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CONTENTS

I A CHANGING SOCIETY  
PART ONE THE ARISTOCRATIC SOLUTION
1 GREEK EDUCATION
2 THE MEANING OF A CULTURAL EDUCATION
3 ROMAN EDUCATION
4 MEDIEVAL EDUCATION

II ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL  
VII FULL DEMOCRACY
1 INDIVIDUAL OR SOCIETY
2 ADVANTAGES OF THE RECONCILIATION OF PRIVATE CULTURE AND VOCATION
3 ARE CULTURE AND VOCATION IDENTICAL?

III RENAISSANCE AND AFTER  
PART TWO THE DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION
1 RENAISSANCE
2 THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISM
3 THE CHALLENGE OF CAPITALISM
4 THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENCE

IV CONTEMPORARY
1 DEMOCRACY ATTEMPTED
2 DEMOCRACY UNACHIEVED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page
PREFACE 111

III A CHANGING SOCIETY 2

IV CONTEMPORARY 45

VII FULL DEMOCRACY 96

Preface

At the commencement of a lecture entitled 'Cultural Aspects of Vocational Education,' Sir Fred Clarke said:

'The more I have thought about the implications of the topic under discussion, the more do I realize how momentous and far-reaching they are. I now feel that in this innocent-looking title the whole crisis of our times is involved.' (1)

This judgment explains the raison d'être of this thesis, viz., that the problem of relating vocation and culture in education has implications which are 'momentous and far-reaching' for the present day social crisis.

The statement indicates the aim of the dissertation: this is to trace the historical growth of the educational relation of vocation and culture in order to perceive more clearly the present situation and its widespread implications. To do so is to see more clearly, in one special field, something of the problems the educator is faced with in a world which everywhere cries out for reconstruction.

The approach has been historical, and the primary source materials have been significant statements by famous educational thinkers, past and present.

Secondary source materials have been historical accounts of various patterns of education. The practice has

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been adopted of deliberately using direct quotation and not paraphrase whenever a point of view is concise and well expressed. All quotations are an integral part of the argument; they are not merely descriptive illustrations.

Briefly the thesis is:

— The solution of the problem of relating vocation and culture may be according to either of two patterns, the aristocratic and the democratic, dealt with in parts one and two respectively.

— The aristocratic pattern is characteristically restrictive in its selection of subject matter and recipients of education.

— The democratic pattern, on the other hand, is not restrictive. This raises the profound problem of the relation of individual and society, a recurrent theme in part 2.

— All education is both vocational and cultural to some extent, even though not explicitly so.

— The aristocratic pattern has been continually challenged, first by humanism, then by capitalism, science and democracy. (Chapters 1 and 2.)

— We are living in the midst of a fifth great challenge to secure full democracy. This, perhaps a continuation of the fourth, is the challenge made by the age of machinery and social theory.

— The issue is still undecided.
Those authors who have, over a period of time, influenced me most in an indirect and general way in the formation of the viewpoint herein expressed are, in order of acquaintance: John Dewey, Erich Fromm, Karl Mannheim, Adolf Lowe, I.L. Kandel, R.H. Tawney, Fred Clarke, Alexander Meiklejohn, and I.B. Berkan. (1)

(1) See Bibliography.
CHAPTER I - A CHANGING SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

In sociology culture is used to refer to the rearing or production of, for example, bees, oysters, fish, silk or bactria. Regularly it means mental or physical improvement as the result of training. The educational meaning, especially in the term 'cultural education,' it is the purpose of this survey to discover, and a definition is given on page 10.

By anthropologists and sociologists the term is used to refer to all the things that a group of people inhabiting a certain geographical area do, the way they do things and the ways they think and feel about things, their material tools and their values and symbols.

Kinchell Young gives the following definition:

'The sum and content of habitual behaviour common to a group, community or society. It is made up of material and non-material traits and patterns.'

In the following pages culture is used in both the educational and anthropological sense, the meaning being clear from the context.


Note on the Meaning of Culture.

In biology culture is used to refer to the rearing or production of, for example, bees, oysters, fish, silk or bacteria. Popularly it means mental or physical improvement as the result of training. The educational meaning, especially in the term 'cultural education,' it is the purpose of this survey to discover, and a definition is given on page 16.

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(2) Kimball Young, Sociology (New York, 1942), p. 969.
'Mr Rosengrenet somewhere says that so far from the dark ages being over, we are just at the beginning of a new dark age period. He means that ignorance and unculture, which then were merely brutal, are now articulate and possessed of a literary voice, and the fight is transferred from fields and castles and town walls to "organs of publicity;" but it is the same fight, of reason and goodness against stupidity and passion; and it must be fought through to the same kind of success. But it means the re-educating of perhaps twenty more generations.' (1)

When William James wrote these words in 1900 he was one of a few who perceived what is now a sociological commonplace, 'documented beyond question in the current literature of social science and, more important, in the experience of everyone who has eyes to observe,' (2) viz., that cultural change is widespread, 'rapid, striking and generally taken for granted.' (3)

James also perceived what is now another sociological commonplace: that changes in non-material culture have not kept pace with changes in material culture; that 'many of our social institutions are mediaeval survivals.' (4)

This phenomenon is generally called cultural lag.


(2) Jesse H. Newlon, Education for Democracy in Our Time (New York, 1939), p.3.

(3) Kimball Young, Sociology, p.98.

Education, far from having escaped the effects of cultural change, has been their veritable mirror. In education can be discovered all the problems of modern society. It is relevant to our purpose to notice, in particular, two major effects.

First, material changes closely associated with science, technology and industry have made new claims on the curriculum, namely, the inclusion of subjects generally referred to as vocational. Non-material changes, in particular the principles of scientific psychology, have worked in the same direction.

Second, material changes, slowly enough admittedly, have made possible a gradually increasing school population. This change has been supported by new sociological theories preaching the equality of mankind. Pressed by such demands the community has been compelled to realize that it is not physically impossible to educate all its youth, indeed, that it is highly desirable to do so.

Education does not only reflect change in our time. Being a social institution it also lags behind it. This cultural lag is evident in regard to the present tendency both to widen the scope of the curriculum by including vocational activities and to increase the extent of educational opportunity; in other words by the decreasing preferential selection of content and recipients of education.

Let us consider first the increase in school population. In a selective system of education individual differences among students can be ignored. The misfit is rejected.
Likewise the problem of an over-production of intellectuals does not arise. Not so when educational opportunity is democratized. Then the school is compelled to take note of individual differences of aptitude, ability and interest, both for the welfare of the individual and the community, which means a complete rethinking of the organization of the curriculum.

One answer to the problem is the organization of the curriculum on the basis of a compartmentalization of knowledge, each compartment being the amount required for a specialized training in some field activity, and the amount which equips the individual to earn a living.

Such a solution results in the production of a host of specialists who are extremely competent in all activities relating to their own specialized fields. But they are socially astigmatic, for their perception is dominated by their own preoccupation; and they are socially myopic, for they are unable to see the wider social implications and relationships of their own doings. For then complete stress has been laid on the vocational function of education, to the neglect of the cultural - the understanding of the meaningfulness of the total pattern of things.

To comprehend something of this total meaningful pattern is to have a realization of:

1. The worth of the human individual.
2. The essentially social nature of being human: in order to be a fully human individual one cannot avoid being social.
How to reconcile these two aspects of being human — individual and social — has been one of the major problems of educational thought, indeed of all thought, through the ages. It has underlain the problem of relating culture and vocation in education, for which there have been two types of solution, the aristocratic and the democratic.

The aristocratic, with a metaphysical basis of idealism has tended to stress the second aspect, and has made society supreme over the individual. The pattern of this solution has invariably been worked out in a class-stratified society by which it has been strongly, although perhaps unwittingly, influenced, and for the perpetuation of which it has proved a convenient instrument.

The democratic solution has stressed the importance of the individual. No completely acceptable metaphysical basis for it has yet been worked out. The pansophism of Comenius was one attempt which is no longer acceptable because of its theological, idealistic implications. John Dewey's experimentalism is the most recent attempt to trace the metaphysical background of democracy. It is now generally agreed that he did not completely solve the problem of relating individual and society, and the evidence is that this is the major concern of the philosophers of democracy at the present time. The need of a solution to this problem has become increasingly obvious in recent decades when individual freedom has tended to become licentious individualism.
In the following chapters it is intended to sketch the various patterns which the aristocratic solution of the relation of culture and vocation in education has taken, then, similarly, the democratic solution. Each pattern of education will be examined according to the following formula:

Degree to which it is preferential in selection of subject matter and recipients.

Extent to which, wittingly or not, it has cultural and vocational functions.

In general it will be discovered that the aristocratic type is highly preferential, so that culture and vocation are related for only a privileged few. The rest are excluded from acquaintance with culture with the result that their education becomes narrow, specialized trade training, not true vocational education.

The democratic type is non-preferential; consequently culture and vocation can be related for all - can be, but at present are not always so.

The problem of the true democratic solution is the central problem of contemporary education, and in part two an attempt is made to see a way through its many complexities. In the preceding chapters - three and four - we deal with the challenges of the traditional system made by humanism, capitalism, science and democracy - challenges which were unsuccessful. We await with anxiety the outcome of the challenge of the present era for full democracy in education.
PART ONE
THE ARISTOCRATIC SOLUTION

Chapter

II ANCIENT & MEDIAEVAL

III RENAISSANCE & AFTER

IV CONTEMPORARY

In Athens only the privileged group of free male citizens, about one tenth of the population, were deemed worthy to partake of education of the type later termed liberal, worthy of a free man (liber = free). (2)

This situation considerably simplified matters of curriculum for all the personal, domestic, industrial and commercial tasks being relegated to slaves and foreigners, the free citizens were released to pursue only those studies most worthy of them, and of their vocation as free citizens and rulers. In their education the vocational-cultural conflict did not arise, for culture and vocation were one.

Inclined though the conflict was not, it continued to exist within the community at large. Not for ever were the less privileged group content to remain subservient. After the fifth century B.C., one of

CHAPTER II

ANCIENT & MEDIEVAL

Section 1. Greek Education.

Many of the problems discussed by the intellectual leaders of ancient Greece are of contemporary relevancy because they were a product of an era of social-cultural change, in many respects similar to the present era. For this reason we begin our discussion with a consideration of Athenian education; and also because Athenian educational practice and theory influenced all later western education.

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the symptoms of social unrest was the rapid rise to popularity of the sophists (1) who met the educational needs of the commercial and trading classes whose increasing power was based on wealth, not ancestral family rights and prestige. These people, concerned with the very practical affairs of living needed an education relevant to their vocations, quite different from that of the ruling classes. The sophists furnished this need for professional and technical training, and the separation between culture and vocation in education became clearly apparent.

None scorned sophist education more than the great thinkers who themselves were of the favoured classes. Plato and Aristotle both advocated education on a class basis.

Plato in the Republic adopts a three class division of society on the basis of a tripartite division of the soul. The three social groups are the industrious, military and guardian or philosopher classes, corresponding to the three graded qualities of soul: appetitive, spirited and rational. Each class is mutually exclusive, and the philosopher guardians, alone being capable of high rational achievement, alone have the privilege and duty of higher learning, or as Plato calls it, the vision of the Good. (2)

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(2) See Republic, p.434 and p.519.
For such a select group who ultimately must comprehend the true reality of the realm of Ideas a special education is outlined. All unworthy studies which may excite the baser passions are ruthlessly censored, so that Plato prescribes a course of calculation, geometry, astronomy and Pythagorean music which leads up to the final study of all, secret of the initiated, dialectic or philosophy.

Plato's ideal education is selective both as regards recipients and subjects of study, but it avoids many of the vices of a class-privilege education by selecting the philosophers on a basis of merit and by training them to serve the rest of society.

Aristotle also regarded education as selective, the liberal pursuits alone being worthy of free men. He clearly states his point of view:

'It is therefore evident that we shall have to teach our children such useful knowledge as is indispensable for them, but it is equally clear that all useful knowledge is not appropriate for education. There is a distinction between liberal and illiberal pursuits, and it is manifest that only such knowledge as does not make the learner mechanical (vulgar) should form a part of education. By mechanical pursuits we should understand all arts and studies that make the body, soul, or intellect of free men unserviceable for the use and exercise of virtue. This is the reason why we call mechanical such arts as produce an inferior condition of body, and all wage-earning occupations. They allow the mind no leisure and degrade it to a lower level. There are even some liberal branches of knowledge, the acquisition of which up to a certain point is not unworthy of freemen, but which, if studied with undue intensiveness or minuteness, are open to the charge of being injurious in the manner described above. The object with which we engage in the arts or study them, also makes a great difference. If it be for our own sakes or for that of our friends, or to produce goodness, they are not illiberal while a man engaged in these very same pursuits to please strangers would in many instances be regarded
as following the occupations of a slave or a serf.' (1)

We do not agree with Aristotle's education for it was based on class privilege. Nevertheless, Aristotle has a lesson to teach us, for his educational philosophy was a direct product of his social philosophy. His view has been epitomised in the phrase: as is the state, so is the school. In contrast Plato’s educational philosophy, like his social philosophy, was a direct product of his metaphysics.

The revival of the Aristotelian viewpoint, from the time of Rousseau on, has led to a fresh examination of what should be the relation of individual and society, which has become the central problem in education, especially in the contemporary period. It raises the problem of how to find a criterion for judging what the relation between individual and society should be; for rejecting the aristocratic position. But this topic belongs to Part Two.

The main characteristics of the Greek solution of the relation of culture and vocation in education may now be sketched.

On the debit side Greek education was preferential both in selection of subject matter and of recipients. On the credit side, however, with the limitation that it was for an elite class, a rather fine type of education was developed which had the great virtue of possessing

(1) Aristotle, Politics, p.1537 b4-21
a clearly defined aim and goal. Although Greek opinion
disliked to recognize the fact, this education was both
vocational and cultural:

It was vocational in so far as it had direct bearing
on the student's later occupation, in this case that of
being a ruler. To use Kandel's expression it was an
'apprenticeship to public life.' (1)

It possessed another quality in virtue of which it
was later called a liberal, cultural, or humanistic education.
This 'something else' I shall refer to as culture and
attempt forthwith to elucidate its meaning.

Section 3

The Meaning of a Cultural Education

Value Judgments.

Culture is not an ornamental accretion to be acquired
during the course of experience. Rather it is a growth
of the whole personality characterized in its highest
manifestation by breadth, openness and discrimination in
the making and applying of value judgments in the different
spheres of human activity and experience. This implies an
ability to see unity in diversity, to clearly grasp the
meaning of units in their relationship to the whole; for
having seen the wider implications of their meaning, their
wider perspective, as it were, the individual is more
capable of evaluating them.

(1) I.L. Kandel, Conflicting Theories of Education (New
York, 1938), p.60.
The full significance of this assertion will become clearer by an examination of the cycle of creative activity and its connection with seeing unity in diversity. The choice of the creative process as throwing light on the meaning of culture is not accidental. The activities and productions of creative workers are closely associated with culture. They are highly valued because they indicate that someone has been able to create a unity out of many parts, whereas most men see only the several parts.

Characteristics of the Creative Process.

The creative cycle may conveniently be considered as a succession of stages.

The pattern of insightful thinking, says Hutchinson, involves a period of preparation, a period of remuneration or recession, a period or moment of insight, and a period of verification, elaboration, or evaluation. The process of creative thinking is the cycle of these stages in multiple and ever changing emphasis. (1)

Hutchinson has supported his thesis in a series of articles, analysing the creative process in some detail, with much reference to reports of creative workers. Others have arrived at essentially the same position as Hutchinson.

For example, Graham Wallas postulates four stages in creative activity. The first is one of preparation in which we consciously accumulate knowledge, divide the field by logical rules of enquiry and adopt a 'problem attitude;' the second is the incubatory stage when 'fringe-conscious' psychological events are important; the third

is a period or moment of insight or illumination, followed by the fourth stage of verification. (1)

Somewhat similar is Dewey's analysis of a 'complete act of thought' into five stages: occurrence of a difficulty, definition of the difficulty, suggested explanation or possible solution, rational elaboration of the idea, and corroboration of the idea and formation of a concluding belief. (2)

So it is that we see the process of creative activity as one of insightfully grasping the relation of a unit to a total pattern, the meaning of the part to the whole.

An interesting point to note in passing is that one of the reasons why religion is significant to so many rests on the fact that it also allows a unity to be created out of many diversities in the individual's life. Indeed there is a close resemblance between the process of creative activity and such religious activities and experiences as prayer, conversion, mysticism, and faith. Hutchinson (3) has sketched this similarity very clearly and shown how the above religious experiences consist of just such a four stage process as does creative activity.

(1) Graham Wallace, The Art of Thought (London, 1931), Ch. 4.
(2) John Dewey, How We Think (London, 1909), Ch. 6.
Definitions & Meanings.

Educationally this pattern of seeing unity in diversity - this pattern of the creative process - is of great importance. Not only does it offer some fruitful leads for the method of teaching, (1) but it also indicates the distinctive qualities of a cultural education which may now be defined.

A cultural education is one which enables the individual to perceive unity amidst diversities, in various spheres and at various levels, but especially the relationship of himself to the total pattern of things, so that he has a basis on which to make discriminating value judgments.

It is within fields that are familiar and of immediate relevance and interest that an individual will begin to comprehend the meaningfulness of parts within the whole, until finally he comes to perceiving the relationship of his own special activities to the total field of human activity and knowledge. Having grasped this relationship, he will be enabled to see other fields of specialization in their true perspective - all of them parts which fit together in a meaningful whole, even though he is unable to become a specialist in them all himself. Further, having achieved the ability to be discriminating in his own fields because he is able to

(1) E.D. Hutchinson, 'The Phenomenon of Insight in Relation to Education.'
evaluate the parts or units against the background of the whole, he will have the broadness of mind to recognize his limitations outside them and hence refrain from acting as if he were informed. This latter is an important mark of culture.

To have grasped something of the total meaningfulness of things is immensely important. It paves the way for a system of values, because it allows the individual to transcend the limits of his own self and to discover his relationship to the other human beings with whom, as a social being, he cannot escape living. This is particularly relevant a problem at the present time when social chaos is largely due to unprecedented technological advance and its consequent specialization of activity, along with an ignorance of its possible effects on the total social process, effects which have turned out to be very adverse in their influence on human beings in general.

It has been to the lasting disadvantage to mankind that the Greeks never sufficiently grasped the meaning of their relationship to others to get beyond a class stratified society; and this is the major fault of Greek education, namely, that it always saw culture in terms of class privilege, and that it saw culture and vocation as educationally irreconcilable.

This is a question with which we shall be later concerned, namely, whether a cultural education is necessarily preferential in regard to subject matter, and hence selective of recipients. In other words, are cultural
and vocational education mutually exclusive? According to the definition given above they need not be. There is no reason why many activities may not be the basis of a cultural education.

The opposite of a cultural education is not a vocational education, as commonly assumed. It is that narrow type of specialized training which restricts the awareness and understanding of its recipient to small compartments of human knowledge so that he does not see the relation of parts to the whole, especially of himself to the total social process. Non-cultural education may be called trade training, and the trade may be anything from learning Latin to mining coal.

Sophistic teaching at its worst was narrow specialized training which so restricted the awareness of its recipient as to allow him to be preoccupied with personal gain and not with the welfare of others. That is why the Greek thinkers showed such scornful contempt of it.

What then is vocational education? We cannot do better than quote John Dewey:

'A vocation means nothing but such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates.' (1)

So defined vocational education is not opposed to cultural; it is not even supplementary to a cultural education; it is an integral and essential part of it. Cultural education is vocationally conceived. It was so with the Greeks, with the limitation that the vocation was selectively restricted. Our task is to discover, in the next chapter, if this restriction is essential.

The opposite of vocation, again to quote Dewey, 'is neither leisure nor culture, but aimlessness, capriciousness, the absence of cumulative achievement in experience, on the personal side, and idle display, parasitic dependence upon the others, on the social side.' (1)

Vocational education, as a term, has in the past accumulated unfavourable connotations associated with class prejudice. Perhaps career education is a more satisfactory expression.

Section 3. Roman Education.

During the Alexandrian period of Greek thought a cultural or liberal education became formalized into a study of the so-called seven liberal arts, namely, grammar, music, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and certain aspects of rhetoric and dialectic. This stereotype of the seven liberal arts was to be profoundly influential on all later concepts of a cultural education. (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 359.
The more practical Roman temperament for a long while remained aloof from the Greek ideal of a cultural education. Even when the Greek pattern was introduced during the first half century B.C., its spirit was not really captivated. Much the same: Among the Romans grammar and rhetoric were the first of the liberal arts to obtain general recognition. The Romans were inclined to identify culture with eloquence, as the art of speaking and the mastering of the spoken word, based on a varied and extensive knowledge of things. In his great work on the Education of an Orator, Quintilian (35 A.D. - 96 A.D.) begins his course of instruction with Latin and Greek grammar... The Roman conception of these (liberal) arts was as a mere appanage to rhetoric, the view of such writers as Cicero, Quintilian and Tacitus.' (1)

Like Grecian education Roman education was based on class privilege and was selective as to curriculum. But there was a significant change. Greek education, it will be remembered, performed two functions, the vocational and the cultural. Rome almost discarded the latter function. In the words of Clarke:

'But what Rome did was, quite characteristically, to professionalize and mechanize culture itself, so that the very "liberal" subjects became themselves professional material for wage earning and thus really vocational. The Roman schools of literature and rhetoric were full of people whose sole aim was to make a living out of these things.' (2)

The result was that, especially in the latter days of the Empire, a cultural education became little more than an ornamental appendage, a symbol of class rank and privilege. This was no doubt due partly to Roman temperament

(1) Ibid., p. 405-6.
and mentality and partly to social conditions, but the significant fact was that acquaintance with culture necessitated the learning of a foreign language, which very easily became the substitute for culture itself. Much the same was to happen again after the Renaissance.

Section 4. Mediaeval Education

The idea of a cultural education as the study of the seven liberal arts culminating finally in a study of philosophy was taken over from the ancients by the Western Church and was transmitted to the Middle Ages largely through the writings of St. Augustine, Martianus Capella and Cassiodorus. (1)

In the early mediaeval period education remained alive almost only in the monasteries, and some interesting changes crept in. The liberal arts remained, but much of pagan learning was lost and what remained was subordinated to religious dogma. A completely new value was placed upon manual activities because of their value as moral training, especially as an escape from the vices of idleness. This distinctive feature was part of the set of rules drawn up by St. Benedict in 529. (2) Thus education no longer remained rigidly preferential in the selection of subject matter. Neither did it remain rigidly preferential in the selection of recipients, for in accordance with Christian teaching all men were equal in the sight of God. This tradition of educating

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(1) R. Young, op. cit., p. 405.

(2) Monroe, op. cit., p. 113.
the sons of those even of lowly class continued so that

in about 1350 Piers Plowman bitterly complains that
every cobbler's son and beggar's brat gets book-
learning, and such wretches bishops, and lords'
sons and knights crouch to them. He thinks that
lords should make bishops of their own brothers'
children.' (1)

Likewise the nobles complained:

"In the reign of Richard II indeed, a petition
was presented to Parliament by certain lords,
praying that children of serfs and the lower sort
might not be sent to school, and particularly to
the schools of the monasteries, wherein many were
trained as ecclesiastics, and thence rose to
dignities in the state. But the clergy were strong
enough to defend the cause of the poor." (2)

Indeed in the later Middle Ages many schools were specially
endowed for children of the poor, schools that were
later to become the stronghold of class privilege.

Guild schools and burgher or town schools, more free from
ecclesiastical control, likewise taught children of all
classes. (3) Unhappily the Renaissance wasted see the

class basis of education renewed with increased rigour.

Greek education we said gave vocation and culture.
So also did monastic. This time the vocation was that
of piety, and the range of activities serving this end
was much wider than ever would have been permitted by
the Greeks. On the contrary the something else, called
culture, was more narrowly conceived than in Greek times,
and was completely subordinated to religious ends and
the achievement of an after life.

(1) F.W. Farrar (ed.), Essays on a Liberal Education
(Macmillan, 1867), p.44.
(2) Ibid., p.45.
(3) See Monroe, op.cit., pp. 156-7.
The monastic pattern of education did not everywhere prevail. There was, in particular, controversy about the pagan influence of the seven liberal arts. In the end, however, secular learning was subordinated to Holy Scripture, and the later Middle Ages saw the rise of Scholasticism as an intellectual discipline. Scholasticism says John Dewey:

'is the whole-hearted and consistent formulation and application of the methods which are suited to instruction when the material of instruction is taken ready-made, rather than as something which students are to find out for themselves.' (1)

Inevitably the education of the School Men became primarily preoccupied with linguistic study. The quadrivium, the disciplines of physics and mathematics so important to the Greeks fell into disuse, monastic conceptions of manual labour had no place, and once again a cultural education was narrowly linguistic, so much so that it was virtually non-cultural.

The Middle Ages saw another pattern of education, the education of chivalry, which rose as a protest against the intellectual and ecclesiastic domination of liberal learning. This was the education of the knighthood, acquired by the page during his service to the squire. Its emphasis was on the cultivation of fine manners to the exclusion of intellectual study. It also was so narrowly conceived as to merit being branded as a non-cultural education, a trade training for the occupation of knight.

In summary, mediaeval education gives examples of both cultural and non-cultural education, with distinctive characteristics of the period.

The Renaissance saw the appearance of new trends which came to be considered educationally irreplaceable:

The classical revival.

The growth of science.

Both were expressions of the same new spirit that was abroad and it has indeed been unfortunate for posterity that their essence was not received. Instead the revival of classical education very soon allied itself with traditionalism, while education influenced by the new science and its applications was left the inferior partner, struggling for recognition.

Concurrent with the classical revival, vigorous growth of vernacular literatures appeared. Before these Latin, once the international language of Europe, slowly succumbed. The issues in the educational struggle became clear: a classical education clinging tenaciously to dead languages on the one hand, and on the other a scientific education in the vernacular, usually with a study of native literature.

why the cleavage? Heavy outline near main reason. (1)

1. The old tradition resolutely entrenched in institutions, politics, law and diplomacy were rooted in authoritative literature; the essence of academic custom meant insularity to the advances for which methods of teaching were not

CHAPTER III
THE RENAISSANCE & AFTER

Section I. Renaissance

The Renaissance saw the appearance of two trends which came to be considered educationally irreconcilable:

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- The growth of science.

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Why the cleavage? Dewey outlines four main reasons. (1)

1. The old tradition was firmly entrenched in institutions. Politics, law and diplomacy were rooted in authoritative literature; the inertia of academic custom meant inhospitality to the sciences for which methods of teaching were not

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highly organized as with language teaching; and finally the aristocratic tradition still despised material things and manual activity.

2. The protestant revolt brought with it an immense increase of interest in theological discussion and controversies, and the appeal on both sides was to literary documents. Hence the emphasis on languages.

3. The new science was for a long time to be worked in the interests of old aims of human exploitation. It allied itself with capitalism in the service of immediate goals. There was no long term view of the ultimate welfare of human beings. We may add that it remained for the twentieth century to remedy this lack by perceiving the value of scientific procedure in the development of the social sciences, thus being midwife at the birth of the youngest child of the mother, philosophy. Now, the Renaissance upholders of a literary education, whether always validly or not, did at least claim that their type of education did not only furnish means for ends but considered ends themselves. In this they had a strong argument in their favour.

4. The philosophy which professed itself based upon science, which gave itself out as the accredited representative of the net significance of science, was either dualistic in character, marked by a sharp division between mind (characterizing man) and matter, constituting nature; or else it was openly mechanical, reducing the signal features of human life to illusion. In either case it
meant that science had no place for a teleological conception, for purpose and ultimate ends of human living and any philosophy which excludes these is bound to leave out what is most interesting and most important to mankind. This, says Dewey, does not represent the genuine purpose of science, but is a mistaking the technique for the thing itself, the method for its subject matter. Science should not ignore the qualities of events. Actually, here again the twentieth century has seen an awakening to the former limitations of science as exemplified by the scientist-philosophers, experimentalists on the one hand, and idealists on the other. However, the immediate effect of modern science was to accentuate the dualism of mind and matter, and it thereby prejudiced its own claim, for physical and humanistic studies were established as two disconnected groups.

From this point I proceed to consider the revival of classical education and its development, the growth of the new scientific education being left till the next chapter.

Section 2. The Challenge of Humanism

The first enthusiasms of the Renaissance brought a redawning of the Greek ideal in education, development of the whole personality. Vergerio in his treatise on education (circa 1574) wrote:

'We call those studies liberal which are worthy of a free man; those studies by which we attain and practice virtue and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains and develops those highest gifts of body and of mind, which ennoble men and which are
rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue only.... to the vulgar temper, gain and pleasure are the one aim of existence; to a lofty nature, moral worth and fame. (1)

Great educators of the period like Vittorino, Guarino, and Erasmus were all apostles of that which was best in the education of Greece, wherein it seemed that the solution to all problems of education lay.

But the good intentions of the Renaissance educators were, some of them at least, to fall by the wayside. Had the great thinkers of the time seen the limitations of Greek education the tale would be a different one. Not only did they fail in this, but they also tended to neglect the Greek interest in physical science. This was the inevitable price of hero worship, for not only did the Greeks, but also the Romans have great prestige during this period, and it has already been pointed out that Roman ideas about a cultural education were narrowly conceived and inferior to those of Greece. Quintilian aimed twice: once in Rome and once in Renaissance Europe.

Roman education came to exalt literary studies partly because, to use Dewey's phrase, of the "increasingly reminiscent and borrowed character of culture," (2) a culture recorded in a foreign tongue. So also during the Renaissance,

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(1) Quoted by Monroe, op. cit., p. 163.
with the difference that this time there were two foreign
tongues, and neither of them living languages. Humanism
which had entered the schools as a vitalizing force was
soon on a downward path towards a soulless preoccupation
with verbal forms. By the end of the fifteenth century
there was the most ridiculous spectacle of the cult of
Ciceronianism which condemned any Latin expressions not
found in Cicero. (1) Castiglione's Book of the Courtier
(1528) was an Italian complaint against the degenerate
liberal education, but the battle against formalism was
to be a long one.

Preoccupation with formal linguistic study became
reinforced by Protestantism. Paradoxically enough the
humanistic revival was the parent of the Protestant revolution;
and its child, once born immediately set about devouring it.
The intensity of the religious conviction of the reformers
could allow no other dogma than their own, not even any
learning that would engender criticism of their dogma.
Further, religious truth had its source in written documents,
which led to emphasis on language learning; and finally the
religious educational aim was moral rather than intellectual
or aesthetic. All conspired to making Protestant education
formal and linguistic. Even so great an educator as
Melanchthon (1497-1560) did not escape the pitfalls and
the system in all its iniquity was firmly established by
John Sturm (1507-89). Its influence was to be long and
tedious.

(1) William Boyd, The History of Western Education
Section 3. The Challenge of Capitalism.

In the seventeenth century the spirit of educational reform was stirring over Europe, in response to the changed conditions of the social and material environment. The studies which he set his monks to make, as it were, to give him by little and by little, a view of what is excellent and profitably, and in the possession of this spirit Comenius is the greatest representative. (1)

There is a superficial resemblance between Comenius and other educational reformers, for example the Puritan reformers in England of whom John Locke (1632-1704) (2) is selected as leader.

Unhappily the resemblance is only superficial. For although both rebelled against the existing tradition of formalism and linguistic training, whereas Comenius saw the need of a complete about-turn and had a new understanding of the relationship of culture and vocation in education, Locke did little more than accommodate an outworn educational pattern to the demands of a new environment with as few changes as possible and without abandoning the aristocratic conceptions of culture and vocation in education.

Locke saw the need of introducing new studies into the curriculum, studies which were considered of vocational use. These were in the nature of appendages, for the major concern of education he saw as something else, with what was for him the cultural in education:

(1) See Ch. 3.

(2) Source material for John Locke taken from A. Meiklejohn, Education Between Two Worlds (New York, 1942), Ch. 3.
'The great work of a governor (tutor) is to fashion the carriage and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits, and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him by little and little, a view of mankind and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praiseworthy; and in the possession of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies which he sets him upon are but, as it were, the exercises of his faculties, and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application, and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry may perfect. For who expects that, under a tutor a young gentleman should be an accomplished critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics; or be a master in history or chronology? Though something of each is to be taught him, but it is only to open the door that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there; and a governor would be much blamed that should keep his pupil too long and lead him too far in most of them. But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much; and, if he have these, he will not long want what he needs or desires of the other.' (1)

This quotation also makes it clear that Locke does not completely neglect useful knowledge; but his usefulness is specific, practical and narrowly conceived. It is not a true vocational element in education, but bears the characteristics of technical training, whether it be arithmetic to help those in charge of business affairs or Latin which is essential to a gentleman. Locke had no idea of culture through vocation, for he had no idea of the unity of the total pattern of knowledge.

His inability to break with the past is further evidenced in his acceptance of the class basis of education. Education for culture, outlined above was for youths of family and property, and was treated in Thoughts Concerning Education (1693). In that essay he expresses his deep fears of 'beggars boys and the abhorred rascality' and 'the taint of servants' terrifies him. Without enquiring why the common people are an abhorred rascality and what conditions have made them thus, Locke plans a completely different education for them, sketched in his memorandum on reform of the Poor Law (1697). Education for the children of the working poor is undisguised trade training, direct preparation for some useful occupation, along with a requisite dose of religion which will help to make them industrious and moral. He thoughtfully adds that they may each day be given:

'a bellyful of bread,' and 'to this may be added, without any trouble, in cold weather, if it be thought needful, a little warm water-gruel; for the same fire that warms the room may be made use of to boil a pot of it.' (1)

Educationally Locke is a bitter disappointment. At a time which was ripe for educational reform he taught a compromise with the past, from which the past ultimately emerged triumphant, to haunt western civilization for another two and a half centuries with its ills. In Miclejohn's words:

(1) Ibid., p.33
'Out of the same Bible in which Comenius finds the democracy which would have made England one people Locke derives and establishes the vicious aristocracy which, throughout the technological era, has divided her into two industrial classes, the masters and the servants. He has managed, without realizing what he is doing, to state the gospel of that competitive struggle for wealth and power which has arrayed man against man, class against class, nation against nation, as England has led the way in the creating and maintaining of the industrial activities of the modern world.'  

Melanchthon and Sturm had reconciled Protestantism with traditional concepts of culture and vocation in education and linguistic study remained supreme. Locke carried the process a step further and reconciled the traditional concepts with Capitalism, the close bed-fellow of Protestantism. This he did by fixing the gulf between culture and vocation in education, identifying vocational education with the gaining of useful knowledge, or trade training; and by fixing the gulf between upper class and lower class education: for the upper class, cultural education and a little useful knowledge, for the lower class, trade training alone. For the first time since Plato educational theory explicitly recognised the lower classes, again only to trample them underfoot.

Traditional education was again secure to go its own way, raising its own cultural priesthood. Before long it even disowned those studies which Locke would have appended, and once again went headlong in the descent into formalism and linguistic study.

(1) Ibid., p. 35.
Section 4. The Challenge of Science.

The slothfulness of the schools had reached its peak by the opening years of the nineteenth century and it was obvious to even a casual observer that something had to be done. Science was again insistently demanding a place in the curriculum, and its entry was now no longer a matter of benefit to individual development, but also of social and national welfare. (1)

A whole book could be filled with quotations, from various authors, commissions and committees, concerning the place of science in the curriculum in the nineteenth century, in reference to England alone. Suffice it to quote the following section from the Spens Report. (2)

"William Whewell, the celebrated Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, had urged in 1837 the claims of Mathematics and Science to be regarded as part of a liberal and academic education. The Prince Consort was keenly interested in the claims of science, and these were further stressed by the Great Exhibition of 1851, which brought home to Englishmen their comparative backwardness in this respect. In 1854 three eminent scientists urged the claims of science as an integral part of general education. Professor T.H. Huxley delivered a famous address on the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences; John Tyndall lectured on the Importance of the Study of Physics as a Branch of Education; and Michael Faraday, in a lecture on the Education of the Judgment, stressed the importance of cultivating the scientific spirit. Herbert Spencer in an article in the North British Review, took the view that a knowledge of life was more important than any other knowledge whatever. His Education: Intellectual, Moral, Physical (1861), which had a very wide circulation, did much indirectly to undermine confidence in traditional methods of education. Spencer concludes that knowledge of the various branches of natural science is of the highest value, and his section on curriculum mainly consists of an elaborate plea for giving the teaching of natural science the

(1) See F.W. Farrar, op.cit., p.78.
leading place in formal education... Professor T.H. Huxley (1) in his Essays and other writings urged the claims of science to be included in any proper scheme of secondary education. His views exercised much influence on the development of public opinion in regard to the teaching of science.  

The Essays on a Liberal Education published under the editorship of F.W. Farrar in 1867 (2) were a concise expression of the views of leading educational thinkers who were in favour of a reformed curriculum for a cultural education, in which the weaknesses of the traditional system were bitingly disclosed, although there was still a very strong sympathy for the classics and no hint of dethroning them from central place. Science was admitted, but by most writers as a very junior partner.

(1) Huxley's definition of a liberal education, written in 1893, is noteworthy:
'...That man, I think has had a liberal education who has been so trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with ease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamer as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of Nature and of the laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will; the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself.'  
(Science and Education (London, 1910), p.36.)

(2) Farrar, op.cit.
Matthew Arnold’s report (1) to the Schools Inquiry Commission (1866) after his observation of education in France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland is worth mentioning. Arnold’s views were strongly influenced by the German insistence on a general liberal culture. He did not follow their strictly classical pattern, however, but rather the French, who at that time gave in the first three years of the secondary school a general course, after which there was a bifurcation and the pupil chose either humanities or the study of nature. The choice should rest on aptitude and aim, thought Arnold.

Pure classical education was not without its defenders. The now familiar arguments were all heaped into shape: (2) training the faculties and the assumption of transfer of training; the moral discipline of distasteful study; incalculable aid in comprehending the grammar and syntax of the vernacular; and the unsurpassed aesthetic beauty of the ancient writers. Sidgwick very adequately answered all these arguments in 1867, but they have had remarkable longevity.

Of all the supporters of traditional liberal education(3) none has been more influential than Cardinal Newman. (4)

(1) R. Young, op. cit., pp. 410-1.
(2) See Farrar, op. cit., Essay II by Henry Sidgwick.
(3) The most complete exposition of arguments for a classical education is R.W. Livingstone’s A Defense of a Classical Education (London, 1916), which is valuable in showing just what are the valid claims of the classicists, and how absurd others of their claims can become.
He summarizes his own argument:

'I consider, then, that I am chargeable with no
paradox, when I speak of knowledge which is its own
end, when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman’s
knowledge, when I educate for it and make it the
scope of a University. And still less am I incurring
such a charge when I make this acquisition consist,
not in knowledge in a vague and ordinary sense, but
in that knowledge which I have especially called
Philosophy...' (1)

Newman’s influence was greatly furthered by the noble-
ness of his educational aim, the apprehension of:

'the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on
which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights
and its shades, its great points and its little...' (2)

The scientific specialist will have an 'illumination and
largeness of mind and freedom and self possession, and will
treat his own study in consequence with a philosophy
and a resource;' but, Newman ominously adds, a resource
'which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal
education.' (3)

Newman’s is the fault of all classicists: his type of
education alone can make possible the achievement of his
educational aims. Today, when the establishing of true
democracy is everywhere so urgent, we can no longer afford
to be so dogmatic. Further, scientific psychology refutes
many of the classicists' basic assumptions. The work of
Speckman and others, for instance, shows that it is just

(1) Ibid., p.111
(2) Ibid., p.101.
(3) Ibid., p. 166
naive to talk of 'cultivation of the intellect,' and 'knowledge for its own sake': (1) as if these can be divorced from other activities of the human organism.

The real basis of an argument like Newman's is a nostalgia for the past: our great debt to the ancients and how much our civilization owes to the Greeks. Thomas Arnold, reformer at Rugby, had something of this hero-worship:

'Expel Greek and Latin from your schools and you confine the views of the existing generation to themselves and their immediate predecessors, you will cut off so many centuries of the world's experience, and place us in the same state as if the human race had come into existence in the year 1500.' (2)

To this type of argument Whitehead gave a perfect answer when he said:

'Of all types of men today existing, classical scholars are the most remote from the Greeks of the Periclean times.' (3)

No-one knows what the spiritual forces accumulated at the time of the Renaissance would have accomplished without the hindrance of classical rediscovery.

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(1) See Newman p.152. 'This process of training by which the intellect...is disciplined for its own sake...is called Liberal Education.'


Another favourite argument of the classicists is to point to the achievements of the traditional curriculum in the past. This is still a very favourite trick in present day controversies about reform of the conventional cultural education, especially at the secondary school level. For example Norwood traces the history of classics in English education from the eighteenth century, notes its great success in training imperial leaders and administrators, recognises that it was at times too narrowly conceived, and asserts that reformed cultural education has real value.

"For minds so endowed by nature as to be able to profit by it. But it is by no means suitable for all." (1)

Now this attitude may be true enough, but having once accomplished the difficult task of discovering who are able to profit by such an education, it is very likely that some other type of education will prepare them for their future much more adequately. For example, there is a very strong argument for the case that a classical education does not prepare the best administrators and that a course in social science would be much more effective. Products of a system seem to have a blind spot for criticism of that system.

Eventually the pure classicists had to give way.

But alas! the reformers turned round to see that their

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opponents had 'classicism' the teaching of science and other modern studies. The battles had to be fought all over again, and at the present time the war is at its height. The main issues of the opposing sides will be drawn at the end of this, and in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, by way of generalization let us apply our formula to the post-renaissance period, namely preference in selection of subject matter and recipients; and the degree to which the education performed vocational and cultural functions.

Erratum: The following four paragraphs should appear on p. 42 at +

always to tolerate such industrial capitalist class, rapidly increasing its wealth in an era of imperial expansion asserted its claim to an education previously the preserve of the aristocracy, mainly, no doubt, because education was an effective instrument of class mobility. Wealth rivalled birth as the criterion of upper class membership.

On the other hand socialistic theory taught the equal rights of man and showed what true democracy should be. The French Revolution was a grim reminder to the ruling class that the ruled did not always suffer in silence for ever. Although slowly, the lower classes were admitted to the privilege of a liberal education. But not en masse; for a very rigid selection on the basis of ability was made by imposition of a system of examinations, on the basis of which scholarships were granted.
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Public opinion was not always to tolerate such unadulterated class stratification. On the one hand the industrial capitalist class, rapidly increasing its wealth in an era of imperial expansion asserted its claim to an education previously the preserve of the aristocracy, mainly, no doubt, because education was an effective instrument of class mobility. Wealth rivalled birth as the criterion of upper class membership.

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Liberal education still remained selective, the
privilege of an elite, but now the criteria of selection
were widened to include: birth and wealth for the upper
class, wealth alone for the middle class, and ability for
the lower, unfinancial class. The change in emphasis
is seen in the quotation from Norwood, that liberal
education is 'for minds so endowed by nature as to be
able to profit by it.' (1)

In some communities the movement away from class
privilege has gone even further; but this topic belongs
to the next chapter.

In this period liberal education remained severely
restrictive in subject matter, although in the nineteenth
century it was compelled to extend its frontiers. Its
selective character was plainly manifest by the growth of
various institutions offering technical and trade training
of a rather narrow variety.

Likewise it remained severely restrictive in the
selection of recipients, witness again the dualistic
growth of a system of technical education for the working
classes, and above all the rise of national systems of
universal elementary education. In general the class
basis of education was quite openly upheld. The Spens
Report, referring to the Schools Inquiry Commission (1864-8)
says:

(1) See p. 39.
"The constructive recommendations of the Commissioners in respect of curriculum show clearly the influence of that class idea of education which held the field in England till the end of the nineteenth century. Education was envisaged in terms of social classes, there was to be one education for the less affluent class, another for the middle classes of society and a third for the upper..."

Their understanding limited by their class membership, men failed to see that liberal or classical education continued, as in previous centuries, to perform a vocational function, which it did in so far as it prepared boys for:

- Leadership and the vocation of being gentlemen. As the Philosopher Locke said, Latin was 'necessary to a gentleman.' (2)

- Conspicuous idleness. As Dewey says:

'display, the adornment of person, the kind of social companionship and entertainment which give prestige, and the spending of money, have been made into definite callings.' (3)

- The learned professions, including teaching, literary occupations, research, law, medicine and the Church.

The same limitation of understanding prevented a true comprehension of the meaning of culture. When culture is the preserve of an aristocratic or upper class it is easy to assume that leisure is an essential component. Thus culture became identified with activity which is not done for the sake of immediate gain, not one's usual

(1) Spens Report, p.32.
(2) See F. Clarke, Education & Social Change (London, 1940), p.32.
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(1) Spens Report, p. 32.

(2) See F. Clarke, Education & Social Change (London, 1940), p. 32.

occupation or employment. Carried to its extreme this means that the same activity can be cultural or not depending on the subjective state of the individual - his motives - as he carries it out. Newman clearly stated this point of view:

'... that alone is liberal knowledge which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be informed (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our contemplation. The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self sufficient and complete; the highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond them. (Newman finds justification in Aristotle, Rhetorica 1.5.)

"Of possession those rather are useful which bear fruit; those liberal which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using."'

A contemporary statement of culture as non-gainful occupation is made by Cyril Norwood:

'But it is not the business of the school, it has never been part of the English tradition, to make boys at school into electrical engineers or chartered accountants, butchers, bakers or candlestick makers. Therefore it is its business to train the mind, give a liberal education, and fit the boy for life, whatever his course is going to be.' (2)

It is an easy step from here to the identification of culture with something inner, self-development or the like, regardless of social reference. With no boundaries except self development, the vicious circle may be completed, and the man of leisure exploits whom he may in order to perpetuate his life of leisure. So it is that one writer can make


(2) Norwood, op. cit., p. 90.
the preposterous claim that:

"A leisure class is a social necessity, for it serves as an example to other people, showing them how to enjoy their idle hours. The English aristocracy with its horse races and other outdoor sports has done much to make life interesting in that otherwise factory-ridden country." (1)

The aristocratic conception of the relation of culture and vocation in education has had surprising powers of self regeneration. It came safely through the ordeal of the Reformation under the guidance of Melanchthon and Sturm. Locke piloted it safely through the restlessness of the social order during the ascendancy of Capitalism and Industrialism, when true democracy was preached but not accepted. It managed to make a compromise with nineteenth century scientific demands, but not a peace. There ensued a period of armed neutrality until in recent years the traditional conception is again making virile attempts to survive another period of great social agitation and change, for which there is as yet no name. In the midst of this struggle we at present live. Some reasons for this longevity and tenacity are suggested:

— It has been to the advantage of an upper ruling class to retain its privileges.

— A rising middle class has found an education rooted in class distinction an effective instrument of upward class mobility, once their wealth has guaranteed their entrance.

Further, middle-class industrialists and financiers are frequently self-made men, who display, as a kind of defence mechanism, a distrust of education for vocation or career; an attitude noticeably absent in professional men, for example. On has manifested three main trends.

A - The lower classes have been conditioned to humility and obedience, for only with such attitudes are they the effective instruments to be exploited by the upper and middle classes.

B - Teachers who have themselves been vociferous advocates of the cultural value of liberal education have probably been motivated, unawares, by inferiority feelings and a need to compensate for their own manifestly technical or trade interest in a liberal or cultural education.

C - Ability even to see the problem has been hindered by the inertia of custom and the psychological security which the individual finds in a stable social order - the conservative tendency in human personality; and by the compartmentalized nature of knowledge as taught, which prevents a comprehension of the total social process.

Education should have been in U.S.A. when the swing away from it went further than in most other countries. The reasons are clear, however, for the greater the change the more the problems associated with a new education become manifest, and the clearer it becomes that educational change needed reconsideration.

Notes: (1) Like many other educational thinkers
CHAPTER IV
CONTemporary

The Challenge of Democracy

During the present century the aristocratic concept of cultural education has manifested three main trends.

A. For a while and in some places it seemed that the aristocratic view of cultural education was gradually dying a peaceful death. It seemed quite unable to vigorously counter-attack progressive educational theory and practice under the leadership of such as John Dewey.

In England, where it held its grip as strongly as anywhere, unchanged from the end of the nineteenth century, it was slowly losing ground and giving way to a changed pattern of education. It's disappearance to many seemed only a matter of time.

B. But this traditional viewpoint has manifested remarkable powers of self-regeneration, and has recently appeared in a revised version, the editor of which is R.M. Hutchins in U.S.A.

It is interesting that the revival of traditional liberal education should have been in U.S.A. where the swing away from it went further than in most other countries. The reasons are clear, however, for the greater the change the more the problems associated with a new education became manifest, and the clearer it became that educational change needed reconsideration.

Hutcheson, (1) like many other educational thinkers

was profoundly disturbed by present day chaos in education
which he attributes to three main causes:

- Love of money. For need of finance educational
  institutions have been obliged to concede much to the
  interests that supplied it.
- A confused notion of democracy, which has left education
  responsive to all whims of public opinion, and without
  purpose or goal.
- An erroneous notion of progress, and the belief
  that all that is needed is further development of science
  and technology.

Three dilemmas have resulted:

- The dilemma of professionalism, which has led to
  narrowness and specialization in education.
- The dilemma of isolation, resulting in compartmental-
  ization of human knowledge, and a losing of the total
  pattern.
- The dilemma of anti-intellectualism, the accumulation
  of facts and details at the expense of general principles.

So far there is no cause for disagreement with
Hutchins. But now he exhibits a typically infantile
reaction in the face of fear and danger. Instead of
facing the real problems of the present and constructing
a secure future with due recognition of them, he flees
to the comfort and security of the past.

To do this he suggests a reformed curriculum in the
shape of a general education of permanent studies, of
which he says:
It may not assist him to make money or to get ahead. It may not in any obvious fashion adjust him to his environment or fit him for the contemporary scene. It will, however, have a deeper, wider utility: it will cultivate the intellectual virtues.' (1)

The justification of intellectual cultivation is given by Cardinal Newman, approvingly quoted by Hutchins:

If then the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, than through him to the world.' (2)

The permanent studies have an additional advantage:

'If we propose the permanent studies because these studies draw out the elements of our common human nature, because they connect man with man, because they connect us with the best that man has thought, because they are basic to any further study and to any understanding of the world.' (3)

These permanent studies are in the first place 'those books which have through the centuries attained to the dimensions of classics.' (4) Hutchins apologizes that many such books are in the ancient and mediaeval period, explaining that they are really contemporary

(1) The Higher Learning in America, p. 62
(2) Ibid., p. 63-4.
(3) Ibid., p. 77.
(4) Ibid., p. 73.
in spirit and relevance. The first necessity, of course, is to know how to read these books, for which a study of grammar is necessary, although it need not be the grammar of the ancient languages. Translations are adequate. Hutchins makes the age-old complaint about degeneracy of instruction in English grammar and even permits himself to say: 'Grammar disciplines the mind and develops the logical faculty.' (1) Added to grammar, or the rules of reading, are: 'rhetoric and logic, or the rules of writing, speaking, and reasoning.' (2) Mathematics are added, and the grand finale is a study of metaphysics, the knowledge of highest principles and causes.

The wheel of change sometimes turns with amazing tardiness. In the nineteenth century the upholders of liberal education were fighting against the claims of the physical sciences. Now that the growth of the social sciences has remedied many of the defects that came in the train of science the fight still continues and the social sciences are anathema. There is even the ridiculous spectacle of some conservatives upholding the physical sciences with classics against the social sciences.

Hutchinism is an expression of distrust of the social sciences as well as of concern about genuine educational problems, and a refusal to recognise that social studies will be beneficial to social welfare except at the level of university specialisation.

(1) Ibid., p.82.
(2) Ibid., p.83.
Hutchins may be criticised on many grounds. Two very important attacks are that he commits himself to a faculty psychology which is no longer acceptable, and that the main arguments of all the great books of the world - or of his list - are compatible, which is quite absurd. He shows no other way than reading whereby the intellect may be trained and the eternal truths comprehended. A thorough reading of the great books should compel Hutchins to change his point of view.

Extensive quotations clearly reveal Hutchins' acceptance of the philosophy of idealism, especially the ancient and medieval varieties. He thus also shows the implicit philosophical basis of traditional liberal education, in Europe. Hutchins also expresses his admiration for eighteenth and nineteenth century aristocratic liberal education, again by extensive quotations and by the following tell-tale remark: 'My own impression is that within twenty-five or fifty years we shall be about where England is today.' (1)

On this point and of Hutchins' idealism Bode makes a delicious criticism:

'Classicism naturally does not like to admit that it is the posthumous child of a defunct aristocracy, and it is learning to become distrustful of self-cultivation in terms of harmonious development. Consequently it has recourse, whenever necessary, to a world beyond space and time.' (2)

(1) Hutchins, No Friendly Voice (Chicago, 1936), p.129.
(2) Bode, How We Learn (Boston, 1940), p.74.
Concerning extension of educational opportunity to all, Hutchins is caught in a dilemma. He is influenced enough by democratic principles to demand a general education for all, particularly until seventeen or eighteen. After that true democracy in education ends, for he says:

'Democracy does not require, however, that the higher learning should be open to anybody except those who have the interest and ability that independent intellectual work demands.' (1)

This is an open readmission of the selection of an educational elite, true to the Platonic idealist conception. Hutchins admits his own defeat. He cannot invent an education which will solve contemporary problems and yet find a place for all types of aptitude and interest. Further, he roughly rides over the existence of these differences of aptitude and interest during the period of general education, forcing every student into the same mould.

What is Hutchins' answer to the relation of culture and vocation in education? Cultural education for him is general education aimed at the cultivation of the intellect; and it has absolutely no connection with vocation-alism, which he identifies with technical or trade training. If his general education could be administered to everyone with no distinction, it would not even be a trade training for the vocation of idleness — which would of course be to its merit if it worked. The latter is very doubtful, however, first because individual differences have the

(1) The Higher Learning in America, p. 20.
knack of being persistently present, and because the conditions of the modern world demand some degree of specialization in education even at the secondary level.

Hutchin's major fault is that he identifies vocational education with a narrow trade training, and cannot conceive of vocation as defined previously, and hence of cultural education through vocation or career.

In New Zealand, where the educational scene has many points of resemblance with that of U.S.A., Hutchinism has taken root, especially in the controversy raging over the new post-primary school curriculum recommended by the special Committee appointed by the Minister of Education. (1)

The following is an example:

"In New-educational jargon the opposite to an "academic" course is a "cultural" one; some even have the nerve to say "liberal". New Education has taken over this tiresome word "cultural" from Anthropology (the science of man as a biological species) where it has the technical sense of denoting the influence of the environment, as opposed to racial or hereditary factors. But as applied to school subjects or "activities" (when is a man active?) it carries a further suggestion of that which is non-professional, plus a strong dose of the "free-and-easy," in contrast with hard work, "grinding" or "cramming." Now surely the case that distinguishes the operations of a man of culture, in the rational sense of the word, is the result of hard work; it has been won at last through much grammatical, mathematical or other analytical labour. Still more disturbing in the current recommendation of "cultural" studies is the suggestion of manipulating the "social" environment, "social control," "planning" and the like." (2)

(1) Report of the Committee Appointed by the Minister of Education in November 1942, The Post Primary School Curriculum (Wellington, 1944).

The faults of such argument lie in ill-defined concepts of cultural education. It is useful, therefore, to have seen the faults of Hutchinian in order to make our own discussion less aimless than they are inclined to be. c. Hutchinian should be a warning, for it exposes the background of idealism in traditional liberal education; and the path of idealism in education, given the right social background and psychological condition of the people, leads directly to authoritarianism and the totalitarian state in which is evidenced the third contemporary trend of the traditional pattern of education. It has done so in many countries today, and the pattern of the educational bears systems/no superficial resemblance to that of Plato.

The philosophy of idealism is most attractive, for it gives men a goal, and an aim and a purpose in living, the virtue of which no-one would deny. But its dangers are sinister. It provides an excellent basis for the justification of restrictive selection of curriculum content. The extent to which this can go is evident in the astonishing hold which race theory has in Nazi Germany, where even individuals of high intellectual ability have been converted. (1) It also provides the basis for justifying restriction of the participants in education, and thus the formation of a new elite, a privileged and exploiting group.

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(1) Kneller, G.F. The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism. (New Haven, 1943).
Under such an education as the Nazi, culture is lost, for ability to validly see the meaningfulness of the total pattern of things would be dangerous to the social policy. Instead one must see the pattern demanded by this policy; and so culture is displaced by propaganda, the uncritical acceptance of a pre-fabricated pattern of thought.

Vocation in this type of education is, with all intention, given central place, and is identified with state service. Education is framed to mould the individual as the efficient instrument of the state, ready to obey its every command. This, of course, is not vocation in the sense herein defined, but in its narrowness of aim resembles technical training in politics.

By way of final summing up let us note the features of the traditional way of relating culture and vocation in education:

They have been opposed in an irreconcilable dualism, a dualism which is related to the opposition of labour and leisure, theory and practice, individual and society, mind and body. Such dualism is possible only on the basis of a class stratified society, an upper class or elite opposed to a lower class. Hence traditionally cultural education has been preferential in its selection of subject matter and of recipients. Ericksen neatly describes the situation:

'Who shall function on the level of culture and who shall remain in the field of mechanics, seems thus to have been determined by nature and accepted by philosophers, by scientists, by industrialists, and by educators. Nature it is that has predetermined who are and who are not to enjoy the emotional ecstasy that accompanies creativeness in the realms
of truth, beauty and goodness. Thus, if we substitute nature for God, natural law for predestination, we have an old philosophy dressed in new robes. We go on clinging to the notion that, for the many, between the exigencies of birth and death, life must remain a matter of vegetating, little more." So we see written in large letters at the door of the kingdom of culture: DEMOCRACY ENDS HERE. ONLY THE ELECT MAY ENTER. (1)

Democracy had made its challenge and the opponent is retaliating with vigour, but the issue is yet undecided. It remains to be seen whether the traditional, aristocratic conception of vocation and culture in education will once again survive attack. But let us now turn to consider in more detail the exact nature of the alternative solution offered in the name of democracy.

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRACY ATTEMPTED

Part Two

Herein lies the appeal of a cultural education which is not essentially preferential if its selection of curricula and recipients—a cultural education that is not rooted in class distinction. It is in education in which there is no longer a distinction between culture and vocation. It is instead culture through vocation.

Chapter V

DEMOCRACY ATTEMPTED

Chapter VI

DEMOCRACY UNACHIEVED

The story begins with the Middle Ages, for there one catches a glimpse of the part which vocational activities, of the type devised by Greek educators and their successors, contribute to culture; of culture achieved through vocation.

'Centuries ago,' says Kekulé, 'there was a time in Germany when the masters, not only of one trade, but of many trades, felt the educative influences of work in some. It was the age in which Gothic and Early Gothic cathedrals were built, in which work people and masters combined in the plan of the whole, in which almost all the trades of a town united to construct those monumental edifices that have gained the individual admiration of our time by the finished unity of their construction. If we could but understand the eloquent silence of these cathedrals our curiosity and our patience would once more exert a gentle harmonious and exclamatory influence, and the civic edifice—common districts, counties and states—will benefit by the study.' (1)

Perhaps there is a touch of romanticism in this statement, but in contrast with the background of scholastic argument in which the schools were engrossed, it remains substantially true.

Herein is traced the slow dawning of a cultural education which is not essentially preferential in its selection of curriculum and recipients—a cultural education that is not rooted in class distinction. It is an education in which there is no longer a dichotomy between culture and vocation. It is instead culture through vocation.

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'We may almost say,' states Clarke, 'with some exaggeration no doubt, that in the Middle Ages the "vocational" education was the more genuinely liberal and the "liberal" education had become very largely vocational. That is, it is among the craftsmen of the Middle Ages and in the towns that we must look for signs of a liberal culture.' (1)

The Renaissance, for all its effect on education, did not, we have seen, escape the limitations of class distinction in the selection of pupils. The influence of the Reformation was exactly opposite. The spread of Protestantism depended greatly for its success, as Luther clearly saw, on widespread education of the people so that they could read the Bible for themselves. Further, the new movement had the spirit of Christianity concerning all men as equals — with modifications of course. The real effects of this were to become evident in the education system of Scotland, a direct product of the Reformation via Calvin and John Knox. Protestant education created a precedent for universal education and equality of opportunity.

Protestant education grievously sinned when it allied itself with narrow classicism and went on the downward way of most Renaissance education. Not all educators followed institutionalized education on this downward track, however, and the greatest names among educators of the period are of those who rebelled, those who caught something of

the enthusiasm of the new scientific spirit as well as of the classical revival, and saw its significance.

Amongst Renaissance educators Vives is quite outstanding in his understanding of the educational value of activities other than the classics, a product of his revolutionary conception of education as a process determined by the nature of the learning mind, his interest in psychology and in the individuality of the pupil.

'The student,' he says, 'should not be ashamed to enter into shops and factories, and to ask the craftsmen questions and get to know about the details of their work. Formerly men of learning disdained to inquire into these things, which it is of such vital consequences to know and remember. The ignorance grew in succeeding generations up to the present, so that we know far more about the age of Cicero or of Pliny than about that of our grandfathers.' (1)

Vives also made one of the first protests against inequality of opportunity, namely, concerning female education.

Rabelais and Montaigne in the sixteenth century both complained about the barren formalism of education and outlined their ideas on a type of education which would have social relevance and be of significance to the individual in all aspects of life.

The real trumpeter of the new scientific spirit was Francis Bacon. At the beginning of the seventeenth century he wrote:

(1) Quote by Boyd, History of Western Education, p.190.
'These four causes concurring, the admiration of the ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence, and copia of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily into an excess: for men began to hunt more after words than matter; and more after the choiceness of phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of the works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention or depth of judgment.' (1)

Several decades later the great philosopher, scientist and thinker, Leibnitz, repeated Bacon's call. After inveighing against traditional linguistic teaching and the survival of scholasticism he urges:

'It was the education of real democracy in action. At the teaching of youth should be centred not so much upon poetry, logic and scholastic philosophy as upon realia, history, mathematics, geography, vera physica, moralia et civilis studia; instruction in realia should be pursued in collections of rarities, the study of man in anatomical theatres, chemistry in the apothecary's shop, botany in botanical gardens, zoology in zoological gardens. The pupil should constantly move in the theatrum naturae et artis, receiving living knowledge and impressions.' (2)

But the voice of the new scientific spirit was not in vain, and its educational exponent was found in the person of John Amos Comenius. (3) (1592-1670), a Czech and a bishop of the Moravian Brethren, or the Church of the Christian Unity.

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(2) Quoted in *Spens Report*, p.419.

(3) Source material for Comenius is taken from Alexander Neilejohn, *Education Between Two Worlds* (Harper, 1942), Ch.2.
Professor S. S. Laurie of the University of Edinburgh says that Comenius is:

'…the most eminent figure in the history of European education,' and 'the most penetrating writer on method whom the world has ever seen.' (1)

Meiklejohn says of him:

'in him Protestant Christian education finds its fullest, its most consistent expression. If one wishes to know what it means to have education planned and carried on by the Christian church I am sure that nowhere else in European literature will he find a truer account of it.' (2)

Comenius had the vision of an education in which there was no antithesis between culture and vocation. It was the education of real democracy in action. At the foundation of this education was his philosophy of the unity of things in God—a Christian philosophy. Unity was for him the directing and dominating principle, the purpose of which was to fit together the various and manifested itself in the unity of knowledge and the unity of mankind.

The unity of knowledge meant that wisdom was obtainable not by narrow linguistic study alone, against which Comenius bitterly complained:

'Men must, as far as possible become wise by studying the heavens, the earth, cakes and beeches, but not by studying books: that is to say, they must learn to know and investigate the things themselves and not the observations that other people have made about the things.' (3)

(2) Ibid., p. 31.
(3) Comenius, The Great Didactic, quoted by Meiklejohn, op. cit., p. 16.
The great Czech was clearly a disciple of the Baconian scientific spirit. But his insight was penetrating, and he saw the dangers of isolation of the separate scientific investigations and the compartmentalization of human knowledge. At all stages of the educational ladder the individual would be dealing with the same topic, the nature and meaning of the world, which always he is trying to bring within his grasp. The progress of education does not mean a change of subject matter, but a change in the level of understanding of a constant topic.

Such an education is cultural, for it is aimed at seeing the meaningfulness of the total pattern of things. Comenius regarded this perception of unity in diversity as so urgent that he envisaged a great Pansophic Institute, the purpose of which was to fit together the various and newly added branches of knowledge.

Cultural education was not independent of vocational, but achieved through it.

'With every subject of instruction,' runs the Great Didactic, 'the question of its practical uses must be raised, that nothing useless be learned.' (1) is This/true vocational education, not conceived in the narrow spirit of trade training, long denigrated, 'he wrote, in the name of his mind and heart and will. The principle of the equality of mankind means that all have equality of educational opportunity. This does not mean identity of opportunity - forcing all into the same mould. On the other hand:

(1) Ibid., p.16.
'Knowledge is unsuitable when it is uncongenial to the mind of this or that scholar. For there is as great a difference between the minds of men as exists between the various kinds of plants, of trees, of animals: one must be treated in one way, and another in another, and the same method cannot be applied to all alike.' (1)

This is true democracy of opportunity and is only possible when culture and vocation are in close relationship. Otherwise culture becomes the by-product of a selected course of study or activity, and thereby becomes restricted to an elite.

The historian occasionally meets with a figure whose thought raced so far ahead of his time that it was unacceptable to his contemporaries, and became neglected. Comenius is one of these. The situation is all the more tragic in this case in that he was in 1641 called to England to engineer educational reform anticipated by the Long Parliament - a reform which was indefinitely delayed and never actualized. As Meiklejohn points out the significance of the loss is unknowable. England was on the verge of the industrial revolution and was deciding momentous issues:

'What would it have meant to England and to the whole modern industrial and commercial civilization which England has created and so long dominated,' he wrote, 'if in the forming of her mind and heart and will, education and research, thinking and acting, could have been linked together, unified, as they were in the mind of Comenius rather than sundered and, at times, incoherently hostile, as they have been in fact.' (2)

(1) Ibid., p.17.
(2) Ibid., p.24.
CHAPTER VI

DEMOCRACY UNACHIEVED

Section 1. Individual or Society?

Comenius was able to understand the meaning of culture through vocation because he had a clear insight into the full meaning of democracy, an insight which was closely allied to his deep religious conviction. Western civilization lost its first chance of full democracy during the first act of the drama of the Industrial Revolution, because it was unready to accept the teachings of one so enlightened as Comenius. Instead it accepted the half-democracy of Locke, which ended up with licentious individualism and the rise of a new privileged class, the industrial elite.

This state of affairs began with Locke's eagerness to repudiate the divine right of rulers. He managed to do this by proving, to his satisfaction at least, that affairs of the state are completely independent of affairs of God; for the state derives its authority not from God, but from the decision of men that it is prudent to make an arrangement - a social contract - whereby the natural rights of each is guaranteed by the other. In escaping from one dilemma Locke did not perceive that he was establishing another, equally bad one, namely, a fatal dualism. Henceforth in some spheres of human activity the principles of Protestantism were the signposts, in others, the principles of Capitalism. The two were independent, and astime has shown mutually exclusive. The idea of responsibility, duty or function became completely
separated from the idea of natural rights. Of the two natural rights reigned supreme.

This dualism provided sufficient justification for the rise of a new exploiting class, the industrial aristocracy, which found it convenient to perpetuate the education of the older aristocracy, but above all to maintain the class basis of education, and hence the fixed gulf between culture and vocation in education.

Locke's dualism remains the curse of our time, and a solution of it is a necessity of pressing urgency. Our problem is to reconcile the demands of individual liberty and welfare with group liberty and welfare.

The creative, tumultuous genius of J. J. Rousseau (1712-78) (1) understood how fatal was Locke's dichotomy. Rousseau's mind always rushed to extremes when contradictory ideas were under review, so that his perspicacity is not always evident, even to the extent of his appearing self-contradictory at times. However, he clearly saw the problem of the liberty of the individual as contrasted with the problem of group authority. The first he dealt with in *Emile*, the second in his *Social Contract*, and more than once did he assert that the best education is possible only in an ideal society. Rousseau did not find the answer to the relation of individual and society. His significance lies in the fact that he clarified the issues and showed in no uncertain terms that here was a grave problem to be faced up to.

(1) Source material for Rousseau taken from Meiklejohn, *op. cit.*, and from *Emile*.
Rousseau's insistence on individual welfare and on social welfare has the promise of a true understanding of the relation of culture and vocation in education. Unhappily the inconsistencies in his thought are such as to have prevented his drawing all the conclusions. For instance, he is not really quite sure what true equality of educational opportunity means, as is so painfully manifested in his consideration of the education of girls in Emile. That is, he did not understand that culture through vocation meant that culture was open to all; and this in spite of the fact that he so blatantly defied tradition in the education of Emile himself, and placed the major emphasis on vocational activities as culturally valuable in education.

Rousseau's failure was probably due to the fact that he was not directly concerned with the question of relating culture and vocation. Rather vocational activities entered his educational scheme because of his psychological assumptions. Rousseau accepted the psychology of his day, the sensationalist psychology of Condillac and Helvetius, developed from that of Locke, which stressed the initial blankness of the mind which developed wholly as a result of sense experience. Hence Rousseau taught that in childhood the pupil must have abundant sense experience in preparation for the appearance of reasoning ability - again he accepted the faculty psychology of the day. In adolescence the same emphasis was placed on

active doing things. The student was compared with Robinson Crusoe, whose major concern would obviously be first with manual activities. More abstract learning and philosophical interest would come later, and would be prepared for by the earlier activities:

'Do not stay,' writes Rousseau, 'to watch the bodily exercises and manual skill of our pupil, but consider the bent we are giving to his childish curiosity; consider his common-sense, his inventive spirit, his fore-sight; consider what a head he will have on his shoulders. He will want to know all about everything he sees or does, to learn the why and the wherefore of it; from tool to tool he will go back to the first beginning taking nothing for granted; he will decline to learn anything that requires previous knowledge which he has not had.'(1)

For us Rousseau is significant because he fixed attention on the great importance of vocational activity in the ideal education of youth, even though he did not work out the full implications of what he did. Henceforth, until the twentieth century, every leading educational thinker was to accept the idea of culture through education, in terms of the individual, as axiomatic.

They were not so agreed, however, as to the social implications of such a relation of culture and vocation, and of the relationship of individual and society in the educational process. Locke's unhappy dualism had still to be reconciled.

Let us at this point break off from tracing the development of educational thinking in order to see what the schools themselves were doing about the relation of culture and vocation.

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In the seventeenth century, as we saw in the last chapter, (1) established education successfully resisted innovations, in spite of the growing dignity of the new fields of scientific knowledge. But the demands of the technological effects of science, of the rapid expansion of industry and commerce, and of the new economic system of capitalism were urgent. For example, maritime trade was not possible without those who were skilled in the art of navigation, which necessitated knowledge of mathematics, astronomy and geography; trade and commerce needed men trained in arithmetic and calculation; and capitalism itself required highly skilled financiers. To meet these needs various schools appeared, in particular the Nonconformist Academies, (2) whose teachers were excluded from the regular system on religious grounds. These schools provided a wide curriculum and were responsive to educational reform. Unhappily, by force of circumstances, they came to give a rather narrow technical education more than a cultural one, although many great figures, including scientists and educational reformers, came from their doors. Their great handicap was that they were identified as belonging to social classes of inferior status. Thus the type of education they gave became considered as typically lower class education, and they provided the pattern for working class education when eventually the working class was educated.

(1) See p. 58.
(2) See Spens Report, p.12.
After Rousseau educational thinkers were particularly concerned with the reconciliation between individual and society in education. This was the problem of Kant and of his direct successors, Pestalozzi and Herbart. These men worked out a solution by making morals central in education. The emphasis was still on the individual who would not, however, be in antagonism with society, because his education would give him understanding of duty and social obligation. Such a solution, as Kant saw, involved absolute moral standards which were knowable, and this was one of the major problems worked out in his philosophy and reflected in his notes on education. (1) It led him to assert the existence of an ultimate absolute which he termed God.

Now the postulation of an Absolute had unhappy consequences for education, for it opened the road to a return to philosophical idealism, a road which was unhesitatingly followed by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche and finally Nazism. Idealist philosophers solved the dualism between individual and society by quite frankly showing that society, or the state, or the collective will, or the Absolute - no matter what the name - is supreme over the individual, on which alone the individual depends for his very existence. In the early stages of idealism the state was quite gentle, but later it was to assume hideous proportions, a devouring monster to whom the individual was sacrificed.

(1) See *Kant on Education* (London, 1899).
The education of idealism followed the same progression. Its first exponent at the commencement of the nineteenth century was Fichte (1762-1814). Fichte followed Rousseau in uniting culture and vocation in education and then went the next step to say that this education should be for all, rich and poor, boys and girls alike. But there was a catch. Education was to be universal because the state needed every one of its citizens to be loyal patriots.

Fichte's fatherland had just suffered defeat under Napoleon. Fichte made no bones about asserting the supremacy of the state. Nazism, the most recent exhibition of idealism shows just how far this philosophy may go in asserting the superiority of the state. As we saw in the last chapter, it produces an education of which the aim is wholly vocational, the vocation of state worship, and in which culture is replaced by propaganda.

Let us not forget, however, that idealism was attempting to find a way out of the dualism between individual and society. In so doing it had the honour of leading the way in facing up to the problem of universal education and equality of opportunity, even though it later changed its policy. But in escaping from licentious individualism it went to the other extreme. This does not mean that if we repudiate idealism we are left with the very undesirable secondary education may be described as the able alternative of individualism run riot; unless, that is, we realize our responsibility and attempt to find a new

way out of the dualism.

Idealism found a solution for the relation of culture and vocation in education, but it was at the expense of subjecting the individual to society, not world society, but a selected section of it called the nation state. Even before it culminated in Nazism, idealism provoked thinkers to find a more propitious solution for the relation of culture and vocation, in a renewed defence of the individual. It became realized, implicitly at first, that the initial step in the educational reconciliation of Locke's dualism lay in the reconciliation of culture and vocation.

As early as 1895 the Royal Commission on Secondary Education in England made the following astonishing statement: (1)

'We have spoken as if technical and classical instruction alike fell as subordinate or co-ordinate divisions under the common head of secondary education. We are aware that there are some who would limit the term education to the discipline of faculty and the culture of character by means of the more humane and generous studies, and who would deny the name to instruction in those practical arts and sciences by means of which man becomes a craftsman or a bread winner. But this is an impossible limitation as things now stand. We have just seen that the training in classics may have as little liberal culture in it as instruction in a practical art; modern literature may be made a field for as narrow and technical a drill as the most formal science. Education inevitably becomes more and more practical, a means of forming men, not simply to enjoy life, but to accomplish something in the life they enjoy...

'Now secondary education may be described as the education of the boy or girl not simply as a human being who needs to be instructed in the mere rudiments

of knowledge, but it is a process of intellectual training and personal discipline conducted with special regard to the profession or trade to be followed. Plato in the Protagoras draws a distinction between the man who learns the arts of a grammarian, the musician, or the trainer as a craftsman, for trade, and the man who learns them as a private person or freeman, for education or culture (Protagoras, 312 B). But even culture is not an end in itself; it makes the private person of more value to society and to the State. All secondary schools, then, in so far as they qualify men for doing something in life, partake more or less in the character of institutes that educate craftsmen. Every profession, even that of winning scholarships, is a craft, and all crafts are arts. But if Secondary Education be so conceived, it is evident that under it technical instruction is comprehended. The two are not indeed identical, but they differ as genus and species, or as general term and particular name, not as genus and genus or as opposed terms. No definition of technical instruction is possible that does not bring it under the head of Secondary education, nor can Secondary Education be so defined as absolutely to exclude from it the idea of technical instruction...

Technical instruction is secondary...and secondary education is technical, i.e. it teaches the boy so to apply the principles he's learning, and so to learn the principles by applying them, or so to use the instruments he is being made to know, as to perform or produce something, interpret a literature or a science, make a picture or a book, practise a plastic or manual art, convince a jury or persuade a senate, translate or annotate an author, dye wool, weave cloth, design or construct a machine, navigate a ship, or command an army. Secondary education, therefore, as inclusive of technical, may be described as education conducted in view of the special life that has to be lived with the express purpose of forming a person fit to live it.

Mankind is slow to learn, and it was not yet ready to adopt so enlightened a view of the relation of culture and vocation, let alone to build on it the education of full democracy. What was needed was a vigorous offensive campaign for reform. The attack was led by such brilliant figures as John Dewey, a rebel Hegelian, in America and Georg Kerschensteiner in Germany. In Democracy and Education (1916) Dewey again called attention to the mutual interdependence of culture and vocation in education:
Education should aim not at keeping science as a study of nature apart from literature as a record of human interest, but at cross-fertilizing both the natural sciences and the various human disciplines such as history, literature, economics and politics. (1)

As a matter of fact any subject is cultural in the degree in which it is apprehended in its widest possible range of meanings. Perception of meanings depends upon perception of connections, of context. To see a scientific fact or law in its human, as well as in its physical and technical context is to enlarge its significance and give it increased cultural value. Its direct economic application, if by economic is meant something having money worth, is incidental and secondary, but a part of its actual connections. The important thing is that the fact be grasped in its social connections — its function in life...

"Humanism" means at bottom being imbued with an intelligent sense of human interests. The social interest, identical in its deepest meaning with a moral interest, is necessarily supreme with man...

Men may keep busy in a variety of ways... but unless such activity reacts to enlarge the imaginative vision of life, it is on a level with the busy work of children. It has the letter without the spirit of activity... Any study so pursued that it increases concern for the values of life, any study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater ability to promote that well being is humane study. (2)

An education which acknowledges the full intellectual and social meaning of a vocation would include instruction in the historic background of present conditions; training in science to give intelligence and initiative in dealing with material and agencies of production; and study of economics, civics, and politics, to bring the future worker into touch with the problems of the day and the various methods proposed for its improvement. (3)

Dewey was the first to give serious consideration to the fuller implications of the true relation of culture and vocation in education. Indeed he virtually made their relationship the central problem of all educational

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(1) P. 334.
(2) P. 335-7.
(3) P. 372.
discussion. But more of this aspect later.

An enthusiastic group of disciples, intent on educational reform, followed Dewey's lead, and his influence became very widespread; for, not only did he advocate reform which seemed so common-sense and obvious, but he thereupon proceeded to find a philosophical foundation on which to base it.

The reformers not only wrote and talked, but set about establishing 'experimental' schools in which their new education was practised. From these many new teaching techniques and practices, such as the 'project method' were borrowed and adapted to existing school conditions, rapidly rising to immense popularity. Such changes in the existing system were insufficient. Something more was demanded.

Slowly institutionalized education found itself giving way. Legislative and administrative bodies controlling education set up committees and commissions of inquiry into various aspects of education affected by the new movement, which owed much, although not everything, to Dewey's leadership, witness the famous series of reports of the English Board of Education's Consultative Committee.

The effect has been considerable educational change, almost worldwide in extent, witness the controversy about which types of schools, for each age level, has been widespread. There is still no complete agreement, even within a single nation, as to the provision of: nursery schools; junior high schools or intermediate schools; multi-lateral or separate grammar, modern and technical schools at the secondary
level; opportunity for higher education at the university level; and adult education and community centres. But the significant thing is that discussion is going on; change is afoot.

Changes manifesting the broader conception of vocation appeared in the curriculum, although many schools still cling tenaciously to tradition. The recent report on the post-primary curriculum in New Zealand is quite certain about the relation of culture and vocation:

'It should be particularly noted that we are not exalting "general" education at the expense of "vocational" education. It is now recognized that the antithesis is largely a false one. Ideally vocational education should include a humane study of the social implications of the job in view, and of its relations to the arts and sciences, and general education should bring its studies to bear on some particular function the individual is preparing himself to perform in society. As Sir Percy Num remarks of such occupations as engineering, cabinet-making, building and farming, "To train a boy in the tradition of one of these ancient occupations is to ensure (if it suits his 'ingenium') that he will throw himself into his work with spirit, and with a zeal for mastery that schoolmasters usually look for only in the elect. And it does more. Work which carries a boy directly towards the goal of his choice, work whose obvious usefulness gives him a sense of dignity and power, often unlocks the finer energies of a mind which a "general" education would leave stupid and inert. The boy's whole intellectual vitality may be heightened, his sense of spiritual values quickened. In short, the vocational training may become in the strictest sense liberal...

On the other hand the needs of life are not completely met even in the most liberally-conceived vocational course. Further, it is unhappily true that a great many jobs give little scope for the exercise of intelligence or taste or responsibility and an by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as a "way of life." Where pupils are likely to enter such occupations it is the plain duty of the school to place its main emphasis on preparation for other functions, such as home-making, citizenship, and the use of leisure.' (1)

(1) The Post Primary School Curriculum, p. 5.
Section 2. The Reconciliation of Culture & Vocation

The reconciliation of culture and vocation in education into the advantage of both.

A. Advantages to Vocation: Narrow specialized trade training, it becomes increasingly clear, is not the most suitable even from the employers point of view. On the one hand there is a danger that an over-supply of highly educated specialists in any one discipline will be produced, a state of affairs which actually happened, especially in Europe, after the last war and during the ensuing depression of the thirties - with dire consequences. On the other hand, for many of the mechanized, routinized processes of modern industry little specific technical preparation is necessary, and this can best be provided on the job or in a factory school. The best preparation for such a job is a cultural education, which makes for adaptability and, furthermore, provides the individual with leisure time activities, facilitates his ability to see the meaningfulness of the pattern of things and enables him to play a constructive role in the community.

As one writer has put it:

'We now clearly recognize that certain forms of vocational power and flexibility are acquired with difficulty, if at all, under an apprenticeship system resting largely on the psychological foundations of imitation and suggestion. These limitations are more acutely felt in proportion as, on the one hand, industry becomes departmentalized, and, on the other, apart and science become more purposefully applied....'

'The workshop alone may give the prospective machinist skill in tool manipulation, but it cannot give in any effective way the mastery of drawing, of mechanics, of mathematics, of industrial economics and of industrial hygiene, with out which he has but limited capacity for
growing or for playing any satisfactory role as citizen and master of his own destinies. The ordinary farm as an educational institution can give little of the science which the modern world places at the disposal of the properly taught tiller of the soil. (1)

B. Advantages to Culture: Culture is not cheapened, diluted down to the crude unrefined standards of the masses. Contrarily, the culture of the masses is ennobled; for it becomes possible for them to understand what the leaders of culture, the individuals with great creative insight, are trying to say. Since they have some experience of the creative process culture becomes a vital and living thing in which all the people may participate.

The Grecian temples and Mediaeval cathedrals were cooperative enterprises in which many people participated in a creative way. That is why they remain perpetually significant. Folksong has been grasped by modern composers for this very same reason. Their own music, infused with the spirit of folksong, gains new significance.

At times in the past men have been able to participate spontaneously in the great cultural activities of their time:

(1) S. Clarke, 'Cultural Aspects of Vocational Education,' The Education Review, 1923.

'Think,' says Clarke, 'of the audience that crowded the Globe Theatre in Shakespeare's day at a performance of one of his plays, or the Athenians who assembled to witness a tragedy of Aeschylus or Sophocles. What they saw there was just the life they knew raised to a higher power, as it were, and held up to them as in a mirror with all its lights and shades richly intensified. They could feel that behind the most ordinary occurrence the deepest and greatest things in heaven and earth may lie.

'This was surely because the leaders and interpreters of culture were just citizen-craftsmen, men like themselves but with unusual powers of vision and execution. Of the same order were the potters, the weavers, the masons, and the workers in metal, wood, and leather, all alike having something vivid and meaningful to say about the common life through their craft.' (1)

Clarke further points out that when culture becomes the property of groups which become detached from the main body of the daily activities and interests of men, and even become parasitic upon it; when their members seem excessively anxious that the world should acknowledge and recognize them as the truly cultured people, the priesthood of culture in fact, then something has gone wrong.' (2) On this same point Dewey makes a very pertinent remark:

'It is impossible for a high industrial society to attain a widespread high excellence of mind when multitudes are excluded from occasion for the use of thought and emotion in the daily occupations. The contradiction is so great and so pervasive that a favourable issue is hopeless. We must wrest our general culture from an industrialized civilization; and this signifies that industry must itself become a primary educative and cultural force for those engaged in it.' (3)

Culture through vocation ensures that culture does not become a priestcraft.


(2) Loc. cit.

(3) Quoted by Ericsson, 'Materialism in Democracy,' p. 129.
Section 3. Are Culture & Vocation Identical?

Whether or not there is a point for point relation between culture and vocation will become clear after a glance at the modern industrial situation.

It cannot be denied that the highly specialized, repetitive, routinized and monotonous tasks of some industrial processes have practically no potential cultural value. In Strachan's words:

"...many millions are forced to live in the technological and middle parts of civilized life, without a chance to realize either the sources of life and energy in the earth or its consummation in creative arts. Only a few can enjoy these experiences for themselves and so grasp life whole." (1)

Activities and occupations which have potential cultural value are those in which the characteristics of the cycle of creative activity, outlined above, are manifested. Such activities are intrinsically interesting on their own account, and in them culture and vocation unite. Such are the activities that a cultural education will be interested in as sources for its content.

It may be that the conditions of modern industry, demanding thousands of unskilled workers for repetitive, specialized tasks, are due to an incomplete development of the mechanization of industry; and that a change may later be experienced. For instance, under pressure of war, rapid progress has been made in the mechanization of previously very laborious industrial processes which were extremely

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wasteful of manpower; and hydro-electric plants have long
offered an example of vocations which are far removed, in
potential cultural value, from the monotonous tasks of a
'chain' system of production. Indeed, as Strachan says:

'It seems that the educational possibilities of skilled work are widening once more. The first
effects of introducing powered machines have certainly been the mass production of standardized products and
the elimination of the craftsman. But that is because the machine is only half assimilated. As more of the
drugery of routinized labour on the production of
standardized necessities is made mechanical and automatic, there will again be more scope for intel-
ligence and artistry in craftsmanship.' (1)

A point worth noticing, also, is that there are a few
for whom the simplified conditions of mass production are
eminently suitable. These are the people of low grade
intellectual ability who are capable of making a living
only in jobs that require a minimum of thinking. Plant
records the case of a feeble-minded girl to whom he said:

"Edna, I see that you have all your fingers intact. I
can't believe that you put in six months on a punch
press." "Yes, I did, Doctor, it's only then that
thinks that loses their fingers." (2)

Whatever changes may come in the future the fact
remains that at the present time many industrial occupations
are too highly specialized to be of value educationally, if
taken alone. Yet this does not mean that the whole
industrial process does not possess potential cultural value
and hence provide suitable educational material. Quite

(1) J.E. Strachan, on cit., p.106-7.

(2) James S. Plant, Personality and the Cultural Pattern
the opposite is true, as the following statement by Professor Whitehead testifies:

'A factory with its machinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the general population, its dependence upon organizing and designing genius, its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stocks, is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness.' (1)

To this Erickson adds:

'But the average worker remains an artisan rather than an artist for the simple reason that he does not achieve this complete apprehension. His relation to the total process is not grasped, is not realized. He is detached, concerned only in the isolated and routine acts that entitle him to his day's wage. The same worker may, however, as a participant in a great cooperative enterprise, an enterprise that unites the routine with the novel, that creates values significant for the community - become an artist.' (2)

We may anticipate the later argument by saying that education alone cannot bring about the achievement of that situation wherein each workman is an artist. It is part of the wider task of social reconstruction. Erickson himself says that what is needed is a:

'socialization of our industrial process.' (3)

Without this education would be open to the charge of being but another 'opiate of the masses.'

From this glance at industry it is clear that if education is to accept a positive correlation between

(1) Quoted by E.E. Erickson, 'Materialism in Democracy - Democracy in Culture,' p. 139.
(2) Ibid., p. 139.
(3) Loc. cit.
culture and vocation, then not all occupations must be considered vocational. Some occupations are so specialized that education which concerns itself with them alone becomes narrow, technical or trade training. True vocational or career education is not concerned with such occupational preparation alone. Its concern is, to use Dent's expression:

'the full and harmonious development of body, mind and soul for the three-fold purpose of personal living, civic responsibility, and useful employment.' (1)

Such an education is also cultural education.

It is unhappily true that under present day conditions not all occupations are of equal cultural potentiality. It is easier for the creative artist to see his relationship to the total meaningfulness of things, by reason of his vocation itself, than it is for the factory worker. On the other hand it is possible to be closely associated with activities customarily regarded as of high cultural value and yet to remain quite uncultured.

For example, there are not a few musicians in this country who are little more than highly competent technicians who can play unalteringly almost any score placed in front of them; but whose understanding, even of their own field, is meagre. They know nothing of the historical background of music, and still less of its contemporary developments; their literary and artistic tastes are almost completely undeveloped; and they have not that breadth of mind which

allows them awareness of even the least of their shortcomings. (1) Such people are no more cultured than those who are condemned to life-long factory routine and monotony, and who never see beyond it.

Similarly a classical education may be little more than a specialized technical training, perhaps without even the virtue of later being occupationally useful. It may be objected that the extent of knowledge is so vast that education cannot avoid becoming, to some degree, trade training. There must be some selection and specialization. To this the reply is that cultural education does not overlook the need to specialize. Its last purpose is to raise Jacks of all trades who are masters of none. All it wants is to limit the degree to which the specialist becomes, either by chance, or as is more frequent by economic circumstances, engrossed in his own study. It wants him, during his years of schooling at least, to comprehend enough of the total pattern of the meaningfulness of things as will enable him to have a balanced judgment in spheres other than his specialist one; for he will never be able to become a complete hermit, however near he approaches that state.

This is possible of achievement when the vocational activity is the core around which education and later the

(1) From a personal interview with an orchestral player.
life activity is organized. But vocation should not become the sole preoccupation, a neurotic obsession overwhelming life itself.

We were obliged to call the last chapter democracy unachieved not only because the democratic solution of the relation of culture and recreation was not understood in its entirety, nor because many vocations still leave little room for culture, but also because the underlying objection is not yet overcome. To understand the objection, it will be essential to consider consideration of Dewey's view of the educational relation of culture and recreation from the point at which they were left. (1) The vicious circle can be broken when the education of these people is cultural, not exclusively trade training. But this is not a matter for education alone. It marks the point where the discussion of a cultural education becomes a broad sociological problem, the theme of the next chapter.

Locke perpetuated and which defended democracy at its birth: 'An occupation is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity of an individual with his social service.' (a)

In the first place vocational activities are of incontestable educational value to the individual on psychological grounds. Dewey here really does nothing more than develop Rousseau's viewpoint, bringing it in line with a more up to date psychology.

Secondly vocational activities also link the individual

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(1) See p. 76
CHAPTER VII
FULL DEMOCRACY

The key to the present educational situation,' writes Dewey, 'lies in a crucial reconstruction of the older tradition for a select few, that vocational education is trade education.' (2)

We were obliged to call the last chapter democracy unachieved not only because the democratic solution of the relation of culture and vocation was not widespread in its influence, nor because many vocations still leave little room for culture, but also because the underlying philosophy is not yet complete. To understand the deficiency it will be convenient to resume the consideration of Dewey's views on the educational relation of culture and vocation from the point at which they were left. (1)

For Dewey there is no divorce of culture and vocation, because culture is achieved through vocation. The achievement of this reconciliation is the focus of all educational thought, for in it Dewey sees the solution of the dualism of individual and society, the fatal dichotomy which Locke perpetuated and which deformed democracy at its birth:

'An occupation is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity of an individual with his social service.' (2)

In the first place vocational activities are of incontestable educational value to the individual on psychological grounds. Dewey here really does nothing more than develop Rousseau's viewpoint, bringing it in line with a more up to date psychology.

Secondly vocational activities also link the individual

(1) See p. 75
with society, and his education only becomes meaningful when it mirrors the broader social process:

'The key to the present educational situation,' writes Dewey, 'lies in a gradual reconstruction of school materials and methods so as to utilize various forms of occupation typifying social callings, and to bring out their intellectual and moral content.' (1)

Now comes a problem. As it stands the argument falls into the traditionalists' hands. The school must reflect the established social order, and hence perpetuate the status quo. Dewey is emphatic that such must not happen:

'There is a standing danger that education will perpetuate the older traditions for a select few... that vocational education will be interpreted in theory and practice as trade education.' (2)

Rather, there must be a transformation of society so that:

'every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible - which breaks down the barriers of distance between them. It denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent; based upon its congeniality to his own aptitudes.' (3)

Dewey's intention is clear: the schools must do something more than reflect exactly a rapidly changing society, especially a society one of the characteristics of which is licentious individualism. To do this is not to solve the dualism between individual and society, but to disregard the social and exalt the individual as much as possible.

(1) Ibid., p. 368
(2) Ibid., p. 369
(3) Ibid., p. 369
Russia after the revolution accepted Dewey's Progressive educational theory and practice whole-heartedly, only to find after a decade that it had not completely solved the dualism between individual and society. What was needed was some social aim and goal which would balance individual rights on the one hand with social function on the other, and which would give a purpose and goal to education.

It is possible to argue that Russia has gone too far and has overemphasised social function. One suspects that this was inevitable in a community whose social philosophy was basically idealistic, but this need not concern us at present. The lesson we must learn is one which recent years have made more clear, viz., the need of purpose and goal in the change which society is experiencing.

Dewey realized this need, but hesitantly, for to postulate something in the nature of a fixed goal came perilously near to selling out to the idealists, a peril which is all the more real in view of the sinister developments of idealism; and he did not work out the full implications involved in relating society and individual.

The time has come when the issue can no longer be put aside. Contemporary Deweyan theory itself recognizes this:

'We believe profoundly that society requires planning; that planning is the alternative to chaos, disorder, and insecurity. But there is a difference between a society which is planned and a society which is continuously planning - namely, the difference between autocracy and democracy, between dogma and intelligence in operation; between suppression of
individuality and that release and utilization of
individuality which will bring it to full maturity.' (1)

It is on this very point that Dewey's destructive
critics have gained ground, although it is only fair to
say that they invalidly attack Dewey. It is only in so
far as they attack the popular vulgarization of Dewey's
teaching that they have any semblance of justification.

It is on this point too that Dewey's constructive
critics have found his weakness. In a most searching
analysis of Dewey's philosophy Melklejohn finds that there
are two unreconciled points of view which permeate all of
Dewey's thinking:

"Our concern is with the fact that there are two
methods, that Dewey has given us two different
accounts of the search for intelligence. And, as
they are stated, those accounts are radically
opposed to one another. For the first, intelligence is "based in passion." For the second it is the
product of criticism. In the paper on "Philosophy
and Democracy," the task of philosophy is to "exhibit
as reasonable" convictions which are adopted from
"custom and instinct." Such beliefs start "not from
science, not from ascertained knowledge, but from
moral convictions." But in the quest for Certainty
and Experience and Nature, philosophy has become "a
reasoned discipline," whose business is "criticism." In
the first case, the attempt of intelligence is to
"convince," to "persuade." In the other it is an
activity of "inquiry." In the argument of Democracy
and Education, a social program is "taken for granted." When Dewey is in his objective mood, all social pro-
grams are to be "justified" and "criticised" by an
"inquiry into conditions and consequences." Philosophy
which, at first, had only the "garb" of reason has
now taken on its "form"...

I am not saying that these two points of view are
wholly irreconcilable. It is obvious that when

(1) W. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), The Educational Frontier
(New York, 1933), Ch. 3 by Dewey and Childs, p. 72.
Dewey makes these different statements, he is, in different moods, looking at different aspects of the human situation. But the difficulty is that those differences are not clearly recognized. And the resulting total impression is one of confusion and incoherence. (1)

Thus Dewey's indecision about the reconciliation of individual and society is symptom of a wider indecision in his whole system of thought; an indecision as how to relate knowledge to value, that which can be discovered by the experimental formula to that which must be accepted.

What is needed is a brilliant synthesis of that which is best in the two philosophies, idealism and experimentalism:

from idealism the concept of an aim or goal which gives purpose to living, and from experimentalism that cautious attitude of investigation which prevents dogmatism. (2)

Until we have this we have no firm basis for the philosophy of democracy. Until its aims and values are not only clearly stated, but also firmly based philosophically, democracy remains but another way of life to be accepted or rejected as a matter of choice or prejudice. We may remain subjectively perfectly convinced about democracy as a way of life. But the matter is more urgent. We are soon to be faced with the task of convincing others, many of them openly antagonistic, of the value of our way of life. In such a situation we can not be satisfied with statements like the following

(1) Alexander Meiklejohn, Education Between Two Worlds, p.164.

(2) This view is held by I.B. Berkson in Preface to an Educational Philosophy (New York, 1940). See especially Ch.3 and p.40.
by Dewey and Childs taken from the very same paragraph as the quotation on p. 87.

"Upon one thing we take our stand. We frankly accept the democratic tradition in its moral and human import. That is our premise and we are concerned to find out and state its implications for present life under present conditions, in order that we may know what it entails for theory and practice of public education." (1)

Evidence of the urgency of reconciling individual and society is the present day concern of leading thinkers, particularly in the social sciences, with this problem, both in its detailed aspects and its philosophical implications. (2)

It is not yet possible to see the total pattern of the solution; nor would it be within the limits of this survey to trace it. One thing which is clear is the agreement that democracy must no longer be an excuse for licentious individualism. There is a consensus of opinion that society should always be actively planning its own growth, to do which, of course, it must have an aim or plan. This does not mean totalitarianism. The difference is between a static and dynamic conception of planning. For totalitarianism the plan is an end in itself; for democracy it is an ever-active, ongoing and self-critical process. The situation is well summarized by Karl Mannheim whose well-informed judgment is to be respected:

(1) Educational Frontier, p. 72.

(2) See for example: Diagnosis of our Time, p. 71. I. E. Berkson, Preface to an Educational Philosophy (New York, 1940). Ch. 15 lists various bodies in U.S.A. such as the
John Dewey Society and the American Historical Association, which have actively espoused the 'Reconstructionist' position.


Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940), and *Diagnosis of Our Time* (London, 1943). The problem attacked from a sociological point of view.


'...There is no doubt that our society has been taken ill... If I had to summarize the situation in a single sentence I would say: "We are living in an age of transition from laissez-faire to a planned society. The planned society that will come may take one of two shapes: it will be ruled either by a minority in terms of a dictatorship or by a new form of government which, in spite of its increased power, will still be democratically controlled." (1)

In a planning society education plays a dual role.

1. It is an agent of planning in so far as it is concerned with the development of those whose main occupation will be the planning of society and of those who will be intelligent and co-operating citizens in

(1) Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of our Time*, p. 1.
a planning society. To each it must give culture, an understanding of the meaningfulness of the total pattern of things; and to each it must give a career. For the former this will be a training in social science. For both education for culture will also be education for career.

2. As a social institution education must also be planned. Its function will be to give a cultural-vocational education to all. No longer will cultural education be preferential in its selection of subject-matter and recipients; no longer will culture and vocation be antagonistic.

The birth cries of educational planning have already been heard even in England, where the social dislocation of war has given the required stimulus for literally scores of plans for reconstruction. Two are outstanding:

Adolf Lowe has suggested an excellent plan for a reconstructed university in which culture and vocation are united; (1) but the most comprehensive plan is that of H.C. Dent (2) who really attacks the problems involved in making cultural-vocational education universal until late adolescence.

Dent's scheme has many similarities with the Greek pattern of education, with the exception that it is open

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(2) H.C. Dent, A New Order in Education (London, 1942), pp. 60-4
to all. Greek education was described as an apprenticeship to public life. Dent would also make education an apprenticeship to the community, but not exactly in the Greek sense, for not all may be rulers and administrators. Primarily it would be an apprenticeship to citizenship, and secondarily to some specific vocational activity of the community. There is also something of our own pattern of professional education in this, periods of learning alternating with periods of active participation in some occupation. Dent’s scheme is worth outlining, beginning at the secondary school level.

For the first two years the emphasis would be on orientation and exploration of aptitudes. Included in the course would be acquaintance with libraries, fine arts collections, science, crafts, engineering, commercial and industrial processes, and school journeys. Then would come a period of pre-vocational training in special annexes located near the appropriate occupational centre in the community, for example, language study would be near a university, agriculture on a farm. During this period general education would be continued, but the next period would be one of vocational training only. Such training would be done in real life situations much as apprenticeship is at present done, but the student would still be under the care of the community through its education system. Ultimately this would be most profitable to industry, and would at the same time safeguard the child and solve part of the unemployment problem.
At eighteen all young people would enter on a life of residence in common for one and a half to two years. They would be given much greater responsibility and would manage their own government. They would continue in their occupation, earning a living, but would have the option of a change of job, e.g., land service. Part of the time would be devoted to study of social organization and government, and this would be the time when a philosophy of life was formed.

Finally would come the taking of a permanent job (to be guaranteed) or, if necessary, the continuation of specialized training.

Such a plan is not final, for a planning society never rests self-satisfied. But it does indicate in which direction educational change must lie if the challenge of full democracy is to be met, if culture is to be democratized.

There is no better epitome of our present situation than Matthew Arnold's lamentation that he was:

'Wandering between two worlds, one dead, The other powerless to be born.' (1)

That other world is even yet unborn, but the hour seems very near. In anxious anticipation we wait lest our midwifery is still so primitive, unscientific and clumsy as to kill it at its first appearance.

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(1) From The Grand Chartreuse.
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