Abstract:
Most cognitive studies of religion adopt a modular theory of cognition. The 'space'that is studied is often the 'space between the ears'. Culture and
religion are viewed as by-products of more entrenched features of our brains.
Although this 'Standard Model' explains many intuitive expressions of religious belief, it has trouble explaining (a) the variability of religious systems crossculturally (b) the uses of material culture (i.e. symbolic structures etc) in transmitting religious concepts. The following thesis presents a 'wideware
mind' hypothesis for religious cognition. I urge that while our internal cognitive
architecture is causally relevant to religious cognition, the material artefacts of
culture must be viewed as cognitive properties in their own right. Hence any
causal account of religious cognition must acknowledge the external features
of minds and how our neurological resources interact with the artefacts of our
world.
