Victoria University

Agency Theory and Trust Ownership of Shares

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Show simple item record Emanuel, David van Zijl, Tony 2007-11-21T21:53:28Z 2007-11-21T21:53:28Z 2005 2005
dc.description.abstract The problems of agency theory related to security valuation are normally discussed in the context of “owner-managers” and “outside shareholders”, and/or equity-holders and debt-holders. In this paper we discuss agency problems that emerge when there is only one shareholder (and no debt), but where the shareholder is a trust with separate income and capital beneficiaries. Trust ownership of this sort is not uncommon. The agency problems emerge as the two classes of beneficiaries have claims on cash flows that occur at different times, with income beneficiaries having claims until “capital” is transferred to the capital beneficiaries. The agency problems that are discussed are dividends, risk shifting, capital structure, cost capitalization, and investment policy. In all cases agency problems arise, and in some respects the agency problems are more pervasive than in the more “orthodox” settings. en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries No. 32 en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper en_NZ
dc.subject Industry regulation en_NZ
dc.subject Company structure en_NZ
dc.subject Organisational structure en_NZ
dc.title Agency Theory and Trust Ownership of Shares en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit School of Accounting and Commercial Law en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.marsden 390105 Corporations and Associations Law en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.marsden 390120 Trust Law en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Working or Occasional Paper en_NZ

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