Infinite horizon hydroelectricity games

dc.contributor.author	Robles, Jack
dc.date.accessioned	2016-05-11T21:16:23Z
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-07T21:21:02Z
dc.date.available	2016
dc.date.available	2016-05-11T21:16:23Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-07T21:21:02Z
dc.date.copyright	2016
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19421
dc.description.abstract	We present an infinite horizon game between a hydro power plant and a thermal power plant. The Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized and related to the closed loop equilibrium of a one year finite horizon game. We show that the infinite horizon and one year horizon models make predictions which are surprisingly similar. Essential differences in predictions are noted.	en_NZ
dc.format	pdf	en_NZ
dc.language.iso	en_NZ
dc.publisher	Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington	en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries	SEF Working paper ; 11/2016	en_NZ
dc.subject	Energy market	en_NZ
dc.subject	Hydroelectricity	en_NZ
dc.subject	Markov Perfect Equilibrium	en_NZ
dc.subject	Cournot competition	en_NZ
dc.title	Infinite horizon hydroelectricity games	en_NZ
dc.type	Text	en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit	School of Economics and Finance	en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor	149999 Economics not elsewhere classified	en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.marsden	140303 Economic Models and Forecasting	en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw	Working or Occasional Paper	en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2	389999 Other economics not elsewhere classified	en_NZ
dc.rights.rightsholder	http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sef/research/sef-working-papers	en_NZ