The Politics of Activism and Biculturalism:  
the emergence of bicultural consultancies in New Zealand

by

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Abstract

In what many commentators have characterised as a contradictory trajectory, a number of people involved in radical anti-state activism, which defined New Zealand from the late 1960s to the 1980s, became consultants on biculturalism for government agencies by the late 1980s. These consultants ran seminars for Pākehā public servants on the history and contemporary impact of Māori oppression under colonialism; Māori language, culture, and protocol; and the proposed future of the Crown-Māori relationship. This thesis uses genealogy and case study methodology to track the emergence of bicultural consultancies, their ideology and techniques, and their role in Māori policy reform beginning in the late 1980s. It aims to reveal the connections and disjunctions between the goals of anti-state activists active from the late 1960s to the 1980s, and the bicultural consultancies which emerged by the late 1980s.

Māori anti-racist and anti-state activists and their Pākehā allies skilfully leveraged the state by invoking the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi to call for a new partnership between Māori and the state, a partnership that by the 1980s was officially termed biculturalism. The public sector, which was identified as institutionally racist by activists, was an important focus of this activism. Activists demanded that Pākehā-dominated government departments be reformed to better reflect and serve Māori. The state’s response to these demands, beginning in earnest with the 1988 policy paper *Te Urupare Rangapu* and additionally sustained by the precepts of so-called ‘bicultural’ or ‘Treaty’ issues, created the demand for consultants to assist with reforming Māori policy making and delivery, and by extension, those public servants that would be responsible for the success of these reforms. While bicultural consultants were still working with anti-racist ideas and frameworks, the ascendancy of bicultural and Treaty discourses by the end of the 1980s somewhat obfuscated the ontologies of race and institutional racism in their work.
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Introduction

“The white way and the Maori way have always been incompatible.”
- Donna Awatere, ‘On Maori Sovereignty’, 1982

In 1982 and 1983, at the peak of a period defined by Māori anti-colonial protest, prominent Māori activist Donna Awatere published a series of articles in the feminist magazine *Broadsheet* collectively titled *Maori Sovereignty*. The publications became definitive of the radical edge of Māori activism. Since the late 1960s, Māori activists had powerfully demanded the Pākehā-dominated New Zealand state to recognise Māori grievances and commit to institutional reform. *Maori Sovereignty* went a step further by arguing institutional reform would not be possible without Māori control of New Zealand. Criticising Māori leaders for working with Pākehā governments for fundamentally piecemeal concessions, Awatere rejected any Māori attempts to pander to the state, and white people more broadly, as futile. She characterised the emerging articulations of biculturalism, broadly a governing partnership between Māori and the Crown, as the “most conservative” imagination of institutional change.

By the mid-1980s, however, Awatere had changed her perspective. She became an advisor for the Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Education, and instructed *Broadsheet* to cease publication of a book version of *Maori Sovereignty*. In 1984, she founded Ihi Management Consultants, a company which provided workshops for public servants focusing on the relevance of biculturalism and Māori issues to the work of the public sector. Ihi was hugely popular, and within a year of its inception had serviced around twenty government agencies. In just a few years, Awatere had gone from being a vocal Māori critic of biculturalism to one of its most prominent agents.

This thesis investigates the origins and emergence of bicultural consultancies such as Ihi in the late 1980s. The immediate context to this emergence was the explosion of Māori anti-state activism in the late 1960s and 1970s. A new wave of young, urban-born Māori activists utilised direct action protest strategies to demand thorough reform of the state, whose continuing legacy was Māori disproportionately represented in negative social and economic statistics. Using the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi as a frame to articulate their grievances, they

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3 Donna Awatere, ‘Maori Sovereignty part two: Alliances with Pacific Island People, White Women, the Trade Union Movement, and the Left’, *Broadsheet* 103 (October 1982).
demanded meaningful avenues for redress and compensation for the impact of colonialism. However, they also used the framework of the Treaty to argue for genuine participation in, and indeed at least partial control of, government policy making relevant to Māori. Principles of self-determination and indigenous autonomy that were thematic of indigenous rights movements around the world were invoked to argue for a shift away from Pākehā hegemony and towards a nation which allowed for tikanga Māori to have genuine political and sociocultural impact on New Zealand.

After its election in 1984, the Fourth Labour Government responded to these demands by announcing a rethink of Māori government policy. Jos Raadschelders, a scholar of public administration, has written on the tension of having a ‘national’ public service which presumes a single, unified civilian community, whereas in reality civilians live in a multiplicity of communities and associate in countless different ways. Pat Walsh similarly highlights that throughout the 1980s New Zealand public servants echoed an international push for “greater consumer responsiveness and client sensitivity on the part of public service organisations”. These broader ideas intersected with the demands of Māori activists and manifested as an increasing compatibility of priorities. Given how cognisant the overwhelmingly Pākehā public service was becoming to the ‘split’ in New Zealand society, some officials began discussion how to improve their services to Māori.

In the context of government, biculturalism was ideally conceived as an extensive decolonisation effort framed by the spirit of partnership implied in the Treaty. In this way, biculturalism was not simply redress for the marginalisation of Māori under European colonialism: it reimagined New Zealand as a state of two distinct, yet equal, cultures fundamentally joined in a governing partnership. Many envisioned a society where people could negotiate a shared cultural space encompassing public and private institutions, while simultaneously allowing space for their own cultures to flourish undisturbed.

The practicalities of bicultural policy are ultimately what created the demand for bicultural ‘experts’. As biculturalism became ascendant over the course of the 1980s, consultancies began offering seminars on biculturalism for non-Māori public servants. Veritable laboratories aimed at realising the agenda of biculturalism on an individual level within the state, seminars included an overview of Māori issues, society, and culture in order

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to better attune government staff to Māori aspirations and needs in their specific policy areas. Essentially, these workshops became a tangible distillation point for biculturalism, often managed by ‘former’ activists who saw an opportunity to continue their activist work under the guise of supporting the new policy priorities of the state’s public sector.

This study will attempt to reveal the contextual conditions and emergent demand for bicultural consultants in this period. Chapter One comprises an overview of Māori activism in the late 1960s and 1970s and explains how this activism both compelled a number of early state reforms and figured Māori activists in particular as natural experts for further reform of the state. Chapter Two outlines the Fourth Labour Government’s response to the Māori activism of the preceding decade through developing bicultural policy during their two terms from 1984 to 1990. These early state responses included a number of tentative consulting relationships with leading Māori figures and anti-racist activists, foreshadowing the rise of bicultural consultants by the end of the 1980s. In particular, the chapter will explain how early, idealistic calls for radical reforms of the state’s bureaucracy and relationship with iwi were eventually diluted to a much vaguer conception of government partnership, defined by consultation more than by institutional change. Chapter Three will focus on Ihi’s agenda and methods in particular, as well as how the company’s work fitted into the reforms of Māori policy more generally. As narrated primarily by Awhatae’s trajectory from ‘radical activist’ to Ihi’s principal architect, this chapter intends to suggest continuities and departures between the anti-state activism of the 1960s and 1970s, and bicultural discourse in the 1980s, as embodied in Ihi’s workshop material.

Source material and approach

This thesis aims to contribute to the extant historiography on modern Māori anti-colonial activism and state responses to the politics of that activism in the second half of the twentieth century. A recent ethnography by anthropologist Tanja Schubert-McArthur, that detailed the impacts of bicultural relationships in the conception of Te Papa Tongarewa, comprises the only discrete study of a kind of bicultural consultant-state institution relationship to date. More broadly, a considerable New Zealand historiography focusing on the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly the work of Ranginui Walker, Aroha Harris, Richard Hill, and more recently Miranda Johnson, have highlighted the way Māori protest impacted the state

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and its policy making towards Māori peoples, revealing dynamics central to this study. The emergence of bicultural consultancies clearly fits into these narratives of activism and state reform, but in spite of this these companies have not been the focus of any extant academic literature.

Further, in these and other histories, biculturalism is featured as a backdrop to studies of activism, Crown-Māori relations, and particularly the origins of the Waitangi Tribunal settlement process, rather than as the main focus of research. Indeed, as Lorenzo Veracini argues, revisionist historiography in the 1980s was itself an important facet of bicultural politics, whereby academics wrote new, ‘bicultural’ histories of New Zealand in an attempt to dilute and ideally replace older histories and reveal the previously stifled narratives of Māoridom in New Zealand. Jacob Pollock has more recently argued that two of the most significant histories of New Zealand released in the past two or so decades, authored by Michael King and James Belich, sustain a bicultural view of history and of New Zealand rather than critiquing or analysing biculturalism itself. Biculturalism has been the focus of study by political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, the literature of which is utilised periodically throughout this study. However, biculturalism has not yet been discretely tackled by those using historical method. Drawing on extant interdisciplinary secondary literature, this suggestive study further aims to contribute to the scant historiography on biculturalism itself.

There are four main types of primary materials used in this thesis, comprising the writings and papers of activists and other historical actors; the reports and curriculum of consultancies; government papers and ephemera relating to Māori policy reform; and interviews. The examples of Ihi’s work used in this thesis, including pitching documents, reports, and the curriculum used in seminars, are partly scattered throughout a number of public

library catalogues. The complete series of Ihi’s curriculum that is analysed in Chapter Three was archived by Treasury in the late 1980s and are held in the Wellington office of Archives New Zealand. Further primary source material on Māori policy reform, largely comprising public sector correspondence and internal reports, are drawn from Archives New Zealand records. Additionally, this thesis utilises the Alexander Turnbull Library’s collection of curriculum documents, reports, and correspondence from 1979 to 1990 relating to the National Council of Churches’ (later the Conference of Churches in Aotearoa New Zealand) own anti-racism consulting efforts, the Programme on Racism. The materials relating to the work of the Programme on Racism and Ihi Management Consultants have not been the focus of study before.

To provide broader context, research also involved interviews with figures at the heart of the narrative and themes covered by this study. Legal scholar Moana Jackson and Treaty educator Robert Consedine were both interviewed specifically for this thesis, providing insight on the sociocultural and political shifts of the time, and their specific experience of the difficulties of Crown-Māori relations in retrospect. An interview with Donna Awatere Huata conducted by Master of Arts student Laura Kamau and Māori studies scholar Te Maire Tau in 2007 provides some important context for her personal motivations as an activist and as Ihi’s principal architect.14 Additional context for personal motivations and the work of Ihi is sourced from Awatere Huata’s 1995 autobiography My Journey.

These sources require a critical appreciation of the impact of memory on personal oral history interviewing and autobiographical narratives. This is perhaps best illustrated by the concept of composure, or the way remembering and oral retelling for an audience creates subjectivities in the rendering of interviewees’ ‘life-stories’. Subjectivities constructed through a subject’s instinct to relate a coherent narrative, the process of making oneself the protagonist in that narrative, and potential misremembering are issues relevant to the sources which rely on personal retelling, namely interviews and autobiography.15 Further, the dynamics of interviews themselves create subjectivities, influenced as they are by the setting and the

14 Because Ihi’s work was periphery to Kamau and Tau’s interview, interviews were further sought with Donna Awatere Huata and her business partner Maria Mareroa to reveal elements of Ihi’s methodology and workshop style that were not evident purely from the written course material. However, Awatere Huata was not successfully contacted, and Mareroa was unwilling to be interviewed. Interviews were also sought with Sir Tipene O’Regan, who headed Aoraki Consultants, and Kiri Potaka Dewes, who co-headed Haparangi Consultants. However, O’Regan was unable to be interviewed, and Potaka Dewes was not successfully contacted.

differences in race, gender, class, and age of all participants. These sources remain essential to this study, usefully illuminating personal ideological threads that can be read against and onto the narrative revealed by the other sources relied on by this work.

In terms of methodology, this study tentatively draws on French philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy to track the emergence of bicultural consultancies from New Zealand’s activist and bicultural discourses. Foucault conceives of history not as defined by singular ideas or forces (in the way that Marxist theory conceives of a dominant ideology) but as the relative and relational interplay of subjects, all of which influence and define the discourses of a historical period:

> The genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin...he must be able to recognize the events of history, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats - the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities.\(^{17}\)

While biculturalism can certainly be considered a prominent idea in this period, it remained so diversely defined that it arguably never became ideology. Instead, biculturalism, and the consultants and other actors who attempted to wield it, created concurrent discourses through mingling with various politics of activism, neoliberalism, and other emergent ideas. Biculturalism is necessarily and contradictorily defined as both comprising self-contained, binary culturalisms and nationalisms, and as spaces and subjects within which culturalisms and nationalisms might overlap and coexist. As Homi Bhabha identifies in a similar vein to Foucault’s idea of genealogy, the heterogeneities and concurrent politics of the themes and ideas discussed in this thesis, which focuses on a time of rapid and substantial change, suggest that this period is defined by ideas and processes that are “neither the One...nor the Other...but something else besides.”\(^{18}\) A genealogical approach to the factors intrinsic to the emergence of bicultural consultants, though certainly only partial given the scope of a Master’s thesis, is a useful departure point in embracing the inherent complexity of this chapter of New Zealand’s history.

The politics of ‘radical’ activism

While modern Māori activism was prompted by local experiences of oppression, the arguments and ideas advanced by international rights movements significantly influenced the

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articulation of these local experiences. Key to the new wave of Māori activism from the late 1960s was the concept of institutional racism, first coined by African-American activists Stokely Carmichael (later Kwame Ture) and Charles V. Hamilton in their 1967 book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation*. Differentiating from overt racist acts committed by individuals, Carmichael and Hamilton defined institutional racism as a covert, pervasive system of “anti-black attitudes and practices” which placed whites in a position of power over oppressed blacks. A compounding of the legacies of exclusionary rules and practices of public and private institutions, and the normalisation of racist attitudes and behaviours, had resulted in an implicit, pervasive bias in society towards minorities. While many white individuals may not express or practice overt racism, Ture and Hamilton argued that institutional racism is sustained “deliberately by the power structure and through indifference, inertia and lack of courage on the part of white masses as well as petty officials.”

Thus, racism was not a problem of the oppressed; instead, it was a problem of whites, the subjects of racism. This logic resonated deeply with Māori, who were struggling against assimilationist (and later integrationist) policies pursued by the New Zealand state. Donna Awatere herself invoked one of the earliest explicit usages of institutional racism as an analytical framework for New Zealand’s race relations in a 1972 article, and it was similarly key to her later discussions in *Maori Sovereignty*. The interpretation that racism was a ‘Pākehā problem’ became the rallying cry of Māori activists in their attempted refiguring of Māoridom’s relationship with the state.

The way in which institutional racism as an analytical framework was utilised by activists and then by bicultural consultants is central to this study, especially with regards to Awatere’s trajectory. Both the authors of *Black Power*, and Awatere in *Maori Sovereignty*, discounted working with or within the state as a useful or valid strategy to undoing institutional racism. While the nature of bicultural consultancies like Ihi contradicted this assertion, they

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still fundamentally attempted to erase institutional racism and effect many of the same goals as activists involved in direct action.

Thus, discussion of continuities and departures in the context of activism, particularly Awatere’s activism, highlights some difficult issues. The term ‘activist’ is utilised in this thesis somewhat reluctantly, mainly as a way of conveniently differentiating Awatere’s work with Ngā Tamatoa and the Black Feminism movement from her work with the public sector. It is not meant to pre-emptively assume what defines her trajectory - that she ceased to engage in activism when she became a consultant, or that Ihi Management Consultants was not in itself a form of activism.

It is important, however, that this is a distinction forwarded by many, both at the time and since. Legal scholar Jane Kelsey remarked in the late 1980s, in a thinly veiled critique of Awatere, that the government’s insubstantial reforms had “[co-opted] many formerly radical critics”. In 1983, Ranginui Walker of Ngā Tamatoa characterised Awatere and her ideas in *Maori Sovereignty* as the definitive representation of a new, radical interpretation of mana motuhake; however, in his history of the period first published in 1990, Walker described Awatere as relatively conservative compared to other members of Ngā Tamatoa. In her autobiography *My Journey*, Awatere herself makes the distinction between her work as an activist and her work with government, remarking “up until now I had been the radical; suddenly I am a senior negotiator for the government.”

This perception of Awatere’s trajectory, that she ‘de-radicalised’, has become even furtheraccentuated since she founded Ihi in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, she became associated with Roger Douglas’ far-right ACT Party and in 1996 became one of its Members of Parliament. This association engendered fierce scepticism of her identification “as both a feminist and a Maori nationalist.” Tūhoe activist Tame Iti commented in a 1998 biographic documentary on Awatere that he and others in the sovereignty movement thought that Awatere had “sold out”. Sue Bradford, a Green Party politician and activist, declared that Awatere’s alignment with ACT was a forceful “betrayal” of the activist movement in a confrontation that

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led to Bradford being struck by Awatere’s husband, Wi Huata. What many saw as Awatere’s meteoric “fall from grace” was completed in the early 2000s, when she was jailed for defrauding more than $80,000 from a school she ran in South Auckland.

Encouraged by public discourse suggesting that Māori were too strident and were unfairly favoured by state policy, the scandal prompted many of her critics to revive the descriptor ‘radical activist’ and its connotations to disparage her. This kind of commentary had, of course, followed her since her days in Ngā Tamatoa, but revelations that she had funded stomach stapling surgery with the money invited gendered insults in the media which referenced her past as an ‘outspoken Māori’. The politics of Awatere and other activists’ identity formation, then, were important not just to the distinctiveness and radicality of their activism, but also tied them to the expectations of their peers and their detractors. This echoes what American postcolonial theorist Henry Louis Gates Jr. has described as “that homely notion that you represent your race, thus that your actions can betray or honor it.”

It is fair to characterise Awatere’s protest activities in the 1970s and early 1980s as radical. Radicalism in an activist context implies desire for not just the thoroughness but also speed of reform. Further, it implies a need to historicise radicalism, in addition to comparing radical views to the ‘mainstream’, in order to define a set of beliefs or an ideology as such. Awatere’s urgent calls for Māori nationhood and Māori control over New Zealand in Maori Sovereignty differentiated her political views even from some of her activist contemporaries. Though other 1970s activists argued for reform within the confines of the existing state, they too were labelled radical, both contemporaneously by the political establishment and by the

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33 For more on the complexity of the construction of Māori women’s identities and their interactions with other identities and discourses, see Carla Anne Houkamau, ‘Identity construction and reconstruction: the role of socio-historical contexts in shaping Māori women’s identity’, *Social Identities* 16, no. 2 (2010), pp. 179-196.
bulk of the Pākehā public, and since then by scholars of Māori activism.\(^{36}\) The fact that Māori activists were employing direct action protest strategies, as was being practiced by rights movements in the United States and elsewhere, is also seen as a significant shift in the nature of Māori activism becoming more radical in the 1970s and 1980s.\(^{37}\)

Regardless of the breadth of views held by the Māori protest movement, their actions were ultimately defined by the fact that they were overtly political and were broadly attempts to change the status quo. Indeed, Māori legal scholar Moana Jackson, who has himself been labelled an “ultra-radical activist”, is sceptical of even the label activist, as it potentially excludes those who do not meet the vague ‘criteria’ of activism but nevertheless practice divergent politics or attempt to protest the status quo with different means.\(^{38}\) Former Ngā Tamatoa members Taura Eruera, Hilda Halkyard, and Hone Harawira have pointed out that they and many of their activist peers became consultants of some description in the 1980s, or ceased direct action protest in order to engage in local work with their and other Māori communities.\(^{39}\) Awatere’s trajectory, then, was certainly not unique.

Thus, definitions of what constitutes radicalism are arguably unfixed, and indeed, in the context of 1980s New Zealand, remain difficult to orientate. A spectrum with a mainstream, ‘reasonable’ centre was obfuscated as the state both began to respond to Māori demands, and more broadly, engaged in radical neoliberal economic reform. Many similarly saw the government’s embrace of biculturalism as a mainstreaming of Māori activism and politics. Thus, New Zealand’s political landscape was increasingly populated by a number of free radical actors, interacting with one another in unsettled spaces. In this context, the coalescing of activists-‘turned’-bicultural consultants with an increasingly unrecognisable and reforming state is perhaps not so surprising if seen as a reflection of a tentative mainstreaming of radical politics. The heterogeneity, complexity, and volatility of politics in this period created a uniquely ‘fertile ground’ for a potentially unprecedented transformation of the Māori-Crown and Māori-Pākehā relationship.\(^{40}\)

\(^{37}\) Harris, p. 48.
\(^{40}\) Bhabha, pp. 27-28.
Neoliberalism and biculturalism

The neoliberal economic revolution in New Zealand was internationally unparalleled in its swiftness and efficacy. While anti-racist activism and growing cognisance of New Zealand’s Māori dimension certainly had an impact on the change in government in 1984, for most non-Māori the state of the economy under conservative Prime Minister Robert Muldoon dominated election year. Between 1984 and 1993 sweeping deregulation and economic reform transformed New Zealand from one of the most “state dominated” capitalist nations in the world into a truly open, free-market economy.\(^{41}\) Given how embedded neoliberalism has become in the fabric of New Zealand society, politics, and economy, it has had an inextricable effect on the parallel struggle of indigenous activists and their allies. However, assessing the multiplicitous impact of the neoliberal revolution on Māori is complex, with varying overlaps and incompatibilities with indigenous political, social, and economic agendas. Neoliberalism can allow space for what Fiona McCormack has carefully described as “locally appropriate versions of modernity”; equally, it can manifest as a vehicle for the continued colonisation and oppression of marginal groups. As is arguably the case in New Zealand and particularly within the scope of this thesis, these two processes can coexist.\(^{42}\)

Broadly, neoliberalism is a heavily free market-centric form of capitalism characterised by the miniaturisation and decentralisation of the state and its functions, in favour of a society and economy regulated by market forces.\(^{43}\) Its mass proliferation is linked to globalisation, with proponents proclaiming the robustness of the global marketplace and its potential economic gains as justification for implementing neoliberal policies.\(^{44}\) This market liberalisation purportedly empowers individual citizens and corporations, with less regulation allowing more opportunities to accumulate wealth and more freedom of choice for non-state actors.

In principle, then, the promise of a neutered state making space for the priorities of individual citizens perhaps explains why early neoliberal agents came from across the political spectrum. The focus on individualism and deregulating the market to encourage enterprise fit the rubric of conservative governments in the United States and United Kingdom. Calls from civil rights movements condemning the historic and ongoing role of the state in their oppression

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saw neoliberal ideas taken up by social democratic governments in Australia and New Zealand. Wielded by supporters on the left and right, neoliberalism was allegedly undoing the state’s intrusive influence on individuals’ social, political, and financial decisions.

Neoliberalism theoretically offered a chance for power to be shifted away from the state to citizenry, including those in the margins. A number of Māori saw the decentralising imperative of neoliberalism as an opportunity for securing purposeful recognition of rangatiratanga. The principles behind the Department of Maori Affairs’ popular Tu Tangata policy, begun in the late 1970s, had already foreshadowed devolution as a framework for reform. Kōhanga Reo and other Māori immersion education institutions that were conceived and successfully developed by Māori were partly assisted by the decentralisation of state functions. Given the Pākehā-dominated state apparatus was seen to have failed in their accommodation of Māori welfare needs, a social program delivered by Māori organisations themselves under the auspices of Tu Tangata was an attractive prospect. By the time the Fourth Labour Government came to power, the precedent of Tu Tangata and the success of Māori educational institutions led to a cautious endorsement of devolutionary principles for Māori policy at the 1984 Hui Taumata. Te Urupare Rangapu, the subsequent devolutionary policy devised by Minister for Maori Affairs Koro Wētere and his department in 1988, was intended to realise the call for ‘policies for Māori, delivered by Māori’. The shifting of responsibility away from the state and to Māori themselves, then, reflected and was arguably partly facilitated by the neoliberal zeitgeist.

However, scholars have questioned how - or whether - power is reshaped and redirected under neoliberalism. Foucault, for example, has described the modern state as an ideal vehicle for “pastoral power” over individuals. Rather than seeing power as something exercised by an authority ‘onto’ society, Foucault suggests that power is fundamentally discursive, defined by its expression as a relationship between its subjects:

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\text{Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted “above” society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of.}
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In this way, he argues, power requires its subjects to have a degree of freedom in order to exercise influence. A true exercising of power is not total but instead defined as “a way certain

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45 McCormack, p. 421.
actions may structure the field of other possible actions.”\textsuperscript{50} In the context of a neoliberal state, then, ‘control’ is arguably more present as individuals are allegedly afforded the freedom to act for their own interests, even though ultimately their choices are restricted by the priorities of the market as a social regulator. Neoliberalism as a paradigm allows persons to participate or be integrated into society, subject to their ‘personhood’ being reshaped to fit neoliberal discourses.\textsuperscript{51}

This process has been articulated by local scholars, who argue the neoliberal framing of power relations has acute implications for Māori and their tikanga. Particularly highlighted is the clear genealogy between the resource extraction priorities of imperialism and the market imperative of neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{52} However, neoliberalism poses a fundamentally more insidious reframing of colonial power relationships. Indigenous studies scholar Maria Bargh echoes Foucault’s ruminations on the so-called ‘freedom’ afforded by neoliberalism and highlights its role in a modern ‘postcolonial’ settler state:

> treating the former ‘savage people’ as supposed equals has meant that the neoliberals have diversified the tactics used for training and civilising indigenous peoples…[demonstrating] a translation of many older colonial beliefs, once expressed explicitly, now expressed implicitly, into language and practices which are far more covert about their civilising mission.\textsuperscript{53}

More specifically, Bargh points to fundamental incompatibilities between neoliberal principles and tikanga Māori, such as attitudes towards resources as “diverse and holistic” rather than purely “market based.”\textsuperscript{54} Scholars contemporaneously and since argue that devolutionary Māori policy was designed to make welfare more financially efficient, rather than a genuine attempt to acknowledge rangatiratanga.\textsuperscript{55} While the Fourth Labour Government perhaps genuinely wanted to avoid paternalism, the neoliberal model for Māori policy design and implementation in many ways narrated a broader Pākehā scepticism of whether Māori were capable of taking charge of their own affairs.\textsuperscript{56}

There is a danger, as Bargh argues, that in the face of these analyses of neoliberalism one might assume that it is everywhere, inevitable, and wholly encompassing. Perhaps most

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p. 791.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p. 783.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p. 15.


notably, Elizabeth Rata argues that iwi as an organising structure did not exist before global capitalism and is instead a twentieth century invention in response to calls for Māori to corporatise and mirror Pākehā organisations.\textsuperscript{57} Rata fundamentally ignores long-standing and established histories of Māori, in addition to presuming the unquestioning ubiquity of neoliberalism. Its ubiquity is also implicitly presumed in other, if more measured, studies of New Zealand neoliberalism utilised in this study.\textsuperscript{58} The inherent complexities of the relationship between Māori and neoliberal governments explored above are central to the emergence of bicultural consultants.

\textit{The politics of culture and the origins of biculturalism}

A number of New Zealand scholars have dubbed the scope covered by this thesis (broadly, 1960s through to 1990) as the genesis of an emerging postcolonial New Zealand. This is broadly attributed to New Zealand’s more local, Pacific foreign policy focus, the domestic policy overhauls begun in the 1980s, and the politics of Māori activism.\textsuperscript{59} The emergence of biculturalism discourse, particularly, is seen as an important signal for the tentative remaking of New Zealand. Notwithstanding the significant shifts during this period, according New Zealand the status of ‘postcolonial’ is contentious to say the least. In part, this difficulty centres on the fact that increased contact between Pākehā and Māori seems both the definition of this new phase in New Zealand’s apparent bicultural national evolution and also a site of cultural struggle and survival for Māoridom. As reflected by Māori activism’s deployment of institutional racism analyses in this period, Māoridom was still contending with the pervasiveness of overt and covert colonial influences.

In an echo of McCormack’s exploration of locally appropriate modernities, then, the politics of culture at play in interactions between Māoridom and Pākehā hegemony is intrinsic to the discussions in this history. Commentators and academics continue to debate the effects of acculturation, contending with “the contradictions inherent in postcolonial identities” from conceiving of the ‘over-essentialisation’ of culture on the one hand, and the capacity for culture to change over time on the other.\textsuperscript{60} As foreshadowed earlier in this

\textsuperscript{57} Elizabeth Rata, \textit{A political economy of neotribal capitalism} (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999).
\textsuperscript{58} For example, see McCormack (previously cited), and also Katherine Smits, ‘The Neoliberal State and the Uses of Indigenous Culture’, \textit{Nationalism and Ethnic Politics} 20, no. 1 (2014), pp. 43-62.
introduction, biculturalism discourse further complicates these discussions through both implying binary distinctions between subjects and denoting cultural ‘compositions’ within subjects.61

Discussion surrounding the Kaupapa Māori research methodology, for example, is one site where differing conceptions of culture are often teased out. Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s and Michael Stevens’ divergent opinions on research methodologies are partly due to their disparate conceptions of culture. Both authors frame their works with statements of their whakapapa and their strong connections to their respective iwi.62 They also acknowledge the pervasiveness of Western cultural hegemony in both academia and Māori society and the difficulties posed by this intrusion. However, Smith’s endorsement of Kaupapa Māori is arguably linked to her more essentialist characterisation of Māori culture, while Stevens’ historicist conception of culture leads him to favour a broader, ‘composite’ methodology.

Throughout her seminal book on Kaupapa Māori, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, Smith invokes a language of boundaries which places the pursuit of archetypal indigenous methodologies in opposition to the colonised space of Western disciplines. She conceives of herself and other indigenous researchers as writing “from the borders of the vast and expanding territory that is the margin”, a territory that creates self-contained, extra-colonial spaces “outside the gated and fortified community” of Western methodology.63

For Smith, this definitively indigenous academic space is drawn from an idealised extra-colonial cultural space, too. Smith formulates her argument for distinctly indigenous research methodologies around essentialist principles of continuous, “uninterrupted” indigenous cultures that “appeal to an idealised past where there is no colonizer”.64 She is thus sceptical of any dilution of Māori culture. Indigenous youth developing a “[taste] for American culture” and “American sports and rap stars” disqualifies their awareness of true autonomy for indigenous individuals in the global “cultural marketplace.”65 Revitalisation and revival, terms that explicitly invoke a ‘return’ to a pure, untainted cultural state, are used throughout the book to describe cultural processes favoured by Smith. The revitalisation of te reo Māori - fittingly,
a space that necessarily excludes most non-Māori or is unintelligible to them - is highlighted as an example of a favourable cultural process.\(^\text{66}\)

Conversely, Stevens argues that what Smith negatively characterises as cultural dilution is a natural trait of culture and does not necessarily erode tradition. Given the comingling of Māori and non-Māori cultures predates European contact, Stevens suggests a more “regionally calibrated” analysis of Māori culture.\(^\text{67}\) He agrees with Smith that Western methodologies are inadequate tools when utilised in isolation. However, he charges that Kaupapa Māori, in so actively privileging an inherently fixed Māori or “marae-focused” approach, is equally inadequate for both interpreting Māori history and the analysis of modern manifestations of Māori culture.\(^\text{68}\) He further argues Kaupapa Māori homogenises the cultural practices of iwi up and down the country, implying historical interactions and exchanges between iwi are not dissimilar to the modern cultural overlap and mutual exchange Māoridom has with Pākehā and other non-Māori.\(^\text{69}\) Thus, Stevens argues, culture cannot be essentialised because it is a historicised process, inherently defined by a “coexistence of change and continuity”.\(^\text{70}\)

Stevens acknowledges that, in embracing the constantly changing nature of culture, one “can lose sight of substantial changes in belief” and lose cultural knowledge.\(^\text{71}\) Yet, the dilution of culture Smith is sceptical of does not, in Stevens’ view, necessarily replace or erode Māori culture: instead, he contends cultural knowledge “need not be exclusively Māori in origin” for it to be innately Māori.\(^\text{72}\) Using the practice of muttonbirding from his own iwi as an example, Stevens intimates that the understanding and practice of this cultural act has changed drastically since European contact, incorporating modern technologies, for instance, and the cultivation of non-native vegetables.\(^\text{73}\)

Ultimately, both scholars are engaging in a discussion around tikanga Māori and how it interacts with Pākehā hegemony. Smith is distrustful of any Māori appropriation of Western culture. She argues the existence of ‘modern’ Māori culture, where rugby is discussed just as frequently as iwi politics and tribal leaders engage in business with multinational companies, is ultimately a confused contradiction of cultural binaries, simply a new form of imperialism masquerading as “progress”.\(^\text{74}\) Stevens argues traditions remain inherently Māori because there

\(^{66}\) Ibid, p. 148-149.  
\(^{67}\) Stevens, p. 58.  
\(^{68}\) Ibid, p. 56.  
\(^{69}\) Ibid, pp. 59, 61.  
\(^{70}\) Ibid, p. 65.  
\(^{71}\) Ibid, p. 64.  
\(^{72}\) Ibid.  
\(^{73}\) Ibid, pp. 63-64.  
\(^{74}\) Smith, pp. 148-149.
is a fundamental continuity of the Māori epistemology which conceived them.\textsuperscript{75} While these authors differ in their conception of culture, the stakes and complexities of tikanga Māori’s contact with Pākehā hegemony is strongly thematic of both texts.

These issues can be readily read back onto the origins of bicultural ideas, rooted in Ngāti Porou politician Sir Āpirana Ngata’s “post-assimilationist” conception of Māoritanga.\textsuperscript{76} Māoritanga broadly denotes the breadth of Māori customs and culture, with a particular emphasis on “expressive” features of traditional culture, such as traditional art, waiata, ceremonial acts at social gatherings, and speaking te reo Māori.\textsuperscript{77} Jeffrey Sissons argues that “Ngata envisaged that Māori would increasingly participate in Pākehā economy as individuals, yet retain, in their social lives, their tribal links and loyalties.”\textsuperscript{78} Māoritanga, then, was a form of what postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has termed “strategic essentialism”: Māoritanga would form the basis of idealised interactions between Pākehā and Māori, with each retaining their distinctiveness.\textsuperscript{79} By defining Māori identity as primordial, Māori could engage with and benefit from ‘modernity’ while remaining ethnically distinct from Pākehā.

Initially, Ngata’s Māoritanga was practiced largely isolated from Pākehā society, remaining focused on autonomous Māori development from their base in rural areas. Ngata’s ideas would be thoroughly put to the test by a massive urban migration catalysed by the Second World War. Māori - who had also been exponentially growing in number throughout the first half of the twentieth century - left for the cities seeking employment in the industrial sector, which was growing as a result of the war effort.\textsuperscript{80} In the 1930s, around 10 percent of Māori lived in urban centres; by 1971, the figure was 70 per cent.\textsuperscript{81}

While Ngata’s conception of Māoritanga was never intended for the cities, it assisted with cultural survival as Māori became an urban population. Recent scholarship has suggested that increased participation in the economy and more direct contact with Pākehā did not significantly undermine the primacy of iwi and traditional culture that had been strengthened by Ngata. Māori culture clubs sustained Māori traditions, and the marae and a kinship system based on traditional whānau and hapū social groupings were all successfully transplanted to

\textsuperscript{75} Stevens, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{76} Sissons, ‘The post-assimilationist thought of Apirana Ngata’, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{78} Sissons, ‘The post-assimilationist thought of Apirana Ngata’, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{79} Ashcroft, Bill; Griffiths, Gareth and Helen Tiffin, \textit{Post-colonial Studies: The Key Concepts} 2nd. ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 64-65; Sissons, pp. 52, 54; van Meijl, p. 334.
\textsuperscript{81} Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou}, p. 197; Sissons, p. 58.
urban environments with little modification. Historian Melissa Williams has characterised Māori urbanisation as a process of adaptation, which kept connections to Māoritanga, whakapapa, and land fundamentally intact. Notwithstanding these successes, individual Māori still found these urban environments difficult and contradictory. Irihapeti Ramsden, the architect of the notable sensitivity/cultural education framework ‘cultural safety’ and one of the first urban-born members of the Ngāti Pōneke Young Māori Club in Wellington, notes:

Growing up in 1940s Wellington among the Diplomatic Corps, government circles, lunching at government house, as well as frequently travelling to my old family in Ngāi Tahu, had a bell-jar feel to it. Life was and still is, a constant series of borders and frontier crossings.

Thus, Māoritanga’s actual ‘deployment’ by urban Māori as a strategic method of resisting assimilation in the post-war period is perhaps a messy combination of the conceptualisations of culture explored by modern scholars such as Stevens and Smith. While Māoridom’s engagement with Pākehā hegemony markedly increased after urban migration, creating extra-colonial cultural spaces was still possible. As Ranginui Walker says of New Zealand’s new post-war urban society, capitalism, the prevalence of Christianity, and a love of rugby comprised a shared cultural space, yet:

…outside these transactions, Maori and Pakeha lived discrete lives. Ethnicity, cultural difference and the experience of being colonised impelled the Maori to dwell in the dual world of biculturalism, or surrender to the Pakeha imperative of assimilation.

However porous the borders of this Māori dimension are, and the nature and scope of the dimension’s transactional space with Pākehā New Zealand, the “inner, spiritual” aspect of its sovereign domain figures Māori identity as fundamentally immune to colonial interference.

Māoritanga was an important tool for the maintenance and strengthening of Māori society and culture as Māori found themselves closer to the influence of the metropole, and under renewed threats of assimilation policies. The 1961 Hunn Report, commissioned by the Second Labour Government to assess the impact of Māori urbanisation and population growth,

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suggested a slew of assimilationist measures. Ignoring extant institutional racism, the Hunn Report instead argued for “a kind of equality…that presumed the eradication of differences and downplayed the importance of tribal and collective identity.” The persistence of land grabs signalled by the 1967 Māori Affairs Amendment Act and the dismantling of the relatively autonomous Māori Schools system stoked growing Māori discontent. Māori organisations opposed the Act by demanding direct consultation, criticising the fact that this law was to be “rammed down their throats” despite their protestations, as many others had been. By the end of the 1960s “the political fuse for an explosion of Māori radicalism had been laid.”

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Chapter One
Projecting Aotearoa outward: activism, the Treaty, and the politics of Māori culture and sovereignty

Introduction

Subaltern studies scholar Partha Chatterjee has argued that resistors of colonialism begin by creating their own sovereign nationalism within colonial states before using these nationalisms against the state itself.\(^1\) Accordingly, the postcolonial reframing of the New Zealand nation through biculturalism originates from the assertion of Māori culture and activist politics throughout the twentieth century. Māoridom’s sociocultural distinctiveness was politicised in the New Zealand public sphere to effect the forced insertion of a Māori dimension, Aotearoa, into the politico-cultural space of New Zealand in the 1970s.\(^2\)

Using the Treaty of Waitangi as a lens for articulating their grievances, Māori activists leveraged the ascendancy of Māori culture and politics, simultaneously upsetting white New Zealand’s conception of national identity and providing a solution: a genuine recognition of and partnership with Māori. The politics of Aotearoa’s emergence - characterised by this period of protest, anti-racist activism, and cultural revitalisation - shifted the obligation to become bicultural to Pākehā, the perpetrators of racism. The projection of Māori culture ‘at’ white New Zealand encouraged many Pākehā to take stock of their own identities and their role in the construction of the colonial state. As opposed to expecting Māori to further adapt to a hostile society, Pākehā, the group fundamentally in control of New Zealand’s status quo, were now expected to be empathetic to Māori concerns and implement institutional change on a national scale. Thus, activism figured Māori - and particularly those Māori who had explicitly articulated this political project - as practically essential to the so-called redemption of the settler state. This new, perceptibly necessary relationship articulated by activists became the basis for Māoridom’s relationship with the state, and created fertile ground for the emergence of bicultural consultants.

Rangatiratanga and reframing the Treaty: Māori activism and the emergence of biculturalism

The Treaty of Waitangi, first signed on the 6\(^{th}\) of February 1840 between representatives of the British Crown and a number of Māori rangatira, had long been a significant point of

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contention for Māori. Contention centred around the terms of the Treaty, and particularly the apparent differences between the English and Māori translations of the Treaty with regards to sovereignty. In the English translation, the three clauses of the Treaty broadly secured sovereignty of New Zealand for the British, guaranteed Britain control of all land transactions (“both its purchase from Maori and its sale to settlers”), and afforded Māori “the ‘protection’ and ‘all the rights and privileges of British subjects’”. Additionally, it enshrined Māori possession of their land and resources “for as long as they wished to retain them”.

The Māori translation, however, did not reflect the spirit or content of the Crown’s version. To communicate the cession of Māori ‘sovereignty’, translators used ‘kāwanatanga’, a transliteration of ‘governorship’ which did “not communicate the many facets of sovereign power and authority.” Further, the Māori version promised ‘rangatiratanga’ over Māori lands, forests, fisheries, and other important taonga, which much more closely suggested a retention of tribal or chiefly sovereignty of respective iwi territories and resources. Calls to honour the Treaty throughout history, then, revolved around what the retention, or recognition, of rangatiratanga definitively would have looked like, and particularly what it could still look like if it were justly restored.

Anthony Patete argues that assertions of rangatiratanga since the early colonial period likely revolved around a form of “separate authority...one akin to partnership or shared power.” Thus, assertions of rangatiratanga by Māori activists importantly interacted with articulations of biculturalism in the 1980s. Noting its varying uses by Māori activists, however, Patete elucidates that rangatiratanga was a somewhat contextual concept: while arguably not directly synonymous with ‘sovereignty’, rangatiratanga also mapped on to the right to self-determination, or further, simply a political expression of Māori identity and mana. In these ways, while rangatiratanga was sometimes associated with the call for sovereignty, many Māori suggested that at its core rangatiratanga did not necessarily conflict with the extant state structures in New Zealand. Instead, the right to its ‘retention’ in the Treaty was defined by some as the Māori right “to be accountable to no one but Maori”, or to be free to exercise their mana - and in this way, rangatiratanga had never, and could not, be ‘ceded’ in the first place.

6 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
7 Ibid, p. 17. See also, for example, Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-Determination (Auckland: Oxford UP, 1998).
8 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
Despite its varying deployment by Māori, there remained a firm consensus that rangatiratanga was not being honoured as promised in the Treaty. Thus, assertions of rangatiratanga became intrinsic to Māori activism in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Treaty’s growing primacy in the second half of the twentieth century stemmed from invocations of the Treaty both by the state itself and in modern Māori activism and protest. From the late 1960s onwards, a new generation of young, urban-born Māori activists pursued new resistance strategies defined by the convergence of anti-racist discourse and a growing revision of the Treaty in national consciousness. Part and parcel with the assimilationist rhetoric of the 1961 Hunn Report and the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act, government officials attempted a new national project by declaring an annual celebration of the signing of the Treaty. The Treaty of Waitangi Day appropriated the Treaty as a signifier of racial cohesion, and necessarily ignored more than a century of Māori dispossession and systemic contemporary racial oppression. The 1960s had seen Pākehā largely dismiss Māori grievances and continue their attempts to assimilate the indigenous population. The inauthenticity of their new attempt at fabricating a nation through Waitangi Day was keenly felt by Māori, who reacted against their rendering in “national memory” as “symbolic co-founders”.

Thus, while certainly not the sole emphases of Māori protest, activists recognised that the government’s linking of Waitangi Day and the Treaty to national genesis made these touchstones powerful discursive sites for Māori anti-state protest and rights activism. Activists charged that the Pākehā majority and, importantly, the New Zealand state mechanisms which favoured them, had obligations to respect and recognise the rights of Māori as a sovereign people. Discussions of the Treaty confirmed what the existence of government-recognised Māori representative groups and so-called Waitangi Day suggested: that the colonial state recognised not just Māoridom’s cultural difference, but their legitimate “political distinctiveness”. Further, the fact that the Treaty had recognised Māori authority at the time of its signing meant that that authority was justifiably ongoing.

This line of argument, effectively provided to them by the hypocrisy of the colonial system itself, was used as a vehicle for a bold new anti-colonial activism which gestured at an agenda that moved beyond merely redressing past wrongs committed by the state. Two

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12 Johnson, *The Land is Our History*, p. 111.
newsletters released in 1968, generally considered the geneses of modern Māori activism, alluded to a link between expressions of Māori sovereignty and the Treaty. *Te Hokioi* was named for the newspaper of the Kingitanga movement, a pan-tribal organisation formed in the 1850s to elect a Māori monarch as an equal to the Crown’s own monarch.\(^\text{13}\) The second, *MOOHR (Maori Organisation on Human Rights)*, argued for minority rights on the strength of provisions inherent in the Treaty’s text.\(^\text{14}\) Koro Dewes, a young Māori student, published a piece in *Comment* on Waitangi Day 1968 charging that the Treaty was a fraud. He observed that “consultation with the Māori chiefs was to pacify both them and the humanitarian elements in English and in New Zealand”, and demanded the recognition of the “bi-racial” reality of New Zealand history and Crown treatment of Māori since colonisation.\(^\text{15}\)

These publications “[foretold] the new wave of Māori activism”, emphasising Māori history, identity, culture and language, while also drawing on “the philosophies of Marxism and white liberalism, the ruminations of academics, and the analyses of the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements.”\(^\text{16}\) The assertion of mātauranga Māori was no longer just for Māori self-esteem, but was increasingly invoked alongside anti-colonial rhetoric to draw attention to state transgressions and rights violations.

Perhaps the most explicit exploration of a governing partnership between the Crown and Māoridom came from Canadian scholar Erik Schwimmer, who predicted the development of biculturalism over the next two decades in an essay collection published in 1968. Schwimmer affirmed that Māori had necessarily become bicultural subjects through interaction with Pākehā society and culture.\(^\text{17}\) However, he rejected the notion that bicultural understanding should “remain confined to the Maori”, especially since urbanisation had drastically increased contact between the two cultures: “it seems impossible”, he remarked, “that the Maori can form a bicultural group on a basis of equality with a monocultural Pakeha group.”\(^\text{18}\) In any case, Pākehā would have to make a genuine effort to understand Māori culture and aspirations in order to effect true equality.

Schwimmer emphasised the role of the state bureaucracy in this bicultural solution. He argued that granting relative autonomy to Māori iwi to manage their own affairs would have to be supplemented by state endorsement of biculturalism. Noting the largely inauspicious

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\(^\text{14}\) Ibid, p. 39.

\(^\text{15}\) Koro Dewes, quoted in Johnson, *The Land is Our History*, p. 111.

\(^\text{16}\) Harris, p. 40.


\(^\text{18}\) Ibid, p. 17.
bicultural literacy of government bureaucrats (particularly in the Department of Education) since the 1940s, he declared that the reimagining of New Zealand as a bicultural nation would “succeed only as part of an acceptance in the top administration.”19 Schwimmer stressed the role of bureaucrats in this transformation, stating “those who have to deal professionally with Maori…ought to aspire to a higher level of bicultural sophistication than the average person.”20 Schwimmer not only seemed (if only vaguely) to echo the sentiments of Koro Dewes and other Māori activists, but directly linked the success of such a partnership to public bureaucracy.

Ngā Tamatoa

The emergent brand of activism utilised by young urban Māori soon coalesced around Ngā Tamatoa (the Young Warriors), a group formed in 1970 at the University of Auckland. Its members included young Māori inspired by the Black Power movement in the United States, and a number of university-educated Māori, including psychology student Donna Awatere.21 The group emerged from the 1970 Young Maori Leaders’ Conference, where priorities were the imminent threat to Māori language and culture, and the need to foster “understanding and respect for Māori and Māori culture among Pākehā.”22 As Paul Spoonley reveals, they signalled an ideological break with previous activism that had been stoked by Te Hokioi and MOOHR:

…while they offered a critique of the state and Pākehā they were also critical of Māori, and of Māori leadership in particular. They represented the post-migration generation of Māori who felt alienated from their cultural roots and angry at the way in which the settler colonialism of New Zealand was either perpetuated or remained unaddressed.23

Ngā Tamatoa’s critique of Māori leadership also partly revolved around methodology: the group quickly gained a reputation for their radicalism and often aggressive protests, which many Māori argued brought Māoridom into disrepute. These young urban Māori were openly frustrated with the more conservative leaders of Māoridom, views that earned younger activists “ridicule, personal harassment, and rejection” from older Māori leaders.24 Despite their

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, p. 18.
22 Harris, p. 44.
23 Spoonley, pp. 80-81.
24 Harris, p. 48.
frustration, Awatere highlights a clear genealogy between the aspirations of their elders and Ngā Tamatoa’s own agenda:

Critics liked to say in those days that the young radicals were not in touch with the old people. On the contrary, we were driven by the old people. We were driven by their pain more than ours. Our urban movement was driven by the pain they felt in the countryside.\(^{25}\)

Indeed, in his own history of the period, Walker characterises the younger activists as “the cutting edge of social change” and the conservative leadership as the “slow grinding edge”.\(^{26}\)

While there were certainly notable rifts, both groups were ultimately the dual arms of a similar agenda.

However, young Māori protestors moved beyond their elders’ calls for redress and advocated for thorough, systemic change. While their initial actions centred around language revitalisation and the preservation of Māoritanga, they soon made bolder targets of Pākehā New Zealand and their institutions.\(^{27}\) A 1972 declaration advocated for a form of Māori autonomy, “including Maori monies and their distribution, Maori lands [and] the integration of Maori language in the New Zealand education system”. Later, they argued Māori education should be controlled by Māori themselves, along with calls for equal representation in Parliament and Crown ratification of the Treaty.\(^{28}\) Their protests of Waitangi Day became annual, showing Pākehā assumptions of a sociocultural paradise to be decidedly false.\(^{29}\)

Throughout the 1980s, protests of Waitangi Day were continued by the Waitangi Action Committee and others, becoming the “focal point of Māori activism.”\(^{30}\)

The beginnings of widespread Pākehā cognisance and the path to bicultural partnership

The activities of Ngā Tamatoa and other so-called radicals amounted to the first widespread cognition of Māori protest and culture by many Pākehā.\(^{31}\) In 1975, Dame Whina Cooper and Ngā Tamatoa member Syd Jackson led a march of over 30,000 people from the top of the North Island to New Zealand Parliament in Wellington in what was the first major protest of this period. In addition to the presence of a large number of sympathetic Pākehā, the fact that the march was jointly organised by Ngā Tamatoa and older Māori leaders made it

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\(^{27}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.


\(^{29}\) Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou*, pp. 210-211.

\(^{30}\) Harris, p. 110.

particularly significant.\textsuperscript{32} Internal debate persisted: Ngā Tamatoa members established a Māori embassy on the steps of Parliament, against Cooper’s express wishes. After the march, a very public debate between supporters of each side continued, which was seen by the wider public as “petty factionalism”.\textsuperscript{33} Nonetheless, Aroha Harris emphasises that the convergence under a joint commitment to articulating Māori land grievances should not be understated:

The aftermath of the march is often viewed with some regret, but bringing together such a disparate collection of groups and interests...is a huge accomplishment rarely achieved, and a testament to the depth of feeling about the land issue.\textsuperscript{34}

These events prompted the beginnings of what historian James Belich has famously termed the Pākehā “identity crisis”. Until the 1970s, Belich argues, Pākehā identified themselves as “Better Britons”: proud of and linked to their settler heritage, while forging pseudo-uniqueness through demonstrating “superiority to the original...in war, sport and the climbing of mountains.”\textsuperscript{35} However, Māori activism and protest in the 1970s stigmatised Pākehā pride in their colonial origins. Pākehā contact with Māoridom, which increased with post-war urbanisation, became the genesis of early explorations of a new Pākehā identity.

Research suggests that people most likely to self-identify as Pākehā have a high degree of interaction with Māori.\textsuperscript{36} Beyond this ‘benign’ contact between cultures, Pākehā reactions to Māori activism betrayed a deep strike to the Pākehā psyche. The Land March and other major flashpoints of Māori protest were largely dismissed by Pākehā as the acts of “an obnoxious minority haranguing the country with unrealistic and unfounded demands.”\textsuperscript{37} The Better Britons identity, associated as it was with colonisation and the now-thoroughly problematised presumption of social cohesion, was becoming increasingly untenable.

This was most apparent in Pākehā anti-racist circles in the 1970s. The identity category Pākehā and its symbolic positioning of white New Zealanders as the Other of Māori reflects a broader collective identification of Pākehā as in some way empathetic to Māori issues. Historian Miranda Johnson argues that members of anti-racist groups such as the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD) grappled with this tension, contending with their own complicity in

\textsuperscript{32} Harris, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Orange, \textit{An Illustrated History}, p. 146; Harris, p. 91.
the institutional racism they sought to eradicate. Pākehā self-critique revealed “understanding racism” as a possible resolution to their problematised sense of belonging, leading to a positive settler identity:

Accompanied by increasing pressure from Maori activists to assist them in decolonising New Zealand, the new analytic framework led many anti-racists to see the potential for Pakeha identity to be transformed, and, consequently, politically transformative.38

Thus, rather than being based on any material cultural expression, self-identifying as Pākehā primarily indicates some level of commitment to a bicultural partnership.59 While certainly not representative of widespread Pākehā responses to Māori activism, the self-reflection of anti-racists belied the impact activism was having on New Zealand public discourse.

This sociocultural shift was further reflected by state responses. Under pressure from this activism, the government relented and abolished the Acts which had allowed Māori land - in Awatere’s words - to “be taken without appeal, or notification, or compensation.”40 It also established the Waitangi Tribunal with the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act.41 The Tribunal’s would investigate Crown transgressions of the Treaty brought by Māori claimants or existent in proposed legislation, and recommend resolutions to these grievances to Parliament. Given the Treaty’s two conflicting versions, the Tribunal was charged to evaluate claims based on an interpretation of both translations, otherwise referred to as the principles of the Treaty, as opposed to its literal content.42

While a significant step in the growing prominence of the Treaty in national discourse, this iteration of the Tribunal was almost entirely ineffective. The Tribunal could not consider claims from before 1975, and its recommendations were non-binding.43 Its inefficacy compounded by the election of the conservative Third National Government in 1975, which delayed setting up the Tribunal, was largely dismissive of its functions, and at one point announced it would simply ignore the findings of the Tribunal.44 Two more momentous land rights protests at Bastion Point in 1977 and Raglan in 1978 further cemented the need for a more robust Tribunal process.


39 Fleras and Spoonley, p. 99.

40 Awatere Huata, My Journey, p. 55.

41 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p. 212.

42 Belgrave, p. 51.

43 Claudia Orange, An Illustrated History, p. 145.

44 Ibid, p. 151.
Notwithstanding the fact that it lacked teeth, historian Claudia Orange argues the Tribunal marked an important, official recognition of Treaty transgressions that further assisted in asserting the Treaty’s growing primacy. By the turn of the 1980s the Tribunal had perceivably moved beyond sorting issues of redress and became central to articulating the Treaty’s modern relevance as a basis of partnership in the context of a still-growing anti-racist discourse. Having been largely inactive in its first five years of operation, the appointment of Edward Durie as its Chairman in 1980, the first Māori to hold the position, marked the beginning of the Tribunal’s discursive challenge of government authority.

Its subsequent recommendations, while avoiding the issue of sovereignty, increasingly recognised the Māori translation of the Treaty, affirming Māori rights to fisheries and other customary title. Much to Māori frustration, the Fourth National Government remained largely dismissive of Tribunal interpretations and the protest movement. Despite this, the Tribunal’s findings, magnified by the increasing cacophony of the annual protests of Waitangi Day and broader use of the Treaty by activists, received wide publicity.

Additionally, Māori voices within the state bureaucracy reiterated the autonomist, partnership discourse promoted by Māori protest and the Tribunal. In 1977, Ihakara Puketapu became the second Māori head of the Department of Maori Affairs. During his term as Secretary he pioneered development of a new philosophy on how the public service might interact with Māori. Tu Tangata, or Standing Tall, comprised programmes that were “centred upon community-based Māori development”, encouraging self-reliance and self-determination.

Importantly, the Department of Maori Affairs endorsed cultural revitalisation as an essential part of this new policy process. The core strategy was to let “culture be the catalyst.” Māori self-esteem resulting from the preservation of tikanga Māori “could enhance the effectiveness of locally-based projects.” The internationally successful Te Maori exhibition is perhaps the most famous example of the state’s new participation in cultural development and is considered an important event reflecting both the maintenance and expression of Māoritanga and growing Pākehā cognisance of it.

Tu Tangata suited the Fourth National Government’s views on individual

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45 Orange, An Illustrated History, p. 144.
46 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, pp. 243-244.
47 Orange, An Illustrated History, pp. 150-151.
48 Hill, Maori and the State, p. 191.
49 Ihakara Puketapu, ‘Reform from Within’ , paper given to Public Service in a Multicultural Society conference, March 1982, p. 4.
50 Hill, Maori and the State, p. 191.
responsibility. By the same token - perhaps unintentionally from the National government’s perspective - it tentatively amounted to state recognition of not just the objectives of the so-called Māori ‘Renaissance’, but additionally at least a form of tino rangatiratanga. Māori communities would work with Department of Maori Affairs representatives to formulate ideas for policy and assist with their implementation. Many Māori were justifiably sceptical of the government’s agenda (indeed, National were arguably much more focused on it becoming a viable replacement for what it saw as an overly expensive welfare state), and its programmes were not universally successful. Nevertheless, Tu Tangata was still considered a key development in the journey towards meaningful autonomy. These efforts reveal that radical activism gave Māori working with or within the state the clout to make modest changes, or indeed, forced less sympathetic state actors to make concessions.

While the Land March and the protests at Bastion Point and Raglan were significant, the broader Pākehā public were vastly more cognisant of the He Taua protest in 1979 and the Springbok Tour protests in 1981. He Taua were a protest group including Ngā Tamatoa members Hilda Halkyard and Hone Harawira who made national headlines when they confronted Pākehā engineering students over the latter’s annual tradition of performing a mock haka at their graduations. Public reaction to the event was severe enough that the Race Relations Conciliator Hiwi Tauroa compiled a report titled *Racial Harmony in New Zealand* published later that year, a synopsis which revealed a gulf in understanding between Pākehā and Māori on the nature and impact of racism and the viability of constructing a truly pluralist society.

The Springbok Tour protests of 1981 realised these anxieties, producing the scenes of civil unrest the general public had feared. While Māori had been protesting Springbok rugby tours since the 1920s, the scale of protests in 1981 was unprecedented, involving over 150,000 protesters over the full eight weeks of the tour. Māori protesters Donna Awatere, Ripeka Evans, and Hone Harawira led a Māori presence at the protests, collectively known as Patu. Their challenge to Pākehā activists, particularly the members of Halt All Racist Tours (HART), was hard to argue with: if they were opposed to apartheid in South Africa, they must also contend with the racism extant in their home country.

51 *ibid*, p. 192.
53 Harris, p. 91.
54 *Ibid*, p. 94.
56 Harris, p. 108.
Echoing the key strategies of Māori activism, the fact that the protests so thoroughly upset a centrepiece of New Zealand’s national distinctiveness, and occurred all over the country in urban and rural areas, ensured wider Pākehā cognisance of racial and Māori issues. Rugby’s centrality to the nation could not, in good conscience, be maintained in its existent form now that it had been shown to be associated with racism. The protests proved to be a significant national and cultural disruption, such that Hiwi Tauroa republished the submissions to his report on He Taua with new analysis in 1982. History and sociology scholar Malcolm MacLean argues these protests marked a significant turning point, forthrightly embodying the issues that Ngā Tamatoa and other Māori activists had been forwarding for the preceding decade and laying the groundwork for the emergence of bicultural policy:

During 1981 [biculturalism] was barely considered outside Maori activist circles and a tiny number of Pakeha activist supporters. The prioritization of ‘race’ and the ontological challenges presented through the challenge to history and national self-image during the anti-tour campaign shifted the terrain to provide more fertile ground for the growth of this post-colonizing tendency.

Similarly, historian Aroha Harris posits that the Tour had a particular impact on Pākehā activists, whose presence at Waitangi Day protests notably increased following 1981.

**Donna Awatere, Black Feminism and the articulation of Māori sovereignty**

In addition to the broader fallout from the Tour, the protests marked an important moment in the evolution of the Māori protest movement. The strong presence of female Māori activists at protest actions - particularly after 1976 - reflected a growing trend that would see Māori women firmly at the forefront of Māori activism in the 1980s. The maturation of Māori protest at the beginning of the 1980s was when Awatere, along with collaborators such as Ripeka Evans, who had both been prominently present at major flashpoints as members of Ngā Tamatoa, began writing sustained literature on race and the oppression of Māori.

These articulations were inspired by encounters with international civil rights

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59 Harris, p. 98; *Race Against Time* (Wellington: Human Rights Commission, 1982).

60 Harris, p. 108.

61 MacLean, p. 61.

campaigners - especially indigenous women activists - during Awatere’s visit to the United States in 1976 and at a conference Evans and Awatere attended in Cuba in 1978.\(^{63}\) Evans charged that the Māori activist campaign embodied by the Land March and the occupations of Bastion Point and Raglan needed a national focus “based on the demand for Māori sovereignty.”\(^{64}\) These strategies for defining and emphasising a collective struggle for sovereignty further echoed the writings of Algerian philosopher Frantz Fanon, whose ideas influenced many global indigenous rights and decolonisation movements, including Māori activism.\(^{65}\) First published in 1963, Fanon’s Marxist analysis of decolonisation processes in *The Wretched of the Earth* highlighted the most oppressed class in colonial society as the genesis site for any meaningful decolonising revolution.\(^{66}\) Black Feminism, with their consistent argument that Māori women in particular constituted this ‘super-oppressed’ class in New Zealand, thus articulated a radical, and often perceptively militant, call for Māori sovereignty that had not yet been forwarded by other activists.

Written positions and presentations bearing Awatere’s name synthesised and focused the arguments made by Māori activists throughout the 1970s, of how a long and continuing colonial experience had resulted in Māori being overrepresented in every negative statistic. However, on the topic of sovereignty, Awatere and her collaborators asserted relatively more radical ideas. While the protest actions of Ngā Tamatoa were distinct from the calls for redress and compensation engaged in by their elder forebears, Ngā Tamatoa’s aims and particularly their conception of tino rangatiratanga allowed the presence of Pākehā power structures to co-exist with reinvigorated Māori political and social organisations.\(^{67}\) At the centre of this new articulation of Māori sovereignty was the demand for the complete dismantling of Pākehā power structures and the realisation of literal indigenous sovereignty. This ideology was articulated by a number of publications from 1979 to 1982 which critiqued second wave feminism, the trade union movement, and the public service. Eventually, these ideas coalesced into *Maori Sovereignty*, a series of articles Awatere wrote for *Broadsheet* magazine in 1982 and 1983, and which were published as a book in 1984.

A key characteristic of these works was the analytical framework of institutional


\(^{64}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{65}\) Moana Jackson, interviewed by Ethan McKenzie, 19 September 2017.


racism, and particularly its figuring of individual white privilege as essentially irredeemable. This was reflected in a consistent and scathing rejection of white liberalism, whose activism and politics they argued deemphasised race in favour of gender and class.\(^{68}\) In a paper given at the Piha Women’s conference in 1979, Awatere argued the women’s movement was racist, dominated by Pākehā whose complacency and complicity in colonialism had resulted in black women becoming “a savagely oppressed group” in New Zealand society.\(^{69}\) Highlighting Māori women’s overrepresentation in negative statistics, Awatere called for non-white women to separate from the broader women’s movement:

> Since you are mostly Pakeha women here, I had to ask myself why the hell I was giving the paper, because racism is a Pakeha concept, created by your European ancestors for other races and adapted here to suit the needs of the white colonisers.\(^{70}\)

Similar views were espoused by Awatere and Evans in a 1981 paper presented at the Auckland Trade Union Centre as spokeswomen of a group called Black Unity. Again arguing Māori (and particularly Māori women) were a “super-oppressed section of the working class”, Black Unity rejected Marxism as another colonial import that did not genuinely fight for the empowerment of Māori workers:

> Maori workers lose labour too. But more than that, we have lost our traditional means of survival, our autonomy, our sovereignty. The contradictions the Maori face transcend any that the white worker faces.\(^{71}\)

Again, Awatere and Evans forcefully rejected white allyship and called for sovereignty:

> The aims of Maori revolutionaries and the white left are not the same. The whites want to stop the loss of their labour. The Maori want a return of our autonomy. Maori control of Maori things means control of all Aotearoa.\(^{72}\)

Additionally, these publications challenged patriarchal oppression amongst Māori, too. The Black Unity paper charged Māori male leadership, who were seen to be cooperating with white “capitalists”, were selling out their racial identity and effectively becoming Pākehā.\(^{73}\) In her Piha Women’s Conference paper, Awatere criticised not only white men but black men for their continued abuse of Māori women.\(^{74}\) Both papers criticised what was seen as a trend of

\(^{68}\) Locke, p. 254.

\(^{69}\) Donna Awatere, ‘I want a New Zealand where it is safe to be born a Maori child’, *Broadsheet* 76 (January/February, 1980), p. 18.

\(^{70}\) *Ibid*.


\(^{72}\) *Ibid*, p. 7.

\(^{73}\) *Ibid*, p. 6.

\(^{74}\) Awatere, ‘I want a New Zealand…’, p. 22.
Pākehā women having relationships with Māori men as ‘race betrayal’.  

Conclusively, these early publications implored Māori women, who had few allies and were the most oppressed section of New Zealand society, to be the leading radical edge of a new, revolutionary effort to re-establish Māori sovereignty.

Articulations of partnership at the Public Service in a Multicultural Society Conference, 1982

Awatere continued elements of this rhetoric in a paper presented at a conference on Māori policy organised by the State Services Commission in 1982. The Public Service in a Multicultural Society Conference aimed, in the spirit of Tu Tangata, to liaise with the wider community on possible policy solutions to the issues raised by the atmosphere of activism and protest, particularly in the aftermath of the Springbok Tour. Tu Tangata’s principle of Māori consultation and its attempted accommodation of Māori epistemology highlighted the institutional racism of the public sector, and many felt similar principles should be implemented public sector-wide. In an important symbolic gesture to the public sector’s commitment to consultation, the conference was held at Waahi Marae in Huntly, the seat of power for the Kīngitanga movement. Most of the conference participants comprised Pākehā bureaucrats and Māori from all sides of the protest movement. The latter group included many of the elder Māori leadership and younger activists, the most prominent of whom was Awatere.

In an acknowledgement of the success of the consultative policies of Tu Tangata, State Services Commissioner Peter Boag and the other conference convenors suggested “partnership” between the public service and ethnic groups as the solution to the public sector’s inadequacies and the growing divisions in New Zealand society. Over the course of the conference, the definition of partnership began to imitate that of the partnership based on the Treaty that was being contemporaneously demanded by Māori activists. At the centre of their concern was holding the public service directly accountable to the nation’s citizens. Puketapu presented a paper detailing the community consultation process undertaken under Tu Tangata. Another Maori Affairs official suggested this model be reflected in the rest of the public service, which would have the effect of turning the pyramid hierarchy of the public service upside down, with policy being essentially designed by communities themselves. The

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75 Black Unity, pp. 6-7; Awatere, ‘I want a New Zealand…’, pp. 22-23
76 Locke, p. 254.
77 ‘Multiculturalism in New Zealand: Implications for the Public Service’, February 1982, Record no. 15/1/35/13 part V1, Item no. R1004188, Box 26, Archives New Zealand, p. 3.
78 ibid., p. 1.
79 Puketapu, ‘Reform from Within’. 
other papers broadly comprised explorations of various communities’ experiences of public sector inefficiency and inadequacy, largely focused on the welfare state and health system.  

Awatere presented perhaps the most confrontational paper of the conference, titled ‘Cultural Imperialism and the Māori: The Role of the Public Servant’. It argued, to a room full of Pākehā public servants, that bureaucrats were the primary agents of colonialism and cultural imperialism, akin to the missionaries who arrived in the early 1800s. The paper highlighted similar themes to her previous work: of the inadequacies of European politics, of the existence of ‘brown Pākehā’, and so on. However, perhaps in a reflection of its audience, the paper did not assert sovereignty as literally as it had been in Awatere’s previous writings. Instead, it tentatively acknowledged the state’s role not just in past oppression but its potential role and relevance in the future.

While the paper largely lays out the public service’s dismal record of engaging with and oppressing Māori, the paper’s title directly lay the gauntlet at the feet of individuals themselves, not the un-anthropomorphised ‘system’. Indeed, the paper’s title resonates the loudest in her closing remarks:

> The task ahead of the Public Service to pave the way for biculturalism requires it to examine closely how the existing economic, political and social relations support the powerful vested interests of those who benefit from white hegemony.

Reflecting her earlier work, Awatere’s argument intended to make clear that abstracting discussions of institutional racism couched these issues in language that kept institutional racism one step removed from the individuals who were responsible for whether or not they were perpetuated. However, Awatere’s location of the role and responsibility of individual whites within institutional racism is figured as more future oriented in this paper, with biculturalism highlighted as a tentative framework to rid government departments of inherent prejudice. “This is a big job,” she declared, making it clear that individual self-reflection was necessary for it to succeed. A direct comparison between the Pākehā in the room and the engineering students who had mocked the haka a few years before hammered this point home.

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80 Transcript from Tapes of a Conference held 23-25 March 1982 on Public Service in a Multicultural Society EEOU, Conferences - Departmental - The Public Service in a Multicultural Society papers, Record no. 15/1/35/13 part V2/A, Item ID: R1004191, Box 27, Archives New Zealand. This is one of the models Jos Raadschelders suggests as a way of catering to the different priorities of fragmented communities in Jos Raadschelders, Public Administration: The Interdisciplinary Study of Government (New York: Oxford UP, 2012), p. 99.
81 Donna Awatere, ‘Cultural Imperialism and the Māori: The Role of the Public Servant’ (March 1982).
82 ibid, p. 4.
83 Transcript from Tapes of a Conference held 23-25 March 1982 on Public Service in a Multicultural Society EEOU.
This language aside, the acknowledgement that the public service could have a future positive impact on Māori was a notable departure from her other work.

Discussions at the conference, including Awatere’s, resulted in an early exploration of the way biculturalism would define Māori public policy under the Fourth Labour Government. The idea of inverting the pyramid hierarchy and allowing communities to have input on policy design was received favourably by most people present. Tipene O’Regan argued that whatever the form of partnership, it should thoroughly end the power imbalance between ethnic minorities and the public sector (again, perhaps predicting his support of devolution proposals that he would have a hand in designing). Awatere enthusiastically agreed, declaring that while the base paper and reading material prepared by the State Services Commission was helpful, it did not explicitly address the idea of a true, power-sharing partnership.84

While the intended focus of the conference was multiculturalism, the Māori relationship with the public service, and their experience of New Zealand more broadly, took precedence. The conference had been called in response to racial issues largely involving Māori; its working group was partly comprised of leading Māori; it was held on a marae and adopted hui protocols for its proceedings; the vast majority of the participants were either Māori or Pākehā; and so on. Talk of ‘partnership’ mapped perfectly onto concurrent Māori calls for participation in government and, further, alluded to the partnership inherent in the text of the Treaty.

Importantly, one of the ‘bigger picture’ questions raised by Boag and other officials was how to fashion a public service that reflected the unique identity of New Zealand. With national identity being reified in public discourse as requiring the inclusion of a Māori sphere alongside the extant, dominant Pākehā one, biculturalism, and not multiculturalism, seemed destined to dominate the conference. Indeed, most Māori speakers spoke of biculturalism and multiculturalism. Such was the presence of Māori and Māori issues at the conference, that by June the working group that had organised it had changed their priorities:

Discussion seemed to revolve around bi-cultural versus multi-cultural imperatives. It was finally generally accepted that the bicultural imperative should take precedence.85

The fact that this imperative already had a working articulation in Puketapu’s Tu Tangata perhaps made it the most attractive, pragmatic option for the public service at large. While any interpretation of what a bicultural partnership involving the public service might look like

84 ibid.
would not be formulated for another five years, it is clear from the conference that it was formulated with Māori demands for a bicultural partnership on a national scale firmly in mind.

**Further defining Māori sovereignty**

Immediately after this conference in June 1982, Awatere published the first of a series of influential articles in *Broadsheet* magazine titled *Maori Sovereignty*, which argued emphatically for indigenous nationhood. While she already had a profile as a stalwart protester, the articles earned her a reputation as one of the most outspoken and radical activists of the Māori protest movement. Awatere charged government and Pākehā New Zealand as essentially neo-colonialist, and argued Māori who supported the state were “sellouts” who deliberately “pass for white” in order to reap benefits solely for themselves. They had no natural allies in white liberals, the women’s movement, the trade unions, or even Pacific Island peoples. Education for Pākehā, she argued, would ultimately be futile, as the priorities of the colonial system would supersede all others:

> Merely telling judges that statistics and research show that they are seven times more likely to find any Maori guilty than any other white will not stop them doing it. Because under the separate White Nation system they are *supposed* to do it. Neither will telling the police that they are six times more likely to arrest any Maori as any white stop them doing it. Again, they are *supposed to act this way.*

Declaring that “a bicultural nation” was the most conservative realisation of Māori sovereignty, she argued that Māori nationhood was the only acceptable outcome to colonisation. In her final Broadsheet article, Awatere delivered an outright rejection of biculturalism:

> The kaupapa is Maori sovereignty. It must not be biculturalism. All efforts at biculturalism have only resulted in integration and assimilation, bitterness and tears. No more.

The statement was the lynchpin of her argument for Māori nationhood, and was highlighted as a pullout quote. Consistently drawing on the Gramscian theory of hegemony, Awatere argued that the only defence from Pākehā hegemony was to exist outside of it. Māori sovereignty of New Zealand was the only course of action.

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86 Donna Awatere, ‘On Maori Sovereignty’, *Broadsheet* 100 (June, 1982), pp. 38, 42.
91 *Ibid*, p. 29.
Awatere did, however, acknowledge a place for Pākehā in Māori-controlled New Zealand which hinged upon their rejection of British, or colonial, culture. This culture, Awatere claimed, was fundamentally what had operated and sustained colonialism and colonial systems throughout the world. Invoking the spectre of unsettled Pākehā identity, Awatere argued that Māori sovereignty provided the opportunity to “forge a distinctive New Zealand identity from a Maori point of view”:

The Maori people offer the Pakeha an opportunity to become part of that hegemonic consciousness, to establish an identity as New Zealanders which must be forged not in opposition to us, but for and with us. A new identity based on Maoritanga must be forged.93

Indeed, Awatere specifically debunked the idea that Māori sovereignty of New Zealand necessarily excluded Pākehā and would require them to leave.94 Regardless, perhaps focused on the militancy of Awatere’s critique of New Zealand society, readers often interpreted Maori Sovereignty as a Marxist plot to force Pākehā into the sea.95

The Awatere who wrote Maori Sovereignty was ultimately unforgiving of the extant, Pākehā-dominated power structure in New Zealand. Her series is one of the better-known expressions of Māori anti-government protest of the period, and Broadsheet published the collection as a book in 1984.96 It had an enormous impact on Māori, and also on many of the sectors of society who it criticised, particularly liberal activists.97

Conclusion

Thus, Māori sovereignty as explicated by Awatere and Evans in the 1980s became a pivotal cumulation point for the development of Māori activism from the late 1960s onwards. By presenting the Treaty of Waitangi as a social compact which was the basis of Crown sovereignty, Māori activists began to impact government decision making in unprecedented ways. This use of the Treaty as a lens for highlighting institutional racism and then demanding recognition of rangatiratanga was by no means restricted to so-called radical activists: in 1982,
the relatively conservative New Zealand Maori Council noted the Treaty granted the Crown sovereignty predicated on their duties to iwi.98

While most Māori activists broadly seemed to call for forms of Māori autonomy which coexisted with Pākehā structures, however, *Maori Sovereignty* created a new discourse around sovereignty that was impossible to ignore. Awatere’s articles presented a precis of institutional racism and its pervasive effects in an unprecedentedly impactful critique of the state and New Zealand’s status quo. As Māori writer Keri Kaa expressed when she reviewed the book for *Broadsheet* in 1985, “First I hated the anger in it, then I sat down and thought about the issues and wept for the voiceless ones.”99 Importantly, historian Cybèle Locke posits that the militancy of this articulation of Māori sovereignty created an atmosphere where bicultural coexistence “seem moderate and almost appealing” by comparison.100 Additionally, Awatere’s *Maori Sovereignty* contained within it the seeds of the ‘cultural reform’ of Pākehā she would eventually undertake as a consultant. This articulation of a kind of Pākehā cultural redemption through their shedding of ‘British’ modes of thinking became the roots of her commitment to bicultural reformism in the latter half of the 1980s. The shifting grounds of what constituted nationhood provoked by this activism was to be resolved by the creation of a bicultural state.

99 Kaa, p. 20.
100 Locke, p. 265.
Chapter Two
State Responses: biculturalism as government policy

Introduction

By the 1980s, Māori activists had broadly articulated an explicitly political project which would decolonise the state, using a modern invocation of the Treaty of Waitangi as the basis for a co-operative governing partnership. In this way, the decolonisation being called for by Māori differed from anti-colonial revolutionaries in other colonial states, instead focusing on reforming existing state apparatuses and institutions.¹ Indeed, despite its militant language and calls for Māori political and economic control of New Zealand, even Donna Awatere’s *Maori Sovereignty* stopped short of calling for an armed revolution.

Nonetheless, modern Māori activism had a practically unprecedented impact on New Zealand. The protests of the Springbok Tour and the public discussions in its aftermath positioned the ontology of race firmly at the forefront of national discourse. The Waitangi Tribunal, Tu Tangata, and the Public Service in a Multicultural Society Conference showed Māori demands for rangatiratanga were compelling the government to seriously engage with racism and the state’s complicity in it.² This trend of state responses to Māori grievances peaked in the 1980s, against the backdrop of a broader Pākehā identity crisis and new revisionist histories by Pākehā academics.

These tensions were intrinsic to Māoridom’s increasing figuring as partners who could stabilise both the unsettled legitimacy of the state, and the reflection of that unsettling within Pākehā individuals themselves. Awatere’s declaration in *Maori Sovereignty* that Pākehā had no choice but to construct a new national identity in genuine partnership with Māori, while somewhat of a sweeping abstraction, resonated with the prevalence of race relations discourse and particularly relationships between the public sector and Māori communities. Building on its new relationships with Māori communities forged through Tu Tangata, the public service became an important genesis site within the state for the government’s interpretation of biculturalism. As a body charged with catering to *all* citizens, the notion that the public sector was not fulfilling this obligation was increasingly difficult to discount, forcing further fundamental rethinking of its relationship with the people it was meant to serve.³

This sentiment, combined with both Māoridom’s calls to honour their rangatiratanga and the primacy of racial issues, eventually resulted in the policy paper *Te Urupare Rangapu/Partnership Response*, released in 1988. Partly influenced by Labour’s concurrent neoliberal reforms foreshadowed in the Introduction, this new approach to Māori policy proposed a significant devolution of policy design and implementation responsibilities to iwi, and simultaneously outlined affirmative action proposals to create a Māori dimension to the public service. In this way, not only would Māori communities themselves have increased control over their affairs, but the public service as a whole would come to more accurately reflect those communities.

To some extent, this reflected invocations of biculturalism by Māori activists. However, the somewhat measured nature of state responses indicated that biculturalism became increasingly synonymous with principles of ‘consultation’ and ‘fiduciary duty’ by the end of the 1980s, rather than the anti-racist ideology of Ngā Tamatoa, broader Māori activism, and their Pākehā allies. Discussions of culture, a much vaguer governing partnership, and the decentralising (rather than devolutionary) imperatives of concurrent neoliberal reform threatened to obfuscate *Te Urupare Rangapu*’s tackling of institutional racism in the public service.

*The Fourth Labour Government and the articulation of a governing partnership*

The New Zealand Labour Party had long been broadly sympathetic to Māori activism. Since the 1930s, Labour had been closely aligned with Rātana, a pan-iwi religious and political movement, many of whose members successfully became Members of Parliament either aligned with or as members of the Labour Party. It was Labour Minister for Maori Affairs and Rātana follower Matiu Rata who had spearheaded the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, and the party had reaffirmed a commitment to the principles of democratic socialism and equal human rights at a party conference in 1977. A significant increase in branch membership during the protests that had defined the late 1960s and 1970s benefitted Labour activists for minority rights, and by the 1980s internal party groups such as the Labour Women’s Council and Pacific Islands Council began to have a significant influence on party affairs. Further, as political scientist Andrew Sharp argues, Labour Party MPs and particularly

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the new Labour Party Cabinet were broadly more progressive on moral and ethical issues than mainstream New Zealand. Prime Minister David Lange had been a legal advisor for ACORD in the 1970s, and other Cabinet members and Labour MPs had connections to the protest movements that had dominated the preceding decade.

In spite of Labour’s long-standing relationship with Rātana and the party’s social progressivism, by the 1980s the politics of Māori protest had upset the presumption that Labour enjoyed the firm support of voting Māori. Matiu Rata himself, frustrated by the Labour caucus’ reluctance to embrace more robust policies for Māori development and land reform, left the party in 1979. The following year, he founded Mana Motuhake, the first political party with a definitively Māori agenda. While Mana Motuhake never made it into parliament, the threat of a promising alternative to Labour encouraged the party to more explicitly engage with the demands of Māori. The Labour Party’s 1984 election platform included promises to extend the Waitangi Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear claims from 1840 onwards, and the legislative recognition of the Treaty in a Bill of Rights. Further, the party promised to investigate the flashpoint that was Waitangi Day national celebrations. Labour won the July snap election in a landslide.

Māori policy was an immediate, visible priority of the new government. The Crown’s fiduciary duties to Māori, as had been foreshadowed by the Tribunal interpretations of the Treaty in the early 1980s, became a key focus of Cabinet. A meeting between government and Māori leaders in 1984, the Hui Taumata/Maori Economic Development Summit Conference, confirmed that Māori keenly felt the inadequacy of government programmes. Echoing the New Zealand Maori Council and wider Māori opinion, delegates categorically declared that the state was failing to fulfil its Treaty obligations and demanded institutional change.

10 Ibid, p. 375.
The conference broadly doubled down on the philosophy of Tu Tangata by endorsing a Māori policy based on better targeted support from government but delivered by Māori organisations. Further, the government recognised disproportionate Māori representation within government agencies and the conference committed to the active recruitment of qualified Māori for senior positions. Calls for autonomy and for the respect of rangatiratanga would be satisfied by public institutions making space for Māori control of their own affairs. To assist with this transition of responsibility, a ‘Decade of Maori Development’ would equip iwi and other Māori organisations with the skills necessary to handle “new social and economic initiatives.”

Accordingly, speakers at the hui discussed different ideas and frameworks to continue the cultural revitalisation of Māoridom, and further cement their steps towards meaningful self-determination. Submissions on youth, the business sector, housing, mental health, the arts and more were discussed by participants. For her part, Donna Awatere co-presented a proposal for a more robust Māori dimension to the New Zealand broadcasting landscape. Echoing the sentiment of her paper at the Public Service in a Multicultural Society Conference, Awatere identified broadcasting as a vehicle for globalisation and Western cultural imperialism, which was resulting in the acute erosion of tikanga Māori and low self-esteem in Māori individuals. She began by negatively evaluating Sir Āpirana Ngata’s concept of Māoritanga, arguing its focus on economic survival had actually fast-tracked assimilation:

The problem was that the physical could not be divorced from all the other elements of life. Slowly, the minds, hearts, souls and spirit of Maoridom has been etched away in the search to ensure our physical survival.

Cultural strengthening and maintenance was the key theme of her presentation. While a call for Māori control of New Zealand was absent, Awatere reiterated Maori Sovereignty in advocating for cultural development that was as far removed from Western cultural influence as possible. Awatere’s proposal for Māori broadcasting centred on creating more Māori-

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17 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
18 Ibid, p. 4.
focused ‘spaces’ on television, through funding Māori television programmes, more regular use of te reo Māori in everyday programming, and specialised programming for Māori children.20 The veritable neo-colonial war that Western culture dominated-broadcasting was waging in Māori family living rooms was, Awatere argued, a key problem in Māori capacity to maintain cultural traditions:

Broadcasting carries a message of our absence that communicates itself directly to us; as babies, as children, as young people, as adults. Who are you if you are a member of a people who don’t exist. [sic]21

Awatere’s presentation was intended to be an ‘introduction’ to a series of other papers on Māori representation and portrayal in broadcast media and the arts more broadly, authored by Auckland-based advocacy group Te Koputu Taonga, filmmaker Merata Mita, Māori radio pioneer Haare Williams, and musician Dalvanius Prime.22 All revolved around the same theme: of the need for distinctively Māori cultural spaces both on broadcast airwaves themselves and behind the scenes.

The articulation of what Māori autonomist spaces in New Zealand might look like prompted delegates and observers to call the Hui Taumata a significant turning point not just for Māori policy discourse, but for the self-esteem of Māori more generally. Hekia Parata, then a representative for Māori youth, noted “the current mood of the country is towards consensus.”23 One of the main convenors, Ngātata Love, later commented that the Hui Taumata showed a shift from “being told what to do to establishing quietly a determination to take control of our destiny. There was a spirit that came out of it that energised people.”24

Minister for Maori Affairs Koro Wētere and the new Labour government interpreted the broadly positive discussions at the hui as an endorsement of their wish for devolution to define the emerging strategy for Māori policy. Indeed, the 1980s saw iwi and other Māori organisations grow and take on new importance: organisations such as the Manukau Urban Maori Authority and Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust were set up to represent urban Māori, with aspirations to “[deliver] health and other services to Maori.”25 Māori communities were

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21 Ibid, p. 5.
22 Ibid, p. 2.
24 Ngatata Love, quoted in Hill, Maori and the State, p. 203.
increasingly responsible for delivering social welfare programs like Maori Access (MACCESS), which was established in 1987 to provide training for the long-term unemployed.  

Similarly, some iwi became involved in managing Māori-focused employment centres (Kōkiri) and the child-rearing programme Matua Whangai.

Thus, the legacy of the Tu Tangata programme’s ‘by Māori, for Māori’ policy approach meant that devolution as was being broadly explored by Maori Affairs and Cabinet already had both a successful precedent and a growing number of Māori organisations prepared to opt into a similar policy framework. The embrace of a devolutionary framework for government policy revealed Māori were demanding “autonomist outcomes” from the state, as well as redress or compensation.

As the genesis for Labour’s later devolutionary policy ideas began to take shape, so too did a renewed national and political primacy for the Treaty. Māori activists’ use of the Treaty as a lens for highlighting their oppression had also become a potentially redemptive structure for Pākehā New Zealand; and indeed, the state seemed to be responding along these lines. Labour’s commitment to extend the Waitangi Tribunal’s mandate back to 1840 was implemented in 1985. Between this and Labour’s commitment to Māori development at Hui Taumata, Māori were hopeful at least some form of meaningful, Treaty-based autonomy was within reach. Ngā Tamatoa member Ranginui Walker later argued Labour’s election win proved a watershed moment for a country experiencing a crisis of nationhood.

However optimistic or realistic a Treaty-based partnership for ‘postcolonial’ New Zealand might have been, it would be made or undone by its bureaucratic substructure. Māori activists recognised that new possibilities for Māori-controlled spaces were still, ultimately, at the behest of the Crown. In order to guarantee these spaces would be truly autonomous, the government institutions that would create them would have to be free of inherent prejudice. Decolonisation elsewhere included colonial authorities leaving, whereas indigenous sovereignty in settler colonial states such as New Zealand had to contend with the continuity of imported government systems and institutions, and the continued presence of settler-descendants. Thus, because calls to ‘decolonise the state’ were unlikely to be realised literally, Māoridom’s ‘decolonising’ project seemed precarious. Indeed, Awatere expressed in Maori

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26 Ibid, p. 205.
27 O’Reilly and Wood, p. 322.
28 Hill, Maori and the State, p. 231.
29 Orange, An Illustrated History, p. 155.
Sovereignty that Māori escaping hegemony meant nothing less than the complete “redesign [of] this country’s institutions from a Maori point of view”; the fact that she thought this would be impossible without Māori control of said institutions shows the high stakes of the decolonisation project more broadly called for by Māori activists. As the government continued to assert a commitment to Māori issues, Māori attempted to explore and define biculturalism from a Māori perspective in ways that broadly mapped onto their own ideas of rangatiratanga and Treaty-afforded rights.

One important exploration was by Ngā Tamatoa member Ranginui Walker in his 1986 paper *The Meaning of Biculturalism*. Walker defined biculturalism as a postcolonial Māori-Pākehā power dynamic based on the Treaty. After positioning Māori anti-colonial resistance in the broader, international history of indigenous rights movements, Walker neatly condensed the Treaty debate and the inconsistencies between the Māori and English translations that had been gestured at in early Tribunal recommendations. Walker linked the Pākehā interpretation of kawanatanga to mean absolute sovereignty as the ideological seed of the presumption of social cohesion, and Māori dispossession and disenfranchisement. As a resolution, he affirmed that the Māori translation “can be interpreted as a charter for biculturalism”, as Māori had considered it since it was signed.

Conclusively, Walker listed prescriptions for implementing biculturalism that hinged upon government agencies becoming bicultural through Māori representation. Invoking the discussions at the Hui Taumata, he suggested that the proportionate Māori share of funding for welfare programs be handed to Māori to be used as they saw fit. Additionally, he proposed strict affirmative action to reconstitute the public service and make it bicultural, with Māori comprising at least 10% of government employees. These two arms - a devolved, iwi-based dimension for control of policy, and a guaranteed Māori presence within the state apparatus itself - were the lynchpin of a vision for a new, fundamentally Treaty-based society. In this paper, broadly representative of the kinds of devolutionary concessions Māori had called for at the Hui Taumata, Walker challenged the new government directly, pushing Labour’s apparent advocation for Māori self-determination to its absolute limit.

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33 *Ibid*, p. 5.
The Programme on Racism, Pākeha anti-racism education and the Pākehā identity crisis

Pākehā anti-racists, too, used the social progressiveness of the new government to continue their attempts to sway the opinions of the general public and exact impactful, reformist responses from the state with regards to Māori grievances. As outlined in Chapter One, Māori activism and the impact it was having on both state institutions and public discourse reflected broader Pākehā unease about their identity and sense of belonging. These anxieties became even more defined in the 1980s, encouraged by an explosion of revisionist histories and the maturation of Māori activism.

With the rejection of ‘traditional’ historical narratives of New Zealand by activists, a veritable “historiographical ‘revolution’” would soon create new histories to fill the gap in national memory.34 Scholars (who were overwhelmingly Pākehā) began producing academic work which spoke to the discussions of Māori-Pākehā relations which were dominating the public sphere. James Belich’s The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict and Claudia Orange’s The Treaty of Waitangi, two of the more popular revisionist histories released in the 1980s, stayed on the non-fiction bestseller list for months.35 Additionally, scholars of New Zealand history enjoyed new opportunities for professionalisation - not just at museums and archives, but in positions which had the potential to tangibly effect constitutional, legislative, and policy reform, such as the Waitangi Tribunal and as historical advisors to government departments.36

Against the backdrop of the historiographical revolution and the cautious optimism engendered by the election of a progressive government, Pākehā-led anti-racist initiatives grew in scope. As well as assisting and echoing Māori activism with direct action protests as they had done in the 1970s, Pākehā anti-racist groups held seminars on racial issues for other Pākehā, intending to grow the ranks of anti-racist activists. These groups emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and often included members actively or previously involved with protest groups like ACORD and HART. A Wellington-based anti-racism education group, Urban Training to Combat Racism, formed in 1978, and encouraged the creation of another Wellington group, Double Take, soon after. Another Pākehā-led initiative, Fight Against

Institutional Racism, formed in Palmerston North. While these early groups did hold seminars for government departments, after the 1984 election anti-racist education found further relevance and even a degree of state recognition. In 1985, a group of anti-racists from the National Council of Churches (NCC; after 1988, Conference of Churches in Aotearoa New Zealand (CCANZ)) called Project Waitangi secured a substantial amount of government funding to develop anti-racist training workshops, setting up a national network of educators.37

Amongst these important sites for Pākehā anti-racist activities in this period was the NCC’s Programme on Racism. Originally formed in 1979, the aftermath of the Springbok Tour protests led to it becoming a full-time program in 1982.38 The Programme on Racism was convened by Reverend Bob Scott and Christian laypersons Mitzi and Raymond Nairn, who aimed to direct consciousness-raising activities at Pākehā New Zealand. In a newsletter announcing the new full-time programme, the National Council of Churches restated the narratives of historical revisionists, particularly the historic and continuing breaches of the Treaty.39 In 1983 they reported on Pākehā Christians who had been arrested at a Waitangi Day protest and narrated their motivations and protest strategies.40 The same year they funded and helped produce ‘Totara and the Rose’, a resource kit for Pākehā primary and secondary school teachers to teach their students about revisionist history, racism, and the legacy of the Treaty.41 The kit was reportedly well received by teachers and the Department of Education.42

Aside from this important work, workshops and seminars focused on institutional racism are arguably the Programme on Racism’s most enduring legacy. At the heart of their mission to rid society of institutional racism was the use of sin as a direct analogical framework for individual racism.43 It was hoped that conceiving of racism as, like sin, an inherent feature of individuals would encourage individuals to engage in repentance defined by anti-racist action. Participants would end sessions by committing to a ‘contract’ entitled ‘A time of

39 National Council of Churches, Our Own Backyard, c1981, File on Racist Matters, Record no. 97-081-12/12, Alexander Turnbull Library.
43 Letter from Bob Scott to Earle D. Howe, 28 March 1983, Church and Society Commission Programme on Racism correspondence, Record no. 92-085-2/1, Alexander Turnbull Library, p. 1.
repentance and hope’, which bound them to the task of rooting out racism wherever they encountered it.\textsuperscript{44} This revealed its direct ancestry with Paulo Freire’s \textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed} and his conclusions on the power of education and self-reflection.\textsuperscript{45} After Labour’s election in 1984, the Programme on Racism reported that, beyond their more regular work with community groups and congregations, the team were receiving a marked increase in interest from government agencies, particularly the Department of Social Welfare and its local offices.\textsuperscript{46} The Programme’s convenors saw an important opportunity to reveal the analytical framework of institutional racism to the public sector, and contribute to the betterment of the Crown-Māori relationship.

While workshop content and delivery varied depending on the needs of each group, there were a number of continuities. The structure of workshops was framed around critical self-reflection, partly prompted by an exercise on ‘Pākehātanga’. The exercise intended to racialise white participants by getting them to identify what they saw as the core tenets of Pākehā culture. The Pākehātanga exercise seems to have been a particularly successful and enjoyable part of the curriculum, and was the most consistently employed method used by convenors across all workshops.\textsuperscript{47} A second session usually unravelled the normalisation of Pākehātanga by comparing it with Māori cultural tenets.\textsuperscript{48} Participants would then use these exercises to give their own definitions of racism, and then to discuss proposed actions participants could take, either as a group or individually.\textsuperscript{49}

Overall, the contested history of New Zealand was a key focus of both the Programme’s wider publications and the workshops themselves. The National Council of Churches commissioned histories which spoke to this agenda, such as Betty Whaitiri’s \textit{The Passage of Maori Land in pakeha Ownership: a Maori View} and their various reports on Waitangi Day protests. Further, they re-published works by revisionist academics such as Sidney Moko Mead, Tony Simpson, and Ranginui Walker. Donna Awatere’s essay ‘Cultural Imperialism and the Maori’ was also re-published by the Programme and was occasionally used as

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\textsuperscript{44} ‘A Time of Repentance and Hope’, c1981, Church and Society Commission Programme on Racism correspondence, Record no. 92-085-2/1, Alexander Turnbull Library.
\textsuperscript{46} Scott, Bob and Mitzi Nairn, ‘Report to the Annual Conference of the Associated Churches of Christ’, p. 1. The volume of records of the Programme on Racism held at the Alexander Turnbull Library confirm a marked increase in workshop material and reports after 1985.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid}, p. 2.
\end{flushright}
background reading for workshops.  

The Programme’s methodology was to present Māori grievances and evidence of racism to individuals such that their critical reflection and their ‘re-making’ into an anti- or non-racist subject would be practically inevitable. Many participants found this process enlightening, if shocking - even those participants who already conceived of themselves as activists:

…it made a deeper impact on me than I expected...I went with an “I know where I stand” attitude and a surety of my awareness of the issues of racism and my commitment to anti-racism. But all that was challenged...  

Many participants related their new understanding of racism and anti-racism to personal pain, as one unnamed participant intimated:

…it turned out to be a personal pilgrimage into previously unrecognised areas of attitudes and conditioning...though it was at times painful, the experience was profoundly enriching...  

Robert Consedine, who would later lead his own bicultural education programme and was then working for the Presbyterian Support Services in Christchurch, shared a similar experience:

...like everyone, I found it an extremely uncomfortable experience...[though] I got what I felt I needed from the workshop. I believe that the process is challenging and that the challenges are necessary.  

Acknowledging Māori as indigenous proved particularly transformative for one participant, who related it to their own sense of belonging:

I realise that the fears I have of being wrenched from the soil which I experience as the deepest centre of my own spiritual being...if I accept Maoridom’s claim to be tangatawhenua [sic] [I project] onto Maoridom a tendency towards selfishness and inhospitality which is entirely inappropriate given what I know about them.  

Expressions of how helpful, though difficult and often deeply unsettling, these workshops were are thematic of many more responses.
Of course, there were participants who were sceptical of, or outright insulted by, the confrontational nature of the seminars. One group of Aucklanders felt “accused and lambasted” at their workshop, and expressed concern that a commitment to Māori issues would eclipse their commitment to feminism.56 Based on his previous experience at another workshop, Rodney Routledge, a lecturer in social work at the University of Canterbury, actively protested the organisation of a Programme on Racism workshop commissioned by the Social Work Training Council in a letter he forwarded to every social work school in the South Island.57

A common thread through these protests argued that the Programme’s use of institutional racism analysis, and thus their figuring of racism as ‘inherent’ in individuals, ignored the good work already being done by participants. The All Saints’ Church in Matamata went as far as to announce their complete dissociation from the Programme, rejecting the premise that “members of the dominant culture are guilty by association, of inherited racist attitudes and racist social structures.”58 Canon Earle Howe was particularly incensed:

Members of Vestry are involved in efforts through local Service Clubs, schools, health services, and the Matamata District Council of Social Service...These efforts have, on a number of occasions, led to hard negotiations with Government departments on such issues as Courthouse facilities, work skills programmes, State housing, Maori Affairs housing...while acknowledging that much needs to be done, Vestry feels that the Programme on Racism ignores the value of such an approach.59

Beyond their reactions to the workshop, Bishop of Waikato Brian Davis was careful to point out the deep-seated conservatism of Christians in the area and revealed that there were members of other Waikato parishes who thought the National Council of Churches was “a communist front organisation, and all protesters and ‘stirrers’ should be locked up.”60

Notwithstanding Bishop Davis’ sympathy for Scott and Nairn, he too expressed concern at the confrontational nature of the seminars and their potentially negative impact on individuals, particularly those who were already resistant to their premise.61 Both Scott and

56 Letter from Perrin, Liz; Rae, Pam; Ward, Elizabeth; Purcell, Johanna; Brake, Caleb; McDonagh, Dorothy; Paver, Anne; and Peter Adams to Mrs. Armstrong and Bob Scott, 30 September 1985, NCC Workshop Material 1983-1985, Record no. 92-085-4/3, Alexander Turnbull Library.
58 Letter from Earle Howe to Angus McLeod, 21 March 1983, Church and Society Commission Programme on Racism correspondence, Record no. 92-085-2/1, Alexander Turnbull Library.
59 Ibid.
60 Letter from Brian Davis to Bob Scott, 31 March 1983, Church and Society Commission Programme on Racism correspondence, Record no. 92-085-2/1, Alexander Turnbull Library, p. 1.
61 Ibid, p. 2.
Nairn, in their responses to Bishop Davis and in a Programme on Racism newsletter published in 1986, argued that the seminars were, by nature of their subject matter rather than the manner of their delivery, inherently confrontational.\(^\text{62}\) Indeed, the confrontational nature of the workshops throughout the 1980s had profoundly deep impacts on participants, and perhaps reflected reactions to the broader historiographical revolution, too. Pākehā-led workshops such as these were nevertheless important sites where institutional racism was identified and directly related to individual Pākehā, foreshadowing the emergence of bicultural consultancies towards the end of the decade. The Programme’s work with public servants, particularly social workers and health professionals, appears to have had a role in engendering support for institutional reform.

*Bicultural reformism and the Puao-te-ata-tu report, 1986*

In June of 1986, the Department of Social Welfare released the *Puao-te-ata-tu* report. Led by Tūhoe leader and public servant John Rangihau and building upon earlier reports completed by the Human Rights Commission and the Women Against Racism Action Group, the report baldly concluded that the Department of Social Welfare was institutionally racist and further suggested this conclusion applied to other government departments.\(^\text{63}\) The report became an important, influential criteria for realising biculturalism, and emphasised both internal reforms and devolution of the control of welfare services to iwi, hapū, and whānau as solutions.\(^\text{64}\) Echoing the Hui Taumata, the report confirmed the lack of a Māori perspective on policy making and delivery, calling for an authentically Māori dimension to be incorporated into the department. The report highlighted “racial imbalances in the staffing, appointment, promotion and training practices” as areas in need of essential reform, pushing affirmative action measures as solutions.\(^\text{65}\) Overall, deficient knowledge of Māori culture and custom was partly identified as the source of institutional racism in the department.

Perhaps most importantly, *Puao-te-ata-tu*’s authors handled the issue of affirmative action somewhat delicately. The summary of their recommendations on recruitment and staffing firmly foregrounded the “racial imbalance” amongst staff as a significant barrier for


\(^{64}\) Harris and Williams, ‘Rights and Revitalisation’, p. 376.

\(^{65}\) *Puao-te-ata-tu*, pp. 7; 12-13.
effective engagement with Māori communities, stating “we were told that the absence of brown faces inhibits Maori clients of the Department”. Highlighted excerpts from submissions all clearly pointed to the lack of Māori staff as a huge concern for welfare recipients and social workers alike.\footnote{Ibid, p. 38.}

While ultimately declaring they were “not convinced the answer to such problems lies in the wholesale recruitment of Maori staff”, the authors’ emphasis on staffing imbalances seems deliberate. Its prevalence prompted Jim Murphy, head of the New Zealand Association of Social Workers, to address this aspect of the report in an interview in the \textit{New Zealand Herald}. Murphy acknowledged the report’s conclusions, that social workers had a “moral obligation to confront their own racism and racist practices within social work agencies” and the wider community, and further, that recruitment should focus on hiring more Māori staff. However, he was careful to argue that, because of budget cuts and a lack of skilled social workers, Pākehā social workers were capable of reforming themselves or learning to negotiate bicultural spaces, and should not quit their jobs on principle:

\begin{quote}
I believe Pakeha social workers need to be aware [sic] of indulging in a collective guilt trip, for which they seem to purge themselves by ritualistic mass occupational suicide.\footnote{Jim Murphy, quoted in ‘Occupational Suicide Not the Answer’, \textit{New Zealand Herald} (26 August 1986), p. 1.}
\end{quote}

Indeed, Murphy expresses concern at the prospect of a redefinition of a qualified social worker, warning existing staff “[were] at the mercy of administrations, bureaucrats and politicians” - perhaps a passing reference to the report’s insistence that staff at all levels should have a more thorough understanding of Māori issues.\footnote{Ibid.}

Murphy’s commentary arguably reflects the broader discursive impact of the report, and perhaps also the spectre of the Programme on Racism’s popularity with social workers. The report’s appendix included far-reaching evaluations of the impact of colonisation and the extent of institutional racism in the public service. Importantly, the report further entrenched the mainstreaming of activist rhetoric regarding New Zealand’s history:

Modern Maori commentators have argued that the aim of these assimilation policies was to “domesticate” Maori people and Maori culture. It is a view that is difficult to argue with. It is certainly clear that virtually all policies concerning Maori welfare and development have been founded on pakeha cultural prescriptions of what was best for the Maori...[and] that virtually all Maori attempts to direct and shape the Maori future...were resisted either militarily, legislatively
or by ignoring them.\textsuperscript{69}

It also located individuals’ complicity within racist institutions, echoing Walker, Awatere, and the Programme on Racism:

If those in positions of influence within institutions do not work to reduce and eliminate the monocultural bias that disadvantages Māori and minorities, they can be accused of collaborating with the system, and therefore of being racist themselves.\textsuperscript{70}

Puao-te-ata-tu’s actual recommendations were perhaps relatively benign given the inclusion of these analyses. While its language gave credence to so-called radical rhetoric of Ngā Tamatoa and others, its final recommendations to the department prioritised increasing cultural awareness amongst existing staff, and educating, rather than immediately replacing, senior management. The department accepted most of the report’s recommendations, though it ignored the few calls for affirmative action - such as guaranteed Māori representation on district legislative committees and the creation of a bicultural advisory unit within the department.\textsuperscript{71}

These omissions were a notable dilution of the core arguments of the report, especially as Puao-te-ata-tu became an important and influential framework for realising biculturalism as policy. Other, similarly ‘diluted’ state responses began to show that the government’s interpretation of biculturalism was a guiding precept that on the whole did not reflect the kind of autonomy and participation desired by Māori. A number of proposals for parallel judicial institutions, variously suggesting the Maori Land Court be restructured to restore iwi control and that iwi-based courts be created, were all rejected by Cabinet.\textsuperscript{72} A two-volume report commissioned by the Department of Justice and authored by Moana Jackson, The Maori and the Criminal Justice System: A New Perspective/He Whaipaanga Hou proved particularly controversial when it was published in 1988. The first volume directly utilised institutional racism analysis, outlining the distinctiveness of tikanga Māori and the Māori worldview, and outlining a Māori research methodology for the rest of the paper. The second volume argued for the creation of a complete, autonomous justice system based on Māori conceptions of justice.\textsuperscript{73}

Tellingly, Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer was so incensed by He Whaipaanga Ho that he not only rejected its proposals but additionally refused

\textsuperscript{69} Appendix to Puao-te-ata-tu (Wellington: The Maori Perspective Advisory Committee, June 1986), pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{71} Walker, ‘Irresistible demands’, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{72} Hill, Maori and the State, p. 212.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
to attend the Ministry’s event marking its release.\textsuperscript{74} Despite its rejection, Jackson’s articulations of an autonomous justice system and of the distinctiveness and usefulness of Māori-based epistemology remained very influential amongst Māori.\textsuperscript{75} Arguably of most importance was Jackson’s overarching assertion that ideas of justice were not solely Western in origin. The report articulated to Pākehā that Māori had long had institutions and practices which made up a system of laws that existed before colonisation, and that they could potentially (and perhaps foreseeably) replace imported systems.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Articulating and obfuscating a new Crown-Māori partnership}

Though discussions like Walker’s explored how neoliberal ideology had the potential to be accordant with Māori self-determination, the September 1986 State-Owned Enterprises Act demonstrated the limit of this overlap. Mimicking international neoliberal governments, the Act proposed corporatising a number of government subsidiaries, covering “land, forestry, electricity, telecommunications, coal, the airways, the Post Office Bank, the Post Office and Government Property Services.”\textsuperscript{77} Included in the asset sales was the alienation of extensive Crown land and resource holdings. Concerned that comprehensive asset sales would mean that before long the Crown would have little land or resources left to return to iwi, the Tribunal hastily prepared a report asserting the Act’s contravention of the Treaty.

In order to reflect their declared commitment to Māori development, the government had little choice but to acknowledge these criticisms. Amendments to the bill forbid sales if it forseeably breached the Treaty and allowed more time for Tribunal cases to proceed. However, Māori still considered the amendments too vague to ensure that asset sales would not proceed without evaluating the mounting claims before the Tribunal. In March 1987 the New Zealand Māori Council were granted an interim freeze on the sale of Crown assets by the High Court, in anticipation of a hearing before the Court of Appeal in May. In the so-called Lands Case, the Māori Council successfully argued that in not giving special provisions to Tribunal claims filed after the Act’s signing, the asset sales were in contravention of the amendment forbidding transgressions of the principles of the Treaty; this latter section, therefore, superseded the rest of the Act.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} Moana Jackson, interviewed by Ethan McKenzie, 19 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{75} Hill, \textit{Māori and the State}, p. 212.
\textsuperscript{77} Orange, \textit{An Illustrated History}, pp. 162-163.
The Court of Appeal’s ruling in the Lands Case crucially affirmed the Treaty as the basis of a co-operative partnership. While its judicial impact was important, legal scholars and historians alike have argued the Lands Case’s more enduring legacy is much broader in scope.\(^{79}\) In their rulings, the judges noted that while the text of the Treaty was not directly relevant, its principles required signatories to “‘act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith’”.\(^{80}\) Thus, the Crown had a fundamental duty to consult Māori on matters of governance and policy decisions, especially those matters directly affecting Māori affairs. The ruling was affirmed when the Treaty became statutory law with the passing of a revised state-asset sale plan, the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act, in 1988.\(^{81}\) The judgment and resulting act implied the Crown’s duty to consult Māori would not be limited to state-owned enterprises, but to every other piece of legislation or policy relevant to the Treaty principles. Bicultural partnership, and particularly its relevance to the public sector, now had a foundation in the fabric of New Zealand law.

However, the Lands Case still explicated a fundamentally unequal partnership. Parliament and the government executive, by their and the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty, retained ultimate sovereignty. Any attempt to deal and liaise in good faith could very easily be undermined by the extant prejudices of Crown institutions, as had been warned by Walker the year before. The New Zealand Maori Council articulated this in a submission to the Government barely seven months after the Lands Case:

> [This government perpetuates] bureaucratic systems which deny the principles of partnership and bicultural development under the Treaty...and, as a consequence, are based on the GIRA (Getting It Right Accidentally) management principle, with the partner of one culture (Pākehā) prescribing for the well-being of the partner of a distinctly different culture.\(^{82}\)

The stakes of this potential new paradigm were still high, and would rely on a significant, systematic revolution of bureaucracy. The Lands Case further fostered the discourse of biculturalism, with ‘partnership’ and ‘consultation’ increasingly characterising Labour’s Māori policy language.

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Te Urupare Rangapu and the articulation of devolutionary Māori policy, 1988

Against this backdrop, in 1988 the government set out a firm policy agenda intended to resolve and enact this new partnership between Māori and the Crown. After several months of public consultation on and development of the practicalities of this new partnership, in November the Department of Maori Affairs released its policy paper *Te Urupare Rangapu/Partnership Response*. The initiative resolved around a two-pronged approach similar to the bicultural ‘distributivist’ framework suggested in Walker’s paper *The Meaning of Biculturalism*: the government declared its intention to both devolve significant decision-making power to Māori, and to require government departments to be more responsive to Māori needs, grievances, and aspirations.83 Thus, the reforms would create both a Māori dimension within the public service as a whole, and accommodate a new autonomous role for iwi alongside Crown institutions.

The importance of a stronger Māori dimension to the public sector was underlined by the centrepiece of *Te Urupare Rangapu*: the proposed dissolution of the Department of Maori Affairs. This dissolution required transferring the department’s policy making functions to mainstream departments. Mainstream departments would then be required to involve iwi and other representative Māori groups in the formulation of Māori policy for their respective communities. Improving responsiveness was fundamentally defined by the number and seniority of Māori staff within a department, as outlined in *Te Urupare Rangapu’s ‘Personnel Policy’* section. *Te Urupare Rangapu* emphasised recruiting more Māori public servants, and developing and training extant Māori personnel for senior positions, as clearly defined strategies to improve the responsiveness of government agencies long term.84 Policy language carefully and directly linked responsiveness to “levels of recruitment, training, and promotion of Māori people at all levels of the state sector”, stressing a commitment “to increasing the numbers of Māori staff employed” through prioritising management training and affirmative action measures.85 These proposals would then feed into the success of devolution. Māori public servants were to be seconded to iwi authorities to gather policy input from and forge relationships with Māori communities.86 The government promised that chief executives of

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83 *Te Urupare Rangapu/Partnership Response* (Wellington: Department of Maori Affairs, November 1988), pp. 5-6.
84 Ibid, p. 21.
85 Ibid.
government departments would be directly accountable to their Ministers for implementing these measures.87

A new Ministry of Maori Affairs would also provide assistance and advice to mainstream departments on policy making (the assumption being that it would largely comprise staff with whakapapa Māori), and would control the design of relevant Māori policy.88 This new Ministry “would operate with the Treaty at its ‘core’”, officially confirming a new approach to Māori-Crown relations.89 In addition, concurrent reforms under the State Sector Act 1988 required government departments to have a Mission Statement which included how they would incorporate Treaty principles into their everyday activities.90 Accommodating devolution to iwi and improving departmental responsiveness to Māori issues were now intrinsic responsibilities of the public sector. The emphasis on these two arms of the policy strategy were not just for operational effectiveness, but also reflected the importance of the government’s perceived commitment to renewed Māori policy. The government declared it was “determined that real change will happen.”91

‘Knowledge acquisition’, the dilution of institutional change, and the demand for consultants

While accommodating devolution and improving responsiveness were inter-reliant strategies, the latter strategy is primarily what created and sustained the demand for consultants. Consultants became especially relevant as the criteria definitively measuring responsiveness shifted following the release of Te Urupare Rangapu. This shift comprised a marked de-emphasis of the need for internal departmental reform centred on affirmative action, instead defining responsiveness as the capacity of a department to consult with external Māori groups without linking this capacity to the presence of Māori staff.

This shift is gestured at in an internal information booklet published by the State Services Commission in July 1989 titled Towards Responsiveness: objective setting and evaluation.92 While “Affirmative Action” is listed as a so-called “operational dimension” of responsiveness, “Knowledge Acquisition” or an “honest effort to ascertain the facts” is highlighted as the key strategy to improve a department’s responsiveness. All the other

87 Te Urupare Rangapu, pp. 21-22.
88 Ibid, pp. 5-6; 19-20.
90 Te Urupare Rangapu, p. 19.
91 Ibid.
operational dimensions of responsiveness - variously framed as “Protection” of Māori rights and properties, and “Consultation”, “Cooperation” and “Negotiation” with Māori - stemmed from successful “Knowledge Acquisition”. Adequate responsiveness was achieved if a department’s actions resulted in a “Mutual Benefit” for Māori and Pākehā.93

Importantly, this was released the same month as Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi, a statement of a framework for how the Crown would deal with Treaty issues.94 Both publications contained similar stated principles on the government’s position on the Treaty (though it appears Towards Responsiveness contained an earlier draft of those that made up the Principles for Crown Action). These were articulated in Principles for Crown Action as follows:

- Principle 1: The Principle of Government/Kawanatanga
- Principle 2: The Principle of Self Management-Rangatiratanga
- Principle 3: The Principle of Equality
- Principle 4: The Principle of Reasonable Cooperation
- Principle 5: The Principle of Redress95

Reflecting on the historical disagreements over what the Treaty meant for its signatories, the government instead attempted to distil the spirit of the agreement rather than strictly the text of its contradictory translations.96 While this certainly proved a useful public declaration of the government’s interpretation of the Treaty, it appeared to undermine the policy priorities of Te Urupare Rangapu by implicitly figuring the government, and by extension the public service, as solely a Crown entity, rather than ‘shared’ by Māori and Pākehā.

This interpretation of responsiveness was perhaps not entirely surprising, given that Te Urupare Rangapu centred on devolution. Presupposing that iwi authorities would manage most services to Māori suggested that in practice departments merely required public servants who could effectively communicate with Māori groups. Knowledge acquisition was less difficult to implement than the policy’s other benchmarks, as it would not require overhauls of department structure or personnel policies. Instead, departments would seek consultation from Māori groups or experts on Māori policy, but this would be the extent of their involvement. Departments would then independently design policy based on this advice. Further, the reforms of Rogernomics and of the public service resulted in the core public service shedding nearly a

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93 Ibid, pp. 21-22.
96 Ibid, p. 7.
third of its total staff. Affirmative action measures sat uncomfortably against a backdrop of what must have been a feeling of significant job insecurity amongst public servants.

In spite of this, the State Services Commission continued to push for recruiting and personnel issues to be a key priority for chief executives. On top of its clear articulation in *Te Urupare Rangapu* itself, much of the planning for the policy’s implementation in early 1989 focused on recruitment and Māori staff development. Because of the increased independence of departments due to public sector reform, however, the State Services Commission had little to no authoritative oversight after 1988. This, combined with *Te Urupare Rangapu*’s broad criteria for responsiveness, essentially meant chief executives could interpret the policy however they saw fit. While previously Equal Employment Opportunity and other personnel decisions had been dictated by the State Services Commission, the State Sector Act left this responsibility to chief executives. There was a stipulated requirement that departments should implement “an equal employment opportunities program”, but ultimately this was to be defined by the senior management of each department.

**Conclusion**

Thus, it can be seen *Te Urupare Rangapu* policy language encouraged government institutions to engage Māori consultants, in a way that broadly fit the official discourse of Treaty-based partnership. This Crown-Māori consulting relationship was, then, part pragmatic policy strategy and part performative politics. *Te Urupare Rangapu* was formulated on the assumption that the public service lacked a distinctly Māori perspective, implying internally-calibrated reforms would be insufficient. Belied by their title, bicultural consultancies were encouraged by the institutional reform promised by *Te Urupare Rangapu* and sustained by continuing bicultural discourse.

Discussion of ‘bicultural issues’ was invoked to describe more thorough institutional reform signalled in *Puao-te-ata-tu* and by Walker’s *The Meaning of Biculturalism*. By the time *Te Urupare Rangapu* was outlined in 1988, however, biculturalism had become associated with a kind of national mythos that would replace the Better Britons-based national identity that had been upset by Māori activism and the maturing of historiographic revisionism during

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98 *Te Urupare Rangapu* Partnership Response: Personnel Policy.
this period. Māori attempted to define biculturalism as a framework for realising a meaningful degree of autonomy, mapping on to the promised recognition of rangatiratanga inherent in the Treaty. However, government responses, while mimicking calls for ‘biculturalism’, instead seemed to co-opt bicultural discourse as representative of a much more meagre and abstract ‘new’ Crown-Māori partnership. In spite of this, Māori still saw Te Urupare Rangapu as an opportunity to claim autonomous outcomes, force government recognition of rangatiratanga, and continue their leveraging open of the state. Principal of these agents were those who began providing bicultural consulting services to assist in the rollout of Te Urupare Rangapu.
Chapter Three
Responsiveness and the emergence of Ihi Management Consultants

Introduction

The emergence of Treaty education experts towards the end of the 1980s coincided with the relative decline of Pākehā anti-racist groups such as ACORD, CARE, and HART.¹ While the National Council of Churches’ Programme on Racism continued, other similar Pākehā-led anti-racist education groups became less popular with government. Project Waitangi had their government funding and contracts pulled entirely by 1990 and struggled to continue its workshop programme.² There were, of course, continuities between the anti-racist focus of these groups, and the later-emerging groups which focused on bicultural issues. Despite the abstract scope of bicultural discourse, the demand for race relations ‘experts’ that Māori activists had created through protest since the late 1960s remained and was clearly consistent with biculturalism as it was figured as a national project.

However, these consultancies’ association with biculturalism meant they perhaps unintentionally reflected biculturalism’s de-emphasis of institutional racism analyses, analyses that had been the focus of Māori activists, as well as Pākehā anti-racists and their education programmes. Certainly, the incredulous reaction many Pākehā had to Māori activism, which played out in both the public sphere as the so-called Pākehā identity crisis and on a micro level within the workshops of groups like the Programme on Racism, loomed over the emergence of bicultural consultancies and influenced the nature of their work.

In these ways, it appears that Treaty education both contributed and was victim to the relative vagueness of bicultural/Treaty discourse in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. In order to suggest some of the continuities and discontinuities between anti-racism and Treaty education, this chapter largely centres on material prepared by Ihi Management Consultants, arguably the most important company of its kind, as its major case study.

The emergence of bicultural consultancies

In early 1989, the Maori Affairs Restructuring Act passed in Parliament, establishing the Ministry of Maori Affairs and, in October, the Iwi Transition Agency.³ This latter agency

would exist alongside the new Ministry for five years, to both ensure that iwi were independent enough to adequately receive their new responsibilities under devolution, and to administer the transfer of any remaining programmes to other government agencies. The Runanga Iwi Act followed, outlining the criteria by which iwi and other Maori groups could apply to be recognised as a legal entity, to which policy delivery could be devolved. While noting its substance fell somewhat short of Māoridom’s calls for institutional change, Ranginui Walker endorsed the policies, particularly the symbolism of the devolution of some functions of government to iwi, as “admirable” in his influential *New Zealand Listener* column in February 1989. “The hard part”, he cautioned, “will be translating them into action.”

Critics of *Te Urupare Rangapu* noted that, given financial resources remained centralised, the proposals effectively left the Crown with the power of veto, so that *Te Urupare Rangapu* still resulted in a fundamentally unequal partnership. Legal scholar Jane Kelsey argued at the time *Te Urupare Rangapu* unfairly defined sovereignty as “self-management”, charging “this was far from the handing over of resources with ‘no strings attached’ demanded by many Maori.” Indeed, when Prime Minister David Lange was asked whether the government was truly devolving resources to Māori, he answered: “no more to the iwis than to the Rotary club.” Additionally, Māori found engaging with *Te Urupare Rangapu* and attempts at registering their iwi for devolution a bureaucratic nightmare. Some iwi viewed the policies as a modern version of assimilation, and refused to engage with the policies at all. Many Māori felt they had their scepticism confirmed when the registration process revealed that the partnership was conceived on the government’s terms and with real balance of power remaining with the Crown. As *Te Urupare Rangapu* began to be implemented, it became clear the end result would likely be more akin to decentralisation rather than true devolution.

There were some hangovers of a more definitive push for thorough internal reform, though perhaps emphasising framing different from that of policy makers. A number of departments nominated existing Māori staff to assist with policy implementation, and it was

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8 Ibid.
9 Hill, *Maori and the State*, pp. 243-244.
recognised that Māori public servants would be important to maintaining Te Urupare Rangapu policy objectives. However, both the Puao-te-ata-tu report and the State Services Commission emphasised that, more often than not, Māori staff were unfairly expected to provide advice on bicultural issues in addition to their regular duties and without remuneration. Outsourcing the beginnings of policy strategising seemed a much better option, especially given budget cuts and the myriad other restructuring priorities demanded by broader state sector reform.

Figureheads of the cultural revitalisation movement were obvious first points of contact. Reverend Henare Kingi, a staunch advocate of te reo Māori and a broadcaster with the first Māori radio station, Te Upoko, provided advice to the National Library of New Zealand on Māori protocol and culture, and was formally hired in an advisory role in 1988. Tipene O’Regan, who worked on Puao-te-ata-tu and lead Ngāi Tahu through their Waitangi Tribunal claim from 1986, founded Aoraki Consultant Services in the mid-1980s. He regularly advised the government on their Māori policy and prepared the policy document Partnership Dialogue for the State Services Commission, which provided advice for chief executives on how to consult with Māori groups.

People associated with protest action made the move into government consulting, too. Māori activist Eru Potaka Dewes, perhaps most famous for remarking that Labour’s 1986 appointment of a Pākehā, Wally Hirsch, as Race Relations Conciliator was “a smack in the teeth” for Māori, became an outspoken supporter of biculturalism towards the end of the 1980s. In 1987, he was a co-founder and spokesperson for the short-lived Aotearoa Party, which advocated for a form of bicultural governance. Around this time, he and his partner Kiri Potaka Dewes co-founded a consultancy company, Haparangi Consultants, which

11 Alison Nevill, ‘Maori Perspectives’, 23 February 1989, NLNZ Bicultural Policy papers part 2, Record no. NL7-1, Item ID: R18761470, Box 67, Archives New Zealand; Letter from Kevin Heitia to Margaret Hobbs, 14 October 1988, Health Department, Corporate change 1988-1990 – Change Management Taskforce – Bicultural input during change process, Record no. 378-6-7, Item ID: R16666220, Box 2061, Archives New Zealand.
13 Letter from Peter Scott to Henare Kingi, 8 December 1988, NLNZ Bicultural Policy papers part 1, Record no. NL7-1, Item ID: R18761469, Box 67, Archives New Zealand.
14 Report of a seminar on “biculturalism and voluntary agencies” (Wellington: Voluntary Welfare Organisations, 10th April, 1987).
17 Ibid.
conducted bicultural staff training courses for the National Library of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{18} Ripeka Evans became the trustee of the Pākehā-led Waitangi Consultancy Group, founded in 1988.\textsuperscript{19} Project Waitangi member Robert Consedine, a Pākehā Catholic who had been present at the Springbok Tour protests and Waitangi Day demonstrations since the early 1980s, founded his own company, Waitangi Associates, in 1990.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Ihi Management Consultants/Ihi Communications & Consultancy Limited}

Ihi Management Consultants was founded by Donna Awatere Huata and fellow University of Auckland psychology graduate Maria Mareroa in 1984.\textsuperscript{21} Because of Awatere Huata’s profile and the fact it predated many other consultancies, Ihi became the most prolific and prominent bicultural consultancy.\textsuperscript{22} By Awatere Huata’s estimation, the company serviced 56 government agencies and State-Owned Enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{23} The disconnect between senior bureaucrats and the local communities they were serving was the source for Awatere Huata’s inspiration for Ihi:

\textquote{...I was working in South Auckland and I could just see the policies being made in Wellington and regional [public servants] were so dumb and stupid[,] I figured they don’t understand their client...so I thought I would go to Wellington and work at head office and try and inform them about their clients so that they could make better decisions...to get a better deal for Maori in South Auckland.}\textsuperscript{24}

Though a less emphasised endeavour, Ihi also worked with private companies on bicultural issues.\textsuperscript{25} Their foray into consulting for the private sector created a rather unlikely bicultural relationship in Awatere and Sue Wood, previously the National Party’s President during Robert Muldoon’s terms in government, who partnered with the company in 1989. While the pair had known each other since their first year of university in the 1960s, the joint venture represented to many the peculiar and seemingly contradictory shift in Awatere’s ideology.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{18} Letter from Janet McKee to Kevin Jones, ‘Bicultural Development’, 8 July 1988, NLNZ Bicultural Policy papers part 1, Record no. NL7-1, Item ID: R18761469, Box 67, Archives New Zealand, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{20} Consedine and Consedine, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{22} Baird, Patrick and Colin James, ‘Business and biculturalism: side by side’, \textit{Management} (April, 1990), p. 28.
\textsuperscript{23} Donna Awatere Huata, interviewed by Laura Kamau and Te Maire Tau, 26 November 2007, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{25} Baird and James, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{26} Tim Grafton, ‘Unlikely pair push corporate biculturalism’, \textit{The Dominion Sunday Times} (22 October, 1989), p. 5.
There is little public record of Ihi’s early activity, yet its genesis was a clear continuation of Awatere Huata’s views on government and cultural imperialism that she had articulated before 1984. However, the aims and nature of Ihi, especially after 1987, indicate Awatere Huata believed real change could be effected without Māori control of New Zealand, directly contradicting her position in her 1982/1983 articles Maori Sovereignty. In various interviews published in the mid-1990s, Awatere Huata regularly commented that she now conceived of ‘Maori sovereignty’ to be more closely aligned to a conception of rangatiratanga that had been iterated by most of her activist peers: one that did not discount or completely replace Crown sovereignty but allowed Māori a degree of control over their affairs.

In spite of this change in thinking, Awatere Huata linked Ihi to her previous activist projects:

I never thought about Ihi as a business[:] I thought of Ihi as a mission[,] [It] was my goal to get these white bureaucrats understanding that they belong to a miserable soulless society that had crushed the Maori spirit.

Personal experiences of ill-treatment by institutions made Ihi’s aims all the more pressing. As a defendant in court cases relating to her time in Ngā Tamatoa and Patu, Awatere Huata had witnessed the bias inherent in the police and the judicial system first-hand. Mareroa, who was the second Māori to become a qualified psychologist in New Zealand, became involved with Ihi after confronting racism from her colleagues early in her career.

Ihi’s more general aims were to focus on liaising strategies for government departments, covering “culture, the Treaty, communication styles, [and] how to deal with and approach Māori.” Ihi began with generalised consulting services, such as organising seminars for participants featuring Māori speakers. In 1987, the company began offering what it called a “Bicultural Development Programme”, likely prompted by the ascendancy of biculturalism in public sector thinking due to the release of Puao-te-ata-tu in 1986 (a quote from which the company used as an epigraph for a pitching document prepared in 1987) and the judgment of

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27 “Change is hard, but not impossible. Obstacles stand in the way. One...is the fallacy of thinking that “racism” in this country can be eliminated without achieving Maori sovereignty. It can’t.” - Donna Awatere, ‘On Maori Sovereignty’, Broadsheet 100 (June 1982), p. 42.
29 Awatere Huata, interviewed by Laura Kamau and Te Maire Tau, 26 November 2007, p. 133.
31 Ibid, p. 89.
32 Ibid, p. 92.
33 Report of a seminar on “biculturalism and voluntary agencies”. This publication contains a summary of a seminar organised by Ihi featuring Tipene O’Regan as a guest speaker.
the Lands Case in 1987.\textsuperscript{34} While this content preceded the government’s official articulation of devolutionary policy, it emphasised the role of iwi in government policy and suggested (echoing the discussions at the Hui Taumata in 1984) they were capable of becoming more autonomous in providing services to their communities.\textsuperscript{35}

However, real change came in 1988 with \textit{Te Urupare Rangapu} and the Māori- and Treaty-relevant portions of the State Sector Act, both of which considerably bolstered Ihi’s public sector client base and firmed up a government-wide demand for expertise on ‘bicultural issues.’\textsuperscript{36} After 1988, much of the written curriculum for the Bicultural Development Programme stayed the same, but was amended with language and some additional material which more closely aligned with the policy plans now favoured by the government.

Like the ongoing Programme on Racism run by Mitzi and Ray Nairn for public servants and the general public, the Bicultural Development Programme required personal reflection and re-evaluation of one’s attitudes. Its philosophy revolved around a central idea: that personal and institutional racism was the result of an information deficit rather than manifesting as an inherent, irreversible trait. Awatere Huata later explained that:

Initial hostility of a deep and entrenched kind would be overcome... by the transforming power of information...Certain facts go into people’s minds and they find - with various degrees of struggle - that their attitudes are based on a mistake. Once this realisation is made, people change.\textsuperscript{37}

Human empathy and understanding would mean that individuals learning the historical and present reality of Māori would eventually root out their perpetuation of institutional racism.

However, content delivery - at least on the surface - focused less on personal self-critique and more on broader, institutional problems. In this way, individual apprehension or defensiveness could be mitigated. Reformation of public sector and management processes was framed as a vehicle through which institutional racism could be erased. The curriculum tackled issues that activists had grappled with in the preceding two decades, and yet remained fundamentally optimistic, attempting to locate redeemable value in individual public servants, public sector institutions, and indeed, Pākehā New Zealand as a whole. This new ‘packaging’ of activism was careful and deliberate: as Awatere Huata later described, the driving force of

\textsuperscript{37} Awatere Huata, \textit{My Journey}, p. 93.
her new business “was to develop ideas which had been radical into their increasingly conventional, mainstream form.”

Awatere Huata, for her part, was particularly cognisant of the impact her legacy as an activist had on the reception of Ihi’s course content. For example, she describes early Ihi courses conducted with New Zealand Police as incredibly difficult because many of the participants had arrested her in the past. The officers were initially actively resistant and disruptive to proceedings, which she attributes to their perception of her as a “revolutionary dyke”.

Indeed, some departments opted not to engage outside consultants for fear of receiving what they perceived as radical rhetoric. Veteran public servant Tony Simpson, who worked for Customs under the Fourth Labour Government and succeeding Fourth National Government, pejoratively described the use of consultants by the public and private sector as “throwing Maori at the problem”. Simpson argues that Customs staff were either actively defensive or, at best, unreceptive to the “guilt trip” offered by consultants. Instead, he developed and ran an internal programme at the behest of Customs’ senior management. Simpson’s summary of the programme describes it as a “crash course in New Zealand history”, with a focus on the impact European culture had on Māori culture at, and since, first contact:

Operationally it entailed a half-day small group seminar on the pre-European nature of Maori culture and how the cultural objectives of the incoming pākehā settlers had collided with that culture. The seminar was divided into segments with plenty of space for discussion and clarification.

This model, Simpson claims, was completely unlike any programme offered by consultants, particularly lacking the “finger pointing” characteristic of consultants’ seminars. In Simpson’s eyes, this seems to have been achieved by keeping content focused on early colonial history, separating modern-day Pākehā from colonial-era atrocities. This obviously differed from the rhetoric of Ngā Tamatoa and consultants like the Programme on Racism, who unapologetically implicated present-day individuals and institutions in the legacy of colonialism. Simpson reports that the voluntary course was broadly well-received (albeit with resistance from some participants), and by the time the programme had concluded around six hundred Customs employees had attended one or more of Simpson’s seminars.

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38 Ibid, p. 89.  
39 Ibid, p. 93.  
41 Ibid, p. 231.  
42 Ibid.
Crucially, Simpson framed knowledge of Treaty issues as a practical skillset rather than a moral or ethical obligation: “their personal feelings about the Treaty of Waitangi were of no relevance: the point was to include a level of awareness of the issues involved in their daily work.”

Indeed, the existence of Ihi’s curriculum and its overlaps with Simpson’s own ideas problematises his claim that his programme was “almost one hundred per cent differently orientated” to the work of consultancies, and that “no consultants [were] offering such a programme or anything even approaching it.” It seems likely that the fact that Ihi and many other consultancies often involved so-called radicals - and, frequently, Māori radicals, once more - engendered defensiveness in Pākehā participants at the outset. For her part, Awatere Huata similarly stresses the importance of having senior management who were supportive of this work. Certainly, staff of any institution would foreseeably be more receptive to a course designed and run by a colleague. In the final analysis, however, Simpson too readily dismisses the work of Ihi, who formulated a programme on much the same terms as his programme for Customs’ staff.

**The Ihi Management Consultants ‘Bicultural Development Programme’ curriculum**

Ihi’s curriculum had a number of main aims, as defined in a pitching document released in 1987. Its primary service was bicultural literacy. Participants would be taught definitions of key Māori words, customs, and marae protocol. The centrality of iwi both to Māori social organisation and to concurrent policy reform was particularly emphasised. Bicultural literacy also included education on the history and relevance of the Treaty, utilising some of the new historiography being published on Māordom’s experience in New Zealand since 1840. This provided participants with background knowledge and 1100 pages of reference material. While participants were not expected to read the entire body of material provided, the material was intended to assist them in effectively communicating with Māori clients.

This knowledge base underpinned Ihi’s efforts to encourage public servants to incorporate “a bicultural approach” to their activities. Ihi were particularly conscious of staff resistance to such initiatives, declaring their intention to mitigate that nervousness and engender the beginnings of a process towards institutional biculturalism. To this end, Ihi formulated a Māori-based management system, suggesting the system could be incorporated.

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45 *Tangata Whenua: Bicultural Development Programme*, p. 3.
47 *Ibid*, p. 3.
into the governing structure of departments. Again, harkening back to Awatere Huata’s concern with issues of cultural hegemony, these measures would ideally create bicultural spaces within of government agencies, and allow for the beginnings of a Māori hegemonic influence within the public service. In organising this material, Awatere Huata became more convinced that Māoritanga should be, as she later declared, “the main culture of New Zealand”.

This idealised aspiration in some ways reflected the alleged aims of the Labour government’s focus on biculturalism: creating a more bicultural governing structure would set a precedent that would later influence the rest of society to also become bicultural.

Ihi’s programme for government departments began with pre-course preparation for participants. Participants were directed to complete a closed-book test on bicultural policy and Māori history, culture, and language, and then rate their own experience level. They were then provided with the first three sections of written curriculum to be read before workshops began. *Section One: Bicultural Relevance* outlined the rationale of bicultural policy, and included a paper authored by Awatere Huata on monoculturalism.

*Section Two: The Search for Tribal Autonomy* affirmed the centrality of iwi as an organising structure throughout history and in the present, particularly their relevance to bicultural policy. Finally, *Section Three: Historical Database* comprised a sizeable history of Māori and Pākehā New Zealand from early contact to present-day policy changes authored by Graham Butterworth, an institutional historian then working for the Department of Maori Affairs. The questionnaire was intended to assess the extant knowledge level of participants to identify any particular areas for improvement, while the three booklets of pre-course material was to prove useful background reading for the seminars themselves.

Ultimately, because Ihi was concerned with effective praxis, Awatere Huata and her collaborators carefully framed this course material so that it would preclude reactive feelings from would-be participants. In this vein, the most striking characteristic of this pre-course material is the almost complete absence of an explicit discussion of race ontology. While Awatere Huata’s previous publications unapologetically alluded to *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, The Wretched of the Earth*, and other classic works emphasising the ontology of race, discussions of culture stand in for an explicit discussion of racism and race as a category.

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48 Awatere Huata, interviewed by Laura Kamau and Te Maire Tau, 26 November 2007, p. 128.
49 *Tangata Whenua: Bicultural Development Programme*, p. 10.
50 Ibid., pp. 13-14. Conversely, more recent scholarship has emphasised the centrality of hapū. For example, see Angela Ballara, *Iwi: The Dynamics of Māori Tribal Organisations from c.1769 to c.1945* (Wellington: Victoria UP, 1998).
51 Ibid., p. 16.
52 Ibid., p. 5.
of difference. The legacy of New Zealand’s chequered race relations is described variously as “cross-cultural considerations”, “cross-cultural issues”, “cross-cultural difficulties”, “cross-cultural conflict”, and “cross-cultural hazards”. In the Historical Database, Butterworth refers to Victorian-era colonisers as “culturally insensitive”, possessing “a dark side that the Maori people were to particularly experience”, but stops short of labelling them racist.

Throughout the rest of Historical Database, Butterworth is careful to present New Zealand’s colonial history in a way that would make it more palatable to sceptics of biculturalism. As a political and institutional history, the narrative is driven by Māori ‘progress’ as defined by their treatment by the Crown. This approach was favoured in Butterworth’s other work: his Master’s thesis, a biography of Sir Āpirana Ngata, emphasised Ngata’s attempts to progress Māori through his work in government while advocating the practice of Māoritanga. Similarly, Butterworth’s last project for Maori Affairs was a largely glowing account of the department’s history and impact on Māoridom, co-written with Hepora Young. His research background in institutional history, and particularly his intimate knowledge of and relationship with Maori Affairs, made Butterworth an ideal author for a commissioned history which naturally ended with Te Urupare Rangapu.

With this frame in mind, Historical Database was a relatively progressive piece of work for its time. In order to set up the centrality of iwi to Te Urupare Rangapu, Butterworth often departed from the more generalised narrative to focus on discrete case studies of iwi, an approach that had not been attempted by a Pākehā academic before in a sustained way. Further, as part of an effort to suggest ways in which a ‘bicultural history’ of New Zealand could be written, Butterworth included waiata at different points in the narrative. Butterworth’s

56 Butterworth, Graham and Hepora Young, End of an Era: The Departments of Maori Affairs, 1840-1989 (Wellington: Department of Maori Affairs, 1989).
57 Graham Butterworth, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. This iwi-focused approach to history had been signalled by Butterworth in a revision of a paper he presented at Massey University in 1987, which argued for the development of learning institutions, archives, and oral history programmes in each iwi, which would be controlled by iwi-nominated kaumātua. These institutions and practices, he hoped, would serve the basis for not just the proliferation of Māori histories but as research centres for the preparation of Waitangi Tribunal claims. For more, see Graham Butterworth, Breaking the Grip: an historical agenda for nga iwi Maori (27 July, 1987).
declared aim with this new history was to avoid what he saw as the blow-by-blow account of colonialism of his revisionist history peers, as he describes in the introduction:

What this brief narrative attempts to do is to develop a more bicultural history that moves away from the simple “race relations” model of all previous history, to one that attempts to make changing Maori values and social structure its centrepiece.\(^{58}\)

In this vein, readers are further reassured they will not be directly implicated as agents for institutional racism. Like Simpson, Butterworth carefully creates a temporal distance between Pākehā readers and colonialism, invoking explorations of Pākehā identity by differentiating between Britain and ‘New Zealanders’:

The ties of British New Zealanders began to loosen in the 1950s as American influences became more significant and the pattern of economic dependence on Britain began to change. The steady emergence of a New Zealand identity and a growing New Zealand nationalism meant that the Pakeha whom modern Maori are dealing with is vastly different in ideas, attitudes and experiences from the colonists of the 1840’s.\(^{59}\)

Butterworth also highlighted what he saw as redeemable Pākehā figures and actions in the colonial era. Captain James Cook, Governors William Hobson and Robert FitzRoy, and the New Zealand Company are presented as humane and altruistic - if naive - historical actors, while Governor George Grey is cast as an unfeeling bureaucrat bent on domination.\(^{60}\) An emphasis on the link between the abolitionist movement in Britain and the Treaty of Waitangi is gestured at in the introduction and is a strong theme throughout.\(^ {61}\)

Missionaries, similarly, are framed in a positive light.\(^ {62}\) Christianity is used as a yardstick for Māoridom’s social and cultural progression. Butterworth directly invokes the language of a civilising mission in the Introduction:

Between 1790 and 1846 Maori society transformed itself from a neolithic hunting and gathering economy to a literate, christian [sic] society that had replaced stone tools with metal and which was now producing a range of horticultural products for the market. There are few societies which have changed quite so dramatically in such a short period.\(^ {63}\)

\(^ {59}\) Ibid, p. 9.
\(^ {60}\) Butterworth, ‘Age of Experimentation (1780s - 1840s)’, in Historical Database, p. 18; Butterworth, ‘Age of Domination (1850s - 1890s)’, in Historical Database, p. 1.
Butterworth’s Quaker beliefs may partly explain his favourable treatment of missionaries and the impact of Christianity. However, Butterworth’s framing also provided a kind of balanced compartmentalisation of New Zealand’s colonial past, such that Pākehā could distance themselves from its more difficult aspects (for example, embodied by a practically villainesque Grey) and proudly locate themselves in others. His own beliefs aside, this is a distinctly conscious and careful effort on Butterworth’s part, which appealed to the defensive feeling amongst many Pākehā engendered by the mainstreaming of Māori issues and politics.

Given much of its audience was expected to be unwilling participants, this curation is not at all surprising, and arguably key to the reception of seminars. Awatere Huata herself later noted she was primed for an uphill battle, describing public servants as uniquely conservative and holding “deeply entrenched views of what Maori were and what they could achieve.”

The vigorous backlash against Māori politics during this period (and indeed, against Awatere Huata’s own activism, particularly the sentiments expressed in *Maori Sovereignty*) suggested anti-racist ideology should be reframed to be less confrontational.

This appeal is explicit in the final section of *Historical Database*, where he ironically criticises Awatere Huata and her compatriots in Ngā Tamatoa for their “separatist and exclusionist tactics and strategies” which allegedly forbid “even sympathetic Pakeha” from being involved in Māori issues. Butterworth is particularly forthright about the perceived rejection of liberal Pākehā, arguing they were unfairly “stereotyped as paternalistic and racist” and as incapable of reforming themselves or contributing to activism.

He similarly singles out Mitzi and Ray Nairn’s work as “extreme” and as effectively echoing the ideology of “Maori radicals” like Ngā Tamatoa. Butterworth firmly situates his work as a reaction to these ideas, lamenting the fact there is “no impartial history to set against the propaganda” of Ngā Tamatoa and the National Council of Churches. Instead, he lauds the “more pragmatic” contemporary Māori (“the inheritors of the Carroll and Ngata tradition”), who are amenable to a partnership with Pākehā.

Partnership was shown to be, with great optimism in Butterworth’s final analysis, the devolutionary proposals pursued by the government in 1988. Acknowledging that

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65 Butterworth, ‘The Reassertion of Rangatiratanga (the present)’, in *Historical Database*, p. 12. This section appeared as a separate booklet, *Section Four: Rangatiratanga*, in earlier versions of the course material (see notes in the 1987 pitching document, *Tangata Whenua: Bicultural Management Programme*, p. 22). After 1988, this section appeared twice, both at the end of the *Historical Database* booklet and as a separate booklet.
66 Ibid, p. 34.
67 Ibid, p. 35.
68 Ibid, p. 16.
rangatiratanga as it had existed before and arguably during the early colonial period could not
be achieved again, Butterworth argued that Te Urupare Rangapu signalled a chance for a kind
of rangatiratanga to be realised in modern times.69 Echoing Ranginui Walker’s 1986 paper on
The Meaning of Biculturalism, this section impressed the need for Pākehā participants “in
significant numbers” to become bicultural, like Māori necessarily continued to do, in order to
cultivate “true dialogue” and eventually foster these sentiments beyond the public service into
a kind of national biculturalism.70

Given Butterworth’s optimistic conclusion, the fact that the careful curation inherent to
Historical Database is included in pre-course material, then, is significant. A later part of the
programme, Section Ten: Te Tiriti o Waitangi, focused on the contemporary relevance of the
Treaty included recent historiography which perhaps would have been less palatable to
sceptics.71 It detailed the Treaty’s role (or indeed, the Crown’s ignorance of it) throughout
history and up until the present day, focusing mostly on its legal and judicial relevance, and an
explanation of the history and functions of the Waitangi Tribunal.72 Ruth Ross’ pioneering
revisionist account of the Treaty’s signing is included, which argued the British deliberately
misled rangatira signatories with the translations of the agreement, causing considerable
controversy when it was first published in 1972.73 Also featured are excerpts from Claudia
Orange’s 1986 book The Treaty of Waitangi, various contemporary Tribunal reports, and a
piece by historian Michael Belgrave on the Tribunal’s relevance. A further article by Mānuka
Hēnare and Edward Douglas discussed the Treaty’s importance to Māori, and some
interpretations of the principles of the Treaty that had been suggested by Labour in the 1989

Section Ten: Te Tiriti o Waitangi, then, remained focused more on land rights and the
redress process prompted by the Tribunal, rather than the Treaty’s implications for governance
itself. Even so, the Treaty, and particular Māoridom’s interpretation of it, was emphasised as
crucial not just for broader discussions of national identity, but specifically for the public
service’s struggle with bicultural issues. Importantly though, and in a reflection of
Butterworth’s work, the ontology of race seems only implicit in these writings. Nevertheless,

69 Ibid, p. 36.
70 Tangata Whenua: Bicultural Management Programme, p. 22.
71 R. J. Young, Section Ten: Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Wellington: Ihi Management Consultants, 1988), Bicultural
Management Programme prepared for The Treasury papers, Item ID: R23430148, Box 41, Archives New
Zealand.
72 Ibid, pp. 1-22
73 Michael Belgrave, Historical Frictions: Maori Claims and Reinvented Histories (Auckland: Auckland UP,
this section’s invocation of themes, and some actual texts, from the concurrent historiographical revolution highlighted by Lorenzo Veracini and discussed in Chapter Two, linked it to the crisis that revisionist history was stoking amongst the Pākehā public. Because they echoed some of the more controversial aspects of academic and public discourse in this period, it is significant that Te Tiriti o Waitangi was not included in pre-course material.

*Ihi Management Consultants, a ‘cultural reference compendium’, and neoliberalism*

Building on the pre-course material, Ihi provided participants with two booklets of reference material to assist with their new responsibilities to Māori as public servants. *Section Five: Tikanga Maori* and *Section Six: Communication* included a dictionary of key te reo Māori terms and concepts, examples of waiata and whaikōrero in Māori and English, and a particular emphasis on marae and hui protocol.74 The general outline for a marae welcome, including various suggestions of speech formats, mihi, waiata, and other aspects of protocol, is painstaking and substantive, taking up over 40 pages.75 While disclaimed as not completely authoritative for every iwi’s preferences, the section provided useful information for a government department delegation to marae, something which was clearly expected to increase given the new principles of partnership.

These sections outlined protocol for meeting places both on the traditional grounds of iwi, but also figured ways of creating bicultural meeting spaces within government institutions, too. A section entitled “How do I hold a hui in my office” outlined a general framework for hosting Māori in the offices of government departments.76 This largely comprised details of meeting logistics, such as the kind of food to prepare and how to bless a meal, and how to arrange chairs so as to mimic the layout in a marae.77 Further, the section suggests the difference in meeting procedure between Pākehā and Māori: while Pākehā might outline an agenda before a meeting, the section suggests that outlining an agenda when meeting with Māori groups “is not appropriate”, as “everybody is given the opportunity to speak and reply [and] topics are covered intensively”.78

75 *Tikanga Maori*, pp. 49-91.
76 *Communication*, pp. 10-14.
78 *Ibid*. 
Overall, the section suggests the procedure and nature of a hui may include frank exchanges (especially “if your organisation has slighted this group in any way”), but is presented as a kind of part of a reconciliation process: if hostilities are expressed in the open, as at a hui, this aids proceedings and allows for new, positive dialogues to begin. In this way, this section - detailing meetings between individual public servants and Māori groups on both marae and in government offices - mapped onto the broader ideals of the policy reforms of *Te Urupare Rangapu*, and the aspirations for a positive future for Crown-Māori/Pākehā-Māori relations.

Another striking characteristic of the programme’s effort to create a kind of Māori dimension or bicultural space within institutions is the framing of bicultural issues through management theory. Ihi placed itself at a crucial intersection of the need for bicultural education, and a demand for change management expertise encouraged by broader state sector reform. This proved an important continuation of the masking of anti-racist rhetoric in the early course material and particularly Butterworth’s history. By framing responsiveness to Māori issues as simply another way of improving efficiency, Ihi curated its course material in a way that would have been more palatable to senior public servants, and in line with the neoliberal reforms that arguably defined broader government policy concerns.

Outside of the specific demands for consulting created by bicultural discourse itself, market liberalisation created a huge demand for professional consulting by public and private institutions. Neoliberalism’s global ascendancy in the 1980s encouraged a boom in the management consulting industry internationally. Operating outside of business structures and biases, third-party experts were considered better able to provide objective advice to solve problems in business hierarchies or management practices. This trend was reflected in New Zealand, where free market principles were embraced at an astounding pace from 1984.

The potential returns promised by free market reform were integrally related to increasing market volatility and unpredictability. This, of course, made business management and structuring significantly more complex. The analysis and re-evaluation of transaction costs was one key area of potential improvement highlighted by public service reformers under the Fourth Labour Government. While historically consultants were engaged for particular

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problems often to do with streamlining of production costs (such as “plant layout [or] wage-incentive programs”), they were now being sought to suggest “a company’s basic objectives, policies, structure and strategies.” The impact of transaction cost theory is highlighted by Staffan Canbäck as a likely explanation of the use of consultants by institutions. In addition to this specific framework, Labour’s neoliberal reformers broadly argued that, given the new primacy and influence of the free market, principles of good management from the private sector should be employed by government, defined by “accountability, responsibility, and efficiency.”

Efficiency, then, informed by transaction-cost analysis, also became a priority of public institutions as neoliberal ideology saw sweeping reforms to the New Zealand public service, making government departments more corporate in their structure and outlook. The New Zealand public service in particular has orientated itself in this way to the extent that today consultancies are an integral part of government department’s policy making and delivery processes.

The public sector focus on a more corporate outlook, on efficiency and cost minimisation, made management theory an ideal medium to present knowledge of Māori history, culture, and contemporary grievances as business best practice or common sense. Liaising effectively with Māori was figured by Ihi “as a purely practical issue that [sic] departments could save millions of dollars by offering their services to their clients in a more suitable form.” Framing anti-racist principles in this way was intended to mitigate any preconceptions that Ihi’s material would contain accusatory language or so-called radical Māori politics.

Thus, the course content Ihi prepared for _Te Urupare Rangapu_ partly masked its anti-racist underpinnings through using the thesis of a 1987 New Zealand book on management consulting, _Theory K: the key to excellence in New Zealand management_, as a framework. _Theory K_ purported to offer a distinctly ‘Kiwi’ precis of New Zealand businesses and their management techniques. The authors cited an explosion of management theory publishing in the United States as the signal for a new trend in management consulting. American theorists, they contended, were linking both good management and management theory to Japanese

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83 *Ibid*, p. 35.
84 Franks and McAloon, p. 209.
86 Inkson, Kerr; Henshall, Brian; Marsh, Nick and Gill Ellis, _Theory K: the key to excellence in New Zealand Management_ (New Zealand: David Bateman Ltd, 1987).
culture, adapting the central tenets of the Japanese work ethic to improve American businesses.\textsuperscript{88} Ihi’s course content similarly framed tikanga Māori as something that could be incorporated into a business context to increase worker dedication and efficiency:

All the excellent business factors derive from the level of commitment the people and the organisation have towards the Mission, towards each other and towards their consumers. Maori culture provides one way that practical steps can be developed to incorporate these factors into your organisation.\textsuperscript{89}

This Māoritanga-based management structure would be created by adopting the view “that the workplace is a marae.” Colleagues were thus “whanaunga”, and the workplace “their turangawaewae.”\textsuperscript{90} Ihi suggested improving worker dedication could be achieved by creating a more horizontal governing structure, whereby every employee would have the capacity to influence decision making, a framework they termed “marae style consensus”. The concept of tapu, the curriculum argued, could be superimposed onto the rules and governing parameters of institutions. Further, participants were encouraged to think of a guiding concept, or even a favoured public servant from the department’s past, to serve as a “tipuna” for the organisation.\textsuperscript{91}

Overall, the concept of “whanaungatanga” was invoked to describe the ideal institution: one which recognised a more holistic view of the personal and work lives of public servants, centred around principles of tikanga Māori.\textsuperscript{92} These core principles were supplemented by examples of performative or expressive culture, such as replacing a “daily peptalk” with a “karakia”, which, Ihi explained, effectively had the same uniting, focusing effect as a ‘peptalk’, but was Māori in origin.\textsuperscript{93} The outline of the Tribal Management framework was followed by a group worksheet, where participants were encouraged to suggest ways in which bicultural issues and specifically the Tribal Management framework could be used in their organisation.\textsuperscript{94}

While the courses Ihi prepared in the late 1980s were tailored to support Te Urupare Rangapu and extant Māori policy, the curriculum did also suggest changes. Highlighting the positive results of the MANA and MACCESS programmes, the curriculum argued for their

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{89} Section Seven: Tribal Management (Wellington: Ihi Management Consultants, 1989), Bicultural Management Programme prepared for The Treasury papers, Item ID: R23430146, Box 41, Archives New Zealand, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{94} Section Eight: Towards a Bicultural Policy (Wellington: Ihi Management Consultants, 1988), Bicultural Management Programme prepared for The Treasury papers, Item ID: R23430146, Box 41, Archives New Zealand.
dissolution and for their resources to be funnelled directly to iwi organisations, reiterating the contention from Māori that local communities had a better idea of where to invest funding than central government.\(^95\) Thus, Ihi engaged in an activism within the state apparatus, accepting the framework of *Te Urupare Rangapu* while pushing for even greater iwi autonomy with regards to the allocation of funding. This was a clear attempt to push the government away from its decentralising tendencies and towards a more literal fulfilment of *Te Urupare* Rangapu’s promises of devolution. Nonetheless, it appears that, for Awatere Huata’s government clients, knowledge acquisition remained the preferred interpretation of improving responsiveness to Māori issues.

*Treasury and the emphasis on consultation over institutional change*

One notable manifestation of the focus on knowledge acquisition to satisfy responsiveness criteria was Treasury’s engagement with *Te Urupare Rangapu*, and their relationship with Ihi Management Consultants. Awatere Huata notes in her autobiography she saw Treasury as the ministry which, through their control of funding priorities, ultimately set the parameters for all other government departments.\(^96\) Additionally, as Ihi had pointed out in its own course material, Treasury had already signalled a somewhat dismissive attitude towards Māori issues, declaring for example that the Tribunal’s decision that te reo Māori should be considered a taonga and protected by Crown authorities “is not [a guarantee] directly relevant to the non-Māori community”.\(^97\) In Awatere Huata’s eyes, any true institutional reform of the public service and the realignment of its priorities would have to have the backing of Treasury and its staff.

In his history of Treasury, Malcolm McKinnon briefly characterises Secretary Graham Scott’s directorship, from 1987 to 1993, as relatively progressive.\(^98\) Treasury’s engagement of Ihi for bicultural workshops and the construction of a wharenui in the Treasury building in 1991 are cited as partial evidence of Scott’s progressivism.\(^99\) However, McKinnon’s evaluation makes the same assumption that Treasury officials made at the time: that training for Pākehā staff was an end, rather than a means, for realising the reforms of *Te Urupare Rangapu*.


\(^97\) Quoted in ‘Te Reo Māori And Treasury’, in *Section Ten: Te Tiriti o Waitangi*, p. 84.


Treasury’s response to an information request in anticipation of devolutionary policy in May 1988 reveals that the core of their bicultural strategy was personnel training. There is passing acknowledgement of an obligation beyond personnel training, as well as a vaguely defined need to consult Māori for information on “particular issues” and protocol. But senior management argued that a proposed devolution would primarily require “adequate understanding within Treasury of the issues facing the iwi and the Maori people.” Crucially, this framed Treasury’s goals in a way that did not require Māori staff in key decision-making positions.

On Scott’s insistence, the vast majority of Treasury employees, beginning with senior management in May 1988 and later general staff, attended over thirty bicultural seminars run by Awatere Huata and Mareroa. While the courses seem to have been a source of pride for Treasury, the State Services Commission viewed the courses alone as inadequate. Further, there are indications that Treasury staff were not particularly receptive to the courses. Awatere later observed how difficult it was working with Treasury officials, particularly the younger generation of staff. While she made a concerted effort to engage with participants, she found Treasury largely unreceptive to institutional change or the call for genuine and lasting accommodation of Māori in decision-making processes.

McKinnon’s characterisation of this period in Treasury as a relative progression still holds true, and certainly the fact that Scott was strongly supportive of bicultural seminars is significant. Overall, though, it appears the Treasury’s Te Urupare Rangapu strategy was undermined by a general lack of commitment even to the policy’s basic tenets. Indeed, when prompted for a second evaluation of its responsiveness to Māori issues in 1989, Treasury did not formally reply, declaring itself a bicultural organisation on the strength of the bicultural seminars its staff attended. While Treasury had signalled that the seminars were only the beginning, ultimately, this commitment was not met.

This broadly reflected the situation in most government departments, as confirmed in an evaluation by the State Services Commission’s Responsiveness Unit in October 1989. Barely half (19 of 36) of the agencies replied to the Unit’s information request. Those responses

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100 Letter from Mark Byers to Secretary of SSC, ‘Partnership Perspectives’, 2 June 1988, Social Services Division – Maori Policy – Responsiveness in the State Sector – The Treasury (TSY) papers, Record no. SOC-3-1-TSY, Item ID: R4196519, Box 323, Archives New Zealand, p. 2.
101 Ibid., p. 1.
102 McKinnon, p. 390; letter from Mark Byers to Secretary of SSC, ‘Partnership Perspectives’, p. 2.
103 Awatere Huata, My Journey, p. 98.
104 Handwritten note by Doug Bailey, ‘SS3 |1| TREAS’, 12 February 1990, Social Services Division – Maori Policy – Responsiveness in the State Sector – The Treasury (TSY) papers, Record no. SOC-3-1-TSY, Item ID: R4196519, Box 323, Archives New Zealand.
received indicated that “little substantive progress” had been made with regards to Te Urupare Rangapu. ¹⁰⁵ Training for Pākehā personnel was the most referenced area of improvement, and most departments reflected the Treasury’s view that staff training was sufficient to satisfy Te Urupare Rangapu’s demands for improved responsiveness. ¹⁰⁶ Only two departments acknowledged the Ministry of Maori Affairs’ responsibility for policy design, and few spoke of Māori participation within departments, outside of isolated incidences where prominent Māori figures or Māori community representatives were engaged in an advisory capacity. ¹⁰⁷ The Unit’s evaluation concluded “understanding and treatment of both Treaty principles and responsiveness remain superficial.” ¹⁰⁸ It revealed a marked lack of commitment to Te Urupare Rangapu and its objectives, and further suggested a deeper failure to make bureaucrats even basically biculturally literate.

The difficulties of bicultural partnership and the consultant-Crown relationship

This uncovers many of the difficulties faced by consultants. At the core of these difficulties was the bare power imbalance between consultants and the agencies with which they worked. As argued in Chapter Two, the limited mechanisms provided by Te Urupare Rangapu, combined with the increased independence of individual departments, meant that chief executives were not required to heed calls or frameworks for institutional change under the government’s Māori policy. As argued above, the government itself seemed less than committed to institutional change on the scale many Māori were calling for; and indeed, even the government’s own promise of devolution was, at best, a more limited degree of devolution.

Similarly, then, departments could be satisfied that they had performed their fiduciary duty to Māori simply by hiring consultants such as Ihi, even if they then ignored their suggestions. This was a dynamic Awatere Huata reported as having occurred with Ihi’s wider relationship with the public sector. While Ihi’s work was only with senior and middle management of government departments, Awatere Huata describes a network of consulting relationships between regional arms of government institutions and Māori communities that Ihi created in its wake. A number of companies that allegedly mimicked Ihi conducted seminars...
for regional public servants. Additionally, Awatere Huata declares she also encouraged regional departments to look to their local community for advice:

I thought at the time, why don’t you [public officials] ask the clients, why don’t you talk to Maori leaders at the local level, and find out what they think? They might be able to give you a better steer, why don’t you form collaborations at a local level and just ask them?109

In retrospect, she believed this ultimately was not “a great idea”, effectively because departments could call it consultation without substantially heeding much, if any, of the advice.110 The evidence at hand indicates it is likely this was a tension for all consulting arrangements. Indeed, this seems to reflect the broader dynamic of the Māori-Crown relationship, even in spite of such a significant policy change.

Another tension apparent in Ihi’s work arises from its masking of analyses of both institutional racism and the location of individual whites within hegemony. There may be a perceived break with some of the beliefs Awatere Huata expressed in Maori Sovereignty and her other work, given its apparent absence from Ihi’s written material. Certainly, Awatere Huata clearly now believed meaningful reform was possible without Māori control of New Zealand. Despite this, given Ihi’s declared intentions and her past writings, it is unlikely that the topic of race and institutional racism would not have been discussed at all in seminars themselves, even if only discussed in abstraction. Regardless, the language of cultural and ethnic difference rather than racial difference signalled in Ihi’s written course material recalls the Programme on Racism’s conclusions about confrontation: that diluting discussions about Pākehā individual responsibility for the perpetuation of racist systems, while less confrontational, would ultimately preclude the kind of self-critique needed for seminars to be impactful.

Bicultural discourse’s obfuscation of institutional reform, then, was also mirrored by an obfuscation of race ontology. In a 1991 article in Race, Gender, Class, Lynne Alice noted a new trend amongst sociologists and other academic disciplines to favour ‘ethnicity’ over ‘race’ as a signifier of difference. Further, she observed that this trend was reflected by the Pākehā public, arguing that this slip in terms “perpetuates the cultural values of the dominant culture”.111 While acknowledging that race alone was “clearly an inadequate way to understand a people or their sense of identity”, outright replacing race with ethnicity posed a number of

109 Awatere Huata, interviewed by Laura Kamau and Te Maire Tau, 26 November 2007, p. 129.
110 Ibid.
problems largely focused on analysing and revealing institutional racism.\textsuperscript{112} Discussion of race firmly “reveals power”, Alice argued, whereas discussion of ethnicity does not:

In Aotearoa, Pakeha use ‘race’ when talking about Maori or Tagata Pasifika, never about themselves, and the difference in power is glaringly captured.\textsuperscript{113}

This blindness, Alice contended, was compounded by the ascendancy of biculturalism, and particularly its promotion by the state.\textsuperscript{114}

Legal scholar Moana Jackson similarly expressed frustration at the ascendancy of Treaty discourse, arguing it “[buried] the debate” at the expense of dealing directly with contemporary power imbalances and issues of racism, and sarcastically commenting that consultants had become New Zealand’s “salvation”.\textsuperscript{115} Jane Kelsey, too, lamented the “prominent” growth of Treaty education in the late 1980s, which was “a product of attempts to stave off more radical change”. Noting that Prime Minister David Lange had described biculturalism as “a subtle cultural repositioning”, she linked them more directly with the traps of bicultural discourse, arguing that bicultural consultancies sustained the government’s attempts to “recognise the treaty [sic] symbolically but not literally”.\textsuperscript{116}

So, though Ihi’s use of bicultural and Treaty framings for its work made it relevant to departments who were increasingly being told to deal with bicultural issues, the language of biculturalism could have undermined (and indeed, did undermine, according to many commentators) Ihi’s efforts to undo institutional racism. Further, Ihi’s subscription to this discourse also, if unintentionally, sustained biculturalism and its obfuscation of these issues.

Following on from this is the friction of cultural appropriation at the heart of these bicultural relationships. African-American theorist bell hooks contended in her influential 1992 essay ‘Eating the Other’ that the expressions of difference by non-white minorities, whether racial or cultural, can be commodified and ‘traded’ in a global marketplace, such that non-white race and culture can be co-opted and consumed by dominant, white hegemonies.\textsuperscript{117} This issue was accentuated in the midst of the neoliberal revolution in the 1980s - though not always in a necessarily negative way. Fiona McCormack argues that state adoption of neoliberalism can create “newly propertised things” which indigenous communities can use to their

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, pp. 64-65.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
advantage as a “source of compensation”\textsuperscript{118}. Indeed, with specific reference to Ihi, Te Maire Tau has suggested that the deregulated economy created by neoliberalism under the Fourth Labour Government and Fourth National Government fostered a wave of Māori entrepreneurialism.\textsuperscript{119}

Katherine Smits is careful to point out that while cultural appropriation has the potential to have “undoubted economic benefits to Maori themselves if they can maintain control over its uses”, this still seems largely at the behest of the state.\textsuperscript{120} Instead, the more measurable outcome has been the appropriation of performative Māori cultural forms for use by the state for its own agendas.\textsuperscript{121} This seems particularly relevant to Ihi’s ‘gifting’ of their Tribal Management governance system to government departments.\textsuperscript{122} In these contexts, then, there are complex implications for Ihi’s focus on bicultural literacy for Pākehā participants. That the nature of consultancy meant Ihi and Māoridom more generally could not ultimately control the state’s use of tikanga Māori after the workshops ended is significant.

**Conclusion**

The way in which tikanga Māori was ‘wielded’ by Ihi clearly moves beyond a purely economic transaction to one where Māori culture could become an agent for institutional change. At its core, Ihi’s popularity indicates it had successfully curated its content to suit the various dominant priorities of the public sector, as set by bicultural discourse and broader state sector reform. In order to engage in any praxis confronting institutional racism, the instinct to utilise language which perceptibly separated Ihi’s work from the more confronting activism of the period (and indeed of one of its main convenors) was understandable. Despite the stakes of the process of cultural appropriation, where Māori culture could be absorbed and ‘performed’ by government departments without this reflecting institutional change, it was also reflective of a potentially positive, and radical, process:

> Within a context where desire for contact with those who are different or deemed Other is not considered bad, politically incorrect, or wrong-minded, we can conceptualize and identify


\textsuperscript{119} Te Maire Tau, speaking in Donna Awaater Huata, interviewed by Laura Kamau and Te Maire Tau, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p. 58.


\textsuperscript{122} Importantly, the Tribal Management System/Workplace as Marae framework was absent from versions of Ihi’s course material published from 1992. See *Bicultural Management Programme* vols. 1&2 (Wellington: Ihi Communications & Consultancy Limited, 1992).
ways that desire informs our political choices and affiliations.\textsuperscript{123}

While, as hooks stresses, this process cannot be accepted uncritically, it hints that the work of Ihi and agents like it, in creating contact points for a kind of forced acculturation of institutions, had the potential to ultimately be politically transformative.

The specific policy context that had definitively created the demand for bicultural consultants was short-lived. The devolutionary proposals of \textit{Te Urupare Rangapu} were immediately repealed by the new Fourth National Government in 1991.\textsuperscript{124} The complete manifestation of a new autonomous role for iwi was largely squandered. However, because of this change, the responsiveness of mainstream departments became even more of a priority under National.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, the public sector focus on knowledge acquisition became even more acute after their election, and seems to have somewhat sustained the demand for bicultural consultancies through the 1990s. In 1995, Awatere Huata estimated the government had spent a grand total of $26 million per annum on Māori consultants. However, she cited the repeal of \textit{Te Urupare Rangapu} as a significant blow to any meaningful reception of Ihi’s work and the acknowledgement of Māori activists’ demands. National’s attitudes towards Māori, she declared, had resulted in the reversion of ten years of progress on race relations.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} hooks, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{124} Hill, \textit{Maori and the State}, p. 248.


\textsuperscript{126} Awatere Huata, ‘Biculturalism and Bureaucracy in New Zealand’.
Conclusion

In spite of the impressive ascendancy of the politics of Māori activism from the late-1960s through the 1980s, this study reveals the immense difficulty of constructing methodologies to meaningfully influence the culture of government institutions. The trend discussed in Chapter One, by which Māori activists made the acknowledgement of their Treaty demands and the recognition of their culture essential to the ‘redemption’ of the state, had accorded an important new ‘value’ for Māori culture and politics. Through confrontational direct-action protests and the use of anti-racist politics and strategies such as Black Power’s institutional racism framework, Māori contributed to the unsettling of the presumed hold on New Zealand by Pākehā hegemony, forcing Pākehā and the state to engage with their calls to respect their rangatiratanga.

As shown in Chapter Two, this unsettling resulted in a number of significant state concessions which made efforts to recognise the Māori desire for autonomy. These concessions, though largely falling short of Māoridom’s ideal outcomes, initially showed that the state seemed willing to fashion a form of governing partnership with Māori polities. Official discourse of new bicultural outlooks for the public service and governing structure of New Zealand seemed to promise affirmative action for Māori and the genuine participation of Māori groups in policymaking. For Māori, the devolutionary proposals in Te Urupare Rangapu held out promise of an unprecedented opportunity to secure real autonomy.

Devolution formed only a part of the call for bicultural reform offered by official discourse. The broader emerging politics of biculturalism in public discourse embodied a desire to create a postcolonial New Zealand and fashion a genuine kind of ‘exceptionalism’ through a national cultural hybridity. This desire for exceptionalism was reflected on an individual scale with the so-called Pākehā identity crisis. While this crisis was defined by Pākehā backlash and defensiveness, some Pākehā searched for new, distinctly local settler descendant identities that would be expressed by a bicultural national distinctiveness. The much grander, and vaguer, definitions of ‘biculturalism’ and ‘Treaty partnership’ co-opted by the state seemed to amount to more sophisticated government rhetoric around Māori issues rather than reflective of a real commitment to tackling institutional racism. While familiarity with Māori and bicultural issues was intended to only be the beginning of departments’ journey towards a better appreciation of both biculturalism and rangatiratanga, the more stringent and institutionally transformative aspects of Te Urupare Rangapu, particularly its focus on affirmative action, were quietly deemphasised by most of the public sector.
Ihi Management Consultants capitalised on increasing demands for Māori cultural knowledge and the rethinking of national and personal identity created by the intersection of activism, biculturalism, and neoliberalism. However, as Chapter Three reveals, the intersection of these discourses created dilemmas for Ihi as they attempted to create a curriculum for their public sector clients. Well aware of the implications of the broader backlash to anti-racist ideology, Ihi reframed the discussions of institutional racism deployed by early activists, and instead focused on cultural competency. Ihi’s techniques, then, firmly centred around the degree to which a government department’s ‘absorption’ of cultural knowledge could prove useful in undoing institutional racism. This reframing undermined the full effectiveness of Ihi’s immediate goal to reveal and begin a dismantling of institutional racism. Indeed, Ihi’s Māoritanga reference compendium arguably represents a literal resource which would have aided in the fashioning of more sophisticated official bicultural rhetoric.

However, it is understandable that the instinct of consultancies was to prioritise securing as many clients as possible and guaranteeing the prolific dissemination of their ideas on institutional racism and rangatiratanga. Institutional racism and its effects, the central focus of Māori activism, still fundamentally informed Ihi’s agenda. At its core, therefore, Ihi’s attempted ‘masking’ of institutional racism with bicultural language made it an exceptionally well-timed and well-targeted project. Certainly, the politics of culture itself meant that its work could have a potentially radical impact; an impact that was at least partially realised.

Ihi’s careful strategising reflected the broader responses of many Māori to the new Māori policy instituted under the Fourth Labour Government. *Te Urupare Rangapu* and its implementation in the (albeit short-lived) Runanga Iwi Act seemed to indicate significant contextual changes along the lines, if not exactly reflective, of Māori activism and its demands. Ihi, like many other groups, saw the reforms as an opportunity to force discussions of rangatiratanga and what its expression could look like in a modern state. The creation of the Department of Justice’s Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (later, the Office of Treaty Settlements) in 1988, the office that would coordinate policy advice on Māori issues and would soon have responsibility for negotiating terms of settlement with iwi on behalf of the Crown, signalled a significant step forward in Crown recognition of Māori aspirations.¹ When the Fourth National Government took office in late 1990, momentum was such that settlement processes were continued, and then escalated. Consultancies continued to be engaged by departments to

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improve government responses to assertions of rangatiratanga. Further, while some consultant’s reports such as Moana Jackson’s proposal for a separate Māori criminal justice system were rejected, these and other ideas for Māori autonomy remained prominent amongst public servants, if only in abstraction.\(^2\)

It is safe to suggest, then, that by the late 1980s public sector knowledge and understanding of Māori issues was notably increasing. This was probably partly because of general knowledge in public discourse stoked by Māori activism and revisionist histories of New Zealand, but also because of the more direct work of consultancies like Ihi. The discursive impacts of these consultancy companies from 1990 onwards should certainly be the subject of further research, focused on reception studies and a continuing genealogy of biculturalism. These seminars were, and remain, important sites of biculturalism and anti-racist activism, highlighting not just persisting national questions, but also the complexities and politics of identity formation in New Zealand, particularly for Pākehā. To this day, there is considerable debate over the issues that were at the heart of bicultural consulting: whether government and its apparatuses work for Māori; or indeed, as Māmari Stephens explores, the degree to which the Crown and other imported institutions have, or can, ‘become’ Māori.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Indeed, this conclusion is echoed by Moana Jackson in his interview with the author (Moana Jackson, interviewed by Ethan McKenzie, 19 September 2017).

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