittgenstein in support. This use of analogy has great power in explaining the l-g thesis (see Ch. 2 above). As this particular criticism of Smart's does not seem to be relevant to this use of the analogy, one can only presume that it is meant to bear on the results of the l-g thesis—the NAl-gs into which language divides, which we might call the topographical features of language. If this is the case then a word in defence is called for: NAl-gs are not games. An analogy with games proved useful in explaining the thesis, and the continued use of the expression "l-g" provides a useful way of referring to it, and a continual reminder of it. However, the fact that the word "game" is part of the newly coined expression "l-g" is not grounds for the complaint Smart is making here. To repeat, l-gs are not games, they are parts of language. (See Ch. 6 below for a further discussion of the language-game thesis.)

e.) Language is an instrumentality, whereas games are
not. This criticism has rather more interest than the previous ones. It is, of course, avoidable as a criticism on the grounds that the two sides of an analogy do not have to correspond at every point. However, to dismiss it thus would be to miss some of the interesting points arising from it.

The interest here arises from Wittgenstein's own emphasis on the instrumental nature of language. For example, there is the famous tool-box analogy of PI, *11. In PI, *23 he seems to assimilate this analogy into the idea of language-game. The assimilation of the language/game and language/instrument analogies is confusing in one important respect, viz., the place of rules. The place of rules in language and games has been discussed already; the important point here is that the kind of rules that are common to both are rules limiting the range of behaviour of a person who can appropriately be said to be engaged in one or other of them.

The confusion arises thus: if it is appropriate to say of tools that there are rules for their use then the rules that come most readily to mind are of the converse kind: i.e., they indicate the most appropriate use for the tool in question, the use for which it was devised, but do not prescribe limits to what one might do with that tool while still being said to be using it. Thus, for example, if I use a carpenter's hammer as a sinker for a fishing line, I am still using a carpenter's hammer (cf. PI, p. 227). However, on the other hand, we do find in most cases practical limitations on the range of possible uses of a tool; for example, one would not get far using a spanner to paint a house.

One of the great values of the language/tool analogy which must be taken into account here is in respect of what one learns in learning to use a tool or word. In learning to use a tool one learns a utility technique: one learns that one will succeed best at a particular task if one uses
such-and-such a tool in such-and-such a way. And thus it is with learning words (cf. PI, *199). Thus, pursuing the analogy, the advertising industry might well take note of the maxim: "Never use a crescent spanner as a hammer" (for it would not stay a useful crescent spanner for very long if you do).

There are further important respects in which the toolbox analogy does help us to understand the functioning of language. Wittgenstein continues to discuss these in PI, *24, in which he points out that even the comparatively distinct tools, question and description, have many different uses. Even so some philosophers have tried to reduce questions, etc., to descriptions, treating the latter as the primary linguistic form; of course, Wittgenstein is also making special reference to his own work in T (cf., e.g., T, 4.5; PI, **11, 96, 97). Furthermore, any given sentence might be used for a great variety of purposes. Mundle has a good example:

"Would you like to go to Timbuctoo?" may be used as an invitation, a request for information, a polite way of giving an order, a joke, a translation, a way of teasing, etc. (Mundle, p. 189)

Even the specialised languages of the sciences are not immune as, for example, Cecil Day Lewis' description in a poem of the English countryside as "crescented with calcified corallae" shews; Day Lewis is not writing chemistry.

Like the use of tools, there are limits outside which we cannot go and "make sense" in a language. However, the meaning, social implications, emotional overtones, rules for use, i.e. the function of a single linguistic item (tool) can change quite radically from one language-game to another.

Thus the two analogies, language/game and language/tool, do sit reasonably happily together. Only to the small extent to which they do not does Smart's criticism carry a little weight.

Overall, Smart's attack on Wittgenstein's use of
"language-game" does not amount to much. He has misconceived the use to which Wittgenstein put the expression, misconceived Wittgenstein's purpose in doing so, and generally misconceived the idea of analogy.

There is, in PI, another analogy which is very commonly quoted, but which Wittgenstein used only once and did not pursue. This is the famous language/town analogy of PI, *18. This is a beautifully drawn analogy, with many virtues, even by comparison with the language/game analogy. It might also have been drawn out in the same way as the latter analogy, leading to the idea of, say, language-towns, in much the same way as we reach the language-game thesis.

This idea has a virtue(cf.language-game) of not conflicting at all with the language/tool analogy. Towns and cities are clearly purposive; we do not build them nor do they grow for their own sake, nor do we build them without a clear relationship to their surroundings, this relationship being intimately linked with their purpose. Thus we have, for example, the different resource-type towns—mining towns, forestry towns, fishing villages—industry-type towns—manufacturing centre, agricultural centre—and nodal (transport) towns—ports, railheads, etc. Within towns the various elements also have clear purposes: e.g., streets, shops, houses, churches, town halls, etc. The "rules" for use of a town also vary from town to town; for example, navigating in Wellington on the Street-Avenue grid system would be disastrous. Finally, the "new suburb" clearly illustrates the new uses of language that develop, with clearly defined terms and relationships, but which, with age and increasing use, sometimes become obscured and/or inappropriate.

Towns also have vaguely defined boundaries (which may be precisely defined for a particular purpose, such as administration), outside which one can no longer be said to be in that town. This, however, is a little strained and
may have been the reason Wittgenstein did not pursue this analogy rather than the game one. That is, he saw the limiting, or prescriptive nature of the rules of language use as centrally important.

Even so, one still wonders why he did not make more use of this beautiful analogy. I think the reason is probably historical. Wittgenstein developed and used language-games as a method, that is, he used the ARL-gs before he developed the NAL-gs of the language-game thesis. The expression "language-town" does not lend itself so readily to the use Wittgenstein made of artificially constructed languages as does "language-game," for all that the latter, as noted in sec. 4.1 above, is essentially arbitrary. At the time Wittgenstein wrote the early part of PI, in which the language/town analogy occurs, the language-game thesis was still very much in its infancy. Perhaps the language/town analogy prompted it? But this is mere speculation. Overall, there does seem to be a grain of truth in the suggestion that Wittgenstein was obsessed with games.
4.4 We are now in a position to make a rough classification of l-gs, i.e., of Wittgenstein's various uses of that expression. In sec. 2.2 we made a cursory examination of the classifications made by three notable commentators. Also, throughout the following work and in some parts of the preceding it was found necessary to draw basic distinctions in l-g types. Thus, this section will merely be a brief summary.

There are three distinct uses of "l-g" in Wittgenstein's later philosophy:

i) the whole of language;
ii) artificial language-games (ARl-gs);
iii) natural language-games (NAI-gs).

The first use occurs only once and is not of very great importance.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game." (PI, *7)

Wittgenstein does not in fact find occasion to do so in his subsequent work. I think he saw the whole of language as the set of all NAI-gs; as many NAI-gs include others or parts of other NAI-gs it is quite reasonable to call that which contains them all also a l-g. This, at least, seems to be a plausible interpretation. The remark is also important for its emphasis on language's being interwoven with actions and that these actions are included in the concept "l-g."

ARl-gs are "certain primitive and simplified forms of language such as, say, those used by a child when learning a language, or such as can be artificially drawn up." (Specht, p. 42) There is reason to doubt the accuracy of the reference to child language acquisition, although it is made by Wittgenstein in PI, *7. Also, many linguists and anthropologists would object to Wittgenstein's use of "primitive," although this is of no great consequence to the present work.

AR1-gs are the languages Wittgenstein invents in order
to study certain philosophical problems. In Ch. 5 we shall investigate how and why AR1-gs work as a method in philosophy, and examine some of Wittgensteins uses of them.

NAl-gs are the consequence of the language-game thesis. As Specht (Specht, p. 62) puts it, they are "certain individual partial language systems, functional entities or applicational contexts that constitute part of an organic whole." Language-games are the functional and topographic features of language. In Ch. 6 below we shall discuss the uses, complications, and consequences of the language-game thesis and certain problems associated with it.

NOTES

1. This is sometimes held to be a feature distinguishing the native and non-native speaker of a language: the non-native speaker can quite commonly produce pronouncements upon the grammar of the language in question on demand.

2. The main difference is that the notion "universe of discourse" accounts only for a use of words: "NAl-g" is a concept freely incorporating non-verbal behavioural communication such as gesture—see Ch. 6, below.
CHAPTER FIVE

ARTIFICIAL LANGUAGE-GAMES

5.0 My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. (PI, *464)

In this chapter we shall examine Wittgenstein's use of artificial language-games (ARl-gs). First we shall examine them as philosophical method and then in light of this, we shall examine some of Wittgenstein's actual uses of them.

As is well known, Wittgenstein believed that he was doing philosophy in a new way. Many who attended his lectures and knew him during his later life also report that he had a profoundly original approach to the subject. As was pointed out in Ch. 2, an important aspect of this new approach must have been the use of ARl-gs. The historical and textual evidence overwhelmingly favours such a view. It is indeed odd then that there is not in the literature a thorough examination of how and why this new procedure counts as a method of doing philosophy: how and why it works. Of course, many commentators discuss ARl-gs: some just take their mode of operation as self-evident, making no attempt to investigate it further; some treat them as analogical argument; and at least one (E.K. Specht) calls ARl-gs a model concept. The first is the most plausible, simply because it leaves open the possibility that ARl-gs are a genuinely new way of doing philosophy. However, further examination is obviously desirable.

In sec. 5.1 we shall examine the possibilities of models and analogical argument as an explanation of the workings of ARl-gs. I shall then suggest an alternative explanation which seems to me to be genuinely new in philosophy. In the best Rumplestiltskin tradition of "name it and claim it," I have dubbed this "homologous mediation."

In sec. 5.3 we shall, as I said, examine some of
Wittgenstein's uses of AR1-gs. It is notable that most of the important examples of Wittgenstein's use of AR1-gs come from the early part of PI—the sections up to about *100. Here his purpose was mostly negative: to dispose of his earlier logical theory of language, as exemplified in T. We shall also look briefly at the "private" l-g "S" (PI, *258).
5.1 (a) ARL-gs as a model concept.

We must first investigate the notion of a model and how this is used. For there are more than one kind of model.

In many sciences models are constructed in order to study the properties of something not readily accessible. Examples of this kind of model are: large (several feet high) multicolored models of the DNA molecule used heuristically to clarify doctors' ideas of its properties and to speculate on possible undiscovered properties; engineers' scale models of bridges for destructive strength testing; aircraft designers' models of their designs, etc. Such models are different for different purposes. The model the aircraft engineer builds for testing aerodynamic properties in a wind-tunnel is quite different from the one he builds for the sales department to test for consumer appeal. There are two conditions which must hold for this use of models to be effective:

1) the characteristics under investigation must be common to both the model and that of which it is a model;
2) these characteristics should be more readily accessible in the thing under direct examination (the model) than in the thing being indirectly examined thereby.

In most instances of this type of investigation, accessibility is a function of cost (which is, presumably, an irrelevant consideration in philosophy). Models of the DNA molecule are an obvious exception. However, it is an exception in more ways than this: without going into the philosophy of science (and thus being prepared to beg questions in that field), a mechanical representation of a DNA molecule (i.e. a model) is a model of a theoretical entity, i.e., a model of something which is itself part of a scientific model of a biological phenomenon. (This latter use of "model" we shall come to shortly.)

If this is the kind of model that ARL-gs are then why bother? After all, language must be quite readily access-
ible, for we do all use it. This, unfortunately, is not so. Language is notoriously difficult to pin down and study. As Robert E. Gahringer says:

The phenomenon of language is not easy to understand. Even though it has behavioural aspects, language is not an object of any empirical science. Meanings are not things; and words functioning as words do, as vehicles of meaning, are not things. Nor is language a state of mind, the proper concern of psychologists. Language has an objectivity which transcends any immediate state of consciousness. And neither the categories of physical nor psychological events explain the logical features of language. Language does not lend itself to ordinary modes of explanation. (Robert E. Gahringer, "Can Games Explain Language?" J.P. Vol. LVI, No. 16, 1959)

That AR1-gs, at least in Wittgenstein's philosophy, are clearly not models of the engineering type is shown in PI, **130 and 133. Furthermore, Wittgenstein was quite emphatic that philosophy should not interfere with language, but must leave everything as it is. This is stated quite explicitly, for example, in PI, *124.

The DNA molecule model is of more interest. Here, however, it will be necessary to go into the workings of the scientific model of which it is a mechanical representation. In order to avoid problems in the philosophy of science—it is disputable that the theory of biology in which DNA molecules occur, like quantum theory or relativity theory, is best understood as a model—I shall take a different example in discussing this use of "model."

A good example is the model used by applied mathematicians in the field of ballistics. This is a mathematical model into which one feeds empirical data and out of which once gets empirical predictions. It works well enough for most practical purposes. But no one would suggest that it is an accurate description of the actual flight paths of unguided missiles. For example, for a missile to follow a parabolic course, acceleration due to gravity must be constant; but gravity follows an inverse square law with dis-
tance from the earth, and varies slightly from place to
place. There is also non-constant air-resistance, etc., not
taken into account by even the most sophisticated of ballis-
tics models. Theoretically, however, this model does pro-
vide a description of a certain aspect of the "real world"
that serves our purposes in most instances. It provides a
way of organising observable phenomena, a way of making
these phenomena intelligible to us, thus enabling us to bet-
ter put them to our own uses. As such the question of its
"truth" as a representation of reality does not arise. The
relevant question is: how well does it work for the purposes
for which we need it? The criterion for this will be in
terms of how close we get to the target in practice.

Much of logic might reasonably be called a model of
this kind. For example, a propositional calculus provides
a model of the structural features of certain argument forms.
Generative and transformational grammars are most commonly
regarded as models of the linguistic aspect of mind. In
this sense there seems to be some plausibility in treating
AR1-gs as models. Thus in 1-g2 (the AR1-g introduced in
PI, *2) Wittgenstein has devised a language consisting only
of names, the better to study the functioning of such a lan-
guage.

There is also some textual evidence to support this
"model" view of AR1-gs, as can be seen, for example, in PI,
*131. Wittgenstein obviously considered that many philoso-
phers (himself in T. included) were guilty of the dogmatism
referred to in this passage (cf. PI, **107, 114, 115).

However, to treat AR1-gs solely as models would be
dangerously misleading. PI, *131, Wittgenstein's only use
of "model" with respect to AR1-gs provides a clue to one
respect in which AR1-gs differ from the kind of model exem-
plified by ballistics. The AR1-g is devised and then com-
pared with our uses of language; thus insofar as the model
fits or does not fit our actual use of language, we learn
something about the latter (cf. PI, *130). This is not, however, very greatly different from our use of mathematical models in science. On the positive side, the existence of Pluto was deduced from a mathematical model of our solar system before Tombough studied six million star images to find it; and, on the negative side, we also learn about nature from empirical results which deviate from those predicted by a model. In the latter case, we usually get a new model as well. This process is admirably illustrated by the history of astronomy.

There is another respect in which ARl-gs seem to differ more greatly from our usual models. If we look again at 1-g 2, we see that it was devised, not to "fit" a certain feature of language (in this case, names) but to fit a certain theory of language; viz., the Augustinian theory outlined in PI, *1. Thus, in the introduction of 1-g 2, in PI, *2, we are asked to imagine a language "for which the description given by Augustine is right" (see PI, *2). Such a language, 1-g2, is then described. Again, from about *44, PI, Wittgenstein considers the theory of language in which it is claimed that the "simples" of language, Russell's "logically proper names," signify simple elements of the world--Russell's "individuals," or the earlier Wittgenstein's "objects" (see PI, *44 ff.). In *48 he devises a language-game with which to study this theory. We shall examine this ARl-g further in sec. 5.3; for our present purpose we need only note the first two sentences of PI, *48.

Thus it is clear that if ARl-gs are to be treated as models, they are models constructed to comply with, or to represent, a theory, rather than an "aspect of the world." The ARl-g thus constructed is then compared with language as we actually use it in order to throw light on that theory. They are not, however, falsifying models of the kind used in formal logic, for Wittgenstein does not use them to falsify theories; usually he seems to shew a lack of generality
in the theory—the essential difference being between the criteria appropriate in formal logic and in representing everyday language.

Obviously there is nothing to prohibit our calling ARI-gs models. As such, however, they are models of such small parts of language that they can be of little help in understanding that complex and multifarious phenomenon (and shewing this is in fact one of their main uses). There is some plausibility in the suggestion that the theories of language which Wittgenstein uses ARI-gs to examine, are themselves models of language. His own theory in the Tractatus, against which most of the early part of PI is directed, is a case in point. Similarly also with Russell's work in Principia Mathematica. Thus if we are going to call ARI-gs models, we must in doing so note that they are importantly different from what we usually call models in at least two ways: i) they are "intermediate" in that they are between models of language and language; ii) their "orientation" is the reverse of normal: instead of being models of reality, they are models of models (theories) of reality. Yet, despite all this, ARI-gs "are meant to throw light on the facts of our language" (cf. PI, *130) (rather than on the theories of which they may be called models) and it seems clear that, overall, this is what they do. Thus, as "models," their function is so different from the usual run-of-the-mill models that it would seem better, perhaps, not to call ARI-gs models at all.¹

(b) ARI-gs as analogical argument.

It might also be suggested that ARI-gs function as analogical argument. There is some plausibility in this too. However, there is, amongst philosophers, much prejudice (shared by the present writer) against analogical argument as an effective method in philosophy. In the following we shall examine our previous example of analogical argument
to find the basis of this prejudice. In doing so, we shall also provide a framework in which to examine the plausibility of the suggestion that AR1-gs function as analogical arguments.

Let us return to the example of sec. 4.1 above, Hemi Baxter's story of the canoe and jet boat. The analogy started by the (assumed) establishment of: the traditional Maori way of life is to the Paheka way of life as the canoe is to the jet boat. As suggested in sec. 4.1, let us go astray by talking of hull characteristics. Thus it is perfectly clear (in fact it is analytic in the language of naval architecture) that the prismatic coefficient of the canoe (a percentage) is to the prismatic coefficient of the jet boat (a percentage) as the canoe is to the jet boat; but the canoe is to the jet boat as the traditional Maori way of life is to the Paheka way of life; therefore, the prismatic coefficient of the canoe is to the prismatic coefficient of the jet boat as the traditional Maori way is to the Paheka way. But this is absolute nonsense. The point here is not so much that the relation "as" in "x is to w as z is to y" is intransitive, for that is incorrect, but that its transitivity is topic relative, it is restricted to a specific subject matter. Thus if we are to use the "as" transitivity, we must establish its transitivity in each domain (i.e., the subject under investigation and the analogue) independently. So analogical argument either proves nothing or is superfluous.

Nevertheless we should not dismiss analogical argument too hastily. Quite obviously it is very useful as an illustrative device and as a debating technique. Furthermore, phenomena whose occurrence is inferred by analogical arguments can then be investigated by more direct methods. In this it is similar to our use of correlations in social science; everyone knows that a high correlation does not imply a causal connection, but we are still very much inclined
to look for the latter and some important social phenomena might be uncovered in this way. However, if it can be shown that ARl-gs do function as analogical arguments they will have to be dismissed as neither very new nor very important.

Fortunately for our subject of study, analogical argument does not seem to be a particularly useful way of describing its mode of operation. Take, for example, l-g 2, the familiar "builders language-game." As an analogue it obviously fulfills the condition of being more accessible than everyday language, for it was artificially devised for the purpose. Wittgenstein then uses this ARl-g in a discussion of language acquisition, bringing certain factors and problems involved therein into "the open." (For a full discussion of this see sec. 5.3, below.) If he is using l-g 2 as an analogue in an analogical argument, we would expect to find, implicitly if not explicitly, (i) a demonstration that l-g 2 has some features in common with or parallel to everyday language, and (ii) a discussion of further features which hold or do not hold of l-g 2 and whose counterparts in everyday language are correspondingly claimed to hold or not to hold.

Clearly there is some parallel between l-g 2 and everyday language, viz., that they are both used for a purpose in a social setting. This similarity is, however, so extremely restricted that it makes the analogy of very little use. Any attempt to develop the argument analogically on such a restricted base would either have to be independently justified or dismissed as wild extrapolation.

As with models, it would be in accord with Wittgenstein's own writing to claim that ARl-gs are analogues of theories. As such, ARl-gs would be very odd analogues, but still I think, quite effective: for if the theory in question is correct then the ARl-g is qualitatively the same as (although obviously quantitatively different from) everyday language. Insofar as it is not the same as everyday language, we may
say the theory in question is wanting. (In principle this is much the same as the view presented in sec. 5.2, below) Thus the use of ARl-gs would be so unusual as analogical argument that so calling them would probably be more deceiving than enlightening.

Some commentators have raised doubts even as to the plausibility of some of Wittgenstein's ARl-gs being used in a social setting.

For example, Rush Rhees writes of 1-g 2:

But I feel there is something wrong here. The trouble is not to imagine a people with a language of such limited vocabulary. The trouble is to imagine that they spoke the language only to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all. I do not think it would be speaking a language.

(Rhees, p. 76)

The discussion of 1-g 2 certainly shews problems involved with it as a language, and these may well be taken as features of the analogue developed in an analogical argument. However, far from shewing that these problems also occur in everyday language, it is much more plausible to say that Wittgenstein rejects the ARl-g in question (the analogue) as being relevantly like, similar to, everyday language.

(It would be pointless to anticipate and thus duplicate the full discussion of 1-g 2 in sec. 5.3, below; if the reader will be so indulgent he will find the above-mentioned points fully explained therein.) If this is an analogical argument it is indeed an odd one. It might well be said that analogical arguments are illustrative as much in case they break down as in case they succeed. That is, if an analogy fails at a certain point, we may learn as much from the reasons for its failure as we might otherwise have learned from its success and the reasons for that success. Thus we might insist on calling ARl-gs analogical argument, but we would have to note so many differences between them and the usual analogical arguments that it would be more confusing than enlightening to do so.
The main reason for ARl-gs' lack of resemblance to the usual form of analogical argument is exactly the same as in the case of models. Wittgenstein constructed them, not on the basis of everyday language, but on the basis of a theory of language. Their use is thus in discussing that theory, and in each case showing its limitations.

5.2 How ARl-gs "throw light on the facts of our language": homologous mediation.

In this section we shall offer an alternative explanation of how and why ARl-gs succeed as a method of doing philosophy. This will require us to investigate philosophy at the "grass roots level," so to speak—to take an "anthropological approach" in more than one respect.

The term "homologue" and its cognates are most commonly used in the biological sciences. Things may be said to be homologous if they shew an affinity of origin and structure, apart from form or use. Thus standard examples are a man's arm, a whale's flipper, a bird's wing. Compared with analogy (agreement or correspondence in certain respects between things otherwise different—cf. sec. 4.1 above), the emphasis in an homology is on structure and origin; this may be seen more clearly in another example: the suits of a deck of playing cards are homologous, but not analogous. ARl-gs are constructed as homologues of theories, not of language. They exhibit the same structural features as expressed in the theory, and their origin, being the theory itself, is held in common with that theory. However, they have, clearly, a very different form, and, trivially obviously, different uses.

Thus, for example, 1-g 2 is constructed from a theory of language:

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. (PI, *2)

the theory (description) having already been outlined in PI, *1. The structural feature in common is the primitive
connection of the word with its correlated object as meaning. The forms of the theory of ARl-g are different as are their uses: the ARl-g is an hypothetical language used by an hypothetical community in construction work; the theory is just that—a theory, suggested by at least one philosopher as an explanation of language. We shall return to this later.

The use of the term "mediator" and its cognates which we have adopted here comes from structural anthropology. (See, for example, Structural Anthropology by Claude Levi-Strauss for a clear account of the relevant theory.) In explaining it we shall also introduce the basic idea behind the function of ARl-gs as homologous mediators.

Man is faced in life with a bewildering array of data; to make this intelligible to himself and to enable himself to live with it he organises it by classifying it into related categories (cf. Individuals by P.F. Strawson). As a result of this categorisation man is, in many spheres of life, faced with conflicts. The most obvious example is life/death; others are day/night, natural/supernatural; in war: we/they (friend/enemy), domestic/wild, to name but a few of the more striking ones. Thus within a given sphere of life there are categories in opposition to one another. Structural anthropologists, it might be said as a generalisation, subscribe to the hypothesis that man seeks to alleviate these oppositions by devices created in his social and conceptual schema. Such devices are called "mediators." The explanatory power and practical success of this approach has been one of the most dramatic and important features of anthropology in this century. To make it clear let us look at some examples.

A clear and comparatively familiar case occurs in Christianity. On the one hand we have man; he is sinful, bound to and dependent upon the earth, has a limited life span, etc. On the other hand there is God, in whose image man is built; but God is without sin, is outside space and
time (which is most plausibly interpreted as: is not a suitable subject of spatial and temporal predicates), lives in the heavens (heaven), is infinite, etc. Thus, within the sphere of Christianity, there is a profound opposition between man and God. This opposition is alleviated by a whole hierarchy of mediators. At one end (man's) we have saints, then there are angels and arch-angels leading to the other end (God's). Jesus has an outstandingly important place because he covers this entire range: the son of God, yet born of woman, he led a life subject to the same problems as man, yet after his death and resurrection he ascended directly to heaven. Thus also we can see how important it is to have saints, and we can understand why, on his death, St. Thomas Aquinas was chopped up, boiled, and preserved. It is important to maintain the near (man's) end of the mediation chain. Modern man, however, seems to find objectionable the idea that new saints should be drawn from within his ranks. This problem is overcome, for example, in the conception of the church as the body of Christ (or the Kingdom of Heaven on earth). The clergy, as agents of the church are also agents of the body of Christ and thus have special authority in certain cases. Thus, the near end of the mediation chain is maintained.

Another familiar example is the life/death opposition. Man does not seem to be able to accept, or live comfortably with, a sharp and sudden division between life and death (now he's here, alive, a man, now he's gone, a nothing), and so has created devices for smoothing the transition. The manifestations of this mediation are the ceremonies of funerals, periods of mourning, sitting shiva, etc. During these times we suspend all mundane activities, we do not work, or play. If we look at the form of the rituals performed during this time it is clear that they involve the placating of the shade, so to speak. The concept of the spirit, not yet in Heaven, but not alive as a human, serves
to mediate the opposing categories. Thus, in Christian funerals the priest commends the deceased's spirit to the Lord; this would not be so reasonable a thing to do if that spirit was already with the Lord; he also commends the physical remains to the earth, thus creating the division life/death ceremonially. In the chants at a Maori tangi there always occur such phrases as: "Haere ki to tupuna! Haere ki Hawaiiki!" ("Go to your ancestors! Go to (the place we came from)!"); again this would not be said to a spirit who was already there. (Such funeral rituals have been found to be universal except among some groups of Eskimos.) Thus we see that the opposition between the categories alive and dead is eased by mediators, the concept of spirit and the rituals of funerals.

It is important also to note that mediators cross the boundaries of categories; they are in both opposing categories, or partially in each while not being fully in either. Jesus is a very clear example: the sequence clergy-archangel also does this, but progressively. Entities which do this have always been treated with a special reverence, awe, or contempt by man, and are often attributed supernatural powers (cf., Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse by Edmund Leach). There are an enormous number of well known examples: rabbits, which remain wild but are allowed to live in the farm yard, are eaten only on special occasions and are called "coney" (from the Latin or Anglo-Saxon for "vagina"); cats are domestic but retain many wild attributes and have a special place with witches; treason is the most heinous of crimes, for the traitor crosses the very powerful opposition between friends and enemies by appearing to be friend, but turning out to be enemy (and note the awe in which we presently hold spies, as exhibited in fiction); hermaphrodites have commonly been attributed special powers (Tiresias, the seer in the Oedipus myth, is an hermaphrodite) or treated with disgust (present practice here); the raven and
coyote have a special place in Pueblo mythology for they neither farm nor hunt, but eat carrion (cf., Levi-Strauss, *ibid.*, p. 221).

It might be objected that this presupposes clearly defined categories, concepts "bounded by sharp edges," and that nothing is more counter to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. If this objection seems to hold it is only because of the brevity and inadequacy of the preceding outline. Actually, the reverse comes nearer the mark. If it is to be possible for something to cross categories, to be in both and also in neither, then the boundaries of the categories must be ill-defined. Thus, in our second example, the spirit of the physically dead person is both here with man, but in a form suited to life in heaven; as such it is in the ill-defined boundary area between the categories living and dead, it is in neither but in both. Even this is not, however, in accord with the thinking of structural anthropologists; they emphasise that any search for clearly defined categories is bound to be fruitless and that the important things to note are the relationships between various entities. Thus in the example, we should look at the spirit's crossing of categories not in terms of the defining characteristics of the categories of life, death, and spirit, but in terms of the relationship of the spirit to that which is clearly living and to that which is clearly dead. This attitude is very much in accord with Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

How then do ARIs fit into this theory? To explain this we must put Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially that in *PI*, into its proper historical context. As is well known, Wittgenstein came to philosophy by way of engineering, mathematics, the foundations of mathematics, and logic. Wittgenstein's earliest philosophical investigations were in the realm of the problems with which Frege and Russell had dealt. Concepts such as 'propositional function,' 'variable,' 'generality,' and 'identity'
occupied his thoughts. (George Henrik von Wright in 'Biographical Sketch' in Malcolm (2).)

In his first published work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein offered an austere and scientific theory of language, a theory which also claimed to explain in a unified way all aspects and uses of language. Later he came to have qualms about the correctness of that theory. How he came to drop the theory altogether, following a discussion with the economist Piero Sraffa, is related by Norman Malcolm (Malcolm (2), p. 69):

One day (they were riding, I think, on a train) when Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and that which it describes must have the same 'Logical form,' the same 'logical multiplicity,' Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: 'What is the logical form of that?' Sraffa's example produced in Wittgenstein the feeling that there was an absurdity in the insistence that a proposition and what it describes must have the same 'form.' This broke the hold on him of the conception that a proposition must literally be a 'picture' of the reality it describes.

From this point on he came to realise that language was not at all, in actual use, like he had previously described it. In use language does not possess the cohesion or homogeneity necessary for a theory such as he had propounded in the *Tractatus* to be even remotely correct.

From then on Wittgenstein developed a new approach to language. In Saussurean terms, he now emphasised *la parole* rather than *la langue* as he had done in the *Tractatus*. We shall discuss his later conception of language more fully in Ch. 6, below; for the present it will suffice to note that his later conception of language was opposed to the idea that any theory of the (scientific) type expounded in the *Tractatus* could explain language. However, he thought that this new approach could best be understood against the background of such a theory:

It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those
old thoughts (T) and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. (PI, Preface, p. x)

However, this was all in the "modern age," the age in which science is the dominant myth. By this I mean simply that we tend to look to science for the explanation of any puzzling phenomena we might come across. The explanations provided by science are held to be better than those provided by other means, for example, religion. Thus we are inexorably drawn towards the unified scientific kind of explanation offered in the Tractatus; if only it would work we would all be much happier.

Philosophers are no more exempt from this than anyone else. It is commonly said that philosophers are specialists in the study of argument. Argument is the business of convincing people, of making them "see it my way," of winning hearts rather than heads. It seems clear that Wittgenstein saw this; he thought of himself as a teacher, and was very worried lest his teaching be misunderstood (cf., Norman Malcolm, op. cit.). Thus, we might say that philosophers are that group of men who labour under the illusion that their hearts are won only by way of their heads. We must also realize that although much of Wittgenstein's teaching seems "old hat" to us now, it was very new at the time, and set against a general background of logical positivism and pseudo-scientific theorising. Wittgenstein understood the nature of his audience, as may be seen, for example, in PI, **108 and 113 to 115.

Hence the conflict is clear. On the one hand there is language as we actually use it and Wittgenstein's desire not to misrepresent it; on the other hand is the background of scientific theories of language and his audience's (which to some extent included himself) penchant for scientific theories. The former places emphasis on la parole, a diachronic, "organic" subject matter, the latter on la langue,
a synchronic and comparatively determinate body of data. Despite Wittgenstein's efforts I believe this conflict is still with us today. Some of use, who profess "Wittgensteinianism," even go so far as to make quasi-formal theories of non-definability, and of meaning as use (cf., Garth Hallett, Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as Use; a glance at the headings of Ch. IV should be sufficient to make the point.) Recent developments in linguistics are, however, alleviating this tension. They provide theories of depth grammar (cf., PI, *664) with emphasis on la parole and using data collected from genuine and various uses of language.

ARl-gs, as a method for doing philosophy, function as mediators between these two. At the theory end (la langue) ARl-gs maintain contact by being homologous with the particular theory in question. But having set them up to be so, Wittgenstein immediately emphasises that language is used, that it is a part of the social life of a community. Thus he describes the purpose for which the ARl-g is used by an hypothetical community. We are asked to "Conceive this as a complete primitive language" (PI, *2). This makes the ARl-g make contact with the other end of the conflict: we are to treat, or investigate, this ARl-g as la parole.

I am not suggesting that Wittgenstein devised this method in the manner outlined above, nor even that he was necessarily conscious that this was what he was doing; I am only suggesting that this is a plausible explanation of how and why the method was so successful. There is, however, evidence to suggest that he was aware of this procedure (see PI, *122; note especially the last sentence and the emphasis).³

As is noted repeatedly above, most of Wittgenstein's uses of ARl-gs occur within the first hundred sections of PI where he was primarily concerned with ridding himself and us of the bogey of the old theories of language. Thus these ARl-gs are used negatively; that is, they are used in shewing the incorrectness of the theories in question. This,
at first sight, might seem to be significantly different from the usual use of mediators explained earlier. That is, rather than alleviating a felt opposition they are used to eliminate one side of the opposition. This would be incorrect on two accounts. Firstly, the opposition is not between theory on the one hand and actual language on the other, but between our penchant for scientific theories as the only acceptable mode of expression and understanding and our penchant for accuracy, or correctness, as a condition of knowledge or understanding. Secondly, the theories are not so much eliminated as shewn to apply only to a small and somewhat rarified aspect of language.

We might also note, in passing, that Rhees' suggestion that, e.g., L-g 2 does not have sufficient richness to be properly called language is irrelevant on this account. Another interesting point is that in many of the most notable examples of mediation the category on at least one side of the opposition is not amenable to verbal formulation, or at least is problematic in this respect. This is interesting in that it suggests that mediators may also serve to increase what we might call "conceptual accessibility." The most obvious example of things to which mediators might increase access is God, but note also death, etc. This also clearly applies to Wittgenstein's use of ARl-gs: la langue is comparatively easy to describe—we might, for example, make a list of expressions—but la parole is notoriously difficult in this respect. Thus, the mediation function of ARl-gs may be seen as aiding us to get a clear view of the extremely complex social phenomenon of language which does not lend itself at all well to verbal description.

It will, no doubt, have been noticed that the above exposition involves a somewhat unusual view of philosophy. This, however, is a view to which I think Wittgenstein would have subscribed. Philosophy is the activity (cf., T, 4.112: "Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity")
engaged in by philosophers. Philosophers are also human beings; thus they are creatures of habit and fashion, subject to social sensitivities, emotions and all the rest. They are often emotionally committed to the philosophical positions they expound and defend. That Wittgenstein held this view of philosophy seems quite clear (see, for example, Malcolm (2)). Philosophical problems were, to him, personal problems; he would have regarded as dishonest, the practice of "compartmentalising" one's life into "professional philosopher" and "ordinary human" parts. Thus, in PI, he says:

255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (PI, *255)

133. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. (PI, *133)

His method of doing philosophy was appropriate to this conception; he aimed at alleviating "deep disquietudes" and to do so he hit upon a method which, according to anthropologists, is as old as history. It was, however, quite new to philosophy.

As an example, let us examine, briefly, the first chapter of P.F. Strawson's treatise on descriptive metaphysics, *Individuals*, in the light of the above discussion. For all the criticisms that have been levelled at it, this book still has a great appeal to philosophers. We are now in a position to offer an explanation of this appeal. As noted above, and emphasised by Strawson, man is confronted by a bewildering array of phenomena, which, to make intelligible to himself, he organises according to a conceptual scheme. One of the most devastating oppositions in this organisation is between that which is perceptually present and that which is not perceptually present. Quite obviously, a lack of confidence in the continued existence of that which is not perceptually present would produce overwhelming feelings of insecurity. To alleviate this conflict, we base our conceptual scheme, our organisation of data, on
the material object (in Strawson's terms, material objects are ontologically primary; they are the basic particulars of our conceptual scheme), whose outstanding feature is that it maintains all its properties while unperceived. The material object mediates between that which is perceptually present and that which is not perceptually present. The way material objects achieve this mediation is described very clearly by Strawson.

For even though the particular in question cannot itself be demonstratively identified, it may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified. (Strawson (2), p. 21)

Strawson describes such identifying descriptions in terms of our being able to trace out "a unique spatio-temporal path" in terms of the basic particulars, material objects, from that which is perceptually present, and thus demonstratively identifiable, to that which is not perceptually present and not so identifiable. Thus material objects provide us with a mediation chain between these opposing categories.

Strawson insists that his work is descriptive metaphysics; descriptive metaphysics, he says, "is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" (Strawson, p. 9) and aims "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure" (Strawson (2), p. 9). He claims that the naive realist conceptual scheme he defends is both universal and consistent. The first claim is problematic in many respects with which we are not directly concerned here. Whether or not he succeeds in substantiating the second claim, its appeal is now obvious: it allows us the psychological security of continuing to view the world, to organise our experience, as we have always done, without fear of logical or epistemological inconsistency.

One final comment on Strawson's account as analysed above: we noted earlier that things which cross categories, or are in the "grey" area at the boundary between categories,
have a special place in our belief systems. This also holds for the above account. Think, for example, of our regard for the horizon, and the many effective uses of "horizon" in literature. There are other expressions, too, like "over the hill" and "out of sight" which likewise derive from this boundary.

The point of including this example is to emphasise the power and scope of this mode of analysis. Not only does it make myths and customs intelligible to us, but can also account for the appeal of certain metaphysical arguments, over others. There are, of course, many fascinating philosophical problems involved in it. These are not our concern here. What is of concern here is that the method works, and that arguments, or philosophical methods functioning on this pattern succeed at a relatively more primitive level than more conventional ones. This is in accord with the conception of philosophy outlined earlier in this section.

In sec. 5.3 we shall examine some of Wittgenstein's uses of ARL-s on the basis of the above explanation of their "modus operandi."

5.3 In the opening sections of PI (the first hundred or so) Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with shewing the inaccuracy and inadequacy of "Tractatus type" theories of language. ARL-s are used to examine various central aspects of such theories. Thus 1-g 2 is used to examine the theory of meaning as word-thing correlations (meaning as naming); with 1-g 48 he examines the claim that there are primary elements of the world which can only be named; with 1-g 60 he examines the claims of analysis as a method of doing philosophy. We shall now examine these uses of ARL-s.

Wittgenstein begins PI with a long quote from St. Augustine (Confessions, I.3). This is clearly about language acquisition. Wittgenstein's first interest is, however, with the theory of language contained therein, and it is this which he immediately proceeds to discuss in PI, *1.
Obviously enough this is the Tractatus theory. Where such a theory goes wrong is immediately outlined (in PI, *1).

Most of the first forty odd sections of PI are taken up with substantiating this—with showing that such a theory can apply to only a small part of language. There are two main threads running through this part of PI and we shall treat them separately. Both use the one ARI-g, the famous "builders l-g." This is introduced in PI, *2 and is developed in PI, *8. It is designed to fit the theory of language found in the passage from Augustine. This very clearly exemplifies the nature of Wittgenstein's use of ARI-gs outlined in 5.2 above. The l-g is constructed so as to have formal features in common with the theory in question, thus being, by construction, homologous with that theory. The theory itself is of the fashionable scientific kind and is a theory of la langue; the l-g, however, is described as a system of communication in actual use by a community, thus shifting the emphasis to la parole, but nevertheless maintaining a foot in the theory's camp.

The first attack on this theory of language involves the learning, or the possibility of learning a language. This, surprisingly enough, is in the form of a reductio argument. First, we assume the Augustinian theories of language and language acquisition and construct an ARI-g in accord with the theory of language. Then we shew that this language cannot be learned by the method of language acquisition without prior knowledge of a language. Thus, we reject either the language theory or the language acquisition theory. As Wittgenstein seems to accept the language acquisition theory, we reject the language theory. Of course, this is a gross simplification and based on many contentious assumptions and the usual judicious selection of remarks. It is, nevertheless, a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on language acquisition.

The theory of language acquisition presented in the
passage from Augustine is quite familiar: it is roughly the stimulus-response (S-R) theory of B.F. Skinner and others. Wittgenstein calls it the "ostensive teaching of words" to distinguish it from ostensive definition. In *6 he says, in drawing this distinction, "I do not want to call this 'ostensive definition,' because the child cannot as yet ask what the name is." (PI, *6) This is further stated in *27: "in languages (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking something's name. This, with its correlate ostensive definition, is, we might say, a l-g on its own. That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask: 'What is that called?'--upon which the name is given." (PI, *27) In **6 and 7 Wittgenstein describes three exercises by means of which a child of the builder's tribe might learn the words of l-g 2 . . . i.e., "slab," etc.: (a) the teacher points to an object, thus directing the child's attention to it, and says the word; (b) the teacher points to the object and the learner says the word; (c) as in (a), but with the learner repeating the word after the teacher, or, in the more simple case, the learner just repeats the word after the teacher without there being any pointing to objects. We might, of course, add (d), the teacher says the word and the learner points to the object. It seems that Wittgenstein accepted this S-R theory of language acquisition, for he says: "I say that it will form an important part of the training, because it is so with human beings, not because it could not be imagined otherwise." (PI, *6) This is understandable, for S-R psychology was very much in vogue at the time at which Wittgenstein was writing and, in fact, was not seriously questioned until the late 1950's. We should also note that the word "training" used in PI in this connexion is only an approximate translation of the German "Abrichtung," used by Wittgenstein in the original. "Abrichtung" is used of animals, but not of humans, except in certain specialised contexts, such as in a psychological
laboratory. Wittgenstein himself points this out in The Brown Book, which was, of course, in English: "I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward, punishment and suchlike." (Brh, p. 77) Thus, it seems clear that Wittgenstein is describing the same learning process described by Augustine but from the point of view of observer rather than of learner. And it seems that he accepts this theory, or explanation of the language acquisition process.

As noted above, Wittgenstein distinguishes between ostensive definition and ostensive teaching of words. Philosophers are prone to talking of ostension as if it were the ultimate mode of definition, as it were the last court of appeal. In PI, *28 ff., Wittgenstein provides an argument designed to shew the error of this, to knock ostensive definition down from its pedestal.

In real-life situations we use other words to eliminate unwanted possibilities, the various ways of going wrong, in using an ostensive definition. Now I think it should be relevant only to the cases where we do not have the use of other words—which of course is the situation in first language acquisition. Thus, by his own criteria, Wittgenstein's arguments apply, or are directed at, not ostensive definition, but ostensive teaching of words.

The distinction between ostensive definition and ostensive teaching was drawn on the basis of ostensive definition's being part of a language and requiring a certain prior knowledge of language for its use. Thus, we can conclude that ostensive teaching is inadequate as an explanation of the acquisition of language. Thus, in PI, *32, we have the conclusion:

And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child
could already think, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself."

As a conclusion about the theory of language acquisition with which he has been working, this is quite reasonable and would, these days, meet with fairly wide acceptance. If this is all Wittgenstein meant, then we need go no further, except to note that he anticipated modern language acquisition theory by at least ten years. However, one gets the feeling that this is not what we're meant to do here at all. On the contrary, my feeling is that *32 is meant as a reductio conclusion—that we are supposed to reject the suggestion of innate ideas.

My reasons for this are: At the very beginning of this part of PI our attention was drawn towards a theory of language, "a particular picture of the essence of human language" (PI, *1) and not towards any theory of language acquisition. Thus, it would seem that the theory of language is Wittgenstein's primary concern here. This theory of language is, essentially, a part of the Tractatus theory, and all the eminent commentators, including Wittgenstein himself, tell us that this part of PI at least is directed against the earlier work. Nowhere in the Tractatus do we find any mention of language acquisition. Next, philosophers generally have tended to reject the notion of innate ideas (cf., for example, Putnam and Goodman's cases against Chomsky in "Symposium on Innate Ideas," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. III, PP. 81-107); thus if Wittgenstein had, so early, espoused this cause, it would, presumably, be widely noted today. Finally, there are Wittgenstein's own remarks, noted above, that suggest that he did accept S-R explanations of learning, which are quite clearly against the innateness hypothesis.

If we look again at **28 to 30, we see that Wittgenstein confines his discussion to names and numerals, i.e., if we exclude the deictic pronouns "there" and "this," the types of word that occur in l-gs 2 and 8. Thus, on Wittgen-
stein's argument, if we take \*32 as a reductio conclusion and accept the Augustinian theory of language acquisition, we must reject the Augustinian theory of language on the grounds that a language in accord with it cannot be learned. And surely this conclusion is exactly in accord with Wittgenstein's aims at the time.

Before going on to examine the adequacy of this argument it is worth noting the part played in it by the AR1-gs, especially in the light of 5.1 and 5.2 above. It does seem quite plausible to call it a model of the special kind noted in 5.1 (a). It does "model" the theory in question, for, in a way, this is what it is to be homologous with that theory. Much the same could also be said of l-g 2 as analogy. It might even be said that the l-g is then compared with an aspect of our actual use of language, viz., how we learn it, and thus shewn to be wanting as an adequate representation of language. As noted in 5.1 above, there is some plausibility in treating AR1-gs as models or analogues, and doing so does not conflict with the theory of homologous mediation outlined in 5.2 above. However, as noted in 5.1, there are good reasons for not being content to leave it at that. Firstly, neither analogy nor models can account for the much vaunted newness of Wittgenstein's approach, or for the tremendous impact l-g 2 in particular has had on the philosophical world. Secondly, AR1-gs are so different from we are used to as analogies and models that it is probably more misleading than helpful to characterise them thus.

Let us return to the formal outline of the argument (see 5.3, above). The most striking thing to note is that, formally, nothing would be lost by completely omitting l-g 2. The argument would then run: Hypothesis: Augustinian theory of language; outline theory of learning (which we accept); show that if language is in accord with hypothesis then it cannot be learned without prior knowledge of lang-
language; reject the idea that a child is born with a knowledge of language and therefore reject hypothesis. Why then the intrusion of the AR1-g?

Compared with his earlier work, Wittgenstein's interest had now turned from theoretical approaches to language as a relatively fixed set of data (la langue) to language as it is used in its natural home. In the version of the argument without the AR1-g, the emphasis is still very much on theory and la langue. The only aspect of the world in which we actually use language to play a part is the method of language learning and even this, on its own, is very static and theoretical. By using 1-g 2 and taking some pains to describe how it is used and in what sort of community, and by describing the learning process in terms of activities in that community, Wittgenstein makes sure that the emphasis is kept on language as a dynamic social phenomenon. In terms of his audience, it may be said that Wittgenstein uses the language game to bring the social environment of language into the argument while simultaneously (because the AR1-g is homologous to the theory) keeping in touch with their scientific cultural background. The AR1-g serves as a mediator between one fashion or mode of thinking and a possibly distasteful replacement for (but not "revision of") it. Thus, it might even be said that 1-g2's being formally superfluous is essential to the argument's having philosophical value in a more traditional sense.

Some general comments on the whole argument are now in order. First, let us return to the doubts raised by Rush Rhees as to whether 1-gs 2 and 8 have sufficient richness to be appropriately called language (see 5.1 above, or R. Rhees, p. 76). In 1-g 8 (the extended version which contains 1-g 2) we have only the words "this," "there," "block," "pillar," "slab," and "beam" and numerals. This gives a total of 24n possible sentences, where n is the number of numerals available. If n is, say, 10 (not an unreasonable limit when
one considers the occupation, etc., of this tribe) then there are only 240 possible sentences. It is quite possible that someone should learn these sentences parrot fashion, or learn to react to each as a stimulus in much the same way as a dog can be trained to react to distinguishable orders. When we compare this with the vast number of possible English sentences with, say, up to and including 4 words, it does look as if $1^g 8$ is excessively primitive, especially in the context of language acquisition theory.

It would seem reasonable to say that a theory of learning presupposes a knowledge of what it is that is learned. In learning a language, it is clear if somewhat superficial, that we have not only to learn a vocabulary, but also how to combine elements of that vocabulary to form a potentially infinite range of sentences. Thus, it seems, a theory of language acquisition and a theory of language go hand in glove and that discrediting one means discrediting the other. This may very well have been Wittgenstein's intention; if so, little if anything is lost in the above.

However, we are always left with the possibility of accepting the conclusion of PI, *32, i.e., of accepting innate ideas. In fact, as noted earlier, the innateness hypothesis is now quite widely accepted as a result of more detailed study of the actual mechanics of child language acquisition and a general rejection of stimulus-response psychology.

B.F. Skinner, the "high priest" of S-R psychology, expounded Augustinian learning theory in its most developed form in his book Verbal Behaviour. In this book he attempts to generalise on the information gained in experiments with rats and pigeons. In the Skinner-box experiments and other highly restricted situations, the notions of stimulus, response, and reinforcement are fairly well defined. However, there are problems in generalising them to real life behaviour. In his famous review of Skinner's book, Chomsky says:
(first quoting Skinner) "A part of the environment and a part of behavior are called 'stimulus' and 'response' respectively, only if they are lawfully related." This "lawful relation" seems very obscure and arbitrary. A response is said to be under the control of its "lawfully related" stimulus. Typical examples (these examples are all taken from Skinner) are the response to a piece of music with the utterance "Mozart" or to a painting with the utterance "Dutch." These responses are said to be under the control of extremely subtle properties of the physical object or event. Suppose instead of saying "Dutch" we had said "Clashes with the wallpaper," "I though you liked abstract work," "Never saw it before," "Remember our camping trip last summer" or whatever else might come into our minds while looking at a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other responses exist in sufficient strength) Skinner could only say that each of these responses is under the control of some other stimulus property of the physical object. But the word "stimulus" has lost all objectivity in this usage. Stimuli are no longer part of the outside physical world; they are driven back into the organism. We identify the stimulus when we hear the response. (Chomsky)

This argument is clearly of similar form to Wittgenstein's in PI, *28 ff., but is not restricted to a particular class of words, or theory of language. It also points to our accepting the conclusion of *32. Empirical evidence also points towards innateness. It is not within the scope of this thesis to go into this in detail. Thus, we shall make do with one quote. Roger Brown, a Harvard psychologist, writing in a forthcoming issue of *American Psychologist*, explains the semantic relations that seem universally to be the subject of "Stage 2" speech:

In brief, it may be said that they are relations or propositions concerning the sensory-motor world . . . A short list of 11 will account for 75% of Stage 1 utterances in almost all language samples collected. A longer list of about 18 will come closer to accounting for 100%. What are some of these relations? There is, in the first place, a closed semantic set having to do with reference. These include Nominaive (e.g., That ball.), expressions of recurrence (e.g., More ball), and expressions of disappearance or non-existence (e.g., All gone ball). Then there is the Possessive (e.g., Daddy chair), two sorts of Locative (e.g., Book table and Go store) and the
Attributive (e.g., Big house). Finally, there are two term relations comprising portions of a major sort of declarative sentence: Agent-Action (e.g., Daddy hit); Action-Object (e.g., Hit ball); and, surprisingly from the point of view of the adult language, Agent-Object (e.g., Daddy ball).

Brown goes on to shew that complications—longer sentences—are all based on the same kind of structures:

All of this of course gives a very 'biological' impression, almost as if semantic cells of a finite set of types were dividing and combining and redividing and recombining in ways common to the species.

It is not our aim here to argue for or against innateness. It is sufficient to note that the correct position on Pi, *32 is not yet clear and consequently it is not clear whether or not Wittgenstein's argument is effective.

The other use Wittgenstein makes of 1-g 2 is simply to point out and emphasise the difference in the kinds of linguistic expression we use. He begins this immediately after the introduction of the ARl-g with some fairly general comments, in Pi, **3 and 4. This is taken up again, following the discussion of how the children learn the language and the extension of 1-g 2 in Pi, *8, in *10, this time with specific reference to the ARl-g. This is followed by the famous tool-box analogy and a picturesque comparison with the levers in the cabin of a locomotive to shew that "what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print" (Pi, *11). He continues in Pi, **13, 15 and 17 to discuss the difference between kinds of words and the different viewpoints from which they might be classified. All this is straightforward enough. Wittgenstein then continues the discussion to shew how different are the various kinds of sentence we use. This begins in *19 with a rather protracted argument to shew that "slab!" in 1-g 2 is just as much a sentence as is "Bring me a slab!"; e.g.,

But that is surely only a shortened form of the sentence "Bring me a slab," and there is no such sentence in example (2). —But why should I not on the contrary
have called the sentence "Bring me a slab" a lengthening of the sentence "Slab!"? (PI, *19)
The claim is the more general one that if, in everyday English we choose to call "Slab!" a sentence then we are not grammatically mistaken. The classification of certain sequences of words into sentences is not something given but is something we do for our various purposes. We tend to get confused about this because we have been brought up in a linguistic community subscribing to certain grammatical paradigms and allowing our thinking to be limited by this.

For example, when children learn Maori in school they are told that in, for example, the sentence "Tino marino te moana" (literally: "Very calm the sea.") the verb "to be" is understood. But this is just trying to inflict English grammatical paradigms on Maori. Wittgenstein makes this point very clearly in PI, **20 and 21. This leads up to the list of examples of different types of uses of language in PI, *23, much quoted in other parts of this thesis, and the first mention in PI of NAI-gs.

How does the AR1-g, 1-g 2, function in this argument? At a superficial level we might dismiss it as just a source of examples. But if this was all Wittgenstein wanted of 1-g 2 he might just as well and just as effectively taken his examples from everyday language. To do this would, however, be to treat language as a set body of data—virtually as a vocabulary. In using examples from 1-g 2, he automatically draws upon the emphasis he has previously placed on the social environment and use to which the language is put. Thus, his examples are all in a social context. Furthermore, 1-g 2 was specifically devised to be in accord with the Augustinian theory of language. If examples taken from it in the social setting in which it occurs do not comply with that theory, so much the worse for the theory. Wittgenstein cannot be accused of "stacking the case" by using biased examples. Cf.:
A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example. (PI, *593)

The second example of Wittgenstein's use of AR1-gs that we shall examine occurs in PI, *48. The discussion of which 1-g 48 is a part is again directed against the theory of the Tractatus.

One of the basic ideas underlying the theory of the Tractatus is that there is one and only one final analysis of a state of affairs—it analyses into atomic facts. A proposition likewise analyses into a concatenation of names (in the technical, Tractatus sense) picturing a state of affairs. Each name is a "linguistic simple," being primitive-ly connected with its bearer.

This belief in the existence and uniqueness of a final analysis, both of a linguistic expression and a state of affairs, is an important and an ancient one. Wittgenstein quotes from Socrates' "Theaetetus" and cites both himself and Russell as sometime believers (see PI, *46).

In PI, *47 Wittgenstein discusses the first part of this belief: that reality divides into a unique set of simple constituent parts. This attack is, by comparison with much of PI, fairly straightforward and has, I think, gained fairly wide acceptance. If something is to be composed of constituent parts, then the whole thing must be composite. The sense in which a set of constituent parts are simple will be determined by the sense in which we take "composite." This may vary according to our purpose or interest. Wittgenstein takes as examples a chair, my visual image of a tree, a chessboard, etc., and shews different ways in which they may be regarded as being composed of simples. These are fairly clear and I shall not repeat them here. One point that seems to me to be very incisive but which seems to be overlooked by many commentators is, however, worth reiterating. If it was, for example, "laid down that the visual image of a tree was to be called 'composite' if one saw not
just a single trunk, but also branches, then the question 'Is the visual image of this tree simple or composite?' and the question 'What are its component parts?' would have a clear sense—a clear use." (PL, *47) The important point is that "The branches" would not be an appropriate answer to the latter question for this has already been specified in the meaning of "composite" or "component part" with respect to visual images of trees. "The branches" would be an appropriate answer to a question about meanings: "What are here called 'simple component parts'?"

In PL, *48 Wittgenstein discusses the second part of the belief, viz., that the names of the simple constituent parts of reality cannot be further analysed and have as meanings just those simples and cannot be otherwise defined. It is here that he uses an ARI-g.

The ARI-g is again constructed in accord with the theory to be examined: "Let us consider a 1-g for which this account is really valid." (PL, *48) And there follows immediately a remark on the use to which the 1-g is put: "The language serves to describe combinations of coloured squares on a surface." (PL, *48) However, compared with 1-g 2, the emphasis on the social use of 1-g 48 is minimal at this stage. It is not until PL, *49 that Wittgenstein really discusses the 1-g in its natural (if hypothetical) home.

It is here we see how Wittgenstein uses the 1-g to shew how a linguistic element may be classified in one way or another depending on the context of its actual use: "—that a sign 'R' or 'B,' etc. may be sometimes a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it is a word or a proposition depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written." (PL, *49)

The function of the ARI-g in this argument should be clear. The 1-g was constructed as an homologue of the theory under consideration but then discussed as if it were actually used for some social purpose. In terms of the
audience, it is in accord with a theory of the popular kind, but also in touch with "reality." That the theory fails even in a language especially constructed to fit it shews up the limited applicability of the theory all the more dramatically.

It is worth noting how strongly the special construction of 1-48 favours the theory under consideration. For example, in *49 we have: "In this situation the word 'R', for instance, is not a description; it names an element—but it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be named!" (PI, *48) The point made here only has force because in 1-48 there are only names and descriptions. In everyday language, as of course Wittgenstein would be quick to point out, there are many other classifications of linguistic performances. For example, "water" might be a name, a description, a cry or plea, an instruction, etc.

The reader may object to my use of emotive terms such as "dramatically" and "favourites" in the above discussion. Rather than repeating it I would refer him back to the discussion of 5.2 where the fact that philosophers are also human was discussed in relation to Wittgenstein's work. Also, the remarks in the preceding paragraph should shew that to formally discredit the theory in question it would be rather easier to take examples from everyday language with its vast variety of types of expression than from the AR1-g with its very limited range of types. The point is that in doing philosophy Wittgenstein took into account the nature of his audience, their predispositions, prejudices, and conceptual background. I would thus suggest that the element of drama in his work is at least in part responsible for its impact on and popularity with the philosophical world.

The third AR1-g we shall discuss occurs in PI, *60. Here Wittgenstein is examining the usefulness of analysis as a method in doing philosophy. The word "analysis" is
often used very loosely; here by "analysis" we mean the breaking up of something (in this case a sentence) into supposedly simpler parts. This method was, of course, basic to his earlier works and enjoyed general favour at the time Wittgenstein was working on PI, as it still does to this day. In the Tractatus the idea was that any sentence could, ultimately, be analysed into a unique set of simple parts. As he has already discredited the idea that there is a unique ultimate analysis of a sentence, Wittgenstein, in PI, *60 ff., discusses the virtues of analysis in shewing more clearly the meaning of a sentence. The ARL-g he uses, l-g 60, differs from the previously discussed ARL-gs in that it uses sentences from everyday language in a situation which might plausibly be encountered anywhere. Furthermore, what is under examination is not a theory but a method; the method is, however, closely associated with certain theories and theoretical considerations.

There is something quite amiss in Wittgenstein's use of l-g 60. The notion of a unique final analysis has already been eliminated: things, we now know, are composite or not according to the purpose for which we are examining them, and are divisible into constituents correspondingly. Thus, if one is using analysis as a method then presumably one will use the analysis most suited to one's purpose at the time. The most notable thing about Wittgenstein's analyses in l-g 60 us that they are utterly inappropriate to the context of the l-g. If someone wanted to clean our floor, I might say "The broom is in the corner." If, in this context, the word "broom" was unknown to the other person—for these are the kind of difficulties analysis is here supposed to overcome—then I might say "The implement for cleaning the floor is in the corner." The "brush and stick" analysis is probably only appropriate to talk of the construction, dismantling, or repair of brooms; but even then the actual sentences Wittgenstein uses as examples are
rather odd.

In 1-g 60, we are supposedly giving orders to someone to move pieces of furniture. In our use of the words ("broom," "chair," etc.) for these objects, our aim will be to make our worker pick out the correct object. To this end we need to make identifying references. Keeping this in mind, I think the answer to Wittgenstein's first question about 1-g 60—"In what sense is an order in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first?" (PI, *60)—should be: "None, unless you can show some point in analysing orders type (a) into orders type (b). Analysis is, after all, a purposive game." To the second question: "Does the former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis?" (PI, *60)—an appropriate answer might be: "Only if this is a way to make our worker do the right thing."

Thus a more interesting and relevant 1-g would have had, instead of Wittgenstein's variations (b), descriptions of the pieces of furniture in terms of their uses; e.g., implement for sweeping, implement for sitting, etc., or something similar that is at least feasible as an analysis in the circumstances he describes. As it is, the straw man he sets up on behalf of the method of analysis is altogether too in-substantial.

These points are brought up by Wittgenstein in PI, **61 and 62. In PI, *62 Wittgenstein comments: "But is is not everywhere clear what should be called the 'point' of an order." (PI, *62) Within 1-g 60, what might be plausible alternatives to the simple point of getting the desired objects to the desired place? To familiarize an apprentice with the structure of various pieces of furniture? In this case we would be inclined to call forms (b) further analysed versions of forms (a). To exhaust the worker? In this case, forms (b) would be fairly useless for they are too clear. To get the furniture shifted quickly? In this case the appropriate analysis will be whatever the worker best
understands.

It will be noticed that in the above I have emphasised words like "appropriate," "relevant," and "useful," and that these relations tend to be relative to the listener (in l-g 60 the worker) rather than the speaker. This is important for it would seem that any philosophical method is of value only insofar as it helps solve the problem at hand. By putting up as candidates for further analysed forms, forms which are so likely to be inappropriate, Wittgenstein has already prejudiced the case against analysis. ("The one-sided diet." cf. PI, *593)

A problem that arises here is whether or not an ARl-g needs to be remotely plausible to be effective in clarifying a philosophical question. This will, of course, depend on what is to count as plausible. However, it should be noted that the ARl-gs discussed previously, i.e., l-gs 2, 8, and 48, despite being rather more divorced from reality, have all been considerably more plausible than l-g 60.

The source of Wittgenstein's error here is clear. Analysis is not a theory but a method, a practice. As noted above this method is closely associated with certain theories, but the theories which depend upon analysis for their use, viz., the Tractatus and other logical atomist theories, have already been discredited in PI. The crucial question here is "Is he going to understand the further analysed sentence better?" (PI, *60). Wittgenstein's error here is thus in failing to recognize consequences for his method of the fact that analysis is itself a l-g (NAL-g). As such it is not "played" gratuitously or at random, but in some social context and for some social purpose. As Wittgenstein points out, a basic source of confusion is examining expressions in isolation from the l-gs which are their natural homes; "... one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the l-g which is its original home?" (PI, *116)
If there is, with respect to analysis, a relevant theoretical consideration to take into account in constructing an ARl-γ, it is that in using analysis we seek to maximize clarity and understanding. Both of these are relative to the social context, especially to the parties involved. L-γ 60 fails so completely to reflect this that it is virtually useless as a means of "dispersing the fog" (cf. PI, *5) around analysis.

In terms of our hypothetical explanation of the function of ARl-γs, l-γ 60 is exceptional. As an instance of analysis it must, trivially, have the features of analysis. As analysis is not a theory it would seem somewhat superfluous to note that l-γ 60 is not homologous with a theory. However, insofar as there are theoretical considerations relevant to the use of analysis, it is the failure of l-γ 60 to reflect (or by homologous with) these considerations that is the source of its ultimate failure. This also leads to its not fitting the idea of mediation; for, although there is a very firm emphasis on the social use of the l-γ, it fails to maintain contact with the other side of the opposition, the theoretical considerations involved.

For completeness we must note that in PI, **63 and 64 Wittgenstein takes a different approach to analysis with considerably greater success. He begins by framing this in terms of l-γ 60, but it is, in essence, independent thereof. He illustrates this with an interesting extension of l-γ 48. Here he is discussing the claim that an analysed form is somehow more fundamental than the corresponding unanalysed form. It can be seen that the ARl-γ, l-γ 64, works much better because it does theoretically reflect this claim and yet, in a social situation (N.B. "the French tricolour" (PI, *64)) does not always substantiate that claim.

No discussion of PI, or indeed the later work of Wittgenstein, could possibly be complete without some mention of the "private language," ARl-γ "S." This is an argument
that has been flogged to death over recent years. Thus I shall only mention it very briefly, and then only as an illustration of the use of AR1-gs. The important passage is PI, *258.

The theory under consideration is, roughly, that as pain words are the names of private experiences, their meanings (i.e., the "objects" for which they stand, or with which they are correlated) can only be known to oneself. L-g 258, the one word l-g "S," is obviously set up in accord with this theory. The discussion is then of its use in the social setting which is its natural home (that this happens to be a one person society should cause no difficulty). Thus it is a very clear example of homologous mediation. It is constructed to be homologous with a theory of the type his audience were used to, but discussed with the emphasis on its practical social use, thus mediating between the audience's propensity for theories and love of accuracy which at the time were incompatible.

Thus it can be seen from these examples that the idea of homologous mediation does explain the efficacy of AR1-gs as a method of doing philosophy. And, it should be noted, the selection of examples discussed above is not just a random one, but covers almost all the actual uses of AR1-gs in PI. "Homologous mediation" can explain why the method was genuinely new and why it was so successful as a method of convincing other philosophers, despite its not measuring up to the standards so dear to them.
NOTES

1 It may seem that in this section I have taken an overly instrumentalist view of science. This is a question which it is obviously inappropriate to argue here. However, let me just note that my personal prejudices are much more in favour of a realist view, and that I have yet to see how the above talk of models, etc., is incompatible with such a view.

2 If you really stretch the imagination it can be made sense of thus: prismatic coefficients shew the extent to which the canoe is long and narrow and the jet boat is short and fat; hence, it is saying that the old Maori way is long and narrow by comparison with the Pakeha way which is short and fat; however, anyone using such an odd analogy would, I think, be more likely to say exactly the reverse.

3 It will be noted that in calling the preceding an "explanation" of the mode of operation of ARIs I am being somewhat "un-Wittgensteinian;" cf. II, *109: "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." This is a problem which, in studying and trying to understand Wittgenstein, we just have to face. There is a further "un-Wittgensteinian" error which should be avoided: this is the idea that in showing how various concepts mediate between categories, we are in effect creating new categories, a new conceptual map with more of the same type of parts. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that there are no hard and fast discrete categories in this way of thinking. We individuate categories for certain purposes but only insofar as this is useful and only, as it were, for as long as they are useful. In a sense, we should accept all (and any) systems of categorisation, and none of them.

4 For example, after reading a paper to a meeting of the New Zealand Philosophical Society (Auckland, 1970) the noted Australian philosopher D.M. Armstrong was asked a question by Professor Deutscher, to which he could not find an answer; he said: "But I will have to find a way around that, for otherwise I would have to give up my beloved physicalism."
CHAPTER SIX

NATURAL LANGUAGE GAMES

6.1 In this chapter we shall examine the second main type of l-g found in Wittgenstein's later work, viz., natural l-gs (NAL-gs).

As noted above (see Ch. 4, etc.) Wittgenstein used the expression "l-g" not only for the artificial l-gs he devised for specific philosophical purposes, but also for various "parts" of our natural language. In Ch. 2 we noted that this second use of "l-g" developed later than the first (AR1-g) until in PI it is the more dominant. There are, however, earlier expressions of the idea behind NAL-gs to be found in the Blue and Brown Books, and these ideas also occur, expressis verbis, in "Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data."

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language. (BlB, p. 5)

(Many different grammatical games, resembling each other more or less, are played with this word. Think of the different uses of the numeral "1") (BlB, p. 50)

If someone taught me the word "bench" and said that he sometimes or always put a stroke over it thus "Bench," and that this meant something to him, I should say: "I don't know what sort of idea you associate with this stroke, but it doesn't interest me unless you show me that there is a use for the stroke in the kind of calculus in which you wish to use the word "bench." (BlB, p. 65)

When the boy or grown-up learns what one might call special technical languages, e.g., the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc., he learns more language games. (Remark: The picture we have of the language of the grown-up is that of a nebulous mass of language, his mother tongue, surrounded by discrete and more or less clear-cut language games, the technical languages). (BrB, p. 81)

In NL, explicit use of made of the idea of NAL-gs on six occasions, all of which are quoted in 2.1 above. Two are
worth repeating here.

"Surely if he knows anything he must know what he sees!"—it is true that the game of "showing or telling what one sees" is one of the most fundamental language games; which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game. (NL, p. 283)

We call something a language game if it plays a particular role in our human life. (NL, P. 300)

The occurrences of NAl-gs in PI are too numerous to reiterate here; for a survey thereof the reader is referred back to Ch. 2. The general idea is that language and its associated surroundings divide up into parts which are called "1-gs." Thus the "nebulosus mass of language" referred to in BrB, p. 81, is not only "surrounded by discrete and more or less clear-cut language games, the technical languages" but is itself composed of such 1-gs. However, in the later work, the degree to which these NAl-gs are discrete and more or less clear-cut is less rather than more. The boundaries between NAl-gs are hazy and imprecise, although they may be made precise for a particular purpose (cf. PI, **88, 108, 132). The analogy of language and town of PI, 18 is also illuminating here.

In these passages it is clear that we have not only a rough introduction to the idea of NAl-g, but also an overall view of language as composed of NAl-gs. It is this view that I have called the "1-g thesis." It is a thesis about language and quite obviously is inextricably bound up with the idea of NAl-gs. The 1-g thesis is now well known and widely accepted, especially since the publication of D.F. Pears' Modern Masters series book on Wittgenstein in which it is most clearly presented (see sec. 2.1 above for two very clear passages). The thesis is directly opposed to the theory of language set out in the Tractatus. This opposition is explained by Specht in a very pretty analogy:

The difference between the two views can best be illustrated by a comparison. If language is compared to an organism (which is, of course, only possible in
a quite definite respect) then a theory of organism which starts with individual cells as completely isolated entities and which attempts to construct the organism summatively from these individual cells—such a theory corresponds to the Tractatus theory. The conception of language in the PI, however, could be compared to a theory of organism which lays down as a foundation the individual functional systems of the organism as entities and construes the cells only as members of a functional system. The individual language games correspond to the different functional systems of an organism: circulation, respiration, the organ of sight, etc. Now, the decisive thing is that, although different moments can be distinguished in an organic functional system, e.g., individual cells, groups of cells, the interplay of these groups of cells etc., they cannot exist independently of the functional system. Something similar is true of language-games; here too, different moments can be distinguished: the individual linguistic signs, the rules for the use of linguistic signs, the activities that are indissolubly bound up with use. But none of these moments can be construed as independently existing entities.

(Specht, p. 54)

In the Tractatus and other "logical atomist" theories the primary linguistic elements are words. However, it is clear that, with a few exceptions (ellipsis, exclamation, stylistic devices, etc.) individual words do not occur alone in linguistic discourse, and in a large part of our use of language, viz., speech, words are not even precisely distinguished or bounded. Words occur singly almost only in dictionaries and grammars, and are thus natural elements if one is making a theory of language. For these reasons De Saussure ("Cours de linguistique général"), for example, took the sentence as the primary element in the study of language. But the meaning of sentences also varies considerably from one context to the next (there are numerous examples illustrating this; see, e.g., Mundle's "Would you like to go to Timbuctoo?") and thus a sentence cannot be studied independently. In Wittgensteinian terms, what a particular sentence means will depend upon the l-g in which it occurs. This does not, however, mean that the l-g should be taken as the primary linguistic entity, whatever that may
mean, but rather that the various parts of language are related to one another in such a way that any study or argument concentrating on one to the neglect of the others is bound to be misleading. The advance in the study of language that Wittgenstein made in his later work was to show that l-gs are of at least equal importance. In philosophy, the recognition of this would, Wittgenstein claimed, lead to the dissolution of many problems (see PI, **109 to 133, especially *116).

NAI-gs are many and various. They "overlap and crisscross" and some are included, either in whole or partially, in others. In the important passages PI, *66 ff., Wittgenstein answers a question as to the essence of l-gs by a discussion of "game" and the introduction of the notion of family resemblance. (See Ch. 3 above for a discussion of this.) Thus we may take these passages as applying also to l-gs. From PI, *23 and other passages in PI (notably **25, 71, 156, 249, pps 170, 184, 224) we can get enough examples of and comments on NAI-gs to make a rough classification of them (cf. Specht, p. 45 ff.). There are, I think, great dangers in such a procedure; but if we keep in mind that such a classification is in no sense final or exact and would probably be quite objectionable to Wittgenstein, it is quite illuminating.

First, following Specht, we may sort out NAI-gs according to the amount of overt linguistic activity involved. At the top of the scale are what Specht calls "achievements of language" and in which an actual linguistic act or performance is central. From PI, *23 we have: asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, reporting an event, giving orders, telling a story, describing the appearance of an object. From PI, *249 we have lying; from PI, p. 184, telling a dream; from PI, p. 224, confessing one's motive for an action. Praying (PI, *23) might at times be included in the above and at other times in the next classification. If one
prays in the sense of discussing a problem with God, then clearly praying will go in the above group. If, however, one is, for example, chanting a formula such as the Lord's Prayer, then it probably goes in the next. In this group we have those NAl-gs in which language is used overtly and essentially, but not in the "achievement" sense of the first group. From PI, *23, examples are: speculating about an event, guessing riddles, making up a story (including these in this group is a bit too mentalistic, and they thus have some claim to being in the first but also the third group), singing catches. Also included would be acting, translating, reading (as if one were a reading machine) out loud, and copy typing.

In the third group language withers further into the background, although the activity is still bound up with language. From PI, *23, examples are: acting on orders, constructing an object from a description (drawing), presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams, forming and testing an hypothesis. From PI, p. 224, we have being certain. It should be noted, however, that this 1-g cuts across and is associated with many others.

It will be quite obvious in the above groups of NAl-gs actions other than linguistic gain in prominence as we move down the range. It should not be thought that non-linguistic activity is thus of little importance to the first groups. On the contrary, the physical action, social (human) surroundings and even the geographical environment (e.g., room size, furniture layout, relative position of the speaker, etc.) are all involved to some degree in all NAl-gs.

A quite different type of NAl-g are those which centre on a particular word or group of words. For example, there is the 1-g with "game" (see PI, *71), and the 1-g with "reading" (see PI, *156). The most obvious example of a NAl-g centering on a group of words would be the 1-g with colour words. Other examples are the 1-gs with physical object
words and with sense-impression words, to which Wittgenstein may have been referring on p. 180, PI. However, it is just as likely that this is a reference to a further similar type of NAI-g, viz., those that centre on a particular material paradigm or group of paradigms. The obvious example is the metric measuring l-g, in PI, *50. Wittgenstein continues, in PI, *50, to suggest the possibility of similar paradigms for colour words. Thus, it might be more correct to say that these NAI-gs are dependent upon their paradigms rather than that they centre thereon. Nevertheless, they have a peculiar interest of their own which makes them worthy of a separate mention. We shall return to this later.

It is clear that all these NAI-gs are distinguished on a quite different basis from those previously mentioned, for they cut across and are included in many of them. Thus, for example, both the l-g with colour words and the l-g of metric measurement may well occur in the l-g of describing the appearance of an object.

There are also the subject oriented NAI-gs, the "new suburbs" (cf., PI, *18) of our language. These are the various technical languages which grew up along with different sciences, arts, etc. Thus, for example, there are the symbolisms used in chemistry, physics, etc., the notations of logic and mathematics, legal jargon, even ski language, etc.

Finally, it might be inferred from the beginning of PI, *23 that different types of sentence as distinguished in grammars might be the basis of another range of NAI-gs. Such a range of l-gs would cut completely across all other types of NAI-g. For this reason isolating and treating separately NAI-gs distinguished on this basis is likely to be misleading. Wittgenstein warns us of this in PI, *24.

In most of the above discussion the emphasis has been mainly upon language. Insofar as this may be misleading I would like to now rectify it. In his later work Wittgen-
stein continually reminds us that he is discussing language in its natural home, "language in action" in all the variety of uses to which we put it. That is, he was interested in la parole, and not in language as a static body of data, la langue. Thus, to understand any NA1-g we must understand the actions and social surrounds that are naturally involved with the use of the purely linguistic items. We might call it the "total ecology" of the linguistic act.

There is a danger in using expressions such as "speech act" of divorcing the various parts of this "ecology."

Thus, we might be tempted to separate: a) the physical production of sound (or written sign); b) the psychological event giving rise to a); c) the social situation in which it occurs, etc. In using the idea of 1-g, Wittgenstein maintains and emphasises the natural unity and interdependence of these various aspects. Thus, in PI, *23, he says:

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI, *23)

And in PI, *7:

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game." (PI, *7)

Our classification of NA1-gs is not intended to be used formally, nor is there any intention of its representing Wittgenstein's views. Its only place here is as a device to show the diversity and scope of the notion of NA1-gs. Heuristically it does seem to be of value, but it must be emphasised that nothing further should be made of it.

This diversity and great scope of the notion of NA1-g has been the subject of some criticism by commentators.

For example, Pole writes:

In the catholicity of Wittgenstein's list of linguistic activities, such things as prayers and writing poetry are included; and Mr. Strawson has suggested that reading aloud to send an old man to sleep might equally legitimately find a place. It seems that Wittgenstein's account of language or language-games,
each functioning by itself in its own way, leaves him
no criterion for disqualifying from this name any sys-
tem or pattern of activities—or perhaps we may say
any involving marks or noises—no matter how remote
from the assertion of what may be true or false.
(D. Pole, p. 92)

Strawson in the review referred to by Pole, adds:
Surely distinctions are needed here to save the whole
notion from sliding into absurdity. (Strawson (1),
p. 26)

Such criticism shows a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's
purpose. If he had drawn distinctions between types of
NA1-gs, or if we were to do so, then we would always be tempt-
ed in a given case to say, e.g., "This is a 1-g of type X
and therefore it follows that . . . ." The use of language
is an highly dynamic social phenomenon and any such prior
ruling is likely to be misleading. We also distinguish
NA1-gs according to different criteria for our different
purposes (this should be obvious from the preceding classi-
fication of NA1-gs). It would be unnecessarily restricting
to be bound by some prior categorisation (cf., PI, *132).

Such a prior differentiation of NA1-gs would also tend
to mislead us into thinking that they were clearly and pre-
cisely demarcated. Nothing would be more contrary to Witt-
genstein's view in PI (and surely this must have been one
of the points which prompted him to use "game" in "language-
game"), as can be seen, for example, in PI, *71.

Furthermore, it is mistaken to think that Wittgenstein
placed no restraints whatever on what was to count as a
NA1-g. His conception of NA1-gs was quite down to earth and
realistic as one should expect from a philosopher who con-
tinually recommended the investigation and use of anthropo-
logical type data (cf. e.g., PI, **66, 124, 126, 340, 415,
654, p. 230). By far the most famous restriction on what
is to count as a NA1-g is that it shall not be private.
The sense in which "private" is used here is now very well
known. It is explained, briefly, by Wittgenstein in PI,
*243. Many have interpreted Wittgenstein as arguing specifically against the possibility of a private language; most notable is, of course, Norman Malcolm (see Malcolm (1))—he was, however, severely taken to task by Judith Jarvis Thomson (see Thomson) for the interpretations of Wittgenstein upon which he based his claim. The "Private Language" argument is the most favoured topic of all who have written on Wittgenstein's later work; it has been the subject of many, many articles (so many that Moltke S. Gram remarks: "Discussion of the private language problem has reached a mildly disreputable stage" (Gram, p. 298)) and is quite familiar to most. Perhaps only one point is quite clear: Wittgenstein was most concerned to show that our sensation l-g is not private and to remove the grammatical picture of meaning (a word means the object for which it stands) which leads to the view that it is private. It is difficult to say whether he was also concerned with showing the impossibility of a private l-g. for in all the passages dealing with this topic he is primarily concerned with our sensation l-g.

Nevertheless, we can say, quite confidently, that Wittgenstein does show that if there was such a thing as a private l-g it is very, very different from any of the l-gs we actually use. If we ally this with his recommendations to look at language in its various uses in its natural home then I think we can conclude that at least the l-gs of philosophical interest and importance are not private ones.

The following are some passages not commonly included in the "Private Language" discussions which may help to throw light on Wittgenstein's views of the matter.

If we describe a game which he plays with himself, is it relevant that he should use the word "red" for the same colour in our sense, or would we also call it a language-game is he used it anyhow? Then what is the criterion for using it in the same way? Not merely the connection between "same," "colour," and "red." (NL, p. 289)
"Toothache" is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me.

In the use of the word "meaning" it is essential that the same meaning is kept throughout a game.

Are you sure that you call "toothache" always the same private experience?

What's the use of being sure, if it doesn't follow that it is so and if your being sure is the only criterion there is for its being so?

This means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction. (NL, p. 289)

"To give a sensation a name" means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is to be used. (NL, p. 291)

In our private language game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression—in order, of course, to use the name for this impression in the future. The definition, that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impression to use the name and for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occasions after having given the definition we did use the word and on others we didn't; but we described these occasions only by saying that we had "a certain impression"—that is, we didn't describe them at all. The only thing that characterised them was that we used such and such words. What seemed to be a definition didn't play the role of a definition at all. It did not justify one subsequent use of the word; and all that remains of our private language game is therefore that I sometimes, without any particular reason, write the word "red" in my diary. (NL, p. 291)

The next restraint on what is to count as a NAI-g comes from PI, *207. Here we see that, in Wittgenstein's view, for sound sequences (or written patterns) to count as language there must be some regularity in their use. An arbitrary, or random, sequence of sounds will not be a NAI-g.

This may cast some doubt on the relevance of Strawson's example: "and there is also the special use involved in sending an old man to sleep by reading aloud from a translation of a play." (Strawson, p. 26) If all that is being used in this example is a stream of sound to induce sleep, then the reader may just as well use any text or none at all, just say, a buzz. In that case we may have doubts about
calling this a l-g; but even so the use of a play may serve to save the reader from the boredom of buzzing. However, presumably a lot more is relevant than just the noise and thus the example is most probably a NAl-g.

The passage referred to above (PI, *207) comes in an important discussion of rules and language, which was examined in some detail in Ch. 3 above. The conclusion reached there was that although it was demonstrable that not one rule was common to all uses of language, all uses of language were rule governed (in the special sense of "rule governed" explained in Ch. 3). The conception of "rule," it will be remembered, was closely associated with regularity of behaviour, conforming to a practice, a form of life. Thus, in NAl-gs, we find a regularity of behaviour, of use of linguistic expressions, this regularity being associated with what is done with the l-g. This regularity is internal with respect to a given l-g; obviously if it was general then some rule would be common to all of language. This requirement of internal regularity (consistency) is also expressed in NL, in a passage already quoted above:

In the use of the word "meaning" it is essential that the same meaning is kept throughout a game. (NL, p. 289)

However, it should not be expected that such regularity will be found in all respects throughout any given l-g; for if that was the case then NAl-gs would be clearly demarcated by that phenomenon alone. Around the "borders" of NAl-gs we must thus expect doubts, questions, to arise about the rules for certain elements of those l-gs.

Another point arising from PI, *207 is that there must be some connection between NAl-gs and the world ("... between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions." (PI, *207) "L-g" is very much a "feet on the ground" concept. Wittgenstein was concerned with language as it was actually used:
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI, *116)

Behaviour, human actions and elements of the non-linguistic world enter into all NAL-gs; the tendency to forget this, according to Wittgenstein, was the source of much unnecessary philosophical puzzlement (cf., PI, *113 ff.; B1B, p. 65). Thus, in NL we find:

The game we play with the word "toothache" entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression of toothache. (NL, p. 290)

It seems, whatever the circumstances I always know whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game but then it becomes independent of this game. (This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of measuring it.)

We are tempted to say: "damn it all, a rod has a particular length however I express it." And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see (know) how long it is, although I can't say how many feet, meters, etc.—But suppose I just say: I always know whether it looks tiny or big! (NL, p. 306)

Both these passages are taken up again in PI. The latter is developed in PI, *50, with a discussion about the standard metre in Paris (already noted above) and in PI, *251. This argument is quite well known. The former point is somewhat more difficult and more contentious. It recurs quite explicitly in PI, *300. The regularity found in NAL-gs is dependent upon the regularity found in the extra-linguistic world, or, perhaps more correctly, our conception thereof (our conceptual schema). Thus, we have standard measurement methods regularising the l-g in which we discuss lengths and the regularity of, e.g. pain behaviour in the ascription of sensations. This is further borne out in PI, **249, 250.

As is now well known, the possibility of acting, of pretence, depends upon there being some regularity in genuine behaviour. Such regularity of behaviour including verbal behaviour and the associated conception of the world make up the overall concept of NAL-g. Thus, NAL-gs are
closely associated with forms of life in Wittgenstein's later work. We shall return to this association shortly.

In summary then we see that "language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI, *7) divides up into NAl-gs in many and various ways. Each of these l-gs is public (not private) and has an internal regularity associated with the regularity of behaviour and environmental circumstance in which it is appropriately used. However, just as different behaviour patterns, modes of action, environmental conditions, and purposes melt into one another without there being clear-cut lines of demarcation, so it is with NAl-gs. Clear-cut limits may, however, be drawn for particular purposes, but in doing this we must recognise that these are our own limited creations and not generalisable. It is as if there were maps of language with areas separated in many different ways (cf. administrative area, electoral district, parish, utility district, etc. on maps) with boundaries criss-crossing, only here the boundaries would not be clear lines, but fuzzing shadings. These parts of language, l-gs, are a completely natural part of a linguistic community, but, as with all elements of culture, they are not distinguished by the members of that community from other elements in any hard and fast way.

Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. (PI, *25)

6.2 Language-games and forms of life.

In sec. 6.1 above it became increasingly obvious that NAl-gs were closely associated with forms of life (or, more accurately, an interpretation of the concept "form of Life"). The concept "form of life" plays a very important, in fact basic, part in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As Harold R. Smart puts it, somewhat scathingly but nevertheless, I believe, correctly:

Forms of life evidently play the role in Wittgenstein's own language-game, of a metaphysical ultimate in terms
of which the functioning of language is to be understood. They must be accepted, and they are given—that is to say they are regarded as an undubitable basis, a rock of certainty, like the Cartesian cogito. (Smart, p. 233)

Dallas High writes:

The concept "form of life" is central and crucial to Wittgenstein's later thought, and, by the same token, it is perhaps the most difficult. (High, p. 99)

And Norman Malcolm in his famous review of PI says:

One can hardly place too much stress on the importance of this latter notion (form of life) in Wittgenstein's thought. (Malcolm (1), p. 91)

(He nevertheless devotes only one page of a forty page review to it; perhaps a tribute to the difficulty of the notion.)

Given the importance of form of life in Wittgenstein's later work, and the close association of this concept with that of Nal-ga, it is essential that we should now devote some time to it. Oddly enough, considering its importance, the expression "form of life" occurs only five times in PI. They are:

And to imagine a form of language means to imagine a form of life. (PI, *19)

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI, *23)

241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI, *241)

Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (PI, p. 174)

What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life. (PI, p. 226)

Textual clarification: the passage from PI, p. 174, should presumably be understood in such a way that the complicated form of life referred to is the use of language, not the phenomena of hope.
"Form of life" also occurs in On Certainty:

358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)

359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, something animal. (That is very badly expressed, and probably badly thought as well.)

There are, however, many other passages which, although not mentioning forms of life expressis verbis, do help throw light on that notion. Such passages are mostly to do with customs, culture, practice, activity, institution, etc. It will be advantageous in this section to use passages from Wittgenstein's later works other than PI; viz., Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, On Certainty, etc.

Despite its importance the notion of form of life has received very little detailed study in the literature on the later Wittgenstein. Most writers seem to recognise its importance, but either take it to be a self-evident and clear idea, or else just neglect it. The only works I can find that make any real attempt to come to grips with the notion are those of Dallas High (High), Farhang Zabeh (Zabeh), Patrick Sherry (Sherry), and J.F.M. Hunter (Hunter).

High interprets "form of life" in the sense that humans, cats, tigers, trees, etc., are different forms of life. This view is superficial, and, as it cannot account for all of Wittgenstein's uses of the expression, must be considered incorrect. Zabeh and Sherry proceed by quoting all the most useful (in this respect) passages from Wittgenstein's work and summarizing. Thus, for example, Sherry concludes:

By "forms of life" he means basic human activities and responses like hoping, feeling certain, measuring, giving orders, asking questions, and greeting people, and indeed using language generally. He regards these things, together with customs, institutions, etc., as the fundamental "given" facts from which philosophy must start." (Sherry (1), p. 161)
Such summary accounts are very useful as far as they go, but they do not go far enough towards an interpretation of "forms of life" to be of genuine assistance in understanding the notion. Hunter, however, provides a detailed investigation of Wittgenstein's "forms of life" and offers a plausible and very interesting interpretation thereof. In the following I shall give a brief summary of his account (which, as with all summaries will not do justice to the original) and then argue that a slightly modified interpretation might better accord with Wittgenstein's overall philosophy.

Hunter begins (Hunter, p. 275) by giving four possible interpretations of "forms of life," the fourth of which is the one he proposes as most plausible. The first three are: 1) a form of life is something shared and standardised; 2) a form of life is a package of mutually related tendencies to behave in certain ways (including linguistic behaviour); 3) a form of life is a way, mode, or style of life, having to do with class structure, commerce, religion, etc. The fourth interpretation he calls an "organic account" (p. 278): a form of life is seen as "something typical of a human being"--"typical in the sense of being very broadly in the same class as the growth or nutrition of living organisms," means of propulsion, ability to react to environment, etc.

Our initial resistance to this last view is based on our tendency to think of much of our behaviour, especially verbal behaviour, as the responsibility of a person's mind, which is said to have a non-organic mode of operation. We do not include in the biological what is learned, intelligent, done at will, etc., but only what goes on within us, unnoticed and without our direction. However, if we look at the progression from purely reflex unlearned processes through the many learned or acquired processes which are done automatically (not at will) but which can be resisted
at will, through walking, speaking, writing—we may select a word at will but do not will the physical action of forming it—finally to expressing ourselves in a certain way, the acceptability of this account becomes clearer. Of expressing ourselves in a certain way, Hunter says (pps. 278-79): "... we do not know how just this form of words satisfies all the various grammatical, social, personal, and intellectual requirements of being something we "want to say." We may by studying it afterwards find out how it satisfied such requirements (cf. PI, *82), but the interesting thing is that we generally manage to say things that are just about what we would say if we had the requirements in mind, but without a thought of the requirements." How do we manage to perform such complex operations with so little difficulty? "They flow from a living human being as naturally as he walks, dances, or digests food: operations of comparable complexity." (Wittgenstein's discussion of toe wigglings, PI, **614, 615, is helpful here.)

Hunter goes on to produce three claims which he says are the "main cash value" of the organic account, and considerable textual evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein made these claims. The first of these claims we are already familiar with from Ch. 3 above. It is that language acquisition is a moulding and shaping process, more like learning to dance than being programmed like a computer. In support of Wittgenstein's acceptance of this view, Hunter cites PI, **6, 29, 69, 75, 145, 189, 208, 218, 362, 495, 630, and pps. 188 and 227.

The second claim is that there is no mental act, such as connecting a name to a thing, involved in most speech acts. We learn to use language, but the learning has brought it about that we act, as it were, instinctively. "Not that we generally 'speak without thinking,' but that in speaking, thoughtfully or otherwise, the words we use come immediately, without thought" (p. 282). A good way to illustrate
this point, it seems to me, is to compare one's own experiences with the use of a relatively unfamiliar foreign language with the use of one's own language. In support of Wittgenstein's acceptance of this view, he cites PI, **290, 377, 379, 381, 659, and p. 195.

The third claim does not seem to me to be as clearly distinguishable from the second as would appear from Hunter's article. However, together they are very important. It is what Hunter calls "the theory of linguistic self-sufficiency." This is the theory that in linguistic acts—saying, reading, hearing, writing things—"we do not need and do not generally use, any logical or psychological paraphernalia of any kind; the words themselves are quite sufficient" (P. 283). The passages he cites here both show what is meant by this and make it clear that Wittgenstein did support this view. They are: B1B, p. 37; PI, **393, 403, 449, and 652.

In contrast to this is the "view to which one is easily inclined; that language is a late development in human evolution, and an artificial and foreign thing (PI, *432) which needs to be connected with what is natural and human to acquire meaning. On this view we do not understand language until we translate it into something non-linguistic—things, feelings, images, sensations, activities. But if instead we regard language as something natural to us, and so as being itself one of those things into which we would otherwise want to translate it (PI, *649), then its self-sufficiency may for the first time be seen as obvious and to be expected." (Hunter, p. 284) Thus:

Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. (PI, *25)

Finally, in support of the claim that Wittgenstein held this organic theory, Hunter cites T 4.002 to show that he was even then aware of it, and PI, **364, 366, and p. 185.

To show that the organic theory provides an adequate
interpretation of "form of life" in Wittgenstein's later work, Hunter examines in detail various possible analyses of the five passages from PI in which that expression is used. He does not claim his theory to be the correct or only plausible and consistent one, only that it does fit the text.

Hunter's organic account of forms of life seems to me to offer not only a very plausible interpretation of this concept, but also a useful and, I believe, essentially correct basis for understanding Wittgenstein's later work. The only point with which I would disagree is quite minor: it is his apparent restriction of forms of life to humans: "Something typical of a human being." There does not seem to be any point in such a restriction and it also inhibits possible explanations of some of Wittgenstein's remarks; e.g.,

If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.
(PI, p. 223) (cf., PI, *241)

If you went to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out, you wouldn't know what to look for.
(La, p. 2)

The account of Wittgenstein's "forms of life" which I wish to propose does not in any other way run counter to Hunter's; on the contrary, it includes Hunter's account, but goes further to put his organic account into an even wider framework which, I believe, can explain even more of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It can best be explained from a human perspective although I hope it will be clear that it also applies to animals. It might most conveniently be called a "conceptual scheme" account. However, the expression "conceptual scheme" is to be treated with great caution here. The advantage of using it is that it is already quite familiar in philosophy. However, we should note that there is a tendency to think of a conceptual scheme as something mentalistic; insofar as this is so, using this expression is misleading. Certainly there are aspects of forms of life which are mentalistic—but, as I
hope will become clear below, they are only some aspects among many, and not in Wittgenstein's work given any special priority. Also, conceptual schemes are commonly regarded as in need of justification, or, at least, as the proper subject of justification (cf., Strawson (2)). Forms of life, on the other hand, do not stand in need of justification; justification is totally inappropriate to them. However, provided these cautionary notices are kept in mind, I feel there is considerable heuristic value in continuing to use "conceptual scheme" here.

In the following I shall first give a brief synopsis of this view and then run through the textual evidence indicating that Wittgenstein subscribed to it.

Human beings are faced with a bewilderingly great and various array of data. To make this data intelligible to ourselves and to make it possible for us to live with it, we organise it by classifying it and giving special prominence to certain aspects of it (cf., Strawson (2), and sec. 5.2 above). The idea of this overall organisation of data is much the same as Strawson's "conceptual scheme" in Individuals (Strawson (2)). As compared with Strawson, however, I see no reason to believe that there can be only one way of organising, only one conceptual scheme (cf., Strawson (2), pp. 9 and 10). However, even if one can describe in one's own language a conceptual scheme other than one's own (which in many respects is doubtful), it does not make sense to ask for an interpretation of one's own language in terms of that conceptual scheme, or for criteria of adequacy for it. Our language is inextricably bound up with our conceptual scheme and does not contain the possibility of such a thing. Even in the most general and basic aspects of a conceptual scheme, problems (conflicts) may occur. In sec. 5.2 above I suggested that the question of the continued existence unperceived of material objects is such a problem in our conceptual scheme.
Because data is so varied and because we use it in so many different ways, our organisation and categorisation of it is also highly varied. Thus, our overall conceptual scheme is comprised of many different facets. Many of these are individuable at least on the grounds that they are handled differently by different cultures. (There is a possibility of circularity here for "culture" is often defined in terms of this kind; thus one might be more correct in saying "group of people." However, for the sake of clarity and intelligibility I think it easier to live with the possible circularity and shall henceforth use "culture"). These differences tend to centre around methods of coping with problems and conflicts within the conceptual scheme; many examples can be found in sec. 5.2 above. There are, however, other examples of a more general kind; e.g., the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert do not have the idea of personal superiority in any respect and thus do not have orders, even for children. By comparison with the possibility of radical basic differences in conceptual schemes these differences may seem minor or superficial; however, as they are all we can describe (possibly all we can imagine, although suggestions such as this always seem question begging and fraught with problems of communicability), we tend to make considerable use of them. A culture's conceptual scheme is evidenced by their language, their behaviour (including linguistic behaviour), their attitudes to each other and the world, their social organisation, customs, institutions, practices, and activities.

On this account a child learns not only the language of the culture into which he is born but also the conceptual scheme of that culture. In talking about child language acquisition, we tend to assume that the child's perceived world has the same constancy, coherence and organisation as the adult's and that he has only to learn the language used to talk about that world. On the view being proposed here
there is no such assumption; the data presented to the child is just as unsystematic and disorganised to him as is the linguistic part of that data. The moulding and shaping process by which he acquires language also provides him with the appropriate organisation of the other (non-linguistic) raw data. The two processes are indistinguishable.

On this account, a form of life is an integrating concept. In the above outline it may have seemed that the conceptual scheme or various internal facets of it were somehow distinct, mentalistic frameworks behind our behaviour and language; the expression "form of life" emphasises that all these aspects are very tightly interwoven. Forms of life closely parallel NAl-gs in range and diversity. However, whereas in the use of "NAl-g" the emphasis is on language (while most emphatically not excluding the manifold related aspects), "form of life" includes all aspects without special emphasis on any one. Thus, a form of life is a natural part of our highly complicated and various life, and includes all the aspects of this part, from conceptual through behavioural, attitudinal, social, institutional, linguistic, and organic. Also, following PI, *7, we may say that whole of a conceptual scheme and its concomitant behaviour is a form of life, for it contains all the others (cf. sec. 4.4 above), although for this Wittgenstein also uses "world-picture" (cf., e.g., OC, *167). Quite obviously it should not be expected that different forms of life should be clearly demarcated from one another; just as with NAl-gs, they merge into one another without clear cut boundaries, although different ones may be distinguished in different ways for different purposes. In some of his later writing Wittgenstein also uses "language-game" as if it were synonymous with "form of life" as interpreted here.

We shall now go through the above account point by point, citing some of the textual evidence which most clearly supports the claim that Wittgenstein subscribed to it.
Of course it is impossible to cite all such evidence here, and more importantly, to get the overall feeling behind protracted discussions, such as, e.g., OC, **60 to 170.

First, the view that we organise the raw data of the senses into a conceptual scheme which is not something fixed and immutable: the best textual support for this comes from OC. For example, see OC, **94 to 97, 99, and 253. An interesting comparison with Wittgenstein's idea here is Kuhn's "paradigm" account of development in science. As an illustration of change in conceptual scheme through time the current development from Newtonian to relativity physics is interesting. We have been brought up on, and (except in our scientific moments) think in terms of Newtonian physics; thus, we would say that two events cannot be both simultaneous and consecutive—that the proposition "Events X and Y are both simultaneous and consecutive" is contradictory. Someone brought up on relativity physics (I have doubts as to whether this is really possible—but in that regard we can only wait and see) would have no qualms about such a proposition, and would simply ask for more information about the position and relative velocity of the observer.

That Wittgenstein also thought conceptual schemes might vary from people to people, or organism to organism, is exhibited in two passages already quoted (i.e., from PI, p. 223 and LA, p. 2). That he thought the conceptual scheme a matter of convention rather than somehow independently given, is also hinted at in RFM (RFM, 1-75). We might cite also PI, pps 223 ("... one human being can be a complete enigma to another...") and 230 (where it is suggested that we imagine certain facts as very different from what they are and note how concepts would also change), and OC, *108, etc. There is, however, in PI (PI, *206, for example) a suggestion that Wittgenstein might have thought our basic conceptual scheme common to all humans at least.

That Wittgenstein closely connected behaviour, ways
of acting, with conceptual schemes will become apparent in
the following. Most of the differences in conceptual schemes
that Wittgenstein suggests are differences in various facets,
forms of life. He had an extraordinary genius for imagining
such differences.

Thus, we are asked, for example, what would be the
point of our pricing system if lumps of cheese suddenly
changed size on the scale (PI, *142), or measuring if rulers
"suddenly fell into confusion" by having unstable sizes
(RFM, II-75, V-1, 2). It seems that Wittgenstein conceives
all human activities as grounded in our conceptual scheme,
or a facet thereof. Even mathematics is not exempt:

For mathematics is after all an anthropological phe-
nomenon. (RFM, V-26; see also RFM, V-35)

He provides illuminating illustrations showing how mathema-
tics, calculation, is part of "the natural history of man"
(RFM, I-141) and how the systems which we regard as correct
might be different (e.g. RFM, I-142 to 149).

If a culture has a conceptual scheme that is differ-
ent in some aspects from ours then this will be reflected
in the language of that culture. Such a difference will
give rise to problems in the translation of their language
into ours (cf. Prof. J. Pouwer, Inaugural Address, V.U.W.);
Wittgenstein discusses this question in BrB, p. 103.

There may also be possible variations in facets of
conceptual schemes that are based on differences in some
humans, although our acceptance of this possibility is in-
hibited by our thinking being so conditional upon our con-
ceptual scheme (cf. "aspect blindness," PI, 213). This is
made clear, for example, in Zettel, **371, 372). However,
among normal humans the propositions expressing features
of our conceptual scheme are of a special kind; they are
not the sort of thing about which we may be mistaken (OC,
*155). That we have an organisational framework of this
kind is not exhibited only in our language or in the status
of certain propositions. Our entire way of life and beha-
viour and institutions are all integrally associated and consequent upon the conceptual scheme. One part is not a ground for another. Wittgenstein illustrates this in PI, p. 174, and (with respect to the uniformity of our conceptual scheme) in PI, **472 to 474. Thus, we may say that the character of our conceptual scheme is also evidenced by the way we behave, what we do and what we will and will not do. The importance of actions, ways of acting and behaviour to this view will become more apparent later when we discuss the reasons why Wittgenstein thought forms of life basic.

Remarks on the child's acquisition of the conceptual scheme in all its behavioural, linguistic, and social aspects are not so readily available in Wittgenstein's work. The discussion of Wittgenstein's conception of rules in sec. 3.2 above was, as noted in that place, not specifically about language, but about "rule governed" behaviour in general; thus, the "moulding and shaping" process of learning rule governed behaviour may be taken as applying to the whole conceptual scheme. This finds an echo in OC, *95:

... and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. (OC, *95)

In OC, *94, Wittgenstein calls the world picture an "inherited background;" the idea of inheritance occurs also in Z, *391. In the overall conception of the world being propounded here this suggestion of innateness has much the same status as the innateness hypothesis in language acquisition theory. However, as with the latter hypothesis, all that is required here is not an inherent (instinctive) conceptual scheme, but an inherent propensity to acquire one—a "deep need for convention" (RFM, I-75). Thus, a child will acquire whatever conceptual scheme he is brought up in.

The passages in OC from OC, *128 to OC, *131 are very important here. Wittgenstein's use of "judge," etc., in OC is very much as an activity, something we do, which will only sometimes be something we do verbally (cf., OC, **149,
150, 156, 232). The above-mentioned passage is far from being transparent. As I see it, the point is that before we can use our experience of the world as a basis for judgment we have to make certain distinctions in and classifications of experience; but these are themselves judgments, and hence (at some point) experience cannot be the ground of judgment--some judgment is learned other than by experience of the world. If this is a correct interpretation, it is clear that the problems relevant to the acquisition of a conceptual scheme are very much the same as those relevant to the acquisition of language. The idea of moulding and shaping, of nudging each other into line, of conforming to a practice, is a plausible and adequate way of avoiding the undesirable implications of the more extreme forms of the inatness hypothesis. As noted above, all that is required is a "deep need for convention."

Throughout the above discussion we have assumed that this is an account of what Wittgenstein meant by "form of life." We must now examine the evidence supporting this assumption. That is, given that Wittgenstein did hold the position expounded above, is this what he intended when he used the expression "form of life"? The only evidence that we can use here are the few explicit uses of that expression. Hunter's technique is to examine various crucial phrases in the passages in which "form of life" occurs, and to shew that only the last of his four suggested interpretations fits all the most plausible interpretations of these phrases. He does this in some detail and in each case ends up with the most intuitively plausible interpretation; e.g., for PI, *19, he discusses possible ways of reading "means" and concludes that most plausible is "is a case of" as in "To imagine New York means to (is a case of) imagine a city" (Hunter (1), pp 286-7). I shall not reiterate this discussion but shall simply take his conclusions on these questions.

And to imagine a form of language means to imagine a form of life. (PI, *19)
This should cause us no problems. As language is integrally bound up with behaviour, customs, etc., all of which are bound up with and overtly evidence our conceptual framework, it is clear that if one imagines a form of language then one also imagines a form of life. This passage may be seen as a reiteration of Wittgenstein's insistence that we should look at language in its natural home and not neglect all the behavioural and social phenomena "into which it is woven" (PI, *7).

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI, *23)

There are two interpretations of "activity": organised communal affairs (activities listed at schools, like basketball, carpentering) and something we do (playing basketball); on textual evidence, especially:

Of course mathematics is a branch of knowledge, but it is also an activity. (PI, p. 227)

Hunter concludes that Wittgenstein uses the word in the latter sense (clearly, if he was using it in the former sense then in the above quoted passage there would be no contrast) (Hunter (1), p. 288). As all the things we do, including using language are, on our interpretation, a part of some form of life this again presents no problems. To put it paradoxically, even our most random and gratuitous activities, are not random and gratuitous. (They can only be called random and gratuitous by comparison with forms of life which are not so.) *23 (PI) is also of importance to us for its emphasis on the connection between 1-gs and forms of life.

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI, *241)

This passage is much clearer when seen in the light of the remarks from OC mentioned above. The possibility of agreement and disagreement only arises in case people have the
same form of life, or against the background of a common form of life. What people say is true or false only with respect to a form of life. There are, however, certain propositions which are exempt from this—viz., propositions expressing features of our conceptual scheme (cf., e.g., OC, *155).!

Can only those who hope talk? Only those who have mastered the use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (HII, p. 174)

Hunter's discussion (Hunter (1), pps 290-1) is illuminating here. He first considers the passage on "It makes me shiver" (HII, p. 174; see above), then continues:

Applying this to hope, we might reckon that Wittgenstein would say that when we say we hope (or have been hoping) as information, this is less a report on our thoughts and feelings than another expression of hope, and also that our saying we hope may itself fill us with those thoughts and feelings. Either way, saying that we hope is not a secondary or derivative, but a primary thing, at least as basic and natural as any of the other "phenomena of hope." ((Thoughts, feelings))

But there is also a sense in which it is prior to any of them: the sense in which, by saying that we hope, we make or show the phenomena of hope to be such. For if the thought that a certain delightful person may come to my party fills me all day with pleasurable feelings, there are no criteria which would decide whether these thoughts and feelings were a case of hoping, yearning, or musing. And if I later say that I have been hoping . . . I have not discovered this, but made what I have been doing hoping (cf. HII, **557, 653). (Hunter (1), pps 290-1)

This does present us with some problems which will require some explanation. First, remember that on this interpretation of forms of life, where language takes a part, they closely parallel NA kills, but without giving that expression's emphasis to language. On this ground we suggested that it might be reasonable to suggest that our entire world view and its behavioural, social, and institutional concomitants might also be called a form of life (following HII, *7).

When we individuate forms of life for one purpose or another,
we are inclined to do so in terms of either a "geographic" or a social basis; likewise, we are most inclined to think of a particular NAt-g in terms of some non-linguistic factor (e.g., working from a diagram). But there was also the NAt-g of asking questions, for example, which cuts right across any partitioning according to non-linguistic factors. "Forms of life" emphasises all aspects equally: thus a partitioning on the basis of language is as much a possibility as one on any other basis. Likewise we may also partition the whole form of life (everything) according to this range of different aspects of it. It is this interpretation which fits the passage in question (Fl, p. 174). The form of life here is the one separated by concentrating on the use of language, as compared with, e.g., religion (or a particular religion), house building, water usage, etc. As such, this form of life is indeed complicated.

What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life. (Fl, p. 226)

This is perhaps the most important of all Wittenstein's remarks containing this expression. It is also the one that best supports the interpretation of "form of life" that I am proposing here. A detailed discussion of the evidence shewing that it is this interpretation that fits other remarks on what is basic will follow shortly.

The remark from OC containing "form of life" also fits very well into this interpretation.

358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)

359. But that means that I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal. (OC, **358, 359)

He is talking here of our certainty of propositions such as Moore's "I have lived my life in close proximity to the earth," that is, propositions expressing features of our
conceptual scheme. This is a kind of certainty without contrast (uncertainty) for such propositions express features of our form of life and it is only within this (i.e., given it) that doubt or uncertainty can make sense (cf., e.g., OC, *354, etc.).

There is, finally, one further use of "form of life" to be found in Wittgenstein's later work. This one is especially interesting to us for Hunter says his organic account cannot cope with it (Hunter, p. 278).

Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgment? (LA, n. 58)

This does not seem to offer any special difficulties for the account being offered here. If someone believes in the Last Judgment, it will presumably affect his behavioural and social practices in a variety of ways which will be distinguishable from those of someone who does not share this belief. Most noticeable among these will, of course, be the things that he says in certain circumstances. Thus, the utterance of this belief may be seen as central to this form of life; if, in appropriate circumstances, we wished to distinguish this form of life from others we might well do so by citing such an utterance and comparing it with forms of life in which such an utterance would not occur, or those in which its negation might occur. Thus, I think we can conclude that this "conceptual scheme" interpretation of "form of life" is an adequate and plausible one. Its plausibility will, I believe, be reinforced by the following discussion of the various remarks Wittgenstein made about what is basic, the given.

Throughout Wittgenstein's later work there are many references to some point beyond which further explanation makes no sense, bedrock, the point at which we must just accept something as given. For example, in FI there are **109, 217, and 654 to 656. In OC there are many further remarks on what has to be accepted, but here the emphasis
is not only on the linguistic aspects of forms of life. In fact much emphasis is given to acting and judgment (and, as noted above, Wittgenstein's use of this word is not restricted to verbal judgments). Thus, for example, see OC **110 and 204.

OC, *204 puts one in mind of the slick answer to certain expressions of doubt about induction: "If you really do not believe in induction, next time you get a blood test, get them to take the whole lot!" Our actions, our behaviour, belies many of such professed doubts (cf., PI, *472 ff., etc.)

I want to say: We use judgments as principles of judgment. (OC, *124)

156. In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind. (OC, *156)

Wittgenstein also uses "believe" in talking of the given. The following two passages shew that he thought of our conceptual scheme as conventional rather than somehow fixed and immutable.

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. (OC, *166)

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. (OC, 253)

If we take these passages in conjunction with passages such as OC, *94 ff., and others quoted earlier, it seems inescapable that Wittgenstein saw "bedrock," the given, as learned and conventional. We should not, however, think that we somehow acquire this and then build linguistic behavioural and social patterns on it as a foundation:

248. I have arrived at rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house. (OC, *248)

We might say that the nature of the conceptual scheme is deduced from all the overt manifestations of it, but we would have to note that this does not mean a separation of something psychological ("conceptual" in a mentalistic sense) from the observable aspects.

There are also in OC some remarks which shew the kind
of thinking that led Wittgenstein to this position. For example, see OC **150, 341, and 342. Note also OC, **24, 80-83, 105, 155-156, 163-164, and 192.

Why then, if this important notion form of life is so all-embracing, did Wittgenstein place so much emphasis on the linguistic aspect (as evidenced, e.g., by his use of l-gs rather than forms of life)? First of all, he was doing philosophy and the forms of life on which philosophical issues centre do have a linguistic aspect which, furthermore, provides the most useful philosophical evidence. He also saw much of his later work as against the background of his early work and the work of other philosophers in the immediately preceding period. The mistake of those philosophers (including himself) was to isolate language from its essential social and behavioural surroundings.

If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words. (LA, p. 2)

Certainly the use of "l-g" emphasises language more than the use of "form of life;" but it also emphasises the use we make of language, that using language is an activity (cf. PI, *23, etc.). He saw philosophical problems arising from an overly restricted view of language (of looking at la langue instead of la parole):

The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI, *109)

Thus, we see that for all that "form of life" is the more basic idea in Wittgenstein's later work, "l-g" is the more useful and philosophically relevant.
NOTES

1. This analogy is misleading in that maps of a relatively static body of data—land, towns, etc.—which is more an analogue of la langue than la parole, and it is to the latter of these that the concept of NAL-γ is meant to apply.
CHAPTER SEVEN

APPLICATIONS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE-GAMES

7.1 It may seem from sec. 6.1 and 6.2 above that the notions "l-g" (NAI-g) and "form of life" are so broad and loosely demarcated as to be of little genuine use. Such an impression would be mistaken. Firstly, l-gs are used in doing philosophy; thus we distinguish them for our purposes. Such a distinction is only of value insofar as it serves this purpose, and is not permanent and has no permanent correctness. For any given purpose the l-g need only be as clearly demarcated as the exigencies of the problem require; it will, however, follow that l-gs will always be as clearly demarcated as we need them to be. Similarly with forms of life, it would be counter-productive to provide a map or method of mapping all of them, distinguishing one from another. For any given purpose we may make such a set of distinctions or map, but it will always be only one among indefinitely many possible ones. To think there is only one way to distinguish l-gs or forms of life would lead us into error. As Wisdom puts it (beautifully):

As we all know, but won't remember, any classificatory system is a net spread on the blessed manifold of the individual and blinding us not to all but to too many of its varieties and continuities. A new system will do the same but in not just the same ways. So that in accepting all the systems their blinding power is broken, their revealing power becomes acceptable.
(Wisdom, p. 119)

How does all this help us solve philosophical problems? How do NAI-gs remove the bumps on the head of understanding? (cf. PT, *119). In this section we shall look briefly at a selection of philosophical problems and sketch solutions arising from the general understanding of Wittgenstein's idea of NAI-gs. In section 7.2 we shall examine in rather more detail the relationship between Wittgenstein's views as interpreted above and those of W.V.O. Quine on the ques-
tions of synonymity and analyticity. In section 7.3 we shall apply the results of Ch. 6 to a further problem in philosophy, viz., the question of the isolation of various NAI-gs, in particular religious ones.

No attempt will be made to use ARI-gs in these investigations. As was made clear in Ch. 5, ARI-gs as a method of doing philosophy are to a large extent heuristic, and related in important ways to various characteristics of their audience. Thus, the use of such a thing in the context of the present work would be altogether too contrived and artificial. It should, however, be noted that their use in philosophy has not passed on with their inventor. A good example can be found in Hintikka (2), oddly enough on the question of Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis.

First, let us take the question of synthetic a priori propositions. (Here I do not mean to discuss the special status of certain propositions having to do with the basis of our conceptual scheme—see sec. 6.2 above.) The proposition "Nothing can be both red and green all over" is a fairly standard example for discussion of this question. As an introduction to the approach to be taken, consider the following situation: we examine a chess game, after a certain number of moves have been made; there are two white pawns, one behind the other, on the same file, say, on c3 and c4; now I say, "One of white's pawns has captured a black piece or pawn;" am I asserting something a priori or a posteriori? And is this proposition synthetic or analytic? The answer will depend upon the surroundings of the statement—the l-g in which it occurs. If we are both familiar with chess and talking, as it were, in chess—i.e., in the l-g centering on chess—then the proposition in question will be analytic, for it is a consequence of the rules of chess that doubled pawns cannot occur without at least one of them's having made a capture. However, if I am trying
to teach you the game, and we are talking about chess, and thus in a larger l-g with which you are already familiar, then this statement might provide you with a useful piece of information about chess. In this case the proposition in question is synthetic; things might easily have been otherwise. Thus, we may say that this proposition is either analytic or synthetic, depending on the l-g in which it occurs (cf. PI, *247). This kind of argument was applied to our original question by Frederick Ferré in his paper, "Colour incompatibility and language-games" (Mind, v. LXX, 1961). Ferré reformulates the proposition in question so as to avoid certain fruitless side issues. Thus, he asks: "How do we know that red and blue cannot occur simultaneously in the same part of the visual field? Is this a case of logical or some other kind of incompatibility? Or is it merely a contingent truth?" (Ferré, p. 91) The answer is again dependent upon the l-g in which the question occurs. Within the l-g in which we use colour words and, in fact, it would be fair to say, within the whole of English (most persons blind from birth can acquire an adequate facility with colour words) a proposition such as "No one part of the visual field can be both red and blue simultaneously" is analytically (logically) true. However, if we were explaining our colour words to a person with no previous experience of them or a person from a culture with a different system of colour discrimination (e.g., a Hanunoo), then it might state an important and contingent fact about our colour l-g. It is worth noting, in passing, that our ability to make colour discriminations has been found to be bound up with and to some extent dependent upon our command of colour words (cf., e.g., Roger W. Brown & Eric H. Lenneberg, "A Study of Language and Cognition," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, v. 49, 1954).

A problem which Wittgenstein himself treats of in PI and which has already been mentioned above is that of in-
duction (cf., PI, *465 ff.). Our belief in certain inductively derived principles is exhibited by our behaviour, both verbal and otherwise. But this belief is not of the kind that admits the possibility of being wrong; it is so natural that it has become involved in the foundations of our l-g. Wittgenstein's two example are of a quite contrasted kind (they occur in PI, **466 to 472). We do not have to think whether to establish whether or not to put a hand in the flame, and nor does an engineer have to think whether or not to calculate the thickness of a boiler's walls; we have to learn these things, but, like learning language, having learned them they become completely natural, even, as it were, instinctive. Thus, propositions such as "Putting one's hand in a fire hurts," although inductively established, are not open to question, but form part of the basis of our everyday form of life.

The idea of NAI-gs may also be used to gain clarity in some other topics, including, for example, aesthetics and ethics. The general idea behind a l-g account of these fields is that they are complexes of human institutions, activities, responses, dispositions, etc., and that the language used in them (the propositions appropriately used in them) is somehow sui generis and thus not subject to evaluation according to criteria from "outside." These l-gs can only be understood, as it were, from the "inside." On this view we can see, for example, how pointless and fruitless any attempt to derive "ought" propositions from "is" propositions will be.

Such a nice pat account does not, however, fit very well with Wittgenstein's overall view. We might well, for a given purpose, distinguish, say, the l-g of ethics, but to draw conclusions based on this distinction would be quite wrong: for any demarcation of a l-g is to some extent legislative and thus conclusions derived from that demarcation will be to the same extent legislative. As pointed out re-
peatedly above, 1-gs are not separated in some fixed manner by hard and fast lines.

The proper questions here are questions of translatability and accessibility. This may be best approached by considering the problem of translating from one language into another, especially if they are the languages of quite different cultures (say, the language of New Guinea hill tribesmen into English). Prof. J. Pouwer explains the problems:

Every conscientious translator is aware of his frustrations when he tries to convey meanings for which the vehicles are sometimes completely missing. The Italian proverb "traduttore, traditore," that is, the translator is a betrayer, is all too correct. For example, in what way can one formulate an English equivalent for the concept of the Mimika people in West New Guinea that the essence of life called ipu is located in each of the jointing parts of the body separately, such as the knuckles, shoulder-blades, and knee-caps. To these Papuans each individual person has a number of substantive ipu. English equivalents such as spirit or principle of life or for that matter mana hardly convey the meaning of ipu. Small wonder so many anthropological monographs are littered with native terms. (J. Pouwer, p. 9)

Here Prof. Pouwer has given us a good example of a Mimika word that is untranslatable with respect to English. But it is not inaccessible to the English speaker for to demonstrate the word's untranslatability Pouwer has had to give us a rough explanation in English, of what it means. Furthermore, Pouwer is not a native speaker of Mimika. Accessibility is, in fact, a condition of the discovery of translatability. (A radical and basic difference in conceptual scheme may render an associated language inaccessible, in which case the question of translatability would not arise. Wittgenstein suggests this may be the case with lions—see PI, p. 223—and spherical men from Mars—see LA, p. 2. That Wittgenstein was well aware of problems of translatability and that these problems are rather more complicated than the brief account above would make them appear, can be
seen for example, in ErB, p. 103.)

The problem of defining an aesthetic predicate, say, "beautiful" (for all this is a scarcely used word—see LA—it is still our standard example of an aesthetic predicate) in terms of physical descriptions (see, e.g., The Modular, Le Corbusier, for a practical attempt at this), or of deriving aesthetic predicates from physical descriptions is very much akin to this problem of intranslatability. It would be very odd indeed if the distinctive language of the NAL-γs we call "aesthetics" was translatable into non-aesthetic language for in that case there would not be such a distinctive l-γ. That there is, is a feature of our form of life. The question of the accessibility of aesthetics is a very complicated one for it involves hereditary as well as cultural factors to an extent not found in many other l-γs. For example, if Yehudi Menuhin had been brought up in an Australian aborigine family he might well have been the greatest digery-doo players of all time, but if I had been brought up in a family of gifted and dedicated musicians I would have been the black sheep. Nevertheless, this NAL-γ is, by and large, accessible to most people, at least in some respects (it is prodigiously diverse); we develop interests in art and in different types of art and learn what counts as good examples, etc.

Similarly with ethics; that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" is not a problem but a condition of there being such a l-γ. It is not a problem because an understanding of morals, moral behaviour, etc., is accessible even although its language is not translatable into non-ethical language. We learn by being "nudged into line" just as with the other conventional aspects of life. We can also learn new and different codes of moral behaviour by observation and the correction of an initiate and can become quite adept at changing from one system to another. This account does not imply that the NAL-γ of ethics is clearly
defined, only that there is a part of our total range of language uses which is distinguishable both in the words found commonly in it and the subject matter for which it is used. The boundaries of this l-g are vague.

The above sketches are far from complete and do not, of course, solve all problems of ethics or aesthetics. My aim was only to give an indication of how Wittgenstein's l-gs can serve to clear up some misconceptions into which we fall because of the "uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print" (cf., PI, *11).

These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. (PI, *109)

The method is to some extent empirical, however, for the existence of the data which makes NAI-gs such as those of ethics and aesthetics and religion is an empirical phenomenon. It lies at the base of investigation:

124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. (PI, *124)

655. The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game. (PI, *655)

Finally, let us look briefly at philosophical scepticism. The sceptic argues that there are no grounds for our belief in the independent existence of material objects—\(\text{in Strawson's (see Strawson (2)) terms, for the distinction between things which are oneself, or states of oneself, and things which are not oneself.}\) Hume argues for and accepts the rationality of such a conclusion. For example:

Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent ex-
istence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. (Hume, Book 1, Part IV, Sect. IV)

On the other hand Hume professes a quite different position:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter them any farther. (Hume, Book 1, Part IV, Sect. VII)

In Hume's view, reason supports scepticism, but human nature is such that reason does not provide the basis for, or back, or eliminate, all our beliefs; hence we do not behave as sceptics. Wittgenstein's position is, if my account is correct, that any argument must begin somewhere, and our conceptual scheme (our form of life) is bedrock, the most primitive starting point. Our conceptual scheme is manifested in our language, behaviour, etc. Certain propositions expressing things basic to our conceptual scheme cannot be doubted because doubting them does not make sense in a l-g (or, form of life) founded on them. Norman Malcolm noted Wittgenstein in a lecture in Cambridge (U.S.A.) in 1949 thus:

Certain propositions belong to my "frame of reference." If I had to give them up, I shouldn't be able to judge anything. Take the example of the earth's having existed for many years before I was born. What evidence against it could there be? A document? (Malcolm (2), p. 92)

Hume calls the latter-mentioned of his positions "indolent" and attributes it to his "natural propensity" and "animal spirits and passions." It is, however, firmly founded in his "form of life"--in his way of organising phenomena and making them intelligible to himself. His sceptical position is the result of raising doubts where no doubts could be sensibly raised, of being bewitched by language. Which is
a very easy thing to be for, after all, "cause," for example, does not look much different from "house," "muddle," or "mouse" (cf., PI, **109, 11, etc.)

The argument form sketched here as Wittgenstein's is quite familiar. It is a clear and simple way of putting the view usually arrived at by transcendental arguments.

I characterise a transcendental argument as one to the conclusion that the truth of some principle is necessary to the possibility of the successful employment of a specified sphere of discourse. Its use will be to show the necessity either of accepting the principle on the part of anyone who claims seriously to employ localities of the relevant sphere of discourse, or of abandoning such a claim. (Phillips Griffiths, p. 167)

It might be suggested that Wittgenstein's position is stronger because he takes behaviour other than linguistic into account, and there would seem to be some truth in this. For forms of life, as explained in sec. 6.2 above do seem to be the ultimate starting point and also to provide the framework for any discussion or argument. However, Wittgenstein was concerned with philosophical problems and philosophy is done in words. But also, on his view, language is inextricably interwoven with all other aspects of behaviour:

To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (PI, *19)

Furthermore, as has been noted many times above, l-gs do take non-linguistic behaviour, social setting, etc., into account. Wittgenstein's approach to many philosophical problems is in terms of l-gs, and thus does put language back in its proper home.

116. When philosophers use a word—"knowledge," "being," "object," "I," "proposition," "name,"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: Is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI, *116)

7.2 In this section we shall discuss the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction as it might be interpreted along
Wittgensteinian lines and the relevance to this of Quine's attack on that distinction. Wittgenstein did not, in his later philosophy, either propound or use an explicit analytic-synthetic distinction. That he did not propound such a distinction is not surprising, considering his claim not to advance theses; that he did not use a distinction in these express terms is not surprising either, given his view that many philosophical problems arose from deceptions in the use of language which were only compounded by the use of special jargon. In general he avoided the use of any of the traditional jargon.

However, Wittgenstein does place considerable emphasis on a similar distinction, namely, the distinction between what he calls grammatical statements and those which are not grammatical. Although he does not tell us how, precisely, this distinction is to be drawn, there are passages from which we can draw some clues. Thus, from e.g., PI, *370, we can see that grammatical questions are not to be decided by pointing to or describing something (extra-linguistic); nor are they settled by psychological descriptions or instructions (e.g., PI, *232); nor, again, by investigation of causes (PI, p. 203 and Z, *458). On the positive side, we see that the grammatical-non-grammatical distinction might be drawn similarly to a conceptual-factual distinction (PI, p. 203; Z, *458), or similarly to the a priori-a posteriori distinction (PI, *158; Z, *442). It is not my intention here to try and make explicit from Wittgenstein's remarks a distinction which he did not choose to explicate himself. These remarks are intended to show only that he did use a distinction of a kind at least similar to the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is also clear that he regarded the failure to draw such a distinction as a common source of problems in philosophy (PI, *251, *392; Z, *55, etc.). These problems could be removed by the assembling of commonplace information in a perspicuous manner so as to
make it explicit whether the statement in question is to be understood as grammatical or not. Making such perspicuous assemblies of reminders was one of the most striking features of Wittgenstein's genius.

As noted above, that Wittgenstein did not make explicit the grammatical-non-grammatical distinction is only to be expected, for to do so would be to advance a thesis about language. But in the light of the above, we can see why he should not want to advance such a thesis; the distinction is used in "dissolving problems" and thus should be variable according to the problem at hand. It is this aspect of Wittgenstein's method that is therapeutic and therapy, to pursue the analogy, varies from illness to illness. However, there are some further points which we can draw from this analogy, upon which Wittgenstein himself placed much emphasis. Thus, the distinction will be relative to the subject matter in which the problem occurs. For example, if a statement about energy is to be shown "grammatical" then the reminders to be assembled should come from physics. The grammaticality thus shown will be within the language-game of physics. As it is people who have philosophical problems (to Wittgenstein), and as the reminders assembled will be reminders to people, the distinction will be relative to the persons involved. Following on this, we can see that it will also be relative to the language used by these people, and thus to the language—words, idiom, etc.—current at that time and place. In short, the grammatical-non-grammatical distinction is relative to language-game. This, however, is in accord with our most basic and useful employment of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Many theses have been proposed in many different contexts, that rest upon disguised analyticities. Finding the offending step in the argument supporting such a thesis and making its analyticity apparent is one of the most important methods of doing philosophy. In any given instance of this
process, what is important is getting clear about the value and cognitive status of the thesis being advanced and the method is relative to the subject matter and general context (the language-game).

From what we have gleaned above about Wittgenstein's distinction of the grammatical from the non-grammatical, and from the preceding chapters of this thesis, we can construct an explication of the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction which we might call "Wittgensteinian." Obviously, though, it should not be attributed to Wittgenstein. We would not expect this explication to provide us with a method for making, or even beginning, a list of "The Analytics of English." This would be to propose an invariant thesis about language. We should, however, expect it to provide a method for showing whether or not a given use of a given sentence (type) is analytic.

Analyticity is usually explained in terms of meanings and synonymy. As Quine (Quine (1)) makes very clear, the concepts of meaning, synonymy and analyticity are all closely related, and in such a way that an explication of any one of them will serve to establish the others. Let us proceed by discussing synonymy.

We are by now familiar with the Wittgensteinian dictum that for a large class of cases (although not for all) the meaning of a word is to be found by looking at its use (PI, *43), and that in looking at a word's use, we should look in the language-game that is the word's natural home (PI, *116). Thus, if we are to look for a characterisation of synonymy in accord with Wittgenstein's later work we will have to make it in accord with these tenets. Clearly, such a characterisation will not now be too difficult.

Firstly, synonymy will be relative to language-game. As has been argued earlier (see Ch. 6, etc.) we should not expect the meanings of expressions to remain constant in different language-games. Thus, we should not expect that
because two expressions may be found synonymous in one language game, that they will be so in all. Similarly, just as language, customs, and language-games, change through time, so too will synonyms. Finally, the criterion of synonymy within a given language-game will have to be in terms of the use of the expressions in question, for most cases. (We shall discuss another type—those whose meaning is given by pointing to their bearer (cf., PI, *43)—later.)

Thus we might begin by saying that two expressions will be synonymous within a given language-game if they have similar uses within that language-game. This, obviously, will not be of much help without an explication of "similar use." The relevant criterion of similarity of use will be found by looking and seeing (cf., PI, *66) how the expressions are used. Thus, we look first at the distribution of sentences in which the expressions in question occur within the language-game and test the acceptibility of interchanging them to those who use the language-game.

In principle then this investigation of synonymy will be empirical. We will collect data drawn from observations of participants in the language-game and by questioning them and testing hypotheses in various ways such as were outlined in sec. 3.4 above. Such an approach was supported by Wittgenstein; for example:

We want to replace wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic fact. (Z, *447)

One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice. (PI, *340)

Usually, of course, we do not make such empirical studies. We rely on our intuitions as speakers of the language, and as users of, or participants in, the language-game in question, although the legitimacy of so doing has been the subject of much dispute.¹ This dispute need not delay us here, however. As noted above, our most important use of
the distinction which it is our aim here to explicate, is to show the misconceptions underlying certain philosophically problematic theses when they are and as they are presented. Thus, in doing this our main source of information will be the person propounding the thesis in question. Thus, for example, we would ask of a person arguing that all human motives are selfish, what sort of a thing he would count as a legitimate counter example to his thesis; depending on his answer we should be able to demonstrate that his claim is either analytic (resting on some redefinition) or false. Information thus gained, being within the language-game in all respects, and authoritative with respect to the problem at hand, is (with respect to this Wittgensteinian therapeutic method) beyond reproach.

On such empirical tests, what will be preserved—e.g., truth value, topic-comment orientation—will vary from context to context, 1-g to 1-c. Thus we should not always expect, for example, the simple truth functionally equivalent forms we learn in propositional calculus to come out synonymous in all substitution instances; nor will all passive sentences be exact synonyms of the corresponding active sentence. Furthermore, Wittgenstein continually emphasised that language is a social instrument and thus language-games take into account social and behavioural features of a non-verbal kind. The criterion of similarity of use will thus have to take into account various possible differences in social and behavioural setting that might distinguish expressions. Some illustrations of the above points are:

(1) John went to town and bought fish and chips.
(2) It is not the case that John either did not go to town or did not buy fish and chips.
(3) Mary Weinstein does not like many boys.

is not relevantly similar, in most language-games in which one might expect to find it, to:

is not likely to be relevantly similar to:
(4) Many boys are not liked by Mary Weinstein. The expressions "serviette" and "table napkin" (and many other similarly related pairs) are used by different social groups and in many situations could not be substituted without prejudicial overtones.

It might be protested at this point that on the above criteria there will be no synonyms. With such a protestation I'm sure Wittgenstein would have much sympathy. The relationship called "synonymy," as intuitively exploited by Quine or as depicted above is a comparatively simple one. On the other hand, the relationships between various parts of language are extremely complex and intricate, as is evidenced by their stubborn resistance to adequate elucidation. Thus we should not expect apparent examples of synonymy to stand close scrutiny in a very wide variety of contexts. Nevertheless, we must do what we can if we are to get anywhere, and thus it is now in order for us to look at an example.

Let us take a variation of the standard example of "bachelor" and "unmarried man" and the l-g of the "singles industry." Marital status is of crucial importance to this industry and thus we would expect to, and do, find frequent use of expressions associated therewith. Advertising is addressed to unmarried persons only; people taking advantage of the industry's products—holidays, clubs, bars, etc.—are expected to be willing and able to behave in a manner which the social institution of marriage would preclude. In this l-g, the expressions "bachelor," "single person," and "unmarried person" are generally interchangeable. Only unmarried people are invited to bachelor, or singles, weekends at resort hotels. If you throw a bachelor party you invite only unmarried persons. It is interesting to note that the substitutions seem to fit badly only for stylistic reasons. Thus, for example, "bachelor" does not rhyme with "unmarried" and thus in a rhyming context could not replace
"unmarried." If we neglect such stylistic considerations (while allowing that doing so is of dubious legitimacy) it does seem that in this l-\(g\) "bachelor," "single person," and "unmarried persons" are all, on the criterion of similarity of use, reasonable synonyms.

Such cases are probably rare. However, a somewhat weaker relation does seem to hold, within l-\(gs\) between certain expressions. An expression \(X\) is thus related to an expression (or practice or institution) \(Y\), if the absence of \(Y\) would significantly affect the use of \(X\). Such a relation will typically hold within a l-\(g\) between a word with a wide variety of uses in many different l-\(gs\) and an expression or institution quite characteristic of that l-\(g\). This may become clearer if we look at an example.

For an interesting and obviously contentious example let us take the word "good." "Good" has an enormously large and varied range of uses. It may be used to praise, to evaluate, to command, to recommend, etc. (cf. Hare). Let us take the use of "good" in a specific l-\(g\), viz., the vintner's l-\(g\). The wine merchant in dealing with me, his customer, will recommend a wine of one type or another. In doing so he will often use expressions like: "This is a good claret." Now it is clear that the institution of recommending wines to customers might proceed quite adequately without the word "good." But if the merchant does use the word "good" of a wine then he must be recommending it. If there were no institution of recommending on the part of wine merchants then the word "good" would not have the same currency in the vintner's l-\(g\) that it does now. Thus we might say that "good" in the vintner's l-\(g\) is dependent for its meaning (as evidenced by its use) upon there also being in that l-\(g\) the institution of recommending.\(^4\) If the institutions thus related to "good" in a large (but how large is not specifiable, this being an empirical social phenomenon) proportion of the l-\(gs\) in which the word is used, were to change or
disappear, we would have to say that the meaning of the word had changed. If the relationship held both ways between two expressions in a l-g we would say that the expressions (one being, in some cases the expression of an institution) were synonymous in that l-g.

This gives us a new characterisation of synonymy, but one that is effectively equivalent to the formulation with which we began. The relevant criteria (of lack of change on the first formulation; of change in one consequent upon change in the other—i.e., of dependence—in the second formulation) are all to be empirically determined in the manner discussed earlier.

The notions of synonymy (and this also of meaning and analyticity) outlined above allow, indeed require, variation relative to the many factors which are related to the (family) concept of l-g. Such relativity in these notions is no longer a novelty in philosophy. David Lewis in discussing truth and analyticity (Convention, Ch. V) provides an analysis in which these (meaning related) concepts are variable according to population, occasion and mood (he treats only indicative, imperative, permissive, and interrogative) while he notes that other factors will also be involved. Clearly, any expression using demonstrative pronouns, personal pronouns, or expressions referring to preceding linguistic expressions will not be fully intelligible (in respect of meaning and meaning-related properties) without information pertaining to the context in which it occurs. Many of the factors determining this context (many aspects of the l-g) may be individuable and specifiable, and in this way we might work towards a formal theory of the concepts we are seeking here to explicate. However, there are factors that are not thus individuable and which do not lend themselves to description. The effect that the different aspects of facial expressions can have on the use of an expression, the inflexion with which that expression is used, the ante-
cedent social relations and the expectations of the parties to the use of the expression, and the interrelationship of all these, are examples. All such factors are taken into account by the use of the concept language-name.

It might be objected that this diversity and unspecificity of aspects of l-gs makes this concept of no use in explicating synonymy, etc. Such an objection need not worry the Wittgensteinian. Behind it lies the requirement that an explication should be some permanent formalised (or at least formalisable) theory—i.e., a thesis. Given that to Wittgenstein these concepts and the distinctions resting thereon were to be used as tools in dissolving problems and attaining philosophical clarity our explication need not meet such a requirement. Furthermore, this diversity and unspecificity of l-gs is not a barrier to our using this notion; in any given problem all this background will simply be there—assumed and understood by all parties. Understanding l-gs is simply what it is to be a member of a society and speaker of the language of that society.

All the above, however, if it holds at all holds only for that "large class of cases—though not for all—" of words for which Wittgenstein considers the meaning is the use in language. We must now, briefly, consider the case of names:

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. (PI, *43)

We should note that Wittgenstein does not say that the meaning of a name is its bearer, only that it "is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." The former view is one which he might be said to have supported in T, but against which he argued in the earlier sections of PI. In PI, *79 ff. Wittgenstein gives the basis of a theory of meaning for proper names which was later very clearly developed by Searle (see Searle). Given that we accept this as an adequate account of proper names, then they may be treated exactly the same as the other words discussed earlier with
respect to synonymy. Again the relevant criteria will be empirical and again their satisfaction will be relative to 1-g.

The traditional distinction of analytic and synthetic and the related notions of meaning and synonymy have been the subject of much discussion recently. A leader in the attack on the philosophical usefulness and validity of this distinction has been W.V. Quine. Quine is a very difficult writer and his work has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Furthermore, his publications on this subject cover a time span of some twenty years and thus include many developments, clarifications, and, as would be expected, differing views. It is not appropriate to survey all this work here. We shall simply examine certain of Quine's more notable arguments against the bifurcation of the analytic and synthetic (and synonymy, etc.) as they might apply to the above "Wittgensteinian" account, and later note certain respects in which Quine's views are similar to those of Wittgenstein, at least as interpreted in this thesis.

In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Quine (1), p. 20 ff.) Quine discusses the traditional classification of truths into those which are analytic and those which are synthetic. He argues that the distinction is illfounded. His argument begins as follows.

A statement is said to be analytic when it is true in virtue of meanings and independently of fact. This definition is quite obviously dependent upon our having a clear, prior notion of meaning, and this, according to Quine, is something we do not have. He very quickly disposes of the theories which hold that meanings of expressions are the objects named (in the case of singular terms) or extensions (in the case of general terms) by recourse to the usual examples (see Quine (1), p. 21). Thus, it can be seen that although "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" name the same man, they have different meanings; similarly "9" and "the
number of the planets" name the same abstract entity but have different meanings. "Creature with a heart" and "creature with kidneys" have the same extension but again different meanings.

At this stage Quine seems happy with the analyticity of logical truths, exemplified by:

No unmarried man is married.

but continues to find difficulty with examples such as:

No bachelor is married.

The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. (Quine (1), p. 23)

In this case "bachelor" is supposedly synonymous with "unmarried man." However, this will not do as an account of analyticity for it rests on the as yet unexplained notion of synonymy. Such considerations lead Quine to:

... the primary business of the theory of meaning (is) simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned. (Quine (1), p. 22)

Quine then proceeds to discuss and reject various explanations of "synonymy," first in terms of definitions and then in terms of interchangeability (salva veritate). With his rejection of the latter we have no quarrel; as was noted therein, our Wittgensteinian account does not regard this as adequate either. Nor are the discussions of analyticity of statements in terms of semantical rules in artificial languages, and in terms of verification theory (both of which he finds wanting) directly relevant. What is directly relevant is his discussion of definition, Quine (1), pps 24-27.

Quine's argument is important here for it is here he discusses the possibility of determining synonymy by recording empirical data, i.e., the determination upon which our "Wittgensteinian" account ultimately rests.
The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses "bachelor" as "unmarried man" it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between those forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work. The notion of synonymy presupposed here has still to be clarified, presumably in terms relating to linguistic behaviour. Certainly the "definition" which is the lexicographer's report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy. (Quine (1), p. 24)

To accept the lexicographer's report, we are told, would be "to put the cart before the horse" (Quine (1), p. 24). Here we meet the first important difference between Quine's conception (or intuition) of analyticity and synonymy and our "Wittgensteinian" view: Quine requires that for synonymy to hold between two expressions it must hold generally with respect to context and time and both these requirements were found inappropriate to our account. This generality and permanence which Quine takes to be essential to these notions is an important condition of much of his argument. That he does so require is evident from, for example:

Two alternative definitions may be equally appropriate for the purposes of a given task of explication and yet not be synonymous with each other; for they may serve interchangeably within the favoured contexts but diverge elsewhere. (Quine (1), p. 25)

... synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience and analytic statements, which hold come what may. (Quine (1), p. 43)

To the extent that it depends on these conditions Quine's argument cannot be sustained against the "Wittgensteinian" account. But this is not all there is of Quine's argument; he seems to have doubts about the notion of meaning as use.

Before going on to this we must note briefly an important point Quine makes on p. 25 (Quine (1)). If a word has a variety of different uses in different l-gs, but also a precise and common use in a sub-set of those l-gs, then we might specify that use as the meaning of the word. This, as Quine notes, "is an activity to which philosophers are given, and also scientists in their more philosophical mo-
ments." (Quine (1), p. 25). Rightly enough he argues that to the extent that this process is legislative it cannot serve as the basis for an explication of synonymy.

Quine's attitude to empirical reports of use as a basis for synonymy is not clear in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In the passage quoted earlier he does make the point, quite validly I believe, that the lexicographer's definition cannot be a basis for synonymy because it is itself based on an empirically observed synonymy. To make this point more clearly Quine writes:

Just what it means to affirm synonymy, just what the interconnections may be which are necessary and sufficient in order that two linguistic forms be properly describable as synonymous, is far from clear; but, whatever these interconnections may be, ordinarily they are grounded in usage. Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon usage. (Quine (1), p. 24-25)

Apart from making the point noted above this seems to regard empirical reports with some approval as a basis for synonymy. All that one needs to add is an acceptance of the Wittgensteinian dictum of meaning as use. This, however, Quine does not do. And he has no more to say about it in this paper. However, it is fair to say that his approach, at least at this stage, was behavioural, and that he did regard behaviour and reports thereof as the only good ground for explication of linguistic phenomena.

Some ten years later ("Two Dogmas of Empiricism" first appeared in the Philosho-hical Review in January 1951; Word and Object was first published in 1960) Quine argued that behaviour was not an adequate basis for determining meanings. In Quine (2) he argues that meaning is always under-determined by all the behavioural evidence, that there will always be possible incompatible meaning hypotheses in accord with the behavioural evidence. If this argument holds then
so much the worse for our "Wittgensteinian" notions of synonymy based upon meaning as use. Let us now examine this argument.

In Word and Object (Quine (2), especially Chs. 1 & 2) Quine discusses the possibility of there being a relation between elements of different languages. He argues that it is never possible to establish such a relation because all the relevant evidence will always support more than one hypothesis. This conclusion is variously known as "Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis;" "the indeterminacy of radical translation" or variations thereon. Following Young, I shall refer to it simply as "Quine's IDT."

As seen in the first part of this section Quine rejects our intuitive notion that synonymy is likeness of meaning. In Quine (2) he is "concerned with language as the complex of present dispositions to behave, in which speakers of the same language have perforce come to resemble one another." (Quine (2), p. 27. The second part of this may rule out by stipulation interesting problems which otherwise arise and which we shall discuss later.) Accordingly he defines the notion "stimulus meaning" as:

\[
\text{a stimulus } \sigma \text{ belongs to the affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence } S \text{ for a given speaker if and only if there is a stimulation } \sigma' \text{ such that if the speaker were given } \sigma', \text{ then were asked } S, \text{ then were given } \sigma, \text{ and then asked } S \text{ again, he would dissent the first time and assent the second. We may define the negative stimulus meaning similarly with } \text{"assent" and } \text{"dissent" interchanged, and then define the stimulus meaning as the ordered pair of the two. (Quine (2), pps. 32-33)}
\]

Stimulus synonymy he defines as sameness of stimulus meaning (Quine (2), p. 46) and of it he says:

Stimulus synonymy, or sameness of stimulus meaning, is as good a standard of synonymy for non-observation-al occasion sentences as for observation sentences as long as we stick to one speaker. (Quine (2), p. 46)

And he allows for stimulus synonymy to hold between elements of two different languages for a bi-lingual speaker of those
languages:

A practical extension even to the two-language case is not far to seek if a bilingual speaker is at hand. "Bachelor" and "Soltero" will be stimulus-Anonymous for him. (Quine (2), pps. 46-47)

Now we are asked to consider the problem facing the linguist trying to learn and translate a language with which he has had no prior contact, that is, the problem of radical translation. Quine acknowledges that this is, in practice, unlikely to arise, because even to the most remote corners of the earth we should be able to form a translation chain of bilingual speakers (Quine (2), p. 28). The hypothetical problem is still quite intelligible and can even be considered to underlie our learned translations of non-native tongues. Quine assumes that the hypothetical linguist knows the native gesture of assent and then argues the familiar example: "Gavagai"-"Rabbit."

At first the linguist will treat "Gavagai" as an occasion sentence and may well become quite adept at picking in which stimulus situations it may be used. But this is no guarantee that he understands the stimulus meaning "Gavagai" has for the native, for common to those stimulus situations there will be any number of different stimuli, any set of which might be the stimulus meaning.

Even if he does establish stimulus-synonymy between the occasion sentences "Rabbit" and "Gavagai" the linguist will still not have found support for the analytical hypothesis: "gavagai"-"rabbit;" Quine argues:

For, consider "gavagai." Who knows but what the objects to which the term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? (Quine (2), p. 51)

Or perhaps the objects to which "gavagai" applies are all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again the stimulus meaning would register no difference. (Quine (2), p. 52)

A further alternative likewise compatible with the same old stimulus meaning is to take "gavagai" as a singular term naming the fusion, in Goodman's sense, of all rabbits: the single though discontinuous por-
tion of the spatiotemporal world that consists of rabbits. Then even the distinction between general and singular terms is independent of stimulus meaning. (Quine (2), p. 52)

And still a further alternative in the case of "gavagai" is to take it as a singular term naming a recurring universal, rabbithood. The distinction between concrete and abstract object, as well as that between general and singular term, is independent of stimulus meaning. (Quine (2), p. 52)

Ostension does not help:

Point to a rabbit and you have pointed to a stage of a rabbit, to an integral part of a rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and to where rabbithood is manifested. . . . Nothing not distinguished in stimulus meaning itself is to be distinguished by pointing, unless the pointing is accompanied by questions of identity and diversity: "Is this the same gavagai as that?" "Do we have here one gavagai or two?" Such questions require of the linguist a command of the native language far beyond anything that we have as yet seen how to account for. (Quine (2), p. 52)

Generalising on such considerations, Quine argues to the conclusion that all translation between languages is radically indeterminate:

The indeterminacy that I mean is more radical. It is that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can conform to all speech dispositions within each of the languages concerned and yet dictate, in countless cases, utterly disparate translations; not mere mutual paraphrases, but translations each of which would be excluded by the other systems of translation. Two such translations might even be patently contrary in truth value, provided there is no stimulation that would encourage assent to either. (Quine (2), pps. 73-74)

Thus in the terminology of Ch. 6 above, IDT states that different languages are not merely untranslatable, but are mutually inaccessible.

In form this argument is quite familiar. It occurs in PI, *28 ff., applied to ostensive definition and ostensive teaching of words, an argument we discussed at some length in sec. 5.3 above. In that argument Wittgenstein was not concerned with the problem of translating between two different languages, but with child language acquisition. With,
one might say, the problem of translating—i.e., gaining access—from zero to one language.

When Quine says (Quine (2), p. 28) that the problem of radical translation (as he describes it) is unlikely to occur he is quite wrong, for it is exactly the problem facing the infant in learning his first language. Thus it occurs continuously the world over. The lack of a command of a suitable range of sentences in the language to eliminate irrelevant stimuli (as pointed out by both Quine—quoted above—and Wittgenstein—P1, **27, 28, 29) is the crucial feature of such learning situations. Thus, if we accept IDT as Quine argues it we must also accept that the language each of us English speakers (for example) uses is, with respect to the language of each other English speaker, radically untranslatable. This is a view Quine later came to accept; for example:

... the resort to a remote language was not really essential. On deeper reflection, radical translation begins at home. Must we equate our neighbour's English with the same string in our own mouths? Certainly not; for sometimes we do not thus equate them. (Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969)

However, at the earlier stage he clearly (see, for example, the next quoted passage; and note the impact of the above on the "homophonic"hypothesis) did not see this. Wittgenstein used essentially the same argument, but rather than accepting IDT, concluded that meanings could not be exclusively extensional (whether in terms of stimuli as Quine advocates, or objects as in the passage from Augustine quoted in P1, *1).

Thus Quine must tell us from where comes the force by which we English speakers (for example) "have perforce come to resemble one another" (Quine (2), p. 27). In his most explicit consideration of this problem Quine calls the suggestion that IDT applies between speakers of the same language "perverse and ingenious" and "the impractical joke"
If we were perverse and ingenious we could scorn that hypothesis and devise other analytical hypotheses that would attribute unimagined views to our compatriot, while conforming to all his dispositions to verbal response to all possible stimulations. (Quine (2), p. 76)

The hypothesis referred to in this passage is the "homophonic hypothesis" that is, he says, "fundamental to the very acquisition and use of one's mother tongue" (Quine (2), p. 59). He does not tell us explicitly what this homophonic hypothesis is. Presumably he is not referring to the four methods of language acquisition he lists on pp. 9 and 13 (Quine (2)) (which, as Chomsky shows (Chomsky (2)) do not avoid the problem), or to the system of innate ideas on pp. 83 ff. (Quine (2)), for if so he would have said so somewhere. Besides there is nothing "homophonic" about either.

The most likely explanation is that by this hypothesis he means that in a given language, the same sequences of sounds or signs have the same meaning (whatever the account of meaning). This would be in accord with his "broader account" of synonymy on p. 62:

The two sentences command assent concomitantly and dissent concomitantly, and this concomitance is due strictly to word usage rather than to how things happen in the world. (Quine (2), p. 62)

where we are to interpret likeness of word usage strictly in terms of the uses of sounds (or, presumably, marks on paper). This notion of synonymy is distinctly different from the stimulus-synonymy we are otherwise asked to consider. Quine does attempt to establish a connection:

when the sentences are occasion sentences, the envisaged notion of synonymy is pretty well realized in intrasubjective stimulus synonymy, especially as socialized. For we can argue that only verbal habit can plausibly account for concomitant variation of two occasion sentences, in point of assent and dissent, over the whole gamut of possible stimulations. (Quine (2), p. 62)

Verbal habit, however, is inadequate as a connective between
the two notions of synonymy. How, for example, are such habits initially established? Furthermore, as Chomsky (Chomsky (2)) points out, the probability of occurrence of any sentence (with the exception of a few special ones, like "Hello!") approaches zero, and how are habits maintained (as habits) on data thus distributed?

The idea, suggested in the above-quoted passage, of socializing intrasubjective stimulus synonymy, is another attempt to avoid this problem—i.e., the problem that if IDT holds between different languages then it holds between different speakers of the same language. It is thus suggested on P. 55 (Quine (2)) in a relevantly similar context. The idea first occurs on p. 46:

The one speaker restriction (of stimulus synonymy) presents no obstacle to saying that "Bachelor" and "Unmarried man" are stimulus-synonymous for the whole community, in the sense of being thus for each member. (Quine (2), p. 46)

And on p. 55 it is characterised thus:

we can count on those terms as socially stimulus-synonymous that come out stimulus-synonymous for each individual speaker almost without exception. (Quine (2), p. 55)

Suppose "F" and "G" are two expressions in use in a given speech community. Then on Quine's definition socialized stimulus-synonymy will hold between "F" and "G" if each member of that speech community would agree that "F" and "G" had, for him, the same stimulus meaning. To avoid the problems under consideration we would need not this, but that there would be some set of stimuli, say M, such that each member of the speech community would agree that M was, for him, the stimulus meaning of both "F" and "G." This stronger requirement cannot be provided in Quine's account without begging the whole question to which he addresses himself.

Finally, there may seem to be a way out for Quine in the acceptance of innate ideas. And, as noted earlier, this Quine does seem to do in Ch. 3 of Quine (2), with his
introduction of a pre-linguistic "quality space" upon which grounds a child may make pre-linguistic discriminations. This is a strangely untypical move for Quine, for two reasons. Firstly, he states his acceptance of Skinnerian S-R learning theory (Quine (2), p. 32), in which innate ideas have no part. Secondly, and more importantly, such mentalistic hypostatizations as quality spaces are quite out of place in the austere Quinean ontology. But even allowing for these inconsistencies, innate ideas will not help. If these innate quality spaces are qualitatively similar and universal then they will provide a basis for translation and IDT will fail. If they are not qualitatively similar then either (a) they are characteristic of a speech community (and thus inherited), or (b) they are variously distributed in some random or haphazard manner. If (b) then the problem is not avoided—we can save IDT only at the expense of in-translatability between speakers of the same language. If (a) then the problem is avoided. However, there is no evidence whatever to support this view and substantial evidence against it (see, for example, McHugh).

Although the textual difficulties with both are exceptional, it is interesting to compare Quine's IDT argument with Wittgenstein's use of the same basic ideas. Quine offers an extensional theory of meaning and synonymy and then using this shows that radical translation is indeterminate. However, he fails to come to grips with important associated problems and we are left with the conclusion that if IDT holds between languages, then it also holds between speakers of "the same" language. Wittgenstein's account (see sec. 5.3 above) follows much the same lines; ostensive teaching of words, as noted earlier, preserves the important feature of radical translation, viz., that the person trying to learn the new language does not have the use of sentences in that language to eliminate alternative possibilities. Wittgenstein, however, sees the difficulties that Quine fails to.
They are, in fact, the crux of his argument. If we accept an exclusively extensional theory of meaning then all users of language are mutually unintelligible. Thus the hypothesized extensional theory of meaning must be rejected.

Both Quine and Wittgenstein fail to handle adequately the question of innate ideas. This, however, is highly problematic and would require a considerably more detailed treatment than either could be expected to give it (neither of them being specialists in psycholinguistics).

If we look at the overall impact of these positions, the difference is most clearly marked in their accounts of the notion of synonymy. This becomes especially clear if we look at them in the light of Quine's famous arguments, discussed earlier in this sections. There an account was given of a Wittgensteinian view (at least on the interpretation argued in earlier parts of this thesis) of synonymy and it was argued that it avoids Quine's difficulties. Quine's own stimulus-synonymy fails to avoid these difficulties simply because it is not generalizable (as was shown above) to a suitable socialized stimulus-synonymy holding among different members of a speech community. As Haas (see W. Haas) points out, there will even be difficulty applying Quine's synonymy to a single speaker at different times, especially if one has an ontology without memories.

Quine does, in a passage quoted above from p. 62 (Quine (2)), introduce a more general and somewhat Wittgensteinian notion of synonymy. However, his attempt to connect it with stimulus-synonymy has already been seen to fail. Furthermore, despite his statement of intent to do so, Quine does not make any further use of it.

We must now examine what Wittgenstein has to say about translation and see if his account avoids the problems Quine, despite all the criticisms above and elsewhere, does seem to have raised. As noted earlier, what Quine calls radical translatability we have, in Ch. 6 ff., called
accessibility.

Wittgenstein often in his later work talks of radical translation situations. There are also situations in which he does consider languages would be mutually inaccessible—i.e., he does admit cases of IDT:

If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. (PI, p. 223)

If you went to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out, you wouldn't know what to look for.

(IA, p. 2)

To Wittgenstein the learning of a strange language will be a much more complicated and various thing than Quine's simple establishment of the truth of analytical hypotheses. This of course follows from his treatment of language as a multifarious social organism. From the view of language and the world drawn in Ch. 6 above, it will follow that learning a language will involve not only the acquisition of a vocabulary (the point at which Quine finds accessibility—i.e., radical translation—fails) and grammatical rules, but also the learning of a form of life (cf., PI, *19).

This learning process will not be ordered in the sense that you must do one thing before you can do another. On the contrary, language, language-games, and forms of life are so bound up with each other that the radical translation process will not distinguish one part from another (as would be expected—see sec. 6.2 above). However, in cases of inaccessibility it will be most appropriate to talk in terms of forms of life. On Wittgenstein's view for radical translation to succeed there must be some commonality of form of life—there must be something about the form of life of the linguist that is common to the form of life of his informant (see PI, **241, 242). If we look at the examples Wittgenstein gives of inaccessibility, we see that they are quite profoundly different, especially compared with the kind of differences Quine uses. Thus we might reasonably take it that the kind of commonalities Wittgenstein would
require are very general and basic ones. For example, all humans as living creatures require food for survival—in other words, we eat. This is illustrated many times in PI, but an especially clear case is given in PI, **386 ff.

Where forms of life do not have commonalities such as these, languages will be inaccessible, as, for example, Wittgenstein suggests would be the case with lions, or his stick-and-sphere men from Mars. Learning an accessible language will then involve partaking in a form of life, learning and using a language game.

Of course, many languages will be mutually untranslatable in the weaker sense (see sec. 6.2 above) of there not being analytical hypotheses giving one word synonyms in the languages. Wittgenstein recognised this and provides illuminating illustrations of it (see, for example, BrB, 46). This and the preceding point may, however, be seen as simple consequences of that "old truism" that the more you learn its language, the more you learn a culture and vice versa. As such it will also be noted that Quine states specifically that this is not what he had in mind by IDT; in fact this is to Quine one of the main sources of his readers' failure to understand IDT (see Quine (2), p. 73 ff.). How then is Wittgenstein going to account for the problems Quine raises?

These difficulties will not arise for Wittgenstein because he rejects the conception of meaning that is essential to the establishment of IDT. This can be seen from our earlier discussion: it was because of the consequences of the IDT (which Quine failed to account for) that Wittgenstein rejected a purely extensional theory of meaning. Thus the Wittgensteinian linguist will learn behavioural customs, social organisation, economic organisation, etc., and will accustom himself to using the appropriate linguistic terms in the appropriate places. Appropriateness will be learned by observation in the first instance. In other words, the linguist learns language-games. If he learns the use of a
word and can use it as the native does then he will know the meaning.

It might be objected that he might learn the words like nonsense rhymes and thus be able to use them but in fact to have no idea of their "meaning." This objection I believe does hold of Wittgenstein's conception of language, which is a structural one (in the sense that Chomsky and Levi-Strauss are structuralists). His conception of meaning as use, in a language-game, can be seen as relating semantics very closely to syntax, or even as completely blurring that distinction. As a criticism, however, it is rather simplistic. As noted many times earlier (see, e.g., sec. 5.3, or sec. 6.2 above) one of the main features of language is that we can with a finite knowledge understand a non-finite range of sentences. Thus for this criticism to carry any weight, the linguist would have to have memorised an infinite set of "nonsense rhymes," which is somewhat implausible to say the least.

Finally we must take note of the "translation relations" between language-games in a single language. If IDT holds then it might be suggested that it holds between language-games in a single language. This is an important question for it has considerable bearing on a topic we shall discuss in sec. 7.4 below, viz., religious language-games and their accessibility. In reply we must re-emphasise that language-games are not fixed and isolated entities of some kind. Any classification in terms of language-games will not only be temporary and related to some other purpose at hand, but will contain overlaps and crisscrosses within it. Thus there will be relevant shared linguistic and behavioural items precluding the possibility of a radical translation situation.

As noted earlier there are passages in Quine's work which can be interpreted as presenting a view quite similar to that attributed to Wittgenstein in this thesis. The
general position he presents in the conclusion (sec. 6, "Empiricism Without the Dogmas") of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" has aspects that are much the same as the "conceptual scheme" account of forms of life in Ch. 6, above.

The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. (Quine (1), p. 42)

He goes on to argue that in case of new empirical information we always have a choice as to which statements of knowledge we shall change. Even so-called logical laws are not immune from such change, as he notes on p. 43:

Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics.

All this is, of course, in the context directed against the claimed permanence of analytic statements. However, the similarity with the Wittgenstein position, at least as interpreted here, is striking. The main difference is that on the Wittgensteinian account we do not have or use one only language-game; thus we might hold to statements that superficially appear contradictory, but which occur only in different and relatively isolated language-games. Quine, on the other hand, would seem to require a generality and constancy in all possible circumstances not necessary on the Wittgensteinian view.

Two further passages from "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (pps 44 & 45) will emphasise the similarity with the "conceptual scheme" account of forms of life:

The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Epistemologically these (the abstract entities which are the substance of mathematics—ultimately classes and classes of classes and so on) are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experiences.
7.3 "Wittgensteinian Fideism"

In this section we shall discuss the view in the philosophy of religion that has been dubbed, by Nielsen, "Wittgensteinian Fideism." Even before the publication of LA (1966) Wittgenstein's idea of NA1-gs had been adopted quite enthusiastically by some philosophers of religion, and quite a body of literature built up on the theme. Especially important are Winch (1958 & 1964), Malcolm (3) (1960), Hughes (1962), Phillips (1965 & 1970), Nielsen (1967), High (1967), Holmer (1968), and Sherry (1972). This literature is well known and readily available and thus it will be assumed that the reader is familiar with it.9

The position that shall be taken here follows from the interpretation of Wittgenstein's concepts of NA1-g and form of life presented in earlier sections of this thesis. Thus it will not be exactly like that of any of the "Wittgensteinian Fideists" among the above writers. One of the most striking things about the above-mentioned works is that they do not give adequate accounts of the notions of NA1-g and form of life, upon which they rely. As has been pointed out earlier, these concepts are not, in Wittgenstein's writing, so transparently clear that it can be taken for granted that we will understand them. And it is primarily in just this respect that these accounts tend to fall down. The other important respect in which we shall differ here from the usual "Wittgensteinian Fideist" account of religion is that we shall place appropriate emphasis on the theory of linguistic primacy (see Ch. 6 above) as found in Wittgenstein's later work.

The best known of the above-mentioned works is that of Peter Winch. Winch writes on the social sciences in these papers, but the view he proffers has been the basis of most of the later works mentioned. The account to be offered here is basically similar, but I believe, more faithful to Wittgenstein's own writing. Winch's idea of NA1-gs
(and forms of life) is that of discrete, isolable social phenomena—as Nielsen puts it, they are compartmentalised (Nielsen, pps 201, 205, 207). It should be clear from the preceding chapters that this is not in accord with Wittgenstein's conception of NAl-gs. Consequent upon this view of NAl-gs, Winch has to resort to a form of verification to avoid a "plunge straight down into an extreme Protagorean relativism, with all the paradoxes that involves" (Winch (2), p. 308). These two related weaknesses in Winch's account allow Nielsen's attack to prevail, as will be seen later. However, it is in just these respects that I believe Winch is "unWittgensteinian." Patrick Sherry, on the other hand, while similarly mistaken in taking NAl-gs and forms of life to be fixed and permanent, accepts such a wild proliferation of them (NAl-gs) as to make the concept virtually useless as an aid to philosophical understanding.

The remainder of this section will proceed thus: First I shall outline, very briefly, the basic ideas of Wittgensteinian Fideist position that will be supported; then I shall examine Nielsen's argument against Winch and show how the different position outlined would be unaffected thereby; then I shall examine Nielsen's criticisms of Hughes—these two discussions being aimed at bringing out the important philosophical considerations involved in Wittgensteinian Fideism; finally, I shall discuss how, far from being philosophically inviolate, all forms of life are subject to investigation, but of a rather different kind than I think Nielsen has in mind.

Religion is a form of life. Here, in using the expressions "NAl-g" and "form of life," I shall presuppose all their backgrounds as discussed in the preceding sections of this work. Thus, associated with the religious form of life will be a NAl-g. Of course, there are many different religions and each of these may sensibly be said also to be a form of life. This presents no problems as forms of life
(and NA1-gs) include forms of life (and NA1-gs—see Ch. 6). Nor need we concern ourselves with trying to find a characterisation of religion; as should now be clear we would only expect to "find" one relative to some given purpose, which we do not, at present, have. For convenience, I shall confine the discussion to unspecified but basically Judaeo-Christian belief systems.

In LA, p. 58, Wittgenstein (reportedly) says:

Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgement?

The passage has already been discussed in Ch. 6. Here I want only to draw special attention to the choice of words—the use of "culminate in." A religious l-g should not be expected to have clearly defined boundaries, or to include only expressions peculiar to it. Quite the contrary: like most other NA1-gs it will contain expressions that also have currency in many other NA1-gs; it will overlap and criss-cross with an enormous variety of NA1-gs. However, the use of certain expressions may be characteristic of a religious l-g. That is, there may be certain expressions, such as "I believe that God is in Christ" or "I believe in a Last Judgement," that are central and peculiar to the religious l-g in question. It is this that I think Wittgenstein wishes to point out in the passage quoted. (We shall return to this point later.) It will be seen that this view is opposed to both Sherry and Winch, for they both seem to conceive of NA1-gs and forms of life as discrete and isolable, and such that, once distinguished, they must permanently remain so. It is further opposed to Sherry in not holding that if one, for some reason, distinguishes some NA1-g, then one is obliged to distinguish all possible NA1-gs which might be contained in or overlap that NA1-g. Because we distinguish NA1-gs and forms of life for our purposes there is no point in accepting the counter-productive claim that religion must be seen as a collection of NA1-gs or forms of life.
(although, it should be noted, there is nothing to prevent one from doing so).

The claim then that most clearly characterises Wittgensteinian Fideism is that expressions central to a NAl-g can only be understood from within that NAl-g or form of life. Winch, writing of anthropology, puts it thus:

... the concepts used by primitive peoples can only be interpreted in the context of the way of life of those peoples. (Winch (2), p. 315)

Thus it would not make sense to examine one form of life and interpret it according to the methods and criteria appropriate to some different form of life. It would be quite unreasonable to "test" a proposition central to a religious l-g, say, for example, "God is in Christ" in the same manner and according to the same criteria as one might use with respect to "The car is in the garage." That Winch was correctly representing Wittgenstein in this respect at least became clear with the publication of LA. In the first section of "Lectures on Religious Belief" (LA, p. 53 ff.), we find:

Suppose that someone believed in the Last Judgement, and I don't, does that mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always."

If someone said: "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?"
I'd say: "No." "Do you contradict this man?" I'd say: "No." It isn't a question of my being anywhere near him, but on an entirely different plane, which you could express by saying: "You mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein." The difference might not show up at all in any explanation of the meaning. (LA, p. 53)

And later:

That is partly why you don't get in religious controversies, the form of controversy where one person is sure of the thing, and the other says: "Well, possibly." (LA, p. 56)

And:

It doesn't rest on an historic basis in the sense that the ordinary belief in historic facts could serve as a foundation. Here we have a belief in historic
facts different from a belief in ordinary historic facts. (LA, p. 57)

In Ch. 6 we saw how Wittgenstein argued, mostly in OC, that certain statements about the world were such that it did not make sense to doubt them. In a similar way certain expressions, such as "There is a God" or "God is in Christ," which are central to and characteristic (in the sense mentioned earlier) of the religious language-game, cannot sensibly be doubted within that language-game. In Wittgenstein's language, we might even say that this is a remark about the grammar of the language-game.

The question will immediately arise as to how an "outsider" might gain access to, or learn, a religious language-game, if it contains expressions which are peculiar to it. This is essentially the problem of radical translation discussed at length in the preceding section so we shall not go into it in any detail here. However, some important points should be noted.

First, because of the overlap in NAl-gs an outsider to a religious language-game will, in fact, encounter very few totally unfamiliar expressions. However, this is of little real help, because the unfamiliar expressions will be the ones crucial to the NAl-g in question and because many familiar expressions will be found to apply only according to subtly different criteria (see Winch (2), p. 320, and MacIntyre, p. 97, for good illustrations of this point).

Secondly, we must not forget the linguistic primacy thesis (see Ch. 6 above) which was intended, like all of Wittgenstein's ideas, to be used in philosophical problems and not just expounded and forgotten. We must also remember Wittgenstein's rejection of the purely extensional (Tractatus) theory of meaning (i.e., that one only understands an expression when one knows the object or state of affairs it picks out). It is this last mistake, I believe, that leads Winch into his verificationism. Finally, Wittgenstein
urges us in problem situations to consider how we might have learned the word or expression in question. When we do this we typically describe different possible learning situations; but one point which is not often made is that we cannot usually pick some point in time (some point in the learning situation described) before which one didn't know the expression and after which one did. This will, I think, be especially so of religious expressions, which, as Wittgenstein points out (see LA, p. 59) we learn very early in life. For example, there was almost certainly no particular point in a believer's life when he might suddenly have cried: "Ah-ha! Now I know what 'God' means!" In the light of these points and the conclusions of the preceding section, the problem of accessibility is easily surmounted.

Finally, it is very easy to consider religion as something artificial or secondary in human society. Such a view is common among social scientists whose functional analyses of religions usually see them as solving problems in some supposedly more fundamental form of life. This, I believe, is probably mistaken. If it is a mistake, it is a similar one to the mistaken belief that language is a conceptual late-comer and can only be understood in terms of something non-linguistic. Whether or not religious belief is a cultural universal is a fascinating question (see Needham for a discussion of it) but one which does not directly concern us here. What we should note is that in societies with a prevalent religion (such as ours), even if the religion is a fairly recent acquisition to the society (again, such as our Christianity), the religious NA₂ functions as an old and basic cultural element.

Kai Nielsen in his paper "Wittgensteinian Fideism" offers interesting and illuminating opposition to a position at least similar to that outlined above. He begins by offering a characterisation of the position that he dubs "Wittgensteinian Fideism," but also noting that he does not
know whether Wittgenstein himself might have held such a position, only that his work has been taken in that way (Nielsen, pps 192-194). Certainly this and ensuing detail do seem to be in accord with Winch, but to this extent it is not in accord with a more faithfully Wittgensteinian position (as, I believe, obviously, I have outlined above). The most crucial difference is that Nielsen's "straw man" (and Winch) takes NAL of to be in mutual isolation—"compartmentalised"—and this is clearly not in accord with a genuinely Wittgensteinian position. Further differences will become apparent as we examine Nielsen's arguments in more detail.

Nielsen begins his case against Winch with a discussion of the latter's mild verificationism:

But we should not lose sight of the fact that the idea that men's ideas and beliefs must be checkable by something independent—some reality—is an important one. (Winch (2), p. 308)

Winch goes on to argue (Winch (2), p. 309) that the distinction between the real and the unreal is relative to some language-game, and that, that the distinction should be drawn in a language-game is a precondition of there being such a language-game. It is thus that he (Winch) seeks to avoid the "plunge straight into an extreme Protagorean relativism."

Nielsen replies by calling into question the whole Wittgensteinian background to the use of the idea of NAL of:

But they have given us no reason for adopting this procedure. (Nielsen, p. 200)

This criticism must be accepted for, as noted earlier, the writers to whom Nielsen is referring do not offer justifications or even explications of these difficult notions they use. It is hoped that the preceding parts of this work satisfy this demand. There is, however, a sense in which there can be no reply to Nielsen that is not itself relative to some NAL of and subject to the same charge. This does not seem to be what he has in mind, though, for he goes on
to extol the virtues of the kind of empirical check used in science. It seems that the only sorts of things that Nielsen will accept as suitable candidates for "reality" are those to which we can sensibly attribute spatial and temporal properties. On this account, of course, the subjects of many important religious utterances will not be "real," but this shouldn't worry a believer. Indeed it has been argued that the claim "God is outside time and space" is most sensibly interpreted as: "It does not make sense to attribute spatial or temporal properties to God." Nielsen's difficulties with the idea of "reality" being relative to some NAL-ß will be taken up in discussing his second criticism of Winch.

Winch claims that not only what counts as real but also what counts as logical or illogical (and consequently what is coherent and what incoherent) is relative to the NAL-ß under consideration. Here Nielsen comments:

Winch's view here has rightly been taken to involve a claim to conceptual self-sufficiency for all forms of life. It has also been thought that it involves a kind of compartmentalisation of the modes of discourse or forms of life. (Nielsen, p. 201)

He goes on to object that there is much that is common to different NAL-ßs, and with that, as has been stated earlier, I am in complete agreement. However, Nielsen considers this compartmentalisation to be crucial to Winch's or any Wittgensteinian position.

The forms of life are not compartmentalised as Winch seems to imply, and as Wittgensteinian Fideism requires. (Nielsen, p. 205)

This claim seems to rest upon considerations of what I have called "accessibility," i.e., the problem of how an outsider may acquire a form of life. On p. 201 Nielsen writes:

Moreover, in that conceptual structure there is a large amount of discourse, which is neither religious nor scientific, that is constantly being utilised by both the religious man and the scientist when they make religious or scientific claims. In short, they share a number of key categories.
This sharing of key categories provides, in Nielsen's view, the link he requires between different NAl-gs if they are to be inter-accessible (a link which, for example, he claims is not available between us and the Azande, whom Winch discusses). Thus he seems to think that Winch's or any Wittgensteinian Fideist's case depends on the supposed inaccessibility of the religious NAl-g to, say, a scientific one. As should be clear from the discussion of translatability and accessibility in preceding sections, such NAl-gs and forms of life (including the Azande) are mutually accessible on a properly Wittgensteinian account.

There are, however, further points specific to this discussion to be cleared up. Of course, important concepts are shared by different NAl-gs. As Nielsen notes, a large part of the language of a scientist at work will also be used in a religious NAl-g. The criteria for appropriate and correct use of terms may also vary from NAl-g to NAl-g, but in a very good sense this does not mean that the logic of those expressions must change. Consider, for example:

A regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion; hence statements of uniformity presuppose judgements of identity. But . . . criteria of identity are necessarily relative to some rule. (Winch (1), p. 83)

For the natural scientist makes relevant judgements of identity according to his rules, that is the rules incorporated in the practice of his science; whereas the social scientist must make his judgements of identity in accordance with the rules governing the behaviour of those whom he studies. (MacIntyre, p. 97)

The interesting point here is that the formal features of the concept of identity, the formal rules for the use of "identity" such as a logician might enunciate, need not and generally do not change from NAl-g to NAl-g. What changes are the criteria of identification; that is, what features, or properties will be important and relevant will vary quite dramatically from NAl-g to NAl-g. (Examples of such variation have already been given earlier in this work.) So it
is, for example, with "reality," "knowledge," "belief," and many other important expressions that are common to many of the most interesting NAl-gs. However, the key categories in any given case will not, as Nielsen claims, be the common ones, they will be the distinct ones. Thus there will be isolable and distinct expressions in any NAl-gs we choose to distinguish, but this does not mean that NAl-gs need to be compartmentalised for a Wittgensteinian Fideist position to hold.

Nielsen's main argument against Winch is his verificationist one which, he says, "stands here as an unmet challenge to Wittgensteinian Fideism" (Nielsen, p. 204). His argument is:

It is a fact that there is a God; it is a fact that He created the world; it is a fact that He protects me and the like. Yet, how could we say what it would be like for God to create the world, if it is impossible in principle to say what would have to transpire for it to be false that God created the world? Or to put this verificationist point in a weaker and more adequate way, if we cannot say what in principle would count as evidence against the putative statement that God created the world, then "God created the world" is devoid of factual content. (Nielsen, p. 203)

That is, as Strawson puts it, they are not actually part of that type of discourse we call a fact-stating type of discourse. Thus they lack the kind of coherence they must have to make genuinely factual claims. (Nielsen, p. 203)

Here he misses the whole point of the Wittgensteinian position. "Factual content" as he seems to require it is not at all important, if it even has a place at all in a religious 1-g. Wittgenstein himself makes this point very clearly in LA (which, in all fairness to Nielsen, it must be noted was published after Nielsen wrote this paper), in passages already quoted, and also for example, in:

The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business. Anything that I normally call evidence wouldn't in the slightest influence me.
Suppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of Judgement Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if it were more convincing than I have described, belief in this happening wouldn't be at all a religious belief. (LA, p. 56)

A corollary to this is pointed out by Holmer (see Holmer). The concept of "proof" does not seem to have any significant role in a religious l-σ. Thus Nielsen's pseudo-scientific verificationist requirements have no impact on Wittgensteinian Fideism.

We should note in passing a point which has been discussed in detail in Ch. 6 (with respect to Wittgenstein's argument in OC) and which has relevance here, viz., that certain statements, while for all intents and purposes being synthetic, are still such that it would not make sense to question them in the NAl-σ which is their natural home. Such, with respect to a religious l-σ, is, for example, "God is in Christ;" with respect to our everyday empirical NAl-σ, an example Wittgenstein uses is: "My body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval" (cf., OC, *101). That Wittgenstein was opposed to a verificationist position, as espoused here by Nielsen, is made quite clear in OC (see Ch. 6 above, or OC, **105, 110, 124, 163-6, 192, 204, and many others).

Nielsen's final attack on Winch's position is essentially on empirical grounds. First he states his acceptance of the basic contention that "to understand religious conceptions we need a religious tradition; without a participant's understanding of that form of life, there can be no understanding of religion." But then he states that incoherencies can appear "from the inside," so to speak, and he supports this with the claim that this is in fact how many people come to abandon certain NAl-σs. Thus, for example:

Once magic and belief in fairies were ongoing practices in our stream of life. By now, by people working from the inside, the entire "form of life" has
come to be rejected as incoherent. (Nielsen, p. 206) This, I believe, is factually wrong. Belief in fairies and such like has ceased to have any utility in our culture and this external fact is behind its demise, not some supposed internal incoherence.

These empirical considerations are again used by Nielsen in his disagreement with Hughes, and again I believe he has his "facts" wrong. C.E. Hughes provides the argument in question in his review of the book *Religious Belief* by C.B. Martin; Nielsen notes (Nielsen, pps 194, 195) that he concurs with Martin (as against Hughes). It must, in fairness, be noted that Hughes does not mention Wittgenstein, and nor does he claim to be representing a Wittgensteinian position. However, the view he puts forward is clearly in accord with a Wittgensteinian Fideist position. Thus he writes of the two opposing views:

In one of them the fact that the pattern of usage of a term such as "God" does not accord with that of the other (non-theological) terms with which it is taken to be analogous is made the basis for the charge that the use of the term is logically incoherent. In the other, this same non-accordance is regarded as showing that the terms are not as analogous as they may have at first appeared, and the actual usage of religious terms within religious language is taken as normative for the logical type and the kind of meaning they have. (Hughes, p. 215)

And he continues:

Which of these programmes is preferable is perhaps the most important question for meta-theology (even, mutatis mutandis, for all meta-theorising). (Hughes, p. 215)

Here I must register some (mild) concern, which Nielsen does not, apparently, feel. What is "preferable" will always be relative to some purpose and this within some NAl-g. Thus the basis of such preference will be both variable and empirical and we cannot expect once for all answers.

Hughes prefers the second programme and, we must note, this preference is in accord with Wittgenstein's lectures in LA, which was published some years later (see LA, p. 59
in this respect, note also the passages from OC cited above and the discussion in Ch. 6 above). Hughes' reasons for his preference are, however, of an anthropological kind:

I am disposed to prefer the second largely because religious language is a long established fait accompli and something which does a job which, as far as I have been able to discover, no other segment of language can do. (Hughes, p. 215)

It is with these reasons that Nielsen takes issue; his first reply is:

We should counterpose against the fact that religious language is a fait accompli another fact, namely, that at all times and at all places, even among the most primitive tribes, there have been sceptics and scoffers, people who though perfectly familiar with the religious language game played in their culture would not play the religious language game, not because they could not, but because even though they were perfectly familiar with it, even though they had an insiders' understanding of it, they found it incoherent. (Nielsen, p. 196)

This also is empirical and, I believe, wrong. People do not, in general, reject religion (religious l-g) because they find it internally incoherent. Like the fairies, some religious beliefs, some religious l-gs, disappear for want of a use in society. But more often a person who (consciously) rejects a religious l-g of which he has an insiders' understanding, does so because it is inconsistent with some other NAI-g which he holds to be more important. Bertrand Russell provides a fine example of this in Why I Am Not A Christian. This point, however, requires empirical investigation and this within some theoretical framework, so a conclusion is beyond the scope of this work.

Nielsen's second reply is of a similar kind:

I want simply to point out that in a culture like ours, religious discourse is coming to fail to do its distinctive tasks because many people do not find it coherent. (Nielsen, p. 196)

Again I disagree with the factual claim made here. It is not the incoherence of the NAI-g that might provide his reason here, but the change in the job it is required to do;
it may be an open question whether or not a religious \( \text{Mal-g} \) has a useful job to do in modern society, but this is not what is relevant here. It is impossible to avoid going into the social scientists' type of functional or structural analysis if we want to progress further with these empirical problems. To do so, however interesting it may be, would be outside the scope of this work. Thus we must leave this argument hanging on a disputed question of fact.

Nielsen's final blast is:

... that religious language does a job no other segment of language can do, does little to show that Christian or Islamic or Jewish first-order God-talk or God-talk at all is in a coherent order just as it is. (Nielsen, p. 197)

This is quite correct. But on the other hand, nor does Nielsen's side of this empirical dispute "show that... first-order God-talk or God-talk at all" is incoherent as it is.

This does not, however, leave us with an impasse. There are some further considerations which may be brought to bear. The second view Hughes outlines (the Wittgensteinian one) favours distinguishing expressions whose usage patterns differently; the first view (the Martin-Nielsen view) favours unity of categorisation of expressions and rejecting as incoherent those expressions that do not fit in. Just as much as Nielsen may demand of Hughes that he show good reason for paying attention to the distinctions he would draw, so Hughes may demand of Nielsen that he show good reason for not doing so. (As noted above, the empirical claims they both use do not help much). The whole preceding part of this thesis is intended to count in favour of Hughes' position. But we can say a little more against Nielsen's argument. On p. 194 he states his agreement with taking a Wittgensteinian \( \text{Mal-g} \) view of ethics and inductive logic. As he says:

... if we try to construe moral statements as if they were empirical statements, and moral reasoning
as if it were scientific reasoning, we would make nonsense out of morality. (Nielsen, p. 194)

Thus his opposition to a like position with respect to religion would appear to be an inconsistency in his general philosophical attitude.

This last remark brings up an important problem. It may be thought that the revised Wittgensteinian Fideist position maintained above means having to agree that any NAI-g is coherent. This is not so. Let us introduce the notion of "compatibility" among NAI-gs: the set of NAI-gs compatible with a given NAI-g, NAI-\(g_i\) comprises just those NAI-gs the statements occurring in which are not inconsistent with the statements of NAI-\(g_i\). This, however, is not very helpful unless we have an account of what it is for statements in different NAI-gs to be consistent.

NAI-gs include and are included in other NAI-gs and intersect or overlap one another. And there is, of course, "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (PM, *7), which includes all NAI-gs. Here we are concerned (as we usually are in philosophy) with the kind of NAI-g that is distinguished by certain characteristic statements and behaviour. Such NAI-gs incorporate and affirm statements common to, and affirmed in other NAI-gs. They also incorporate and affirm statements that may be denied in other NAI-gs. If this occurs these language-games will not, for that reason alone, count as inconsistent. Suppose NAI-g1 and NAI-g2 are two NAI-gs, and P an arbitrary statement that is affirmed in NAI-g1 and denied in NAI-g2 (and suppose both NAI-gs are internally consistent in the usual sense: neither containing both the affirmation and denial of the one statement). If there is another NAI-g, say NAI-g3 which contains both NAI-g1 and NAI-g2, then with respect to NAI-g3, NAI-g1 and NAI-g2 may be said to be inconsistent. It must be noticed that, as emphasised throughout this work, that language-games are not permanent or isolated, they are
distinguished for some purpose, usually by people doing philosophy. Thus $\text{NAI-}g_3$ cannot be just any language-game, it must be one distinguished for some purpose, some use. And furthermore, to show that $\text{NAI-}g_1$ and $\text{NAI-}g_2$ are incompatible will not count as such a purpose. In other words, the account we give of inconsistency will follow from the account we would give of analyticity, following Quine (1), p. 23, with synonymy explicated as in sec. 7.2 above: thus two statements are inconsistent if the negation of their bi-conditional is analytic.

Some examples might help make this clear. Suppose the Mayor of town $K$ is also the manager of the local insurance company, and that the property of many citizens of $K$ is seriously damaged by an earthquake and suppose further that the laws of insurance and civic aid are framed to suit the example (not an implausible assumption). The Mayor of $K$ classifies the earthquake as a natural disaster so that he can provide vote catching civic aid; the manager of the insurance company classifies the disaster as an act of God, thus avoiding making payments. The "civic duties" $\text{NAI-}g$ includes the former, the "insurance" $\text{NAI-}g$ the latter. In the biography of this civic-insurance executive the incompatibility of these two will be noted and evidenced by the consequent marital crisis, his wife being a very honest woman. Further examples can be generated by taking substitutions in opaque contexts. Thus in the $\text{NAI-}g$ of John's religious life, suppose (i) "John worships Zeus" is affirmed, but (ii) "John worships Jupiter" is hotly denied. This $\text{NAI-}g$ will be incompatible with the "meta-religions" $\text{NAI-}g$ in which "Zeus=Jupiter" is affirmed.

The important point is that inconsistency occurs only in a $\text{NAI-}g$ and is relative to that $l-g$. Thus two $l-g$s may be inconsistent only with respect to another $l-g$ in which the two are embedded. (In the second of the above examples, this would be, say, the $\text{NAI-}g$ in which John, as a student of religions, considers his own religious life.) There is
a temptation here to try and "tighten" this account, or make it more "formally specific." This temptation must be resisted. Any further "tightening" of this account would require specifications of NAl-gs and their inter-relationships of an exactness, fixedness, and generality that would be quite counter to this whole Wittgensteinian programme.

Now if a person or society partakes in NAl-gs (forms of life) which are incompatible then their form of life (the overall NAl-g comprising all the NAl-gs associated with all the forms of life of which they partake) is incoherent. However, we must recognise as a matter of fact that humans are quite capable of living with incoherence; they can, with few qualms, compartmentalise their lives, or simply ignore inconsistencies even when brought to their attention. I have argued above that Nielsen's own paper presents an example of such an incoherence.

The Wittgensteinian position does not provide automatic answers to theological and meta-theological problems. What it does is to "clean up the logical geography" of such problems so that we will not get in (as many) fruitless and counterproductive muddles.

Nielsen himself provides a good concluding remark:

Inductive reasonings and moral reasonings have, in the sense Ryle uses "logic," a logic of their own. Our job as philosophers is to come to understand and display that logic, not to distort it to the logic of some other preferred type of discourse or to try to interpret it in terms of some ideal language like that found in Principia Mathematica. (Nielsen, p.194)
NOTES


2This example is due to Lakoff. It is called the "Yiddisher transformation" because the two would probably be synonymous for an English speaker whose first language was Yiddish.

3Like Quine we shall not worry about uninteresting side issues raised by holders of certain degrees or by adolescent seals.

4It is interesting to note that this relation has many of the characteristics of the "corner" ("\( \Rightarrow \)") operator (see Stalnaker), as compared with the "\( \succ \)" or "\( \Rightarrow \)" operators. Thus, briefly and informally, if A and B are expressions such that this relation holds between their uses (meanings), i.e., such that \( \text{ARB} \), where \( R \) is this relation, then:
(i) \( R \) is not truth functional, although we do hold that it will be false that both A is used and B is not;
(ii) \( \text{ARB} \) may be contingent;
(iii) from \( \text{ARB} \) is does not follow that (A\&C) \( RB \) (from our vintners' \( l\rightarrow g \) a counter example would be: "This is a good wine but absurdly overpriced by comparison with that, and so I cannot recommend it.");
(iv) \( R \) cannot be hold to be transitive because \( l\rightarrow g \) boundaries may too easily be crossed; also suitable substitutions for B might not always make suitable substitutions for A;
(v) for similar reason exportation may not always hold for \( R \).

However \( R \) differs from Stalnaker's "corner" in that the analogy with transposition clearly does hold for \( R \), and it is difficult to find a counterpart (for \( R \) of pragmatic ambiguity.


6This position has recently come under considerable attack; see, e.g., S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" and Keith S. Donellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions" in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972); Michael Devitt, "Singular Terms," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXII, No. 7, April 18, 1974. Although the points made in these articles are of
great significance, there is, I believe, much that could be but has not yet been said in Wittgenstein's defence. For example, one important point which these papers fail to recognise is that if a particular use of an expression is odd or deviant then our theoretical explanation of it must account for it as odd or deviant, not as normal.

There is, in between, a brief but important discussion of Carnap's explanation of analyticity in terms of "state descriptions;" we should note that this too is found wanting, but the discussion does not directly affect us here.

This, presumably, holds only within the temporal modulus of those expressions. The temporal restriction Quine puts on stimulus meanings is not without problems, but as it does not directly concern or affect us here we shall make no further mention of it.

However, if the reader is not acquainted with these papers I would suggest that he need read only Winch (2), part II, Hughes, Nielsen, and especially Phillips (2).

Norman Malcolm (Malcolm (2), p. 72) writes: "But I think that there was in him, in some sense, the possibility of religion. I believe that he looked on religion as a 'form of life' in which he did not participate, but with which he was sympathetic and which greatly interested him." That Malcolm himself considers religion a form of life is made very clear, for example, on p. 62 of Malcolm (3).

Not "characteristic" in the sense of "most commonly occurring;" as has been pointed out by many people, "God exists" and "There is a God" are not common expressions in Christian 1-gs at least.

A similar mistake is, I believe, endemic among economists who talk of money as valuable only in terms of non-monetary goods and services. Even at the most superficial level this seems wrong, many goods in our society being valuable mainly for their high price. However, the problems in economic theory that this mistake produces are far more deep-seated than that.

For example, the N.Z. Inland Revenue Department has a practical interest in such questions: are Scientology or The London School of Philosophy properly called religions and thus not liable to property tax?
And to this extent they are empirical. This is found objectionable by some philosophers, but I do not see why. Much that is of philosophical interest and importance arises out of empirical observation.

The characteristic of such a statement (i.e., an analytic statement) is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms." (Quine (1), p. 23)

"A logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles." (Quine (1), pps 22-23)

This seems to me a most plausible way to explain the effectiveness of transcendental arguments (see also sec. 7.1 above).

The account offered here does not differ significantly from that in the first part of Phillips (2). The difficulties that Phillips finds in the second part of this paper are due mainly to his failure to distinguish between *AAl*-gs and *ARI*-gs.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1 Thus we see there are two main types of $l$-gs in Wittgenstein's later philosophy: ARL-gs and NAL-gs. The term "$l$-gs" is not definable in the sense of there being necessary and sufficient conditions for its use, but it is restricted in at least four ways. Like both language and games, $l$-gs are rule governed (although no one particular rule is common to all), and involve, or require, the use of skill (although not the same skill in all cases); most $l$-gs are purposive (although they do not all have the same purpose) and most $l$-gs are social. This applies to both ARL-gs and NAL-gs although it is more important in the case of the latter.

ARL-gs are invented $l$-gs and are used as a method in doing philosophy. As such they were quite new to philosophical method. Argument is the business of convincing people, of making them "see it my way," of "winning hearts" so to speak. Philosophers, specialists in argument, are that particular group of people who labour under the misconception that their hearts are won only by way of their heads. (That this is a misconception, that philosophers, even as philosophers, are still human, is evidenced by their quick and quite general acceptance of the argument against definition and for family resemblance even although this argument, at least as presented by Wittgenstein, never measured up to their professed standards.) Wittgenstein saw this and devised a method to overcome the difficulties which this created for him. His audience had been "brought up" on science and philosophical theories constructed like scientific ones but also with a great penchant for correctness. In the philosophy of language at least these two were incompatible; but as the latter was seen only in terms of the former the incompatibility was not apparent. Had Wittgenstein stated this
incompatibility straight off he would have met with the same rejection most revolutionary thinkers meet with in their own "back yard." The method of AR1-gs overcomes this problem; AR1-gs are constructed in terms of a theory, thus "capturing" the audience, but are discussed as if they were in purposive social use by a community. Thus they mediate between the incompatible penchant for accuracy and love of scientific theories; they also increase the "accessibility" to the audience of the social processes involved in using language. As such it might be said that they have merely heuristic value; even so they were most effective.

NAL-gs are the various areas of language. They are not sharply partitioned but we can for our own purposes separate them according to the criteria appropriate to our purposes. Language is not treated as a static body of data (la langue), but as a social process (la parole) and thus various behavioural, social, and institutional factors are taken into account in NAL-gs. NAL-gs are closely tied in with, we might even say founded in, the idea of forms of life. This is a theory of our knowledge of the world in all its aspects. The nature of this knowledge is evidenced by our behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, attitudes, institutions, etc. It is not fixed and immutable, but is known to vary slightly from culture to culture, and we can conceive the possibility of radical differences, although we cannot say what they might be. The idea of NAL-gs highlights the linguistic aspect of forms of life. This is the appropriate aspect for philosophers to deal with, but nevertheless they should never overlook the fact that more than just words, sentences, is always involved.

Any argument or explanation must begin or end somewhere. The ultimate base, "bedrock," is form of life, and in philosophy we say NAL-g because this is the side we deal with. Philosophy is done in words. So in the end we can only "note the l-g;" this is not explanation but description.
8.2 Because of the claim that in the end we can only describe, and what we describe, the given, is form of life, Wittgenstein's has been called "the anthropological approach." It is certainly anthropocentric and relativistic. Calling his approach anthropological may be helpful—it is interesting to note that many of Wittgenstein's ideas are now widely accepted by social scientists (cf., e.g., Whorf, p. 213)—but the extent to which it is misleading should also be noted.

If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. (P, p. 230)

Some writers take this passage, allied with, for example:

(The question of whether the muscles of the larynx are innervated in connexion with internal speech, and similar things, may be of great interest, but not in our investigation.) (P, p. 220)

as evidence that Wittgenstein was "anti-science" (see, e.g., Pears, pp. 173-4). It is easy to see the point of this. We do tend to look to science for explanations and to hold the explanations provided by science in special regard ("science is the prevailing myth of our time"). And to say that this is simply a fact of our form of life dies seem like a dismissal of science. That, however, is not so; for what more could one say of it? There is also the claim that we must do away with explanation and replace it with description.
As science provides explanations this might be interpreted as "anti-science." That, however, would be a very superficial interpretation. Even the explanations of science come to an end somewhere, and even the scientist must at some point say, "This is the basis, bedrock; we describe this, we do not explain it." As science progresses explanations push further back, and what is bedrock today is explained in terms of some more primitive given tomorrow; but there is still "the given." Our acceptance of it is a feature of our form of life. (This is a special kind of "acceptance"; we, in our enlightened moments, might accept relativity physics, but we commonly behave and talk in a way that shows we accept, live in terms of, Newtonian physics. Thus Wittgenstein's philosophy is no more against science than against anything else:

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. (PI, *126)

Wittgenstein's "anthropological approach" has had some impact on the philosophical world. It has been suggested that this is the kind of thing Strawson, for example, is doing in *Individuals* (see Strawson (2)); he is describing very general facts about the way we organize our experience, as it were "describing bedrock."

Note however that what is called "philosophical anthropology" or "descriptive metaphysics" (Strawson) is, in effect, a systematic development of Wittgenstein's idea of describing certain general facts of nature and formation of our concepts. (Zabeh, p. 349)

It is also interesting to note in this respect, that Strawson does "note our l-s" as the given. It is from our use of language that he argues.
Philosophical problems arise when we ask questions about things which are such that our language does not contain the possibility of doubting them (cf., "Is \((\text{p} \lor \text{p}) \lor \text{p}\) true in \(\Pi\)?"). This is a very easy thing to do because all words look more or less similar. The perplexities arrived at thus are, however, not simple or superficial; they are "deep disquietudes." Thus it is language that leads us astray, and:

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. \(\text{(PI, *109)}\)

When we ask such questions and get caught up in the perplexities of trying to answer then we have, in a sense, lost the basis of our thinking, we are lost in our own conceptual scheme.

A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about." \(\text{(PI, *123)}\)

If an illness is a (systematic) malfunction of one of the body's systems then such a philosophical problem is like an illness, in that it is a (systematic) malfunction in a mode of thought.

255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. \(\text{(PI, *255)}\)

The treatment is to get back to our form of life (back to "normal") \(\text{(cf., PI, *116)}\). These perplexities arise because philosophers tend, in looking at language, to look at "a form of words and not the use made of the form of words" \(\text{(LA, p. 2)}\). On the other hand:

We don't start from certain words, but from certain occasions or activities. \(\text{(LA, p. 3)}\)

309. What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. \(\text{(PI, *309)}\)

The only way out of the fly-bottle is, oddly enough, the way in. The fly might, by some chance, fly right out again; but that would be unsatisfactory, because he couldn't expect to do it again next time. To find a way out he must first investigate the entire bottle. This is doubly difficult because (the bottle being transparent) through the bottle he views the world. However, once he has "mapped the logical geography of his cage, he will be able to fly out, in again
and out again, at will.

"The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to."

(HI, *133)
APPENDIX

In this appendix are included important passages from The Blue and The Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.

THE BLUE AND THE BROWN BOOKS

pvi1
When I describe certain simple language games, this is not in order to construct from them gradually the processes of our developed language - or of thinking - which only leads to injustices (Nicol and Russell). I simply set forth the games as what they are, and let them shed their light on the particular problems.

p17.
I shall in future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language-games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent. On the other hand we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones.

p25.
For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussion on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to strict rules. To suppose that there must be (definitions strictly circumscribing concepts) would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.

p37.
We want that the wish that Mr. Smith should come into this room should wish that just Mr. Smith, and no substitute should come, and no substitute for that, into my room, and no substitute for that. But this is exactly what we said.

p77.
Imagine this language:-
1). Its function is the communication between a builder A and his
man B. B has to reach A building stones. There are cubes, bricks, slabs, beams, columns. The language consists of the words "cube", "brick", "slab", "column". A calls out one of these words, upon which B brings a stone of a certain shape.

p81
Systems of communication as for instance 1), 2), 3), 4), 5), we shall call language games. They are more or less akin to what in ordinary language we call games. Children are taught in native language by means of such games, and here they even have the entertaining character of games. We are not, however, regarding the language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication. To keep this point of view in mind, it very often is useful to imagine such a simple language to be the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society. Think of primitive arithmetics of such tribes. When the boy or grown-up learns what one might call special technical languages, e. g. the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, chemical symbolism, etc., he learns more language games.
(Remark: The picture we have of the language of the grown-up is that of a nebulous mass of language, his mother tongue, surrounded by discrete and more or less clear-cut language games, the technical languages.

p98.
Imagine the gestures, sounds, etc., of encouragement you use when you teach a dog to retrieve. Imagine on the other hand, that you tried to teach a cat to retrieve. As the cat will not respond to your encouragement, most of the acts of encouragement which you performed when you trained the dog are here out of the question.

p92.
23). Like 2) A orders B to bring him a number of building stones. The numerals are the signs "1", "2", ............ "9", each written on a card. A has a set of these cards and gives B the order by showing him one of the set and calling out one of the words "slab", "column", etc. 24). Like 23), only there is no set of indexed cards. The series of numerals 1.....9 is learned by heart. The numerals are called out in the orders, and the child learns them by word of "mouth".

p94.
Note analogy and lack of analogy between the limited supply of cards in 23) and of words in our memory in 24).

p95.
What do we call a rule? 33). B moves about according to rules which A gives him. B is supplied with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>←</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A gives an order made up of the letters in the table, say "asadda". B looks up the arrow corresponding to each letter of the order and moves accordingly; in our example thus:

The table 33) we shall call a rule (or else "the expression of a rule").

p.98.

The game is similar to 33), but the pupil is not just trained to use a single table; but the training aims at making the pupil use any table correlating letters with arrows. Now by this I mean no more than that the training is of a peculiar kind, roughly speaking one analogous to that described in 30). I will refer to a training more or less similar to that in 30) as a "general training". General trainings form a family whose members differ greatly from one another. The kind of thing I am thinking of now mainly consists: a) of a training in a limited range of actions, b) of giving the pupil a lead to extend the range and c) random exercises and tests. After the general training the order is now to consist in giving him a sign of this kind:

He carries out the order by moving thus:

Here I suppose we should say the table, the rule, is part of the order.

p.99.

And therefore if we conceive of the symbol in 41) as a unit, this may make us realize what a sentence can look like.

p.100-101.

An activity of the men of a certain tribe is to test sticks as to their hardness. They do it by trying to bend the sticks with their hands. In their language they have expressions of the form, "This stick can be bent easily", or "This stick can be bent with difficulty". They use these expressions as we use "This stick is soft", or "This stick is hard". I mean to say that they don't use the expression, "This stick can be bent easily" as we would use the sentence, "I am bending this stick with ease". Rather they use their expression in a way that would make us say that they are describing a state of the stick.

p.102.

It is an important remark concerning this example and others which we give that one may object to the description which we give of the
language of a tribe, that in the specimens we give of their language we let (editor's note re 'let': "German lassen, i. e. 'make' ").

them speak English, thereby already presupposing the whole background of the English language, that is, our usual meanings of the words. Thus if I say that in a certain language there is no special verb for "skipping", but that this language uses instead the form "making the test for throwing the boomerang", one may ask how I have characterized the use of the expressions, "make a test for" and "throwing the boomerang", to be justified in substituting these English expressions for whatever their actual words may be. To this we must answer that we have only given a very sketchy description of the practices of our fictitious languages, in some cases only hints, but that one can easily make these descriptions more complete.

p.103.

Now what characterizes an order as such, or a description as such, or a question as such, etc. is --- as we have said -- the role which the utterance of these signs plays in the whole practice of the language. That is to say, whether a word of the language of our tribe is rightly translated into a word of the English language depends upon the role this word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions on which it is used, the expressions of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, the ideas which it generally awakens or which prompts its saying, etc.


The function of the word 'now' is entirely different from that of a specification of time, - this can easily be seen if we look at the role this word really plays in our usage of language, but it is obscured when instead of looking at the whole language game, we only look at contexts, the phrases of language in which the word is used. (BrB p108).

One has been tempted to say that "now" is the name of an instant of time, and this, of course, would be like saying that "here" is the name of a place, "this" the name of a thing, and "I" the name of a man... But nothing is more unlike than the use of the word "this" and the use of a proper name - I mean the games played with these words, not the phrases in which they are used. For we do say "This is short" and "Jack is short"; but remember that "This is short" without the pointing gesture and without the thing we are pointing to would be meaningless.

- What can be compared with a name is not the word "this" but, if you like, the symbol consisting of this word, the gesture, and the sample. We might say: Nothing is more characteristic of a proper name A than that we can use it is such a phrase as "This is A"; and it makes no sense to say "This is this" or "Now is now" or "Here is here".

p.125.

It was not the function of our examples to show us the essence of 'deriving', 'reading', and so forth through a veil of inessential features; the examples were not a description of an outside letting us guess at an
inside which for some reason or other could not be shown in its nakedness. We are tempted to think that our examples are indirect means for producing a certain image or idea in a person's mind, - that they hint at something which they cannot show. This would be so in such a case as this: Suppose I wish to produce in someone a mental image of the inside of a particular eighteenth-century room which he is prevented from entering. I therefore adopt this method: I show him the house from the outside, pointing out the windows of the room in question, I further lead him into other rooms of the same period. - Our method is purely descriptive; the descriptions we give are not hints of explanation.

p.161.
All the questions considered here link up with this problem: Suppose you had taught someone to write down series of numbers according to rules of the form: Always write down a number n greater than the preceding. (This rule is abbreviated to "Add n"). The numerals in this game are to groups of dashes /, //, ///, etc. What I called teaching this game, of course, consisted in giving general explanations and doing examples. - etc.

p.172.
But let us look at an example: consider this language game: A sends B to various houses in their town to fetch goods of various sorts from various people. A gives B various lists. On top of every list he puts a scribble, and B is trained to go to the house on the door of which he finds the same scribble; this is the name of the house. In the first column of every list he then finds one or more scribbles which he has been taught to read out. When he enters the house he calls out these words, and every inhabitant of the house has been trained to run up to him when a certain one of these sounds is called out, these sounds are the names of the people. He then addresses himself to each one of them in turn and shows to each two consecutive scribbles which stand on the list against his name. The first of the two, the people of that town have been trained to associate with some particular kind of object, say, apples. The second is one of the scribbles which each man carries about him on a slip of paper. The person thus addressed fetches say, five apples. The first scribble was the generic name of the objects required, the second the name of their number."

p.183.
It is easy, on the other hand, to point out experiences characteristic of remembering, expecting, etc., accompanying the images, and further differences in the immediate or more remote surrounding of them. Thus we certain say different things in different cases, e.g. "I remember his coming into my room", "I expect his coming into my room", "I imagine his coming into my room". - "But surely this can't be all the difference there is!" It isn't all: There are three different games, played with these three words, surrounding these statements.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

PART I.

1. When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. This intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learned to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of words. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

2. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; - B bring the stone which he has learned at such-and-such a call. -- Conceive this as a complete primitive language.

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises. "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you are claiming to describe."

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..." and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games.

4. Imagine a script in which the letters were used to stand for sounds, and also as signs of emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be conceived as a language for describing sound patterns.) Now imagine some-
one interpreting that script as if there were simply a correspondence of letters to sounds and as if the letters had not also completely different functions. Augustine's conception of language is like such an oversimple conception of the script.

7. We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) ((the builders l-g)) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game. And the processes of naming stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.

     I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game".

8. Let us now look at an expansion of language (2). Besides the four words "block", "pillar", etc., let it contain a series of words used as the shopkeeper in (1) used the numerals (it can be the series of letters of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, which may as well be "there" and "this" (because this roughly indicates their purpose; and finally a number of colour samples. A gives an order like: "d-slab-there". At the same time he shews the assistant a colour sample, and when he says "there" he points to a place on the building site. From the stock of slabs B takes one for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of the same colour as the sample, and brings them to the place indicated by A. - On other occasions A gives the order "this-there". At "this" he points to a building stone. And so on.

10. Now what do the words of this language signify? What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind of use they have? And we have already described that. So we are asking for the expression "This word signifies this" to be made part of the description. In other words the description ought to take the form: "The word....signifies....".

     Of course, one can reduce the description of the use of the word "slab" to the statement that this word signifies this object. This will be done when, for example, it is merely a matter of removing the mistaken idea that the word "slab" refers to the shape of building-stone that we in fact call a "block" -- but the kind of 'referring' this is, to say the use of these words for the rest, is already known.

     Equally one can say that the signs "a", "b", etc. signify numbers; when for example this removes the mistaken idea that "a", "b", "c", play the part actually played in language by "block", "slab", "pillar". And one can also say that "c" means this number and not that one; when for example this serves to explain that the letters are to be used in the word a, b, c, d, etc., and not in the order a, b, d, c.

     But assimilating the description of the uses of words in this way cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely unlike.
11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. — The function of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (and in both cases there are similarities.)

Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script or print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy.

13. When we say: "Every word in language signifies something" we have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make. (It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language (6) from words 'without meaning' such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poems, or words like 'Lilliburlero' in songs.)

15. The word "to signify" is perhaps used in the most straight-forward way when the object signified is marked with the sign. Suppose that the tools A uses in building bear certain marks. When A shows his assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has that mark on it.

It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is given to a thing. — It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

17. It will be possible to say: In language(6) we have different kinds of word. For the functions of the word "slab" and the word "block" are more alike than those of "slab" and "d". But how we group words into kinds will depend on the aim of the classification, - and on our own inclination.

Think of the different points of view from which one can classify tools or chess-men.

20. But now it looks as if when someone says "Bring me a slab" he could mean this expression as one long word corresponding to the single word "Slab!" — Then can one mean it sometimes as one word and sometimes as four? And how does one usually mean it? — I think we shall be inclined to say: we mean the sentence as four words when we use it in contrast with other sentences such as "Hand me a slab", "Bring him a slab", "Bring two slabs" etc.; that is, in contrast with sentences containing the separate words of our command in other combinations. — But what does using one sentence in contrast with others consist in? Do the others, perhaps, hover before one's mind? All of them? And while one is saying the one sentence, or before, or afterwards? — No. Even if such an explanation rather tempts us, we need only think for a moment of what actually happens in order to see that we are going astray here. We say that we use the command in contrast with other sentences because our language contains the possibility of those other sentences. Someone who did not understand our language, a foreigner, who had fairly often heard someone giving the order: "Bring me a slab!", might believe that this whole series of sounds was one word corresponding perhaps to the word
for "building-stone" in his language. If he himself had then given this
order perhaps he would have pronounced it differently, and we should
say: he pronounces it so oddly because he takes it for a single word.
But then, is there not also something different going on in him when he
pronounces it, - something corresponding to the fact that he conceives
the sentence as a single word? - Either the same thing may go on in him,
or something different. For what goes on in you when you give such an
order? Are you conscious of its consisting of four words while you are
uttering it? Of course you have a mastery of this language - which
contains other sentences as well - but is this having a mastery something
that happens while you are uttering the sentence? - And I have admitted
that the foreigner will probably pronounce a sentence differently if he
conceives it differently; but what we call his wrong conception need not
lie in anything that accompanies the utterance of the command.

The sentence is 'elliptical', not because it leaves out something
that we think when we utter it, but because it is shortened - in
comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar. - Of course one
might object here: "You grant that the shortened and the unshortened
sentence have the same sense. - What is this sense, then? Isn't there
a verbal expression for this sense?" - But doesn't the fact that
sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use?
(In Russian one says "stone red" instead of "The stone is red"; do they
feel the copula to be missing in the sense, or attach it in thought?

21. Imagine a language-game in which A asks B the number of
slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones
that are stacked in such-and-such a place. - Such a report might run:
"Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or state-
ment "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"? Well, it is the
part which uttering these words plays in the language-game. No doubt
the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much
else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the
tone's being the same - for an order and a report can be spoken in a
variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face - the
difference being only in the application. (Of course, we might use the
words "statement" and "command" to stand for grammatical forms of
sentence and intonations; we do in fact call "Isn't the weather glorious
to-day?" a question, although it is used as a statement.) We could
imagine a language in which all statements had the form and tone of
rhetorical questions; or every command the form of the question "Would
you like to...?" Perhaps it will then be said: "What he says has the
form of a question but is really a command" - that is, has the function
of a command in the technique of using the language. (Similarly one
says "You will do this!" not as a prophecy but as a command. What makes
it the one or the other?)

23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question,
and command? - There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of
what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is
not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

- Giving orders, and obeying them
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)
- Reporting an event
- Speculating about an event
- Forming and testing a hypothesis
- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams
- Making up a story; and reading it
- Play-acting
- Singing catches
- Guessing riddles
- Making a joke; telling it
- Solving a problem in practical arithmetic
- Translating from one language into another
- Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?" -- Is it the statement that I do not know such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other person would tell me...? Or is it the description of my mental state of uncertainty? -- And is the cry "Help!" such a description?

Think how many different kinds of thing are called "description"; description of a body's position by means of its coordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of a mood.

Of course it is possible to substitute the form of statement or description for the usual form of question: "I want to know whether..." or "I am in doubt whether..." --but this does not bring the different language-games any closer together.

The significance of such possibilities of transformation, for example of turning all statements into sentences beginning "I think" or "I believe" (and thus, as it were, into descriptions of my inner life) will become clearer in another place.
(Solipsism.)
27. In languages (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking something's name. This, with its correlate, ostensive definition, is we might say, a language-game on its own. That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask: "What is that called?" - upon which the name is given. And there is also the language-game of inventing a name for something, and hence of saying, "This is..." and then using the new name.

28. Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number two, "That is called 'two!'" - pointing to two nuts - is perfectly exact. -But how can two be defined like that? the person one gives the definition to doesn't know what one wants to call "two"; he will suppose that "two" is the name given to this group of nuts! - He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a numeral. And he might equally take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.

29. Perhaps you can say: two can only be defined ostensively in this way: "This number is called 'two'". For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood. -The word "number" in the definition does indeed show this place; does show the post at which we station the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings by saying: "This colour is called so-and-so", "This length is called so-and-so", and so on. That is to say: misunderstandings are sometimes averted in this way. But is there only one way of taking the word "colour" or "length"? --Well, they just need defining. -Defining, then, by means of other words! And what about the last definition in this chain? (Do not say: "There isn't a 'last' definition". That is just as if you chose to say: "There isn't a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one".)

Whether the word "number" is necessary in the ostensive definition depends on whether without it the other person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I give it to.

And how he 'takes' the definition is seen in the use that he makes of the word defined.

30. So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use -- the meaning--of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia!'" will help me to understand the word. --And you can say this, so long as you do not forget that all sorts of problems attach to the words "to know" or "to be clear".
One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?

32. And now I think we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself".

43. For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

46. What lies behind the idea that names really signify simples?

-Socrates says in the Theaetetus: "If I make no mistake, I have heard some people say this: there is no definition of the primary elements - so to speak - out of which we and everything else are composed; for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, neither that is is nor that it is not........ But what exists in its own right has to be....named without any other determination. In consequence it is impossible to give an account of any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare name; its name is all it has. But just as what consists of these primary elements is itself complex, so the names of the elements become descriptive language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech is the composition of names."

Both Russells's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements.

48. Let us apply the method of 2 to the account in the Theaetetus. Let us consider a language-game for which this account is really valid. The language serves to describe combinations of coloured squares on a surface. The squares form a complex like a chessboard. There are red, green, white and black squares. The words of the language are (correspondingly) "R", "G", "W", "B", and a sentence in a series of these words. They describe an arrangement of squares in the order:

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1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
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And so for instance the sentence 'RRBGGRMW' describes an arrangement of this sort:
Here the sentence is a complex of names, to which corresponds a complex of elements. The primary elements are the coloured squares. "But are these simple?" - I do not know what else you would have me call "the simples", what would be more natural in this language-game. But under other circumstances I should call a monochrome square "composite", consisting perhaps of two rectangles, or of the elements colour and shape. But the concept of complexity might also be so extended that a smaller area was said to be 'composed' of a greater area and another one subtracted from it. Compare the 'composition of forces', the 'division' of a line by a point outside it; these expressions shew that we are sometimes even inclined to conceive the smaller as the result of a composition of greater parts, and the greater as the result of a division of the smaller.

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine? - And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstanding in any particular case?

49. But what does it mean to say that we cannot define (that is, describe) these elements, but only name them? This might mean, for instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.

Here we might say - though this easily leads to all kinds of philosophical superstition - that a sign "R" or "B", etc., may be sometimes a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it is a word or a proposition depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word is a description - a proposition. But if he is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R", for instance, is not a description; it names an element - but it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same level; naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game - any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning only as part of the sentence.
50. There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. - But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.

Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not. We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in the ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.

60. When I say: "My broom is in the corner", - is this really a statement about the broomstick and the brush? Well, it could at any rate be replaced by a statement giving the position of the stick and the position of the brush. And this statement is surely a further analysed form of the first one. - But why do I call it "further analysed"? - Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the stick and brush must be there, and in a particular relation to one another; and this was, as it were, hidden in the sense of the first sentence, and is expressed in the analysed sentence. Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush? - If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying "Bring me the broom", you said "Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted to it." - Isn't the answer: "Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly?" - Is he going to understand the further analysed sentence better? - This sentence, one might say, achieves the same as the ordinary one, but in a more roundabout way. -- Imagine a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring certain objects which are composed of several parts, to move them about, or something else of the kind. And two ways of playing it: in one (a) the composite objects (brooms, chairs, tables, etc.) have names, as in (15): in the other (b) only the parts are given names and the wholes are described by means of them. -- In what sense is an order in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first? Does the former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis? -- True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of corresponding parts?

63. To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an 'analysed' form of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more fundamental form; that it alone shews what is meant by the other, and so on. For example, we think: If you have only the unanalysed form you miss the analysis; but if you know the analysed form that gives you everything. - But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is lost on
you in the latter case as well as the former?

64. Let us imagine language-game (48) altered so that names signify not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such squares. Let such a rectangle, which is half red half green, be called "U"; a half green half white one, "W"; and so on. Could we not imagine people who had names for such combinations of colour, but not for the individual colours? Think of the cases where we say: "This arrangement of colours (say the French tricolor) has a quite special character."

In what sense do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis? How far is it even possible to replace this language-game by (48)? It is just another language-game; even though it is related to (48).

65. Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. -For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language.

And this is true. -Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language". I will try to explain this.

66. Consider for example the proceeding that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? -Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games!'" - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball-games there is winning and losing; But when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see
how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances": for the various resemblances between members of a family; build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a direct - relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties" - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".

68. All right: the concept of numbers is defined for you as the logical sum of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way the concept of a game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts." --It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used to say the word "game".)

But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated. --It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.

71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges. - "But is a blurred concept a concept at all?" - Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?

81. F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely,
that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and
calculi that have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is
using language must be playing such a game. --But if you say that our
languages only approximate to such calculi you are standing on the very
brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as though what we
were talking about were an ideal language. As if our logic were, so to
speak, a logic for a vacuum. --Whereas logic does not treat of language
—or of thought—in the sense in which a natural science treats of a
natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we reconstruct
ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it
sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday
language; and as if it took the logician to show people at last what a
proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to different rules.

82. What do I call 'the rule by which he proceeds'? —The hypothesis that
satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rule
which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in
reply if we ask him what his rule is? —But what if observation does not
enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings none to light? —
For he did indeed give me a definition when I asked him what he under-
stood by "N", but he was prepared to withdraw and alter it. —So how am I
to determine the rule according to which he is playing? He does not
know it himself. —Or, to ask a better question: what meaning is the
expression "the rule by which he proceeds" supposed to have left to it
here?

83. Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here?
We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing
with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many
without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into
the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another
for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are
playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw.

And is there not also the case where we play and—make up the rules
as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go
along.

84. I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by
rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by
rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the
cracks where it might? —Can't we imagine a rule determining the
application of a rule, and a doubt which it removes—and so on?

But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible
to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting before
he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and
making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right) -- but that does not make me doubt in the same case.

85. A rule stand there like a sign-post. --Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the foot-path or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? --And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground -is there only one way of interpreting them? --So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.

108. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. --We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!

109. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the working of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings; in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

113. But this is how it is --- "I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter."

114. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of proposition is: This is how things are." --That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.

115. A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
116. When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name", and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. --Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularisation of language - as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

131. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language; an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order.

133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.

143. Let us now examine the following kind of language-game: when A gives an order B has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation rule. The first of these series is meant to be that of the natural numbers in decimal notation, - How does he get to understand this notation? - First of all series of numbers will be written down for him and he will be required to copy them. (Do not balk at the expression "series of numbers"; it is not being used wrongly here). And here already there is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction.

151. But there is also this use of the word "to know" : we say "Now I know!" - and similarly "Now I can do it!" and "Now I understand!". Let us imagine the following example: A writes series of numbers down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on!" - So this capacity, this
understanding, is something that makes its appearance in a moment. So let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance here. A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What has happened here? Various things may have happened; for example, while A was slowly putting one number after another, B was occupied with trying various algebraic formulae on the numbers which had been written down. After A had written the number 19 B tried the formula \(a_n = n^2 + n - 1\); and the next number confirmed his hypothesis.

186. But the part the word ('reading') plays in our life, and therefore with the language-game in which we employ it, would be difficult to describe even in rough outline.

185. Let us return to our example (143). Now- judged by the usual criteria - the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers. Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and get him to the point of writing down series of the form

\[0, n, 2n, 3n, \text{etc.}\]

at an order or the form "+n"; so at the order "+1" he writes down the natural numbers. --Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1,000.

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1,000 -- and he writes 1,000, 1,002, 1,004, 1,006, 1,012.

We say to him: "Look what you've done!" --He doesn't understand.

We must say: "You were meant to add two; look how you began the series!" --He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it." --Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way." --It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see...?" --and repeat the old examples and explanations.

--In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1,000, 4 up to 2,000, 6 up to 3,000 and so on."

Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.

186. What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight - intuition - is needed at every step to carry out the order '+n' correctly. -To carry it out correctly! How is it decided what is the right step to take at any particular stage? --"The right step is the one that accords with the order -as it was meant." --So when you give the order +2 you meant that he was to write 1,002 after 1,000 --and did you also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100,036 after 100,034, and so on -- an infinite number of such propositions? --"No: what I meant was that he should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote;
and from this all those propositions follow in turn." --But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, we are to call "being in accord" with that sentence (and with the meaning you then put into the sentence --whatever that may have consisted in). It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage.

189. We use the expression: "The steps are determined by the formula......". How is it used? --We may perhaps refer to the fact that people are brought by their education (training) so to use the formula $y=x^2$, that they all work out the same value for $y$ when they substitute the same number for $x$. Or we may say: "These people are so trained that they all take the same step at the same point when they receive the order 'add 3'.

198. But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretations, in accord with the rule. --That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine the meaning.

Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule? --

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule --say a signpost --got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? --Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

But that is only to give a casual connexion to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary: I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.

199. To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

199. To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)

206. Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on? The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

207. Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we watch their behaviour we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical'. But when we try to learn their language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connexion between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the
the same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall into confusion —as I feel like putting it.

Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest?

There is not enough regularity for us to call it "language".

208. Then am I defining "order" and "rule" by means of regularity"?
--How do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same" to anyone?
--I shall explain these words to someone who, say, only speaks French by means of the corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. --And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself.

In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce them, and so on. I shall for instance, get him to continue an ornamental pattern uniformly when told to do so. --And also to continue progressions. And so, for example, when given: .... to go on: ....

.......

I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.

Imagine witnessing such a teaching. None of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle.

The expressions " and so on ", " and so on ad infinitum " are also explained in this teaching. A gesture, among other things, might serve this purpose. The gesture that means "go on like this", or " and so on " has a function comparable to that of pointing to an object or a place.

We should distinguish between the "and so on" which is, and the "and so on" which is not, an abbreviated notation. "And so on ad inf." is not such an abbreviation. The fact that we cannot write down all the digits of it is not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians sometimes think.

Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different from that which 'points beyond' them.

217. How am I able to obey a rule? --If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do.

243. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.

249. Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence? --And on what experience is our assumption based? (lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one).
250. Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him to howl on particular occasions as if he were in pain, even when he is not. But the surroundings which are necessary for this behaviour to be real simulation are missing.

258. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with a sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. -- I will remark first of all that a definition of this sign cannot be formulated. -- But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. -- How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation -- and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. -- But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. -- Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. -- But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.

261. So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. -But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described.

290. What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensations by criteria; but to repeat an expression. But this is not the end of the language-game; it is the beginning.

But isn't the beginning the sensation - which I described? - Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the differences between the language-games.

300. It is -- we should like to say -- not merely the picture of the behaviour that plays a part in the language-game with the words "he is in pain", but also the picture of the pain. Or, not merely the paradigm of the behaviour, but also that of the pain. -- It is a misunderstanding to say "The picture of pain enters into the language-game with the word 'pain'". The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture. -- The image of pain certainly enters into the language-game in a sense; only not as a picture.
304. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please.

340. One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.

But it is difficult to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice.

355. The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie, but that we understand their language (And this language like any other is founded on convention).

373. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.

393. When I imagine that someone who is laughing is really in pain, I don't imagine pain behaviour, for I see just the opposite. So what do I imagine? I have already said what (I imagine that he is in pain, that's what).

403. If I give anyone an order I feel it to be quite enough to give him signs. And I should never say: this in only words, and have got to get behind the words.

409. Imagine several people standing in a ring, and me among them. One of us, sometimes this one, sometimes that, is connected to the poles of an electrical machine without our being able to see him. I observe the faces of the others and try to see which of us has just been electrified. - Then I say: "Now I know who it is; for it's myself." In this sense I could also say: "Now I know who is getting the shocks; it is myself". This would be a rather queer way of speaking.

But if I make the supposition that I can feel the shock even when someone else is electrified, then the expression "Now I know who...." becomes quite unsuitable. It does not belong to this game.

449. But mustn't I know what it would be like if I were in pain?" - We fail to get away from the idea that using a sentence involves imagining something for every word .... It is as if one were to believe that a written order for a cow ....always had to be accompanied by an image of a cow, if the order was not to lose its meaning.

466. What does man think for? What use is it? --Why does he make boilers according to calculations and not leave the thickness of their walls to chance? After all it is only a fact of experience that boilers do not explode so often if made according to these calculations.

472. The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame -- although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself.
473. The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the fear that it will burn me.

474. I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire; that is certainty. That is to say: Here we see the meaning of certainty. (What it amounts to, not just the meaning of the word "certainty").

501. The purpose of language is to express thoughts. --So presumably the purpose of every sentence is to express a thought. Then what thought is expressed, for example, by the sentence "It's raining"?

556. Imagine a language with two different words for negation, "X" and "Y". Doubling "X" yields an affirmative, doubling "Y" a strengthened negative. For the rest the two words are used alike. - Now have "X" and "Y" the same meaning in sentences where they occur without being repeated? - We could give various answers to this.

563. Let us say that the meaning of a piece is its role in the game. --Now let it be decided by lot which of the players gets white before any game of chess begins. To this end one player holds a king in each closed fist while the other chooses one of the two hands at random. Will it be counted as part of the role of the king in chess that it is used to draw lots in this way?

569. Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in metres and centimetres; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some systems of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them.

630. Examine these two language-games:
(a) Someone gives someone else the order to make particular movements with his arm, or to assume particular bodily positions (gymnastics instructor and pupil). And here is a variation of this language game: the pupil gives himself orders and then carries them out.
(b) Someone observes certain regular processes - for example, the reactions of different metals to acids - and thereupon makes predictions about the reactions that will occur in certain particular cases. There is an evident kinship between these two language-games, and also a fundamental difference. In both one might call the spoken words "predictions". But compare the training which leads to the first technique with the training for the second one.

652. He measured him with a hostile glance and said......The reader of the narrative understands this; he has no doubt in his mind. Now you say: "Very well, he supplies the meaning, he guesses it". - Generally speaking: no. Generally speaking he supplies nothing, guesses nothing.
654. Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.

655. The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game.

656. What is the purpose of telling someone that a time ago I had such-and-such a wish? -- Look on the language-game as the primary thing.

669. One can refer to an object when speaking by pointing to it. Here pointing is part of the language-game. And now it seems to us as if one spoke of a sensation by directing one's attention to it. But where is the analogy? It evidently lies in the fact that one can point to a thing by looking or listening. But in certain circumstances, even pointing to the object one is talking about may be quite inessential to the language-game to one's thought.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION

PART II.

p.174. I must tell you: I am frightened. I must tell you: it makes me shiver. And one can say this in a smiling tone of voice too. And do you mean to tell me that he doesn't feel it? How else does he know it? --But even when he says it as a piece of information he does not learn it from his sensations. For think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: the words "it makes me shiver" are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this belongs among the rest of those sensations. Now why should the wordless shudder be the ground of the verbal one?

p.180. Doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt? And doubts may be entirely lacking. Doubt? It has an end. It is like the relation: physical object - sense impressions. Here we have two different language-games and a complicated relation between them. -If you try to reduce their relations to a simple formula you go wrong.

p.183. I sing with a particular expression. This expression is not something that can be separated from the passage. It is a different concept. (A different game).

p.184. People who on waking tell us certain incidents (that they have been in such-and-such places, etc.). Then we teach them the expression "I dream", which precedes the narrative. Afterwards I sometimes ask them "did you dream anything last night?" and am answered yes or no, sometimes with an account of a dream, sometimes not. That is the language-game.

p.188. Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between games?

p.224. Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four? - Does this show the former to be mathematical certainty? -- Mathematical certainty is not a psychological concept. The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.

p.224. Let yourself be struck by the existence of such a thing as our language-game of: confessing the motive of my action. We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing-of our language makes everything alike. Something new (spontaneous, 'specific') is always a language-game.

p.225. While you have complete certainty about someone else's state of mind, still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty. -- These two words betoken a difference between language-games.
P.226. What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life.

p.230. If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? --Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the information of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history - since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize - then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.
ON CERTAINTY

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No; it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically without learning my explicit rules.

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of one from the other.

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place, now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

110. As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.

128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.

129. This is how I learned to judge: this I got to know as judgment.

130. But isn't it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not just the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.

131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor its outstanding success.

150. How does someone judge which is his right hand and which his left hand? How do I know that my judgment will agree with someone else's? How do I know that this colour is blue? If I don't trust myself here, why should I trust anyone else's judgment? Is there a why? Must I
not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging.

155. In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances). If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just share his opinion; we should regard him as demented.

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; -- but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i. e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
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