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| dc.contributor.author | Wang, Hanqing | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-02-11T21:38:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-02-11T21:38:39Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 6/03/2006 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3845 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper develops a formal model to study earnings manipulation. It analyzes the effects of real earnings auditor quality and at-risk incentive on management's earnings manipulation decision. It shows that the management has the incentive to smooth corporate earnings even when the employment contract is linear. It also demonstrates that adding the ability to manipulate earnings to the principal-agent model drastically changes the management's attitude towards risk. The management will become risk seeking in the company's earnings when cumulative earnings management in previous periods is high even if the management has a risk-averse utility function. | en_NZ |
| dc.format | en_NZ | |
| dc.language.iso | en_NZ | |
| dc.rights | Permission to publish research outputs of the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation has been granted to the Victoria University of Wellington Library. Refer to the permission letter in record: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3777 | en_NZ |
| dc.title | Earnings Manipulation and Risky Investment | en_NZ |
| dc.type | Text | en_NZ |
| vuwschema.contributor.unit | New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation | en_NZ |
| vuwschema.contributor.unit | Victoria Business School: Orauariki | en_NZ |
| vuwschema.type.vuw | Working or Occasional Paper | en_NZ |
| vuwschema.subject.anzsrcseo | 149999 Economics not elsewhere classified | en_NZ |
