A short note on discrimination and favoritism in the labor market

dc.contributor.author	Salamanca, Nicolas
dc.contributor.author	Feld, Jan
dc.date.accessioned	2016-10-26T18:59:19Z
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-07T21:33:35Z
dc.date.available	2016-10-26T18:59:19Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-07T21:33:35Z
dc.date.copyright	2016
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19543
dc.description.abstract	We extend Becker’s model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not favoring firms.	en_NZ
dc.format	pdf	en_NZ
dc.language.iso	en_NZ
dc.publisher	Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington	en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries	SEF Working paper ; 23/2016	en_NZ
dc.subject	Wage gap	en_NZ
dc.subject	Nepotism	en_NZ
dc.subject	Firm preferences	en_NZ
dc.subject	Long-run equilibrium	en_NZ
dc.title	A short note on discrimination and favoritism in the labor market	en_NZ
dc.type	Text	en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit	School of Economics and Finance	en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor	140211 Labour Economics	en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw	Working or Occasional Paper	en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2	380111 Labour economics	en_NZ
dc.rights.rightsholder	http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sef/research/sef-working-papers	en_NZ