dc.contributor.author |
Bossi, Luca |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Calcott, Paul |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Petkov, Vladimir |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-06-23T01:54:56Z |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2022-07-05T02:04:00Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2011-06-23T01:54:56Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2022-07-05T02:04:00Z |
|
dc.date.copyright |
2011 |
|
dc.date.issued |
2011 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18595 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
This paper studies implementation of the social optimum in a model of habit formation. We consider taxes that address inefficiencies due to negative consumption externalities, imperfect competition, and self-control problems. Our contributions are to: i) account for producers’ market power; and ii) require implementation to be robust and time consistent. Together, these features can imply significantly lower taxes. We provide a general characterization of the optimal tax rule and illustrate it with two examples. |
en_NZ |
dc.format |
pdf |
en_NZ |
dc.language.iso |
en_NZ |
|
dc.publisher |
Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington |
en_NZ |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
SEF Working Paper Series |
en_NZ |
dc.subject |
dynamic externalities |
en_NZ |
dc.subject |
internalities |
en_NZ |
dc.subject |
addiction |
en_NZ |
dc.subject |
optimal taxation |
en_NZ |
dc.subject |
time consistent implementation |
en_NZ |
dc.title |
Optimal Tax Rules for Addictive Consumption |
en_NZ |
dc.type |
Text |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.contributor.unit |
School of Economics and Finance |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor |
149999 Economics not elsewhere classified |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.subject.marsden |
140199 Economic Theory not elsewhere classified |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.type.vuw |
Working or Occasional Paper |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2 |
389999 Other economics not elsewhere classified |
en_NZ |
dc.rights.rightsholder |
www.vuw.ac.nz/sef |
en_NZ |